



# LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

## **Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. United Nations and general international matters. Volume II 1958/1960**

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958/1960

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84>

As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.

S.I.:958-60/v.2

FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES

1958-1960


VOLUME II

UNITED  
NATIONS  
AND GENERAL  
INTERNATIONAL  
MATTERS




DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

Washington







S 1.1:958-60/v.2

DOCUMENTS COLLECTION

NOV 02 1993

University of Michigan - Flint Library

**DEPOSITORY**

**93 05 99**

**DOCUMENT**







**Foreign Relations of the  
United States, 1958-1960**

---

**Volume II**

**United  
Nations  
and General  
International  
Matters**

*Editor in Chief*    John P. Glennon  
*Editors*            Suzanne E. Coffman  
                             Charles S. Sampson



**DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9833**

**OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN**

**BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

---

**For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402**

# Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925:

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification: in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.



### *Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume II*

In selecting documents for this volume the editors first developed a research plan based on the topics to be included and on the records at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the Department of State, and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. At the Eisenhower Library, particular attention was given to the Ann Whitman file with its master collection of National Security Council memoranda of discussion and other institutional documents. These NSC records were supplemented by copies of NSC documents in the Executive Secretariat files of the Department of State. The editors also reviewed other pertinent records at the Eisenhower Library, and they believe that no documentation relevant to the subject matter of this volume was either overlooked or withheld.

The editors had complete access to the records of the Department of State and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. They reviewed all the central indexed decimal files of the Department of State and the various special decentralized files (lot files) relevant to this volume that were originally maintained by Department policymakers at the bureau, office, division, and staff levels. A complete list of the files which they consulted in preparing this volume is on pages IX–XII. Similar research was conducted in the records of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

The documentation regarding U.S. policies in the United Nations focuses on the question of expanding the U.N. membership and other institutional questions taken up by the General Assembly. The editors have presented material on Chinese and Hungarian representation at the United Nations, admission of new members, and, in particular, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev's visit in 1960. Documentation on the principal political and substantive issues considered by the United Nations is included in *Foreign Relations* volumes covering those topics.

Two separate compilations document the negotiations leading to the treaty on Antarctica and the two conferences on the Law of the Sea. In the compilation on the foreign affairs implications of the beginning of the exploration of outer space, the editors focused primarily on high-level U.S. Government discussion of the question. The documents on Antarctica and the Law of the Sea included in this volume were selected primarily from the files of the Department of State which coordinated U.S. policymaking on these subjects. The documents on outer space are drawn more particularly from the Whitman File at the Eisenhower Library, specifically the memoranda of discussion at NSC meetings. Identification of particular files and subseries of documents is included in the first footnote to each document.

The declassification process in the Department of State and in other government agencies, described on page VI, resulted in the withholding of a very small percentage of the documentation originally proposed for inclusion in this volume. The editors are confident that these few deletions do not distort the principal lines of policy originally compiled and now printed here.

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents in the volume are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversations are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the Editor in Chief and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an omission in roman type. Brackets are also used to indicate text that has been omitted because it deals with an unrelated subject or because it remained classified after the declassification review process. The amount of material not declassified has been quantified by noting the number of words, lines of source text, or pages of source text that were omitted. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or Secretary of State read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in this volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs of participants and other first-hand accounts has been used where possible to supplement the official record.

### *Declassification Review Procedures*

Declassification review of the documents selected for publication was conducted by the Division of Historical Documents Review, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State. The review was made in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the criteria established in Executive Order 12356 regarding:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; and
- 9) a confidential source.

Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State and of other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and communication with foreign governments regarding documents of those governments. The principle guiding declassification review is to release as much information as is consistent with contemporary requirements of national security and sound foreign relations.

Suzanne E. Coffman compiled the documents on the United Nations and Charles S. Sampson prepared the sections on Antarctica, Law of the Sea, and Outer Space, under the supervision of Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Althea W. Robinson of the Editing Division of the Historian's Office performed the technical editing under the supervision of Rita M. Baker. Barbara A. Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief) oversaw production of the volume. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

**William Z. Slany**  
*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*



# Contents

	Page
<b>Preface</b> .....	II
<b>List of Unpublished Sources</b> .....	IX
<b>List of Abbreviations</b> .....	XIII
<b>List of Persons</b> .....	XVII
 <b>United Nations</b>	
January–August 1958 .....	1
September 1958–August 1959: Final preparations for the U.N. General Assembly; the Thirteenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly .....	58
September–December 1959: Final preparations for the U.N. General Assembly; the Fourteenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly .....	178
January–September 18, 1960: African participation in the United Nations; candidacies for President of the Fifteenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly; preparations for the Fifteenth General Assembly . . .	213
September 19–October 13, 1960: U.S. reaction to Khrushchev's participation in the U.N. General Assembly .....	338
October 14–December 1960: Remainder of the Fifteenth General Assembly .	421
<b>Antarctica</b> .....	464
<b>Law of the Sea</b> .....	641
<b>Outer Space</b> .....	828
<b>Index</b> .....	937
	VII

1917

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the war. It is a very interesting and comprehensive survey of the state of affairs in the various countries of the world.

2. The second part of the report deals with the military situation. It gives a detailed account of the operations of the various armies and navies, and the progress of the war in the various theatres of operations.

3. The third part of the report deals with the political situation. It discusses the policies of the various governments, and the progress of the peace negotiations.

# List of Unpublished Sources

## Department of State

1. *Indexed Central Files.* Documents in the indexed central files of the Department of State for the years 1958–1960 are indicated by a decimal file number in the first footnote. The following are the most significant decimal files consulted for this volume:

301: United Nations

303: Admission of new members into the United Nations

310 and subseries: United Nations: Charter; membership; delegations

320 and subseries: United Nations General Assembly

320.11 and 320.5701: United Nations and Outer Space

330 and subseries: United Nations Security Council

399.731: Law of the Sea

701.022: U.S. policy toward Outer Space

702 and subseries: Antarctica

2. *Lot Files.* Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

Conference Files: Lots 63 D 123; 64 D 559; 64 D 560

See entries under Washington National Records Center.

## INR–NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, including NIEs and SNIEs.

## IO Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, comprising the official U.N. documentation and classified Department of State records on United States policy in the U.N. Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and ad hoc committees for the period from 1946 to currency.

IO Files: Lot 60 D 216

Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs for the year 1958.

IO Files: Lot 61 D 91

Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs for the years 1959 and 1960.



## **X List of Unpublished Sources**

---

### **IO Files: Lot 71 D 440**

Master files of classified records and correspondence of United States Delegations to sessions of the U.N. General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

### **L Files: Lot 69 D 306**

Chronological and correspondence files of Leonard C. Meeker for the years 1946–1967, excluding Meeker's Bucharest post files.

### **OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385**

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained in the Operations Staff of the Department of State.

### **OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430**

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

### **ODA Files: Lot 62 D 228**

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

### **P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661**

Subject files containing OCB and NSC documents retired by the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

### **Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 174**

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

### **Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204**

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1**

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.

### **S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) File: Lot 66 D 95**

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947–1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199**

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75**

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meetings during the years 1952–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328

Top secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1959-1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

**United States Mission at the United Nations, New York**

USUN Files

Files of the United States Mission at the United Nations, 1950 to date.

**Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas**

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1953-1959.

Herter Papers

Papers of Christian A. Herter, 1957-1961. Herter was Under Secretary of State, 1957-1959, and Secretary of State, 1959-1961.

Staff Secretary Records

Records of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, 1952-1961, including records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., and Christopher H. Russell.

White House Office Files

Several White House office collections, including files of the Office of the Staff Secretary, and Project "Clean Up."

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953-1961, as maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name Series, Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administration Series, and International File.

**Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland**

Conference Files: FRC 59-83-0067

Lot 63 D 123: Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955-1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Conference Files: FRC 59-83-0068

Lot 64 D 559: Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the year 1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## **XII List of Unpublished Sources**

---

**Lot 64 D 560:** Collection of documentation of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conference attended by the Secretary of State for the year 1959, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

**ODA Files: FRC 64 A 561**

**Lot 62 D 228:** Subject files of the Director of the Office of Dependent Areas, Department of State, for the years 1943–1961.

**Presidential Correspondence: FRC 59–83–0056**

**Lot 64 D 174:** Exchanges of correspondence between President Eisenhower and heads of foreign governments, excluding the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Soviet Union, for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

# List of Abbreviations

- A**, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration
- AA**, Administering Authority; Afro-Asian
- ACBAQ**, Advisory Committee on Budget and Administrative Questions, United Nations
- AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission
- AF**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until August 20, 1958; thereafter Bureau of African Affairs
- AFN**, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Bureau of African Affairs after August 20, 1958), Department of State
- Amb**, Ambassador
- ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARPA**, Advanced Research Projects Agency
- ASAF**, Asian-African, Asia-Africa
- AU**, Arab Union
- BNA**, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- CA**, circular airgram; Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- Cahto**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Herter while away from Washington
- Chi**, Chinese
- ChiComs**, Chinese Communists
- ChiRep**, Chinese Representation
- CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency
- CINCNELM**, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
- CINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific
- comite**, committee
- COSPAC**, Committee on Space Research
- CPR**, People's Republic of China
- DBM**, Division of Buildings Management, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Operations
- DC**, Disarmament Committee
- del**, delegation
- Delga**, series indicator for telegrams from the delegation at the United Nations General Assembly to the Department of State
- Depcirtel**, Department of State circular telegram
- Dept**, Department
- Deptel**, Department of State telegram
- desp**, despatch
- DEW Line**, Distant Early Warning Line
- DRV**, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
- Dulte**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
- ECOSOC**, Economic and Social Council, United Nations
- EE**, Eastern Europe
- elint**, electronic intelligence
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- ETAP**, Expanded Technical Assistance Program
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/BNA**, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- FAO**, Food and Agriculture Organization
- FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FLN**, *Fédération de Liberation Nationale; Front de Liberation Nationale*
- FonMin**, Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry
- FonOff**, Foreign Office
- FYI**, for your information
- G**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

## XIV List of Abbreviations

---

- G-2**, military intelligence section of the Army or Marine Corps; military intelligence officer
- GA**, General Assembly, United Nations
- GAA**, General Armistice Agreement
- Gadel**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
- GATT**, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
- GC**, General Committee, United Nations
- GDR**, German Democratic Republic
- GOL**, Government of India
- GOL**, Government of Libya; Government of Lebanon
- GOS**, Government of Sudan
- GOT**, Government of Tunisia
- govt**, government
- GRC**, Government of the Republic of China
- GVN**, Government of Vietnam
- H**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
- HKJ**, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
- Hung**, Hungary, Hungarian
- IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency
- IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- ICAO**, International Civil Aviation Organization
- ICBM**, Intercontinental ballistic missile
- ICJ**, International Court of Justice
- ICSU**, International Council of Scientific Unions
- IGY**, International Geophysical Year
- ILC**, International Law Commission
- ILO**, International Labor Organization
- infotel**, information telegram
- INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- IO/OIA**, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- IO/UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- IRBM**, intermediate-range ballistic missile
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JCSM**, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
- L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- L/EUR**, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State
- L/SFP**, Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems, Department of State
- L/UNA**, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
- LA**, Latin America
- Leb**, Lebanon
- Leg**, Legation
- ME**, Middle East
- memcom**, memorandum of conversation
- mytel**, my telegram
- NAC**, North Atlantic Council
- NACA**, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
- NASA**, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NE**, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs after August 20, 1958), Department of State
- NEA**, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until August 20, 1958; thereafter Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Niact**, night action; communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
- NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate
- NSC**, National Security Council
- NSGTs**, non-self-governing territories
- NY**, New York
- O**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
- OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
- ODM**, Office of Defense Mobilization
- OPI**, Office of Public Information
- ourtel**, our telegram
- P**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
- P/OPS**, Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
- para**, paragraph
- Phil**, Philippines
- PM**, Prime Minister

- Polto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
- PriMin**, Prime Minister
- reftel**, reference telegram
- Rep**, Representative
- reourtel**, reference our telegram
- res**, resolution
- ROK**, Republic of Korea
- ROKG**, Republic of Korea Government
- RPA**, Office of Inter-American Regional Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- RVN**, Republic of Vietnam
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State
- S/AE**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy
- S/P**, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- S/S-RO**, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- S/SA**, Science Adviser to the Secretary of State
- SA**, Specialized Agency
- SC**, Security Council, United Nations
- SCAP**, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers
- SCAR**, Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research
- SEATO**, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
- Sec**, Secretary of State
- Secto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences to the Department of State
- SNIE**, Special National Intelligence Estimates
- SOA/NEA**, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs after August 20, 1958), Department of State
- Sov**, Soviet
- SPA**, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- SWA**, Southwest Africa
- SY**, Office of Security, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
- SYG**, Secretary-General
- TA**, Technical Assistance
- TC**, Trusteeship Council, United Nations
- tel**, telegram
- Tocah**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter while away from Washington
- Topol**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the United States Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Council
- Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international Conferences
- U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State
- U/FW**, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Office of the Under Secretary of State
- U/LS**, Special Assistant for Law of the Sea, Office of the Under Secretary of State
- U/OP**, Operations Coordinator, Department of State
- UAR**, United Arab Republic
- UK**, United Kingdom
- UN**, United Nations
- UNEF**, United Nations Emergency Force
- UNESCO**, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly
- UNHCR**, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- Unn**, unnumbered
- UNOGIL**, United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon
- UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- UNREF**, United Nations Refugee Fund
- UNRWA**, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Arab Refugees from Palestine
- UPC**, *Union des Populations du Cameroun*
- ur**, your
- urtel**, your telegram
- USAF**, United States Air Force

## XVI List of Abbreviations

---

**USARP**, United States Antarctic Research Program

**USDeI**, United States Delegation

**USG**, United States Government

**USIA**, United States Information Agency

**USIS**, United States Information Service

**USN**, United States Navy

**USNHO**, United States National Hydrographic Organization

**USRO**, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**USUN**, United States Mission at the United Nations

**W**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

**WE**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Western European; Western Europe

**WHO**, World Health Organization

# List of Persons

- Abdoh, Dr. Djalal**, Iranian Representative to the United Nations, 1958–1959
- Achilles, Theodore C.**, Counselor of the Department of State from March 1960
- Ackerson, Garrett G., Jr.**, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, Legation in Hungary
- Acly, R. Austin**, Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs, Department of State, August 1959–September 1960; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Adams, Ware**, Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, 1958
- Aiken, Frank**, Irish Foreign Minister
- Allen, George V.**, Director, United States Information Agency
- Alphand, Hervé**, French Ambassador to the United States
- Armitage, John A.**, Officer in Charge of Multilateral Political Relations, Department of State, from September 1960
- Arneson, R. Gordon**, Deputy Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Law of the Sea from the end of 1959
- Ayub Khan, General Mohammad**, President of Pakistan from October 1958
- Bacon, Ruth E.**, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until September 1960
- Bane, David M.**, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from May 1959
- Barco, James W.**, Counselor, United States Mission at the United Nations
- Beale, Howard**, Australian Ambassador to the United States from March 1958
- Becker, Loftus**, Legal Adviser, Department of State, until August 15, 1959
- Beeley, Harold**, British Deputy Representative at the United Nations from June 1958
- Belaunde, Victor Andrés**, member, Peruvian Delegation to the United Nations
- Bennett, Elmer F.**, Under Secretary of the Interior from October 1958
- Berding, Andrew H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
- Berry, J. Lampton**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs after August 20, 1958) until October 1958
- Blow, Stuart**, Office of the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Department of State
- Bock, Benjamin**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Bohlen, Charles E.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from December 1959
- Boland, Frederick H.**, Irish Representative at the United Nations
- Bomboko, Justin**, Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo from July 1960
- Booker, Malcolm R.**, Counselor of the Australian Embassy in the United States until late 1958; Minister of the Embassy, late 1958–spring 1960
- Border, Lewis H.**, First Secretary of the Australian Embassy in the United States until early 1959; Counselor of the Embassy, early 1959–spring 1959



## XVIII List of Persons

---

- Bovey, John A., Jr.**, Deputy Director, Office of Northern Africa Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Bureau of African Affairs after August 20, 1958), Department of State, until August 1959
- Breithut, Richard C.**, Deputy Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs, Department of State, until November 1958; Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Affairs, November 1958–April 1959
- Brewer, William D.**, Officer in Charge of United Arab Republic–Sudan Affairs, Department of State, from August 1958
- Brosio, Manlio**, Italian Ambassador to the United States
- Brown, Elizabeth A.**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until August 1958; Acting Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs, August 1958–November 1959; Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs, November 1959–April 1960
- Bruns, William H.**, Acting Staff Assistant, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, 1958; Staff Assistant, 1959
- Buffum, William B.**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, June 1958–April 1960; thereafter Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs
- Bulganin, Marshal Nikolai Aleksandrovich**, Chairman, Soviet Council of Ministers, until March 1958
- Bunker, Ellsworth**, Ambassador to India
- Burdett, William C., Jr.**, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from September 1960
- Burke, Admiral Arleigh A.**, Chief of Naval Operations
- Caccia, Sir Harold A.**, British Ambassador to the United States
- Cadieux, Marcel**, Canadian Legal Adviser and Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs
- Calhoun, John A.**, Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until September 1958; Director, September 1958–September 1960
- Caprio, Gene E.**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from August 1960
- Cargo, William I.**, Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until August 1958; thereafter Director
- Carson, James L.**, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until October 1960
- Casey, Richard G.**, Australian Foreign Minister until February 1960
- Castro, Fidel**, Commander in Chief, Cuban Armed Forces, January–February 1959; thereafter Prime Minister of Cuba
- Chehab, General Fuad**, Commander in Chief, Lebanese Army, until September 1958; thereafter President of Lebanon
- Colclough, Vice Admiral Oswald S.**, Department of Defense member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, 1958 and 1960
- Coote, Wendell B.**, Deputy Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from September 1960
- Cordier, Andrew W.**, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Correa, José**, Ecuadoran Representative at the United Nations from summer 1958
- Couve de Murville, Maurice**, French Foreign Minister from June 1958
- Cutler, Robert**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to June 1958

- Daniels, Paul C.**, Special Adviser on Antarctica, Department of State, 1958–January 1960
- Davis, Richard H.**, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, August–December 1959; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Day, Arthur R.**, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- De la Grandville, Jean**, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States until December 1958
- Dean, Arthur H.**, head, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, 1958 and 1960
- Diallo, Telli Boubacar**, Guinean Ambassador to the United States
- Diefenbaker, John G.**, Canadian Prime Minister
- Dillon, C. Douglas**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs through June 1958; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, July 1958–June 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State
- Dimechkié, Nadim**, Lebanese Ambassador to the United States from February 1958
- Dixon, Sir Pierson**, British Representative at the United Nations until October 1960
- Dorman, John R.**, Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, December 1958–September 1960
- Dreier, John C.**, Acting Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until January 1960
- Drew, George A.**, Canadian Ambassador to the United Kingdom; head, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
- Driscoll, Elizabeth C.**, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Dryden, Hugh L.**, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, from August 1958
- Dulles, Allen W.**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State until April 1959
- Eisendrath, Craig R.**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from July 1958
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States
- Eisenhower, Major John S. D.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President; promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in May 1960
- Elbrick, C. Burke**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 1958
- Farinholt, Larkin H.**, Deputy Science Adviser, Department of State, from June 1958
- Farley, Philip J.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Affairs from March 1958
- Feld, Nicholas**, Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs, Department of State, until September 1959
- Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr.**, Director, Office of South African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Bureau of African Affairs after August 20, 1958), Department of State, until October 1960; thereafter Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
- Fessenden, Russell**, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, September 1958–September 1960; thereafter Director
- Fisher, Wayne W.**, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1959

## XX List of Persons

---

- Fitzmaurice, Gerald**, Legal Adviser, British Foreign Office; member, British Delegation to the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
- Ford, Alan W.**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State, 1958
- Freimark, George S.**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- García Robles, Alfonso**, member, Mexican Delegation to the United Nations, and head, Mexican Delegation to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1958
- Gates, Thomas S., Jr.**, Secretary of the Navy to June 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense, June–December 1959; thereafter Secretary of Defense
- Gerig, O. Benjamin**, Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J.**, Staff Secretary to the President
- Grand, Stanley I.**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from November 1958
- Gray, Gordon**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from July 1958
- Gros, André**, Legal Adviser, French Foreign Ministry; head, French Delegation to the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, 1958 and 1960
- Green, Howard C.**, Canadian Foreign Minister from June 1959
- Green, James F.**, United Nations Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, March 1959–January 1960
- Hager, Eric H.**, Legal Adviser, Department of State, from September 1959
- Hammarskjöld, Dag**, Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Hanes, John W., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until January 1959; thereafter Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
- Hare, John**, British Agriculture Minister, Fisheries and Food; head, British Delegation to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1960
- Hare, Raymond A.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from January 1960
- Harr, Karl G., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the President
- Hartley, Virginia F.**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Hawley, Charles F.**, Officer in Charge of General Assembly and Security Council Affairs, Department of State
- Heeney, Arnold D. P.**, Canadian Ambassador to the United States from March 1959
- Henderson, Horace E.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from January 1959
- Henderson, Loy W.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
- Herrington, William C.**, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Office of the Under Secretary of State
- Herz, Martin**, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from January 1960
- Home, Lord (Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home)**, British Foreign Minister from July 1960
- Hood, Viscount Samuel**, Minister of the British Embassy in the United States
- Hope, A. Guy**, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern, South Asian Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from May 1960
- Hussein, King**, King of Jordan

- Jackson, C. D.**, Vice President, Time Inc., and former speechwriter, special assistant, and consultant to President Eisenhower
- Jackson, Henry M.**, Democratic Senator from Washington
- Jandrey, Fred W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until early 1959
- Jeffrey, H. P.**, First Secretary of the New Zealand Embassy in the United States until summer 1958
- Johnson, Lyndon B.**, Democratic Senator from Texas; Senate Majority Leader
- Jones, G. Lewis, Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from July 1959
- Kádár, Janos**, Hungarian Prime Minister and First Secretary of the Hungarian Revolutionary Socialist Party through January 1958; thereafter First Secretary only
- Kasavubu, Joseph**, President of the Republic of the Congo from July 1960
- Kerley, Ernest L.**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
- Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich**, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; also Chairman, Soviet Council of Ministers, from March 1958
- Killian, Dr. James R., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology until May 1959
- Kohler, Foy D.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, February 1958–December 1959; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Krebs, Max V.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from June 1959
- Kuznetsov, Vasily V.**, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
- Lall, Arthur**, Indian Representative at the United Nations, 1958
- Lane, George M.**, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until January 1960
- Lebel, Claude**, Minister-Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States, from May 1959
- Lloyd, Selwyn**, British Foreign Minister until June 1960; thereafter Chancellor of the Exchequer
- Lodge, Henry Cabot**, Representative at the United Nations until September 1960
- Long, Edward T.**, Special Assistant, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, October–December 1959; thereafter Special Assistant, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Looney, Warren W.**, Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife until June 1958
- Lopez, Salvador P.**, member, Philippine Delegation to the United Nations
- Luboeansky, Earl H.**, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1958; Officer in Charge of Special Political Matters, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, 1959–1960
- Lucet, Charles**, Minister of the French Embassy in the United States through spring 1959
- Ludlow, James M.**, Acting United Nations Adviser to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until December 1958; thereafter United Nations Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Lumumba, Patrice**, Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo from July 1960
- McBride, Robert H.**, Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from September 1958
- McClintock, Robert M.**, Ambassador to Lebanon

## XXII List of Persons

---

- McElhiney, Thomas W.**, Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, September 1958–August 1960
- McElroy, Neil**, Secretary of Defense until December 1959
- Macmillan, Harold**, British Prime Minister
- McNutt, Louise**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- Macomber, William B., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from October 21, 1957
- McSweeney, John M.**, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1960
- Magnuson, Warren G.**, Democratic Senator from Washington; Chairman, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
- Mahgoub, Mohammed Ahmed**, Sudanese Foreign Minister
- Mak, Dayton S.**, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from December 1958
- Maleter, General Pal**, former Hungarian Defense Minister
- Malik, Charles**, Lebanese Foreign Minister until September 1958
- Mansfield, Mike**, Democratic Senator from Montana
- Marcus, Melvin M.**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Matsch, Dr. Franz**, Austrian Representative at the United Nations
- Meeker, Leonard C.**, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
- Mendenhall, Joseph A.**, Officer in Charge of Vietnam Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, March 1958–August 1959
- Merchant, Livingston T.**, Ambassador to Canada until November 1958; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, November 1958–August 1959; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Menshikov, Mikhail A.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States from February 1958
- Menon, V. K. Krishna**, Indian Defense Minister from April 1958
- Menzies, Robert G.**, Australian Prime Minister; also Foreign Minister from February 1960
- Mindszenty, Cardinal Jozef**, Primate of Hungary, resident in the U.S. Legation at Budapest from November 1956
- Monsma, George N.**, Officer in Charge of International Organizations, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1958; thereafter International Organizations Adviser, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs
- Moor, Carol C.**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Mountbatten, Lord Louis**, British Chief of the Defense Staff from December 1958
- Munro, Sir Leslie**, New Zealand Representative at the United Nations, 1958
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August 1959–December 1959
- Nagy, Imre**, former Prime Minister of Hungary
- Nash, Walter**, Prime Minister of New Zealand
- Nasser, Gamel Abdel**, President of Egypt until February 1958; thereafter President of the United Arab Republic
- Nehru, Jawaharlal**, Prime Minister of India
- Neidle, Alan F.**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, until 1959; thereafter Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- Newlin, Michael H.**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from June 1958

- Nixon, Richard M.**, Vice President of the United States
- Nkrumah, Dr. Kwame**, President of the Republic of Ghana from July 1960
- Nosek, Jiri**, Deputy Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia
- Nunley, William T.**, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Nutt, Jim S.**, First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy in the United States, fall 1958–summer 1960; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy
- Oakley, Robert**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from summer 1960
- Olympio, Sylvanus**, Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Togo from April 1960
- Ortona, Egidio**, Italian Representative at the United Nations from 1959
- Owen, George H.**, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until March 1959; Officer in Charge, Antarctica Staff, Department of State, March–December 1959; thereafter Special Assistant for Antarctica
- Parsons, J. Graham**, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, from July 1959
- Pella, Guisepppe**, Foreign Minister of Italy until June 1958 and February 1959–February 1960
- Pelly, Thomas M.**, Republican Congressman from Washington
- Pender, John H., Jr.**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems, Department of State
- Penfield, James K.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from September 1958
- Phleger, Herman**, Chairman, Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica, 1958
- Piccioni, Attilio**, member, Italian Delegation to the United Nations
- Plimsoll, James**, Australian Representative at the United Nations, 1960
- Puhan, Alfred**, Deputy Director, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until February 1959; Director, Office of International Administration, February 1959–July 1960
- Quaison-Sackey, Alex**, member, Ghanaian Delegation to the United Nations
- Quarles, Donald A.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until May 1959
- Rae, S. F.**, Minister of the Canadian Embassy in the United States
- Raymond, John M.**, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State
- Rewinkel, Milton C.**, Deputy Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from August 1959
- Richards, Arthur L.**, Special Assistant for Law of the Sea Matters, Office of the Under Secretary of State, January 1958–June 1960
- Robertson, Walter S.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until June 1959
- Rosen, Arthur H.**, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- Rossel, Agda**, Swedish Representative at the United Nations from summer 1958
- Rountree, William M.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs after August 20, 1958) until July 1959
- Rubottom, Roy R.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until August 1960
- Salaam, Saleb**, Lebanese Prime Minister from August 1960
- Satterthwaite, Joseph C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from September 1958

## XXIV List of Persons

---

- Seip, Peter A.**, Assistant Chief, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from November 1959
- Shukairy, Ahmad**, Saudi Representative at the United Nations
- Sisco, Joseph J.**, Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State, until August 1958; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs
- Slim, Monghi**, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- Sobolev, Arkady A.**, Soviet Representative at the United Nations
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Officer in Charge of Disarmament Affairs, Department of State, until October 1960; thereafter Chief, Political Office, Disarmament Administration
- Sprague, Mansfield D.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until August 1958
- Spruiks, H. Charles**, Special Assistant to the Chief of Protocol, Department of State, from September 1958
- Stans, Maurice**, Director, Bureau of the Budget
- Stavropoulos, Constantin A.**, United Nations Legal Counsel
- Steeves, John M.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from October 1959
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from September 1960
- Sukarno, Ahmed**, President of Indonesia; also Prime Minister from July 1959
- Sullivan, William H.**, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, from September 1960
- Taylor, Fred E.**, Fisheries and Wildlife Adviser to the Under Secretary of State, until December 1959; thereafter Deputy Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife
- Terry, William M.**, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Interior
- Thacher, Nicholas G.**, First Secretary of the Embassy in Iran until August 1958; National War College, August 1958–June 1959; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Thompson, Llewellyn E.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Thors, Thor**, Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Iceland from April 1958
- Tito, Marshal Josef Broz**, President of Yugoslavia
- Tron, René**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from mid-1960
- Tunkin, Grigoriy I.**, head, Contractural Law Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry
- Twining, General Nathan F.**, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until August 1960
- Valdes, Philip H.**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1959
- Van Heuven, Marten H. A.**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State, 1959–1960
- Wadsworth, James**, Deputy Representative at the United Nations until September 1960; thereafter Representative at the United Nations
- Waggoner, Edward L.**, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs after August 20, 1958), Department of State, 1958
- Wallner, Woodruff**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from August 1959
- Walmsley, Walter N.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until October 1959; thereafter Ambassador to Tunisia

- Wan Waithayakon, Prince**, Foreign Minister of Thailand until October 1958; Thai Representative at the United Nations until October 1958–February 1959; thereafter Deputy Premier
- Ward, Rear Admiral Chester**, Judge Advocate General of the United States Navy
- Waterman, Alan T.**, Director, National Science Foundation; also member, National Aeronautics and Space Committee, from September 1958
- Westfall, Virginia C.**, Office of International Administration Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until February 1959; Acting Deputy Director of the Office, February 1959–April 1960; Deputy Director, April–June 1960; thereafter Acting Director
- Wexler, Harry**, Director, Office of Meteorological Research, Department of Commerce
- White, Ivan B.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from March 1959
- White, General Thomas D.**, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force
- Whitney, John Hay**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom
- Wilcox, Francis O.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Williamson, Larry C.**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1960
- Willis, Frances E.**, Ambassador to Norway
- Willoughby, Woodbury**, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from August 1958
- Wright, Edward E.**, Office of South American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until November 1958; thereafter Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Law of the Sea
- Yang, Dr. You Chan**, Korean Ambassador to the United States until spring 1960
- Yingling, Raymond T.**, Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems, Department of State
- Zorin, Valerian A.**, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union





# UNITED NATIONS

JANUARY–AUGUST 1958

## 1. **Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions**<sup>1</sup>

CA-5634

*Washington, January 2, 1958.*

SUBJECT

The Question of Chinese Representation

At a recent meeting in London of the North European Chiefs of Mission (September 19–21, 1957),<sup>2</sup> some of the participants stationed in countries recognizing the Chinese Communists questioned the desirability of making approaches to the Foreign Offices in such countries on matters involving the Chinese representation issue in the various organs of the United Nations system, particularly when the respective Government is publicly known to have a traditional and unalterable position on this question.

The following comments may assist officers in the field better to understand the reasons behind the Department's repeated instructions to posts to seek support for the Government of the Republic of China and Chinese candidacies in the international arena, both within and outside the UN system.

There are cases in the UN and in other organizations in which the voting situation on a Chinese representation resolution or an election affecting China is so close that one vote, or even an abstention or a blank ballot, may make the difference between success or failure or may prevent the development of a prolonged deadlock. For example, election forecasts had indicated a very close vote at the Twelfth General Assembly in the case of: (1) China for reelection to ECOSOC, and (2) Judge V.K. Wellington Koo for reelection to the International Court of Justice. As the five permanent members of the Security Council

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–258. Confidential. Drafted by Bacon and Bock on December 19; cleared by CA, EUR/BN, and Ludlow; and initialed for the Acting Secretary by Walmsley. Sent to 29 missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; and repeated to Taipei and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding this meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. IV, pp. 608–641.

have traditionally been represented in both of these UN organs, success of the Chinese candidacies was of direct importance in maintaining China's international status.

As another example, it is clear from the votes cast that, with a secret ballot and an understanding that in the opinion of the United States a particular vote is crucial, states which are publicly known to have a position of non-support for the Government of the Republic of China have, in fact, supported it. China thus obtained 61 votes (out of 82) in the election on September 18, 1957, for one of the Vice Presidencies of the Twelfth General Assembly. A vote of this size can be explained only by assuming that several states who usually do not support the GRC, did so in this particular instance. It would seem inescapable that some of the Scandinavian countries must have been included in this group.

Approaches in the past, even to Norway and Sweden, have been of demonstrated usefulness. Even though they may not have resulted in promises of support, they have in several cases led to commitments to "abstain" or cast blank ballots. In a tight situation, an abstention or an "accidental absence" on the part of a delegate can be most helpful in cases in which positive support cannot be given. It was reported, for example, that Sweden would abstain on China's reelection to ECOSOC and that Norway, while most likely unable to support Judge Koo for reelection to the ICJ, might cast a blank ballot were a protracted deadlock to develop.

In most cases it is possible to find a basis for asking support which does not directly involve the issue of recognition. Thus, in asking support for the Chinese candidacies for ECOSOC and the ICJ, the Department could stress Europe's interest in maintaining representation of the five permanent members of the Security Council on UN organs generally, and on these two particularly.

In some cases a new aspect of the Chinese representation problem may be involved. A recent case in point was provided by the International Red Cross Conference at New Delhi (October 28 to November 7, 1957). There the issue was an offensively addressed invitation to the Republic of China (which was called the "Republic of Formosa"), while invitations to the Chinese Communists and other Communist regimes had been addressed by the titles chosen by those regimes. When the matter was discussed with the Swedish Ambassador in Washington, it was pointed out to him that the situation involved not recognition, but a matter of international usage and propriety. He responded that the United States position appeared perfectly reasonable to him and that he would recommend to his Government that it support our position. At New Delhi, after the Conference adopted, by a vote of 62 in favor, 44 against, with 16 absentions, the United States resolution that "all parties invited to attend the Conference be ad-

dressed according to their own official titles", the representative of the Government of the Republic of China took his seat. An attempt, on a point of order, to prevent the seating of the Chinese representative was denied by the Acting Chairman of the Conference and his ruling was upheld by a vote of 51 in favor, 3 against, with 18 abstentions.

The Department hopes that addressee posts will find the above information helpful when discussing this question with officials of the Government to which accredited, as well as with friendly diplomatic colleagues.

The Department also believes that it is desirable that our Embassies in friendly countries, regardless of the attitude of the country concerned toward the Republic of China, keep the Foreign Offices informed of our thinking on the China situation through discussions from time to time. Our policy with respect to China has a direct bearing on the security interests of the countries of the Free World. Speeches by the Secretary of State and other high officials provide a basis for such discussions and should be utilized as occasion offers.

**Herter**

---

## 2. Letter From the President to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 3, 1958.*

DEAR FOSTER: I am not certain that you had a copy of a recent note sent to me by Cabot Lodge. I quote its text:

"There is no doubt that Bulganin's letter<sup>2</sup> made a big impression at the UN. The so-called 'uncommitted' countries seemed to agree with it and thought his points were reasonable. The countries on our side thought it was clever.

"I certainly wish we could get things organized so that we could make frequent specific offerings liberally peppered with sweet talk—for which the world, as I judge it here at the UN, has an apparently insatiable appetite.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.311/1-358. Attached to the source text was a copy of a January 3 letter from Dulles to Eisenhower which stated, "I have your letter of January 3. I think Cabot sent me a copy of his note to you. I quite agree with his point of view." No copy of the letter from Lodge to the President has been found.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Bulganin's letter, December 10, 1957, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 27, 1958, pp. 127-130.

“This should not necessarily mean new policy decisions (useful though they undoubtedly are), but a technique of ‘ringing the changes’ on the policies we already have. We should be the ones to make the advances.”

It seems to me that what Cabot is referring to are procedures and methods at the United Nations, rather than guidance, as to substance, from the State Department. I see some advantage of wrapping our proposals in different packages occasionally and tying them up in different colored ribbons.

I have already acknowledged Cabot’s note.

As ever,

D.E.

---

### 3. Editorial Note

On December 4, 1957, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin handed Ambassador Thompson an aide-mémoire protesting demonstrations outside the Soviet Mission at the United Nations. The aide-mémoire referred specifically to disturbances on October 23 and November 7, alleging that U.S. authorities had not taken appropriate steps to prevent them, despite having previously promised to do so. It stated further that a Mission employee had been assaulted during the November 7 incident. The aide-mémoire asserted that the disturbances had violated the Mission’s diplomatic immunity, and noted that Soviet resentment about the protests might incite similar demonstrations at the Embassy in Moscow. For text, see telegram 1033 from Moscow, *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, volume XI, page 257.

The Department of State sent the Embassy a draft response in telegram 700, December 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/12–457) The Embassy suggested an addition to the text (telegram 1159, December 31; *ibid.*, 310.361/12–3157), with which the Department concurred. (Telegram 711, January 2, 1958; *ibid.*)

On January 3, 1958, the Embassy reported that it had delivered the aide-mémoire to Zorin. (Telegram 1174, January 3; *ibid.*, 310.361/1–358) The aide-mémoire stated that the United States was unaware of any interference experienced by the Soviet Mission in carrying out its activities, or of any violation of the Mission’s diplomatic immunity. Police records, it continued, did not support Soviet contentions that appropriate measures had not been taken to prevent the incidents, or that a Mission employee had been assaulted. The aide-mémoire con-

cluded by noting that the U.S. Government could not interfere with its citizens' rights to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. A copy is *ibid.*

---

#### 4. Editorial Note

On January 13, the White House released the text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman Bulganin. Dated the previous day, Eisenhower's letter responded to a December 10, 1957, communication from Bulganin. (See footnote 2, Document 2)

Eisenhower noted that Bulganin's letter seemed to address three items: the need for peace; the idea that collective self-defense efforts of free world nations endangered peace; and Bulganin's specific proposals. The President offered his own suggestions for enhancing international stability. The first concerned strengthening the United Nations by rededicating "ourselves to the United Nations, its Principles and Purposes and to our Charter obligations."

The President continued:

"I propose that we should make it the policy of our two governments at least not to use veto power to prevent the Security Council from proposing methods for the pacific settlement of disputes pursuant to Chapter VI.

"Nothing, I am convinced, would give the world more justifiable hope than the conviction that both of our governments are genuinely determined to make the United Nations the effective instrument of peace and justice that was the original design."

He then addressed the problems of Germany and arms control. Eisenhower closed his letter with the statement that he would be willing to meet with Soviet leaders, provided adequate preparations were made in advance of the meeting and leaders of other nations with responsibilities in the areas to be considered attended. For the full text of his letter, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pages 75-84.

In his February 1 reply, Bulganin commented on Eisenhower's suggestions for strengthening the United Nations:

"The U.N. Charter provides that this organization must be a center for coordinating the actions of nations and for working our mutually acceptable decisions. These ends are also served by the rule of unanimity of the great powers. The abolition of this rule would lead to abuses, to the violation of the interests of the minority, and to attempts to use this organization to the advantage of some one power

or group of powers. Is it possible to forget that states which are members of the U.N. are sovereign and independent states and cannot permit themselves to be saddled with decisions which are incompatible with their sovereignty?"

For full text of this letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 10, 1958, pages 376-380.

Eisenhower addressed Bulganin's reactions to his proposals for the United Nations in his February 15 response:

"That proposal you reject, alleging that it would give to the Security Council a power to 'adopt decisions that would be binding on all States' and make it in effect a 'world government.' That argument is directed to a misrepresentation of my proposal. I suggested that our two nations should, as a matter of policy, avoid vetoing Security Council recommendations as to how nations might proceed toward the peaceful solution of their disputes. Surely authority to *recommend*, and that only as to *procedures*, is not to impose binding decisions. Already, the General Assembly can, free of veto, recommend procedures for peaceful settlement. Would it really be catastrophic for the Security Council to exercise that same facility?"

For full text of the letter, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pages 153-160.

Bulganin's March 3 response commented again on Soviet opposition to restricting the use of the veto in the U.N. Security Council:

"We cannot agree at all with the claim that the only thing in question is the procedural aspect of the matter, although, as is well known, this aspect also has important significance in settling great political problems. We are firmly convinced that the implementation of measures proposed by you would in practice lead to the use of the Security Council in the interests of one or several powers to the detriment of the interests of other states, to undermining the various principles of unanimity of the great powers which have the basic responsibility for maintaining international peace, that principle on which the U.N. is founded and which represents the basic guarantee for the normal activity and the very existence of the U.N."

For full text of Bulganin's letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 21, 1958, pages 648-652.

Discussions regarding a summit meeting continued into the summer. The Soviet Union, however, consistently omitted any items on the United Nations from its agenda proposals. On June 16, in response to an announcement that the Soviet Government intended to publish previously unreleased documentation on the proposed meeting, the Department of State released three documents pertaining to it. One was a May 28 memorandum listing the Western agenda proposals. It contained the following item:

*"9. Means of strengthening the United Nations*

"The peoples of the world look upon the UN organization and the pledges of its members embodied in its Charter as man's best hope for peace and justice. Thus, the Western governments cannot but welcome the recent assertion of the Soviet Union that it believes in the importance of the United Nations and its role in the maintenance of peace and security as well as in the peaceful settlement of international issues. Like the USSR, they deem that efforts should be made to strengthen the United Nations by every means, so that it should be able to fulfill its tasks more effectively. One practical way in which this can be done now is through an undertaking by the Governments of the US, UK, France and USSR that they will, as a matter of policy, avoid vetoing Security Council recommendations as to how nations might proceed toward the peaceful solution of their disputes."

For full text of the memorandum, see *ibid.*, July 7, 1958, pages 12-16.

---

**5. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 6, 1958.*

SUBJECT

Italian Security Council Candidacy

*Discussion*

The Italian Minister called on me January 29 to ascertain whether the Department could not now make a commitment to support the Italian candidacy for election to the Security Council at the 13th General Assembly next autumn (Tab A).<sup>2</sup> Ortona said he was making the approach, a very earnest one, in advance of, one, the Italian Ambassador (who raised this matter with you on November 1, 1957—Tab B), is under instructions by his Foreign Minister to make at the highest

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/2-658. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on February 3 and sent through S/S. Approved by Murphy and concurred in by EUR. A note from Herter to Calhoun is written on the source text: "Let's find out how far in advance we could announce our support? CAH" Murphy's copy of the memorandum was initiated by Walmsley, Murphy, and Elbrick, and approved by Murphy on February 7. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Neither of the Tabs is attached. Tab A is *ibid.*, 330/1-2958; Tab B is *ibid.*, 330/11-157.



appropriate level. According to the Minister, the Italian Government now has commitments of support from nine of the Western European UN Members and considers a U.S. commitment before the elections in Italy this spring of great importance as a mark of solidarity with a staunch ally. (This is at least the sixth approach by the Italians for U.S. support. The Italians gracefully withdrew their name a year ago last fall to avoid a race with Sweden, which was elected.)

I could say only that we would warmly welcome Italy on the Security Council; that we are encouraging no other candidacy for the "European" seat; but that an early commitment, as he knew, would be a radical departure from our usual practice and would make it almost impossible for us to avoid similar commitments to other friendly candidates at an early date (for example, to the Lebanese on behalf of Dr. Malik's candidacy for GA President) and would greatly increase the difficulty of adhering to our normal practice in future years. With the European support Italy has gained and in the absence of any rival candidate, the Italian candidacy seems to be progressing well (and in the opinion of UNP, the Italians may be a "shoo-in"). In any case, it is clear that the Italians want their request to be put up to you again, or to the Secretary.

#### *Recommendation*

That you authorize me to inform the Italian Minister that I have consulted with you and that while we are very pleased to learn that Italy appears close to being the European choice, and that we would warmly welcome Italy's election to the Security Council, it is quite impracticable for the Department to depart at this time from the position you set forth to Signor Brosio on November 1, i.e., that we cannot make known our support so far in advance, but that we are not encouraging any other candidate. (You may nevertheless anticipate a request by the Ambassador to see you or the Secretary.)

6. **Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 21, 1958—8:29 p.m.*

777. Following transmitted for your information and may be used in discretion mission if subject raised in conversation with FonOff officials:

1. With respect participation United Arab Republic in United Nations and other international organizations, it is view Department that since UAR product merger Syria-Egypt both of which Charter Members UN, UAR their successor and succeeds to membership UN and other international organizations of which either Syria or Egypt formerly member. In exercising rights membership, however, UAR can be represented by only one delegation with one vote. USDel Law Sea Conference instructed support that position with respect representation UAR that Conference.

2. In order minimize possibility affording UAR excuse disavow international obligations and in order minimize certain political difficulties in UN, references UAR as "new" state should be avoided. Thus, for example, US will recognize government UAR rather than first recognize UAR as "new" state and then recognize its government.

3. If mission questioned re federation Iraq-Jordan, should state that comment re recognition federation or its representation UN premature before promulgation federation constitution.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/2-2158. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Ford; cleared by Wilcox, Monsma, NEA, and EUR; and approved by Meeker who signed for Dulles.

## 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 19, 1958—8:51 p.m.*

674. Re GA Presidency. We have given arguments advanced urtel 995<sup>2</sup> and Beirut Embtel 3067<sup>3</sup> our most careful consideration. We recognize Lebanon expects US support Malik candidacy in view our posture re his 12th GA candidacy,<sup>4</sup> and at this stage see no reason we should not give our support at appropriate time. However we do not believe advantages set forth early public or "private" commitment Malik outweigh disadvantages in departure our normal practice at this time. Continued adherence this practice appears in overall US interest. Dept under constant pressure of type being exerted by Azkoul from other friendly states to make exception their candidacies for other offices, and it would not be politically feasible resist these pressures once exception made for Malik. For example, early public announcement support Italian SC candidacy could not be avoided and two such announcements in Dept's view would make others inevitable before we have full knowledge of what candidacies may be advanced and reaction among our friends to these candidacies. This would not only seriously complicate election situation this year, but would set bad precedent future years. Commitments given to Munro and Japanese in June last year being cited by current candidates as precedents for this year. Reaction next year's candidates to still earlier commitment Malik, Italians, and others this year would undoubtedly be similar. Moreover, substantial number exceptions this year would provide reasonable grounds for future contention that any US refusal give early commitment not in fact reflection of normal practice.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/3-1958. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on March 15; cleared by Walmsley, Monsma, Nunley, Rountree, and Bacon; and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Beirut. Sent to Dulles through S/S as an attachment to a March 18 memorandum in which Walmsley outlined the background to the situation and recommended that Dulles sign the telegram. (*Ibid.*, 320/3-1858)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 995, March 11, reported on a meeting between Lodge and Lebanese Delegation member Azkoul, and recommended that the United States give Malik its formal support in the near future. (*Ibid.*, 320/3-1158)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 3067 from Beirut, March 14, recommended that the Embassy be allowed to support privately Malik's candidacy for President of the 13th session of the U.N. General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 783A.00/3-1458)

<sup>4</sup> Dulles' September 17, 1957, statement regarding Malik's withdrawal from consideration for the presidency of the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly was transmitted in Document 18.

Dept does not at this time see any serious threat Malik candidacy and doubts validity Azkoul contention US commitment now would have deterrent effect any possible move by Nasser. Dept further doubts commitment would have any great impact among our friends in Middle East or elsewhere since, as you point out, there general assumption US will support Malik. At same time, Dept sees certain potential risks inherent any public announcement US support Malik now when it impossible foresee how situation in Middle East may develop before next GA.

Taking all these considerations into account, I believe we should postpone any final decision on whom we shall support for presidency of 13th GA at least until mid-June, following last year's precedent.

**Dulles**

---

**8. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 2, 1958.*

**SUBJECT**

Parity Principle in the United Nations

In response to your oral request to me day before yesterday, I submit the following brief analysis from the United Nations standpoint of the current Soviet drive for acceptance of a parity principle at a "Summit Meeting".

*Soviet Tactics to Date*

The United Nations Charter provides parity in effect for the major powers in the Security Council through the veto and it provides parity for the administering and non-administering powers in the composition of the Trusteeship Council. Otherwise, the Charter does not recognize any parity principle, but does establish the principle of "equitable geographical distribution" for the selection of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. In practice, this principle has been extended to U.N. bodies generally.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 216, Memorandum to the Secretary, 1958. Secret. Drafted by Hartley and sent through S/S.

The closest approach within the United Nations system to a Soviet drive for parity arose in connection with the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission at the twelfth General Assembly, when the USSR insisted on a "balanced" group. The enlarged Commission, which the USSR immediately declared unacceptable, has 17 Western-oriented, 4 Communist, and 4 "neutral" members. An Albanian amendment would have increased the number of Communists to 6 and the number of "neutrals" to 9. The Communists would obviously have been grossly over-represented on the Commission under this proposal (as would the "neutrals" to a lesser extent) from the standpoint of the political alignment of the UN membership as a whole.

The Soviet objective with respect to representation on UN bodies generally appears to be 1) the retention of those seats traditionally accorded the Communists, 2) equitable representation for the Communist bloc where a new agency is being established or an old one enlarged, 3) assurance of as many friendly or at least uncommitted members as possible, and 4) establishment of a "neutral" body where anything approaching an arbitral, conciliatory, or supervisory function is involved.

For example, in the 1956 General Assembly debate on enlargement of the Security Council, the USSR demanded that the one seat to which it considers Eastern Europe entitled under the "gentlemen's agreement"<sup>2</sup> be assured. When the General Committee was enlarged by the twelfth General Assembly from 17 to 21, the Soviet Union received (and apparently asked for) only one additional seat beyond the two hitherto held by the Soviet bloc. It made no effort to have a parity principle applied to the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

Similarly, the USSR has made no effort to increase the number of seats traditionally held by the Communists on the Economic and Social Council and its functional commissions. While the Soviet bloc has recently increased its participation in the specialized agencies, this has been a matter of joining or resuming membership, not of seeking parity. Several social science seminars proposed in the UNESCO program were originally planned on a fifty-fifty basis by the UNESCO Secretariat. These were expanded to provide more balanced geographic representation only after U.S. action with the Secretariat. We have no evidence, however, that the USSR was behind this Secretariat move.

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to an implicit agreement regarding the geographical distribution of seats for nonpermanent members of the U.N. Security Council reached at the Five-Power Informal Meetings held in London in January 1946. For minutes of the meetings, see *Foreign Relation*, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 141-147 and 153-156. Although the United States supported following this practice in succeeding years, it maintained that the "Gentlemen's Agreement" applied only to the 1946 Security Council elections, and that U.N. members were not bound by it thereafter.

Neither a parity principle nor the "balanced" group concept has so far been advanced by the USSR in the dependent area or administrative and budgetary fields.

The Soviet Union has not attempted to change the generally accepted geographical distribution of seats on U.N. bodies. It has, however, supported the enlargement of U.N. bodies where Charter amendment is not involved, and the election of uncommitted African and Asian candidates where there is no clearly established pattern of geographic distribution.

### *Implications for the United Nations*

Acceptance of a parity principle, outside purely bilateral negotiations, such as in the "Summit Talks" could not help but increase the stature of the USSR in the eyes of the uncommitted nations and might thus have psychological repercussions in such U.N. bodies as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Moreover, it would also tend to increase the stature of the satellites in the United Nations. The Soviets presumably seek parity at least in part because (a) it gives to the satellites an appearance of independence, thus increasing their prestige without actually diminishing the fact of Soviet control and (b) would seem to constitute a kind of tacit acquiescence in the status quo.

If the "Summit Talks" were successful, parity would create a precedent which we believe would be reflected to some extent in the United Nations, at least in forums primarily concerned with issues involving East-West power relations. If, however, negotiations at the "Summit" should make it clear that the USSR is not prepared, despite acceptance of a parity principle, in fact to negotiate seriously, then there would be little justification or pressure for any extensions of this principle to the U.N.

We would not anticipate that acceptance of a parity principle for "Summit Talks" would result in a broad extension of the parity principle to U.N. forums generally. However, were there to be such a result it would have the following serious disadvantages. It would:

1. extend the parity of power concept to areas not involving matters for great-power negotiations;
2. make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assure the favorable composition of U.N. organs and agencies that is essential to the attainment of United States objectives on such matters as Chinese representation in the U.N.;
3. encourage the formation of blocs, with the possible end result of in effect reducing the voting entities to two East-West committed blocs, plus a group of so-called uncommitted states whose interests the Soviets are frequently able to identify as their own.

Limitation of the application of a parity principle in the U.N. to those areas where the East-West power balance is an essential factor could be effectively justified on the grounds that a parity principle reflects essentially the power relationship of only two U.N. members and does not reflect the actual political aspirations of the U.N. membership as a whole.

---

9. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 1, 1958—10:53 p.m.*

2446. FYI We have impression Iraqis and Jordanians still thinking in terms retaining two seats at UN after Arab Union becomes effective.<sup>2</sup> We foresee number of objections to effort retain dual representation and believe would be regrettable if AU leaders took public position favoring dual representation and were subsequently obliged recede from that position in GA. End FYI

You should therefore inform Foreign office our wish discuss Arab Union UN representation with them and to make known to them our thoughts on basis friendship existing between us.

1. If Foreign Office indicates AU intends seek retain UN seats of Iraq and Jordan you should convey following as US reaction.

a) US understands natural desire AU retain seats and votes Iraq and Jordan.

b) However we believe effort to do so would in first instance be compared unfavorably with action UAR, would appear in minds some people substantiate charge Jordanian and Iraqi leaders did not intend create genuine union and would open Arab Union to major propaganda attack from UAR.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.386/5-158. Confidential. Drafted by Ludlow and Waggoner on April 29; cleared by Adams, Bruns, and Ford; and approved by Berry who signed for Dulles. Sent also to Baghdad and repeated to London and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Ludlow reported on March 24 that, on the previous evening, the Jordanian Ambassador had informed him of the Arab Union's intention to retain both Iraq's and Jordan's seats at the United Nations. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, 310.2/3-2458) The First Secretary of the British Embassy discussed this matter with Waggoner in a meeting at the Department of State on April 9. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, 310.2/4-958) On April 11, he noted that the United States and the United Kingdom were in general agreement on this subject. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, 310.2/4-1158)

c) Decision whether AU will retain seats and votes Iraq and Jordan will be made by GA. We believe however that AU with single head state and constitutional provisions such as Article 62 will have great difficulty persuading other UN members that AU entitled two seats. Effort maintain this might invite debate this subject with AU on uncertain ground. Defeat would be most unfortunate for Union's prestige. If by chance AU were able retain two seats, we see likelihood that entire problem multiple votes would be opened up by some members. We believe such development should be avoided.

d) Decision re UAR representation<sup>3</sup> will, we believe, be considered firm precedent for expecting AU retain one seat and one vote.

e) We believe most desirable course for AU to follow is to decide maintain single delegation with one vote as successor Iraq and Jordan in which capacity it will succeed to single membership in any international organization of which Iraq or Jordan now member and to inform SYG accordingly soonest.

2. If Foreign Office indicates AU intends maintain single delegation at UN as at national capitals, you should state US considers this best course to follow. You should also suggest SYG be notified of this intention at earliest opportunity.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 781 to USUN, May 7, instructed Lodge to inform Hammarskjöld of the U.S. approaches to Amman and Baghdad and to ascertain his reaction to the U.S. position on Arab Union representation in the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 310.386/5-758)

---

**10. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, May 8, 1958—1 p.m.*

1282. Re Arab Union membership UN (Deptel 2446 to Amman<sup>2</sup>).

1. At UK Del request we have discussed problem Arab Union representative in UN in connection with other items reported separately.<sup>3</sup> UK had received report from its Ambassador in Amman on

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.386/5-858. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Reported in telegram 1284 from USUN, May 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/5-858)



conversation between Wright and Rifai (substantially similar to Amman's 1872 to Dept<sup>4</sup>).

2. UK Del thought it was unlikely objection would be raised to retention two seats by Arab Union in GA by any other member. They discounted likelihood UAR raising issue, because of traditional Arab reluctance to fight intra-Arab problems in UN. Others unlikely raise issue unless UAR does.

3. If issue arose they felt it would more likely be result of SYG position on basis legal considerations stemming from Arab Union Constitution. Difficulties arose from fact constitution called for single foreign office and fact that Arab Union planning to amalgamate its foreign representation everywhere except at UN. They thought that "conscience" of UN might be stimulated especially if SYG took stand.

4. They were inclined to doubt whether maintenance two seats at UN would diminish Arab Union prestige. Re situation in area, they stated belief that looser union was preferable to tighter union because it would be more acceptable as possible basis for future federation by Syria following break-off from Egypt. (Also interesting to note comments made by Jamali about fomenting revolution in Syria (Jidda 1098 to Dept),<sup>5</sup> which we received subsequent to conversation with UK). In any case, UK questions whether we (US and UK) should be in lead in urging Jordanians and Iraqis to give up vote when issue had not yet arisen.

5. We have some doubt ourselves whether Arab Union representation will be made issue in GA if Jordan and Iraq decide to maintain separate seats. Our reasons substantially same as UK Del (para 2). On other hand, even if issue not raised formally there would undoubtedly be substantial corridor comment comparing Arab Union unfavorably to UAR, and prestige Jordanian and Iraqi Amb's, and their usefulness for US policy, likely to decrease. We also presume implications failure Arab Union to amalgamate its position in UN would not go unnoticed in area.

6. Our conversation is further evidence UK pursuing different policy than we are on Arab Union. We doubt whether this can be resolved here, although their tendency favor two UN seats may be overcome eventually through their own legal doubts.

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1872 from Amman, May 5, reported on a meeting between Thomas K. Wright, Chargé of the Embassy in Amman, and Samir el Rifai, Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, regarding Arab Union representation in the United Nations and the situation in Lebanon. (*Ibid.*, 310.386/5–558)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 1098 from Jidda, May 3, reported on comments by the Iraqi Foreign Minister on Middle East developments. (*Ibid.*, 786.00/5–358)

Will discuss situation with SYG as soon as possible in accordance with Deptel 781.<sup>6</sup>

Lodge

---

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 3, *supra*. Lodge reported on the discussion with Hammarskjöld in telegram 1303, May 13. The Secretary-General stated that on May 12 he had discussed the matter with a member of the Jordanian U.N. Delegation and that he had expressed reservations about the Arab Union's efforts to maintain two seats at the United Nations. The Secretary-General, Lodge observed, obviously felt the Arab Union should have only one vote. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.386/5-1358)

---

11. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 19, 1958.

SUBJECT

Italy's Security Council Candidacy

*Discussion*

As you know, Italy has been pressing us for a public commitment before the Italian elections on May 25 to support Italy's SC candidacy (Tab B).<sup>2</sup> Such a commitment would, it is generally agreed, have little if any effect on the elections themselves but would serve as a mark of friendship and confidence in the Italian Government.<sup>3</sup> It would, however, be impossible to acquiesce in the Italian wish without at the same time giving a similar commitment to the Lebanese in support of Dr. Charles Malik's candidacy for GA President, and the situation in Lebanon clearly precludes a commitment to Dr. Malik at this time. Moreover, any commitments so far in advance of the GA elections would be a departure from our normal practice and would seriously jeopardize

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 216, Security Council, 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on May 16 and sent to Dulles through S/S and Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Tab A is not printed. Tab B was not found attached to the source text, but a copy is *ibid.* Italian Minister Ortona also mentioned Italy's candidacy during a May 16 meeting with Jandrey and Officer in Charge of Italian and Austrian Affairs Harvey. A memorandum of that meeting is *ibid.*, Central Files, 330/5-1658.

<sup>3</sup> Jandrey informed Wilcox and Rountree in a May 12 memorandum that he intended to recommend that Dulles inform the Italian Government of U.S. support for Italy's candidacy before May 20. (*Ibid.*, 320/5-1258) Wilcox and Rountree both objected in memoranda, May 14, citing the arguments outlined in the source text. (Wilcox to Jandrey, *ibid.*, 320/5-1458; Rountree to Jandrey, *ibid.*, 330/5-1458)

our ability to maintain this practice with respect to other candidates both now and in the future. The Italian Government plans to announce before May 21 the names of those governments (11 European and 9 Latin American) from which it has received commitments. It is thought that in this connection Italian wishes could in part be met through a statement by you in response to a press inquiry, expressing our esteem for Italy but explaining that as a matter of general practice we do not give commitments so far in advance of the GA elections.

### *Recommendations*

That you authorize me to inform the Italian Ambassador 1) that we cannot make an exception for Italy in our general practice, particularly as the current situation in Lebanon does not permit of a similar exception in the case of Dr. Malik and 2) that you, however, would be prepared, in response to a press inquiry, to explain our general practice and to express our high esteem for Italy. A suggested draft of the proposed statement is attached (Tab A).<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Dulles responded along the lines of the draft statement when asked about Italy's Security Council candidacy during a May 20 press conference. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1958, p. 948.

---

## 12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 20, 1958—7:30 p.m.*

811. Re: Arab Union. Dept reviewed with British Embassy officer last Friday<sup>2</sup> our recent approaches Amman, Baghdad, and SYG (Deptel 2446 to Amman, pouched USUN, and 781 to USUN)<sup>3</sup> re present AU intention try retain two UN seats after Union becomes effective. Dept expressed concern basis urtel 1313<sup>4</sup> that UK and US may be taking somewhat divergent positions this matter, stressing

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.386/5-2058. Secret. Drafted by Hartley and Ludlow, cleared by Waggoner and Nunley, and approved by Adams who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, and London.

<sup>2</sup> No other record of this conversation has been found, but a memorandum of a May 15 conversation along these lines is *ibid.*, 310.386/5-1358.

<sup>3</sup> Document 9. Regarding telegram 781, see footnote 3, *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1313, May 4, transmitted the Mission at the United Nations Daily Classified Summary Number 220. Under the heading "Arab Union Representation," it summarized the U.K. position on this subject, and noted that Dixon was scheduled to discuss it with Hammarskjöld on May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.5/

desirability close coordination between us. Dept reemphasized US view that assuring AU actually a union in eyes of world of greater importance than tactical advantage conceivably obtainable from maintaining Jordan and Iraq seats in UN.

Also expressed doubts that separate seats would lessen chances future Iraqi interventions in Palestine case.

Dept reiterated hope avoiding embarrassing UN debate or taking of public position by Jordan and Iraq from which they would have difficulty withdrawing later. Stated, in answer Embassy officer inquiry, our view US probably have to oppose continuation two seats if problem aired publicly.

Embassy officer said he would inform Foreign office of US views immediately. In his opinion what difference exists between us lies more in tactics than substance, UK being desirous if possible avoid pressing Iraq and Jordan on matter apparently so dear to them.

Embassy officer informed Dept today of UK Embassy's approach Rifai Amman urging Rifai consult with SYG on representation problem. Embassy officer pointed out his representation not in response to last Friday's conversations on which no UK Foreign Office response as yet.

USUN requested keep in touch SYG this matter. May inform SYG fact US Chargé Amman instructed continue to stress to King and HKJ officials our belief that 1) prestige of Jordan and Jordanian leaders is now clearly committed to making Union an effective entity and 2) welfare of Jordan can best be served by so doing.

Mission should in its discretion express hope SYG will keep us informed his latest thinking on subject together with any further discussion which he may have with Jordanians.<sup>5</sup>

**Dulles**

---

5-1458) A record of Dixon's conversation with the Secretary-General was transmitted in telegram 1330 from USUN, May 16. (*Ibid.*, 310.386/5-1658)

<sup>5</sup> Lodge reported on his conversation with Hammarskjöld in telegram 1376, May 23. (*Ibid.*, 310.386/5-2358)

13. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 5, 1958—4:51 p.m.

871. Re: Arab Union. In view determination Amman and Baghdad maintain separate and distinct responsibility re foreign affairs for present, now apparent to us implementation AU constitutional provisions re unified handling foreign affairs to be delayed. US has not altered its views concerning wisdom Jordan Iraq forming demonstrably effective union. US adheres to its views previously set forth in Deptels 781 and 811.<sup>2</sup> However in light above developments there would appear be no real ground at this time on which continued representation in UN both Iraq and Jordan could be opposed.

Suggest USUN convey foregoing views to SYG for his consideration (urtel 1376),<sup>3</sup> together with observation that until we see how situation develops and exact nature expected communication from AU we are unable to comment on appropriate response or steps such those suggested by SYG in urtel 1376.

With particular reference to his indicated concern over possible renegotiation GAA, it our view that if at any time in future AU is prepared indicate assumption and willingness carry out all international obligations of Jordan and Iraq, AU, like UAR, would legally assume GAA responsibilities without renegotiation of GAA. Any discussion of renegotiation GAA could only serve as basis possible weakening Israel's or Jordan's willingness abide by present agreement. Might also provide pretext for continued dual representation even if AU does assume full constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs in due course.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.386/6-558. Secret. Drafted by Ludlow and Hartley on June 4, cleared by Ford and NE, and approved by Adams who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding telegram 781, see footnote 3, Document 9. Telegram 811 is *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1376, May 23, described Lodge's conversations with Hammarskjöld and United Arab Republic Delegation member Riad regarding Arab Union representation at the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.386/5-2358)

#### 14. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New York, June 19, 1958—1 p.m.

1532. Re: SC elections

1. Slim (Tunisia) asked Barco today if we had anything to tell him in response to his indication (reported in mytel 1397<sup>2</sup>) that Tunisia might be interested in running for SC seat now held by Iraq. Slim said his govt was seriously interested but he was not speaking to anyone else about it until he had some reaction from US. He said GOT felt their election to SC would represent further significant evidence of Tunisia's attachment to West and would, in fact, help to maintain it.

2. I think Dept should give early consideration and favorable decision to this request.

3. We have not been able to meet many of Tunisian requests in past few months and we should not overlook anything we can do to show our desire for continued close relations with Tunisia.

4. Iran is openly in running, but there is not likely to be great enthusiasm for Iran's candidacy since they left Council only last term. Furthermore it seems possible Iran would be willing to step down if Tunisian interest becomes known.

5. I do not know what French position would be (although Abdoh has said French committed support Iran) but should think it would be in France's interest also to encourage Tunisians.

6. It seems likely Tunisia would obtain support entire ASAF group, while this may not be the case with Iran.

Please instruct.<sup>3</sup>

Lodge

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/6-1958. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1397, May 28, recounted Lodge's discussion with Slim regarding Tunisia's desire to bring to the U.N. Security Council a complaint against France. (*Ibid.*, 330/5-2858)

<sup>3</sup> The Department instructed Lodge in telegram 975, June 26, to inform Slim that while not wishing to appear unresponsive, the United States was not yet able to support any candidate and could therefore offer no advice on a Tunisian candidacy. (*Ibid.*, 330/6-1958)

**15. Editorial Note**

Between June 23 and July 15, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged a series of notes and aides-mémoire regarding demonstrations outside the Soviet Mission at the United Nations on June 19, 21, and 22. The Soviet Government contended that U.S. authorities had taken inadequate measures to protect the Mission, alleged that New York City police had incited the picketers, and eventually demanded that the United States pay for property damage that occurred during the June 21 and 22 incidents. The United States denied complicity with the protesters or official negligence in protecting the Mission and refused liability for the damages, but agreed to consider an ex gratia payment to cover them. For text of the June 23 Soviet note to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 14, 1958, page 50. U.S. aide-mémoire 59, delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office on July 15, is in Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/7-458.

---

**16. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 11, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Hungary

PARTICIPANTS

Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy  
Mr. Charles Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy  
IO—Mr. Francis O. Wilcox  
EUR—Mr. William T. Nunley  
UNP—Miss Elizabeth Brown  
UNP—Mr. M. H. Newlin

Mr. Wilcox said that present indications are that the UN Special Committee's report will appear during the first part of next week.<sup>2</sup> We were concerned that perhaps not enough was being done to keep the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source; Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 216, Hungary. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newlin on July 15 and cleared by Wilcox.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, released July 14; U.N. doc. A/3849

executions of Nagy, Maleter and others before the eyes of the world.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Wilcox referred to the action taken by the ILO meeting in Geneva in rejecting the Hungarian credentials.<sup>4</sup> There is a growing feeling in the Department Mr. Wilcox said, that we must consider "where do we go from here?"

Lord Hood asked if we had had a preview of the contents of the UN Special Committee's report. Mr. Wilcox said he understood that, considering the composition of the Committee, the report will be generally favorable. It will not mention the possibility of a special session or placing the Hungarian item on the agenda of the 13th GA. In his opinion, it was important not to permit the indignation of the overwhelming majority of the world to evaporate between now and the time the GA meets in the middle of September. He said that the US is inclined, if enough support is forthcoming, to call for a special Assembly session. Possible action at such a special session would be to reject Hungarian credentials; condemn the Hungarian authorities for recent events in Hungary; appeal for an end to repression; and renew the mandate of the Special Committee. Lord Hood inquired whether the action contemplated against Hungarian credentials would apply not only to the special session but also to the 13th GA. Mr. Wilcox expressed the hope that any action taken by a special session to reject Hungarian credentials would be also followed by the 13th GA.

Lord Hood inquired as to the actual mechanics of possible action on Hungarian credentials. Mr. Wilcox replied that action under Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter was not contemplated, but rejection of credentials under the pertinent GA rules.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Wilcox referred also to the pressure in the US last fall for UN action against Hungary growing in part out of reports of renewed repression in December. At that time it was decided to take no action, but Ambassador Lodge made a statement in the Assembly to the effect

---

<sup>3</sup> On June 16, Radio Moscow announced that former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, General Pal Maleter, and other Hungarian officials had been executed for their participation in the 1956 uprising.

<sup>4</sup> After learning of the executions, the 42d regular International Labor Organization Conference, which met at Geneva June 4-26, voted by a two-thirds majority to reject the entire Hungarian Delegation's credentials.

<sup>5</sup> Article 5 of the U.N. Charter states: "A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council." Article 6 states: "A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." For text of the U.N. Charter, see 3 Bevans 1153. For text of the U.N. General Assembly Rules of Procedure, see U.N. doc. A/520/Rev.15.



that it might be necessary to reconvene a special session of the GA should subsequent events warrant.<sup>6</sup>

Lord Hood asked whether, if action were taken in the UN to reject Hungarian credentials, the American Legation in Budapest would be closed. Mr. Wilcox replied that we did not know but were willing to accept such a risk. Mr. Wiggin observed that if a state voted in the GA to reject Hungarian credentials it was logical to assume a rupture in diplomatic relations would ensue. Mr. Wilcox thought that this was not necessarily the case and drew a distinction between representation in the UN and bilateral diplomatic relations.

Lord Hood asked when a special session could take place. Mr. Wilcox replied that we would like to see a special session convene as soon as possible after the appearance of the Special Committee's report. Lord Hood inquired if we thought there was enough sentiment in favor of a special session. Mr. Wilcox answered in the affirmative, noting the attitude of many Latin American countries, Denmark and other Western European countries such as Italy. Lord Hood said that one could not always equate expressions of indignation with readiness to vote in the GA. Mr. Wilcox recognized this point, but nevertheless the GA had repeatedly voted to condemn Hungary in the past and many governments had shown a willingness to reject Hungarian credentials at the recent ILO meeting.

Lord Hood said that he could see the advantages of a special session from the point of view of political warfare because it would provide an opportunity to make speeches. Mr. Wilcox said that a special session would have a definite humanitarian purpose too in that it might deter future executions and repression. He thought it would be a great mistake to sit by and permit the Soviet Union to divert attention from the Hungarian situation. Lord Hood promised to consult London and give an answer as soon as possible.

Lord Hood inquired as a practical matter how long would it take to convene a special session and how long such a session would usually last. Mr. Wilcox said that a special session could be convened in less than two weeks and that ordinarily its business, depending on the number of speeches, could be completed in three or four days. He mentioned that the Italians had informed us that they were in favor of a special session. Lord Hood said that an alternate course of action would be to inscribe the Hungarian question on the agenda of the 13th GA. Mr. Wilcox thought that this would permit present indignation to evaporate. Lord Hood asked if a condemnatory resolution would mention the Soviet Union. Mr. Nunley interjected that a primary objective

---

<sup>6</sup> For text of Lodge's December 14, 1957, statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.731.

of a special session would be to fix Soviet responsibility for the situation in Hungary. Any resolution adopted should also contain an appeal to stop future trials and executions.

---

**17. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Diplomatic Posts in the Other American Republics<sup>1</sup>**

CG-7

*Washington, July 11, 1958—9:12 p.m.*

USUN advises member Indian Delegation UN. "working energetically on ChiRep question" among LA UN Delegations. He is reported using trade with ChiComs as point of argument.

From information available Department India intends make ChiRep question "major issue" 13th GA. At 11th and 12th GAs Indian attempts include question on agenda were rejected by wide margin.

Addressee posts should seek early opportunity mention Indian activity to appropriate officials government to which accredited emphasizing, where needed, U.S. attitude remains one of strong support for GRC position in UN and firm opposition to seating ChiComs. You should point out ChiCom attitude acclaiming recent Hungarian executions is yet added reason why they, as convicted aggressors against UN, should not be seated, or indeed considered for seating in GA. As appropriate you should also make point that with respect question of trade, political support for Peiping not necessarily conducive to increased economic opportunity. For example Peiping unable or unwilling purchase from UK in quantities commensurate UK purchases Communist China. On other hand, Federal Republic Germany which does not recognize Communist China has favorable trade balance with it. In fact, Peiping uses generous trade overtures with nations withholding political support as apparent device inveigle countries into believing such support would pay commercial dividends.

We believe question of seating should be handled as at previous sessions, on a procedural basis and you should as appropriate urge continued support this position at forthcoming Assembly. You should, of course, stress our appreciation for constant support given in past on this question, which U.S. believes continues to be one of paramount importance entire Free World.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/7-1158. Confidential. Drafted by Bock and McNutt; cleared with Bacon, in draft with CA, and with ARA by phone; and approved by Adams who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN.

Over-all instruction covering U.S. attitude on items expected to arise at the forthcoming General Assembly (including ChiRep question) will follow in due course.

**Herter**

---

**18. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 12, 1958—4:27 p.m.*

**39. Re Malik Candidacy.**

Rountree informed Lebanese Ambassador today that US will support Malik for Presidency 13th GA. Informed Lebanese Ambassador also that Lebanese may make our support known informally to other dels. Stressed at same time there should be no public announcement by Lebanese re above since we would prefer that matter become known publicly as result Lebanese informing other dels of our support.

USUN authorized confirm to other dels in response their queries US support for Malik candidacy.

Re responses to press inquiries Department spokesman will recall Secretary's statement on September 17 at last GA following Malik's withdrawal in favor of Munro as follows: "This organization is fortunate that it has among its members those who are well qualified to serve as President of the General Assembly. We have just heard one of them speak: Mr. Malik, a man of great eminence whom it has been my privilege to know even before the United Nations was formed. He has shown, I think, by his statesmanlike act today, his devotion and dedication to the principles and ideals of the United Nations. I know that we all rejoice that he will be able in the future to serve this Organization, the more so because of his act here today."<sup>2</sup> Dept. spokesman will also confirm in response to queries our intention support Malik. We would prefer that our support be interpreted in context our belief for some time that Malik would be excellent GA President rather than connected primarily with current developments in Lebanese situation.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/7-1258. Confidential. Drafted by Hanes and Sisco, cleared by Rountree, and approved by Hanes who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Beirut.

<sup>2</sup> See U.N. doc. A/PV.678.

19. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 18, 1958—2:27 p.m.*

67. Re Iraqi credentials (USUN tel 75 to Dept<sup>2</sup>).

USUN may inform Stavropoulos Dept requesting Amembassy Amman suggest to HKJ that SYG be informed in name King Hussein that persons purporting to be Iraqi representatives to UN or UN body on basis accreditation from Iraqi rebel regime do not in fact represent Iraq. Dept believes such notification could best be justified by referral to July 14 announcement Hussein assuming constitutional authority as President Arab Union, of which Iraq component part.

Amman is requested take action along above lines.

FYI For time being USG would prefer not advise HKJ on possible assumption now by Arab Union of Iraqi and Jordanian seats in UN. End FYI.

USUN may wish inform Stavropoulos following: Dept has instructed all consular posts not issue visa to persons purporting represent Iraqi regime without referral to Dept. If Jawad has valid visa it is difficult to see legal grounds on which he could be denied admission to US if otherwise admissible. If he were to arrive and present credentials to SYG his seating would then be matter for SC decision.

Since above drafted Jawad reported in New York.<sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.387/7-1758. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by IO/UNP, cleared by Becker and NE, and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dulles. Sent niact to Amman.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 75, July 17, described a conversation with Stavropoulos regarding the Iraqi rebel government's designation of Hashim Jawad as Iraq's Representative at the United Nations. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> For text of the August 2 U.S. announcement recognizing the Republic of Iraq, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 18, 1958, p. 273.

20. **Circular Instruction From the Department of State to  
Certain Diplomatic Missions**<sup>1</sup>

CA-894

Washington, July 28, 1958.

SUBJECT

Thirteenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

[Here follow a Table of Contents and Summary of Action Requested.]

THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

*Introduction*

The thirteenth regular session of the General Assembly (GA) is scheduled to convene in New York on Tuesday, September 16, 1958. There are indications that this session may be among the most important in the history of the United Nations (UN). Aside from the situation in the Middle East, which is not at this moment on the agenda, and the outcome of a likely special meeting of the Security Council, the GA will consider or take action on many other vital questions, the answers to which will likely shape international relations and the role of the UN in years to come. In finding the best answers, the United States hopes that, together with other free nations, it will be able to contribute substantially to the success of the 13th GA.

*A. Composition and Atmosphere*

When the 13th GA convenes, it will comprise 81 members, which number takes account of the admission of Malaya at the 12th GA and the formation in February 1958 of the United Arab Republic as the successor to Egypt and Syria. The expanded membership of the UN has been a development of great significance in the attitude and work of the UN. Since 1955 the UN has increased its membership from 60 to 81 members with a concomitant shift in the geographical and political balance of the GA. The number of members from Asia and Africa increased from eighteen to twenty-nine, there now being three African, ten Arab, and sixteen Asian. The Soviet orbit increased its membership from five to nine. The non-communist Europeans expanded their number from ten to sixteen, while the old Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa) remains at four, the Latin Americans continue at twenty, and those otherwise classified for the purpose of this analysis (Israel, Yugoslavia, and the United States)

---

<sup>1</sup> Source; Department of State, Central Files, 320/7-2858. Confidential. Drafted by IO/UNP; cleared with Monsma, Nunley, Ludlow, Bacon, Kerley, Westfall, S/AE, OES, and ODA; and initialed for the Secretary by Adams. Sent to 73 posts; and repeated to 11 diplomatic posts and 4 consular posts.

remain at three. The effect has been to (1) change somewhat the political complexion of the GA; (2) make more difficult the attainment of two-thirds majorities on controversial issues; (3) increase the role and importance of smaller powers; (4) intensify the pressure for progress towards self-government or independence; (5) promote the long-held UN interest in economic and social progress; and (6) increase the difficulty of Free World Members to focus the attention of the GA on the threat posed by the Soviet system to the independence of free countries and the purposes and principles of the UN. (Also see CA-1171, Sec. A, of August 3, 1957,<sup>2</sup> for further analysis of this problem.) The United States welcomed this expansion of membership and particularly the admittance of the new states because it believes the UN provides free governments a world organization that can influence order and progress among countries and peoples while guiding inevitable change constructively. The composition of the GA necessitates that members consult and accommodate themselves to one another if they wish GA approval for proposed UN programs or avoid what they consider undesirable. The United States for its part will offer leadership or cooperation whenever it may contribute successfully to the attainment of UN objectives.

The atmosphere at the 13th GA will undoubtedly be affected by developments in the Middle East and in the anticipated special meeting of the Security Council, but other important issues also will give this forthcoming GA a distinct tone. Action by the UN on the future use of outer space alone would make this a noteworthy Assembly. The situation in Hungary in the light of the executions of Nagy, Maleter and others, and the recent report of the Special Committee will, in the absence of earlier consideration, be discussed in the 13th GA. This discussion should serve the purpose of focusing world attention on the nature of the Soviet system and the continued suppression and terror in Eastern Europe. The GA will certainly show keen interest in the question of disarmament, including the testing of atomic weapons, and it may find some way to follow-up the experience gained by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Developments concerning Algeria will affect the atmosphere in which the GA considers that question. Whether the Cyprus question will again be submitted to this GA will likewise depend on events. The GA will again consider how to use its influence to promote the unification of Korea pursuant to UN principles. Progress will be evident in the inauguration of the Special Projects Fund which will augment the UN Technical Assistance Program. While these are not all the important issues, their successful handling would in itself make this GA historic. The United States hopes to take on these and other matters a forward-looking position.

---

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. xi, p. 205.

[Here follow Sections B, "Agenda;" C, "Consultations;" and D, "Specific Instructions."]

E. *United States Views*

1. *13th GA Presidency*

The Lebanese Ambassador was informed by the Department on July 12 that the United States would support Dr. Charles Malik for the Presidency of the 13th General Assembly. Dr. Malik is so far the only announced candidate.

It will be recalled that Dr. Malik withdrew his candidacy for President of the 12th Session in the interest of general agreement on Sir Leslie Munro (New Zealand). Following his withdrawal the Secretary stated on September 17, 1957:

"This organization is fortunate that it has among its members those who are well qualified to serve as President of the General Assembly. We have just heard one of them speak: Mr. Malik, a man of great eminence whom it has been my privilege to know even before the United Nations was formed. He has shown, I think, by his statesmanlike act today, his devotion and dedication to the principles and ideals of the United Nations. I know that we all rejoice that he will be able in the future to serve this Organization, the more so because of his act here today."<sup>3</sup>

While Dr. Malik's election should, particularly in view of his withdrawal last year in favor of Sir Leslie Munro, be uncontested, it may become complicated by the Lebanese situation. The Department would be most interested in any repercussion of this situation on Dr. Malik's candidacy that may come to your attention. If questions are raised in this connection, it may be said that our support for Dr. Malik is based on our long-standing belief in his excellent qualifications for the Presidency, as expressed by the Secretary last year.

2. *The Election of Other Officers Comprising the General Committee*

The Assembly at its 12th Session increased the size of the General Committee from 16 to 21 by adding five Vice-Presidencies.<sup>4</sup> It also provided in the same resolution [1192(XII)]<sup>5</sup> for the geographical allocation of these seats, which has heretofore been a matter of accepted practice rather than written stipulation. FYI The increased size of the Committee and the geographical allocation approved by the Assembly will complicate the problem of obtaining a satisfactory Committee from the standpoint of United States interests. End FYI.

<sup>3</sup> See U.N. doc. A/PV.678.

<sup>4</sup> Reference, is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1192 (XII), adopted December 12, 1957. For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

<sup>5</sup> Brackets in the source text.

The allocation in the enlarged Committee varies somewhat, the area from which the President comes losing a Vice-Presidency, but in general it is as follows: *Vice-Presidents*—Republic of China, France, United States, United Kingdom, USSR, four from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, two from Western Europe and other States (i.e., Old Commonwealth and Israel); *Committee chairman*—two from Latin America, two from Asia and Africa, two from Western Europe and other States, and one from Eastern Europe. The "slate" for this Committee, which is developed by the Secretariat in consultation with the various UN delegations in New York, customarily is not finally determined until just before the Assembly convenes, and to date relatively few candidacies for these offices have been advanced.

### 3. *The Representation of China*

We anticipate that proponents of the seating of the Chinese Communists will make an especially strong effort to raise the question of Chinese representation. In accordance with our policy of strong support for the Government of the Republic of China in international organizations, we shall again take the position that the Assembly should decide "not to consider" any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. FYI By taking such procedural position and avoiding a vote on the substance, we expect to be able again to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support. Furthermore, we anticipate that the UK will support the moratorium formula for the entire session. End FYI.

At your discretion, you may point out that the Chinese Communists do not meet the standards for international behavior set by the Charter. They are unrepentant aggressors against the UN in Korea. They applauded the USSR's actions in Hungary last year and just recently they endorsed the executions of Prime Minister Nagy and other Hungarian leaders.

For your background, the breakdown of the vote on the US-sponsored resolution "not to consider" Chinese representation at the 12th General Assembly, taken on September 24, 1957,<sup>6</sup> when the UN membership stood at 82, was as follows:

a. *48 states in favor*: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaya, Mexico, Netherlands,

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1135 (XII). Text is *ibid*.



New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

b. 27 states against: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Ukraine, USSR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

c. 6 states abstaining: Cambodia, Israel, Laos, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

d. 1 state absent: Union of South Africa.

Posts in those countries which *voted with* the United States should express appreciation for support on this question, which the United States believes continues to be one of paramount importance to the entire Free World, and solicit continued support for a like United States position in the 13th GA. Posts in those countries which *voted in the negative* should, in their discretion, solicit support for the United States position, or possibly an abstention, instead of a negative vote, if it is believed that any useful purpose would be served thereby. Posts in those countries which *abstained* should, in their discretion, endeavor to obtain assurance for support of the United States position, and if this is not forthcoming, at least continued abstention in preference to a negative vote. Baghdad, Phnom Penh, Rabat, and Tunisia should bear in mind respective governments may have or have altered their attitude on Chinese representation from that reflected at the 12th GA. FYI Additional instructions may be sent later to missions in Austria, Finland, Ghana, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Laos, Libya, Malaya, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Sudan. Missions in such countries may wish to bear this possibility in mind when approaching governments concerned. End FYI.

#### 4. Elections to U.N. Councils

At the 13th GA, elections will be held for three seats on the Security Council, six seats on the Economic and Social Council, and three seats on the Trusteeship Council. We have, with the exception of Italy's candidacy for the Security Council, so far made no commitments with respect to any of these seats, and in this connection would be interested in the reactions of others. (For the present composition of these organs see *US Participation in the UN, 1957, Appendix II.*)

a. *Security Council.* The seats currently held by Colombia, Iraq, and Sweden become vacant at the end of 1958. Argentina is a candidate to succeed Colombia; Iran, a candidate to succeed Iraq; and Italy, a candidate to succeed Sweden. To date, no other candidacies have been announced, though future announcements cannot be precluded, particularly in the case of the seat currently held by Iraq.

We have made known our support of Italy's candidacy.<sup>7</sup>

b. *Economic and Social Council.* Brazil, Canada, Greece, Indonesia, the United States, and Yugoslavia retire from the Council at the end of this year. Venezuela and Uruguay are candidates to succeed Brazil; New Zealand, to succeed Canada; Spain, to succeed Greece; Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, to succeed Indonesia; and Bulgaria to succeed Yugoslavia. Ireland and Ceylon are also candidates, but for exactly which seats is not clear. Traditionally, the five permanent members of the Security Council are always represented on the Council, and the United States will be a candidate for re-election.

c. *Trusteeship Council.* The terms of Burma, Guatemala, and the United Arab Republic (successor to Syria) expire at the end of 1958. Burma is a candidate for re-election, and the Indonesian candidacy for this seat has been withdrawn. No candidacy has been announced for the seat currently held by Guatemala. There are four candidates to succeed the United Arab Republic (UAR): Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, and the UAR.

### 5. *The Situation in Hungary*

The 11th GA reconvened on September 10, 1957, and, on the basis of an exhaustive report issued by the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary,<sup>8</sup> adopted a resolution which noted the Committee's conclusion that the 1956 revolution was a spontaneous national uprising; found, inter alia, that the Soviet Union had deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and that the present Hungarian regime was imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the USSR; condemned the actions of the USSR and the Hungarian authorities; called upon the USSR and the Hungarian authorities to desist from repression; and requested Prince Wan of Thailand, the General Assembly's Special Representative on Hungary, to take steps to achieve the objectives contained in previous GA resolutions.<sup>9</sup>

The above-mentioned resolution also placed the Hungarian item on the provisional agenda of the 12th GA. As at the 11th GA, the 12th GA took no action on the credentials of the Hungarian representatives, leaving them in a provisional status. Prince Wan reported to the Assembly on December 9, 1957, that the Soviet Government and the Hungarian authorities refused all cooperation with him but that he would continue his efforts to promote respect for human rights and

<sup>7</sup> Walmsley informed the Counselor of the Italian Embassy of the U.S. decision to support Italy's candidacy on July 12. A memorandum of their telephone conversation is in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 216, Security Council, 1958.

<sup>8</sup> For text of the Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 10, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/3592.

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1133 (XI), adopted September 14, 1957. For text, see U.N. doc. A/3572/Add.1.

fundamental freedoms in Hungary.<sup>10</sup> Before the 12th GA adjourned, Ambassador Lodge referred to reports which indicated that repressive measures were continuing in Budapest in defiance of GA resolutions and announced that the United States would call for a special session of the GA to consider Hungary should later developments warrant such action.<sup>11</sup>

The Special Committee on Hungary met shortly after the secret trials and executions of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, and their associates, were announced on June 16, 1958, to prepare a further report.

The Committee's latest report, approved unanimously by all five members (Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, Uruguay), was issued July 16.<sup>12</sup> It contained, in addition to proof of gross duplicity on the part of the Soviet, Rumanian, and Hungarian Governments, evidence that the Kadar regime was continuing its reign of terror. The report cited 33 executions since the appearance of its previous report in June 1957 and called on the Hungarian regime to cease repression and to recognize human rights.

FYI The Department is actively considering ways to obtain maximum exploitation of the material contained in the Special Committee's latest report with a view to discouraging the trials and executions now being rumored. As a result of recent developments in the Middle East, no decision has been made as to how the Department's objectives would be best served. Possibilities include: action at a special GA session; inscribing the Hungarian item on the provisional agenda of the 13th GA; further meetings of the Special Committee should additional evidence of repression come to light. End FYI.

#### *6. Disarmament*

The 12th GA, by a vote of 57 to 9 with 15 abstentions, adopted a resolution which, in substance, endorsed the proposals submitted by the Western 4 (US, UK, France and Canada) to the UN Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee on August 29, 1957. The resolution further requested the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee and to invite it to establish, as one of its first tasks, a group or groups of technical experts to study inspection systems for disarmament measures on which the Sub-Committee may reach agreement in principle and to report to the Disarmament Commission within a fixed period. [Res 1148(XII)].<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> For text of the Report of the General Assembly's Special Representative on the Hungarian Problem, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on December 9, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/3774.

<sup>11</sup> Regarding Lodge's December 14, 1957, statement, see footnote 6, Document 16.

<sup>12</sup> For text of the Special Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, see U.N. doc. A/3849.

<sup>13</sup> Brackets in the source text. For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

During the course of the 12th GA the Soviet Union proposed the unrealistic enlargement of the Disarmament Commission to include all 82 members of the UN. Despite the adoption of a resolution, as a gesture of conciliation to the Soviet demands, which enlarged the Disarmament Commission from its former composition (i.e., the Security Council members plus Canada) to 25 member states,<sup>14</sup> the Soviet Union announced it would boycott future Disarmament Commission meetings unless the Commission were enlarged to include a "balance" between nations allied with the United States and nations allied with the USSR or "uncommitted."

In the succeeding months it became apparent through correspondence between the President and Premier Bulganin and Khrushchev that the Soviet Union wished to consider the question of disarmament within the context of a summit meeting. The United States during this period made extensive, quiet efforts to bring about a resumption of negotiations under UN auspices.

On March 31 the Soviet Union announced a unilateral suspension of all nuclear testing and called upon the United States and Great Britain to do likewise.<sup>15</sup> On April 21 the Soviet Union introduced into the Security Council a complaint against the supposed provocative flights of US bombers equipped with atomic and hydrogen weapons in the direction of the Soviet Union over the Arctic area. This Soviet complaint was rejected by the Council and quickly followed up by a US initiative. This came in the form of a draft resolution introduced in the Council calling for the establishment of a zone of inspection in the Arctic area to provide against the possibility of great surprise attack. The United States resolution was strongly endorsed by all Council members except the Soviet Union who vetoed it.<sup>16</sup>

In his letter to Premier Khrushchev of April 28,<sup>17</sup> President Eisenhower reiterated the United States proposal that technical talks be convened to discuss the means of detecting violations of any agreement to suspend nuclear weapons tests. These talks would be of a completely technical nature and not linked to any decision to suspend tests which would be a political consideration. After a series of exchanges it was finally agreed that such discussions should be held.

---

<sup>14</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1150 (XII), adopted November 19, 1957. Text is *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> For text of the decree adopted by the Supreme Soviet regarding the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 21, 1958, pp. 647-648.

<sup>16</sup> The U.N. Security Council considered the Soviet complaint against the United States at its 813th meeting, April 21; its 814th and 815th meetings, April 29; and its 816th and 817th meetings, May 2. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. docs. S/PV.813-817. For text of the U.S. draft resolution introduced at the 814th meetings, see U.N. doc. S/3995.

<sup>17</sup> For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 350-351.

They commenced on July 1 in Geneva and are currently in progress. At United States initiative these talks are under UN auspices, are utilizing UN facilities, and are attended by a representative of the UN Secretary-General.

On July 2 Premier Khrushchev, in an apparent response to the United States proposals regarding surprise attack protection, proposed that technical discussions be initiated on the type of inspection necessary to ensure against surprise attacks.<sup>18</sup> The United States is presently considering its reply to this letter.

During the entire period since the 12th GA, the United States has been reviewing its substantive position on the question of disarmament. In this regard, the over-all relationship between the disarmament question, the role of the UN disarmament machinery and the possibility of an eventual summit conference discussion of disarmament must be borne in mind.

While it is assumed that disarmament will once again be a major issue, it is impossible at this point to determine exactly how the issue will take shape. Factors in this situation are (1) the possibility of a summit conference at which disarmament will be a major issue; and (2) the status of technical talks on nuclear testing and possibly on surprise attack protection. The question of nuclear testing is likely to be among the most important subjects for discussion. However, the factors cited above will be important in determining to what degree the Assembly will consider the question.

### 7. Outer Space

Man's first activities in outer space have arisen from developments undertaken in connection with the international cooperative scientific program of the International Geophysical Year (IGY). The United States believes that this type of cooperation should be continued and expanded. We are considering also the problem of how to assure that outer space be used only for peaceful purposes. The United States has already proposed that technical discussions involving this problem be held among the parties concerned.

The United States believes that the disarmament aspects of outer space and the peaceful uses aspects of outer space should be considered separately and each on its own merits. Accordingly, the United States is in favor of resuming discussion of the disarmament aspects of outer space among the parties concerned in an appropriate forum. Meanwhile, we propose that governments begin now to plan for future international cooperation for the peaceful uses of outer space. Accordingly, we intend to propose that the GA establish a UN Com-

---

<sup>18</sup> For text of Khrushchev's letter to Eisenhower, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 18, 1958, pp. 279-281.

mittee on Outer Space to survey the needs, potentialities and resources in the field of the peaceful uses of outer space and to recommend to the GA the most appropriate steps the United Nations might take in this field. Meanwhile, certain proposals in non-governmental scientific organizations for the continuation of various aspects of the IGY program relating to outer-space cooperation will be supported by the United States.

### *8. Effects of Atomic Radiation*

The Scientific Committee established by the 10th GA in 1955 will release its report about the middle of August for consideration by the 13th GA.<sup>19</sup> The report will include information collected by the Committee from national reports submitted to it on (a) levels of ionizing radiation and (b) the effects of ionizing radiation on man. The report also will include recommendations as to subjects on which further research is desirable in this field. It is expected that the GA will pass a resolution continuing the Committee with approximately its present terms of reference and adding one or two new activities which the Committee might undertake. The United States will support the acceptance of the Committee's report and the extension of its life.

In connection with the discussion of the Committee's report, there will probably be efforts made by the Soviet Bloc and some other governments to claim that scientific data in the report justifies GA action to bring about the cessation of nuclear weapons testing. The delegations of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the United Arab Republic attempted to include a recommendation in the Committee's report to this effect. The large majority of the Committee, however, refused to adopt this position on the grounds that such a recommendation was beyond the terms of reference of the Committee. In the GA the United States will take the position that the report of the Committee is a thorough and scientific document.

### *9. Algeria*

Twenty-four African and Asian countries on July 16 submitted a request that the Algerian problem be put before the 13th GA.<sup>20</sup> Their request is based on the argument that since the last UN session there has been no progress toward a settlement of the Algerian question.

The 12th GA had debated the problem of Algeria at length, and a mildly worded compromise resolution was adopted on December 10, 1957, by 80 votes to 0, which expressed the concern of the GA over the situation in Algeria and expressed the wish that in a spirit of

<sup>19</sup> For text of the Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, see U.N. doc. A/3838.

<sup>20</sup> For texts of the request and the explanatory memorandum sent with it, see U.N. doc. A/3853.

effective cooperation *pourparlers* will be entered into and other appropriate means utilized with a view to a solution in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.<sup>21</sup>

Since that time, however, Algeria has continued to be a focal point of military and political activity. While engagements between the French and rebel bands have continued, they have been on a somewhat smaller scale during the past few months. Terrorist activity has continued at a high level. In the political arena, the brief seizure of authority by the Committees of Public Safety followed by appointment of de Gaulle as French Prime Minister opened a new phase. De Gaulle has perforce moved cautiously, first attempting to re-establish the authority of the French Government over the military commanders who attained power in May. His appointment of Soustelle, the spokesman of the extremists, to the Cabinet has been considered a sop to the *colons*, but gave no indication of the final direction Premier de Gaulle's policies will take.

On July 13 de Gaulle depicted the inclusion of Algeria in a new federal system linking France and her overseas territories. The formula used was purposely vague, specifying primarily that "the place of Algeria will be a choice one." A referendum on constitutional reform is fixed in principle for the end of September or the beginning of October. Assuming approval of the reforms, elections would probably be held in November for the French National Assembly.

De Gaulle hopes to secure the participation of the Algerian rebels in the referendum, but FLN leader Abbas stated to the press that his group would certainly not take part. The future of Algeria remains cloudy. It can be presumed France will continue to maintain that the UN is not competent to discuss Algeria since under French law it is an integral part of France, but it is not yet known what position the French Government will take on the inscription of the item.

Future developments will necessarily affect our views on the best manner of handling the question of Algeria during the 13th GA.

### 10. Cyprus

FYI The inscription of the Cyprus question in the agenda of the 13th GA has not yet been requested. The United States hopes that no such request will be made, since we are convinced that "quiet diplomacy," including consideration in NATO, offers a better prospect for the development of a solution than GA debate. For this reason, the United States believes that every reasonable effort should be made to discourage submission to the 13th GA of the Cyprus issue. It would appear undesirable at this time to raise with other governments the

---

<sup>21</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1184 (XII). For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

possibility of action on the Cyprus issue at the 13th GA. If asked, you should limit yourself to expressing the view that: no request for inscription has been made and "'quiet diplomacy', including consideration in NATO, offers a better prospect for the development of a solution than GA debate." The information in the following paragraphs is provided for your background only.

Greece requested the inscription of Cyprus on the provisional agenda of the 12th GA under the heading: "(a) application under the auspices of the United Nations of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus; (b) violations of human rights and atrocities by the British Colonial Administration against the Cyprians." The General Committee referred the Greek item to the Political Committee under the heading, "the Cyprus question."

During discussions in the Political Committee, the Greek representative called for direct negotiations between the British Government and the people of Cyprus based on the principle of self-determination. The Turkish representative objected to the Greek proposal on the ground that it did not provide for the partition of Cyprus that was necessary to protect the Turkish minority on the island from the Greek majority; he called for tripartite negotiations between Britain, Turkey, and Greece. The British representative stated that his Government wished to promote self-government on Cyprus but that any settlement must provide for: internal order and security; protection of the rights of all Cypriots; safeguards for British strategic interests. He said that Britain was willing to discuss sympathetically any proposals commending themselves to both Greece and Turkey. The United States representative reiterated our conviction that "those directly concerned must work out the eventual settlement" utilizing "quiet diplomacy" and that UN deliberations at that time would not contribute to a solution.

A resolution calling for negotiations "with a view to applying the right of self-determination in the case of the people of Cyprus" was adopted in the Political Committee by 33 votes to 20 with 25 abstentions (US), but in the plenary the resolution failed (as an important question) to receive the necessary two-thirds majority.<sup>22</sup>

On June 19, 1958, the UK publicly announced the outlines of a new plan which, among other things, would provide for a modified representative government on behalf of the Greek and Turkish communities and which would include representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments on the Governor's Council.<sup>23</sup> Greece rejected

<sup>22</sup> For text of the draft resolution on Cyprus, see U.N. doc. A/3794. For a record of the debate and vote on the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.731

<sup>23</sup> For text, see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1958, pp. 376-378.



the plan on the basis that it would give the Turkish Government a status on the island and lead to partition. After initially rejecting the plan on the grounds that it failed to provide for partition, the Turkish Government has since shown some receptivity to it and has announced it believes the proposals are compatible with the Turkish demand for partition. Cyprus was discussed in the North Atlantic Council prior to and subsequent to the announcement of the British plan with no immediate results. Informal conversations have since been begun by M. Spaak, the NATO Secretary-General, with the Greek, Turkish, and British NAC Permanent Representatives in Paris, but nothing has developed from these as yet. Violence and terrorism, including clashes between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as activity directed against the British forces, erupted again this spring and summer. During June and July casualties reached a new high. The Greek and Turkish Governments and Archbishop Makarios now in Athens have been unwilling or unable to restrain the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities from further violence. End FYI.

#### *11. Enlargement of UN Councils and the ICJ*

Three items on the agenda of the 11th GA were postponed until the 12th session after inconclusive debate on the first—increasing the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council. The other two items, which were never taken up, concerned enlargement of the Economic and Social Council and of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). All three items had originated with a varying number of Latin American members and Spain, and arose out of the new situation created by the greatly enlarged membership of the UN. The first two involved amendment of the Charter, and the third, amendment of the Statute of the Court. The United States was prepared to support the enlargement of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council by two and four, respectively, but in approaches to other governments opposed any increase in the size of the Court.

The debate at the 11th session made it appear unlikely that an increase of the Security Council by only two non-permanent seats would be acceptable to the majority of Members. At the same time, there was no consensus on a larger increase. Those pressing for a larger increase could not agree on exactly what they wanted. A resolution co-sponsored by a group of African and Asian states called for the establishment of a special committee to study the composition of the Security Council "in all its aspects,"<sup>24</sup> thus obviously referring to the permanent as well as the non-permanent seats. The USSR made its

---

<sup>24</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/3468/Rev. 1.

agreement on any increase conditional (1) on a seat for Eastern Europe and (2) on the settlement in its favor of the Chinese representation issue.

The 12th GA, in turn, by unanimous decision postponed consideration of these three items until its 13th session.<sup>25</sup> A spokesman for those who had originally proposed the inclusion of these items on the agenda explained that it was "clear that political conditions were not favorable to the establishment of a general agreement or the proposals in question for the time being" and expressed the hope that the "atmosphere would be more favorable" at the 13th session.

The Department is currently reviewing its position on these three items, and in this connection would be much interested in any indications of the views of others on them.

### 12. *UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)*

a. *Report of the Director.* The UNRWA Director's annual report on the operation of the Agency<sup>26</sup> will be presented to the 13th GA. Until the contents of the report are available, the United States will not be in a position to formulate its position. However, our reaction undoubtedly will be conditioned by the fact that the mandate of the Agency is due to expire on June 30, 1960, when it is presumed the Agency will cease to exist.

b. *Voluntary Pledging of Contributions.* UNRWA has been able to carry out satisfactory, if modest, programs for the relief and rehabilitation of Palestine refugees. However, if these are to continue, generous support for the Agency must be forthcoming.

The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France have accounted for over 90 percent of contributions to UNRWA (with the US alone contributing approximately 70 percent). We earnestly hope that broader and more extensive support for UNRWA will be forthcoming during the pledging meeting of the ad hoc committee of the whole Assembly, which is expected to meet early during the 13th GA.

### 13. *Antarctica*

The United States on May 2 [3] proposed that a conference be held among the countries carrying on scientific activities in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year.<sup>27</sup> The purpose of the conference would be to draft a treaty which would assure freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica and guarantee that the

<sup>25</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1190 (XII), adopted December 12, 1957. For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

<sup>26</sup> For text of the Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1 July 1957-30 June 1958), see U.N. doc. A/3931.

<sup>27</sup> Regarding this announcement, see Document 274.

area would be used for peaceful purposes only. The countries invited to participate with the United States (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, USSR, and United Kingdom) all accepted the US invitation and preliminary informal discussions preparatory to a conference are now being held.

India in 1956 indicated an intention to have the subject of Antarctica placed on the GA agenda but was dissuaded at that time. India at first requested that the question of Antarctica be put on the provisional agenda of the 13th GA but then withdrew its request shortly thereafter. The Indian initiative was no doubt in part prompted by a desire to participate in any arrangement made in regard to Antarctica. It is possible that India or some other member might re-introduce the item later, especially if the present 12-nation discussions do not result in agreement.

The United States does not think that Antarctica should be included in the GA agenda. Moreover, certain claimant countries, particularly Chile, have indicated serious objection to discussion of the subject in the GA.

FYI The position the United States would take regarding inclusion of the question of Antarctica in the agenda if another request were made, or in discussing the matter in that forum in the event it were included, has not yet been formulated and would depend largely on the progress of the present negotiations. For this reason general consultation with foreign governments regarding this matter is not considered desirable at this time. (See CA-8100, March 19, 1958, and CA-11231, June 20, 1958.)<sup>28</sup> End FYI.

#### 14. Soviet Political Propaganda Item

Czechoslovakia has requested the inscription of an item entitled "Measures Aimed at Implementation and Promotion of Principles of Peaceful Co-existence Among States." This item would appear to be brought forward to serve as a vehicle for customary Soviet propaganda attacks against the West, following up the Soviet proposal at the 12th GA for a "Declaration concerning the peaceful co-existence of States" (See pp. 100-103, *President's Report on the United Nations: 1957*).

The United States stands ready to cooperate with the USSR and all Governments in any measures which would help to promote a greater degree of harmony among nations and to encourage, as well, greater understanding among peoples by direct contacts and by removing present barriers to communications between them. We would

---

<sup>28</sup> CA-8100, March 19, transmitted memoranda on U.N. administration in Antarctica and possible USSR participation in the Antarctica Conference and Administrative Organization. (Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/3-1958) CA-11231 is printed as Document 275.

be particularly interested in seeing the removal of the official obstacles placed by the Soviet Union to the free flow of thought and information and the free movement of people. Measures of censorship, secrecy, and other controls, notably government regulation of opinion, impede human understanding and contacts, and make it the more difficult for countries to compose, or adjust to, their difficulties. We feel, therefore, that in addition to earnest efforts for solutions to the political and military problems which disturb relations between States, much can also be done in other fields to promote peaceful and neighborly relations.

#### *15. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*

The 13th GA will have before it the second annual report of the IAEA to the UN on its activities.<sup>29</sup> This report will include information on the size and composition of the Agency's staff and the program and budget for 1959. It will also summarize actual projects in which the Agency is already or soon will be engaged. These include such projects as the fellowship program, technical assistance, holding of conferences and seminars, etc.

The GA probably will not take any specific action with regard to this report, but a general discussion of IAEA's activities will likely take place.

#### *16. Special Projects Fund*

The 12th GA adopted a United States inspired resolution approving the establishment of a Special Projects Fund designed to extend systematic and sustained technical assistance in certain basic fields essential to integrated technical, economic and social development, and designating a Preparatory Committee to negotiate preliminary agreements on the functions, operations and organizational structure of the Fund.<sup>30</sup>

The Preparatory Committee met in April 1958. The decisions of this meeting are being discussed by the Economic and Social Council currently meeting at Geneva.

The Special Projects Fund should not be confused with the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program (ETAP). The Fund is an extension of the ETAP and, as the United States has consistently emphasized, should not be implemented at the expense of the ETAP.

---

<sup>29</sup> For text of the Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly of the United Nations (1 November 1957-30 June 1958) (Vienna, October 1958), see U.N. doc. A/3950.

<sup>30</sup> Under reference is U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1219 (XII), adopted December 14, 1957. For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

Specifically, the United States would hope that countries will not reduce their contributions to ETAP in order to make larger contributions to the Special Projects Fund.

Governments will be expected to announce their contributions to the Special Projects Funds, which is scheduled to begin operations in January 1959, at a pledging conference which is to take place during the 13th GA.

Congressional action on the United States contribution has not been completed. Authorizing legislation, however, has been approved by the Congress which would permit the United States to contribute 40 percent of the total contributions to the ETAP and the Special Projects Fund. Action on the appropriation, however, is still pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Two specific items which generated controversial discussion at the Preparatory Committee Meeting were: (1) the kind of currency in contributions and (2) the election of the Governing Council of the Fund. On the first item, the United States took the position that contributions should be in convertible currency; however, because of substantial opposition to the United States position, the United States finally agreed that the contributions should be made in "useable funds." So far as the second item is concerned, the United States strongly favors the election of the Governing Council by the 18 members of ECOSOC rather than by the 81 members of the General Assembly.

#### *17. Soviet Economic Propaganda Item*

The Soviet Union is expected to launch a propaganda drive pretending concern for the world expansion of trade and progress in economic development. As in the past, the Soviets no doubt will (1) call for the removal of security controls on strategic items that other nations regulate in the interest of their collective security and (2) demand some sort of world economic conference in which the Soviets could appear to be a champion for economic development and prosperity. In light of the propaganda nature of this offensive, the Free World ought to cooperate, not only in rebuffing the Soviet line, but in taking positive measures to provide a real and healthy expansion of trade and further progress towards economic development.

In consonance with the UN Charter, the United States, in cooperation with other states, is taking and will continue to take concrete steps to promote economic progress and well being through the UN, the appropriate specialized and other international agencies, and bilateral arrangements. In connection with the expansion of trade, the United States is a contracting party and a strong supporter of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and believes that this system provides the best means towards future progress in world

trade. The United States is particularly interested in programs that will facilitate most wisely the economic development of less developed countries, for which reason it supports the UN Expanded Technical Assistance Program, the Special Projects Fund and the World Bank. The United States Government itself has contributed to economic development through financial support by the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund, and other bilateral programs, and through its system of guarantees of private investment abroad. In addition, of course, there is the considerable assistance rendered through the flow of private United States capital. The United States is cooperating with primary producers and consumers concerning problems arising in connection with commodity trade. As further proof of its willingness to discuss commodity problems, the United States has indicated that it would accept membership in the UN Commission on International Commodity Trade, provided its terms of reference were amended satisfactorily.

You may recall the USSR contributes little to the several UN economic and social institutions and programs, such as UN technical assistance programs and even that is so restricted, because of its non-convertibility, that it may be spent only in the Soviet Union.

#### 18. *UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)*

a. *Report of the High Commissioner.* The Report of the High Commissioner will include a statement on measures taken under resolution 1166(XII) of the General Assembly. (See UN, "Resolutions . . . Twelfth Session," enclosed in CA-643 of July 18, 1958.)<sup>31</sup> This report will be delayed to accommodate a Working Group established by the UN Refugee Fund (UNREF) Executive Committee to consider the question of programming for 1959 which will not meet until late in August. It is not appropriate, at this time, therefore to attempt to consider the measures which the High Commissioner will have taken to implement GA resolution 1166(XII). However, it might be pointed out that the intention of the resolution was to give the High Commissioner a more flexible and more inclusive program than that envisaged under the UN Refugee Fund (UNREF) and hence it should be of great interest to all governments rather than only those immediately concerned with the integration or resettlement of political refugees of Eastern European or Chinese origin.

<sup>31</sup> Ellipsis in the source text. For text of the Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and its addendum, see U.N. docs. A/3828/Rev.1 and A/3828/Rev.1/Add.1. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1166 (XII), adopted November 26, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/3805. A copy of CA-643 is in Department of State, Central Files, 315.91/7-1858.

It appears likely that the USSR or one of the satellites will attempt to interject at some point in the discussion of refugee questions a resolution or an amendment to a resolution requiring the High Commissioner to give special emphasis to "repatriation" as a solution to refugee problems. The United States position is that repatriation is an appropriate solution only if it is voluntary in the purest sense of the word and devoid of any compulsion or pressure either explicit or implied. It is particularly important that the High Commissioner not be required to engage in activities designed to encourage or stimulate repatriation as a solution, since any activities involving a modification of his present procedures, which are impeccable on this issue, would imply a change in the Free World attitude detrimental to the morale of refugees.

It is hoped that the Government to which you are accredited will concur with the United States position and instruct its delegation to work in consultation with the United States Delegation on refugee matters.

b. *Voluntary Pledging of Contributions.* The UNHCR Program will succeed the United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF) which terminates on December 31, 1958. The United States is interested in obtaining maximum financial support for this new program from as many governments as possible. Even small pledges from governments that have not previously contributed to UNREF will have significance in indicating support for the program. If funds requested by the Administration are appropriated by Congress, the United States plans to announce a pledge of 1.2 million to the UNHCR Program for calendar year 1959, subject to the condition that its contribution is not to exceed 33-1/3 percent of total government contributions.

#### *19. Election of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)*

The present UNHCR for Refugees, Mr. Auguste R. Lindt, is expected to be a candidate to succeed himself in office after December 31, 1958. In view of his excellent record as High Commissioner, the United States will support him, and hopes that other friendly governments might do so also. If Mr. Lindt should not become a candidate to succeed himself, the United States would wish to consult with other friendly governments as to his possible successor.

#### *20. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information*

The draft text for a proposed Convention on Freedom of Information has been under consideration in the United Nations since 1948. The United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and other Western European and Old Commonwealth nations have opposed it because it includes provisions that would permit objectionable exceptions and limitations on freedom of information inconsistent with principles ex-

pressed in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The fact that no way has been found to avoid such provisions indicates the difficulty inherent in attempting to embody principles of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a legally binding document. However, thus far the GA has been unwilling to agree to put the draft convention aside and take no further action on it. The Department believes that some Delegates who supported this draft convention in the GA last year may have feared a vote against the draft convention would be interpreted as a vote against freedom of information. The Mission is therefore requested to undertake advance exploration looking toward agreement in the GA to take no further action on the convention with the result it would be dropped from the agenda of future General Assemblies. (The draft text of the preamble and substantive articles are attached as Annex A.)<sup>32</sup>

In discussing the draft convention, the Mission should emphasize: (1) Our belief that this convention represents a step backward rather than forward. This problem is immediately apparent in Article 2, which would permit various limitations on freedom of expression. While some of these may not appear objectionable in principle, governments so inclined might readily abuse them in practice. The fact that no satisfactory way to avoid this danger has been found, even though this proposed convention has been under consideration for ten years, indicates the inherent difficulties in attempting to define legal and binding obligations regarding freedom of information and the press on an international basis. (2) The greater advantage of using UN time and resources to promote freedom of information along more practical lines, such as by UN technical assistance, seminars, advisory services, promotion of mass media, etc.

### *21. Self-Determination*

The consideration of the item on "International Respect for the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination" was postponed at the 10th and 11th GA's. The 12th session adopted a resolution reaffirming the importance of due respect being given to self-determination and deciding to consider the item further at the 13th session.<sup>33</sup>

The United States will continue to support the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people. The United States Delegation will be instructed to oppose the first two of the three draft resolutions submitted by the twentieth (1955) session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to the GA. The United States Delegation will support the approval of a resolution along the lines of the third

---

<sup>32</sup> Not printed.

<sup>33</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1188 (XII), adopted December 11, 1957. For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805.



draft resolution submitted by ECOSOC. This proposal, initiated by the United States Delegation in ECOSOC, proposes the establishment of an ad hoc commission on self-determination, consisting of five persons to be appointed by the Secretary General, to conduct a thorough study of the concept of self-determination. The United States is prepared to agree to appropriate revisions of this draft resolution as may be necessary to obtain wide support for it in the GA. The United States Delegation will favor the adoption of such a resolution if it is likely that the GA will take some substantive action on the self-determination item.

For the three draft resolutions forwarded by ECOSOC to the GA in 1955, see CA-2630, September 21, 1956,<sup>34</sup> and subsequent communications.

## 22. *The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)*

a. *Cost Estimates.* Presumably, the treatment of UNEF will be similar to that accorded this item at the last GA, i.e., no specific term will be placed on the unit's duration, but a financial resolution will be passed authorizing enough funds to carry on the operation for another year.

With regard to estimated expenses for the continued functioning of UNEF in 1959, it is believed that these will be substantially reduced from the amount of \$25 million authorized for the period since December 31, 1957. In line with the views of the Secretary General, we hope that the cost for 1959 will be covered by assessment on the membership as a whole, calculated on the scale approved for 1959.

b. *Study of Experience.* The Secretary General plans to submit a summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of UNEF.<sup>35</sup> It is expected that the Secretariat will formulate some principles based on this experience which may provide guidance for the future. We hope this discussion will lead to the consideration of a permanent UN staff and contingent forces system.

The United States would welcome a UN initiative to develop some sort of stand-by plans which would make it possible to expedite the raising and deployment of UN patrol-type forces to meet various future contingencies. The Department visualizes the possibility of a permanent planning staff to develop the necessary plans for such a force as well as the concepts for operation and training of truce observation and patrol type functions. We believe that the principle of consent on the part of the country concerned must be maintained with respect to such a force functioning in connection with Chapter VI of

<sup>34</sup> Not found.

<sup>35</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/3899.

the Charter, i.e., peaceful settlement, and that contingents should desirably compromise personnel from countries other than the permanent members of the Security Council.

### 23. *Law of the Sea: Outstanding Questions*

The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which met in Geneva from February to April, 1958, adopted two resolutions requesting the GA (1) to arrange for the study of the problem of historic waters, including historic bays, and (2) to study the advisability of convoking a conference for further consideration of the problem of the breadth of the territorial sea and other matters raised in connection with this problem.<sup>36</sup> These questions no doubt will be considered in the Sixth Committee (Legal). Instructions are being prepared on these questions. The Department has these questions under study and will communicate its views later.

[Here follow section F, "United States Delegation," and two enclosures: Annex A and Check List of Agenda Items, a reproduction of U.N. document SD/A/458, July 23.]

**Herter**

---

<sup>36</sup> For text of these resolutions, both adopted April 27, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.13/L.56.

---

## 21. Editorial Note

On August 8, the Third Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly convened to discuss the situation in the Middle East. The Special Session lasted through August 21. Documentation on the Special Session is scheduled for publication in volume XI.

**22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 8, 1958—2:55 p.m.*

133. Re: Hungary. Confirming Brown-Thacher telecon.<sup>2</sup>

In view unconfirmed reports certain LA dels may raise Hungarian credentials issue initial plenary GA, USUN should indicate to friendly dels strong US hope matter not raised in plenary in order minimize problems attendant Chinese representation. Should Hungarian credentials nevertheless be raised in initial plenary, you should arrange for matter to be considered first in Credentials Committee without prejudice ultimate decision.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-858. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newlin, cleared in substance by Nunley and Bacon, and approved by Walmsley who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this telephone conversation has been found

---

**23. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, August 27, 1958—7 p.m.*

284. Re: Tunisian candidacy for SC seat.

Mestiri (Tunisia) informed US today he has received instructions to send letter to all UN Missions announcing Tunisia's candidacy for SC seat now held by Iraq. Mestiri has notified Iranian Mission (only announced candidate for the seat) today and will send out letters tomorrow.

When informed of our pledge of support to Iran, Mestiri said he had not heard of it before. Added that his instructions were clear and "quite formal", therefore, he said, he would have to carry them through.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/8-2758. Confidential.

Subsequently Adamiyat (Iran) phoned to say he had been informed by Tunisian Del of these plans. Adamiyat said he had informed Abdoh (Iran) who was on vacation and that he did not know what position his government would take and was anxious to know US views. [remainder of paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

We said that of course US was committed to Iran, but that understood problem he had raised and difficulty Iran might face. We would report to Department immediately.

*Comment:* There is much in what Adamiyat says, which we believe Department should consider. Please instruct urgently re reply to Adamiyat.<sup>2</sup>

**Wadsworth**

---

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 182, August 28, the Department instructed USUN to state that the United States remained committed to Iran and to express the hope that an open contest over the Security Council seat would not develop between Iran and Tunisia. (*Ibid.*)

---

**24. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 27, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Yugoslav Candidacy for Presidency of United Nations General Assembly

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Acting Secretary

Mr. Franc Primozic, Chargé d'Affaires, Yugoslav Embassy

Mr. William I. Cargo, UNP

Mr. Primozic called on the Acting Secretary to inform him of the decision of the Yugoslav Government to put forward the name of Mr. Popovic, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, as a candidate for the Presidency of the General Assembly. He said this would be made known to the United Nations within a few days. Mr. Primozic said that Yugoslavia had played an important role in the United Nations as an independent country and had made constructive and objective proposals toward the solution of various UN problems. A major reason for Yugoslavia's seeking the General Assembly Presidency was that it wished to affirm the independent position of the Yugoslav Govern-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-2758. Confidential. Drafted by Cargo and initialed by Herter.

ment, bearing in mind the current dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. [*remainder of paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified*]

Mr. Primozic said that he had been informed earlier by State Department officials that the United States is committed to Mr. Malik. While not wishing to comment on Mr. Malik as a personality, he said that the differing world impressions of him indicated that he was a controversial figure. Yugoslavia had been in touch with a number of the Arab leaders, particularly Foreign Minister Fawzi of the UAR. [*1 sentence (14 words) not declassified*] Mr. Primozic added that the general consideration favoring a European candidate was that the last European to hold office of General Assembly President was Mr. van Kleffens of the Netherlands in 1954.

Mr. Primozic asked whether the United States could extend its sympathy and support for the candidacy of Foreign Minister Popovic.

The Acting Secretary replied that the United States had made a commitment to Mr. Malik. He recalled that at the General Assembly last year, when Mr. Malik was a rival to the New Zealand candidate, we had urged him to withdraw. At that time there had been a more or less tacit understanding that if he would wait, his turn would come. The Acting Secretary said we had been informed that Mr. Malik would have the support of Chehab as well as of Chamoun.<sup>2</sup> The situation therefore was that, since we remained committed to Mr. Malik, it was not possible to give the commitment sought by the Yugoslav Government. The Acting Secretary complimented Mr. Primozic for the eloquent manner in which he had presented his case.

Mr. Primozic referred to the possibility of a candidacy by Mr. Belaunde of Peru. He said that Yugoslavia has indicated its support for Mr. Belaunde for the 1959 General Assembly and that he believed the Latin American group would not press the Belaunde candidacy this year.

Mr. Primozic asked whether the United States would "insist until the end" on Mr. Malik's candidacy. Governor Herter responded that we would of course act as our best interests should indicate. While it was impossible to foresee what developments might occur in the future, on the present basis, we remained firmly committed to Mr. Malik. Mr. Primozic responded that he hoped the United States would study carefully the considerations which he put forward in favor of Yugoslavia's candidacy.

---

<sup>2</sup> Camille Chamoun, President of Lebanon.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the Acting Secretary asked why the Communist Chinese attacked Yugoslavia even more strongly than Moscow did. Mr. Primožic said that his personal view was that there were two reasons for this: [*remainder of paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified*]

---

**25. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 28, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

General Assembly Slates; Hungary

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. M.R. Booker, Counselor, Embassy of Australia  
Mr. T.A. Pyman, Counselor, Embassy of Australia  
Mr. John W. Hanes, Jr., IO  
Mrs. Virginia Hartley, UNP  
Miss Elizabeth Brown, UNP

Messrs. Booker and Pyman came in at their request. At the outset they sought US support of the Australian candidacy for vice-president of the General Assembly. Mr. Hanes explained that we were not in a position to make any commitments prior to a clearer indication of the over-all General Committee slate but would certainly give the Australian candidacy our most sympathetic consideration. In response to a question, Mr. Hanes stated that the US remained committed to support Mr. Malik for President of the Assembly. Mr. Booker said Australia had made no commitment as yet.

Mr. Booker inquired what the prospects appeared to be for postponement of the Assembly.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Hanes replied that the US was taking no initiative but would be prepared to acquiesce in a short postponement of the opening date provided the Assembly could complete its work before Christmas. Mr. Booker noted that Foreign Minister Casey was already en route to New York.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-2858. Confidential. Drafted by Brown and cleared by Hanes.

<sup>2</sup> Wadsworth reported on August 27 that several U.N. delegations wished to postpone until October 1 the opening of the 13th session of the U.N. General Assembly. (Telegram 278 from USUN; *ibid.*, 320/8-2758) The Department discussed the proposal with foreign government representatives in Washington and at the United Nations August 27-30; documentation on these consultations is *ibid.*, 320. The proposal was also discussed at the Secretary of State's August 28 Staff Meeting; the notes of this meeting are *ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75.

Mr. Booker referred to the action of the Australian Delegation in placing the Hungarian item on the agenda of the 13th session and inquired whether there was any prospect that the US would join as a cosponsor, something Australia would definitely welcome. Mr. Hanes indicated we would give this matter our serious consideration and expressed our gratification at the Australian action in inscribing the Hungarian item, a subject which certainly merited further UN consideration. We had not yet reached any firm conclusions as to the position we would take in the Assembly on the Hungarian item, although one possibility which we had under study was the rejection of Hungarian credentials. Mr. Booker pointed out that his Government continued to be concerned about the wisdom of maintaining the Special Committee in existence, particularly because of the position of the new Ceylonese representative and the tendency of the Uruguayan to go too far. Australia therefore was inclined to believe the Committee should be terminated and other machinery substituted, such as resort to the Secretary General. He doubted whether continuing machinery was necessary. Mr. Hanes indicated we would not look favorably upon reintroduction of the Secretary General into the Hungarian situation and emphasize the demonstrated usefulness of the availability of the Special Committee during the summer when it pulled together its report on the recent reprisals and executions. This was another matter to which we would wish to give further attention.

---

**26. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 28, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Postponement of 13th General Assembly and Presidency

PARTICIPANTS

M. Nadim Dimechkie, Lebanese Ambassador

NEA—Mr. William M. Rountree

IO—Mr. John Hanes

NEA—Mr. James M. Ludlow

The Lebanese Ambassador called today at his request to indicate Dr. Malik's position concerning possible postponement of the forthcoming General Assembly.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-2858. Confidential. Drafted by Ludlow.

Mr. Rountree commenced the conversation by telling the Ambassador that our latest information was that the movement toward possible postponement of the General Assembly until the end of the month had practically come to a halt. We now understood that the UN Secretariat felt that it was too late to effect postponement. It was the feeling of many delegations that, while they would have been prepared to go along with a possible postponement, they would not wish to take the initiative. As for the US, we were ready to proceed with the General Assembly as scheduled but would have been prepared to agree to postponement if the necessary number of delegations so desired.

The Ambassador indicated that this information appeared to remove the necessity for his visit. Mr. Rountree then asked concerning Dr. Malik's views on postponement, to which the Ambassador replied that Dr. Malik had been deeply concerned that postponement of the session might create, unnecessarily, opportunities for other candidates for the Presidency. He had been so concerned over this prospect that he had asked the Ambassador to enlist our support in opposition to postponement.

Mr. Rountree, with Mr. Hanes concurring, expressed our view that while we understood Dr. Malik's reason put forth by the Ambassador, we felt that proceeding with the session as scheduled might well seriously lessen his chances of election. If the election occurred prior to General Chehab's assumption of the Presidency of Lebanon, a number of delegations might well question whether Dr. Malik would in fact have the confidence and support of that incoming administration.

The Ambassador explained that the constitutional situation in Lebanon was such that General Chehab could not assure that Dr. Malik would in fact have official endorsement of the Lebanese Government after Chehab assumed the Presidency. He pointed out that the new Prime Minister and Foreign Minister would have this responsibility. While he, the Ambassador, was reasonably confident that the new Government would be willing to support Dr. Malik, nothing could constitute official endorsement now.

Mr. Rountree reiterated his belief that a public statement, possibly through the press, would be helpful in persuading many delegations that Dr. Malik continues to have the support of his Government.

The conversation concluded with a general recognition of the fact that while there was only one other official candidate in the field for the Presidency of the General Assembly, a number of other candidates could develop very quickly in the days to come.



27. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 28, 1958—7:27 p.m.*

279. Urtel 294.<sup>2</sup> Suggest you inform GVN our views re raising question Viet-Nam's admission UN as follows:

U.S. continues firmly committed support admission RVN to UN and regards it politically important keep before public and place on record RVN's continued desire admission.

We believe, considering all factors, this purpose can best be served by next raising matter in Security Council. Question timing can be adjusted with view obtaining maximum attention item and allowing necessary diplomatic preparatory work. Issue might also be mentioned Secretary's major address GA.

Above method preferable in our view to formally raising question 13th GA. Since any move would spark Soviet counter move behalf north Viet-Nam, advisable consider whether outcome might serve enhance prestige north Vietnamese regime. Close vote (37 against, 33 for, 10 abstentions) at 12th GA on Indian-Indonesian draft resolution requesting SC "consider all applications"<sup>3</sup> including north Viet-Nam indicates scope of effort required try hold line against losses. In view fact membership question not now on agenda and absence any indication change Soviet position which alone prevents Viet-Nam's admission, reaction many countries to placing question on agenda likely be unfavorable as involving GA in repetitious and acrimonious debate without hope furthering solution problem. Thus psychologically important not raise question in GA with too great frequency. We shall certainly wish consider with GVN next year whether question should be raised in GA. Meanwhile substantial affirmative vote (49 for, 9 against, 22 [23] abstentions) at 12th GA endorsing RVN application can continue be cited.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-1858. Confidential. Drafted by Mendenhall and Hartley, cleared by Bacon and EUR, and approved by Hanes who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 294 from Saigon, August 18, reported on South Vietnamese representation at the Third Emergency and 13th sessions of the U.N. General Assembly and transmitted a query from the Secretary-General of the South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry on whether it would be opportune to raise the question of South Vietnamese membership in the United Nations. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a draft resolution on which the Special Political Committee voted on October 17, 1957. For text, see U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.17. For a record of the debate and the vote on the resolution, see U.N. doc. A/SPC/SR.49.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1144B (XII). For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805. For a record of the debate and the vote on this resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.709.

Dept had no indication renewed DRV activity respect its application but would of course take appropriate steps counter such activity or any similar Soviet moves should these develop.

Report GVN reaction.

**Herter**

**28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 6, 1958—2:53 p.m.*

199. Re: SC Elections. FYI. Dept does not believe any effort our part persuade Iran withdraw its SC candidacy consistent our commitment support (USUN's 306<sup>2</sup>). Should, however, Iranians on their initiative request our advice with respect problem created for them by Tunisian candidacy, Dept present thinking is that we might indicate on purely friendly basis that in our view Tunisia likely prove strong candidate and Iran might prefer withdrawal to possible defeat, making clear however we consider this matter for decision Iran itself, whose candidacy US remains committed to support. End FYI.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/9–458. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on September 5, cleared by Ludlow and Bovey, and approved by Sisco who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Tunis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 306, September 4, recommended that the Department advise Iran to reconsider its candidacy. (*Ibid.*)

---

**29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Khartoum<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 9, 1958—7:07 p.m.*

333. Khartoum's 335.<sup>2</sup> Sudanese Ambassador saw Rountree September 9<sup>3</sup> on instructions to inquire regarding US attitude re Arab

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–858. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Brewer, cleared in draft with Hartley, and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Jidda, Baghdad, Benghazi, Beirut, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 335, September 9, reported that a Cairo newspaper had stated that the Arab League would unanimously support the Yugoslav candidate for President of the 13th U.N. General Assembly, in order to avoid supporting Malik. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*

League Political Committee nomination Sudanese FonMin Mahjub for presidency 13th GA. Rountree expressed Department's high regard Sudan Govt and Mahjub personally but explained US position has been to assure Malik and GOL of our support for Malik's candidacy. When Ambassador inquired regarding US position should Malik voluntarily withdraw, Rountree replied we had no information such development and could not say what would be our attitude in the eventuality.

Should GOS approach you on this matter, you may make preliminary reply along foregoing lines.

**Dulles**

---

**30. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Abroad<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 12, 1958—8:20 p.m.*

267. View current speculation re GA presidency, Embassy should unless it perceives overriding objections inform Foreign Office soonest at appropriately high level US continues support Malik and hopes other friendly states will take similar position. Embassy should note Malik candidacy has now been publicly endorsed by Lebanese President-elect. Report reaction soonest.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1258. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Cargo; cleared with AF, ARA, EUR, FE, and NEA; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dulles. Sent to 48 missions worldwide and repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Khartoum, Jidda, and USUN. Telegram 217, September 12, instructed the USUN to inform the other delegations of continued U.S. support for Malik. (*Ibid.*)

**31. Editorial Note**

The 13th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly opened at 3 p.m., Tuesday, September 16. Sir Leslie Munro, President of the 12th General Assembly, presided over the opening, appointment of a Credentials Committee, and election of a President. Prior to the election, Czechoslovakia withdrew the candidacy of Jiri Nosek in favor of Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub of Sudan. The General Assembly then elected Charles Malik of Lebanon President of the 13th session, casting 45 votes for Malik, 31 for Mahgoub, and 4 abstentions. Malik assumed the Chair immediately after the elections. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.747.

---

**32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 17, 1958—7:10 p.m.*

102. ROK admission UN not inscribed agenda 13th UNGA. Suggest therefore you discuss question ROK membership UN with ROKG as follows:

US continues firmly committed support admission ROK to UN and regards it politically important keep before public and place on record ROK's continued desire admission.

We believe, considering all factors, this purpose best served by next raising matter Security Council. Question timing can be adjusted with view obtaining maximum attention item and allowing necessary diplomatic preparatory work.

Above method preferable in our view to raising question formally 13th GA. Since any move in GA would spark Soviet counter move behalf North Korea, advisable consider whether outcome might serve enhance prestige North Korean regime. Close vote (37 against, 33 for, 10 abstentions) at 12th GA on India. Indonesian draft resolution requesting SC "consider all applications" including North Korea indicates scope of effort required try hold line against losses. In view fact membership question not now on agenda absence any indication change Soviet position which alone prevents ROK admission, reaction

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9-1758. Confidential. Drafted by FE/NA and Hartley, cleared by Bacon and Nunley, and approved by Walmsley who signed for Herter. Repeated by pouch to USUN.

many countries to placing question on agenda likely be unfavorable as involving GA in repetitious and acrimonious debate without hope furthering solution problem. Thus psychologically important not raise question in GA with too great frequency. We shall certainly wish consider with ROK next year whether questions should be raised in GA. Meanwhile substantial affirmative vote (51 for, 9 against, 21 abstentions) at 12th GA endorsing ROK application<sup>2</sup> can continue be cited.

Department has had no indication renewed North Korean activity respect its application but would of course take appropriate steps counter such activity or any similar Soviet moves should these develop.

Report ROK reaction.

**Herter**

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1144A (XII). For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805. For a record of the debate and the vote on this resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.709.

---

### 33. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Dulles was in New York September 14–19 to attend the opening of the 13th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly. On September 18 he addressed the General Assembly during the general debate. He deplored the use of the veto in both the General Assembly and the Security Council, noting: "In consequence, there is no uniformity in the acceptance and application of our Charter and our processes. There are two different standards of conduct. The United States believes that this double standard is incompatible with the basic purposes of our Organization and that it poses a challenge which we shall have to meet."

He continued: "A related concern is the apparent reluctance of some nations to support those basic principles of the Charter which outlaw aggression, direct or indirect." The Charter and the implementing resolutions clearly represented the "will of the world community, which this Organization was prepared vigorously to support", and he pledged the United States, as one of the "great Powers," to be ready to "dedicate that power to world order."

Secretary Dulles concluded by stating: "May we not hope that, if only the minds and efforts of Governments were to be concentrated more fully upon the welfare of their own peoples and upon creative tasks of universal import, the issues that divide the world may fade away and the 'cold war' become a thing of the past."

For full text of Secretary Dulles' address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.479.

---

#### 34. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, September 24, 1958—7 p.m.*

Delga 37. Reference: Chinese Representation.

1. The debate on Chinese representation this year was the most difficult one which has been held in my service at the UN.<sup>2</sup>

2. We received numerous indications this year of distaste for the moratorium from among the LAs, several of whom expressed their reluctance to go along with us any further, one of whom said immediately after the vote that his country considered our policy a "disgrace" and constituted extremely abusive treatment of LAs. He said our position was "humiliating" to the LAs and served only to give the impression they were US satellites. This morning he said a new approach to the ChiRep question must be found which will make it possible for LAs to continue to support US. A member of the Chinese Delegation said he had asked among others Cuba and Peru to speak in support, but they both declined. A member of the Argentine Delegation reported congratulated the Swedish Representative after her statement in plenary while another member of that same delegation told us a majority the LA Delegations were personally opposed to the US position. Another LA Delegation told us it "out of the question to use the moratorium again". He pointed out if one LA deserts moratorium, another ten or fifteen will also desert it. The Chinese Delegation has already questioned Belaunde's candidacy for GA Presidency in the light of Peru's abstention on moratorium.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2458. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> The General Assembly discussed Chinese representation in the United Nations, September 22–23. On September 23, it adopted Resolution 1239 (XIII), which rejected India's request to place the question of Chinese U.N. representation on the General Assembly agenda and stated that the 13th General Assembly would not consider any proposal to exclude representatives of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China. For the record of the debate and vote on this issue, see U.N. docs. A/PV.753–755; for text of Resolution 1239 (XIII), see U.N. doc. A/4090.

3. Similarly we had reports of dissension within Pakistan Delegation and, although Japan supported us, they refused outright to speak in favor of our resolution in plenary. Department aware New Zealand's problem.

4. We understand Canadian Cabinet had lengthy touch-and-go session in deciding what to do on moratorium, and decision support this year based solely on ChiCom use force. Emphasis in Smith's speech<sup>3</sup> and as described beforehand to USDel made clear this was last year they could be counted on to back US.

5. Also understand Belgium too has decided this is last year they can go along, and for same reasons as motivated Canada.

6. Unfavorable changes in the voting as compared to last year were as follows: Austria, Greece, Iceland and Libya changed from support to abstention on our resolution as a whole while Iraq changed from support to opposition, and Cambodia from abstention to opposition. Additionally, Malaya and Peru abstained on our second paragraph while Ethiopia, Mexico and New Zealand abstained on our first paragraph. On the first paragraph of the Indian amendment Austria, Iceland, Liberia, New Zealand changed from last year's opposition to abstentions; Libya from abstention to support and Iraq from opposition to support. Although opposing the Indian first paragraph, Malaya and Peru abstained on the Indian second paragraph. A full analysis of the vote will be pouched Department.<sup>4</sup>

7. Our support came almost entirely from loyalty to the US as free world leader. There was no discernible evidence that it was based on the view that our policy is right. Many members feel that we have pursued a course of action with respect to China which inevitably leads to situations like that in the offshore islands. When it becomes in their minds a question of choice between following US policy out of loyalty and avoiding the possibility of a major war, many of them will decide that, in this particular case, avoiding such major war is paramount to follow US. It is at this point that their support for the US begins to fail. We have seen this attitude developing on this question this year.

8. There is widespread support at the UN for the proposition that we cannot and should not allow Formosa and the Pescadores to fall into unfriendly hands; that there must be no appeasement of Communist imperialism; and that we must draw the line somewhere and say: "This far and no further."

---

<sup>3</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/PV.753.

<sup>4</sup> Not found. An October 17 memorandum from Wilcox to Dulles, however, analyzed the vote on the moratorium resolution in the 11th, 12th, and 13th sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2458)



9. But the fact the US appears to be so deeply committed in a place which seems so clearly disadvantageous as Quemoy, deeply perplexes representatives of governments here and leads them to wonder whether we have not somehow fumbled and whether we have not been dragged into following policies which are not in our own best interests. This largely accounts for our unprecedentedly low vote and the total lack of enthusiastic support in speeches.

10. If it were possible to spell out our case in a logical, common sense way so that governments friendly to us can put our case effectively to their own public opinion, explaining the favorable factors which outweigh the military drawbacks in connection with Quemoy, our position would be different. On no other issue are we unable to back up our position with arguments that answer all questions in the minds of our friends. Yet no issue affects us more vitally. Even on disarmament we finally thought out language which enabled us to persuade others. But on the China question, which means so much to us, we fight with one arm tied behind our back and with the other in a sling.

11. In saying this I do not necessarily advocate substantive argument in public, which, of course, cannot be used under the moratorium procedure although we may come to this. But we must have a more persuasive basis for private conversations and private responses to questions which are so helpful in a government's determination of its position, conversely, inability to answer questions injures US.

12. As nearly as we can judge, public opinion in countries generally friendly to us is not moving towards our stand on the question of Chinese representation or China generally, but it might do so if we were able to eliminate from the problem of ChiRep situations like that in the offshore islands which appear at the UN to threaten to bring about a general war. How to isolate ChiRep from the offshore island is admittedly a complicated task. But surely one essential is to be able to give a common sense, clear reason for our stand in Quemoy which would eliminate the current atmosphere of mystery which is really pernicious. If these friendly countries were not preoccupied with the possibility of war resulting from Quemoy, it would very much increase our chances to continue to keep the Chinese Communists out in the future. It is our failure to hold out a solution to this and related problems after so many years which leads people to feel that there must be a change even though it is a change unacceptable to us. We can count on wide support in the UN even on an issue which could involve war if our friends are convinced that the issues justify it. As they see the present issues, they are not convinced.

13. Under present policy we must deal with all these questions on a procedural basis and avoid discussing what is in most people's minds. This tactic in the present circumstances is the best we can do. I cannot believe it will be enough in the long run.

14. If we want surely to succeed in the future in keeping the Chinese Communists out, we must have a better position.

15. It seems from here that some brand new factor should be brought into the whole subject.

16. But an unchanging adherence to the tactics used at the last three general assemblies may well not be enough in the future. If the offshore islands question comes to the UN in circumstances appearing to threaten war, the Chinese representation question may again be raised at this very same GA in a matter of weeks and we may then not be able to hold our position. Without the LAs we obviously cannot even be sure of a blocking third.

17. It appears clear today that we should maintain the moratorium as long as we can, but everything else related to the ChiRep question, both as to short range tactics and as to what can be said to delegates, should be restudied.

18. The whole purpose behind the above observations is to make it possible for us to continue to keep the ChiComs out the UN. As things are now going, this in very serious danger.<sup>5</sup>

**Lodge**

---

<sup>5</sup> Gadel 30, October 2, acknowledged that the debate on Chinese representation in the United Nations had been difficult, but noted that the final vote was better than expected. The Department, however, agreed with Lodge that tactics on this issue needed revision, suggested some changes, and solicited further input from Lodge. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-2458)

---

### 35. Editorial Note

On September 23, the Mission at the United Nations received a note from the Soviet Delegation protesting a demonstration at the Soviet Mission on September 21. The note also stated that the New York City Police Department had informed the Soviet Delegation another demonstration was scheduled to take place on September 28, and insisted that U.S. authorities take action to prevent anti-Soviet demonstrations at the Soviet Delegation offices. The text of the note was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow in airgram G-146, October 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/10-2258)

**36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 30, 1958—8:16 p.m.*

906. Following based on uncleared memo of conversation:<sup>2</sup>

Secretary informed Iranian Foreign Minister Hekmat September 29 US continued support Iran for SC and while not prepared electioneer, US would inform any nation asking our views of our continued support for Iran's candidacy. In reply question from Secretary, Hekmat indicated present Iranian estimate it now had about fifty percent of votes, with success dependent on Latin American support. Hekmat indicated belief that it up to UK-US indicate whether Iran should continue seek election SC or withdraw.

Secretary informed Hekmat that decision to withdraw was up to Iran but agreed US would make own discreet count number votes favoring Iran's SC candidacy and inform Iranians of result.<sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/9-3058. Confidential. Drafted by Ludlow and NE, cleared by Hartley and Calhoun, and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330/9-2958)

<sup>3</sup> Gadel 26, September 30, instructed the USUN to estimate how the other delegations would vote between Iran and Tunisia based on informal conversations rather than systematic polling, in order to avoid any appearance of U.S. campaigning on Iran's behalf. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-3058) The mission transmitted its estimate in Delga 80, October 3, noting that even with the most favorable vote, Iran could not win a two-thirds majority, that the British also felt Iran could not win, and that the Iranian Representative had indicated that Iran would probably withdraw from the race. (*Ibid.*, 320/10-258)

---

**37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 1, 1958—6:52 p.m.*

Gadel 27. For Lodge. Department disturbed over latest activities of Menon and Lall during course GA consideration Chinese representation issue. We fully appreciate that Indians and US do not see eye-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10-158. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sisco on September 30, cleared by Bacon and Berry, and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dulles.

to-eye on question Chinese representation. Moreover, we understand, even though we do not agree with, Indian Government's position. We understand a negative vote on its part and a speech or two stating its public position. What particularly disturbs Department, however, is that activities of Lall and Menon in General Committee and Plenary put India in forefront rather than Soviet Union. In short, active lobbying of Lall and Menon, including applying pressure on certain delegations, puts India in position of doing the job for Soviet Union. We recall also Lall's unhelpful activities during recent Emergency Special GA consideration of ME. We feel that such activities are harmful to US-Indian relationships and are not understood by American public opinion.

We are not at all sure as to how aware Nehru is of extent of activity of Menon and Lall in this regard. At same time we are very mindful of good relationships which you have developed with Menon and need to avoid deterioration overall US-Indian relationships. Nevertheless, Department believes that point made in paragraph one above should be brought to attention of Nehru, if it can be done without undue embarrassment. We would appreciate your views on this matter and any suggestions as to the best way to convey this information and any other information gathered from your direct contacts with Menon and Lall.<sup>2</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>2</sup> Lodge responded in Delga 79, October 2, stating that he believed Menon and Lall had acted in accord with Nehru's policies, and recommended against speaking to Nehru. Lodge assured the Department that he would report any actions by other delegations which warranted such an approach. (*Ibid.*, 320/10-258)

---

### 38. Editorial Note

On the afternoon of October 7, at the close of the general debate of the 13th U.N. General Assembly, the Iranian Representative announced that Iran was withdrawing its candidacy for a seat on the U.N. Security Council in favor of Tunisia. The Tunisian Representative responded with a brief statement of acknowledgment. The texts of their statements were transmitted to the Department of State in Delga 115 (Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-758), and are printed in U.N. doc. A/PV.744.

The next afternoon, the U.N. General Assembly elected Argentina, Italy, and Tunisia nonpermanent members of the Security Council, with terms to begin January 1, 1959. For a record of the vote, see U.N. doc. A/PV.755.

---

**39. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) and International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 7, 1958.*

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Consultations with the UK and France on Rejection of Hungarian Credentials at the Thirteenth General Assembly

*General Political Considerations*

We believe Hungary is the major item capable of putting the USSR on the defensive at this current session. However, we are concerned that the worldwide revulsion and indignation which resulted from the secret trials and executions of Nagy, Maleter, and other leaders of the 1956 Hungarian national uprising have been somewhat diminished by events in the Middle and Far East and that there is a real danger that the USSR will escape its due share of the blame and penalization for the continuing repression in Hungary. With these considerations in mind, we have sought to devise a course of action which would not only dramatize conditions in Hungary but which would also exert genuine pressure on the Soviets and the present Hungarian regime to end the armed intervention and repressive measures. We feel that just another condemnatory resolution would have little or no effect on the USSR and the present Hungarian authorities and would tend to advertise UN impotence and frustration concerning Hungary. Our legation in Budapest supports an attempt to reject credentials on the grounds that no action by the General Assembly short of rejection would have a significant impact within Hungary itself. The Hungarian representative in New York has already served notice that his Government would ignore future General Assembly resolutions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 216, 13th GA. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin and Nunley.

Provided necessary support is forthcoming, we favor rejection of credentials. As our primary motivation is humanitarian, we do not consider rejection of credentials tantamount to expulsion and we would want to make clear our view that Hungarian credentials could be accepted at some future date provided the armed intervention and repression ceases. Secondly, public attention, both in the Free World and behind the Curtain would be focused on the atrocities committed in Hungary. The efforts of the present puppet regime to pass itself off as respectable would be dealt a well-nigh mortal blow and the USSR would suffer a major psychological defeat. Thirdly, we feel that rejection of credentials would not only enhance the prestige of the UN by demonstrating that it refuses to apply a double standard of conduct where Communist and non-Communist nations are concerned, but that it does have certain sanctions at its disposal when its findings and recommendations are willfully ignored.

#### *Action Contemplated*

Our preliminary thinking has been along the lines of raising Hungary initially in plenary and, after adequate debate, seeking the adoption of a condemnatory resolution which, among other things, would find the Hungarian authorities incapable of fulfilling their obligations under the Charter to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and which would call upon other UN organs to take account of this finding. Subsequent to the adoption of the resolution the Credentials Committee would meet, note the finding of the General Assembly, and reject the credentials of the Hungarian delegation. We would then seek approval of the Credentials Committee's report in plenary.

#### *Technical Considerations*

The question as to whether a simple or two-thirds majority is required to reject credentials has never arisen. In order to avoid a possibly adverse precedent, we would insist that a two-thirds majority is required and would proceed with our campaign to reject credentials only if our consultations indicated that a two-thirds majority would be assured. At the ILO Conference last June we succeeded in mustering a two-thirds majority which rejected the credentials of the Hungarian government delegation. The vote by UN member governments was 34-15-12. Several negative votes and abstentions were based on the procedural objection that a subsidiary UN body should not reject credentials in the absence of prior action by the General Assembly. Ambassador Lodge seriously doubts that a two-thirds vote could be mustered for rejection at this General Assembly. However, this is such an important matter that we feel we must have a definite expression of

views on the part of key friendly governments before we can make a final decision. It is noteworthy that the vote on the Chinese representation resolution at the current session was 44-28-9. A shift of only 4 votes would mean a two-thirds majority should the number of abstentions remain constant.

Reservations have been expressed by Ambassador Lodge concerning the proposed course of action because the United States and certain of its allies face difficult issues at this session such as Taiwan and Middle East. It has been argued that a vigorous initiative on Hungarian credentials would complicate our position on other issues and might necessitate a wasteful expenditure of influence and good will. On balance, we do not believe that rejection of Hungarian credentials would adversely affect our support on other problems. Just because the USSR is trying to place the US and the West on the defensive in regard to certain issues, we should not let this deter us from taking the initiative on action morally and politically desirable.

As to retaliation by the Hungarian authorities, the only significant action available to them would be to initiate a break in diplomatic relations. While we are prepared to accept such an eventuality, we feel it is unlikely, and that the collective character of UN action would render it even less likely.

In the event the UK and France agree that rejection of credentials is desirable and that its feasibility is worthy of exploration, we plan to initiate wider consultations as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup>

Attachments:

Three copies of draft resolution on Hungary. (Tab A)  
Gadel 28 to U.N. (Tab B)<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Murphy met with Caccia and Hood October 9; a memorandum of their conversation is *ibid.*, Central Files, 320/10-958. He met with Alphand, Leprette, and De la Grandville on October 15; a memorandum of that conversation is *ibid.*, 320/10-1558.

<sup>3</sup> Neither attached. Tab A was not found. Tab B, dated October 2, discussed attempting to reject the Hungarians' credentials. (*Ibid.*, 764.00/9-1258)

#### 40. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>

CA-3492

Washington, October 14, 1958.

SUBJECT

Representations on Attitudes of Representatives to the United Nations

The Department wishes to call to the attention of the various diplomatic missions a matter of importance in respect to relations between our Mission in New York and other Missions accredited to the United Nations.

At times governments ask concerning the performance of their delegations at meetings of the United Nations or its Specialized Agencies, or we must ask for the support of a government when we know that its delegation in New York may not be sympathetic to our point of view. What is said in such cases may have considerable impact on relations between our delegation in New York and delegations of other countries. There is always the possibility of antagonizing the representatives of other countries in New York, with consequent, unfortunate effect on important issues before the Assembly. Slightly adverse statements by us have at times resulted in far stronger reactions on the part of other governments than was ever intended, for example, the recall of representatives of other governments. Such recall may make our relations with other delegations more difficult since they will resent what appears to them to be interference by the United States in the affairs of other governments. Thus, delegations may become hesitant to express their views or to deal frankly with our own delegation.

Ambassador Lodge has asked that the Department and the United States Embassies make no comment which might be interpreted by other governments as a complaint concerning their representative to the United Nations in New York, without first consulting with him. It is therefore requested that no protest or critical comment be made about any delegation or representative to the United Nations without specific authorization from the Department.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310/10-1458. Confidential. Drafted by Monsma and Hawley; cleared by Bacon, ARA, AF, ODA, and NEA; and approved by Wilcox. Sent to 56 posts worldwide, excluding Europe. A second instruction was addressed to all European diplomatic posts except Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, and Bonn. Its first two paragraphs and those in the source text were identical; the following statement replaced the last two paragraphs: "It is accordingly requested that Missions exercise caution to avoid comments which might imply personal criticism of individual representatives or delegates, without specific authorization from the Department." (CA-3493, October 14; *ibid.*) A Cargo-to-Wilcox note attached to the source text noted that this more general language had been substituted at EUR's request.



The foregoing is not intended to discourage the normal exchange of views between missions and the governments to which they are accredited; it applies only to critical comment on representatives to the United Nations.

Dulles

---

#### 41. Editorial Note

On October 24, the Mission at the United Nations received a note from the Soviet Delegation protesting demonstrations at the Soviet Mission on October 18 and 23. The note contended that the protests disrupted delegation activities and therefore violated the U.N. Headquarters Agreement. It also noted that press reports stated another demonstration was to occur on November 7 during a diplomatic reception at the Mission, and insisted that U.S. authorities implement measures to prevent anti-Soviet demonstrations at the Mission. The text of the note was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow in airgram G-153, October 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/10-3158)

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov protested further about the demonstrations in a November 5 oral presentation to Thompson in Moscow. The Soviet Government, Kuznetsov stated, expected the U.S. Government to take appropriate measures to ensure normal working conditions for the Soviet Mission at the United Nations. Failure to take such measures could affect the Soviet public's attitude toward the Embassy, a development the Foreign Ministry would not like to see occur. Thompson reported Kuznetsov's comments in telegram 1020, November 5. (*Ibid.*, 310.361/11-558)

42. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 7, 1958.

SUBJECT

General Assembly Consideration of the Item on Hungary

*Discussion*

Concerning your inquiry whether, in the absence of rejection of Hungarian credentials, Hungarian representatives could be barred from the Committees of the General Assembly, the Office of the Legal Adviser has prepared the attached study (Tab B)<sup>2</sup> which concludes that, strictly as a matter of law, the Assembly is empowered to bar the representatives of Hungary from its Committees while permitting them to be seated in the plenary sessions. The Office of the Legal Adviser states further, however, that logic, traditional practice, and the Assembly's Rules of Procedure make it unlikely that the Assembly would in fact be more disposed to deny Committee participation to the Hungarians than to reject their credentials. In other words, we could probably obtain a far more impressive result (e.g., rejection) with less effort than would probably be required to deny the Hungarians Committee membership.

In this connection, paragraph 7 of our draft condemnatory resolution (Tab C)<sup>3</sup> calls upon the other organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies to "take appropriate account" of the Assembly's determination that Hungary has not fulfilled its Charter obligations. Such phraseology could be used to deny the Hungarians election to office and appointment to Committees or organs in the UN system.

At the beginning of October we asked the UK and France whether they would be willing to join us in an effort to determine if sufficient support (a 2/3 majority) could be mustered to reject Hungarian credentials. While we have had no definite replies to our inquiries, both the UK and French Embassies have cited a joint estimate prepared by the US, UK and French Missions in New York that only a simple rather than a 2/3 majority could be mustered for rejection. This estimate was

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-758. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin, initialed for Wilcox by Walmsley, and concurred in by Kohler and Meeker. Sent to the Secretary through S/S. A note on the source text states that Dulles saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Not found as an attachment; a copy is *ibid.*, 310.2/10-2958.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

based on the views of uninstructed delegates and would, of course, probably be effective if the United States took a definite position in favor of rejection of Hungarian credentials.

American Legation Budapest reports that the French and Italian Ministers were summoned by Szarka, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, and requested that France and Italy not support rejection of credentials. While both Ministers agreed to transmit the request to their respective capitals, both reportedly told Szarka that their governments would probably vote in favor of rejection if such a move were supported by a majority of UN members. Furthermore, Hungarians indicated to the Italian Minister, that, while relations would be impaired by Italian support for rejection, Hungary was not planning to initiate a break in relations to retaliate.

On October 28, we transmitted the text of a draft condemnatory resolution to USUN with instructions to consult with the UK, French and Australians to develop a text capable of securing broad cosponsorship and support. Our instructions (Tab D)<sup>4</sup> made it clear that, while the language of the draft resolution does not effect rejection of Hungarian credentials or compel subsequent efforts to this effect, paragraphs 5 and 6 laid the foundation for rejection if it is later decided to do so. It is believed, therefore, that we should authorize Ambassador Lodge to proceed with consultations among delegates in New York on the basis of the previously transmitted resolution, while reserving our position on the credentials issue until consultations with the British, French and other friendly governments have been completed.

Ambassador Thompson has expressed concern that the language of our original draft resolution may cause the USSR and the satellites to withdraw from the UN. Suslov, in New York, has warned USUN that General Assembly rejection of Hungarian credentials would bring about the "end of the UN". Without regard to the merits of a move to reject credentials, the Departmental staff is convinced that Soviet threats of this kind must be heavily discounted.

In order to give our resolution a slightly more humanitarian tone, we propose to amend it slightly in accordance with the attached telegram (Tab A).<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Not found as an attachment. The text of the draft resolution was transmitted in Gadel 72 (*ibid.*, 320/10-258); the instructions to USUN were sent in Gadel 73. (*ibid.*, 320.5764/10-2358)

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

*Recommendation*

That you sign the attached telegram transmitting the revisions to our draft resolution on Hungary (Tab A).<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Dulte 3 from Seattle, November 10, informed the Department that Dulles found the draft resolution "deficient" because it did not specifically address rejection of Hungarian credentials. It noted that the President had told Dulles the United States "must take a positive line on credentials question even if we get licked." (Department of State, Central Files, 320.2/11-1058) In Tedul 12 to Seattle, November 13, the Department noted that it assumed this constituted a decision to seek rejection of the Hungarian credentials and suggested high-level approaches in certain capitals regarding this decision. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11-1358) Tedul 13 to Seattle, also November 13, transmitted the text of a revised draft resolution on Hungarian credentials. (*Ibid.*)

---

**43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 20, 1958—8:38 p.m.*

1847. UK Foreign Office determined make effort dissuade Sekou Toure<sup>2</sup> from seeking United Nations membership for Guinea at present moment but, according UK Embassy here, has instructed Jebb<sup>3</sup> to seek French agreement to support Guinea's admission during last week current GA session. In view urgent British proposals that this be joint US-UK approach, and in light known French views against Guinea's admission now, Department is agreeable make attempt in concert with British defer Guinea's membership application for brief period.

Unless it perceives over-riding objections, Embassy should approach French with suggestion they agree support Guinea's membership during last week current GA session. British in London (following planned initial approach in Accra) and we in Washington will present argumentation to Special Emissary Diallo that Guinea should not press

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/11-2058. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by AF/AFS; cleared by Ferguson, McBride, and Walmsley; and approved by Murphy who signed for Herter. Repeated to London, Accra, Dakar, and USUN by pouch.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister of Guinea.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb, British Ambassador in France.

for admission until unanimous support for its application can be obtained, indicating, if French agreeable, that this time likely be in closing days this GA session.

Herter

---

**44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 20, 1958—8:36 p.m.*

4974. For Whitney. For London: You should seek early appointment with Selwyn Lloyd and earnestly request UK support for rejection credentials of Hungarian representatives at 13th General Assembly. At outset you should say that US is strongly of the opinion that rejection of credentials should be sought, that this decision was reached on the highest level in the Government, and that the President has indicated his interest in this course of action. Department believes that, if UK willing to join US and France in strong approaches certain capitals (France has already indicated willingness to seek rejection), necessary two-thirds majority for a condemnatory resolution which will also provide for rejection could be mustered. As UK aware, joint voting estimates made in New York indicated only 40 votes could be counted upon for rejection. Department firmly convinced that strong joint position by US, UK, and France in favor of rejection and appropriate representations in key capitals would substantially increase number of votes for rejection.

While the US feels strongly that the USSR and the present Hungarian regime must not be allowed to escape penalty for their defiance of the General Assembly's resolutions, Special Committee, and Special Representative, as well as credentials not purely a cold war exercise. Rejection of Hungarian credentials is most effective and practical sanction available to UN under present circumstances and may serve conduce amelioration current repression. Rejection of credentials would not be "for all time" and, should conditions in Hungary improve, way would be open for return of Hungarian delegation to future sessions of the Assembly.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-2058. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newlin; cleared by Becker, Wilcox, Kohler, and Bacon; and approved by Murphy who signed for Herter. Also sent to Paris and USUN, and repeated to Moscow and Budapest.

You should stress that our Legation in Budapest strongly supports rejection of credentials. FYI Department has reason to believe UK Minister in Budapest also favors rejection of credentials but working level FonOff cool to idea End FYI. The Hungarian people and those in other captive European nations would welcome proof they not written off. Blow to puppet regime's prestige would hearten man in the street. In light of recent executions, UN must take effective action in support of purposes and principles of the Charter.

Voting to reject Hungarian credentials in UN is not, in our view, inconsistent with maintenance bilateral diplomatic relations. We plan raise issue initially in plenary and secure adoption condemnatory resolution which, inter alia, would contain following operative paragraph "Decides to reject the credentials submitted on behalf of the representatives of the present regime in Hungary." Context in which this paragraph would appear would make clear reasons for rejection. Should large number cosponsors for resolution be forthcoming and should vote substantially exceed required two-thirds majority, we believe collective nature UN action would minimize likelihood Hungarians would initiate break in diplomatic relations. While discounting such an eventuality, we would, nevertheless, be prepared to accept it.

Lloyd may refer to hints which we have received from the Soviets and which they may have also made to the UK that rejection of Hungarian credentials might lead USSR (and satellites) to withdraw from UN with implication this would break up Organization. Department has carefully studied this aspect and has concluded we must discount heavily such threats which primarily intended as tactic to discourage prospective supporters of rejection.

General Assembly since 1956 Hungarian national uprising has neither accepted nor rejected Hungarian credentials via the medium of taking "no decision" on credentials submitted by representatives of the Hungarian regime. This action has served to cast doubt on Hungarian credentials. The execution of Nagy, Maleter, and other patriots is conclusive evidence that present regime incapable at this time of representing Hungary in the United Nations.

Rejection of credentials only effective sanction available to UN since action under Articles 5 and 6 of Charter to suspend rights or expel Hungary subject to approval Security Council.<sup>2</sup> While we could go through motions of suspension or expulsion procedure, certainty of Soviet veto would render such action futile propaganda maneuver.

Department hopes favorable reply will be forthcoming soonest.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For texts of Articles 5 and 6 of the U.N. Charter, see footnote 5, Document 16.

<sup>3</sup> Whitney met with Lloyd on November 24 and reported in telegram 2869 from London that Lloyd felt a resolution to reject the Hungarian Delegation's credentials would not gain a two-thirds majority, had raised some legal questions regarding such

For Paris: You should make approach FonOff along lines of above.

For USUN: You should inform UK, French, and Australian dels of above approaches.

**Herter**

---

an effort and how it would affect East-West relations, and had tentatively decided against it. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-2458)

---

**45. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

*London, November 26, 1958.*

DEAR FOSTER: I have now had time to consider your proposal that we and the French should make strong appeals to a number of Governments with the aim of obtaining their support for a move to reject the credentials of the Hungarian representatives to the General Assembly. Mr. Whitney will already have reported my preliminary reactions; but, for the sake of completeness, I repeat below much of what I said to him on November 24.<sup>2</sup>

It seems to me that there are two quite separate problems: first, whether we can secure the rejection of the Credentials by an adequate majority and second whether, if we think we can, it is desirable to do so.

As regards practicability, I think we both start from the position that a favourable vote of less than two-thirds would not be acceptable. The United Kingdom Mission at New York have made several careful assessments of the probable vote on a motion for rejection. On each occasion they concluded that a two-thirds majority was unobtainable. As recently as October 23 our two Missions at New York, together with the French and the Australians, made a joint assessment. The unanimous conclusion was that, even on the most favourable assumptions (including strong representations in Capitals), a two-thirds majority could not be achieved; the best vote that could be expected was 40 in favour, 22 against, and 19 abstentions. Dixon has within the last

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a November 26 note from Hood forwarding the letter to Dulles. The notation "Sec saw" is written on Hood's transmittal letter.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, *supra*.

day or two confirmed that this is still his view. I find it hard to believe that even the strongest representations could at this stage produce a substantial change.

I know that your own estimate is somewhat more favourable, but I imagine that you would agree that there is at least some uncertainty whether we could achieve complete success. To embark on it at all would, to my mind, involve two serious risks.

(a) Once the lobbying operation became known, the prestige of the three Governments concerned would be engaged, and it would not be possible to withdraw without giving the Soviet Union a major propaganda victory.

(b) We would have to press on to a vote, therefore; whatever the outcome appeared likely to be. We might well get (and I think would most likely get) a simple but not a two-thirds majority, would we then be compelled to argue that a matter of this sort can be decided by a simple majority? In view of your preoccupations about Chinese representation, I should not have thought that this would be what you want.

I am moreover doubtful whether it would be wise to embark at this time on an intensive lobbying campaign on the issue of Hungarian Credentials. Very many delegations at the United Nations in all geographical groups are at present very anxious to avoid anything likely to increase East/West tension, and indeed wherever possible to go a long way to achieve East/West agreements. I am sure that members of the Afro-Asian group, some Latin American Governments, the Governments of the Scandinavian countries and indeed some Commonwealth Governments would dislike the idea of rejection as likely to increase tension.

These arguments alone seem to me overriding. But I also think that the desirability of rejecting the Hungarian Credentials is seriously open to question. I agree entirely with you that action of this sort by the United Nations would give satisfaction and encouragement to the Hungarian people. It might conceivably, though I doubt it, bring about a diminution of repression in Hungary. But I think we must consider possible consequences in the longer term very carefully before we take such a step, merely because there is no other practical sanction the United Nations can apply. Here I see difficulties and risks besides those to which Mr. Whitney drew attention.

For me, at least, there is a legal and intellectual difficulty. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly lay down that Credentials should be issued by the Head of the State or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Hungarian Government have issued such Credentials. If we did not recognize the Hungarian Government, we could argue that the Credentials were not in good form; but we do recognize that Government and we intend, if we can, to maintain bilateral relations with them. If, therefore, we reject Hungarian Credentials, it will be



either because we do not approve of the Hungarian Government's actions; or because that Government was established by the Soviet armed forces and has, therefore, no legal basis. That leads to further difficulties.

Rejection on the first ground could very easily form a most unwelcome precedent. Surely the remedy should be expulsion in accordance with Article 6.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, even if a two-thirds majority for rejection were obtained, it is by no means impossible, for instance, that the Russians could, during the present session, get a similar majority for the rejection of the South African Credentials.

Rejection on the second ground is not much more satisfactory. The same argument could be applied to some other Governments (though less obviously); it is also difficult (though not impossible, I agree) to reconcile with the maintenance of Missions in Budapest. No improvement of conditions in Hungary would remove that ground for rejection, short of the establishment of a new Government by methods which we could regard as valid. Re-admission without a change of political system would be incompatible with the original argument for exclusion, and we should have to face an annual battle of uncertain outcome.

There is one other minor point. Your note<sup>4</sup> mentioned the possibility that the Hungarian Government might break off diplomatic relations with the West. It is not, of course, certain that they would do this. But if they did, is not Mindszenty an embarrassment? It is not only his fate personally which worries me, but the danger that a major quarrel over him might upset the present delicate balance in Poland by forcing Gomulka<sup>5</sup> and the Polish Catholics to take sides.

I am entirely in favour of strongly condemning, during the debate on Hungary, both the Soviet Union and the present authorities in Hungary. I am also strongly in favour of continuing our previous policy of leaving Hungarian Credentials in suspense. But I do not think it would be either timely or wise to attempt to secure their rejection. I hope you can agree.

Yours ever,

Selwyn<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For text of Article 6 of the Charter, see footnote 5, Document 16.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 28, 1958—7:34 p.m.*

1967. You should endeavor see Foreign Minister Couve de Murville immediately (unless you believe Cornut-Gentille<sup>2</sup> could be more effective) and discuss question Guinea along following lines:

We are most concerned by likely prospect Guinea will press for UN membership this session in conflict with present French position. Diallo scheduled have talks in Department Monday, December 1, and at that time we shall strongly urge him defer requesting membership this session.<sup>3</sup> However, on basis Diallo's talks London (London 2910 to Department, repeated 403 to Paris<sup>4</sup>) we are not at all sanguine our arguments will have any effect.

Under circumstances it seems highly likely that Diallo will permit in applying for UN membership at beginning next week and that issue may be posed before Security Council immediately thereafter.

While we have not decided what our position will be in such eventuality, we frankly see serious difficulties for US abstain. In this connection French have so far failed to give us memorandum setting forth legal basis their views as promised by Alphand to Secretary. (Alphand told Secretary today he hoped be able to give memo to Dept. December 1.<sup>5</sup>) At same time we look with grave concern at possibility US voting differently from France in SC on issue of importance to France. However, it seems unlikely irrespective US vote there would be sufficient abstentions SC to prevent Guinea's admission in any case.

If Western powers should abstain or even if friendly SC members fail to sponsor Guinea's request this will be exploited by elements unfriendly US and France, and Guinea's admission will appear to be obtained solely through Soviet and Afro-Asian efforts. Repercussions of this on Guinea in particular and Africa in general could be serious for overall Western interests.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1-2758. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by EUR/WE; cleared by Ferguson, Cargo, and Walmsley; and approved by Jandrey who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard Cornut-Gentille, Minister for Overseas France.

<sup>3</sup> No records of these meetings have been found.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2910, November 27, reported on Diallo's conversations with British officials regarding Guinea's admission to the United Nations and its relationship to France. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-2758)

<sup>5</sup> In a December 1 meeting at the Department, De la Grandville confirmed that the copy of a draft speech on Guinea which he had given McBride on November 28 constituted the French Government's legal views on the issue. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, 310.2/12-158) No copy of the speech has been found, but Tosec 2 to Mexico City, December 1, transmitted its text to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 330/12-158)

We would accordingly hope that French Government would urgently reconsider its position at highest level carefully weighing all factors involved. It is essential for future orientation Guinea and latter's relations with West that French influence that country be maintained. It is accordingly our strong hope that French may yet find it possible or at least agree to sponsor Guinea's admission UN next week.<sup>6</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 2017 to Paris, November 29, reported that Couve de Murville had "stated categorically" France's refusal to support Guinea's application for U.N. membership before bilateral arrangements were completed between the two countries. These arrangements, he continued, could not be finished before the current General Assembly session ended. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11-2958)

---

**47. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Mexico City, November 30, 1958—9 p.m.*

Dulte 2. Following are action items from Secretary's conversation with President today:

[Here follows paragraph 1 concerning Germany.]

2. Re Hungary in UN, US will at appropriate time introduce resolution on rejection credentials. In connection with the resolution US would note provisions of UN Charter on expulsion and suspension of members, and in the certainty of Soviet veto of effort to expel or suspend Hungary, would frankly set out to make "new law" in the UN by rejection present Hungarian Delegation's credentials on the ground of flagrant and persistent violation of UN resolutions. US will not lobby in support of such resolution. Timing of its introduction is technical matter depending on status of credentials matter; if for example in credentials committee or elsewhere it is proposed to accept

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-3058. Secret; Priority.

Hungarian credentials, US would counter with its proposal for rejection.<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows paragraph 3 concerning an unrelated subject.]

**Dulles**

---

<sup>2</sup> Tedul 5 to San Francisco, December 3, requested clarification of the instructions not to "lobby" for a resolution rejecting the Hungarian credentials. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/12-358) Telegram 510 to USUN, also December 3, informed Lodge of Eisenhower's and Dulles' decision, noted that the Department was seeking clarification of the instructions, and stated that Dulles wanted Lodge to consult with Senators Mansfield and Hickenlooper to gain their support for the U.S. efforts. (*Ibid.*)

---

**48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 3, 1958—7:27 p.m.*

798. In view fact Guinea has filed application for admission UN<sup>2</sup> and SC expected consider application December 8 or 9, Wilcox called in Vietnamese and Korean Ambassadors to inquire whether they desired their governments' applications be considered by SC at same time but separately and after Guinea. Korean Ambassador replied affirmatively. Vietnamese Ambassador after re-studying instructions on hand from his government also replied affirmatively.<sup>3</sup> US will therefore sponsor and actively support both applications.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12-358. Confidential. Drafted by Mendenhall; cleared by Lane, Bacon, Hartley, and SEA; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Repeated by pouch to CINCPAC POLAD, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Guinea presented its formal application for admission to the United Nations to the U.N. Secretary-General on December 2. (Delga 593 from USUN, December 2; *ibid.*, 330/12-258) For text, see U.N. doc. A/4048.

<sup>3</sup> Memoranda of Wilcox's December 3 conversation with Korean Ambassador Yang and Vietnamese Ambassador Chuong and of a subsequent telephone conversation with Chuong are in Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12-358.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 516, December 4, instructed the Mission to request that the Security Council consider Korea's and Vietnam's applications for U.N. membership and ensure that these applications were considered separately and after Guinea's. The telegram also transmitted the text of draft Security Council resolutions on Korean and Vietnamese membership. (*Ibid.*, 320.11/12-458)

49. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 4, 1958—3:51 p.m.*

Gadel 162. In view status Hungarian Credentials problem, USUN should urgently seek postponement meeting Credentials Committee until after plenary consideration Hungarian item.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/12-458. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum, cleared by Nunley and Bacon, and approved by Cargo who signed for Herter.

---

50. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 4, 1958—7:52 p.m.*

Gadel 167. Re: Hungary. Pursuant to decision to seek rejection Hungarian credentials, USUN should begin consultations with friendly states inviting co-sponsorship for appropriate res.

UK should be approached first. You should inform them of US decision to seek rejection of credentials and suggest they support; you may also tell them Secretary will write Selwyn Lloyd on this subject. You should then approach French and number friendly delegations seeking broad representative co-sponsorship. Dept assumes appropriate point departure would be to start with sponsors last year's res on Hungary.

In view short time remaining, it will be necessary undertake these consultations immediately. Dept prepared to assist you in capitals wherever appropriate and necessary.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/12-458. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buffum; cleared by Cargo, Nunley, Kohler, Becker, and McElhiney; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

Dept recommends you consult on basis text res contained Delga 555, substituting following for present para 3: "Decides to reject the credentials of the representatives of the present Hungarian regime."<sup>2</sup>

Herter

---

<sup>2</sup> Delga 555, November 28, transmitted the text of a draft resolution. Paragraph 3 of the draft reads: "Decides to exclude, for the time being, representatives of the existing regime in Hungary from representation on the main committees of the General Assembly and on any other committee or organ constituted by the Assembly from the whole membership of the United Nations." (*Ibid.*, 320.11/11-2858)

---

51. **Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, December 5, 1958, 5:20 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

TELEPHONE CALL TO AMB LODGE

The Sec said he is in a quandary re Hungarian business. They discussed rejecting credentials and the committee idea of L's. The Sec said the only thing he and the Pres meant was no arm twisting but it was o.k. to try to get votes by talking around.<sup>2</sup> L said his recommendation was to have a comm with a rapporteur like Prince Wan to make a report which he grants is not very manly. The Sec does not think the Soviets and satellites will get out because he does not think we will get 2/3s. L would say we don't know how many votes we will get—we are doing it because we think it is right. It is very far-reaching etc. They were not too keen on the wording of the res, though L has not seen it. The Sec mentioned CD<sup>3</sup> pressuring the Pres but L said he does not know about it. L said he has not talked with Mansfield and Hick-enlooper<sup>4</sup> as he did not want to at this stage. L receives a lot of telegrams from Senators but it is just going through the motions. The Sec would anticipate that just L would work on it there but L said unless he and the Pres worked on it too they would barely get a majority. The Sec mentioned his having to reply to Lloyd. He would have signed the letter but got to worrying about it. L said he was glad

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations, November–December 1958. Transcribed by Bernau.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to instructions that USUN should not "lobby" for a resolution to reject the Hungarian Delegation's credentials. See Document 47.

<sup>3</sup> C.D. Jackson.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 47.

the Sec would have to make the decision—he would end up with a comm. L said the session is supposed to end Dec 12 but he would extend it and told Wilcox how he proposed to operate—this would not please people. There would be some applause in Congress but he does not know if freedom-loving Hungarians would be pleased to see us get defeated which we could very well. The Sec will give it more thought but in his present mood he is ready to drop it. L said he would not regret it—irritation from CD but he would not worry about that. You get something from the comm and that is perfectly respectable. L said you would have to do it next year and it will be tough. ILO will have a problem next year.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Lodge discussed the issue of Hungarian credentials with Eisenhower during breakfast at the White House, Saturday, December 6. Observing that there was “very little differentiation in principle” between refusing to seat Hungary . . . and continuing to seat the Soviets, the President stated he could not support efforts to reject the Hungarian Delegation’s credentials as long as the Soviet Union maintained its seat. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman Files, Eisenhower Diaries)

---

## 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 8, 1958—11:54 a.m.*

528. Re: membership meeting. Despite considerations advanced Delga 632,<sup>2</sup> Mission should support renewed SC consideration of long-standing membership applications ROK and Viet-Nam as instructed Deptel 516.<sup>3</sup>

Not to do so, when SC is meeting to consider membership Guinea, would be construed as decreased interest our part to support two well qualified states. Communist obstructive tactics should not deter UN from making clear Communist responsibility this impasse and continuing UN interest welfare these Free World governments.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/12-858. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hawley and Bacon on December 6; cleared by Kohler, Bacon, Ferguson, Ludlow, Monsma, SEA, and NA; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 632, December 5, reported a general reluctance among Security Council members to consider the question of admitting Vietnam and Korea to the United Nations, advised the Department to reconsider its instructions to introduce the matter, and outlined the factors militating against such a move. (*Ibid.*, 320.11/12-558)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 48.

Effect sustaining morale ROK and Viet-Nam also important considerations. Moreover, we have already undertaken in consultations with them to support their applications.

Herter

53. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 8, 1958—1:23 p.m.*

530. After carefully weighing all factors and with every desire to cooperate with French, in absence convincing reasons Department sees no grounds on which we can comply with formal French request made earlier and repeated by Alphand December 5<sup>2</sup> that US abstain on SC resolution recommending Guinea's admission. We are so informing French.<sup>3</sup> We understand UK GA Del being instructed vote affirmatively on assumption Ghana supporting Guinea application and in absence unexpected developments. Dept has been informed Canadians will vote affirmatively. You therefore authorized vote affirmatively but not sponsor or solicit support for resolution recommending Guinea admission. Should situation respect Guinea admission change materially including attitude Ghana Del, Mission should inform Dept soonest so that we can give further consideration this matter. Assume sponsorship question being satisfactorily resolved along lines outlined Delga 625<sup>4</sup> or some comparable basis. Should question Soviet sponsorship arise, inform Dept urgently. In event

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12-858. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley on December 6; cleared by Calhoun, Walmsley, Ferguson, Murphy, Jandrey, and Bacon; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Accra, London, Monrovia, Paris, and Dakar.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2073 to Paris, December 9, transmitted the substance of Alphand's conversation with Merchant. (*Ibid.*, 330/12-558)

<sup>3</sup> Herter telephoned Alphand at 11:45 a.m., December 8, to inform him of the U.S. decision. A memorandum of their conversation is in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, CAH Telephone Calls, 10/1/58 to 12/31/58.

<sup>4</sup> Delga 625, December 4, reviewed other members' positions on Guinea's application for U.N. membership and noted that the Afro-Asian group had decided Japan and Iraq would sponsor Guinea. (Department of State, Central Files, 330/12-458)



French prefer hold off GA action until closing days of sessions, Del should acquiesce if this will not give rise any misunderstanding.

Draft of brief SC statement in following message.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>5</sup> The draft statement was transmitted to USUN in telegram 529, December 8. (*Ibid.*, 330/12-858)

---

**54. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 8, 1958.*

DEAR SELWYN: Thank you for your message of November 26<sup>2</sup> on the question of rejecting Hungarian credentials.

In light of all the circumstances, we have reluctantly come to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to press for rejection of Hungarian credentials at the present session of the General Assembly. However, as a minimum we would by our statements make clear the continued concern of the Free World about the situation in Hungary.

We will, as you suggest, take action as in the past to keep the Hungarian credentials in suspense, thereby seating the Hungarians provisionally without either approval or disapproval of the Assembly. We also believe it is desirable for the Assembly to renew its condemnation of the continued violation of General Assembly resolutions by the USSR and Hungary and to take action which will provide for

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12-858. Confidential. Transmitted priority to London in telegram 5478, December 8, which is the source text, for delivery to Lloyd. An earlier draft of the letter stated that the United States would press for rejection of the Hungarian Delegation's credentials, cited the reasons for this decision, and requested that Lloyd support it. (Tedul 5 to San Francisco, December 3; *ibid.*, 310.2/12-358)

<sup>2</sup> Document 45.

continuing UN machinery to keep this matter under constant surveillance.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,

Foster<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Gadel 176, December 8, instructed the mission to work toward keeping the Hungarian credentials in suspense and to seek broad cosponsorship of a resolution condemning the actions of the Hungarian and Soviet regimes and providing for continued U.N. machinery regarding Hungary. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/12-858)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 5478 bears this typed signature.

---

## 55. Editorial Note

On December 9, the U.N. Security Council considered the admission to the United Nations of the Republics of Guinea, Korea, and Vietnam. The Security Council resolved to recommend to the General Assembly that the Republic of Guinea be admitted to the United Nations, decided against a Soviet proposal to consider the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for U.N. membership, and voted in favor of resolutions recommending that the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations. The Soviet Union, however, vetoed the latter two resolutions, and they were not adopted.

For text of the resolution on the Republic of Guinea, see U.N. doc. S/INF/13, page 12. For text of the draft resolution recommending the admission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, see U.N. doc. S/4129/Rev. 1. For text of the Soviet amendment to this resolution, see U.N. doc. S/4132. For text of the draft resolution for admitting Vietnam to the United Nations, see U.N. doc. S/4130/Rev.1. For the record of the Security Council discussion of these proposals and the votes on them, see U.N. docs. S/PV.842 and S/PV.843.

**56. Instruction From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

CA-5133

*Washington, December 11, 1958.*

## SUBJECT

Demonstrations Against Diplomatic Missions Accredited to the United Nations in New York City

The Department has watched with mounting concern the recurring demonstrations in the proximity of the building housing the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York City (as well as near buildings housing other Eastern European missions from time to time). Although the damages inflicted to the Mission buildings as result of such demonstrations has been kept to a minimum and officials of the Mission have not been injured, thanks largely to the efficient work of the New York City police, these demonstrations have brought in their wake protests from the Government of the USSR, retaliation against our Mission in Moscow, to say nothing of injuries to New York City policemen and uncomplimentary publicity. The Department appreciates the motivation of the demonstrations and has hesitated in the past to recommend a course of action which would in any manner curtail the area or the time in which these demonstrations may take place. The Department has now come to the conclusion, however, to urge upon the authorities of New York City the adoption of legislation which would give the missions accredited to the United Nations in New York City protection from public demonstrations against them as is enjoyed by diplomatic missions accredited to the United States Government in the District of Columbia, and which we expect and insist upon for our diplomatic missions abroad.

The Mission should therefore, at a high level, if convenient the Ambassador, call on the Mayor of the City of New York and leave with him the following memorandum:

“The Department of State has noted with increasing concern that demonstrations in the proximity of buildings housing diplomatic missions accredited to the United Nations, particularly missions from Eastern European nations to the United Nations, have tended to end in altercations between the demonstrators and New York City police. Although the New York City police authorities have been most efficient in providing a maximum of protection to the diplomatic personnel of such establishments and their guests, and have kept damage to physical property to a minimum, for which the Department expresses its appreciation, the demonstrations have resulted in evoking sharp diplomatic protests from the foreign governments against which the demonstrations took place, in organized retaliation against the United

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.261/12-1158. Drafted by IO/OIA; cleared by Wilcox, Kohler, Raymond, Spruks, L/EUR, EE, L/UNA, and O; and approved by Walmsley who signed for Herter. Repeated to Moscow.

States diplomatic missions abroad, and in payment by the United States Government for damages inflicted upon the physical property of the missions in New York City.

"The Department of State appreciates the motivations of the individuals and groups who have demonstrated against certain missions accredited to the United Nations. However, the Department believes that these demonstrations have assumed proportions which go beyond normal peaceful picketing. The effectiveness of these demonstrations as a means of self expression is tempered or outweighed by difficulties they make for the United States Government as host to foreign diplomatic missions, and the risk they generate of reciprocal or retaliatory actions against United States representatives and property abroad on whose protection the United States must insist.

"The Department therefore urges the City of New York to take all action that may be required to accord the missions accredited to the United Nations adequate protection from demonstrations directed against these missions. Protection of buildings occupied by diplomatic missions in the District of Columbia is afforded by statute. If it should be considered necessary to secure the adoption of new legislation as a basis for affording adequate protection the Department would support any such move."<sup>2</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>2</sup> Lodge recommended in telegram 647, December 16, that a letter signed by Henderson or Murphy be sent to Mayor Wagner instead of a memorandum. Lodge suggested also that the letter state that Hammarskjöld had sent the United Nations a November 6 note requesting U.S. support for legislation governing picketing at the U.N. headquarters and at missions accredited to the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 310.361/12-1658) A letter signed by Murphy was forwarded to the United Nations as an attachment to instruction A-146, December 31. (*Ibid.*, 310.300/12-3158)

---

## 57. Editorial Note

On December 12, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1312 (XIII) on the situation in Hungary. The resolution, which was cosponsored by the United States and 36 other nations, was adopted by a vote of 54 for, 10 against, and 15 abstentions. It expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Special Representative of the General Assembly on the Problem of Hungary; endorsed the July 14 report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary; deplored the refusal of the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to cooperate with the Special Representative and the Special Committee; deplored the continued repression of civil rights in Hungary; denounced the execution of Nagy, Maleter, and others; condemned the continued defiance of U.N. General Assembly resolutions on Hungary; called upon Soviet and Hungarian authorities to cease denying Hungarian rights; declared that the United Nations would continue to examine the situa-

tion; appointed Sir Leslie Munro to report on significant developments relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolutions on Hungary; and requested that the U.N. Secretary-General provide Sir Leslie with the facilities necessary to perform his duties. For text, see U.N. doc. A/4090. For a record of the debate and the vote on the resolution, see U.N. docs. A/PV.784-787.

The Credentials Committee of the General Assembly also met on December 12. At that meeting, the U.S. Representative proposed that the Committee "take no decision regarding the credentials submitted on behalf of the representatives of Hungary." The motion was adopted by a vote of 6 for, 1 against, and 2 abstentions. For a record of the discussion and vote, see U.N. doc. A/4074.

On December 13, the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 79 for, 1 against, and 1 abstention, Resolution 1346 (XIII), which approved without change the report of the Credentials Committee, including the section on Hungarian credentials. For text of the resolution, see U.N. doc. A/4090. For a record of the debate and vote on the resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.792.

---

#### 58. Editorial Note

On December 12, the General Assembly adopted without vote Resolution 1325 (XIII) admitting the Republic of Guinea to membership in the United Nations. For text, see U.N. doc. A/4090, page 60. For a record of the proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.789.

---

#### 59. Editorial Note

In 1959 and 1960, the Eisenhower administration considered repealing a section of the "Connally amendment" (Senate Resolution 196, enacted August 2, 1946) recognizing compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The clause in question declared that compulsory jurisdiction did not extend to "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States." For full text of the resolution, see *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949* (revised edition), page 129.

President Eisenhower announced in his State of the Union Message on January 9, 1959:

"It is my purpose to intensify efforts during the coming two years in seeking ways to supplement the procedures of the United Nations and other bodies with similar objectives, to the end that the rule of law may replace the rule of force in the affairs of nations. Measures toward this end will be proposed later, including a reexamination of our own relations to the International Court of Justice." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 6-18)

Secretary of State Dulles echoed the President's comments in a January 31 address before the New York State Bar Association, and added: "we are closely examining the question of our relationship to the International Court of Justice with the view of seeing whether ways and means can be found to assure a greater use of the Court by ourselves and, through our example, by others." (*Department of State Bulletin*, February 23, 1959, pages 255-260)

On February 9, however, Eisenhower told Dulles the administration should not initiate revision of the Connally amendment, but might accede to a congressional attempt to change it. (Memorandum from Meeker to Becker, February 16; Department of State, Central Files, 360/2-1659) Thus, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee solicited its opinion, the Department of State supported passage of Senate Resolution 94, which proposed deletion of the U.S. right to determine which matters fell under its domestic jurisdiction. (Letter from Herter to Fulbright, April 30; *ibid.*, L Files: Lot 69 D 306, LCM Chronological, 1959) For text of Senate Resolution 94, introduced and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, see *Congressional Record*, volume 105, part 4, page 5037.

Both Vice President Nixon and Attorney General Rogers spoke in favor of revising the Connally amendment. For text of Nixon's April 13 address before the Academy of Political Science in New York City, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 4, 1959, pages 622-627. The text of Roger's August 26 address before the American Bar Association in Miami Beach, Florida, is *ibid.*, September 14, 1959, pages 379-383. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, took no action on Resolution 94 that year. Following the adjournment of the first session of the 86th Congress, Senator Hubert Humphrey wrote to Eisenhower expressing his support for the President's proposal to strengthen the International Court of Justice and for Senate Resolution 94. But, he noted, there was a general feeling that "since you have indicated a desire to speak further on this subject, final action should be held in abeyance pending your message." Humphrey urged Eisenhower to make a statement defining the measures Congress should pass in order to help establish an international rule of law. In his November 17 response, Eisenhower stated that he would make such a statement on appropriate occasion. The texts of these letters, which Humphrey released on November 27, are *ibid.*, pages 128-130.

Eisenhower reiterated his support for the International Court of Justice and specifically for passage of Senate Resolution 94 in his January 7, 1960, State of the Union message. For full text of Eisenhower's statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961*, pages 3-17. Secretary of State Herter and Attorney General Rogers testified in favor of Senate Resolution 94 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 27. Their testimony is printed in *Compulsory Jurisdiction [of the] International Court of Justice: Hearings [Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate], 86th Congress, 2d Session, on S. Res. 94, January 27 and February 17, 1960*.

On March 29, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided in executive session to postpone further consideration of Senate Resolution 94. Further documentation on the resolution and proposals to revise the Connally amendment is in Department of State, Central Files, 360; and L Files: Lot 69 D 306, LCM Chronological, 1959 and 1960.

---

**60. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 16, 1959.*

**SUBJECT**

United States Support for Ambassador Dorsinville of Haiti as President of Trusteeship Council

In accordance with your request for background on the reasons why the United States is supporting Ambassador Max Dorsinville of Haiti for Presidency of the Trusteeship Council for 1959,<sup>2</sup> the following is submitted for your information:

1. In equity, this year it is the turn of a non-administering member to hold the Presidency. If Italy were to be elected in 1959, there would have been no non-administering President during 1957, 1958 and 1959 except for two months in early 1958 when Ambassador Arenales

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 350/1-1659. Confidential. Drafted by Feld; cleared in substance with Warner, Monsma, ARA, and WE; initialed by Henderson; and sent through Calhoun. The handwritten notation "Good explanation C.A.H." appears on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> The referenced request has not been found. Telegram 600 to USUN stated that the United States would support Dorinsville and instructed the mission to inform the Italian Delegation of this decision. (*Ibid.*, 350/1-959)

of Guatemala held the office. He was recalled by his Government and was replaced by Belgium as Acting President for the remainder of 1958.

2. With the expansion of UN membership, the balance of power in the General Assembly has shifted somewhat to the non-administering side, resulting in loss of prestige by the Trusteeship Council—a balanced organ, but one which the majority of General Assembly members consider to be dominated by the Administering Authorities.

3. We believe Ambassador Dorsinville will be an excellent President, because of his relative moderation and sincere endeavors to find compromises in difficult situations. Moreover, he deserves the Presidency because of his many services to the Trusteeship Council and the international community as Chairman of UN Visiting Missions to Trust Territories and as UN Commissioner to supervise the 1958 elections in French Togo. This year may well be his last chance, inasmuch as Haiti will probably go off the Council at the end of 1959. If elected, he would also be the first person of the Negro race to serve as President of an important UN organ.

4. Most importantly, we believe Ambassador Dorsinville can materially influence the decisions taken by the resumed 13th Session of the General Assembly which will consider the future of the two Cameroons. For example, he could assist greatly in obtaining General Assembly acceptance of the Reports of the UN Visiting Mission to these two Trust Territories (which are scheduled to become independent in 1960). These Reports will be fair and moderate and will have the unanimous agreement of the United States member, who was Chairman, and of the Indian, New Zealand and Haitian members. The recommendations of the Trusteeship Council thereon, if acceptable to the General Assembly, will minimize the risk that the latter will pay undue heed to the demands of the UPC (Union des Population du Cameroun), the dissolved Communist oriented party in French Cameroun. If the UPC were to come to power on the basis of General Assembly support, the West's position in the Cameroons would be seriously weakened.

5. While we highly esteem the Italian representative, Minister Vitelli, we believe that, having just joined the Council, he will make a more effective President after having served a year on it. We do not agree with his contention that 1959 will be the last year in which the Presidency will bring credit and prestige to his Government. On the contrary, we believe that 1960 will be a crucial year, because it will see the termination of trusteeship for four trust territories in Africa, including Italian Somaliland. While our policy is to make no commitments for future support, we believe Minister Vitelli, if he serves as Vice President in 1959, would be in an excellent position to obtain the Presidency in 1960. Withdrawal of his candidacy for the Presidency this year would be a very generous act, well received by the non-



administering members of the UN. We believe it would increase Italian prestige in the UN.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2123 from Rome, January 21, reported that the Italian Foreign Office informed the Embassy in Rome that Italy would withdraw its candidacy for President of the Trusteeship Council. (*Ibid.*, 350/1-1259) Brosio informed Wilcox of the Italian Government's decision on January 22. A memorandum of their conversation is *ibid.*, 350/1-2259.

---

### 61. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 2, 1959.*

DEAR SELWYN: As I wrote you on December 8, 1958,<sup>2</sup> in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at that time, we reluctantly concluded that rejection of the credentials of the Hungarian representatives should not be sought at the thirteenth General Assembly. However, we question the desirability of letting the Hungarian issue wither away, particularly in view of certain evidence that the USSR and the Hungarian authorities are tending to interpret our failure to take stronger action as an indication of weakness on our part. While it may now be too late to secure effective punitive measures against Hungary, I believe we must at least give serious consideration to all the possibilities before deciding whether to press further for such action.

Our present efforts, I believe, should be directed toward helping Sir Leslie Munro secure the cooperation of the Hungarians. If he fails, it seems to me that action in the Security Council might be useful. We are presently considering the following five steps in the order indicated: (1) a behind-the-scenes approach by Sir Leslie Munro to the Hungarians and the USSR urging them to cooperate with him on the basis of their own self-interest; (2) public approaches by Sir Leslie to the USSR and, principally, Hungary; (3) assuming the failure of these approaches, consideration by the Security Council of a resolution noting the General Assembly's findings on Hungary and urging the present regime to cooperate with Sir Leslie, which would probably be vetoed by the USSR; (4) a second resolution in the Council recommending to the General Assembly that Hungary be expelled, which would also be vetoed; (5) action at the fourteenth General Assembly to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/2-259. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newlin. Transmitted to London in telegram 6999, February 2, which is the source text, for immediate delivery. Telegram 6999 was repeated by pouch to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Document 54.

seek rejection of Hungarian credentials. I envisage that steps (1) through (4) would be completed well before September in order that we would have sufficient time to develop support for (5).

I should appreciate receiving your reactions to the plan outlined above. Of course, other considerations including the general state of our relations with the Communist bloc at the time, would have to be examined before actually proceeding in the Security Council. In the meantime, we plan to inform Sir Leslie in strict confidence that, should his efforts not bear fruit, we intend to consider Security Council action on Hungary.

Sincerely yours,

Foster<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 6999 bears this typed signature.

---

**62. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, February 10, 1959—7 p.m.*

646. Re: Hungary (Deptel 6999 to London<sup>2</sup>). Herewith my comment on Dulles letter to Lloyd February 2, 1959 contained in Deptel 6999 to London.

1. Steps (1) through (4) inclusive may be a logical approach to doing something about credentials in GA, because they seek to create an urgency and immediacy to Hungarian problem which it does not now have in minds most delegations.

2. Rejecting credentials in GA is at best, however, questionable from a legal as well as political standpoint. No one seriously questions that Hungarian credentials are technically and legally in order, and this is only ground on which, under present practice, UN considers question of credentials. Credentials of Republic of China are approved each year on this basis and to upset this practice could have serious effect on Chi Rep issue. A political action on credentials would undoubtedly also raise fears among LAs as to their own credentials in the future. For these reasons and as result of my assessment of continuing opinions among UN delegations, I continue to doubt feasibility of taking action to reject Hungarian credentials.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/2-1059. Secret; Limit Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

3. If, however, it is still felt that this is action we should take in Assembly, I question whether we should move for expulsion in SC. It is entirely possible that moving in SC for expulsion, with inevitable Soviet veto, would increase our difficulties in getting support from other delegations for further action in GA. It seems to me highly doubtful that Munro's activities, however active he may be, can or will produce enough of a new situation to justify in the minds of most delegations going into SC at this late date. I fear that most delegations, including some of those on SC, will regard this as an unnecessary straight cold war action because it cannot result in expulsion but only in a veto and, if we pursue it against their opposition, they will be even more opposed to further action at a later date in GA.

4. As noted in reference letter our relations with Communist bloc would have to be examined before proceeding in SC. In this vein an aggressive US posture on Hungary in UN in coming months might jeopardize voting support for US position on Berlin if, as appears possible, this question were brought to UN.

5. An alternative to SC action and rejection of credentials in GA might be resolutions which, in light failure Hungary to heed GA resolution or cooperate with UN Reps, recommends to member governments that they not elect Hungary to any UN or specialized agency bodies, and that they oppose any allocation of UN funds for expenditure in Hungary. Such action would raise problem of Article 5 of Charter,<sup>3</sup> which deals with suspension of "rights and privileges". But formula of recommendation to Member States or some other method might get around this problem.

**Lodge**

---

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 16.

### 63. Instruction From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

A-183

Washington, February 10, 1959.

## SUBJECT

Refusal of Soviet Bloc to Contribute to UNEF

## REFERENCE

USUN Telegram 542 of January 16, 1958<sup>2</sup>

The Department appreciates the Mission's analysis of the situation created by the refusal of Soviet bloc states to pay UNEF assessments.

The Department recognizes that the Soviet Union has demonstrated frequently its contempt for the UN, its resolutions and for financial obligations of membership. It does not want the Secretariat to become an efficient and effective administrative instrument, and it regularly works to prevent the Security Council and the General Assembly from creating collective security and peaceful settlement arrangements. The United States takes this fact into account and tries to devise ways and means of making the UN work in spite of it.

In the matter of payment of UNEF assessments, however, we are dealing with more than Soviet bloc intransigence. Twenty-four countries outside the Soviet bloc have made no payments against 1957 assessments and 41 outside the bloc have failed to pay anything against 1958 assessments.

The Department naturally is deeply concerned to promote financial responsibility on the part of all UN members. It wants to prevent any weakening of the ability of the General Assembly to act by the introduction of a kind of item veto on the UN budget.

At the 13th General Assembly, the Soviets assumed an even more uncooperative posture than before. In Committee 5, the Soviet representative said that his country would never contribute anything on any basis to UNEF or any future UN peace force operation.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, an uncooperative attitude on the part of other countries became more evident. It is believed these countries will be reluctant to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5700/2-1059. Confidential. Drafted by IO/OIA; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Nunley and Sisco; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dillon.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 542 reported that the Soviet refusal to pay its UNEF assessments had created financial problems for the United Nations and suggested ways to address this problem. (*Ibid.*, 320.5700/1-1659)

<sup>3</sup> For a summary of this statement, see U.N. doc. A/C.5/SR.697.

exert unusual pressure for UNEF payments as long as they and their friends are involved, and particularly as long as they are interested in maintaining pressure on the United States to consider alternative means of financing future UN peace force activities. The Department feels in the light of the above it is unlikely that sufficient support could be raised for any real pressure to obtain delinquent payments.

Nevertheless, the Department agrees that a constant, general pressure must be maintained on *all* UN members to pay UNEF assessments. Probably the most effective way of doing this would be for the Secretary General to utilize his existing authority to draw on the Working Capital Fund for UNEF cash needs. The Fund will then be drawn down and will remain at a dangerously low level because reimbursement from the UNEF Account will be delayed and only partial. If the prospect is that Working Capital will be exhausted at the end of 1959, the General Assembly will be forced again to consider raising the level of the Working Capital Fund. This it always does very reluctantly and only after many complaints against all those who are delinquent in their contributions. This kind of general pressure is difficult to avoid or resist and the payment record as a whole may be improved. Furthermore, the Department doubts that the Soviets would refuse to pay their share of increased advances to the Working Capital Fund. Admittedly raising the Working Capital Fund level will hit the just and the unjust, those who have paid and those who have not, but it serves to get indirectly and in part at the delinquents in a perfectly legal manner.

#### *Action Proposed*

The Mission is requested to make known to the Secretary General that the United States realizes he must draw heavily on Working Capital for UNEF and that we would support an increase in that Fund if the UNEF Account is unable to reimburse the Fund.

At the same time, the Mission should make it known:

- 1) That the United States has no objection to borrowing from the reserve account for the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance for UNEF cash needs whenever sufficient regular Working Capital is not available. In the United States view, such borrowing will further dramatize the delinquency of many nations and may encourage several who are greatly interested in technical assistance to pay their UNEF assessments. This is especially true since TA reserves may need to be drawn upon in order to maintain the TA program at the desired level in 1959.

- 2) That the United States is aware that the Secretariat has delayed payment of many UNEF bills and that it deplors such payment practices. It recommends that they be improved and brought into line with regular UN practices so far as possible.

*Further Action to be Considered*

The Department believes that a General Assembly request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, as suggested by the Mission, would certainly confirm the Charter obligation to pay UNEF assessments and thereby further dramatize the delinquency of the USSR and others. However, it should not lead us to expect that such an opinion would lead to fulfillment of USSR obligations. This move will be weighed as preparations are made for the 14th Session of the General Assembly.

The next moves in regard to the Soviet percentage in the contributions scale will not likely occur until the Contributions Committee reports in 1960 or 1961 on the basis of a new set of national income statistics. The Soviets are already aware of our views on an increase in their percentage and we may wish to pressure them further at the 14th General Assembly. However, such moves are not likely to be effective in bringing in delinquent UNEF payments.

**Dillon**

---

**64. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

G-586

*Washington, February 13, 1959—8:45 p.m.*

In connection with 14th UNGA, Department considering ways and means avoiding divisive atmosphere at very start which results from Chinese representation issue being introduced as agenda item.

Prior to 13th GA, member UKDel, New York, informally told Department British would welcome arrangement which would obviate India's raising issue as agenda item requiring initial consideration in General [Steering]<sup>2</sup> Committee. British expressed view easier handle issue when raised initially in plenary.

Department believes might be useful to ascertain willingness Foreign Office approach Indian Government (either in London or New Delhi) and ask it to refrain from taking initiative this question 14th GA

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/2-1359. Confidential. Drafted by Bock; cleared with Nunley (in draft), Bacon, Rosen, and Ludlow; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dulles. Repeated to USUN, New Delhi, and Taipei.

<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text.

as GOI has done at last three General Assembly sessions. We feel it is possible GOI willing to listen to British more sympathetically on this issue than if we were to make approach ourselves.

Undoubtedly British would have to develop own arguments to present in support of such request. Department, however, considers that following might be suggested:

1) Prior to 11th GA (except in 1950 when both India and USSR offered resolutions to seat ChiComs) issue generally raised on Soviet initiative, usually in opening plenary.

2) GOI initiative raises difficulties and complications which prevent expeditious procedural disposition of question, thus hindering smooth functioning UN machinery.

3) US feels Indian role as leading speaker and leading tactical strategist this issue not consistent Indian statements re policy non-alignment. Indians have talked great deal about need use UN machinery to improve international understanding. GOI has often urged both US and UK avoid initiatives re what Indians describe as "cold war" issues, especially in early days of session. While not always possible accept Indian advice, US and UK have always carefully considered it, and have recognized essential desirability avoiding controversy in UN re issue where such controversy serves no useful purpose. Whatever India's convictions re merits China question, must agree Indian initiative in pressing ChiRep issue in UN inevitably disturbs atmosphere and may tend weaken Indian persuasiveness in other efforts avoid useless controversy.

4) This is not question of change in Indian policy re ChiComs but rather development common understanding on methods of handling issue which would avoid starting General Assembly off on divisive note. There would be sufficient opportunity for India to state its position on ChiRep issue in course plenary.

If Embassy has objections or comments re proposed approach to UK, please advise Department prior making such approach. Otherwise, should discuss matter with Foreign Office and determine whether UK willing take initiative on question with India without indicating action taken at US request.

**Dulles**

**65. Editorial Note**

On February 20, the 13th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly resumed to consider the future of the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under French administration and the Cameroons under British administration. For the verbatim records of the resumed session, which lasted through March 13, see U.N. docs. A/PV.793-794.

---

**66. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Acting Secretary of State Herter<sup>1</sup>**

*London, February 23, 1959.*

Foster wrote to me on February 2<sup>2</sup> about Hungary and I have given careful consideration to his proposals in consultation with our posts concerned.

I agree that the Hungarian issue should not be allowed to wither away, and the General Assembly's purpose in appointing so prominent a figure as Sir L. Munro was to ensure that the question of Hungary should be kept in the public eye and that the Assembly itself should be kept informed of any developments with regard to its resolutions on Hungary. But his mandate from the Assembly is to act as rapporteur, no more. The Resolution appointing him<sup>3</sup> did not request the Hungarian or the Soviet Governments to cooperate with him, nor did it ask him to take any action with the Soviet or Hungarian authorities to secure implementation of the Assembly's resolutions. It would be consistent with the terms of the Resolution that he should approach the Hungarian and Soviet Governments and ask for their cooperation in the discharge of his mandate; and I should see no objection to his making such an approach, though I am sure that he would encounter a rebuff. To have such a rebuff on record may be a desirable preliminary if he is to submit to the Assembly a report based on other than official Soviet and Hungarian sources. But I should not favour Foster's step (1) partly because it is not in accordance with the terms of Sir L. Munro's mandate that he should try behind the scenes to persuade the Soviet

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. No salutation appears on the source text. Attached to the source text is a February 23 note from Hood forwarding the letter to Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Document 61.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1312 (XIII), December 12, 1958, see Document 57.



and Hungarian Governments that it would be in their own interest to cooperate with the United Nations; and partly because such a move would probably be countered with a charge of provocation for which public opinion would not have been prepared. As for stage (3), Sir P. Dixon considers, and I agree, that under the Charter it would be difficult to justify the summoning of the Security Council for this purpose. A difficulty I foresee as regards step (4) is that under Article 6 of the Charter,<sup>4</sup> expulsion is only foreseen in respect of persistent violation of the principles of the Charter, and in this respect the Russians are as deserving of expulsion as the Hungarians. These considerations regarding step (4) seem, however, to be hardly relevant to the role of Sir L. Munro as rapporteur.

The situation would, however, be altered if the Hungarian Government committed some conspicuous act of repression or of defiance of the United Nations which would present an obvious occasion for Security Council action. It is just conceivable, for example, that Hungarian action against Cardinal Mindszenty and the United States Legation at Budapest might provide such an occasion without effort on our part. Even so I should wish to consider the circumstances at the time before giving an opinion on the expediency of resorting to such a measure. I should not wish to see such a situation artificially engineered by us; but if it were provoked by the Hungarians and we were agreed that step (4) had become appropriate, step (5) would seem to follow.

If we were to get to stage (5)—without any development of the sort envisaged in the last paragraph—I assume that the technical basis for the rejection of Hungarian credentials would be that the Kadar Government was illegally constituted; and I think it is late to argue this.

In general, I doubt whether the General Assembly would favour the rejection of Hungarian credentials unless the Hungarian Government were to do something quite horrible while the Assembly was actually in session. I certainly do not think that the frustration of the mandate given to Sir L. Munro would be sufficient to achieve this.

As you are aware, I should regard it as a serious setback if we were to go for the rejection of Hungarian credentials and fail.

I have commented individually on the steps listed in Foster's message. I do not agree with all of them; yet in the proposed plan of action they are closely linked. I regret that such a closely linked plan does not commend itself to us, particularly in that we regard the frustrations of Sir L. Munro's mandate as an inadequate starting point

---

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 16.

for such an operation. Moreover, as I said to Foster on February 4,<sup>5</sup> I think that there is a real risk that a move against Hungary in the United Nations might create a precedent which would be used to the disadvantage of the Western Powers, e.g., over South Africa.

So far as Anglo-Hungarian relations are concerned, I have no evidence that the Soviet or Hungarian Governments are trying to exploit our failure to take stronger action in the United Nations as an indication of weakness.

More generally, I would suggest that we must be careful not to drive the more thinking elements of Hungarian society and administration to despair. While we have no exaggerated hopes of the Hungarian Government we are counting on helping to keep hope alive by contacts with actual or potential elements of discontent among the Hungarian leaders. If we adopt too harsh a policy toward the Hungarian Government, we shall be hindering this main object.

Selwyn Lloyd<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of this conversation reads: "Mr. Lloyd acknowledged that he had received the Secretary's letter about handling Hungary in the United Nations, and said that he would like to have time to study it before commenting in detail." (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1196) Dulles was in Europe, February 3-9, to consult with French, British, and German Government leaders and with the NATO Secretary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**67. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, February 26, 1959.*

DEAR FRANCIS: This is in reply to your letter of January 22 with enclosure,<sup>2</sup> concerning the admission of new members to the United Nations.

I agree that there is no practicable way to slow down or limit the admission of new members. Indeed, I do not think that the admission of new members is necessarily a bad thing for us. In fact we can make it into an advantage.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310/2-2659. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of Wilcox's letter to Lodge is *ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Correspondence—Ambassador Lodge. Regarding the attachment, see footnote 1, *infra*.

I do not agree that it will be increasingly difficult to use the General Assembly in situations which can be described as "cold war". The way in which the debate is conducted will undoubtedly change as the membership changes, but it is changing all the time anyway, with the changing course of events, and I believe that the increase of membership will increase the value of the United Nations as a forum for him who has the wit to use it.

I agree that we will be under increasing pressure from uncommitted countries to show a so-called "flexible" attitude toward the Soviet Union. But, as you know very well, it is possible to be completely firm in fact and yet not inflexible in appearance.

I do not agree that as the membership grows the atmosphere in the United Nations will become more favorable to the Soviet Union. To be sure, the United States cannot afford to look stuffy or pro-colonialist, or stick-in-the-mud. The United States has got to *be* for peaceful change, and it must *look* as though it is for peaceful change. If such is our attitude, we have nothing to fear.

Nor do I agree that so-called "colonial questions" will be increasingly difficult to deal with. They could not be any more difficult than they have been. We shall undoubtedly have to take a line that is more evolutionary and consequently less pro-Europe than it was, but it will be just as painful as always—no more and no less. I reiterate that whenever a country absents itself from the debate the way France did on Algeria last year, we should jump at the opportunity which it gives us to abstain on the entire question.

I agree that we should be prepared in the future to see that the United Nations takes no action on important questions rather than compromise on matters of principle in order to achieve a 2/3 vote. The idea that the United Nations must "resolute" on everything has always seemed to me very naive. God knows what would happen in Congress if Congress felt they had to pass a bill on every single matter that comes up.

I always stress the fact that resolutions of the United Nations are purely recommendatory and hortatory. There are very few cases in my service here where a General Assembly resolution has constituted an "over-riding moral obligation". Our condemnation of the Soviet Union on Hungary by a vote of 60 to 10 was certainly such an action, but usually they are recommendations which we can take or which we can leave, and I quite agree that we may ourselves at some future time be faced with resolutions which we do not intend to carry out.

Sincerely yours,

H.C. Lodge

68. **Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 4, 1959.

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

*Prospective Candidates*

1. Somaliland (independence 1960)
2. Nigeria (independence 1960) (possibly including all or part of British Cameroons)
3. Cameroun (independence 1960) (possibly including southern British Cameroons)
4. Togo (independence 1960)
5. Cyprus (independence by February 1960)

*Possible Candidates Within Next 5 to 10 Years*

*Most Likely*

6. The West Indies (possibly including British Guiana and British Honduras)
7. Central African Federation (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland)

*Less Likely*

8. Western Samoa (self-government 1960—but foreign relations may be handled by New Zealand)
9. Tanganyika
10. Uganda
11. Kenya
12. Sierra Leone
13. Madagascar
14. French West Africa (except Guinea), or parts thereof
15. French Equatorial Africa, or parts thereof
16. Aden

Present prospects are that the French overseas territories will remain within the French Community and therefore will not be eligible for separate membership in the UN. However, some of those listed above may become independent or States associated with France under Article 88 of the new French Constitution and thereupon apply for membership.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/3-459. Secret. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Wilcox to Herter which noted that the paper had been prepared at Dulles' request, that Becker had cleared it, and that the Office of the Legal Adviser agreed with its conclusions. Herter initialed the memorandum. A previous draft of the paper, December 30, 1958, was sent to Dulles on January 5, 1959, and to Lodge for comment on January 22. (*Ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Memoranda, 1959) The paper was revised to reflect Cyprus' probable admission to the United Nations.

The future status of the Belgian Congo and the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi is too uncertain to warrant an estimate of future constitutional change.

There is nothing at present to indicate that any change in the status of Portuguese and Spanish colonies looking toward independence is to be anticipated within the next ten years, nor are there grounds for projecting independence within this period for any of the dependent territories in the Pacific except Western Samoa.

## MEMBERSHIP IN UN BY AREA

	<i>Present UN</i> (82 Members)	<i>UN of 87</i> Members	<i>UN of 98</i> Members
<i>Western Hemisphere</i> (including US but excluding Canada)	21	21	22
<i>Old Commonwealth</i>	4	4	4
<i>Non-Communist Europe</i>	16	16	16
<i>Africa</i> (excluding UAR and Union of South Africa)	8	12	20
<i>Middle East</i>	14	15	16
<i>Far East and Pacific</i>	9	9	10
<i>Communist Europe</i>	10	10	10

*Analysis*

Omitting the three divided states whose admission to the UN depends on political settlements and is therefore unpredictable, admission by 1961 of at least five new states (total 87) appears almost certain if there is no change in the attitude of the UN membership generally toward admission. Within 10 years there is the possibility of a further addition of from 2 to 11 new members (possible total 98). All of these prospective or possible candidates are now dependent territories. The rapid progress of these areas toward independence can be measured by the fact that a similar analysis prepared in April 1957<sup>2</sup> lists but two such areas as prospective candidates. At that time only Malaya (since admitted to the UN) and Somaliland were scheduled for independ-

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a paper entitled "Forecast of New U.N. Members During the Next Decade." (*Ibid.*, Lot 60 D 113, U.N. General, 1957)

ence. While Nigeria was regarded as a likely possibility, the future status of the French trust territories was considered too uncertain to warrant an estimate with respect to the Cameroons and Togoland.

Four of the prospective candidates are from Africa and will raise the number of African UN members (exclusive of the UAR and the Union of South Africa) to 12 and, exclusive of the Arab states in Africa, to 8. The great majority of the possible candidates over the next 10 years are also from Africa and their admission could raise these figures as high as 20 and 16, respectively. Of the four remaining possibilities, 2 are in the Middle East, 1 in the South Pacific, and 1 in the Western Hemisphere.

### *Voting Situation*

UN membership for the four prospective African candidates will increase the voting strength of the Africans and Asians (including China) in the UN to 34-35 (depending on the future alignment of Cyprus). Theoretically, were these 34-35 Asian and African members to vote together they and the 10 Communist members (the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia) would have a simple majority in a UN of 87 members. In a UN of 98 members, the Africans and Asians plus the same Communist group would have four votes more than necessary for a simple majority. They would still, however, fall far short of the two-thirds majority required for decisions on "important questions"—58 in the first case and 66 in the second.

In fact, however, all the present Asian and African members do not always, or even usually, vote together or with the Soviet bloc. Nor does Yugoslavia always vote with the Soviet bloc. The Africans and Asians come closest to voting together on "colonial" and economic development issues but definitely split on East-West issues. There are certain members in both Asia and Africa that are aligned with or oriented toward the West; some among the Asians and Arabs that lean increasingly toward the USSR; and a very substantial group of "neutralists." There is no reason to expect this situation to change essentially with the admission of the prospective and possible new members. The fact that a large proportion of them are from Africa may serve to detract in some measure from such "Afro-Asian" cohesiveness as presently exists. The Africans have no close ties with the Asians and are likely to prefer African to Arab-Asian leadership if effective African leadership develops. At the same time, even with separate leadership, the new African states, being relatively unexperienced politically and economically underdeveloped, are likely to find many points of common interest and of common emotional reaction with the Asians.

In the area of East-West issues, the potential new membership can be expected to result in a very substantial addition to the "neutralist" group. There is no reason to anticipate that any of this new mem-

bership will be Communist-aligned (at least in the beginning). They are developing toward independence under Western influence and, with two exceptions in the Middle East, they are all far removed from the Communist bloc geographically and at this time, from any strong Communist influences or ties. There is reason to believe, however, that given their geographic location, their stage of political and economic development, their past experience, and the "cold war" atmosphere, most of the prospective and possible new members will lean toward "neutralism." This disposition will undoubtedly be encouraged by the power position of the USSR, its efforts to appear as a sympathetic and generous friend in those matters of most concern to the new members, and its present posture of flexibility in accommodating to neutralist sentiment, which appears to offer some hope for compromise. This disposition toward neutralism will also be encouraged by the desire of the new members to further their own immediate ends by playing the Soviet bloc off against the West.

There is no question but that the US will encounter increasing difficulty in finding built-in support for its positions in the UN as the membership grows. So far as substantive proposals on "important questions" are concerned, the problem appears to be one of degree. Any "automatic majority" the US may have had in the UN has already disappeared. We cannot now obtain the necessary two-thirds vote to carry a proposal unless some "uncommitted" members vote with us, the number required depending on the solidity of our support from Latin America, from non-Communist Europe and the "Old Commonwealth," and from among those Asian and African nations with which we have close ties. As the membership grows, and with it the voting strength of the "neutralists," the solidity of this support and our ability in competition with the USSR to attract the votes of the "uncommitted" to our proposals will become increasingly important. It is likely to prove more and more difficult to obtain a two-thirds vote, with the result that Assembly discussion may more frequently end in no action or in non-controversial resolutions, which may fall definitely short of our objectives. At the same time, we can safely anticipate continuing to have the one-third vote necessary to defeat clearly unacceptable proposals except on occasion in the economic, social, and colonial fields where the Asians and Africans can be expected to develop the greatest degree of cohesion and to be joined by a varying number of Latin Americans, depending on the issue.

The US will encounter the greatest difficulty in an expanding UN on those matters where a simple majority vote is required. Here our ability to manipulate the GA committee structure to our own advantage and to assure procedural decisions favorable to our position will be much less certain. Failure in this field could have most serious consequences, particularly on Chinese representation, where the vot-

ing margin is already narrow and on which little positive support for our position can be expected from the potential new membership. However, it does not appear that the admission of the four prospective candidates can materially affect the Chinese representation issue in the GA so long as the present voting pattern on this issue remains otherwise relatively unchanged, though it will probably narrow our margin. In fact, even if all 16 potential and possible new members voted against us on this issue the opposition would still, projecting the present voting pattern, be in the minority in a UN of 98 members, though whether this situation would be reflected in the actual vote would depend on the number of abstentions.

### *Limitation of Membership*

Despite the difficulties for the US in an ever-expanding UN, any effort on our part at this juncture to limit UN membership to more mature nations or to slow down the admission process in the case of newly independent states appears both impractical and undesirable. It is unlikely to obtain the necessary support to be successful without resort to the veto; it would seriously prejudice our relations with the states directly concerned; and in the eyes of the "anti-colonial" majority, it would place the US on the side of the colonial powers—all to the advantage of the USSR.

Though the Charter stipulates that membership is open to all "peace loving states" accepting the obligations of the Charter and "able and willing" to carry them out, these criteria have in the past been very liberally interpreted by the UN membership, including the US. We ourselves have never abstained on or voted against any applications except those of Soviet-bloc candidates. In the case of the ten newly independent nations applying for membership in the last eight years, their ability to carry out their Charter obligations has not been seriously questioned. Since 1949, no application has been referred by the Security Council to its Committee on the Admission of New Members, established to review applications in private and report its conclusions to the Council. Indonesia applied on September 25, 1950, was unanimously recommended for admission by the Council the following day, and admitted by the Assembly on September 28 by acclamation. This was the last state admitted until 1955 because of the membership deadlock. Then, however, Ceylon, Jordan, Libya, Laos, Cambodia, and Nepal were admitted as part of the "package" proposal, having previously been found qualified by the General Assembly but vetoed by the USSR in the Security Council. In 1956, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan were admitted by the unanimous vote of the General Assembly on the opening day of its 11th session following unanimous recommendations by the Security Council earlier in the year. The question of their ability to carry out their Charter obligations



was not raised in either the Council or the Assembly. The same was true in the case of Ghana, which was recommended for admission by unanimous vote of the Council the day following its achievement of independent status, and of Malaya, which the Council unanimously recommended for admission five days after it became an independent state. In all these cases, the Council has accepted without discussion the view expressed by the sponsor or sponsors of the draft resolutions adopted that reference to the Committee on the Admission of New Members could be only a formality since there was no doubt about the qualifications of the applicants under Article 4 of the Charter.<sup>3</sup> The recent admission of Guinea without reference to the SC committee and without objection, despite the reservations expressed by France and the uncertainty created by the Ghana-Guinea declaration of intention, reflected the overwhelming sentiment of the UN membership. It is a clear indication that any effort now to apply strictly the criteria set forth in Article 4 would be regarded by the applicant and its supports as discriminatory treatment, while any effort to revert to prior committee consideration in the SC would be interpreted as reflecting on the qualifications of the applicant.

There is a general disposition among UN members to favor "universality" of membership. This is true not only of the Asians and Africans but also of the Latin Americans and certain European states, the Scandinavians in particular. The Soviet bloc can be expected to support the admission of newly independent states, at least in Africa or Asia, as part of its effort to extend Communist influence. Any US attempt to reduce or slow down admissions, even if supported by the UK, France, and certain others, is therefore not likely to be successful without resort to the veto and would probably result only in a psychological loss for the US and a psychological gain for the USSR. Resort to the veto would mean a complete reversal of the position endorsed by the Vandenberg resolution of 1948<sup>4</sup> and strongly advocated by the United States ever since. Such use of the veto would be widely resented within the UN and could only alienate the newly independent states whose admissions had been vetoed.

Three of the four prospective candidates (Somaliland, Togoland, and the Cameroons) are trust territories which, therefore, will have been brought to independence under UN aegis and whose independent status will have been recognized by the GA in agreeing to the termination of the trusteeship agreements concerned. UN membership

---

<sup>3</sup> Article 4 of the U.N. Charter reads in part:

"1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."

<sup>4</sup> For text of the Vandenberg Resolution, June 11, 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. 1, p. 25, footnote 7.

has come to be regarded as the ultimate symbol of independent status, and it does not appear practical or desirable to deny this symbol for a test period to new states that are the creation of the UN. To do so would cast doubt on whether the basic objectives of the UN trusteeship system had in fact been achieved in their cases. This being so, it would be extremely difficult to justify denying or delaying membership in the case of other newly independent states whose ability to carry out their Charter obligations had been tested to no greater extent than that of the ex-trust territories.

The problem presented by the growing UN and its changing complexion is primarily one affecting the United States leadership role and the position of the older powers in the Organization. Since together we constitute no more than a small minority of the members, the suggestion that this problem be referred to a UN committee for study and recommendation does not appear practicable. Any such committee would have to be geographically representative of the membership as a whole, and it would be unrealistic to expect a committee so composed to view sympathetically, or even to see as a problem, the difficulties presented by the new UN for US leadership and for a relatively small number of older powers. This is particularly true in view of the disposition of the majority of UN members to favor "universality" and to be antagonistic to "colonialism." They could not therefore be expected to come up with recommendations tending to restrict membership in the UN. Moreover, they are jealous of their "sovereign equality" in the Organization as laid down by the Charter, and therefore could not be expected to arrive at recommendations designed to permit a more accurate reflection in the Organization of the widely divergent power positions—military, political, and economic—of its members. This estimate is borne out by the widespread opposition to any scheme for weighted voting that was evidenced at the time the Charter review question was active in 1955.

#### *Implications for US Position in the UN*

The substantial and growing number of "uncommitted" members has strengthened the USSR's position in the UN. The vote the US can expect in support of its position vis-à-vis the USSR is likely to fall noticeably short of the very substantial majority it has obtained in the past. The UN will not provide as effective a cold-war forum as heretofore. This does not mean that where the USSR is in flagrant violation of the Charter the possibility of obtaining a two-thirds vote should be precluded, but it does mean that in other situations, the US will be under strong pressure to compromise.

In these circumstances the US will be required to go as far as it can without sacrificing basic principles and objectives to meet the desires of a substantial body of the membership for resolutions that are ac-

ceptable to the membership generally, including the USSR. An appearance of inflexibility vis-à-vis the USSR will alienate rather than attract support. Moreover, the US should be careful not to prejudice the future usefulness of UN mechanisms and procedures (as might have been the case recently had we pressed our position on the Standby Peace Force item in the GA) in order to demonstrate in any given instance its imperviousness to Soviet threats or its ability to win in the face of strong opposition. At the same time, the US should not carry its flexibility to the point of giving the impression it is abdicating its leadership or is susceptible to blackmail, Soviet or other. Where basic principles and objectives are at stake, the US should make clear that it is prepared to accept a vote short of the required two-thirds—and thus to see the Assembly take no action—rather than to compromise them.

To offset the effect on “uncommitted” states, as well as on some of those that are aligned with us, of such Soviet threats as the recent ones implying the USSR’s withdrawal from, or non-participation in, the UN, the US should make clear that we regard these threats as nothing more than blackmail; that we see no evidence of slackening Soviet interest in the UN and its activities; that, on the contrary, in our view the price to the USSR of any such move would not be worth its psychological advantages since it would 1) deprive the USSR of a major mechanism for identifying itself with the nationalist, “anti-colonial” movement in Asia and Africa and for cultivating the neutralists in these areas; 2) deprive the USSR of its ability to block UN decisions disadvantageous to it; and 3) be inconsistent with the Soviet policy objectives since Stalin’s death of ending the diplomatic isolation of the Soviet bloc and gaining recognition for itself and its satellites of equal status with the “capitalist” world. We should make it clear that we will stand firm, and expect our friends to do likewise, against this blackmail, and moreover, that, even at the risk of its proving to be more than blackmail we, and they, cannot afford to give in to it.

Rather than withdrawing from the UN, the USSR may well decide to place greater emphasis on the UN as the atmosphere there becomes more favorable to it. The USSR may become an increasingly active participant in various fields of UN endeavor as part of its effort to cultivate the “uncommitted” and gain recognition of its “equal status.” The Soviet drive for “parity,” symbolic or real, can be expected to intensify.

In the new UN, the quid pro quo factor will assume increasing importance in marshalling support for the US position. As the number of “uncommitted” members grows their bargaining position will be enhanced, and their support on matters of vital interest to the US can be expected to become more and more conditional on receiving our support both inside and outside the UN on matters of primary concern

to them. In this situation the US will be faced with serious difficulties in the economic and "colonial" fields, where the desirability of being responsive to the urgent desires of the "uncommitted" countries must be weighed against what it is desirable and feasible to do in terms of the long-range interests of the states whose political and economic development is involved, the impact on our relations with the states already committed to us and the retention of whose support is essential to the US position, and the costs in money and manpower.

To minimize the quid pro quo factor, US positions in the UN will need to be such that the "uncommitted" members will find them difficult to oppose from the standpoint of rightness in the moral sense, and reasonableness in the political sense. The US will also need to be as responsive to the desires of the "uncommitted" where their own immediate objectives are concerned as over-all policy considerations permit. Where such problems as racism are involved, with their highly emotional content, the US must stand firmly on principle. While the development of a responsible approach to international relations, both bilateral and multilateral, on the part of the newly independent states can only be expected as they gain in experience, thought should be given to continuing through the UN and its mechanisms the guidance and assistance previously received from the administering powers.

In this connection, besides the various forms of UN technical and economic assistance, the possible device of a UN presence of some type in such states has been suggested, to which they might turn for information and advice. A UN presence would at the same time serve to make more difficult the exploitation of the inexperience of the newly independent states by others for their own ends. Any arrangement of this sort would of course require the consent of the state concerned. This consent would probably be easiest to obtain in the case of ex-trust territories, but other newly independent states might prefer assistance from this source to that of a bilateral character.

It is unlikely that the new UN can be developed into an effective instrument for collective security action. It should, however, continue to be useful in the field of pacific settlement, particularly where the problem is not essentially an East-West one or one having strong "colonial" implications. These latter questions, moreover, may be expected to become less prominent in the UN as more and more now-dependent areas achieve self-governing or independent status. On the other hand, emphasis on the economic and social functions of the UN is likely to continue to increase.

It is possible that the US will wish to make a more selective use of the UN as it grows in size and its character changes. It is possible that the General Assembly may become too unwieldy a body for its present purposes. The Secretary General in these circumstances is likely to play an increasingly important role. Greater reliance may have to be

placed in sub-bodies. While it would be unrealistic to expect the establishment by the GA of subordinate bodies that do not reflect fairly accurately the complexion of the UN as a whole, smaller bodies could reduce our operating problems somewhat. Greater emphasis on the more selective Councils, as against the General Assembly, would appear to be to our advantage, and serious consideration should be given whether we should not consciously strive to direct the trend back toward greater reliance on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, respectively. (The future of the Trusteeship Council is currently under review in light of the reduction in the number of trust territories and of administering powers that is anticipated.)

The eventual enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to reflect the increased UN membership must be anticipated if we are to have greater recourse to them, and it is not likely that the very modest enlargements so far advocated by the US will prove generally acceptable. The prospect of a substantially enlarged Economic and Social Council does not have too serious implication for the US, since it can only recommend. This is not true, however, in the case of the Security Council. Here, where we could easily lose with enlargement the certain majority we have enjoyed to date, we should review carefully whether it is in the long-run US interest to go as far in giving up our veto power as we have said in the past we could go.

We should also weigh carefully whether it is advisable to continue to emphasize the over-riding moral obligation of UN members to carry out General Assembly resolutions, instead of the recommendatory character of these resolutions. We may ourselves at some future time in the new UN be faced with resolutions we cannot or do not consider it in the national interest to implement.

69. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 11, 1959.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your letter of February 23 in which you commented on the five-step course of action on Hungary suggested in Secretary Dulles' February 2 letter to you.<sup>2</sup>

I am glad to see that we agree on the necessity for not permitting the Hungarian issue to die through inaction. However, we have a somewhat different view of Sir Leslie's mandate and the extent to which the Soviets and the Hungarians are interpreting our failure to take stronger action at the last General Assembly as an indication of weakness. Concerning the latter, it appears to me that Zorin's statement hailing the reduced majority for the resolution on Hungary as a "victory",<sup>3</sup> the offensive Hungarian note of January 27 which the American Legation in Budapest was instructed to return,<sup>4</sup> and the recent threatening complaints to the United Kingdom, French, and Italian Missions in Budapest regarding the policies of their respective Governments on Hungary,<sup>5</sup> are all indicative of aggressive attitudes which should not be encouraged by seeking to restrict the scope of Sir Leslie Munro's activities.

We consider Sir Leslie's mandate sufficiently broad to enable him to do as much or as little as he sees fit. He is certainly more than a rapporteur, since this title was deliberately rejected in favor of that of "Agent" at the time the resolution on Hungary was drafted in New York. When other co-sponsors objected to the connotations surrounding the word "Agent", the language finally decided upon was "De-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Newlin on March 3.

<sup>2</sup> Lloyd's letter is Document 66. Dulles' letter is Document 61.

<sup>3</sup> Zorin's statement has not been identified.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 215 from Budapest, January 29, transmitted the text of a January 27 note from the Hungarian Government which termed relations between the United States and Hungary "abnormal and absurd" and accused the United States of pursuing a "consistently hostile policy" toward Hungary. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/1-2959) Telegram 175 to Budapest, January 30, instructed the Legation to return the note to the Hungarian Foreign Office and to state that its tone belied the Hungarian Government's assertion that it wished to establish normal relations with the United States. (*Ibid.*, 611.64/2-2959) Telegram 217 from Budapest, January 31, informed the Department of State that the note had been returned. (*Ibid.*, 611.64/1-3159)

<sup>5</sup> Despatch 466 from Budapest, February 20, transmitted a copy of the Hungarian note to the British Legation. (*Ibid.*, 310.364/2-2059) Despatch 484 from Budapest, February 27, reported that the Legation had seen the Hungarian notes to the French and Italian Legations and compared their texts to the note the British Legation had received. (*Ibid.*, 310.364/2-2759)

cides to appoint Sir Leslie Munro to represent the United Nations for the purpose of reporting to Member states or to the General Assembly on significant developments relating to the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Hungary." Although the resolution does not require him to approach the Soviet and Hungarian authorities or call upon the Communist regimes concerned to cooperate with him, he is not limited to the narrow functions of a rapporteur. The reference to implementation of the Assembly's resolutions makes this abundantly clear.

Sir Leslie himself suggested that he might begin his activities with informal behind-the-scenes approaches to the Soviets and the Hungarians. I believe that, although the prospects of success are dim indeed, Sir Leslie should not be discouraged from his proposed private initiatives. Communist charges of provocation, if made, would probably only serve further to advertise Soviet and Hungarian intransigence, and would be unlikely to affect adversely our own objectives with respect to Hungary. Moreover, I am convinced that Sir Leslie Munro, in any case, should be encouraged to make eventual public approaches to the Soviets and the Hungarians before he prepares his report. I hope upon further consideration this course will commend itself to you.

We have told Sir Leslie Munro that we hope he will keep us informed during his public and private efforts, as well as during the preparation of his report. Such close coordination should be mutually valuable.

In the event Sir Leslie's efforts fail, I continue to believe that we must then consider what further action should be sought on Hungary in the United Nations. In the light of your letter of February 23 and after further consideration here in the Department of State, I agree that we should postpone consideration of moves to expel Hungary through action in the Security Council or to press for rejection of Hungarian credentials at the next General Assembly. The situation mentioned in your letter, i.e., the possibility that the Hungarian regime might commit flagrant future outrages, had also occurred to me and is a strong argument for keeping in reserve drastic action in the Security Council and the General Assembly on Hungary. Meanwhile, I suggest we continue to maintain close consultation on the subject of Hungary and carefully watch developments in that country.

Sincerely yours,

**Christian A. Herter**<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

**70. Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

CA-8216

Washington, March 26, 1959.

## SUBJECT

The Future of the Trusteeship Council

## REFERENCES

USUN's 483 of December 19, 1958 and Delga 762 of March 5, 1959; Deptel 621 of January 19, 1959<sup>2</sup>

The Department refers to Delga 762 regarding the informal meeting, which was attended by Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, held on March 4 to consider the future of the Trusteeship Council.

The Department recently received, under cover of an informal note from an official of the British Embassy, a summary of the tentative views of the United Kingdom on the future of the Trusteeship Council.<sup>3</sup> These views were advanced during recent Anglo-French discussions held in February 1959 but do not constitute a firm United Kingdom position. Rather, the United Kingdom stated that it was advancing its views preliminary to holding exploratory talks in New York in order to determine what the other administering powers think the best course would be before the United Kingdom considers further steps. The informal views transmitted by the United Kingdom on this question are summarized as follows:

A problem will be posed when France ceases to be an administering member, probably in 1960, when French Togoland and French Cameroun are expected to become independent, and Italy, not being a permanent member of the Security Council, loses its membership altogether on the attainment of independence by Somaliland in 1960. Thus the Charter would appear to require that Italy leave the Council and France become a non-administering member but that the elected non-administering members would have to complete their three-year terms. The administering members would thus be placed in a minority until the end of 1961, when the terms of three elected non-administering members (Burma, Paraguay and the UAR) expire. Assuming the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 350/3-2859. Confidential. Drafted by Feld; cleared by Green, Cargo, Nunley, McNutt, van Heuven, and Walmsley; initialed by Sisco; and approved by Gerig. Repeated to Brussels, Canberra, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Taipei, and Wellington.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 483 reported on a meeting of administering authority representatives regarding the Trusteeship Council's future and requested instructions on the issues raised at that meeting. (*Ibid.*, 350/12-1958) Delga 762 is *ibid.*, 350/3-559. Telegram 621 to USUN outlined the Department's views on the Council's future. (*Ibid.*, 350/12-1958)

<sup>3</sup> A copy of the February 26 memorandum is *ibid.*, 350/2-2659.



letter of the Charter were followed, upon the expiration of the terms of the three non-administering members the Council would be reduced to ten members—Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States as administering members and China, France, the Soviet Union and the remaining two elected non-administering members on the non-administering side. Moreover, the presence of a former administering member (France) on the non-administering side might be resented by the anti-colonial powers who could argue that parity did not exist in reality. This in turn would tend to weaken the authority of the Trusteeship Council in the eyes of the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the General Assembly which might accentuate its current tendency to override or bypass the Trusteeship Council. The United Kingdom would consider this as regrettable since it regards the Trusteeship Council as a valuable body in view of its continuing responsibilities as Administering Authority for Tanganyika and its consequent desire to see the Council retain its effectiveness. The United Kingdom, however, suggests two possible approaches to this problem which had already been mentioned tentatively in earlier discussions:

(1) That means be found to allow France and Italy to retain their status as administering powers notwithstanding the grant of independence to their Trust Territories;

(2) That the permanent members of the Security Council renounce their right to belong automatically to the Council so that non-administering members could be elected.

A third course of action had been proposed by Iran to the United Kingdom, namely, to have an equal number of administering and non-administering members plus the non-administering members of the Security Council "sitting on the cross benches."

The United Kingdom points out that the second and third proposals would certainly require an amendment of the United Nations Charter, as would probably the first proposal as well. The United Kingdom does not consider that the second proposal would be acceptable to the permanent members of the Security Council (including itself) and could be regarded as ruled out. Furthermore, it believes that the third, i.e., (the Iranian) proposal would disturb the principle of parity and not necessarily to the United Kingdom's advantage; it would therefore not be acceptable to the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom believes that the most satisfactory solution, politically, and the one least in conflict, legally with Article 86 of the Charter,<sup>4</sup> would be to allow France and Italy to retain their status as administering members. The United Kingdom points out that for the short term no course of action could be entirely reconciled with the

---

<sup>4</sup> Article 86 of the U.N. Charter concerns membership in the Trusteeship Council.

terms of Article 86 which recognizes at the same time parity between administering and non-administering powers and three-year terms for those elected in the latter capacity. This was perhaps due to the fact that the drafters of the Charter had not foreseen that the administering members might lose their character as administering members in the intervals between elections of non-administering powers.

The French stated that it could be argued that parity had priority over the three-year term stipulation, but the United Kingdom legal advisers felt that both principles were absolute. The latter also felt that it might be just legally tenable to maintain that "administering" in Article 86 should be interpreted to mean not exclusively "currently administering" but "founder administering powers and currently administering powers." This would exclude Italy but keep the Council at a membership of 12 with France on the administering side (Italy not having been a founder administering power).

The United Kingdom memorandum stated that after the Anglo-French talks, the following points were tentatively agreed:

(1) That further discussion should be held in New York initially among administering powers on policy;

(2) That it might be worthwhile to consider during these talks the proposal that the Council be temporarily "frozen" at its present size with France and Italy being classed as administering powers so long as five non-administering elected members remained on the Council; it being borne in mind that this temporary measure might or might not pave the way for a solution of the longer term problem on the same lines; and

(3) That the question of tactics be taken up when policy views are clearer.

In its reply to the United Kingdom memorandum, the Department repeated the views contained in its instruction of January 19, 1959 to USUN.<sup>5</sup>

With regard to the possible approaches to the problem contained in the United Kingdom memorandum the Department also set forth the following tentative views in its reply:

1. Any solution involving amendment of the Charter should be based on the desirability of having the Council continue as a useful body. This springs from the fact that the United States (as in the case of the United Kingdom with respect to Tanganyika) is administering the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and will probably continue to do so for some time. In view of the legal requirements for Charter review, any such solution would, of course, have to be acceptable to the great majority of United Nations members, as well as to all of the

---

<sup>5</sup> The instruction is presumably telegram 621 to USUN, cited in footnote 2 above. On March 30, Dorman sent the First Secretary of the British Embassy, Charles Wiggin, a memorandum outlining the tentative U.S. views on the future of the Trusteeship Council. (Department of State, Central Files, 350/2-2659)

permanent members of the Security Council. It is in this light that it is necessary to examine not only the alternatives set forth in the Annex to the United Kingdom memorandum but also to anticipate other proposals designed to have the membership of the Council represent more accurately the climate of the Fourth Committee.

2. Barring Charter review as a practical solution, the range of possibilities appears to be limited. Thus, with reference to the suggestion in the Annex to the United Kingdom memorandum regarding renunciation by permanent members of the Security Council of their right to belong automatically to the Trusteeship Council so that all non-administering members could be elected, in our view Article 86 does not leave to the members of the Security Council the discretion to renounce membership in the Trusteeship Council. Similarly the Iranian proposal mentioned in the Annex to the United Kingdom memorandum, although possibly quite interesting politically, clearly excluded by the language of Article 86.

3. The Annex to the United Kingdom memorandum describes the suggestion that the outgoing Administering Authorities remain on the Council notwithstanding the cessation of their duties, as being least in conflict legally with Article 86. If this suggestion means that France would stay on the Council indefinitely as a "founder administering power" (Italy having joined the United Nations only in 1955), it would obviously be contrary to the precise terms of Articles 86 and 81.<sup>6</sup> If, however, France and Italy were to stay on the Council as Administering Authorities only until the expiration of the terms of three non-administering members, this would appear to be a possibility not inconsistent with Article 86. Although Article 86 admittedly does not explicitly provide for the case in which Administering Authorities cease administering Trust Territories in the interval between elections for non-administering members, its language does give some indication about the intent of the drafters. Thus, Article 86, 1., c., states "as many other members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer Trust Territories and those which do not" (underlining supplied). In the view of the Department, this indicates that the number of non-administering members having membership on the Council is to be governed by the principle of parity. The stipulation for a three-year term should, therefore, be read so as to satisfy this requirement of parity. If, consequently, and Administering Authority ceased to exercise the administration of a Trust Territory, thereby reducing the number of Administering Authorities on the Council by one, there would be need for one less "other Member" as specified in Article 86, 1., c. The Department, therefore, agrees with the French view that the three-year term requirement is subject to the overriding principle of parity. If, however, both the parity principle and the three-year term requirement are to be observed, it might be suggested that a retiring Administering Authority serve as such on the Council until the end of a term of a non-administering member.

<sup>6</sup> Article 81 of the U.N. Charter concerns the administration of trust territories.

4. The foregoing views of the Department are tentative and exploratory in nature. Since diverse interpretations are possible, even within the terms of Article 86, and since eventually agreement must be reached on a broad basis, the Department agrees with the United Kingdom view that it will be highly useful to obtain the views of other Governments on as wide a basis as possible. With this in mind, therefore, the Department favors extending informal consultations beyond the limited group of Administering Authorities at an appropriate stage in the consideration of this question.

The Department agrees moreover, with the suggestions tentatively agreed to during the United Kingdom's discussions of this question with the French, namely, 1) that further discussions be held in New York, initially among Administering Authorities, on this question, and 2) that it would be worthwhile to consider carefully and possibly request the ICJ to render an advisory opinion regarding the proposal that the Council should be temporarily "frozen" at its present size, with France and Italy being classed as Administering Authorities, so long as five non-administering elected members remain on the Council; it being borne in mind that this temporary measure might or might not pave the way for a solution of the longer term problems on the same lines.

#### *Action Requested*

USUN is requested to take the above views into consideration in any further discussion of this question held in New York, and to report the results of such discussions to the Department.

FYI. The Department hopes that it will be possible for France and Italy to remain on the Council on the administering side until the end of 1961 when the terms of Burma, Paraguay and the United Arab Republics expire. This will permit the Council to remain at fourteen members for nearly three years, thus providing at least a short-term solution of the problem of the Council's future. This is perhaps the most that can be achieved at this time in view of the limited chances for Charter revision. End FYI.

**Herter<sup>7</sup>**

---

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The annex enclosed with the airgram is not printed.

**71. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 9, 1959.*

DEAR SELWYN: You are no doubt aware that an issue has arisen in the Board of Governors of the IAEA in Vienna concerning a proposal of the IAEA Secretariat to send a technical assistance survey mission to five East Asian countries, including the Republic of China. A similar mission was sent to five Southeast Asian countries in January of this year after approval by the Board of Governors. The sending of the second mission to the five FE countries is being challenged, however, by the Soviet Union in pure cold war terms on the basis of the inclusion of the Republic of China on the mission's itinerary. It is expected that, when the Secretariat's proposal comes to a vote in the Board, the Soviets will move that the Republic of China be dropped from the mission.

In our view, such an exclusion of the Republic of China would be a violation of that country's right to technical assistance as a full and equal member of the Agency. We believe that a basic principle is involved and that Soviet success in this tactic would be detrimental to the Free World and Agency interests.

The Foreign Office has taken the position that, while your government would be able to vote affirmatively for the mission as a whole, with an appropriate statement explaining its vote, it would be forced to abstain on a separate vote on the Republic of China.

In the representations of the Department of State and our Embassy in London to your government, we have stressed the following points: (1) the Republic of China is a full member of the IAEA entitled to equal treatment in receiving technical assistance from the Agency; (2) the Agency is a technical organization whose operations will be seriously impaired if political reservations are raised each time a member's request for technical assistance is considered; (3) the position of your government with respect to the membership of the Republic of China was made clear at the time of the latter's ratification of the Statute;<sup>2</sup> (4) your government has supported technical assistance to the Republic of China in the UN and several of its specialized agencies and we hoped it would follow these precedents in the IAEA; and, finally and most important, (5) this issue is not a question of creden-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Stanger. Transmitted priority to London in telegram 8964, April 9, which is the source text. Telegram 8964 was repeated priority to Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done at New York October 26, 1956, entered into force July 29, 1957. (8 UST 1093)

tials and we hoped that your government would not extend its views on the credentials question into a matter affecting normal operations within a UN agency. We, therefore, requested your government to vote affirmatively on the Far East mission as a whole or on a separate vote on the GRC.

These representations have not been successful, however, and I am therefore appealing to you to give your personal attention to this problem in terms of the political considerations involved rather than the more narrow legal ones. I sincerely believe that the position of your government apparently equating the issue of technical assistance to a member of a UN agency with the credentials question has grave and far-reaching implications. It could jeopardize the whole concept of technical assistance administered through the UN and its Agencies to Member States. Moreover, Soviet success in downgrading the government of the Republic of China through this maneuver would tend to undermine the latter's position as a full and equal member in other UN agencies and quite possibly have other undesirable repercussions far beyond the immediate issue involved. It would involve a public US-UK division on China of a completely new character which might be interpreted as involving a significant policy change, which we do not believe your government intends.

I therefore strongly hope that your government's instructions will be altered to permit its Delegation in Vienna to vote to include the Republic of China in this technical mission, however the issue may arise. We know of no other case where your government has refused to concur in the normal program of the UN and its agencies involving a Member State in good standing. As previously stated, the US is fully prepared to accept an explanation of your vote, if your government feels this necessary.

Most sincerely,

Chris<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 8964 bears this typed signature.

## 72. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Acting Secretary of State Herter<sup>1</sup>

*London, April 13, 1959.*

DEAR CHRIS: I have given very careful thought to your message of April 9<sup>2</sup> about the despatch of an International Atomic Energy Agency Mission to the Far East. We are naturally as anxious as you to keep in step as far as possible and to avoid public differences and I have, therefore, sympathetically reconsidered the whole question with the aim of seeing how far we can go to meet you.

I will not rehearse in this message all the details of our views, some of which are referred to in your message, which are generally known to your Embassy here. The fundamental difficulty however lies in the fact that we recognise the Chinese People's Government as the Government of China whereas you recognise that of Chiang Kai-shek. It was because of our recognition of the Peking Government that we could not logically consider that the nationalist signature of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency could bind the State of China so as to make it a member of the Agency. It was for this reason that we made the reservation attached to our ratification of the Statute and felt unable to vote in favour of sending a Mission to "China" as a member of the Agency.

If, however, it would help you, I should be prepared to instruct our delegation to vote in favour of the despatch of a Mission to Nationalist China in a separate vote (if it comes to this) but this would have to be accompanied by an explanation on the following lines: "In voting for the despatch of this Mission, I wish to make it clear that I understand this as a vote for the despatch of a Mission to the territory at present administered by the Nationalist authorities. I support the despatch of a Mission to that territory but my vote does not imply any retraction from the position stated in the reservation made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government at the time of their ratification of the Statute regarding the validity of the signature which purported to have been made on behalf of China or any recognition of the Nationalist authorities as the Government of China".

Alternatively, as explained to your Embassy here, we should be prepared either to abstain in a separate vote, in which case we should not need to make any statement, or to vote in favour of a "package" proposal for the despatch of a Mission to all the territories concerned including "China" with a statement that this did not imply any retrac-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. Attached to the source text was a note from Hood forwarding the letter to Herter. The notation "CAH saw" is written on Hood's transmittal letter.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

tion from the position stated in the reservation made at the time of our ratification of the Statute regarding the validity of the signature which purported to have been made on behalf of China.

We should, in any case, be prepared to support you in a procedural motion designed to ensure that the proposal for the Mission is voted on as a whole.

With warm regards,

Selwyn<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Telegram 9106 to London, April 14, transmitted a letter from Herter thanking Lloyd for reconsidering the issue and noting that a separate vote and the proposed British statement were acceptable to the United States. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

---

**73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 13, 1959.*

SUBJECT

Eastern European Seats of Various UN Bodies

I recommend the establishment of a new policy for arrival at decisions on candidacies for various United Nations offices. Whereas I recognize the need for flexibility and provision for exceptions under any policy, I believe that the present practice of deciding on candidates for vacated Eastern European seats on an ad hoc basis is illogical, time-consuming, and cumulatively harmful to our basic policy of supporting the United Nations. My reasons follow.

1. The ad hoc approach creates jurisdictional difficulties. As particular cases arise, EUR inclines to favor continued US support of customary patterns of regional allocation, including customary allocations to Eastern Europe, in the absence of special circumstances. Other Bureaus incline to propose that Eastern European vacancies be filled by worthy candidates from their own areas. It is frustrating to attempt to decide this kind of question on its individual merits, since EUR itself sees no merit in supporting a Soviet bloc candidate except in terms of general principles of regional distribution. If we begin with the as-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Memoranda, 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Nunley and Merchant. Cleared in AF, ARA, FE, NEA, and IO.



sumption that the field is wide open and hence have no obligation to be guided by customary patterns of allocation, I would always favor supporting a friend rather than an enemy or neutral. On the other hand, if EUR in support of a principle continues to resist attacks on Eastern European seats on a case-by-case basis, I foresee time wasted by you and Assistant Secretaries in resolving these disagreements. This is absurd. We need a general guideline which will permit us to resolve the great majority of these inter-regional disputes at the working level.

2. The absence of such a guideline can disadvantage overall US policy. The US has an interest in sustaining established regional allocation patterns as they affect friendly nations, and I think it is a mistake to give the appearance of ignoring these patterns whenever it suits our convenience. Most other governments, including allies, neutrals and the Soviet bloc itself, tend to adhere rather meticulously to customary allocations. A contrary practice isolates the US on this issue. It places us in the position of seeming to wage petty battles against the Soviet bloc without real profit. Finally, I believe present practice tends to undermine our basic position in resisting Soviet demands for parity in UN organs. We have opposed parity primarily on the grounds that UN bodies should fairly represent the whole UN membership. This argument will obviously be undermined unless we demonstrate respect for the right of the Soviet bloc to fair representation in UN organs.

3. The ad hoc approach creates embarrassment for us in those instances where we continue to accept Soviet bloc candidacies. In the past, for example, we have been able to justify a refusal to support Norway for an Eastern European vacancy simply on the grounds that the vacancy occurred in Eastern Europe. However, if it is a matter of general knowledge that we are supporting free world candidates in numerous instances, such as the Philippines for an Eastern European vacancy sought by Poland, I do not see how we can justify a refusal to support anybody for a seat sought by the Ukraine, Hungary or Rumania. In other words, once we preclude ourselves from using the geographical argument, diplomatic pressures from our friends will virtually compel us to oppose Eastern European candidacies in nearly every instance.

4. The ad hoc approach fails to take account of the real needs for regional representation within UN bodies. Thus far, we have occasionally supported Far Eastern and Western European candidates to fill Eastern European vacancies, but we have rarely supported a Near Eastern candidate, and to the best of my knowledge have never supported a candidate from Africa, where the need for increased representation is most acute. The ad hoc approach precludes any balance readjustment of regional representation.

5. Perhaps the most important objection to the present practice is the fact that we have accomplished very little in the way of concrete results. We have almost never been successful in actually displacing a Soviet bloc candidate for a seat which the rest of the world regards as the "legitimate property" of Eastern Europe. If we are really serious in our belief that Eastern Europe is grossly over-represented in UN organs and are also convinced (as I am) that Asia and Africa deserve more representation, then I think we should stop giving purely nominal support to free world candidates on an ad hoc basis and make an active effort to get allied support for a reasonable reduction in Soviet voting strength all across the board.

As an alternative to present practice, I would propose the following course of action:

(a) We should make a direct and forceful approach to the USSR on the enlargement question. We should tell the USSR that we believe Asia and Africa deserve increased representation and that the Soviet bloc is over-represented. We should point out that we are prepared to support fair representation for the Soviet bloc, but that, unless the USSR ceases to block enlargement proposals, we see no alternative to a campaign aimed at reducing Soviet bloc representation to reasonable proportions.

(b) If the USSR refuses to make a deal on enlargement, IO and the geographic bureaus of the Department should work out a careful plan for the reduction and reallocation of Soviet bloc seats in all UN organs. We should leave Eastern Europe with representation in each UN organ roughly equivalent to the ratio of Soviet bloc membership to UN membership as a whole. Any Eastern European seats in excess of this margin should be reallocated, either to particular regions where the need for representation is greatest, or perhaps to a category of "floating seats."

(c) Once a broad and equitable plan for a general reallocation of Eastern European seats has been developed, we should undertake intensive consultations with our friends and allies on this plan, particularly those in the NATO area and in Latin America, seeking their support. We should explain our position in detail, pointing out that the Soviet Union is responsible for blocking enlargement and that a planned reduction of Soviet bloc seats is the best alternative available. We should try to minimize possible WE and LA anxieties that their own seats may be put in jeopardy by promising firm support to sustain customary allocation patterns in the free world, pending eventual enlargement. We should also explain our willingness to respect the right of the Soviet bloc to *fair* representation, once over-representation has been corrected.

(d) When these consultations are concluded, we should undertake an open and vigorous campaign to replace EE incumbents in all seats ear-marked for transfer to the free world. We should justify our position publicly, emphasizing that the Soviet Union is continuing to block enlargement but emphasizing also our respect for legitimate representation from the Soviet bloc. We should explain that a truly adequate correction of the under-representation of Asia and Africa can come

only through the enlargement of UN bodies, but that meanwhile, so long as the Soviet bloc continues to thwart Asian and African demands for increased representation, it should pay the penalty.

I believe the foregoing course of action would have numerous advantages. It should place the US in a reasonable position before world opinion. It would give us credit for a serious initiative to meet the representational needs of Asia and Africa. It would avoid the impression that we are "nibbling" at Soviet bloc seats as a cold war maneuver. If we can persuade our allies to support us, it would make our opposition to Soviet bloc over-representation effective rather than nominal. It would permit us to work out a fair and balanced redistribution of the seats removed from the Soviet bloc, rather than leaving this redistribution to chance. Finally, the course of action suggested would minimize petty wrangling among the geographic bureaus of the Department and permit the great majority of these seating issues to be resolved more or less automatically.

*Recommendation:*

That authority be given IO to pursue the course of action outlined above in collaboration with the geographic bureaus.

---

**74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 17, 1959—5:22 p.m.*

822. Re: 14th GA President. USUN should inform UK Delegation Dept sees two serious difficulties in possible Boland candidacy for President 14th GA: (1) uncertainty re region from which next candidate will be selected, and (2) Irish refusal support moratorium formula on Chinese representation.<sup>2</sup> (Normally, LA holds presidency every four years; however, LA has held presidency since Western Europe. Moreover, US has no clear indication at present re LA and Western European sentiments this matter.)

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/4-1759. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on April 14; cleared by Bacon, Ludlow, AF, Monsma, and Nunley; and approved by Walmsley who signed for Murphy.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a policy the United States pursued in the General Assembly and other international meetings which declared that the meeting would not consider any proposals to seat delegates of the People's Republic of China or to exclude representatives of the Republic of China.

Belaunde's candidacy is long standing. When Malik deferred his candidacy from 12th to 13th GA to allow uncontested election Munro, Belaunde in turn postponed his candidacy from 13th to 14th GA. If European candidacy develops and is maintained against LA-supported candidacy, result might be painful split in free-world vote. If LA's decide not press Belaunde or other candidacy at next session, we assume West European would be logical choice, but US could not possibly support Boland without modification Irish position on Chinese representation. If developments should indicate likelihood of candidacy from European region and Boland candidate, US will probably wish discuss directly with Irish Government problem of Irish policy on Chinese representation. Moreover, unless some agreement possible with him on handling ChiRep issue, Dept would be reluctant see Boland Chairman Committee One because of implication this chairmanship for future GA presidency.

Dept would appreciate receiving such background information as USUN has or can obtain on reported LA split over Belaunde's candidacy and USUN's estimate seriousness this split.<sup>3</sup>

**Murphy**

---

<sup>3</sup> Lodge reported in telegram 1033 from USUN, May 20, that Correa and others had informed the mission that the Latin American nations planned to support Belaunde, although some were still unhappy about the idea. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/6-2059) Barco reported in telegram 1112 from USUN, June 8, that the Latin American caucus had agreed unanimously to support Belaunde. Barco recommended that the United States inform Peru it would vote for him, stating that Lodge agreed with this recommendation. (*Ibid.*, 320/6-859)

---

**75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 21, 1959—8 p.m.*

2170. Re possible Indonesian candidacy for President 14th GA (urtel 3466),<sup>2</sup> Embassy may use following background information in its discretion: In view fact presidency 1956 and 1958 held by Wan (Thailand) and Malik (Lebanon), respectively, there little likelihood

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/5-1659. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on May 19; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Green, Bacon, Nunley, Ludlow, and Monsma; and approved by Walmsley who signed for Dillon. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3466, May 16, reported that Indonesia might try to obtain the U.N. General Assembly presidency. (*Ibid.*)

any candidate from Asia would find general acceptance 1959. Under principle rotation among regions normally followed by GA both Latin American and West European may be expected hold presidency before another Asian. Last European presidency was 1954 and last Latin American, 1955. Belaunde (Peru) has been announced candidate election 14th GA President since 12th GA in 1957 when Peru, in interest avoiding conflict that year between Munro (New Zealand) and Malik (Lebanon), decided postpone announced Belaunde candidacy for President 13th GA to 14th session. It therefore likely Belaunde candidacy already has substantial support because of both its long-standing character and circumstances 1957 postponement.

FYI. Among other considerations while Dept following its usual practice has so far made no commitment re 14th GA presidency, assume Embassy aware effect Indonesian position re Chinese representation issue would have on any prospect US support Indonesian candidacy. Embassy's attention also called CA 9808 pouched May 12.<sup>3</sup> End FYI.

**Dillon**

---

<sup>3</sup> CA-9808 relayed to the Embassy in Djakarta rumors that Indonesia might be a candidate for the General Assembly presidency. (*Ibid.*, 320/5-1259)

---

**76. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, May 26, 1959—6 p.m.*

1056. Re: Hungary.

1. As we are approaching time for preparation of GA position papers, I reiterate my suggestion in USUN 646, February 10<sup>2</sup> that Department consider res for next GA recommending Member States not elect Hungary to UN bodies nor approve allocation of UN funds for expenditure in Hungary, unless summit conference introduces factors not now evident. Draft paragraphs that might accomplish this are set forth at end this telegram.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/5-2659. Secret; Limited Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Document 62.

2. My doubts about desirability and feasibility rejecting credentials remain same as expressed reftel and when we were considering this possibility last fall. Potential repercussions in ChiRep issue, and reluctance many nations, including large number LA's, make success dubious and are not outweighed by advantages which in any case would be slight. Any new action against Hungary should also be considered in light Berlin and overriding importance of not endangering possibility broad UN support for our position there.

3. Article 5 of Charter<sup>3</sup> is biggest bar to any UN sanction against Hungary for failing to cooperate with UN, but formula of recommending that each "Member State" act individually on elections and funds, rather than to seek to "suspend" any rights or privileges on a general basis, offers a way.

4. Department may also want to study effect refusing to allocate funds. This may involve considerable difficulties where refugees or relief or possibly UNICEF are concerned, but stopping expenditure of funds is one of the most effective actions we can take, providing we make clear this action directed against Hungary Government, not people. In order to forestall complaints that to stop funds is hard-hearted, US could help through Red Cross if necessary.

5. Attempt to prevent both election to UN bodies and allocation of funds may also be more than traffic can bear. We would have to assess this after consultation with others. We would probably have a drop in neutralist support for res such as this, and might find some, such as India, even voting against it. If, as seems likely, something has to be dropped, "allocation of funds" idea would probably be one to eliminate, as it would be more likely to attract strong opposition.

6. Draft key operative paragraphs might read:

"Recommends to Member States, in the light of the continued refusal of the Hungarian authorities to heed GA resolutions, or to cooperate with the UN and its reps, that they refrain from electing or appointing Hungary or its reps to any offices, councils, commissions, or other elective organs of the UN and the UN specialized agencies,

"Recommends further to Member States that they oppose allocation by any UN organ or by any specialized agency of funds to the present Hungarian regime; and

"Requests the SYG to bring this res to the attention of all UN organs on the occasion of elections, appointments, or allocation of funds, and to communicate it to the UN specialized agencies for the same purpose."

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 16.

7. If Department approves some plan of this kind, suggest I be authorized to take into my confidence in advance of policy announcement leaders in the fight in the US for a free Hungary, such as C.D. Jackson, Arthur Goldsmith, etc.

Lodge

---

**77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 23, 1959—7:28 p.m.*

969. Mission should immediately and continuingly make clear Secretariat and friendly UN members Nosek not acceptable US as Chairman Committee One 14th GA (ur desp 1144<sup>2</sup>). Mission should also take appropriate occasion inform Suslov (urtel 1070<sup>3</sup>) Soviet prevention enlargement SC primary factor preventing election Soviet bloc member SC seat. There is in general agreement that, with new UN membership, opportunities for representation this and other UN bodies inadequate, particularly for Asians and Africans. To rectify situation reasonable enlargement these bodies essential. Such enlargement thus far prevented by Soviet introduction extraneous Chinese representation issue into enlargement question. If USSR continues maintain this position, needed enlargement will be deferred indefinitely. In these circumstances, US does not see how additional SC seat for Soviet bloc could be justified and Soviet position enlargement will inevitably affect present allocations of seats to Soviet bloc in other UN organs and specialized agencies. On other hand, if USSR willing accept reasonable enlargement SC and ECOSOC, US would be prepared negotiate on arrangements for fair distribution of added seats. For

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/5-2859. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on June 8; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Green, Bacon, Ludlow, Nunley, Kohler, and Monsma; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Despatch 1144, May 28, transmitted the text of a Czech note regarding Jiri Nosek's candidacy for Chairman of the First Committee of the 14th U.N. General Assembly and Nosek's curriculum vitae. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1070, May 28, reported that Suslov had stated that the Soviet Union intended to gain the presidency of the 15th U.N. General Assembly for an Eastern European candidate. (*Ibid.*, 310.5/5-2859)

example, as US representative indicated during debate on SC enlargement at 11th GA, US prepared accept seat for Eastern Europe in any new pattern of distribution developed as result enlargement SC.

**Herter**

---

**78. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, June 24, 1959—7 p.m.*

1179. Reference: 15th GA Presidency. There is every reason expect USSR planning major campaign on behalf Nosek (Czechoslovakia) for Presidency 15th GA. As we reported yesterday,<sup>2</sup> Nosek and Magheru (Romania) have both called on Boland (Ireland) in apparent effort feel him out re possibility his candidacy next year.

Cordier (Secretariat) has told US more than once he and SYG both feel sooner or later GA presidency will have to go to Eastern European and have made clear their opinion the sooner the better. It equally clear this is no off-hand view of theirs. On contrary they both, as far as we can judge, seem convinced UN would gain by making this gesture to Communist bloc. We have at every opportunity told them we do not agree and have argued that to elect Communist President of GA serious effect as far as US opinion toward UN was concerned. We have no reason, however, to think we have converted them to our view.

It generally assumed here 1960 will be year for European have GA Presidency. Since this so and in view of what we expect to be strong campaign for Nosek, favorable attitude of Hammarskjold and Cordier can easily be enough to build up irresistible trend in favor Nosek unless we do something soon to check it.

Our best bet by far to accomplish this is for Boland to put himself in position as acknowledged rival to Nosek.

Whenever European President is discussed here, Boland's name almost invariably heads list. He is first-class parliamentarian, is widely respected, commands support among all major groupings, and is undoubtedly pro-Western.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/6-2459. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1175. (*Ibid.*, 310.5/6-2359)



Only impediment his candidacy from US point of view as far as we know, is Ireland's position on ChiRep question. However, Boland had made it clear more than once to US—and he repeated this in strong terms yesterday—he does not agree with FonMin Aiken's approach to ChiRep question and plans do everything he can to get it modified. But even if he should not be successful, we have little doubt we would get assurance from him he would be "impartial on our side" in presiding over general comite and GA whenever issue was raised.

I therefore recommend: (1) we be authorized tell Hammarskjold and Cordier US definitely and officially opposed to election of Communist as President of 15th GA and (2) we be authorized make it known to Irish, SYG and other friendly delegations that if Boland is European choice for President in 1960, US would support him. I fear that only by coming out in this way at this early date do we have reasonably good chance of stopping Nosek without lot of blood on floor.

Lodge

---

**79. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, June 29, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

India's Role in the United Nations

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Bunker  
IO—Francis Wilcox  
IO—Walter Walmsley  
UN/P—Joseph Sisco  
UNP—Miss Elizabeth Brown  
UNP—C. Franklin Hawley  
SOA—Benjamin A. Fleck

Mr. Wilcox opened the conversation by remarking that, as Ambassador Bunker was aware, the role of India in the UN has become particularly important. For this reason, he welcomed the opportunity to obtain from Ambassador Bunker the latter's views in regard to Indian personnel and policies at the UN. Mr. Wilcox stated that Ambassador Jha appeared to be a much more reasonable person than his

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.391/6-2959. Confidential. Drafted by Fleck.

predecessor, Arthur Lall. He added that he had heard some reports that since Ambassador Lodge's trip to India last year there had been some evidence that Krishna Menon had changed his viewpoint to some extent.

Ambassador Bunker replied that he viewed Ambassador Lall's departure from the UN as a welcome development. He pointed out that Lall is not at all popular among the top officials of the Ministry of External Affairs and that N.R. Pillai, Secretary General of the Ministry for External Affairs, had expressed satisfaction that Lall had been shunted off to Austria where he could not get into too much trouble. Ambassador Bunker added that he thought Jha would be a distinct improvement over Lall and that Pillai thinks very highly of Jha.

In response to Mr. Wilcox's comments in regard to Krishna Menon, Ambassador Bunker stated that Krishna Menon has seemed to be much more friendly to the U.S. and to Ambassador Bunker personally since the visit to India of Ambassador Lodge. As an example, Ambassador Bunker cited his recent conversation with Krishna Menon in regard to the shooting down of an Indian Canberra by the Pakistan Air Force. The Ambassador said that Krishna Menon had been much more restrained in discussing this incident than he would have been two years previously. As an example of Krishna Menon's changing attitude, the Ambassador referred to a remark which Krishna Menon made to him to the effect that the moral stature of the U.S. has increased during the last two years.

Mr. Wilcox asked if the reports that Krishna Menon had used Ambassador Lodge during the latter's visit were true. Ambassador Bunker replied that Krishna Menon had indeed used the Lodge visit for his own personal purposes. Nevertheless, Ambassador Bunker added, he believed the trip had been on balance worthwhile. The Ambassador stated that friends of the U.S. in the highest levels of the Government of India do not like Krishna Menon, and thus dislike to see Menon in a position to use something like the Lodge visit to increase his stature and to disprove statements that "the Americans do not like me." He said that the Prime Minister has driven Krishna Menon with a very tight rein during the last year or so. Two examples of this control occurred during the crises over Lebanon and the Taiwan Straits. In both cases, the Ambassador said, Krishna Menon had been practically silent, presumably under instructions from the Prime Minister, and although he obviously wanted very much to join in the discussions at the special session of the General Assembly convened in regard to the Lebanon crisis, he had been kept in India by Mr. Nehru.

In view of Krishna Menon's continued connection with the Indian delegation to the UN, Mr. Walmsley asked what the tactics of USUN should be. Ambassador Bunker replied that Ambassador Lodge should continue his very skillful handling of Krishna Menon.

Mr. Walmsley inquired whether the Prime Minister still harbored any thoughts of resignation. Ambassador Bunker replied that Nehru had got out of his system any thought of resignation or retirement and would undoubtedly continue to hold the Prime Ministership until the 1962 elections if his health held out. The Ambassador said that Nehru appeared to be remarkably healthy on the eve of his 70th birthday next fall and that he continued to work at an amazing pace. The Ambassador referred to a conversation which he had had with Dr. Radhakrishnan<sup>2</sup> at the time of Nehru's most recent threat of resignation. Dr. Radhakrishnan had indicated that in putting the question up to the Party, Nehru had indicated that he was not sincere in his talk of resignation. Dr. Radhakrishnan had also told Ambassador Bunker that when Rajkumari Amrit Kaur<sup>3</sup> had come to him and urged him to step into the breach, he had replied that no vacancy existed.

Mr. Walmsley indicated that the Department was somewhat concerned by the fact that in the past the Indian delegation had taken the initiative in regard to the Chinese Communist representation issue. Mr. Sisco asked the Ambassador whether it would be useful to approach the GOI, requesting it to instruct its delegation not to take the lead in favor of Chinese representation at the General Assembly. Mr. Sisco said that he was not suggesting that the GOI change its policy in regard to the issue but merely that it permit some other delegation to take the initiative in placing the issue on the agenda, in guiding it through the debate, and in making the leading speeches on its behalf.

Ambassador Bunker replied that he was not sure whether such an approach to the GOI would be effective, ineffective, or counter-productive. He said that on the one hand the strong, unfavorable reaction in India to the recent Chinese Communist actions in Tibet would be a plus factor. On the other hand, the GOI, in following its policy of non-alignment, might feel that in view of the Indian reaction to Tibet a balancing action on the part of the Indian Government might be called for and that continued support of Chinese Communist representation in the UN might constitute such a balancing action in the eyes of the GOI.

Mr. Walmsley stated that there was a body of opinion within the Department which believes that the US Government should be more forthright in condemning Chinese Communist actions in Tibet and should initiate consideration of the question by the UN if no other government does so. Ambassador Bunker replied that this was not an easy issue to resolve. On the one hand, certain Indians had said to him that the fact that the U.S. had not condemned the Chinese Communists more vigorously for their actions in Tibet indicated that we are

---

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Vice President of the Republic of India.

<sup>3</sup> Former Indian Minister of Health.

interested only in decrying Communist attacks on white populations and not in Communist aggression against non-white people. On balance, however, the Ambassador stated that he felt our position on Tibet to date had been correct in so far as India was concerned. He stated that the Ministry of External Affairs believes that we have followed the right course. In passing, the Ambassador stated that initially he had been concerned over the possibility that the Lowell Thomas Committee to aid Tibetan refugees might try to build the refugee situation up out of all proportion. The Ambassador stated that the refugee problem is not a major problem. The Ambassador alluded to the statement made recently in Geneva by Mr. Tricumdas of the International Commission of Jurists on the subject of genocide in Tibet and said that Mr. Tricumdas has a very high reputation in India.

Mr. Sisco inquired what the reaction in India would be if we took the initiative in raising the Tibetan situation in the UN. Ambassador Bunker replied that the reaction in India would be very adverse if the U.S. or a country identified as a "stooge" of the U.S. were to take the initiative. However, if a country not identified as a "stooge" of the U.S. were to take the initiative, then we should support it, the Ambassador said.

Mr. Sisco stated that since Ambassador Jha had arrived at the UN, it appeared that the Indian representative was taking less initiative than previously and that the representatives of Japan and the Philippines were taking greater initiative. Ambassador Bunker agreed with Mr. Wilcox that this was a favorable development and referred to the increasing Indian interest in Japan as evidenced by the recent visits to the latter country of the Indian Prime Minister and President and the joint iron ore project entered into by India and Japan.

Mr. Wilcox stated that the Department had been disappointed by the Indian failure to join the Outer Space Committee. Ambassador Bunker stated that he shared this disappointment and that he believed that this was an example of the kind of balancing action on the part of the GOI to which he had previously referred.

80. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 7, 1959—9:29 p.m.*

14. Re Chirep Issue at 14th GA. In anticipation expected UK initiative to discuss Chirep issue with us and as part of preparations for 14th GA, Dept has been reviewing question tactics along lines indicated Gadel 30, October 2, 1958.<sup>2</sup>

1. We believe we should be prepared for major effort on Chirep with probability proposal separate agenda item as in recent years.

2. We continue believe classic moratorium formula has served us well in past, is understood by other countries, is most advantageous in terms creating precedent which helpful on Chirep issue other UN bodies and should be followed again this year.

3. In view developments since last GA, including Chicom acts Tibet, and changes in governmental attitudes or compositions certain countries, we believe it would be possible obtain at least as much support for moratorium formula as we did last year. We would hope should be possible for example obtain support Greece which last year abstained for reasons largely unconnected with China problem. Influence Tibetan situation and one of formulae, discussed below, envisaging more substantive debate, might lead Ireland adopt more cooperative attitude. There has also been favorable change in relations between Libya and China.

4. In order make our position even more effective and avoid certain past difficulties, we have considered certain variations on past procedures. Our general objective is to find tactics which will encourage participation in substantive debate by our friends prior adoption moratorium procedure without our losing tactical control of situation. We have kept in mind following factors:

(1) At recent GA's and particularly at the 13th GA Soviet bloc and neutralist members engaged in substantive debate China issue while friendly countries for most part refrained from so doing.

(2) Certain friendly states, particularly LAs, showed restiveness on certain preliminary moratorium votes and indicated desire have substantive debate.

(3) UKDel, which in earlier years had opposed substantive debate, expressed concern after 13th GA that most speakers had reflected only the Communist and Afro-Asian views (Delga 41, September 24,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/7-759. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and Bacon on July 2; cleared by Parsons, Martin, Green, Wilcox, and Day; and approved by Murphy who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 34.

1958<sup>3</sup>) and UK Foreign Office official has recently mentioned possibility having debate on Chirep issue prior moratorium resolution.

5. Department has considered following possibilities based on assumption separate agenda item would be proposed. Generally similar tactics might be followed whether issue first arises in Credentials Committee or in Plenary.

A) If separate agenda item proposed and is considered by General Committee, USDel instead of proposing moratorium immediately, might defer initiating proposal until after there has been substantive debate on Chinese issue. Following substantive debate US would propose usual type recommendation consisting of two points: rejection inclusion of item and decision adopt "moratorium". When General Committee report reaches Plenary, GA might engage substantive debate on General Committee recommendation in view precedent thus already created for substantive discussion by General Committee. We recognize our delay in moving moratorium might involve risk undesirable neutralist proposal for creation study committee, etc., might be tabled and obtain precedence; and that our delay in proposing moratorium would have to be explained to our friends to avoid impression change in our general policy.

B) Alternatively, we might seek have General Committee simply recommend rejection proposed item with no moratorium recommendation. When GC report is discussed in Plenary we might then move to amend the GC report by adding moratorium recommendation. This procedure would meet objections of those who are concerned with legal basis for GC recommending moratorium, but would be likely encounter difficulties with UK which reluctant reject item in absence moratorium. Our failure to include moratorium recommendation in General Committee would also be likely create misunderstanding.

C) We might continue procedure followed recent GAs but inform our friends in advance that in view practice recent years of Soviet bloc and others discussing substance Chinese issue we believe substantive debate on China issue is in order in the General Committee prior adoption of the GC recommendations on handling Chirep and is likewise in order in the GA prior to adoption of GC report; that we intend accordingly to speak on substance and we hope that friendly states will participate in debate also.

6. Tibetan issue should provide additional material this year for speeches against Chinese Communists. Prior to GA we should inform friendly states of our intended procedure with view encouraging these states participate and we should make available background material which might be useful in planning speeches. Ambassador Lodge's proposal to issue press release prior GA and to hold discussions with LAs and others would offer helpful forum for enlisting support new procedure.

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

7. Once we have worked out preferred procedure we should consult fully and promptly with UK on manner in which substantive discussions of China issue should be developed so as to avoid creating impression of any break in US/UK cooperation on this issue.

Department inclined believe procedure 5 C above offers best prospect. USUN's comments and suggestions would be appreciated.<sup>4</sup>

Herter

---

<sup>4</sup> USUN noted in telegram 40, July 10, that it favored the option outlined in paragraph 5 B. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/7-1059)

---

**81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 14, 1959—9:02 p.m.*

27. Re: 15th GA Presidency. Dept shares your concern re apparent stimulus being given Nosek candidacy for presidency 15th GA. Also agrees we must seek avoid "irresistible trend" in favor Nosek (urteil 1179<sup>2</sup>). At same time, US should not be in position stimulating Boland candidacy until clear he preferred choice West Europeans and clear satisfactory assurance re Chi Rep can be obtained. US should also avoid formal commitment this matter so far in advance in order not establish awkward precedent and retain for US as much latitude as possible in circumstances. Mission should therefore seek early opportunity discuss Nosek candidacy with UK and French delegations in first instance as follows:

1) We recognize with LA President this year it European turn to have GA presidency next year.

2) We assume they and other friendly European members agree with us on undesirability at this time of Soviet-bloc president, whose election we would anticipate having actively to oppose.

3) Open fight against Soviet-bloc candidacy if it has gained substantial support likely affect unfavorably atmosphere whole GA mission.

4) We hope therefore Western Europe can reach early agreement on acceptable non-Communist candidate so as present united front and thus discourage build-up Soviet-bloc candidacy.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/7-1459. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on July 7; cleared by Green, Nunley, NEA, Monsma, and Bacon; and approved by Walmsley who signed for Dillon.

<sup>2</sup> Document 78.

5) Following our usual practice, we would give full weight West European choice and would expect be able support it when taking our own position on 15 GA president. Boland acceptable if West European choice provided problem presented by Irish position on Chi Rep issue can be resolved, and we intend ourselves indicate this Boland privately unless there serious objections.

Mission should indicate Boland that our only difficulty respect his possible candidacy next year, which we agree is European turn, is Irish failure support moratorium formula. We hope he can persuade his Government modify its stand this question, which so far as we can foresee would assure our support provided he West European choice.<sup>3</sup>

Mission should immediately make clear SYG and Cordier, Soviet-bloc candidate not acceptable US for President 15th GA in present circumstances and also make points covered in (3) and (4) above. Mission should point out:

1) election Soviet-bloc candidate to office such prominence as GA presidency would give USSR and its satellites aura respectability and international prestige unwarranted by their present conduct and might have seriously adverse effect on US opinion toward UN;

2) quite aside any difficulties Soviet-bloc president could create at regular GA session, opportunity presented him for trouble-making by any Emergency Special Session could have most serious consequences.<sup>4</sup>

**Dillon**

<sup>3</sup> At this point in the source text the following sentence was deleted before transmission: "We would hope even be able support him if he West European choice on basis his personal assurances that he would not be influenced by Irish position on moratorium formula in his actions as presiding officer."

<sup>4</sup> Barco reported in telegram 194 from USUN, August 14, that he had not spoken with Boland, who was away from New York, but that Beeley had indicated the British would probably support Boland and had already begun working quietly to develop his candidacy. Roux of the French Mission noted U.S. opposition to a General Assembly president from Eastern Europe and stated that Paris had not reacted to Boland's possible candidacy. Hammarskjöld stated he must remain detached from the election of General Assembly officers, but indicated that he felt personally that the United States should not try to block an Eastern European presidency. Barco observed that Cordier would probably speak in favor of an Eastern European president and, by virtue of his position in the U.N. Secretariat, would appear to be speaking for the Secretary-General. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-1459)



## 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 22, 1959—10:13 a.m.*

55. Department should decide by August 15 whether to request inclusion on Agenda 14th UNGA of item recommending Security Council reconsider ROK membership application. Although items "of an important or urgent character" under GA Rules of Procedure may be proposed after August 15, would be difficult urge persuasively that Korean membership application falls in this category.

Last year question ROK UN membership was not included on GA agenda but was subsequently included Security Council agenda on US initiative when Council called upon act on Guinea's application. ROK admission again vetoed by USSR. At that time we told ROK we would wish consider with them next year (1959) whether question should be raised in General Assembly. We are thus committed to discuss matter with ROK.

We would anticipate ROKG will (1) strongly urge item be inscribed (2) argue necessary keep membership before UNGA and (3) argue step necessary for maintenance morale in Korea as well as for bolstering international prestige ROKG.

We are of course deeply sympathetic with ROK position. However we believe following consideration pertinent to any discussions this year.

No new applications anticipated for consideration by 14th GA. Introduction of Korean (and FYI possibly Vietnamese End FYI) application in these circumstances and without hope fruitful outcome may reduce sympathy on part many UN members and if Korean application received less votes than in past it would not be helpful to Korean prestige. FYI: Only US spoke on behalf ROK at 13th GA after Soviet SC veto. End FYI. Moreover discussion ROK application can be expected be broadened include unrecognized regimes in north Korea north Vietnam and Outer Mongolia. Voting down consideration of applications from these regimes will require considerable US effort. Must be borne in mind also 1957 vote on Indian-Indonesia draft resolution requesting Security Council consider "all applications" defeated by close vote 37 against to 33 for with 10 abstentions<sup>2</sup> and it by no means certain similar resolution could again be defeated.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/7-2259. Confidential. Drafted by Lane and Hartley on July 1; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Bane; and approved by Walmsley who signed for Dillon. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a draft resolution on which the Special Political Committee voted on October 17, 1957. For text, see U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.17. For a record of the debate and vote on the resolution, see U.N. doc. A/SPC/SR.49.

Another factor to be considered is whether in connection repatriation dispute ROKG may take actions that might prejudice support for ROK membership.

You should therefore immediately discuss this matter with ROKG unless you perceive objection, using such of above arguments as appropriate and making sure ROK understands risks involved as indicated above. You should further point out at least four new membership applications appear likely to be presented to 15th GA for action, and proposal to reconsider ROK application more likely obtain sympathetic reception in this context than alone.

We would appreciate not only ROK reaction but your views and comments on this reaction.<sup>3</sup>

**Dillon**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 86 from Seoul, August 4, reported that the previous day the Embassy had received a note from the Korean Government regarding discussion of Korean issues at the 14th General Assembly and soliciting U.S. support for Korean unification and South Korean admission to the United Nations. The Foreign Ministry official delivering the note had stated he felt it would be unwise to apply for U.N. membership, but that the decision had to be made by a higher authority. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/8-459) On August 3, the Korean Ambassador discussed Korea's application for U.N. membership with Parsons and urged that the United States raise the question in the General Assembly. A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, 310.2/8-359.

---

**83. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 28, 1959.*

**SUBJECT**

Communist Chinese Representation at the United Nations

At last year's General Assembly the vote on continuing the moratorium, i.e., refusing to consider the question of seating the Chinese Communists, was carried by 44 in favor, 28 against and 9 abstentions. The breakdown of the vote is attached.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Dillon, C. Douglas. Confidential. On July 24, Wilcox and Parsons sent Dillon a memorandum on Chinese representation at the 14th General Assembly. Much of this information was incorporated in Dillon's memorandum to Eisenhower. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/7-2459)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see *infra*.

While we have not as yet made any general approach to United Nations members soliciting support for our position at the coming meeting of the General Assembly we believe that the vote this year will not vary much from that of last year. We already have assurance that the U.K. will again support us on this issue and also have assurance that Greece, which abstained last year because of Cyprus, will vote with us this fall.

We cannot yet tell whether Tibet will cause any actual shift in the voting lineup. We doubt that it will, but we are certain that it will have a restraining effect on countries which might otherwise have been tempted to move toward the Chinese Communist position.

Nevertheless there are a few weak spots in our position as compared to last year. Ethiopia, which has supported us in the past, although last year only with some hesitation, may well abstain or vote against us this year as a result of the Emperor's trip to the Soviet Union. In addition there have been some indications of a softening in the Cuban attitude toward the Chinese Communists. What they will finally decide to do cannot be foretold. A change in the Cuban attitude would undoubtedly influence certain other Latin American countries, such as Venezuela and Mexico where some restiveness on this issue has been noted previously.

On the optimistic side Libya has recognized the Republic of China since last year and may possibly be persuaded to change their abstention to a favorable vote. We are also attempting once again to change the Irish position to one of support or at least abstention although we are not too sanguine about success.

**Douglas Dillon**

---

#### **84. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>**

CA-1258

*Washington, August 7, 1959.*

[Here follow the Table of Contents and a Summary of Action Requested.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-759. Confidential. Drafted by Eisendrath; cleared with Monsma, Westfall, Spiers, Ludlow, Bacon, Green, Kerley, Nunley, Driscoll, and OES; and approved by Cargo. Sent to 74 missions and repeated to 25 diplomatic and consular posts.

## *Introduction*

The fourteenth regular session of the General Assembly (GA) is scheduled to convene in New York on September 15, 1959. Such issues as Disarmament, Outer Space, Algeria, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, will command widespread attention to the work of the GA. Moreover, a number of key items will arise in the economic, social, and colonial fields, reflecting the increasing interest of the General Assembly in these areas.

### *A. Composition*

When the 14th GA convenes, it will comprise 82 members, an increase of one over last year, reflecting the admission of Guinea as a new United Nations member in December of 1958. Since its founding, the United Nations has increased its membership from 51 to 82 members. The increase reflects for the most part the admission of new nations in Africa and Asia emerging from colonialism, as well as the admission of a number of traditional European states. At present the United Nations is composed of thirty members from Africa and Asia (four African, ten Arab, and sixteen Asian), nine Soviet, sixteen non-communist Europe, four old Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa), twenty Latin American, and those otherwise unclassified, three (Yugoslavia, Israel, and the United States). The growing membership has tended to (1) render the UN a more representative organization (2) increase the role and importance of smaller powers, particularly, the African and Asian (3) make more difficult the attainment of two-thirds majorities on controversial issues (4) intensify pressure for progress toward self-government or independence (5) strengthen the demand that economic and social progress be attained through the UN system (6) increase the difficulty of Free World Members in focusing the attention of the GA on Soviet abuses of the purposes and principles of the UN.

The United States has welcomed the expansion of membership and particularly the admission of new states. It regrets the failure of the UN to admit two qualified candidates, Korea and Viet Nam. It believes the Organization provides an appropriate platform for its expanding community of Members from which to make their views known and give voice to their aspirations. It thereby encourages the growth of mutual understanding between States. The Organization also provides a framework in which its Members can work to gain objectives through common action they cannot achieve themselves. Thereby it promotes the growth of moderation in the presentation of demands and of cooperative action necessary to secure their fulfillment.

### *B. Bloc Voting*

While recognizing the common interests of Member States of a particular area, history, or stage of economic development, the United States believes that each Member State has its own peculiar problems and interests which require individual consideration, and that therefore we should not base our dealings with Member States primarily on the concept of blocs and bloc membership. To do so, we believe would (1) encourage the tendency of some groupings of Members to pressure individual nations to relinquish their genuine national interests to those of the group majority (2) severely restrict the freedom of voting of Members in disagreement with their group (3) encourage the development of large unwieldy voting blocs in the UN whose private interests might well be detrimental to the growth of respect for and practice of UN Charter principles. With the exception of the nine members of the Soviet bloc, the United States primarily attempts to deal with each Member as an individual nation.

### *C. The Issue of Parity*

The 13th GA witnessed the renewed insistence by the USSR on parity in the composition of GA bodies. This was highlighted in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, where the Soviets insisted that the composition of this body should be such as to give the USSR and its satellites percentage representation which would be completely disproportionate to their nine votes in the GA. The USSR has also espoused the parity concept in connection with disarmament negotiations, and there is every likelihood that parity will continue to be a major Soviet objective within the UN.

Actually, the USSR has suggested two forms of parity. The first is based upon the concept that there are "two sides" in the world—the Communist bloc and the remainder of the UN—and that UN organs should reflect this division by providing equal representation to the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The major variation on this concept, also suggested occasionally by the USSR, is the idea of "three-cornered" parity, by which UN organs would be constituted of equal representation from the (1) Soviet bloc (2) non-aligned countries (3) countries aligned with the United States. This "three-cornered" parity would serve Soviet purposes in two ways. It would give the non-aligned countries disproportionate representation vis-à-vis the United States and its allies and would simultaneously give the Soviet bloc disproportionate representation vis-à-vis both the non-aligned nations and the free world allies.

The United States fully recognizes Soviet eminence in the field of outer space and is equally aware that on certain other matters, such as disarmament, Soviet cooperation is essential to any kind of successful results. However, the US continues to oppose firmly the application of the parity principle within the UN or any of its subordinate bodies. In our judgment, parity would (1) tend to subvert underlying premises of the UN system, in which all member nations are regarded as sovereign equals; (2) destroy the principle that UN bodies should reflect the interests and views of different geographic areas of the world; (3) provide representation to the Soviet bloc far out of proportion to the number of Soviet bloc states in the UN; (4) ignore the fact that both the non-aligned nations and the free world allies, unlike the Soviet bloc, maintain a high degree of individuality in their voting behavior and do not act as rigidly disciplined units; (5) subject independently-minded nations to the necessity of declaring themselves as members of a particular "bloc"; (6) help the USSR to achieve a de facto veto over the actions of UN subsidiary bodies, thus rendering some of these bodies wholly impotent.

Because of its failure to obtain acceptance of the parity concept, the USSR continues to boycott the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This Committee has notwithstanding done a great deal of useful work and has largely avoided controversial political issues. The US hopes that the USSR will eventually modify its position and agree to participate actively in UN studies and activities related to outer space. The US is convinced, however, that non-Communist nations, allied and neutral alike, cannot afford to purchase Soviet cooperation by accepting the parity concept, since this concept threatens the basic structure of the UN system.

#### *D. Major Contingencies*

The major unknown factor which will affect the atmosphere of the 14th GA is the outcome of the conferences currently in progress at Geneva, the nuclear test talks, the Foreign Ministers meetings on the problem of Germany, and the possibility of a meeting at the "summit." Any prediction however at this time as to their specific influence is obviously premature. (FYI There should be no suggestion that the Western powers are planning to bring the German problem itself into the 14th UNGA, but it is always possible that discussions among foreign ministers or among heads of governments might involve other questions which could affect both the atmosphere and the activities of the 14th GA. End FYI)

[Here follow Sections E, "Agenda;" F, "Consultations;" and G, "Specific Instructions."]

## *H. United States Views*

### *1. 13th GA Presidency*

The Peruvian Ambassador was informed by the Department on July 17 that the United States will support the candidacy of Dr. Belaunde for President of the 14th General Assembly. Dr. Belaunde's candidacy was first advanced in 1957 for the presidency of the 13th Assembly session but was postponed that same year until the 14th session in the interest of avoiding a contest between Sir Leslie Munro (New Zealand) and Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanon) for the presidency of the 12th session (1957). Dr. Belaunde's candidacy has received the unanimous endorsement of the Latin American caucus and we do not expect it to be contested.

### *2. The Election of Other Officers Comprising the General Committee*

The Assembly at its 12th session increased the size of the General (steering) Committee from 16 to 21 by adding five vice-presidencies. The Committee is therefore now composed of the President, 13 Vice-Presidents, and the chairmen of the seven main Committees. The Assembly also provided in the same resolution [1192 (XII)]<sup>2</sup> for the geographical allocation of these seats, which has heretofore been a matter of accepted practice rather than written stipulation. The allocation in the enlarged committee varies somewhat, the area from which the President comes losing a vice-presidency, but in general it is as follows: Vice-Presidents—Republic of China, France, United States, United Kingdom, USSR, four from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, two from Western Europe and other States, and one from Eastern Europe. We attach special importance to the election of the Republic of China to a vice-presidency pursuant to the principle that the five permanent members of the Security Council are always represented among the vice-presidents. The "slate" for the General Committee, which is developed by the Secretariat in consultation with the various UN delegations in New York, customarily is not finally determined until just before the Assembly convenes. Candidacies so far advanced are Matsch (Austria) and Nosek (Czechoslovakia) for Committee One, King (Liberia) for the Special Political Committee, Tamayo (Bolivia) for Committee Two, Ciselet (Belgium) and Lopez (Philippines) for Committee Three, Palar (Indonesia) for Committee Four, and Herrarte (Guatemala) for Committee Six. Brazil, Burma, and Morocco are announced candidates for vice-presidencies. The Bolivian, Guatemalan, and Brazilian candidacies have the endorsement of the Latin American caucus. We have taken no final position on any of these candidacies except that of Nosek, which we cannot support.

---

<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text. For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

FYI. The increased size of the General Committee and the geographical allocations approved by the Assembly have complicated the problem of obtaining a satisfactory committee from the standpoint of US interests. We hope through early and close consultations with the UN Secretariat and friendly delegations in New York to obtain a General Committee at the 14th GA more favorable to US interests, particularly on the Chinese representation issue, than at the 13th session. Particularly do we hope to see a sufficient number of desirable candidacies advanced early enough to be effective, and sufficient flexibility maintained by interested friendly delegations with respect to the particular offices desired so that the possibilities available to us are not wasted by competition or by candidacies that cannot hope to succeed. End FYI.

### 3. *The Representation of China*

India has again proposed for inclusion on the Agenda an item on the representation of China. In accordance with our policy of strong support for the Government of the Republic of China in international organizations, we shall again propose that the Assembly decide "not to consider" any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. FYI By taking such procedural position and avoiding a vote on the substance, we expect to be able again to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support. Furthermore, the UK has advised us that it will, as in the past, support the moratorium formula. End FYI.

At your discretion, you may point out that the Chinese Communist regime (1) does not meet the standards for international behavior set by the Charter and continues to show nothing but contempt for the principles for which the UN stands; (2) its action in Tibet is but the most recent example of the regime's shocking disregard for human life and liberty; meanwhile it continues to disturb the peace in the Taiwan Strait; and (3) is a condemned and persistent aggressor against the UN in Korea.

For your background, the breakdown of the vote on the US-sponsored resolution "not to consider" Chinese representation at the 13th General Assembly, taken on September 23, 1958,<sup>3</sup> when the UN membership stood at 81, was as follows:

a. *44 states in favor:* Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan,

---

<sup>3</sup> Regarding this vote, see Document 34.



Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

b. *28 states against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sudan, Sweden, Ukraine, United Arab Republic, USSR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

c. *9 states abstaining:* Austria, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Laos, Libya, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

Posts in those countries which *voted in favor* of the resolution should express appreciation for support on this question, which the US believes continues to be one of paramount importance to the entire Free World, and solicit continued support for a like US position at the 14th GA. Posts in those countries which *voted in the negative* should, in their discretion, solicit support for adoption of the moratorium resolution or possibly an abstention, instead of a negative vote. Posts in those countries which *abstained* should, in their discretion, endeavor to obtain assurance for support of the moratorium resolution and if this is not forthcoming, at least continued abstention in preference to a negative vote.

*Attention Athens:* The Greek Delegation in New York has indicated to USUN that Greece will support the moratorium resolution, as it did at the 12th and previous GAs.

*Attention Addis Ababa, Baghdad, Benghazi, Conakry, Dublin, Jidda, Reykjavik, and Vientiane:* Await receipt of special instructions from the Department before approaching the Foreign Office on the Chinese representation issue.<sup>4</sup>

*All posts* including those listed in the preceding paragraph, are requested to report the outcome of this representation by cable.<sup>5</sup>

#### 4. *Elections to UN Councils and the International Court of Justice*

Elections will be held at the 14th GA, for three seats on the Security Council, six seats on the Economic and Social Council, two seats on the Trusteeship Council, and one seat on the International Court of Justice. To date, relatively few candidacies for these seats have been advanced and we are following our usual practice of not making commitments so far in advance of the elections. (For the present composition of these organs, see *US Participation in the UN, 1958.*)

<sup>4</sup> These telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-2459 through 320/9-859.

<sup>5</sup> Responses from all posts are *ibid.*, 310.2 and 320.

*Security Council*—The seats currently held by Canada, Japan, and Panama will be vacated at the end of 1959. So far the only announced candidate is Ecuador to succeed Panama. Ecuador's candidacy has the endorsement of the Latin American caucus.

*Economic and Social Council*—Finland, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the USSR retire from ECOSOC at the end of 1959. The United Kingdom and the USSR may be expected to be re-elected pursuant to the generally accepted practice that the five permanent members of the Security Council are always represented on all major UN bodies. Brazil, with the support of the Latin American caucus, is a candidate to succeed Mexico. Denmark, with the support of the other Scandinavian countries, is a candidate to succeed Finland. Japan (which declared its candidacy in 1958) and Ceylon are announced candidates, and India a possible candidate, to succeed Pakistan.

*Trusteeship Council*—Bolivia is the Latin American choice to succeed Haiti on the Trusteeship Council, and India is a candidate for re-election.

*International Court of Justice*—The election of one judge to the Court is necessary to fill the vacancy created by the death of Judge Guerrero of El Salvador. The Latin Americans are supporting Dr. Alfaro of Panama to succeed Judge Guerrero. Other candidacies so far advanced are those of Mr. Truong Cang (Cambodia), Dr. Milan Bartos (Yugoslavia), and Justice Kuriyama (Japan).

### 5. *The Situation in Hungary*

The inscription of an item on the situation in Hungary in the agenda of the 14th GA has not yet been requested. However, in view of the action taken by the 13th GA,<sup>6</sup> and the continued defiance on the part of the USSR and the present Hungarian authorities of all UN resolutions and efforts concerning Hungary, the situation in Hungary will certainly be discussed in some connection at the forthcoming session of the Assembly.

Prior to the convening of the 13th GA, Australia, in its capacity as chairman of the UN Special Committee on Hungary requested inscription of "The Situation in Hungary" on the agenda. In the Assembly, the United States joined with 36 other nations to introduce a resolution which deplored the continuing refusal of the USSR and the present Hungarian regime to cooperate with the UN Special Committee and the Special Representative on Hungary; denounced the execution of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, and other patriots; condemned the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly; and again called upon the USSR and the authorities in Hungary "to desist from

<sup>6</sup> See Document 57.

repressive measures against the Hungarian people and to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms." The resolution further declared that the United Nations would continue to watch the situation in Hungary in view of the fact that the General Assembly's resolutions are being disregarded. After thanking the UN Special Committee and the Special Representative, Prince Wan Waithayakon, for their efforts, the resolution appointed Sir Leslie Munro to report on significant developments relating to the implementation of the Assembly's resolutions on Hungary. The 37-power resolution was adopted on December 12, 1958, by a vote of 54 to 10 with 15 abstentions.

As the result of a motion introduced by the United States, the Assembly again voted to take no decision on Hungarian credentials. FYI. As a minimum, the United States will again request that the General Assembly take "no decision" (neither accept nor reject) with regard to the credentials of the Hungarian representatives, which would continue to demonstrate that a serious question exists about the status of the present Hungarian regime. No decision has been taken regarding the possible submission of a separate Hungarian item on the agenda.

#### *6. Enlargement of UN Councils*

Three items concerning enlargement of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the ICJ, respectively, appear on the agenda of the 14th GA by reason of action taken by the Assembly at its 13th session.<sup>7</sup> These items were originally introduced at the 11th session by a varying number of Latin American members and Spain, and arose out of the new situation created by the enlarged membership of the UN. The first two involve amendment of the Charter and the third, amendment of the Statute of the Court. The first of these items—increasing the number of non-permanent members on the Security Council—was discussed inconclusively at the 11th GA. It was decided to postpone further consideration of all three items until the 12th GA after it became apparent that there was no consensus either on the number of seats that should be added to the Security Council or the geographic allocation of the additional seats and after the USSR had made its agreement to any increase conditional on the settlement of the Chinese representation issue in its favor. (The USSR has a veto over any necessary Charter amendments.)

The 12th GA decided unanimously and without discussion to postpone consideration of these items until its 13th session on the ground that political conditions were not favorable to any general

---

<sup>7</sup> For texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1299 (XIII) and 1300 (XIII), adopted December 10, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090.

agreement on this matter. At the 13th GA the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council was discussed, primarily in connection with the Assembly's consideration of the Council's report, which included a recommendation that the Council be increased in size. The United States was one of the co-sponsors of the Council's recommendation and strongly supported it in the General Assembly. The Assembly adopted two resolutions—one postponing consideration of the three enlargement items until its 14th session since the necessary amendment of the Charter would require "a larger area of agreement than prevails at present"; and the other recognizing the desirability of enlarging the Economic and Social Council. The first resolution was adopted by a vote of 65 to 0, with 9 abstentions (Soviet bloc) and the second, by a vote of 52 to 9 (Soviet bloc), with 17 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Yemen, and Yugoslavia).

The Department continues to favor the enlargement of the two Councils, and has under current review whether in view of the Soviet position (described below under the discussion of Charter review), there is any constructive action, particularly with respect to enlargement of the Economic and Social Council, that can be taken at the forthcoming GA. In this connection, we would be much interested in any thoughts others may have.

#### *7. Review of the UN Charter*

The Committee of the Whole established by the 10th General Assembly to consider the "question of fixing the time and place" of a Charter review conference must under the terms of a 12th GA resolution report again to the 14th General Assembly.<sup>8</sup> In recommending to the 12th GA that a decision on the time and place of a conference be deferred, the committee took the position that the "appropriate time" and "auspicious international circumstances" referred to in the 10th GA resolution "had not yet materialized." The 12th GA adopted this recommendation by a vote of 67 to 0, with 9 abstentions (Soviet bloc). The GA Committee of the Whole is tentatively scheduled to meet to prepare its report to the 14th GA shortly before the 14th session convenes.

Led by the United States, the great majority of UN members at the 10th and 12th GA's supported the holding of a review conference under circumstances conducive to maximum accomplishment at such a conference. At the same time no pressure for an early conference was evident, and we have had no indication that there is currently among UN members generally any increased desire for an early review con-

---

<sup>8</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 136 (XII), adopted October 14, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

ference. To us the "international circumstances" appear no more "auspicious" now than in 1955 and 1957 for the holding of a fruitful conference. However, we do not wish to take a position on this matter until we know the views of the UN membership generally. We are therefore most interested in learning the thinking of others on this matter.

FYI. The lack of pressure for an early conference may be attributed to 1) a general realization that any shortcomings of the Organization result more from the policies of individual member states than from defects in the Charter; 2) a general skepticism that any agreement could be reached in the existing international climate on amendment of the Charter; and 3) a general fear that a review conference in these circumstances would only serve to increase tensions—between the "have" and "have-nots," between the "colonial" and "anti-colonial" powers, and with the USSR. The latter has consistently opposed any review conference, which it regards as aimed primarily at undermining the principle of great-power unanimity as embodied in the Charter.

No government, so far as we are aware, is advocating an early review conference, and the only interest observed recently in a conference has been that displayed by those that advocate drastic revision of the Charter toward "world government" in one form or another. The prospects for a successful conference have been decreased by USSR's introduction of the Chinese representation issue. In connection with the 13th GA's consideration of the three "enlargement" items on its agenda, the Soviet representative declared Chinese Communist participation "a prerequisite to examining the question of any amendment whatsoever to the United Nations Charter." The Soviet representative also maintained that ratification by Communist China is necessary to bring an amendment of the Charter into force and stated that the USSR "and many other countries" would never accept a decision that ratification "by the other China" is sufficient. Earlier at the 11th GA the USSR had categorically stated that it would not ratify any amendments of the Charter to enlarge the principal Councils of the UN so long as the "legitimate rights" of a Communist China in the UN "had not been restored."

We are not therefore currently disposed to favor a decision by the 14th GA on the date of a review conference. However, should there appear to be substantial support for holding a review conference in the near future, we would wish to reconsider our own estimate, as outlined above. End FYI.

#### 8. *Disarmament*

13th GA consideration of the question of disarmament resulted in one of the longest debates in the history of the UN on this subject. The scheduled tripartite conference on the discontinuance of the nuclear weapons tests which was to begin in Geneva on October 31, 1958, as

well as an impending conference of experts to study possible measures which might be helpful in preventing a surprise attack which was scheduled to begin in Geneva on November 10, 1958, resulted in the GA adopting three resolutions aimed primarily at expressing the GA's hope that these talks would be successful.<sup>9</sup> The US, along with fifteen other nations, sponsored a resolution which: (1) urged early agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests under effective international control; (2) urged the parties to the Geneva talks not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations were in progress; (3) called attention to the urgency of reaching agreement on measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack; (4) urged that other initiatives be continued looking toward a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament; (5) reaffirmed the responsibility of the UN in the field of disarmament; and (6) invited the states concerned to invest any disarmament savings in economic development in the less-developed countries.

This resolution was passed by a vote of 49 to 9, with 23 abstentions, the Soviet bloc alone voting against it.

A resolution introduced by Japan, Austria and Sweden, expressing the hope that the Geneva talks on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would be successful was also adopted by the General Assembly, by a vote of 55 to 9, with 12 abstentions. Here again only the Soviet bloc objected.

An Indian-Yugoslavian resolution urging success for the meeting of experts on surprise attack was adopted by a vote of 75 to 0, with 2 abstentions.

India and Yugoslavia introduced a fourth resolution designed to reactivate the UN disarmament machinery which had not been able to function due to Soviet insistence that it be granted so-called parity in the Disarmament Commission in 1959 to include all of the members of the UN on an ad hoc basis. Although it was recognized by many members that such an organization probably would not prove to be a useful forum for meaningful disarmament negotiations, the resolution was passed by a vote of 75 to 0, with 2 abstentions.<sup>10</sup>

During the debate some nations, particularly India and Yugoslavia, made strenuous efforts to evolve a compromise resolution which would produce big power agreement concerning the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. In every case, however, these efforts were frustrated by unreasonable Soviet demands, most of which were aimed at the formulation of a resolution which would serve as a Soviet

---

<sup>9</sup> For texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1252 (XIII) A, B, and C, adopted November 4, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090.

<sup>10</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1252 (XIII) D; *ibid.*

propaganda platform but which would not in fact give any impetus for an agreement to discontinue nuclear weapons tests with effective controls.

The unequivocal US and UK announcement that we would not test nuclear weapons for one year after the beginning of the Geneva Nuclear Test Talks, on October 31, 1958, if the USSR also did not test during this period,<sup>11</sup> is believed to have had a salutary effect, particularly in negating the effectiveness of Soviet-inspired "ban the bomb" campaigns. Moreover, our expressed willingness to continue to refrain from nuclear weapons testing has contributed to a lessening of public preoccupation with the present dangers from radio-active fallout.

President Eisenhower, noting the protracted nature of the Geneva Nuclear Test Talks, recently suggested that the parties to the talks agree to a ban of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere as a first step which might give impetus to reaching agreement on a cessation of all nuclear weapons tests.<sup>12</sup> This proposal was useful in putting pressure on the Soviets to loosen their position on controls and demonstrated the strength of our determination to take any beginning step possible in arms control.

It is difficult to indicate even in broad outline the scope and nature of the US position on the question of disarmament during the forthcoming GA. Presently unforeseeable developments in the Geneva Nuclear Test Talks and disarmament discussions at the reconvened Foreign Ministers' Meeting and possibly at a meeting at the Summit can be expected to affect our position. These developments should also effect the positions which may be taken by other members of the UN.

It is clear however that the question of disarmament has a high priority in the minds of many Member States. Already some of the smaller nations have begun initiatives. Ireland has indicated that it will reintroduce its resolution calling for the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Both Mexico and Indonesia are candidates for the Chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. We have informed them that we consider it premature to convene the DC while the nuclear talks continue in Geneva.

### 9. Outer Space

At the 13th GA, a US initiative led to the passage of a 20-power resolution establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.<sup>13</sup> The Ad Hoc Committee was established to report to

---

<sup>11</sup> For text of the U.S. statement, issued August 22, 1958, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 530–531. For text of the British statement released the same day, see U.N. doc. A/3896/Rev. 1.

<sup>12</sup> For text of Eisenhower's April 13 letter to Khrushchev, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 331–332.

<sup>13</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), adopted December 13, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090.

the next GA on (a) the activities and resources of the UN, its specialized agencies and other international organizations involved in the peaceful uses of outer space; (b) activities which the UN might usefully engage in to further the peaceful uses of outer space; (c) organizational arrangements which the UN might wish to establish to facilitate international cooperation in this area; and (d) the nature of legal problems which may arise as a consequence of the exploration and exploitation of outer space. The Soviet Union boycotted the Ad Hoc Committee due to its failure to gain acceptance of parity of representation.

It is expected that there may be extensive discussion of the peaceful uses of outer space at the next GA. New technical achievements in this area by the US and/or the USSR prior to or during the GA session may be such as to further stimulate public and government interest in working out some kind of UN machinery which will be useful in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space. The GA will have before it the report prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee. This report is scientific and technical in nature and it is understood that the Soviet Union has not found it objectionable. It is to be expected, however, that the Soviet Union will continue to attempt to use its obvious technological achievements in this field to further its political objectives of gaining parity on UN committees and specifically in any organization established by the UN to handle outer space matters. Although the final US position has not been established, it is hoped that it may be possible to work out this question in such a way that the UN will continue to play a constructive role in this field.

#### 10. *Algeria*

A group of 25 African and Asian countries decided on July 4 to request that the 14th GA again consider the Algerian problem.

During the 13th GA, this question was debated at some length, but a resolution on the subject failed by one vote to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption.<sup>14</sup> The resolution as put to the vote in plenary session, in its preamble recognized the right of the Algerian people to independence, expressed concern at the continuation of the war, considered that the situation in Algeria constituted a threat to international peace and security and, in its only operative paragraph, urged "negotiations between the two parties concerned with a view to reaching a solution in conformity with the Charter of the UN." The French did not attend the Committee or plenary sessions when this item was being considered. The US abstained on this resolution and did not speak in the debate.

---

<sup>14</sup> Regarding the December 13, 1958, debate and vote on Algeria, see U.N. doc. A/PV.792. For text of the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/4075.



It is anticipated that the Algerian question may prove one of the most troublesome items for the United States at the coming GA. The French Government can be expected to continue to maintain that since Algeria is an integral part of France, it is a domestic problem and that the UN is therefore barred from considering it under Article 2(7) of the Charter.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the present government has indicated that it considers the stand of her allies on the Algerian question to be the acid test of friendship with France. The sponsors of the Algerian item, on the other hand, are anxious to demonstrate that a majority of the UN, particularly the US, do not support the French policy on Algeria.

Developments between now and the time the GA again considers the problem will necessarily affect our views on the best manner of handling the Algerian item.

### 11. South Africa

A. *"The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa."* This item has been included on the agenda of every regular GA session since 1952, and on July 15, a group of 12 African, Asian and Latin American countries decided to request its inclusion on the agenda of the 14th GA. In the 13th GA, the United States joined 69 other nations in voting for a resolution which (1) reaffirmed that in a multi-racial society harmony and respect for freedoms were best assured when patterns of legislation and practice were directed toward insuring equality before the law of all persons; (2) noted that policies designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination were inconsistent with pledges of Member States under Article 56 of the Charter; (3) called upon all members to bring their policies into conformity with their human rights obligations under the Charter; and (4) expressed regret and concern that the Government of the Union had not yet responded to the 12th Assembly's appeal that it reconsider policies which impaired the rights of all racial groups to enjoy the same fundamental freedoms.<sup>16</sup> The US voted in favor of the foregoing resolution and will be guided by the principles contained therein with respect to any resolution submitted at the coming Assembly.

FYI. The Union asserts that the matter is entirely a domestic one, and because of this declined to participate in the United Nations from the 11th GA in 1956 until July 1958. At that time the Union announced its return to full participation in the work of the UN, but

<sup>15</sup> Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter enjoins the United Nations from intervening in matters which are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

<sup>16</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1248 (XIII), adopted October 30, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090. Article 56 of the U.N. Charter reads: "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Article 55 addresses economic and social problems and universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

opposed the inclusion of the apartheid and the treatment of Indians (see below) items on the agenda of the 13th session and remained away from the Special Political Committee when these controversial issues were under discussion.

The US favors the expeditious disposition of the apartheid item in the least contentious manner possible. We would hope for a moderate resolution similar to the one passed by the 13th GA. Our view is that the discussion of such matters or general recommendations on carrying out Charter obligations if the field of human rights do not infringe the limits set by the Charter on intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. End FYI.

B. *Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa*. This item has been considered by the GA every year with one exception since 1946. In its 12th session the GA appealed to the Union to negotiate with India and Pakistan on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>17</sup> In the 13th GA, 62 nations including the US passed a resolution which (1) noted the readiness of India and Pakistan to negotiate; (2) expressed regret that the Union had not responded to communications giving evidence of this readiness; (3) again appealed to the Union to enter into negotiations without prejudice to its juridical position on the issue; (4) invited Member States to use their good offices to bring about negotiations; and (5) invited the parties to report on any progress made.<sup>18</sup>

This item has again been included, and we would hope for a debate with the minimum exchange of acrimony. While we do not intend to take any initiative on this issue, if there is widespread support for a resolution similar to that of last year, we would support it.

## 12. *The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)*

It is anticipated that the Secretary General will recommend that the United Nations Emergency Force be maintained at its present strength and that the members of the Organization give urgent attention to providing adequate financial support to the Force. UNEF was established in 1956 to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East and to assist in the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. It presently consists of about 5,000 men from India, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Brazil and Yugoslavia. It is stationed along the border between Egypt and Israel and near the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

<sup>17</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1179 (XII), adopted November 26, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

<sup>18</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1302 (XIII), adopted December 10, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090.

The US continues to support strongly the maintenance of UNEF as a means of contributing to peace and stability in its area of operations. With the exception of the Soviet bloc, there is general agreement among the members of the United Nations as to the importance of continuing UNEF.

On the other hand, the cost of maintaining UNEF presents considerable financial difficulties for some members. The General Assembly authorized the expenditure of \$30 million for UNEF in 1957, \$25 million in 1958 and \$19 million in 1959, as compared to a regular UN budget of about \$55 million annually. Despite steadily decreasing costs, some members have not met all their UNEF assessments, while the Soviet bloc has refused to pay its share of UNEF's costs, claiming that the Force is illegally constituted and that "the aggressors" should pay for it.

The US has made voluntary contributions totaling \$13 million to UNEF during its first two years. In 1959 the US expects to contribute \$3.5 million voluntarily in addition to its assessment of \$4,943,146.

Efforts are now underway by the Secretary General and a number of interested members of the UN to obtain additional financial support for UNEF. The US hopes that these efforts will be successful and that UNEF will continue to be a bulwark for peace in the Middle East. The US hopes further that free-world members of the Organization will support the maintenance of an effective UNEF, thereby frustrating what in effect is a Soviet attempt to exercise a veto on the decisions of the General Assembly.

### *13. Standby Arrangements for a United Nations Peace Force*

At the 13th GA the Secretary General submitted a summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), (Doc. A/3943), as a basis for consideration by member Governments, not permanent members of the Security Council, of possibly participating in the establishment of standby arrangements under which personnel of their armed forces could be made available upon a specific decision of the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council for service with a United Nations Force for pacific settlement. Included in the Secretary General's study was a series of principles, which were designed to protect the interests of the Organization and the potential contributing and host governments under which such a Force could be established.

On the basis of these principles, the Secretary General is now consulting with the twenty-three member Governments who contributed military personnel to UNEF and the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) as to what action they are taking or would be willing to take to assist in the establishment of such standby arrangements. These members are Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Fin-

land, India, Ireland, Indonesia, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, and Yugoslavia. It is likely that the Secretary General will report to the 14th GA on the results of his consultations.

Since the United States has consistently supported practicable proposals for making the United Nations a more effective organ for pacific settlement, the Secretary General's efforts are being followed with great interest.

14. *United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)*

A. *Proposals by the Secretary General and a Report of the Director.* On June 15, 1959, the Secretary General released a document, "Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees," (A/4121) for consideration by the 14th GA. (For over 10 years UNRWA has been caring for the basic needs of the almost one million Arab refugees, most of whom are in Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon, who left Palestine during the hostilities attendant to the creation of the State of Israel.) In this report, the SYG recommended the indefinite continuation of UNRWA, the mandate of which is due to expire on June 30, 1960, and development projects to assist in "the reintegration of the Palestine refugees into the surrounding economic life of the area." He also called for the transfer to the Arab host governments of the administrative responsibility for educating the refugees. The Acting Director of UNRWA will also present a report to the 14th GA covering the Agency's accomplishments during the last year.

The position of the United States on the future of UNRWA is now being formulated in the light of the SYG's recommendations, about which we are not enthusiastic. We consider that the proposal to transfer educational responsibilities to the host governments is a step in the right direction, though we prefer to have additional administrative responsibilities of UNRWA transferred to the Arab states. At the same time, we believe that Israel should be encouraged to acknowledge responsibility for the repatriation of those refugees who wish to return to their former homes, and for just compensation to those who left behind identifiable property. The final position adopted by the US, and public expression thereof, must be geared to the tactical situation at the time of GA consideration. In the meantime, posts may on appropriate occasions take the general line outlined above, stressing that the United States is actively reviewing the Palestine refugee problem as a whole.

The Department would be particularly interested in reports on pertinent reactions of Governments and of interested foreign groups to the SYG's proposals, as well as any indications of possible initiatives towards a solution of the problem outside the framework of these proposals.

B. *Voluntary Pledging of Contributions.* The financial resources available to UNRWA have enabled the Agency to provide essential relief services to the Palestine refugees. However, lack of funds has unfortunately necessitated a marked reduction in UNRWA's modest but effective rehabilitation program, which included the making of individual grants to enable some of the refugees to become self-supporting. As UNRWA's mandate is now due to expire next June, the Department's precise tactics vis-à-vis the Palestine refugee item are still being formulated. This matter may be the subject of a subsequent instruction to the field. We shall still seek broader and more extensive support for the Palestine refugee program during the pledging meeting of the ad hoc Committee of the Whole Assembly. Whatever the fate of UNRWA, we shall continue to stress the necessity for continued international aid to Palestine refugees until the problem is permanently settled.

#### 15. *Good Offices Committee on South West Africa*

GA Resolution 1243 (XIII) of October 30, 1958,<sup>19</sup> invites the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa to renew discussions with the Union of South Africa to find a basis for an agreement which would continue to accord the mandated Territory of South West Africa an international status and to submit a further report to the General Assembly at its Fourteenth Session. At the 12th GA, the Assembly adopted Resolution 1142,<sup>20</sup> drawing the attention of "member states to the failure of the Union of South Africa to render annual reports to the United Nations, and to the legal action provided for in Article 7 of the Mandate read with Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice."<sup>21</sup> This resolution was a clear warning to the Union that legal action might be forthcoming if the attempt at conciliation represented by the creation of a Good Offices Committee failed.

#### 16. *Cameroons Under United Kingdom Administration*

The GA, at its resumed session in February–March 1959 recommended that the United Kingdom, under UN supervision, organize separate plebiscites in the northern and southern parts of the Cameroons under British administration, in order to ascertain the wishes of

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/3805.

<sup>21</sup> For text of the Mandate for South West Africa, see U.N. doc. A/70. For text of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, see *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949* (revised edition), pp. 110–118.

the inhabitants regarding their future.<sup>22</sup> The plebiscite in the north will be held in mid-November 1959 and is expected to confirm the desire of the overwhelmingly Moslem population to remain an integral part of the northern region of Nigeria. In the south, the outcome is in considerable doubt, in as much as there is widespread sentiment in favor of some form of association with French Cameroun, which will become independent on January 1, 1960. The southern plebiscite will be held during the next dry session between the beginning of December 1959 and the end of April 1960. The alternatives to be put to the voters, which are now under discussion between the Governor General and the local political leaders, and the manner in which voting registers will be drawn up, may become major issues at the 14th session.

In view of the controversial nature of the British Togoland plebiscite—where a majority of the voters elected to join Ghana despite the opposition of the important Ewe minority—we believe considerable care should be devoted both to the phrasing of the questions to be put to the voters and to the organization of the plebiscite.

#### 17. *Cameroun Under French Administration*

The General Assembly, at the resumed session this year, also endorsed the recommendations of the 1958 Visiting Mission to French Cameroun (United States, Haiti, India, and New Zealand).<sup>23</sup> The Assembly voted 56-0-23 in favor of the French and Cameroun plan to grant independence to Cameroun on January 1, 1960, without the holding of national elections prior to that date. We agree with this decision and continue to believe that the present Cameroun Government and Legislative Assembly (elected on the basis of universal suffrage in December 1956) are fully representative, having demanded and received from France the commitment to grant independence next January.

In recent weeks we have been approached by Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia to reconsider our opposition to new general elections in Cameroun prior to independence. As explained to Ghana's External Affairs Minister, Ako Adjei, and to the Liberian Ambassador in Washington, we are opposed to reconsideration by the forthcoming GA of a problem which was fully discussed at the resumed session last February and March. We believe that Guinea, for reasons which have more to do with that country's African policies than with the merits of the case, is probably the only non-Communist country genuinely interested in reviving debate on this subject. Guinea is expected to press for support at the current meeting in Monrovia of nine independent African states

<sup>22</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1350 (XIII), adopted March 13, 1959, see U.N. doc. A/4090/Add.1.

<sup>23</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1349 (XIII), adopted March 13, 1959, *ibid.*

in its efforts to have the Cameroun issue inscribed on the 14th UNGA Agenda as a separate item. However, even in the unlikely event the GA decided to reverse itself, there would be insufficient time to prepare and carry out UN-supervised elections prior to independence.

For the reasons outlined above, and particularly in the light of the definitive decision taken on this question by the resumed session of the 13th UNGA on March 11, 1959, we intend to oppose inscription. Posts should discourage inscription and explain the arguments against it when discussing this matter with local officials.

#### 18. *The Future of the Trusteeship Council*

A difficult legal and practical problem is posed by the situation, unforeseen in the Charter, that will occur in the Trusteeship Council during 1960, when France and Italy will cease to be administering authorities upon the scheduled attainment of independence by French Cameroun (January 1), French Togo (April 27) and Italian Somaliland (December 2). In order to maintain the Council's prestige as long as possible, as well as the Charter requirement of true "balance" between administering and non-administering members, certain administering authorities, especially the United Kingdom, have recently been active in trying to develop general sentiment to "freeze" the Council at its present membership of 14 until December 31, 1961, when the three-year terms of three of its five elected non-administering members expire. To achieve this France and Italy would remain on the administering side until that date, at which time Italy would leave the Council and France would move over to the non-administering side to take a Charter-allotted seat as one of the permanent members of the Security Council that are not administering any trust territory. If the "freeze" proves impractical, we would then seek to assure our primary objective of never having an "unbalanced" Council. We would in this case favor the idea that the General Assembly at its annual sessions adopt a procedure that will assure the maintenance of a balanced Council by elections adjusted to bring about this result.

#### 19. *The Korean Question*

At the 13th General Assembly a resolution was approved setting forth again the determination of the United Nations to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area.<sup>24</sup> The resolution reflected the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva in 1954 and subsequently reaf-

<sup>24</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1264 (XIII), adopted November 14, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090.

An enclosed checklist was not found with the source text, but is printed in U.N. doc. SD/A/477.

firmed by the General Assembly. The resolution of the 13th General Assembly was adopted by a vote of 54 (US)-9 (Soviet bloc)-17. The Korean question will be discussed at the 14th General Assembly in connection with the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and it is anticipated that a resolution likewise reflecting the UN objectives and the fundamental principles as announced in 1954 will again be proposed.

**Herter**

---

**85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 11, 1959—9:37 p.m.*

105. Assistant Secretary informed Yang this afternoon<sup>2</sup> he hoped Yang would not press us on UN membership as we now convinced it not in best interest either ROK or free world for US to initiate separate item on 14th GA calendar re Korean membership UN. Parsons pointed out that (1) no other application on agenda hence undesirable risk erosion good will of Korea's regular supporters by asking them to go through fruitless exercise; (2) at 12th GA Indian effort to bracket ROK application with others defeated by slender margin of 4 votes; (3) recent events such as passage security and local autonomy legislation, suspension Kyong Hyang Shinmun, execution Cho Bong-am, although matters obviously within jurisdiction ROKG had not made it easier for Korea's friends arouse active support this year. Yang offered usual defense ROKG actions citing Communist threat, etc. At close Parsons assured him we would give full support to ROK on unification item and would mention membership problem and encourage other friendly states to do so in connection with debate on same; and perhaps in other contexts when appropriate. He added that we intended bring up Korean membership question whenever SC or GA next considers any other membership application unless circumstances presently unforeseen should convince ROK or US such move inappropriate at such time.

**Dillon**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/8-1159. Confidential. Drafted by FE; cleared by Bacon and Hartley; and approved by Parsons who signed for Dillon. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*



86. **Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

Views on Possible UN General Assembly Initiative on an "Open World"

In telegrams of June 29 (Tab A) and August 4 (Tab B),<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Lodge has proposed that the US employ the theme of an "open world" as a basis of a major US initiative at the 14th General Assembly. This would take the form of a separate agenda item in one of the political committees. Ambassador Lodge stresses the importance of pursuing increased contacts with the Soviets through this initiative, and of proclaiming our belief and practice of "open world" principles.

IO concurs that the US has much to gain, particularly in the light of the recent US-USSR exchange agreement and the proposed Eisenhower and Khrushchev visits,<sup>3</sup> in reaffirming before the General Assembly that a truly free world has to be an "open world." The visit of Khrushchev particularly may tend to obscure the fact that the Iron Curtain in many areas is still very much a reality. These factors, as well as indications of our interest in furthering contacts with the Soviets in line with the statements of Nixon in Moscow,<sup>4</sup> might well be emphasized in the Secretary's address before the General Assembly.

Ambassador Lodge in his proposals has emphasized in the present atmosphere of the GA the need to bar obvious propaganda from any "open world" initiative and to avoid rancor toward the Soviets. IO agrees that if we were to introduce an item on the "open world" theme, we would need to be prepared with specific proposals to render it genuinely constructive.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-1359. Confidential. Drafted by Eisendrath and initiated by Cargo and Walmsley. Sent to Herter through S/S and initiated by Herter. Copies were distributed to Bacon, Ludlow, Monsma, Nunley, and AF. A typed statement beside the distribution list on the source text reads: "These officers have agreed that the memorandum accurately states the positions of their bureaus."

<sup>2</sup> Neither attached. Tab A, telegram 1202 from USUN, is *ibid.*, 320/6-2959. Tab B, telegram 123 from USUN, is *ibid.*, 320/8-459.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields, signed at Washington and entered into force January 27, 1958, see 9 UST 13. Khrushchev visited the United States September 15-27.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Nixon's August 1 address in Moscow, broadcast over radio and television in the Soviet Union, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 887-894.

Ambassador Lodge suggests that the promotion of our contacts with the Soviets as advanced under the US-USSR exchange agreement might be a principal object of the "open world" initiative. However, as has been indicated by the East-West contacts office these exchanges have in the past been negotiated on a highly selective basis, and blanket-type proposals in the GA, such as would be embodied in a resolution, could not be well coordinated with the continuing bilateral negotiations which are being conducted under the agreement, and it might be more difficult for the US to refuse unprofitable exchanges which are continually being advanced by the Soviets during these negotiations.

Moreover, the Nixon statements have clearly been directed to the task of securing exchanges between the US and USSR as the leading nations of the "two systems." A proposal which would include this program in one embracing the entire GA membership might seriously encumber it by displacing its object, which is the increase of contacts between this country and the USSR, to contacts between all UN members, for which we have decidedly less enthusiasm. While the US and free Europe generally can negotiate profitable increases of contacts on a bilateral basis, other areas are not likely to handle the Soviets with the same level of sophistication. Broad multilateral promotion of increased contacts could seriously weaken our position in some areas. ARA, FE, and NEA have expressed their concern that a blanket UN endorsement of increased international contacts involving the Soviet bloc and possibly the Chinese Communist regime could pose a threat to the stability of their areas.

An "open world" item if it were placed in a political committee would probably invite a series of East-West clashes or more likely a major Soviet propaganda barrage to win acceptance for "peaceful co-existence." Highlighting of political differences, and promulgating of the "open world" as an alternative to "peaceful co-existence" to demonstrate the superiority of the free world's system might be considered desirable. However the "open world" initiative would be considered by other General Assembly members as an invitation to such a propaganda clash. Moreover, as illustrated by the history of the Peaceful and Neighborly Relations item during the last two years, the Assembly while conducting such debates has shown increasing reluctance to pass a resolution with concrete proposals on "open world" matters in a political committee which the Soviets do not at least tacitly accept. A bland, unspecific resolution similar to those on Peace-

ful and Neighborly Relations of the last two years<sup>5</sup> is therefore likely to be the end product of the US initiative on an "open world."

As a part of the "open world" initiative, Ambassador Lodge has suggested that the General Assembly establish a Committee to recommend to the 15th General Assembly ways of furthering an "open world." Support for such a Committee would be difficult for a number of pro-Western states, and neutralist states would be unlikely to support it against Soviet opposition. If such a Committee were nevertheless established, neutrals such as the UAR and India might also refuse participation, as they did in the Outer Space Committee, and the Committee as a result would find it difficult to function.

At this juncture, IO and the other area bureaus, with the exception of EUR, do not believe that either in the fields of East-West contacts, world-wide freedom of information, or exchanges, that the US can advance proposals under an "open world" item in the General Assembly which would be "constructive," tactically feasible, and at the same time not damage our position in other areas or jeopardize programs which are pursuing the end of the "open world" bilaterally.

EUR agrees with the Lodge proposals that a separate item should be introduced in a political committee on the "open world." It feels that secrecy and barriers to normal intercourse between peoples are inherent features of the Soviet system, and those most vulnerable to attack.

On balance, however, IO believes that the "open world" can better be promoted in the General Assembly through integrating it as a theme whenever appropriate throughout our General Assembly position, e.g., in the Secretary's opening speech, in Committee 3 on freedom of information, and in the disarmament and outer space items. Also, it is quite likely, as in the past two years, that the Soviets will again request inscription of an item on "peaceful co-existence" among states, in which case the "open world" can form much of the basis of the free world's response.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> For texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1236 (XII), adopted December 14, 1957, and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1301 (XIII), adopted December 10, 1958, see U.N. docs. A/3805 and A/4090, respectively.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 144 to USUN, August 26, informed Lodge that the Department had decided to pursue the "open world" as a theme in U.S. presentations in the 14th General Assembly rather than as a separate agenda item. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-2659)

87. **Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, August 14, 1959—8 p.m.*

202. Re Czech item on rotation GA presidency.<sup>2</sup>

1. Recommend Dept consider voting against inscription Czech item on rotation GA presidency.

2. Prompt reaction against inscription Czech item would be early and excellent way to show our opposition to Nosek candidacy for 15th session and help put brakes on candidacy before it gets out of hand and before Cordier can give it too much help (see USUN 194<sup>3</sup>).

3. If item goes on agenda we may find ourselves unable to defeat general res along lines adopted in 1957 re general comite, which bound to react in Nosek's favor and which would mean Soviets be able to choose pres every 5 years. Even if we could defeat res, effort would probably be as great as effort to defeat inscription. Defeat of inscription could, on other hand, provide added advantage against Nosek candidacy because it will demonstrate unusually firm US attitude from start.

4. Number arguments available against inscription would include: (1) Item obviously directly connected Czech candidacy 15th GA and is therefore not appropriate question for GA to discuss; (2) There is no charter requirement rotation Presidency as Czech memo alleges; (3) Election President is by secret ballot without nominations pursuant early GA decision and on basis individual qualifications.

5. Also some advantage in taking firm stand on some East-West issues during Khrushchev visit. This is secondary question on which we can take strong position without causing any serious difficulties with USSR outside UN and serves give notice that USSR, because of Khrushchev's visit, not in position run away with things.

6. If Dept decides to oppose inscription it is essential we be authorized to consult on that basis soonest or it will not be possible achieve.<sup>4</sup>

**Barco**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-1459. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Barco reported on August 13 that the Czech Delegation had submitted for inclusion on the 14th General Assembly agenda an item on the consistent application of the principle of equitable geographical representation in the election of the President of the General Assembly. (Telegram 183 from USUN; *ibid.*, 320/8-1359)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 81.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 176 to USUN, September 2, the Department instructed the mission to oppose inscription of the Czech item. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-1459)

**88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 20, 1959—7:15 p.m.*

127. Re Charter Review. In Dept's view no useful purpose served by including in report of Committee on Arrangements excerpts from 1958 Eisenhower-Bulganan exchange of letters (urtel 207<sup>2</sup>). Dept sees no basis for interpreting Bulganin letters as indicative change in Soviet position of consistent and firm opposition to Charter review. Moreover USSR subsequent to Bulganin letters again insisted in connection discussion enlargement items at 13th GA that any amendment Charter dependent seating Chinese Communists in UN. Mission should therefore endeavor persuade Matsch drop his idea.

Re consultations UK Del: While we continue favor holding review conference when circumstances appear favorable to fruitful outcome such review, circumstances now appear to us no more auspicious than in 1955 and 1957. Moreover, prospects for successful conference have been decreased by USSR's introduction of Chinese representation issue into question Charter amendment. However, as in past, we would be guided by views of others on this matter and would favor setting date review conference should this clearly prove be wish substantial majority UN membership. In absence such desire we would favor continuance of Committee on Arrangements with request from GA that it report again no later than 16th session.

Mission should inform UK Del that above is line US proposes take in connection with forthcoming meeting of Committee on Arrangements, subject our consultations with them and other friendly delegations. Mission should point out that so far as we aware no member government now advocating early review conference and only interest in early conference observed recently is among those advocating drastic revision of Charter to provide some degree supernatural authority. However, this interest such that from public relations standpoint, if no other, continuation of Committee on Arrangements appears desirable. We see no reason for lengthy meeting unless widespread sentiment for early review conference develops and hope Committee will complete its work expeditiously and without substantive discussion, which not within its terms of reference. Mission should seek British concurrence our view handling Chinese representation question, if it arises, either on basis that moratorium resolution approved 13th GA applies com-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/8-1759. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hartley on August 19; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Bacon, Nunley, Green, Monsma, and Ludlow; and approved by Walmsley who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 207, August 17, reported a conversation with Matsch regarding a Charter Review Committee meeting scheduled for September 2. (*Ibid.*)

mittee since it continues apply GA or that Committee of Whole as subsidiary body of GA is not competent discuss any proposal alter representation.

Suggestion 1957 slate of officers be carried over (Afghanistan, chairman; Ecuador, vice-chairman, and Austria, rapporteur) leaves something be desired from standpoint ability and position on moratorium formula of proposed chairman. Dept would therefore not wish be bound accept this arrangement if more acceptable candidacy put forward. Dept not, however, prepared make issue this matter unless it appears there likely be difficulties over Chinese representation or that meeting likely become controversial.

Following discussion UK Del Mission should consult with other key friendly delegations and Secretariat to ascertain their thinking.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegrams 248 from USUN, August 24, and 264 from USUN, August 26, reported on discussions on Charter Review with the British Mission. (*Ibid.*, 310.1/8-2459 and 310.1/8-2659, respectively)

---

**89. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts<sup>1</sup>**

CG-118

*Washington, August 25, 1959—6:07 p.m.*

SUBJECT

Policy Information Statement (IO-77) *United States Support of the United Nations*

*Background:*

The Fourteenth General Assembly of the United Nations will convene in New York on September 15, 1959. The United States has always regarded the United Nations as a keystone of its foreign policy.

Since its foundation in 1945, the United Nations has grown from 51 to 82 members. Four new states will become independent in 1960—Nigeria, Somaliland, French Togoland and the French Cameroons. It is almost certain that one of their first acts will be to apply for membership in the next generation.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/8-2559. Confidential. Drafted by IO; cleared with USIA and in draft with Wilcox, EUR, and WE; and initialed for the Secretary by Philip Burris, Policy Coordinator, Bureau of Public Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Circular Airgram CG-121, August 26, changed this paragraph to read:

*Continued*

The small and the newly-independent states place a premium on membership in the United Nations. Many of them regard it as their shield and defender, their hope for the future. It is, therefore, obvious that any apparent denigration of the United Nations by the United States would lessen their confidence in the United States as an honest champion of democracy and of the integrity of the smaller and newer states.

In a world where the powerful ferment of the new nationalism of Africa and Asia grows almost daily and may well, in the long run, provide the fulcrum of power to either "East" and "West",<sup>3</sup> this consideration is not to be taken lightly.

*Problem:*

In the next four months the role of the United Nations in world affairs may well be over-shadowed by more spectacular events which will capture headlines and dominate public reaction. In the forefront of these is the exchange of visits by the President and Mr. Khrushchev.

There is already some press speculation to the effect that "the big two" are about to arrange world affairs between themselves, perhaps bypassing the UN in the process. Should this idea gain currency among responsible leaders of the small, the "uncommitted" and, particularly, the newly-emerging nations, the long-range results in terms of confidence in American foreign policy on the part of these increasingly important components of the power-complex may well prove deleterious to United States foreign policy objectives.

*Guidance:*

In these premises, posts are urged to use available opportunities, subject to the discretion of Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers in the light of local conditions, to underscore the United States basic commitment to and belief in the United Nations as a primary instrument for preserving world peace and for bettering the lot of mankind.

As an immediate and general guide, the text of the President's Letter of Transmittal covering "U.S. Participation in the United Nations—Report by the President to the Congress For The Year 1958"<sup>4</sup>

---

"Since its foundation in 1945, the United Nations has grown from 51 to 82 members. Four new states will become independent in 1960—Nigeria, Somaliland, French Togoland and the French Cameroons. It is almost certain that one of their first acts will be to apply for membership in the United Nations. It is equally certain that they will be admitted. There is no foreseeing how many other newly-emerging nations may similarly be admitted to the United Nations in the next generation." (*Ibid.*, 511.00/8-2659)

<sup>3</sup> Circular Airgram CG-121 substituted "East or West" here.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 69-75.

will be found useful. (All Foreign Service and USIS posts should have at least one copy of the complete Report available and those of previous years may well be at hand.)

Various avenues of approach will undoubtedly suggest themselves to officers in particular areas in implementing the objective of this instruction.

Suggestions on the part of posts will be welcomed. Further material is available upon request to provide documentation for this important argument.

**Herter**

---

**90. Memorandum for the Record by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 29, 1959.*

Having reviewed the problem outlined in Mr. Wilcox's attached memorandum of August 24 [26] regarding the Security Council seat to be vacated by Japan,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Parsons concurred in the draft telegram authorizing our support of the Greek candidacy subject to the conditions outlined in that telegram. It was emphasized in our conversation that there is at the moment no active Far East candidate. Thailand is not actively seeking the seat at the present time.

I informed Mr. Parsons that there is no suggestion in the present plan of a "transfer back to Eastern Europe" of this particular seat as a permanent regional matter. It is planned that in the future this seat would be allocated to the best advantage of American policy at the time and subject to the prevailing circumstances. It is my judgment that U.S. objectives will be best served under present circumstances by support of Greece. Greece is an active candidate. USUN has recommended that we support the Greek candidacy. It is also our understanding that Britain will support Greece.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/8-2959. Confidential. Drafted by Murphy and cleared by Parsons.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; it outlined the background to the election of three nonpermanent members to the U.N. Security Council, recommended that the United States support Greece to replace Japan, noted that FE disagreed with this recommendation, and forwarded telegram 156 to USUN (*infra*) to Murphy for signature. (*Ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, 14th General Assembly)



It was also understood that should Thailand be an active candidate for the seat next year that, in the absence of adverse considerations which conceivably might develop at that time, our hope would be to support Thailand. There is no intention in the present instance to prejudice Far East considerations in the slightest.

RM

---

**91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 29, 1959—12:15 p.m.*

156. Re SC slate. Since there no immediate prospect enlargement SC, Dept sees merit in "floating" seat status for SC seat currently occupied Japan (urtel 89<sup>2</sup>). Dept also sees serious risk that with Ceylon Commonwealth choice succeed Canada, effort to elect second Asian to succeed Japan would produce another contest with all its divisive effects and could result in election Soviet bloc candidate, which Dept firmly opposes so long as USSR continues to block enlargement. Furthermore election Soviet bloc candidate would leave us with only minimum number of required votes (7) in SC on Chi Rep issue. With Cyprus no longer before GA, Greece, supported by US and UK, should prove strong vote-getter. Moreover, election Greece SC should serve substantially reduce Greek disappointment over its recent failures obtain certain other posts desired. Dept therefore prepared concur with UK in favoring Greece to succeed Japan 1) when it certain Ceylon and not Ghana Commonwealth choice to succeed Canada, 2) if there general agreement that SC seat in question will be regarded as "floating" pending enlargement SC and not as having reverted to Eastern Europe through election of Greece, and 3) if definite assurances can be obtained Greece will support moratorium formula.

USUN authorized so inform UK Delegation, making clear that if there any chance Ghana will be Commonwealth choice, Dept would wish see Thailand succeed Japan provided Thailand likely obtain necessary support. When definite Commonwealth decision on Ceylon

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/7-2559. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Green, Monsma, Parsons, Nunley, and Ludlow; and approved by Murphy who signed for Dillon. Repeated to Athens and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 89, July 23, reported on a conversation with Palmas regarding a Greek candidacy for the Security Council. (*Ibid.*, 330/7-2359)

confirmed by UK Delegation and if UK decision support Greece remains unchanged, USUN should inform Palamas US would favor Greek candidacy provided it understood seat in question will be regarded as "floating" and not reverting Eastern Europe, and provided we can count on Greek support of moratorium formula. Mission should point out success Greek candidacy will depend on their obtaining broad support.<sup>3</sup>

### Dillon

---

<sup>3</sup> At this point in the source text the following paragraph was deleted before transmission: "In discussions with Latin Americans it would be desirable to avoid emphasizing 'floating seat' concept since this might only tend to make it more difficult for Latin Americans to continue attach importance to maintenance of so-called 'gentlemen's agreement', to support our preferred candidate on an ad hoc basis each time this seat must be filled."

Telegram 284 from USUN, August 31, reported that the British still intended to support Greece and that Ceylon would be the Commonwealth candidate. (*Ibid.*, 330/8-3159) Telegram 642 to Athens, September 1, instructed the Embassy to approach the Greek Foreign Ministry regarding the U.S decision to support Greece, and to report the Foreign Ministry's reaction. (*Ibid.*)

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1959: FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY; THE FOURTEENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

**92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 8, 1959—8:02 p.m.*

466. While US of course strongly supports Vietnam membership, there is no membership item on 14th GA provisional agenda and Dept does not anticipate any new applications during 14th session. Dept therefore does not consider desirable press for reconsideration VN and ROK applications 14th GA in absence any indication of change in Soviet position, and has so informed ROK in response its request US raise matter (urtel 721<sup>2</sup>). However, US prepared, as in case ROK, raise matter again when new applications next considered (Togoland, Cameroun, Nigeria and Somaliland scheduled become independent during 1960) if VN then desires and in absence unforeseen developments making such move contrary our mutual interests.

**Dillon**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9-459. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Bacon and in substance with SEA; and approved by Wallner who signed for Dillon. Repeated to USUN and Seoul.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 721, September 4, reported that the Secretary-General of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry had asked if the United States intended to raise at the 14th General Assembly the issue of Vietnamese admission to the United Nations. (*Ibid.*)

---

**93. Editorial Note**

The 14th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly opened at 3 p.m., September 15. Victor A. Belaunde of Peru was elected President of the session. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.795.

Secretary of State Herter addressed the General Assembly during general debate on September 17. Herter spoke of several foreign policy issues in terms of the theme "constructive change through peaceful

means." For text of his statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.797. Three days later, the American Broadcast Company televised a statement by Herter about the United Nations, in which he termed it "a cornerstone of United States foreign policy." For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 12, 1959, pages 507-508.

---

**94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 15, 1959—7:36 p.m.*

238. Re: Czech Item on GA Presidency.

Dept agrees that in view UK reaction (urtel 357<sup>2</sup>) it not practical attempt oppose inscription. USDel should therefore vote for inscription after indicating briefly we believe past practice has operated successfully respect this office producing series competent presiding officers from various regions. US supporting inclusion item on basis its usual practice not oppose inscription and not because we think consideration this item necessary or desirable.

Dept has under active consideration possible ways handling item after inscription including suggestions contained urtel 357.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1159. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Bruns; cleared by Green, Bacon, Nunley, Ludlow, and in substance with Monsma; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 357, September 11, reported that the British Delegation had informed the U.S. Mission that the Foreign Office did not think it desirable to oppose inscription. (*Ibid.*)

95. **Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 17, 1959—7:45 p.m.*

319. Infotel—Question Chinese representation handled in General (Steering) Committee with less vituperation than previous years. By vote of 12 to 7 with 1 abstention, Committee adopted our moratorium proposal. Despite our request for supporting statements in Committee, French, Belgian, Liberian and Brazilian representatives declined; France because of failure China to support France on Algeria; Belgium because its representative belonged to political party that supports recognition Chicoms; and Brazil also for domestic political reasons. Belaunde (Peru), President General Assembly, who did not vote in Committee despite our request, said Peru definitely would support moratorium procedure in plenum. Our Mission reports Brazilian representative said support for US position on issue was "heaviest burden Latin American countries had to bear in return for US friendship." Venezuelan permanent representative told our Mission he hoped be able convince his Foreign Minister continue support moratorium procedure in plenum so as to present solid Western front during Khrushchev visit. He informed our Mission support our position was political "hot potato" at home since public opinion could not understand why matter should not be debated. He expressed relief we intend make substantive speech on issue.<sup>2</sup>

**Dillon**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1759. Secret. Drafted by Moor; cleared by Bock, EUR, NEA, and ARA; and approved by Bruns who signed for Dillon. Sent to 10 missions.

<sup>2</sup> Robertson presented the U.S. position on Chinese representation in the United Nations to the General Assembly on September 21. For text of his statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.800. On September 22, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1351 (XIV) rejecting India's request to include the question of Chinese representation on the General Assembly agenda and stating that the 14th General Assembly would not consider proposals to exclude representatives of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China. For text, see U.N. doc. A/4354. For a record of the debate and vote on this issue, see U.N. docs. A/PV.800-803.

96. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 17, 1959.*

RE

Security Council Election

As you know, we must consider urgently the question of the replacement of Japan on the Security Council. Greece seems clearly out of the picture.<sup>2</sup> We have examined three possible candidates, Turkey, Thailand and Jordan. Based on our estimates (copy attached<sup>3</sup>), we believe that Turkey might be the strongest candidate. However, we do not know whether the Turks would be willing to run, and I believe it would be desirable, after discussing this matter with Lloyd and Couve, for you to see the Turkish Foreign Minister as soon as your schedule permits with a view to encouraging him to put forward Turkey's candidacy for the Security Council.

In doing so, I would suggest that you make clear to him that we do not anticipate an easy fight, but that the US is prepared to give the Turkish Government all feasible support in order to achieve Turkey's election.

Should Turkey be unwilling to enter the race, I believe we should next sound out Thailand.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/9-1759. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and initialed by Wilcox and Parsons. A note on the source text indicates that Herter saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 658 from Athens, September 4, advised that Greece probably did not wish to assume Japan's seat. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-459) Gadel 4, September 16, informed the USUN that Greece had decided not to run for the Security Council, and instructed the Mission to consult with the British Delegation to determine whether Jordan, Thailand, Turkey, or another friendly U.N. member would have the best chance to win against Poland. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1659)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Memoranda of Herter's September 18 conversation with Lloyd and Couve de Murville and of his September 22 conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu are in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1476.

## 97. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 29, 1959—3:58 p.m.*

397. Turkey is candidate for election at current GA to Security Council seat currently occupied Japan and has been assured our full and active support.<sup>2</sup> Poland rival candidate for election same seat and also for re-election ECOSOC.

Dept considers success Turkish candidacy most important for following reasons:

1) Turkey can be expected make constructive contribution SC's work, which cannot be expected any Soviet-bloc member, and Turkey's election would add to rather than detract from over-all composition SC from standpoint Free World interests. This particularly true for 1961 when there good possibility, if Poland elected, of having two Soviet-bloc and two "neutralist" members SC since neutralist candidate for election in 1960 to succeed Tunisia appears possible.

2) Dept opposed additional representation for Soviet bloc on SC so long as USSR blocks any enlargement SC to permit more equitable geographic representation other areas that organ. US on record as being prepared see one elective seat go to bloc in event enlargement and if bloc obtains this seat earlier, we lose important means maintaining pressure on USSR re enlargement.

3) Dept on principle does not favor election one member to two major UN organs at same GA election in view relatively few election posts in terms expanded UN membership. Dept prepared vote for Poland re-election ECOSOC but not for election SC.

In supporting Turkish candidacy, Dept does not consider SC seat in question which originally held by Eastern Europe and diverted to Far East in 1956 as reverting to Eastern Europe, which might be interpretation given election Poland. Dept believes this seat must be regarded as floating pending enlargement. SC in view increased membership UN and Charter provision re equitable geographic distribution SC. Election Turkey would tend establish floating character seat in question. However, there many UN members which still consider important maintenance so-called "gentlemen's agreement" of 1946, which allocated one elective SC seat to Eastern Europe, and from standpoint these members Turkey should prove acceptable candidate as it has already held seat in question as EE state (1954-55).

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/9-2959. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on September 28; cleared by Green, Bacon, Monsma, Ludlow, and Nunley; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Sent to 62 missions and repeated to 17 missions.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 70, September 25, reported that the Turkish Delegation had informed USUN that Turkey would run to replace Japan on the Security Council. (*Ibid.*, 330/9-2559)

Polish candidacy advanced before Turkey's and likely attract considerable support. USGAdel instructed actively support Turkish candidacy.<sup>3</sup> At this stage Dept believes main US effort should be in New York. However, Embassy should seek appropriate occasion inform Foreign Office US supporting Turkey and unless Emb perceives objection, express hope FonOff will do likewise. Emb should also indicate USGAdel discussing this matter with other dels in New York. Report reaction promptly.

Herter

---

<sup>3</sup> Gadel 21, September 29, instructed USUN on tactics and provided arguments to use in support of Turkey's candidacy. (*Ibid.*, 330/9-2959)

---

98. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 8, 1959—7:30 p.m.*

327. Re Delga 52.<sup>2</sup> Dept. welcomes Australian proposal as means maintaining both parity principle and three year term for elected members. Dept. agrees that proposal would be justified by precedent of Rule 148<sup>3</sup> which also adjusted balance between administering and non-administering members as result of changes in number administering powers.

If two paragraphs quoted are intended as alternatives Dept. would favor second because of specific mention parity principle. Would require clarification cover AA with two or more trusteeships.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 350/9-2459. Official Use Only. Drafted by Acly on September 25; cleared by Nunley, Green, Monsma, Ludlow, McNutt, Cargo, and L/UNA; and approved by Gerig who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 52, September 24, transmitted the text of an Australian proposal to amend the U.N. General Assembly rules of procedure. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Rule 148 establishes the terms of office and eligibility for reelection of nonadministering members of the Trusteeship Council. For text, see U.N. doc. A/520/Rev.15.



Wieschhoff proposal (Delga 49<sup>4</sup>) appears unrealistic in that it would leave Council unbalanced during first session 1960 and establish dangerous precedent which might later be used to disadvantage administering powers.

Herter

---

<sup>4</sup>Delga 49, September 23, reported that Wieschhoff, Director of the Division of Trusteeship in the U.N. Secretariat, favored electing no additional members to the Trusteeship Council. Instead, France would become a permanent member in March 1960, while India and Haiti would leave the Council. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.5/9-2359)

---

**99. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 12, 1959.*

SUBJECT

Your Meeting October 13 with Senator Clark on Charter Review

*Discussion*

Senator Clark in a letter to you of August 24, 1959 (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> expressed the hope that he and certain of his colleagues might have the opportunity of discussing the problem of United Nations Charter review with you at your convenience. The Senator also urged 1) that the United States support a recommendation to the Fourteenth General Assembly by the General Assembly Committee on Arrangements for a Charter Review Conference that the Committee be continued in being and requested to report again not later than the Sixteenth General Assembly; and 2) that the Policy Planning Staff undertake a study of the problem of Charter review, taking as its starting point "World Peace through World Law" by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn (Tab B). In your absence Mr. Murphy replied to the Senator's letter pointing out 1) that a recommendation to the General Assembly of the kind

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/10-1259. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hartley on October 7, initialed by Sisco, sent to Herter through Calhoun, and initialed by Herter. Concurred in by Macomber, Hager, and Smith.

<sup>2</sup> None of the tabs is attached. A copy of Tab C is *ibid.*, 310.1/8-2459. The May letter from Macomber to Fulbright listed under Tab E is *ibid.*, 310.1/5-759; the August 5 letter listed under Tab E and the other tabs have not been found.

advocated by the Senator was made by the Committee on Arrangements on September 3 with the support of the vast majority of its members, including the United States, and 2) that the Department has given thorough and continuing study to the problem of Charter review, including such proposals as those advanced by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn. (Tab C)

Senator Clark is a proponent of "enforceable world law" has two concurrent resolutions before the Senate (S. Con. Res. 52 and 25) looking toward the revision of the United Nations Charter to this end (Tab D). The second resolution is a modification of the first, and the Department has commented unfavorably on both (Tab E). Senator Clark has been joined by some twenty other Senators in co-sponsoring the second of these resolutions and about the same number of identical resolutions are before the House (Tab F). These resolutions have the backing of the United World Federalists and the World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government, and stem from the Clark-Sohn book "World Peace Through World Law". This book presents a detailed plan for complete and universal national disarmament, and the establishment of a world police force under the authority of a world organization having the attributes of a superstate.

I have myself endeavored to persuade Senator Clark that proposals of this nature are not realistic in the foreseeable future. I found him, while not unreasonable in his general attitude, dedicated to the "world government" concept, and I seriously doubt that he can be otherwise persuaded. However, he has been most anxious to discuss the matter with you and I would hope such a discussion may at least serve to convince the Senator that 1) the Department is sympathetic with his objectives; 2) continues to favor the holding of a Charter review conference when, in the view of a substantial majority of UN members, international circumstances are conducive to constructive review; and 3) has under continuous consideration what it is feasible to do toward strengthening the United Nations in the present circumstances. At the same time care must be taken to avoid encouraging the Senator in his belief that any study by the Policy Planning Staff or by a specially appointed study group (as proposed in S. Con. Res. 52 and 25) or any Charter review conference within the foreseeable future would result in any endorsement or acceptance of the Clark-Sohn proposals.

#### *Recommendation*

That you indicate to Senator Clark and his colleagues 1) that the Department fully shares the concern reflected in his concurrent resolutions; 2) that the United States continues to favor the holding of a review conference as soon as circumstances appear auspicious and will support favorable General Assembly action on the recommendation of the Committee on Arrangements for a Charter Review Conference that

it be continued in being to report again not later than the Sixteenth General Assembly (1961); and 3) that the Department has given, and will continue to give, continuing study to the problem of Charter review, including proposals such as those advanced by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn.

You may wish to note in passing that the Clark-Sohn proposals were most recently again reviewed by the Department in connection with the Khrushchev proposal for total disarmament. However, it remains our conviction that there is no chance in the present international climate of such proposals as these, involving a very substantial relinquishment of national sovereignty, gaining the broad international acceptance that would be required to make them effective and thus to enable them adequately to protect the United States national interest.

You may also wish to point out that Department has already available a comprehensive series of basic studies relating to Charter review. It is our belief that further systematic work of this nature, over and above the day-to-day consideration given this general problem in relation to specific questions as they arise, can most profitably be undertaken when opinion among the United Nations membership generally appears favorable to setting a definite date for a review conference.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Herter met with Senators Clark and Javits at 4:30 p.m., October 13, to discuss repeal of the Connally amendment. Regarding this amendment, see Document 59. A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/10-1359. Further documentation on proposals to promote the rule of law through U.N. Charter review is *ibid.*, 301, 302, 310.1, and L Files: Lot 69 D 306, LCM Chronological, 1959 and 1960.

## 100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 15, 1959—7:15 p.m.*

525. Depcirtel 397.<sup>2</sup> In 25 ballots to date, support for Turkey to succeed Japan on SC remaining firm while that for rival candidate Poland dropping off. Vote on 25th ballot 37 for Turkey and 43 for Poland, whereas Poland received 48 votes to Turkey's 33 on one ballot in previous day's voting. Voting will be resumed Monday morning, October 19. Voting by secret ballot and positions being taken Cambodia and Morocco uncertain.

You should immediately approach Foreign Office to urge GADel be instructed support Turkey if not already so doing. Beside reiterating arguments previously suggested reference telegram you should point out: 1) We have no intention withdrawing support from Turkey; 2) Turkey has hard core support sufficient prevent election Poland; 3) Poland already re-elected ECOSOC by this GA and therefore has no justifiable claim election to second major UN Council at this time contrary UN precedents; 4) continued deadlock over SC election will have deleterious effect atmosphere GA and be prejudicial constructive action other items before this GA; and 5) we recognize some countries may have made commitment Poland before Turkish candidacy announced but believe any such commitment fully honored after 25 ballots.

For Amembassy Djakarta: Dept believes this approach desirable unless Embassy perceives serious objections. FYI: Indonesia presumably voting for Poland. End FYI.

For Amembassy Katmandu: FYI: USUN informed by head Nepal Del commitment given Poland before Turkish candidacy announced and that in view present deadlock he requesting new instructions, implying he recommending switch to Turkey. End FYI.

Report reaction USUN priority.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/10-1559. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley; cleared by Green, Ludlow, and Bacon; and approved by Henderson who signed for Herter. Also sent priority to Morocco and Nepal, and repeated to USUN. Similar telegrams were sent to posts in the American Republics, NATO countries, Africa, and Asia. (Telegram 481, October 14, *ibid.*, 330/10-1459; Topol 674, October 14, *ibid.*, 330/10-1359; and telegram 490, October 15, *ibid.*, 330/10-1559)

<sup>2</sup> Document 97.

<sup>3</sup> Voting resumed on October 19, but was postponed until November 2 after the 31st ballot remained deadlocked with 42 votes for Turkey and 39 for Poland. (Telegram 1227, October 19; Department of State, Central Files, 330/10-1859)

### 101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 20, 1959—7:04 p.m.

383. Subject: Proposed USSR Resolution re UN Secretariat. Delga 186.<sup>2</sup>

USSR Resolution would undoubtedly appeal to many nations, since on surface at least objectives are economy and efficiency of operations. In addition to this consideration, would give USSR opportunity pose as benefactor small nations, disinterested party championing economy and win new "respectability".

However this is Soviet ploy of long standing. Some indications are they may now be exploiting to greater extent. Mission will recall Czech Resolution in Fifth Committee re UN Field Missions (Delga 153 and Gadel 46<sup>3</sup>).

Department considers proposed resolution has following serious defects from U.S. point of view:

1. Would give USSR position of power in UN management it does not now enjoy.

2. As in Czech resolution, purpose this proposal obviously political rather than budgetary, being part of over-all Soviet strategy to weaken and hamstring UN and field missions under guise of improving administrative facets of organization.

3. Would give USSR opportunity to gather information which could be politically and/or propagandistically valuable to them for use at later date.

4. Establishment of Committee "appointed by member governments" would open door to political wrangle which helpful only to Soviets. (Department has "parity" in mind here.)

5. Past experience with such bodies (most recent was Public Information) most unhappy and time-consuming in rejecting harmful Soviet recommendations.

(See, for example, loose, contention-inviting language Soviet resolution: ". . . that since last general review a number of important changes have taken place in the work of the organization and many new factors have appeared.")<sup>4</sup>

6. Resolution as drawn reflects lack of confidence in SYG.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.15/10-1659. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Freimarck and Puhay; cleared by Sisco and in substance with OES; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 186, October 16, transmitted the text of a Soviet draft resolution proposing the establishment of a committee to review the organization and activities of the U.N. Secretariat and its field bodies. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Czech draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C.5/L.572 or U.N. doc. A/4336, para. 18. Neither Delga 153 nor Gadel 46 has been found.

<sup>4</sup> Ellipses in the source text.

Additionally, experience shows that over-all surveys such as contemplated here have little practical utility. What is needed is detailed and precise study specific areas. Accordingly you should:

1. Consult British, Canadians and in your discretion other interested Members to explain U.S. reasoning and position on this proposal.

2. You should consult SYG to obtain his reaction to USSR proposal. In anticipation of his lack of enthusiasm for USSR proposal, you should urge him to gain support for his position, and obtain his and Secretariat's reaction re desirability of US proposal.

3. You may wish to make following counterproposal: The Administrative Management Staff, created by SYG last spring for the very purpose of examining UN organization, as well as the Advisory Committee, should be encouraged to work on specific areas of the UN Secretariat as well as field bodies. If additional expert help is needed by either, they should be empowered to engage disinterested professionals at direction of SYG. Possible counter-resolution, operative parts of which might be, follows:

"Recognizing the utility of conducting periodic general reviews of the structure and functioning of UN bodies with a view to reducing expenses and increasing efficiency,

"Noting that it was with this thought in mind that the Secretary-General last spring established an Administrative Management Staff in the Office of the Controller,

"Requests that the SYG pursue this forward-looking step by taking such measures as he may deem appropriate to strengthen the work of the Staff, and,

"Suggests that the Management Staff explore the advisability of engaging the services of a reputable firm of private consultants and/or qualified academic authorities in the field of corporate management to conduct a survey of the organization and activities of the Secretariat and its field bodies."

Para 3 and 4 of USSR draft resolution could be included.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>5</sup> Delga 238, October 22, transmitted the text of a U.S. draft resolution on a management survey of the U.N. Secretariat. (*Ibid.*, 320.15/10-2259) The Department commented on the U.S. draft in telegram 396, October 23. (*Ibid.*)

## 102. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, October 26, 1959—11 a.m.*

Delga 259. For Herter and Wilcox from Lodge. Re: Presidency 15th GA.

Now that Tibet question is completed<sup>2</sup> with Irish having played major role with skill and distinction, I believe time has come for me to talk to Aiken (Ireland) about possibility Boland running for Presidency 15th GA.

My instructions on this subject (Deptel 27, Jul 14<sup>3</sup>) do not seem to me to meet situation which now faces US.

1. We cannot wait (as Deptel 27 suggests) for "Western Europe to reach early agreement on acceptable non-Communist candidate". As we reported (ourtel 194, Aug 14<sup>4</sup>), UK favors Boland's candidacy and since then has been privately encouraging him. French have indicated they unwilling commit themselves this far in advance. Western Europeans, I think, are generally favorable to Boland but we cannot expect this favorable sentiment to crystalize until Boland becomes active candidate and he will not do this until he gets green light from US.

2. We must therefore be more explicit with Aiken and Boland than merely telling them that "we would give full weight to Western European choice and would expect be able support it when taking our own position".

Request new instructions which will permit me tell Aiken fol:

1. That we are anxious support Boland's candidacy if he decides run. Only thing that worries us is our disagreement with Ireland over ChiRep issue but we are confident Boland would not use his position to influence 15th GA's action this question and I should talk to him about it so that we may be satisfied on that point.

2. That we assume Aiken understands danger to Boland's candidacy posed by Nosek's (Czechoslovakia) prior entry into field and vital necessity that Boland openly enter race immediately or withdraw his name conclusively.

I can well understand that Dept might feel Boland not best possible Western European for Presidency. But as practical matter Boland has first refusal. No other Western European will come out openly for Presidency so long as he is in field. I believe Boland is determined to

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-2659. Confidential. Received at 12:42 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> The General Assembly adopted Resolution 1353 (XIV) on the question of Tibet on October 21. For text, see U.N. doc. A/4354.

<sup>3</sup> Document 81.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, *ibid.*

run and has Aiken's full support. In case where choice is limited to Ireland or Czechoslovakia I do not think we should hesitate. I do not think Boland would use his position as GA Pres against US. There is no doubt that Nosek would.

I cannot emphasize too strongly my conviction that we must take clear stand now on this issue. We cannot afford wait until August to make up our minds. We must not get ourselves into same kind of trouble on this question as we are in with SC elections. There are too many parallels between Poland's candidacy for SC and Nosek's candidacy for 15th GA Presidency to allow ourselves think decision can be put off, however desirable that course of action might otherwise be.

Czech item re geographic distribution GA Presidency still in offing, and will need forceful defeat. Snowballing movement for Boland for 1960 GA Pres should help in defeating Czech initiative and is additional reason for getting Boland in race now.

Lodge

---

### 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 26, 1959—7:31 p.m.*

Gadel 68. Re: Enlargement Item. Confirming Sisco-Buffum Telecon:<sup>2</sup>

1. Dept considers revised Salvadoran draft resolution marked improvement over previous draft<sup>3</sup> but would still hope Latin American-Afro Asian consultations will result in dropping of Committee proposal and agreement on compromise text.

2. If no agreement reached, both revised Salvadoran and Afro-Asian texts<sup>4</sup> acceptable Dept. While we still prefer Afro-Asian text, recognize that USGadel efforts have this resolution voted on first in apparent absence any spontaneous Afro-Asian move this direction

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-2659. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Nunley, Green, and Ludlow, and in substance with Meeker, Bacon, and Monsma; and approved by Cargo who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the revised draft resolution introduced in the Special Political Committee by El Salvador on October 26, see U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.32/Rev. For texts of previous drafts, see U.N. docs. A/SPC/L.32 and A/SPC/L.32/Rev.1.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the draft resolution introduced in the Special Political Committee by 12 Afro-Asian nations, see U.N. docs. A/SPC/L.33 and A/SPC/L.33/Add.1.



would have serious repercussions among LAs. We also recognize US failure support Committee proposal could be misinterpreted as weakening US position on enlargement vis-à-vis USSR which can be expected oppose such proposal. Furthermore we see possibility, as was case last year, of both resolutions being adopted.

3. USGADel therefore authorized, depending on tactical situation, support either revised Salvadoran or Afro-Asian draft resolution or both, or compromise text marrying these two drafts.

4. If there is move place item on enlargement ICJ on provisional agenda 15th session, you should vote for inclusion unless you would be in minority in doing so.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>5</sup> On October 28-29, the Special Political Committee voted to recommend that the General Assembly adopt two draft resolutions on increasing the Security and Economic and Social Councils. For texts of the draft resolutions and a record of these deliberations, see U.N. doc. A/4256. On November 25, the General Assembly adopted the first draft resolution, 1404 (XIV), and decided not to vote on the second. The United States supported these decisions. For a record of these deliberations, see U.N. doc. A/PV.843.

---

**104. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 28, 1959.*

SUBJECT

Message to the Canadian Foreign Secretary on the Turkish Security Council Candidacy

*Discussion*

Ambassador Lodge on October 22 recommended a personal letter from you to the Canadian Foreign Secretary as "about the only hope" of discouraging the Canadians from promoting a compromise solution for the present deadlock in the Security Council elections between Turkey and Poland and of obtaining Canada's support of Turkey (Tab

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/10-2859. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on October 27 and initialed by Cargo, Wilcox, and Murphy. Sent also to Murphy and Herter through S/S, and designated 9700.

B<sup>2</sup>). Since Mr. Murphy was then in Ottawa, Ambassador Lodge's telegram was forwarded to him, and he and Ambassador Wigglesworth discussed the situation with the Foreign Secretary and Norman Robertson (Tab C). This discussion was inconclusive and our UN Mission telephoned yesterday to urge that you proceed with the personal message previously suggested. This seems to me highly desirable. Obtaining a solid NATO vote for Turkey is crucial to the success of its candidacy and, furthermore, it appears that other countries, New Zealand for example, are being influenced by the Canadian position.<sup>3</sup> A campaign now to promote a compromise solution will not only be harmful to the Turkish candidacy but also prejudicial to our ability to obtain the best possible compromise if a compromise becomes necessary. The strength of our bargaining position in such an event will depend on the strength of the Turkish candidacy.

#### *Recommendation*

That you sign the attached telegram requesting Amembassy Ottawa to deliver a personal message from you to the Foreign Secretary (Tab A).

<sup>2</sup> None of the tabs is attached to the source text. Tab A is *infra*. Tab B, Delga 223, October 23, is in Department of State, Central Files, 330/10-2259. Regarding Tab C, see footnote 2, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> At Wilcox's suggestion, Herter had discussed New Zealand's position on the Security Council elections with Nash on October 26. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 330/10-2659. Wilcox's October 23 memorandum recommending that Herter meet with Nash is *ibid.*, 330/10-1959.

#### 105. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Secretary of State for External Affairs Green<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 29, 1959.*

DEAR MR. GREEN: Bob Murphy has told me of his recent conversation with you on the Security Council election issue.<sup>2</sup> I gather that you believe either a split term similar to the arrangement made between Yugoslavia and the Philippines in 1955 or a compromise candidate

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/10-2959. Confidential. Transmitted in priority telegram 1807 to Paris and telegram 252 to Ottawa, October 29, which is the source text. The telegram was repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Murphy reported on his October 23 conversations with Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs Robertson, External Affairs Secretary Green, and U.S. Ambassador Wigglesworth in telegram 274 from Ottawa, October 23. (*Ibid.*, 330/10-2359)

offers the best solution to the present impasse in the General Assembly. As you know, the United States is strongly supporting the Turkish candidacy. Turkey has now taken the lead in the balloting and we believe that Turkey can be elected. Our respective appraisals of the present situation would therefore appear to differ. This causes us serious concern and I would like to set forth for your consideration our reasons for attaching such importance to the election of Turkey.

Whatever may have been the original issues in this election, we believe the course of events has given it great significance. It is apparent that Turkey's difficulty must be attributed in large part to the lateness of its candidacy. It is also apparent that a number of members of the Western world are inclined to be more generous to Poland than to other members of the Soviet bloc, perhaps in recognition of Poland's efforts to attain a greater degree of independence. In this instance, however, it seems evident that the Soviet Union is capitalizing on Poland's relative attractiveness to the non-Communist world. We have noted that the USSR is usually rather meticulous about distributing important U.N. offices among the various satellites, and there is certainly unusual significance in the fact that Poland was chosen this year to campaign both for the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council.

We believe that Soviet motives in this situation are based on several factors. As you know, the USSR claims that the seat currently occupied by Japan "rightly" belongs to Eastern Europe, despite the fact that no member of the bloc has held the seat since 1949. The USSR, therefore, seeks to take advantage of the currently hopeful international atmosphere to re-establish a permanent claim to this seat, which it would most certainly assert if Poland were actually elected. We believe it is important to maintain the concept of the seat as "floating", in order to meet the minimum requirements for West European, Asian, and African representation.

We believe the Soviet bloc is also attempting to demonstrate, at a critical psychological moment, its ability to exercise a de facto veto within the General Assembly, through a process of splitting the Western states. The achievement of a split on an important issue, in itself, is probably a matter of considerable importance to the USSR. It is inevitable, of course, that the sovereign nations of the West will tend to take somewhat different attitudes toward Soviet policies and tactics, since none of us would ever wish to achieve the monolithic unity that is imposed upon the members of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, I am disturbed whenever the Soviet Union finds evidence that its tactics of dividing the Western nations seem to be succeeding, since any evidence of success is likely to encourage the USSR to step up such tactics in preference to engaging in serious negotiations. In this instance, failure to elect Turkey would generally be regarded as a rebuff to the

West. It would be attributed to a split in Western solidarity and regarded as an indication of declining influence just when the West is about to undertake important negotiations with the Soviet Union. All of us would be put at a psychological disadvantage in our negotiations, and the Soviet Union can be counted upon to take full advantage of such a situation. These repercussions, in our view, may be expected if the future course of the balloting at the General Assembly leads to anything short of the outright election of Turkey.

Turkey, in view of its record of cooperation in the United Nations and as a fellow member of the free world's collective security system, can be expected to add dependable strength to the Security Council. The election of any Soviet bloc member, including Poland, would add a government that will do nothing except parrot the Soviet line. Moreover, while I agree with you that there is no vast difference between a 10 to 1 as against a 9 to 2 vote in the Security Council, there is a very great difference between a 10 to 1 as against a 7 to 4 or a 7-2-2 vote in the Council. With Ceylon coming on the Council, the latter situation is one we might face if Poland were to be elected and if a confirmed neutralist is elected next year to succeed Tunisia, which is likely. In the event there should be any increased recourse to the Security Council, we cannot believe it would be consonant with free world interests to have the voting indicate a substantial growth in international support for Soviet positions.

We are also disturbed by the prospect that the return at this time to the Soviet bloc of a seat that it has not held since 1949 will be misinterpreted as a reward for Soviet intransigence. It is the Soviet Union, after all, that has consistently prevented what both you and we have felt to be of real importance in view of the constantly growing membership of the United Nations, namely,<sup>3</sup> any enlargement of either the Economic and Social Council or the Security Council. To permit the Soviet bloc to improve its voting position on either Council while this condition prevails would be most undesirable in our view.

It would be equally undesirable, we believe, to have the Soviet leaders or the world in general interpret the election of Poland as a result of the preliminary efforts that the West has undertaken to reach a closer understanding with the Soviet Union on important international issues. If the Soviet Union is encouraged to believe that the mere hope of a *détente* is sufficient to obtain concessions from the West, we can hardly expect it to take concrete steps to give substance to this hope. Real progress toward disarmament, significant political settlements and lasting peace will be a matter of hard bargaining at

---

<sup>3</sup> The phrase, "what both you and we have felt to be of real importance in view of the constantly growing membership of the United Nations, namely," was added by Herter. (Note from Krebs to S/S, October 29; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)

best, and there is no reason to believe that we will improve our position in this bargaining process through gestures of unrequited generosity. The United States certainly has no desire to intensify the "cold war" on any front, major or minor, but we are painfully aware that the "cold war" is the result of Soviet initiatives, and we fervently hope that our friends and allies will stand firmly with us in refusing to abandon our resistance to basic Soviet ambitions. In brief, I am convinced that premature and unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union at this time could gravely damage our prospects for achieving a genuine and mutually satisfactory settlement of important issues at a later date.

The fact that Turkey is now in the lead indicates that a number of countries have already shifted their vote from Poland. I would hope that you might find the considerations I have outlined above sufficiently compelling to warrant a similar shift on the part of Canada.

With warmest personal regards,  
Most sincerely,

**Christian A. Herter**<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> The telegram bears this typed signature. The telegrams transmitting the text of the letter contained the following statements after the complimentary close:

"FYI. Dept is at present concentrating its efforts on election of Turkey and therefore avoiding, as counterproductive these efforts, any discussion of alternatives. We have, moreover, taken no firm position internally as among possible alternatives, such as a split term or a compromise candidate. End FYI.

"For Amembassy, Ottawa:

"You should deliver copy above message to Under Secretary External Affairs Norman Robertson."

---

**106. Letter From Secretary of State for External Affairs Green to Secretary of State Herter**<sup>1</sup>

*Paris, October 30, 1959.*

DEAR MR. HERTER: Your Embassy in Paris has today delivered to me your letter of October 29,<sup>2</sup> on the Security Council election issue and I do appreciate your having taken the trouble to explain so fully and frankly the bases of your concern. I genuinely regret, too, that our respective appraisals of this issue have led us to differing conclusions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.10-3059. Confidential. Attached to the source text is an October 30 letter from Rae forwarding the letter to Herter.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

I share your concern about what might be the consequence of a continuing deadlock in the voting for the Eastern European seat on the Security Council. At the same time, I do not think it is realistic to expect that the issue can be satisfactorily resolved at this stage by the transfer of votes from one of the present candidates to the other. Had there been an earlier canvass of opinion amongst members of the Western side regarding elections to the various UN Councils to be elected this year, I quite agree that we would all have seen objections to electing one state to two Councils, but I do not think this is a consideration on which one could base a withdrawal of support after some thirty ballots. At this stage a compromise solution seems necessary.

As I explained to Mr. Murphy in Ottawa,<sup>3</sup> I thought that on the basis of past experience, the deadlock might be resolved either by an agreement between the candidates to split the two-year term between the candidates standing down in favour of a third country which was reasonably acceptable to both groups. Yugoslavia, Austria and perhaps even Finland might be possibilities, though I imagine that none would accept the nomination unless they were assured that it was acceptable to the main sponsors of Turkey and Poland. Having in mind the cold war character which this contest has already assumed, it seems to be too much to hope that either of these solutions can be brought about by the manoeuvrings of delegations in the General Assembly, and I have spoken in this sense to both the Turks and the Poles. To the Turks, whose Representative on the NATO Council was talking to me on this subject when your letter arrived, I have of course stressed that our voting for Poland was not in any way incompatible with our respect for Turkey as an ally or our recognition that it would make an admirable member of the Security Council.

I am afraid that if the present wrangle goes on much longer and if the prestige not only of the competing candidates but of the main groups that back them is further committed, the effect on the prospects for the success of East-West negotiations during the months ahead will be bad. In the shorter run, chances of getting more or less agreed arrangements in the Security Council for a continuing UN presence in Laos, or for getting off to a good start on disarmament within the Ten-Power Committee, may be prejudiced. I have been encouraged to believe that considerations like these underlie the spontaneous support and understanding throughout Canada for the position our Government has taken.

It is because I believe that such easing of East-West relationships as these last weeks have seen is due in large part to President Eisenhower's initiative and leadership that I have been wondering whether

---

<sup>3</sup> Regarding Murphy's October 23 conversation with Green, see footnote 2, *ibid.*

you and the United Kingdom would not consider discussing with the Russians the possibility of an understanding with them about the Security Council seat.

With kind personal regards.

Yours sincerely,

Howard Green<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 5, 1959—3:02 p.m.*

Gadel 86. Re: 15th GA Presidency. For Lodge.

Dept fully aware seriousness problem raised Delga 259<sup>2</sup> and has given most careful consideration your views. Our past experience with commitments given far in advance elections has not been happy and any departure our usual practice this regard likely create future difficulties for us. On balance, however, we agree seriousness of situation created by Nosek candidacy necessitates our running some risks and thus may necessitate earlier commitment this year. We recognize that early and vigorous launching Nosek candidacy likely result his obtaining sufficient support to prejudice ultimate outcome election in our favor if announcement any West European candidacy long delayed.

At same time we do not believe it practical or desirable attempt to dictate West European choice of candidate or promise our support any West European candidate before it clear he will have support Western Europe.

In these circumstances we believe you should:

1) Again approach British and urge early West European decision on non-Communist candidate for reasons given Delga 259 and Deptel 27.<sup>3</sup> You should also indicate Dept prepared support West European choice of candidate outside Soviet bloc and specifically Boland if he is West European choice and is prepared not use his position influence

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-2659. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Green, Day, Dreier, Kohler, Parsons, and Ludlow; and approved by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Document 102.

<sup>3</sup> Document 81.

adversely GA action on Chi Rep issue. Same would apply any other West European choice. You should further indicate that you intend make this clear to Aiken.

2) Inform Aiken we prepared support Boland if he West European choice on understanding he will not use his position influence adversely GA action on Chi Rep issue. You should also point out Aiken need for prompt decision re Boland candidacy in view Nosek's announced candidacy and likelihood it already gaining support.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup> Delga 360, November 6, recounted Lodge's discussion with Aiken and Boland regarding the 15th General Assembly presidency. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-659) Delga 377, November 9, reported that the Irish Cabinet had agreed to Boland's candidacy. (*Ibid.*, 320/11-959)

---

**108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 6, 1959—10:31 p.m.*

Gadel 95. Re: SC Election. View background Turkish candidacy, Dept believes US must remain firm in support Turkey so long as Turkey remains candidate and must be guided far as possible by Turkish wishes with respect any compromise. Of three alternatives suggested Delga 313,<sup>2</sup> Dept believes (A) would raise awkward and unnecessary constitutional questions under Charter that could present us with serious problems. Moreover, Dept believes even as tactic as suggested numbered paragraph 5 urtel alternative (A) would create impression of US-Turkish intransigence which could be counter-productive. Dept therefore considers this least desirable alternative. As between (B) and (C) Dept prefers (C) for following reasons:

1) It impossible project with any accuracy overall composition SC in 1962-63 or international climate so far in advance. It therefore impossible forecast implications for US position of Poland's election

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/11-359. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley and Ludlow on November 4; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Nunley, Day, Ludlow, Bacon, Wilcox, AF, and NEA, and in substance with Monsma and Meeker; and approved by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 313, November 3, stated there was no acceptable Eastern European candidate available to run for the Security Council, nor any candidate from outside Eastern Europe who could win the seat, and listed the alternatives Lodge perceived as a result of this situation. (*Ibid.*)



SC two years from now should Turkey be chosen for next two years. Situation could be equally bad (or, conceivably, worse) in 1962-63 as in 1961.

2) Not only US but other Member States cannot reasonably be expected make firm commitments two years in advance and even if such commitments given now, we could not anticipate with any assurance they would stick.

3) Poland's election for two years, whether for 1960-61 or 1962-63, would tend to freeze SC seat in question as bloc rather than floating seat to greater extent than in case split-term solution.

4) View precedent 1955 election, Dept does not believe split-term solution would be serious blow US prestige, even if seat went to Poland for first year as it did to Yugoslavia and, in Dept's view, any added loss prestige in latter event more than compensated for by concrete advantages from our standpoint of having Turkey on SC in 1961.

USGADel in any consultations UK and Turks should be guided by above evaluation and considerations, making clear, however, we prepared maintain our support Turkey so long as Turkey desires and to take into full account Turkish views with respect any compromise.

FYI. Dept sees possible additional alternative i.e., maintenance support Turkish candidacy so long as practical and Turks desire and then if Turks not able win election, agreement to settle matter by lot. This procedure would involve no greater innovation than 1955 split-term solution. It would avoid any long-term commitments. It would clearly demonstrate inability Soviet-bloc candidate win seat through election, thus mitigating implications for geographic allocation seat in question. It would place US and Turkey in reasonable light, and we would have even chance getting seat for Turkey and disposing of Polish candidacy. While this solution does have obvious disadvantage of possibly giving Poland seat for two years, it might have advantages from face-saving standpoint. USGADel's comments requested prior any discussion this alternative with UK or Turkish Dels.

Dept, moreover, does not wish preclude possibility of compromise candidate should one be put forward though it clear US should take no initiative this regard unless Turks request.

Furthermore, Dept convinced neither US, UK nor any other Turkish supporters should at this juncture be discussing with other compromise of any nature. End FYI.

**Herter**

**109. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 9, 1959—9:03 p.m.*

643. Infotel—In absence UK Foreign Minister our Ambassador London took opportunity with FonOff (Profumo) strongly to emphasize importance US attaches to Hungarian item leaving with him summary our specific views.<sup>2</sup>

Profumo in reply stated UK opposed inscription as a "cold war act" and that British UN Representative felt it was impossible obtain UN majority for it since "steam had gone out of Hungarian situation". Our Ambassador expressed shock at this attitude and indicated that if this view is correct it even more stresses need "put on coal to keep up steam". Our Ambassador made it clear that he wished highest level UK Government to be aware strength US feeling this matter and would be glad discuss it with Foreign Minister when he returns London. Our Ambassador stressed that it was just this attitude which we could not accept or even understand. Hungary is unique situation, not analogous South Africa, and we can only hope avoid great Soviet triumph over apathetic Western morality if we together demonstrate indignant disapproval.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/11-959. Confidential. Drafted by Moor; cleared by Newlin and EUR; and approved by Bruns who signed for Herter. Sent to Budapest, Moscow, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Whitney reported on his conversation with Profumo in telegram 2463 from London, November 6. (*Ibid.*, 764.00/11-659).

**110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 6, 1959—6:10 p.m.*

Gadel 114. Re: SC Election. Dept agrees Polish intransigence re any compromise (Delga 425<sup>2</sup>) could offer best hope gaining votes for Turkey. Moreover, Dept believes Polish attitude underscores importance of at least maintaining unimpaired Turkish lead if our bargaining position is not to be undermined. USGADel should continue therefore stress as appropriate and in concert with Turks our hope countries in balloting tomorrow will take into account Polish intransigence which may be aimed at keeping seat vacant and thus providing basis for challenging legality future SC action which, as Ambassador Lodge has pointed out, consistent with Soviet "rule or ruin" approach.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/11–1359. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Nunley and Ludlow; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 425, November 13, reported that Michalowski had informed Amadeo and Freitas-Valle that Poland was unwilling to consider a compromise. (*Ibid.*)

---

**111. Telegram From Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 19, 1959—3:45 p.m.*

Gadel 129. Delga 458, Deptel 436, Deptel 383 Management Survey.<sup>2</sup> Department has same basic objection new USSR draft resolution on Management Survey of Secretariat as set forth Deptel 435 including view that at considerable expense to UN, USSR plans undermine Secretariat.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.15/11–1759. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Puhan, Freimarck, and Westfall; cleared with Cargo; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 458, November 17, transmitted the text of a Soviet draft resolution calling for a management survey of the U.N. Secretariat. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 435, November 3, transmitted the Department's response to a previous Soviet draft resolution on the item. (*Ibid.*, 320.15/11–359) Telegram 383 is printed as Document 101.

Mission should therefore consider seriously introducing counter-resolution along lines proposed Deptel 383.

Should it appear after consultation that US resolution would not carry, or third resolution postponing both US and USSR resolutions not feasible mission should adopt tactic of amending new USSR draft to:

- 1) Eliminate "geographical representation." (With Committee of Five this clearly undesirable.)
- 2) Make clear Committee is advisory to SYG, and is to counsel him in surveying activities of UN Secretariat.
- 3) Eliminate report to 15th session which, even though provisional, clearly impractical.

US Del in talking with other delegations should make clear US most sympathetic with objective of achieving greater economy and efficiency in UN machinery, but in light past experience with so-called expert committees, notably last year's OPI Committee, is apprehensive lest greater problems raised than now exist. Del will also stress existing machinery ACBAQ etc., which with broader and more forceful direction from SYG could accomplish more effective results with considerably less risk than expert committees.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Delga 497, November 20, transmitted the text of a revised U.S. draft resolution on a management survey of the U.N. Secretariat. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.15/11-2059) Delga 528, November 25, reported that Hammarskjöld had accepted the U.S. draft with minor editorial changes. (*Ibid.*, 320.15/11-2559) On December 5, the U.N. General Assembly adopted unanimously Resolution 1446 (XIV) on the organization and management of the U.N. Secretariat. For text, see U.N. doc. A/4354. For a record of the vote and debate on the resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.846.

---

## 112. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Canada<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 20, 1959—7:35 p.m.*

299. Canadian UNGA delegation has informed USUN of its intention maintain same position as last year—i.e., to abstain—in event of proposals inviting North Korea as well as ROK to GA discussion

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2259. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by O'Sheel (IO/UNP); cleared by Bane, McNutt, Hawley, Rewinkel, and Lane; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN.

Korea. Pol Committee scheduled take up Korean item November 23 or 24 and it is virtually certain such proposals be introduced again this year, probably by USSR and/or India. USUN calls attention fact Canadian abstention is only instance of split in Korean-question voting record among 16 members who contributed forces UN command, and suggests we take up matter in Ottawa.

Dept has reviewed results Embassy's earlier representations at External Affairs (Embtel 205<sup>2</sup>) and believes new approach worthwhile. (FYI: USUN was unable act on your suggestion take matter up with Green while he was in New York. End FYI) Accordingly, unless serious objections perceived by Embassy, you should at earliest opportunity call on Green or Robertson and, drawing also on arguments set forth Deptel 170, 172,<sup>3</sup> make following points:

1. In September conversation at division-chief level, Embassy was given some insight into Canadian thinking on Korean question in UNGA. We appreciate that sincere desire Korean solution lies behind this thinking.

2. US views on Communist intransigence are well known. We believe that erosion of position in UN, especially as exemplified by attitude of 16-nation group, is more likely to reinforce than to reduce that intransigence. When question of inviting North Koreans come to vote, we strongly believe 16 should vote together.

3. US is mindful of attitude some neutralist nations that US views invitation North Koreans in purely cold-war context. In fact, we believe that proposals to invite North Korea involve other and more important factors. First, UN recognizes ROK as only lawful government in Korea. Idea of inviting North Korea, with new status such action would confer on Communist regime, has major political implications. Secondly, Communists have consistently claimed UN lacks competence in Korean question. Thirdly, we are dealing with consequences of aggression in decidedly hot war, to which UN responded in terms of deepest possible commitment.

4. US hopes Canadian Government, in light these considerations, will reconsider its position on this point and join with other members of sixteen in voting against any proposals inviting North Korean regime to UN.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>2</sup> Dated September 22. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 170, September 18, instructed the Embassy in Ottawa to urge the Canadian Government to reconsider its decision to abstain on the question of the North Korean representation at the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-859) Telegram 172, September 19, instructed the Embassy to ignore the first item in telegram 170 and instead to avoid referring to Canada's previous vote on the issue. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1959)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 320 from Ottawa, November 23, reported that Green had agreed Canada would vote against any proposal to invite North Korean representatives to the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 320/11-2359) Delga 510, November 23, reported that Canada had voted against the Soviet resolution on Korea, but had not been required to state its position on North Korean representation, since the First Committee voted on the resolution as a whole. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11-2359)

### 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 1, 1959—1:30 p.m.*

Gadel 155. Re Czech Item. Department would still prefer see no resolution adopted on Czech item. If this not possible would prefer text suggested Delga 553.<sup>2</sup> However Department recognizes not feasible split with LAs on this issue if we hope see US views reflected in any GA action. Department therefore believes USGADel, after consultation friendly delegations in other areas, should go along with LA text reported Delga 568,<sup>3</sup> which though it refers "principle equitable geographic distribution" appears sufficiently hedged re application this principle as to safeguard GA's freedom of choice any given year. LA text would be greatly improved, however, with addition provision suggested numbered paragraph 4 Delga 568 and with substitution "geographic rotation" for "equitable geographic distribution" in second preambular paragraph and in operative paragraph LA draft. USGADel should therefore endeavor obtain support for these changes. Department would also hope see deleted in first preambular paragraph LA text reference to GA rules of procedure re-election President which appears irrelevant this context and open possible interpretation that these rules of procedure have implications re criteria to be taken into account in selection GA President.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-3059. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Green, Nunley, Bacon, and Ludlow and in substance by Monsma; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 553, November 27, transmitted the text of a U.S.-U.K. draft resolution on equitable geographic representation of the General Assembly Presidency. (*Ibid.*, 320/11-2759)

<sup>3</sup> Delga 568, November 30, reported on Lodge's meetings with Latin American representatives regarding geographic representation of the General Assembly presidency, and transmitted the text of a Latin American draft resolution on the item. (*Ibid.*, 320/11-3059) For text of the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.40.

<sup>4</sup> The Special Political Committee considered the question of equitable geographical representation in the General Assembly presidency during its 163d-169th meetings, December 1-7. For a record of these proceedings and texts of the draft resolutions considered, see U.N. doc. A/4340. On December 10, the General Assembly considered and rejected by a vote of 36 for, 40 against, and 6 abstentions the draft resolution forwarded by the Special Committee. The United States voted against the resolution. For a record of the debate and vote on the issue, see U.N. doc. A/PV.852.

**114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 3, 1959—3:47 p.m.*

Gadel 166. Department offers following comments re Delga 585:<sup>2</sup>

While Department recognizes practical advantages solution proposed by Protitch and agrees that it would not in effect cause change in orientation TC up to July 1 Department concerned violation Charter and precedent established by recognition unbalanced Council after that date in violation Article 86 c<sup>3</sup> which Department holds essential. Therefore believe Delegation should press for limitation terms newly elected members to date on which Italy leaves Council. This would obviate special GA session in May and could be done without establishing undesirable precedent as U.S. could continue consider France administering authority until July 1.

Suggest Delegation discuss legal aspects with Meeker and ascertain views other AAs on Protitch proposal and their reactions to Department comments above.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 350/12-159. Confidential. Drafted by Acly on December 2; cleared in substance with Hartley and L/UNA; and approved by Gerig who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 585, December 1, reported on a discussion with Protitch, U.N. Under Secretary-General for Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, who suggested ensuring that the Trusteeship Council's summer session end by July 1, 1960; holding elections for 3-year terms on the Council; and allowing the imbalance in the Council's composition to exist until the 15th General Assembly examined the issue. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 70.

<sup>4</sup> USUN reported on conversations with Meeker and other administering authorities in Delga 625, December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 350/12-459)

**115. Instruction From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

A-142

Washington, December 4, 1959.

**SUBJECT**

Identification of Premises Occupied by Delegations to the United Nations By  
Means of Exterior or Other Markings

National Security Council (NSC) Directive Number 5427 of July 19, 1954,<sup>2</sup> states that all Soviet Bloc Missions in the United States should be identified adequately by exterior plaques and signs. Since then, the Department has received, periodically, reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation establishing that the premises of certain Soviet Bloc Missions are not identified in the manner described in the NSC Directive. The latest report calls the Department's attention to the lack of plaque or sign on buildings occupied by the delegations of the USSR, Byelorussia, Albania and the Ukraine.

The Department recognizes that it would not be appropriate to request the identification of premises occupied by Soviet Bloc delegations to the United Nations without making a similar request of other United Nations delegations. Therefore, to avoid affording the USSR, or a Bloc member, the opportunity to charge discrimination and possibly invoke the Headquarters Agreement thereby involving the Secretary General, the Department believes the custom observed in Washington, D.C. would suffice to form the basis for a circular note to all United Nations delegations requesting that they identify the premises they occupy and that the means employed, sign, plaque, office door lettering, etc., would be governed by the nature and location of the premises.

The United States Representative is requested, therefore, to address a note along the following lines to each Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

"It has come to the attention of my Government that the building or premises occupied by certain delegations to the United Nations are not identifiable as such to the general public. My Government requests, therefore, that each delegation to the United Nations, which has not done so, take appropriate measures to identify the premises it occupies either by means of a plaque, sign, office door lettering or other means depending upon the nature of the premises.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.360/12-459. Secret. Drafted by IO/OIA; cleared in draft with Spruks and Davis and in substance with SCA; and approved by Puhan.

<sup>2</sup> A copy is *ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.



"Should questions arise concerning the foregoing request they may be directed to the Department of State through the United States Mission to the United Nations."

The United States Mission is requested not to make any reference to the NSC Directive either in the note or in conversations with members of delegations.

**Herter**

---

**116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 9, 1959—7:35 p.m.*

Gadel 178. Re: 15th GA Presidency. Dept agrees Boland stronger candidate against Nosek than Italians mentioned for reasons cited Delga 634.<sup>2</sup> Dept also recognizes factors cited Delga 634 as favorable Nosek and agrees desirability early West European decision on WE candidate if Nosek candidacy is to be prevented from developing dangerous momentum.

However, Dept does not believe situation justifies approaches Lloyd and Segni<sup>3</sup> at this time. While it clear from British question to Pella reported Rome's 2113, rptd USUN 19,<sup>4</sup> UK trying to smoke out Italian intentions, evidence not conclusive in Dept's view, UK in fact trying encourage Italian candidacy. Furthermore, if UK actually does prefer Italian, US approach behalf Boland likely be resented by British and surely be resented by Italians as gratuitous on our part. Approach to Italians to urge they refrain putting forward candidate on grounds Boland would be better vote-getter obviously presents serious difficulties from standpoint Italian sensibilities.

While Dept would prefer Boland as West European choice to Italians mentioned both from tactical standpoint and in order maintain precedent that GA President should be someone well known at GA

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/12-559. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on December 7; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Green, Nunley, Bacon, Ludlow, and in substance with Monsma; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 634, received December 5, reported that the British Delegation appeared to favor an Italian candidacy for President of the 15th U.N. General Assembly. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Antonio Segni, Italian Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2113 from Rome, December 4, reported that Lloyd had discussed with Pella an Italian candidacy for President of the 15th General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/12-459)

and well versed in procedures, his strength in last analysis contingent on his being West European choice. US could hardly urge West European support Boland against Italian if latter actively seeks position. Moreover if West European choice of Italian made sufficiently far in advance Dept would anticipate his election without too great difficulty though admittedly not by as large vote as Boland could be expected receive.

Dept believes all we can do in circumstances is continue press UK for early West European decision this matter and is prepared support your discussion along this line with UK Delegation by similar approaches here and in London. You may inform UK our judgment Boland probably better vote getter than any Italian (and particularly Piccioni) but should avoid impression US exerting pressure against Italian candidacy and should stress principal US interest is early WE agreement on worthy opponent to Nosek.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 4753, December 16, instructed the Embassy in London to approach the Foreign Office and urge that the Western Europeans choose a candidate for President of the 15th General Assembly, but to avoid giving the impression that the United States was trying to dictate the Western European choice or working against an Italian candidacy. (*Ibid.*, 320/12-1659)

---

## 117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 12, 1959—12:47 p.m.*

Gadel 184. Re: SC Elections. USGADel authorized accept split-term compromise with Poland occupying seat 1960. Dept also approves suggested statement by GA President contained Delga 688 and numbered para 9, Delga 687.<sup>2</sup> Dept cannot accept any statement such as that proposed Kuznetsov Delga 687 which would prejudice outcome 1961 elections SC, reaffirm so-called "gentlemen's agreement", or in

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12-1159. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley; cleared by White, Green, and Ludlow, and in substance with Monsma and Bacon; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Henderson.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 688, December 11, transmitted the text of a draft statement on the Security Council elections which the mission had prepared for Belaunde to make before the General Assembly. Delga 687, also December 11, transmitted the text of a statement the Soviet Mission had drafted for Belaunde. Paragraph 9 outlined a proposed U.S. revision to this text. (Both *ibid.*)

effect assure Eastern Europe of SC seat in future. USGADel might stress Kuznetsov US on record in statements at 11th GA in connection debate on enlargement SC as being willing see one seat allocated Eastern Europe in enlarged SC. In meantime, Charter criterion of "equitable geographical distribution" requires provision be made for Far East and new African members by rotating SC seat.

**Henderson**

---

### 118. Editorial Note

On December 12, in a meeting that lasted from 8:30 p.m. to 4:15 a.m., the 14th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly met to consider eight items, including election of two members to the Trusteeship Council. Tunisia presented a resolution proposing that the General Assembly elect two members to the Council; that on the dates France and Italy ceased to be administering authorities, the Trusteeship Council draw lots to designate which elected countries would cease to be members of it; and that the 15th General Assembly consider the question of Trusteeship Council membership. By a vote of 45 for, 28 against, and 8 abstentions, the resolution was rejected because it failed to gain a two-thirds majority. The United States supported it. For text of the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/L.275/Rev.1. For a record of the debate and vote on the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.857.

The Soviet Union then offered a resolution proposing that, based on Article 86 of the U.N. Charter, the 14th General Assembly elect two members to the Trusteeship Council and that it resume on April 28, 1960, to decide the composition of the Council. This resolution also failed to gain a two-thirds majority by a vote of 29 for, 26 against, and 26 abstentions. The United States voted against it. For text of the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/L.274. For a record of the debate and the vote on the resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.857.

Next, the Soviet Union proposed a second resolution which also called for the 14th General Assembly to elect two members to the Trusteeship Council in accord with Article 86 of the U.N. Charter and, in accord with rule 7 of the General Assembly rules of procedure, to convene a special session on April 28, 1960, to decide the Trusteeship Council composition. For text, see U.N. doc. A/L.277. Voting on this

draft resolution, however, was delayed when the United States proposed that the General Assembly consider the election of one nonpermanent member to the Security Council. (U.N. doc. A/PV.857)

Earlier that day, General Assembly President Belaunde had met with Ambassador Lodge, Delegation Counselor Barco, Soviet Representative Kuznetsov, Turkish Representative Esin, and Polish Representative Michalowski. The meeting's participants agreed to split the Security Council term between Poland and Turkey. (Delga 696, December 13; Department of State, Central Files, 330/12-1359) Thus, that evening the General Assembly elected Poland to replace Japan on the Security Council with the understanding that Poland would resign from the seat effective December 31, 1960, and that Turkey would be elected to replace it. For a record of the debate and vote on this item, see U.N. doc. A/PV.857.

Following Poland's election to the Security Council, discussion of the Trusteeship Council membership resumed. Soon thereafter, Bolivia proposed that the General Assembly elect the two members. The General Assembly then elected Bolivia and India to the two seats, and discussion of the second Soviet draft resolution began again. This resolution was rejected by a vote of 26 for, 32 against, and 20 abstentions. The United States opposed it. For a record of the debate and vote on the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.857.

Closing statements were made, and the 14th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly ended. The record of these proceedings is *ibid.*

---

## 119. Editorial Note

On December 15, following an address Ambassador Lodge made before the U.N. Correspondents Association, the Mission at the United Nations released a statement by Lodge evaluating the accomplishments of the 14th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly. Noting that there were many "worthwhile accomplishments," Lodge identified 11 as "outstanding as they affect the United Nations' future and its ability to survive and to meet its responsibilities." These items included continued funding for the U.N. Emergency Force, creation of the U.N. Committee on Outer Space, protest of the situation in Hungary, exclusion of the Chinese Communists from the United Nations, and authorization of a management survey of the U.N. Secretariat. For text of the statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pages 116-118.

120. **Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, December 29, 1959—1 p.m.*

541. For the Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re: 15th GA Presidency. Boland (Ireland) candidacy is welcome news.<sup>2</sup> We now have in field best possible candidate to beat Nosek (Czechoslovakia).

We must come out soon for Boland so no one can say they made commitment to Nosek because they did not know we were strongly behind Boland, which is what happened in Turkey–Poland contest for SC.

Western Europeans have known of Boland's intentions for some time and not one of them has opposed him.

British tell us we cannot expect group decision by all WE's.

USSR obviously well aware Boland's strength (as can be seen from letter received yesterday from Sobolev (USSR) dated Dec 25 soliciting support for Nosek).<sup>3</sup> Soviets can be expected do everything possible to defeat Boland. They might very well calculate that while election Nosek impossible they could get enough commitments for him to reduce majority for Boland to point where issue would come to be regarded as "cold war exercise" and pressures for "compromise" candidate could become impossible to resist. This would be almost as bad defeat for US as would outright defeat of Boland and election of Nosek. In essence this is what happened in SC election at 14th GA: Where Soviets were able establish proposition that nothing can be settled here without US–USSR agreement. We cannot afford let this happen again.

We took initiative in first place in getting Boland into field and we must not drop ball now. If we come out for Boland now no one will be surprised or offended. If we do not, situation will become murky, cause US more trouble with our friends, and give Soviets ready-made opportunities to work against US.<sup>4</sup>

**Lodge**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/12–2959. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 527 from USUN, December 22, reported that Boland had decided to announce his candidacy. (*Ibid.*, 320/12–2259) Telegram 534 from USUN, December 23, reported that the mission had received a letter from Aiken announcing Boland's candidacy, and quoted from the letter's operative paragraph. (*Ibid.*, 320/12–2359)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 602 to USUN, December 30, instructed the mission to coordinate with the British Delegation the U.S. response to Boland's candidacy, and to discuss it with the other Western European and Latin American delegations. (*Ibid.*, 320/12–3059)

JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 18, 1960: AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS; CANDIDACIES FOR PRESIDENT OF THE FIFTEENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY; PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIFTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

**121. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, January 7, 1960—6 p.m.*

575. Re: African Group.

1. Growing importance of African group in UN, with expected admission during 1960 of four new states, and tendency of Africans (including Liberia and Ethiopia to increasing degree) toward "neutralism" pose important problems for US in coming years. One key problem is to assure as effective a pro-Western leadership within African group as possible.

2. Most likely state to assume this role is Tunisia. Tunisia has highly pro-Western orientation. Tunisian Del is of unusually high caliber. Tunisia is SC member and served on Hungarian and Laos committees. It already plays role of leadership on African issues (such as Algeria). In consequence it seems to us that Tunisia is natural leader and we should consciously utilize opportunities available to increase Tunisian influence within African Group.

3. Anticipated admission of new African members this year is one such opportunity. Tunisia is already thinking about its role in this regard as African member of SC. For example, in discussing membership for new African states with us yesterday, Mestiri (Tunisia) said he believed that with regard to Cameroun, Tunisia should be included as sponsor in SC along with France and Asian country such as Ceylon. Applications other African countries, he thought, could be similarly handled by SC as they became independent.

4. We recognize difficulty of pushing Tunisia out ahead of former administering powers in initiating SC and GA action. However, Tunisia as African member SC has logical claim to be included and to assume prominent role. We think we should informally encourage Tunisians to take lead in assuring SC mtgs are called promptly, to join as sponsors and otherwise to exercise leadership on behalf Africans as their memberships come before UN. We believe this be suitable way to enhance already key position of Tunisia.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/1-760. Confidential.

5. Africans can also be expected to put forward candidate for GA Presidency in near future, possibly for 1961. We believe Slim (Tunisia) recognized among African reps as ablest rep in regular group, and would be most likely candidate. From US point of view he has always been cooperative and friendly. Given possibility Soviet bloc may well be contestant for GA Presidency in 1961 (assuming Boland elected this year), we should begin without committing ourselves to insure strong and appealing candidate in a position to counter Soviets. Slim is most likely to be able to do this, without saying anything about possibility his being candidate, our conscious support of Tunisia along lines paragraph 4 above and otherwise as possible would also help put him in favorable position to be African candidate. (Mistiri told us yesterday there is possibility Slim might return to Tunisia to take "new position in govt" after Tunisian term on SC is completed. This would not be until after next GA, and should not be obstacle to his candidacy at 16th GA in view his long service at UN. If he became FonMin it might, in fact, enhance it.)

6. We are hopeful other steps can be taken, especially with Cameroun and Nigeria, to assure that new African states do not follow neutralist line during their first GA and thus establish voting pattern for future. We believe special efforts warranted by Dept in both countries prior next GA to seek persuade them vote with West on as many issues as possible. Cameroun, for example, should be urged to vote for Boland as GA Pres. Cameroun likely to be admitted by then and Ahidjo should remember Boland well, as he was chairman 4th Committee when Cameroun issue debated.

7. Unless Dept objects we plan proceed regarding Tunisia along lines paragraphs 4 and 5 this telegram.<sup>2</sup>

**Barco**

---

<sup>2</sup>The Department noted in telegram 618 to USUN, January 12, that it agreed generally with Barco's comments, but had reservations about the specific actions he suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5. (*Ibid.*)

**122. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 8, 1960.*

SUBJECT

Request of Sir Leslie Munro for an appointment

*Discussion:*

Sir Leslie Munro, UN Special Representative on Hungary, has an appointment at 11:00 a.m. January 9 to discuss the Hungarian situation and his role in particular. I and a representative from EUR (Mr. Nunley) will accompany him.

Since my talk with Sir Leslie on December 23 (Tab A<sup>2</sup>), I understand he has talked with the UK about his future activities and the Hungarian problem in general and he will probably wish to inform us of the British views. Based on my December 23 conversation with him, Sir Leslie can be expected to inquire what the U.S. position is concerning: (1) recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe in the absence of genuine concessions from the Communist side; and (2) future UN action on Hungary including his activities and the duration of his mission. In spite of the generally satisfactory results of the debate on Hungary at the 14th GA, Sir Leslie was disturbed by the agreement of the U.S. and the other Free World UN members to accept Hungary as a member of the UN Outer Space Committee and was therefore worried that the West, in the interest of improved relations with the Soviet Union, would agree to the status quo in Eastern Europe.

I assured him on December 23 that acceptance of Hungary on the Outer Space Committee was distasteful to us and that we had gone back to our friends and allies on this point during the negotiations with the USSR. However, the consensus was that since the USSR had not attempted to name the 12 Free World members we could not very well attempt to name the 7 Soviet bloc members once agreement had been reached on the 12-7-5 ratio. I also said that, while we could not tell at this time exactly what sort of UN action on Hungary would be desirable at the 15th GA, in view of continued Soviet and Hungarian disregard of UN resolutions and efforts, we were unlikely to modify our basic position on Hungary.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-860. Secret. Drafted by Newlin, initialed by Wallner for Wilcox, and sent to Merchant through S/S. Concurred in by Nunley and Vedeler.

<sup>2</sup> Neither of the tabs is attached. Tab A has not been found. For text of Tab B, see U.N. doc. A/4304.



Sir Leslie is planning to depart for Europe in the near future and is contemplating making a public appeal while there to the Hungarian authorities for permission to visit Hungary pursuant to his mandate.

*Recommendation:*

When you see Sir Leslie that you: (a) congratulate him on his report (Tab B) to the 14th GA; (b) express our gratification at his willingness to continue as UN Special Representative; (c) assure him that, although no one can be certain as to what will result from the summit conference, we are not prepared to recognize the status quo in Eastern Europe; (d) that we have no present indication that the summit talks will bring any basic change in the Hungarian situation; and (e) that our acceptance of Hungary on the Outer Space Committee has no special political significance and is not inconsistent with our basic policy. If Sir Leslie requests your views as to the propriety of his appealing publicly to the present Hungarian regime for permission to visit Hungary, I recommend that you say we have no objection to this initiative.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> No record of Merchant's meeting with Munro has been found.

---

**123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 16, 1960—2:14 p.m.*

627. Re: 15th GA Presidency. Acting Secretary informed British Minister January 13<sup>2</sup> we greatly concerned over delay reaching any agreement on WE candidate, that Nosek completely unacceptable President Eisenhower, who sees nothing inconsistent "Camp David spirit" in opposition Nosek, and that we hope British will use their influence to encourage Western Europe reach agreement on candidate and discourage advancement Italian candidacy. Acting Secretary said we reaching point where we must make our position known or lose now next September's battle. We wish to be in position soon begin work actively for WE candidate and we plan ourselves encourage our

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-1660. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hartley and Nunley on January 15; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Seip, Ludlow, Wilcox, Bacon, Kohler, and in substance by Herz and Monsma; and approved by Merchant. Sent also to London and Rome and repeated to Dublin.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Merchant's meeting with Hood is *ibid.*, 320/1-1360.

friends in West Europe make up their minds. In our view every day lost is to advantage Nosek for whom Soviet bloc actively campaigning. We cannot put off indefinitely making our support of Boland known.

British Minister took position that situation re 15th GA presidency and delay last summer over SC candidate not comparable view difference in time factor. He contended that with Boland announced candidate clear Nosek candidacy would be contested and other countries will wish take position in light political situation existing when GA convenes. British therefore consider any decision now both unnecessary and possibly counter-productive as it might be regarded as another "cold war exercise". British wish consult West Europeans and Old Commonwealth and would consider requested approach to Italians. However regardless result consultations British will still not wish make firm commitment this early. They plan make "warmly sympathetic" reply Aiken letter while avoiding firm commitment and hope US in its reply will not go beyond suggested formula contained Deptel 602.<sup>3</sup>

It clear from above there basic difference between us and British on necessity and desirability early decision. British FonOff apparently, basis this conversation and urtel 566,<sup>4</sup> considering possibility decision re GA presidency may be affected by posture at Summit as result which we may be forced go along Nosek candidacy. Mission and Amembassy London should therefore advise British Dept believes US and UK cannot allow hypothetical Summit developments delay speedy action in obtaining strong alternative to Nosek. Important that we concentrate at this juncture on (1) obtaining generally agreed WE candidate as soon as possible and (2) actively supporting his candidacy. Have no present basis for assumption 15th GA presidency will become issue or bargaining point at Summit, or that other Summit developments will warrant Western agreement to Soviet bloc control of GA presidency. Unless we make early and vigorous stand against Nosek, he may win by default.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, we believe best way preventing Nosek candidacy becoming cold war issue is by keeping this question out of Summit discussions and by early decision on WE candidate. Therefore hope UK will proceed with consultations as rapidly as possible along lines suggested by Acting Secretary.

---

<sup>3</sup> Regarding Aiken's letter announcing Boland's candidacy, see footnote 2, Document 120. Regarding telegram 602 to USUN, see footnote 4, *ibid*.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 566, January 6, reported that the Foreign Office favored Boland's candidacy, but was not ready to commit itself to supporting him, and that Beeley and Moore of the British Delegation hoped the United States could help them persuade the Foreign Office to change its position. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-660)

<sup>5</sup> At this point in the source text, the following sentence was deleted before transmission: "If UK thinks that presidency may become bargaining point at summit, believe it will agree it important build up Western strength on this issue by developing strong support for WE candidate."

Dept recognizes Communist as chairman First Committee less objectionable than as GA President but would not wish consider this possibility at this time when it is not clear that it is necessary in order defeat Nosek. To inform other delegations now, as British suggest, we willing accept Communist as chairman. First Committee would almost certainly result in having Communist as chairman regardless of how Summit meeting goes or whether this concession necessary defeat Nosek. You should accordingly strongly impress UK with need avoid discussion of this with other delegations.

*For Embassy London:* Dept hopes Embassy will do everything feasible expedite favorable UK response to Acting Secretary's approach.

*For Embassy Rome:* Embassy requested institute discreet inquiries current Italian intentions concerning candidacy for presidency 15th UNGA, with particular reference determining Italian reaction to conversation reported New York's 559.<sup>6</sup> If no decision yet reached and if Italians seek US views or if suitable opportunity otherwise presents itself, Embassy should make following observations to Foreign Office:

1. Soviet bloc making vigorous campaign in behalf Nosek of Czechoslovakia for presidency of 15th GA. US believes important defeat Nosek since there is general agreement that 15th GA will be "European turn" for president. Best method defeating Nosek is early agreement on strong Western European candidate.

2. Boland of Ireland has already announced candidacy for 15th GA presidency. US has not yet made any commitments, since would prefer Western Europe's consensus before making final decision re particular candidate. Moreover, US would prefer knowledge re Italian intentions before making any final commitment. On other hand, believe cannot afford wait for indefinite period, since absence early and active campaign for Western European may permit Nosek win by default.<sup>7</sup> US hopes Italian Government will carefully consider implications putting forward Italian candidate at this time. Boland unlikely withdraw, and additional WE candidacy would tend to split vote of non-Communist countries and give Nosek overwhelming advantage. In any event, hope obtain definitive Italian thinking on this matter soonest.

FYI. Embassy will appreciate that object of above approach is to suggest delicately to Italians undesirability of Italian candidacy in light of fact Boland is already in field. While we have no commitment

---

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 559, January 5, reported on the mission conversations with other delegations regarding the presidency of the 15th General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-560)

<sup>7</sup> At this point in the source text, the following sentence was deleted before transmission: "Danger is illustrated by recent SC contest between Turkey and Poland where Poland obtained numerous free world commitments before Turkey announced candidacy."

Boland, he has been told informally we would look favorably on his candidacy if he WE choice.<sup>8</sup>

### Merchant

---

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 614 from USUN, January 18, reported on Lodge's meeting with Beeley. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-1860) Telegram 3570 from London, January 19, reported on Deputy Chief of Mission Barbour's meeting with British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Millar. (*Ibid.*, 320/1-1960) Telegram 2612 from Rome, January 20, reported on a conversation with Italian Vice Director General for Political Affairs Grillo. (*Ibid.*, 320/1-2060)

---

#### 124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 20, 1960—8:40 p.m.*

629. Re: Cameroon Membership. Mission authorized agree early SC meeting on Cameroon membership application as desired by French (urtel 612<sup>2</sup>) without raising other pending applications at this time. However, barring unforeseen developments Dept does feel obliged by reason US position given by Secretary and Parsons to Koreans last year<sup>3</sup> to request SC again consider Korean, and Viet-Nam's, application before next General Assembly.

If Koreans raise with Mission question our failure request SC reconsider their application at time Cameroon application considered, Mission should indicate:

1) We plan make this request before next GA but desire make it in most favorable circumstances.

2) In our view this not case when USSR President SC and thus in position cause more than usual difficulties over north Korea.

3) Do not wish postpone consideration Cameroon application because of Cameroon internal situation.

4) We anticipate SC action on at least four other new membership applications before or during next GA.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/1-1860. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on January 19; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Bacon, AF, EUR, Bane, and Steeves; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 612, January 18, reported that France wished to convene a Security Council meeting to consider admitting Cameroon to the United Nations, and discussed whether Vietnam's and Korea's applications should be raised at the same time. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> No record of Herter's statement has been found. Regarding Yang's August 11 discussion with Parsons, see Document 85.

5) In our view would not be feasible or in Korean interest raise Korean application each time SC considers new application, particularly as with present composition SC ROK can only anticipate receiving 8 favorable votes, which less than heretofore.

6) Another Soviet veto Korean application will in our opinion have greater impact GA discussion this application if veto takes place closer to GA session.

7) Furthermore, indicated GA action re ROK application shortly after another Soviet veto not likely be of type that would stimulate introduction further resolution requesting SC reconsider all pending applications. As will be recalled resolution this character, which contrary both ROK and US interest, defeated by very narrow margin in 1957.<sup>4</sup>

Re Tunisian co-sponsorship resolution recommending admission Cameroon, Dept agrees this good idea but for reasons given Deptel 618<sup>5</sup> Mission should not take initiative to encourage it.

We plan inform Koreans and Vietnamese above sense.

Herter

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding this draft resolution, see footnote 3, Document 27.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 121.

---

**125. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wallner) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 21, 1960.*

SUBJECT

Your Luncheon Conversation with Ambassador Lodge on January 22

We believe it would be desirable for you to discuss briefly with Ambassador Lodge the question of the date for convening the 15th General Assembly which would normally open this year on September 20. As evidenced by the informal discussions which have already taken place in New York as reported by Ambassador Lodge (attached),<sup>2</sup> there is considerable interest among a number of delegations regarding a possible postponement of the Assembly until some time

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-2160. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco, initialed by Wallner, and sent through S/S.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably telegram 622 from USUN, January 19. (*Ibid.*, 320/1-1960)

after the elections. There is past precedent for this. The opening of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly in 1956 was postponed to November 15. It reconvened on January 8 after a brief Christmas recess and completed its work early in March. The General Assembly decision to postpone the opening was based on the experience in 1952 and 1948 which indicated that little useful work was accomplished until after the election and only a few Foreign Ministers decided to attend the Assembly until the elections were over. We took, at that time, no public position favoring—postponement, but acquiesced in the majority view.

Norway has suggested the 15th General Assembly convene in December of 1960 to consider organizational questions and reconvene in January. Under such a schedule the General Assembly could elect its officers as well as the new members of the various Councils and take such minimal budgetary action as would be required to assure the continued financing of the organization until the budget for 1961 could be approved. The Assembly could reconvene shortly after January 20 and complete its work by the end of March.

There are a number of relevant questions of an internal political character in regard to the convening of the 15th General Assembly which you and Ambassador Lodge will undoubtedly wish to discuss. Strictly from the point of view of orderly procedure in the United Nations and the effective operation of the United States Delegation, as well as what may be the general feeling of other delegations, postponement of the Assembly until some time after the elections would have certain advantages.

Our judgment, therefore, based on the limited considerations cited above is that our United States Mission, while taking no initiative in stimulating postponement, should respond to inquiries by informing other delegations that although we are not asking for postponement, we would agree if the majority of members favor such action.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> No record of Herter's conversation with Lodge has been found; Hawley, however, noted in telegram 622, referenced above, that they discussed whether the opening of the 15th U.N. General Assembly should be postponed.

**126. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wallner) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 22, 1960.

SUBJECT

Your Luncheon Conversation with Ambassador Lodge on January 22: 15th General Assembly Presidency

*Discussion*

Ambassador Lodge may be expected to raise with you the question of the presidency of the 15th General Assembly. There are at present two announced candidates for this office—Nosek, Deputy Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, and Boland, the Irish Permanent UN Representative. The Nosek candidacy was formally advanced last July and the Soviet bloc has since been actively campaigning in its behalf. The Boland candidacy was put forward late in December. Since then, on January 5, the Italian Embassy put us on notice that the question of a possible Italian candidacy was still open (Tab A<sup>2</sup>) and Embassy Rome reported on January 20 that the Italian Foreign Minister has still taken no decision on this matter (Tab B).

In this situation no consensus has been reached among the West Europeans on the Boland candidacy. Our UN Mission reports on the basis of consultations with the West European delegations that there is no opposition to Boland and that the UK delegation has found the West Europeans favorably disposed toward him but without instructions. The French have expressed the hope that no commitment will be given to Boland until the Italians decide what to do. Our UN Mission and the British delegation agree that the only thing standing in the way of a general West European consensus in favor of Boland is the uncertainty with respect to the Italian intentions (Tab C). The British Foreign Office has itself been reluctant to make a commitment to Boland this early, apparently being concerned over the possible implications for the GA presidency of a Summit meeting, a concern we do not share and which, according to the British UN delegation, is not shared by the West Europeans generally.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-2260. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley, initialed by Cargo and Wilcox, and sent to Herter through S/S.

<sup>2</sup> None of the tabs is attached. Tab A is *ibid.*, 320/1-560. Regarding Tab B, see footnote 8, Document 123. Tab C is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-2160. Regarding Tab D, see footnote 2, Document 123. Tab E is Document 123. Regarding Tab F, see footnote 6, *ibid.*

Ambassador Lodge discussed this matter with the President on January 13.<sup>3</sup> The President indicated that he opposes the election of a Soviet Bloc candidate as President of the General Assembly, particularly just before the US national elections, and that we should proceed as rapidly as possible to take the steps necessary to prevent such a development. Mr. Merchant on January 13 saw Lord Hood to urge the British to encourage prompt West European agreement on a candidate and to discourage an Italian candidacy (Tab D). Similar approaches have been made to the British in New York and London (Tab E) without any definitive result so far (Tab F). Furthermore, the British believe it may be some time before the Italians take a decision on their candidacy, which the British understand hinges on a possible Government crisis within the next few months.

Ambassador Lodge has therefore proposed that he reply next Tuesday to Foreign Minister Aiken's letter announcing the Boland candidacy<sup>4</sup> with a definite commitment to support this candidacy and to release this reply to the press. Ambassador Lodge also proposes to inform the Italians of our intentions and the reasons therefor the previous day, and to say that should the Italians later decide to run we would not stand in the way of any accommodation reached between them and the Irish (Tab C).

We agree with Ambassador Lodge that unless we take an early and vigorous stand against Nosek, he may win by default and that Boland should prove a stronger candidate against Nosek than any Italian, both because of the esteem felt for Boland among GA delegations generally and because of Ireland's "neutral" position.

The French Embassy this morning asked the Department to hold up any announcement of support for Boland until the French have had an opportunity to talk with the Italians. The French agree as to the urgency of the problem, but fear that an Italian candidacy would greatly complicate the picture and are willing to approach the Italians in order to try to clear up the situation. The French Ambassador plans to take up this matter with you this afternoon.<sup>5</sup>

It seems clear that the French and British Foreign Offices would not wish to see a firm commitment made to Boland without a clearer picture of the Italian position.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 120.

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of Lebel's conversation with Kohler, White, and McBride is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-2260. Alphanth reiterated Lebel's arguments and requested that the U.S. delay announcing its support for Boland until Couve de Murville could speak with Pella the following day. Agreeing that the situation could develop into a serious problem, Herter consented. A memorandum of their conversation is *ibid.*; its substance was transmitted to certain posts in telegram 2286 to Rome, January 22, repeated in telegrams 5548 to London, 3088 to Paris, and 637 to USUN. (*Ibid.*)



*Recommendation*

1. That you say to Ambassador Lodge that before making any formal commitment to Boland we wish to see further efforts made quickly with the Italians in order to minimize any possible misunderstanding on their part, noting that the French wish to take the matter up with the Italians.

2. That we share Ambassador Lodge's sense of urgency in this matter and that we do not intend to let it drag on in an unsettled way.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> No record of Lodge's meeting with Herter has been found. Lodge, however, stated in telegram 654 from USUN, January 25, that he had told Herter he would inform Boland of U.S. support for his candidacy on January 27, and that Herter had approved this arrangement. (*Ibid.*, 320/1–2560)

---

**127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 26, 1960—5:49 p.m.*

644. Re 15th GA Presidency. In view my conversation with French Ambassador January 22 (Deptel 637<sup>2</sup>) Dept called in French Minister to inquire whether he had received report from Rome concerning approach to Pella.<sup>3</sup> He replied in negative and was informed our present plan to have you hand Boland Wednesday reply Aiken letter, stating our intention support Boland for Presidency 15th GA, adding that you had discussed this Monday with Ortona. French Minister said his government did not wish provoke Italian candidacy and that it was for purpose of smoothly removing this candidacy that Couve's démarche was to be or had been framed. He asked whether Wednesday was irrevocable date for replying to Aiken letter and Department replied that that was our present intention. He said he would immediately ascertain whether Couve had made his démarche since reply might have bearing on our action.

As agreed in our recent discussions this matter (urtel 654) you are authorized barring unforeseen developments to reply Aiken letter as

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–2160. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wallner and Hartley, cleared by Calhoun and White, and approved by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Lebel's January 26 conversation with White, Wallner, Nunley, and Valdes is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–2660.

proposed urtel 634.<sup>4</sup> However, in order give French time inform us result Couve démarche,<sup>5</sup> suggest you defer giving Boland reply Aiken letter until Thursday. You should stress orally to Boland that our support of course based on assumption his candidacy will attract general support of Western Europe.

I also agree it desirable make our position this matter generally and promptly known both to other delegations in New York and through our Missions abroad as you suggest urtel 634. I have however reservations re making your reply Aiken available as press release at this time in absence any WE consensus his favor. Apart from possible Italian sensitivity, press release in support Boland could arouse WE resentment on grounds US taking lead in matter essentially WE concern in first instance i.e. choice of WE candidate. Moreover Boland's strength as candidate among some members due in part fact Ireland's posture UN not closely identified that US, and US public support Boland ahead WE's could serve undermine this aspect his strength, particularly as it would be contrary normal US practice in case elections involving secret ballot. I fully appreciate desirability letting our support Boland be generally known but believe this can best be accomplished at this time through normal diplomatic channels, thereby minimizing risks of unfavorable reactions and erroneous interpretations in certain quarters.<sup>6</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding telegrams 654 and 634, see *supra*, footnotes 6 and 2, respectively.

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of Lebel's and Counselor of the French Embassy Winckler's conversation on the evening of January 26 with McBride, Brown, and Valdes is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-2660.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 659, January 26, sent niact to the Secretary, Lodge urged that the United States delay no longer than Thursday in making a decision regarding the presidency of the 15th U.N. General Assembly. (*Ibid.*)

128. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 27, 1960—8:14 p.m.*

652. Re: Deptels 644 and 645 (latter rptd Paris 3126, Rome 2308, London 5630).<sup>2</sup>

Secretary called in Italian Ambassador this afternoon to discuss UNGA presidency problem.<sup>3</sup> Secretary recalled in detail need for getting ahead with Western European candidacy because of Nosek's head start. In this connection he mentioned that Boland had indicated his availability as early as December while question of Italian candidate not raised until later. In light possible Italian candidacy, we had stalled in New York and had not given Boland definite commitment. Nevertheless in light of long period which had passed without other possibility presenting itself, Secretary said Boland definitely felt he had right expect our support. Throughout Secretary stressed our principal objective was to avoid seeing Communist candidate elected to UNGA presidency. Therefore it was essential to block Nosek and also to avoid splitting West. Although we were not given to giving advice, Secretary did feel it was necessary to know where we stood re Italian candidacy soonest and he indicated we hoped Italy would see fit not present candidate. He concluded noting that if Pella did present himself we believed Boland would maintain himself in field anyway. Therefore we could not commit ourselves to supporting Pella if he did seek presidency but would have to take matter under advisement. He thought finally that if Pella wished clear field for himself it would be up to Italians to discuss this directly with Irish. Throughout Secretary laid emphasis on fact our advice in this particular delicate question was devoted to this matter only and had no implications whatever with regard to our close general relationship with and friendship for Italy.

In his reply Brosio stressed difficulty presenting urgency of this matter to his government in light previous US policy not making advance commitments on GA slates. Secretary said our experience in Turkish-Polish SC problem proved need for revising this policy in light new Soviet tactics. Brosio added problem was also complicated by French encouragement of Italian candidacy and fact Italy had not

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-2160. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McBride; cleared by Calhoun and in draft with Herter; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Repeated priority to Rome, Paris, and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 644 is *supra*. Telegram 645, January 26, reported that Couve de Murville had discussed with Pella the 15th General Assembly presidency, and that Pella had told him he would have an answer from the Italian Government within 48 hours. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-2660)

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Herter's conversation with Brosio is *ibid.*, 320/1-2760.

realized we on verge making commitment to Boland. He noted matter involved in internal Italian politics because Italy "had already presented one candidate" (presumably reference to reported but unconfirmed Piccioni candidacy) and it was hard disavow him and present Pella. However, matter still under consideration in Rome. Brosio asked if US was requesting that Italy not present candidate, to which query Secretary reviewed US position as indicated above and said Boland certainly had every right expect our support.

In conclusion Brosio asked if matter could wait a few days more for Rome to take definitive position. Secretary said we would wait until Monday of next week but did not feel we could wait longer. Brosio promised present US position in most objective possible light and let us know results promptly.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup> On January 29, the Minister of the Italian Embassy informed the Department of State that Pella had decided to withdraw from the race for 15th General Assembly President. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, 320/1-2960) Herter telephoned this information to Lodge at 12:05 p.m. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) Lodge immediately informed Boland and sent him a letter addressed to Aiken announcing U.S. support for his candidacy. (Telegram 682, January 29; *ibid.*, Central Files, 320/1-2960) Circular telegram 967, January 29, instructed posts to inform their respective host governments that the United States had decided to support Boland. (*Ibid.*)

---

**129. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Minister Pella<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 2, 1960.*

MY DEAR PELLA: I just wanted to send you this personal note of appreciation for your very generous action with respect to the presidency of the next General Assembly of the United Nations. When I talked to Ambassador Brosio about this matter,<sup>2</sup> I tried to make it very clear that I found myself in an extremely difficult position both because I count you as a close personal friend and because of our great friendship for your nation. However, under the circumstances, I know that we both share the same concern lest we drift into the difficulty

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/2-260. Confidential. Drafted by Herter. Transmitted to the Embassy in Rome in telegram 2386, February 2, which is the source text.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

which led to the impasse over the Security Council seat last year and might even find a Communist elected to the presidency of the General Assembly. Your own fine action has, I think, gone a long way toward mitigating these dangers.

With warmest personal regards,  
Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2386 bears this typed signature.

---

**130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 12, 1960—2:18 p.m.*

679. Re: Security Council seat for Chile. Dept happy note Chile candidate for Security Council seat Cuba now seeking obtain (urtel 723<sup>2</sup>). Dept also pleased Chilean candidacy according Chilean rep advanced two months ahead Cuban candidacy. Dept hopes Chile will maintain candidacy and actively seek this post since our best hope avoiding election Cuba is strong rival candidacy. Best development now would appear be early LA caucus decision support Chile. Dept notes some LA delegations concerned LA might lose seat to other area if Cuba were maintain candidacy while caucus supported Chile. Dept hopes this concern would not lead LA decide would be better support Cuba as caucus choice rather than run danger losing seat. Dept would also hope that no tacit understanding develops that Cuba succeed Ecuador in 1961 election.

Dept concurs your judgment US should not raise matter in LA capitals at this time and that decision on this should await further reaction LA reps. Dept however sending background circular for use Embassies in LA if matter raised with them.<sup>3</sup> Dept would appreciate

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/2–860. Confidential. Drafted by Monsma and Hartley on February 10; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Wieland, Silberstein, and Rubottom; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 723, February 8, reported the Latin American delegations' reactions to Cuba's and Chile's candidacies. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

continuing reporting this important issue and any recommendations Mission may have.

Herter

---

131. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 29, 1960.*

SUBJECT

Soviet Request that US Support Nosek for GA President

The Soviet Delegation in New York and the Czechs, both here and in New York, have been informed of our decision to support Boland for President of the 15th General Assembly. In view of Mr. Merchant's statement to the Soviet Ambassador on February 23<sup>2</sup> that we would give the Ambassador "a considered reply either orally or in writing" to his request that we support Nosek, I suggest that I call in the Ambassador and reply orally along the following lines:

As Mr. Merchant had agreed, the Ambassador's request that the US support Nosek for President of the 15th General Assembly has been considered in light of the arguments the Ambassador had advanced and we see no reason to reverse our earlier decision to support Boland, of which the Soviet Delegation in New York was informed by our Mission there on February 3.<sup>3</sup>

It might be reiterated that we know of no Charter provision calling for equitable geographic distribution of the GA presidency and that in our view geographic distribution is only one of a number of factors that should be taken into account in selecting the Assembly's President.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/2-2960. Confidential. Initialed by Wilcox and copies distributed to Nunley and McSweeney. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Merchant's conversation with Menshikov is *ibid.*, 320/2-2360.

<sup>3</sup> On March 4, Wilcox informed Menshikov that although the Department had reexamined U.S. support for Boland in light of Menshikov's conversation with Merchant, it saw no reason to change its position. Menshikov expressed his regret at this decision. The question of geographical distribution of the General Assembly presidency was not discussed. (*Ibid.*, 320/3-460)

<sup>4</sup> Kohler initialed agreement on the source text.

**132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iceland<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 2, 1960—7 p.m.

229. Thors called Department today to announce to Wilcox his candidacy for presidency 15th UNGA,<sup>2</sup> asserting firm support Icelandic Government, including personal urging by Prime Minister. Explained prevented from earlier announcement by internal political situation in Iceland. In support of candidacy, cited long tenure as UN representative, various offices held, close friendship for US and repeated support US positions under difficult circumstances. Said he understood US inclined toward Boland of Ireland but wished know whether Boland had been given firm commitment by US. Pointed out US has normally stressed policy of refraining from commitments to UN candidates far in advance of elections. For this reason assumed he would be able defer announcing candidacy and still receive sympathetic consideration by US.

Wilcox informed Thors US has given Boland firm commitment. Departure from customary practice of avoiding early commitment resulted from unusually early announcement candidacy of Nosek (Czechoslovakia) and determined Soviet bloc campaign in his behalf. US believes election Soviet bloc candidate as president highly undesirable for various reasons, including continued unwillingness Soviet bloc to cooperate with important UN policies and programs. Therefore US favored early selection Western European candidate to oppose Nosek. Boland made definite announcement of candidacy in December and no other announcements were forthcoming. Department heard rumors re possibility Icelandic interest, but received no definite indications Thors candidacy probable. In view need for early agreement on Western candidate to counter Nosek and in view Boland's strong personal qualifications, US announced support Boland in early February.

Wilcox also expressed gratitude for Thors' long-standing friendship and helpfulness in UN matters and highest regard for Thors' qualifications for presidency.

Thors expressed keen disappointment at foregoing information and seemed inclined regard US commitment to Boland as personal affront. Pointed out his long-standing friendship for US has often subjected him at home to criticism for being "too pro-American". Also stressed Iceland's alliance with US in NATO and asked somewhat

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/2-860. Confidential. Drafted by Nunley, initialed by Cargo, cleared by Hartley and in draft with Rewinkel, and approved by Wilcox who signed for Merchant. Repeated to Dublin and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, 320/3-160.

bitterly whether NATO membership is meaningful. Expressed hope US would not feel obliged conduct active campaign for Boland. However, indicated his own firm determination remain "in fight" regardless of US position. Also expressed conviction he could obtain enough votes to win and hoped US would "congratulate him on his victory".

Believe Ambassador should seek earliest suitable occasion discuss situation with Foreign Minister, sounding out strength of Icelandic feeling on matter and stressing following points as appropriate:

(1) US commitment to Boland in no way reflects on US friendship for Iceland or personal regard for Thors. US has high opinion Thors' abilities and appreciates his steady support of principles and programs of importance to free world interests.

(2) US had no knowledge Thors' candidacy until Thors himself approached Wilcox on March 1. Knew Iceland had expressed some interest in GA presidency at one stage of 1958 campaign and also that Thors had mentioned possibility of candidacy to Ambassador Lodge on January 28, 1960,<sup>3</sup> subsequent to definite announcement by Boland. On basis Embassy's G-49,<sup>4</sup> Foreign Office apparently failed make any mention possibility Thors' candidacy when US informed Iceland of our support for Boland on Feb. 8.

(3) Because of close friendship with Iceland, US finds present situation very painful. Nosek began campaign for 15th GA presidency during 14th GA and seemed to be attracting considerable sympathy. Since there was general consensus that 1960 was Europe's "term", seemed evident Nosek could be defeated only by early campaign for strong Western European candidate. Boland made early announcement candidacy, had outstanding personal qualifications, and seemed likely attract substantial support both from Western Europe and other regions. Therefore US departed from normal policy of delaying commitment and announced support Boland. Since that time a number of other governments have given similar commitments to Boland.

(4) In addition embarrassment to US itself, US disturbed by prospect of two strong Western candidates competing against each other. In view Thors' long experience and known abilities, will undoubtedly attract support from various quarters, thus splitting free world vote. Result might be prolonged deadlock or even Nosek victory. For this reason US hopes Iceland willing reconsider plans press Thors candidacy.

(5) If Thors remains candidate, US sees no alternative but to continue support of Boland. US certainly would not feel its interests impaired by election Thors and would be pleased support Thors under different circumstances. Nevertheless US is committed to Boland and continues believe Boland has best chance defeating Nosek. In view probable strength of Nosek candidacy, US may be required give fairly active support to Boland, but in any case will avoid any unfavorable

<sup>3</sup> Lodge reported on his conversation with Thors in telegram 678 from USUN. (*Ibid.*, 320/1-2860)

<sup>4</sup> Dated February 8, it reported that the Icelandic Foreign Ministry had been informed of U.S. support for Boland. (*Ibid.*, 320/2-860)



comment re Thors. Hope both Icelandic Government and Thors himself will understand difficulty US position.<sup>5</sup>

**Merchant**

---

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 247 from Reykjavik, March 4, reported that the Icelandic Foreign Minister understood the U.S. need to honor its commitment to Boland, but stated that the decision on whether or not to maintain his candidacy rested with Thors. (*Ibid.*, 320/3-460) On March 4, Wilcox met again with Thors and outlined for him the contents of telegram 229 to Reykjavik. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*)

---

**133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 17, 1960—8:14 p.m.*

3907. GRC and African states.

1) Department concurs Embassy suggestions G-845<sup>2</sup> and welcomes initiative Embassy has subsequently taken in seeking French cooperation on behalf GRC.

2) Department has been encouraged by indications friendly attitude toward GRC on part emerging French African states. Department hopes this tendency can be discreetly but effectively encouraged. Our general concern relates both to need for forestalling ChiCom penetration Africa and preventing prestige gains there among new states. Department also hopeful friendly attitude new African states might result in favorable votes on Chinese moratorium resolution next GA if new states admitted UN. We believe French Government shares our objectives this general problem and agrees entire free world would be adversely affected if ChiComs permitted spread their influence Africa.

3) We would hope accordingly French might use influence helpfully with new states to extent feasible.

4) Re independence day celebrations we note invitation lists have assumed importance in connection recognition policy of some new states. We would accordingly hope France might find means sug-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/3-1760. Confidential. Drafted by Bacon on March 16; cleared by Rosen, Herz, Nunley, and Bock; and approved by Steeves who signed for Herter. Repeated by pouch to London, Brussels, Taipei, Dakar, Lome, Yaounde, Tananarive, and Brazzaville.

<sup>2</sup> Dated February 24, it recommended discussing informally with the French Government coordinated French-U.S. démarches with newly independent African nations regarding Chinese representation in the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 303/2-2460)

gesting that invitation list might appropriately be based on members UN which we understand was basis for Cameroun list; and might also suggest that members UN Specialized Agencies be invited.

5) Re recognition policy we would hope France would find it possible indicate to new states that most free world countries like France recognize GRC and GRC has honorably upheld principles UN Charter. ChiComs on contrary repeatedly violate those principles and stand convicted of aggression against UN.

6) Re Chinese representation issue in GA would be helpful if France could explain at propitious time to emerging states general background moratorium resolution pointing out that it in practice affords opportunity discuss ChiRep issue thoroughly and expeditiously without unduly taking up time GA and that moratorium resolution by large majority UN members.

7) In view indications Communists losing no time in seeking influence new states Department believes desirable free world position be presented new states and that every opportunity be taken to further general objectives above. Department realizes delicacy problem and leaves to Embassy's discretion timing and manner seeking obtain French cooperation within framework to which authorities in new states most likely be receptive.

**Herter**

---

**134. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, March 22, 1960—5 p.m.*

935. Re: 15th GA slates. In absence Dept instructions in response ourtels 924 of Mar 18 and 920 of Mar 17,<sup>2</sup> request authority proceed as fols:

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/3-2260. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 924 urged the Department to reconsider its decision not to allow the USUN to take initiative regarding the composition of the General Committee and regarding reports that some Latin American nations at the 15th U.N. General Assembly might not support the U.S. position on Chinese U.N. representation. (*Ibid.*, 320/3-1860) Telegram 920 reported that Nosek might withdraw from the race for President of the 15th General Assembly to seek instead chairmanship of Committee I. (*Ibid.*, 320/3-1760)

1. Of all unsolved slates questions (assuming presidency solved), believe most important is preventing Communists from getting chairmanship Comite I. Word likely get around very soon Nosek (Czechoslovakia) will withdraw as candidate for presidency to stand instead for Comite I. Such move will be supported by many dels as praiseworthy Communist effort achieve "harmony".

2. Possibility Nosek getting chairmanship Comite I disturbing for several reasons: (a) it could serve to build him up for GA presidency one or two years hence; (b) this kind of "harmony" maneuver by Communist bloc (i.e. backing off from presidency) will further enhance Communist prestige among many dels especially Afro-Asians; (c) Communist chairman in Comite I where major political issues debated will prevent US from working, as we have always done in past, with chairman on such matters on scheduling comite meetings and other tactical arrangements which help US keep initiative and provide leadership in debates.

3. Only way avert this is stimulate strongest possible candidate to announce candidacy for Comite I chairmanship before Communists take any further steps to launch Nosek. We see no prospects of anyone coming forward soon unless US takes hand in problem.

4. We cannot count on help from Cordier or Hammarskjold. Both of whom, as we have reported before, feel "Communists too should have their turn at prominent GA positions."

5. We anxious be authorized make arrangements quickly checkmate possible Nosek move because we convinced if Communists move first, subsequent effort on our part to defeat them will not only fail but decrease our own standing in eyes many dels who will charge US with poor sportsmanship, with engaging in unjustified "cold war maneuvers", and with trying "have everthing our own way".

6. Believe Slim (Tunisia) has by far best chance and that we should attempt quickly determine if Slim available.

7. Recommend we be authorized urge Slim run. If Slim decides do so we certain he will not announce we have given him commitment, since this would weaken his chances among neutralists. In some quarters, of course, he might make it clear he can count on our support and we should be prepared confirm this if asked. We do not believe such commitment on our part could do US any damage with LA's or anyone else since 1960 is clearly "turn" of Afro-Asian region have Comite I chairmanship.

8. Less satisfactory alternative would be approach Slim through Rossel (Sweden) by responding to her *démarche* to US on Feb 9 (ourtel

729<sup>3</sup>). We could tell Rossel we think she should encourage Slim run and that she thinks he would receive wide support.

9. Slim would be stronger candidate than LA because he Afro-Asian (which makes him difficult for USSR to oppose) and because it is Afro-Asian "turn" have Comite I. (LA's had chairmanship only two years ago and can hardly claim it this year in opposition to outstandingly well-qualified African.)

10. There is added advantage in Slim as Dept has recognized (Deptel 759<sup>4</sup>): He is only African in position get GA presidency in near future. If he is chairman Comite I this fall our chances having him beat Communists for presidency in 1961 are further enhanced. Furthermore he would undoubtedly stay in race once he entered.

11. We realize Slim's candidacy might endanger position Lopez (Philippines) to some extent but we continue feel, as we said ourtel 729, most likely result Slim candidacy would be eliminate Pachachi (Iraq). We feel this is risk we must take because risk losing Comite I to Communists is more dangerous for US interests. As for possible French objections, we feel Slim would preside over Algerian debate with studied impartiality and French might well conclude it would be to their advantage remove Slim from traditional position "floor leader" Afro-Asians during Algerian debate. Once he were in race it would be difficult for French oppose him. (For example, French Govt did not want Tunisian sponsorship of Cameroun for UN membership, but when Tunisia asked, French felt compelled, in fact saw advantages in it, to include them as co-sponsor.)

12. Request authority therefore approach Slim as suggested above and press for quick decision. If he decides not run, we would have make new assessment.<sup>5</sup>

**Lodge**

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 729 reported that Rossel had recommended that Sweden urge Slim to run for chairman of Committee I, and evaluated this suggestion. (*Ibid.*, 320/2-960)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 759, March 17, acknowledged the difficulties in waiting to firm up slates for the 15th General Assembly, but instructed the mission to continue working on this issue. (*Ibid.*, 320/2-560)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 777 to USUN, March 23, authorized the mission to approach Slim regarding the chairmanship of Committee I after ascertaining the Latin Americans' desires for chairmanships. (*Ibid.*, 320/3-2360)

135. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 8, 1960—8:15 p.m.*

781. Formal Iceland Government announcement Thors candidacy received Department April 6 (urtel 671<sup>2</sup>) reinforcing earlier personal approach by Thors. Latest information indicates Iceland will maintain candidacy unless Thors fails receive support other Scandinavians. Department position as set forth CG-157 and 577<sup>3</sup> remains unchanged. FYI From Department's standpoint, would be highly desirable if Helsinki Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting could persuade Iceland withdraw Thors candidacy, but US wishes avoid any action which might be interpreted as exerting pressure on Scandinavians in this direction or as directed against Thors. End FYI. In further discussion Danish Foreign Office Embassy should pursue line already undertaken emphasizing: (a) fact that Boland candidacy being actively pursued and appears already to have gained substantial support, and (b) our concern that maintenance of rival West European candidacies will serve only to create situation susceptible Soviet exploitation to serious disadvantage Western interests, including possible deadlock. In any such discussions, however, Embassy should stress high US regard for both Thors and Icelandic Government, making reference to long and effective cooperation with Thors at UN.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/4-560. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley and Nunley, initialed by Cargo, and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Thors delivered a biographic sheet and a letter from the Icelandic Government regarding his candidacy to Wilcox on April 6. A memorandum of their conversation is *ibid.*, 320/4-660; the biographic sheet and letter are attached to it. Telegram 671 from Copenhagen, April 5, reported on a conversation with the Director General of the Danish Foreign Office regarding the 15th General Assembly presidency. (*Ibid.*, 320/4-560)

<sup>3</sup> Dated February 16, circular airgram CG-517 provided background information on Boland's candidacy. (*Ibid.*, 320/2-1660) Circular airgram CG-577, March 10, informed posts of Thors' candidacy and the Department's position regarding it. (*Ibid.*, 320/3-1060)

### 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Norway<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 19, 1960—6:29 p.m.

952. Re Deptel Copenhagen [Oslo] 944, Copenhagen 803, rptd info Stockholm 937, Helsinki 554, Reykjavik 277, USUN Unn.<sup>2</sup> In discussing US opposition Nosek for 15th GA presidency, you may wish stress as appropriate following additional points:

1. Soviets basing campaign to large extent on contention Soviet bloc is "entitled" to seat because failure Soviet bloc candidate be elected in past years. US sees no validity this argument. Past refusal UNGA elect Soviet candidates to top UN offices has resulted largely from unwillingness Soviet bloc to cooperate sincerely in UN policies and programs. (May cite Korea, Hungary, Tibet, refusal pay UNEF assessments, etc., as well as prodigal use of veto in Security Council.) US believes Soviet bloc should not be given major office such as GA presidency until there is substantial evidence improvement basic Soviet attitude toward UN. Otherwise, election Soviet candidate might be misinterpreted as meaning free nations willing reward Soviet bloc for long record of intransigence.

(2) 15th GA may be especially important session. Conceivable agenda may be affected by outcome Summit talks and other negotiations currently being conducted with USSR. Believe would be especially unfortunate have Soviet bloc president in chair during session when GA may be required take decisions on issues of vital concern to free world.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/4-1960. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Nunley; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Hartley; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Also sent priority to Copenhagen and repeated to Stockholm, Helsinki, Reykjavik, and by pouch to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Dated April 18, this telegram instructed the Embassies in Oslo and Copenhagen to approach the Norwegian and Danish Foreign Ministers prior to the Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting to reemphasize U.S. support for Boland and opposition to Nosek. (*Ibid.*, 320/4-1360)

<sup>3</sup> Willis reported in telegram 863 from Oslo, April 20, that she had discussed the points outlined in this telegram with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, who had not responded to them specifically. He had noted that the Nordic Foreign Ministers would discuss it at their April 25 meeting, but probably would not decide on it then. (*Ibid.*, 320/4-2060)

### 137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 22, 1960—5 p.m.*

862. Re Chirep. Department of course shares concern expressed your telegrams 1028 and 1056<sup>2</sup> re Chirep issue at 15th GA and will continue make every effort maintain majority support as in past years for moratorium formula.

In LA area we are preparing high level approach to Venezuela.<sup>3</sup> Information from Embassies Quito and Buenos Aires indicates likelihood continued cooperation Ecuador and Argentina on moratorium. Cuban attitude is admittedly unfavorable.

Information on views prospective new African members can only be speculative at this stage, based primarily on attitudes re GRC representation and invitations to independence celebrations. This shows fair possibility balance in favor GRC on Chirep issue. GRC attended Cameroun ceremonies and has been invited to Togo. We are hopeful for similar invitation to Belgian Congo. Moreover information received from Malagasy Republic seems favorable.

We thus see likelihood maintenance majority close to proportions of previous years. Agree however situation at next GA will be more difficult and will require continuous attention, with intensified representations as GA approaches.

Under circumstances presently envisaged Department believes we should at next GA employ same tactics as in past years, i.e. apply moratorium both to inscription and resolution. Despite restiveness of some members on moratorium on inscription, this has now become classic formula which has served us well, and we believe its abandonment would raise misunderstandings, confusion, and be of net disadvantage to us. Some might also use such abandonment as excuse for changing their position. We are especially concerned that if item is once placed on agenda there is great danger that situation might well get out of hand, especially since we might face increased possibility of

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/4-2260. Confidential. Drafted by Hawley on April 15; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Herz, Nunley, Monsma, Bacon, and Ludlow; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Repeated by pouch to Caracas.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1028, April 6, reported that several Latin American nations at the 15th U.N. General Assembly might not support the U.S. position on Chinese representation and suggested that the United States allow the item to be inscribed on the General Assembly agenda, but continue to seek a moratorium resolution. (*Ibid.*, 303/4-660) Telegram 1056, April 13, estimated how a vote on such a resolution would break down. (*Ibid.*, 303/4-1360)

<sup>3</sup> At Sparks' suggestion, Herter on June 20 sent the Venezuelan Foreign Minister a letter soliciting Venezuela's support at the 15th General Assembly for the U.S. position on Chinese representation. (*Ibid.*, 303/6-2060)

GA votes on whole range of substantive issues involved. Use of moratorium formula not inconsistent with increased attention in debate to actions of ChiComs and undesirability of seating them.

Department would appreciate your views on foregoing considerations.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1185 from USUN, May 11, agreed that as long as no harmful erosion of support for the U.S. position on Chinese representation was envisioned, there was no reason to change tactics on this issue at the 15th General Assembly. It noted, however, indications that votes would be lost on it, as well as signs that some African nations would not abstain on the question. (*Ibid.*, 303/5-1160)

---

**138. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 1960.*

**THE FOURTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND FUTURE UNITED NATIONS PROSPECTS**

This memorandum seeks to evaluate the present and future usefulness of the United Nations in terms of the achievement of United States objectives. The bases for this examination are (1) an analysis of the extent to which United States objectives were achieved at the Fourteenth General Assembly; and (2) the anticipated impact on the United Nations of a large number of new members over the next few years and the growth of Soviet power. Finally, specific measures are suggested whereby we can, to a significant extent, adjust the modifications now taking place in a direction favorable to us.

Since this study is oriented toward the present and the future, it does not seek to assess in detail the value of the United Nations to the United States during the fourteen years of its existence. However, certain major objectives achieved through the United Nations should be recalled briefly. By arranging for or assisting in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, the cessation of Communist guerilla attacks

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 301/12-160. Confidential. Attached to an undated memorandum from Wilcox to Merchant, which notes that the paper was sent to the heads of 19 other bureaus in the Department of State.



on Greece, and the repelling of Communist aggression in Korea, the United Nations proved itself a valuable instrument for rallying the Free World against the Communist threat.

The United Nations has also provided a point of contact between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. where it is sometimes possible to meet quietly and resolve disputes without any loss of prestige for either side (e.g., the settlement of the Berlin blockade).

The United Nations has provided us and other free nations with a unique instrument to influence world opinion by upholding the Charter's code of international conduct, which is consonant with U.S. objectives, and by countering Communist propaganda.

The case of Laos has demonstrated that the United Nations is capable of protecting one of its smallest and weakest members from indirect Communist aggression. In the area of the Middle East alone, the United Nations achieved and maintains the 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and her Arab neighbors, prevented the 1956 Suez conflict from becoming a major war, and frustrated the subversion of Lebanon and Jordan after the Iraq revolution in 1958.

The UN is now facing its most crucial test in trying to bring order out of chaos in the Congo. In essence, the UN operation is designed to administer the affairs of a country which has no experience in self-government and to prevent the area from becoming the arena of cold war conflict. With a force of 18,000 men now operating in the area and with a vast economic program required, the UN is called upon to finance and carry out the most costly and complex operation of any in its history. It cannot now be predicted with certainty that the UN operation will be a complete success, but it clearly offers the best hope of all the available alternatives. The Congo operation also offers an example of the vital role which the Organization can play in dealing with the myriad problems which may attend the attainment of independence by the large number of African states.

The above crises, it should be noted, have tended to overshadow the great influence for peaceful change exerted by the United Nations during the past fourteen years through its peaceful settlement processes, its efforts to foster economic and social advancement, and its role in promoting or guiding the peaceful attainment of independence in many formerly dependent areas of the world.

As we look to the future, the relative power positions of the United States and the U.S.S.R. can be expected to manifest themselves in the United Nations. The measure of our influence in the United Nations is likely to reflect reasonably accurately our relative political influence in the world. Therefore, U.S. policy in the United Nations is not and cannot be something apart and separate from our total diplomacy everywhere.

Moreover, the United Nations is a permanently established instrumentality which we cannot disregard. To the extent to which we do not exercise leadership either to advance positive proposals in our own national interest, or to neutralize or prevent proposals contrary to our interests, the U.S.S.R. and others will be afforded, by default, the opportunity to use the instrumentality for their own purposes contrary to our and Free World interests.

## I. Evaluation of the Fourteenth General Assembly

### *General Approach*

An analysis of the results of the recent General Assembly session shows that satisfactory results were achieved on all major issues except the Sahara testing item which was unique. In appraising in concrete terms the Assembly's results, we have examined the extent to which the United States succeeded in achieving its objectives on key issues on the agenda. We would define the key issues as those problems in which the United States has either a direct interest of its own or on which a particular course of action would be prejudicial to eventual solution of a problem or the sound development of the United Nations. (A list of twenty-five key issues of the Fourteenth General Assembly is appended as Annex A, and the voting results are tabulated as Annex B.<sup>2</sup> However, as indicated below, no statistical tabulation can be reliably employed to assess the results of the session. Therefore, there has also been included a narrative summary of the results on these key issues in terms of United States objectives.)

### *Political Climate*

The Fourteenth General Assembly met in what many delegations regarded as a changed international atmosphere marked by an apparent relaxation of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States was widely regarded as tangible evidence of this. Agreement to resume negotiations on disarmament in the new 10-nation group was felt to be another promising development.

### *Character of the Agenda and Principal Results*

For the most part the agenda of the Fourteenth Session was routine. The Lao crisis having just subsided, no sense of urgency or crisis attached to the political aspects of the Assembly's agenda. The sharpest conflicts of the session arose on two issues involving France: the prospective French nuclear weapons tests in the Sahara, and Algeria, on both of which the United States found itself with the minority.

---

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed.

In the political field five items involving the Soviet Union directly were Tibet, Hungary, Korea, Chinese representation and the Security Council election. In the first four the United States position was supported by decisive majorities. However, some Afro-Asians abstained in their desire to remain disassociated from such issues. We did not succeed in electing Turkey to a two-year Security Council term, although we did block the Polish candidacy and the term was eventually split.

US-Soviet agreement was reached on resolutions on the peaceful uses of outer space and disarmament. The agreement on the composition of the outer space committee, while satisfactory to us, involved mutual concessions.

The questions of Sahara testing and Algeria were particularly difficult. While the United States was able to deal reasonably successfully with the general problem of testing, against the background of the continuing Geneva negotiations and our own moratorium, the French intention to test independently ran directly counter to the strong and often emotionally charged conviction of the overwhelming majority of countries, including such allies of the United States as Japan and Thailand, that testing was per se wrong. French, British, and United States assurances regarding technical safeguards were unavailing. Moreover, aside from a general statement on safety, the United States did not actively participate in the debate on this item.

A somewhat comparable situation obtained in respect of Algeria where we largely limited ourselves to making clear our belief that United Nations action could not prove helpful. The absence of France from the debate increased the difficulties. However, no resolution received the required two-thirds majority.

In the colonial field generally we were again confronted with difficult and unpleasant choices. Particular issues do not stand out so much as the "colonial problem" as a whole. With respect to this complex of issues, we continue to be frequently faced with the choice either of abandoning our European allies or of opposing the views of the recently emerged independent states. Frequently, where we are able to take a position on the merits of the issue we can successfully exert a moderating influence.

Three resolutions on economic matters which originated in the Economic Committee at the Fourteenth General Assembly<sup>3</sup> are included in the list of key issues. We were generally successful in the Economic Committee in either watering down Communist-inspired propaganda moves or in introducing sound economic principles in

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1427 (XIV) on industrial development banks and development corporations, 1420 (XIV) on the International Development Association, and 1424 (XIV) on a U.N. capital development fund. For texts, see U.N. doc. A/4354.

measures proposed by some of the non-Communist members. The overwhelming majority of human rights and social issues considered in the Social and Humanitarian Committee were non-controversial and no single resolution can be considered a key issue as defined above.

There follows below a more comprehensive analysis of the results obtained at the Fourteenth General Assembly.

[Here follows discussion of "Possible Methods of Evaluation," "Invalidity of any Strictly Quantitative Voting Analysis," and "Qualitative Appraisal of Achievement of United States Objectives on Key Issues."]

## II. United States Position in the Changing United Nations

The Fourteenth General Assembly clearly revealed trends which are likely to be maintained or intensified in the future and which will affect both the character of the United Nations and the relation of the United States to this organization. Two principal elements are involved. One of these is the impact on the United Nations of the relative power position in the world of the United States and the Soviet Union. The general assessment in various countries throughout the world of the relative power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though this assessment may be a subjective one, has a strong influence in the United Nations. It is particularly reflected in the degree to which various member states may seek to avoid taking sides on US-Soviet disputes which do not immediately affect them. We must recognize that this factor will continue to be present in the United Nations and that the assessment of United States-Soviet power relations will be influenced by such matters as the respective achievements of these two countries in economic growth, missilery, outer space exploration, and general scientific advancement.

The second principal element affecting the United Nations and the relation of the United States to it is the rapidly expanding United Nations membership. Some of the consequences of this are now being felt, and they will be more evident in the short-range future. The above-noted inclination to sit on the sidelines may tend to increase with the arrival of new members unversed in the background and history of Soviet-Free World disputes such as Korea and Hungary. Increased efforts on our part will be required to counter this tendency.

At the same time the great power status of the United States and the magnitude of our financial support for the Organization will continue to be positive factors.

The sections that follow contain our best estimate of the admission of new members to the United Nations and the effects of this expanding membership on United States operations in the United Nations.

*Admission of New Members to the United Nations*

While estimates by various areas of the Department regarding future UN membership differ in some details, they are nevertheless in general agreement. The following tabulation reflects what we consider to be a reasonable projection.

*Prospective Candidates—1960*

1. Cameroun (Independent, January 1, 1960)
2. Togo (Independent, April 27, 1960)
3. Mali Federation (Independent, June 20, 1960)
4. Malagasy Republic (Independent, June 25, 1960)
5. Republic of the Congo (Independent, June 30, 1960)
6. Somali Republic (Independent, July 1, 1960)
7. Dahomey Republic (Independent, August 1, 1960)
8. Niger Republic (Independent, August 3, 1960)
9. Republic of Upper Volta (Independent, August 5, 1960)
10. Ivory Coast Republic (Independent, August 7, 1960)
11. Chad Republic (Independent, August 11, 1960)
12. Central African Republic (Independent, August 13, 1960)
13. Congo Republic (Independent, August 15, 1960)
14. Gabon Republic (Independent, August 17, 1960)
15. Cyprus (Independent, August 16, 1960)
16. Nigeria (Independent, October 1, 1960)

*Likely or Possible 1960-65*

17. Mauritania—November 28, 1960
18. Sierra Leone—1961
19. Tanganyika—1961-1962
20. Zanzibar—1962-1963
21. Uganda—1963
22. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (in whole or in part) 1962-1963
23. Kenya—1963-1965
24. Ruanda-Urundi—1961
25. The West Indies (Federation)—1961-1962
26. Western Samoa (foreign relations may be handled by New Zealand)—1962
27. British Guiana
28. British Honduras

*Unpredictable*

29. Algeria
30. Aden
31. Angola
32. Mozambique

*Effects of Expanding U.N. Membership*

On the basis of the above projection, the anticipated breakdown of United Nations Membership by area over the next five-year period would be as follows:

	UN of 82 Members (end of 1959)	UN of 98-99 Members (end of 1960)	UN of 108-109 Members (1965)
<i>Western hemisphere (including US but excluding Canada)</i>	21	21	24
<i>Old Commonwealth</i>	4	4	4
<i>Non-Communist Europe</i>	16	16	16
<i>Africa (excluding Union of South Africa)</i>	9	24-25	30-31
<i>Middle East</i>	13	14	14
<i>Far East and Pacific</i>	9	9	10
<i>Communist Europe</i>	10	10	10

At the Fifteenth General Assembly, with the addition of sixteen or seventeen prospective new members, all but one of which will be from Africa, the number of African members excluding the Union of South Africa will be twenty-four or twenty-five. The African states will constitute the largest geographic grouping in the United Nations (24-25), a position heretofore held by the Latin Americans (20). From 1961-1965, a conservative estimate indicates there will be at least 10 additional new members, at least six of which will be from Africa, and the number may well be larger, depending primarily on developments in Africa.

Members from the Western Hemisphere, non-Communist Europe, and the Old Commonwealth now constitute exactly half of the total United Nations membership. At the Fifteenth General Assembly this will no longer be true, and by 1965 the Africans and Asians will in all likelihood constitute about half the total United Nations membership.

In the United Nations of 98-99 members, which is likely to be reached this year, it would be theoretically possible for the African and Asian members, along with the Communist bloc states, to command a

simple majority. On this same hypothetical assumption of near bloc unanimity, the Afro-Asian-Communist strength would increase, but this group would lack the two-thirds majority for decisions on important questions, even in a United Nations which exceeds 100 members.

However, among these various groupings only the Soviet bloc consistently votes as such. The Africans and Asians come closest to voting together on "colonial" and economic and social development issues but definitely split on East-West issues. Some are aligned with or oriented toward the West. Others lean toward the USSR, and there exists a very substantial group of "neutralists". It is this latter group that appears likely in present circumstances to derive the major increment from the new membership. The geographic location of the possible new members, their past experience and the prejudices deriving therefrom, and their state of political and economic development may be expected to predispose them toward non-alignment. This predisposition is likely to be encouraged by Soviet efforts to appear as a sympathetic and generous friend in those matters of most direct and immediate concern to the new members, and by the present Soviet posture of appearing actively to seek a relaxation of tensions. Non-alignment, moreover, affords the new membership a vehicle for attempting to play the USSR off against the West in an effort to further their own more immediate ends.

Just how extensive the above tendencies will be among the new members and whether they will be oriented toward the West or toward the USSR will depend largely on future developments which cannot now be forecast with any accuracy, and principally on 1) whether the African states succeed in their present efforts to develop an "African voice" (as distinct from Indian or UAR spokesmanship) in the United Nations and which African influences are predominant in such a "voice"; 2) the extent to which the influence of the metropolitan powers can be projected into the new independent regimes; 3) the extent to which the United States both inside and outside the United Nations can be responsive to the primary concerns of the new African states; 4) the United States political posture vis-à-vis that of the USSR in their eyes; 5) the future posture of the USSR toward Africa; and 6) the relative power position of the United States and the USSR, as this is assessed by the new states.

It is clear that substantial efforts will be required on our part or by others with the newly emerging states on many issues involving a direct conflict between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other if the effects of the anticipated non-alignment tendencies are to be mitigated. We would expect this problem to be much less serious in cases involving some flagrant

Communist aggression. In general, the emerging and newly-emerged states will wish to see the attention of the United Nations focused on their own needs and desires.

Outside the area of East-West issues and regardless of whether the African United Nations members succeed in developing a distinctively "African voice", the Africans can be expected to continue to find many points of common interest and common emotional reaction with the Asians and therefore to continue by and large to vote with them on "colonial" and economic and social development issues. At the same time it is significant to note that "colonial" questions may diminish in number with the widespread attainment of independence, but difficult issues like Algeria, South West Africa, and issues with "colonial" overtones will not be readily resolved. The new states will also probably place increasing emphasis on economic and social questions in the United Nations. In addition to their almost certain desires for United Nations technical assistance, the new states are also likely to look to the United Nations for assistance in resolving territorial and other disputes among them.

#### *Effects on United States Operations in the UN*

As the United Nations grows, and with it the number of "uncommitted" members, the United States will increasingly have to ensure that the votes from this latter group are either affirmative or abstentions in order to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to carry any proposal on an "important question". In general, we may expect that the attainment of two-thirds votes in the General Assembly will be more difficult, and this may present us increasingly with the choice (a) of accepting a resolution that falls short of our objectives; or (b) of being satisfied with no resolution at all. We will also continue to be under increasing pressure in areas such as disarmament, nuclear testing, and outer space to compromise in order to reach agreement with the USSR on the text of a resolution, which will then probably receive the unanimous endorsement of the General Assembly.

On the other hand, in the event of cases of aggression or threats to the peace, including those from Communist sources, United States initiatives can be expected to receive broad support in an expanded United Nations in circumstances where the objective is to prevent such breaches of, or threats to the peace from spreading into a broader conflict. There will also be broad support in the United Nations for action in disputes involving smaller powers which do not necessarily involve the direct interests of the Great Powers.

In the absence of new Soviet bellicosity, an increasing number of abstentions must be anticipated on future East-West issues. This tendency may extend to items like Hungary and Korea, as those members



that participated in the United Nations handling of the original situations become a smaller proportion of the total membership. This tendency, to some extent, will be amenable to United States counter-measures. While, in certain circumstances, our previous flexibility in taking initiatives on East-West issues may be reduced in the expanded United Nations, we foresee no serious threat to our capacity to block unacceptable proposals in this field requiring a two-thirds vote. In economic and social questions, and in connection with "colonial" problems, where the Africans and Asians may act with substantial unity and receive the support of the Communist bloc and some Latin American states and others, we may expect increasing difficulties though it should be possible to continue to muster a blocking one-third. In this connection, it should be noted that the Soviet Union shows no signs of supporting items in these categories which involve substantial financial contributions.

As the numerical balance in the United Nations shifts from the West to the Africans and Asians, the United States will encounter greater difficulty in preventing undesired action where only a simple majority vote is required. In particular, we will face an increased likelihood of special sessions of the General Assembly being called on matters which we might prefer not to have raised in this fashion (e.g. the Afro-Asians fell only six votes short of a majority needed to convene a special session on French nuclear tests in the Sahara). Our ability to obtain the most advantageous slates for General Assembly committees and vice presidencies from our point of view may decrease. (It is already hampered by the 12th General Assembly resolution allocating geographically the seats on the General Committee.<sup>4</sup>) It seems unlikely, for example, that we can continue to avoid indefinitely a General Assembly president from Eastern Europe or East European chairmen of committees where we do not want them. Similarly, the frequency with which General Assembly officers are chosen from among our supporters in Asia and Africa (allocated six places—more than any other region—by the Twelfth General Assembly resolution) is likely to decrease as the membership increases.

In connection with the Chinese representation issue, the advent of new members unfamiliar with Chinese Communist actions in Korea, the Off-Shore Islands, South East Asia and Tibet, will probably require greater emphasis on current factors in the presentation of United States views, than on historical factors. The task of arguing our viewpoint persuasively will become more difficult if Peking succeeds in befriending new members and convincing them that it poses no threat to peace. If new members oppose our position it could have serious consequences and might cause defections from other areas, particu-

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding this resolution, see footnote 2, Document 84.

larly Latin America. In the short range, however, the admissions of eight new states this year should not materially affect the outcome at the Fifteenth General Assembly, though it may narrow our margin and increase the number of abstentions. We and the Chinese are currently engaged in seeking the support of the potential new members on this issue.

Finally, it seems likely that in the United Nations of the future, the United States may have to operate with a less favorable composition of the Security Council because it will be more difficult to obtain the two-thirds vote to elect our friends. Furthermore, for obvious reasons the new membership may be expected to place major emphasis on equitable geographic distribution rather than on qualification. In this connection it should also be noted that an increased number of "uncommitted" states will be eligible for election. This problem will be magnified for the United States if the Council is enlarged and will also exist, though perhaps without as many implications, in the case of other United Nations organs and agencies.

The estimates contained above are largely in general terms. This is necessarily the case because the actual course of events in the future United Nations will depend upon the inter-action of many diverse elements, including the direct U.S.-Soviet power relationship, which is outside the United Nations but is clearly reflected in it. Some of these elements are within our capacity to influence.

### *Implications for United States Policy*

Although it is not possible to state in detail all the things that may be required in order to assure, to the maximum extent feasible, the achievement of United States objectives in the future United Nations, a number of the implications for United States policy over the next few years can be identified. Moreover, on some points specific steps can be recommended. Other matters will need further study.

Set forth below are certain implications and conclusions for United States policy that can now be foreseen, as well as some suggestions with respect to other areas that require further exploration.

#### *1. UN Membership for the Emerging States*

Despite the difficulties for the United States in an expanding United Nations, it is not practicable or desirable for the United States to seek to prevent or impede the admissions of newly independent states to the United Nations. Such an effort would seriously prejudice our relations with the newly independent states and it would put us directly at odds with the anti-colonial majority in the United Nations. United Nations members generally are inclined to favor universality so that any such effort is unlikely to be successful without resort to the veto in Security Council. It would also put us at a disadvantage with

the emerging states vis-à-vis the USSR, which can be expected to support their admission to the United Nations as part of its effort to extend Communist influence. Moreover, since United Nations membership is a badge of independence for the new states, "associate membership" is not a feasible possibility since it would be viewed by them as second class status.

Furthermore, the problems raised for us by the rapidly increasing number of African states, i.e., of potential "neutralism", of pressure for economic and technical assistance, of political instability, and of emotional and irresponsible attitudes, will exist whether these states are in or out of the United Nations. In these circumstances, the United Nations could provide a valuable safety valve and could assist the new states in ways that will also advance United States interests.

We should seek through informal consultations and in other feasible ways to encourage the new members to take a responsible attitude toward the United Nations and to emphasize that the Organization should not be viewed only as a source of assistance without regard for the positive obligations of membership.

To the extent feasible, we should encourage moves toward a consolidation of the new states in order to reduce the number which will become United Nations members.

It will be clearly in our interest to avert the development of a solid Afro-Asian bloc. There are already tendencies within this bloc which should encourage to emphasize primarily the African group, the Arab group, and the Asian group. (UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld believes that these three groups do have distinctly separate interests and that the African group is divided within itself.) In addition, we should lay stress on approaches to individual countries within the Afro-Asian group, particularly on important issues, in order to maximize our influence with them and cut into the "bloc" approach which is likely to operate against us. We should seek the help of our European friends in these efforts.

## *2. Guiding Principles for the United States in the Future United Nations*

A. In a situation offering no "built-in" majority for the United States position, the United States must be prepared to take the initiative on matters of direct and major interest to it and play an active part in the consideration of items where an unsatisfactory result could be prejudicial to United States over-all objectives.

B. In general, a policy of abstention not only prevents our being able to influence the outcome on a given question but discourages other moderating influences from being exercised. At the same time,

the achievement of our basic objectives in the General Assembly will be facilitated by concentrating our efforts on issues of major importance to us and not expending them across the board.

C. A relaxed posture on matters of minor concern to the United States or essentially of "appearance" will avoid wasting our reservoir of good will and so involving our national prestige as to make failure of our view to prevail appear as a defeat of the United States.

D. Past experience indicates that our ability to attract support where we wish to assure a given outcome can be adversely affected by our disinterest in other issues. The United States should therefore give careful consideration to the Assembly's agenda as a whole in order to develop the most coordinated approach possible, taking into account the inter-action of different problems and the probable reactions of other members.

E. In some situations United States objectives are more likely to be achieved through the medium of friendly "middle" countries than by direct United States efforts. This will require advance selective consultations, while the necessity of maintaining unimpaired our normal support and at the same time of attracting support from the "uncommitted" members underscores the increasing importance of early and systematic consultations on a wide geographic basis.

F. In the enlarging General Assembly, the United States could occasionally find itself in a minority position on certain issues. To minimize the number of such occasions and to assure support on matters of vital concern to it, the United States will need to be as responsive to the desires of the "uncommitted" as over-all policy considerations permit. On East-West issues, an appearance of inflexibility toward the USSR may alienate rather than arouse sympathy. Where basic United States principles and objectives are at stake, however, the United States should make clear that it is prepared to see the Assembly fail to take any action rather than to compromise essential principles and objectives.

G. The support of the "uncommitted" on matters of vital interest to the United States may become increasingly conditional, as they learn their own capabilities, on receiving our support on matters of primary concern to them. Since their desires on such matters may sometimes be unrealistic the United States will face the difficult problem of determining how far it is desirable and feasible to go in meeting them. This will require casting a balance in terms of the long-range interests of the states whose political and economic development is involved, the impact on our relations with the states already committed to us and whose support is essential to the maintenance of the United States power position, and the costs to us in money and manpower.

### *3. Colonial Questions in the Future United Nations*

The number of territories under colonial administration will sharply decline in the short-range future. As this occurs, the need for our European allies to defend "colonialism" in the United Nations should be accordingly reduced. We should continue to re-examine our approach to colonial questions in the United Nations and attempt to take as affirmative a position within the United Nations as we have elsewhere on the movement toward self-government or independence. If we do this systematically, we can hope that the anti-colonial countries in time will become more conscious and critical of Soviet colonialism than they are today.

### *4. Activities to Influence Emerging African States*

The United States position in the United Nations will be greatly affected by steps which we take outside the United Nations. Our goal should be, through carefully selected programs such as exchange of leaders, public information programs, and other types of assistance, to promote a Western orientation on the part of new members. This will require a careful evaluation of what types of activities will be most productive if carried out on a bilateral basis and which could be more profitable if channelled through the United Nations.

### *5. Composition of the United Nations Bodies*

As our problem of control in the General Assembly increases, we may find it advantageous to seek to emphasize the role of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and other smaller bodies.

We should be prepared to see the complexion of the United Nations as a whole, including the Soviet bloc, reasonably accurately reflected in such organs, agencies and sub-bodies. This means we should not agree to hard parity for the Soviet bloc. We should at the same time give careful consideration to the posts which can least easily be exploited to our disadvantage if filled by bloc nationals.

The United States may also be required to take greater initiative, on a selective basis, in trying to encourage particular candidates for election in order to assure a favorable overall composition of United Nations organs and agencies rather than to leave the choice to a particular geographic bloc as a matter of normal practice.

### *6. Future Role of the United Nations Secretariat*

A number of newly emerging states are anxious to have the active assistance of the United Nations. This will take a variety of forms, including financial assistance and technical and administrative advice. It will doubtless result in the presence of United Nations personnel in

many of the newly emerging countries. As suggested earlier, this is a desirable development in helping fill the vacuum caused by the departure, abrupt in some cases, of the previous authorities.

The Secretary General will have an increasingly important role and we will need to exercise the greatest care in choosing future incumbents. The United States should also intensify efforts to place qualified Americans in key positions in the Secretariat and to encourage the choice of qualified nations from other countries.

### *7. Status of Assembly Resolutions*

We should gradually begin to stress the recommendatory character of Assembly resolutions rather than their morally binding force, against the time when we may find ourselves increasingly in a minority position. There may be an increased number of occasions on which we may find it preferable to have no resolution at all, relying instead upon the effects of public discussion of the particular subject. The qualitative character of votes, i.e., who voted which way, rather than the absolute numerical results, may gain increasing significance.

### *8. Improvement of United Nations Through Charter Review*

We are committed publicly to a Charter Review Conference at such time as circumstances are considered propitious. However, it is very unlikely that either with the present or anticipated future membership of the United Nations, revision of the Charter would work to United States advantage. The present Charter, conceived primarily in political terms, has provided a flexible framework within which pragmatic adjustments have been readily made in light of changing international circumstances. While maintaining our present public posture, we should refrain from pressing for an early conference. While some enlargement of the Council appears inevitable eventually, there is no comparable consensus in favor of more far-reaching changes.

### *9. Improved Techniques of United States Participation*

We need to give serious thought as to ways in which we can maximize the effectiveness of our participation in the United Nations. With the enlarged membership and the consequently increased operating difficulties for the United States, we must ensure that our staffing arrangements, both in the Department and in the field, and our operating techniques are adequate to the increased demands. For example, our Missions in New York and Geneva must be adequately staffed for effective liaison on a continuous basis with other members, many of whom will require considerable individual attention. Close continuing relationships between United States officials and the representatives of the newly independent countries are imperative, and much may be won or lost in the first few months after the arrival of a new delegation

at the seat of the United Nations. The increase from nine to twenty-five members from "black" Africa gives added importance, if any were needed, for efforts to improve the reception of non-white visitors to the United States, most immediately in the vicinity of New York. High-level stimulation of civic officials, public and private groups, seems necessary to remove barriers to appropriate housing, schools, athletic facilities, clubs, etc., for non-white officials who, if treated inhospitably by private Americans, can be expected to receive official American diplomatic approaches and persuasions with reserve. The United States Delegation to the General Assembly must be carefully selected, giving primary emphasis to qualifications and experience, and using experienced representatives for more than one session. In this connection, consideration should be given to changing the present basis on which delegates are chosen, possibly selecting delegates who have professional diplomatic experience. Means to assure continuity of staff operations in IO and USUN must also be devised.

#### *10. Public Attitudes*

Public opinion in the United States, guided both by official policy and by private organs of public opinion, now accepts the concept of the United Nations as "a cornerstone of United States foreign policy". In the light of the anticipated future development of the Organization, it may become necessary to introduce a sense of caution in certain of the views now held. We must be sure that public opinion has a proper understanding of our capability at any time to implement United States foreign policy objectives through the United Nations. Moreover, on the basis of our past record, public opinion is not now prepared for the prospect that we may be on the losing end of votes in the United Nations. While we must be careful to avoid in any way undermining the position and prestige of the Organization, we ought to consider how we can begin to make the leaders of the organs of public opinion more fully aware of what we may face in the future if future public support for the United Nations is not to be jeopardized.

#### *11. United Nations and Pacific Settlement*

In the absence of substantial progress on disarmament or other major contentious issues, the United Nations is unlikely to become an effective collective security instrument, but we will be able to continue to use the United Nations in a major way in the field of pacific settlement. We foresee a continued active role for the UN in connection with the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. As new states emerge in Africa, there are likely to be numerous disputes, particularly over such matters as borders, where we can utilize the pacific settlement functions of the United Nations to achieve constructive results.

Even in areas where great power interests conflict more directly—as in Laos—U.S. interests may be served by utilizing the UN on a selective basis.

### *12. Prevention of Bloc Voting*

We should increase our efforts to prevent the Afro-Asians from voting as bloc by: (1) expanding UN activities in newly independent and emerging states; (2) intensifying our bilateral diplomatic and economic efforts; (3) expanding multilateral aid programs where such activities can be more effective or economic than bilateral assistance; (4) utilizing friendly non-colonial powers (e.g., Canada, Japan, Norway and the Latin Americans) to foster stable, pro-Western governments; and (5) encouraging former metropolises to extend bilateral assistance to their former dependencies as a means of maintaining a degree of influence. We should encourage the Latin Americans and other Free World states to vote with us on issues important to us; at the same time we should realize that some of our friends will occasionally not be willing to do so primarily in order to demonstrate their independence.

### *13. The Role of the Security Council*

As the number of UN members continues to increase, it may be advantageous for the United States to encourage greater use of the Security Council. In general, our voting position in the Security Council is likely to be better than it will be in the expanded General Assembly. Moreover, the size of the Security Council will make it more manageable than the enlarged General Assembly. Greater use of and reliance on the Security Council could also assist in keeping certain issues from being exploited in the General Assembly by members not parties to the dispute for their own purposes. In disputes between smaller powers where the United States and USSR may have parallel interests in keeping such disputes circumscribed and localized, the Security Council should continue to be particularly useful. The Security Council can also continue to be useful where United States and USSR interests are opposed. For example, the Laotian case provided an extremely useful precedent whereby an investigating subcommittee can be established through a veto-proof procedure under Article 29 of the Charter.

### *14. Future Development of the United Nations*

The United Nations constitutes a continuing factor in international politics. The United Nations Charter is a better charter than any which could be expected to result from any new effort today.



The influx of new members more interested in economic and social problems than in the East-West struggle or other matters of primary interest to us will, to some extent, diminish the usefulness of the United Nations to the United States. However, a dilution of United States hegemony need not mean a corresponding growth of Soviet power in the United Nations. This will depend in large measure on our continued willingness to play an active role in the United Nations. Adoption by us of a negative attitude toward the expanded Organization would result in the United Nations becoming by default an instrumentality of anti-U.S. forces. There is no realistic alternative to an active U.S. role in the United Nations if proposals serving our interest to be adopted or bad proposals neutralized or defeated. To adopt a policy of progressive U.S. disengagement from the United Nations would, at a minimum, be handing the USSR an effective instrumentality through which it could seek to organize the international community in its own image. The United Nations is here to stay. This is a fact which cannot be wished away by the U.S. simply because the enlargement of the United Nations will make our own operations more difficult. On the contrary, a more active role will be necessary, particularly on carefully selected issues seriously affecting our interests.

If, in fact, we are ever confronted with a situation in the United Nations where the U.S. is consistently in the minority, then a reappraisal of U.S. policy would have been long overdue. It is impossible to separate U.S. policy in the United Nations from U.S. policy outside the Organization. The United Nations will continue to mirror the extent of our international influence and the reactions of other governments to our over-all policy. If the mirror should ever reflect an unfortunate image, it would be folly to imagine that the image could be changed simply by smashing the mirror. Our hope for an eventual peaceful world depends simply in no small degree on the extent of our success in the building on the framework of the United Nations to develop genuinely effective international law and peace-keeping machinery.

[Here follow Annex A, "Results at Fourteenth General Assembly on Key Issues," and Annex B, "Extent to Which Members Voted the Same Way as the United States on 25 Key Issues at the 14th General Assembly."]

139. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 10, 1960—8:12 p.m.*

906. Ref 15th GA agenda. Mission should take immediate steps place question future of TC on agenda 15th UNGA in order prevent probable Soviet attempt seize initiative. Department would prefer Mission consult first with Tunisians, in view of fact we were forced oppose their resolution this subject last year.<sup>2</sup> If Tunisians do not wish take lead after defeat their proposal at 14th GA, Mission should propose item itself. In event Tunisians prefer inscribe item without US involvement, Mission should accede and offer discussion substance later.

In raising future TC with Tunisians, Mission should explain background of position last year, including our hope East-West agreement on bringing Council members more in line with expanding UN. This hope has not materialized and we realize GA discussion essential at 15th session.

Department believes argument that matter is on agenda 15th GA would form additional basis for reply to Soviets if they challenge legality of Council at current session.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/5-1060. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Tron; cleared in substance with Hawley, Meeker, and AFN; and approved by Dorman who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 118.

**140. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to  
Certain Diplomatic and Consular Missions<sup>1</sup>**

CA-10814

Washington, June 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

Participation of new African States in the United Nations

REF

USUN 921<sup>2</sup>

INTRODUCTION

1. The fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly is scheduled to convene in New York on September 20, 1960. Up to fifteen newly independent states, including 14 from Africa, are expected to be admitted to the UN, i.e., 1. Belgian Congo, 2. Cameroon, 3. Cyprus, 4. Dahomey, 5. Gabon, 6. Ivory Coast, 7. Malagasy, 8. Mali Federation, 9. Mauritania, 10. Niger, 11. Nigeria, 12. Somaliland, 13. Togo, 14. Union of Central African Republics, and 15. Upper Volta. With this development the number of African members including the UAR but excluding the Union of South Africa would be twenty-three, making the African members the largest single geographic group in the UN, a position heretofore held by the Latin Americans. Moreover, there would then be an Afro-Arab-Asian membership of 45 out of a total of 97 members. Since an overwhelming majority of the new members of the United Nations in the next five years will come from Africa, the Afro-Asian group will probably constitute a majority of the UN Membership by 1965. The sub-Sahara Africans alone will probably be the largest subgroup, with as many as twenty-six members.

2. Given this vast increase in the African membership, it is axiomatic that the way in which these new members vote will be a major factor in US policy in the General Assembly. It is recognized that the geographic location of the prospective new members, their past experience and the outlook derived therefrom, and their state of political and economic development, together with the influence and pressures of some of the older African and Asian members may predispose them

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/6-2360. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin, Eisendrath, Buffum, Nunley, and OES; cleared by Green, Dorman, Bacon, Wallner, and CA; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Sent to 8 diplomatic and 3 consular posts in Africa, and repeated to 12 diplomatic and 7 consular posts in Africa and Europe and to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 921, March 17, transmitted Lodge's suggestions for dealing with the new African nations in the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 303/3-1760) This instruction incorporated many of his points.

toward non-alignment. But if the Africans as a group abstain on key political votes at the 15th General Assembly, we will have considerable difficulty in subsequent General Assemblies in shifting their voting from neutralist patterns to support of Western positions on items most vital to us. We believe that the voting patterns adopted by the new African members at the 15th General Assembly will also have an important influence on the UN postures assumed by the many additional African members which are expected to be admitted to the United Nations during the next five years.

We are therefore faced with the important and essential task of developing at the outset, as far as possible, voting habits on the part of the new African members which will be most consonant with U.S. interests. We believe, therefore, that maximum efforts should be made to encourage them to play a constructive and responsible role in the UN and to seek their understanding and support for our positions on basic UN issues.

3. The United States has welcomed the admission into the United Nations of new states which are able and willing to fulfill the obligations of membership. The United States believes that the Charter of the United Nations, if supported by all members in its entirety, provides the best hope for genuine world peace and continued peaceful change.

With the increased tempo of the movement toward self-government and rise of independent African Nations, the United Nations has strengthened its interest in Africa and has adopted programs which are responsive to the evolving needs of the African continent. The United States has been a major originator of and contributor to these programs and will continue to accord them its support.

While the United Nations has made special efforts to serve the interests of the new African members, particularly in the economic and colonial fields, there is a corresponding obligation laid upon them to support the Charter in all of its aspects, including the political. We believe that the promotion of understanding by the new African members of our support for the United Nations, and an awareness that their interests are served by this support will be helpful in maintaining their orientation toward the West.

4. Efforts to influence favorably the voting of the new African members of the UN at the 15th General Assembly should initially concentrate on gaining their support for our position on a limited number of issues which are important to us. This approach seems preferable in view of the limited background of the new Foreign Offices on matters on the Assembly's agenda. Moreover, the General Assembly agenda is long and of uneven importance, and an approach

embracing too many items might be more confusing than helpful. By dealing with issues of only peripheral importance, we would risk diminishing our influence on major questions.

5. The Department has accordingly prepared (see Section A below) statements of its position on a number of key political items which will be before the 15th General Assembly. In addition, relevant material in the economic and colonial fields (Sections B and C) has been included to illustrate that our over-all UN policy is responsive to the interests of the new African members. These statements are designed for presentation to the new or provisional Governments at addressee posts either orally or in written form, tailored as posts deem most appropriate. It is hoped that this material will be useful not only for a single formal presentation but also for periodic informal conversations about the UN. Section D provides background material that can be used in informal conversation about the UN.

6. The attention of the posts is directed to 4 FSM 121.32<sup>3</sup> pursuant to which each Mission is to designate an officer to be responsible for following and coordinating United Nations affairs. The names of the officers designated should be reported to the Department by separate despatch.

*For African Posts:* Unless you perceive serious objection, you should approach appropriate leaders of the new or emerging government on the political items contained in Section A below. At your discretion, you may draw on material contained in Sections B, C, and D to support your presentation. In the event you consider that some of the items in Section A should not be included in your approach or that they should be presented in substantially different terms, you should seek the Department's instructions by airgram giving your reasons and, if appropriate, suggested substitute language.

*For USUN:* The Mission should inform UK, French, Belgian and Italian Delegations of approaches and their general nature.

[Here follow Sections A-C, containing background information and U.S. positions on "A. Political": 1, "Advancement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," 2, "Disarmament," 3, "Chinese Representation," 4, "Measures to Repel Aggression," and 5, "Peace-Keeping"; "B. Economic": 1, "Capital Assistance," 2, "The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (ETAP) and the Special Fund," 3, "OPEX," 4, "Other U.N. Technical Aid Programs," and 5, "ECA"; and "C. Colonial."]

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the *Foreign Service Manual*, which contains the body of regulations for the Foreign Service.

### D. General Observations

At their discretion, posts may find appropriate occasions to make certain additional observations orally about the nature of the United Nations system and the general environment of UN activities. Since some of these observations are capable of misinterpretation, and since some may have connotations about which the African states are particularly sensitive, posts should observe due caution in making any such remarks, and should choose an opportunity to make the points informally and should not make them as a part of an official governmental approach.

1. The U.S. is one of the strongest proponents of the UN system, including the various specialized agencies. The U.S. Government took a leading role in creating the system and has made constant efforts to strengthen it. We believe that the UN provides great advantages for the smaller nations of the world and that it is capable of playing an increasingly stronger role in the maintenance of world peace and in promoting international political stability and economic progress.

2. One of the frequently negative factors in the operation of the UN has been the attitude of the Soviet Union and its satellites. While the members of the Soviet bloc participate in the UN and most of its specialized agencies, there is little evidence of a sincere desire to cooperate toward achieving the objectives of the Charter. The Soviet Union, for example, has repeatedly hampered the work of the UN through the exercise of its veto in the Security Council, and has frequently disregarded or flagrantly defied all recommendations of the General Assembly which seem contrary to the interests and ambitions of the Soviet Government. It has also refused to pay its assessments for programs which it opposes such as UNEF, and has given only limited support to UN technical assistance activities.

While largely disregarding the UN insofar as its own policies are concerned, the Soviet bloc has increasingly sought to make cynical use of the UN system to promote its imperialist ambitions, thereby applying a double standard. It seeks to aggravate and exploit the inevitable conflicts which arise between nations and regions of the Free World.

The U.S. believes that the UN can be developed and improved as a channel for resolving differences and relaxing tensions between the Soviet bloc and the Free World. However, we are concerned over continued evidence of a double standard applied by the Soviet bloc within the UN. This is harmful to the UN.

The Soviet bloc has attempted to win the sympathies of the new African states by appearing to take an interest in matters of direct concern to these states, and by siding with them almost automatically in all disputes with nations in Western Europe and other parts of the

world. It seems clear that a major objective of the Soviet strategy in the UN is the development of a permanent "habit of alignment" with the emerging nations of Africa and Asia.

3. The UN is required to deal with a great many political, economic, social, legal and administrative issues of varying degrees of priority and complexity. Sometimes the competence of the UN to deal with such issues is challenged. As a matter of principle, the U.S. takes a generous attitude toward the problem of UN competence. In other words, we are inclined to give the UN the benefit of the doubt whenever the competence question is raised, and prefer to err on the side of permitting issues to be discussed rather than inhibiting their discussion. At the same time, the U.S. is anxious that the UN and its various specialized agencies devote primary attention to those matters with respect to which UN discussion and action may be expected to make constructive contribution.

There are some issues which the U.S. believes the UN is competent to consider, but concerning which there may be considerable doubt that UN action will produce constructive results. UN consideration is not always the best way of dealing with delicate international issues. For example, the U.S. abstained last year on the final version of the resolution on Algeria,<sup>4</sup> not because the U.S. had any reservations concerning the specific content of the resolution, which called for self-determination in Algeria, but rather because the U.S. was convinced that a UN resolution of this kind would not contribute to an actual solution of the Algerian problem. It should also be noted that there are certain issues which may be very appropriate for one UN body to consider, but highly inappropriate for consideration elsewhere. Thus, we believe it is highly important that the Security Council and the General Assembly devote continuing attention to the problem of disarmament, but we have generally opposed the efforts of the Soviet Union to raise the disarmament question as a purely propaganda issue in other UN organs, e.g., the Economic and Social Council, and in such agencies as the WHO, UNESCO, and ILO.

4. While the UN has already made a substantial contribution to the protection of international peace and security, it is evident that given the attitude of the Soviet bloc, additional instrumentalities are required for this purpose. For this reason, the U.S. and more than forty other nations of the Free World have joined together in regional security arrangements designed to provide one another mutual assistance in deterring and resisting military aggression from whatever quarter. The Soviet Union, of course, has repeatedly denounced these defen-

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to a draft resolution submitted by Pakistan and considered by the General Assembly on December 12, 1959. The resolution failed to gain a two-thirds majority and was not adopted. For text, see U.N. doc. A/L.276.

sive arrangements and has described them as "aggressive military blocs". Soviet propaganda on this issue ignores several vital considerations, including: (A) the fact that the UN Charter in Chapter VIII makes specific provision for regional collective security arrangements; (B) the fact that these arrangements were developed directly as a response to Soviet-sponsored military aggressions, after the Soviet Union had hampered effective functioning of the UN; (C) the fact that none of these regional systems has yet committed a single act of aggression nor made an aggressive threat against any nation, and (D) the fact that many of the acts of direct and indirect aggression which have occurred during the past 15 years have involved nations and areas not covered by these regional security arrangements. In brief, the overwhelming preponderance of evidence indicates that these regional security systems afford a powerful supplement to the efforts of the UN to maintain international peace and security, and that world peace would be gravely endangered by their elimination or deterioration.

5. The future of the UN must necessarily depend upon the attitudes, policies and actions of its individual members. The UN cannot be regarded as a "dumping ground" for difficult international problems, nor as a magic fountainhead of solutions. Through the UN individual nations may discuss problems with one another and agree on various forms of collective action. While it is altogether natural that each government should approach the issues arising in the UN primarily in terms of its own national interest, it is also important that each government take account of its national interest in the successful application of UN principles and purposes to the entire international environment. The efficacy of the UN will depend in large part upon the ability and willingness of individual governments to consider each particular issue upon its merits, and not merely to follow the voting behavior of other nations or blocs. It cannot escape notice, for example, that various members including a number of African, Asian and European states, which were justifiably concerned about racial violence in South Africa, and which took a strong stand on this question, nevertheless chose to abstain upon UN resolutions directed against the even more violent suppression of human rights in Hungary and Tibet.<sup>5</sup> The U.S. is convinced that the maintenance of international peace and the protection of human rights and human dignity can be achieved through UN channels only to the extent of the principles governing these matters have universal application. We also believe that those nations which automatically vote as a part of a "bloc" regardless of the merits of particular issues, or which choose to avoid

---

<sup>5</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1454 (XIV) on the question of Hungary, see U.N. doc. A/4354. Regarding the 14th General Assembly resolution on Tibet, see footnote 2, Document 102.



taking a stand upon vital questions of principle, are doing a disservice to their own international influence and to the effectiveness of the UN system itself. It may sometimes require fortitude for member nations to "stand up and be counted" in the midst of critical controversies, but the manifestation of this courage is an essential ingredient of a strong and useful UN.

6. Finally and most importantly, the great extent of the United States commitment to the United Nations system and the purposes and principles of the Charter should be stressed. We have consistently supported the United Nations in all its undertakings and have constantly sought to improve its ability to discharge its responsibilities. We have led in United Nations actions to preserve human rights and freedoms, to settle by peaceful means disputes among states, to resist aggression, and to preserve the independence of small states. A striking evidence of United States support for the United Nations is the fact that although no one Member state is assessed more than 33% of the regular budget of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and their special programs, the United States has voluntarily contributed well in excess of 33% of total United Nations expenditures. In 1959, out of total United Nations expenditures of approximately \$241 million, the United States contributed approximately \$106 million. For example, last year we contributed 50% of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and 40% of the budgets of both the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program (ETAP) and the Special Fund.

[Here follows Annex I, containing a breakdown of the vote on the U.S. proposal not to consider the question of Chinese representation at the 14th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly.]

**Herter**

**141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iceland<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 28, 1960—7:18 p.m.*

346. While US has made its support Boland generally known, he has been campaigning actively on behalf of Boland and US has so far remained in background (urtele 372<sup>2</sup>) Dept would hope to be able to continue to do so. However, this would not be feasible were the situation to develop making election Nosek or some other unacceptable candidate appear a serious possibility. Such a situation is only likely to arise should Thors' candidacy attract sufficient votes seriously to detract Boland's strength, thus splitting the vote. A non-Communist candidate can be expected to attract and opening way shift to Nosek or some unacceptable "compromise" candidate. In this event US would have to take whatever steps seem necessary to assure election of a candidate acceptable to West and Dept believes Boland a stronger candidate than Thors.

You should therefore reiterate to Prime Minister our strong friendship and high regard for Iceland and Thors; our deep regret at his candidacy put forward in circumstances making it impossible, as Iceland is aware, of our support by US; and Dept's continuing concern over the potentially difficult situation inherent in two rival West European candidacies. You should stress that if such a situation appears to be developing, any steps US may deem necessary to take will be taken not against Thors or the interests of Iceland but to avoid dangers to the free world in a Soviet bloc or neutralist "compromise" candidate as GA President. These dangers are underscored by the fact that the 15th GA will in all likelihood be required to consider, in view of the abortive nature of the Summit Meeting,<sup>3</sup> matters of vital concern to the free world. Within this context US will continue to the extent possible to limit its campaigning on behalf of Boland to making our firm support of his candidacy clear as circumstances warrant.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/6-2460. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Hartley and Williamson; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Willoughby, Van Heuven, BNA, and U/LS; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 372, June 24, reported that the Icelandic Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had asked that the United States refrain from campaigning for Boland and had alleged that it had used pressure tactics and had acted against Iceland's interests during the last Law of the Sea Conference. (*Ibid.*) Regarding the Second Law of the Sea Conference, held at Geneva March 17-April 26, see Documents 399 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Documentation on the collapse of the summit meeting in Paris, May 16-17, is scheduled for publication in volume ix.

Should appropriate occasion arise you might also wish point out Foreign Minister we do not agree his characterization of US actions of Law of Sea Conference accurate. Joint US-Canadian position put forth and supported Geneva at considerable sacrifice interests of US and other countries which supported this proposal. These countries agreed considerable self-sacrifices were justified in seeking codify international law in this very important field. None of so-called US pressures at Geneva were directed against Iceland specifically but were rather earnest attempt reach agreement which we considered essential for security of free world. We were distressed find minority of nations, including Iceland, could not modify their original positions in order reach such an agreement. We of course unhappy Iceland could not join us in this endeavor since we cannot see how adoption US-Canadian proposal would have been inimical Iceland's long-term interest, especially with further suggestion by UK for special consideration for Iceland.<sup>4</sup> We feel failure this conference with its resultant threat to free world security is event which can only be deplored in Western world and can only in end rebound to disadvantage Iceland itself.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup> At this point in the source text, the following sentence was deleted before transmission: "We also distressed some Icelanders could see fit to boast conference failed because of Icelandic vote."

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 6 from Reykjavik, July 6, reported that the information regarding the U.S. position on Thors' candidacy and at the Law of the Sea Conference had been given to the Icelandic Foreign Minister, who had stated he thought the United States would not need to campaign against Nosek, and had accepted without argument the explanation of the U.S. position at the Law of the Sea Conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/7-660)

---

**142. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 25, 1960.*

94. FYI Prime Minister Rahman of Malaya has called publicly for seating of Communist China in UN on condition that Government

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/7-2560. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by FE/SPA on July 22; cleared by Bock, Steeves, SPA, S/S, BNA, GER, CA, and in draft with Bacon; and approved by Parsons who signed for Herter. Also sent to Canberra, Bangkok, London, and Bonn; and repeated to Kuala Lumpur. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text.

Republic of China (GRC) be allowed remain in UN as Government of independent Taiwan. Rahman has indicated privately he greatly concerned by threat to peace posed by ChiComs and apparently is convinced this threat can best be met by bringing ChiComs into UN and attempting to inculcate in them sense of responsibility. Rahman has also expressed opinion that seating of ChiComs in UN would provide necessary safety valve to ease increasing tensions within Communist China. Rahman may be receiving dangerously warped information on Communist China since one of his principal sources is Malayan Chinese college-mate who fought with Communist terrorists against Malayan Government until he escaped from Malaya to Communist China.

Rahman has stated emphatically, both publicly and privately, that his proposals do not reflect any softening of Federation Govt opposition to communism. He says even if his proposals are accepted Malaya while granting recognition ChiComs and GRC would not exchange diplomatic representatives with either. Forthcoming termination state of emergency, Malayan term for Government's war against Communist rebellion, eliminates basis, in Rahman's view, for continuation government's opposition to bilateral recognition ChiComs and their seating in UN on basis of GRC membership also. Rahman apparently fears increasing criticism and disaffection among large body Malayan Chinese if such opposition is maintained. Furthermore, Rahman's thinking toward Communist China appears to have been significantly influenced by Prime Minister Nash and possibly by European officials whom Rahman met during recent visit to U.K. and Western Europe.

Federation cabinet, especially Foreign Minister, and Federation Govt generally are reported strongly opposed to Rahman's proposals. Principal Malay opposition party has publicly criticized them. Does not appear however Rahman yet ready change his mind, especially since ChiComs have so far refrained from attacking his proposals. Rahman apparently has not yet decided on what action Federation Government should take implement his proposals. Quite possible however that unless Rahman changes his mind Federation Govt may reverse its previous position and abstain or vote against Chi rep moratorium resolution during upcoming 15th UNGA and also seek support for seating both GRC and Communist China in UN.

Department deeply concerned by Rahman's proposals. We convinced that they not only impractical but fact they proposed by hitherto staunch supporter free world would fortify ChiComs in their dangerous attitude and belligerent expansionist tactics. We have so informed Rahman but apparently have not been able budge him from his new views. U.K. and Australian High Commissioners in Kuala Lumpur have also tried to get Rahman back on track but with negative

results. Outgoing French Ambassador told our Chargé in Kuala Lumpur that during his farewell call on Rahman latter appeared "un-deflectable" in his new course.

India has not so far proposed inscription item on Chinese representation which it has proposed every year since 1956. Prospect exists that acrimonious debate on Chi rep issue may be largely avoided or confined to credentials context. It would be regrettable if Malaya should take initiative which clearly can have no practical result except to give impetus to controversy in GA which will be fully occupied with Africa, and other immediately pressing matters.

Problem compounded for US by fact Rahman has accepted President's invitation to make official visit to US late next October. Rahman has stated he must feel free speak his heart and mind on Communist China problem. We, of course, have assured him that although we would not wish put any restrictions on his freedom of speech while in US we would hope he would express himself on subject in such a way as to avoid embarrassment to President or US Govt. End FYI.

*For Ambassador Hickerson*

In view of the foregoing would appreciate your views on desirability discussing problem with President Garcia and suggesting to him that during his forthcoming visit to Malaya he attempt persuade Rahman abandon his proposals.

*For Ambassador Sebald*

In view of foregoing would appreciate your views on feasibility your discussing problem with Menzies and suggesting to him that he send Rahman personal message, urging him withdraw his proposals and return to Malaya's pre-existing position on Communist China.

*For Morris*

Would appreciate your views on desirability your discussing this problem with appropriate U.K. authorities and suggesting high-level U.K. approach to Rahman persuade him reconsider his current position.

*For Unger*

In view of foregoing would appreciate your view on desirability your discussing this problem with appropriate Thai authorities in hopes that Thai Govt in turn might communicate with Rahman regarding it. Rahman believed be on close terms with Thai Govt based partly on fact his mother was Thai princess.

*For Ambassador Dowling*

Would appreciate your view on desirability your discussing this problem with appropriate German authorities and suggesting high-level German approach to Rahman persuade him reconsider his current position.<sup>2</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>2</sup> Hickerson responded in telegram 148 from Manila, July 27, that he thought speaking with President Garcia was an excellent idea, and that he would seek an appointment with him upon receiving instructions to do so. Sebald stated in telegram 44 from Canberra, July 27, that he believed Menzies would discuss the problem with him frankly and would agree to send a letter to Rahman. Telegram 472 from London, July 27, replied that the Embassy would approach the Foreign Office upon receiving instructions to do so, and suggested that the Department call in the British Ambassador or Minister at the same time. Unger proposed in telegram 144 from Bangkok, July 28, that he review the contents of this telegram with the Thai Acting Foreign Minister and suggested that the Chinese Ambassador to Thailand might help with this problem. In telegram 189 from Bonn, July 27, Dowling questioned the efficacy of asking the German Government to approach Rahman, but suggested he see how senior Foreign Ministry officials responded to the idea. (*Ibid.*, 303/7-2760 through 7-2860)

---

**143. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to Secretary of State for External Affairs Green<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 27, 1960.*

DEAR HOWARD: At our meeting at Montebello the other day<sup>2</sup> you asked what our views were on the question of Outer Mongolia being admitted into the United Nations.

We have recently been reviewing not only this question, but that of Outer Mongolia's exact status, and we have come to the same conclusion as we have before. We do not consider Outer Mongolia to be independent nor to be a genuine state. This seems to be a general view, also, since only three non-Communist countries have recognized Outer Mongolia—Burma, India, and Indonesia. We believe that admission of Outer Mongolia into the United Nations would generally

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/7-2760. Secret. Drafted by Hubbard; cleared by Boster and White and in draft by Parsons, Willoughby, Bacon, and Hartley.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Merchant's July 13 conversation with Green is *ibid.*, 303/7-1360. Merchant was in Canada as part of the U.S. Delegation to the third Canadian-U.S. Ministerial Meeting on Joint Defense, held at Montebello, Quebec, July 12-13. Documentation on this meeting is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume.

hurt the free world position. Any marginal advantages accruing to the free world by admission of Outer Mongolia would, we believe, be far outweighed by the disadvantages of such an action.

If the United States were to support admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations, our position in the Far East might well be compromised by an incorrect interpretation of such an action. It might be thought that we were giving in to Communist pressure in that area. This would be particularly unfortunate in the face of continuing Communist aggression in Tibet and India.

Likewise, we are strongly of the opinion that the addition of yet another Communist representative at the United Nations, particularly at this time, would not help the free world in attaining its objectives in that organization and would actually, of course, militate against it. I need only refer you to the recent efforts of the Communist bloc as a whole to interfere with the United Nations effort in the Congo.

We have followed the course of events in Outer Mongolia with considerable interest. We have evidence, for example, that there has occurred a local resurgence of nationalism in the area, but at the same time it is clear that the Soviet Government has cracked down hard on this Mongolian sentiment and has strengthened its hold over the local government. Outer Mongolia is in reality a Communist-controlled puppet, whatever may be the nationalistic instincts of its people, and we believe that admission into the United Nations would not really be of any assistance to the Mongolians themselves. Any Mongolian Mission to the United Nations would be carefully indoctrinated, would not move outside Communist diplomatic circles, and would not be susceptible to free world suasions under present circumstances.

We have concluded, therefore, that we will oppose any effort on the part of the Soviet bloc to gain admittance into the United Nations of Outer Mongolia.

With all good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Livingston T. Merchant**<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### 144. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>

CG-97

Washington, August 2, 1960—6:53 p.m.

Ref Oslo's G-12 to Dept, rptd info G-3 to Stockholm, Copenhagen, G-2 to Helsinki, G-1 to Reykjavik.<sup>2</sup> In Dept's view two factors, 1) Iceland's position as participant Nordic Foreign Minister's Meeting and 2) Dept's own assurances Thors and GOI US would not actively campaign against him or for Boland unless it appears necessary in order avoid election Soviet bloc or neutralist "compromise" candidate, make any effort persuade other Scandinavians not support Thors' candidacy "in first instance" both undesirable and likely prove unproductive. However Dept remains concerned over possibility of deadlock over GA presidency even though such possibility appears remote at this juncture. You should therefore seek occasion before Nordic Foreign Ministers Meeting approach Foreign Minister along following lines:

1. We appreciate why Scandinavians believe they must at least initially support Thors candidacy and have no intention trying to dissuade them.

2. We continue however be concerned over potentially dangerous situation inherent in maintenance two rival West European candidacies which could so split free world vote as to result in deadlock and pave way for shift to Nosek or some unacceptable "compromise" candidate.

3. We believe danger to free world in Soviet bloc or neutralist "compromise" candidate as GA president underscored by fact 15th GA will in all likelihood be required, in view abortive nature Summit meeting, consider matters of vital concern free world. Recent performance Polish chairman in breaking off Committee of Ten disarmament negotiations at Geneva in complete disregard rules of procedure<sup>3</sup> indicative why Soviet bloc president 15th GA clearly not conducive orderly conduct GA's business or in free world interest. Moreover we consider election of Soviet bloc GA president would be most undesirable and inappropriate at this time in view barrage of threats now

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-260. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Nunley; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Sent to Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Helsinki and repeated to Reykjavik and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 28, this telegram reported that the Nordic Foreign Ministers would meet in Oslo August 29-30, predicted they would support Thors for President of the 15th U.N General Assembly, and requested instructions by August 24. (*Ibid.*, 320/7-2860)

<sup>3</sup> On June 27, the Soviet Delegation to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which had convened in Geneva on March 15, walked out of the meeting. The Polish chairman then ended that day's session, despite requests from Western delegations to speak. The conference ended the following day.



issuing from Moscow and Soviet efforts to disrupt UN operations in Congo, where Scandinavians themselves are making important contributions toward restoration order.

4. We continue to believe Boland stronger candidate than Thors and our information indicates Boland candidacy has substantial support. We would therefore hope Scandinavians could see their way clear to shift to Boland if it appears after first ballot he leading Thors, and thus assist in avoiding any prolonged and open contest between two West European candidates from which only Soviet bloc could hope to profit.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup> Willis reported that the Nordic Foreign Ministers had decided to continue supporting Thors' candidacy, but had agreed to reconsider this decision once voting began, and that the Norwegian Foreign Minister felt they would not support Nosek. (Telegram 161 from Oslo, August 31; *ibid.*, 320/8-3160)

---

#### 145. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>

CA-1178

*Washington, August 4, 1960.*

SUBJECT

Fifteenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

[Here follow a table of contents and a summary of action requested.]

##### *A. Introduction*

The fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly (GA) is scheduled to convene in New York on September 20, 1960. This session will see a large increase in the size of the United Nations, comparable to 1955 when 16 new members were admitted. With all but one of the 16 probable applications for membership this year coming from the newly emerging states of Africa, this increase will pose a challenge and opportunity for the United States and other free world members to so influence and guide the new members that they will become effective supporters of the UN system. The Assembly will

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-460. Confidential. Drafted by Oakley; cleared by Sisco, Kerley, Monsma, Herz, Driscoll, Westfall, Ludlow, Bacon, Nunley, S/AE, and OES; and approved by Sisco who signed for Herter. Sent to 83 diplomatic posts and repeated to 13 diplomatic and 11 consular posts. An enclosed checklist of items, SD/A/483A, is not printed.

deal with a number of issues of importance to the security and well-being of the world. Moreover, meeting in the aftermath of the summit collapse and the Communist withdrawal from the Geneva disarmament negotiations, an atmosphere of sharper confrontation between the free world and the Soviets will prevail. The growth in the General Assembly's size dramatizes the role of the Assembly as an arena in which the battle for the minds and allegiance of the uncommitted peoples is being fought.

## *B. Background Information*

### *1. Composition of the General Assembly*

When the 15th GA convenes, it will comprise 82 members. By the time it adjourns, there may well be 98 members. Since its founding in 1945 when it had only 51 members, the UN has periodically admitted new members, reflecting the emergence of newly-independent nations in Africa and Asia as well as the admission of a number of European States. Clearly the principle of one state one vote in the GA does not accurately reflect the relative power of individual members, and many of the new members are too inexperienced in international affairs to act responsibly on all vital issues. Through active consultation in New York and in foreign capitals it is possible to achieve necessary majorities or consensuses for positions which are fundamentally in the interests of the US and the other free world members of the UN.

The 15th GA is expected to consider the applications of the following sixteen new states: Cameroun, Togo, Republic of Congo (former Belgian), Mali Federation, Malagasy Republic, Somali Republic, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Gabon, Chad, Congo (former French), Central African Republic, and Cyprus. The Security Council has already acted favorably upon the applications of Cameroun (January 26), Togo (April 27), Mali (June 28), the Malagasy Republic (June 29), the Somali Republic (July 5) and the Republic of Congo (July 7). With the exception (Cyprus) these prospective members are African. The admission of some or all could expand the size of the present group of African states (9) at the UN until it equalled or surpassed that of the Latin American states (20) which is presently the largest geographic grouping. The influence of both the African and the Asian groups has increased considerably in recent years and will probably continue to increase as new countries obtain their independence.

For African and Asian nations, membership in the UN holds a special significance because it symbolizes international acceptance and status. Many of these nations regard the UN, and especially the GA, as a forum in which they are able to exert a greater influence upon international developments than they might otherwise expect. Many have had little or no experience in traditional diplomacy and, in many

instances, have little knowledge of or interest in issues which the United States considers vital. Anticolonialism, social and humanitarian issues, and problems of economic development are of paramount importance to these nations. There is a predisposition by some Afro-Asian states toward non-alignment on "cold-war" issues although a number of the present members are firm free world supporters. This predisposition has been encouraged among the present Afro-Asian members of the UN by the Communists and there is every reason to believe that the latter will encourage, or foster, such a predisposition in the new members whenever possible. Among the Afro-Asian states are at least 11 firm supporters of the free world on cold war issues: Japan, Laos, Malaya, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, China, Turkey, Iran, Tunisia and Liberia. It is important accordingly to avoid referring to the Afro-Asians as if all were neutrals and to give credit to the substantial support the free world enjoys there.

## *2. Bloc Voting*

The groupings in the GA are: Non-Communist Europe, Soviet bloc, Latin America, Old Commonwealth, and Afro-Asian. All of the groups either caucus or hold informal consultations. In recent years two distinct sub-groups have developed within the Afro-Asian group, (1) the Arab League states, and (2) the African states. Arab League representatives meet in advance of the GA to formulate the Arab position on candidates and issues, and league decisions are binding if adopted unanimously. The African group (which includes all states of the African continent except the Union of South Africa) caucuses during the General Assembly for the purpose of consulting on particular issues. Decisions of the caucus are frequently not binding. The rapid evolution of additional independent African states and their admission to UN membership will augment the relative voting strength of this group. There is the possibility that, in time, the African states south of the Sahara may decide to organize themselves into a distinctive African group.

The "Old" Commonwealth members consult periodically during the Assembly and on special occasions are joined by Asian and African Commonwealth members for informal discussions. Non-Communist European countries do not hold caucuses as such, although they are developing the practice of periodic informal group meetings. Two European sub-groups—the five Scandinavian countries and the three Benelux states—meet on the Foreign Minister level prior to the General Assembly to concert their actions on candidates and issues, and the members of these sub-groups consult regularly during Assembly meetings. The UK also meets formally with France, Portugal and the US prior to the session.

The Soviet bloc follows the directives emanating from Moscow and meets regularly during the Assembly.

The solidarity of the groups (the Soviet excepted) varies considerably. On slates, but not on substance the Latin Americans display the greatest unity. The Afro-Asians do not act as a unit but maintain cohesiveness on questions of economic development, on colonial issues and on humanitarian questions. While the groups constitute a source of pressure for conformity on individual delegations within the respective groups, the effectiveness of this pressure varies with the issue involved. As in any deliberative group, the practice of log rolling is employed, though in the Assembly it is limited largely to elections.

United States operational relations with the Latin American bloc have been established on a firm footing. From time to time members of the U.S. Delegation are invited to appear before the Latin American caucus to explain the United States position on a particular issue and/or to enlist Latin American support. U.S. contacts with the non-Communist Europeans and the Old Commonwealth groups are close and rest on a basic community of interests, though colonial issues present difficulties. Relations with the Afro-Asian group are primarily with individual members of the group, although we have occasionally dealt with the African caucus as a whole. Relations with the Soviet bloc depend on the undulations of the "cold war".

The U.S. must cooperate effectively with all but the last of the various geographic groupings in the General Assembly in order to achieve the majority necessary to secure the adoption of important Assembly resolutions. This means working closely with individual members of the different groups to influence so far as possible group thinking and to obtain the support of as many of the individual members as possible.

To a degree, the groups serve a useful purpose in providing a means for informally exchanging views on the various items that come before the GA and in working out slates of candidates for offices. Tendencies toward any further coalescence of regional or special-interest groupings, particularly among the Afro-Asian countries, may result in a rigidity of voting patterns prejudicial to a constructive approach to international problems and to the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the GA.

### *3. Communist-Free World Relations*

East-West relations in the 15th General Assembly will be decidedly less amicable than those which existed, at least superficially, during the 14th General Assembly. The 14th General Assembly was conducted against a backdrop of a strong and oft-repeated Soviet line of peaceful co-existence with the "Capitalist" world. This backdrop included the visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to the U.S. and the

acceptance of his invitation by President Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union in 1960.<sup>2</sup> Talks for the suspension of nuclear tests had resumed in Geneva with some hope of limited success, and the big four (U.S., USSR, U.K., and France) had reached agreement for the resumption of disarmament negotiations in a ten-nation committee. The 14th General Assembly adjourned with increased hopes that continued progress would be made for the lessening of international tension.

The pacific interlude has since been broken by Khrushchev's refusal to meet with President Eisenhower and Premiers DeGaulle and MacMillan at Paris, the withdrawal of the invitation to President Eisenhower to visit the USSR, and the subsequent Soviet walk-out from the Geneva disarmament talks. These events have been accompanied by the resumption of an abusive Soviet propaganda campaign which has served to heighten international tension. It seems clear that the Soviet Government has chosen to adopt a posture of extreme militancy and to seek its goals through intimidation rather than the appearance of conciliation. While it is likely that the Soviet spokesmen will continue to stress the theme of "peaceful coexistence", this theme will undoubtedly be subordinated to Soviet missile rattling and threats against countries accused of hostile policies.

Against such a background it is clear that the 15th General Assembly will be conducted in an atmosphere charged with tension. The Soviets can be expected to exploit their participation in the UN for four principal purposes. First, they will attempt to promote the concept of an affinity of interests between the Soviet bloc and the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America, primarily by seeking a "habit alignment" with these nations on a wide variety of issues. Second, they will exploit every opportunity for disrupting the unity of the free world allies. Third, they will attempt to attain a larger measure of international prestige and respectability for the Communist bloc. Finally, they will concentrate on various propaganda goals. In particular, they will attempt to persuade the world that Soviet power and prestige are constantly increasing while United States power has suffered a decline. They will pose as the "true champions of peace" and will attack the United States and the Western powers for their failure to accept Soviet disarmament proposals. They may also be expected to make repeated references to the U-2 incident, and to contend that the elimination of foreign bases represents the sine qua non of a relaxation of international tensions.

Our guideline in this situation was set forth by the President in his report to the nation following the collapse of the Paris Summit talks,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 89.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Eisenhower's May 25 address, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961*, pp. 437-445.

in which he said that the United States "must continue business-like dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues and improve the contacts between our own and Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it." It should be noted that this policy does not imply that the U.S. must refrain from firmness in dealings with Soviet militancy, that we feel obliged to make unilateral concessions to Soviet ambitions or that we need to avoid taking strong positions in support of our own principles and vital interests. It is important that the Soviet leaders learn as soon as possible that the free nations are not being intimidated, that our essential unity is not impaired, and that militant Soviet policies are not otherwise paying dividends.

[Here follow sections C, "Consultations," and D, "Specific Instructions."]

### *E. United States Views*

#### *1. 15th GA Presidency*

As you know the U.S. is committed to support the candidacy of Frederick H. Boland (Ireland) for President of the Assembly and, to date, the Boland candidacy appears to be progressing satisfactorily. The US position on the other candidacies for President (Thor Thors of Iceland and Jeri Nosek of Czechoslovakia) remains as set forth in CG 517 of February 16, 1960, and CG 577 of March 10, 1960.<sup>4</sup> You should in any discussions of this matter with the Foreign Office make clear that our strong opposition to Nosek as President of the 15th GA has been underscored by the abortive nature of the Summit Meeting, since this greatly increases the likelihood that the 15th GA will have before it crucial issues of vital concern to the Free World. You should also as appropriate cite the complete disregard of rules of procedure by the Polish chairman in breaking off the Geneva disarmament discussions of the Committee of Ten as a concrete example of why a Soviet bloc President of the GA would be clearly prejudicial to the orderly conduct of the Assembly's business as well as detrimental to free world interests.

#### *2. The Election of Other Officers Comprising the General Committee*

The Assembly's General (steering) Committee is made up of the President, the 13 vice presidents, and the chairmen of the seven main committees. The geographic allocation of seats there, established by the Assembly at its 12th session, varies slightly from year to year—the area holding the presidency losing a vice presidency. In general, however, the allocation is as follows:

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding CG-517 and CG-577, see footnote 3, Document 135.

Vice Presidents—4 from Asia and Africa, 2 from Latin America, 2 from "Western Europe and other states", and 1 from Eastern Europe, plus the five permanent members of the Security Council; Chairmen—2 from Latin America, 2 from Asia and Africa, 2 from "Western Europe and other states", and 1 from Eastern Europe. The "slate" for the General Committee is usually not fully developed until just before the Assembly session opens and tends to be determined by general agreement before the actual elections take place.

Candidacies so far advanced are: for Vice President—Libya, Sudan; Panama, Venezuela; Japan, Canada; for Chairmen—Committee I, Shaha (Nepal), Corea (Ceylon); Special Political Committee, Tarabonov (Bulgaria); Committee II, Stanovnik (Yugoslavia); Committee III, Lopez (Philippines); and Committee IV, Pachachi (Iraq). No candidacies have yet been announced for Committees V and VI. We have taken no final position on any of these candidacies since it is our normal practice not to take a position on candidates for GA offices until we can look at the "slate" as a whole, the over-all composition of the General Committee being in our minds very important.

FYI. The primary U.S. objective in this connection is to obtain a General Committee favorable to U.S. interests generally, and particularly with respect to the Chinese representation issue. We also attach special importance to the election of China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to a vice presidency. End FYI.

### *3. Elections to the United Nations Councils and the International Court of Justice*

Elections will be held at the 15th GA for four seats on the Security Council, six seats on the Economic and Social Council, and five seats on the International Court of Justice. In addition, a separate election will be held to fill the vacancy on the International Court of Justice created by the recent death of Judge Lauterpacht (British). We have with two exceptions given no commitments of support to candidates for any of these seats, in keeping with our usual practice of not making commitments so far in advance of the actual elections. You should, however, let it be known that we are committed to support the election of Portugal to the seat on the Security Council currently occupied by Italy, this being generally regarded as a West European seat and Portugal being the West European candidate. We have also given a commitment of support to China for election to the Economic and Social Council.

#### *(a) Security Council*

The seats currently held by Tunisia, Italy and Argentina will be vacated at the end of 1960. Announced candidates for these seats are the UAR, Portugal, Chile and Cuba. Jordan may also be a candidate to succeed Tunisia. A Jordanian candidacy was announced last year, but

since then, Jordan has announced its candidacy for the Economic and Social Council and has made no recent mention of its earlier candidacy for the Security Council. The Arab League is apparently disposed to support the UAR as Tunisia's successor. An earlier Netherlands candidacy to succeed Italy has been withdrawn in favor of Portugal. Pursuant to the compromise worked out at the 14th General Assembly,<sup>5</sup> Poland should submit its resignation from the Council before the end of this year in order that Turkey may occupy the seat for the second half of the term. This will require that the Assembly go through the formality of electing Turkey.

(b) *Economic and Social Council*

Chile, China, Costa Rica, France, Netherlands, and the Sudan retire from the Economic and Social Council at the end of 1960. The re-election of China and France would be in accord with the generally accepted practice that the five permanent members of the Security Council are always represented on all major UN bodies. In this connection, the U.S. attaches major importance to the re-election of China, in order both to maintain the GRC's international status and to maintain the five-permanent-member tradition unimpaired. Ethiopia, Ghana, and Jordan are candidates to succeed the Sudan. Jordan has received the preliminary endorsement of the Arab League. Belgium is an announced candidate, and Italy a possible candidate to succeed the Netherlands. El Salvador is a candidate to succeed Costa Rica. No candidacy has yet been announced for the seat currently occupied by Chile.

(c) *International Court of Justice*

The seats on the International Court of Justice currently occupied by United States, Norwegian, Uruguayan, Pakistani and Russian nationals become vacant early in February 1961. Each member of the Court maintains a panel of up to four legal experts, termed the "national group", which submits nominations to the Secretary-General; vacancies are filled by the General Assembly and Security Council from the nominated candidates. The Uruguayan (Armand Ugon), Pakistani (Zafrulla Khan) and Norwegian (Klaestad) incumbents have been nominated for re-election. The United States national, Judge Hackworth, has already been nominated by five national groups, but the United States national group has not yet acted. There is as yet no indication whether the incumbent Soviet judge will be candidate. Other candidates are: Bartos (Yugoslavian), Bustamante y Rivero (Peruvian), Castren (Finn), Daftari (Iranian), Fernandes (Brazilian), Guggenheim (Swiss), Jarfa (Chilean), Morelli (Italian), Pal (Indian), Petren (Swedish), Sapena Pastor (Paraguayan), Sorensen (Danish), Tanaka (Japanese), Trolle (Danish), Tunkin (Russian).

<sup>5</sup> Regarding this compromise, see Document 118.



The UK national group has nominated Fitzmaurice to fill the unexpired term of Judge Lauterpacht (UK) who died recently.

While the Statute of the Court takes no cognizance of geographic distribution, referring rather to the representation in the Court of "the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world", there is nevertheless a disposition in the UN to take into account the factor of geographic distribution.

#### 4. *Enlargement of UN Councils*

For the fifth consecutive year the Assembly will have on its agenda two items concerning, respectively, an increase in the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council. The position of the USSR making its ratification of any Charter amendments conditional on the settlement of the Chinese representation issue in its favor has so far discouraged the Assembly from adopting the amendments necessary to bring about an increase in the size of the two Councils. Such amendments are subject to the Great Power Veto. However, the Assembly at its 14th session, in deciding again to carry over these two agenda items to its next session, adopted a "declaration of intention" that if no progress is made on enlargement of the two Councils at the 15th GA, the Assembly should at that time set up "a committee to study the possibilities of arriving at an agreement which will facilitate the amendment of the Charter" to achieve such enlargement.<sup>6</sup> The discussion at the 14th session had made clear the consensus of the Assembly that the expanding membership of the UN requires a reasonable enlargement of these two Councils if the new membership is to have adequate opportunity for participation in their work, particularly in the work of the Economic and Social Council. In the case of a similar agenda item concerning the International Court of Justice, opinion in the Assembly was divided and this item was not carried forward.

The US continues to favor the enlargement of the two Councils, and particularly the Economic and Social Council in whose work the new membership has such a direct and primary interest. The Department sees little prospect at this time of any change in the Soviet position—certainly not with respect to the Security Council—though there may be some slight possibility that with respect to the Economic and Social Council the USSR might prove responsive to pressure from the African and Asian members. The Department would in this connection like to be kept informed of any indications that such pressure may be developing. In the meantime it is reviewing the situation to

---

<sup>6</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1404 (XIV), adopted November 25, 1959, see U.N. doc. A/4354.

determine whether there is any constructive action which can be taken so long as the Soviet position remains unchanged. For example, the US has already proposed to the members of the Economic and Social Council that, in the event the Soviet Union continues to prevent an enlargement of the Council itself, the functional commissions of ECOSOC should be moderately enlarged to provide increased representation for Asia and Africa.

### *5. The Representation of China*

The question of the representation of Communist China in the UN is expected to be raised. (At the last four General Assemblies India took the initiative and introduced the question in the form of an item for inclusion on the agenda; prior to 1956 the USSR generally raised the issue.) To date India has taken no steps to introduce this issue at the 15th GA. In accordance with our policy of strong support for the Government of the Republic of China in international organizations, we shall again propose that the Assembly decide "not to consider" any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. FYI. By taking such procedural position and avoiding a vote on the substance, we expect to be able again to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support. Furthermore, we are confident that the UK, as in the past, will support the moratorium formula. End FYI.

At your discretion, you may point out that the Chinese Communist regime (1) does not meet the standards for international behavior specifically set forth in the UN Charter and continues to show nothing but contempt for the principles for which the UN stands; (2) by continuing its brutal actions in Tibet, about which the 14th GA expressed grave concern and of which new and serious reports are now being received, adds one more example to its record of shocking disregard for human life and liberty; meanwhile it continues by its wanton shelling to disturb the peace in the Taiwan Strait; (3) is a condemned and persistent aggressor against the UN in Korea; and (4) prevents the implementation of the UN resolution calling for peaceful reunification of Korea by free elections.

For your background, the breakdown of the vote on the U.S.-sponsored resolution "not to consider" Chinese representation at the 14th General Assembly, taken on September 22, 1959, was as follows:<sup>7</sup>

(a) 44 states in favor: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,

---

<sup>7</sup> Regarding U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1351 (XIV), see footnote 2, Document 95.

Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

(b) *29 states against*: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sudan, Sweden, Ukraine, United Arab Republic, USSR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

(c) *9 states abstaining*: Austria, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iceland, Israel, Libya, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

Posts in those countries which *voted in favor* of the resolution should express appreciation for support on this question, which the U.S. believes continues to be one of paramount importance to the entire free world, and solicit continued support for a like U.S. position at the 15th GA. Posts in those countries which *voted in the negative* should, unless it is believed to be counterproductive, solicit support for adoption of the moratorium resolution or possibly an abstention, instead of a negative vote. Posts in those countries which *abstained* should, in their discretion, endeavor to obtain assurance for support of the moratorium resolution and if this is not forthcoming, at least continued abstention in preference to a negative vote. Posts should coordinate approach with local GRC Mission.

Posts are requested to report the outcome of this representation *by cable*.

#### 6. U-2 Incident

The U-2 incident appears certain to be discussed at the Fifteenth General Assembly either in a separate agenda item or as part of the disarmament item. Our position has been made quite clear in the President's May 25 radio and television address to the nation. The text of this address was reprinted in the June 6 edition of the Department of State *Bulletin* (Vol. XLII, No. 1093).

#### 7. Disarmament

On June 27, 1960 the Soviet Union submitted a request for inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled "Disarmament and the Situation with Regard to the Fulfillment of the GA Resolution of November 20, 1959 on the Question of Disarmament".<sup>8</sup>

The U.S. and its allies are now consulting on the position to be taken in the disarmament field during the coming session. As a first step, the U.S. has requested that the UN Disarmament Commission be

<sup>8</sup> For texts of the Soviet request and explanatory memorandum, see U.N. doc. A/4385. The resolution under reference is U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV); for text, see U.N. doc. A/4354.

convened in August to consider on an urgent basis the situation arising from the Soviet decision to break off disarmament negotiations in the 10-nation committee which had been working in Geneva. During debate the Soviet Union will attempt to show that it has sought an agreement on general and complete disarmament and will allege that the Western powers are interested only in control and inspection without disarmament. The Western powers, for their part, can be expected to explain the proposals which they made in Geneva. This will include the disarmament proposal introduced into the Committee by the U.S. on June 27, the day that the Soviet Union walked out of the meeting. In the latter connection, we plan to stress the arbitrary and irresponsible torpedoing of the negotiations by the Soviet Union at a time when the Communists know that further Western proposals were about to be presented. The manner in which the Communist Chairman steam-rolled the final meeting of the 10-nation conference is particularly illuminating, and, in discussions on this point, posts may find it useful to draw on CG-909, June 30, 1960.<sup>9</sup>

The main burden of the Western case will be to contrast the Soviet and Western records. The Soviets have insisted on an "all or nothing" plan for general and complete disarmament with discussion of effective international controls postponed until full agreement has been reached on its plan; the West, while agreeing with the goal of general and complete disarmament, has urged agreement be reached on feasible first steps of an overall plan which could be taken immediately, would greatly reduce the risks of war, and would be concrete progress toward the ultimate goal.

In presenting its proposals, and in subsequent negotiations, the Western Governments were guided by the following fundamental concepts which we believe constitute the proper approach to complete and general disarmament under effective international control:

1. We believe that disarmament must be carried out by stages with each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible but that it is impossible to fix in advance a timetable for the process as a whole.
2. We believe that in the process no country or side should obtain military advantage, and that to this end nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced.

<sup>9</sup> On July 21, Eisenhower announced that he had instructed Lodge to request an early meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. For text of his statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961*, pp. 583-584. For text of Lodge's July 22 letter to Disarmament Commission Chairman Padilla Nervo, see U.N. doc. DC/154. For text of the U.S. proposals submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on June 27, see U.N. doc. TNCD/7. A copy of circular airgram CG-909, which transmitted background information and the U.S. position on the Soviet walk-out, is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/6-3060.

3. We hold that disarmament measures must be verified from their entry into force. To ensure that there is no evasion, there must be an effective international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations.

4. Finally, we believe that disarmament measures which can be implemented and effectively controlled at an early stage should be negotiated now and put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

The Western proposals have provided for certain concrete measures which could be undertaken as early and immediate steps in working toward general and complete disarmament.

These include:

A) A prohibition against orbiting vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction.

B) Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and transfer of agreed quantities of such materials to peaceful uses.

C) Prior notification of proposed missile launchings.

D) Establishment of force level ceilings for the U.S. and the USSR, and further reduction of the forces of the U.S. and the USSR and all other militarily significant nations, under adequate control, together with deposit of military equipment in internationally supervised depots.

E) Measures for protection against surprise attack.

The U.S. plan of June 27 was a major policy action which would have provided a useful basis for negotiation. It should be pointed out that this proposal constituted a speedy and flexible response to the Soviet proposal of June 2<sup>10</sup> and represented an adjustment of our position to accommodate significant aspects of the Soviet and allied views.

Certain factors in the Soviet plan which are particularly objectionable to the U.S. were the following: (1) The Soviets have continued to insist that not a single measure be implemented and not one significant control system worked out until the entire Soviet package plan has been accepted. We have consistently emphasized the desirability of exploring, isolating and agreeing on feasible first stage measures to prevent the development of an unstable military environment and to promote the development of that confidence necessary for agreement on broader measures. We have opposed and will continue to oppose negotiations on rigid package plans put on an "all or nothing" basis. (2) The proposals advanced by the USSR for the first stage could result in unbalanced disarmament which can upset the strategic equilibrium which now exists and, rather than promoting peace and stability, would create an unstable situation in which the danger of military conflict would increase. (3) The Soviet proposal makes it plain that the right to search for clandestine military activities would be reserved

---

<sup>10</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. TNCD/6/Rev. 1.

until general and complete disarmament had been achieved. This obviously would not be adequate to the purpose of verifying that the Soviet proposals were, in fact, being carried out.

The Soviet record thus far strongly indicates that the Soviet Government has been wholly disinterested in conducting any serious negotiations on disarmament, but has instead concentrated exclusively on propaganda objectives. This hypocrisy is demonstrated by the Soviet insistence on the "all or nothing" package plan, the Soviet refusal even to consider concrete and immediate disarmament measures, by Soviet fulminations against "control without disarmament" (which indicates a Soviet desire to defer control measures until significant disarmament steps have already been taken and to avoid any verification of the status of armaments at the time disarmament begins), and by the Soviet insistence that the Western nations take certain initial steps which would be dangerous to free world security prior to any significant and verifiable Soviet disarmament. The U.S. continues to hope that the Soviet Government can be persuaded to negotiate seriously on disarmament, and believes the pressure of world opinion may be a useful means toward this end, but sees no evidence that the Soviet Government is yet prepared to enter into serious discussions on any workable disarmament arrangement.

#### *8. Outer Space*

The 14th General Assembly established a 24-nation UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space consisting of Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, USSR, UAR, UK and the U.S. The inclusion of 7 Soviet bloc members was agreed—in order to secure the active participation of the USSR, which had boycotted the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space established at the 13th GA.

The tasks assigned the new Committee were based in large part on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee which outlined the future work that the UN might undertake in the outer space field. The first task was the study of means to effect scientific and technical programs in the peaceful uses of outer space that could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices. The second was the study of legal problems that might arise from the exploration of outer space. The GA also entrusted the Committee with working out proposals for the holding of an international scientific conference for the exchange of experience in the peaceful uses of outer space, to be held in 1960 or 1961.

Since January, an effort has been underway at UN Headquarters to negotiate a mutually agreeable slate of officers and a scheme of organization for the Committee, and if possible, for the proposed Conference. The USSR has insisted on a predominant role in the Conference. Alternately, it has advocated that as the U.S. and USSR are the only two significant powers in the outer space field, they should share most of the major offices. Such an argument in our view counters a well established tradition in the UN that the big powers should not hold major offices in UN conferences, and subsidiary bodies. Moreover, we believe that the essence of the GA is the principle that the smaller powers should play a significant role, and that they can make useful contributions.

The Committee was expected to report to the 15th GA on its progress in the scientific and legal fields. However it is unlikely that it will be able to proceed with work in depth prior to the 15th GA.

### 9. Algeria

It now appears certain that the Algerian question, which has been debated by the GA every year since 1955, will be discussed at the 15th GA. In the event negotiations between the French Government and the Algerians are proceeding at the time of the 15th GA, it is questionable whether the African and Asian countries which have requested inscription of the item in previous years will wish to run the risk of hampering direct talks. On the other hand, the prospects for high level talks in Paris are highly uncertain.

During the 14th GA, the Algerian question was debated at length. France did not participate in the debate, although the French Foreign Minister in his general debate statement at the beginning of the session did call the Assembly's attention to President de Gaulle's September 16 "self-determination" offer.<sup>11</sup> He reiterated at the same time the French contention that a debate on Algeria was outside the competence of the UN. The US representative, speaking on December 2 in the Political Committee,<sup>12</sup> recalled the hope of the United States Government that a "just, peaceful and democratic solution" might be found, offering satisfaction to the aspirations of the Algerian people as a whole. He expressed the belief that the September 16 de Gaulle statement formed a basis for concrete discussions between the parties concerned, and he urged upon the committee "the wisdom of avoiding a resolution which could prejudice a solution" of the problem.

---

<sup>11</sup> For text of Couve de Murville's general debate statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.814. For text of de Gaulle's September 16, 1959, address, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 1096-1099.

<sup>12</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 1102-1104.

Two resolutions were put forward during the course of the debate. The first called for Algerian independence and for negotiations between the French Government and the so called "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic" composed of the rebel leaders. This resolution was adopted by the first committee, but by less than a two-thirds majority.<sup>13</sup> The U.S. opposed the resolution. A modified resolution was put forward in the plenary, which recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, expressed concern over continuing hostilities, and urged the two parties to negotiate to determine the conditions necessary for the implementation of the right to self-determination for the Algerian people, including conditions for a cease fire. This resolution failed by one vote to secure the required two-thirds majority.<sup>14</sup> The U.S. abstained on this resolution, pointing out that while we support the substantive principles embodied in the resolution, we nevertheless did not believe the resolution would actually help to resolve the Algerian problem or otherwise serve a useful purpose.

On June 14, 1960, President de Gaulle again appealed to the "leaders of the insurrection" in Algeria to come to Paris to find "an honorable end to the fighting that still drags on . . ." <sup>15</sup> Once this can be done, he stated, "we shall set everything in motion in order that the Algerian people can speak its mind in an appeased atmosphere." On June 20, the "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic," while reserving its position on details of the self-determination offer, "decided to send a delegation headed by Mr. Ferhat Abbas to meet General de Gaulle." To prepare the way for the Abbas mission emissaries were sent to Paris in June to make the necessary travel and security arrangements. After five days of talks, the Algerian negotiators left Paris, terming French proposals "humiliating" and predicting that Abbas would not go to Paris. Both sides took pains, however, to stress that the talks were suspended, rather than broken off. The issues over which they were suspended are probably all negotiable, but not at that time, and not all at once.

The negotiations, which may well be protracted and will almost certainly be difficult, if they finally take place, will profoundly affect the climate of opinion and the prospect for renewed discussion of the problem. Progress toward an agreement this summer could obviate a bitter debate. On the other hand, if negotiations do not take place, or if they are held and fail, UN consideration of the problem is almost certain and may well be more difficult than in the past.

<sup>13</sup> For text and a record of the vote on the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/4339.

<sup>14</sup> For text of the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/L.276. For a record of the debate and vote on the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/PV.856.

<sup>15</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.



Developments between now and the opening of the GA will necessarily affect our view on the best manner of handling the Algerian item.

### 10. South Africa

A) "The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa Resulting from the Policy of Apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa"

This item has been on the agenda of every regular GA since 1952 and on July 20 a group of African, Asian and Latin American countries decided to request its inclusion on the agenda of the 15th GA. At the 14th GA, the U.S. joined 62 other nations in voting for a resolution which: (1) expressed its opposition to the continuance or preservation of racial discrimination in any part of the world; (2) called upon all member states to bring their policies into conformity with their obligations under the Charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; (3) expressed its deep regret and concern that the Government of the Union of South Africa had not yet responded to appeals by the GA that it reconsider governmental policies which impair the right of all racial groups to enjoy the same fundamental rights and freedoms; and (4) appealed to all member states to use their best endeavors as appropriate to achieve the purposes of the resolution.<sup>16</sup>

On March 25, 1960, 28 African and Asian delegations, later joined by Laos, requested "an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation arising out of the large-scale killings [at Sharpeville]<sup>17</sup> of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa." Seven Asian and African countries other than Security Council members participated in the debate, as did the Representative of the Union of South Africa. The U.S. supported inscription and voted for a resolution: (1) recognizing that the situation in the Union of South Africa is one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security; (2) deploring the loss of life of so many Africans during the March 1960 disturbances as well as the policies and actions of the Union Government which gave rise to the situation; (3) calling upon the Union to take measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality; and (4) requesting the Secretary General, in consultation with the Union Government, to make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the

<sup>16</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1375 (XIV), adopted November 17, 1959, see U.N. doc. A/4354.

<sup>17</sup> Brackets in the source text.

purposes and principles of the Charter.<sup>18</sup> On April 19, 1960, the Secretary General accepted a Union proposal to hold preliminary consultations with the Union Minister of External Affairs in London. Later this summer, the Secretary General will spend several days in the Union discussing the international effects of apartheid with Union Government and non-official leaders.

FYI. The Union asserts that the question of apartheid comes entirely under its domestic jurisdiction, and because of this declined to participate fully in UN activities from the fall of 1956 until July 1958. At that time, the Union announced its return to full participation in the work of the UN, although it continued to oppose the inclusion of apartheid and treatment of Indians (see below) items on the agenda.

Our view is that the discussion of such matters or general recommendations on carrying out Charter obligations in the field of human rights do not constitute intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. At the same time, we hope that the efforts of the Secretary General in South Africa will be fruitful. End FYI.

#### B) Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa

This item has been considered by the GA every year with one exception since 1946. At its 12th Session, the GA appealed to the Union to negotiate with India and Pakistan on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At the following session, the U.S. joined with 62 nations to adopt a resolution regretting the Union's failure to negotiate and again appealing to the Union to enter into negotiations without prejudice to its juridical position.<sup>19</sup>

The 14th Session of the GA adopted a resolution which: (1) noted the continued readiness of the Indian and Pakistani Governments to enter into negotiations with the Union; (2) regretted deeply that the Union had not replied to communications from these governments; (3) drew the attention of the Government of the Union to the repeated appeals of the GA to the Union to enter into negotiations with India and Pakistan; and (4) invited Member States to use their good offices in such a manner as might be appropriate to bring about the negotiations envisaged.<sup>20</sup> This resolution was adopted with 66 votes in favor, including the U.S.

<sup>18</sup> For text of this U.N. Security Council Resolution, adopted April 1, 1960, see U.N. doc. S/INF/15.

<sup>19</sup> Regarding U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1179 (XII), adopted November 26, 1957, and 1302 (XIII), adopted December 10, 1958, see footnotes 17 and 18, respectively, Document 84.

<sup>20</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1460 (XIV), adopted December 10, 1959, see U.N. doc. A/4354.

This item has again been included, and we would hope for a debate with a minimum of acrimony.

### 11. Hungary

United Nations Special Representative on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro, on November 17, 1959, cited rumors of continuing secret trials and executions in Hungary and requested inscription of "the Question of Hungary" in the agenda of the 14th GA as an urgent and important item. In his report to the GA, Sir Leslie, among other things, stated that there had been no evidence during the preceding year of any basic change in the Hungarian situation that would warrant relaxation of continued UN attention to the problem.<sup>21</sup>

After debating the Special Representative's report, the U.S. joined with Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, France, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, and Uruguay in submitting a draft resolution. The resolution deplored the continued disregard by the USSR and the present Hungarian regime of the GA's resolutions, called upon them to cooperate with the Special Representative, and requested Sir Leslie Munro to continue his efforts to obtain compliance with the Assembly's resolutions on Hungary. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 53 to 10 (Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia) with 17 abstentions (Afghanistan, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAR, Yemen). As in previous years, on the initiative of the U.S. no decision (i.e., neither accept nor reject) was taken on Hungarian credentials.<sup>22</sup> By this action the Assembly expressed its doubts as to whether the present Hungarian regime did, in fact, represent the people of Hungary.

On March 31, 1960, the Budapest authorities announced that a partial amnesty had been declared for certain categories of persons who had been sentenced for "crimes against the people." Sir Leslie Munro at a press conference in Geneva on June 8 asked for full details as to the persons affected by the decree. He also requested information concerning the fate of the large number of Hungarian patriots deported to the Soviet Union in 1956 and that of the Hungarian refugees who returned to their country after 1956. The United Nations Special

<sup>21</sup> Regarding Munro's report to the 14th U.N. General Assembly, see footnote 2, Document 122.

<sup>22</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1454 (XIV) on the Question of Hungary, adopted December 9, 1959, see U.N. doc. A/4354. For text of the Report of the Credentials Committee, see U.N. doc. A/4346. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1457 (XIV) approving the report of the Credentials Committee, adopted December 10, 1959, see U.N. doc. A/4354.

Representative reiterated his desire to consult with Hungarian and Soviet authorities with a view to implementing the Assembly's resolutions on Hungary.

A request for inscription of an item on Hungary in the agenda of the 15th GA has not thus far been made, and the plans of the Special Representative concerning the submission of a report are unknown. In the absence of a demonstration of willingness by the Hungarian regime to undertake some measure of compliance with the resolutions of the UNGA, however, it is virtually certain that the Hungarian question will be considered in some form by the 15th GA. The U.S. does not believe that the UN can wholly abandon the Hungarian question so long as the Soviet Union and the Hungarian regime maintain a position of total intransigence.

### 12. Korea

The resolution on Korea adopted by the 14th GA requested the Secretary General to inscribe the Korean question in the provisional agenda for the 15th session.<sup>23</sup>

This matter will be discussed in connection with the annual report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). It is anticipated that representatives of the sixteen nations which contributed armed forces to the defense of Korea will again submit a resolution calling upon the Communists to accept the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the states participating on behalf of the UN in the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva in 1954 and subsequently reaffirmed by the General Assembly. The principles are: (1) the UN, under its Charter, is fully and rightly empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; and (2) in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held, under UN supervision, for representatives in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

Last year's resolution was adopted by a vote of 54 to 9 (Soviet bloc) with 17 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAR, Yemen, Yugoslavia). It reaffirmed the Geneva principles and reiterated the United Nations determination to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area.

<sup>23</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1455 (XIV); *ibid.*

This issue takes on particular importance this year because of the elections of July 29, 1960 in the ROK which have been notable for their fairness and freedom despite isolated instances of violence and demonstrations and which stand in sharp contrast to the Presidential election of March, 1959, the abuse of which led to the overthrow of the Rhee administration.

*13. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)*

In accordance with usual practice, the Director of UNRWA will submit to the GA an annual report chronicling the recent activities of the Agency in its relief and rehabilitation work for the approximately one million Palestine refugees. By 1456 (XIV) of the last GA,<sup>24</sup> the mandate of UNRWA was extended for three years beyond June 30, 1960. The length of this extension was essentially a compromise between the views of the Arab host governments, which favored a longer extension, and those of the U.S. We believed that a longer range or indefinite extension of the Agency's mandate would tend to relieve such pressure as there might otherwise be on the parties principally concerned, i.e., Israel and the Arab States, to endeavor to find a fundamental solution to the problem of the Palestine refugees. The 14th GA's resolution also called upon the Arab host governments to cooperate with the Director in rectifying widespread irregularities in the Agency's relief distribution system. Further, the resolution called upon the Arab host governments to accord UNRWA personnel the privileges and immunities befitting the personnel of a subsidiary organ of the UN. Potentially, the most significant element in resolution 1456 was a request that the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) make further efforts to seek implementation of paragraph 11, resolution 194 (III). This paragraph gave the Palestine refugees the right to choose either repatriation or compensation for property they left behind in what is now Israel. The principle of the refugees' right to choose between repatriation and compensation has been reaffirmed by the GA many times. Israel opposes its implementation, and the Israeli abstention on resolution 1456 was based on that objection. All of the Arab delegates supported the resolution and there were no negative votes.

Presumably the UNRWA Director's report will outline the measures taken to implement the provisions of last year's resolution, excepting that part calling for further PCC efforts. The PCC, as is customary, will submit its own report when it is timely to do so.

---

<sup>24</sup> Adopted December 9, 1959; *ibid.*

FYI. At present it is not possible to foresee whether circumstances next autumn will be such that the usual full-blown debate on the Palestine refugee problem would serve a useful purpose. Possibly we shall seek to avoid debate, especially if it is deemed that an acrimonious exchange could impair quiet diplomatic efforts to make some progress on the refugee issue and related matters. (There are procedural means whereby the Director's report could be handled in a manner that would not necessitate a contentious debate.) On the other hand, interim developments may render a full scale debate tactically desirable. Posts should not take the initiative in raising the question of debate with foreign officials. However, if asked, you should indicate that we do not at present view a "regular" debate on Palestine refugees in the 15th GA as necessarily appropriate. End FYI.

The finances (of which the U.S. has traditionally contributed about 70%) available to UNRWA have in general enabled the Agency to provide only essential relief services and elementary education to the Palestine refugees. Lack of funds has unfortunately severely restricted the scope of UNRWA's extremely effective vocational training and individual grants and loans programs. These programs constitute the sole means presently available by which some of the younger refugees can be rendered self-supporting. The U.S. believes its contribution to UNRWA should not exceed 70% of the total governmental contributions. The more funds that are contributed to the Agency by other governments in the future, the more real progress will be made towards a solution of this problem. Posts are requested to avail themselves of every appropriate opportunity to urge those who have not yet contributed to do so, and urge those who are presently contributing to increase their pledges.

### 13. *South Tyrol*

In a letter dated June 23, 1960, the Foreign Minister of Austria requested the Secretary General to inscribe an item entitled "The Problem of the Austrian Minority in Italy" on the agenda for the 15th GA. In an enclosed explanatory memorandum, Austria asserted that Italy had failed to grant the Province of Bolzano, and hence the South Tyrolese, the autonomy which, according to Austria, had been provided for in the 1946 De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement between Italy and Austria.<sup>25</sup> The memorandum requested the Assembly to bring about a settlement based on democratic principles.

---

<sup>25</sup> For texts of the letter and explanatory memorandum, see U.N. doc. A/4395. The text of the September 5, 1946, agreement between Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber and Italian Premier De Gasperi was incorporated into the Treaty of Peace With Italy as Annex IV. For text of the Treaty, signed at Paris February 10, 1947, see 61 Stat. 1245.

The De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement, according to Italy, does not specifically provide for autonomy for Bolzano Province. The Agreement states that the German-speaking inhabitants of Bolzano Province and the neighboring bilingual townships of Trento Province "will be granted the exercise of autonomous legislative and executive regional power".

The South Tyrol, or Alto Adige as the Italians call it, has been a part of Italy since 1919. Subsequent to the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement, the Italian Government in 1948 established the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige, comprising the provinces of Bolzano, where the German-speaking population predominates, and the Trento, where the Italian-speaking inhabitants are a majority. Within the entire autonomy there is a majority of Italian-speaking residents. Although the leaders of the South Tyrolese assented to the amalgamation of Bolzano and Trento provinces in 1948, they and their Austrian supporters in North Tyrol now claim that Italy has not lived up to the spirit or the letter of the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement. Among other things, the South Tyrolese assert that the Italian Government has failed to appoint German-speaking officials in proportion to the German-speaking inhabitants and has discriminated against them in such matters as public housing and employment.

We were opposed to the submission of this dispute between two of our friends to the United Nations. On numerous occasions we urged both Italy and Austria to make every effort to settle the matter through direct discussions. Furthermore, in the event bilateral negotiations were to fail, we urged that the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under the contentious proceedings provisions of the Statute by which both parties undertake to implement the Court's decision.

On June 22, the Italian Government did in fact propose to Austria recourse to the ICJ. The Austrian response was to request inscription of the matter in the agenda of the 15th GA. Although Foreign Minister Kreisky has said that he would seek only a resolution by which the General Assembly would request an advisory opinion from the ICJ, we are concerned over the prospects that a public debate in the GA will invoke polemics which will encourage extremists and make the ultimate resolution of the problem more difficult.

#### *14. Tibet*

Following Chinese Communist attacks upon the Tibetan people aimed at the destruction of their political and religious liberties and human rights, the Dalai Lama appealed in 1959 to the Secretary General for UN consideration of the plight of his people. An item was proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the 14th GA by Ireland and Malaya and a resolution on the question of Tibet was subsequently

approved by the General Assembly.<sup>26</sup> This resolution, after expressing grave concern over reports of the loss of human rights and freedoms of the Tibetan people and deploring the effect of events in Tibet in embittering international relations, called for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.

Reports of continuing attacks upon the Tibetan people by the Chinese Communists continue to be received and the International Commission of Jurists has investigated the problem. The results of this investigation have recently been embodied in a report which reveals acts of religious genocide and violation of human rights.

While the United States has not yet reached a decision on specific action on Tibet, and would in the first instance wish to take into account the views of others, particularly the sponsors of last year's item (Ireland and Malaya), we foresee the likelihood that the Tibetan question will be before the forthcoming General Assembly in some form.

**Herter**

---

<sup>26</sup> Regarding U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1353 (XIV), see Document 102.

---

**146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 8, 1960—4:59 p.m.*

115. Seoul 131 info USUN 2.<sup>2</sup> GA session scheduled open September 20. Agree desirability in view problem preparation faced by newly organized government that debate on Korean item not come up too soon. Although impossible at this time determine how far back in agenda item can be moved, you may assure Foreign Ministry Department understands problem and certainly will endeavor be helpful.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-260. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and Hartley on August 5; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared with Bacon and Manhard; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Repeated by pouch to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Dated August 2, this telegram requested confirmation of the 15th General Assembly opening date, stated that the Korean Government hoped the item on Korea would not be considered at the beginning of the session, and requested guidance on how to handle the question of Korean admission into the United Nations. (*Ibid.*)



Re membership, 8 African states and Cyprus scheduled attain independence by August 17. On basis recent practice anticipate SC meeting recommend membership these nine may be held shortly thereafter which date too early best interests ROK application. Department currently disposed think Korean (and Vietnam) membership application might best be raised again SC when Nigerian application considered. (Nigeria scheduled become independent October 1.) By this time new ROK Government been functioning some weeks under new constitution which would provide new grounds for urging SC reconsideration and favorable recommendation. Moreover with GA in session, SC debate would attract wider attention, particularly among new membership, than discussion earlier. However, should USSR raise question Outer Mongolia in SC prior October, Department might wish raise ROK and Vietnam applications.

Whether following anticipated Soviet veto in SC, resolution re ROK membership should be introduced GA will in Department's view depend on assessment at time of likely GA reaction, particularly with respect possible Soviet or "neutralists" move involving Outer Mongolia, north Korea, and north Vietnam. While SC vote not likely be nearly as favorable ROK as heretofore (1958 vote 9-1-1)<sup>3</sup> view present composition SC (USSR, Poland negative; Ceylon, Tunisia abstention) nevertheless seven votes required to make Soviet negative vote constitute veto appear assured. However, situation less clear in GA where new members, having just been admitted themselves, might well be inclined join substantial number other A-A's in endorsing resolution of type narrowly defeated in 1957 lumping together all pending applications (Vietnam, ROK, north Korea, north Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia).<sup>4</sup> Such GA action clearly not in either ROK or free world interest. As possible alternative to resolution, Department has in mind statements in GA plenary deploring SC's failure act affirmatively on ROK (and Vietnam) application.

Embassy should discuss matter in above sense Foreign Ministry and report reaction.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>3</sup> Regarding this vote, see Document 55.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding this draft resolution, see footnote 3, Document 27.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 188 from Seoul, August 13, reported that the Korean Government agreed with the views outlined in this telegram, but was becoming impatient with the exercise of requesting U.N. membership, only to be denied it by a Soviet veto. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-1360)

## 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 23, 1960—9:42 p.m.

159. Re urtels 188, 197.<sup>2</sup> Dept most sympathetic ROK frustration re admission UN, particularly in view pending admission large number newly independent African states. Dept also agrees ROK in position this year make even stronger case than heretofore for admission. While ROK's qualifications for membership never seriously questioned except by Soviet bloc, same arguments in support its admission repeated year after year tended lose their effectiveness. This year internal developments ROK will permit introduction new elements in debate.

You should inform Foreign Minister in above sense, assuring him of continued US support this matter. You should also indicate Dept prepared request SC meeting in September, when Italy SC President, to reconsider ROK application in effort focus maximum attention on fact admission ROK long overdue. At same time you should make clear Dept sees no possibility favorable SC action barring major change in Soviet policy. Dept pleased note Prime Minister's statement reported urtel 216<sup>3</sup> appears recognize this fact.

Re possible tactic suggested by Yun: We have given most careful consideration Yun proposal but find it not practical procedurally. UN Charter provides for admission by GA on recommendation SC and 1950 advisory opinion ICJ states admission not possible in absence this recommendation.<sup>4</sup> Charter also gives five permanent members veto in all SC decisions of substantive character and admission new members clearly substantive both by nature of admission and on basis precedents. Moreover US itself has recognized admission as matter legitimately subject veto by proposing in 1949 Vandenberg resolution<sup>5</sup> and subsequently five permanent members agree voluntarily forego their veto on admission new members. While SC President has on occasion succeeded in having his ruling that given matter procedural upheld over opposition permanent member despite five-power agree-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/8-1660. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Cargo; cleared in draft with Bacon, Reis, and Bane; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Repeated by pouch to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding telegram 188, see footnote 5, *supra*. Telegram 197, August 16, reported on Ambassador McConaughy's conversation with the Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding Korean membership in the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, 303/8-1660)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 216, August 29, transmitted the substance of two press interviews given by the Korean Prime Minister on August 19 and 20. (*Ibid.*, 795B.00/8-2060)

<sup>4</sup> Regarding this opinion, see *Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations: Advisory Opinion of March 3, 1950*.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 68.

ment San Francisco that decision this question itself subject veto, this only possible where good case can in fact be made for regarding matter as procedural. Lao and Chinese Communist invitation cases thus not precedents because they related procedural not substantive matters.

While 1948 ICJ advisory opinion that making admission one state dependent on admission others incompatible "letter and spirit" Charter<sup>6</sup> obviously applicable Soviet linking admission ROK and north Korea, SC President has no authority rule this ground for denying Soviet negative vote constitutes veto. Had SC President such power membership deadlock 1950–1955 would not have occurred and Charter provision giving veto power five permanent members would be seriously undermined. SC acceptance determination by President that permanent member acting contrary Charter and therefore deprived of veto would clearly exceed recognized powers presiding officer and would constitute very dangerous precedent, which could be extended beyond admission's question and to which none of permanent members could be expected agree. Moreover, in Dept's view GA reaction any such maneuver likely be highly unfavorable and likely prejudice obtaining required two-thirds vote there. You should therefore make clear ROK suggested tactic both unrealistic and undesirable for reasons given above and US could not support it and we see no possibility other permanent SC members would do so.

With respect GA, Dept believes consideration ROK application best handled in conjunction unification item, assuming Soviet veto in SC. Dept has in mind not only strong statements deploring ROK's continued exclusion UN during debate but also inclusion reference this matter in preambular paragraph resolution on unification item. This tactic in Dept's view has best chance obtaining maximum support for new GA statement endorsing ROK application and at same time avoiding resolution lumping together all pending applications. In this general connection, Dept hopes ROK will actively seek stimulate as many supporting statements in GA as possible, particularly from friendly A-As. After last Soviet veto ROK application, only US spoke in GA deploring failure SC act favorably.

**Dillon**

---

<sup>6</sup> Regarding this decision, see *Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter) Advisory Opinion of May 28th, 1948*: I.C.J. Reports 1948.

148. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nepal<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 24, 1960—6:32 p.m.*

108. Your 150 repeated USUN 1 New Delhi 63.<sup>2</sup> Chinese representation.

Department concurs position you took with Acting Prime Minister.

FYI. From 1956 through 1959 issue raised on Indian initiative by proposal inscribe item on ChiRep on agenda respective General Assembly regular session. Annually this proposal has been rejected by GA adoption US-sponsored "moratorium" resolution whereby GA decided "not to consider" question at particular session. Dept assumes that last year when GA considering moratorium resolution Indian delegation prevailed upon Nepalese delegation to make certain procedural moves in plenary which Indian delegation in previous years had made itself. These moves involved offering of amendments to US resolution which would have had effect of vitiating sense of resolution. Assume Ambassador Shaha's request may reflect Indian influence New York. If Soviet bloc itself should be forced to raise issue this year, would be political and psychological gain free world. End FYI.

You are authorized discuss issue with Prime Minister on his return or take any other steps you believe would be helpful to ensure Nepal declines assume India's role this issue. In addition to points which you mentioned and with which Department fully concurs, you might make use of following: Introduction ChiRep issue 15th GA would have no effect but create divisive political debate at time when attention UN urgently required to solve important issues pending before General Assembly. Believe energies GA should be concentrated on major tasks at hand. We hope Nepal will not accede to request play role which serves interests ChiComs to detriment larger interests with which GA concerned, role which United States and many other free world states would find most difficult understand. Decision decline raise issue would also reflect revulsion against Chinese Communist acts Tibet which should not be rewarded with endorsement for seating in United Nations by law-abiding members of Organization.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/8-2260. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Bacon and Bock; cleared by Hope and CA; and approved by Cargo who signed for Herter. Repeated to New Delhi and by pouch to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 150 from Kathmandu, August 22, reported that the Nepalese Representative at the United Nations had requested instructions to sponsor a resolution proposing U.N. membership for the People's Republic of China and that the U.S. Ambassador had told the Nepalese Acting Prime Minister he hoped these instructions would not be sent. (*Ibid.*)

As appropriate you should emphasize our hope that Shaha would be instructed not only not to take any initiative with respect to inscription ChiRep item but also instructed to refrain from introducing amendments to US moratorium resolution which will be offered if ChiRep issue should be raised by some other country.<sup>3</sup>

**Dillon**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 182 from Kathmandu, August 26, reported on Ambassador Stebbins' conversation with Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala, who stated that Nehru had told him he assumed Nepal would sponsor an item at the 15th General Assembly on Chinese representation in the United Nations. Koirala had made no commitments, but also made no comment when Stebbins' presented the U.S. arguments against the item. (*Ibid.*, 303/8-2660)

---

#### 149. Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 29, 1960.*

##### TRANSFER OF UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS TO BERLIN

*Problem:* Can a key to the solution of the Berlin problem be found in the transfer of the United Nations headquarters to Berlin?

##### *I. Advantages of transfer.*

a. The presence in Berlin of the headquarters of as august an international body as the United Nations might act as a deterrent to any harassment of Berlin involving the use of force and might discourage other kinds of aggressive Soviet initiatives against the city.

b. The presence in Berlin of United Nations delegates from countries all over the world could lead to improved international understanding of the Berlin question, notably on the part of representatives of neutral nations who now show no particular sympathy for the Western position on Berlin.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. Attached to an August 29 memorandum from Dillon to the President.

## *II. Disadvantages.*

a. It seems clear from earlier Soviet statements and actions that the Soviets would not consider agreeing to a transfer of United Nations headquarters, if only because of the advantages it might create for the West.

b. Moreover, and more importantly, the transfer would undoubtedly be opposed by most of the United Nations members and staff. Leaving New York would mean leaving behind a huge investment; more than that, it would involve giving up a place where very suitable working and living facilities exist in favor of a less desirable location for the work of the United Nations.

c. An important disadvantage is presented by the problem of access to Berlin. The United Nations staff and delegates would find it necessary to submit to "German Democratic Republic" controls to enter and leave the city. There is little doubt that the "German Democratic Republic" would seize every opportunity to enhance its status and demand recognition as a sovereign country in the form in which it applied these controls. It would find the United Nations necessity for crossing its territory an invaluable asset in its drive to be recognized as the "second" German state. It would be in a position to apply subtle but gradually increasing pressures to United Nations communications.

d. It thus appears that while moving the United Nations headquarters to Berlin would have some positive advantages, they hardly are worth the difficulties they would create, quite apart from the question of the acceptability of the proposal to the Soviets.

## *III. What are the merits of not only moving the United Nations headquarters to Berlin but making all of Berlin United Nations territory?*

a. Obviously, it would be more desirable in stating this proposal to include all of Berlin rather than just West Berlin, for it would end the present division of the city, a real source of conflict. Since Soviet rejection of this aspect seems certain, the proposal should be regarded as one to convert West Berlin into a United Nations trusteeship.

b. Soviet acceptance of this proposal seems excluded so long as the Soviets can hope to gain ground under the present arrangements. Once West Berlin became a ward of the United Nations, Soviet aggressive initiatives against the city would be initiatives against the United Nations. If a situation ever developed crucial enough to make the Soviets wish to remove Berlin from the area of political conflict they might accept this solution.

c. Putting to one side Soviet acceptance, if the Western powers concluded that they ought to divest themselves of the responsibilities in Berlin (as the alternative to carrying out their commitment to defend

the city at the risk of general war) the acceptance of a United Nations trusteeship would be the most plausible and honorable way of doing so.

d. A proposal to turn over Western responsibility for Berlin to the United Nations would under most circumstances be regarded as a proposal by the Western powers to withdraw from their often-reiterated "guarantee" of Berlin's security. This would cast doubt on our strength and our determination and involve serious repercussions in NATO and our other alliances. The Soviets might step up their pressures elsewhere. These considerations, however, would not apply with the same force if the proposal were to come from the Germans or from the United Nations itself at a point at which it appeared the only alternative to general war.

e. United Nations administration of Berlin was discussed with the Secretary General of the United Nations in April 1959,<sup>2</sup> who considered it an unacceptable solution. It has been assumed among the Western allies, after study, that the United Nations should not be called on to exercise any real political, executive or police responsibility. The judgment is that the organization is not capable of doing so considering the strains which would be imposed on its management by the conflicting groups which would purport to give it instruction and advice. Its present difficulties in Africa are not encouraging in this regard. The administration of the city under the United Nations—the settlement of practical day-to-day questions—would be the concern ultimately of a group of sharply contending nations and a neutral group who might well be ready to accept solutions for solution's sake.

#### *IV. Other aspects of United Nations involvement in the Berlin problem.*

a. The United Nations, it has been generally agreed, should not be looked to as a forum for settling the Berlin problem. It would impose an intolerable strain on the organization to do so. By tacit agreement, the problem of Berlin has been left to be settled among the four powers it concerns. Nevertheless, the United Nations has been thought of as an appropriate agency to *monitor* agreements already reached between the Soviets and the Western Powers.

b. Finally, the contingency planning for Berlin envisages a role for the United Nations under certain circumstances. The Three Powers have agreed (although French support is somewhat equivocal) that it would be desirable, when a withdrawal of the Soviet Union from its functions with respect to Allied access seems imminent but before it

---

<sup>2</sup> Hammarskjöld discussed Berlin with Khrushchev in Moscow March 25–26. On March 31 Lodge reported that Hammarskjöld had briefed him on the discussion and had stated that Khrushchev had assured him that there would be no unilateral action on Berlin until the possibilities of negotiations had been fully explored. (Telegram 840 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–3159)

has actually occurred, to attempt to freeze the status quo through a Security Council resolution calling on the Four Powers not to violate existing agreements, to negotiate their differences, and to report the results of their negotiations to the Security Council. No agreement has ever been reached on the possibility of other subsequent action in the United Nations, for example in the General Assembly, principally because it has been believed unwise to undertake any commitment which would have the effect of precluding the possible use of force to maintain Allied rights. Of course, the possibility cannot be overlooked that the Berlin question might eventually be raised in the General Assembly by others if not by the Three Powers.

---

**150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 1, 1960—7:29 p.m.*

299. Re: Dominican Credentials, ur 501.<sup>2</sup>

1. In view alarming report urtel LA group will meet later this week to decide whether to seek rejection DR credentials at 15th GA, Dept has considered possible action (1) prior to meeting, and (2) subsequent action in event LAs decide seek rejection. Following factors taken into account.

2. Mission aware Dept's traditional position that, in general, acceptance or rejection credentials purely legal and procedural matter under Rules 27 and 28 Rules of Procedure.<sup>3</sup> As a rule, we do not believe challenges to credentials should be made on political grounds since this would convert Credentials Committee into major political body. Even more serious, rejection, if actually achieved, would be drastic step of dubious legal validity which would set dangerous precedent capable of being used against friendly countries including other present LA governments. Added disadvantage in this particular case is

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8-2560. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin on August 31; initialed by Sisco and Buffum; cleared by Kerley and Monsma; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 501, August 25, reported that the Latin American group intended to meet to consolidate plans for rejecting the credentials of the Dominican Republic's Delegation to the United Nations. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Rule 27 of the General Assembly rules of procedure pertains to submission of credentials; rule 28 governs the composition and function of the Credentials Committee. For text, see U.N. doc. A/520/Rev.15.



that rejection attempt would introduce inter-American dispute into GA where Soviets and other non-American Members, for their own ends, could exploit issue.

3. Mission also aware exception to our general policy made in Hungarian case when results 1956 revolution in doubt GA adopted no decision procedure. Even after GA later adopted by overwhelming majority resolution finding present Hungarian regime imposed by armed intervention USSR, UN limited action to continuation no decision procedure. In 1958 after extreme provocation Nagy-Maleter executions we seriously considered rejection credentials but finally decided political risks involved in such course outweighed gains.<sup>4</sup>

4. Considering current emotional anti-Trujillo sentiment prevalent in LA, as well as MFM decision to apply Rio Treaty measures for which US voted, Dept does not consider it desirable for USUN to undertake actively dissuade LAs from voting to seek rejection since such action could be misinterpreted US soft on Trujillo. However, if Mission's opinion sought, you should while making clear our distaste for Trujillo, and bearing in mind LA opinion on Trujillo, discreetly indicate disadvantages rejection along lines those para 2 above. Mission should continue take soundings among LAs and keep Dept informed on prospects for majority LA group voting to reject. We are hopeful doubts expressed by Brazil and Uruguay will be shared by others.

5. In event LA group does vote seek rejection, Dept will consider means avoiding GA vote this issue including your suggestion intercession non-LA power.

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding U.S. deliberations on rejecting the credentials of the Hungarian Delegation to the 13th U.N. General Assembly, see Documents 16 ff.

---

**151. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 2, 1960.*

**SUBJECT**

Your Attendance at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

The Soviet Government has officially announced that Khrushchev will head the Soviet delegation to the Fifteenth Session of the UNGA. He has written Nehru a letter urging him to come<sup>2</sup> and the Soviets are undoubtedly trying to line up other heads of state and government.

We consider it important to do what we can to counter Khrushchev's efforts to turn the UNGA session into a spectacular propaganda circus. Accordingly, I recommend that you authorize us to instruct our missions to inform local governments of our views of Soviet intentions and our belief that heads of state and government should not lend themselves to Khrushchev's exercise, and to describe your intentions as follows:

- (1) You will not participate in the work of UNGA or be there while Khrushchev is.
- (2) You will not be addressing the UNGA during the opening general debate.
- (3) You have not yet made a firm decision to appear at the UNGA. A final decision will be taken later in light of subsequent developments.

**Christian A. Herter<sup>3</sup>**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series, U.N. The source text bears the handwritten notation by Goodpaster: "President OK'd State notified G". Circular telegram 341, September 2, incorporating the points in this memorandum, was then sent to all diplomatic missions that night. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-260)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 486 from New Delhi, September 1, reported that Khrushchev had written to Nehru about his impending visit to the U.N. General Assembly, encouraging Nehru to attend also. Nehru wished Eisenhower to know this. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-160)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**152. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 3, 1960.*

345. Circular 341.<sup>2</sup> While desiring avoid Soviets' turning UNGA into worldwide "summit," Department does not wish put pressure on leaders African states, especially new states, not to attend, so long as this is not result Soviet pressure. Posts in dealing with reftel should avoid giving such impression and should indicate African chiefs of state, prime ministers, foreign ministers and others will be most welcome in US, although they may wish weigh benefits obtained by attendance on occasion admission their country to UN against possibility such attendance might be used by Soviets turn session into something highly undesirable from their, as well as our, point of view.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-360. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Green and Ferguson; cleared by AFN and in substance by Kohler; and approved by Penfield who signed for Herter. Sent to 17 posts in Africa. The time of transmission is not legible on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, *supra*.

---

**153. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 5, 1960.*

SUBJECT

Khrushchev's Attendance at General Assembly

In connection with arrangements which must be made preparatory to the arrival of Khrushchev at New York, particularly with regard to security, it is recommended that a decision be taken whereby Khrushchev would be limited in his movements to Manhattan. This

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1773. Secret. Drafted by McSweeney and sent to Merchant through S/S; concurred in by IO. The source text is an unsigned copy which was attached to a September 7 memorandum from Merchant to the Secretary.

would greatly facilitate security arrangements and would, it appears to us, reflect the United States Government's attitude toward the presence of Khrushchev in the United States at this time.

Decision in this sense with regard to Khrushchev would also facilitate limitation of the movements of other possible controversial figures who are heads of government and who might decide to come to New York for the General Assembly.

For your information, we understand that Khrushchev, traveling neither as head of state or head of government, but as head of a General Assembly delegation and not at the invitation of the United States Government, would normally be granted a G-2 visa. If it were deemed desirable, the visa requirement for him could, of course, be waived.

It is recommended that the restriction be communicated by USUN to the Soviet Permanent Delegation at New York (in order further to underline the UN character of Khrushchev's visit) with an aide-mémoire as a matter of record along the lines of the attached draft. This communication would not be delivered until after our receipt of Ambassador Thompson's report of his further action with regard to the RB-47.<sup>2</sup>

The USUN officer would make it clear that this restriction applies to the special route established for movement of Permanent Delegation personnel from Manhattan to Glen Cove as well as to all other areas outside Manhattan Island. Thus, if Khrushchev should have in mind travel to the Glen Cove residence, advance notification would be required just as would travel through or over any of the other closed areas surrounding Manhattan Island.

In the meantime, pending publication of our communication, it seems important that any official public comment with regard to Khrushchev's presence in New York stress that he is visiting the United Nations and not the United States. (I have already spoken with Andy Berding about this point.)

Representatives of SY are understood to be planning to talk with New York security officials next Tuesday. To assure that the security arrangements will be in accord with the Department's wishes, it is necessary to be able to communicate these wishes at an early stage in the local officials' planning.

---

<sup>2</sup> Documentation on the shooting down of an American plane by the Soviet Union on July 1 is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume.

*Recommendation:*

That the foregoing limitation and method of approach to the Soviets be approved.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Attached to the memorandum was a draft aide-mémoire to the Soviet Delegation, not printed.

---

**154. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Budapest, September 6, 1960—5 p.m.*

81. Dept certainly aware serious problem which presence Kadar at GA would present for standing and authority of UN. It was he who permitted himself to be used by Sov Armed Forces to set up regime "in opposition to govt which enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people of Hung" (Special UN Committee Report on Hung).<sup>2</sup> He also bears large share of responsibility for judicial murders Nagy, Maleter and others. While he is no longer Prime Minister he is Minister of State and, as First Secretary of Party, the most important political figure in the country. Regime has done nothing to meet requirements UN report of numerous GA resolutions; on contrary it has continued to flout every effort of UN to seek solution of Hungarian question and has refused visas to reps (Wan and Munro) of that very organization which Kadar now seeks to attend and to utilize to his own ends.

It would therefore be clearest possible manifestation of UN inability to make effective its motions of censure if Kadar were to take a place as a delegate in the GA. Leg appreciates that, under treaty agreement with UN, it is probably impossible refuse him visa, but it is to be hoped every possible effort (in name of good standing of UN) will be made to have Hung credentials refused at opening of session.

Under existing circumstances here comment to Leg by Hungs necessarily limited but one Hung has already observed in bitter tone: "Hammerskjold was not permitted to come to Hung but Kadar can go to the United States".

**Ackerson**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-660. Limited Official Use; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Report of the Special Committee on Hungary, published June 20, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/3592.

**155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 6, 1960—9:32 p.m.*

394. VN Embassy raised with Dept Friday question GVN application UN membership along lines urtel 491.<sup>2</sup> Embassy informed Dept inclined believe desirable again bring attention UN long standing GVN membership application and prepared, if GVN desires, again request consideration its application when SC consideration ROK application requested. ROK Foreign Office has been informed US prepared request SC meeting this month, when Italy President SC, to consider ROK application and Dept currently awaiting ROK reaction, which we expect will be favorable. Since, however, barring unforeseen shift in Soviet position, there no possibility favorable SC action on either GVN or ROK application, Dept does not now plan request GA consideration these applications but contemplates statements by US and others at appropriate points in GA proceedings deploring repeated Soviet vetoes these applications. This tactic serves focus attention UN members continued exclusion these two applicants repeatedly found qualified by GA but would avoid possibility GA adoption resolution requesting SC reconsideration "all pending applications" (including north Korea, north Viet-Nam, and Outer Mongolia) which defeated by only very narrow margin (37-33) in 1957.<sup>3</sup>

In response inquiry, Dept said consideration ROK and GVN applications by GA when it considers applications newly independent states not feasible. These newly independent states all recommended unanimously by SC for admission and on basis past practice GA can be expected admit without debate and without reference to committee shortly after 15th session convenes to enable them participate fully in session. This procedure not applicable in controversial cases where SC has failed recommend admission.

VN Ambassador noted he instructed only to consult Dept and he without instructions on substance. Speaking personally he doubted desirability again raising GVN application at this time when there no hope SC recommendation and vote likely be less favorable than last time. Vote in 1958 8 to 1, with 2 abstentions; this year likely be 7 to 2

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/8-3060. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by FE and SEA and in substance with Williamson; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Repeated to Seoul and by pouch to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> No record of the September 2 meeting at the Department of State has been found. Telegram 491, August 30, reported that the Vietnamese Ambassador would consult with the Department about submitting Vietnam's application for U.N. membership along with Korea's. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Regarding this draft resolution, see footnote 3, Document 27.

(USSR, Poland), with 2 abstentions (Ceylon, Tunisia). Dept expressed sympathy with Ambassador's view but pointed out since US has traditionally requested SC consideration both ROK and GVN applications, failure do so on this occasion might be interpreted to detriment GVN position. Basic question for GVN, US and general free world position would appear be which course has more unfavorable implications: (1) diminishing vote in SC or (2) failure raise GVN application when that of ROK raised. Dept would of course be guided entirely by GVN wishes. Ambassador said he would report this discussion fully Foreign Office.

**Herter**

---

#### 156. Editorial Note

On September 7, the Department of State transmitted to the Mission at the United Nations the text of a draft aide-mémoire restricting Soviet Premier Khrushchev's movements during his attendance at the U.N. General Assembly. (Telegram 327 to USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/9-760) Regarding the draft aide-mémoire, see footnote 3, Document 153.

The following day, Executive Secretariat Director Stoessel explained in a memorandum to Goodpaster that, upon receiving the President's approval, the Department would instruct the Mission to inform Hammarskjöld and the Soviet Delegation of the telegram's contents. Secretary of State Herter had approved this approach. Hungarian Minister of State Kadar and Cuban Prime Minister Castro would probably receive similar treatment, but each would be decided on an individual basis. On the upper righthand corner of the memorandum, near the date, appears the handwritten notation by John S.D. Eisenhower: "Pres. approved Told State OK 8 Sep 1960. JSDE" (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series)

On September 10, the Department announced that the Mission at the United Nations had delivered to the Soviet Mission an aide-mémoire regarding Khrushchev's movements during his visit to the United Nations and released its text. A similar aide-mémoire regarding Kadar's movements was delivered to the Hungarian Delegation; its text was also released. For texts of the announcement and the two aides-mémoire, which were dated September 9 but delivered on Sep-

tember 10, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1960, pages 521–522. A third aide-mémoire restricting the movements of the head of the Albanian Delegation was delivered to the Albanian Mission.

The Soviet Union responded with an aide-mémoire which Ambassador Menshikov delivered to Herter September 13. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. The aide-mémoire termed the limits placed on Khrushchev "unprecedented in the history of the United Nations." Stating that the actions "cannot be considered other than as an unfriendly act toward the U.S.S.R.," it asserted that the restrictions could only intensify international tensions. The Headquarters Agreement, it continued, did not give the United States the right to act arbitrarily against the heads of delegations to the United Nations. The Soviet Government could not accept these actions, protested against the attempts to interfere with the work of its delegates, and expected the United States to ensure that Khrushchev could travel between New York City and Glen Cove. For text of the aide-mémoire, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1960, page 523.

The United States replied the same day, noting that under the Headquarters Agreement, it had a responsibility to protect other nations' U.N. delegates and to ensure that they could travel to and from the United Nations without hindrance. For these reasons, the United States had restricted Khrushchev's movements. "Travel beyond the limits of Manhattan Island," it concluded, "is clearly not essential to the normal functioning of a delegation to a session of the United Nations General Assembly." The text is *ibid.*, pages 522–523.

On September 14, Foreign Minister Szarka gave Legation Chargé Ackerson Hungary's response to the U.S. aide-mémoire. The note accused the United States of attempting to interfere in Hungary's internal affairs and of discriminating against its U.N. delegation. (Telegram 96 from Budapest; Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1460) On September 19, the Department instructed the Legation to ignore the Hungarian note, since no protest to the aide-mémoire had been received in Washington, nor had it evoked much press comment. (Telegram 89 to Budapest; *ibid.*)

For Eisenhower's account of the decision to restrict Khrushchev's, Castro's, Kadar's, and Shehu's movements, see Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pages 577–578. For Khrushchev's view on the restrictions, see Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pages 467–468 and 476–478.



**157. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) and the Secretary of State, Washington, September 8, 1960, 11:55 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

Goodpaster telephoned that the UN meeting had been on the President's mind and the President was inclined to think he should go up. The President thought he was entitled to make the first speech that is made and was disposed to go even if Khrushchev was there, make his speech as if Khrushchev weren't there and then leave. He feels that if he waits and then goes up that Khrushchev has gotten the jump here. Khrushchev could stay around for some time working up the situation and snarling and accusing the U.S. The President thought he should make the opening speech. He said it would probably be attacked and rebutted by Khrushchev but it would be better than the other way around. As to the content of the speech he (the Pres.) has Moos working on a draft that came over from the State Department<sup>2</sup> and some suggestions from C.D. Jackson. The Secretary asked if there wasn't someone in Nixon's office (Jim Shepley) who had been working on a draft and Goodpaster said Shepley and C.D. Jackson had teamed up on it. The Secretary said that Jim Shepley had been in to talk to Gerry Smith about this speech. Goodpaster said there were only two things in the works, he was quite sure. The Secretary said it took the UN a couple of days to get organized. The 22nd date, the time we have reserved, appears to be at the very beginning. The Secretary said he thought we could get it transferred to first place and Goodpaster said the President thought that he as host was entitled to this spot. The President does not intend the speech to be a polemic against Khrushchev but it would be constructive and positive in tone. It may, he said, deal with the strain that has arisen between him and Khrushchev and added that this had not been ruled out. The main thrust would be to come up with proposals in a constructive way on how to put the world on a better footing. Goodpaster said the President wanted to raise with the Secretary the idea itself; whether the Secretary's trend of thinking was the same as his as to his getting up there at the beginning and whether it was possible to make this arrangement. The Secretary said we had had a meeting in the Department on this subject<sup>3</sup> and the opinion was divided on whether or not the President should do this. The Secretary said he himself thought the President should not, and he did not want Khrushchev to think that merely by beckoning a finger he could bring together the Heads of State. The Secretary also mentioned the message we had sent on this

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. Drafted by Asbjornson.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. Malcolm C. Moos was an administrative assistant to the President.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

to the field.<sup>4</sup> The Secretary said there was a lot to be said for doing it. Goodpaster asked if the Sec. would give some thought to this and he knew Pres would want to talk to him.

The Secretary mentioned to Goodpaster that he had not been invited to Wadsworth's swearing-in at the White House yesterday.<sup>5</sup> Goodpaster said that Wadsworth must have assumed we were handling it and that he (Goodpaster) and Stephens assumed it was being completely set up by State.

---

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, Document 151.

<sup>5</sup> James J. Wadsworth was sworn in as Representative at the United Nations in a September 7 ceremony at the White House; he presented his credentials to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld the following morning. Ambassador Lodge had resigned on September 3 to participate in the 1960 Presidential election as the Republican Party candidate for Vice President.

---

## 158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 10, 1960—7:08 p.m.*

213. Your 308, info USUN 7.<sup>2</sup> Reappraisal of prospects for useful SC discussion Korean membership issue in light recent developments, especially presence Khrushchev at UN, and anticipated lengthy disarmament debate, leads Dept to belief SC meeting on ROK membership most productive if postponed until early November.

Principal factor leading this view is fact that any action SC on Korea during Khrushchev visit apt be greatly overshadowed by his activities and Council discussion will lose much of impact hoped for. In addition, view recent number SC meetings, and prospect more in next month, must expect some reluctance on part our friends to hold meeting at this time on issue which can be no more than exercise in view Soviet attitude. While no doubt meeting can be held soon if we desire, lack of enthusiasm likely result in less effort in SC debate on part other friendly members. Finally, seems highly likely general debate in Assembly will last longer than usual and the disarmament

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 301/9-860. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and NA; cleared by Bane and in substance with Sullivan; and approved by Cargo. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 308 from Seoul, September 8, reported on a conversation with the head of the Korean U.N. Observer Mission regarding Korea's application for U.N. membership, the General Assembly item on Korean unification, and the composition and travel plans of Korea's Delegation to the 15th General Assembly. (*Ibid.*)

discussion, which may be prolonged, will result in pushing Korean question into November. Would be useful have Foreign Minister present at both SC and GA discussions of Korean question. Postponement SC debate until November would be beneficial in that it would have maximum impact if timed close to unification debate in GA. This would also enable ROK FonMin easily attend both debates.

Nevertheless Dept believes Chung should be encouraged attend UN early in GA session, even though this would necessitate second trip for Korea debate. His presence would be useful in starting off work of ROK observer delegation in laying groundwork for subsequent debate on Korea, and in familiarizing him with UN problems. Moreover according Tokyo tel 845,<sup>3</sup> Chung apparently planning confer privately with Japanese FonMin while latter in New York, which also desirable in terms ROK–Japan relations.

Suggest you discuss this with FonMin soonest, emphasizing for reasons cited above, would be preferable put SC action off until November. We would, of course, call SC meeting prior GA debate on Korean item. Also might note no disadvantage in Tunisian chairmanship SC in November.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 324 from Seoul, September 12, reported that the Korean Foreign Minister had agreed to postponing Korea's membership application until November and that he would be able to attend the General Assembly then, but would be unable to attend the earlier sessions. (*Ibid.*, 301/9–1260)

---

**159. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Moscow, September 12, 1960—4 p.m.*

734. Khrushchev will have ample time on ship fully coordinate Commie bloc policy at GA. In my opinion this likely be most important GA yet held and trust we are making strong efforts achieve coordinated position with our allies. Following comments and suggestions are necessarily based on limited outlook from Moscow but hope will be helpful in Dept's preparation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN. Another copy of this telegram was initialed by the President. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series)

Re overall strategy, while normally best take initiative and not always be in position responding to Soviet moves, there would seem to me to be advantage this year in letting Khrushchev lead. Suggest we should have flexible policy designed to meet either attitude sweet reasonableness on his part or strong propaganda attack which seems more likely. Wish repeat suggestion that while we should take strong position we should endeavor avoid giving ammunition to those Communists who argue that West is so irreconcilably opposed to communism that attempt resolve problems by negotiation is futile Soviet emphasis on US "aggression" in U-2 and RB-47 cases is certain. Appears from here that on balance our position in world opinion has been seriously injured by U-2 case. Judging from Khrushchev's remarks to me he will make much of alleged "calculated policy" of overflights and will continue interpret Secretary's statement<sup>2</sup> as meaning we intended continue them. Will also connect RB-47 with overflights. I believe we will lose in world opinion if we attempt base our defense on justification overflights by Soviet secrecy unless we are prepared to produce startling evidence of Soviet preparation for aggression revealed by early U-2 flights such as wide-scale preparation for example in field of bacteriological warfare. Also think attempt on our part to put overflights on same level as other intelligence activities will be ineffective. Would appear to me that greatest Soviet weakness is in their over-exploitation of U-2 and our major emphasis should be on this aspect on RB-47 we have choice of exploiting Soviet refusal of impartial investigation or of considering assembly itself as investigating body and producing our evidence that overflight did not occur. On first point Soviet contention that this matter of national sovereignty is weak. How far out does plane have to be when shot down to become international affair? Second point dependent upon nature our evidence about which I am uninformed. Soviets apparently intend shoot down planes even "approaching" Soviet border and we could make much of this including previous attack on American plane far from Soviet frontier. Suggest we also produce or simultaneously release to press photographs of electronic gear on Soviet trawlers.

If Khrushchev takes hard line suggest we should be prepared with historic survey of events since war putting recent developments into proper perspective and highlighting question of confidence which must be built up gradually through honoring commitments. Soviets still owe world demonstration to "peaceful coexistence" is not continuation cold war by new tactics and burden is on them to prove that

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to a statement by Herter which the Department issued on May 9. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 418-420.

collective security arrangements no longer necessary. We could also make use of many missile-rattling statements by Khrushchev and other Soviets, especially those relating to Congo and Cuba.

Suggest Soviet secrecy could best be used in general context maintenance peace. Greatest assurance of peace lies in abhorrence of war of all peoples including Soviets and their ability influence govts. In case of Soviets we do not have this assurance since even to limited degree that Soviet people can influence their govt, they are unable judge international problems because of complete absence or distortion of information about them. This argument might be useful in dealing with Commie proposal on education of youth for peace.

In view of importance of Africa in this GA assume our position on Algerian problem will be of particular importance. As seen from Moscow, however, probability that we will face major crisis on Berlin within next six months gives maintenance NATO unity overriding importance. As minimum suggest we should have clear understanding with French in advance.

Clear that major Soviet emphasis will be on disarmament. While Soviets will doubtless raise question broadening membership Disarmament Commission, doubt if they will refuse continue disarmament talks unless this position met. Possible, however, that they will hold this position even until after GA in effort build up bargaining position for eventual summit talks. One line we might use is to stress that each time negotiations have approached showdown on concrete measures, Soviets have walked out thus throwing doubt on their intentions.

We should be able to exploit Soviet by-passing of UN on Congo question effectively, particularly if we could present some concrete proposal along lines Senator Mansfield's suggestions.

Likely that Soviets will push harder this year on ChiCom representation both to cover up or "ease" their current difficulties with Peiping and to demonstrate erosion of China position in UN. If it should appear that Communist China likely gain membership this year what about tactic of requesting them to send delegation to clarify doubts requalification for membership? Such move would probably embarrass Russians and if adopted and Chinese refused might gain some negative votes. If accepted, questions re commitment against use of force against Nationalist China, acceptance UN resolutions on Korea, et cetera, might also gain votes against admission. Alternatively membership committee might put written questions along these lines to ChiCom [garble].

Since Khrushchev going as head Soviet Delegation doubt that he will agree speak only once. Likely that he will announce startling scientific progress or else time new space achievement with Assembly opening.

As insurance against real possibility of violent demonstrations or incidents suggest appeal by President or at least Secretary to public not to molest UN delegations.

In general believe Khrushchev will follow dual strategy of attempting create image of warlike, provocative, imperialist US while trying create impression of peace-loving Soviet UN.<sup>3</sup>

**Thompson**

---

<sup>3</sup> On September 20, John Eisenhower sent the following memorandum to Herter:

"The President read Moscow 734 this morning, which consists of Ambassador Thompson's views on prospective tactics in the coming UN meeting. He was much impressed with Ambassador Thompson's lines of reasoning and asked that I call it to your particular attention, even though he knows you are familiar with it." (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series, U.N.)

---

## 160. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 13, 1960—4:05 p.m.*

395. Depcirtel 341.<sup>2</sup> In view developments subsequent sending reftel, including Congo, President has decided would be advisable for him address opening session UNGA despite his earlier disinclination speak at that time.<sup>3</sup> However, he will return immediately thereafter to Washington without becoming involved in any contact with Khrushchev and leave Secretary Herter responsible, as originally intended, for directing participation in work of UNGA. Announcement this effect will be made just prior Secretary's press conference tomorrow morning September 14 at eleven o'clock.<sup>4</sup>

Missions (in absence important local factors dictating otherwise as specified reftel) should approach local governments as soon as possible after announcement and explain reason for change of President's

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1360. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Hare; cleared by Satterthwaite, Wilcox, Berding, Jones, Parsons, Stoessel, and Merchant, and in substance with the White House; noted by Kohler; and approved and signed by Herter. Sent to all American diplomatic posts except Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, New Delhi, and Habana; and repeated to the latter eight posts.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 151.

<sup>3</sup> For Eisenhower's account of this decision, see *Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, pp. 577-578.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the White House announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1960, p. 515. The transcript of Herter's press conference is *ibid.*, pp. 515-520.

plans as given above. You should add that decision make opening statement in no way alters our view that Heads of Government and Chiefs of State should avoid enhancing Khrushchev's efforts utilize UNGA for own ends by lending their presence to debate at UNGA.

Herter

---

**161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 13, 1960—8:21 p.m.*

277. Depcirtel 395.<sup>2</sup> Leb Embassy here speculates that now that Nasser has announced he coming to UNGA Leb PriMin Saeb Salaam will be strongly tempted to decide to head Leb Delegation. With view forestalling such possibility, you may in your conversations with Salaam, and perhaps even Chehab, make following points:

1. Through personal letters and otherwise Khrushchev has been seeking press certain heads of state and heads of government to attend UNGA as if some sort of summit parley in New York would occur in interests of world peace. This is such a transparent hoax and Soviet propaganda ploy that few people being taken in. As President has said this is a debasing of UN.

2. Nasser's motivation in deciding to come not clear, although there some indication that his coming may be connected in part at least with fact that large number of African leaders expect to attend. We have seen no indication he is coming as result of Arab League decision.

3. Arab attendance likely be interpreted in many quarters outside Arab world as heavily influenced by Khrushchev's pressure. This interpretation will be widely publicized by Arab world's critics.

4. According to present info, no other Arab head of state or government planning attend. In this connection we gratified by Takla remarks to you (Embtel 237). We also consider Iraqi attitude (Baghdad

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1360. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Brewer and NEA; cleared by Armitage and Jones and in draft with Cargo, AF, SOA, and U/PR; and approved by Hare who signed for Herter. Repeated priority to Cairo, Amman, Jidda, Baghdad, Khartoum, Tel Aviv, London, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, and Taiz.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

Embtel 372<sup>3</sup>) one of common sense. Word has been received that Ceylonese PriMin has decided not to come. In fact, there are no confirmations that any NEA heads of state or government except Nasser and Nepalese PriMin have decided to attend, and Koirala's intention announced before Khrushchev made decision. Possibility exists that Nehru may come but rumors are that it would in any case be later during UN session.<sup>4</sup>

FYI Only: So far twenty-two heads of state or government planning attend early meetings UNGA. Majority are from new African states. Even this number poses very difficult security and protocol problems for USG since all will wish receive special courtesies and hospitality including visits with President whose schedule for period already very full. While decisions not yet reached re treatment to be accorded visiting leaders, appears impossible accord each one attention and hospitality he will expect and thus many likely be disappointed. Complexity problems make problematical that such visits can be materially expanded beyond UN context. This additional factor in our desire not have VIP attendance at UNGA widened further. In event Salaam announces decision attend, Embassy Beirut should avoid actions or statements which might be construed locally as in any way constituting official US position re Salaam's trip.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 237, September 8, reported on a conversation with Lebanese Foreign Minister Takla regarding Khrushchev's visit to the United Nations. Telegram 372, also September 8, reported on a conversation with the Iraqi Foreign Minister regarding Khrushchev's visit and other U.N. matters. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-860)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 580 from New Delhi, September 13, reported that Nehru had decided to attend the General Assembly and outlined the reasons for this decision. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1360)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 280 from Beirut, September 15, reported that Salaam, who had decided to attend the General Assembly, understood U.S. concern over Khrushchev's visit, but felt that heads of independent governments might be able to demonstrate their independence from Soviet influence at the session. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1560)



**162. Record of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting,  
Department of State, Washington, September 14, 1960,  
9:15 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows item 1. "Intelligence."]

*2. Top Foreign Officials Attending UN General Assembly*

The Secretary remarked that our troubles are beginning on this problem. Nehru is definitely coming and now it seems there is some possibility that Macmillan may be interested in attending the General Assembly. Diefenbaker probably will want to come. Later in the meeting, Mr. Jones noted that, with Nehru coming, it might well be that President Ayub of Pakistan and Madam Bandaranaike of Ceylon would also wish to come. Mr. Mann<sup>2</sup> commented that there is a rumor that Kubitschek of Brazil might wish to attend. Presumably, Trujillo<sup>3</sup> will also be there. Of course, we already know that Nasser and Tito are coming.

There was discussion as to how the delegations should be received upon their arrival in New York. If a State Department representative from the Protocol Division receives them, this may give some flavor of US approval or participation in their visit. Inclusion of our USUN political liaison officers in the reception committees might give the same impression and would draw press attention. It was decided that the best procedure would be for all delegations to be received by a State Department security representative. Thereafter, on a selective basis, our USUN political liaison officers could call on delegations at their residences.

The Secretary confirmed that he did not wish to give a reception in New York for other UN delegations. Perhaps consideration could be given to a reception to be offered by Wadsworth after Khrushchev has departed.

The Secretary said that the President plans to give a luncheon for representatives of the new states while he is in New York on September 22. He will give a luncheon in Washington on the 21st for the Latin American representatives.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably Hector Bienvenido Trujillo Molina, President of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Huston<sup>4</sup> reported that the port security group met yesterday; we have been assured of the full cooperation of all interested agencies in connection with handling foreign delegations in New York. He said the Army would furnish some personnel in civilian clothes.

The Secretary felt that Castro should be treated exactly like Khrushchev and Kadar so far as restriction on movements is concerned. He asked Mr. Mann to advise the Cuban Embassy of our decision in this matter immediately following the staff meeting so that the Secretary could make a statement to this effect at his press conference.<sup>5</sup>

With regard to the possibility that Nehru would wish to come to Washington to see the President, the Secretary remarked that, if this takes place, it will start a chain of events which will cause great problems. He said that these matters would be handled on a case-by-case basis under the coordination of Mr. Hare.

Responding to the Secretary's inquiry, Mr. Macomber said that he had received calls from several Congressional representatives concerning the Nasser visit. The members of Congress are concerned regarding the Nasser visit as well as the prospect that Egypt will be a member of the Security Council.

### *3. Public Appearances of Personalities Attending UN Meeting*

Mr. Berding reported that Khrushchev has apparently received several requests to appear on public programs, although there has been no flood of such requests. It seems he may appear on Meet the Press and it has been suggested that he appear on the Dave Garroway show and Person to Person.<sup>6</sup> In response to inquiries from the networks and other organizations concerning the advisability of permitting Khrushchev and other controversial officials to appear, Mr. Berding said we are taking the position that these decisions must be made by the organizations concerned. However, he has pointed out that Khrushchev and other Soviet bloc leaders will use such occasions for propaganda hostile to the US.

### *4. VOA Coverage of UN*

Mr. Washburn<sup>7</sup> said that VOA needs State Department guidance concerning coverage of the UN meeting. In response to Mr. Washburn's question, the Secretary said he would depart as scheduled for

---

<sup>4</sup> Harris H. Huston, Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 160.

<sup>6</sup> Dave Garroway was a U.S. television personality; "Person to Person" was a U.S. television interview program hosted by Edward R. Murrow.

<sup>7</sup> Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

the UN but it was not certain when he would speak there. The President has taken the US time on September 22 and, if the Brazilians agree, the President will be the first speaker on that day.

The Secretary said that the present prospect is for 3 solid weeks of speeches at the UN so that there will not be much committee work during that period. Of course, the general committee will meet on September 20 and 21 to consider organizational problems, admission of members, etc. Khrushchev can be expected to participate in these deliberations, especially as regards admission of Communist China.

[Here follow items 5. "UN Security Council Meeting on Congo," 6. "US-Canadian Relations," 7. "Algeria," 8. "Senegal-Soudan," and 9. "Africa."]

#### *10. President's Speech*

Mr. Smith said he was working on a draft of the President's speech at the UN but hoped he could have more time on it. The Secretary said that, in view of his absence in Mexico, Mr. Smith should send it directly to the White House when clearances were obtained. He thought we might have some problems with the Pentagon.

[Here follow discussion of items 11. "Far Eastern Affairs" and 12. "Bogota Meeting," a list of the items used during discussion of item 1, and an attendance list.]

WJS

---

#### **163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Norway<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 15, 1960—5:03 p.m.*

230. After Indians (and reportedly other neutrals) declined sponsor issue this year, Soviets have taken initiative inscribe Chirep item on 15th GA agenda.<sup>2</sup> As in previous years, U.S. intends move "moratorium" resolution proposing "not to consider" question this session.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/9-1560. Confidential. Drafted by Sullivan; cleared by Rosen and Nunley and in draft with Caprio; and approved by Cargo. Sent also to Copenhagen and repeated to Paris for USRO and to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Gromyko requested inclusion of the item in a September 5 telegram to Hammar skjöld. For texts of the telegram and of the explanatory memorandum that accompanied it, see U.N. doc. A/4474.

Dept fully realizes that Norway and Denmark have opposed U.S. resolution in past years because their conviction that ChiComs should assume China seat and separate membership should be created for "Formosa". They have considered that their negative vote on moratorium formula has recorded this conviction.

However, during past year ChiCom leaders have stated unequivocally that they would reject any such representation formula as Nordics propose and Soviet bloc has vigorously supported this rejection. These positions, in Dept's view, demonstrate futility that would be entailed in effort precipitate meaningful discussion Chirep issue in this UNGA. They give positive witness to logic U.S. position that matter should not be considered and make moratorium procedure only reasonable course pursue.

Moreover, in many quarters, Nordic opposition U.S. resolution is construed as implied support ChiCom representation on terms proposed by active sponsors Chirep item. These terms embrace extension ChiCom sovereignty over Taiwan and associated islands. Aside from moral implications these terms entail for surrender 11 million persons to Communist control, military consequences for world-wide defense against Communist territorial expansion are critically significant. Presence large anti-Communist forces on ChiCom flanks constitutes major factor in deterring ChiCom military probes not only into Southeast Asia but elsewhere along their perimeter. Would be difficult calculate magnitude free world effort which would be required restore balance in West Pacific should this deterrent be eliminated. Obvious repercussions such situation for NATO area, and especially for Nordic portion, make negative Norwegian and Danish positions Chirep issue unfortunate in Dept's view.

Finally, without attempting engage in substantive debate re ChiCom qualifications for UN membership (which Dept continues deny), it should be pointed out that truculent bellicose ChiCom behavior during past year as demonstrated not only in flagrant flouting UN resolution on Tibet, continuation border pressures on India and Nepal, wanton shelling off shore islands, but also in violent polemic with Soviets within bloc re "inevitability" war raises question whether, regardless their international behavior, ChiComs should be able year after year count on automatic support free world nations which have serious and demonstrated zeal for international morality.

Using foregoing rationale, Embassies Oslo and Copenhagen are requested approach host governments at highest appropriate level in effort obtain their support U.S. moratorium formula 15th GA. If, despite this approach, Norway and Denmark vigorously resist switch to moratorium support, Embassy should, as minimum, suggest delegates absent themselves from vote. This suggestion made in effort keep as many NATO members as possible from abstaining or opposing mora-

torium. FYI: Embassies Reykjavik and Lisbon being instructed make approaches in similar vein.<sup>3</sup> End FYI.

Dillon

---

<sup>3</sup> A copy of telegram 57 to Reykjavik, September 15, is in Department of State, Central Files, 303/9-1560. A copy of telegram 110 to Lisbon, September 15, is *ibid.*, 320/8-2460.

---

**164. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs (McSweeney) to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Stoessel)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 16, 1960.*

SUBJECT

Soviet Note Concerning Restrictions on Khrushchev's Movements

Mr. Kornienko, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, called on Mr. Kohler this afternoon to hand him a further communication concerning the restrictions imposed on Khrushchev's movements while in this country. As was the case with the Soviet communication of September 13,<sup>2</sup> the statement is made in the name of the Soviet Government.

The tone of the present note, however, differs markedly from that of the statement of September 13. While regretting the unfriendly spirit of the restrictions, it accepts them and goes on in a way which seems to constitute a plea for return to the pre-summit relations between the US and the USSR. In spots this communication reads almost like Khrushchev's letters to the President prior to May and may indeed have been drafted by him. This is particularly noticeable in reference to the need for disarmament, the responsibility of the "two great atomic powers" and the use of personal forms of address such as "we", "our", and "yours". The statement further, although containing a sharp reference to the U-2, completely neglects the RB-47 at a point

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772. Confidential. Drafted by Barnes. Initialed for McSweeney by Davis E. Boster, Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs. Sent also to Bohlen and Wallner; and initialed by Herter. Attached to the source text was a September 17 note from Stoessel bringing the memorandum to Herter's attention.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 156.

where, in keeping with current Soviet propaganda, it should have been referred to. An informal translation is attached.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. Kohler recommended in a September 17 memorandum to Merchant that the Department not respond to the note. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772)

---

## 165. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 16, 1960—9:09 p.m.*

418. Joint State-USIA message. US officials and media should use following points in discussing restriction Khrushchev to Manhattan. (Texts US communications to Soviets and to Hungarian UN Mission, relative Kadar restriction, and Secretary's remarks on Castro restriction, made at September 14 press conference, transmitted previously Wireless File.)<sup>2</sup>

1. Under US-UN Headquarters Agreement, US is obligated provide unhindered access to UN Headquarters by all delegates UN member-states and to assure their security while they are on US territory outside Headquarters area.

2. Ordinarily, this obligation poses no major problems. However, attendance at 15th General Assembly of large number leaders Soviet-bloc Communist Parties, headed by Khrushchev, poses serious security problem, fundamentally different from usual problem arising from state visit. During state visit each movement can be anticipated in advance on split-second basis, but General Assembly session involves movements which are impossible to anticipate and prepare for in advance. May be noted<sup>3</sup> police were involved in assuring Khrushchev's security in NY area alone during his September 1959 visit. Measures necessary assure adequate security are greatly multiplied by extension of area through which protected person moves.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772. Official Use Only. Drafted by Richard T. Davies, Public Affairs Adviser in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs; cleared with EUR/P, AF/P, SCA, P, IO, SOV, EE/P, in substance with USIA and NEA/P, and in draft with ARA/P; and approved by Kohler.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the U.S. communications to the Soviet and Hungarian Missions at the United Nations, see Document 156. Regarding Herter's September 14 press conference, see footnote 3, Document 160.

<sup>3</sup> Omission in the source text.

3. Khrushchev's policies, actions, and public statements during past four months, particularly his personal attacks on President and continued illegal detention RB-47 crew members, have resulted in growing resentment among great number Americans, thus adding substantially to problem posed by deep animosity borne towards him by large number Eastern European émigrés, refugees, and exiles now living in US.

4. Under these conditions, US is obliged, in order be able fulfill its responsibilities under Headquarters Agreement, minimize to greatest extent possible dangers to security of Khrushchev and others whose position or activities can be expected place them in jeopardy. Only reasonable way in which this can be done is through restriction area their movements to minimum compatible with fulfillment their functions as delegates without hindrance.

5. If questions arise regarding Soviet demand that Khrushchev be permitted unrestricted access to Soviet summer residence at Glen Cove, Long Island, point No. 2 above may be supplemented by noting that security in New York City is provided by NYC police. Glen Cove is in Nassau County, outside NYC police jurisdiction, and unrestricted movement between Manhattan and Glen Cove would greatly complicate problem of providing protection, with hazards always attendant upon arrangements involving divided jurisdictions and responsibilities. Should be noted Soviets have not made any request for week-end visit to Glen Cove, but have only demanded unrestricted access to this location, 30 miles from NYC, at any time.

Also may be pointed out that limiting Khrushchev to Manhattan does not impede his carrying out normal functions at UN. Access to Glen Cove has little, if anything, to do with his fulfillment duties at General Assembly. Besides access to Manhattan's unrivaled hotel facilities, Soviet UN Mission possesses adequate quarters, in close proximity UN, at its official Park Avenue mansion.

US officials and media should present argumentation, not as defense US action, but as explanation thinking which lay behind it. Care should be taken avoid leaving impression restriction is punitive in nature. Sole reason for restriction is personal safety of individuals involved. Restriction resulted, not from Khrushchev's recent actions and statements per se, but from effect these are judged to have had on considerable segments US public opinion and from responsibility US police authorities (and ultimately of Federal Government) for Khrushchev's personal security while he is in US.

To extent to which Kadar and Shehu restrictions are matters public interest, US officials may point out they prompted by same general reasoning as Khrushchev restriction. Regarding identical restrictions placed on Castro, same reasons apply except 5 above, particularly

presence in NY area of numbers of hostile Cuban refugees. To maintain proper perspective, restrictions on Castro should be equated to those on Kadar and Shehu rather than Khrushchev.

Dillon

---

## 166. Editorial Note

Early in the morning of September 17, having failed to adopt a resolution on the situation in the Congo, the U.N. Security Council voted to request a special emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly to consider the issue. For a record of these deliberations, see U.N. doc. S/PV.906. For text of the resolution requesting the special session, see U.N. doc. S/INF/15.

The Fourth Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly convened at 8 p.m., September 17, and ended in the early morning of September 20. Documentation on the session is scheduled to be published in a forthcoming volume.

---

## 167. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 17, 1960.*

### SUBJECT

Suggested Press Statement on Controversial Chiefs of State and Heads of Government Attending the United Nations General Assembly

The Department believes that a statement by you appealing for calm and reasonable conduct on the part of our citizens in connection with the attendance of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government at the General Assembly would be eminently useful and appropriate. We are faced, as you know, with an enormous security problem, and such

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that Berding drafted it on September 16 and that it was cleared by Merchant, Hare, Meeker, and Wilcox. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1760)



a statement would be helpful in meeting this problem. If any attempt should be made against any of the visitors, it would be desirable that you should be on record as having appealed for courteous conduct. Otherwise we might be taken to task for not having done so.

Secretary Herter said in his press conference on Wednesday: "Naturally, we are hopeful that the attitude toward these individuals who are a very difficult security risk will comport with the usual courtesy and dignity that the American people reserve for people who are on their shores on a mission, and a legitimate mission, to an international organization."

This, however, was given modest attention by the press, and we therefore believe that a statement by yourself is essential. A draft of a suggested statement is enclosed.<sup>2</sup>

**Douglas Dillon**

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The White House, however, issued on September 17 from Camp David a statement by the President which incorporated most of the text of the Department of State draft. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961*, p. 702.

---

## 168. Note From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 17, 1960.*

The Government of the USSR considers it necessary to state to the Government of the USA the following:

On instructions the Soviet Government has frequently drawn the attention of the Department of State of the USA to the necessity for immediate taking of measures for assuring the security and the creation of normal conditions of work of the Soviet delegation at the 15th session of the General Assembly.

However, as the facts testify, all the necessary measures have not been taken on the part of the Department of State and the appropriate US authorities. As before around the Soviet delegation there is created an unhealthy atmosphere which up to this time is creating obstacles for carrying out the organizational measures in connection with the arrival in the City of New York of the Soviet delegation. A campaign of hostile anti-Soviet public acts is taking on an ever broader character,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files. 320/9-760. Limited Official Use. Translation. Transmitted priority to USUN in telegram 427, September 17, which is the source text.

the preparation by immigrant organizations of demonstrations and picketing and there are being displayed placards slandering the Soviet Union. The Government of the USA not only does not prevent the further spreading of this campaign but even according to all signs connives in it. In particular, the aide-mémoire of the Government of the USA of September 9<sup>2</sup> served as a signal for strengthening the provocative anti-Soviet public acts.

It cannot be unknown to the Government of the USA about a whole series of anti-Soviet acts being prepared in the period of the work of the 15th session of the General Assembly.

According to available information, in the direct vicinity of the headquarters of the UN and near to the building of the USSR Mission to the UN a systematic carrying out of anti-Soviet picketing is noted. According to the press, there is also being prepared hostile public acts in the region of the dock of the turbo-electric ship "Baltica". At the time of its passage on the East River as well as along the route of the movement of the Head of the Soviet delegation.

Up to this time there remains unsettled the question of mooring to the dock, the unloading and servicing of the turbo-electric ship "Baltica" in the period of its stay in New York. Moreover, the New York authorities have presented absolutely abnormal conditions of all kinds of insurance in connection with the arrival of the "Baltica".

The facts as quoted create serious difficulties for assuring the security and normal conditions of work for the Soviet delegation.

The Soviet Government once again draws the attention of the Government of the USA to the necessity of creating normal conditions for the work of the Soviet delegation at the 15th session of the General Assembly and for taking all the necessary measures for assuring its security. The Soviet Government expects that in the first place urgent measures will be taken for removing the concrete abnormalities listed above.

---

<sup>2</sup> See Document 156.

**169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 17, 1960—9:51 p.m.*

426. Re: Chinese Representation.

Since situation re ChiRep is fluid this year we should continue make effective and sustained efforts obtain best possible vote with view improving support on moratorium resolution. Such factors as: (1) New African states, which are unknown quantity; 2) Refusal Indians play traditional role sponsor ChiRep item indicating general neutralist disturbance with ChiComs; 3) Fact that Soviet sponsorship item injects cold-war element; 4) Presence in UN of Khrushchev and other Communist leaders, which may presage extraordinary efforts replace GRC with ChiComs; and 5) Impatience of some moratorium supporters with ChiRep impasse, may combine to make closer vote on this question than objectives US and free world requires.

If majority could be obtained at least as substantial as last year's, prestige of the Communist bloc would fall correspondingly, especially if Khrushchev and his colleagues make a strong effort defeat moratorium resolution.

It is therefore recommended Del plan approach representatives states listed below to obtain best possible majority when question comes to vote.

Along this line arrangements have already been made for Assistant Secretary Parsons to discuss this subject with Malayan Rep Dato Nik Kauval [*Kamil*]. Have learned confidentially Ambassador Yeh will speak with Golda Meir. Israelis have suggested Assistant Secretary Wilcox talk with Meir afterwards.<sup>2</sup> In view unclear responses Deptels from Libya, USUN should endeavor obtain firm assurances from that Del. Embassy Addis Ababa reports Ethiopian representative Akliliu also desires discuss ChiRep in NY. Mission should take initiative to bring this about.

In view general uncertainty it is recommended Mission give closest and continuing attention to new African states in effort obtain best possible votes.

Following is list of states with 14th GA voting position indicated:

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/9-1760. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Caprio; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Carson, in draft by Sullivan, and in substance by Penfield; and approved by Wallner who signed for Dillon.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Parsons' September 21 conversation with Kamil is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1766. No record of a conversation between Wilcox and Meir has been found.

1. Following countries voted in favor moratorium resolution last year and are expected do so this year. However, some reports have been circulating that they are becoming restive under persistence ChiRep issue. They should be approached with view eliminating any tendency to waver from their traditional policy of voting in favor of the resolution: Lebanon, Argentina and Bolivia.

2. New African states are unknown quantity and may be subjected to severe pressures by Communist bloc to line up against GRC. French have promised to speak to delegations from former French areas of Africa in favor of GRC membership. Approaches by USUN may help these delegations remain firm in their support of moratorium: Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Congo Republic, Chad, Gabon and Central Africa Republic. Cyprus, another new member, should also be approached to ensure a positive vote.

3. Iraq is expected to vote against moratorium, but there may be chance of persuading it to vote for resolution. If this is too much to expect, it might be persuaded to abstain or absent itself from voting. Last year it voted against moratorium.

4. Following are expected to abstain but might be persuaded to vote for resolution this year: Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, Laos.

FYI Dept has proposed in cases Ireland, Iraq and Tunisia that Secretary personally make approach.<sup>3</sup> However, allocation Secretary's time and pressure other responsibilities make his personal intervention uncertain this time. Mission should check with Secretary's office in NY before determining exact procedure those three approaches. End FYI.

**Dillon**

<sup>3</sup> Wilcox recommended in a September 17 memorandum that Herter approach Aiken at the General Assembly to discuss Ireland's position on Chinese representation. (Department of State, Central Files, 303/9-1760) No record, however, of such a meeting has been found, nor of any conversation with the Iraqi Delegation. In a September 20 memorandum, Wilcox recommended that Herter discuss Tunisia's vote on Chinese representation with Slim at the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 303/9-2060) A memorandum of Herter's October 4 conversation with Slim is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1767.

**170. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, September 17, 1960—10 p.m.*

733. Re: President's statement to UN.

1. I have not seen draft of proposed Presidential speech for GA, but have been giving considerable thought to what its main focus should be. Dominant feature this GA will be fundamental confrontation of Soviet and American policies in world. While denouncing U.S. for militaristic attitude, Khrushchev will endeavor portray Soviet Union as peaceful and will seek use disarmament theme to do so. He will be making major play for sympathies African states, who are totally inexperienced in world affairs.

2. I therefore believe Pres speech should be major statement of U.S. policy toward world and specifically USSR. We should not wait for Sovs to take initiative to set tone of GA; we should do so ourselves, and should demonstrate firm posture vis-à-vis USSR. Concrete proposals which may be put forward for UN action should be secondary to this theme. States for whose sympathies Sov Union and U.S. will be competing in GA this year (i.e., new African states) know virtually nothing about fundamental issues between Soviet Union and U.S. Our address must therefore be major educative effort. Fundamental statement of issues which divide Communist and democratic worlds together with proposals U.S. has made for their resolution, will also make more difficult inevitable neutralist efforts to seek compromises on superficial basis.

3. In restating U.S. policy, I recommend fol elements be included: (a) absence of war is not sufficient basis for peaceful world—there must also be created world justice under law; "peaceful coexistence", by which Sov Union means continuation of attempts to take over world for communism short of overt military attack but explicitly including subversion and revolution, is not satisfactory basis for 20th century world; (b) expansion of theme that world must become world of "open societies" if permanent peace is to be established; (c) thorough exposition of historical reasons why U.S. distrusts word of USSR which is not verified by impartial mechanism, and our willingness to submit to same verification as USSR; (d) expansion this theme in connection with U.S. proposals on disarmament to show why inspection must accompany disarmament measures and must do so in way

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1760. Secret; Niact. Received at 10:46 p.m.

that cannot be frustrated by any party involved. (Depcirtel 397 contains main elements good disarmament treatment.<sup>2</sup>)

4. Also suggest call for Korea unification be included in Pres's speech. There are indications Khrushchev will call for Korean Federation. He may even propose federal solution all divided country problems—Germany, Viet Nam and Korea—and it would be well to anticipate him.

**Wadsworth**

---

<sup>2</sup> Circular telegram 397, September 15, summarized the significant points of U.S. disarmament policy for use in consultations with African nations participating in the General Assembly for the first time. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1360)

---

**171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 19, 1960—12:48 p.m.*

433. Secretary and Lord Home agreed on following re strategy and tactics at General Assembly at meeting September 18.<sup>2</sup>

1. Useful for Macmillan to come over during week of September 26 and speak perhaps on September 30 or October 3.

2. Macmillan-Khrushchev meeting in US would not necessarily cause difficulties with American public opinion if properly presented.

3. Useful for Menzies to come over and answer Khrushchev at earlier date than Macmillan. Lord Home will ask Macmillan to see what he can do to stimulate Menzies' attendance.

4. Might be useful for Diefenbaker and Ayub to attend and also to answer Khrushchev earlier than Macmillan. However, Ayub already in exposed position and might have domestic problems.

5. Closest liaison between US-UK Delegations in NY is essential. On publicity aspects Glass<sup>3</sup> and Berding should concert in NY on Monday.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1960. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by Burdett on September 18; cleared by Merchant, Bohlen, Stoessel, Kohler, and Krebs; and approved by Burdett who signed for Herter. Sent also priority eyes only to Wadsworth and to Barbour, Minister of the Embassy in London.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, 320/9-1860.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably Leslie Charles Glass, Director General of British Information Services in the United States.

6. Two Delegations should consult Monday regarding specific tactics and publicity by which time Khrushchev may have tipped his hand.<sup>4</sup>

7. Desirable terminate special General Assembly by Monday; not desirable for special General Assembly and regular General Assembly to run simultaneously.

8. US and UK should start lobbying immediately in General Committee to forestall any Soviet effort to obtain agreement to sessions of Committee One, possibly on disarmament, concurrently with general debate.

9. If Khrushchev introduces resolution on disarmament US and UK should consult together immediately on whether to move to refer matter to Committee of Ten.

10. Hold in abeyance decision on stand to be taken if considerable support develops for enlargement of Committee of Ten.

11. Experts to draft on contingency basis possible resolution on Germany and Berlin for introduction in Security Council. Difficulties with French anticipated.

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

---

**172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 18, 1960—3:52 p.m.*

430. Re President's appearance before GA.

As you know, SYG has taken position that insofar as setting time of speeches, he intends to schedule them on basis when member nations inscribe themselves on general debate list of speakers. To this end we have agreed to speak second following Brazil. If the normal procedure was followed this would mean that President as Chief of Delegation would sit in USDel seat during Brazilian speech as well as any speeches following. While we have agreed in order minimize SYG difficulties to have President treated as Head of Delegation insofar as it relates to scheduling of speakers (we should not want this publicized)

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1860. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Sisco on September 17; cleared by Carson, Wallner, SCA, and McSweeney; and approved by the Secretary.

we would not want this to be extended to actual treatment of President while in Assembly hall. We would not want procedure whereby President required sit in USDel seat.

Request you arrange with SYG for Chief of State procedure which would permit President at end Brazilian speech to walk directly into Assembly hall either from rear, front, or side to rostrum and permit expeditious exit from hall directly from rostrum. In this way possibility direct confrontation between President and Khrushchev and others would be avoided.<sup>2</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>2</sup>Wadsworth reported in telegram 744 from USUN, September 19, that Hammarskjöld and Cordier had agreed to Eisenhower's entering and leaving the General Assembly Hall immediately before and after his address. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1960)

---

**173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 18, 1960—6:15 p.m.*

431. Re: Mission's 698.<sup>2</sup> Department has considered SYG's letter and cannot concur his basic allegations either that US restriction Khrushchev and prohibition his repeated travel Glen Cove interferes with his ability carry out his work and duties as Chairman Delegation or that his right enjoy reasonable life outside headquarters district is limited. We would be prepared give consideration request for specific visit, such as weekend, if such were made by Sov Del at least 48 hours in advance. We do not wish include this in letter to SYG which as you point out may well be published, but are willing have you convey this to him orally upon personal presentation of letter, text of which follows, on Monday Sept 19.

Begin text letter to SYG:

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-1560. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McSweeney on September 17; cleared by Merchant, Hanes, Berding, Carson, Kohler, and Wallner, and in substance with John Eisenhower; and approved by the Secretary.

<sup>2</sup>Telegram 698, September 15, transmitted the text of Hammarskjöld's letter, described below. (*Ibid.*)



I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 15 regarding the limitation on the movements of the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations and to convey the following views of the United States Government in this regard.

As was pointed out in the aide-mémoire of the United States Mission to the United Nations dated September 9 and left with an official of the Soviet Permanent Mission to the United Nations on the morning of September 10<sup>3</sup>—a copy of which was handed you on the evening of September 9—the measures taken with regard to the movements of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR during his stay in the United States as head of the Soviet Delegation to the 15th General Assembly were decided upon precisely in order to fulfill the obligations placed upon the Government of the United States by the Headquarters Agreement to which it is a party together with the United Nations.

Your letter refers to these limitations as if they were incompatible with the Headquarters Agreement as interpreted by you before the Economic and Social Council at its 791st meeting.<sup>4</sup> In that statement you referred to the fact that the United States Government had certain responsibilities with regard to the personal security of delegates which might necessitate limitation on their movements. You further made mention of the right of the delegates to a reasonable life outside of the Headquarters district, that is, the property of the United Nations on which the United Nations buildings are located.

In order that you should be fully acquainted with the views of the United States Government in this matter as expressed to the Soviet Government, I enclose an additional copy of the aide-mémoire of the United States Mission delivered to the Soviet Permanent Mission on September 10, and the memorandum of the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy of September 13. There is also enclosed the communication of the Soviet Government to the United States Government of September 13.<sup>5</sup>

Since the essential differences between the Soviet Government's communications and those of the United States Government have to do with the question of travel of the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation from New York City to Glen Cove, Long Island and return, it should be noted that this request of the Soviet Government appears to relate to continual and repeated travel over the route established for the Soviet Permanent Mission between New York and the premises maintained by the Soviet Mission for recreational purposes at Glen Cove. To accord the Chairman what would amount to commuting privileges to Long Island would so multiply the difficulties of providing personal security as to make nearly impossible the assurance of such protection as required by the Headquarters Agreement.

It should be clear from the enclosed copies of communications from the United States Government to the Soviet Government that the primary concern of United States authorities is with the personal security of the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, as required by the

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 156.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding Hammarskjöld's April 30, 1954, statement, see U.N. doc. E/SR.791.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the U.S. and Soviet communications of September 13, see Document 156.

provisions of the Headquarters Agreement. The aide-mémoire of the United States Mission to the Soviet Permanent Mission provides further explanation of the reasons why the United States Government considers that these security precautions are particularly necessary at this time.

Given the size of the area comprised within the limitations set forth for the movements of the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation in pursuance of his official functions in connection with the 15th General Assembly and the variety of facilities available to him on Manhattan Island, it does not seem justifiable to suggest that he is thereby deprived of "reasonable life" during the period of his attendance at the General Assembly.<sup>6</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>6</sup> The Soviet Mission requested and received permission for Khrushchev to spend the three weekends of his stay in the United States at Glen Cove. For Khrushchev's account of these visits, see Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, pp. 476-477. After Khrushchev's first visit, the Mayor of Glen Cove wrote Herter to protest against any future visits. A copy of the letter is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772.

**174. Editorial Note**

At 9 a.m. September 19, President Eisenhower met with British Foreign Secretary Home, British Ambassador Caccia, Secretary of State Herter, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain Whitney, Assistant Secretary of State Kohler, and Colonel John Eisenhower. Among the items discussed was the upcoming U.N. General Assembly session.

The President explained why he had decided to speak at the beginning of the session and noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to portions of his address. A brief discussion on disarmament, Soviet secrecy, and the openness of Western society ensued. The conversation returned to the United Nations when Home asked the President to inform the British of the contents of his speech in advance. Eisenhower agreed.

A discussion of the closing of nuclear plants, possible construction of Soviet plants in the People's Republic of China, and the strain in Soviet-Chinese relations led Ambassador Whitney to observe "that the present sanctuary status of Communist China, in which the U.N. would have no inspection rights within her borders, would present a strong argument for bringing the Chinese Communists into the U.N. The President replied rather sharply that if the Chinese Communists are admitted, the U.S. will leave. Opinion is strong on this line and will remain so, barring a change in deportment on the part of the Chinese Communists. As evidence, the President noted that both Presidential candidates are strongly advocating nonadmittance of the Red Chinese to the U.N." (Memorandum of conference with the President; Eisenhower Library, Whitman Files, DDE Diary, Staff Notes—September 1960 (3))

In answer to a question from the President, Herter and Home stated that they doubted that French President de Gaulle would attend the General Assembly. Home then "said he thought it would be well for Prime Minister Macmillan to wait a while to see how things shape up at the U.N., and then come over, preferably after the Khrushchev group departs, to help pull things together and restore the atmosphere which the President had initiated. A possible target date would be October 1st." (*Ibid.*)

Following discussion of Eisenhower's schedule, "Lord Home commented that Khrushchev may conceivably stay around for some time in an attempt to foul up the procedures of the U.N. with various kinds of tricks," making "definite planning impossible at this time." (*Ibid.*)

The President noted that many people had recommended that he "pressure our American press to play down Khrushchev's activities." Such an effort "would be fruitless," as "the competitive spirit of the American press makes this impossible." After another brief comment on his schedule, Eisenhower "philosophized a little on Khrushchev's visit to the U.N. Perhaps the purpose of his visit is to steal the headlines and belittle our free election system. The President feels it necessary that we present a good face to the newly independent nations. Since there is no hope of slowing down the trend of newly independent countries, we must make a virtue of necessity." (*Ibid.*)

He then offered to telegraph the text of his speech to Home the following day, if it were ready in time.

Following discussion of Berlin and former British Foreign Secretary Lloyd, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, the conversation turned to the General Assembly schedule. The meeting ended with brief comments on the situation in the Congo.

---

175. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 19, 1960—8:17 p.m.*

441. Re Admission New Members. View confused situation re Mali Federation Dept believes GA consideration its application should be postponed. While it possible admit Soudan as Mali Federation if Soudan chooses continue call itself by this name, it would be necessary in present situation make clear general understanding, including that US, of what territory exactly Mali Federation is comprised. Such expression understanding clearly not feasible or desirable at this juncture when question recognition Senegal as separate state still unresolved by most members, including US.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/9-1960. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Sisco; cleared by McBride, Brown, Nunley, Ludlow, Monsma, AF, L/UNA, and FE, and approved by Wallner who signed for Dillon. Repeated to Dakar, Leopoldville, Bamako, Paris, and Brussels.

After consultation with French Delegation, USGADel should therefore seek have A-A member or members propose postponement GA consideration this application pending clarification situation. Should postponement motion fail USGADel should abstain on question admission.

Re Congo (ex-Belgian), USGADel should vote for admission unless African initiative for postponement develops which has general and strong African support and is acceptable SYG. Representation question obviously presents difficulties. In these circumstances, we would wish question of representation deferred, perhaps by referring question Credentials Committee for its consideration. We not aware whether ceremony planned includes speeches by new members. Believe you should discuss this matter with SYG soonest. We would not, of course, if present confusion continues and assuming Congo is admitted, wish have any Congolese representative seated tomorrow or make ceremonial statement. If vote cannot be avoided on question representation we assume consistent with past instructions USGADel would vote in favor Bomboko.

Dillon

---

**176. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 20, 1960.*

DEAR HAROLD: I am most appreciative of your understanding letter of September 15. I have thought over the important questions you raise and discussed them at some length with Chris and Lord Home yesterday.<sup>2</sup>

As you say it is difficult to determine specific tactics until we see how Khrushchev proposes to act and also until we are able to assess the atmosphere at the General Assembly. I am convinced that it is essential for our two delegations to concert closely and to be prepared to move very quickly. Although it seems preferable to defer any public

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1768. Secret; Presidential Handling. The text of the letter was transmitted to London in telegram 1844, which is the source text. Telegram 1844 was repeated to Herter at the USUN.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of Macmillan's letter to the President is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Regarding Eisenhower's conversation with Herter and Home, see Document 174.

announcement or firm decision on timing for the moment, I now believe your attendance at the General Assembly would be a real service to the West. I am impressed also by the desirability, in the meantime, of having some outstanding Western leader answer Khrushchev and his satellites relatively early in the proceedings. Mr. Menzies would be superb in such a role and I hope you might be able to persuade him to attend, preferably at an early date. I realize the problems you would face should Khrushchev request a meeting with you in New York. His behavior in New York may prove the best guide to your answer.

With warm regard,  
As ever,

Ike<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1844 bears this typed signature.

---

## 177. Editorial Note

The 15th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly opened at 3 p.m. September 20. Following the opening ceremonies and the appointment of a Credentials Committee, the General Assembly elected Frederick H. Boland of Ireland President of the session. Boland received 46 votes, Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia 25, and Thor Thors of Iceland 9. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.864.

Next, the General Assembly considered the admission of new members to the United Nations. Three days earlier, at the opening meeting of the Fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, the United States had proposed that this item be transferred from the 15th General Assembly's provisional agenda to the special session. All but one of the applicants were African nations, and the United States hoped that they would be admitted to the United Nations and thus be able to participate more fully in the debate on the Congo. The U.S. proposal was adopted, but later a motion to adjourn the debate was approved, and the item reverted to the 15th General Assembly. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.858.

On September 20, the 15th regular session of the General Assembly decided by acclamation to grant U.N. membership to the following nations: Republic of Cameroun, Togolese Republic, Malagasy Republic, Republic of Somalia, Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Republic of Dahomey, Republic of Niger, Republic of Upper Volta, Republic

of the Ivory Coast, Republic of Chad, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon Republic, Central African Republic, and the Republic of Cyprus. With two exceptions, the delegation representing each new member state was seated in the General Assembly immediately after the vote admitting that nation. The Ivory Coast Delegation had not yet arrived in New York, while the problem of representation for the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) was referred to the Credentials Committee. The U.S. Mission at the United Nations reported to the Department that it had arranged with Boland to have the question of Congo representation transferred to the Credentials Committee. (Telegram 773 from USUN, September 22; Department of State, Central Files, 303/9-2260) The General Assembly also decided at this meeting to delay consideration of the application for membership of the Federation of Mali. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.864. For texts of the resolutions admitting the new members, see U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1476 (XV)-1489 (XV), printed in U.N. doc. A/4684.

Following these decisions, representatives of several nations welcomed the new members, who then responded. Secretary of State Herter gave the U.S. statement. These proceedings lasted through two additional General Assembly meetings, ending on September 21. For a record of the proceedings, see U.N. docs. A/PV.864, A/PV.865, and A/PV.866. The text of Herter's statement is printed in U.N. doc. A/PV.864.

The General Assembly resumed consideration of the admission of new members the afternoon of September 28. The Republic of Senegal was admitted by acclamation to membership in the United Nations and its delegation escorted to its place in the General Assembly hall. Immediately thereafter, the Republic of Mali was admitted by acclamation and its delegation seated. For text of General Assembly Resolution 1490 (XV) conferring U.N. membership on Senegal and text of General Assembly Resolution 1491 (XV) granting U.N. membership to Mali, see U.N. doc. A/4684. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.876.

178. **Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 21, 1960—8:32 p.m.*

431. Following for your information and at your discretion use in confidential discussions with local officials should subject be raised with you. You should avoid giving impression US is urging attendance by any particular Chief of State or Head of Government.

US position on attendance of Chiefs of State or Heads of Government at UNGA has evolved somewhat over past few days because of changed circumstances. Although we do not believe desirable have general attendance all or most other Western Heads of Government, we see certain advantage in having some Heads of Government to speak for West at UNGA. President on his trip to New York September 22–23 will meet with several Heads of Government should they so request, and during second trip September 26 to 27 he will do likewise. Believe preferable for any meetings between President and Chiefs of State or Heads of Government take place in New York rather than Washington.

**Dillon**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Burdett; cleared by White, Stoessel, McBride, Fessenden, Steeves, Mak, Hare, Wallner, and U; and approved by Hare who signed for Dillon. Sent to 21 posts in Europe and Asia.

---

179. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 21, 1960—9:40 p.m.*

Tosec 7. Ambassador Beale requested private meeting with Acting Secretary September 20 at which he raised possibility of Menzies visit to UN.<sup>2</sup> Beale said he had impression US position was changing and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2160. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dillon, cleared by Stoessel, and approved by Dillon. Repeated to Canberra.

<sup>2</sup> No other record of this meeting has been found.



that he was aware Menzies had received message from Macmillan urging him to come to New York. He requested guidance from Acting Secretary.

Acting Secretary told him that position had indeed changed due to prospective arrival in New York of many Heads of Government from neutralist or uncommitted countries such as Nehru, Tito, Nasser, Sukarno, etc. He said that US felt it would be helpful to have a number of strong voices to speak out in general debate in favor of Western position. Prime Minister Macmillan was coming for this purpose. US could think of no abler exponent of Western position than Menzies. If he could come to UN at this time US would consider it very helpful.

Beale then pointed out the domestic complications involved in Menzies absenting himself from Australia at this time but said that he himself felt this was an important occasion and that Menzies just might find it possible to come. He said it would be helpful if Menzies could say publicly that President Eisenhower had asked him to come. The Acting Secretary told him this would not be possible as the President could not ask one Head of Government to come and not others. Beale then wondered if it would be all right for Menzies to say there had been interest in various quarters in his coming and the Acting Secretary said he thought would be perfectly satisfactory if it would be helpful to Menzies. Beale thanked the Acting Secretary and expressed the personal hope that it would be possible for Menzies to come to New York for a short visit.

**Dillon**

---

#### 180. Editorial Note

On September 22, President Eisenhower addressed the 15th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly during the general debate. He emphasized U.S. support for the United Nations, maintaining that only "through the United Nations and its truly democratic processes can humanity make real and universal progress towards the goal of peace with justice. Therefore, I believe that to support the United Nations and its properly constituted mechanisms and its selected officers is the road of greatest promise in peaceful progress. To attempt to hinder or stultify the United Nations or to deprecate its importance is to contribute to world unrest and, indeed, to incite the crises that from time to time so disturb all men."

President Eisenhower concluded: "As we enter the decade of the 1960's, let us launch a renewed effort to strengthen this international community, to forge new bonds between its Members in undertaking new ventures on behalf of all mankind. As we take up this task, let us not delude ourselves that the absence of war alone is a sufficient basis for a peaceful world. I repeat, we must also build a world of justice under law, and we must overcome poverty, illiteracy and disease."

For text of President Eisenhower's address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.868. For his own account of the address, see *Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, pages 579-581.

On September 22, Bohlen sent Herter a note evaluating the reaction to Eisenhower's speech. One comment from the Soviet Delegation "was that it was 'restrained in tone.' The other was that it was not as bad as it might have been but not as good as it could have been. Mr. Khrushchev's comment when leaving the building when asked his opinion was 'I am going to lunch.'" The speech had generally impressed the non-Communist nations, although the U.N. Secretariat was concerned that Eisenhower's praise of Hammarskjöld might provide "ammunition for those who claim he is prejudiced on the Western side." Bohlen termed this fear "nonsense and of no moment whatsoever." (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772)

---

### 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 22, 1960—7:05 p.m.*

Tosec 16. From Hanes. Strongly urge Secretary make or authorize some public statement concerning New York Police cooperation along lines previously discussed with Berding.<sup>2</sup> Could be done as answer to press query. New York Police coming under increasing public pressure and this can be predicted to increase as time passes, tempers grow shorter, and elements interested in provoking incidents become increasingly proficient at doing so. In this connection picketing of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1769. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Hanes and cleared with Stoessel.

<sup>2</sup> On September 21, Berding sent Herter a memorandum suggesting that he issue a statement praising the New York City Police and security officers for the manner in which they were handling the General Assembly security problems. (*Ibid.*, CF 1773)

Yugoslavs<sup>3</sup> apparently being carried on inter alia by professional Communist agitators who adept in skirting fringes of law while producing maximum disorder. Also call attention to death this morning of 9-year-old Venezuelan girl<sup>4</sup> which will be linked in public mind with entire question of police security matters even though incident had no connection with any security operation.

Kennedy has now requested some public support by State Department. I feel he entitled to it in view cooperation with all our requests. I also feel expression our support now will be more valuable in terms our relations with police and their cooperation with other difficult requests which we will inevitably have to make in coming days than would same support a later date. Also suggest public relations benefit from our point of view in making statement now while entire security operation still receiving relatively favorable public reaction than it would later by which time accumulated incidents and irritations may have resulted in general public reaction of being fed up with entire matter.<sup>5</sup>

Dillon

---

<sup>3</sup> The Yugoslav Foreign Minister complained to Herter on September 20 about demonstrations at the Yugoslav Mission. The U.S. Mission acted quickly to rectify the situation. (SecDel/MC/4, September 20; SecDel/MC/48, September 21; SecDel/MC/49, September 21; SecDel/MC/61, September 22; *ibid.*, CF 1766)

<sup>4</sup> On September 21, a 9-year-old Venezuelan girl was fatally shot in a New York restaurant when a fight broke out between anti-Castro and pro-Castro groups. See Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, pp. 699-700.

<sup>5</sup> Herter sent a letter commending the New York City Police to the Police Commissioner on September 24. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772)

---

182. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 22, 1960—8:32 p.m.*

480. Urtel 773, rptd Leopoldville 113.<sup>2</sup> Dept agrees in principle it desirable seat Bomboko as Congo Delegate as soon as possible. Rapid decision would take advantage absence rival del, permit Bomboko

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/9-2260. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Tron; initialed by Sisco; cleared in draft with Penfield, Coote, and Sullivan; and approved by Wallner who signed for Dillon. Repeated priority to Leopoldville.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 177.

return to Congo to assume new position, help solidify positions Kasavubu, Mobutu and Bomboko, and deny time for opposition lobby effectively against him.

However, there are two good reasons delay of at least few days in meeting Credentials Committee. First, meeting should not be called until GA has adopted moratorium on Chinese credentials, Secondly, careful sounding GA opinion required assume favorable vote.

Dept believes ideal course would be for Africans themselves support and take initiative in seating of Bomboko. We hope African caucus to be held Monday will clarify prospects for such African initiative. In preparation for meeting, USUN should discuss discreetly with selected Africans as well as Morocco, and with states likely have influence with Africans (Israel, France, Japan, Haiti and others). Following Monday meeting, Dept would appreciate most careful reading parliamentary situation in Credentials Committee as well as in plenary.

Dillon

---

### 183. Editorial Note

On September 23, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Khrushchev addressed the General Assembly during the general debate. After commenting on how useful and necessary the United Nations was, he turned to criticism of the "executive machinery" of the United Nations by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld as "one-sided." The result, he said, "is that in many cases the practical, routine work of the United Nations and of its Secretariat is carried out in a one-sided manner. The staffing of the Organization is also one-sided." Khrushchev's solution was to propose the abolition of the post of Secretary-General and replace it with a "collective executive organ of the United Nations consisting of three persons each of whom would represent a certain group of States," i.e., "the Western Powers, the socialist States and the neutralist States."

Khrushchev also noted the difficulties which some Members were experiencing because of the location of U.N. Headquarters: "the question arises whether thought should not be given to selecting another place for United Nations Headquarters, a place which would better facilitate the fruitful work of the international body."

He then discussed the importance of the disarmament problem and the issue of the abolition of colonialism, and concluded by stating: "I wish to emphasize once again that the Soviet Government, guided

by the interests of the Soviet people, by the interests of the citizens of a free socialist State, once again proposes to all: let us talk, let us argue, but let us settle the questions of general and complete disarmament and let us bury colonialism that is accursed of all mankind."

For full text of Khrushchev's address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.869.

---

**184. Remarks by the Secretary of State, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, September 23, 1960, 3:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. President, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I too have to apologize, as did your chairman, for the great lateness of this lunch. And because of the shortage of time that has developed, and the fact that I have had to cancel out a few appointments that I had earlier in the afternoon—and I have to keep one very important one at four o'clock<sup>2</sup>—I am going to cut my opening remarks very short.

I assume that what is on the minds of all of you, and on which I am sure I would be asked in a first question, is what is my reaction to the speech which carried on for some two hours and ended only a very short time ago.<sup>3</sup>

I think it would be very foolish of me to try to give you a thoroughly thought-through reaction to the many facets of that speech which developed during the course of those two hours. However, I do want to give you one or two very quick reactions: (1) It was an all-out attack, a real declaration of war against the structure, the personnel, and the location of the United Nations.

With respect to that first comment, I would like to add this: Immediately after the speech concluded I went behind the rostrum to Secretary General Hammarskjöld's office. He and the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Boland, were there. I took to him a letter which I had in my pocket and which I will read you in a moment. The first question that I asked him was whether or not under the procedural rules of the United Nations it was possible to call for an immediate vote of confidence in the Secretary General. That is what I would have liked to have seen done, if it had been possible.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1774. Herter spoke before the Foreign Press Association, then answered questions from the audience.

<sup>2</sup> Herter met with Dutch Foreign Minister Luns from 4-4:45 p.m. They discussed the General Assembly session, European organization, Algeria, armaments, West New Guinea, President Eisenhower's schedule at the General Assembly, and Sukarno's arrival in New York. (SecDel/MC/90, Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2360)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Khrushchev's address, *supra*.

We examined carefully whether that could be done, and found that under the procedural rules that have been set up, it could not be done without bringing in a separate resolution which would have to go through the normal procedure.

I then read to him this letter, which I am going to read to you:

(Reading)

"Excellency:

"This is in response to your letter of September 20, 1960 referring to the General Assembly resolution of September 20<sup>4</sup> which appealed to 'all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo' for which you estimate a need of \$100,000,000.

"My Government is prepared to respond to your request and is immediately making an advance contribution of \$5,000,000 on the assumption that contributions will also be forthcoming from other Governments. Additional contributions will be made as specific plans and requirements are developed by the United Nations.

"No decision can be made at this time concerning the total amount which the United States is prepared to contribute to the United Nations Fund for the Congo because of conditions established by United States legislation. In particular, existing legislation under which funds are now available to the United States Government provides that the United States contribution will not exceed 40% of the total made available to the United Nations for this purpose.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

I then handed him a check for \$5 million, and told him that if I could express my confidence in his activities in no other way I felt that at least I could show my gratitude toward what I consider a very able job done, and I could only repeat the words of the President, of yesterday,<sup>5</sup> in which he expressed faith that the Secretary General was carrying out his mandate from the United Nations in an effective and intelligent and positive way.

The second comment has to do with the colonial issue. There, I am handicapped by the fact that there were two documents which were circulated with the copies of Mr. Khrushchev's speech: One, a declaration in connection with the colonial nations, or colonial body; and the second, a statement with regard to disarmament.<sup>6</sup>

Unhappily, there was no time even to glance at those documents, so that I don't feel that I can properly comment on the full nature of Mr. Khrushchev's offering this morning. I can say though that my first

<sup>4</sup> Hammarskjöld's letter has not been found. The resolution under reference is 1474 (ES-IV); for text, see U.N. doc. A/RES/1474 (ES-IV).

<sup>5</sup> See Document 180.

<sup>6</sup> For text of the Soviet proposal for basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, see U.N. doc. A/4505. For text of the draft declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, see U.N. doc. A/4502.

impression was that this was an incitement to immediate rebellion on the part of all remaining colonial entities, and was a pretty inflammatory speech from that point of view.

As I say, I think that further comment on the speech must be reserved until we have had a chance to study it, because I am sure that you, as I, only have had an opportunity of hearing it once or perhaps reading through the text once, and have not had any opportunity of studying it and studying the many separate points that were raised in it.

If I may, now I will be very glad to answer other questions.

[Here follows a question-and-answer session.]

---

### 185. Editorial Note

On the afternoon of September 23, Ambassador Wadsworth addressed the U.N. General Assembly. Declaring that he spoke "on behalf of and with the authorization of the Secretary of State," Wadsworth responded to the speech which Chairman Khrushchev had made before the General Assembly that morning. (See Document 183)

Wadsworth refuted Khrushchev's comments about the RB-47 incident and East-West disarmament negotiations and questioned his remarks about colonialism. He then addressed Khrushchev's statements about the United Nations and the Secretary-General:

"But there is a second and possibly even more serious crisis, a crisis which consists of an attempt to destroy the office and the very structure of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat and through it to destroy the United Nations.

"This is the same sustained crisis which the Soviet Union posed at the recent meetings of the Security Council and in the emergency General Assembly which closed just before this 15th General Assembly opened, and in both these bodies the United Nations stood firmly and the Assembly firmly endorsed the stand. The crisis has now been sharpened by a direct attack from the head of the Soviet state himself against the office of the Secretary-General.

"The Soviet Union has sought to crush another Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie, because he stood up against Communist aggression in Korea. It is now attempting to crush the very office of the Secretary-General itself, in keeping with the philosophy of what we might term 'what we cannot control we will destroy.'

"The United Nations, Mr. President, must face this crisis head on. If it does not, it will fail."

For full text of Wadsworth's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.870.

186. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 23, 1960, 8 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SecDel/MC/71

SUBJECT

Discussion at Dinner Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers—Soviet Aggressive Tactics

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The Secretary  
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler  
Mr. Theodore C. Achilles  
Mr. Edward T. Long

*UK*

Lord Home  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Mr. Peter Ramsbotham

*France*

M. Couve de Murville  
M. Charles Lucet  
Ambassador Alphand  
M. Pierre De Leuses

Mr. Ramsbotham said that the UK paper<sup>2</sup> had been written about a fortnight ago and of course there had been some developments since then. Nevertheless, the provocative Khrushchev speech of that morning<sup>3</sup> fitted in very well with the prognostication of the UK paper. The paper itself started by observing that since May there has been a dramatic change in Soviet tactics and the reasonableness arising particularly out of the Camp David talks has disappeared, especially in light of the airplane incidents. Increased Soviet aggressive tactics have been noted in Berlin in conjunction with the GDR, in Cuba, the Congo, etc.

Nevertheless, it appears that the Soviets have refrained from carrying their provocative campaign too far, not appearing to wish to force Soviet-Western relations into a dangerous state. Even with the current tension in Berlin, it seems that Khrushchev is avoiding taking irrevocable steps. The Geneva walk-out evinces a changed tactical position on the part of the Soviets, not a complete change in their disarmament position. The door has not been closed by Khrushchev

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1767. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Long and approved by S on October 5 and by M on September 29. The time of the meeting was taken from the chronology of Herter's trip to the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, CF 1776)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a paper entitled "How to Deal With the Soviet Propaganda Offensive in the United Nations," which Ramsbotham had distributed to the U.S. and French Delegations the previous day. A copy is attached to SecDel/MC/26; *ibid.*, CF 1766.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 183.



on future Summit talks. Cultural exchanges have continued. In other words, it doesn't appear that the Soviets at this point in time want to bring things to a head.

As to immediate Soviet aims, it appears likely that Khrushchev wants to isolate and discredit the U.S., to extend Soviet influence in the underdeveloped countries, to stir up opposition to Western bases by a mixture of cajolery and threats, to win the support of neutral countries for Soviet initiatives, to prepare the ground for a propaganda offensive at the UNGA and to stimulate opinion against NATO. There was a slight difference of opinion between the U.S. and the UK on another Soviet immediate aim, with the UK feeling that the Soviets wished to keep the pot boiling on Berlin while avoiding a showdown and the U.S. feeling that the Berlin crisis was being built up as pressure against the new U.S. administration. Another agreed Soviet aim was that of stopping the West from continuing its intelligence gathering activities.

The paper went on to relate several imponderable factors in the situation. In the field of Sino-Soviet relations, it seems probable that one of the factors leading Khrushchev to adopt more militant tactics toward the West has been the desire to defend himself from accusations of softness in the showdown with the Chinese. Another imponderable is Khrushchev's own personality and position in the Soviet hierarchy. He often misjudges the effects on others of his behavior and he tends to overplay his hand when he thinks he holds good cards. The latter was very evident in Khrushchev's speech today.

The conclusions of the paper, on which there was broad agreement among the three Under Secretaries, were briefly as follows:

Within the general framework of peaceful co-existence, as he interprets it, Khrushchev can alternate between sweet reasonableness and his more militant tactics of today where he uses rough language about the West and exploits "targets of opportunity". The only safe assumption is that so long as Khrushchev is in power Soviet tactics will be flexible and unpredictable. This judgment means that in the first place the West must not allow Khrushchev to succeed, either by cajolery or by threats, in gaining material advantage for the Soviet cause, e.g., by ousting the West from Berlin, depriving the Western alliance of necessary bases, compelling the West to agree to disarmament arrangements unfavorable to Western security, etc. In other words, the West need not and should not give way on substantive matters and should pursue a policy of continual firmness matching each Soviet move forward with an appropriate but not excessive counter-action. In addition, Khrushchev must not be allowed to succeed in swaying opinion in the uncommitted parts of the world against

the West. Furthermore, Western spokesmen should consistently expose Soviet policies and aims, pointing up to the uncommitted countries the advantages of cooperation with the West.

Mr. Ramsbotham observed there had been some disagreement with the final conclusion of the paper in which the British thought that given Khrushchev's personality it was not in the interest of the West to keep him at arm's length, particularly since his influence on Chinese policy may prove an important factor in the West's favor. From this point of view alone the West has an interest in diverting him from a militant anti-Western policy. The U.S. view, continued Mr. Ramsbotham, was that the West had no influence in about 95% of Sino-Soviet relations. The French spokesman took some issue with the British argument that the West should seek a renewal of contact with Khrushchev as soon as conditions permit, the French feeling that the next move in this direction was up to Khrushchev.

Mr. Merchant thanked Mr. Ramsbotham for his full and stimulating report and observed that there were no basic tripartite differences on the UK paper, only a difference here and there on a nuance.

---

**187. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, September 23, 1960.*

**SUBJECT**

Possible Meeting between the President and Khrushchev

Following Khrushchev's arrival statement and the President's speech<sup>2</sup> there has been a great deal of speculation and, in some quarters, expectation that the President and Khrushchev will meet while they are both in New York. I suspect in part some of this is being fed from Soviet sources, particularly via Asiatic members—I have heard of at least two such suggestions from Asiatics in close touch with the Soviet delegation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772. Confidential. Drafted by Bohlen, sent to Herter through S/S, and initialed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Khrushchev's statement upon arriving in New York, see *The New York Times*, September 20, 1960, p. A14. Regarding Eisenhower's September 22 statement before the U.N. General Assembly, see Document 180.

Quite apart from the undoubtedly adverse domestic reaction, I believe it would be a very great mistake in connection with our future relations with the Soviet Union if the President were to see Khrushchev without the Soviets at least having done something to rectify the recent record of their past behavior through some action such as release of the two fliers or some form of retraction of the missile threat in regard to Cuba. If Khrushchev were to be received by the President without some demonstration in action of a changed attitude, it would merely convince the Soviets and a large portion of the world that the Soviet Union was so powerful that it could behave with contempt towards the United States through insults, threats, etc., and that at any time of their choosing return to the "spirit of Camp David." In short, it would mean in the eyes of many uncommitted nations that the Soviet Union was, in fact, calling the tune in international affairs.

In present circumstances as outlined above, therefore, the reception of Khrushchev would be a net advantage to the Soviet Union and, in my opinion, a definite loss of standing by the United States. If Khrushchev genuinely wishes to see the President and should make a specific request to that end, this would require some very definite handling. I would suggest that if such a request is received, someone should go to see Gromyko and point out that the President could not receive Mr. Khrushchev as long as he illegally holds the US airmen; that if the Soviets would announce that, after investigation, the fliers were to be released without trial, it would then be possible for the President to see him. Short of this, I believe that any such request should be turned down on those grounds, and most certainly no hint on the US side of a willingness of the President to receive Khrushchev.

---

**188. Memorandum From the President's Secretary (Whitman) to the President<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 24, 1960.

Secretary Herter called at 9:15. He said they in New York had reviewed carefully Mr. K's talk of yesterday and thought for time being it would be best if you said no more—rested on your statement of yesterday.<sup>2</sup>

He said he thought the situation was "riding along very well . . ." <sup>3</sup> Mr. K did not make many friends yesterday."

He also hopes you understand that he could not consult with you, because of time, before he made his statement to the foreign press correspondents about Mr. K's talk. Said Mr. K talked until about two and about a half hour later he had this press conference, and the only thing the reporters were interested in was reaction to Mr. K's talk.

He will be in New York through the lunch hour, just in case you want to call him. But he just wanted you to understand.

ACW<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman Files. A copy was given to Goodpaster.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Khrushchev's statement, see Document 183. *The New York Times* reported that on September 23 the White House press secretary had announced that Eisenhower would not make an official statement on Khrushchev's remarks, but that he supported Herter's and Wadsworth's responses. (September 24, 1960, p. A1) Herter's comments are in Document 184; regarding Wadsworth's statement, see Document 185.

<sup>3</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

---

**189. Editorial Note**

On September 26, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld addressed the U.N. General Assembly, responding to criticism of the United Nations and its Secretariat which Chairman Khrushchev had voiced 3 days earlier. *The New York Times* reported that as Hammarskjöld spoke, Khrushchev pounded his fist on his desk. Other members of the Soviet Delegation joined him. (September 27, 1960, page A16) For a record of these proceedings and the text of Hammarskjöld's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.871.

**190. Record of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting,  
Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1960,  
9:15 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows discussion of items 1, "Intelligence" and 2, "Tito-Nasser Trips."]

**3. UN Developments**

Mr. Hare said he hoped Nasser would talk firmly and frankly with Khrushchev. He has done so in the past in private and may do so again. Mr. Hare reported that Nasser apparently was not pleased with his visit with Castro, particularly the way in which Castro was living. Mr. Merchant remarked that it does not do us much good so far as world opinion is concerned if the Neutralist leaders play up to the Soviets in public but then excuse themselves in private to us. The Russians always play tougher than we do and the Neutrals sometimes take advantage of this.

Mr. Henderson remarked that he was not optimistic regarding the "boomerang effect" of Khrushchev's attack against the UN. His experience has been that the Soviets usually are successful in bringing down any man they aim at. Mr. Merchant said we can certainly not discount the seriousness of Khrushchev's attack. Also, he felt that Nkrumah's speech at the UN<sup>2</sup> had really been much more sinister than Khrushchev's. Mr. Hare commented that we should not take the Neutrals too literally. Most of them are of two minds on any problem and they are not fixed in their positions. He thought there was no harm in defending ourselves against attacks from the Neutralists but we should understand this aspect of their thinking.

There was discussion of the French role in the UN. Couve has already left and it is clear we cannot expect much from the French. They say they will go along with the UK-US line but they will not take the lead.

In responding to the Soviet declaration of war against the UN, we hope that Macmillan will make a major riposte on the Colonial issue. Mr. Kohler said the Department should start getting together now material on Colonialism in Soviet Central Asia for use by the UK or the US. Mr. Merchant thought this could be helpful, although he felt that we should not expect much mileage on this subject with the Neutrals. Mr. Henderson agreed, saying that, for the Africans, Colonialism means the tyranny of light skinned peoples over dark skinned

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel. Merchant presided at the meeting.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Nkrumah's address, which immediately preceded Khrushchev's, see U.N. doc. A/PV.869.

peoples. Mr. Merchant added that the facts are good and the situation in the USSR is outrageous; we should not abandon the issue but simply should not expect too much from it.

Mr. Wallner reported that the Soviets have proposed a resolution in the General Committee on Colonialism.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Kohler felt this would give us a good opportunity to push further the facts about Soviet Colonialism.

Mr. Kohler said it had been agreed that we should file a resolution to the Soviet resolution charging us with increasing tensions. Our resolution will be a blanket attack against Soviet actions and should be filed later. Thereafter, we could focus on any one particular issue. We might wish to concentrate on Germany and Berlin, recalling the 1951 General Assembly resolution for UN commissions to enter Germany to see if conditions were satisfactory for general elections.<sup>4</sup>

[Here follow discussion of items 4, "Yugoslav Financial Problems," 5, "Jordan," 6, "Cuba," 7, "Chinese Representation," and 8, "Bucharest Conference"; a list of the materials used during the discussion of item 1; and an attendance list.]

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 510 (VI), adopted December 20, 1951, see U.N. doc. A/2119.

---

**191. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers, New York, September 26, 1960, 3 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SecDel/MC/108

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The President

The Secretary

Lt. Col. John Eisenhower

Mr. G. Lewis Jones

*India*

Prime Minister Nehru

Mr. Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1767. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones on September 27, approved by S on October 5, and approved by the White House on October 11. For Eisenhower's account of this conversation, see *Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, p. 585.

## SUBJECT

Conversation with Prime Minister Nehru

Prime Minister Nehru opened the conversation with the question, "How are you keeping, Mr. President"?

The President began by saying that Nehru was here at a time "when calm voices are needed". He said he had been astonished by the virulence of Khrushchev's attack on the Secretary General.

Nehru said, "Most of us were astonished; it almost appeared as if that section were added on to Khrushchev's speech at the last minute. It did not appear to be an integral part of it."

The President said it would be a terrible disaster for the world, particularly to small nations, if the UN were to disappear. He said that originally he had been opposed to locating the UN in the United States. He thought it might be more appropriate to have it in a smaller country.

Nehru said that at one time there was a proposal that it be located in San Francisco.

The Secretary said, "or Geneva".

The President said, "or Stockholm".

The President then made the proposal, smilingly, that it might be a good idea to move the UN to West Berlin.

[Here follows discussion of the Congo, Togolese President Olympio, the Indus Water Treaty, location of the Pakistani capital, and the death of Nehru's son-in-law.]

Turning to a new subject, the President inquired whether Nehru had any "convictions or opinions" as to how this session of UNGA will end.

Nehru said he had come because he had been pressed to come by many friends. He had found the situation *worse* than he had expected. It would be a catastrophe for the UN to break up since it is the one thing which holds the world together.

The President said he thought he had made a conciliatory speech.<sup>2</sup> It clearly indicated that aid to Africa should all come via UN.

Nehru (without displaying much confidence) wondered aloud whether, after all the fireworks, Khrushchev "would cool down".

The President said he thought that all the African nations were for the UN. The Secretary said Hammarskjöld had spoken that morning.<sup>3</sup> Nehru said he had heard Hammarskjöld who made a "good and clever speech" which had pleaded that personalities be kept out of the controversy.

---

<sup>2</sup> See Document 180.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding Hammarskjöld's statement, see Document 189.

The President said that from our point of view "he had found nothing constructive in Khrushchev's speech". He had not expected him to be so completely negative. He seemed to be trying to find out how many new countries he could alienate. Khrushchev's speech was "bleak" from the point of view of constructive action.

Nehru asked the President what topics he thought the General Assembly should consider.

The President replied quickly "disarmament". The U.S. was anxious to stop nuclear testing and nuclear production. There was "nothing so important as disarmament".

Nehru said that in his view there were two topics that must be considered—first, disarmament, and second, the new situation which has arisen in Africa. Khrushchev's proposal for a triumvirate to replace the Secretary General was "wholly impracticable". However, he wondered how the Secretary General can manage to deal with all the new African developments.

The President suggested the possibility of giving him some assistance.

Nehru said that at one time there had been three Assistant Secretaries General, but these posts had not been filled lately. If they were filled, the Secretary General would have a small Cabinet with which he might consult.

The Secretary said that the character of the Assistant Secretaries General has changed, now there are so many separate UN agencies.

The President thought that regional assistance, i.e., from the African countries, might ease tension. One thing was sure: "Powerful nations should be kept out of the central African area".

Nehru agreed and said that if the larger powers intervened, this would cause chaos.

[Here follows discussion of Africa, Berlin, and India's relationship with the People's Republic of China.]

The President inquired how long Nehru thought he would stay.

Nehru replied he had in mind 10 days or two weeks, but he could stay on a few days longer if this were necessary.

The President said that he had initially planned to speak later in the Session, but the toughening of the Communist line had caused him to speak early. He thought he had been smart to do this because he was not in a position of answering the Soviet charges. He said the UN part of the speech had been drafted by himself. He felt with all his heart that unless the UN is supported chaos will result.

[Here follows discussion of disarmament and a U.S.—U.S.S.R. summit meeting and termination of the meeting.]



**192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 26, 1960—6:10 p.m.*

Tosec 43. Following is suggested addition to briefing paper for President's talk with Macmillan:<sup>2</sup>

We believe Khrushchev's attack on SYG and UN must be dealt with firmly. We believe that in this approach Khrushchev has chosen extremely unpopular grounds and that West should stress that he is attempting to debase if not destroy the organization which offers best hopes for smaller nations of world to realize their aspirations.

There should be solid Western front on this matter. We regret France was only non-Communist member in SC and only non-Communist member of GA except South Africa that did not support UN effort in Congo during recent emergency GA. Now that Soviet attack on UN has developed into a major issue at fifteenth GA, we believe it is highly desirable that French modify their attitude so that there is solid free world support for SYG and UN.

We hope Mr. Macmillan will use his influence with French to encourage them to modify their position.

**Dillon**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1769. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Buffum, cleared with Wallner and Stoessel and in draft with Davis, and approved by the Acting Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> On September 25, Dillon sent the President a memorandum regarding Eisenhower's meeting with Macmillan. Dillon enclosed two briefing papers, one on disarmament, Germany, and Africa, the second on reconnaissance flights from the British territory, and noted that a paper on berthing facilities for Polaris submarines had been sent to the President separately. A copy of the memorandum and its enclosures are *ibid.*, CF 1771. Eisenhower met with Macmillan at 8 a.m., September 27; Herter and Lord Home joined them at 9 a.m. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 17, 1960, p. 596) No record of these meetings has been found.

193. **Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, September 27, 1960, 9 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

OTHERS PRESENT

Prime Minister Macmillan  
Secretary Herter, Lord Home  
Mr. de Zulueta, General Goodpaster

At 9 AM, after the President and Prime Minister Macmillan had had breakfast alone, the others joined for an hour's discussion.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

The Prime Minister then returned to the subject of the UN General Assembly. He said that the mood seems to be changing. There is a feeling that Khrushchev has again overplayed his hand. The President interjected that the luncheon given by Cyrus Eaton for Khrushchev was about as despicable a thing as he knew of.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Herter said that Hammarskjold has told him that it begins to look as though the United Nations had imported from the Congo some of the political chaos that now exists there. The President observed that after Khrushchev, Castro and their associates go home, the United Nations discussions may take a better turn. He said that Nasser had told him he did not want to destroy the UN.<sup>3</sup>

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Lord Home said that he sees some signs that the neutral or uncommitted countries are beginning to get rather touchy about the course of the General Assembly debate. They are being treated like pawns. The Soviets want to take them into the Communist camp and the West of course is trying to urge them to be free and democratic. There is growing resentment of both of these approaches but at the same time we cannot just say that we will leave them to find their own salvation. The President said one reason for his suggestion for a regional grouping in Africa was to keep out big-power intervention and to discourage the building up of large armaments on the part of these countries. Such a grouping and limitation of arms would mean there would be neutrality among these countries and between this grouping

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries, Staff Notes—September 1960 (1). Secret. For Eisenhower's account of this conversation, see *Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, pp. 585-586.

<sup>2</sup> On September 26, U.S. industrialist Cyrus Eaton hosted a private luncheon for Khrushchev, his party, and over 100 U.S. and Canadian bankers and industrialists in order to promote trade between North America and the Soviet Union.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Eisenhower's September 26 conversation with Nasser, SecDel/MC/115, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1767.

and the major powers. He said these leaders have stressed to him that they want “no Communist domination” but think that they will be skillful enough to accept Communist aid and still avoid this. He commented that the African who has impressed him the most so far is President Olympio of Togo—a modest, quiet-spoken, intelligent man.<sup>4</sup>

The Prime Minister asked how the President found Nehru, commenting that Nehru seemed somewhat “down” and dejected to him.<sup>5</sup> The President said he tried everything with Nehru, but Nehru tended to lapse into long silences. (The President said he was accustomed to this from his meeting with Nehru at Camp David, and was not troubled by it.) Nehru stressed how bad Indian relations with China are becoming over the territorial dispute in the northeastern area. Nehru put little importance on the western disputed area, which is remote and mountainous. Mr. Herter observed that Nehru seemed somewhat confused as to what his own role might best be in the circumstances of this General Assembly. The President said that Nehru had expressed strong support for the UN. Nasser had done the same. Nkrumah has also done this<sup>6</sup> but had gone out forty-five minutes later and made a speech at the UN supporting Khrushchev.

The Prime Minister said that all these countries support the UN as do we. All of us favor peace. The question is how to get peace with justice, when many of these countries are violating the rights of others.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

As the meeting broke up Lord Home said the First Secretary of the Nigerian delegation had come to him to say that he is finding it impossible to get a place to live in New York because of his color. Mr. Herter said this problem is a terribly difficult one. The President said it should be taken up with Mayor Wagner and Police Commissioner Kennedy at once.

G  
Brigadier General, USA

---

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of this September 23 conversation, SecDel/MC/62, is *ibid.*, CF 1766.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 191.

<sup>6</sup> A memorandum of Eisenhower’s September 22 conversation with Nkrumah, SecDel/MC/60, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1766. Regarding Nkrumah’s speech, see footnote 2, Document 190.

**194. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers, New York, September 27, 1960, 2:45 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SecDel/MC/120

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The President  
Secretary Herter  
Gen. Goodpaster  
T. C. Achilles

*Canada*

Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker  
Mr. Howard Green, Secretary of  
State for External Affairs  
Mr. H. B. Robinson, Prime Minister's  
Private Secretary

SUBJECT

UN Matters

The Prime Minister opened the conversation by congratulating the President on his excellent conciliatory speech at the UN. By contrast, Khrushchev's speech had been completely destructive.

The President said that Khrushchev, not content with the veto in the Security Council, was seeking to impose it at the administrative level. Several Heads of Government with whom he had talked had also noted this point. In response to the Prime Minister's question as to what happened next, the President said that some thought Khrushchev would calm down but that he personally doubted it. He was sure of only one thing—that practically everyone outside the Soviet bloc was strong in support for the UN. He regretted that Nkrumah's speech had followed the Soviet line.<sup>2</sup>

The Prime Minister disagreed. Nkrumah had come to see him yesterday and asked what he thought of the Secretary's statement that "Nkrumah was a Communist". The Secretary interjected that he had never said that, only that Nkrumah was tending to follow the Soviet line. The Prime Minister had replied that he had never considered Nkrumah a Communist. The publicity concerning the Secretary's comment had discouraged Nkrumah whereas a few kind words might have brought him back into line. However, Nkrumah should never have made the speech he did. The Secretary remarked that it was the nature of Nkrumah's speech, shortly after the latter had assured him and the President of his complete support for the UN, that had prompted his comment. The Prime Minister said Nkrumah had denied

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Achilles on September 28, approved by S on October 6, and approved by the White House on October 12. For Eisenhower's comments on this conversation, see Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, p. 585.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Nkrumah's speech, see footnote 2, Document 190.

that he had been influenced by Khrushchev. The Secretary observed that after his speech Nkrumah had stopped to talk with Khrushchev for the benefit of the photographers.

[Here follows discussion of Togolese President Olympio, the Congo, and Africa.]

The Prime Minister asked what the President's reaction would be should he receive an invitation from Khrushchev to meet with him. The President replied that Khrushchev would have to do something constructive first, such as freeing the two American aviators. In the absence of some such action by Khrushchev, the American people would never understand the President's seeing him. The Prime Minister observed that any UN resolution requesting that they meet would be out of order. The President replied that it certainly would, that it would put the two on the same level. Khrushchev had cursed him thoroughly but he had never replied in kind.

The Prime Minister expressed concern at Castro's speech and inquired who was going to answer it. The Secretary replied that Wadsworth would speak briefly this afternoon to the effect that all of Castro's charges except that dealing with his treatment in New York had been made at the recent OAS meeting in Costa Rica and answered by all the other governments represented there and that we would be preparing documentation for general distribution in the UN.<sup>3</sup>

The Prime Minister said he had been concerned by the imposition of limitations on the movements of Khrushchev and other bloc leaders. The President said that we had been genuinely alarmed for their safety. Our security personnel was limited. Khrushchev, Kadar, Tito and Nasser had wanted to travel in the US, but, while we imposed no restrictions on the latter two, we were worried over possible dangers to their security. Khrushchev had withdrawn his invitation to the President, who now saw no reason to invite him to this country. The UN Headquarters Agreement referred only to "reasonable access" to the UN and said nothing about the right to travel in the US.

The Prime Minister recognized the antagonism and strong feelings of émigré groups. In his speech,<sup>4</sup> he had emphasized that the essence of the Charter was the right of each people to decide its own destiny. He had received a highly favorable reaction in Canada, especially from émigré groups. The President welcomed the fact that the Prime Minister had been so specific on this point in his speech, more specific than the President had thought it advisable to be himself. However, the President firmly believed in self-determination and would keep on saying so.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Castro's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.872. For text of Wadsworth's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.874.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Diefenbaker's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.871.

The Prime Minister inquired as to Khrushchev's attitude toward the President's speech. The President replied that Khrushchev had remained completely quiet during it and had later referred to it as being conciliatory.

The President expressed the opinion that Nasser's suggestion that the President and Khrushchev meet was probably an attempt on the part of Nasser to gain publicity.

[Here follows discussion of the Prime Minister's and President's conversations with Nasser and of the September 26 Nixon-Kennedy debate.]

---

**195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 27, 1960—8:44 p.m.*

Topol 409. Deliver Burgess 8 am September 28.<sup>2</sup> NAC Agenda Item IIIA.<sup>3</sup> Khrushchev's speech in general debate indicates that Soviets will conduct hard-hitting, three-pronged attack at 15th GA, consisting of (1) major effort to woo support of newly independent countries, particularly of Africa, and to stir up antagonisms among those countries toward West; (2) gambits designed to strengthen Moscow's pose as champion of disarmament, and to discredit peaceful intentions of US by exploiting aerial reconnaissance issue; (3) drive to stake out Communist bloc claim to larger role in UN administration at a minimum, or prevent effective functioning of UN at maximum.

Motivations for extreme tone of Khrushchev speech, in addition to reaction to Congo defeat, not fully clear. We are inclined to believe first need current Soviet foreign policy is to reassert unquestioned Soviets leadership of bloc and performances at UN should be at least partially viewed as effort to portray Khrushchev as fervent champion of "anti-imperialist" forces.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2760. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Armitage and Buffum, cleared by Fessenden, and approved by Kohler who signed for Dillon.

<sup>2</sup> W. Randolph Burgess, Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations at Paris.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

We believe Khrushchev has made serious tactical error in pitting himself against widely respected SYG. We plan continue stress confrontation is USSR–UN and that Soviet Union seeks destroy what it can not control.

In meantime Pres. Eisenhower's speech has met with broad support from all quarters except Communist camp and Cuba. You may wish recall number specific positive proposals contained in his speech and indicate US will follow through on number of these proposals in GA in manner deemed most likely assure their implementation.

**Dillon**

---

**196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 27, 1960—9:50 p.m.*

Tosec 49. US initiative re Soviet actions in GA. We understand that decision taken by Secretary that US should submit basket item at appropriate time prior UNGA debate Soviet agenda item re "U.S. aggressive acts", etc.

Following is suggested explanatory memorandum which US would submit. You will note that memorandum has been updated from previous draft considered by Secretary<sup>2</sup> since it now includes general reference to Soviet attack on UN. From tactical point of view, we see advantage in having this item considered in same committee (Political Committee) which will consider Soviet propaganda item.

As to timing submission of this item, we believe there is merit to waiting at least until General Debate is well advanced giving opportunity for opinion in Assembly to crystalize on dominant issue involving Soviet broadside against UN. There is also added consideration that it would be well for US to come forward first with positive constructive African item as follow-up to President's speech rather than item essentially of a propaganda character.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2760. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco, Buffum, and Nunley; cleared by Wallner, Stoessel, Kohler, Coote (Congo paragraph only), and ARA (Cuban paragraph only); and approved by the Acting Secretary. Repeated to Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

"On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I request inclusion in the agenda of the 15th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly as an urgent and important item the question of 'Threats and Actions by the Soviet Union which Increase International Tension and Friction'. In accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, I attach an explanatory memorandum.

The Government of the United States desires to draw to the attention of the General Assembly a series of actions by the Government of the Soviet Union which it believes must be regarded as major causes of heightened international tensions, which seriously impair good relations between states, and thereby increases the danger of war. Soviet threats to peace have occurred over a long period of years and the Government of the United States has repeatedly called attention to these threats. During the past six months, however, a new series of Soviet actions have taken place which have substantially increased the magnitude of the threat posed by the Government of the USSR to world harmony. These actions, which include interference in the affairs of other nations, fomenting of civil strife, failure to comply with UN resolutions, and threats to unleash a nuclear war, show a contempt for both international law and the purposes of the United Nations, which in the view of this Government is both deplorable and dangerous. The USSR continuously pursues a course of action which demonstrates that the legitimate desire of the world for a stable and ordered peace is subordinated to Soviet communist aggressive and expansionist designs.

Since last May alone the Soviet Union has taken the following dangerous actions:

In May, 1960 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR wrecked the proposed Meeting of Heads of State and Government at Paris, upon which most of the people of the world had placed their hopes for a settlement of important international differences and a general relaxation of tensions.

In June of this year, the members of the Soviet bloc sitting on the 10-nation disarmament committee at Geneva, abruptly left that committee and refused even to hear new disarmament proposals which they had been informed were forthcoming. This unilateral breakoff of disarmament negotiations, which had been sanctioned by the 14th General Assembly, was directly contrary to the Security Council resolution of May 27, 1960,<sup>3</sup> and demonstrates a reprehensible disregard of recognized parliamentary rules of procedure.

---

<sup>3</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. S/INF/15.



Soon after these events the Soviet Union shot down a United States Air Force RB-47 aircraft flying over international waters in the Barents Sea in violation of international law. The Soviet Union is thus responsible for the murder of at least one American, for the disappearance of two others and for the unlawful incommunicado detention of two more. In the course of Security Council action on this matter, the Soviet Government vetoed a Security Council resolution, supported by all non-communist members, calling for an impartial investigation of the incident, and access to the survivors by the International Red Cross.<sup>4</sup>

The Soviet Union has sought to undermine and obstruct the United Nations effort to bring about law and order in the Congo. It has given aircraft, supplies, and personnel outside the framework of the United Nations to support a civil war in which Africans killed Africans. The USSR has made a thinly disguised attempt to achieve political penetration and to heighten tensions and disorders in that already unhappily tense country contrary to the interests of the people of the Congo and Africa. It seeks to impose Soviet imperialism and colonialism on the African people on whose behalf it poses as a champion. The General Assembly in special emergency session has repudiated this unilateral effort and has clearly endorsed the continuing United Nations collective effort to bring about stability and order in the Congo.

The Soviet Union, through its puppet the 'so-called' GDR, is imposing restrictions and harassments on the population of West Berlin. This action, in direct defiance of international agreements, is also an effort to increase tensions and promote the aggressive aims of the Soviet Union in Europe.

The USSR is endeavoring to extend its intervention in the affairs of the American Republics, using the political, economic, and social situation of an American state to this end. The American Foreign Ministers condemned and rejected this type of intervention at San Jose, Costa Rica, on August 28, 1960.<sup>5</sup>

Accompanying all of these efforts to increase tension has been the frequent threats to launch rockets against those who do not supinely accept the desires and ambitions of the Soviet Union, uttered by the

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to a U.S. draft resolution calling for an investigation of the RB-47 incident and an Italian draft resolution proposing International Red Cross access to the survivors. The U.N. Security Council voted in favor of both resolutions on July 29; the Soviet Union, however, vetoed them. For texts, see U.N. docs. S/4409 and S.4411, respectively. For a record of the debate and the votes on the resolutions, see U.N. docs. S/PV.883 and S/PV.883/Add.1.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see OAS doc. OEA/Ser.F/11.7.

most authoritative leaders of the Soviet Union. These threats are clearly contrary to the basic precepts of the United Nations Charter which call upon all states to refrain from threats or the use of force.

The Soviet actions must be viewed against the background of the Soviet Union's long history of actions in the UN itself. It abetted and condoned direct defiance of the United Nations in the cases of both Hungary and Korea. It has consistently refused to contribute to the vital effort to maintain peace in the Middle East by refusing to pay its assessed share of the financing of UNEF. It has continued to ignore the UN resolution designed to promote the reunification of Germany through free elections. During the past fifteen years, the Soviet Government has defied more recommendations and decisions of the United Nations than any other member of the United Nations, and all of this has been done under the guise of 'peaceful co-existence.' And today the Soviet Union has declared war on the entire United Nations. It seeks to control the United Nations, and if this does prove possible, it seeks to destroy it. This poses an unparalleled challenge to the world organization—a challenge that must be met directly and firmly. There can be no compromise on this issue.

The Soviet actions must also be viewed against the background of a militarily powerful state which maintains a wall of secrecy around its borders and threatens indiscriminately to use the most horrible weapons ever known to man. When such a nation closes its doors to a free exchange of ideas and information the result is to heighten fears throughout the world. An attitude of this kind is indefensible in the nuclear age when mankind has a legitimate right to feel itself secure from the threat of death by massive surprise attack. Moreover, these artificial barriers to contact and communication breed widespread suspicion and mistrust among nations and present obstacles to all types of constructive cooperation. To a very large extent, the world's search for effective disarmament arrangements, for the relaxation of tensions and for the evolution of peaceful and neighborly relations among states will depend upon the elimination of these barriers and the development of more open societies, particularly in the areas controlled by the Soviet Government.

The Government of the United States believes that the General Assembly should consider the serious situation resulting from these actions of the Soviet Union."

**Dillon**

**197. Letter From Certain Heads of State to the President**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, September 29, 1960.*

MR. PRESIDENT: We have the honour to bring to your attention that, in view of the present tension in international relations and confident that Your Excellency, your Government and the people of your great country are keenly desirous to reduce this tension and pave the way for the consolidation of peace, it is our intention to submit for the immediate consideration of the present session of the General Assembly a draft resolution of which the text is enclosed.

We trust that this endeavour on our part will receive your early and sympathetic consideration.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of our high esteem.

**Kwame Nkrumah**  
*President of Ghana*

**Jawaharlal Nehru**  
*Prime Minister of India*

**A Sukarno**  
*President of Indonesia*

**Gamal Abdel Nasser**  
*President of the United Arab Republic*

**JB Tito**  
*President of Yugoslavia*

**[Attachment]**

**Draft U.N. General Assembly Resolution**

*New York, September 29, 1960.*

*The General Assembly*

*Deeply Concerned* with the recent deterioration in international relations which threatens the world with grave consequences,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Attached to the source text was a copy of a September 30 memorandum from Stoessel to Goodpaster which stated that the Yugoslav Ambassador had handed the letter to Wadsworth at 10:10 a.m., September 30, that Khrushchev was also to receive a copy, and that there were indications its text would soon be released to the press. The text of the letter and its attachment were circulated to other U.N. members in U.N. doc. A/4522. For Eisenhower's remarks on the letter, see *Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, pp. 586-588.

*Aware of the great expectancy of the world that this Assembly will assist in helping to prepare the way for the easing of world tension,*

*Conscious of the grave and urgent responsibility that rests on the United Nations to initiate helpful efforts,*

*Requests, as a first urgent step, the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to renew their contacts interrupted recently so that their declared willingness to find solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiation may be progressively implemented.*

---

## 198. Editorial Note

British Prime Minister Macmillan spoke before the U.N. General Assembly the morning of September 29. *The New York Times* reported that twice during his address, Macmillan's remarks spurred Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman Khrushchev to shout rebuttals from the floor of the General Assembly Hall. Macmillan continued speaking during Khrushchev's first outburst, but the second interrupted him. He resumed speaking after General Assembly President Boland brought the meeting back to order. (September 30, 1960, page A1) For text of Macmillan's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.877. For Macmillan's account of his address, see *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961*, pages 275-279.

The next morning, participants at the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting discussed Khrushchev's behavior. Bohlen speculated that his "violent actions yesterday were probably motivated in large part by pique over the action of the General Committee concerning the agenda." The General Committee had voted to reword two items the Soviet Union had proposed for inclusion on the General Assembly agenda and had voted against a Soviet request to include an item on Chinese representation. For a record of the General Committee's proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/4520.

Bohlen surmised further that "Khrushchev is mainly concerned with the Chinese. He is also hoping to pick up support from the new African states, but this is not his primary motivation. Likewise, he is not primarily aiming at success in the General Assembly."

Secretary Herter arrived late to the meeting, and was not present during this discussion. A record of the meeting is in Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75.

**199. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, September 30, 1960, 11 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

*3. Current Session of the General Assembly (State Initiative)*

Mr. Merchant said he would like to make a few observations about the current session of the General Assembly. On balance, it was going reasonably well from our standpoint, we had received encouraging support from our allies, particularly from Macmillan and Diefenbaker, and Khrushchev to a degree seemed to have overplayed his hand.

The new African nations appeared to be motivated by a desire to express their national dignity and sovereignty and in this sought identity with the United Nations. In this respect Khrushchev's rough behavior and attacks on the Secretary General had not gone down well with all of these new African nations.

Mr. Merchant said, however, he wishes to qualify this observation, that we should not be complacent or lull ourselves into thinking that Khrushchev has made our case for us. It may be that Khrushchev, on the Secretary General issue, is shooting in excess of what he wants or will settle for. Certainly he is trying to make certain that Hammarhjold is not reelected when his term expires.

We are uncertain as to how long Khrushchev will stay in New York.

Admiral Burke commented that a 19-day extension of stay had just been granted to the Baltika.

General Twining asked if we thought Mr. Khrushchev might come up with something new.

Mr. Merchant said that we had "licked him" on disarmament procedure in the General Committee last night, Khrushchev having wanted to have disarmament discussed in plenary instead of being discussed first in committee. Khrushchev has been anxious for propaganda purposes to get disarmament immediately discussed in the GA itself.

It appeared likely that Khrushchev was going to call for concurrent discussions, i.e., a half day of plenary sessions and a half day of committee work or for plenaries on one day and committee meetings on the next.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 823. Top Secret. Drafted in the Department of State, but not cleared with the Department of Defense. The source text does not identify the drafting officer.

General White asked what weight we could put on Khrushchev's motives in staying in New York for so long and for actually having attended the GA. General White said that obviously Khrushchev was motivated by a desire to get the West to disarm but then again maybe he genuinely wants disarmament on both sides. Another theory was that he expected to fail in this attempt and after failing planned to go back to Moscow and say, "This is it".

Admiral Burke asked about the November ideological-psychological conference of the Soviet bloc.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Merchant said there was some evidence Mr. Khrushchev was winning his ideological fight with the Communist Chinese and perhaps what he was after at this November conference was a public statement by all the bloc members showing agreement on ideology.

Reverting to General White's intervention Mr. Merchant said there was no doubt in his mind but that Khrushchev's main purpose was to get the West to disarm on Soviet terms.

General White said that was the logical answer but certainly his other two observations were possibilities.

Mr. Smith stated that Mr. Bohlen interprets Khrushchev's presence in New York and activities there as being mainly directed toward the Communist Chinese. He said he didn't put any weight on General White's third point, that he couldn't see the Russians mounting a preemptive strike.

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to the gathering in Moscow of the leaders of Communist nations to commemorate the 43d anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7.

---

## 200. Editorial Note

On October 1, the U.N. General Assembly considered whether to include the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations on its agenda. Ambassador Wadsworth presented the U.S. case against inclusion. Immediately thereafter, Chairman Khrushchev responded angrily to the U.S. statement. At one point, General Assembly President Boland interrupted him, declaring that the Soviet leader's remarks about Generalissimo Francisco Franco were "unparliamentary and out of order, and as such should not appear in the official record." Khrushchev took exception to Boland's statement, but his comments about Franco were nevertheless omitted from the verbatim record of the meeting.

Later in his statement, Khrushchev asked:

“What is it that those who oppose the rights of China in the United Nations want? They want only States with one type of social system to be represented in the United Nations. They do not like the People’s Republic of China and the socialist system. But what will happen if the socialist countries leave the United Nations, to set up their own international efforts on behalf of peace?”

Several delegates, including Wadsworth, responded to Khrushchev’s comments. For a record of these proceedings and the texts of the statements made during them, see U.N. doc. A/PV.881. For Khrushchev’s account of the meeting, which apparently combines this incident with one occurring on October 11, see Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, pages 472-473.

---

**201. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 1, 1960—5 p.m.*

867. Re: Reorganization of Secretariat. Moore (UK) said this afternoon UK Mission recommending Macmillan and party raise, during discussions in Washington this weekend, serious dangers involved in proposal which was yesterday launched by Ghana’s Pres Nkrumah, proposing advisory group of Under-Secretaries to UN SYG representing various political power groupings.<sup>2</sup> Moore said they took this proposal very seriously because it would put political consideration into highest level of Secretariat in manner which would permit Soviets to gain either positive direction or at least negative control (by kind of veto) over operation of Secretariat. This would be totally contrary to fundamental concept of Secretariat and may be basic Soviet aim to transform and thereby gain control of UN to their own use.

Moore said they feared certain degree of appeal for proposal of this kind could develop. Most delegations would agree Soviet sugges-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310/10-160. Secret; Niact. Another copy of this telegram was initialed by Herter. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772)

<sup>2</sup> Nkrumah proposed in a September 30 luncheon address before the U.N. Correspondents Association that the United Nations appoint three deputies to the Secretary-General, each of whom would be acceptable to Western, Eastern, and neutralist countries and would have substantive, clearly defined responsibilities.

tion to create triumvirate to replace SYG,<sup>3</sup> since it required Charter amendment for one thing was unrealistic. They would however be susceptible to argument Soviets would have to be given some concession to their point of view. Net result seems be Nkrumah's idea. UK Del feels tough line opposing this will have to be taken, perhaps by threatening, if not withdrawal from UN by major Western Powers, at least financial cold shoulder and tepid cooperation. Would appreciate Dept's reactions to this and other telegrams reporting this subject as soon as possible, because of need to combat it before it picks up momentum.

Wadsworth

---

<sup>3</sup> Proposed in Khrushchev's September 23 address before the U.N. General Assembly; see Document 183.

---

**202. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 2, 1960, 9:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

OTHERS PRESENT

Prime Ministers Menzies and Macmillan; Ambassador Beale, Lord Home, Mr. de Zulueta, Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

The President, after greeting Prime Minister Menzies, said he could not understand why the rest of the world had not reacted with shock and resentment to the resolution by the five neutral nations calling upon Khrushchev and himself to meet.<sup>2</sup> He was especially surprised at Nehru joining in this, since Nehru certainly understands the Communist tactics. However, Nehru had said that his mind was confused regarding the situation that has developed.<sup>3</sup> The President said he does not have much use for the others (Nkrumah, Nasser, Tito, and Sukarno).

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. The time of the meeting is from Eisenhower's appointment book. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments, 1960-1961)

<sup>2</sup> Regarding this resolution, see Document 197.

<sup>3</sup> For a memorandum of Eisenhower's September 26 meeting with Nehru, see Document 191.



Mr. Menzies said that it is an old trick of Nehru's to sit silent, not giving his views on matters up for discussion, in order to embarrass the other man. He recalled that Sukarno had objected to a summit meeting of four people, noting that he was now joining in proposing a summit meeting of two people.

The President said that he has been working hard on a reply to the five neutral leaders. The key point is that the problems are not problems of the United States and the USSR alone, but affect the whole of humankind. Mr. Menzies noted that in Cabinet meetings, when he has a problem it seems impossible to solve, a good technique is to refer it to a committee. He thinks the action of the neutral leaders is of this character—they don't know how to deal with the problem themselves so they want to turn it over to a committee of two. He observed that in Paris, the four nations were ready to meet, and thought that the West should go back to that conference.<sup>4</sup>

The President, in discussing Khrushchev's actions said that perhaps his purpose is to break up the United Nations. At this point Mr. Macmillan, Lord Home and Mr. de Zulueta joined the meeting.

The President told the group that he had been considering how to reply to the neutral leaders. He thought that Khrushchev's public statements attacking the proposal gave the West somewhat more latitude in drawing up its position.<sup>5</sup> He thought he would urge again that the Assembly get down to serious business. He was troubled because he did not see how he could rescue the Neutrals from the foolish position they got themselves into. Mr. Macmillan agreed that this is the first problem to be dealt with. A second is how to counter Khrushchev's attack on the UN Secretary-General. The President said he thinks Khrushchev came here to break up the United Nations, or to change it to suit his purposes. Mr. Herter said that the UN people are very disturbed over Nkrumah's suggestion for three Deputy Secretaries-General who would have power of veto over the Secretary-General.<sup>6</sup> Lord Home said that the Secretariat is simply an international civil servant, and Mr. Macmillan observed that all members of the Secretariat should simply serve the Secretary-General. Mr. Herter commented that there are more than three Assistant Secretaries-General at the present time.

Mr. Macmillan then asked what procedure the group thought should be followed both as to the President's reply to the Neutrals and as to action to be taken on the resolution now before the UN. The President thought that the Neutrals might withdraw their resolution in view of Khrushchev's "blast" against them. Mr. Menzies asked as to

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the summit meeting; see footnote 3, Document 141.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

the terms of the Neutrals' letter to the President, and the President read the text of the letter to him. The President said he had been considering putting out a public statement on the matter, with a very brief reply to the Neutrals. The public statement would explain the reasons behind the reply. Mr. Macmillan thought that the response should recall that Khrushchev had broken up the discussion in Paris. He had a copy of a statement that might be used for this purpose, calling for a resumption of four-power discussions. The President said he is bothered by one feature of the four-power proposal—that the four powers met simply because of their participation in the war. They cannot speak for other nations of the world. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the totality of questions concerning us and those that just affect the four powers. Lord Home said that another basis is that the four powers possess the bulk of the armaments of the world. Mr. Menzies observed that the four powers meet as a volunteer body, but the Neutralists' proposal is to make a two-man UN committee. The President recalled that Khrushchev had had the Russians walk out on the ten-power disarmament talks. He also noted that news reports state that he is in a difficult position—that he doesn't want to say yes to Khrushchev and can't say no. He said that the fact is that he can very easily say no. He read the part of the draft of the reply which he had prepared.

Mr. Macmillan returned to the two questions of the statement and the method of handling the resolutions. He thought that there was need for a substitute resolution, and recommended that it be based on resumption of the Paris meeting. Lord Home suggested that this be qualified by adding "at an appropriate time." Mr. Macmillan observed that each suggestion had referred to the statement regarding a four-power meeting. Mr. Herter said he does not have any enthusiasm for another summit meeting, but favors our making clear who broke up the last one. Mr. Macmillan asked that we should, at the least, not close the door on the future. Lord Home suggested that the phrase "after due preparation" be included in any statement regarding a summit meeting.

Prime Minister Menzies said that the resolution is a very dangerous one. It is drafted in a very cunning way, putting the President and Khrushchev on the same basis. It amounts to very clever propaganda, saying that the only conflict in the world is between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Herter said that some other countries are suggesting changes in the Neutral leaders' resolution. Lord Home thought the best way to kill the resolution would be to put something out later the same day. The President said he thought that Khrushchev had inspired the whole operation. He added he did not think the United States should be in the position of putting in the substitute resolution. Mr. Herter thought it was probably better not to stress too

strongly the resumption of the four-power meeting. He thought that matters which trouble us should be considered in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The President said that a legitimate action for the UN would be to say that it was hoped the four powers would meet to consider problems of special interest to them.

Mr. Herter asked Mr. Macmillan what attitude Khrushchev had taken in his talks with him.<sup>7</sup> Mr. Macmillan said that, on disarmament, he could see no progress whatever. Mr. Macmillan is unable to judge whether Khrushchev wants disarmament or simply wants to keep an issue over disarmament alive. Regarding Germany, Khrushchev wants to have all the nations that were at war with Germany meet early in the year. He says they will make peace together, or he will act alone. Khrushchev favored a renewed meeting of the four, providing there is no "provocation" regarding Berlin in the meantime.

Regarding the United Nations, Khrushchev said there are now in the world one billion Communists, one billion Neutralists, and 700 million capitalists, and he thought the UN should be converted into a three-bloc organization.

Mr. Menzies said that to him this is a rather quaint idea and he plans to say so publicly. The charter of the UN was designed for the preservation of peace by negotiation or, should this fail, by world force. Each member as an individual member has a role to play in this regard.

The President said that in his view there are two places where contacts with the Russians could go forward, either in the United Nations or in a meeting of the four powers. Mr. Herter commented that the President could not of course make a binding agreement for his successor. The President agreed that it would be necessary to leave the door open.

Mr. Macmillan thought that action should be in two parts, first a denunciation of the implication that the West has been opposing the resolution of problems, and second, agreement for a meeting on the basis that it would be a meeting of the four. The President said he had a great deal of doubt as to what any meeting could accomplish, since Khrushchev may simply be trying to see how far he can push us. Lord Home said he saw value in a reply by the President. This may itself stop the Neutrals in their proposal. However, he thought that Menzies should have a substitute resolution ready. Mr. Menzies agreed, commenting that the resolution should indicate the discussions would be limited to matters of concern to the four powers. The President said that the discussion had suggested to him that it would be well to shorten the letter that had been drafted. It should, however, recite the

---

<sup>7</sup> A memorandum of Macmillan's September 29 conversation with Khrushchev is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772.

Soviet action in breaking off the disarmament and summit conferences. Lord Home asked whether a reply would be sent to Nehru. The President said he would be agreeable to doing this. Mr. Menzies suggested sending a reply to each one of the five "Neutrals" and the President agreed.

The President then asked as to the best time to send the letters and make the public statement. Mr. Herter thought this should be done before Nehru speaks, and thought the letters should be delivered a short time before they are made public. The President added that he would like Mr. Herter to check the letters with both Macmillan and Menzies after they had been redone.

Lord Home said that Mr. Macmillan was seeing Nehru later the same day. He suggested it might be best to try to avoid this subject. Mr. Macmillan said his main purpose will be to influence Nehru on the question of the UN Secretariat. He thought that if the Soviets are able to drive out Hammarskjold, they will wreck the UN and make themselves appear to the rest of the world like the masters of the UN. The President said we will stand completely firm on this. Hammarskjold is impartially carrying out the instructions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

If Hammarskjold, as well as the Western nations, were going to be kicked around in the UN, then he thought those doing the kicking should be allowed to go ahead and break up the UN, since there would be no point in pretending that we have anything of value in those circumstances. The President concluded by saying that there is one Khrushchev recommendation he favored and that is to get the United Nations out of New York City. Having the United Nations there imposes a great burden on a free country, with a free press that people like Khrushchev and Castro can exploit for their own purposes.

Lord Home brought up one additional point—Khrushchev wants to add five "Neutrals" to the Disarmament Committee which now consists of ten members. He said his thought was to say that the Soviets may propose the addition of five, but we would like to add five also. Lord Home said it would be very difficult and undesirable to vote against the addition of Mexico, the UAR and one or two of the other nations proposed by the Soviets. Mr. Herter pointed out that the twenty-member committee would be getting quite unwieldy and discussion brought out that it is not desirable to approach this problem on a two-party basis.

G

*Brigadier General, USA*

**203. Editorial Note**

On October 2, President Eisenhower wrote to Nkrumah, Sukarno, Nasser, Tito, and Nehru, in response to their letter to him (Document 197). The President reiterated U.S. and his own personal commitment to resolving international questions by negotiation. He pointed out that the Soviet Union, "far from following a comparable policy of restraint, appears to have undertaken with deliberate intent a policy of increasing tension throughout the world and in particular of damaging relations with the United States."

The President continued: "There is nothing in the words or actions of the government of the Soviet Union which gives me any reason to believe that the meeting you suggest would hold any such promise. I would not wish to participate in a mere gesture which, in present circumstances, might convey a thoroughly misleading and unfortunate impression to the peoples of the world. If the Soviet Union seriously desires a reduction in tensions it can readily pave the way for useful negotiations by actions in the United Nations and elsewhere."

For full text of the President's letter, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960*, pages 742-744. The first draft of the letter was prepared in the Department of State, where it was reviewed by Herter. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772)

---

**204. Editorial Note**

On October 3 at the beginning of the 882d plenary meeting at 10:30 p.m., Chairman Khrushchev spoke in right of reply. He began as follows:

"In reply to the statements of certain speakers, I should like once again to make clear the attitude of the Soviet delegation towards one of the important questions placed before the United Nations General Assembly, at its present session, for consideration. I refer to the role and position of the executive organ of the United Nations which we propose should replace the post of Secretary-General."

He noted that besides the "great and powerful phalanx of socialist countries", new nations were appearing which were following a neutral policy. "More than a third of the world's population is, so to speak, discriminated against in the organs of the United Nations—in

the Security Council, for instance, and particularly in the Secretariat." Regarding Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, Khrushchev noted: "The post of Secretary-General is occupied by a representative of the Western Powers; not once in all these fifteen years has a representative of the socialist countries been allowed to act as President of the General Assembly."

Khrushchev admitted that the Western powers would have no faith in a Secretary-General from the socialist countries, and the "neutral countries, too, wish to play their part in the United Nations; they want their interests to be protected; and these legitimate demands of theirs must be taken into account." He proposed that the "only correct way, therefore, of solving this problem would be to create an executive organ consisting of three persons, representing the three groups of States, whose duty it would be to implement the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly."

He anticipated that some would accuse the Soviet Union of trying to destroy the United Nations, but defended his proposal: "this is a fair request. If not today, then tomorrow, all peoples in the world will realize that the United Nations must take into account the interests of all States. The alternative is the dominance of one or other group of States; and that means not the solution of problems but the aggravation of international tension, which might even lead to military conflict."

For full text of Khrushchev's address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.882.

---

**205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 3, 1960—12:54 p.m.*

573. Re ur 869, ChiRep.<sup>2</sup> Dept in accord Mission's suggestion re tactical procedure for handling Guinea "amendment" moratorium resolution.

To implement your procedure it is necessary to secure Boland's agreement to rule Guinea "amendment" is out of order. In pressing your suggestion following rationale should be given Boland in support

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-160. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Caprio and Sullivan and approved by Cargo who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 869, October 1, transmitted the text of a Guinean draft amendment which proposed seating the People's Republic of China in lieu of the Republic of China in the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*)

your procedure: Guinea proposal cannot properly be considered amendment in accordance with normal practice. It is clearly substantive proposal whereas resolution before the Assembly is clearly procedural matter only. It is improper proposal (even if it had been submitted separately) because it is a substantive proposal on a matter which has not been placed on agenda of Assembly. Acceptance of Guinea proposed "amendment" would establish precedent which would make orderly parliamentary business almost impossible since any del could then frustrate Assembly anytime by sheer sequence of new motions.

Mission should make strong effort persuade UK and other dels assure Boland of their support of your proposed method handling Guinea proposed "amendment".

In speaking to dels you might consider following supporting arguments as well as any others that seem appropriate to you:

1. In this session especially, in which Soviet leader, Khrushchev, is trying so hard dominate UN, non-communist states must stand firm in order maintain unity on important questions.

2. This obviously originated in Soviet Del, not Guinean and is intended to accentuate cold war. Consideration of other issues, such as disarmament, must not be delayed by endless debate on such matters as this.

On basis our understanding UK policy, Dept assumes UK would also regard Guinea "amendment" out of order.

However, even if Guinea "amendment" comes to substantive vote we do not agree UK should feel impelled vote in favor. Believe you should strongly press UK along following line: UK Del should vote against Guinea "amendment" on ground UK is supporting procedural moratorium proposal and is therefore opposed on procedural grounds to any proposal that would undercut moratorium effort. We think UK can take this line without in any way prejudicing its position on ChiCom recognition question.

**Herter**

**206. Editorial Note**

U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld addressed the General Assembly at the opening of its October 3 afternoon meeting, which began at 3 p.m. Responding to Chairman Krushchev's address that morning, Hammarskjöld stated: "I have no reason to defend myself or my colleagues against the accusations and judgments to which you have listened."

He noted his regret that the Soviet statement "tended to personalize an issue which, as I have said, in my view is not a question of a man but of an institution. The man does not count; the institution does. A weak or non-existent executive would mean that the United Nations would no longer be able to serve as an effective instrument for active protection of the interests of those many Members who need such protection."

Hammarskjöld concluded: "It is very easy to resign. It is not so easy to stay on. It is very easy to bow to the wish of a big Power. It is another matter to resist. As is well known to all Members of this Assembly I have done so before on many occasions and in many directions. If it is the wish of those nations who see in the Organization their best protection in the present world, I shall now do so again."

For full text of Hammarskjöld's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.883. Regarding Hammarskjöld's September 26 address before the U.N. General Assembly, see Document 189.

*The New York Times* reported that delegates applauded Hammarskjöld's assertion that he had a responsibility to continue as Secretary-General, and that he received a standing ovation when he stated he would stay in the office as long as the smaller nations wished him to do so. Khrushchev responded by beating his fists on his desk, while the other members of the Soviet Delegation refrained from applauding. (October 4, 1960, page A1)

The Mission at the United Nations issued a statement by Ambassador Wadsworth supporting Hammarskjöld. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1960, page 656.



## 207. Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, October 4, 1960—2 p.m.*

Secto 22. Summary of Secretary's conversation with Minister Nash (N.Z.).

Mr. Nash said that he too was convinced during his conversation last April that Khrushchev sincerely wanted peace but that since that time "everything he has done has been wrong". He described all three Khrushchev speeches as "very bad".

Nash pointed out that the last time he had seen Khrushchev was as Khrushchev's guest and that although he could not call on him he would like to speak to Khrushchev if he met him casually. (It appeared from remarks by McIntosh that the New Zealand Delegation had restrained Nash from approaching Khrushchev.)

Mr. Nash was fulsome in his praise of Mr. Hammarskjold and thought his reply to Khrushchev was excellent.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Nash observed that Mr. Nehru had spoken very well<sup>3</sup> "although there are things that you won't like". The Secretary said it was his opinion that Nehru was unsure as to what role he should play at this time. Mr. Nash thought that Nehru's statements re Hammarskjold were wrong.

In answer to a question as to what the Secretary "had to tell him" the Secretary referred to Khrushchev's proposal to change the organization of the UN and said that the proposal would destroy the entire concept of a Secretariat that worked for the Security Council and the Assembly, the entire idea of an international civil service. Mr. Nash observed that this issue had been fought through at San Francisco with New Zealand opposing the Soviet proposal. Mr. Nash asked what we would do if the Soviets decided to "pull out" of the United Nations. The Secretary replied that we did not think they would but that they might well try to make Hammarskjold's life so miserable that he would quit. Mr. Nash said he had come to the UN with the idea that he might be able to help devise some formula by which it would be possible to get "you and him" together but that Khrushchev had made this impossible. He felt that he could not now make such a suggestion without inferentially supporting Khrushchev.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-460. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Wellington. No drafting information appears on the source text. Another copy of Secto 22, however, indicates that Bell drafted it and that it was cleared with Krebs and Seip. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1769) A memorandum of this conversation shows the meeting took place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel at 3 p.m., October 3. (*Ibid.*, CF 1767)

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Nehru's October 3 address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.882.

The Secretary said that he had had a satisfactory conversation with General Nasution of Indonesia.<sup>4</sup> Nash said that he believed that Nasution and Djuanda were two that could be trusted in Indonesia. The Secretary said that Nasution had assured us that Indonesian troops in the Congo would be under UN command and would be viewed as UN troops.

Herter

---

<sup>4</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

---

## 208. Telegram From Secretary of State to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, October 3, 1960—11:45 p.m.*

Cahto 6. Pass White House. From discussion this afternoon with Macmillan and Lord Home<sup>2</sup> it is clear British are very anxious to placate the sponsors of the 5-power resolution<sup>3</sup> and the general sentiment in the Assembly. They believe Australian amendment<sup>4</sup> would not be adopted by the Assembly and that some other method of dealing with problem of this resolution was necessary. Both Macmillan and Home felt that we should stress the last paragraph of President's reply<sup>5</sup> and even to extent of interpreting the letter as on the whole an acceptance of the idea subject to the "reasonable conditions" set forth in this reply as a willingness to meet with Khrushchev here in New York.

I made it plain that we did not favor such a meeting, that in any event although not specifically in the letter the problem of release of the two members of U.S. Air Force was essential pre-condition, as well as Soviet willingness to resume disarmament discussions in the 10-power commission.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1768. Secret; Priority; Pass White House. Drafted by Bohlen, concurred in by Krebs and Seip, and authorized by Bohlen.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 197.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/L.316.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 203.

After considerable discussion of the various ways of meeting the problem of this 5-power resolution now scheduled to be considered on Wednesday, October 5, there seemed to be general agreement in principle that the best tactic was to concentrate on President's offer of availability of American officials, including myself, to discuss in preliminary fashion concrete measures for the reduction of tension, etc. along the lines in President's reply.

My impression is that Macmillan and Home are so anxious to re-establish the 4-power summit meeting of Heads of Government that they would be prepared to go to considerable length to re-interpret for purposes of General Assembly approval the President's letter in the direction of conformity with the 5-power neutral resolution. We have no intention of going along this path, but believe from tactical point of view it might be wise in either amendment to resolution or in speeches tomorrow or during debate on this item to emphasize point in President's letter that American officials including Secretary of State are available to discuss concrete measures to reduce tension.

Would appreciate any indication of President's views on problem of 5-power resolution which will come up for General Assembly discussion on Wednesday morning.<sup>6</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>6</sup> Dillon telephoned Herter from Washington at 2:30 p.m., October 4, to report that the President agreed with the approach the Secretary had taken during his meeting with Macmillan and Home. A memorandum of their telephone conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 110.11/10-460.

---

**209. Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 4, 1960—9:14 p.m.*

Secto 24. Subject: Averoff's Call on Secretary. During a call on Secretary morning October 4, Averoff urged amendment five-power resolution on Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks in lieu support Australian resolution. Congratulated on his seconding speech on postponement

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1769. Confidential. Repeated to Athens. Drafted by Hope and cleared with Krebs and Seip. A memorandum of this conversation shows the meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers at 9:45 a.m. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

of resolution<sup>2</sup> Averoff said Yugoslavs very offended and hoped efforts could be made save face of neutralist sponsors lest Khrushchev benefit even further from propaganda value. Averoff thought President's reply<sup>3</sup> clear, dignified and highly acceptable because left door open. Averoff undertook to sound out Yugoslavs further and Secretary agreed consult with him and other friends as we developed line on resolution. Secretary expressed concern that UN might establish pattern of recommending chiefs of state discuss all measures (for example Nasser-Ben Gurion, Hussein). He hoped effort would be to avoid resolution which attempted press personal meeting especially since latest Khrushchev statement slammed door except on impossible conditions.

Averoff described King Hussein's speech<sup>4</sup> as courageous and helpful in stiffening spines of delegates on other subjects.

He characterized US friends as being unhappy about ChiRep question saying they followed US only for reasons of decency and loyalty and found no real arguments to counter Soviet and neutralist attacks on US policy. The Secretary described ChiComs as declared aggressors in Korea, who intended take Formosa by force, and who had repudiated signed agreement on repatriation of Americans.<sup>5</sup> Secretary admitted question became more difficult each year and was anomalous in view large number Chinese not represented in UN but he believed Communist Chinese must declare intention stand by provisions of Charter as condition to entering. Averoff agreed and added Formosa should be guaranteed.

Averoff discussed Sino-Soviet relations but averred real evidence of difficulties between Communist states should not be basis for policy since Commie leaders would take measures avert serious clash except possibly where some material consideration involved (i.e., if China should seek extend borders into Soviet territory). The Secretary visualized potential Sino-Soviet trouble if ChiComs should attempt unilateral effort capture Formosa and Averoff concurred.

Averoff and Secretary agreed Khrushchev's behavior in UNGA outrageous and noted that new African states behaving generally with great restraint in situation.

Averoff said he would be leaving soon, going to Paris for Common Market talks which were not proceeding favorably. Then he would return Greece, where possibly necessary call Parliament into

<sup>2</sup> For text of Averoff's October 3 statement before the U.N. General Assembly, see U.N. doc. A/PV.883.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 203.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Hussein's October 3 address before the U.N. General Assembly, see U.N. doc. A/PV.882.

<sup>5</sup> For text of the Agreed Announcement between the United States and the People's Republic of China of September 10, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. III, pp. 85-86.

session in order fight out charges made by Nazi war criminal (and exploited by Commies) that PM and other high officials were Nazi collaborators. He thought crisis could be resolved successfully.

Averoff expressed support for Sarper and Gursal, but concerned over Turkish internal problem and trials which he thought would be accompanied by bloodletting. However, FonMin indicated his information that Menderes would not be executed since he had large and even increasing support among peasants.

Averoff referred repeatedly to report on Bucharest meeting<sup>6</sup> and suggested Department should study Albanian speeches in last and present UNGA, noting Albanian swing away from Soviet idolatry to fawning on Peking.

Lewis Jones and Guy Hope present at conversation.

**Herter**

---

<sup>6</sup> Not identified.

---

**210. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs (Meeker)<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 4, 1960.*

**UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE FIFTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

The United States faces tremendously increased difficulty in the United Nations for a variety of reasons: (1) the political complexion of the international community and of the United Nations membership has undergone marked change, with the Asian-African agglomeration now numbering more than 40 States; (2) the power position of the Soviet Union, in economic, military, and scientific terms, has been improved and strengthened dramatically since 1945; (3) Khrushchev, seeking to capitalize on these developments is making vigorous and determined efforts to alter subsisting international political structures and relationships to Soviet advantage.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, L Files: Lot 69 D 306, LCM Chron: 1960. Confidential. Meeker was in New York as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 15th U.N. General Assembly.

Khrushchev's strategy involves, within the United Nations, the reduction of Western influence. It involves also the destruction of independent and impartially exercised power in the form of the Secretary-General. And it involves undermining a neutrality on the part of uncommitted countries which could lead them in the exercise of their freedom to join with the West, under the banner of the United Nations, on particular issues of special importance to them.

In his attacks on the United States, Khrushchev has harped on the following themes: (a) the United States is now the leading exponent and practitioner of imperialist colonialism; (b) the United States is materialistic, rich in plunder, and grasping for more; (c) it is callous and crass toward the needs and aspirations of underdeveloped nations for economic improvement and social equality; (d) American capitalist society is rotten, and its unequal international relationships, based on exploitation, are crumbling; (e) the Communist world, in contrast, understands and supports the struggles of the poorer and newer countries; (f) the Communist bloc is constantly growing in relative power.

The United States national election contributes, of course, to the difficulty of the current situation in the General Assembly. There is not a great deal that can be done to offset the attendant uncertainties of the election. As suggested at the Delegation meeting this morning,<sup>2</sup> there are some mechanical and tactical steps that can be taken by the United States Delegation: close liaison with other delegations, conducted widely and continuously; good communication and coordination within the United States Delegation; impressing upon other countries in the Western alliance the necessity of taking a strong *public* stand on important East-West issues.

It is a truism that the *substance* of United States policies affects most importantly this country's posture in international relations. For that reason it is worthwhile to review certain of these policies on United Nations questions and see if they can be improved.

### *The area of colonialism*

Nineteenth-century colonialism has no future. The United States would have done well to reach this conclusion fifteen years ago and proceed to act on it. Our NATO allies would have disliked intensely such a decision, but would have had no alternative to accepting this as United States policy. The United States would, moreover, have done the allies a service by withdrawing completely our support of their illusions about colonial empire.

The colonialism issue, in its traditional form, is still alive in certain areas. Perhaps the most important example is the Portuguese colonies. In United Nations contexts, the United States should be prominent in

---

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

taking the position that these colonies must be prepared, as rapidly and effectively as possible, for full self-government and independence; such preparation should be under appropriate United Nations supervision.

While Portugal is yet to take the necessary steps for embarking on this course, the United States should not support its Security Council candidacy in the face of Asian-African opposition. We should promptly stimulate a suitable and promising country to run for the Council.

The time is long over-due for altering fundamentally our attitude toward the Algerian problem in the United Nations. Abstention is a highly unprofitable position to take. It should be our effort to bring about the drafting and adoption of a resolution which will be satisfactory to the African-Asian countries and put maximum pressure on France to agree to and implement early independence for Algeria.

New Guinea is another of these problems. The United States should be active in pressing for international supervision over the tutelage of New Guinea so that it may move with reasonable speed toward independence. It would be rational to see to it that this development should be geared in with progress on the Australian half of the island. Very possibly, ultimate political unification of New Guinea would make sense. We may expect bitter opposition from the Netherlands and from Indonesia, and perhaps also from Australia. This prospect should not deter the United States from floating its New Guinea proposals on their own merits.

#### *Latin American problems*

The United States faces already an acute problem with Cuba over the Guantanamo base. Difficulties over the Panama Canal are likely to recur and intensify. Before either of these matters develops into a crisis, the United States ought to take the initiative and head off trouble. We should state that we are quite prepared to give up Guantanamo provided no other country is given a base in Cuba. We would propose to Cuba and the United Nations an undertaking by Cuba to grant no military base to any country and an arrangement by which the United Nations would take over Guantanamo on a custodial basis, and for possible future use by international military forces.

With respect to the Panama Canal, we would do well to propose internationalization under an appropriate instrument, with United Nations controls, to assure efficient functioning and access for the ships of all nations at all times. In this case, prior consultation with Panama and other Latin American countries might be undertaken as a matter of choice before making a public proposal in the United Nations.

The making of proposals like these, if rejected by Cuba and Panama, would considerably strengthen the United States position if we were later to resist unilateral encroachments by the two countries.

### *The President's programs*

The United States ought to proceed promptly and determinedly with the proposals set forth in President Eisenhower's General Assembly address of September 22.<sup>3</sup> We ought to begin consulting on a resolution to give effect to the Africa program. We should also be able to advance specifics on the President's proposals to remove outer space from international military competition. Whether this is done in the outer space context or the disarmament context is less important than that it should be done and done promptly.

### *The Secretary-General*

It is now late, probably too late, to engage the President in active General Assembly participation on behalf of the United States. It might nevertheless be worthwhile to arrange one or more further meetings for him with selected heads of government and heads of delegation for the substantive discussion of basic United Nations matters: particularly the Soviet and Ghanaian proposals to overhaul the management of the United Nations Secretariat. It could be useful in this connection to emphasize that our disarmament proposals do *not* envisage placing the control mechanism in the hands of the Secretary-General, nor do we contemplate giving the Secretary-General command over the international forces which would eventually be constituted to keep world peace and security. On this basis it might be possible to come to a fruitful understanding with Prime Minister Nehru, for example, and to stimulate support for getting ahead with our disarmament program: the sooner this is done and we have agreement on a sound and workable set of disarmament arrangements, the sooner the United Nations can dispense with improvisations such as the arrangements for UNEF and the United Nations Force in the Congo.

### *Conclusion*

The above are a few suggestions on significant policy questions in the United Nations where change on the part of the United States would seem to offer the prospect of our coping more effectively with the existing political realities.

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 180.



211. Memorandum of a Conversation, Suite 35-C, Waldorf Towers, New York, October 4, 1960, 3 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SecDel MC/103

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.  
The Secretary  
B.E.L. Timmons, Advisor, USDel,  
UNGA

Sweden  
Osten Unden, Swedish Foreign  
Minister  
Mrs. Agda Rossel, Swedish Permanent  
Representative to the UN  
Per Lind, Member of Swedish UNGA  
Delegation and Deputy Director of  
Political Affairs, Swedish Foreign  
Ministry

SUBJECT

UN Problems; Algeria; Nuclear Testing

The Foreign Minister called on the Secretary at 3:00 p.m. today.

The Secretary opened the discussion by saying that the bitter Soviet denunciations of Mr. Hammarskjold, the office of the Secretary General, the UN Secretariat and the very structure and purpose of the UN, had left a very bad impression among delegations of the various countries to the UN General Assembly. Mr. Unden and Mrs. Rossel said they agreed thoroughly with the Secretary's statement. The Secretary said it was difficult to know what the Soviets had in mind or were planning to do. He said that we had been analyzing the situation to see if it seemed likely that the Soviets were preparing to walk out of the United Nations. The Secretary remarked that we did not think the Soviets would walk out, and Mr. Unden said that he was of the same opinion.

The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold's two interventions, in reply to Khrushchev's attacks, had been excellent. The United States is giving its fullest support to the UN and to Mr. Hammarskjold, and any compromise in the direction of the Soviet proposals must be resisted.

[Here follows discussion of the Congo.]

Returning to the question of the Soviet attack on the Secretary-General, Mr. Unden said he had not believed that Khrushchev would pursue the attack on Hammarskjold. It is very difficult to see what it really means. The Secretary said that the attack on Hammarskjold had come toward the end of the first Khrushchev speech, thus making it appear that Khrushchev had almost as an afterthought added the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Drafted by Timmons on October 5 and approved by S on October 11. A summary of SecDel MC/103 was transmitted to the Department of State in Secto 26, October 4. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 320/10-460)

attack on Hammarskjold, probably during his ocean crossing. This was undoubtedly due to the very effective way that Hammarskjold had handled the Congo situation and the failure of the Soviet attempt at unilateral intervention there.

Mr. Uden said that Khrushchev has now bound himself to his demand for revision of the UN structure, and that it would be difficult for Khrushchev to retreat from this position. The Secretary said that certainly the attack was a very strong one, but Khrushchev can and often does change—usually without notice.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister if he planned to speak in the UN general debate. Mr. Uden said he was preparing a speech, which would deal largely with the Congo and disarmament, and that he expected to deliver it on Wednesday, October 12,<sup>2</sup> as the second speaker in the morning.

[Here follows further discussion of the Congo.]

Turning to the resolution on the resumption of contacts between the President and Khrushchev tabled by Indonesia, India, U.A.R., Ghana and Yugoslavia, the Secretary jokingly asked Uden if he had felt "excluded" by not having been asked to join in co-sponsoring the resolution. Uden said that he certainly did not, that Sweden was not a member of any "neutral bloc", and that the very idea of such a bloc is a bad concept. The Secretary agreed, saying that we would hate to see a neutral bloc develop in the UN.

The Foreign Minister expressed the view that the five neutral nation resolution might have been taken "as offered" without debate. The Secretary said that now, with the original resolution and the Australian amendment<sup>3</sup> both on the table, it appeared that further amendments would be offered. We thought that, among other things, passage of the resolution in the form it was originally tabled would establish a dangerous trend, as one might find the UN then calling upon various statesmen to enter into discussion of this or that matter, or to take certain actions, etc. We thought that this tended to "personalize" the diplomatic process. Uden said he thought that probably resolutions of this nature "should not be taken too seriously."

[Here follows discussion of disarmament, Algeria, and Africa.]

Speaking of the Soviet proposal on colonialism,<sup>4</sup> the Foreign Minister inquired whether we had any further information. The Secretary said he had seen no substantive resolution yet. The only Soviet documents circulated were the Soviet anti-colonial "declaration" and a procedural motion to have the subject debated in plenary rather than in the First Committee.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/PV.901.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding this proposed amendment, see footnote 4, Document 208.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 6, Document 184.

## 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 4, 1960—7:59 p.m.

376. USUN just informed Dept Slim has said he has been instructed vote against ChiRep moratorium. GA vote now expected during evening session Oct 5.

You should see Bourguiba and emphasize urgency of position in GA and great importance Dept attaches to attitude on this question of Tunisian Gov't. You should approach him along following lines, using also any other arguments you may believe effective:

In this session especially, in view extraordinary efforts USSR dominate UN for own purposes including those in Africa, and respect with which new African leaders look to Tunisia and Bourguiba, it is of critical importance that noncommitted nations stand fast against this double effort to subvert UN for interests international Communism and to establish centers of influence in Africa.

Shift of Tunisian vote to negative would cause US greatest concern in relation to deeply held views of government and people of US. Would seem be abandonment of neutral position occupied by Tunisia and we fear would be felt by many that Tunisia yielding to pressure exerted by Khrushchev in his recent violent speeches in GA. This connection our information is that new African states will support or abstain on moratorium. Not understood why Tunisia need take different position.<sup>2</sup>

**Dillon**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-760. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Caprio and Cargo; cleared by Sullivan, Penfield, and AF; and approved by Wallner who signed for Dillon. Repeated niact to USUN. Similar instructions were sent to Dakar, Yaounde, Vientiane, and Abidjan. (Telegram 238, October 1; telegram 104, October 5; telegram 377, October 6; and telegram 122, October 6, respectively; *ibid.*, 303/10-160 through 10-660)

<sup>2</sup> Herter met with Slim October 4 to discuss Tunisia's vote on the Chinese moratorium; the substance of their conversation was sent to the Department in Secto 25 from USUN, October 4. (*Ibid.*, 303/10-460) Secto 30 from USUN, October 5, reported that Slim had received instructions to abstain. (*Ibid.*, 303/10-560)

213. **Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, October 5, 1960.*

893. Subject: Five-Power Res.

This morning we met with UK Reps to discuss question of how to deal with Five-Power res calling for mtg between Pres and Khrushchev and with Australian amendment submitted yesterday. It was agreed that best possible outcome would be if neither Five-Power res nor Australian amendments were pressed to vote and no res adopted. We agreed that UK would approach Nehru to seek his agreement to this. We and UK reps also agreed that it was necessary to develop amendment to Five-Power res which would broaden res to include UK and France and include idea of progress necessary before mtg. We worked out following revision of operative para of Five-Power res:

"Expresses the hope that every effort will be made, both within and outside the UN, to bring about the improved circumstances which would make possible an early renewal of fruitful negotiations at the highest level so that the declared willingness of the great powers to find solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiation may be progressively implemented."

Above language was subsequently approved by Secretary and Prime Minister Macmillan.

African-Asian group met this afternoon and heard statements from Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, and Nkrumah. Hoshi (Japan) informed US that Nehru made statement in which he emphasized that it was even more important now to press forward on Five-Power initiative. In these circumstances, Hoshi said, intention is to press Five-Power res to vote. Lord Home also met with Nehru and was told India thought res should be put to vote.

In view of clear intention of Nehru to press Five-Power res, we met with reps of Norway, Greece, and Argentina with view to encouraging them to submit an amendment to Five-Power res containing language given above. After lengthy conversations following revision of above language agreed to ad referendum:

*Expresses the hope that every effort will be made, both within and outside the UN, to bring about the improved circumstances which would make possible early and fruitful negotiations at the highest level among the reps of the major powers to find solutions of outstanding problems.*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Confidential; Priority. Received at 1:02 a.m. The source text bears the handwritten notation by Goodpaster: "President has seen G".

We found great reluctance among group to sponsor foregoing amendment, although they concur in what it seeks to do. Clearly, small powers reluctant to oppose initiative of 5 chiefs of state. Amadeo (Argentina) said that he would wish to check language with Slim (Tunisia) and that he would be reluctant to put forward amendment unless he is assured that at least moderates in African-Asian group would be willing to support revision. Slim said later he did not believe he could cosponsor amendment. Norway felt that above language takes into account changed situation existing today following responses of Pres and Khrushchev but was non-committal as to willingness to cosponsor, pending reactions from others. Greeks agreed to bring above revision to attention of Averoff but expressed serious doubts that he would wish to cosponsor in light of pressures on Greece from Yugoslavia on one hand and UAR on other. We also made above language available to Hoshi (Japan) requesting that they cosponsor along with above group. Hoshi later informed US that Matsudaira had wired our suggested revision to Tokyo requesting instructions. He told US he doubtful whether Japan would wish to be sponsor.

In view of foregoing, we seriously doubt that above group would be willing to sponsor suggested revision. In such circumstances, we believe we should pursue following course of action:

(A) US submit above amendment on its own and to campaign on its behalf;

(B) If such amendment should fail, to oppose Five-Power res and press others to do same in order secure its rejection. We likely need more time to assure sufficient support to reject Five-Power res and may have seek further delay in vote tomorrow morning.

Above course of action approved by Secretary.

**Wadsworth**

---

**214. Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 5, 1960—11:08 p.m.*

Secto 31. Subject: Call on Secretary by Pakistan Min Fuel and Power Bhutto. Following from uncleared memo of conversation:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1769. Confidential. Repeated to Karachi. Drafted by Hope and cleared with Seip. A memorandum of this conversation shows the meeting took place at Waldorf Towers at 10:45 a.m. (*Ibid.*, CF 1767)

### 1. *Five Power Resolution*

In call on Secretary morning Oct 5, Min Fuel Bhutto expressed concern over attention paid to reps of neutralist countries by US at expense of friendly "committed" nations like Pakistan. Stated Pak FM had not come to UN in part because of US lack of enthusiasm over Khrushchev visit and his invitation to neutralist leaders. Bhutto stated frankly that man-in-street in various countries regarded US as most anxious appease neutralists, whom he described as immoral. Obviously smarting under Pak exclusion from confidence Afro-Asians because of committed position, he felt US, which had made mistake in being overly cordial to neutralist leaders, should do more to show its confidence in true friends. Secretary explained Pres had been unable refuse to see heads of govt in NY during his visit; US had not encouraged interviews.

Min described Afro-Asian meeting of Oct 4 as Indian effort exert pressure on Afro-Asians to support Five-Power res completely or be branded as enemies of peace. Said meeting held under guise of farewell of departing leaders to their colleagues, but actually was pressure play in effort establish neutralists as guiding force in UN. Bhutto stated his belief Menon had conceived res, said neither Nasser nor Sukarno appeared fully familiar with implications. He had talked privately with Nasser and had heard Nkrumah speak and obvious to him resolution put together hastily under Indian sponsorship with Tito joining in attempt to enhance his prestige by pushing it. Bhutto had told Nasser that Nehru effort to "break ice" might break UN apart. Bhutto thinks a climate for peace must be built before there can be any effective negotiation.

Min declared Pakistan in quandry about res; Paks had met with Menzies on Australian amendment, but thought if nothing more affirmative forthcoming, his Del would have to support Five-Power res lest [source text illegible] isolated completely from neighbors. He claimed credit for inspiring Argentines introduce amendment so free world would not have to be negative.<sup>2</sup>

Secretary stated frankly concerned about precedent involved in Five-Power res, since no end to possibilities of individual leaders being pressured to meet (example—Nasser—Ben Gurion<sup>3</sup>). Preferred past UN reses which had been directed to govts. Said no final decision on res but Pres being consulted. He knew Pres would not change position on meeting Khrushchev under present circumstances and hoped res might emerge which followed usual pattern; otherwise, US inclined

<sup>2</sup> During deliberations the evening of October 5, Argentina proposed on a point of order that the U.N. General Assembly consider separately the phrases "the President of" and "the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of" in the five-power draft resolution.

<sup>3</sup> David Ben Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

not to have anything to do with effort. We valued Paks loyal support for free world efforts and know they would continue helpful in common effort.

[Here follows discussion of Pushtunistan.]

### 3. *Role of Neutralist Countries*

Bhutto stated had told Nehru, Tito and Nasser that all should concentrate on removing causes of friction in their own areas rather than attempting pressure in UN. Secretary agreed this would be better employment of energies. Min said he was hopeful on discussions between India and Pakistan growing out of Indus Waters settlement, for which Pakistan grateful to US, IBRD and other efforts to solve problem.

### 4. *Chinese Representation*

Bhutto affirmed Pak support for US position on ChiRep moratorium, but declared his country under considerable pressure from ChiComs on logic of position (Paks recognize CPR) and on case made by ChiComs that Indians support CPR seating in UN despite border troubles, while Paks oppose it despite restraint of ChiComs about Pak borders. Secretary acknowledged difficulty with ChiRep issue but pointed out ChiComs are condemned aggressors who show no desire meet conditions of UN charter. Bhutto agreed with US view.

[Here follows discussion of Algeria.]

### 6. *Khrushchev Movements*

Responding to Bhutto query, Secretary said his present estimate Khrushchev movements would be affected by failure or success of effort to get disarmament item allocated to plenary. If he could succeed, he would be likely to remain and make more propaganda. Bhutto agreed it would be illogical and useless to have disarmament discussed in plenary, where it would become simply propaganda sounding-board, whereas small expert group might make real progress.

Lewis Jones and Hope present.

**Herter**

---

## 215. Editorial Note

On October 5, Philippine Representative Delgado addressed the U.N. General Assembly during general debate. *The New York Times* reported that three times during his remarks, Chairman Khrushchev responded to Delgado's comments by pounding his fist on his desk. (October 6, 1960, page A1) For a record of these proceedings and the

text of Delgado's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.888. For Khrushchev's account of the meeting, see *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, pages 471-472.

That evening, the General Assembly met again to consider a draft resolution proposed by Ghana, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia calling for an Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting. After nearly 3 hours of deliberations, the General Assembly decided to exclude the phrases "the President of" and "the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of" from the text of the draft. The United States supported these omissions. At this point, the Indian representative requested a quarter-hour adjournment to allow the resolution's sponsors to consider these changes. When the meeting resumed, Indian Prime Minister Nehru announced that the sponsors wished to withdraw the draft resolution. This was done, and the meeting adjourned. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.889. For text of the draft resolution, which had been revised at that morning's meeting, see U.N. doc. A/L.317. For the previous text of the draft resolution, see Document 197.

---

**216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 6, 1960—8:48 p.m.*

617. Ref: Soviet Draft Declaration on granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

In preparation for debate on Soviet colonialism item, Department believes it important secure as much support as possible in general debate and in committee for proposition that USSR remains major colonial while other former colonial empires have been largely liquidated. Inasmuch as there will be clear majority in UNGA for any statement condemning colonialism, best course we can follow is to seek turn declaration against Soviets themselves by portraying them in true colonialist colors. Department will be transmitting shortly materials for use briefing other delegations on this item. We believe would be helpful have wide geographic distribution of members making this point.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/10-660. Confidential. Drafted by Tron, initialed by Cargo and Buffum, cleared by Nunley and Sullivan, and approved by Wallner who signed for Dillon. Repeated to Moscow by pouch.



Type of statement we have in mind is best exemplified by Prime Minister of Malaya's address to House of Representatives Kuala Lumpur September 20. He said that the Malayan people had been happy at the thought that one of the major problems of the world and a source of acrimony—colonialism—was slowly but surely being rooted out of the African continent. "We had looked forward," he said, "to a period of comparative peace and harmony. The Communists, however, with their pretensions to champion the cause of colonial and enslaved people are in fact seeking to impose the worst kind of slavery on mankind. We have seen what happened in China and Tibet and we should take heed."

Department believes series of statements of this type in general debate and committee would help develop climate of Assembly opinion favorable to amendment of Soviet declaration in manner unacceptable to USSR. Also useful if certain governments could supplement these general statements by including material providing detailed case histories of Soviet takeover, in particular East European areas, such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Baltic countries.

Dillon

---

**217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 6, 1960—10 p.m.*

620. Following are highlights Sukarno's call on President Eisenhower Oct. 6 based on unclear memorandum of conversation.<sup>2</sup>

1. President raised matter of five neutral power resolution and assured Sukarno he did not question motive of sponsoring nations and was in fact completely in accord with objective they were trying to serve. President attempted explain to Sukarno why gesture of meeting with Khrushchev was futile and in our view would be productive of further tension rather than lessening of it. President reviewed U2 incident and abortive summit conference and commented it obvious that Khrushchev was determined make as much propaganda as possi-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:20 a.m., October 7. Sent also to Djakarta and repeated to The Hague.

<sup>2</sup> A copy is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

ble out of breakup in Paris. President remarked that accident of location of United Nations placed Khrushchev in U.S. but this fact had no practical bearing on their getting together. He concluded by assuring Sukarno it was only his firm conviction that nothing would be accomplished by any attempt to get together with Khrushchev which caused him to reject this idea. Sukarno noted that neutrals had of course withdrawn their resolution last night<sup>3</sup> because they were not receptive to amendments suggested by Australia. However Sukarno maintained his viewpoint that President and Khrushchev should meet since he felt that such meeting would break the ice if it accomplished nothing else.

[Here follows discussion of Indonesian domestic affairs; the impending arrival in Indonesia of the Project Hope hospital ship; the prospect of Eisenhower's visiting Indonesia; mention of topics not discussed; and comments on the administrative details of Sukarno's visit.]

Dillon

---

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the withdrawal of the draft resolution, see Document 215.

---

**218. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, White House, Washington, October 7, 1960, 8:35-10:10 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

The following were present:

[Here follows a list of attendees. The President presided at the meeting.]

(Just before this meeting of the Cabinet adjourned, the President said: "I must tell you that, coming into this meeting with Khrushchev on my mind, I did not ask for our usual moment of silent prayer. But this has been a custom in the Cabinet, and I should not like to see us give it up. So I ask you now to join me in a moment of silent prayer.")

[Here follow an announcement that the first item, a presentation by the President's Special Assistant, George B. Kistiakowsky, would be omitted, and discussion of the second item, "Report on the International Atomic Energy Agency."]

*Developments at the United Nations*—Mr. Dillon told the President that Mr. Wadsworth would make this presentation and also a forecast. Accordingly, Amb. Wadsworth reported as follows.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Papers. Confidential. Drafted by James M. Lambie, Jr., Special Assistant in the White House Office.

In general, the news media have given a fairly accurate picture of what has been going on at the UN. But there has been some biased reporting by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. This is too bad, because the delegates read the *Times* to determine, as they suppose, United States policy and government thinking. They forget that we have a free press.

The President's speech was very well received, many delegates feeling that it was the only speech that contained constructive suggestions.

When Khrushchev spoke, he "made a mess of himself". He attacked the structure of the United Nations and the Secretary General.

Amb. Wadsworth could find no real support for Khrushchev's attitudes. The delegates realize that he would destroy the UN, although Sukarno feels that its headquarters should be removed from the United States.

There was a mixed reaction to Khrushchev. Some feel that he has overplayed his hand, others that he has frightened some of the delegates—not that he was rattling rockets, but simply by raising in people's minds the question of what would happen to the UN if the Soviet were to walk out? There was a good deal of talk about the effect on this and future meetings.

Castro's four-hour harangue was simply too much.<sup>2</sup> He would have done well to cut it to two hours, either the first two or the last two. It may have had some effect on some of the Africans, but this is probably transitory. And he did offend some of the delegates.

The proposal by the five neutrals that the President and Khrushchev meet did not get much support. Most delegates recognized that it was impossible. So it became a matter of personal prestige for Nehru and Nkrumah.

Finally, Nehru, in a pique, withdrew the resolution, so the resolution is no longer before the UN. The Africans supported Nehru partly because they do not understand the situation and also because to many of them Nehru is a demi-god. Herter is talking with Nehru today.<sup>3</sup> The probability is that Nehru realizes he made a tactical mistake in naming the parties to meet rather than the more moderate proposal, which would have widespread support, to the effect simply that the United States and the Soviet Union should continue to negotiate on problems of world peace.

---

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Castro's September 26 statement before the U.N. General Assembly, see footnote 3, Document 194.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1767.

Next after the President came Macmillan and Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker was very hard indeed on the Communists. Macmillan no less hard, but very deft and artful. Many of the delegates were offended by Khrushchev's behavior during Macmillan's speech.

Then a number of UN housekeeping items were taken up.

On the vote to consider the admission of Red China, we expect about a 50-30 vote against, with 19 abstentions. We very nearly lost Tunisia for our side; this was avoided only by fast action by the State Department. Indonesia and others argue that we must have Red China. We can keep China out this time, but we must face the prospect that we may one day have her in the UN.

The President interjected to ask whether there are any members of the UN that we do not recognize.

The answer was no, but there are some which some South American countries do not recognize.

Amb. Wadsworth continued. There is much sentiment at the UN favorable to the proposition that Lumumba is the legal head of state of the Congo. They realize he is an unstable, undependable character, but think nevertheless that Kasavubu had no authority to fire him.

In summary, the Ambassador felt that we are finishing much the most difficult period the United Nations has experienced. The picture is not all dark: the delegates are getting to see for themselves some of the Soviet antics. But nothing actually will get done until all the big-wigs leave. The best guess is that Khrushchev will probably not stay beyond the 14th. The big trouble is: Algeria. The Africans and some others will simply never be able to understand how the United States, with its Declaration of Independence and so on, can support France on this issue.

The President commented that he had had Sukarno come to see him<sup>4</sup> for just one reason—to ask him what his thinking was in the five neutral power resolution. The President had, he said, pressed Sukarno hard on this—what did he hope to accomplish? While they were talking the resolution was withdrawn, and the President said he could get nowhere with his questions. Many of these people, the President felt, pretend to think we are as evil as the Soviets. They don't really believe this, but . . . .<sup>5</sup> this one "wouldn't tell you anything".

Sec. Dillon stated his belief that, regarding the neutral question, all spokesmen ought to follow the line of our reply to the five: it was a well-intentioned but naive proposal. On China—the less said the better.

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding Eisenhower's October 6 meeting with Sukarno, see footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

Amb. Wadsworth then addressed the President on the question of receiving representatives of the African nations, saying that the entire U.S. delegation feels strongly that anything the President can do to see the delegates from the new countries the better. It's a matter of face and prestige with them. Here they have been to the United Nations meeting in the United States, and when they get back they will be asked if they met the President.

The President said it would be fine if they will come to his office, but that he couldn't have a lunch or dinner for each of them—it takes too much out of the day. He suggested that if a whole group of them were to come down at once, he might give them a luncheon or something.

Amb. Wadsworth told the President that wasn't really necessary—that all they need to do really is come to the White House and shake hands with him. Most of them don't speak English anyway. It's just a matter of going through that motion so that they will have met the President of the United States.

The President said that was fine with him and would Mr. Wadsworth please tell the Secretary of State to send as many of them down as he wants, and he would see them. Inasmuch as he was seeing the representative of Nigeria the following day, he wondered if some of the others couldn't come along too.<sup>6</sup>

The President went on to say that he had an agreement to make one more speech before the session closes<sup>7</sup>—on implementation of our proposals. The difficulty, as he saw it, on Red China's admission is that too many people say never, never. He remarked that never is an awfully long time. And he himself is always very careful: he says that if these people correct three or four of the worst things they are guilty of, we'd have a tough problem keeping them out. He agreed, however, that the less said the better; as of now, certainly, we just can't accept the admission of Red China.

---

<sup>6</sup> A memorandum of Eisenhower's meeting with the Nigerian Prime Minister, who headed the Nigerian U.N. Delegation, is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Eisenhower met briefly with representatives from the following countries on October 14: Republic of Cameroun, Central African Republic, Republic of Chad, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of Cyprus, Republic of Dahomey, Gabonese Republic, Republic of the Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Republic of Mali, Republic of Niger, Federation of Nigeria, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Togo, Somali Republic, and Republic of Upper Volta. For text of the President's remarks at this gathering, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961*, pp. 760–763.

<sup>7</sup> Eisenhower did not address the 15th General Assembly a second time.

[Here follow discussion of "Report on Statements and Discussions Regarding the Economy Before the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund" and "Department of Defense Consultation with Labor Leaders" and comments by Secretary Gates.]

JML

---

219. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers, New York, October 7, 1960, 10 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

SecDel/MC/124

## PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary, NEA

A. Guy Hope, Adviser to U.S. Delegation to the UNGA

His Excellency Saeb Salaam, President of Council of Ministers, Lebanon

His Excellency Philippe Tacla, Minister for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Fouad Ammoun, Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nadim Dimechkie, Ambassador to U.S.

The Prime Minister expressed the hope that the presence at the General Assembly of so many high-ranking personalities would lead to the strengthening of the United Nations. Unlike some others, he was optimistic in this regard.

Referring to the "everlasting question" of Chinese representation, the Prime Minister thought frankly that the Western position was an equivocal one. He believed it was illogical to continue to deny adequate representation to the large population of China. The Lebanese Government continued to support the moratorium because it did not want to introduce another upsetting factor into the complex of world problems now confronting all of us.

The Secretary said the Chinese Communists have not made it any easier for the United Nations to solve the problem. They had not abided by their written agreements, had consistently failed to show willingness to accept the obligations of the UN Charter, and continued as declared aggressors. Moreover, they continued to hold five Americans as prisoners in defiance of their written undertakings. The Secre-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1767. Confidential. Drafted by Hope and approved by S on October 14. A summary of this conversation was sent to the Department in telegram 923 from USUN, October 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 301/10-760)

tary told how as Governor of Massachusetts he had cooperated with the Federal Government in expressing willingness to pardon a Chinese prisoner so he could be repatriated, only to have the prisoner indicate his preference for remaining in an American jail rather than to be returned to Communist China. (The Lebanese visitors showed appreciation of the incongruity of the prisoner's plight.) Again, the Chinese Communists continued to threaten to take Taiwan by force.

The Prime Minister said such tactics do not go with the present mood of the world, which is opposed to solutions by force.

The Secretary remarked that there were some curious factors in the United Nations set-up. Thus the sixteen new nations of Africa each had a vote, while China, with a population nearly three times that of all Africa, was only represented by one vote. The Prime Minister thought it was healthy to have the small and uncommitted nations represented so fully in the UN so they could voice their opinions on important world measures. The Secretary added that it was a tragic note that there were some two to three thousand specially skilled and experienced Chinese on Formosa whose valuable services were not available to China as a whole. They were getting older now and would be hard to replace.

[Here follows discussion of Ambassador McClintock and development and international assistance in Lebanon.]

The Prime Minister inquired whether there were any important developments expected in the General Assembly after the China issue. The Secretary responded that in the next few days he expected a Soviet effort to overrule the General Committee decision on allocating the disarmament item to Committee One in an effort to get it referred to the Plenary where the USSR could make the fullest possible propaganda exploitation of the issue. The Prime Minister thought that only in Committee could any progress be expected, and the Secretary agreed.

Otherwise, the Secretary noted, we could expect a lot more eloquence from the rostrum on many subjects. He had recently read the text of the statements by Ecuador and Peru<sup>2</sup> and had been struck with the 100 per cent discrepancy in facts. We were a guarantor of the agreement and hoped Ecuador would soon announce more favorable developments.

[Here follows discussion of Israel and Algeria.]

The Prime Minister said he had enjoyed his talk with the Secretary and wanted to express his gratification that the United States was one Big Power which seemed always to support the United Nations

---

<sup>2</sup> For texts of these September 29 statements, see U.N. doc. A/PV.878.

and to be conscious of the problems of small nations. The Secretary said we valued the friendship and understanding of Lebanon and that he had been happy to see the visitors.

---

## 220. Editorial Note

On October 7, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to recommend to the General Assembly that the Federation of Nigeria be admitted to the United Nations. Secretary of State Herter gave the U.S. statement endorsing this proposal; for text of his statement and a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. S/PV.908.

That afternoon the General Assembly decided by acclamation to grant Nigeria U.N. membership. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Wilcox gave the U.S. statement welcoming Nigeria to the United Nations; for text of his statement and a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.893. For text of the resolution admitting Nigeria to the United Nations, see U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1492 (XV), printed in U.N. doc. A/4684.

---

## 221. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, October 7, 1960—8 p.m.*

926. U.S. initiative re Soviet actions in GA (Tosec 49).<sup>2</sup>

1. In my opinion Khrushchev has overplayed his hand with neutralists and others here both through his bitter attacks against U.S., through his attacks on SYG, and his personal behavior in plenary hall when Macmillan spoke.<sup>3</sup>

2. There is prevailing sentiment in GA against cold-war atmosphere and Soviets are suffering for having made such attacks basis their posture in GA.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-760. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Document 196.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 198.



3. In these circumstances I do not think we should submit item of nature contained reftel. We will have ample opportunity in rebuttal to Soviet items and charges to include in speeches and possibly even resolutions main elements contained in draft memorandum of explanation. I believe this is way in which we will be most effective this year.

**Wadsworth**

---

**222. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 7, 1960—9 p.m.*

929. Financial situation at 15th GA.

1. Fol message represents del position agreed to by all reps and alternates.

2. At this GA, UN members being called upon to pay almost \$275 million more than last year. This amount made up as fol:

Regular budget \$12,000,000

UNEF

UN Congo military operation

1960 (minimum of) 45,000,000

1961 80-90,000,000

Financial aid to Congo (approved by emergency GA with U.S. support) 100,000,000

Additional contributions to ETAP and Special Fund (to reach President's proposed level of \$100,000,000) 30,000,000

3. U.S. Del understands most likely source U.S. monies to meet above-mentioned expenses for Congo and Africa are MSP contingency funds subject to condition U.S. contribution will not exceed 40 percent of total.

4. It is clear from (a) fact that Sov bloc cannot be expected to contribute and (b) consultations with dels such as UK, Australia, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, it impossible raise necessary funds with U.S. contribution at 40 percent level.

5. Impossible say at this date what level of U.S. contribution required to maintain UN operation in Africa and solvency of organization. We will continue make maximum efforts—and assume Dept will

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-760. Limited Official Use.

do same—assure largest possible contributions from other sources. However, it obvious other members discouraged at magnitude of financial obligation and hopelessness of financing if U.S. maintains 40 percent position.

6. Believe it essential—to preserve UN as organization, to maintain UN operation in Congo, to implement U.S. proposals re Africa, and to support position of SYG—that U.S. not permit failure UN operations, to which we have given full support and which have been crucial element in keeping Sovs out of Congo, and one of best hopes keeping them out of other parts Africa. Such failure would mean that Khrushchev had attained his objective. In all probability, it will be necessary to request supplemental appropriation in January to enable U.S. increase its contribution substantially during fiscal year 1961 if Sov threat to future of UN is to be checked. In addition, congressional consent to elimination of 40 percent limitation will also be essential. Price for success is not too great for U.S. when existence of UN in balance and when we consider what we have paid for other multilateral operations like UNRRA (72 percent), UNKRA (60 percent), UNRWA (70 percent), and particularly the Korean military operation.

7. Also believe that, if U.S. in position to assure sufficient financial support these operations while Sovs refusing do so (both with respect UNEF and ONUC), we can turn this to political advantage over USSR.

8. Suggest consideration be given financing through combination of (a) emergency transfer from MSP funds other than contingency funds, plus (b) pledges here based on commitment to seek supplemental appropriation in January, plus (c) use of contingency funds subject to 40 percent limit.

9. Suggest Department consult urgently with President and congressional leaders in order assure that U.S. Del can take such action re above financial matters at this GA as may be necessary for purpose mentioned above.

10. Would appreciate guidance as to Department's longer-range thinking re economic development aid and inevitable crisis budgetary aid in Africa.

**Wadsworth**

**223. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs (Meeker)<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 10, 1960.*

**NEW RULES FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

*The Problem of Slow and Inefficient Proceedings*

The General Assembly is in danger of suffocation from a volcanic outpouring of words by 99 member delegations.

The Assembly has now been in session for three weeks. Despite a number of night and Saturday meetings—to debate the inclusion of items on the agenda and their allocation—the Assembly is still a long way from completing the general-debate speeches in plenary; more than a third of the delegations have not yet spoken.

Appeals by the President of the General Assembly for punctuality in starting meetings, for restraint in invoking the right of reply, and for brevity in interventions have not been effective to bring about efficient despatch of the Assembly's business.

The lateness of the plenary in concluding its general debate has delayed the start of main committee meetings. The political committees may not meet until nearly the first of November. When the committees *are* all in operation, their proceedings are likely to be correspondingly slow, with the substantial increase that has taken place in United Nations membership.

These phenomena are occurring in the face of an Assembly agenda that is, if anything, heavier than in previous years. In the past, three months have been considered a long period to devote to the regular annual session of the General Assembly. Now, it would appear that the Assembly may be quite unable to get through its agenda in less than five or six months.

Since purely voluntary measures do not give real promise of enabling the General Assembly to escape a near-paralysis from excessive debate, other steps should be most carefully weighed.

*Reasons for Reform*

Before outlining some of these steps, it may be worthwhile to consider briefly the reasons which argue for expeditious and effective General Assembly proceedings.

It is in the interest of the United States and of most other countries to maintain an effectively functioning United Nations. The General Assembly is of great importance in the whole United Nations struc-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, L Files: Lot 69 D 306, LCM Chron 1960. Meeker was in New York as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 15th U.N. General Assembly.

ture, and we want to keep it in operation as a working body. If the Assembly's deliberations become unduly protracted, it will no longer be a dependable functioning instrumentality.

The attendance of foreign ministers and other high-level government representatives can contribute to agreement and accomplishment at General Assembly sessions. Such officials possess substantially greater authority than the regular delegations. If they attend, and if they involve themselves in the substantive business of the Assembly, progress out of the ordinary can be made. Such a pattern and practice deserves encouragement. If Assembly sessions become over-long, the proceedings are bound to deteriorate in effectiveness and in significance.

### *Suggestions*

There is probably not time to work out reforms which could be applied to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly this year. But steps should be taken to get agreement on reforms to be applied in 1961. This might be undertaken through the proposing of a new agenda item and its allocation to the Assembly's Legal Committee, which has this year a trivial agenda and which has a special interest in the Rules of Procedure (see, for example, resolution 684 (VII), and the 1952 Sixth Committee debate on the report of the Special Committee on Assembly Methods and Procedures).<sup>2</sup>

The following are specific measures which ought to be considered:

1. *Time limits.* At the present time, Rules 74 and 115<sup>3</sup> provide only that the plenary or a main committee *may* limit the duration of speeches. In practice limitations are not imposed. The Rule could be re-drawn to provide definite time limits, with the understanding that these will be strictly enforced and will not be waived by the body in question except in extraordinary circumstances for the most pressing reasons. Forty-five minutes might be set as the maximum for a general debate speech in plenary (only one of these should be allowed per delegation); 30 minutes for the initial statement on any item being considered in plenary or committee; ten minutes for a single statement per delegation on resolutions; ten minutes for a single statement per delegation on amendments.

<sup>2</sup> For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 684 (VII), see U.N. doc. A/2361. For a record of the Sixth Committee debate, see U.N. docs. A/C.6/SR.306-A/C.6/SR.312.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/520/Rev.15.

2. *Explanation of vote.* Oral explanations of vote could be abolished with an appropriate amendment of Rules 90 and 129. A delegation which wished could have a brief written explanation of vote inserted in the record.

3. *Rights of reply.* The rights of reply have been invoked extensively in the plenary general debate this year. Speeches made allegedly in reply have contained all kinds of new matter. To prevent abuse, time limits could be imposed—perhaps ten minutes for plenary and five minutes for committee.

4. *Points of order.* A five-minute time limit should be placed on all points of order. To make Rules 73 and 114 even more definite, words might be added to provide that no representative shall be allowed to speak at all after a point of order until the point has been disposed of by ruling (and vote on a challenge if necessary).

Time limits require time-keeping machinery. A large clock could be installed in each meeting room in full view, to be started by the Committee Secretary as a representative begins speaking, and working backward to show the time still remaining. When time has run out, the presiding officer should require the speaker to end with the sentence he is then uttering.

5. *Start of meetings.* All meetings should open exactly at the appointed hour. If the President or Chairman is not present, a Vice President or Vice Chairman would preside. The Secretariat would have the duty of seeing to it that a presiding officer is always available on time. Rules 69 and 110 (Quorum) could be modified to apply only to voting and elections.

6. *Closing the list of speakers.* Rules 75 and 116 might be amended to provide that the list of speakers in any general debate shall be closed at the end of the second meeting given to such debate. The list would then be announced by the presiding officer. Any delegate not ready to speak when reached would forfeit his place, and would not be allowed to speak later in the same list unless (a) he had previously exchanged places with another delegate, or (b) the body in question voted, in exceptional circumstances, to allow re-inscription.

7. *Voting.* As soon as the list of speakers have been exhausted, the presiding officer should put proposals to a vote without delay.

8. *Relevance of remarks.* The General Assembly might exhort presiding officers to be strict in the application of Rules 70 and 111, requiring all speakers to limit themselves to the subject under discussion.

### *Conclusion*

Many if not most or all of the above suggestions may be objected to by some on the ground of severity and infringing on the sovereign rights of States. With an international organization of 99 members,

and having the prospect of further additions,<sup>4</sup> definite measures to preserve order and efficiency are called for. Unless States exercise part of their sovereignty in self-limitation here—as they do by treaty and by international law in many areas of world affairs—international organization through the United Nations will break down.

Also, it should be recalled that in experience with the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure the most explicit Rules have been applied with generally agreed success: e.g., Rules 76–79 and 117–120 (on procedural motions and their order of precedence).

---

<sup>4</sup> A Rule of Procedure should perhaps also be adopted to ban speeches on the admission of new members. A whole afternoon was taken up by the admission of Nigeria. The welcoming speeches could have taken some other form not occupying the Assembly's time, and the debut of the Nigerian Prime Minister could have been made in the plenary's general debate. [Footnote in the source text.]

---

## 224. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, October 11, 1960—2 a.m.*

954. Subject: ChiRep recapitulation.<sup>2</sup>

1. In addition new members, 13 of whom abstained throughout while 3, Nigeria, Senegal and Mali opposed, following are vote changes from 14th GA on US moratorium:

- a. Res as whole, from 44–29, 9 to 42–34, 22; Laos and Malaya from support to abstain, Cuba and Ethiopia from abstain to oppose.
- b. Para One, from 41–30, 11 to 38–34, 26; Ecuador, Malaya and Laos from support to abstain, Cuba from abstain to oppose.
- c. Para Two, 43–29, 10 to 41–34, 23; Laos and Panama from support to abstain, Cuba and Ethiopia from abstain to oppose.

2. As Dept will note, closest point was Para One where margin only four votes. (As was true last year Mexico, New Zealand and Venezuela abstained this para.) Believe closeness this vote should be emphasized when gratitude is expressed either by Dept or in capitals

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10–1160. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> On October 8, by a vote of 43 for, 34 against, and 22 abstentions, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1493 (XV), which rejected the Soviet Union's request to include an item on Chinese representation on the 15th General Assembly agenda and stated that the 15th General Assembly would not consider any proposals to exclude representatives of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China. For text, see U.N. doc. A/4684. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/PV.895.

to those govts whose support was crucial this year. We believe prompt high level expressions of gratitude should be made to all supporting states who stood firm this year as well as to Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia who abstained despite pressures to oppose. Gratitude should also be expressed for supporting statements by Spain, Greece, UK, Panama (despite their reservation on Para Two), Costa Rica, Australia and Philippines. (Phil Del had at one point removed selves from speakers list. According Gamboa<sup>3</sup> this came after poll of their delegates revealed majority opposed speaking in face overwhelming opposition of ASAF group. Later member ChiDel told US Phil decision reinstate selves on speakers list was result approach, recommended by USGADel, by Chi Amb Manila to Serano.<sup>4</sup> In any case Marcos<sup>5</sup> made extremely effective statement.)

3. On basis conversations with new African Dels prior to vote, observation behavior dels on floor immediately before vote, and actual vote on ChiRep issue, we conclude:

a. Strong current developed since beginning of GA, from initial position of few new African Dels favoring moratorium, toward abstention and even opposition. If vote had come later it might have been worse. Without intensive efforts GADel officers bulk of Africans probably would not have even held to abstention.

b. There is evidence USGADel efforts had toward end approached point where further conversations with Africans could have become counter-productive. Member of ChiDel and also French specifically warned that GADel could not press new Africans further without causing antagonism. Some dels that had earlier indicated position favorable to moratorium were acutely uncomfortable in presence USDel officers. Some of them stated they felt they simply could not break unity of new states. Unity factor was obviously important in decision Malagasy Republic, Cameroun, Congo (Brazzaville) and Togo to abstain.

c. Negative vote of Mali is explained by virtual break with France and rapprochement with Guinea. Negative vote of Senegal probably due to anxiousness not to be accused by Mali of having "sold out to West." Negative vote of Nigeria came as surprise to many dels (including US and apparently UK). Had Nigerians made their position known to other Africans before vote, it would have probably moved more to join them in opposition.

d. Reports received from Chinese and French sources about inclination Central African Republic and Chad to vote against moratorium were probably correct. In addition, vigorous argumentation against moratorium put forward by Upper Volta Del member, together with apparent great activity of Upper Volta Del, probably indicated they were basically antagonistic to moratorium. Conseil de l'Entente thus probably abstained on basis precarious compromise. Similar abstention many Conseil members next year unlikely. Among former French

<sup>3</sup> Philippine Delegation member Melquiades J. Gamboa.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably Felixberto M. Serrano, Philippine Foreign Minister.

<sup>5</sup> Philippine Delegation member Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Equatorial states, great activity on GA floor between Chad and Central African Republic immediately prior to vote probably shows they undecided until end whether to abstain or vote against.

e. There is no firm evidence so far that Soviets themselves have discussed ChiRep issue with new African Dels in UNGA. They could safely leave task to Ghana, Guinea, UAR (whose influence on new African Moslem states should probably not be underestimated) and other neutrals opposed to moratorium. On other hand, Plimsoll (Australia) was informed by Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) after vote that Ghana Del had not pressured new Africans regarding ChiRep; moratorium would otherwise have been defeated; Ghana Del would put pressure on next year. By contrast proponents of moratorium other than US, and to milder extent France, appear not to have been active with new Africans.

f. On basis available evidence and foregoing considerations, it apparent more new African states will vote against moratorium next year, not from lack of understanding US position, but basically for same reasons that prompted them to support neutralist Five-Power resolution: Feeling that neutral countries have obligation to bring cold war antagonists together.

4. Positions which we had not anticipated were those of Cyprus, Ethiopia and Nigeria. In case of Cyprus, member of that del came over to tell us immediately before voting started that contrary to previous understanding his del was instructed to abstain throughout. This last minute notice gave no opportunity for attempt to change their position. We believe point should be raised Nicosia and would appreciate Embassy evaluation of apparent last minute change. Prior to vote, Satterthwaite explained to Amb Imru<sup>6</sup> (Ethiopia) importance US attached this matter. Imru arranged for Satterthwaite to see Aklilou<sup>7</sup> at dinner that night. Arrangements at dinner were such however that discussion this subject did not prove possible.

5. General mood after voting of many of those who supported moratorium was "this is last year for moratorium; if vote had been delayed several weeks we would have been defeated."

**Wadsworth**

---

<sup>6</sup> Mikael Imru, Ethiopian Ambassador to the United States.

<sup>7</sup> Presumably Aklilou Abte Wold, Deputy Premier of Ethiopia.



**225. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 11, 1960.*

**SUBJECT**

Invitation to Speak at a Celebration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the United Nations

The Fifteenth Anniversary of the founding of the United Nations might appropriately be celebrated this year with special emphasis, calling attention to the United Nations as a world-stabilizing influence, particularly during this period of Soviet agitation and when many new states are being admitted to UN membership.

I hope that you might address an important meeting in the new Department of State auditorium during UN Week in celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. The meeting could be held on the afternoons of October 26, 27 or 28, or the evening of October 28. Invitations would be sent to those ambassadors accredited to the United States, and their wives, whose nations are members of the United Nations. Senior members of the United States Government would be in attendance. The occasion, incidentally, would be the first visit of the President of the United States to the new auditorium of the Department of State, which will hold an audience of eight hundred.

It seems to me of particular importance that both our friends and enemies abroad realize that the heat of the Presidential election campaign does not distract our attention from the fundamental issues of world affairs, primary among which is United States support for the United Nations and a world of peace and justice.

Mr. Khrushchev's attempts to damage the United Nations by his attacks at the General Assembly would make your presence at the celebration still more important as a means of re-emphasizing United States support for the United Nations. The wide attention which a speech by you would attract in the nation's press and overseas would be most desirable.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 301/10-1160. Drafted in P/OPS on October 4 and cleared with Wallner and in DBM, A, and P. The source text bears the typewritten notation, "President cannot do (Gen. Goodpaster to Mr. Stoessel, 10/20/60)".

If you should find it possible to accept this engagement, the Department of State will prepare and send to the White House an outline of a statement for this occasion.<sup>2</sup>

Douglas Dillon<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Herter spoke at the celebration held at the Department October 28. For text of his statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1960, pp. 739-741. A statement by Wadsworth on the 15th anniversary of the United Nations was broadcast on October 22 during a concert by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra. (*Ibid.*, p. 742)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

## 226. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New York, October 11, 1960.

961. Congo.

Following introduction by Guinea of resolution (ourtel 957<sup>2</sup>) calling for immediate seating of representative Congo central government, we checked re "credentials" received by UN from Congolese leaders. [9 words not declassified] Telegrams sent to SYG during Security Council meetings, and subsequently, showed that Bomboko has clearest title of any Congolese representative. Latest communication from Kasavubu is dated September 23 and appoints Bomboko, Badibanga, and Fele as delegates to GA. This delegation was later confirmed to Secretariat in writing (Secretariat usually prefers not to accept cables as credentials) by Bomboko after he arrived in New York. (A few days earlier, Secretariat had received cable from Kasavubu which included Kanza, along with Bomboko as delegates, but Kanza was dropped in September 23 telegram.)

Kanza's position is fuzzy. His claim would have to rest on communications sent some time ago which appointed him (and in some cases Bomboko) for various Security Council meetings. [5 words not declassified] Kanza has no General Assembly accreditation although

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-1160. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:43 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 957, October 11, transmitted the text of Guinean draft resolution proposing that the representatives of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo be seated in the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*)

Secretariat did receive telegram from Lumbala (Parliamentary official) supporting Kanza as Congo representative based on actions of parliament in favor of Lumumba. Kanza now in New York as is Badibanga.

Re procedure for handling matter, [4 words not declassified] that Guinea proposal in present circumstances should be opposed by US as interference in domestic Congolese affairs since it designed to lead to recognition of one political faction over others. We pointed out GA had already decided to send issue to Credentials Committee<sup>3</sup> and that Guinea proposal was therefore issue of reconsideration which required decision by two-thirds majority. He had apparently not thought of this but agreed possible tactic would be to fight against reconsideration.

As Dept aware, at time of Congo's admission, on proposal of Chair and without objection GA decided to refer issue of representation Congo to Credentials Committee, in view admittedly confused constitutional situation in Congo. In our view Guinea move clearly challenges this decision and could if point arises be fought on basis reconsideration rule. Another tactic would be to amend resolution by additional words "as designated by the chief of state". From reactions other Africans at Harriman lunch (USUN 959, classified summary 73<sup>4</sup>) seems likely there is little direct support for Guinea move at present and some positive opposition led by Congo (Brazzaville). We are encouraging Secretariat and others to arrange that resolution not be brought up for consideration. UK has agreed to speak to India about this. It may however be pressed as early as tomorrow.

GA debate on Congo credentials now would be extremely divisive. Guinea-Soviet group would not win in seating Lumumba representatives but we might find ourselves pitted against them and large number Afro-Asians, including many with units in ONUC. For our part we do not think time has yet arrived for US to push decision in absence clearer governmental structure in Congo. If Kasavubu appointees could receive parliamentary approval, we could then probably move successfully, although still in opposition to strong position of Ghana, Guinea, UAR, Mali, Indonesia, Soviets, probably Morocco and undoubtedly some others. Would appreciate Department's urgent views this subject.

Wadsworth

<sup>3</sup> See Document 177.

<sup>4</sup> Not found. On October 11, however, Satterthwaite sent Herter a memorandum reporting on the luncheon which Averell Harriman had given for African U.N. Delegates in order to brief them on preparations for a conference on African resources to be held the following year. A copy of the memorandum is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1772.

## 227. Editorial Note

At its afternoon meeting on October 11, the U.N. General Assembly considered a Soviet proposal to discuss disarmament entirely in plenary rather than in the First Committee, as the General Committee had recommended. Chairman Khrushchev spoke in support of his delegation's proposal. Ambassador Wadsworth gave the U.S. response advocating that the matter be referred to the Committee. "We do this because we think that disarmament is a complex subject requiring serious consideration, and not a subject to be exploited for propaganda purposes," he stated.

Khrushchev exercised his right of reply after several other delegates had spoken. The Western nations, he declared, were "the propagandists, and they have become past masters in propagandizing their views." Angrily he announced that "if war breaks out, it will break out all over the globe," and warned: "If war is imposed on us, we shall fight for our country and we shall be victorious, no matter what sacrifices it may cost us." *The New York Times* reported that as Khrushchev returned to his seat in the General Assembly Hall, he noticed that none of the Spanish Delegation was applauding his statement. He then began shouting in Russian at the delegation and shaking his finger at one of its members, who stood and answered him. A U.N. security officer stepped between them. (October 12, 1960, pages A1 and A17) For Khrushchev's account of this incident, which apparently combines it with one occurring on October 1, see *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, page 473.

Following a second statement by Wadsworth and comments from other representatives, the General Assembly decided by a vote of 62 for, 12 against, and 24 abstentions to assign the question of disarmament to the First Committee. The United States voted in favor of this proposal. The General Assembly then voted against the Soviet proposal to consider the item in plenary by a vote of 13 for, 54 against, and 31 abstentions. The United States voted against this proposal. For a record of these proceedings and the texts of the statements made during them, see U.N. doc. A/PV.900.

The following afternoon, the General Assembly considered a Soviet proposal to discuss in plenary an item on granting independence to colonial countries. Khrushchev again led the debate, speaking in favor of the proposal. *The New York Times* reported that the discussion proceeded without incident until Philippine Delegate Sumulong spoke. When Romanian Representative Mezincescu interrupted Sumulong on a point of order, Khrushchev joined him at the podium, where he gestured at Sumulong. Upon returning to his desk, Khrushchev removed his right shoe, stood up, and waved it at

Sumulong, who had resumed speaking. Khrushchev then beat his desk with his shoe, and also hit the desk with his fists, as he had done during previous meetings. (October 13, 1960, page A1)

Several other delegates addressed the General Assembly after Sumulong finished speaking. During a statement by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Wilcox, however, Khrushchev waved his arm and shook his finger at him, then removed his shoe once more and waved it at Wilcox. Mezincescu again interrupted the proceedings on a point of order, then began criticizing General Assembly President Boland for allowing Wilcox to refer to countries in Eastern Europe. At this point, Boland banged his gavel with such force that its head flew off, and adjourned the meeting. (*Ibid.*) For a record of these proceedings and the texts of the statements made during them, see U.N. doc. A/PV.902.

Khrushchev ended his 25-day visit to the United Nations at 11:47 p.m., October 13, when his plane took off from New York International Airport. For extracts of his departure statement, see *The New York Times*, October 14, 1960, page A3.

**228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 15, 1960—2:31 p.m.*

682. Re: Afro-Asian Initiative.<sup>2</sup> USGADel authorized indicate support for Afro-Asian initiative, provided references to 1) disarmament negotiations and Congo, and 2) differences political economic systems omitted as you indicate Afro-Asians prepared do. USDel should seek addition phrase "or threat of action" after word "action" in first operative paragraph. Point can be made that threats of action often highly significant cause of tension. We agree broad co-sponsorship desirable in order not link this initiative with previous effort five neutrals. Sponsors should include as high proportion as possible of members which are strong supporters SYG. Sponsorship should exclude major powers.

We also believe proposed resolution can be regarded as implicit expression GA concern at atmosphere resulting from recent performance Soviet bloc in UN and desire for UN begin serious effort deal with pressing problems. We should of course foster such interpretation of resolution once it is agreed upon. We would of course have take close look at any suggested modifications in text so that basic impact resolution would not be altered in direction contrary our interests.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.001/10-1560. Confidential. Drafted by Cargo and Oakley, cleared by S/S and with the Secretary in draft, and approved by Bohlen who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1016, October 14, transmitted the text of an Afro-Asian draft resolution urging all U.N. members to help stop the deterioration of world relations and to promote world peace. (*Ibid.*, 600.001/10-1460)

**229. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 17, 1960—5:43 p.m.*

531. Our Ambassador in Moscow observes that Khrushchev's behavior in New York in virtually following Chinese Communist line in fact while paying only lip service to his own previous policies would appear constitute further evidence of depth of Soviet-Chinese split and Khrushchev's apparent need undercut Chinese influence with other Satellites on ground that he is too soft toward West. Our Ambassador believes that while Khrushchev will seek meaningful negotiations with West next year, long-range implications of his UN behavior are that present line not merely trial balloon or temporary expedient. Our Ambassador considers his most important actions with long-range implications seem to be: 1) determination force world accept concept of three blocs; 2) determination prevent UN from becoming effective peace-keeping body; 3) refusal accept opportunity keep cold war out of Africa; 4) change in attitude toward Algerian question and relations with France; 5) linking of disarmament with form of UN and Chinese participation; and 6) blatant reassertion of Communist ideological goals and methods. Our Ambassador feels certain present Khrushchev line will be viewed with disfavor most of Soviet people including many important officials.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/10–1760. Confidential; Infotel. Drafted by EUR, approved by Armitage who signed for Herter, and sent to 25 posts in Europe.

---

**230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 19, 1960—9:57 p.m.*

718. Indonesian Chargé October 14 told Department officer that GOI felt insufficient emphasis had been given Indonesian suggestion for change in personnel UN Secretariat on level immediately below Secretary General during Subandrio's conversation with the Secre-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310/10–1960. Confidential. Drafted by Bell; cleared by Sullivan, Mau, and Sisco; and approved by Cargo who signed for Herter. Repeated to Djakarta.

tary.<sup>2</sup> Because of change in composition UN since its establishment GOI believes need exists for greater representation Afro-Asians in Secretariat at Assistant SYG level. It is GOI view that increased Afro-Asian representation this respect would "take the wind out" of Khrushchev's proposal for drastic changes structure UN Secretariat. Indonesia will not offer formal resolution this effect but hopes achieve purpose through informal discussions New York. This proposal will be considered further at Indonesian Chiefs of Mission meeting Paris this week, and Subandrio likely order Indonesian UN Del to embark on campaign this nature shortly. Chargé requested U.S. support.

Department believes this should not be discussed with SYG at this time. Request USUN comments.

**Herter**

---

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Nugroho's conversation with Bell and Lindquist is *ibid.*, 310/10-1460. A memorandum of Subandrio's October 12 conversation with Herter is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1767.

---

**231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 20, 1960—5:16 p.m.*

357. Deptel 341 to Seoul 630 to Saigon rptd info USUN 685.<sup>2</sup> ROK Ambassador Liem October 18 asked USUN whether we prepared press strongly in SC for ROK membership and was told we intend raise this question in SC prior to consideration Korean unification in GA, but we must consult with friendly delegations in advance. Liem then asked that USG give careful consideration to raising Korean membership question in GA as distinct item from unification question.

Since Dept's assumption in reftel that ROKG fully understands US position now appears incorrect at least in respect Liem's interpretation ROK position. Embassy requested make clear to FonOff once again that we have no intention raising ROK membership question in GA. FYI Dept intends make certain Ambassador-designate Chung fully understands US position by going over this question with

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-2060. Confidential. Drafted by FE/NA; cleared by Sisco, Sullivan, and SEA; and approved by Bane who signed for Herter. Repeated to Saigon and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 341 to Seoul, October 15, reported that the United States was prepared to seek a U.N. Security Council vote on Korea's and Vietnam's applications for U.N. membership, but would not raise the issue as a special item in the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 320/10-1160)



him as soon as possible after his arrival in hope bringing additional pressure on Liem. End FYI. Request Embassy report results this representation.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 494 from Seoul, October 21, reported that the Korean Foreign Ministry understood and supported the U.S. position and had agreed to send Liem a message clarifying any misunderstanding. (*Ibid.*, 320/10-2160)

---

**232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 22, 1960—3:51 p.m.*

375. Seoul's 472.<sup>2</sup> Timing Korean item in UN General Assembly largely dependent upon pace debate in First Committee and plenary. Korean question allocated fifth place First Committee agenda, indicating we may expect plenary discussion early December.

Dept has been planning in terms raising ROK membership question in Security Council week Nov 14. However assessment this week of atmosphere among UN delegations in aftermath Khrushchev visit and conversation Commonwealth representatives Oct 20<sup>3</sup> leads Dept to believe SC meeting, since it inevitably will evoke cold-war issues, might detract from possibilities strong GA support for Korean question. New and uncommitted countries shy away from appearance taking sides in cold war and their prevailing view now is Korea solely a cold war issue. On other hand GA debate would strengthen Korean case for membership, especially if GA resolution makes reference ROK eligibility. Moreover Turkey replaces Poland on SC in January, and UK in chair. We therefore propose permit ROK decide whether proceed with November SC debate, with attendant risks weakened support for Korea, or to arrange SC debate early January following GA discussion.

Dept also proposes eliminate preambular paragraphs in draft resolution on Korea<sup>4</sup> which begin "regretting" and "regretting further" substituting following: "Noting that the competence and authority of the UN to deal with the Korean question has been affirmed by re-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-1760. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Macdonald; cleared by Sullivan and Jones; and approved by Bane who signed for Herter. Repeated to Saigon and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 472, October 17, requested an appointment for the Korean Foreign Minister with Dillon and asked when the General Assembly would consider the Korean item and Korean membership in the United Nations. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

peated resolutions of the General Assembly; and believing that the ROK, which has been repeatedly recognized by the General Assembly as fully qualified for membership in the UN, is entitled to the favorable vote of all members of the Security Council". Further propose move sub-para (c) under "*noting with deep satisfaction*" to be sub-para (a) and reword as follows: "the continued fervent desire of all the Korean people to decide their own future in unity and freedom".

Embassy instructed discuss draft resolution, as amended, informally with ROKG and urge upon ROKG desirability holding SC debate January following GA consideration in view considerations outlined, as well as strong preference this course action on part Commonwealth members of Sixteen. However, if ROKG insists on November SC debate despite dangers cited, request you report this soonest to Dept. In this event revised language preambular para 4 which Dept believes more desirable would be more difficult use.

Appointments tentatively scheduled for FonMin Chyung with Under Secretary Nov 7 at 12 noon and with Secretary Nov 9 at 11:30 am.<sup>5</sup> However Embassy advice requested as to possible changes FonMin plans in view above considerations. Believe FonMin's effectiveness among UN delegations would be augmented if wife accompanies. Embassy also requested advise whether calls on Secy and Under Secy for courtesy only or if FonMin intends raise substantive matters.<sup>6</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>5</sup> No record of Chyung's meeting with Dillon was found. Memoranda of his conversations with Herter are in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 507 from Seoul, October 25, reported that the Korean Foreign Minister had agreed to defer discussion of Korean U.N. membership and that Chyung's meetings with Herter and Dillon would primarily be courtesy calls. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 320/10-2560)

---

**233. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 26, 1960—6 p.m.*

1132. For the Secretary from USGADel. United States: A colonial power?

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/10-2660. Confidential; Niact.

Current Fourth Committee positions (or past practice where new positions lacking) will in delegation opinion further reinforce already inaccurate and damaging image of US in eyes of Afro-Asians. If followed, US would vote against any:

1. Resolution inviting states "voluntarily" to submit political information on NSGTS;
2. Resolution inviting states to work out target dates for independence or self-government of their non-self-governing territories; and
3. Resolution calling upon Spain and Portugal to submit information pursuant to Chapter XI<sup>2</sup> on conditions in their overseas "provinces". (As member of Committee of Six whose task was to draft principles which should guide member states in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information, US participated in drafting of, and is associated with establishment of these principles. US would appear even worse if, in effort to apply them, we appeared now to renege on only cases to which principles could relate.)

USGADel, based on assessment by USDel in Fourth Committee of sentiment that committee, believes current instructions re foregoing:

1. Are inconsistent with President Eisenhower's pledge of support for self-determination at current GA<sup>3</sup> (if not inconsistent in literal sense, they would be interpreted as being at variance with moral and ethical posture of statement) and with US traditions and ideals which so well understood by Afro-Asians;
2. Will cause US to be falsely labeled as colonial power. Fact is, type vote cast more important than all anti-colonial speeches or professions. Negative vote would put US in small minority in company Union of South Africa, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and few others;
3. Permit Soviets continue retain advantages their efforts pose as great champion of dependent peoples.

USGADel obviously not in possession of all facts bearing on problem, but wishes Department know any considerations standing in way of reversal US positions must be of utmost importance to be maintained because price we will pay by casting negative vote will be extremely costly to US prestige and US will pay bill in forthcoming assemblies.

USGADel respectfully requests urgent reexamination of positions re (a) voluntary transmission of political information, (b) establishment of final target dates, and (c) position re application of Committee of Six principles to any area where they apply, i.e., Angola, Mozambique, Rio de Oro, etc., with view to enabling delegation sponsor or at minimum support these resolutions. By so doing we would eliminate foregoing faults and reap benefits of reaffirmation basic belief by a—as in fundamental values of US.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter defines responsibilities toward non-self-governing territories.

<sup>3</sup> Made in Eisenhower's September 22 address before the U.N. General Assembly; see Document 180.

USGADel appreciates extent of possible trouble with NATO Allies but believes that, after initial shock, our position would come to be understood even as was our position in Suez and Congo crisis and any damage done to NATO would be, so far as we able determine, only temporary and far outweigh advantages in other fields.

Delegation faces vote possibly today or tomorrow on resolution concerning transmission of political information; therefore, request immediate reply this subject.

**Wadsworth**

---

### 234. Editorial Note

At 7 p.m., October 27, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents arrested Igor Y. Melekh, a Soviet employee of the U.N. Secretariat, on espionage charges. (Telegram 848 to Moscow, October 27; Department of State, Central Files, 313/10-2760) The Soviet Government protested this action orally and in writing to U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the U.S. Government. Documentation on the arrest, the Soviet protests, and the U.S. responses to them is *ibid.*, 313 and 310

---

### 235. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, October 28, 1960.*

DEAR CHRIS: The already developed pattern of Soviet demands as to representation on various bodies in and out of the United Nations prompts me to suggest that the time is rapidly approaching for a very strong statement indeed on the whole subject of "Parity—What it really is".

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-2860. Confidential. Attached to a copy of Herter's November 9 response, which stated that he agreed with Wadsworth and that the Department was preparing a statement on parity along the lines Wadsworth had suggested. A copy of this statement has not been found.

I don't believe that the rest of the world fully understands how outrageous the Soviet demand for parity in negotiating bodies really is when one considers the structure of the United Nations and, indeed, of the world. It is the utmost effrontery to claim that the so-called Socialist States now totaling 12 in number, if you count Yugoslavia and Cuba, should be equated with the 50 States that we characterize as solidly free world, or even with the 37 States that proclaim they are "uncommitted". It is absurd and distorted and artificial and I think we ought to say so.

The only place we have really accepted parity in negotiating bodies is in the 10-nation group. This is not necessary and does not set a precedent. Parity on a Control Commission for a nuclear test treaty is different, because you set forth voting procedures in the Treaty, and you have agreed that in order to succeed, neither side should have advantage over the other.

I think that people in general, all over the world, would respond to the theory that international bodies generally and negotiating bodies specifically should have a composition reflecting the state of the world, not artificially twisted to create "parity" for any one group. Admission could be made, and I believe should be, that in matters such as disarmament a majority vote in any such body could not be considered to be conclusive—that agreement is imperative. That is another reality which we have had to face for some time.

The composition of really important negotiating bodies is no longer important from the standpoint of a majority for voting, and therefore, any demand for artificial parity is merely a device to gain prestige or to make trouble or both. Where voting is necessary and desirable, parity is absurd; where voting is not required, parity is even sillier. Before it is too late, with parity completely accepted all over the place, the United States should take a strong stand on the side of the angels.

Sincerely yours,

Jamy

**236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 1, 1960—8:06 p.m.*

800. Re 8-power Afro-Asian resolution on Congolese representation (USUN's 1184<sup>2</sup>). We understand from telecon<sup>3</sup> that it may not be possible to postpone consideration of 8-power resolution dealing with Congolese representation question and call for meeting of Congolese parliament. We assume GADel will continue to make every effort delay consideration this matter, in order provide more opportunity for fuller consultations. Fact that SYG has already announced his intention to put out report re developments in Congo over past month should provide basis for at least slight delay. At same time we feel that issuance of report by SYG combined with pressure for consideration of 8-power Afro-Asian resolution may result in full-blown debate on question of Congo, which in our judgment is unlikely to be helpful in view fact much of discussion likely to focus upon question of Belgian technicians in Congo.

[Here follows discussion of the text and purport of the draft resolution.]

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-2960. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Woodruff, and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Repeated to Leopoldville and Brussels.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1184, October 29, transmitted the text of a draft resolution to seat the representatives of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) and to ensure a meeting of the Congolese parliament. (*Ibid.*) For text, see U.N. doc. A/L.319/Rev.2.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

### 237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 1, 1960—9:16 p.m.

804. Ref: Soviet Item on Colonialism: Deptel 617 to USUN; USUN's 1011, 1117.<sup>2</sup> Although we expect debate on Soviet "Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples"<sup>3</sup> will be long and difficult, we believe it can provide opportunity make clear our historic principles as well as menace Soviet brand of colonialism poses to newer and smaller states.

Problems raised by Soviet declaration are vast in scope but can be narrowed down to three major elements which USUN should take into account in discussions with other delegations. These are:

1. Position of United States on colonialism, in view our own history and outlook, can only be that we firmly support principles of self-determination for all peoples who desire it and are able and willing undertake its burdens.

2. We will continue to render meaningful assistance through United Nations and elsewhere to facilitate and expedite transition to self-government and independence for former dependent territories. Number of UN institutions, including Fourth Committee, Trusteeship Council and Committee on Information exist primarily to facilitate this transition. Equally important, UN has been instrumental in creating climate of world opinion favorable to achievement of independence by dependent areas.

3. Analysis of Soviet position on colonialism indicates that USSR is at the same time major colonial power in world today while it poses as most ardent champion in theory of rights of dependent peoples. It would be difficult find single case where the Soviets have been instrumental in achievement of independence by any people.

Dept believes all three elements important and that it would be major tactical error concentrate too heavily on (3), for example. We can succeed in pulling majority Africans and Asians towards our position on Soviet colonial structure to extent we are able convince them that

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/10-2560. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Tron on October 26; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Bohlen, Wallner, Stoessel, Kohler, Sullivan, Gerig, Herz, Nunley, and Armitage; and approved and signed by the Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 184.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 617 is printed as Document 216. Telegram 1011, October 9, reported that USUN had prevented a Soviet bloc attempt to narrow the scope of the colonial item and requested material on Soviet treatment of minorities. (Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/10-2560) Telegram 1117, October 25, reported on an administering nations meeting at which the colonial item was discussed. (*Ibid.*)

United States has been most effective champion of rights of dependent peoples and that our continued support is worth more than that of Soviets.

At same time we should not neglect opportunity condemn Communist colonialism to fullest, pointing out Soviet Union is not only largest existing colonial power, but only colonial regime that is still expanding and which has never granted independence or self-government to any subject people. Recognize some Africans and Asians will prefer discourage discussion of Communist colonialism, since tends create voting difficulties in view injection "cold war" issue. However, US must use every opportunity educate these new nations in dangers of Sino-Soviet imperialism. Effectiveness this tactic already illustrated by extreme sensitivity displayed by Soviet spokesmen whenever references to Communist colonialism are made. (To extent possible, of course, desirable condemnations of Communist colonialism emanate from Afro-Asians or from Europeans and LA's without colonial tradition.) Point should be made that colonialism exists not only when colored subject peoples are involved. Principle of racial equality requires that colonialism be opposed everywhere.

Inasmuch as many countries in the UN have recently emerged from a colonial relationship and are deeply committed to principle of self-determination, there is danger that debate may degenerate into series of emotional speeches denouncing colonialism in general and its vestiges in Africa and the Pacific in particular. To avoid such situation from developing, in which Soviets can only stand to gain, Dept considers it important debate be managed as much as possible. Delegation should make major effort enlist speakers in initial stages of debate who will stress accomplishments in dependent-areas field, point out need for peaceful transition, commend United Nations' activities in this field, and parenthetically deliver effective blows at Soviet colonialism.

Details should be worked out New York, but Dept would suggest consultations with Malayans, Turkish, Japanese, Tunisian and Latin American delegations as priority matter. Secy told Malayan PM US hoped Malayan Del would take lead in working out counter-resolution this subject.<sup>4</sup> PM replied he would be happy help on this question and that he and Malayan Ambassador would discuss matter when they arrived in NY. Irish have on occasion in Fourth Committee delivered excellent speeches on general subject of colonialism as have Scandinavians. If members these delegations show interest our general approach, Dept is ready provide basic factual accounts Soviet colonial-

---

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of this October 26 conversation is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.



ism they may find useful in preparing speeches. We have in mind Turkish discussion of Turkestan, for example, and Scandinavian treatment of situation in Baltic Republics.

On assumption Soviet declaration designed to be voted on as draft resolution, we can conceive of three methods of handling. In order of preference, they are: submission of counter-resolution; amendment of Soviet draft; and attempt to secure massive abstentions or negative votes, followed by lengthy explanation of votes.

We believe introduction of moderate counter-resolution has most to commend it, providing it can be of nature to attract at least two-thirds majority. Best sponsorship would include Africans, Asians, Latin Americans and such Europeans as Scandinavians, Ireland and Austria. Dept believes we should avoid submission of "western draft" designed merely to prevent Soviets from securing two-thirds majority. In fact, we hope major initiative will come from friendly Afro-Asians, to which we could lend full and sympathetic cooperation.

Dept pouching this evening comments on Soviet Draft Declaration<sup>5</sup> which can be circulated as UN document and which stresses Soviet record on colonialism.

Texts resolutions mentioned urtel 1117 needed urgently, as well as any other being discussed Afro-Asian caucus.

**Herter**

---

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

---

**238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 3, 1960—4:27 p.m.*

734. Your 851.<sup>2</sup> In absence agenda item any motion or resolution in General Assembly re Vietnam itself or in form amendment Korean or any other item would be clearly out of order and would doubtless be over-ruled. It is possible, however, that question of elections and reunification Vietnam would be injected into discussions by Soviet

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–1960. Confidential. Drafted by Sullivan and Oakley on October 31, cleared by Hewitt and Wood, and approved by Cargo who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN and CINCPAC Polad.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 851 from Saigon, October 19, reported that the Secretary General of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry had asked if the question of Vietnamese elections and reunification might arise during General Assembly discussion of the Korean item. (*Ibid.*)

bloc or others in connection a) Korean item or possibly b) Soviet colonialism item. Since items a) and b) already inscribed, contingency such discussion exists and GVN would seem prudent prepare position for general guidance in event discussion materializes.

Re membership item, we hope bring this up separately in SC in January parallel with Korean membership (ref Seoul 3 to Saigon Oct. 25<sup>3</sup>). January consideration membership (after Korean reunification debate) should make less likely any association Vietnamese reunification with Korean in GA. Also, should assure better SC vote on membership when Turks replace Poles January 1. Dept discussed this change tactics with GVN Embassy official November 1 and latter indicated complete accord.<sup>4</sup> Request Embassy seek confirmation that Fornoff also agrees.

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> No further record of this conversation has been found.

---

**239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 4, 1960—6:17 p.m.*

837. Ref: USUN's 1218, 1219, 1220.<sup>2</sup> Resolution contained below is designed for illustrative and explanatory purposes only at this stage consideration of Soviet colonialism item. It represents attempt by Dept to formulate a resolution that has good chance acceptance by substantial group of Europeans, Africans, Asians and Latin Americans. We realize fully some countries will be inclined vote against or abstain on resolution of this type, while others will believe it does not go far enough. Soviets can be expected find it totally unacceptable. Dept

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/11-160. Confidential. Drafted by Tron; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Sullivan, Monsma, Herz, Ludlow, Nunley, Stoessel, Gerig, and Wallner, and in draft with Meeker; and approved by Merchant who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Dated November 1, telegram 1218 reported on a meeting of six members of the Asian-African group regarding the colonial item; telegram 1219 transmitted the text of a Guinean draft resolution on it; and telegram 1220 transmitted a summary of an Iranian draft declaration on the colonial item. (*Ibid.*)

hopes this illustrative resolution can be discussed with selected friendly delegations from all regional groups, including particularly Japanese.

*“The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* that a fundamental purpose of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

*Reiterating* the provision of the Charter which states that members of the United Nations which have responsibility for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories;

1. *Affirms that all men are created equal and that all have an equal right to governments of their own choosing;*

2. *Declares that the right of each person to participate by a free and unrestricted franchise in the governance of his society is among the most precious rights of mankind;*

3. *Declares that colonialism in all its manifestations should speedily be brought to an end;*

4. *Affirms that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to world peace and cooperation;*

5. *Declares its support for the cause of freedom and independence for all such people;*

6. *Urges all members of the United Nations which have obligations for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained or who have been deprived of a full measure of self-government to redouble their efforts to bring these people promptly to full self-government or independence in accordance with their freely-expressed wishes;*

7. *Urges all members of the United Nations administering dependent areas to encourage free political expression by the dependent peoples, particularly through exercise of a free and unrestricted franchise.*

8. *Urges the appropriate institutions of the United Nations to continue to facilitate and assist in expediting the transition to self-government or independence by the remaining dependent peoples of the world;*

9. *Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report summarizing the major progress and problems in this field for consideration by the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly.*"

In view of developing opposition to final target dates within the African and Asian group, we do not believe we should now make any mention this controversial item. If need to take position arises suddenly, however, USDel should support UK formulation contained your 1219.

Herter

---

240. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 4, 1960—8:47 p.m.*

847. Urtels 1132 and 1210 re US position on Portuguese and Spanish territories.<sup>2</sup> Department has reviewed its position on this question and has concluded that we are opposed to a resolution singling out Portugal and Spain or any other country to remind it of obligations, if any, under Article 73(e) of the Charter. Whether USDel should abstain or vote against depends upon the form and wording of such draft resolution which Department wishes to see in advance of voting.

USDel should explain in statement or explanation of vote that the principles contained in Committee of Six report are described as "principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit" such information. Department considers that, as in the past, each member of UN should in accordance with its obligations under the Charter, decide whether principles contained in report of Committee of Six apply to territories under their administration and, if so, how they should be given effect. If certain members UN wish single out Portugal and Spain for application these principles, it is difficult to see why some other countries should not also be singled out for such application.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/11-160. Confidential. Drafted by Gerig on November 3; cleared by Kohler, Ludlow, Penfield, Monsma, Day, and Bohlen; and approved by Merchant who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1132 is printed as Document 233. Telegram 1210, November 1, reported that the Fourth Committee had begun considering the Report of the Special Committee of Six on the Transmission of Information Under Article 73e of the Charter. (*Ibid.*) For text of the report, see U.N. doc. A/4526.

In presenting argument USDel should state that US has for itself given broadest possible interpretation to Article 73(e) and has reported on territories which were incorporated parts of US, two of which have since become, by their own choice, States of the Union. US convinced that all territories which contain peoples not having full measure of self-government ought to be subject to reporting under Article 73(e) and that states administering such territories have moral obligation to assist such peoples in the progressive development of their free political institutions leading to self-government which, when achieved, removes the obligation under Article 73(e). The US therefore accepts the obligations of Article 73 without any reservation and believes all other UN Members would be wise to do the same.

In indicating firm US opposition to procedure whereby GA would single out particular countries, USDel should also make clear (initially with sponsors and in corridor discussions) that if GA is determined to embark upon this dangerous course, US would consider it intolerable that special reference be limited to Portugal or Spain.

Finally, to take the unprecedented action in singling out Portugal and Spain will not, we believe, produce desired result. A better alternative, it seems to Department, will be to urge all members to fulfill their obligations, if any, to report under Article 73(e). It might even be added that we believe this should be done even if certain domestic legal and constitutional difficulties might seem to stand in the way (provided no particular country is mentioned).

USDel should make our views known to sponsors and others in corridor discussions in hope they might withdraw mention particular countries.

**Herter**

**241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 7, 1960—10:03 p.m.*

865. Congolese Credentials. As indicated Deptel 866,<sup>2</sup> believe Credentials Committee meeting should be held soonest to approve credentials of Congolese representatives other than Kasavubu. Since Kasavubu is Head of State, believe no issue re his capacity to head Congolese delegation should be placed directly before Credentials Committee or Assembly. We should make clear to GA President and any delegation with whom we discuss that there can be no question as to Kasavubu's position as Head of State and his authority to serve as Congolese chief representative at UN.

Believe therefore resolution to be submitted in Credentials Committee should take following form:

"The Credentials Committee recommends that the General Assembly accept the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) issued by the Head of the State and communicated by him to the President of the General Assembly in a letter dated October 21, 1960". Once this resolution is adopted in Credentials Committee and by Assembly, there can be no question of standing of Bomboko, Adoula, and Cardoso as representatives of Congo. Furthermore once this resolution has been approved there could be no further hesitancy on part of GA President to treat Kasavubu as chairman of Congolese delegation, as well as Head of State, if Kasavubu so desires.

Re chairmanship of Congolese delegation, it would probably be helpful if Kasavubu were to send to GA President communication stating who is in charge. We have in mind letter along following lines with any necessary adjustments correspond to Kasavubu decisions re assignments Congolese: "Dear Mr. President, During the sojourn in New York of the Head of the State of the Republic of the Congo, the undersigned will act as chairman of the delegation of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville). Upon the departure of the Head of the State from New York, Mr. Cyrille Adoula, Senator of the Republic, will serve as chairman. Should Mr. Adoula be absent, Mr. Mario Cardoso

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/11-760. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Meeker, cleared by Satterthwaite, and approved by Wallner who signed for Dillon. Repeated to Leopoldville and Brussels.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 866, November 7 (10:04 p.m.), instructed the Mission to call an immediate meeting of the Credentials Committee and transmitted the text of a draft resolution on the situation in the Congo. (*Ibid.*)

will serve as chairman of the delegation. Signed Joseph Kasavubu, President of the Republic of the Congo". Suggest you take this up with Kasavubu on his arrival. Alternative which Congolese might prefer would be to name Bomboko as chairman of delegation during period both he and Kasavubu are in NY. Believe it would be helpful to have Congolese communication on delegation chairmanship circulated as UN document prior to Credentials Committee meeting.

Dillon

---

## 242. Editorial Note

On November 4, Central African Republic Representative Michel Gallin-Douathe was refused service at a diner near Baltimore, Maryland, while returning to New York City from Washington, where he had just presented his credentials to President Eisenhower. In reporting the incident to the Department of State on November 9, the Mission at the United Nations noted that another African representative had also experienced a racial incident, and suggested that Eisenhower send Gallin-Douathe a letter of apology. The Mission also suggested that the Department consider releasing the story so that it would not become a major news item if it leaked out. (Telegram 1332 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 304.70P/11-960)

The Mission reiterated its comments the following day. The "story of this incident is known amongst representatives all African countries this GA," it argued, "and Guinea and Ghana in particular are making special point in conversations with African colleagues of citing this case as proof America is a nation of racists." A Presidential apology was necessary lest the United States "lose favor and respect we presently enjoy with majority black African states." (Telegram 1349 from USUN, November 10; *ibid.*, 304.70P/11-1060)

On November 11, Secretary Herter sent Eisenhower a report on the incident and a draft letter of apology, recommending in his covering memorandum that the President send Gallin-Douathe a letter along the lines suggested. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series, Central African Republic) Four days later, the Department of State notified the Mission at the United Nations that a letter from Eisenhower to Gallin-Douathe had been dispatched to the Mission. The Department wished no publicity about either incident or the

letter, but instructed the Mission to inform it if Gallin-Douathe intended to publicize either. (Telegram 916 to USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 304.70P/11-1560)

Dated November 14, the letter termed Gallin-Douathe's experience "a most unfortunate incident," which Eisenhower had learned of "with deep regret." "I want you to know how sincerely I deplore this incident," it continued. "I assure you that this Government has endeavored to eliminate the causes of such occurrences in this country, and that our efforts will continue toward this end." "The United States," it concluded, "attaches great importance to the friendship of the African people. I hope you will judge this regrettable incident, which reflects the attitude of only a minority of the citizens of this country, in its proper perspective." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series, Central African Republic)

On November 16, the Mission reported that the letter had been delivered to Gallin-Douathe at 11:34 that morning. He did not mention any intention of publicizing it. (Telegram 1424 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 304.70P/11-1660)

---

#### 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in New Zealand<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 9, 1960—1:07 p.m.*

194. Congo Credentials—ref USUN 1330 to Dept repeated info Wellington 3.<sup>2</sup> We strongly hope New Zealand will support full recognition of credentials of Kasavubu representatives in Credentials Committee and in GA. Shanahan suggestion contained refel that Kasavubu be recognized for discussion of Congo item only would in our judgment cause serious loss in Kasavubu's prestige and would be interpreted as substantial victory for Lumumba forces. Would be impossible for Kasavubu to accept "second class" treatment and maintain power and vigor his constitutional position as Chief of State.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/11-960. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Cargo, cleared by Sullivan and in substance with Woodruff, and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1330 from USUN, November 9, reported that the New Zealand Representative had suggested that Kasavubu be recognized for discussion of the Congo only. (*Ibid.*)



While we fully understand there are risks of African abstentions, we see no other acceptable alternative than to seek full acceptance credentials Kasavubu representatives. If Conciliation Commission were to go to Congo in absence affirmative indication GA support for Kasavubu's position, consequence would be to bolster Lumumba's prospects for return to position of influence. Presence of Kasavubu in New York means that credentials issue must be faced now. We are hopeful that as result of consultations now going on substantial African support will be forthcoming.

Further factor is that if Kasavubu is rebuffed in UNGA, prospects his further cooperation with UN in Congo will be heavily jeopardized. This would be serious added element of instability in already difficult situation.

We are taking up this question along foregoing lines with New Zealand representatives in New York and have done likewise with New Zealand Chargé here. While time factor is short, believe follow-up action by Embassy could be helpful unless Embassy believes involvement Primin Nash would prove counterproductive complication. Embassy will have also received Circular 665 re Congo credentials in question.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

---

**244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 9, 1960—6:26 p.m.*

1987. With Kasavubu now in New York, Congo question entering crucial stage. His request for seating his delegation has been referred to Credentials Committee where it likely be approved, but Committee report will be sharply challenged in Plenary by Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, UAR and other pro-Lumumba delegates. Positions taken by new African dels likely determine outcome. Debate on committee report starts probably Thursday.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/11-960. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Herz, cleared by McBride and in substance with Satterthwaite, and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Repeated to Abidjan and USUN.

Pro-Kasavubu delegations reportedly impressed by vigorous opposition offered by Guinea and others and seem to be flagging in their support for Kasavubu. Department suggesting by separate niact telegrams that Tchichelle (Congo Brazzaville) and Okala (Cameroun), who had previously spoken forcefully for Kasavubu and against Lumumba, return to UN for this critical debate.<sup>2</sup>

Consider it exceedingly desirable that Houphouet-Boigny personally come to New York to rally Conseil de l'Entente delegations and exert leadership among other dels from former French African dependencies. After consultation with French government, suggest you urgently approach Houphouet and suggest he come to New York to throw his prestige and ability into scales and follow through on decision of Abidjan conference.

Herter

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to telegram 163 to Brazzaville, November 9, also sent to Yaounde as 179. (*Ibid.*)

---

**245. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wallner) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 10, 1960.*

**SUBJECT**

Senator Javits' Call at Noon Today; Possible Topic of Conversation: UAR's Security Council Candidacy

*Discussion*

In response to a telephone call to Mr. Macomber from Senator Javits, the Department on September 29, 1960, wrote the Senator explaining the situation with respect to the UAR's candidacy for election to the Security Council at the current General Assembly (Tab A).<sup>2</sup> The Senator then wrote the Secretary on October 4, to urge active US opposition to the UAR candidacy (Tab B). A staff study was prepared

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 304/11-1060. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley, initialed by Cargo, concurred in by Macomber and Jones (NEA), sent to Dillon through S/S, and designated 13230. A handwritten notation on the source text states that Dillon saw it.

<sup>2</sup> None of the tabs was attached. Tabs A, B, D, E, F, and G have not been found. A copy of Tab C is *ibid.*, 320/10-1460.

for the Secretary (Tab C) and he decided not to go beyond the Department's letter of September 29 in replying (Tab D). Senator Javits again wrote the Secretary on October 21 (Tab E). Mr. Macomber and I decided, with the concurrence of NEA, that no response to this letter was required. On November 4, Senator Javits joined Senators Scott, Keating, and Case in addressing a letter to the Secretary, again urging active US opposition to the UAR's candidacy (Tab F). It is our intention simply to acknowledge this letter since the Department has already sent letters to all four signatories on this matter.

The UAR remains the sole candidate for the Security Council seat traditionally held by a Middle East or African state. For the reasons set forth in the memorandum to the Secretary (Tab C), no US effort to oppose the UAR's candidacy or to stimulate an alternative candidacy is considered feasible or desirable. The voting is by secret ballot and there is no discussion of candidacies, as has been explained to the Senator. The US Delegation did succeed in having the Council elections postponed until after the US elections and they are now scheduled to be held tomorrow, November 11. It has also been made clear to the Senator and others urging us to oppose the UAR's election that the US is in no way "backing" the UAR's candidacy. You will recall that this is the point we made in the telegram to Moses Schonfeld, Special Consultant to Mr. Lodge, on October 27 (Tab G).

### *Recommendation*

That you stress (1) the very difficult problem presented by the UAR's candidacy in the circumstances outlined above with which the Senator is familiar; (2) the fact that the US is in no way "backing" the UAR's candidacy; and (3) that should the UAR be elected, US opposition to certain of its policies and practices, particularly relating to Israel and the Suez Canal, will not be affected.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> No record of the meeting with Javits has been found.

---

## 246. Editorial Note

The Credentials Committee of the U.N. General Assembly met twice on November 10, when it considered the representation in the United Nations of the Republic of the Congo. Following extensive discussion, the Committee adopted a U.S. proposal to recommend that the General Assembly accept the credentials of representatives whom Congo President Kasavubu had named in a November 8 letter to

General Assembly President Boland. The proposal was adopted by a vote of 6 in favor and 1 against. Morocco and the United Arab Republic did not participate in the vote. For a report on these proceedings, see U.N. doc. A/4578. For text of Kasavubu's letter, see U.N. doc. A/CR/L.3/REV.1.

The next day, Secretary Herter sent the following message to Ambassador Wadsworth in New York: "Please convey to Barco my warmest congratulations for his superb handling of a very ticklish situation in the Credentials Committee yesterday." (Telegram 896 to USUN, November 11; Department of State, Central Files, 304.11/11-1160)

---

**247. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, November 16, 1960<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Long Range Possibilities for UN Reorganization

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Manlio Brosio, Italian Embassy  
Minister Carlo Perrone-Capano, Italian Embassy  
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Mr. Robert H. McBride—WE  
Mr. Hugh G. Appling—M  
Mr. Samuel W. Lewis—WE

Ambassador Brosio called on Mr. Merchant for a general exchange of views on current world problems. The discussion centered on the broad question of the present and future organizational structure of the United Nations, a problem which the Ambassador believed could become acute in the near future. Stressing that he was speaking personally rather than expressing the official views of his government, Ambassador Brosio pointed to the chaotic developments in the current General Assembly session concerning the Congo and to the very real danger that Portugal, Belgium, or France might decide to withdraw from active UN participation in anger over General Assembly handling of their respective colonial and Algerian problems. He questioned whether in fact the West can sit by and watch a further deterioration in the behavior of the General Assembly and the increasing

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-1660. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Lewis and approved in M on November 25.

domination of the Assembly by the Afro-Asian delegations. The Ambassador wished to inform his government whether the US was thinking seriously about this long range problem or was currently studying possible courses of action.

Mr. Merchant replied that many individuals in the Department had been concerned over some of the developments to which the Ambassador alluded. While we have for some time taken the position that it is premature to amend the UN Charter, there is no question that the general character of the United Nations has been altered substantially by the addition of so many new members. Mr. Merchant expressed his personal view that serious consideration should be given to finding ways in which the trend initiated in 1950 and 1951 to emphasize the General Assembly at the expense of the Security Council might be reversed. However, Mr. Merchant said, it is too early to give up hope that the General Assembly may become a more useful and stable organ after the new African leaders acquire experience in UN procedures and Nigeria and the new French community states begin to exercise a stabilizing influence on some other African nations. While admitting that the current General Assembly was the most disorderly in fifteen years, partly as a result of Khrushchev's behavior, Mr. Merchant did not think a continued deterioration of the Assembly's usefulness can yet be accepted as being inevitable.

Mr. Merchant continued that, while we are studying and thinking seriously about the long range problem, we have only two reasonably concrete ideas at this time. We are convinced that the various subsidiary UN organs should be enlarged to give greater representation to the Afro-Asian bloc. We do not, however, believe this principle should necessarily extend to the Security Council for which we are convinced different treatment will be required. We have not yet decided what should be done about Security Council enlargement but we would almost certainly oppose extension of the veto power to additional permanent members. Mr. Merchant pointed out that any broader recommendations concerning UN reorganization would of necessity have to await consideration by the new President and new Secretary of State.

Ambassador Brosio then returned to the question of the Security Council to present with considerable vigor his personal view that it would be wise not to rule out enlargement of that organ. He saw no real objection to a larger Security Council, even one with additional permanent members. The Ambassador thought in fact that enlargement is the only real means of reversing the present trend toward downgrading the importance of the Security Council in favor of the General Assembly. The Ambassador fears that majority rule in a General Assembly increasingly coming under the domination of the Afro-Asian bloc may very soon become a serious danger to Western inter-

ests. At present, the USSR still opposes the concept of majority rule and insists on unanimity for UN actions. Therefore, it could well be possible in the near future to obtain Soviet agreement to enlargement of the Security Council, an organ which depends under the Charter on unanimity for effective action rather than on a majority vote. However, when and if the Soviet Union believes itself close to gaining a working majority in the General Assembly, it would probably abandon its insistence on the principle of unanimity and oppose any changes intended to strengthen the Security Council. Since any enlargement of the Security Council would require a change in the UN Charter, it is essential that the West propose such a change while there is still reason to believe Soviet support would be forthcoming. Once the Security Council were enlarged to become more representative, it would automatically reacquire some of the prestige and influence lost to the General Assembly. Major problems could then be handled by the UN organ in which the West's interests are protected by the veto.

Ambassador Brosio asked what technique Mr. Merchant was thinking of to reverse the trend in favor of the General Assembly. Mr. Merchant replied that it might be possible to reemphasize the Security Council merely by the West's deliberately refraining from taking questions to the Assembly, and by our mobilizing votes to block the efforts of others to do so under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Brosio doubted that this would be sufficient to reverse the trend now that it is well started. He found it hard to believe that the principle of enlarging the UN's subsidiary organs, once adopted, would not soon be extended to include the Security Council. Since he was convinced Security Council enlargement would inevitably take place, he thought it wise to direct our thinking in that direction now as perhaps the only feasible means of reducing the dangerous trend toward General Assembly domination.

Ambassador Brosio said in response to a question that he did not rule out the possibility of Portugal's withdrawing from the UN or at least from active participation in UN affairs; nor could one exclude France's taking similar action. It was for this reason that he considers the problem of UN reorganization a vital one which may become extremely urgent if the Portuguese or French suffer crushing defeats at this Assembly session.

Mr. Merchant expressed his appreciation for having Ambassador Brosio's views. He assured the Ambassador that we were concerned over this whole problem and would continue to study it actively.

---

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

**248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 17, 1960—7:58 p.m.*

934. Re New York's 1346.<sup>2</sup> Dept agrees opposition to Kasavubu will exploit every available opportunity frustrate GA approval Congo credentials. Assume one effort this direction may be attempt claim two-thirds majority required approve Credentials Committee report. Appreciate Mission's concern re precedent this may establish in Chirep connection, but feel this aspect should not constitute deterrent strong US assertion majority vote adequate in this case. We agree any action this matter very likely be cited in future credentials problems. Hence we believe every effort should be made stress routine aspects Congo case and avoid any statements which would commit us in future instances. Delegation should stress Congo is newly admitted member UN now represented in New York by universally-recognized Chief of State who named members of his delegation before entire Assembly in recent statement.<sup>3</sup> Question therefore simply one of seating delegates so named and should not be considered an important question under the terms of Article 18(2).<sup>4</sup> In such situation, it would appear difficult for proponents of two-thirds thesis make a convincing case.

With view to possible impact on Chirep issue, del should avoid precise general definition GA voting requirements re credentials reports and limit itself to Congo question.

Despite need for USUN forcefully maintain simple majority required in Congo case, delegation should under no circumstances acknowledge that precedent has been established, thereby preserving freedom of action re Chirep issue.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/11-1060. Confidential. Drafted by Sullivan and Tron, cleared by Hewitt, and approved by Bohlen who signed for Herter. Repeated to Taipei.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1346, November 10, reported that a proposal to accept the Congolese credentials would not receive a two-thirds majority in the U.N. General Assembly, and repeated instructions on what position the U.S. Delegation should take. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> For text of Kasavubu's November 8 address before the U.N. General Assembly, see U.N. doc. A/PV.912.

<sup>4</sup> Article 18(2) of the U.N. Charter defines which questions before the U.N. General Assembly require a two-thirds vote.

<sup>5</sup> On November 17, the mission reported that the Soviet Delegation was attempting to delay release of the Credential Committee's report, and that it was trying to counter these efforts. (Telegrams 1430 and 1433; Department of State, Central Files, 303/11-1760) The General Assembly considered the question of Congo representation November 18–20. On November 22, it adopted Resolution 1498 (XV) accepting the credentials of representatives named in Kasavubu's November 8 letter to Boland. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. docs. A/PV.917–924. For text of Resolution 1498 (XV), see U.N. doc. A/4684.

**249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 25, 1960—8:21 p.m.*

989. Re USUN's 1339, 1476, 1518, Thacher-Tron Telecon.<sup>2</sup> On specific question raised by UK Del, you should state US will support UK in securing revision of ASAF resolution concerned with "inalienable right to complete independence" without prejudice to our final position. You should tell Cohen privately we may eventually have to support this phraseology if we are unable secure modification by sponsors on grounds that independence has been defined by GA to include self-government. Moreover, it can be argued that although any people have "inalienable right to independence", they also have right seek association with others. A right remains no less an "inalienable right" because peoples concerned do not choose exercise it. Nevertheless, we intend back UK to the hilt in securing language acceptable to them.

USUN may also tell Cohen we are gratified UK has decided work actively secure moderate, universally acceptable resolution and we hope we can work together closely.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/11-2460. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Tron, cleared in substance with Nunley and Herz, and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1339, November 9, transmitted the text of an Asian-African draft resolution on the colonial item. (*Ibid.*, 321.4/11-960) Telegram 1476, November 21, reported that the British had requested U.S. reaction to two points about the Asian-African draft. (*Ibid.*, 321.4/11-2160) Telegram 1518, November 24, reported on a meeting of U.S., U.K., French, Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand Delegates regarding the colonial item. (*Ibid.*, 321.4/11-2460) No record of the Thacher-Tron telephone conversation has been found.



## 250. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

G-209

Washington, November 28, 1960—9:15 p.m.

Reur 1736, G-503, G-414, Deptel 2750.<sup>2</sup>

Department continues to be concerned at UK Foreign Office attitude re question of Chinese representation at GA. We believe that recent approaches (particularly Tenison's<sup>3</sup> as reported G-414) are in nature of probes to test the strength of U.S. reaction. As such, we believe they should be countered at every appropriate opportunity. In this respect, the Department commends the Embassy's efforts with De La Mare (G-503).

In light of the recent U.S. elections, as well as the voting situation existing throughout the UN system, it is not surprising that there is considerable speculation about future U.S. policy toward Communist China and perhaps some hesitation on the part of the UK and other allied nations to continue firm and active support of the U.S. position on Chinese representation. Therefore, it is desirable that Embassy officials seek opportunities to emphasize the following points to appropriate officials of the Foreign Office:

1. It is clear that the policies of Communist China remain fundamentally antagonistic to the interests of the U.S. and UK. Moreover, Communist China remains anxious to expand its power and influence, and the U.S. and UK have a common interest in resisting this expansion.

2. The problem of Chinese representation in international bodies will be the subject of comprehensive study by U.S. authorities over the next few months. It is important that this study be conducted in an atmosphere free from crises associated with this problem and in the assurance that the status quo is not being subjected to unexpected

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-1460. Confidential. Drafted by McNutt and Nunley; cleared by Sullivan, Martin, Herz, Cargo, and Cutler; and approved by Parsons who signed for the Acting Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1736, October 11, reported that Home felt the moratorium on considering Chinese U.N. representation could not be sustained until the 16th U.N. General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 303/10-1160) Airgram G-503, October 29, reported on a conversation between Arthur De La Mare, head of the Foreign Office's Far East Department, and two officers from the London Embassy about the moratorium vote at the 15th General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 303.10-2960) Airgram G-414, October 14, transmitted the Foreign Office's preliminary assessment of the moratorium vote. (*Ibid.*, 303/10-1460) Telegram 2750, November 2, instructed the Embassy to tell Home that the United States counted on U.K. support for the moratorium in other U.N. organs, regardless of how the issue would be handled at the 16th General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 303/11-1160)

<sup>3</sup> Richard Tenison, Chinese Desk Officer in the Foreign Office.

strains. There is every indication that the British have full intention of maintaining the moratorium and ancillary working arrangements in the Specialized Agencies, demonstrated by their recent most welcome actions in WHO and UNESCO. However, it is felt useful to emphasize in discussions with the Foreign Office the importance which we attach to the maintenance of this position in the Specialized Agencies, and our hope that other friendly nations will join in this effort.

3. After its study of the problem of Chinese representation, it is to be expected the U.S. will wish to discuss its conclusions and its plans for future handling of this problem at the highest political level and will presumably wish to renew the existing understanding for a common U.S.-UK approach to this issue in the UNGA and SC as well as in the Specialized Agencies and subordinate organs of the UN system.

4. The key to the present situation is, of course, the attitude of the African states. In order to hold the line in the subordinate agencies and organs of the UN system, utmost efforts will be required to make the new African states more aware of their own interest in preventing the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.

5. We realize, of course, that the question of Africa and Chinese representation has been raised repeatedly with the UK. (We recall especially Parsons' talks in London in January of this year and in Washington with Caccia in April, and the Secretary's conversation with Foreign Secretary Lloyd on April 12.<sup>4</sup>) In this connection we have kept in mind the British contention that they are faced with a number of problems on this matter, such as the fact they themselves recognize the Chinese Communists. They have also asserted that their influence in the African continent is dwindling.

6. The Department, despite these demurrers, continues to believe that the UK does wield considerable and significant influence in the area and that, indeed, their long presence on the continent gives them in certain areas a better entree than that which we currently possess.

We, therefore, hope that the UK will continue to assist in helping these nations to understand the real character of the Chinese Communist threat, as well as the continuing desirability of preventing Communist China from gaining representation in the Specialized Agencies and subordinate bodies of the UN.

**Dillon**

---

<sup>4</sup> No record of Parsons' conversations in London or Washington has been found; a memorandum of Herter's conversation with Lloyd is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624.

**251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 30, 1960—11:15 a.m.*

1006. Re USUN's 1542, 1543, 1547, 1548 and 1560. Department's 804 and 837.<sup>2</sup> ASAF draft resolution on colonialism transmitted your 1542<sup>3</sup> is considerable improvement over previous drafts. Cosponsors have dropped most troublesome concepts in Soviet draft declaration, including independence for all dependent peoples "forthwith," as well as section on foreign bases. ASAF draft also makes no mention of target dates. On positive side, phraseology of resolution borrows from Bandung language to include by implication Soviet-dominated areas. Moreover, public relations implications throughout world and importance our relations with new and emerging African states make it impossible for us take position against concept of independence as an inalienable right for all dependent peoples. It also clear from context earlier debate on allocation of item that ASAF's consider their resolution more as declaration of conscience than as operating resolution. Sponsorship, which includes Liberia, Iran and Nigeria, is also factor in resolution's favor, as well as fact it will be cosponsored or supported by Japan and Turkey.

We hope further improvements can be made. USUN therefore should support amendment efforts along lines suggested your 1548, basing final formulations of various paragraphs your 1560 [and 1570.] We believe advantage this course of action two-fold: 1) it would improve resolution; and 2) it would also help prevent inevitable Soviet-inspired amendments from being accepted by present sponsors. We are particularly concerned Soviets will succeed in eliminating such Bandung language as "end of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" in operative paragraph 1 and "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" in the first declaratory paragraph. Counter pressure from West designed prevent such Soviet tactics from succeeding therefore essential.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/11-2860. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Tron; cleared with Gerig, Sullivan, Williamson, Penfield, and Ludlow and in substance with Monsma; and approved by Bohlen who signed for the Acting Secretary. Repeated to London, Paris, and Lisbon.

<sup>2</sup> Telegrams 804 and 837 are printed as Documents 237 and 239, respectively. The other telegrams, dated November 25–28, reported on aspects of and discussions about the colonial item. (Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/11-2360 through 321.4/11-2860)

<sup>3</sup> Regarding telegram 1542, see footnote 2, above. For text of the Afro-Asian draft resolution, which differed only slightly from the text transmitted to the Department in telegram 1542 and which was adopted without change by the General Assembly, see U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514, U.N. doc. A/4684.

For the same reasons, the Department believes USUN should continue to urge Japan and Turkey to join list of cosponsors if they have not already done so. Selected Latin Americans might also be approached with a view to having their cosponsorship made contingent upon acceptance our amendments.

Dept considers effort should be made secure additional amendment designed bring language of resolution into line with Charter provisions. Wherever feasible, words "self-government or" should be included before "independence." Rationale for this change is that this accords with Charter language and that there are areas which clearly do not desire and are not capable of independent national life—British Cameroons and the Virgin Islands for example—but which should not be deprived of attainment of self-governing status.

Dillon

---

**252. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Missions<sup>1</sup>**

CG-500

*Washington, November 30, 1960—7:40 p.m.*

Re CG-326.<sup>2</sup> Although gratified that the Chinese representation moratorium formula once again approved by UNGA, Department was disappointed results our efforts obtain greater support this year than last (see ref).

Chiefs of Mission at their discretion requested to take appropriate opportunity to express Department's appreciation to Governments to which accredited regarding continued support moratorium or abstentions (Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia) in face of pressures to oppose it. Dept believes that particular gratitude due Liberia. Dept also appreciates and commends Ambassadors who were instrumental in maintaining or changing positions as requested by Dept (Tunisia and Pakistan).

Dept also desires Missions extend thanks to countries whose representatives spoke in favor of moratorium: Spain, Greece, UK, Panama, Costa Rica, Australia and Philippines. (US Del particularly noted effectiveness Philippino statement.)

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-3060. Confidential. Drafted by Caprio, McNutt, and Sullivan; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Rosen; and approved by Cargo who signed for the Acting Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

Numerous abstentions of new African members are of course matter of serious concern, especially since Cameroun, Togo, Malagasy, Congo (Brazzaville) and Senegal had recognized GRC and Entente and Central African states had been regarded as sympathetic.

Dept particularly disappointed by votes of Cyprus, Ethiopia and Nigeria. Ethiopia's negative vote especially is matter of concern in view Department's efforts obtain some prior knowledge its position and its record of support for moratorium prior 1959 when it abstained.

As noted in CG-326 majority (13) of new members abstained on the moratorium resolution; while three voted against; none voted for. Of old members, Malaya and Laos changed from support to abstention; Ethiopia and Cuba from abstention to opposition.

There was series of five preliminary votes before tally on moratorium as whole. In these votes, as in vote on whole, negative ballots remained constant both as to number (34) and composition. Positive votes and abstentions were, on other hand, subject to fluctuation in both categories.

Thus in two instances in preliminary votes (those dealing with whether or not GA should accept for its agenda Soviet item on Chinese representation), ballots for and against came within four votes of one another (see paragraphs numbered 1 and 4 of reference). In each of these two votes Ecuador, Mexico, New Zealand and Venezuela (all of which supported us on the vote as a whole), abstained. (Three of these—Mexico, New Zealand and Venezuela—abstained in similar votes last year; Ecuador voted with us.)

On the two preliminary votes which dealt with the proposal that GA would not consider any proposals on Chinese representation (see paragraphs numbered 3 and 5 of reference), Panama and Mexico abstained on one; Panama alone abstained on other. (Last year Mexico voted similarly; Panama voted with us.)

In reviewing these votes Dept sees three problems which face us in dealing with this question. First, and most important, is attitude of the new African members; second is fluctuation in preliminary votes by number of states which support our overall position and third is constancy or hard core of opposing ballots.

Department analyzing significance these votes, especially those of new member states, in terms tactics, arguments and approaches which may be indicated in future handling this problem. In meantime Dept wishes stress continuing significance Chirep policy to total US position in Far East and as primary factor deterring expanded ChiCom influence internationally, particularly in underdeveloped areas. Posts should underline latter point in discussions with host governments and responsible opinion formers.

**253. Editorial Note**

On December 3–4, the U.N. Security Council met to consider the admission of new members to the United Nations. It denied the Soviet Union's request to include the application of the Mongolian People's Republic on its agenda, but decided to consider the application of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

By a vote of 8 in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstention, the Security Council decided to recommend to the U.N. General Assembly that Mauritania be admitted to the United Nations. The United States voted in favor of this measure. The Soviet Union, however, voted against it, and it was not adopted. The Security Council then decided to submit a special report on these proceedings to the General Assembly. For text of the draft resolution recommending Mauritania's admission to the United Nations, see U.N. doc. S/4567/Rev.1. For text of the Special Report of the Security Council, see U.N. doc. A/4656. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. doc. S/PV.911.

**254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 5, 1960—8:33 p.m.*

1057. Re: GA Recess Schedule (urtel 1628).<sup>2</sup> Department strongly prefers that resumption 15th GA be deferred until late February or early March and USDel authorized take this position both in corridor discussions and December 9 General Committee meeting. This would give new administration sufficient time to review positions to be taken on remaining items. We believe this factor overrides any inconveniences that may be involved in rescheduling certain meetings of specialized agencies and other UN organs.

Soviet proposal to renew 15th GA on January 3 appears designed to clear deck for Khrushchev proposal for Special GA on disarmament in spring. Resumed GA on January 3 would take place during transitional period of US Government, and since it unlikely that 15th GA

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/12-360. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Bohlen and Stoessel, and approved and signed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1628 from USUN, December 3, reported that the Soviet Union wished to resume the 15th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly in early January 1961 and requested authorization to advocate resumption of the session in March 1961. (*Ibid.*)

could complete its agenda before January 20, new administration would be confronted with taking positions on items immediately after it had assumed responsibility. Moreover, we doubt that there would be any strong desire on part other delegations to complete work expeditiously, and drawn out resumed session would be likely result. On other hand, apart from whatever effect it would have on Khrushchev proposal, resumption 15th GA in late February or early March would have advantage cited by Loutfi, i.e., permit new US administration assess position and provide rest period for tired delegations.

Above considerations constitute basic rationale for our strong preference in deferring 15th GA resumption to late February or early March. In your corridor discussions, we believe principal reason which should be given is that 15th GA thus far has been moving in highly charged atmosphere and that more extended period of reflection and assessment by all delegations before resumption is desirable than would be possible if GA resumed in early January.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> On December 15, the General Assembly decided to recess its 15th regular session on December 20, and to resume it on March 7, 1961. (U.N. doc. A/4684, p. 61)

---

**255. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 8, 1960.*

I am attaching herewith a copy of an instruction to our United Nations Delegation which I have just approved.<sup>2</sup> It came to me a few minutes ago for immediate decision since a vote on the resolution, to which reference is made, will probably be taken during the course of a session scheduled at 8:30 p.m.

The resolution itself, of which I am also attaching a copy, contains much language with which we disagree. It also contains some good language. The resolution was introduced by forty-two African and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/12-860. Confidential. Drafted by Herter. The source text bears the typescript notation, "The White House approved, 12/8/60 and telegram sent."

<sup>2</sup> Subject to any decision the President might wish to take. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to telegram 1093 to USUN. No copy was attached to the source text, but a copy is *ibid.*, 321.4/12-660. A copy of U.N. doc. A/L.323 containing the text of the Afro-Asian draft resolution on colonialism was attached to the source text.]

Asian nations who refused amendments which we and some of our European friends offered so as to be able to refuse Soviet amendments of a very objectionable character which were likewise being offered. The resolution will inevitably carry by an overwhelming vote with a few colonial nations abstaining but, as far as we know, none voting against. Our Delegation in New York is unanimously and strongly in favor of our voting for the resolution. This is likewise true of our African and Far Eastern Bureaus here and also Chip Bohlen, who is supervising our United Nations operations in the Department. Our European Bureau is in favor of abstention and the British have been pressing us hard to abstain. It is my own personal belief, while holding my nose with regard to much of the language, that on balance we should vote for it. It is a declaratory resolution and does not call upon the respective states to do other than abide by the Charter provisions (last operative paragraph).

The President might wish to look at the resolution itself and, if he feels strongly that it is so objectionable in some of the language that we should abstain I would certainly understand. I should add just one thing. If we abstain on this resolution, I am afraid that we may lose such influence as we possess when it comes to being of assistance to the French in securing a moderate Algerian resolution.

**Christian A. Herter**<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**256. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, December 8, 1960, 4:10 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

The President telephoned with regard to our vote in the UN on the Afro-Asian resolution on colonialism.<sup>2</sup> The President raised the question of the possible effect on Okinawa, the Ryukyus and the Virgin Islands, and Panama and the Secretary explained our thinking with regard to these areas. The President mentioned the Philippines which had not wanted us to leave before they were adequately prepared, and Guinea which has always claimed that France pulled out on them too fast as examples of the fallacy of some of this resolution.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.



The Secretary said it was an exceedingly badly worded resolution and that he has spent an hour and a half wrestling with this, but everybody feels on balance we have to vote for it rather than abstain. The Secretary said as a practical matter the Charter of the UN is the binding thing and the UN Charter makes it clear that you provide for Trust Territories, etc. The Secretary said this is a bad resolution, but we are afraid of an alternative Soviet resolution. The Secretary said even Cambodia agreed that it is badly drafted but they don't dare change it because of possible Soviet amendments, but they have said if this resolution goes through there would be a more mature discussion of colonialism later. The President said he thought we almost have to take it paragraph by paragraph and give the American interpretation and point out the Charter of the UN with respect to treaties which says there must be a reasonable period and, therefore, we take this to mean the initiation of the process. The President said you have to explain in either case: if we vote no we have to say that the US has stood for this principle for decades and we have never tried to sustain a relationship by force, with a similar explanation if we abstain; if we vote for it we have to make even more explanations. The Secretary said there is a period of explanation of vote and whatever we vote we would explain our reasons. The Secretary said this is a really tough one but on balance we felt we should go along since the resolution would pass anyway. The President said he thinks he would abstain and explain it but with people like Mr. Bohlen and others who work closely feeling differently it makes it difficult. The Secretary said none of us like the wording but felt on balance we would be better off to go along. The President asked if there were any who would vote against and the Secretary said no; that the British and French will abstain and Canada will vote for it. The Secretary said this resolution was filed by 42 nations. The President said none of the 42 were not a recipient of aid. The President said he is beginning to think the whole UN Charter needs redoing which the President said DeGaulle has been calling attention to for some time. The President said he supposed we had better go along with the resolution since he is forced, but the President said we must make clear on the record as to why we do it paragraph by paragraph so there will be no misinterpretation of our meaning.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Herter telephoned Bohlen at 4:50 p.m. and told him to instruct the U.S. Delegation to make a statement before the U.N. General Assembly defining the U.S. position on each paragraph of the resolution. Caccia telephoned Herter later that afternoon on another matter. Herter informed him of Eisenhower's decision, noting that "he had really gagged over it," and that the President was no happier with it. Bohlen called back at 6:10 p.m. to discuss the U.S. explanation. Herter and Bohlen agreed that the United States would make its statement before the vote. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

The Secretary said he had just come from a meeting with Gates and Anderson and would send to the President tonight the statement for NATO.

[Here follows discussion of a meeting with Gates and Anderson and of a statement for NATO.]

---

## 257. Editorial Note

On Friday, December 9, President Eisenhower received a letter from British Prime Minister Macmillan, who wrote he was "shocked" the United States intended to vote in the U.N. General Assembly for the Afro-Asian resolution on colonialism. "Do let us stand together," Macmillan urged, "at least on a decision to abstain, and thus dissociate ourselves from a resolution which has no connection with reality." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

Eisenhower telephoned Secretary Herter at 10:50 that morning, suggesting that, in view of his and Herter's ambivalence about the resolution and Macmillan's strong feelings, the United States abstain during the vote on it. The President noted he had just met with Senegalese Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, who shared the U.S. interpretation of the resolution. Eisenhower believed Dia would abstain if he knew the United States intended to do so. In reply to Herter's comment that the resolution would pass regardless of the U.S. vote, the President stated, "a question arises when our strongest ally feels this way." He said he would telephone Herter later that afternoon, and proposed the U.S. Delegation try to convince certain African delegations to abstain also. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) A memorandum of Eisenhower's 9 a.m. conversation with Dia is in Department of State, Central Files, 770T.00/12-960.

At 5:25 p.m., Herter received a telephone call from General Goodpaster, who stated the President was rethinking his decision to allow the United States to vote for the resolution and was now leaning toward abstaining. Eisenhower would call Herter later that evening. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

The President telephoned Herter from Augusta, Georgia, at 6:15 p.m. After a brief discussion, he instructed the Secretary to "say that much as we would like to vote for the resolution we were going to abstain." (*Ibid.*) Herter then telephoned Charles Bohlen and informed him of the President's decision. Bohlen noted the resolution would probably come to a vote the following Monday or Tuesday, and agreed with Herter that the Mission at the United Nations would dislike the President's instructions. (*Ibid.*)

The following afternoon, Herter called Ambassador Wadsworth at the United Nations. Wadsworth stated he had already learned of the President's decision. "He did not like it," but "if they wanted to take that kind of a chance, all right." (*Ibid.*) Later that afternoon, Herter initialed telegram 1116 to USUN instructing the U.S. Delegation to abstain in the vote on the colonialism resolution and to make a "clear and accurate explanation" of the reasons for the U.S. vote. (Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/12-1060)

---

**258. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, December 14, 1960—1 a.m.*

1744. Colonial item; Deptel 1116.<sup>2</sup> For the record, and as personally indicated to Secretary<sup>2</sup> I am shocked and disheartened by refelt instruction changing US position on Asian-African draft resolution on colonialism from support to abstention. Considerable efforts by our friends, particularly Turks and Japanese, resulted, I believe, in far more moderate and constructive draft than could have been expected, and one which both rejects Soviet approach to subject as well as includes language aimed at Soviet imperialism. Our failure support this resolution would in normal times seriously weaken record of US positive stand on colonialism; coming now, just before recess in exhausting GA session when most delegates are anxious primarily to close and leave, impact may be lessened.

In long run, however, US position may be seriously eroded by Soviet attack in which more, rather than fewer, Asians and Africans will join. It is also particularly unfortunate this last minute reversal was made after Department informed Tokyo and Manila we would support this resolution; it seems inescapable that word will spread that our vote on this issue, of critical importance to Asians and Africans, was determined by wishes of colonial powers which even we recognize as such.

**Wadsworth**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/12-1460. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

**259. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, December 15, 1960—11 p.m.*

1774. Presidency 16th GA. In order to meet candidacy Ali Sastroamidjojo (Indonesia) for Presidency 16th GA (as reported to Dept Dec 12),<sup>2</sup> recommend we be authorized quietly and informally but within next few days to suggest to Slim (Tunisia) that he enter race and announce candidacy before this half session is over. Dept may recall we made this recommendation once before, last spring.<sup>3</sup>

Burmese report Ali will announce in early February. We know from experience that early announcement gives candidate substantial and even commanding advantage. With present UN membership of 99 and political climate to be envisaged at 16th GA Ali Sastroamidjojo may be difficult candidate to beat. There may be further complication of Soviet bloc again putting forward Nosek, in whose favor Ali might withdraw at strategic time.

Decision to postpone problem of 16th GA presidency for new US administration to handle could well have effect of leading to fait accompli which new administration would be too late to undo. For these reasons, believe US decision must be made now, and strongly recommend we act with least possible delay.

Consider Slim (Tunisia) best ASAF prospect from Western point of view. He enjoys maximum chance of waging successful campaign for presidency, we understand Slim is interested. We understand from Riad (UAR), who mentioned 16th GA President to US recently, other Africans also interested. He mentioned Adeel (Sudan) and Ghana FonMin, as well as Slim. Riad said he had thought FonMin Fawzi (UAR) might be considered, view his long UN experience. We discreetly discouraged this.

This is added reason for taking early step.

Urgently request Dept authorize us do so.

**Wadsworth**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/12-1560. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> The report has not been found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 121.

260. **Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, December 15, 1960—11 p.m.*

1775. Colonial item. Reaction to US abstention on 43-power resolution on granting independence to colonial peoples<sup>2</sup> was immediate, strong, sometimes emotional, and invariably negative.

US abstention was greeted by audible gasp of surprise followed by diminishing murmur of whispered comments.

Immediately after vote, Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) commented "How could you vote this way? You have no problem with colonies."

Ifeagwu (Nigeria) said he "couldn't believe it, US abstention was incomprehensible." He then asked, "Are you trying to commit political suicide?"

Omar (Somalia) said he could understand our vote, but thought it unfortunate because most other Afro-Asians could not. He added "US now seems to stand publicly for ideals which seem contrary to basic American beliefs."

Johnson (Liberia) expressed disappointment and suggested vote betrayed US heritage. He added US "handed propaganda victory to USSR without reason."

Rahnema (Iran) said all Afro-Asians previously confident US would support, that US support was wanted by sponsors and that vote could prove only disadvantageous to US in UN and elsewhere.

Malley (Radio Tunis): "Felicitations on your vote. Understand Khrushchev is sending medal."

Harvey (Quincy Mass., *Patriot-Ledger*) found no reason for US to "beat itself."

Goedhart (Netherlands) in jest suggested US in future follow Netherlands' example and divorce self from Portugal and Union of South Africa.

Shanahan (New Zealand) expressed disappointment US had to abstain, adding his instructions were to abstain, but he called Wellington to get permission for positive vote "because I just could not afford to have New Zealand painted to be what it is not."

Kerina (petitioner SWA) said he was sorry US abstained. He knew, he added, US was anti-colonial, but it would be hard for people of SWA to understand this vote which put US and Union of South Africa in same category.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/12-1560. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> The U.N. General Assembly considered this item November 28–December 7 and December 13–14; voting on the draft resolution occurred on December 14. Regarding these proceedings, see U.N. docs. A/PV.925–939 and A/PV.944–947. The record of the vote on the resolution and text of Wadsworth's explanation of the U.S. vote is in U.N. doc. A/PV.947. For text of the resolution, 1514 (XV), see U.N. doc. A/4684.

Chelli (Tunisia) said US took very bad position. US might not understand but for "us, who are your friends, it is sickening to see you in same camp as Portugal." US claims to be champion of liberty but truth is in vote. US has given ammunition to USSR across board including in Congo discussion. "Who will believe Mr. Wadsworth after this."

Menemencioglu (Turkey) found US vote "unbelievable and incomprehensible."

Other comments heard were in accord general theme specified above.

US explanation of vote greeted by absolute silence. We heard several comments to effect that no explanation could salvage position left by vote.

Berg-Nielsen (Norway) commented on "evident lack of unity" in US Delegation regarding vote on colonialism resolutions, as shown by behavior of US Delegate after vote taken.<sup>3</sup>

### Wadsworth

---

<sup>3</sup> *The New York Times* reported that a member of the U.S. Delegation, Zelma Watson George, stood and applauded the resolution's adoption. George was quoted as later stating, "There was no one in the delegation who supported the abstention. I'm not sure that even Mr. Wadsworth did so." (December 15, 1960, p. A1)

---

## 261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 19, 1960—9:06 p.m.*

1188. Re Mauritanian Membership.

1. USGADel should endeavor persuade sponsors 11-power draft<sup>2</sup> agree postpone consideration their resolution until resumed session on grounds Soviet amendments raise highly controversial Outer Mongolian issue and consideration this issue now could result in either postponement recess date or failure complete more pressing questions prior recess. If unsuccessful this effort, USGADel should support 11-power draft resolution reported urtel 1807.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/12-1860. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley, initialed by Cargo, cleared with FE and in substance with Monsma, and approved by Sisco who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a draft resolution favoring Mauritania's admission to the United Nations, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly by 11 African nations. Its text was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1807 from USUN, December 18. (*Ibid.*) For text, see U.N. doc. A/L.335.

2. As proposed reftel USGADel should strongly oppose any amendment to include Outer Mongolia this draft resolution and also oppose consideration as separate resolution Outer Mongolia and other pending applications at this time. Del should actively seek support other friendly dels for this purpose.

3. If draft resolution amended to include Outer Mongolia, delegation should abstain on amended resolution.

4. USGADel should endeavor persuade sponsors 11-power draft substitute "finding" for "decision" in operative paragraph 2 draft resolution since GA cannot make decisions.

5. USGADel should make no statements or explanations of vote.

**Herter**

---

**262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Senegal<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 21, 1960—6:30 p.m.*

489. Dakar's 396 to Dept, rptd Paris 172, Rabat 35.<sup>2</sup> Dept believes Soviets vetoed Mauritania application admission UN mainly to gain favor Morocco and thereby compromise position US air bases there. Soviets pressing Morocco accept military assistance, particularly planes and instructors whose presence Morocco would obviously be useful to Soviet efforts neutralize these bases.

By tying question Mauritanian admission to that Outer Mongolia, Soviets not obliged contest directly issue of reality of Mauritanian independence. They hope thereby potential damage to Soviet relations with other African states can be minimized. Soviets probably calculated their veto likely cost little politically in terms bloc relations with neutralist African states like Guinea, Ghana, Mali. Soviets have apparently now decided to give less weight to attitude pro-West ex-French states and Mauritania whose govts. unlikely seek close relations with bloc in near future. Thus balance of political gain from Soviet viewpoint clearly on side veto.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/12-860. Secret. Drafted by Floyd on December 20, cleared by Armitage and Cargo and in draft by McClintic, and approved by Coote who signed for Herter. Repeated to Rabat and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 8, it reported on the Senegalese reaction to the Soviet veto of Mauritania's application for U.N. membership, and requested background on and an appraisal of the Soviet vote. (*Ibid.*)

263. **Record of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting,  
Department of State, Washington, December 23, 1960,  
9:15 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows discussion of items 1, "Intelligence," and 2, "Sprague Committee."]

3. *UN General Assembly*

Mr. Wilcox reviewed briefly his impressions of the General Assembly. Although it had not been a great success for us, it could have been worse. The "maladjustments" created at the beginning of the session by Khrushchev never quite wore off.

One problem was that our NATO partners were not consistent in their positions on items of interest to us, whereas the Communists were united. Also, it is apparent that we need to steady procedures in the UN on rules, instrumentalities, etc.

We should do more advanced planning and attempt to obtain greater cooperation in achieving our objectives from our partners. We should sit down with our NATO Allies and speak frankly to them, notably concerning colonial issues.

Mr. Wilcox said that we should no longer attempt to change detailed wording of resolutions when the texts do not please us entirely; the total impact of the resolution is what should concern us. Mr. Wilcox said that the past session demonstrated that we cannot afford the luxury of non-expert delegations in the future.

With regard to the Congo, Hammarskjold had told Mr. Wilcox that he was just as pleased that the Western resolution on the Congo<sup>2</sup> had not passed. He feels his hands are freer now than they would have been if the resolution passed with a small margin.

[Here follow discussion of items 4, "Economic Affairs," 5, "Africa," 6, "US-German Financial Negotiations," 7, "Portugese Vote," 8, "U/IGC," and 9, "Laos"; an attendance list; and a list of materials used during discussion of item 1.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel. Herter chaired the meeting.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly by the United States and the United Kingdom, see U.N. doc. A/L.332.



## ANTARCTICA

**264. Memorandum of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, January 10, 1958, 11:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of items 1-5: India-Pakistan, Korea, Indonesia, Japan, and Iraq.]

### *6. Antarctica*

Ambassador Daniels outlined the Department's activities with regard to Antarctica. He referred to secret conversations conducted with the UK, Australia and New Zealand last October pursuant to NSC and OCB directives.<sup>2</sup> These directives provide that the U.S. should (1) assert claim to unclaimed areas and reserve our rights with regard to other areas and (2) consider, with other claimant nations, the establishment of an international regime. This would involve nations having direct and substantial interest, including the Soviet Union.

Basic discussions to be reached include:

1. Should there be an international regime? An international regime might enhance scientific collaboration and might provide assurances of non-military use.
2. Could the Soviet Union be better controlled in or out of such a regime?
3. Should Japan participate?
4. At what instant should the U.S. make public its position—what might be the possible effect on the activities of the IGY?

Mr. Murphy explained that at this point the State Department is concerned with a determination within the U.S. Government of what the U.S. position should be. The Soviets seem to be moving forward very rapidly in their activities in Antarctica.

Admiral Burke referred to the great interest of the Navy in McMurdo Bay and to New Zealand claims of sovereignty. Ambassador Daniels observed that in light of the New Zealand claim we have refrained from making a direct claim for sovereignty in this area but that we reserve all rights devolving from our own activities in the area. Mr. Murphy likened the situation to a sort of joint tenancy.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meeting: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> For the NSC and OCB directives, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. xi, p. 693.

Ambassador Daniels pointed out that an international regime, if it could successfully be established, would avoid the difficult questions of sovereignty and would provide guaranteed access to the whole of the continent.

Admiral Burke noted that the U.S. Navy was spending a great deal of money in McMurdo Bay and elsewhere, and expressed concern that the U.S. might be "building a house on someone else's lot". If we did not assert specific claims at an early date, we might find ourselves in the position where lack of good will on the part of one party could successfully frustrate a multilateral solution. He suggested that perhaps Australia, New Zealand and the United States might jointly assert sovereignty in all areas which they respectively claim at the present time. The possibility of Soviet intervention seemed progressively more likely with awkward implications for the U.S. and her friendly allies.

Mr. Murphy commented that the Soviet Union may previously have been prevented by lack of capability from entering actively into the Antarctic area, but that this period may well be passed and that we must expect an increasingly aggressive policy from the Soviet Union in Antarctica. Admiral Austin noted that under the NSC directive the U.S. was required to firm up the basis for its claims and to establish them. Mr. Murphy commented that at this point, if the Soviet Union were to announce claims based on its present activities in the IGY (which are supposed to be without political implication), the U.S. would find itself undecided as to what areas it should or could claim.

There was general agreement that this was a problem which demanded serious and urgent study.

**265. Memorandum From the Special Adviser on Antarctica (Daniels) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 14, 1958.

SUBJECT

Antarctica

*Background*

Following your approval on January 3, 1958,<sup>2</sup> of the Department's tentative position as outlined in the attached memorandum (Tab A<sup>3</sup>), secret consultations were initiated with representatives of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom on January 6 and continued on January 13, 1958.<sup>4</sup> These representatives were informed of the substance of the Department's position, and it was made clear to them that these proposals were tentatively proposed by the State Department as a basis for consultation, and did not necessarily represent the final position of the United States Government.

The representatives of Australia and New Zealand are awaiting instructions from their Governments, but expressed concern at the proposed reservation of rights by the United States in areas of Antarctica outside the unclaimed sector. The British Representative expressed the opinion that the proposal for an international regime for Antarctica would have a better chance of success if it were not accompanied at this time by a territorial claim by the United States.

The same tentative proposals of the State Department were discussed at a meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board on January 8,<sup>5</sup> and were referred to the Working Group on Antarctica for study and formulation of recommendations to be considered by the OCB on January 29. During the course of the OCB meeting, Dr. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, expressed the view that it would be undesirable for the United States to advance a territorial

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/1-1458. Secret. Drafted by Daniels and sent through S/S and Murphy, who initialed it.

<sup>2</sup> Not identified further.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached, but a copy of the draft Department of State position with an attached draft seven-article convention is in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022.1-858.

<sup>4</sup> Memoranda of the conversations on January 7 and 13 are *ibid.*, 722.022/1-858 and 722.022/1-1558. On January 17, Daniels met again with representatives of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and gave them a "Draft Basic Principles to be Considered in Establishing an International Authority for Antarctica". A memorandum of this conversation with the draft attached is *ibid.*, 722.022/1-2358.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary notes of the OCB discussion are *ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430.

claim during the current IGY. Mr. George Allen, Director of the USIA, expressed a similar opinion. However, it was generally agreed that some action was urgent in order that United States initiative might not be lost or blunted by some Soviet action.

In view of the foregoing considerations, there may be some advantage in separating at this time the proposal for an international regime from the proposal for a United States territorial claim, so as to permit immediate action on the former without prejudice to possible later action on the latter. The purpose would be to take early action (before the end of the IGY) in proposing a reasonable and constructive solution of the Antarctic problem, without prejudicing IGY international cooperation, and at the same time reaffirm basic United States rights in Antarctica even though action in asserting a specific territorial claim is deferred.

One advantage of this procedure would be that it could be accomplished by means of diplomatic notes to the interested governments, which would be made public, without the need for a formal Presidential Proclamation.

There is attached for your consideration a draft note intended to accomplish these objectives (Tab B<sup>6</sup>) and a summary of arguments for and against this modified procedure (Tab C<sup>6</sup>).

*Recommendation:*

That the attached draft note be approved tentatively as an alternative State Department position.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> Dulles initialed his approval on the source text.

---

**266. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, January 24, 1958, 11:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

*1. Antarctica*

General Twining said that he had just signed a letter (what he signed evidently is an internal Defense memo<sup>2</sup>) giving JCS views on four major aspects—area of claims, interest of Soviet Union, relation to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not identified further.

IGY and demilitarization. He said that the Joint Chiefs now feel that the United States should be prepared to assert territorial claims, noting that the Soviet Union may well set forth a claim of its own.

Mr. Murphy noted that this appeared to be a change in the position of the JCS. He said that basically the State Department does not disagree with the view that we should be prepared to assert claims but noted that our present tentative view is that we should reserve our rights regarding territorial claims in any discussion about Antarctica.

Mr. Daniels said that he would like to comment on the various aspects referred to by General Twining:

First, the main reason for confining a possible U.S. claim, while reserving U.S. claims to other areas, is to avoid unnecessary and undesirable conflict with friendly countries. The tentative feeling now is that assertion of a very broad claim would raise difficulties which would outweigh advantages.

Second, regarding the role of the Soviet Union and proposed internationalization, the tentative feeling is that the Soviets have established an interest in Antarctica and will probably continue their bases there. An international regime would provide a basis for observation and control of Soviet activities. If the Soviets are not included in proposed internationalized activities, they will probably redouble their efforts to improve their position.

Third, regarding the IGY, the present thinking is that action to assert claims during the period of the IGY would have unfortunate repercussions by injecting political considerations. This could lead to action in the forthcoming UN General Assembly which might be an unfortunate forum for consideration of the Antarctic problem.

Fourth, regarding demilitarization (non-militarization), the views of the Joint Chiefs could be most helpful. The idea is that the Soviets would be prevented from using their bases for military operations; at the same time, there would be no direct military activities in Antarctica by any of the powers participating in the internationalized activity. *There is no intention, of course, to interfere with operations similar to those going on at present even though these are being conducted by U.S. military elements.*

Admiral Burke commented that we live up to our international agreements whereas the Soviets do not. Mr. Daniels said that under an internationalized setup we would have a better chance to observe what the Soviets are up to than if there were no internationalized arrangements.

Admiral Burke said he felt it important to lay claim to all the areas in Antarctica to which we have any legitimate claim whatsoever, noting that our activities have covered a wide area. He stressed that we should make a large claim even though we did not press our claim to all areas. He added that the Soviets will probably learn that we are

carrying on discussions with other powers, and when they learn this they will assert a claim of their own. Mr. Murphy commented that this is one reason why we are pressing now to get agreement on a U.S. position.

In reply to Mr. Sprague's question, Mr. Daniels said that we have been conducting preliminary discussions with Australia and New Zealand regarding an international regime.

Mr. Daniels then noted that Antarctica is under discussion in the OCB. He then described the alternative proposal now under consideration which would involve an immediate proposal for establishment of an international regime, reaffirmation of all U.S. rights and an invitation to the interested governments to meet in order to work out a suitable agreement. Mr. Daniels commented that if this proposal did not work out we would still have reasserted our claims and obtained the benefit of trying for an international solution.

Admiral Burke inquired about possible Congressional reactions. Mr. Murphy commented that he thought Congress would be influenced to some degree by the position taken by the Executive Branch.

Mr. Daniels commented in regard to Soviet participation that the New Zealand Embassy had received word from its home government that the Soviets should be invited if there is any prospect for a conference on Antarctica to succeed.

General White suggested that the Monroe Doctrine might be applied to Antarctica on the theory that it is part of the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Daniels said that actually much of Antarctica is in the Eastern Hemisphere.

Admiral Burke felt that "demilitarization" should be defined more carefully, noting that airfields, for example, can be readily converted to military use. General Eddleman suggested that this concept should be defined in some such way as to say that the Antarctic should not be used for purely military purposes (non-militarization), and Mr. Daniels agreed that this definition would probably be better than use of the word demilitarization.

General White commented that much of the area involved is ice and shifts around. He felt this would complicate the problem of laying a claim. He also felt that we should have a look at the Arctic region while we are considering policy toward the Antarctic to ensure consistency.

Admiral Burke noted that the Soviets are very active in oceanographic work and have more vessels devoted to this than any other country.

Admiral Burke also said that the Joint Chiefs might do up a paragraph describing the areas to which the U.S. should lay claim. General Twining suggested that perhaps the lawyers should do this. Mr. Murphy observed that the lawyers in the State Department did

not seem disturbed by the proposal that we should reserve our claims to large areas rather than making specific claims. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs would explore this aspect.

Mr. Sprague inquired of General Twining whether the Joint Chiefs oppose internationalization. General Twining replied that the Chiefs take a flexible position but they do oppose internationalization. Mr. Sprague commented that we would have to have a Defense Department position for the OCB meeting on January 29. Mr. Daniels expressed the view that it was not essential to firm up a U.S. Government position immediately, noting that Argentina will hold a national election at the end of February and that it would be undesirable to have the issue of Antarctica injected into Argentina elections.

Mr. Daniels noted that U.S. scientists in general favored internationalization. Admiral Burke commented that scientists seem generally in favor of internationalized activity and observed that sometimes this is not always for the best. Mr. Sprague commented that if the U.S. should come out firmly for demilitarization there would probably be merit in internationalization. He stressed that the basic issue is to find the arrangement by which the U.S. will come out best vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Admiral Burke said that under an internationalized scheme there would be a large number of countries taking part. Mr. Daniels said he thought there would be about nine governments.

It was agreed that the Joint Chiefs would prepare a position on claims and also a definition regarding demilitarization.

[Here follows discussion of NATO, Indonesia, and the cold war.]

**267. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 15, 1958—5:44 p.m.

745. Because of recent widespread publicity,<sup>2</sup> both in the United States and elsewhere regarding future arrangements in Antarctica beyond the end of the International Geophysical Year ending next December, Department desires consult Government to which you are accredited in order to ensure, so far as possible, that any permanent solution of Antarctic problem will be by mutual agreement among the countries having direct and substantial interests in Antarctica. Department is particularly interested in ascertaining the views of host government as to the following broad objectives which might be sought in a common Antarctic policy:

1. Antarctica should be used for peaceful purposes only. No military, naval, or air bases for warlike purposes should be established in Antarctica.

2. Countries having a direct and substantial interest in Antarctica should jointly endeavor to reach agreement with the Soviet Union, possibly by treaty, that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. The objective would be to prevent Antarctica becoming the scene of international discord.

3. There should be provision for adequate measures of inspection and control to ensure the effectiveness of the above objectives.

4. The fruitful international scientific cooperation in Antarctica which is successfully taking place during the International Geophysical Year should be continued, by inter-governmental agreement, beyond the end of the IGY, for the benefit of all mankind.

5. Antarctic affairs of joint interest can be handled more efficiently and competently by the relatively few countries having interests and activities there than by the United Nations. It is understood, of course, that any such arrangements entered into would not be inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/2-1558. Secret. Drafted by Daniels on February 14; cleared by Murphy, ARA, and EUR; and approved and signed by Herter. Sent to Buenos Aires, Santiago, Paris, Oslo, Brussels, Moscow, Ottawa, Tokyo, New Delhi, Pretoria, Mexico City, and Rio de Janeiro, and repeated to Canberra, London, and Wellington.

<sup>2</sup> On February 12, the Embassy in London reported that the *Daily Telegraph* had printed a front-page article including a "fairly accurate résumé" of the British position on Antarctica, and noted that the Foreign Office was "intensely annoyed" at the leak. (*Ibid.*, 702.022/2-1258)



6. It would be desirable for any policy adopted by the free-world claimant countries and the United States to have favorable repercussions in world opinion.

7. The basic historic rights of the United States in Antarctica, as well as such rights as other countries may assert in that territory, should be so exercised as to contribute to a long range peaceful and equitable settlement of Antarctic problems.

In your conversation with FonOff you are authorized if you consider it advisable and necessary to leave an informal secret aide-mémoire along the foregoing lines. You may inform FonOff that while the United States is currently reviewing its Antarctic policy, it has not yet taken a firm or final position, and would prefer not to do so until after consultation between our two governments in the hope of reaching mutual agreement as to the best course to pursue in the light of the current situation in Antarctica.

**Herter**

---

**268. Memorandum of Discussion at the 357th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 6, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Policy on Antarctica* (NSC Action No. 1738; NSC 5715/1; SNIE 11-3-58; NSC 5804; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 5, 1958<sup>2</sup>)

General Cutler briefed the Council in considerable detail on the contents of the proposed new policy on Antarctica (NSC 5804), pointing out at the outset, on a map,<sup>3</sup> the different national claims to portions of Antarctica. He set forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were in opposition to the proposed new policy because they wished to exclude the USSR from any voice in the administration of Antarctica and because they wished the United States, as soon as

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on March 7.

<sup>2</sup> For NSC 5715/1, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. xi, p. 693; copy of NSC Action 1738 is in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95; SNIE 11-3-58 was not declassified. For text of NSC 5804, see NSC 5804/1, *infra*, and footnotes thereto; a copy of the March 5 memorandum, which transmitted the views of the JCS on Antarctica, is in Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

possible, to claim both the unclaimed sector of Antarctica and areas in sectors claimed by other nations in which we had rights and interests. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another copy is attached to this memorandum.)

Upon conclusion of General Cutler's briefing he called upon Secretary Dulles. The latter observed that the State Department supported the policy set forth in NSC 5804. Indeed, this policy had largely been worked out by a representative of the Department of State (Ambassador Daniels) in consultation with the other interested U.S. Government agencies and in discussions with representatives of certain of the claimant countries. Secretary Dulles predicted that we would encounter our greatest difficulty in getting agreement to our proposed joint organization to administer Antarctica, from Chile and Argentina, who were emotionally aroused because their claims to Antarctica conflicted with the claim of the United Kingdom. For this reason it might prove necessary to exclude the tip of the Palmer Peninsula, where the Chilean, Argentine and U.K. claims were in conflict, from the rest of Antarctica which was to be administered jointly by the eight or ten claimant and interested states.

With respect to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Dulles emphasized that he had a natural sympathy with their desire to exclude the USSR from the joint administrative organization and with their desire likewise to claim wide areas of the subcontinent forthwith for the United States. Indeed, this had been Secretary Dulles' own personal position at the beginning of this exercise of rewriting existing policy. Before the conclusion of the exercise, however, he had come to feel that it would be impracticable to try to exclude the USSR from the joint organization, and that an attempt to do so would fail of majority support of the other countries involved. Beyond this, as General Cutler had said, Secretary Dulles saw no way to push the Soviet Union out of Antarctica without resort to force. For all these reasons he had come to feel that the legitimate objectives of the United States in Antarctica would be satisfied if a regime there could be set up which would demilitarize the entire area, because possible use of this area for military bases was a matter of great concern. The Australians were genuinely and legitimately worried about it, and the United States should likewise be concerned; not at what might be done in the immediate future, but what might occur with respect to the military uses of the area over the next twenty years or more.

Secretary Dulles added his view that assertion by the United States of a wide claim in the area would at once precipitate conflicting claims and probably would not advance us very far toward our objectives, although he originally had favored this proposal also. In effect, the procedure proposed in the policy now before the Council would constitute a UN trusteeship with the interested nations acting as trust-

ees. This was different from a direct UN trusteeship and administration of the area, which Secretary Dulles said he did not favor because such a proposal would involve too many complications.

Secretary Dulles concluded by stating his view that if the Council accepted the general position set forth in the present proposal, there would follow a period of intensive negotiation with the other interested and claimant powers. Our negotiations with such powers so far have been very tentative and general because we ourselves lacked a fixed U.S. position. It would be difficult, Secretary Dulles predicted, to deal with the Chileans and the Argentines because of their nationalistic animosity against the United Kingdom.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles' comments, General Cutler asked him whether he thought it would be advisable to include language in the new policy which would provide flexibility so as to exclude certain portions of Antarctica from the proposed joint administration. Secretary Dulles answered in the affirmative, and repeated that we might have trouble in the Palmer Peninsula area.

Thereafter General Cutler called on the Acting Secretary of Defense, but Secretary Quarles said that it would be advisable, first, to hear from Admiral Burke, who was Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Burke, in explanation of the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the proposed new policy, cited in the first instance the unhappy experience of the United States in its negotiations with the Russians. He next pointed out that the views of other countries having an interest in Antarctica may not coincide with our own views, as had been indicated by the British leak.<sup>4</sup> The Chiefs, moreover, do not want the USSR as a member of the joint group to administer Antarctica. As far as propaganda is concerned, the Chiefs greatly feared that the USSR would be able to twist our proposal to its own advantage and might, indeed, suggest the application of this scheme of administration to other areas of the world. Admiral Burke predicted that we would lose our propaganda battle with the Soviet Union, whose claims were, incidentally, in the Admiral's view, very weak indeed. Von Bellingshausen had merely circumnavigated the area in 1819–20. He had made no actual landings on the sub-continent.

The President pointed out to Admiral Burke that he had made no mention of Secretary Dulles' point concerning the possibility that the Soviets would establish a base in the Antarctic. If they remained there, we would not be able to remove them from this base except by the use of force. Admiral Burke replied that he doubted the practicability of bases in the Antarctic area.

---

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

Secretary Quarles commented that it seemed to him that in the matter, first, of preparing our claims, it would be advantageous to have them ready to proclaim even though we made no claim. Everybody seemed to agree on the wisdom of making this preparation. It also seemed to Secretary Quarles that everyone was in agreement that it would be fine if we could exclude the USSR from any voice in the administration of Antarctica, but we also agree that we can't do it. So we will have to assume that we will work with the Soviets. In terms of procedure, the plan set forth in this paper seemed excellent—that is, we begin negotiations with friendly claimant powers and, after reaching agreement with them, we approach the Soviets. If this procedure was practical enough, Secretary Quarles doubted very much whether the terms that we would offer to the Soviets were realistic and likely to be accepted by them. If this is the case, we would find ourselves pretty well insulated from the fear of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Soviets would gain a voice in the administration of Antarctica. Nevertheless, Secretary Quarles counseled earnestly the wisdom of not seeking any agreement with the Soviets that was not an enforceable agreement. We must plan to enforce any agreement we enter into. This will prove expensive, and the expense will fall largely on the United States.

With respect to Secretary Quarles' last point, Secretary Dulles observed that everyone agreed that there was no likelihood in the immediate future for the use of Antarctica for military purposes. But, as in the case of Alaska, which nobody thought of much advantage when we bought it, Antarctica may ultimately prove to have a considerable military usefulness. Accordingly, if we are to be involved in expenses in the area, such expenses will fall upon us perhaps 25 years from now, but certainly not in the near future.

General Cutler summarized for the Council the arguments which had arisen in the Planning Board with respect to the precise relation of the joint administrative body to the United Nations. He gave his own view that it would be highly advantageous, particularly from a propaganda angle, if the administration of Antarctica could be worked out in the UN and made subordinate to the UN. For this reason, the phraseology with respect to the relation between the joint administration and the UN has been made sufficiently flexible to apply to a number of possible situations.

Secretary Quarles commented that it seemed to him that the time to conclude the agreement was the time when we propose to enforce the agreement, not years before we propose to enforce the agreement.

The President observed that we would encounter a very tough inspection problem if and when the agreement was achieved and the joint administration set up.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>5</sup>

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy in NSC 5804, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 13, paragraph 14–e, 2nd line:* Place an asterisk after the word "Antarctica", and insert the following footnote at the bottom of the page:

“\* A certain portion or portions of Antarctica may, if deemed to be in the U.S. interest, be excluded from the area of Antarctica subject to ‘joint administration’ as contemplated in this policy.”

(2) *Page 14:* Delete the asterisk following the heading “Major Policy Guidance” and the footnote thereto; changing the subsequent double asterisk to a single asterisk.

*Note:* NSC 5804, as amended and adopted, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5804/1<sup>6</sup> for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

[Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items. For text of the item on space exploration, see Document 437.]

S. Everett Gleason

[Attachment]

**Briefing Note for the NSC Meeting of March 6, 1958<sup>7</sup>**

*Washington, undated.*

ANTARCTICA (NSC 5804)

1. (a) The first item this morning is consideration of a new policy on Antarctica, to supersede our present Antarctica policy adopted in June, 1957.

(b) I shall ask you first to look at the *Map* of Antarctica so as to be familiar with its claimed and unclaimed sectors. Seven countries which have thus far made formal claims to territory—New Zealand; Australia, which claims two sectors; France; Norway; the U.K.; Argentina; and Chile. The British claim encompasses the Argentine claim and part

---

<sup>5</sup> Paragraph a and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1869. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

<sup>6</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>7</sup> Secret.

of the Chilean claim and the Argentine and Chilean claims also overlap each other. The unclaimed areas are the sectors in the upper left and the sector poleward of the Norwegian claim.

2. In addition to the seven claimant countries, five other countries—the United States, the USSR, Japan, South Africa and Belgium—have Antarctic interests of varying degrees. All five are engaged in some form of activity in connection with the IGY. The United States, of course, has had a long history of discovery, exploration, and other activities in the Antarctic, dating back to the early 1800's.

3. The Soviets have engaged in widespread exploration beginning in late 1955. Current Soviet activities in the area are on a larger scale than those of any other country except the U.S. The USSR may have the basis for a colorable claim by reason of a naval expedition under Admiral von Bellingshausen in 1819–21. The Soviets made very clear, in a memorandum dated June 10, 1950 (Annex D<sup>8</sup>), that they could *not* recognize as legal any decision on the regime for the Antarctic taken without their participation.

4. The U.S. Antarctic policy adopted last June contemplated diplomatic conversations with Free World claimants followed by (1) a U.S. claim to the unclaimed sectors; (2) further U.S. claims, as mutually agreed upon with interested claimant countries, to certain other areas in which the U.S. has rights derived from discovery or exploration; and (3) reservation of U.S. rights in the rest of Antarctica. The U.S. would refrain from announcing claims or reservations: (1) until IGY considerations are no longer a major factor, and (2) until after further review by the National Security Council of the areas to be claimed; unless a claim by the USSR or other developments made the taking of immediate steps necessary or desirable.

5. Antarctica may be said to have assumed some strategic importance in the light of recent technological advances and increased Soviet activity. However, [7 words not declassified] there is *no* evidence of current Soviet military interest in the Antarctic beyond the potential military value of the scientific data obtained; that it is unlikely (despite alleged Australian concern) that the USSR would use the Antarctic for missile testing, submarine or air bases.

6. It has been thought that assertion of U.S. claims might lead to disagreeable controversies with some friendly claimant countries. As far as the USSR is concerned, assertion of U.S. claims could lead to frustration, irritation, and to extending the cold war to a new area. There is no way to *compel* the Soviet Union to observe U.S. rights or to deny Antarctica to the Soviets, short of force or agreement.

7. [paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

8. The objectives of the proposed new policy are the following:

---

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to Annex D to NSC 5804, not printed.

(Read Paragraph 14, p. 13)

9. In essence, the proposed new policy contemplates an Antarctic Organization composed of at least nine nations—the seven claimant countries plus the U.S. and the USSR (the only Communist state)—and possibly Belgium, Japan, and the Union of South Africa. States belonging to the Organization would neither renounce their claims nor recognize any other state's claim. They would turn over administrative jurisdiction and control to the Organization, but the legal status quo of claims and rights would be frozen for the duration of the Organization and changes in existing claims or the assertion of new claims would be prohibited. The Policy Guidance provides:

(Read Paragraphs 15–17, pp. 14–15)

10. As indicated in Paragraph 14–f, the policy is sufficiently broad to permit the creation of an Antarctic organization as I have described, set up outside of the United Nations but informing the UN through reports, or the creation of an Antarctic organization within the UN. A decision on which way to proceed will depend upon the attitude of the claimant countries, unless the U.S. should move independently. In neither type of approach would it be necessary for the participating powers to surrender their territorial claims and rights, although necessarily in the creation of a UN trusteeship some relinquishment of certain attributes of sovereignty is inevitably involved.

11. Another important consideration is the effect of a recent leak to the press of certain alleged British proposals to internationalize Antarctica, but which were said to involve surrender of claims. That leak may have robbed the U.S. of the propaganda value the proposed new policy would otherwise have had. It also suggests that the USSR—or ourselves—might gain propaganda value by moving *first* in—rather than outside of—the UN.

12. The new paper contains the following contingency clause in Paragraph 19:

(Read Paragraph 19, p. 15)

13. Up until now, I have been talking about territorial claims and administrative organization. Another feature of the proposed policy is the level of U.S. activity in the post-IGY period. The new paper continues existing policy in that regard.

(Read Paragraph 21–a, p. 16)

A program agreed upon by the OCB is already being implemented to deactivate three stations at the end of the IGY, thereby reducing the number of U.S. stations from seven to four, as indicated in the Financial Appendix on Page 17. The estimated cost of operating the remaining four stations is \$14.9 million a year.

14. (*Read Paragraph 21-b, p. 16*)

15. At the Planning Board discussions the Chiefs reserved their position on the entire paper (Footnote—Page 14). In their written views circulated on March 5, they have advised the Secretary of Defense that the proposed policy “does not support or advance actions which they consider to be in the best security interests of the United States.” Their stated views are in conflict with Paragraph 15 for they recommend organizational arrangements for Antarctica which *exclude* the USSR, and in conflict with Paragraph 17 for they recommend that the U.S. should take expeditious action to claim all areas of Antarctica in which the U.S. has rights.

**Secretary Dulles**  
**Secretary McElroy**  
**General Twining<sup>9</sup>**

---

<sup>9</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

---

## 269. National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>

NSC 5804/1

*Washington, March 8, 1958.*

### STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON ANTARCTICA

#### General Considerations

1. Antarctica is not readily accessible even during the brief Antarctic “summer”, and much of it has never been seen nor explored. It has no present economic value. It has assumed some strategic importance, particularly in the light of recent technological advances and increased Soviet activity. It has considerable importance for scientific purposes; our understanding of the physical structure of the world and its atmosphere will be materially advanced by data obtainable only in Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not now determinable, so that its importance could conceivably increase greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File. Secret. NSC 5804/1 consisted of a cover page; memorandum of transmittal dated March 8, which stated that it had been approved by the President on that day; Table of Contents; Statement of Policy; Financial Appendix; and Annexes A–F. Only the Statement of Policy, Financial Appendix, and Annexes A, C, and E are printed here.



2. Previous policy on Antarctica (NSC 5715/1, approved June 29, 1957<sup>2</sup>) provided for diplomatic conversations with the Free World claimant countries for the purpose of (a) making known to them the U.S. intent to advance, at an appropriate time, formal claims to the unclaimed sector of Antarctica and to certain other areas in which the United States has rights derived from discovery, exploration or other activity; and (b) negotiating with them the possible extent of their and U.S. claims, the mutual recognition of claims, and the method of exercising sovereignty. In the absence of arrangements satisfactory to the United States with a particular claimant country, the United States would reserve its rights in the area presently claimed by that country. The United States was to refrain from announcing territorial claims or reservation of rights (a) until International Geophysical Year (IGY) considerations were no longer a major factor and (b) until after further review by the National Security Council; unless a claim by the USSR or other developments made the taking of immediate steps necessary or desirable.

3. The presence in the area of Soviet scientific expeditions in connection with the IGY is cause for concern as to possible further Russian activities. The Australian Foreign Minister has expressed the fear that under the guise of oceanographic research the Russians might arrange military facilities in Antarctica and thus constitute a possible threat to Australia's security. Soviet expeditionary parties have already established scientific stations and semi-permanent installations in the area presently claimed by Australia, and there is evidence that they intend to remain in Antarctica after the IGY. In addition, prominent in the Soviet program are non-IGY activities, such as ground-controlled aerial photography, mapping, hydrographic charting, basic geology and biology, which were only incidentally a part of U.S. activities during the past season.

4. The seven countries which thus far have made formal claims to territory in the Antarctic region are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina and Chile. There are two extensive unclaimed sectors: one extending between 90° and 150° West longitude, and the other poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° East and 20° West longitude. The United States has important potential claims based on discovery, exploration, scientific and other activity, both within the other national claims and in the unclaimed sectors. The Soviet Union has not yet announced a claim, which might rest on the tenuous historical basis of a naval expedition under von Bellingshausen in 1819-21. However, extensive Soviet activity in the area at the present time might give color to possible Soviet claims. In addition, the USSR has since World War II taken part in

---

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. xi, p. 692.

pelagic whaling in the area. Neither the United States nor the USSR has recognized the claim of other powers, or made claims of its own. However, the United States, on numerous occasions in diplomatic notes, and publicly, has expressed its policy of reserving all its rights in the area, and the USSR has officially asserted the right to participate in any territorial settlement.<sup>3</sup> Japan, the Union of South Africa, and Belgium are participating in the IGY program in Antarctica, but have made no claims. Declaration of a claim by the United States or the USSR or other powers might precipitate additional announcements of claims by countries, such as the Union of South Africa, which have begun to show an increasing interest in the area.

5. In 1948 the United States approached the governments of the claimant countries with the suggestion that the promotion of scientific investigation in Antarctica and the solution of the problem of conflicting claims might be accomplished through some form of internationalization.<sup>4</sup> This proposal was not well received by most of the claimant countries, and was not further developed, although it has not been officially withdrawn.

6. At the 1956 session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian Delegation sought to have the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda but later withdrew its proposal. It is possible that the Indians will again raise the issue at the next General Assembly. Apparently, the Indian Government believes that the Antarctic may become a ground of further international contention and thus contribute to a continuation of the cold war. If the issue is raised in the General Assembly, a trusteeship arrangement might be proposed as a means of resolving the claims problem. The United Nations, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned.

7. There are certain practical disadvantages to direct United Nations involvement in the administration of Antarctica, principal among which are:

a. Administration by a virtually universal organization such as the United Nations, most of whose members have no direct interest in Antarctica, would not be as efficient as administration by those countries having both experience and substantial interests in Antarctica.

b. Direct United Nations involvement might produce a kind of political maneuvering that could result in questions related to Antarctica not being decided exclusively on their own merits, but in relation to other considerations and other matters pending before the United

---

<sup>3</sup> By a Soviet Memorandum of 1950 to the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France. See Annex D. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>4</sup> The U.S. aide-mémoire, dated August 9, 1948, which constituted this approach, was attached at Annex F.

Nations. The votes of certain states might, for example, be motivated by considerations quite apart from those relating exclusively to the best policy for Antarctica.

c. The usual and normal conditions for a United Nations trusteeship are totally absent. There are no permanent inhabitants of Antarctica—only a few isolated posts where the personnel is rotated. Accordingly, there is no problem of dependent peoples, aspirations toward independence, or the need for tutelage which occasionally has arisen for some dependent peoples living in underdeveloped areas of the world. Furthermore, any consideration of a trusteeship for Antarctica would run into such difficult and controversial aspects in the United Nations, as, for example, the naming of one or more countries to act as trustee, the extent of control by the General Assembly, and possible efforts to supervise the administration of the area that would not accord with the realities of the situation.

d. If it were decided to place Antarctica under a strategic trusteeship, making the Security Council the key UN body, the USSR would have the right to veto, which could be utilized to frustrate the establishment or operation of an equitable international administration in the area.

e. An effort to place the territory under United Nations administration is likely to produce greater resistance among those states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in Antarctica than would be the case if the administration were restricted to the claimants and only a very few others.

8. Recent widespread publicity in the press of the United States and many other countries regarding Antarctica, accentuated by the leak of certain tentative British proposals for internationalization, have given urgency to the need to reconsider U.S. policy on Antarctica. It would be unfortunate if other countries, friendly or unfriendly, were to come forward publicly with proposals which might complicate the problem of arriving at a solution favorable to U.S. interests. It would be desirable to reach prior agreement with at least the claimant countries as to the broad basis of an Antarctic settlement; and it would be useful for any proposals advanced by the United States to be of such a character that they could be made public in the near future without conflicting with the scientific activities carried on during the IGY.

9. As yet there is no common policy on Antarctica among the claimant countries and the United States. New Zealand and the United Kingdom favor some sort of internationalization. Australia, Argentina and Chile are reluctant to renounce sovereignty. It would be desirable to bring the positions of the claimant countries into line with U.S. policy prior to any formal public U.S. proposal.

10. The United States has a long history of discovery and exploration in Antarctica, commencing in the early part of the 19th century and continuing up to the present. On the basis of these activities, the United States has consistently reserved its rights in Antarctica, al-

though it has refrained from making a formal claim to any specific territory. At the same time, the United States has never recognized the claims of other countries.

11. In the light of the foregoing, one possible course of action for the United States to pursue in protecting its rights and interests in Antarctica would be to assert specific territorial claims of sovereignty in Antarctica.<sup>5</sup> Future circumstances might render this course of action advisable, but at present it has the following disadvantages:

a. If only the unclaimed area were claimed by the United States, no difficulties would arise with other claimant countries, but presumably any such claim would not be recognized by the USSR. The unclaimed area is a relatively small portion of Antarctica, and difficult of access by sea. Moreover, it is now reported that two-thirds of Marie Byrd Land may be below sea level.

b. If the United States were to make specific territorial claims in sectors already claimed by other countries, a number of practical difficulties might arise. The United States could logically support territorial claims in most if not all of the sectors now claimed by other countries. If this were done there might be a series of disagreeable controversies with a number of friendly countries. Furthermore, it would be difficult to define precisely the geographic limits of such claims by lines of latitude and longitude.

c. If the United States were to make specific claims throughout Antarctica, the result might be an apparent downgrading of U.S. rights in areas not claimed. The United States might be deemed to have less rights in other areas of Antarctica if it claimed superior rights in certain specific areas.

d. The problem of administering and defending U.S. sovereign soil in Antarctica might become complicated and expensive if the United States had a number of scattered claims over all the territory.

e. The assertion of U.S. claims might accentuate rivalries in Antarctica, and might provoke unwelcome initiatives by the USSR. Competition for the area would be intensified and costly.

f. In view of the general, though unofficial, understanding that political activities in Antarctica should be held in abeyance for the duration of the IGY, there might be much sentiment against positive action by the United States in Antarctica before 1959 if such action were identified with the assertion of territorial claims.

g. An attempt by the United States to extend its sovereignty over large portions of Antarctica might not be so well received in world opinion as a broader policy aimed at international cooperation.

---

<sup>5</sup> Claims would be based on first sighting, exploration, mapping, occupation, and use, of those areas in which U.S. explorers have been active, from Palmer, in 1820, through the latest Deep Freeze Operation. Among the explorers who have advanced U.S. rights are the following: Palmer, Wilkes, Byrd, and Ellsworth, as well as recent explorers such as Dufek, Ketchum, and Ronne, and members of their parties. These areas include, in addition to Marie Byrd Land and the area south of the Norwegian claim, the Palmer Peninsula, Ross Ice Shelf, Wilkes Land, the American Highland, the South Pole, and various areas, interior and coastal, which have been flown over or mapped by U.S.-owned aircraft. [Footnote in the source text.]

h. The assertion of territorial claims does not appear to be necessary in order to achieve the basic objectives of U.S. policy, and might even be detrimental to these objectives.

12. As an alternative to the unilateral assertion of claims by the United States, the conclusion of a multilateral treaty—which would include provision for an Antarctica organization—among the countries having direct and substantial interests in Antarctica, including the USSR,<sup>6</sup> might be a more effective method of achieving basic U.S. objectives. Such a treaty need not require any participating country to renounce whatever claims of sovereignty it may have asserted or to recognize all or any part of any other country's claims. It could specifically provide that such claims would remain unaffected while the treaty is in force. In other words, the legal status quo in Antarctica would be frozen for the duration of the treaty, and the treaty would provide that no activities after the commencement or for the duration of the treaty would have any effect on such status quo. Accordingly, if at any time the treaty were terminated, the United States would remain in full possession of all of its basic historic rights in Antarctica. Cooperation in administrative matters could be carried out through an Antarctica organization in such a way as to minimize political difficulties. The proposed treaty would be deposited with the United Nations; periodic reports would be submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and close working relationship established with specialized agencies of the United Nations. Such an arrangement, if effectively implemented, would:

a. Provide a firm and favorable foundation for a continuation of the productive international cooperation in the field of scientific activity which has thus far distinguished the IGY.

b. Provide an agreed basis for the peaceful and orderly administration of Antarctica during years to come.

c. Provide for effective measures to ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.

d. Lessen the possibility of that continent's becoming the scene of international discord.

13. The designation of responsibilities within the Executive Branch for Antarctic matters depends to a large degree on the extent and direction in which the U.S. interest evolves. Current activities in Antarctica are being carried on under the direction of the Department of Defense acting as Executive Agent. The Department of the Interior is the agency in the Government normally concerned with the civil administration of areas under the jurisdiction of the United States. Some areas, however, are administered by other agencies; for example, the Canal Zone is supervised by the Secretary of the Army, and

---

<sup>6</sup> The reasons for including the USSR are set forth in Annex E. [Footnote in the source text.]

several islands in the Pacific, such as the Bonins, are administered by the Navy. The United States also acts for the UN in the administration of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands.

### Objectives

14. Orderly progress toward a peaceful solution of the problem of Antarctica which would:

- a. Prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes.
- b. Provide for freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens, organizations and governments of all countries.
- c. Guarantee freedom of access to Antarctica by citizens and organizations of all countries, under established uniform rules.
- d. Establish uniform and non-preferential rules applicable to all countries and their nationals for any possible development of economic resources in the future.
- e. In general, provide for an orderly joint administration of Antarctica<sup>7</sup> by the countries directly concerned, on a non-preferential basis for all countries, and for peaceful purposes only.
- f. Provide such relationship or association with the United Nations as would advance the preceding objectives.

### Major Policy Guidance<sup>8</sup>

15. Attempt by secret advance consultation with the Free World claimant countries:

- a. To reach agreement on the broad basis for an Antarctica organization<sup>9</sup> which would have the objectives stated in paragraph 14 and would include the USSR.
- b. To prepare the way for cooperative arrangements between the United States and any or all of the present claimant or other interested powers, in the event of failure to achieve such an Antarctica organization which includes the USSR.

<sup>7</sup> A certain portion or portions of Antarctica may, if deemed to be in the U.S. interest, be excluded from the area of Antarctica subject to "joint administration" as contemplated in this policy. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>8</sup> NSC 5804 contained the following asterisk footnote at this point:

"With regard to the Major Policy Guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

"(1) The United States should make preparations to claim all areas of Antarctica in which the United States has rights derived from discovery, exploration or other activity, and expeditious action should be taken to advance the U.S. claims.

"(2) The organizational arrangement in the best interest of the United States would be one which excludes participation by the USSR in control of the area.

"(3) An agreement among all the claimant nations in Antarctica may be difficult if not impossible to achieve, whereas an agreement among a smaller group might be achieved." (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File)

<sup>9</sup> See Annex C for a possible formulation of such an Antarctica organization. [Footnote in the source text.]

16. Consult as appropriate with countries other than the claimant countries, and with selected international organizations, for the purpose of avoiding an adverse reaction by them to the proposed Antarctica organization.

17. If the consultations under paragraph 15 result in general acceptance of the concept of an Antarctica organization, invite interested governments, including the USSR, to an international conference to conclude an agreement to accomplish the objectives in paragraph 14 and to set up the proposed Antarctica organization. At the same time state that while the United States has basic, historic rights in Antarctica, including the right to make a territorial claim or claims, the United States is refraining from making claims in the hope of reaching a constructive international solution, which will leave existing claims and rights unaffected while the proposed agreement is in force.

18. In the event of failure to achieve an acceptable Antarctica organization which includes the USSR, seek to achieve cooperative Antarctic arrangements (e.g., condominium, joint administration) between the United States and any or all of the claimant powers.

19. If required at any time for the protection of U.S. interests, claim the unclaimed area of Antarctica and reserve U.S. rights in the areas claimed by other powers or make claims in such areas as deemed appropriate.

20. In view of the scientific nature of IGY cooperation and the strength of Free World claims based on the pre-IGY period, support the principle that activities represented as participation in the Antarctic IGY program do not constitute a legal basis for the assertion of Antarctic claims.

21. a. Implement the current program reducing Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period to a minimum to support U.S. interests and to provide for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica.

b. If and when an Antarctica organization is established, to which the United States is a party, review the number of stations to be maintained by the United States in Antarctica.

c. In connection with such cooperative arrangements with other countries as may be worked out pending the establishment of an Antarctica organization, explore the possibility of effecting economies through joint operation.

22. As part of the program referred to in paragraph 21-a above, continue small-scale reconnaissance mapping and geologic studies in areas of maximum U.S. interest in the Antarctic.

23. The Department of Defense should continue as the Executive Agent of the United States Government through Fiscal Year 1959 in supporting scientific and other expeditions to Antarctica. The agency

to administer any territory which the United States might claim or to participate in any joint administration which may be established in Antarctica should be designated at a later date.

## Financial Appendix

### ANTARCTICA

#### Estimated Cost of the Proposed Policies

1. It is assumed that in the post-IGY period Ellsworth and Little America stations would be deactivated and that Wilkes Station would either be turned over to Australia or else deactivated. It is also assumed that the following network of bases would be retained:

McMurdo Sound  
Cape Hallett  
Pole  
Byrd

The annual cost of such a program is estimated as follows:

	(Millions of Dollars)
Scientific costs	1.8
Direct support costs	5.8
Indirect support costs	7.3
	<u>14.9</u>

2. Direct costs include all those expenses incurred as a direct result of the establishment and operation of the Antarctic bases. Examples of direct costs include transportation equipment, buildings, petroleum products used ashore, communications equipment, special clothing, and similar items required to establish and make a base operable. They also include costs of special equipment required by ships and aircraft for Antarctic operations, as well as the repair of damage incurred in such operations. Indirect costs include pay and subsistence of military personnel, fuel, routine maintenance of ships and aircraft, and other supporting costs, which have, in the past, been borne by the armed services.

3. In addition to the above costs, the first year of the program would require additional expenses incident to the expansion of the McMurdo Sound base to accommodate scientific facilities comparable to those at Little America. It is estimated that these additional first year direct costs would amount to .6 million dollars.



4. The responsibilities of the Department of State with respect to Antarctica encompass the usual activities of the Department in any matter having an international impact. Neither the workload nor the cost resulting from these responsibilities can be segregated readily from the costs of other diplomatic and consular activities.

5. Upon the establishment of an international Antarctic organization, the U.S. would be expected to contribute a certain percentage of its annual operating costs. The amount of such costs and the portion to be borne by the U.S. cannot be determined at this time.

### Annex A

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONDOMINIUM OVER ANTARCTICA

1. The United States in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The United States thereafter suggested for consideration and transmitted to the seven powers a draft agreement proposing an international administration in the form of a condominium for the Antarctic whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. This approach was equally unsuccessful.

2. Arguments for establishing a joint administration for the Antarctic comprising the United States and the seven claimant powers would include:

a. Such a regime would have the advantage of placing the United States and the seven powers in a position to maintain that they had de jure right to and control of the Antarctic region.

b. At the same time, agreement on the part of the United States and the seven powers to cooperate with the appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN and to administer the Antarctic area in accordance with Article 84 of the Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security (both of which provisions were provided for in the 1948 agreement), would tend to blunt or reduce concern in and outside of the UN over the possible use of the Antarctic by the condominium powers for other than peaceful purposes.

c. The establishment of such a regime for the Antarctic would in no way preclude the United States and the seven powers from reaching agreement at a later time to apply voluntarily for the application of a UN trusteeship to the Antarctic area if they should so wish.

d. The conclusion of a joint administration would resolve the conflicting claims issue as between the seven claimant powers and would eliminate the necessity of the United States having to decide now upon the entirety of the area to which it might wish to lay claim in the Antarctic. As was contemplated in 1948, the United States, under such an arrangement, would lay claim to areas in the Antarctic to which it had right (presumably but not necessarily limited to the

unclaimed areas), to place it on an equal footing with the seven powers. Thereupon the United States and the seven powers would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime dedicated to administering and developing the area as a unit, not as individual segments. As matters stand now, the United States is reluctant to lay claim to areas in the Antarctic until it is in a position to ascertain more precisely all the areas to which it might wish to lay claim. By seeking a condominium agreement, the United States and the seven powers could move before Antarctica becomes a subject for continuing discussion in the UN and not be retarded by the conflicting claims issue. Under such an agreement, the announcement of a U.S. territorial claim would occur approximately simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of a condominium agreement.

e. A joint as distinguished from an individual country or segment approach to Antarctica would appear to be the most effective and least burdensome way financially to further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena. (This could be either a condominium or a trusteeship.)

f. There is no reason why an agreement between the United States and seven powers to establish a condominium over the Antarctic designed to facilitate the further development of the area in the interest of all mankind could not be presented as a dramatic Free World initiative. Access to the area for scientific purposes would be open to all members of the UN or specialized agencies; however, it would be subject to the controls and regulations promulgated by the joint administration.

g. Although the establishment of a condominium would not preclude the Soviets from claiming the right to participate in the administration of the area based on such claims as it might make, and while it would not force or necessarily bring about the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the area, it would provide a basis for the United States and the present claimant powers to question the validity of the Soviet presence in the area.

3. Arguments against establishing a joint administration for the Antarctic comprising the United States and the seven claimant powers would include:

a. It is considered unlikely that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual "sovereign" rights even to a joint administration or condominium limited to the United States and themselves. However, it is thought that this could be presented to them as a more palatable alternative to UN supervision within the trusteeship system.

b. The Soviets and the Indians, for example, would likely attack in and outside of the UN a condominium proposal as inconsistent with IGY objectives and as an attempt to exclude all other countries from the area as a part of the development of the Antarctic as a Free World military base.

c. The announcement of the establishment of a condominium over the Antarctic would probably precipitate Soviet counter-action in the form of a claim to territory in the Antarctic. On the basis of this claim they might either seek participation in the condominium, or merely continue to administer their own zone.

d. The establishment of a condominium would not bring about or necessarily lead to the withdrawal of USSR personnel from the area or make the USSR more responsive to such control measures as might be promulgated by the condominium administration. The right of the USSR to maintain a military base within the area of its claim would be difficult to challenge on legal grounds, and could, as a practical matter, continue to be exercised whether challenged or not.

4. In the absence of an agreement on the part of all of the claimant powers to enter into a condominium over Antarctica in its entirety, it is possible that a condominium could be established over a part of Antarctica by those claimant powers favoring such action. Although arguments generally along the lines of those indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above could be made for and against the establishment of a condominium over a part of the Antarctic, a partial condominium would not serve to achieve the purpose of a united front and the benefits to be derived therefrom as reflected in paragraph 2 above. Moreover, a partial condominium would resolve the conflicting claims issue only as between those powers participating in the condominium.

### **Annex C**

#### **NATURE OF PROPOSED ANTARCTICA ORGANIZATION**

##### *1. Means of establishing Antarctica Organization.*

An Antarctic Organization would be established by treaty to which all states having a direct and substantial interest in Antarctica as of the date of this proposal will be invited to become parties.

##### *2. Sovereignty.*

States belonging to the Antarctic Organization would not be obliged to renounce any claims to sovereignty in Antarctica or to recognize all or any part of any other state's claims. Nor would they be obliged to transfer whatever sovereignty they had to the Organization. They would, however, in the treaty to which they were party, turn over to the Organization administrative jurisdiction and control. In other words, the legal status quo with respect to Antarctica would be frozen at the commencement and for the duration of the Organization, and the treaty would provide that no activities after the commencement of and during the existence of the Organization would have any effect on such status quo.

### 3. *Principles governing administration.*

The parties to the treaty would agree that the joint administration of Antarctica would be governed by the following principles, which would be implemented through an Antarctica Organization:

A. Encouragement and facilitation of international cooperation in the field of scientific activity for the maximum benefit of mankind.

B. Regulated development and utilization, in the general interest, of the natural resources of the Antarctic region.

C. Conservation, in the general interest, of renewable natural resources of the Antarctic region.

D. Effective measures to insure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only. This shall not be interpreted to prohibit the use of military personnel and equipment, including naval vessels and military aircraft, for logistic support.

E. Any other peaceful purposes not inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

F. Equality of financial contributions to the Organization by the member states.

### 4. *Antarctica Organization.*

#### (a) Organization, membership and procedure.

The policy making body of the Organization would be the Governing Board. Each party to the treaty would have one delegate to represent it on the Governing Board and each delegate would have one vote. Decisions would be taken by majority or two-thirds vote. The position of chairman of the Governing Board would be rotated among the member states. An administrator, appointed by the Governing Board, would act as chief executive officer and, along with his permanent staff, would administer the detailed regulations promulgated by the Governing Board.

#### (b) Functions and objectives.

The Antarctica Organization would have the general function of administering the territory of Antarctica in accordance with the principles set forth in para. 3 above.

### 5. *Scientific activities.*

The Governing Board would act primarily as an advisory and consultative body which would encourage cooperation in international scientific activities, provide helpful information and assistance, and generally facilitate the scientific expeditions of member states and other states to the greatest extent possible.

### 6. *Economic policy.*

Member states and non-member states, as well as their nationals, would be treated on a basis of equality. A state or one of its nationals could explore for and develop resources, subject to a license or concession and reasonable regulations of the Governing Board, which would include the requirement of paying a reasonable license or royalty fee.

Such fees would be the same both for member and non-member states or their nationals. Primarily, the fee would be used to reimburse the Organization for its administrative expenses.

*7. Ensuring peaceful use.*

The Governing Board would be empowered to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of the provision for ensuring peaceful use of the Antarctic region, such as inspection of ships' manifests, inspection of planes at points of landing, stationing of observers at specific locations, and aerial inspection to the extent practical.

*8. Jurisdiction and law enforcement.*

The Governing Board would be authorized to negotiate with the interested states mutually agreeable principles of jurisdiction and law enforcement, both criminal and civil. Pending agreement on these points, each state would have jurisdiction and law enforcement authority, both criminal and civil, over all matters involving their own nationals only. In matters involving the nationals of more than one state, the principles of jurisdiction and law enforcement to be applied would be determined by consultation between the Governments concerned.

*9. United Nations.*

To insure harmonious and mutually advantageous relations with the United Nations, the Governing Board would:

1. Submit informative reports from time to time to appropriate bodies of the United Nations;
2. Establish cooperative working relationships with specialized agencies of the United Nations having a technical interest in Antarctica.

## **Annex E**

(Prepared by the Department of State)

### **USSR PARTICIPATION IN ANTARCTICA CONFERENCE AND ANTARCTICA ORGANIZATION**

The problem of possible Soviet participation in a joint administrative organization for Antarctica will arise when the time comes to invite<sup>10</sup> certain countries to a conference for the purpose of establishing such an organization.

---

<sup>10</sup> If such invitations are issued, it is assumed that they will be extended to all the present claimant countries, i.e., Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Norway, France, Chile, and Argentina. If additional countries are invited to participate, both the Union of South Africa and the Soviet Union will have to be considered. (Possibly some thought should likewise be given to extending invitations to countries having a less substantial interest in Antarctica, such as Japan and Belgium.) Both the Union of South

There are reasons both for and against extending an invitation to the Soviet Union to participate in the proposed Antarctic conference:

*Reasons for Not Inviting the Soviet Union*

1. Such an invitation might be interpreted as a recognition of Soviet interests and rights in Antarctica, and thereby reinforce such rights as the USSR asserts unilaterally.

2. Inviting the USSR to participate in a conference on Antarctica might have adverse repercussions, at least initially, in some countries friendly to the United States.

3. Soviet participation in the conference might render it more difficult to reach agreement on the terms of a treaty satisfactory to the United States which would be intended to accomplish U.S. policy objectives.

4. Soviet participation in the conference would be logically followed by Soviet participation in any joint Antarctic administrative organization which might be established, and thereby render its smooth and effective functioning more difficult to achieve.

*Reasons for Inviting the Soviet Union*

1. Russian interest in Antarctica goes back to Admiral Bellingshausen's voyage around Antarctica in 1819-1821. In recent years Soviet whaling activities in the Antarctic region have been important. Soviet scientific activities in Antarctica are extensive and are an important part of the long-range Soviet research program in the earth sciences. Even though it is held that such scientific activities constitute no valid basis for territorial claims or political action, the fact that the Russians apparently expect to continue being active in Antarctica beyond the end of the IGY will make it difficult to exclude them from any international settlement. Inviting the Russians to the conference would not bring them to the Antarctic, since they are already there. Failure to invite them would not cause them to leave.

2. The Soviet Union has consistently reserved all its rights in Antarctica since 1939. It has insisted on being included in any international settlement of the Antarctic problem, specifically in an official memorandum of 1950 addressed to the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France.

3. If the Soviet Union is not invited to participate in the proposed conference, it would presumably go to great pains to discredit the conference, both directly, and through activity in the United Nations.

---

Africa and the Soviet Union have made known their desire to be included in any international settlement relating to Antarctica. [Footnote in the source text.]

Inasmuch as the Soviet Union has a certain logical basis for participation in Antarctic matters, such agitation might meet with some success internationally.

4. Failure to extend an invitation to the Soviet Union would very likely result in an undesirable intensification of Soviet activities in Antarctica, because the competitive situation would be accentuated.

5. Failure to invite the Soviet Union to the proposed conference would be interpreted in some quarters as aggravating existing world tensions, and might alienate public opinion among the so-called "neutralists". This in turn would again stimulate proposals for the United Nations to take over the administration of Antarctica. (While this latter solution might conceivably be better than no solution at all, it is believed that an Antarctic administrative organization limited to the relatively few states directly concerned would operate more efficiently, and likewise might be in a better position to prevent any undesired Soviet activities in Antarctica.)

6. Inviting the Soviet Union to the conference would not give it any legal status as a recognized sovereign power in Antarctica. The claimant states would maintain their claims of sovereignty, and the United States would not only continue to reserve its historic rights in Antarctica, but also, in the invitation to the conference, would have specifically and strongly reaffirmed such rights.

7. If the Soviet Union should participate in an Antarctic administrative organization established by a formal treaty as a result of the conference, it would be easier to observe and control its activities in Antarctica.

8. If the Soviet Union should participate in the proposed organization, it would be greatly outnumbered by nations friendly to the United States. There is no thought that it would have any veto power in such an organization.

---

**270. Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy of New Zealand, Washington, March 10, 1958, 11 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

**PARTICIPANTS**

Lord Hood, British Embassy  
Christopher Audland, British Embassy  
J.R.A. Bottomley, British Embassy

Malcolm Booker, Australian Embassy  
Lewis Border, Australian Embassy  
Ambassador Daniels

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/3-1058. Secret. Drafted by Luboensky.

G.D.L. White, New Zealand Embassy  
Peter Jeffery, New Zealand Embassy

Alan Neidle, L  
Earl H. Luboiansky, ARA

Representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, as indicated above, met informally at the New Zealand Embassy to discuss the present status of developments in regard to Antarctica.

Ambassador Daniels stated that the United States had had talks with the Governments of Chile and Argentina and their reaction to proposals for an international solution to the Antarctic problem was as anticipated. Both countries, he stated, though opposed to any solution involving sacrifice of claims, seemed to be interested in the concepts of scientific cooperation and peaceful uses of Antarctica.

Ambassador Daniels also stated that the United States is planning to make an approach soon to all claimant powers in order to determine whether or not there is a generally agreed basis for going ahead with plans for Antarctica. Since an international conference is contemplated, a fact which would be known to the public, it would be desirable to have some assurances of success for that conference before going ahead. He said that greatly increased interest and speculation in the United States on this matter emphasized the need to move ahead rapidly. He had of course always hoped that there would be general agreement among the four powers represented at the meeting today, but this consideration had to be balanced against the equally important need for early action, particularly in view of the possibility of premature leaks.

Mr. White said that the New Zealand Prime Minister had been to Canberra and had exchanged views on Antarctica with the Australian Prime Minister. He regretted that the two countries were no closer together and confessed embarrassment over the difference of opinion with Australia. He hoped however that in relations with others, the points of similarity between the two countries, positions could be emphasized. He was still worried about the whole problem being raised in the UN to the mutual disadvantage of all. For this reason, New Zealand would be interested in finding a basis for an early conference.

Mr. Booker, the Australian representative, stated that his Government would prefer that any approach to other governments await the formulation of an agreed position among the United States and the three Commonwealth powers. He felt that the unilateral approach by the United States would result in a certain degree of confusion. He reiterated his Government's position that the approach to the whole question should be on the minimum essential basis and that those things most likely to succeed should be taken up first, that is, the matter of scientific cooperation and of use of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes. He asked the question whether the draft declaration pre-



pared by the Australian Government and distributed previously contained the minimum for an international agreement.<sup>2</sup> He envisaged that this declaration would be a binding international commitment in the form of a treaty and would compare to the Atlantic or Pacific Charter. Mr. Booker acknowledged the possible need for administrative machinery but felt that this matter should be left until later, after it is known that there is general agreement on the two basic principles. On the matter of inspection and control to guarantee that Antarctica is used only for peaceful purposes, he reiterated that his Government is against such an arrangement and felt that if this idea were carried too far it might endanger even the acceptance by Russia of the basic principles. He felt this consideration could be taken care of by exchange of "scientific" personnel between the various bases and by proper briefing as to what they should be on the look-out for.

Lord Hood stated that the Australian draft declaration had been carefully studied in London. On the surface he said it had the merits of simplicity. His Government felt, however, that there were four serious flaws in the Australian position. First, the privilege of denunciation of the treaty is too broad. Second, the draft does not resolve the matter of conflicting claims, especially in regard to the United Kingdom problem with Argentina and Chile. Third, it does not include the matter of economic exploitation which the British Government feels will come up regardless of efforts to refrain from discussing it at a conference. Fourth, his Government feels that it is essential to have machinery for policing and for insuring effective demilitarization. Otherwise, efforts directed toward demilitarization in other parts of the world would be prejudiced since in these latter cases the free world has consistently insisted upon effective control and inspection. Lord Hood also criticized the membership suggested by the Australians and stated that the United Kingdom favored bringing in the widest range of countries in the general agreement, at the same time was interested in limiting the number of countries involved in the actual administration. He felt that the whole arrangement would be open to less criticism in the UN if we went ahead "full steam" taking into consideration all the factors which might cause question or opposition in the UN. An effective, well-rounded program would impress members of the UN and the UN would then be more likely to leave "hands off".

Mr. Booker stated that a number of the points mentioned by Lord Hood would be negotiable. He insisted, however, that his country is against inclusion of any provision regarding economic exploitation. This touches upon nationalist objections and would present a consid-

---

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the Australian draft declaration, which was received by the Department of State on February 10, is attached to a 2-page paper entitled "Antarctica." (*Ibid.*, 702.022/2-1058)

erable internal problem for the Australian Government. If general international recognition of this problem were assured, the situation might be different, but the Australian Government felt this is not possible. Chile and Argentina, for instance, are more nationalistic about their Antarctic claims than Australia.

In this connection, Mr. White said that New Zealand would certainly favor provisions for economic exploitation because New Zealand lacks capital and would see advantages in a joint arrangement.

Ambassador Daniels expressed opposition to the Australian concept that rights might be strengthened by claimant countries in the area claimed by them but at the same time that no country could strengthen its rights in areas not claimed by it. This he said would put the United States at a relative disadvantage and the United States would find it difficult to sign a treaty with such an inequality. He mentioned that there would be opposition in the United States if it appeared that one country were trying to reserve monopolistic rights to any portion of Antarctica.

Ambassador Daniels, before the close of the meeting, again stated that the United States was proposing to send an aide-mémoire to the governments of the claimant powers.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Secretary Dulles also discussed Antarctica briefly with the Prime Minister of New Zealand and the Foreign Secretaries of the United Kingdom and Australia on March 11 during the SEATO Council Meeting at Manila. Each took positions similar to those described in this memorandum of conversation. A memorandum of Dulles' conversation is *ibid.*, 702.022/3-1158.

---

## 271. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to Certain Embassies<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 24, 1958.*

In view of the desirability of continuing in the future the fruitful scientific cooperation in Antarctica now being carried on so successfully during the International Geophysical Year, on the basis of agreement among the interested countries, the Government of the United

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/3-2458. Secret. Drafted by Daniels on March 21; cleared by ARA, EUR, FE, AF, IO, and L; and handed to representatives from the Embassies of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

States wishes to ascertain the views of the Government of  
in regard to the following possible approach to the problem:

### *1. General Policy Objectives*

Before undertaking to work out the details of any program for Antarctica, it would seem desirable that there be broad agreement among the interested countries in regard to the basic objectives to be sought in a common Antarctic policy. It has been suggested that among the principal objectives to be sought there should be included the following:

- a. Freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens, organizations, and governments of all countries; and a continuation of the international scientific cooperation which is being carried out so successfully during the current International Geophysical Year.
- b. International agreement to ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.

### *2. Antarctic Treaty*

It has been suggested that the major objectives to be sought in a common international Antarctic policy could best be achieved by means of a multilateral treaty among the countries having a direct interest in Antarctica. If this procedure should be adopted, such a treaty might contain provisions which would:

- a. Give legal effect to the general policy objectives and major principles set forth above by embodying them in treaty form.
- b. Provide for reports to the United Nations and cooperative relationships with specialized agencies of the United Nations.
- c. Provide for such joint administrative arrangements as might be necessary and desirable to accomplish the agreed objectives.
- d. Ensure that no political rivalries in Antarctica endanger the constructive program contemplated. This could be accomplished by freezing the legal status quo in Antarctica at the beginning of the treaty and for its duration. Under this procedure no state would be required to renounce any claim of sovereignty which it might have asserted; no state would be obliged to recognize any claims asserted by other countries; and no new rights would be acquired or claims asserted by any country after the treaty has come into effect and for its duration. If at any time the treaty should be terminated, the legal situation in Antarctica would revert to the status quo ante.

### *3. Antarctic Conference*

If it should be agreed that a treaty should be concluded to accomplish the foregoing objectives, then presumably a conference would have to be convened for that purpose. The question arises of when such a conference might take place and where it should convene. If a

---

<sup>2</sup> Blank space in the source text.

program along the foregoing lines is to progress, it would be useful to exchange views at an early date on the time and place of such a conference.

#### *4. Participating Countries*

If an Antarctic conference should be convened to conclude a treaty for the purposes set forth above, it is assumed that the countries which have conducted scientific research in the Antarctic region during the current International Geophysical Year would wish to participate.

The Government of the United States has not yet formulated in any fixed or final form its policy in regard to the matters of substance and procedure outlined in the four preceding paragraphs. Without prejudice to the rights which it has consistently asserted in Antarctica, it would prefer to consult with the governments of other interested countries before reaching any final conclusions; and it believes that a flexible approach to these problems on the part of all concerned would be conducive to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. For this purpose the Government of the United States invites an expression of the views of the other interested governments in regard to the questions raised above, in the hope that mutual agreement can be reached on a long range solution of the Antarctic problem.

The governments of the other countries which have participated in the Antarctic program of the International Geophysical Year are likewise being consulted by means of identical aide-mémoire.

It is suggested that this preliminary consultation be considered confidential until such time as public proposals can be made with some assurance of a satisfactory outcome.

---

#### **272. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, April 9, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

##### OCB LUNCHEON

[Here follows discussion of items 1-7: Propaganda, the Brussels Fair, Satellites, a Pan-African Conference, Korea, the Spanish economy, and U.S. employees overseas.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

### 8. Antarctica

The Weekly Activity Report for the OCB meeting of April 2<sup>2</sup> stated that the Department had circulated an aide-mémoire<sup>3</sup> to eleven Washington embassies, including the USSR, noting that there was interest in having consultations in Washington which would look to joint administrative arrangements in Antarctica and asking for an expression of views. At that meeting several members raised the question of whether the note to the Soviet Embassy at this time was not in violation of the spirit, if not the words, of NSC 5804/1.<sup>4</sup>

The Weekly Activity Report for the meeting of April 9, prepared by the OCB staff, stated that: "It was considered necessary by State that the USSR be consulted at this time in order to avoid as far as possible an adverse reaction to the proposed Antarctic organization." The Report also mentioned that: "To have pursued these consultations with Free World countries in order to present to the Soviets at the time of calling a conference a packet fully agreed to by the Free World powers, in State's view, would have assured the opposition and non-cooperation of the USSR."

In reply to a question, Governor Herter said that the Department had decided that no U.S. public announcement on the matter should be made until a reasonable time had elapsed for the receipt of replies to the aide-mémoire. General Cutler, supported by Mr. Harr (the Vice Chairman) and Mr. Sprague (Defense), said that NSC policy called for a sounding out of Free World claimants on support for the U.S. proposal for an Antarctic administrative organization, including the matter of participation by the USSR. General Cutler said that Defense had reluctantly agreed only on the assumption that a great propaganda gain would come to the U.S. He alleged that "State decided to go off on its own," and that this action "was not in conformity with the policy of the U.S." He said that insofar as the USSR was concerned, the policy called for invitations to the USSR for a conference and not prior consultation with it.

Mr. Allen (USIA) said that either the U.S. was seeking an agreement on Antarctica or it was seeking a propaganda victory. If it was an agreement which we wanted, the Department's action had been correct.

Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the addressees be notified that on a particular date the U.S. would call a conference. General Cutler recommended that at a press conference the Secretary announce that:

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>4</sup> Document 269.

"We have called a conference." Thus there would not be time for other countries to object. By taking this action the U.S. could gain the propaganda initiative.

Governor Herter agreed that we should seek a favorable world reaction. He would see if there might be a redetermination on the subject within the Department.

Later Governor Herter said many questions need to be answered before we announce any conference on Antarctica. For example, when and where is the conference to be held? Who will pay costs? What level of representation?, etc. He would talk to Mr. Daniels and Mr. Rubottom about the matter.

---

**273. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, April 23, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

OCB LUNCHEON

[Here follows discussion of items 1-10: Soviet Visits, Euratom, Yemen, The Port of Damman, coordination of public statements, Australia and New Zealand, Wheelus Field, Iran, the Ryukyus, and the exhibition at Gorki Park.]

11. *Antarctica*

During a discussion of the Weekly Activity Report,<sup>2</sup> General Cutler again asked to know the plans of State for publicizing a proposal that there be a conference to discuss joint administrative arrangements in Antarctica. Mr. Murphy said that a leak had occurred in Santiago and that Mr. Lincoln White, Press Officer, had answered press inquiries by emphasizing that the aide-mémoire of the U.S. looked to a continuation of post-IGY scientific cooperation in the area.<sup>3</sup>

A lengthy and lively discussion followed on the issues of: 1) whether the action of sending the aide-mémoire to the Soviet Union at the time was in line with the language of the policy statement or in violation of its spirit; and 2) when what [*sic*] action should be taken by the U.S. to publicize its initiative in seeking to assure peaceful use of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Text of White's statement to the press on April 22 was transmitted to the Embassies in the countries invited to the conference in telegram 1621 to Brussels (repeated to the others) on the same day. (*Ibid.*, 702.022/4-2258)

the area for the benefit of all countries. Views expressed at previous meetings by General Cutler, Mr. Harr and Mr. Sprague were repeated to the effect that U.S. policy contemplated an invitation to the USSR to a conference only after general agreement to such invitation had been expressed by claimant and interested countries and not that the USSR would be asked for its views on holding a conference. The three members urged immediate publicity for the U.S. initiative after notification of the addressees of the aide-mémoire that such action would be taken.

Mr. Murphy said that formal replies to the aide-mémoire had been received from Japan, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, and Australia, and that informal contact with other nations (not including the USSR) indicated general agreement. Mr. Allen Dulles (CIA) added that the Chilean Ambassador thinks the U.S. proposal a fine idea but is not sure that his Government agrees.

General Cutler said it was more important to make a propaganda gain than to obtain an agreement on administrative arrangements. Mr. Murphy and Mr. Allen were of the opinion that the reverse was true. Mr. Allen added that he thought the chances of USSR agreement "very small". If the U.S. is seeking primarily a propaganda gain then we are doing exactly what we charge the USSR with doing, namely, misuse of diplomatic intercourse for propaganda purposes only. While he thought we should give time to the addressees to answer he thought that "maybe the U.S. has now waited long enough".

Mr. Harr, the Acting Chairman, in seeking to summarize the previous discussions of the item by the OCB, said that there was a "certain feeling that State protagonists sold the policy on one basis and executed it on another". Mr. Murphy denied that this was the case and cited language of the policy paper to support his view.

---

#### 274. Editorial Note

On April 28, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Murphy sent a memorandum to Secretary Dulles enclosing the text of a Presidential announcement on Antarctica. (Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/4-2858) Following revisions at the White House, Press Secretary Hagerty on May 3 issued the announcement calling for a conference on Antarctica. At the same time the White House released the text of the note inviting Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Soviet Union, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom to the

conference. For texts of the announcement and the note, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, page 473. A draft of the note, prepared by Daniels on April 14, is in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/4-1558.

---

**275. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>**

CA-11231

Washington, June 20, 1958.

On May 2, 1958, an invitation was extended by the United States to eleven countries to attend a conference for the purpose of concluding a formal international agreement on Antarctica in the form of a treaty, for the purposes set forth in the circular note of invitation. The circular note of May 2 was released to the public by the White House on May 3, and copies have been sent to all diplomatic posts. The circular note of invitation was addressed to the other eleven countries participating actively in the Antarctic program of the International Geophysical Year, namely, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom.

All eleven countries invited have officially accepted. In some countries, however, the question has been raised as to why the invitation was limited to the eleven countries mentioned above, and whether it might not be better to broaden the scope of the conference to permit participation by additional countries. The considerations set forth below are intended to be helpful in the event this subject should arise in conversation:

1. In view of the fact that a major purpose of the proposed treaty is to promote scientific research and international scientific cooperation in Antarctica, it was considered logical to invite the countries actively engaged in the Antarctic scientific program to agree among themselves on a basis for continuation of this fruitful activity beyond the end of the International Geophysical Year.

2. Even though the proposed treaty is signed only by the twelve countries participating in the conference, there is no thought that this would represent any discrimination against other countries which might later wish to engage in scientific activities in Antarctica. As the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/6-2058. Official Use Only. Drafted by Daniels on June 13 and cleared with ARA, EUR, FE, IO, L, and NEA.



note of May 2 specifically stated, the proposed treaty would provide for "freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens, organizations, and governments of all countries."

3. If participation in the conference were broadened to include any country which might wish to attend on the basis of an asserted interest in Antarctica, the conference might well become unwieldy, unmanageable, and subject to political influence. Furthermore, this could raise the question of participation of Communist regimes which the United States and many other countries do not recognize. The door would be open to any country to participate in the debates, even though it had not engaged in activities in Antarctica or expressed other than the most general and intangible interest in the area. Such an arrangement would hardly be conducive to a successful conference or the early conclusion of a satisfactory treaty.

4. The general policy objectives which the United States proposed in its note of May 2 were as follows:

- "A. Freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens, organizations, and governments of all countries; and a continuation of the international scientific cooperation which is being carried out so successfully during the current International Geophysical Year.
- "B. International agreement to ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.
- "C. Any other peaceful purposes not inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations."

It is believed that the successful accomplishment of these objectives in a formal treaty will protect and serve the interests of all peoples and that the proposed treaty will also receive general support as a major contribution to world peace and the advancement of science.

5. Seven countries have asserted claims of sovereignty over certain portions of Antarctica (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom). Even though these territorial claims are not recognized by the United States and many other countries, they are necessarily taken seriously by the claimant countries themselves. Those countries, in general, are opposed to any direct United Nations administration of Antarctica; and for similar reasons would prefer to limit the number of countries participating in the proposed conference and treaty to a relatively small group, such as the twelve countries currently active in Antarctica. The United States itself would prefer that the base of the conference not be broadened and that other members of the United Nations or specialized agencies which might assert an interest in Antarctica not be invited. A further enlargement of the number of participating states would meet with opposition on the part of many of the claimant states and create further difficulties and controversies which it would seem advisable to avoid in order not to prejudice the possibility of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement which would be of benefit to all countries.

6. As indicated in the United States' note of May 2, the proposed Antarctic treaty would be in consonance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. It is anticipated that advantageous working relationships would be established with specialized agencies of the United Nations. None of the twelve countries currently engaged in Antarctica have expressed any desire to have that

area placed under direct United Nations administration and many, as indicated above, are strongly opposed to any such proposal. It is the intention of the United States that the proposed treaty provide fair treatment to all countries and strictly adhere to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, there appears no justified basis on which other countries might seek to participate in the conference and thereby open the door to an indefinite extension of the list of participants without any agreed standards or criteria for such participation. Any such development would be prejudicial to the orderly procedure contemplated by the United States' invitation of May 2.

The foregoing considerations are set forth for the information and background of the Embassy. It is not desired that the Embassy take any initiative in raising these points with government officials or other persons; but if the question of participation in the proposed Antarctic conference should come up in any conversations, it is hoped that the foregoing considerations will be helpful.

Dulles

---

## 276. Status Report on Antarctica<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 24, 1958.*

The U.S. on May 2, 1958 proposed to 11 other countries participating in the Antarctic program of the International Geophysical Year that they join with the U.S. in a Conference on Antarctica. The countries were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, USSR, and the United Kingdom. The purpose of the Conference is to negotiate a treaty providing for freedom of scientific investigation and continuation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica and ensuring that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only. The Conference was to be convened at an early date at such place as might be mutually agreeable. All 11 countries accepted the U.S. invitation to participate in the conference.

Since June 13, 1958, informal meetings have been held once or twice a week,<sup>2</sup> for the most part in the Board Room of the National Academy of Sciences building, among representatives of the Embas-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/8-2458. Confidential. Addressed to the Department of State Duty Officer. The source text is initialed by Murphy and bears the notation "Sec saw."

<sup>2</sup> Memoranda of the 14 meetings held between June 13 and August 20 are *ibid.*, 702.022.

sies in Washington of the eleven countries and the U.S. to reach mutual agreement on time and place of the conference and on other procedural matters. It was the hope of most of the representatives, except the Soviet, that in these meetings preliminary agreement could be reached on some of the substantive questions pertaining to the treaty. The Soviet representative has consistently refused to discuss substantive matters except in the conference itself. He has also insisted at every occasion that all other countries which desire to do so be invited to participate in the conference. This position is opposed by all the other countries invited by the U.S.

The group has tentatively agreed upon Washington as the site of the Conference. Efforts to agree upon a date, however, have been unsuccessful mainly because of Australian insistence that more preparatory work must first be accomplished before a conference date can be set. Both the U.K. and Australia also insist that an understanding must first be reached with the USSR that participation be limited to the 12 invited by the U.S. Both fear that if the Conference convenes during the U.N. General Assembly the USSR will walk out of the Conference and immediately bring up the question of participation before that assembly. (India has already placed the subject of Antarctica on the provisional agenda of the General Assembly but later indicated it would not press for inclusion of the item in the agenda.) The Chilean and Argentine representatives have insisted that if the informal working group now meeting does not agree on an early date for the Conference (October 23 has been proposed) this failure will surely cause the General Assembly to take up the question. Chile and Argentina, which would both consider U.N. discussion of Antarctica as interference in their domestic affairs, would likely refuse to participate in any U.N. discussion of Antarctica. Efforts are now being made to overcome these procedural difficulties.

**Earl H. Luboensky**  
*Office of Inter-American  
Regional Political Affairs*

277. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, October 13, 1958<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Antarctica

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. R.G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs of Australia<sup>2</sup>  
Mr. J. Plimsoll, Assistant Secretary for External Affairs of Australia  
Mr. Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador  
Mr. Malcolm Booker, Counselor, Australian Embassy  
Mr. Lewis Border, First Secretary, Australian Embassy  
Ambassador Paul C. Daniels

At Mr. Casey's suggestion, Ambassador Daniels enumerated the points that they might jointly examine as follows:

1. Whether to include high seas in the zone of application of the proposed treaty, a matter on which there is no general agreement, as yet.

2. Whether the provision regarding "peaceful uses" should expressly be made to apply also in "time of war", as proposed by the Australians;

3. The question of the use of military personnel and equipment for logistic purposes, a practice which it was impossible for the United States to change at the present time.

4. The question of what the other eleven countries should do if the U.S.S.R. refuses to join in the treaty. Like Australia, the United States, at present, reserves its position on this question.

5. The question of whether the proposed treaty should include a provision for accession by other countries.

As to the applicability of the treaty to areas of the high seas, Mr. Casey said that a delimitation which would include all land and sea south of 60° had the advantage of simplicity. He inquired whether the United States favored including only the land surface and that portion of sea regarded as territorial waters. Ambassador Daniels said that for the time being we favored a delimitation at the 60th parallel with the simple proviso of "excluding the high seas." He mentioned that a reference to "territorial waters" might be inappropriate because of the jurisdictional question in Antarctica, namely, that in unclaimed sectors, and even throughout Antarctica as far as the United States was concerned, there was no territorial sovereignty to which territorial waters could be attributed. There was a further question as to whether ice areas would be included as land, but this was a point we did not

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/10-1358. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Owen.

<sup>2</sup> Casey was in the United States for an ANZUS Council meeting at Washington and for the 13th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

propose to settle at this time. The principal reasons for objection to inclusion of the high seas in the zone of application were: (1) The treaty would thereby restrict the activities of signatories also in certain areas of the high seas, without restricting any non-signatories; (2) The problem of inspection measures to ensure peaceful uses would be complicated by inclusion of the high seas. Ambassador Daniels also said that the United States Department of Defense was also opposed to the inclusion of high seas in the zone of application.

Mr. Casey asked if Ambassador Daniels knew why the Russians advocated the "Antarctic Convergence" as the limit of the zone of application. Ambassador Daniels said that he did not know the Russians' motives. Apparently they want to apply to the treaty the definition of Antarctica agreed upon by scientists and that he questioned whether it was logical to use the scientific criterion for a treaty of this character. Mr. Casey stressed the need for precision in delimiting the zone, such as a line at 60° would provide. Ambassador Daniels said that all except the U.S.S.R. agreed to 60° as the outside limit, but that as to the exclusion of the high seas within the area there was difference of opinion among the other countries and that we did not know the Soviet view clearly on that precise question.

At this point, Mr. Casey asked whether Ambassador Daniels believed that the U.S.S.R. really wants to conclude a treaty. Ambassador Daniels replied that the regular attendance of the Russians at every meeting of the preparatory group, despite their reluctance to discuss substantive questions, and the careful attention they have given to such questions as the proposed rules of procedure and other matters discussed seem to indicate that they are very interested in these negotiations.

Mr. Casey then raised the question of making the provision for peaceful uses expressly applicable in wartime. He pointed out that if the Soviets were to use naval vessels for support operations such as the United States does, there would be great concern in Australia. Ambassador Daniels pointed out that a distinction should be made between combat vessels and naval ships of the supply type. If the Russians use the type of vessels the United States does, he could see no reason for concern. Mr. Casey wondered whether such vessels were armed and indicated concern as to the use of aircraft carriers for support operations. Mr. Casey stressed the importance of this question for Australia. He said that expressly extending the application of the provision for non-military use of Antarctica to time of war should not create difficulties for the United States. If the Russians violated it, so could we. He also referred to the possibility of Soviet use of Antarctica for missile bases.

Ambassador Daniels pointed out that the phrase "for peaceful purposes only" without reference to war, would not be the same as saying "only in time of peace." Rather, it would be unusual to add a reference to "war". This might provoke speculation concerning the purposes of the treaty. Ambassador Daniels called on Mr. Neidle to mention some of the legal difficulties in this connection. Mr. Neidle pointed to the difficulty of whether "war" would include "political actions", and whether it was intended to cover war between the parties or wars with non-signatory states.

Ambassador Daniels emphasized that, for practical purposes, the inspection measures to be applied under the treaty would be equally effective whether or not the treaty was made expressly applicable to time of war. Mr. Casey then inquired whether the inspection measures to ensure peaceful uses could not be left to scientists rather than a military inspection system. He said he expected the Russians to oppose an inspection system, but that if it were left to be performed by the scientific observers, this might provide a face-saving solution for the Russians. Ambassador Daniels said that this was a question which required further study and discussion. It might be possible to combine scientific work with inspection procedures. This might even be done in provisions for overflight for observation purposes. As to whether the Russians would accept an inspection system, Ambassador Daniels pointed out that he had not discussed this in any detail with the Russians, but he had mentioned several times in general discussion the need for administrative measures to ensure the successful accomplishment of the principle of peaceful uses, and the Russians had not raised any objections thereto.

Mr. Casey at this point inquired what, in view of the Russian reluctance to discuss substance during the preparatory talks, was the probable date of the conference. Ambassador Daniels recalled that he had recently raised the question of the necessity of a time lag of about eight weeks between agreement on the date and the date the conference would begin. He did not foresee a conference possible before the end of the year. Mr. Casey inquired at what "level" the conference was likely to be held. Ambassador Daniels said that there had been no discussion of this but that in any event he expected parity of treatment among the chiefs of delegations. He doubted whether countries like Belgium or Norway would take as important an interest in their representation at the conference as, for instance, Argentina or Chile.

Mr. Casey asked which of the twelve countries appear to have the most active interest in the matter and Ambassador Daniels replied that after Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Argentina and Chile, appear to be the most actively interested.

Mr. Casey referred to the French objections to the proposed clause regarding rights and claims. Ambassador Daniels indicated he did not regard this as too serious, that he had spoken to the French Ambassador about it and had pointed out that the French draft or counter-proposal on this point appeared to be meaningless and would not prevent the U.S.S.R. from making a claim.<sup>3</sup> At this point Mr. Booker said that the Australian Embassy in Paris had approached the French Government on this point.

Ambassador Daniels said he saw no reason for difficult problems arising with Belgium, Norway, South Africa, or even France, for that matter. The other countries had more special views to be taken into account. It had been gratifying to see how the United Kingdom, Argentina, and Chile had avoided questions of their local rivalry in one sector.

Mr. Booker remarked that Japan had been an "interesting" member of the group especially in dealing with the Russians. Mr. Casey recalled that in a recent foreign policy speech, the Japanese Premier had emphasized close ties with the West and the United States. Ambassador Daniels said the Japanese had been very cooperative in the preparatory talks and, since their inclusion in the negotiations, they had dropped their earlier advocacy of United Nations consideration of the matter.

Mr. Casey referred to the question of what should be done by the eleven other countries if the U.S.S.R. does not go along with the treaty. He said that this was a question on which we did not need to make our minds up at present. Ambassador Daniels pointed out that talking about this problem might detract from the success of the twelve-power treaty, but that obviously we should be giving thought to the possibility. Presumably, such an eventual situation would not preclude an eleven-power treaty or any other combination of the countries concerned.

Mr. Casey then asked Ambassador Daniels his views on an accession clause in the treaty. Ambassador Daniels said he hoped to have a more complete draft of the treaty prepared soon and examine whether an accession clause was desirable. There were several strong objections to such a clause: The Chileans, for instance, objected to it because it would tend to create a further dilution of claims of sovereignty; the United States recognizes the need to reach an agreement, and with such a clause agreement would seem to be more difficult; also, the contemplated procedure for administrative measures, especially as regards an inspection system, would become unwieldy with too many

---

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Daniels' conversation with Alphand on September 23 is in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/9-1358. No copy of the French draft has been found.

contracting parties; moreover, in the event of any revision of the treaty, it would be hazardous to include many other countries; finally, the question of accession raised the difficult problem of the criterion on which accession would be permitted. Would it be for all countries or only those who send expeditions to Antarctica? Such questions might lead to controversy among the twelve. Ambassador Daniels said that in preference to an accession clause he still favored, on balance, the provision that would assure freedom of scientific investigation for all countries, but conditioned on observance of the rules established by the treaty.

Mr. Casey pointed out that except for Iron Curtain countries, he could think of no country whose accession would cause trouble. Yet, even in the case of Iron Curtain countries which might be brought into Antarctica by the Russians, it would be well to assure, by an accession clause, that they would be bound by the obligations of the treaty. Ambassador Daniels agreed, but pointed out that there were other considerations. To leave the treaty open for other Iron Curtain countries to accede might create the possibility of increasing the representation of Communist countries among the participants and force the Free World countries to invite other Free World countries to join. This type of political competition would be undesirable.

Ambassador Daniels then said that on this question of whether an accession clause should be included he hoped to have joint discussion with several of the countries in the near future. This would make it easier to determine the advantages and disadvantages of such a clause.

Mr. Casey said he expected the Russians to make a great play on the question of freezing the status quo as to claims. Ambassador Daniels said that in the Russian reply to the U.S. note of invitation, the Russians had referred to the question of claims.<sup>4</sup> They were obviously afraid that there was something unfavorable to them in the contemplated provision. Indeed, the proposed provision would prevent them from making a claim. Whether or not they would accept this was not yet known.

Ambassador Daniels then mentioned another point: The need of exploring the relationship of scientific activities such as that of SCAR to international scientific cooperation among governments. He pointed to the need for properly defining governmental authority in international scientific arrangements and said that the treaty should anticipate this problem in connection with the role of governments in scientific cooperation. Mr. Casey asked whether SCAR should be referred to in the treaty. Ambassador Daniels said that the treaty should not mention SCAR but that he had been thinking of a separate resolution concerning SCAR. Regarding this need for defining governmental par-

---

<sup>4</sup> A translation of the Soviet reply, dated June 2, is *ibid.*, 399.829/6-258.



ticipation in international scientific activities, Mr. Casey inquired whether he should mention it to Dr. Killian with whom he had an appointment tomorrow. Ambassador Daniels thought this might be useful.

Mr. Booker also raised another matter, namely, he inquired how rigid we should be in limiting the conference to the twelve countries invited. He said that if prior agreement were reached with the Russians there might be no objection to admitting a few more countries to the conference. Ambassador Daniels said that he had definitely opposed broadening participation in the conference since this would open the door to further controversies, make the conference unwieldy, and thereby affect its efficiency. Since the treaty would give non-discriminatory treatment to all countries, there was little reason to accede to proposals to broaden participation in the conference.

No definite agreements were sought or reached in the course of this conversation, but a better understanding of existing problems was undoubtedly achieved.

---

**278. Memorandum From the Special Adviser on Antarctica (Daniels) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 6, 1958.*

SUBJECT

Antarctica

The United States on May 2, 1958, proposed to eleven other countries participating in the Antarctic program that they join with the United States in a conference on Antarctica. The countries were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom. The purpose of the conference is to negotiate a treaty providing for freedom of scientific investigation and continuation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica and ensuring that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/12-658. Confidential. Drafted by Luboiansky.

Since June 13, 1958, informal meetings have been held once or twice a week for the most part in the Board Room of the National Academy of Sciences Building among representatives from the Embassies in Washington of these eleven countries. Up to now, twenty-four meetings have been held.<sup>2</sup> The principal purpose of these meetings was to reach mutual agreement on time and place of the conference and on other procedural matters. It was the hope of many of the representatives, however, except the Soviet, that in these meetings preliminary agreement could be reached on some of the substantive questions pertaining to the treaty. The Soviet representative had consistently refused to discuss substantive matters in these informal meetings, insisting that all these substantive questions should be negotiated in the conference itself. It appears that the Soviet position in this regard has recently softened. The Soviet representative has stated that he does not object to the other representatives making comments on the substantive aspects of the treaty and that he would be happy to listen to these comments. He has implied that on appropriate occasion he might even on behalf of his government make comments on the substantive matters under discussion in the group. The Soviet representative in these meetings has not mentioned for some time the previously stated position of his government that all other countries which desire to participate in the conference be invited to do so.

Up to now, the working group has informally agreed to a two-committee structure for the conference and has made a list of topics pertaining to the proposed treaty<sup>3</sup> which would be discussed by these committees. The group has also completed preliminary consideration of a set of draft Rules of Procedure<sup>4</sup> for the conference. Both of these papers are being referred to governments for their comment and they will again be taken up by the working group after these comments are received. It is now anticipated that the working group will take up consideration of substantive matters to be discussed at the conference.

The group has agreed that there should be an interim of approximately eight weeks between the setting of the date of the conference and the conference itself. This would mean that a conference during 1958 is not possible. At this time it is impossible to estimate when the conference might actually take place though it is hoped that there will be sufficient progress in the working group that the conference can be held during the early months of 1959.

---

<sup>2</sup> Memoranda of the first 24 meetings are *ibid.*, 702.022/6-1358 through 11-558.

<sup>3</sup> A paper on the organization of the two committees is attached to a memorandum of conversation dated September 17. (*Ibid.*, 702.022/9-1758)

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

**279. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, December 10, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows discussion of items 1-3: the Soviet test series, Africa, and the Soviet economy.]

**4. Special Briefing on Antarctica**

Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, Dr. James Joyce, Head of the Office for the International Geophysical Year of the National Science Foundation, and Dr. Harry Wexler, Director of the Office of Meteorological Research of the Department of Commerce, were present at the OCB meeting for the special CIA briefing on Soviet operations and plans in Antarctica.

The CIA in its presentation cited the increasing tempo of Soviet operations in Antarctica and the surrounding seas. The increase in Soviet activities comes at a time when other countries are curtailing their Antarctic operations. The briefing officer said the Soviet Union planned to establish three new stations within two years. In addition, the Soviet Union was turning over to the Polish Government a station at Bunger Oasis thus politically reinforcing the Soviet position. Other expected manifestations of Soviet interest in Antarctica included the use of a submarine equipped with scientific apparatus, of a nuclear-powered icebreaker, the sending out of a second Soviet whaling fleet to operate in Antarctic waters, and the announced intention to utilize nuclear power in Antarctica. In addition, the Soviets say they will launch earth satellites from both the North and South Poles. The CIA speaker believed all these activities with the probable exception of the polar launchings are within Soviet capabilities.

The possible implications and consequences of Soviet Antarctic activities were cited and note was made of the anxiety created among the nations of the Southern Hemisphere, particularly Argentina, Australia and Chile. For the present, the USSR appeared to have three major objectives: 1) set up a large network of bases which would serve to bolster anticipated Soviet claims; 2) increase Soviet scientific capabilities and knowledge; and 3) displace the U.S. as the leading power in the Antarctic region.

At the conclusion of the briefing, the Acting Chairman, Mr. Harr, asked if in view of the expanded Soviet activities, the Soviet Union could be expected to desire a successful Antarctica Conference which would in effect circumscribe Soviet aims. Ambassador Daniels said the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

Soviet intention was a matter of doubt but he pointed out that the USSR representative had expressed readiness to attend the Conference.

[Here follows discussion of item 5, Yugoslavia, and item 6, Italy.]

---

#### 280. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, January 14, 1959<sup>1</sup>

[Here follows discussion of items 1–3: Mikoyan's visit, Geneva nuclear weapons talks, and Africa.]

#### 4. Report on Antarctica

Present NSC policy on Antarctica, dated March 8, 1958,<sup>2</sup> calls for implementation of the "current program reducing Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period to a minimum to support U.S. interests and to provide for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica." The Working Group recommended a review of policy in view of developments since its adoption. The draft Report<sup>3</sup> noted the evolution of political, psychological and scientific factors which project U.S. interests in the area beyond the IGY period and the need to re-examine the adequacy of U.S. organizational arrangements regarding (1) planning, (2) budgeting and (3) the need for a focal point for information on Antarctica.

The principal developments in the area relate to an extensive expansion of USSR activities beyond those in its plans published at the time of the U.S. policy paper. The increase in USSR polar stations will make its network the largest. Penetration is planned into the Unclaimed Sector where U.S. exploration has given it pre-eminence should it wish to claim. Ambitious USSR plans for traversing and mapping and the possible use of scientific submarines and atomic icebreakers by the USSR were presented in the Report as of a nature to leave the U.S. effort inadequate "to support U.S. interests" if we do not challenge and expand.

Governor Herter opened the discussion by stating the U.S. criteria to be our "real scientific interest" and, along with other overtones, the prestige of the U.S. Dr. Alan Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation, was invited to identify U.S. scientific interests. He

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Document 269.

<sup>3</sup> Not found. Presumably this is a preliminary draft of Document 282.

stressed the importance of area meteorological data and study of the ionosphere; gravity, glacial and ice thickness research; and upper air and high altitude studies. The principal lacunas in the planned U.S. effort are those in the following fields:

1. Oceanography—in contrast with the USSR the Navy has no specific vessels to do a systematic job.

2. Traverses—although we have done many, none has been in the Unclaimed Sector.

3. Observations by rocketry—the USSR has shot 22 on a systematic basis.

4. Tracking system for a satellite polar orbit—U.S. orbits have been equatorial until now, while the scientific return from a polar orbit would be greater.

Much of the value of projects in groups 3. and 4. concerns itself with the radiation layer of electrified particles in the inter-polar area which taper off and cease to exist near the poles. Thus, polar launching would be less dangerous for man in space.

Mr. Wexler, Director, Office of Meteorological Research at Commerce, said he had made several trips to the area and thought the Soviet scientific work "superb". He said that although their logistics base is less extensive than that of the U.S., their vessels are specially equipped for scientific work while much of our research is carried out on vessels designed for other purposes. As an example of Soviet thoroughness, he said the USSR had built ships for oceanography which carried men and supplies to the site, then executed the scientific work and stopped on the return voyage to pick up bulk grains and the like for commercial sale before reaching the home port. They have been generous in giving out their meteorological findings but few have been furnished in oceanography which, of course, take longer to develop. In his view, USSR readiness to map aerially one-third of Antarctica, do extensive traverses and assist other nations evidences its desire to take the leading role in the area. Mr. Wexler referred to dry valleys in the area no colder than 31 degrees F. where important agricultural and pollination studies could be carried out.

Asked by Mr. Herter, a representative of Interior said his agency's scientific interest included mapping of Antarctica but that, with a large part of the U.S. still not adequately mapped, Interior's problem is more one of appropriations rather than of science. He suggested Congress would allot no money to his agency for Antarctic mapping unless it could be presented as supportive of the balanced national policy and supported by other interested agencies. International cooperative Antarctic map-making will be discussed at the next meeting of SCAR in March.

Captain Kefauver, Chairman of the Working Group, emphasized that the group has been a semi-administrative agency and the closest approach to a place in Government where planning, budgeting and operations can be discussed and agreed on although without directive authority. He underlined the Navy's problem as the logistics agency in being able to plan only after common agreement had been reached by the interested agencies on the scope of Antarctic projects which might be approved for funding. He noted that the USSR has a Polar Agency responsible for both Poles. Naval resources are being called on oftener for DEW line operations, thus impinging on Antarctic capabilities. Governor Herter noted that the lack of a central point of responsibility for Antarctic affairs created an unfair burden on Defense.

Mr. Herter reviewed some of the evidence of past national and Congressional interest in some type of polar commission but underlined the difficulty of finding a "logical" place in Government for a single operative agency, particularly since U.S. interests were many-sided, included that of prestige. To over-simplify the present procedure, he said, the National Science Foundation adapts its plans to what the Navy can furnish logistically, while the latter can plan only when it knows the scope of the scientific plans.

Under Secretary Herter suggested that the science chapters of the Report were the "key" ones and thought the Report should not go to the NSC before an evaluation had been furnished to the Board by Dr. Killian's office. He also suggested that the Budget Bureau should advise on the establishment of a place of responsibility for Antarctic affairs within Government. Such agency, commission, group, etc., would be charged, among others, with a unified presentation of the Budget to Congress. Vice Chairman Harr thought the "only thing new" in the Report is the Soviet Union's expanded effort and he doubted that this was enough for a policy review. Mr. Dulles (CIA) countered with his view that the expansion was a "most important" element, although he was not prepared to say that at this time it was planned for other-than-scientific reasons. Mr. Herter recalled that in his briefing for the meeting, he thought it appropriate to cite "Seward's Folly" as a bench mark in U.S. thinking on near-pole geography. He said he realized that the citation and his view on the potential importance of Antarctica might let the area come to be known as "Herter's Folly".

Governor Herter proposed that the Report be looked at by the OCB after consideration by Dr. Killian's office and the Budget Bureau. The Board agreed with his suggestion.

**281. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 20, 1959.*

SUBJECT

Status of Preparatory Talks for Antarctic Conference

Since June 13, 1958, thirty-one meetings of preparatory talks on Antarctica have been held,<sup>2</sup> attended by representatives of the United States and of the Embassies in Washington of the eleven countries to whom our note of May 2, 1958, was addressed. It has been agreed that the conference should be held in Washington but no announcement of this will be made until there is a decision on the date of the conference. A number of representatives, particularly Australia, supported by the United Kingdom, have insisted that there be prior agreement on the main substantive points before the date of conference is decided. The preparatory talks have also dealt with the Rules of Procedure of the conference.

For a long time any discussion of the substance of the proposed treaty was resisted by the Soviet representative. However, at the last several meetings the Soviet representative has, in fact, engaged in extensive discussions of substance. Considerable progress has now been made in discussing the substantive points presented in working papers by the United States and other representatives. This has resulted in making known to each of the representatives the preliminary views of the other governments on several of the important features of the proposed treaty discussed until now. It has also shown where agreement will be difficult.

Except for differences as to formulation there is general agreement for the provisions that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only and that there be freedom of, and continued international cooperation in, scientific research in Antarctica. The differences as to formulation are related in most cases to other points which have either not yet been discussed as fully or on which agreement will be difficult.

The problems on which there may be difficulty in reaching agreement include: (1) The inclusion of a provision setting aside the question of rights and claims ("freezing the legal status quo"). The U.S.S.R. has expressed opposition to the inclusion of this provision and France, for other reasons, has also expressed a difference of view regarding its formulation. (2) There is a difference of opinion as to whether high

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/1-2059. Confidential. Drafted by Owen; cleared with ARA; sent through S/S; and initialed by Daniels, Herter, and Murphy. The source text bears the notation "Sec saw."

<sup>2</sup> Memoranda of the first 31 meetings are *ibid.*, 702.022.

seas should be included in the area of application of the treaty. (3) The U.S.S.R. and Australia have opposed a provision which would expressly reserve the right to use military personnel and equipment for peaceful scientific uses. (4) Provisions for an adequate inspection or observation system in order to assure compliance with the principle of peaceful use remain to be discussed among all twelve. (5) For some time now the Soviet representative has not repeated his suggestion that participation in the conference be broadened, which all of the other eleven oppose. Beyond this, the question of the relationship of the treaty to states other than signatories has not been threshed out as yet among the twelve. A revised position paper on Antarctica for the Frondizi visit has been placed in your briefing book.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Briefing books for President Frondizi's visit to the United States, January 20-23, 1959, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560.

---

## 282. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 21, 1959.

### OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON ANTARCTICA (NSC 5804/1)<sup>2</sup>

(Approved by President, March 8, 1958)

(Period Covered: From June 26, 1958 Through January 21, 1959)

#### A. Summary Evaluation

##### 1. Political.

a. *U.S.-Proposed International Conference.* In pursuance of its policy objectives, i.e., use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only, freedom of access to and scientific research in Antarctica, and continued international scientific cooperation in Antarctic research, the U.S. initiated on June 13, 1958, informal confidential discussions in Washington with representatives of the eleven other countries active in the IGY program in Antarctica. The purpose of these discussions is to make

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File. Secret. The report consisted of a cover sheet; memorandum of transmittal, which noted that it had been concurred in by the OCB on January 21; the report; a Financial Annex; and Annexes A-D. Only the report, which covered the period June 26, 1958-January 21, 1959, and Annexes A and C are printed here.

<sup>2</sup> Document 269.



arrangements for the convening of the international conference to negotiate a treaty on Antarctica, as proposed to these countries by the U.S. on May 2, 1958. All countries represented in these discussions, including the USSR, have repeatedly indicated their agreement to the basic objectives of peaceful use and international cooperation as expressed by the United States in its note of invitation. The participating governments have also indicated agreement to holding the conference in Washington. No agreement, however, has been reached on the date for the conference. The participants agree that at least two months should elapse between the preparatory talks and the conference. The USSR representative has resisted discussion in the preparatory talks of substantive matters pertaining to the treaty and has proposed that the conference be expanded to include other interested nations. Representatives of some of the Western nations, notably the UK and Australia, feel that there must be evidence of greater agreement among all the countries concerned with respect to substantive matters prior to negotiation of the treaty at a formal conference. These preliminary discussions are continuing although they have lasted longer than originally anticipated. It has been agreed that statements to the press by any representative will be limited to those statements agreed to by all. Up to now the group has agreed to say only that the preparatory talks are being held. While it is considered to be in the best interests of the U.S. to continue negotiations for a treaty, it should be recognized that these negotiations may continue for a prolonged period. Therefore, the planning of U.S. activities in Antarctica should not be based only on the expectation or assumption that a treaty will be obtained, but, rather, such planning should be accomplished in a manner appropriate to meet U.S. requirements irrespective of possible treaty arrangements. (See Annex C)

*b. Documentation in Support of Possible U.S. Claims.* The Department of Defense has turned over to the Department of State all information available to the Department of Defense in support of possible claims, and documentation has been assembled which can be used to support claims which may be made by the U.S. Although policy guidance provides that the U.S. be prepared to make claims, even in areas claimed by other nations, it is the considered view of interested agencies that, in the event the U.S. should decide to make a claim, its interests would be served best by claiming the Unclaimed Area and reserving U.S. rights in the areas already claimed by other nations rather than by making specific claims therein. Thereby the U.S. should be in a stronger and more flexible position vis-à-vis other claimant nations.

*2. Level of U.S. Operations.* Pursuant to the policy guidance, measures were taken by the U.S. to reduce activity to the minimum essential to support U.S. interests. A network of four Stations (McMurdo,

Byrd, Hallett and South Pole) have been kept in operation [15 words not declassified]. The remaining Stations supported by the U.S. during the IGY period (Wilkes and Ellsworth) were made available to friendly nations for their logistic support under appropriate cooperative arrangements including participation of U.S. scientists. In addition, steps were taken to discontinue the use of Little America as a year-around operational Station. However, due to the fact that during the period under review the Soviets gave firm evidence (see Annex A) of an intention to expand their network of polar stations into the largest and most widespread in Antarctica, the question emerges as to whether the present level of U.S. effort is sufficient to protect U.S. interests in the face of this immediate and long-range challenge to U.S. political and scientific pre-eminence and position of leadership in Antarctica. From the standpoint of military interests, the Department of Defense considers that the present level of activity is adequate to meet its requirements.

3. *Scientific and Logistic Support Activities.* The National Science Foundation, as the agency responsible for the coordination of a continuing Antarctic scientific research program, and in conjunction with those Federal agencies that are conducting portions of the program, has met all commitments planned for the first post-IGY year of Antarctic activities. The Department of Defense fulfilled all logistical support requirements to which it was committed during the period. (In view of the present budgetary and manpower limitations imposed on the Department of Defense, the present program of four stations is the maximum that the Department of Defense can support.) (See Annex B)

4. *Need for Policy Review.* In view of developments since March 8, 1958, particularly the matters discussed in this report, it is recommended that U.S. policy towards Antarctica be reviewed.

#### *B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States*

5. *Agreement on Date of the Conference.* The United States along with Chile, Argentina, and others have urged agreement on an early date for the proposed conference. This group considered that the disadvantages of postponing the conference were greater than the advantages to be gained from prolonged discussion in the hope that greater understanding could be reached beforehand on basic issues. At one point the date October 23, 1958, was proposed as a basis for consultation with governments. The USSR and others indicated willingness to accept that date. Australia and the United Kingdom insisted, however, that the basic issues be explored further and that a greater extent of agreement first be reached on these issues. At that time it appeared that United Nations consideration of Antarctica during the 13th General Assembly was inevitable if an early date for the conference were not announced. Shortly after the United Nations General Assembly

convened, however, India withdrew its earlier proposal to include the subject of Antarctica in this year's Assembly Agenda. Another disadvantage seen in delaying the conference was that the chances were greater that other countries would voice an interest in Antarctica and in the conference, or even organize expeditions to Antarctica thus weakening the basis for the United States invitation list to the conference. These fears have been given some reality by the recently announced intention of Poland to send an expedition to Antarctica and by the articulately expressed interest of Brazil, Italy, and India in Antarctica. (See Annex C)

6. *Implications of Soviet Expansion.* The expansion of the Soviet network of polar stations into the largest and most widespread in Antarctic—notably penetration into the Unclaimed Sector where U.S. rights are now stronger than those of other nations—combined with the introduction of another Bloc nation (Poland), the ambitiousness of the traverse plans of the Soviet Union, and its initiative in pressing for an international program for mapping the continent appear to represent a governmental decision to make the Soviet Union the leading scientific nation in the Antarctic. If and when augmented by the future use of scientific submarines and atomic icebreakers the already impressive Soviet scientific results could eventually be increased to a point where they might overshadow the present pre-eminence of the U.S. in Antarctic affairs, with serious implications to U.S. prestige in the Antarctic. Since implementation of the present and proposed expanded Soviet program presents an immediate and long-range challenge to the U.S. scientific and political position, the scientific program as outlined in the current U.S. Operations Plan for Antarctica may be inadequate to support U.S. interests.

7. *Possible Augmented Activities After FY 1959.*

a. *General.* Contingent upon a policy determination at a higher level that U.S. activity in Antarctica should be increased to a scale commensurate with the projected operations of the USSR, and expanded U.S. program might include the following: (1) initiation of additional activities including geology, traverses, and the establishment of additional bases in western Antarctica; (2) an improved systematic oceanographic program; and (3) a comprehensive coordinated program of Antarctic mapping and resource evaluation. The fact that negotiations on an Antarctic treaty are now being pursued should not affect a decision with respect to the level of U.S. activities in Antarctica. (See Annex A, Sec. E)

b. *Mapping.* Mapping and surveying are a prerequisite of the planning and implementation of scientific programs, the support operations therefor, and the ascertainment of any eventual economic interests of the United States in the area. The political importance of mapping activity lies in its value as evidence to support rights and

claims related to territorial sovereignty. This is especially significant in the unclaimed area where there is a need to delineate the rock base-ment above sea level. The United States should, moreover, be in a position to play a leading role in any international cooperative map-ping program such as has been recommended by SCAR in which the USSR has declared it would participate very extensively. To meet this challenge the U.S. should be prepared to implement a systematic U.S. program of topographic mapping at an early date. Under the current level of operations, projected from existing policy, the U.S. representa-tive at the scheduled SCAR meeting in March, 1959, will be unable to indicate any U.S. contribution to the Soviet-proposed international mapping of Antarctica. (See Annex D)

8. *U.S. Organization for Coordination, Funding, Administration and Support of Antarctic Activities.* During the period covered by this report several major factors have evolved to further identify the projection of U.S. interests in Antarctica beyond the IGY period. These factors are mainly in the political, psychological and scientific fields. They are, broadly stated, the challenge of U.S. prestige and leadership revealed in the ambitious Soviet programs for post-IGY activities in Antarctica, and the initiative assumed by the U.S. in proposing an International Conference on Antarctica. The many and varied implications of these factors in the immediate post-IGY period and in the long-term period have created a need to re-examine the adequacy of organizational arrangements of the United States Government with respect to (1) coordinating the diverse United States Antarctic plans and projects; (2) facilitating balanced consideration of budgetary and financial require-ments of the United States Antarctic programs which are in large measure in the nature of logistic support; and (3) serving as a focal point for information relating to Antarctica. Since the U.S. presence in Antarctica has been maintained on a major scale through utilization of Defense logistic support, the Defense Department finds itself heavily committed in terms of available men, money and resources to pro-grams which are not primarily of Defense Department interest. There-fore, specific means for financing logistic support of Antarctic pro-grams other than by the regular Navy supply appropriations which have heretofore been used should be provided especially if the pro-grams are augmented or expanded.

### *C. Additional Major Developments*

9. *Cooperative Maintenance of Wilkes and Ellsworth Stations.* The United States reached understanding with Argentina and Australia on cooperative arrangements for the continued operation of the U.S. Ells-worth Station and Wilkes Station, respectively. The United States is contributing the facilities of these two stations, concerning which cus-tody receipts will be signed by appropriate authorities at the Stations

at the time the seasonal exchange of personnel takes place in January 1959. Argentina and Australia are assuming administrative and logistical support responsibility. In accordance with the terms of the understandings the United States is sending scientists to each of the stations to participate jointly in the scientific program there.

10. *Scientific and Observer Personnel Programs.*

*a. Scientific Personnel at Stations Maintained by the U.S.* The following table of U.S. scientists is given with respect to the first post-IGY calendar year 1959 winter science team and the IGY 1958–1959 summer team. The 1959 winter team list indicates activities at the four U.S. stations only, whereas the 1958–1959 IGY summer team list indicates terminal scientific activities at the six IGY scientific stations and NAF McMurdo.

[Here follows a table listing the number of American scientists at each station.]

*b. U.S. Scientific Personnel at Stations Maintained Jointly or Under Cooperative Arrangements with Other Nations.*

[Here follows a table listing the number of American scientists at Hallett, Ellsworth, and Wilkes stations.]

*c. U.S. Scientific Personnel at Stations Maintained by Other Nations.*

1959 Winter

(1) Scott (Main New Zealand Base)—4

(2) Efforts to find a United States scientist to participate again the coming year at the Soviet Mirny Station have been unsuccessful, and no approach has been made to the Soviets about continuing the current program. The United States has discussed the possibility with Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand of one of them furnishing a scientist to continue this program [19 words not declassified].

(3) A special program of participation, for the most part by the U.S. Navy, in the Argentine program is being continued in the coming year.

*d. Official Observer Program.* A program for exchange of official observers on resupply missions is being carried out during the Antarctic summer season now starting. Eight countries, including the USSR, accepted in principle the U.S. proposal that official observers be exchanged and accompany the relief and resupply missions to the various Antarctic scientific stations. The United States has named an oceanographer to accompany the Soviet expedition and has suggested that the Soviets also name an oceanographer to accompany the U.S. expedition. The Soviets have responded on November 21 that their plans for oceanographic research have changed and an exchange of observers on the Antarctic expeditions does not appear possible this year. To obtain qualified persons to send on foreign Antarctic expeditions is a difficult problem. There has existed a shortage of travel funds throughout the Government and it is understood the various agencies

desire to reserve what little they have for projects more closely related to their primary mission, as well as the objection to having staff members away from desks for as great a period of time. One suggestion for improvement has been made—that of speeding up the initial date of a placement for each year's program and the second and most important one is to obtain a small allocation of funds to pay the cost of observer travel. The experience of the past several years has clearly demonstrated the value of the exchange of foreign observers. Reports prepared by observers upon return from their assignments with the expeditions of other nations have been a source of much accurate information. In the main, such knowledge might not otherwise have been obtainable. It is, of course, difficult to ascertain what the Foreign Nationals who accompany U.S. expeditions gain from their experiences. However, their active compilation of notes, requests for publications and intelligent queries reveal that they have been obtaining information which they consider of value. The State Department suggested that for the sake of uniformity, it would be advantageous for the exchange of observers program to include all eleven countries, of which the United States sent the note of May 2, proposing an Antarctic Conference. This, of course, included the USSR and New Zealand, in addition to the nine countries on the active list. Action was taken to conform with the suggestion. The Department of State, this season, issued invitations to eleven foreign nations for this observer exchange. About the first of September, five nations had replied, requesting U.S. observers. Whenever possible, it is desirable that the nominating agency, which will benefit directly, pay for the cost of travel for observers. Some foreign countries furnish and accept observers, others accept and do not furnish, while still others do not accept but do furnish them. The following chart demonstrates this point.

[Here follows a chart listing the nations which would send and/or take foreign observers.]

## Annex A

*January 2, 1959.*

### IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET EXPANSION IN ANTARCTICA TO THE U.S. POSITION

#### *A. Background*

Pursuant to the request of the Working Group on Antarctica expressed at its 113th meeting on 26 August 1958, the representatives of CIA and Department of State are submitting herewith (1) an estimate of the implications of reported Soviet plans for expanded activities in

the Antarctic, (2) an evaluation of the adequacy of the U.S. program, and (3) suggested ways in which U.S. activities might be augmented to offset the challenge posed by the contemplated Soviet expansion.

### B. Soviet Plans

1. *Soviet Announcements Since August 1958.* Soviet announcements concerning 1958-59 Antarctic activities as well as post-IGY plans, which were made in August, 1958, at the Second SCAR Conference in Moscow and subsequently modified and elaborated, disclose a major program of expansion in future operations, as follows:

a. The Soviet network of Antarctic stations is to be expanded to nine stations through the establishment of three new stations, two of them in the 1958-59 season. One of the two is already established at the "Pole of Relative Inaccessibility", with indications that Sovetskaya will probably be disestablished as a year-around observation station; a second, to be called Lazaryev, will be located on Princess Astrid Coast in Queen Maud Land at approximately 10° East longitude; the third, to be called Bellingshausen, is to be set up in the Unclaimed Sector in the vicinity of Thurston Peninsula, possibly in 1959-60. The use of Pionerskaya as an active observation station is being discontinued.

b. The Oasis Station with all of its equipment is being turned over to Poland. It will be manned by six Polish scientists arriving in January, 1959.

c. Overland geographic and geologic studies are to be undertaken in the coastal zone of Queen Maud Land (10°W-45°E) and, possibly in 1959-1960, in the coastal zones along the Amundsen and Bellingshausen Seas (85°W-130°W).

d. Oceanographic surveys, including hydrographic charting and mapping, are to be undertaken in the waters adjacent to these coastal zones—in the Atlantic in 1958-59 and possibly in the Pacific during the following year.

e. A major tractor traverse approximately 3,750 miles long—connecting Mirny with Vostok, the South Geographic Pole, the Pole of Inaccessibility, and Lazaryev Station—is scheduled for completion by 1960; and a second—from Mirny to Bellingshausen—is proposed for a later date.

f. Soviets have proposed that an international mapping project for Antarctica at 1:3,000,000 (coastal areas at 1:500,000-1:1,000,000 and special areas at 1:250,000-1:1,000,000) be set up under SCAR. The Soviets have offered to map one-third of the area and any part which other nations are not able to undertake, and have proposed that two Soviet jet-aircraft and equipment be used.

2. *Related Developments and Other Announcements.* Other developments or announcements pointing to new or expanded activities that are relevant to this review of the future Soviet buildup in Antarctica include

a. Organizational changes recently instituted reflect a shift from temporary to permanent arrangements in the planning, coordination, and direction of Soviet Antarctic operations and research. An Interde-

partmental Antarctic Commission was established under the Presidium of Academy of Sciences, USSR, and the long-standing Arctic Scientific Research Institute of the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route was expanded to include the Antarctic—changing its official name to Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute. The reporting of Soviet activities and findings is being stepped up with the issuance of two serial publications. Current activities and preliminary results are being issued in an elaborate *Information Bulletin*, and more definitive studies and findings are to be published in *Proceedings of the Complex Antarctic Expedition*.

b. Progress announcements indicate that the second Soviet whaling fleet is in the latter phases of construction. One report indicates that a third may be built.

c. In connection with a description of the Soviet "scientific submarine" scheduled for operations in 1958, a Soviet source states that the possibility of the adoption of atomic energy "opens broad prospects for the future utilization of submarines for scientific purposes in the Arctic and Antarctic for the economic needs of the country".

d. A responsible Soviet scientist has disclosed that atomic energy (form unspecified, presumably for power at the stations) will be used in the Arctic and the Antarctic.

e. On 30 May 1958, Nesmeyanov, President of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, reportedly stated to an American in a conference that the Soviet Union is contemplating launching earth satellites from the Antarctic as well as from Franz Josef Land in the Arctic.

### C. Implications of Soviet Expansion

3. *Progressive Increase in Station Network.* The expansion of the Soviet network of polar stations to 9 stations is a far cry from the modest original Soviet announcement in July, 1955, stating a desire to establish "one and possibly two stations". Moreover, it belies the expressions of uncertainty and doubt concerning the Soviet post-IGY network advanced by Somov at the First SCAR Conference at the Hague in February, 1958. At that time, he seemed to indicate that the six-station net lying entirely within the Australian-claimed sector, which had been announced at the Stockholm IGSU meetings in September, 1957, might not be continued after the end of the IGY. As Soviet transcontinental operations develop, we anticipate that additional supply bases will be required in the interior, some of which may become summer-season stations. This would further broaden Soviet presence in Antarctica through an even greater network of interior stations.

4. *Implications of Increase.* If established, the network of 9 stations will be the largest single network both in number of stations and extent of territory covered. The U.S., by contrast, operates 3 major stations—South Pole, McMurdo (167°E) and Byrd (120°W)—and participates with New Zealand in the joint operation of Hallett Station (arrangements have also been made with Australia and Argentina for the continued operation of Wilkes and Ellsworth Stations, with the



U.S. contributing personnel to the scientific program). We can expect Soviet propaganda to stress (a) the superiority of their larger effort as evidenced by number and distribution of stations, and (b) their major scientific contribution in order to impress both the scientific and lay international opinion with their vigor and capabilities in the Antarctic. We must anticipate that this large-scale effort is likely to increase an already-existing apprehensiveness among the countries of the Southern Hemisphere.

5. *Penetration of Unclaimed Sector.* The possible accomplishment of the difficult feat of establishing the first encampment on the coastal area of the Unclaimed Sector would afford the Soviets a basis for relating this Soviet achievement to the early Tsarist discoveries of Peter I and Alexander I Islands. If successful in the establishment of the Bellingshausen station, the Soviets will become the first nation to attain a position that could challenge the primacy of U.S. rights in the Unclaimed Sector. If the Soviets prove able to repeat from the Bellingshausen station their past achievements in exploration, geophysical observation, geographic studies, surveys, and mapping, the resultant record as evidenced by scientific reports and by maps and charts will comprise an impressive argument with which to challenge the record of U.S. activities in the Unclaimed Sector. Should Soviet activities in the Unclaimed Sector continue in the magnitude contemplated, they would tend to reduce the relative strength of the U.S. position in the area, which has been built up through the years by discovery, exploration, and other activities. This would become a serious consideration in the event that the U.S. should decide to make a claim to the area. In the event of a failure of the proposed Antarctic treaty, the Soviets' presence and activities in that area could cause the U.S. difficulty in arriving at any limited arrangements under the provisions of which the U.S. might be expected to pool its claims (or its rights) to the so-called Unclaimed Sector with those of certain other nations.

6. *Effect on U.S.-Latin American Defense Relations.* The presence of the proposed Bellingshausen Station overlooking the approaches to Drake Passage and within 10° of the Antarctic area of the Security Zone of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance is likely to arouse substantial anxiety not only in Argentina and Chile but also among other Latin American countries. In the present missile-jittery environment, the Soviet presence less than 1500 miles from the South American continent may well stimulate additional anxieties and complexities as far as U.S.-Latin American defense relations are concerned.

7. *Prospects for Permanent Settlement.* The expanding Soviet station network and the prospects of further supply bases that may be set up in connection with the traverse programs add possible substance to long-term Soviet settlement and development envisaged in 1956 by Dr. D.I. Shcherbakov, now chairman of the Interdepartmental

Antarctic Commission. At that time, he expressed his conviction that the Soviets would continue activities in Antarctica because of their importance to a number of applied sciences and that, after the IGY, the Soviet stations would gradually be improved and ultimately become continuously operating bases. He further speculated that settlements surrounding meteorological and radio stations might be established and continue to develop, as has been the case in the Soviet Far North.

8. *Significance of Proposed Lazaryev Station.* The Lazaryev Station in Queen Maud Land represents another area of major historical interest to the USSR. At approximately  $10^{\circ}\text{E}$ , the station would lie between the point where Bellingshausen made his discovery of the "icy continent of Antarctica" ( $69^{\circ}25'\text{S}-2^{\circ}10'\text{W}$ ) and the site of his second penetration ( $69^{\circ}7'\text{S}-16^{\circ}15'\text{E}$ ). The political significance of the region to the Soviet Union is evidenced by the March 1948 visit of the Slava whaling fleet explicitly to verify the fact that the icefield seen by Lazaryev (commander of Bellingshausen's second ship) was a part of the continental ice shield of Antarctica. As early as 1955 the Soviet Antarctic planning chart has assigned Bellingshausen's name to the two ice shelves and the barrier ice in this area. The new Soviet station would lie within the Norwegian-claimed area, which is a coastal zone that extends poleward for an undefined distance. The Soviets, in their forthcoming traverse to Lazaryev Station, will have the opportunity to cross extensive interior areas never seen by man—many of which lie within the hinterland of the Norwegian claim. If their plans are accomplished the Soviets will here also acquire the political advantages based on discovery, original scientific observations, and mapping.

9. *Objectives of Planned Traverses.* The recent shift in plans from a traverse across Antarctica to one across Queen Maud Land to Lazaryev actually represents an expansion, since the trans-Antarctic crossing from Mirny to Bellingshausen Station has not been abandoned but merely deferred. While motivations for these ambitious efforts may initially have been primarily scientific, there are strong indications that government approval was given for political reasons and for the propaganda value of scoring an achievement in Antarctic exploration that would surpass that of Fuchs and Hillary. If successful with both crossings the Soviets, indeed, will have added a spectacular imagination-capturing contribution to the buildup of the Soviet Union as a leading Antarctic power.

10. *Entry of Poland into the Antarctic.* The sudden possible entry of Poland into Antarctica appears to be a Soviet maneuver to gain another voice for the Soviet Bloc in whatever possible future administrative machinery may be created under the proposed Antarctic treaty as well as in the Special Committee on Antarctic Research.

11. *Possible Soviet Leadership in Mapping.* The lack of reconnaissance-type map coverage of Antarctica represents a basic deficiency, in the topographic delineation of the area. Aware of this deficiency, the Soviets began mapping and charting at the very outset of their operations, and they have repeatedly stressed their progress in new mapping as well as in the correcting of foreign maps, including those of the U.S. This boasting is not without considerable justification. Soviet coastal mapping and charting—including ground-controlled aerial photography, radarscope photography, and echo-soundings—now covers coastal areas extending over 126 degrees of longitude, with 100 degrees more scheduled for the 1958-59 season. In contrast the U.S. has abstained almost completely from any systematic mapping during the past three seasons, and the charting that has been undertaken was on a non-interference basis, principally in the Ross Sea. As a consequence, a basis has been laid for Soviet leadership in the mapping of the entire continent of Antarctica.

12. *Introduction of "Scientific Submarine".* The eventual introduction of a "scientific submarine" (and probably of an atomic icebreaker) into Soviet Antarctic research will not only increase Soviet scientific results but also carry significant propaganda impact in these two fields that rank high in world-wide public interest. The great anxiety manifested in Australia over unfounded reports some 18 months ago that a submarine base had been established by the Soviets provides ample indication of the stronger reactions that are likely to result if a Soviet submarine should actually appear in Antarctic waters.

13. *Contemplated Launching of Earth Satellite.* Although the Soviet contemplation of the launching of an earth satellite from an Antarctic site has not as yet been confirmed by other evidence and although no launching is likely for several years, it is not premature to take cognizance of the problem at this time. The chief significance of the report may be as an indication that the Soviets intend to exploit further the psychological impact of the sputniks. At present, there appears to be no technological or scientific advantage in the launching of satellites from the polar areas themselves. Some scientific support is beginning to emerge in favor of the concept that in polar areas the belt of radiation in the higher altitudes is thinner than elsewhere and hence more favorable for the future launching of manned satellites. This concept, however, is still too speculative to provide a basis for the reported Soviet plans. If evidence of the Soviet intentions should persist, it might seem to indicate the extension of "sputnik diplomacy" specifically to impress the Southern Hemisphere peoples with Soviet missile-launching capabilities.

14. *Soviet Economy in Commitment of Men and Transport.* Soviet Antarctic operations have been accomplished with an unusually small commitment of men, ships and aircraft. The establishment of a 6-

station net (including 2 nearly 900 miles from the coast), the extensive coastal mapping and charting and geologic oceanographic surveys have been achieved with no more than 3 ships (none of which is a true ice-breaker), personnel of about 400, and 15 to 20 aircraft. For the 1958-59 expansion into the interior and into Queen Maud Land, in addition to the re-supplying of their 6 other stations, the Soviets are using only 2 ships and about 300 personnel, including the crews of ships. Some of the factors that account for the successes that have accompanied this small logistic effort include (1) multiple use of ships—for logistic and scientific purposes, freight hauling on return trips, and continued operation in the arctic summers; (2) intensive air operations the year round (in January–November 1957, a dozen aircraft on scientific and logistic missions logged more than 3,000 hours and flew 420,000 miles); (3) increased mobility of extensive air operations from unprepared surfaces in the implementation of widespread scientific activities; and (4) use of a highly experienced corps of Arctic professionals. The economy of Soviet operations is particularly significant because (1) minimum resources were diverted from Soviet Arctic operations, and (2) the strain on the Soviet budget was relatively small. The budgetary strain was reduced still further by the profits of Soviet whaling operations, which in the 1957-58 season were reported to amount to nearly \$6,000,000.

15. *Significance of Whaling-Fleet Operations.* The expansion in Soviet whaling-fleet operations poses some long-range implications. Benefits from these operations have not been limited to economic profits. Since 1947 the whaling flotilla has also collected scientific data (relative to weather, physical geography, and climatology as well as to whaling resources). In 1957-58, an added scientific team for special studies raised the number of scientists in the whole fleet to 10, including 1 glaciologist and 2 geologists. For the 1958-59 season 2 scientific ships have been added to the fleet. The whaling fleet has also been used to serve political ends. Activities during 1957-58 season included landings on 2 islands of the South Sandwich group ( $56^{\circ}18'$  to  $59^{\circ}27'S$ - $26^{\circ}30'W$ ), and on most of the 5 uninhabited Balleny Islands ( $66^{\circ}15'$  to  $67^{\circ}40'S$ - $162^{\circ}15'$  to  $164^{\circ}45'E$ ). Metal stakes or signs were erected noting the landings. In the 1947-48 season the *Slava* approached the coast of Antarctica, at the two points where the Soviets claim that the Bellingshausen expedition discovered the continent, in order to verify the physical-geographic plausibility of that discovery. With the construction of a second and possibly a third fleet, Soviet capabilities in Antarctic operations will be increased, whaling as well as scientific. As a result of mounting Soviet whaling production, the Norwegians have recently expressed alarm concerning the prospect of Soviet domination of the industry in the Antarctic. If this were to happen, Soviet prominence would be extended into another field of

activity. Furthermore, if one were to postulate the possibility of Soviet use of the factory ships for hauling artificial earth satellites and even missiles, the fleet could eventually emerge as another significant tool in extension of Soviet power in the Southern Hemisphere. Since the International Whaling Commission has not as yet established an independent observer program to monitor whale-catching regulations, no method of surveillance could be set up that would provide information on the use of Soviet factory ships. [A program proposed by Norway in 1955 as a protocol to the International Whaling Convention lacked ratification by Mexico, Brazil and Panama as of 1958; unanimous ratification is required before entry into force.]<sup>3</sup>

16. *Withholding of Information by Soviets.* To date, the Soviets have withheld certain results of their Antarctic activities—chiefly new sailing pilots, hydrographic charts, echo soundings, radarscope photography, large-scale maps, gravity data, and improvements in aids to polar navigation—thus creating an imbalance that could have undesirable long-range military implications.

#### D. Conclusions

The expansion of the Soviet station net into the largest one on the Antarctic Continent, the introduction of another Bloc nation (Poland), the ambitiousness of Soviet traverse plans, and their initiative in pressing for an international program for mapping the continent appear to represent a Soviet governmental decision to make the Soviet Union the scientific leader on the continent, thereby strengthening its political position in the Antarctic. If and when augmented by the future use of scientific submarines and atomic icebreakers the already impressive Soviet scientific results could eventually be increased to a point where they might overshadow the present pre-eminence of the U.S. in Antarctic affairs, with serious implications to U.S. prestige in the Antarctic.

Since the expanded Soviet program presents a long-range challenge to the U.S. scientific and political position, the scientific program as outlined in the current U.S. Operations Plan for Antarctica cannot be considered adequate to support U.S. interests. The current U.S. program was developed as a minimum program at a time when Soviet post-IGY plans indicated that a six-nation network would be maintained and that it would be located entirely within their current area of operations. The U.S. program for the first post-IGY season is inadequate particularly because (1) it fails to provide sufficient activities in the interior regions, particularly in Western Antarctica; (2) there is no assurance that an adequate systematic oceanographic program will be implemented; and (3) an adequate program in aerial mapping is lack-

---

<sup>3</sup> Brackets in the source text.

ing. These deficiencies if not corrected would (1) weaken the U.S. political position, particularly in Western Antarctica; (2) lead to the eventual erosion of the position of pre-eminence and leadership in Antarctica now held by the U.S.; (3) provide the Russians a field of scientific endeavor with an opportunity to outpace and outperform the U.S.; and (4) reduce the coverage of basic scientific data to a point of deficiency that would be disadvantageous to the U.S.

#### *E. Suggested Augmentation of U.S. Activities*

The following are suggested as ways in which U.S. activities in Antarctica might be augmented to meet the challenge of the expanding Soviet program and its adverse political, scientific, and defense implications for the United States:

a. Increase U.S. interior operations by (1) establishing several small, seasonal stations, and (2) expanding traverse operations. The former would be most advantageous in the area between the base of Palmer Peninsula and the Pensacola and Sentinel Mountains. Such stations would (1) permit unique, fruitful geologic investigations, (2) serve geodetic requirements by establishing ground-control positions for aerial mapping, (3) provide additional year-round meteorological coverage through the use of automatic weather stations during the winter months, (4) provide imagination-capturing material to publicize U.S. activities and dilute Soviet propaganda, (5) help to maintain U.S. rights beyond the Unclaimed Sector, and (6) provide stations that would be useful as air-rescue facilities for the future, when expanded air operations will be required for mapping [9 words not declassified] and the delivery of Free World scientist-observers.

b. Outfit either a special ice-breaker or a specially reinforced vessel for a systematic oceanographic and hydrographic survey program, including echo-soundings and radarscope photography. Such a program would not only be valuable to basic science but would also provide significant military as well as psychological advantages. By the collection of its own hydrographic data, the U.S. would not lag behind the Russians in the charting of the oceans. Hydrographic charting and bathymetric data are essential not only to naval preparedness but also for the world gravity survey now underway by the USAF and USNHO for the development of a world geodetic datum to meet U.S. guided-missile requirements. A systematic oceanographic program would also serve to strengthen the U.S. exchange position in obtaining the Soviet oceanographic and charting data that have been collected over the past three seasons but have not yet been released.

c. Begin a systematic 1:1,000,000 aerial-mapping program as soon as practicable to ensure U.S. priority in mapping, particularly in western Antarctica. Such mapping is to conform to the master plan and specifications developed for the Working Group by its Technical Advisory Committee on Antarctic Mapping. The prior Soviet mapping of any substantial part of the continent, particularly western Antarctica, would be disadvantageous to the U.S. political position in that area as well as to its prestige in general. The adverse consequences of U.S.

inaction would be further compounded by the opportunity that would be afforded to the Soviets to produce the weightiest possible record of their capabilities and territorial activities.

d. Attempt to secure adequate arrangements in any future political agreement on Antarctica as well as within SCAR for complete exchange of all scientific results, data, and related materials produced since the beginning of the IGY as well as in subsequent programs. This is aimed especially at securing (1) maps and charts compiled by the Soviets and (2) earth satellite tracking data from future observations.

e. Increase U.S. participation at the Wilkes and Ellsworth Stations, which should step up publicity designed to emphasize the joint character of operations at those stations.

f. As a minimum, seek continuation of the Norwegian station at 70°30'S-02°32'W (whose abandonment during 1960-61 season is indicated) and give consideration to its development as a joint U.S.-Norwegian activity.

g. Develop cooperative arrangements for participation in the operations of other friendly countries, such as Belgian traverse operations, to improve the position of Free World countries in Antarctica, and thereby reduce the impact of Soviet achievements and increase U.S. prestige in Antarctica.

h. Stimulate through Free World members of the International Whaling Commission the establishment of an independent observer program for the surveillance of Soviet whaling operations.

[Here follows the remainder of Annex A.]

### Annex C

#### PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANTARCTIC CONFERENCE

*a. Soviet Attitudes.* Soviet attitudes in the United States proposed Antarctic conference will be motivated in part by balancing the prospective substantive and psychological advantages of participating in such a conference against the disadvantages of entering into an agreement which might restrict Soviet freedom of political action in Antarctica. The Soviets are likely to criticize the United States at the conference for restricting the invitations solely to those countries active in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year, and use the announced Polish Expedition to its advantage. They will also likely use the conference as a propaganda forum and will avail themselves of the opportunity to tell the world about the extent and importance of Soviet Antarctic activities.

*b. Substantive Difficulties in Negotiating a Treaty.* Though there has been minimum discussion in the informal twelve power meetings on substantive matters pertaining to the treaty, the United States representative has explored informally with other representatives the various questions which should be dealt with in the treaty. Based on these

discussions and on study of United States policy considerations, the United States representative drew up, and on November 18 distributed in the twelve power informal meeting, a series of informal working papers containing the text of possible treaty articles.<sup>4</sup> It is hoped these papers will generate discussion on these substantive matters to the point that unanimous agreement can be reached soon to set the date for the conference. In the course of the discussions, however, certain areas of possible difficulty and of disagreement to be resolved have become evident. The principal difficulty at the moment appears to be concerned with the question of rights and claims ("freezing the legal status quo"). Nine of the countries agree with the United States that a provision is needed ensuring that political considerations pertaining to rights and claims in Antarctica not be a source of difficulty or conflict in the future. The USSR has expressed opposition to the inclusion of this provision in the treaty. This may constitute a serious obstacle. There is also a minor difference with France regarding the formulation of this provision. There is a difference of opinion as to whether the high seas should be included or not in the area of application of the treaty. The Australian representative in the discussions has also indicated his Government preferred that there be no provision in the treaty that would recognize the participation of military forces in the support of scientific programs in Antarctica. In bilateral discussions it became evident that Australia would prefer the United States and other countries conduct their activities in Antarctica by other than military agencies. Their reasoning appears motivated by the fear this might provide the Soviets with a justification for placing military forces in Antarctica. The United States representative has made it clear that the use of military logistical support in the United States Antarctic program is necessary and that a qualification to the peaceful uses provision is therefore needed in the treaty. The Australian representative has stated in bilateral discussions that Australia desired that the provision for peaceful uses of Antarctica explicitly apply in war as well as in peace. In talks with the various individual representatives it has also become clear that the question of accession, or of the position in regard to non-signatory states, will provide material for considerable contentious debate. In addition it is anticipated that other problems might arise during the further course of negotiations. These problems would be associated with the questions of free access to Antarctica for the peoples and organizations of all countries of the world; of the exploitation of the potential resources of the area; of inspection and control of guarantee that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes

---

<sup>4</sup> A copy of this working paper, which contained drafts of 12 articles, is attached to the memorandum of the 26th meeting in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/11-1858.



only; of nature of administrative measures which might be needed to ensure the accomplishment of the objectives of the treaty; of the nature and extent of any relationship to the United Nations and its specialized organizations; of jurisdiction in regard to civil disputes and criminal matters; and of other matters such as the duration of the treaty, ratification, revisions, and review.

---

**283. Memorandum of Discussion at the 397th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 26, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

**1. U.S. Policy on Antarctica.** (NSC 5804/1; OCB Report, January 21, 1959 on NSC 5804/1<sup>2</sup>)

Mr. Karl Harr, Jr., briefed the Council on the highlights of the OCB Report on U.S. Policy on Antarctica. He described in some detail the expanded Soviet program which began after the conclusion of the International Geophysical Year (IGY). He described this as the principal factor which dictated to the OCB the recommendation for a revision of U.S. policy. Mr. Harr also suggested that a revision of the policy should look carefully into the present organizational arrangements in the U.S. Government for dealing with Antarctica affairs.

Secretary Herter indicated very strong support by the State Department for the OCB recommendation for review which he said should be undertaken expeditiously by the NSC Planning Board. Secretary Herter stated that the activity of the Soviets in the area was indeed mysterious but that it could easily become the basis for Soviet claims for portions of Antarctica. He also endorsed Mr. Harr's suggestion for a review of our organizational arrangements on the ground that the Department of Defense was carrying too heavy a load in terms of its own funds for support of U.S. programs in Antarctica.

Mr. Gray stressed that the issue before the Council was whether or not to agree with the OCB recommendation for a revision of the policy rather than what the revised policy should contain. He pointed out that concern had been expressed in some quarters as to whether what we would be talking about this morning at the Council would involve larger programs and more funds for Antarctica. This, however,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret, Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on February 26.

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5804/1 is Document 269; the OCB Report is *supra*.

was not the real issue before the Council at present. Mr. Gray added that the Planning Board had discussed the OCB recommendation for a review and supported the recommendation. Noting the presence at the table of Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, as well as Dr. Killian, he invited comments from them both.

Dr. Killian pointed out that American scientists in general were very enthusiastic about the desirability of continued scientific research in Antarctica. Among other reasons for their enthusiasm they felt that the area was especially important from the point of view of global meteorology. The Antarctic likewise was a kind of laboratory in which to study the history of the crust of the earth. He also pointed out that our scientists had expressed some concern over the fate of our station at Little America. Obviously since it was insecure and sinking, the Little America base would ultimately have to be abandoned although scientists wanted very much to use it for one more year. Dr. Killian said American scientists were also genuinely concerned over the increasing extent of Soviet programs in the Antarctic although the Soviets have worked more cooperatively with the scientists of other nations in the Antarctic than they have in any other area of joint international effort. Finally our scientists have pointed out that the U.S. has been handling our Antarctic programs pretty much on a year to year basis. They believed that a long range program, covering perhaps a five year interval, would be more effective. In concluding Dr. Killian suggested that Dr. Glennan might touch upon the relevance of Antarctica to the U.S. earth satellite program.

Dr. Glennan pointed out that Antarctica was the best area in which to monitor satellites with polar orbits. Presently there were no plans for a U.S. satellite tracking station in Antarctica but it was only a matter of time before we should have to have one. Antarctica might also become very significant in terms of projects designed to increase our knowledge about the radiation belts surrounding the earth as well as projects for getting a man into Outer Space. Indeed Antarctica might prove to be the best site from which to attempt such a launching since the radiation belts were not so thick in the polar areas as they were elsewhere around the earth.

Secretary Herter again expressed his hope that the Council would decide in favor of a review of U.S. policy on the Antarctic and furthermore to undertake to complete such a review before next May when an international conference on Antarctica was likely to convene. A variety of subjects scheduled to come up at this conference needed to be looked at in any revision of our policy.

Mr. Gray then called on Mr. Elmer Bennett, the Acting Secretary of the Interior, who pointed out that the principal interest of his Department in Antarctica was in the mapping program for the area

now going on. He said that the Department of the Interior strongly concurs in the views of the scientific agencies as to the importance of the mapping program and indeed was making some small provision for such a program in the Department's budget. If a larger program, however, were to be undertaken it would probably have to be justified by larger considerations of policy since as far as Interior was concerned map making was of greater significance than map using. He was, therefore, inclined to defer to the judgments of the Departments of State and Defense with respect to general policy guidance on Antarctica.

Mr. Gray again stated that the issue now before the Council was whether or not to recommend a review of our current Antarctic policy and stated that if the decision was favorable, the Planning Board would undertake to review the policy expeditiously.

Mr. Allen Dulles observed that he wished to reinforce what Mr. Harr and Dr. Killian had had to say about the the extensive Soviet program in Antarctica. Mr. Dulles believed that it was probable that the particularly cooperative attitude of the Soviets with respect to Antarctic programs reflected the belief that such cooperation would enable them to move in without too much fuss if the U.S. moved out of any significant Antarctic areas. Mr. Dulles thought that the Soviets might even try to launch an earth satellite program in Antarctica.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget said that in the face of the obvious enthusiasm of members of the Council for our programs in Antarctica he could only console himself with the fact that the Department of Defense has not submitted a Defense justification for our programs. Mr. Stans added that he would not oppose the OCB recommendation for a revision of our Antarctic policy and stated that a principal objective of any such revision should be to determine whether or not the time had come to assert U.S. claims to Antarctica in view of the increased Soviet activity in that region.

Mr. Gray indicated that the NSC Planning Board would proceed with an expeditious review of NSC 5804/1.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Noted and discussed the reference report by the Operations Coordinating Board in the light of the recommendation therein for a review of U.S. Policy on Antarctica.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to review expeditiously U.S. Policy on Antarctica (NSC 5804/1), in the light of the discussion at this meeting.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

**284. Memorandum From the Director of the Antarctica Staff (Owen) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 13, 1959.*

SUBJECT

Your Request for a Rundown of the Points of Agreement and Disagreement in Current 12-Power Preparatory Talks on Antarctica

This summary follows the order of the articles of the draft working paper (copy attached<sup>2</sup>) distributed at the November 18, 1958, meeting, which covers roughly (but in different order) the list of topics tentatively agreed by the working group (October 8, 1959<sup>3</sup>) for discussion at the conference.

At all times during the talks all representatives have made it clear that their proposals and the views they express are preliminary and not necessarily approved by their governments. References to countries by name in connection with positions described below would be read with this in mind. The positions described are based on what the representatives have indicated to date at the regular meetings and in discussions on the side.

*Article I "Peaceful use only"*

There is unanimous agreement to have a provision that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.

The Soviet representative wishes to elaborate on this with an express prohibition of "military bases," "maneuvers," and "weapons testing." In principle, there is no objection to this, but it does involve close scrutiny of wording in order to avoid ambiguities which might be exploited against us.

Also, we favor the express provision that the principle of Article I does not preclude use of military equipment and personnel for peaceful purposes. This the Soviets wish to delete, as do the Australians. On strict logic alone this provision may seem unnecessary since the peaceful purpose of an activity is not determined by the military or civilian administrative category of persons and things. We have made that clear. The Soviets, whose Antarctic operation is administratively civilian, presumably seek to embarrass us since at present we are not

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/3-1359. Secret. Copies were also sent to AF, ARA, EUR, FE, G, H, INR, L, S/AE, S/P, and S/SA.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached, but a copy of this paper is attached to the memorandum of the 26th informal meeting, November 11, 1958; *ibid.*, 702.022/10-1858.

<sup>3</sup> A copy of the list of topics is attached to the memorandum of the 20th informal meeting, October 8; *ibid.*, 702.022/10-858.

organized for carrying out our program with other than Department of Defense logistic support. The Australians, anxious to keep the Soviet operation civilian, would like not only to delete this provision but even to write in a commitment to make all operations civilian. The Argentines and Chileans, whose operations are almost entirely conducted by their military are strongly against this, and practically all others also agree with us, including those who have purely "civilian" operations now (Norway, France).

*Article II "Freedom of Scientific Research in Antarctica"*

There is unanimous agreement that there should be freedom of scientific research in Antarctica. The Soviets have proposed language closer to that of our May 2 note: "The citizens' organizations and governments of all countries have freedom of scientific research, etc." The United Kingdom and Australia do not find this objectionable. Argentina, Chile, New Zealand and others prefer the more general language of the working draft. Key words in the draft are "in conformity with the provisions of the present treaty" (cf. Article VIII, *infra*). The Soviets have not insisted on their deletion.

*Article III "Scientific cooperation"*

There is unanimous agreement that there shall be international cooperation for scientific research in Antarctica. Our draft enumerates some specific types of cooperation (e.g., exchange of information and scientists) with the saving clause "to the greatest extent feasible and practical." There have been several proposals concerning the language, most of which are not of great substantive importance. We ourselves wish to improve the language of the working paper. The U.S.S.R. and the U.K. would like to add something about cooperation with international scientific organizations, the former wishing to mention SCAR, which we do not favor. The Norwegian has made known his concern that inflexible obligations to cooperate may be a burden to small countries.

*Article IV "Status quo as to claims" or "setting aside political considerations"*

Nine representatives have indicated agreement to the inclusion of this article as is. The French, who earlier had resisted this draft somewhat stubbornly, now merely have some changes in language, mainly because the draft is not easily translated into French. The Argentines, acting on instructions which reflect a preoccupation with sovereignty-consciousness at home with some lack of appreciation of the broader international issues, have reserved their position on one portion of the draft.

The purpose of the article is to set aside the question of territorial claims and consequent political rivalry in order to facilitate scientific cooperation. The Soviets agree, but maintain that the best way of setting this problem aside is by not mentioning it in the treaty at all. The actual reason for Soviet objection probably centers on the prohibition of the assertion of new claims—alongside the express “non-renunciation” of claims already asserted. (The Soviet representative has explicitly agreed to the inclusion of the topic “Provisions to ensure that political considerations do not prejudice the peaceful and constructive objectives of the treaty” in the agenda of the conference.) Our reason for insisting on Article IV as a whole is that we know it is a *sine qua non* for the claimant states. The remaining nonclaimants (Belgium, South Africa, Japan) also support it.

#### *Article V “Jurisdiction”*

The subject matter of this article is the establishment of a minimum set of rules on jurisdiction over persons. Although we included this in the draft, we have stated we would willingly transfer this problem to Article VII, namely, as one to be considered at future meetings of the signatories’ representatives, a view with which the Argentines and Chileans agree. The Australians, British and Japanese have declared their interest in retaining a positive provision of this sort. The problem is not of great political importance, but it is a very complicated legal one and to thresh out a satisfactory formula at the conference would only hold up the treaty as a whole.

#### *Article VI “Inspection”*

Most representatives have agreed to this “inspection” article. The Soviets have said they agree to it “in principle,” but maintain that the substance of its provisions should not be discussed at these preparatory talks but only at the conference itself where “experts” will attend. The Argentines have expressed some misgivings toward the article based once again on their Government’s emphasis on sovereignty over their sector, to the exclusion of greater problems.

The basic idea of our working draft Article VI is to avoid the difficulties inherent in setting up an international body to conduct inspection, i.e.: (1) the dilemma that the Soviets would not accept a body making decisions by less than unanimous voting, which would make it useless, and (2) the strong opposition to anything in the nature of a supergovernment or international control which is shared by most, if not all, claimant countries. That is why our Article VI in essence provides quite simply that *each* party can freely inspect *all* installations of others and that there shall be free aerial inspection everywhere at all times. This, of course, required careful drafting.

The U.K. has proposed an unoriginal approach, namely, to set up an "International Committee of Control" which would actually manage this inspection, taking decisions by two-thirds majority vote. We believe that the U.K. proposal is one the Soviets would not buy without a built-in veto. Moreover, Chile and Argentina have declared they would drop out of the treaty if the U.K. proposal were to prevail since it tends to set up a supergovernment. New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Norway and South Africa have indicated preference for our draft. Also, the U.K. proposal has very many objectionable details, in its present form, aside from this major difficulty. In the face of this opposition, the U.K. representative explains he is acting under instructions. It may be they believe it best to hold out for a two-thirds majority managed inspection system as a bargaining position for other articles, or even other problems. But they have not said so to us.

There is no evidence that the Soviets have not understood that the *intention* of our draft is that the all-important inspection provision be complete in the treaty itself and not dependent on "administrative measures" to be worked out subsequently under Article VII, q.v., with its obvious veto provision. They have said, so far, that the details of an inspection system should be worked out at the conference rather than during the preparatory talks, but they have not said this should be done after the treaty is signed. Presumably they are scrutinizing Article VI for loopholes if, in fact, the principle of inspection, *insofar as Antarctica is concerned*, is really something they consider to be contrary to the interests of communism. The strategic value of Antarctica is quite possibly as much of an unknown to them as it is to us. It should also be borne in mind that in trying to close all loopholes to prevent Soviet evasion of inspection, we should not provide them with a nuisance value in inspecting us.

#### *Article VII "Administrative Maneuvers"*

No representative has objected to a provision for periodic meetings of the signatories' representatives to *recommend* "measures" for adoption by the governments. This article is the remnant of earlier ideas for an "Antarctic Organization," favored by the British, from which the concept of the future "adoption" of measures by a group of representatives has been eliminated—thus obviating the problem of majority vote or unanimity-and-veto. Earlier concepts of the treaty envisaged *adoption* at these future meetings of "administrative measures" to assure effective implementation of the treaty, such as an inspection system (for Article I), and procedures for cooperation in science, etc. The present draft has separate full-fledged treaty articles on these points (Articles VI and III) so that they are "built in" and do not depend on future agreement. The enumeration, not exhaustive, in the present version of Article VII of the kinds of measures which the

periodic meetings would discuss and recommend could be enlarged or reduced. (The inclusion of any item may facilitate its discussion in the future, if we so wish, but does not, of course, either assure or compel the discussion of such item or the production of recommendations pertinent thereto.)

The Chileans wish to provide in this enumeration for the eventual creation of an "International Institute of Antarctic Research" as a device whereby nonsignatories would become associated with the treaty and declare their acceptance of the treaty principles, a problem which is the subject matter of Article VIII, *infra*. We, New Zealand and others have pointed out the possibility of duplication with SCAR, and other problems with the scientific community, that this Chilean proposal invites.

The U.K., as a corollary to their substitute proposal for Article VI (their Control Committee), wish to omit measures related to the "peaceful use" provision, i.e., inspection, from the matters listed in Article VIII, since their Control Committee would purportedly do all that, leaving only the business of scientific cooperation and administrative matters to the meetings under Article VII. New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Argentina, Chile and we, have pointed out that this tends to a proliferation of groups dealing with Antarctica.

#### *Article VIII "Relationship of treaty to nonparties"*

While there has not been full opportunity to date to hear an expression of the Soviet position in this regard (the discussion was incomplete), all other representatives agree that there should be some provision for "extending"—insofar as possible—the treaty obligations to countries other than the twelve, and that this might be achieved by compelling, in practice, or inducing observance of these obligations by these other countries, or such of them as may eventually engage in Antarctic activities. It is also agreed that this should be done in a form that avoids the appearance of seeking to *impose* obligations on nonparties and that should, on the contrary, have a "public relations" appeal as regards the rest of the evergrowing family of nations, especially if pressure for a UN take-over of Antarctica discussions is to be averted.

With this in mind our draft Article VIII states that administrative measures which come into existence pursuant to Article VII will apply without discrimination to nonparties so long as they respect the principles of the treaty. This leaves the inference that there shall be discrimination against the nonparties who do not respect the said principles, which include, of course, "peaceful use only," exchange of scientific information, no new claims, and so forth. Actually, such administrative measures as are envisaged as more likely to impose restrictions than to confer benefits.



The Article must be read in conjunction with Article II where freedom of scientific investigation is recognized (or *conceded* insofar as claimant states are concerned) for the benefit of all others "in conformity with the provisions of the present treaty." This means that this freedom shall not extend to those who do not observe the principles of the treaty. The proposition contained in Article VIII that certain rules generated pursuant to the treaty will be applied to nonparties, provided they observe the treaty principles, might logically have been appended to Article II. But it would seem to be inappropriate for the treaty among twelve parties to ordain that a condition (observance of treaty principles) is imposed on the exercise of certain activities (research in Antarctica) which the nonclaimant states, such as we in particular, who recognize no claims, must admit they already have as a matter of preexistent right, since all countries are now free to engage in scientific and *any other* activities in Antarctica, if, as we maintain, no one has sovereignty there.

While a considerable majority of representatives accept our draft Article VIII, there is no general agreement as to what also should be set forth in the treaty regarding the problem of the treaty's relationship to countries other than the twelve. However; (1) a bare majority, U.S., New Zealand, South Africa, Norway, presumably Argentina and Belgium, and probably France, agree that our Article VIII is sufficient; (2) Chile agrees with the Article but also wants its provision for a future scientific institute in addition thereto (see Article VII, *supra*); (3) Japan and Australia, in addition to Article VIII, want a qualitatively listed accession clause; and (4) the U.S.S.R. agrees to our Article VIII but wants an unlimited accession clause as well. Both the Japanese and Australians at one time asserted that an accession clause would dispense with this Article, but they seem to have understood that with or without accession there will always be nonparties, namely, those who neither sign nor accede.

We, the British, and all except Australia, Japan and the Soviets, oppose an accession clause because there is no justifiable reason for states not having an active interest in Antarctica to participate in this arrangement and it would merely open the door to certain countries without any such interest at all or with only a political interest, to meddle. Claimant states, especially the U.K., Chile, Argentina, New Zealand and France are particularly sensitive on this point and rest their case on the historical fact of their efforts and sacrifices in Antarctica, which, they argue, gives them, together with nonclaimants who have been active there, the right to make the rules. All opponents of accession point out that there is no need for it because the treaty does not seek to deny anything to other states. In fact it guarantees them the benefit of free scientific investigation there which, so far as the claimant states are concerned, they do not necessarily now have.

The Japanese agree that an accession clause is not desirable per se but that it is the only way to avert: (1) criticism and complaints on the part of other countries that they are being "left out" of something, and (2) the eventual injection of the United Nations into the problem. Under the Japanese accession formula, moreover, only members of the United Nations could be admitted and then only by vote of the original twelve signers. The Australians, from the beginning, have favored an accession clause, likewise, in part, to avoid criticism that the treaty is "monopolistic," but mainly because they believe that an accession clause is the best manner whereby other states can be, as it were, compelled to accept all the treaty obligations if they have an interest in Antarctica. Yet, an accession clause, while creating the problem of undesirable meddling, would not provide a means to "bind" those who neither sign nor accede.

On the other hand the U.K., as a solution to the problem, has proposed a separate "Protocol" which it believes can be a substitute for this article. This would, in effect, be a document open for signature by countries *other than* the twelve who would thereby proclaim voluntarily, but unequivocally, their acceptance of the principles of the treaty. The "Protocol" of the British has not met with approval of anyone. Its obvious defect is that it is extremely unlikely that any country would sign it, since it amounts to voluntarily assuming obligations in exchange for the dubious privilege of becoming a kind of second-class party to the whole arrangement. A further technical defect of the proposal is that even if a member of important other countries were to adhere to this Protocol, the result would be that these countries would have a treaty with each other but not with the twelve parties to the main treaty, and they could modify their own treaty as they pleased.

#### *Article IX "Zone of Application"*

The purpose of this Article is to delimit the zone of application of the treaty. Although in our draft it was left incomplete in order to prompt discussion, we have indicated that we favor that this zone include all of the area south of Latitude 60° S. but excluding the high seas. The issues of disagreement here are whether to extend the zone of application to (1) large areas of the sea surrounding Antarctica and (2) to the airspace above Antarctica.

Against inclusion of the sea are: U.S., U.K., New Zealand, South Africa, Norway, presumably Belgium, and, a recent convert, Chile. For inclusion of the sea south of 60° S: Argentina and Australia. (The coastline is mostly nearer to 70° S.) The Soviets have not spoken on this point recently. In much earlier discussion of the matter they appeared to favor inclusion of the sea. (They proposed to limit the zone by the line of the "Antarctic Convergence" which extends to 50° or

more.) The Japanese appear not to have made up their minds on this yet. The French have proposed working out a line by metes and bounds which would include a minimum area of sea.

The advantages of extending the "peaceful use only" provision to the surrounding ocean appear to be well outweighed by the disadvantage of limiting in any way our own right to do what we please in that portion of the high seas. Also, the efficacy of inspection provisions as regards the sea is not only questionable but poses grave problems of interferences with the freedom of the seas. There may, however, be good reason to include within the zone the waters a short distance from the land or fixed ice. The problem is further complicated by the fact that claimant states presumably maintain that there are "territorial waters" in Antarctica as anywhere else, to which they certainly wish the "peaceful uses only" provision to apply; whereas we, for instance, presumably consider all waters in the area to have the legal status of "high seas" since we deny there is any coastal sovereign.

Aside from "peaceful use only," the applicability of the other treaty provisions to sea areas is unnecessary and undesirable. These considerations may lead Australia and Argentina, as they already have Chile, to come around to the formula we favor.

The injection of airspace into this problem (proposed by Australia and Argentina) is very recent. So far, U.K., New Zealand, Japan, Chile and we have objected. Discussion of this has only just begun. It involves even more acutely the problems involved in inclusion of sea areas in the zone of application.

#### *Article X "Settlement of Disputes"*

This is a provision for peaceful settlement of disputes arising under the Treaty by (1) consultation among all the signatories, (2) the usual methods of settlement, and (3) the ICJ. This has not yet been discussed. It is expected that the U.S.S.R. and Argentina will not accept compulsory submission to the ICJ.

#### *Article XI "Revision"*

This draft article has not been distributed at the 12-power meetings. The British dislike it. We have no great attachment to it.

#### *Article XII "Ratification, Entry into Force"*

This is a procedural article. Of significance is our proposal of entry into force only upon ratification by all twelve. If the U.S.S.R. does not ratify there is little reason for this treaty. Possibly some other treaty or treaties and arrangements would then be desirable. Aside from this, the article has only procedural significance.

However, the various proposals for an accession clause, already discussed in connection with Article VIII, would probably be debated in connection with the subject matter of this Article XII.

This memorandum has not been seen by the Special Adviser on Antarctica, Ambassador Daniels, temporarily absent, who has conducted these negotiations. I believe he would agree with all statements herein.

---

**285. Memorandum of Discussion at the 401st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 2, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Policy on Antarctica* (NSC 5804/1; OCB Report on NSC 5804/1, dated January 21, 1959; NSC Action No. 2050; NSC 5905; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 1, 1959<sup>2</sup>)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the proposed revision of U.S. Policy on Antarctica. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.<sup>3</sup>)

When in the course of his briefing Mr. Gray reached Paragraph 20, he pointed out the split of views between the Majority of the Planning Board and the JCS-Budget members. He then read Paragraph 20 as follows:

*"Majority"*

"20. If required at any time for the protection of U.S. interests, claim the unclaimed area of Antarctica and reserve U.S. rights in the areas claimed by other powers or make claims in such

*"JCS-Budget"*

"20. As a means of expediting the achievement of an acceptable agreement on Antarctica, announce a U.S. claim to the unclaimed area of the Antarctic and reserve U.S. rights in the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 2.

<sup>2</sup> For NSC 5804/1 and the OCB Report, see Documents 269 and 282. A copy of NSC Action No. 2050 is in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95; regarding NSC 5905, March 25, 1959, see footnote 1, *infra*. A copy of the memorandum from the Executive Secretary is in Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

areas as deemed appropriate."

areas claimed by other powers or make claims in such areas as deemed appropriate; but advise the interested governments that the United States is prepared to defer action to implement claims and would agree to leave all other claims and rights unaffected if an international agreement is reached, such deferment to continue for so long as the agreement remains in force."

After briefly explaining the basis of this different point of view, Mr. Gray called on Secretary Dillon who was sitting at the Council table for the Acting Secretary of State.

Secretary Dillon commented that it is the view of the State Department that our objectives in Antarctica, on which all of the departments and agencies were in agreement, were actually in the course of being reasonably well achieved through negotiations looking to the establishment of an acceptable international agreement on Antarctica. Therefore, if we were suddenly to inject into the situation at this time a U.S. claim to portions of Antarctica, the result would almost certainly be a statement of claims in Antarctica by the Soviet Union. Such a course of action would therefore not serve the purpose which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Budget people, in their version of Paragraph 20, think it would serve; namely to act as a catalyst to produce an acceptable international agreement. Thus while the State Department cannot agree with the proposal by the JCS and the Bureau of the Budget, Secretary Dillon did point out that the State Department already has available the text of a U.S. claim to Antarctica. Accordingly, we would be prepared to make such a claim at any moment that it is decided to be in the U.S. advantage to do so.

When Secretary Dillon had completed his statement, Mr. Gray called next on General Twining. General Twining replied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the U.S. is bound to encounter difficulties with the Soviet Union in Antarctica no matter what approach we took. This being the case the Chiefs felt that failure to announce a U.S. claim at the present time would merely cost us the loss of our initiative with respect to Antarctica without actually advancing the prospects of achieving an acceptable international agreement on Antarctica.

The President inquired of General Twining about the views of the Chiefs of Staff as to the defense or military value of the Antarctic area. General Twining answered that the Chiefs did not as of now see much military value to Antarctica and believed that its chief value was in the

scientific field. The President then said that as he understood our policy, we are urging upon the other nations a peaceful solution of possible conflicts of interest in Antarctica. If, while we are urging such a solution the U.S. suddenly injects a territorial claim in Antarctica, the result would certainly be to increase the confusion. Moreover, in order to support such a U.S. claim, we might actually be called on to defend areas of the Antarctic, perhaps to send the Marines there. General Twining replied that he thought it was mostly U.S. prestige which was at stake here rather than the military value of the area to the U.S.

Asked for his opinion by Mr. Gray, the Director of the Budget commented that the hard facts of the current political situation made him wonder where the U.S. would find itself if the Soviet Union was the first of the two to make a claim in Antarctica. Accordingly, even if the argument in the JCS-Budget version of Paragraph 20, that a U.S. claim now might act as a catalyst to achieve a peaceful solution, was not a valid argument, he felt that the facts of the situation, as just described, motivated the Bureau of the Budget in supporting the JCS-Budget text.

Mr. John Patterson, Acting Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, desired to change the position taken by its representative at the Planning Board and switch its support to the JCS-Budget position on Paragraph 20. Mr. Patterson explained this change as resulting from anxiety lest the U.S. lose initiative and prestige to the Russians in Antarctica.

Mr. George Allen said, on the other hand, that he wished strongly to support the Majority text of Paragraph 20, particularly from the point of view of public relations. If either the U.S. or the Soviet Union were now to stake out a claim in Antarctica, such an action would have the automatic effect of recognition of the legitimacy of the claims made by all the claimant powers. Mr. Allen felt that the prestige of the U.S. over the years in Antarctica as a whole was so very much greater than that of any other power that we would be unwise to claim only some portion of the Sub-Continent.

Secretary Dillon said he felt strongly indeed that we ought to increase the prestige of the U.S. in the Antarctic area but he felt that this objective was effectively accomplished by other paragraphs in NSC 5905 and indeed that these paragraphs promised a much greater contribution to U.S. prestige than would be achieved by a U.S. claim to specific areas in Antarctica at the present time.

The President explained that the reason he had asked General Twining about the defense or military interest in Antarctica was his belief that if Antarctica does not have a military-defense aspect, then primary responsibility for determining our courses of action with respect to Antarctica should be lodged with the State Department. The President stressed that he did not want the U.S. simply to have pieces

of the Antarctic pie. If we were ever to make claims in the area, we had better claim it all. We should continue to base our position with respect to Antarctica on our long record of exploration and expeditions. On the other hand, the President did believe that this government should state something at the appropriate time, as we had in the past, that we have as much right to any area of Antarctica as has any other nation.

Mr. Allen Dulles warned that if the Soviets continue on with their extensive Antarctic program, they will in due course have a better claim to the interior portions of the Sub-Continent than the U.S. had. In answer to a question from the President, Mr. Dulles went on to point out that most of the exploration of Antarctica up to the present time had been confined to the coastal areas leaving the interior of the Sub-Continent open to future exploration and possible claims.

Dr. Killian stated that it was virtually the unanimous view of the scientific community in the U.S. that this country should not make any claims in Antarctica at this time. International cooperation, including the cooperation of the U.S.S.R., in Antarctica had been altogether remarkable and our scientists did not wish our government to take any action which might impair this promising development.

The President repeated his view that the U.S. ought to assert a right to go anywhere it damned pleased in Antarctica and that the U.S. should at the same time refuse to recognize the claims of any other nation to any part of Antarctica. Secretary Dillon commented that the only real problem areas in the Sub-Continent at the present time were the areas claimed by the Latin American countries, particularly Chile and Argentina. To this the President replied that the proximity of the areas of Antarctica claimed by Chile and Argentina to the Straits of Magellan gave to these Latin American countries a clear defense interest. He said that he would be inclined to recognize their claims to this relatively small portion of Antarctica.

Mr. Dillon then repeated his conviction that essentially the prestige of the U.S. with respect to Antarctica derived from activities conducted by the U.S. in the area. The President in turn repeated his view that we ought to, at an appropriate time, make a statement which would uphold our rights to go anywhere we wished to go in Antarctica under an international aegis. Secretary Dillon told the President that this was of course our present policy but that he could certainly reiterate it. The President said the essence of such a statement would be that we gave up nothing of our rights in Antarctica but that we made no specific claims to portions of the Sub-Continent.

Apropos of the earlier discussion of the military or defense aspects of our interest in Antarctica, Dr. Killian pointed out that there could arise a U.S. defense or space interest in the area because it might be the scene of the launching of satellites with polar orbits.

Mr. Patterson inquired whether it would not be useful to strengthen Paragraph 23—a regarding the U.S. presence in Antarctica by spelling out in greater detail the specific activities which the U.S. would undertake in order to provide for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica. The present statement seemed to Mr. Patterson to be too general in character. The President turned to Dr. Killian and asked what possible reason there was to launch rockets from Antarctica. Dr. Killian replied that the purpose served would be the observation of the upper air. The President then repeated his view that it was the right of the U.S. and of every other nation to use the whole area of Antarctica for peaceful purposes. Thereafter, the President inquired if it was the U.S. Navy alone which provided logistic support to U.S. activities in Antarctica. General Twining and others pointed out that in addition to the Navy the Air Force provided substantial logistical support for such activities. In turn the President inquired of Dr. Waterman information as to the scope of the scientific effort of the U.S. in Antarctica in terms of the money and resources being devoted to this effort. Dr. Waterman supplied the figures requested by the President.

Secretary Dillon expressed the opinion that the kind of statement which the President had in mind about U.S. rights in Antarctica seemed to be almost identical with the statement contained in the note sent on May 2, 1958 by the U.S. to the governments of the eleven nations participating in the International Geophysical Year activities in Antarctica which note was set forth in Annex A to NSC 5905. The President expressed his agreement with Secretary Dillon's suggestion but argued that one would have to keep repeating the U.S. view in order to convince people that we were being good boys.

At this point Mr. Gray returned to his briefing note and discussed in general terms the organizational arrangements within the U.S. Government for Antarctic activities. He pointed out that the responsibility was now divided among several agencies and also pointed out that the discussion in the Planning Board and in the OCB had indicated that the existing arrangements of divided responsibility left much to be desired, particularly when it came to determining the scope of the program and the means of funding its various aspects. This situation induced the Planning Board to make a specific recommendation for the re-examination of the management aspects of our Antarctic program. He read Paragraph 24 which called for such a review and expressed the hope that the Bureau of the Budget would undertake the review and complete it within a period of sixty days.

With respect to the Financial Appendix, Mr. Gray pointed out that no increase in funds for the Fiscal Year 1960 would be required even if the new policy were adopted. On the other hand, the figures for FY 1961 and FY 1962 were by no means so firm and could conceivably be larger than those indicated in the Financial Appendix.



Lastly in his briefing Mr. Gray reached Paragraph 25 which contained the only other split view and which Mr. Gray read as follows:

"25. Until a different organizational arrangement for the handling of Antarctic activities is adopted,

*"Majority*

"the current arrangements should be continued under which the Department of Defense is the Executive Agent of the U.S. Government in supporting scientific and other expeditions to Antarctica."

*"Defense-JCS*

"the Department of Defense will be the Executive Agent of the U.S. Government for operations in Antarctica, coordinating related activities therein and providing logistic support for U.S. Antarctic programs at approximately the FY 1959 level. Any logistic support in excess of this level will be funded by the agency or agencies sponsoring an expanded program."

He then indicated that he had, as a result of discussions with officials of the Defense Department and the National Science Foundation, formulated a new version of Paragraph 25 which he thought acceptable to the National Science Foundation, to the Department of Defense, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He distributed this new version of Paragraph 25 and pointed out that the views of State with respect to the new version had not yet been ascertained. It was generally agreed that the new proposal for Paragraph 25 was acceptable.

The discussion closed with questions by the President as to how and why so many Government Departments seemed to be involved in our Antarctic programs. This suggested to the President that there might be unnecessary duplication. Secretary Seaton of the Department of the Interior pointed out that Interior's interest lay only in the mapping activity inasmuch as Interior was the primary government mapping agency. Mr. Mueller, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, pointed out that his Department's interest in Antarctica was through the agency of the Weather Bureau, the Bureau of Standards, and the Geological Survey. However, Commerce he said had only about thirty people in Antarctica. Even after these explanations the President expressed himself as puzzled as to why so many different agencies seemed to be concerned with the weather in Antarctica and said he presumed this was why we needed to review the organization of our programs in Antarctica.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5905; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 1, 1959.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5905, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 15*: Insert the following new paragraph 20, renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

“20. As timely and appropriate, reiterate the U.S. position on Antarctica as reflected in the Statement by the President and the Note of May 2, 1958, contained in Annex A hereto.”

(2) *Page 15, old paragraph 20 (new paragraph 21)*: Retain the majority proposal, and delete the JCS-Budget proposal.

(3) *Pages 16-17, old paragraph 25 (new paragraph 26)*: Substitute the following:

“26. Pending the adoption of definitive arrangements for the conduct, coordination and funding of Antarctic activities following the completion of the review called for in Paragraph 25 above, the present arrangements with respect to the Department of Defense as Executive Agent will continue.”

c. Requested the Bureau of the Budget to undertake the review called for in Paragraph 24 of NSC 5905, and to complete this review within the next 60 days.

*Note*: NSC 5905, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5905/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

**286. National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>**

NSC 5905/1

*Washington, April 7, 1959.*

## STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON ANTARCTICA

## General Considerations

1. The increasing scientific potential of Antarctica, and growing Soviet interest in this area, call for a reappraisal of U.S. policy. Antarctica is not readily accessible even during the brief Antarctic "summer", and much of it has never been seen or explored. It has no present economic value. It has assumed some strategic importance, particularly in the light of recent technological advances and increased Soviet activity. It has considerable importance for scientific purposes; our understanding of the physical structure of the world and its atmosphere will be materially advanced by data obtainable only in Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not now determinable, so that its importance would conceivably increase greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments.

2. The results of the IGY scientific activity in the Antarctic have emphasized the practical potential of and the need for continued research in the area. Among the research areas of particular importance are: the study of ionospheric phenomena and cosmic radiation, both important to communications and space science; the influence of the huge Antarctic ice cap and atmospheric circulation on worldwide weather; the vast food reservoir in the Antarctic oceans and the Antarctic mineral formation and continental structure as they relate to the geology and structure of the earth as a whole.

3. In the present state of knowledge of Antarctica, this scientific interest appears to be the pre-eminent one from the standpoint of U.S. interests. The strategic and economic potential of Antarctica cannot be stated in specific terms but has to be borne in mind in the light of present day advances in science and technology. While this is so, it is in the national interest of the United States to maintain a leading position in Antarctic activities and to maintain itself in a position to take advantage when new factors, as they emerge, permit an evaluation of strategic and economic potentials of the area.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject Files. Secret. NSC 5905/1 consisted of a cover sheet; memorandum of transmittal; the statement of policy; financial appendix; and two annexes: A, giving the text of the invitation to the conference, and B, the Soviet note of June 10, 1950. Only the statement of policy is printed here. The few differences between NSC 5905 and 5905/1 are indicated in subsequent footnotes.

4. In addition to extensive participation in the IGY, the Soviet program in Antarctica includes such activities as ground-controlled aerial photography, mapping, hydrographic charting and basic geology and biology, which have been only incidentally a part of U.S. activities. The USSR's announcement of plans to expand the Soviet network of stations in Antarctica and to penetrate into the Unclaimed Sector, where U.S. rights are now stronger than those of other nations, the ambitiousness of the traverse plans of the Soviet Union, and its initiative in pressing for an international program for mapping the continent could represent a governmental decision to make the Soviet Union the leading scientific nation in the Antarctic. Whether or not all of these plans are actually carried out, the already impressive Soviet scientific results could eventually be increased to a point where they might overshadow the present pre-eminence of the United States in Antarctic affairs with serious implications to U.S. prestige in the Antarctic.

5. Previous policy on Antarctica (NSC 5804/1, approved March 8, 1958) included a provision for secret consultation with Free World claimant countries regarding the possibility of a treaty among countries having an active interest in Antarctica (including the USSR) providing for the objectives which are repeated in this paper; and depending on the outcome of these consultations, the invitation by the United States of the countries having such active interest to a conference to conclude such a treaty.

6. The contemplated consultations were undertaken and pursuant thereto the United States, in a Note dated May 2, 1958,<sup>2</sup> invited 11 countries (including the USSR) to attend a conference for the purpose of concluding a treaty which would provide that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only and for freedom of, and cooperation in, scientific research in Antarctica. In extending this invitation the United States refrained from making claims in the hope of reaching a constructive international solution, but stated that the United States was reserving its rights in Antarctica. All countries invited accepted; and preliminary informal discussions with representatives of the 11 countries concerned have been held regularly in Washington since June 13, 1958. There has been tentative agreement on a list of topics to be dealt with at the proposed conference. The 12-power discussions, which have not represented any official commitments on the part of any of the governments concerned, have reflected unanimous agreement that Antarctica should be used for peaceful purposes only and that there should be freedom of, and cooperation in, scientific research in Antarctica. However, in the past, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have favored some sort of internationalization; Australia, Argentina

---

<sup>2</sup> Annex A. [Footnote in the source text.]

and Chile have been reluctant to renounce sovereignty. While it is considered to be in the best interests of the United States to continue negotiations for a treaty, it should be recognized that these negotiations may continue for a prolonged period.

7. The seven countries which thus far have made formal claims to territory in the Antarctic region are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina, and Chile. There are two extensive unclaimed sectors: one extending between 90° and 150° West longitude, and the other poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° East and 20° West longitude. The United States has important potential claims based on discovery, and exploration, scientific and other activity, both within the other national claims and in the unclaimed sectors. The Soviet Union has not yet announced a claim, which might rest on the tenuous historical basis of a naval expedition under von Bellingshausen in 1819–21. However, extensive and continuing Soviet activity in the area at the present time might give support to possible Soviet claims. In addition, the USSR has since World War II taken part in whaling in the area, and regards this activity as additional support for the Soviet position. Neither the United States nor the USSR has recognized the claims of other powers, or made claims of its own. However, the United States on numerous occasions in diplomatic notes and publicly has expressed its policy of reserving all its rights in the area, and the USSR has officially asserted the right to participate in any territorial settlement.<sup>3</sup> Japan, the Union of South Africa, and Belgium have participated in the IGY program in Antarctica, but have made no claims. Declaration of a claim by the United States or the USSR or other powers might precipitate additional announcements of claims by countries, such as the Union of South Africa, which have begun to show an increasing interest in the area.

8. At the 1956 and 1958 sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian Delegation sought to have the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda but later withdrew its proposal. It is possible that the Indians will again raise the issue at the next General Assembly. Apparently, the Indian Government believes that the Antarctic may become a ground of further international contention and thus contribute to a continuation of the cold war. If the issue is raised in the General Assembly, a trusteeship arrangement might be proposed as a means of resolving the claims problem. The United Nations, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned.

---

<sup>3</sup> By a Soviet Memorandum of 1950 to the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France. See Annex B. [Footnote in the source text.]

9. There are certain practical disadvantages to direct United Nations involvement in the administration of Antarctica, principal among which are:

a. Administration by a virtually universal organization such as the United Nations, most of whose members have no direct interest in Antarctica, would not be as efficient as administration by those countries having both experience and substantial interests in Antarctica.

b. Direct United Nations involvement might produce a kind of political maneuvering that could result in question related to Antarctica not being decided exclusively on their own merits, but in relation to other considerations and other matters pending before the United Nations. The votes of certain states might, for example, be motivated by considerations quite apart from those relating exclusively to the best policy for Antarctica.

c. The usual and normal conditions for a United Nations trusteeship are totally absent. There are no permanent inhabitants of Antarctica—only a few isolated posts where the personnel are rotated. Accordingly, there is no problem of dependent peoples, aspirations toward independence, or the need for tutelage which occasionally has arisen for some dependent peoples living in underdeveloped areas of the world. Furthermore, any consideration of a trusteeship for Antarctica would run into such difficult and controversial aspects in the United Nations, as, for example, the naming of one or more countries to act as trustee, the extent of control by the General Assembly, and possible efforts to supervise the administration of the area that would not accord with the realities of the situation.

d. If it were decided to place Antarctica under a strategic trusteeship, making the Security Council the key UN body, the USSR would have the right to veto, which could be utilized to frustrate the establishment or operation of an equitable international administration in the area.

e. An effort to place the territory under United Nations administration is likely to produce greater resistance among those states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in Antarctica than would be the case if the administration were restricted to the claimants and only a very few others.

10. The United States has a long history of discovery and exploration in Antarctica, commencing in the early part of the 19th century and continuing up to the present. On the basis of these activities, the United States has consistently reserved its rights in Antarctica, although it has refrained from making a formal claim to any specific territory. At the same time, the United States has never recognized the claims of other countries.

11. In the light of the foregoing, one possible course of action for the United States to pursue in protecting its rights and interests in Antarctica would be to assert specific territorial claims of sovereignty

in Antarctica.<sup>4</sup> Such a course of action might well serve as a catalyst for conclusion of an acceptable international agreement, particularly if the United States advised interested governments that it is prepared to defer action to implement claims and would agree to leave all other claims and rights unaffected if an acceptable international agreement were reached, such deferment to continue for so long as the agreement remained in force. The assertion of U.S. claims could also avoid a situation in which the United States might be forced to react swiftly to Soviet enunciation of a claim.

12. The course of action described in paragraph 11 has the following disadvantages:

a. If only the unclaimed areas were claimed by the United States, no difficulties would arise with other claimant countries, but presumably any such claim would not be recognized by the USSR. The unclaimed areas are a portion of Antarctica which is difficult of access by sea. Moreover, it is now reported that two-thirds of Marie Byrd Land may be below sea level.

b. If the United States were to make specific territorial claims in sectors already claimed by other countries, a number of practical difficulties might arise. The United States could logically support territorial claims in most if not all of the sectors now claimed by other countries. If this were done there might be a series of disagreeable controversies with a number of friendly countries. Furthermore, it would be difficult to define precisely the geographic limits of such claims by lines of latitude and longitude.

c. If the United States were to make specific claims throughout Antarctica, the result might be an apparent downgrading of U.S. rights in areas not claimed. The United States might be deemed to have less rights in other areas of Antarctica if it claimed superior rights in certain specific areas.

d. The problem of administering and defending U.S. sovereign soil in Antarctica might become complicated and expensive if the United States has a number of scattered claims over all the territory.

e. The assertion of U.S. claims might accentuate rivalries in Antarctica, and might provoke unwelcome initiatives by the USSR. Competition for the area would be intensified and costly.

f. In view of the general, tough, unofficial, understanding that political activities in Antarctica should be held in abeyance for the duration of the IGY, there might be much sentiment against positive action by the United States in Antarctica if such action were based on activities conducted during the IGY.

---

<sup>4</sup> Claims could be based on first sighting, explorations, mapping occupation, and use, of those areas in which U.S. explorers have been active, from Palmer, in 1920, through the latest Deep Freeze Operation. Among the explorers who have advanced U.S. rights are the following: Palmer, Wilkes, Byrd, and Ellsworth, as well as recent explorers such as Dufek, Ketchum, and Ronne, and members of their parties. These areas include, in addition to Marie Byrd Land and the area south of the Norwegian claim, the Palmer Peninsula, Ross Ice Shelf, Wilkes Land, the American Highland, the South Pole, and various areas, interior and coastal, which have been flown over and mapped by U.S.-owned aircraft. [Footnote in the source text.]

g. An attempt by the United States to extend its sovereignty over large portions of Antarctica might not be so well received in world opinion as a broader policy aimed at international cooperation.

h. The assertion of territorial claims does not appear to be necessary in order to achieve the basic objectives of U.S. policy, and might even be detrimental to these objectives.

13. For the time being, the objectives of the United States respecting Antarctica could be achieved by the conclusion of a multilateral agreement as proposed in the Note of May 2, 1958. Alternative courses of action, in the event of failure to conclude such an agreement, are provided for below.

14. Mapping has taken on additional significance with the increasing scientific and political importance of Antarctica. It is essential to the accurate delineation of the physical character of the continent. The USSR began mapping and charting from the very outset of its IGY operations, and has been pressing for an international program, whereas the United States has refrained from any topographic mapping during the IGY and has no current program.

15. Current U.S. activities in the Antarctica are being carried on with the Department of Defense acting as Executive Agent through FY 1959 in supporting scientific and other expeditions. With the end of the IGY, the National Science Foundation is coordinating the scientific program of the interested government agencies, providing a single scientific budget and arranging with the Defense Department for support for the scientific program to be carried out.

16. Experience to date has created a need to re-examine the adequacy of organizational arrangements of the United States Government with respect to (a) coordinating the diverse United States Antarctic plans and projects; (b) facilitating balanced consideration of budgetary and financial requirements of the U.S. Antarctic programs which are in large measure in the nature of logistic support; and (c) serving as a focal point for information relating to Antarctica. Since the U.S. presence in Antarctica has been maintained on major scale through utilization of Defense logistic support, the Defense Department finds itself heavily committed in terms of available men, money and resources to programs which are not primarily of Defense Department interest.

### Objectives

17. A leading U.S. position in Antarctica which would satisfy necessary U.S. political, scientific and potential economic, military and other interests.

18. Orderly progress toward a peaceful solution of the problem of Antarctica which would:

- a. Prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes.



b. Provide for freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens and organizations of all countries under established uniform rules.

c. Guarantee freedom of access to Antarctica by citizens and organizations of all countries, under established uniform rules.

d. Establish uniform and non-preferential rules applicable to all countries and their nationals for any possible development of economic resources in the future.

e. In general, provide for an orderly joint administration of Antarctica by the countries directly concerned, on a non-preferential basis for all countries, and for peaceful purposes only.

f. Provide such relationship or association with the United Nations as would advance the preceding objectives.

### Policy Guidance

19. Continue efforts to achieve an acceptable agreement on Antarctica which would have the objectives stated in paragraph 18 and would include the USSR.

20. As timely and appropriate, reiterate the U.S. position on Antarctica as reflected in the Statement by the President and the Note of May 2, 1958, contained in Annex A hereto.<sup>5</sup>

21. If required at any time for the protection of U.S. interests, claim the unclaimed area of Antarctica and reserve U.S. rights in the areas claimed by other powers or make claims in such areas as deemed appropriate.<sup>6</sup>

22. Take all feasible steps now to be prepared, in the event of failure to achieve the agreement referred to in paragraph 19, to achieve other cooperative Antarctica arrangements (e.g., condominium, joint administration).

23. In view of the scientific nature of IGY cooperation and the strength of Free World claims based on the pre-IGY period, support the principle that activities engaged in under the IGY Antarctic program and other similar programs do not constitute a legal basis for the assertion of Antarctic claims.

24. a. Provide for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica, with a scale of activities, including mapping, adequate to realize U.S. objectives.

b. In connection with such cooperative arrangements with other countries as may be worked out in Antarctica, explore the possibility of effecting economies through joint operation.

---

<sup>5</sup> For the unagreed text of paragraph 20 in NSC 5905, see the memorandum of discussion, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> Paragraph 21 was not present in NSC 5905. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File) Paragraphs 22-25 were numbered 21-24 in NSC 5905.

25. Initiate a review of current arrangements within the Executive Branch for conducting, coordinating and funding Antarctic activities in order to assure the most effective arrangements for determining the scope of and carrying out such activities. In connection therewith, consideration will be given to the desirability of an Antarctic Commission.

26. Pending the adoption of definitive arrangements for the conduct, coordination and funding of Antarctic activities following the completion of the review called for in paragraph 25 above, the present arrangements with respect to the Department of Defense as Executive Agent will continue.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> For text of the final paragraph (numbered 25) in NSC 5905, see the memorandum of discussion, *supra*.

---

**287. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 23, 1959.*

**SUBJECT**

Status of Informal Discussions on Antarctica

Representatives of three FE countries (Australia, Japan and New Zealand) are participating in the current informal discussions on Antarctica. Of these, Australia and New Zealand have asserted formal claims, while Japan worked actively in the IGY Antarctic program. Australia and Japan differ with important aspects of the draft working paper now under discussion.<sup>2</sup> Certain parts of that paper also cause me concern for reasons both of policy and precedent.

It has been my understanding that one of the major U.S. objectives in seeking the proposed treaty was to obtain a freezing of the legal status quo of Antarctic claims (Article IV of the draft working paper). The Soviet representative has, however, held that this Article should be eliminated from the draft. I believe that we should consider

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/4-2259. Secret. Drafted by Bacon on April 22 and initialed by Robertson. Copies were sent to Daniels, S/AE, EUR, IO, NEA, ARA, and SPA.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to the draft articles submitted at the 26th (November 11, 1958) informal meeting; see footnote 2, Document 284.

whether, if this proves to be the definitive Soviet position, we are prepared to conclude the treaty without attaining this objective. The Australian representative has expressed doubt on this point.

A second main U.S. objective is to prevent the use of the Antarctic for military purposes. In this connection the Articles on inspection (Articles VI and VII) present several problems:

1) Principles relating to inspection (Article VI) are stated in broad terms which are susceptible of more than one interpretation.

2) The administrative measures to ensure the accomplishment of these principles (Article VII), including such matters as logistic support, are to be agreed upon only *after* the treaty has come into force and are subject to vetoes by all parties including the USSR (Article VIII).

3) The parties agree to accord equal treatment to non-parties so long as the latter act in accordance with the principles of the treaty, but the non-parties assume no commitments (Article VIII).

4) There is no provision for dealing with treaty violations beyond consultation or a reference to the International Court of Justice. The Australian, Japanese and New Zealand representatives agree that as many of the details of the inspection system as possible should be worked out in advance of the conference. I concur strongly in the light of my experience in witnessing Communist techniques of evasion under the Korean Armistice of 1953 and the Geneva Accords of 1954.

Article VIII would also obligate the parties to extend equal treatment in the treaty's benefits to the unrecognized Communist regimes, so long as they respect the treaty principles. This proposal would be contrary to the U.S. policy of avoiding steps likely to increase the status of these regimes. It would weaken our position in opposition to these regimes in the UN and other international bodies. It would create an impression of a softening of our policy toward the regimes. It would also act as an inducement for these regimes which have heretofore shown no interest in the Antarctic to become active there. These effects would be felt even if no treaty were eventually concluded.

Japan has proposed handling the whole question of non-signatories through an accession clause open only to members of the UN or the Specialized Agencies (subject to approval by two-thirds of the signatory states). This formula would exclude the unrecognized Communist regimes. The UK has proposed a protocol likewise based on the formula of members of the UN or of the Specialized Agencies. I believe that we should take advantage of these initiatives by our friends to solve this problem in accordance with customary U.S. policy.

There is no apparent evidence that the USSR is prepared to enter into any treaty on the Antarctic which would effectively meet our objectives. In this situation it would seem to be all the more important that we avoid proposals which might be interpreted as a change in U.S. policy on essential matters, or which might be cited against us as precedents in other negotiations or in UN bodies.

So far as the date of the proposed conference is concerned, we need before the conference, first, a fully agreed Departmental position and second, an understanding on essential points with our friends. These two steps cannot be quickly taken. I believe, however, that it is more important to enter the conference at a later date in a strong position than to have an early conference without a united front with our friends on essential matters.

Detailed comments on certain problems are attached (Tab A<sup>2</sup>).

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

---

**288. Memorandum of a Conversation, Soviet Embassy,  
Washington, May 11, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Antarctica

PARTICIPANTS

H. E. Mikhail A. Menshikov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.  
Mr. Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, Counselor of Embassy of the U.S.S.R.  
Mr. Yuri V. Filippov, First Secretary, Embassy of the U.S.S.R.  
Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, Special Adviser on Antarctica

At the invitation of the Soviet Ambassador extended by telephone through Mr. Filippov, I went to lunch today at the Soviet Embassy. The only other people present were those listed above, i.e., the Ambassador, Mr. Smirnovsky, and Mr. Filippov. During the refreshments preceding luncheon, the Ambassador himself brought up the subject of Antarctica and expressed an interest in discussing and analyzing any points of difference that might exist between the Soviet Union and the United States. The conversation continued along this line, for the most part, throughout the entire luncheon.

It was apparent that Ambassador Menshikov had been giving considerable study to the Antarctic problem. He referred to most of the major points which were currently under discussion, and only occasionally accepted prompting from Mr. Filippov or Mr. Smirnovsky. Among the points brought up by the Ambassador were the following:

(1) *Peaceful Use of Antarctica*. The Ambassador referred to the three additional points proposed by the Soviet delegation last year

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/5-1159. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Daniels.

under that general heading.<sup>2</sup> Neither of us felt there was any basic disagreement involved on that particular issue.

The Ambassador referred to the clause presented by the United States referring to the use of military personnel for peaceful scientific purposes. I explained that not only did that apply to the United States but to a number of other countries, and that for a continuation of our scientific program to be assured some such provision would be essential. I said, furthermore, that we considered abbreviating that phrase to read that military personnel could be used for peaceful purposes, without limiting such peaceful purposes; to scientific research. The Ambassador said that this seemed to be "new"; and I assured him that it was not new because at no time had we assumed that our military would be used for other than peaceful purposes. I pointed out, however, that for the purposes of insuring the peaceful use of Antarctica perhaps military personnel could be useful, and that accordingly it seemed desirable to draft a treaty so as to permit the use of military personnel for inspection purposes. The Ambassador gave no evidence of disagreement on this point.

(2) *Rights and Claims.* Ambassador Menshikov said that there had been an apparent misunderstanding in regard to our draft article on the subject of rights and claims. I agreed, but pointed out that perhaps the apparent disagreement could better be described as a misunderstanding of objectives rather than any disagreement in substance. We discussed the pros and cons of such an article a little further, without conclusive result, but the upshot was that the Russians were willing to discuss it further with an apparent willingness to seek an agreeable formula, since they were obviously impressed with the similarity of our two positions on this subject. This reflected to a considerable degree the first "thawing out" expressed by Mr. Filippov on the occasion of a recent call at the Department (see memorandum of conversation on the subject of Antarctica dated April 28, 1959<sup>3</sup>).

(3) *Inspection.* The Ambassador referred to the article providing for observers to insure the peaceful use of Antarctica. I referred to the agreement recently reached with Mr. Filippov that the removal of any numerical restriction on such observers might be mutually acceptable.<sup>4</sup> The Ambassador said that he did not at this time foresee any major difficulties in regard to this provision of the treaty.

(4) *Accession.* The Ambassador said he did not understand why other countries having an interest in Antarctica should not participate in the treaty. I said that, putting it that way, I fully agreed, but at the same time there are other considerations entering into the picture which made a decision somewhat difficult. The main purpose was to get a treaty. I said this question had come up last year when the Soviet delegate had raised the question of opening the conference to an unlimited number of participants. Ambassador Menshikov said that that is not what he is talking about now, but rather whether, once the treaty had been concluded, other countries might not usefully participate in it by adhering to it. I said that the subject was complicated by

<sup>2</sup> The draft articles referred to here and below are those submitted by the U.S. Delegation at the 26th informal meeting, November 11, 1958.

<sup>3</sup> A copy of this memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/4-2859.

<sup>4</sup> This was done at the meeting between Daniels and Filippov on April 28.

the various and divergent interests of different countries, but that I should welcome the opportunity of exploring the thought further with him or his representatives as we went along. (At no time did Ambassador Menshikov or myself raise the question of the unrecognized Communist regimes.)

(5) *Date of Conference.* The question of the date of the Antarctic conference came up in due course. Ambassador Menshikov made no precise recommendation on that point, but both he and his associates indicated a willingness to get along with the conference. The Ambassador stated that it would be helpful if all possible points of disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union were ironed out in advance. I said that was entirely my view, and we had endeavored to do that during the course of our preparatory talks. I said I did not think substantive points would come up at our next meeting on Wednesday, day after tomorrow, though the matter of the date would certainly be discussed then.<sup>5</sup> The Ambassador insisted that it would be well to go over existing points of disagreement before that meeting in order to have a better basis for going ahead with a public announcement of the conference. I said that, of course, I was at all times agreeable to that and immediately fixed an appointment at 10:30 a.m. tomorrow, May 12, to receive in my office Mr. Smirnovsky and Mr. Filipov, in order to go over all pending points in the proposed treaty.<sup>6</sup> This seemed to satisfy the Ambassador, though it is not entirely clear whether the Russians will or will not agree definitely on a date for the conference at the meeting on Wednesday, May 13. I pointed out that the United States would be willing to go ahead with a conference on any date that was "mutually agreeable" as we had said in our note of May 2, 1958, and had been saying ever since. I hoped that this "mutually agreeable" date would be reached very shortly, whether or not it was in August, September or October of this year.

(6) *Consultations with Soviet Union.* With reference to the indication given above by Ambassador Menshikov that it would be useful to explore mutually any points of disagreement that might exist between the United States and the Soviet Union in regard to Antarctica, I expressed willingness to go into that immediately and continuously, and it was agreed that there would be further talk along that line tomorrow morning as indicated above. I believe that Ambassador Menshikov was serious in indicating that he would like to attempt to reconcile points of difference between the United States and the Soviet Union before going into the conference, and that any clarification of pending issues might be conducive to an earlier as well as more successful conference. I did not see fit to mention to Ambassador Menshikov the fact that we must necessarily keep in close contact with ten other countries concerned with Antarctica, but did agree that it would be most useful if we attempted to reach mutual understanding

---

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of discussion at the 46th informal meeting on May 13 is in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/5-1359. The group agreed to hold the conference as soon as possible in October.

<sup>6</sup> Smirnovsky and Filipov called on Daniels on May 12 and 14 to continue the discussions. Memoranda of these conversations are *ibid.*, 399.829/5-1259 and 399.829/5-1459. Daniels concluded after these two meetings that the United States and the Soviet Union still disagreed only on the question of accession to the treaty and settlement of disputes.

on the major points which might come up at the conference. We agreed that we would attempt to do this during the coming weeks, beginning tomorrow.

After the usual amenities and comments on the Washington weather, I left with the impression that Ambassador Menshikov would be taking an increasingly active interest in Antarctic affairs as we went along.

---

**289. Editorial Note**

At its 47th meeting on May 26, the informal working group on Antarctica agreed that the conference for the drafting of an Antarctica Treaty would open at Washington on October 25. (Memorandum of discussion; Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/5-2659) For text of the press release announcing the decision, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 2, 1959, page 895.

---

**290. Memorandum of Discussion at the 48th Meeting of the Informal Working Group on Antarctica, Department of State, Washington, July 23, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Antarctic Conference Preparations (48th Meeting Informal Working Group at Department of State, Room 5104)

**THOSE PRESENT**

Argentina—Santos Goni  
Australia—Malcolm Booker  
Belgium—Ivan Gennotte  
Chile—Manuel Bianchi  
France—Marcel Barthelemy  
Japan—S. Sugihara  
New Zealand—Thomas P. Davin, D. G. Harper  
Norway—Odd G. Jakobsen, Nils Vogt  
South Africa—Derek Franklin

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/7-2359. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher.

U.S.S.R.—Yuri V. Filippov, Vladimir S. Polyakov  
United Kingdom (Chairman)—David Muirhead, D. L. Benest  
U.S.A.—Paul C. Daniels, George H. Owen, Wayne W. Fisher

*Summary:*

A general discussion of the provisions of the contemplated treaty was held, affording an opportunity for the various representatives to express current attitudes of their Governments and also be brought up to date on the views of others. The discussion was both helpful and timely, since nearly two months had elapsed since the last meeting of the working group on May 26.<sup>2</sup>

It was agreed to hold the next meeting on Tuesday, July 28.<sup>3</sup>

In opening the meeting the Chairman stated there was no formal agenda and suggested that the group discuss any supplemental or revised draft working papers.

The United States representative referred to the revised U.S. draft working papers dated June 1959, copies of which he had distributed to the other eleven representatives since the last meeting of the working group on May 26. He briefly reviewed the new draft working papers and summarized the changes that had been made from the draft working papers which were distributed to the working group last November,<sup>4</sup> adding that he thought a mutual exchange of views at this time would be beneficial to all. Running over various articles, he said that while the second paragraph of Article I had been shortened, the intent to prevent nonmilitary activity in Antarctica remained the same, while the use of military personnel as observers to insure peaceful use, which was not specifically covered in the November draft working paper, would be permitted. Article II was unchanged and Article III was essentially the same, with the addition of a paragraph regarding plans and programs of international organizations. Commenting on Article IV, he said some countries had raised points on drafting, but there now seemed to be quite general agreement on the objectives of this article as set forth in the November draft. He had no comments on the inspection provision (Article V, formerly VI) except to say it was desirable to add a provision for adequate juridical protection of observers. The zone of application of the treaty (Article VI, formerly IX), he admitted, was a difficult point. Although there is no precise definition of the high seas, it would be presumptuous for any country or group of countries to presume to infringe on the freedom of the seas by including large sea areas within the zone of application.

---

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of discussion at the 47th meeting, May 26 is *ibid.*, 702.022/5-2659.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of discussion at the 49th meeting, July 28, is *ibid.*, 702.022/7-2859.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 288.



As to the provision relating to settlement of disputes (Article VII, formerly X), he said he understood some Governments objected to disputes being referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of only one party. Some orderly method should be provided, however, for settling problems arising under the treaty. Under the article on administrative measures (Article VIII, formerly VII), he said the new draft made it clear that the treaty would become effective when it was approved, whether or not any administrative measures had been adopted. Referring to the relationship of the treaty to non-parties (Article IX, formerly VIII), he said several divergent views had been expressed, but he believed the treaty was fair and nonmonopolistic and should stand up well before world opinion without the need for an accession clause. He stated the U.S. position on this point was still under consideration and this article had, therefore, been left blank. He said he favored agreement on a *modus vivendi* (new) to provide an official channel for representatives of the various countries to meet and discuss matters of mutual interest prior to ratification of the treaty, which in the light of experience with other treaties might take some time.

The United Kingdom representative said he had listened with interest to the United States representative's remarks on the zone of application and drew attention to the United Kingdom draft on this point (submitted March 10)<sup>5</sup> which he felt represented the best solution to the problem by referring only to the land and ice shelves together with the waters and submarine areas appurtenant thereto. As for nonmilitarization measures, he called attention to the draft submitted by the United Kingdom (February 17 meeting)<sup>6</sup> which would provide for a Committee of Inspection and Control. Regarding third parties, he said the United Kingdom had submitted a protocol (February 24 meeting)<sup>7</sup> which it considered was fair to all other countries. His Government also believed it was necessary to have an article on jurisdiction, even though it might be difficult to draft, and that this matter should be tackled before the conference convenes. He agreed to a *modus vivendi*. As Chairman, he then asked for comments of other representatives.

The United States representative said that time was drawing short and urged all representatives to attempt to get instructions from their Governments on the points under discussion as soon as possible.

---

<sup>5</sup> A copy of this draft is attached to the memorandum of discussion at the 38th meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/3-1059)

<sup>6</sup> A copy of this draft is attached to the memorandum of discussion at the 35th meeting. (*Ibid.*, 702.022/2-1759)

<sup>7</sup> A copy of this draft is attached to the memorandum of discussion at the 36th meeting. (*Ibid.*, 702.022/2-2459)

The Chairman agreed that the time was becoming very short and pointed out that both the British Embassy and the Foreign Office in London would be understaffed during August due to the holiday period, leaving only September and part of October for discussions.

The Argentine representative assured the group that his Government was carefully considering both the November and June draft working papers submitted by the United States representative, as well as all other drafts submitted by other countries, and said his Government had set up a special committee to give full consideration to the proposed treaty. He pointed out that the Argentine Government had been going through a series of domestic difficulties recently which had delayed policy making on the treaty to a certain extent, but he expected to receive his Government's views on the treaty soon.

The Australian representative recalled that he had put forward his Government's position on the treaty many times and that it remained essentially the same. Australia basically reaffirmed its position regarding the zone of application, although he said he understood no Government was irrevocably committed to any particular position and that his Government would undoubtedly be prepared to adjust its position and hoped that others would do the same in the interest of getting a satisfactory treaty.

The Belgian representative said he had nothing new to add at this time except that the newly appointed Belgian Ambassador was due to arrive next week and would preside over the Belgian delegation.

The Chilean representative said he had made his Government's position clear on many occasions and had little to add at this time. His Government had carefully considered the November draft working papers submitted by the United States and found them fair and acceptable for consideration at the conference. His Government had not yet commented on the June draft working papers, but he felt sure it would also find them acceptable. He recalled that he had previously made Chile's position on inspection clear, i.e., inspection should not be directed by a supranational authority. Although favoring 60° as a conventional limit since other definitions involved difficulties, Chile maintained a flexible position regarding inclusion of sea areas and would probably be willing to go along with the majority. The question of jurisdiction, he said, was difficult and it might require a long time to draft an article that would satisfy all countries concerned. Since this is not a fundamental question or one that is vital to the treaty, Chile would prefer to see it postponed, but is open-minded and willing to discuss it. He said the reaction of his Government to the United Kingdom and Australian proposals on the zone of application (submitted

March 10)<sup>8</sup> had not been very satisfactory. Chile, he said, visualizes the treaty as one of a series of accords on Antarctica and does not consider it necessary that it solve all questions.

The French representative, who was attending his first meeting, said his Embassy was still awaiting instructions and that he would request that they be sent as soon as possible.

The United States representative recalled that the French representatives had previously expressed certain reservations on the wording of Article IV, which he hoped could be ironed out prior to the conference since there now seemed to be general agreement on the substance of this article.

The Japanese representative said his Government is preparing a summary of its position, which is not yet completed. Japanese policy, he said, remains the same regarding the treatment of third parties (March 3 meeting)<sup>9</sup> and the zone of application; on the latter point Japan agrees with the United Kingdom draft.

The New Zealand representative, who was also attending his first meeting, said his Government was preparing position papers on the treaty and he was not able to add anything new at this time.

The Norwegian representative said his Government was in the middle of the holiday season and the Norwegian Embassy had not received any instructions from Oslo regarding the treaty recently.

The South African representative said that Parliament was now recessed in his country and he likewise had nothing to add at this time.

The Soviet representative said his Government had considered carefully both the November and June draft working papers, and that he would like to comment on certain articles. The Soviet Government, he said, would like to enlarge paragraph 1 of Article I of the June draft to include a specific prohibition against military bases or fortifications, military maneuvers, and weapons testing. He said his Government could agree to paragraph 2 since it appeared that some countries, including the United States, Argentina, and Chile, could not carry out their scientific programs in Antarctica without the use of military support; it preferred the November draft of this paragraph. His Government was in perfect agreement with Articles II and III of the June draft. Article IV, he said, was in the Soviet view the most controversial article in the draft working paper. However, his Government was now prepared to agree to inclusion of an article on rights and claims in view of its policy of seeking to conclude a treaty and since it agreed with the objectives of the article. However, a somewhat shorter article would

---

<sup>8</sup> A copy of this draft is attached to the memorandum of discussion at the 38th meeting. (*Ibid.*, 702.022/3-1059)

<sup>9</sup> A copy of this draft is attached to the memorandum of discussion at the 37th meeting. (*Ibid.*, 702.022/3-359)

have been preferable. He said his Government was in agreement with the June draft of Article V on inspection. As to Article VI, he said his Government favored having the treaty apply to the zone South of 60°, omitting wording that would delete the high seas from this zone, since it would be difficult to determine the boundaries of the high seas and the Soviets did not think their inclusion would lead to difficulties with nonparties. His Government did not agree with the last sentence of Article VII and considered disputes should be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) only when all parties to the dispute agreed. He said his Government could agree to either the November or June drafts of the article on administrative measures. Referring to Article IX, he said his Government was not happy that the provision for the relationship of the treaty to nonparties was not yet drafted. He agreed the treaty must seek to avoid the impression of being monopolistic. Therefore, in order to be as fair as possible, all countries should be allowed to join the treaty. He recalled that India has already brought the question of Antarctica before the United Nations, and he strongly believed India had consented to remove this item in the expectation that a treaty would be worked out which would give all countries a chance to join it. As to a period of validity for the treaty, he said his Government favored as lengthy a period as possible. He said he had had no official word from his Government regarding the suggested *modus vivendi*, but he personally shared the United States view that it would be desirable.

Commenting on the Soviet representative's remarks, the United Kingdom representative observed that his Government had approached the question of delimiting the zone of application from the point of view of working outwards from the land rather than inwards from the sea, and he hoped for further exchanges of views on this matter before the conference convened. Referring to the Soviet position on submission of disputes to the ICJ, he said the United Kingdom had always believed all parties to a dispute should agree on referral to another authority for settlement in order for the results to be effective. The United Kingdom, therefore, might be willing to review its position and accept something such as a conciliation commission. As to the period of validity of the treaty, the United Kingdom favored no mention of any period of time.

The Soviet representative said that his Government was supporting 60° as the boundary of the zone of application because it understood most other countries favored it. He said he could not comment any further at this time regarding submission of disputes to the ICJ. Personally, he said he agreed with the United Kingdom representative that it would be best not to mention any period of time for validity of the treaty. He then suggested that since August seemed to be a month for vacations, perhaps the group could meet again in July to work out

the provisions of some articles which were not yet clear, having in mind that the conference should be as short as possible, which was what he understood the other representatives also wanted.

The United States representative said it was certainly desirable that the conference be both short and successful. He was encouraged that the discussion had indicated wide areas of agreement and believed it would be useful to have another discussion, perhaps in early August, of the articles on the zone of application, jurisdiction, accession and relationship of the treaty to third parties, and rights and claims, with the objective of trying to narrow down the remaining points of difference.

The Australian representative said he welcomed the Soviet representative's comments on Article IV, and that it was encouraging to know that there is now basic unanimity on this point. The most difficult question, he said, seemed to be the one concerning nonparties and the means of providing for those countries with a genuine and active interest in Antarctica, particularly the form that this provision should take. His Government believed that only countries who have a genuine and demonstrable interest in Antarctica should join the treaty, since to admit up to 81 countries would be unwieldy and also inject political problems into the Antarctica area, which the treaty sought to avoid. He asked the Soviet representative if he planned to make a specific proposal on this point in the near future.

The Soviet representative said he thought this would be possible to do within the next week or two.

A suggestion by the Chairman that there be another meeting before October to discuss procedural arrangements for the conference met with the agreement of the United States representative, who suggested that such a meeting should take place in September.

The Chilean representative also agreed on the desirability of having the procedural meeting in September and suggested that translations of the provisional agenda and set of rules be furnished in the four official languages of the conference for submission to the Governments concerned before the conference convened.

The United States representative said there were a number of details to be worked out, and that the representatives would undoubtedly, among other things, wish to exchange information about the composition of their delegations later. He said he had no information to announce on the composition of the United States delegation, but probably would have by September.

After some discussion it was agreed to hold the next meeting on Tuesday, July 28, at 11:00 a.m.

In taking leave of the group in view of his departure for London on transfer within a few days, the Chairman, Mr. Muirhead, who had attended the meetings since their inception in June 1958, said he

thought the group had made great progress in preparing for a successful conference during the past year, and that he would continue to follow developments on Antarctica, particularly the conference, with great interest.

## Enclosure

### DRAFT WORKING PAPER

#### Article I

1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.
2. Nothing in the present Treaty shall prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for peaceful purposes.

#### Article II

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica in conformity with the provisions of the present Treaty.

#### Article III

1. There shall be international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica.

2. To this end, to the greatest extent feasible and practical:

(a) Information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations.

(b) Scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations of different countries.

(c) Scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available.

3. In implementing the present Article, consideration shall be given whenever practicable to the plans and programs proposed by international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.

#### Article IV

1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:

(a) A renunciation by any High Contracting Party of any right to territory or claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have asserted;

(b) A renunciation or diminution by any High Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica;

(c) Recognition by any High Contracting Party of all or any part of any other country's right to territory or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting or supporting a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.

#### Article V

1. In order to promote the objectives and assure the observance of Article I of the present Treaty, each of the observers designated in accordance with paragraph 3 of the present Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.

2. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment in Antarctica, and all ships and planes at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 3 of the present Article.

3. Each High Contracting Party shall have the right to appoint observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article.

4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time by any of the High Contracting Parties over any or all areas of Antarctica.

#### Article VI

The zone of application of the present Treaty shall be the area south of 60° South Latitude, with the exception of the high seas.

#### Article VII

In the event that any dispute arises between two or more of the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement.

#### Article VIII

1. Representatives of the High Contracting Parties shall meet at the city of \_\_\_\_\_ within two months of the coming into force of the present Treaty and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, as deter-

mined by them, for the purpose of formulating and considering, and recommending to their Governments, administrative measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the present Treaty, including measures regarding:

- (a) Use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.
- (b) Facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica.
- (c) Facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica.
- (d) Facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article V of the present Treaty.
- (e) The formulation of principles and rules relating to the exercise of criminal and civil jurisdiction in Antarctica.
- (f) Other matters not inconsistent with the purposes of the present Treaty.

2. The representatives of the High Contracting Parties shall receive reports from the observers referred to in Article V.

3. The administrative measures referred to in the present Article shall become effective when approved by all of the High Contracting Parties.

4. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised upon the coming into force of the Treaty whether or not any administrative measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been proposed, considered or approved as provided in the present Article.

#### Article IX

(Relationship of Treaty to nonparties.)

#### Article X

1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. The present Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States named in the preamble hereto.

(Note: Preamble not included in draft.)

Done at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_, in the \_\_\_\_\_ languages, each being equally authentic, the original of which shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the signatory States.



## MODUS VIVENDI

Pending the entry into force of the Treaty on Antarctica signed today, the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and the United States of America have agreed to set in motion the consultative procedure established therein.

To this end, representatives of the signatory states shall meet at the City of \_\_\_\_\_, two months after the date of signature of the Treaty, to constitute a Preparatory Committee. Each signatory State shall be represented by one representative on the Preparatory Committee, who may be accompanied by such alternate representatives, technical advisers and staff as his respective Government may determine.

The Preparatory Committee shall meet periodically thereafter, not less frequently than once every year, at such times and places as may be determined by the Committee itself.

The Preparatory Committee shall have no power to commit any Government to any action whatsoever. Its functions shall be of a consultative character and any recommendations it may formulate shall be subject to the approval of all twelve Governments to become effective.

The Preparatory Committee shall consider the formulation, in a preliminary manner, of recommendations on the administrative measures provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty on Antarctica.

The Preparatory Committee shall remain in existence until the Treaty on Antarctica enters into force, and shall thereupon terminate automatically.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

**291. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 23, 1959.*

**BASIC U.S. PURPOSES IN SEEKING TREATY**

I. The U.S. will be willing to enter into a treaty on Antarctica with the eleven other Governments invited to the conference on Antarctica only if the treaty contains the following provisions in a form satisfactory to the United States:

1. Provision that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only, which does not exclude the peaceful use of military personnel and equipment.

2. Provision for an effective right of inspection by the U.S. of all activities in Antarctica.

3. Provision for "freezing" the legal status quo as to rights and claims.

4. Provision for freedom of scientific research in Antarctica for all who conform to provisions 1, 2, and 3 above, without creating any obligation for the parties to assist non-members in the UN and the Specialized Agencies.

5. The provisions of the treaty as a whole should be such as to give reasonable expectation that nonparties are not likely to engage in activities contrary to provisions of 1, 2, and 3 above.

6. Provision for promoting international scientific cooperation in Antarctica.

[7. Provisions of the treaty should be consonant with U.S. policy in unrecognized Communist regimes.]<sup>2</sup>

II. In addition to the foregoing essential requirements, the U.S. should strongly support inclusion of the following provisions but, assuming other provisions are satisfactory, the Department will determine, on the basis of circumstances prevailing at the Conference, whether or not to make the inclusion of these provisions a sine qua non of U.S. participation:

1. Provision expressly permitting the use of military equipment and personnel for peaceful purposes.

2. Provision delimiting the zone of application of the treaty to the area commonly understood to be part of Antarctica and excluding the high seas.

3. Provision for periodic meetings of representatives of the parties to the treaty for purpose of formulating and recommending additional measures in furtherance of treaty objectives.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-1659. Confidential. This position paper is one of 15 attached to the instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica.

<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text.

4. Provision for consultation among the parties to deal with disputes arising under the treaty and, where consultation fails to produce a settlement, for compulsory ICJ jurisdiction over such disputes.

5. Provision committing the parties to exert efforts to insure that nonparties will not engage in activities contrary to the provisions of the treaty.

III. Essential parties to the treaty to which the foregoing provisions refer are (1) the seven claimant states and (2) the U.S.S.R. The U.S. should not sign the treaty if it is not signed by these countries and the treaty should not come into effect without their ratification.

It is also in the U.S. interest that the treaty be signed by the three other countries invited to the Conference. The treaty should enter into force only upon ratification by all signatories.

As for subsequent accession by other states, it is essential that there be no accession clause which

(1) permits accession by non-members of the UN and the Specialized Agencies.

(2) permits accession by countries having a merely political interest in Antarctica.

(3) could reasonably be expected to prevent ratification by any of the "essential" parties listed above.

---

## 292. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, October 7, 1959<sup>1</sup>

[Here follows item 1 on nutrition for national defense.]

### 2. *Briefing on the International Conference on Antarctica*

Ambassador Paul C. Daniels briefed the Board on the preparations for the forthcoming International Conference on Antarctica. Mr. Daniels said he wished to give "one man's concept" of the possibilities for signing a treaty providing for cooperative international access to Antarctica. Mr. Daniels referred to the secret twelve nation preparatory meetings. These talks had resulted in sufficient agreement to warrant the holding of a full-scale treaty conference. The Conference will open in Washington on October 15, and delegations of a "high caliber" are

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text.

already arriving. The United States chief delegate will be Mr. Herman Phleger. The chief Soviet representative is expected to be Deputy Foreign Minister Piryubin.

Mr. Daniels noted general agreement among the twelve participating powers on (1) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes; (2) freedom of scientific investigations; (3) international cooperation in scientific investigations; (4) rights and claims in Antarctica (which in effect would be frozen at the present status). Signatory countries will be enjoined from making new territorial claims. Informal Soviet acceptance of these provisions was noted.

Ambassador Daniels then referred to the proposal for the rights of inspection for the purpose of ensuring peaceful pursuits and the observance of the treaty's provisions. Mr. Allen (USIA) said the draft article on inspection was "very sweeping."<sup>2</sup> In reply to a question, Mr. Daniels repeated that the Soviets appeared agreeable to forego making territorial claims. He then spoke of the problems of accession to permit countries not parties to the treaty to accede to its terms at a later date. Acceding states would be bound by the terms of the treaty. The US supported accession limited to states which are members of the UN or its specialized agencies. This US position had not been challenged by the Soviets.

There followed a brief discussion of the zone of application of the treaty. Mr. Allen expressed his reservations about the US position that the high seas around Antarctica not be within the zone of application. Mr. Daniels said the US had legal objections as well as practical ones as the Navy, as a matter of principle, did not wish restrictions on use of the high seas. There was a brief discussion over the treaty provision for the settling of disputes. The US favors compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. The Soviet Union is in opposition.

Mr. Daniels said that although we would down-play them, the provisions of the treaty for administrative measures would serve as a basis for a supra-national administration of Antarctica. Mr. Harr (White House) asked what role the US Congress would play. Mr. Daniels said he had on at least three occasions briefed Congressional committees on our views on Antarctica. He had encountered no "disagreeable opposition". Two Congressional figures would be members of the US delegation.

Mr. Harr asked if, under the provisions of the treaty, the US would have access to Soviet plans for Antarctica. Mr. Daniels said this was the case and that the Soviets in Antarctica had generally been cooperative. Mr. Allen asked if USIA should "play up" the Conference. Mr. Daniels said it should be played up. The publicity given the Conference could have a material effect on the treaty's ratification by

---

<sup>2</sup> See Document 290.

the US Senate. At this point, Mr. Allen said that in his opinion the Antarctica pre-conference negotiations had been the best handled he had seen in a long while. Mr. Daniels said he wished that were unanimous view. Mr. Murphy said it was a unanimous view.

Mr. Gordon Gray (White House) asked if, during the course of the negotiations, any noticeable change had occurred in the Soviet attitude, especially since Khrushchev's visit. Mr. Daniels said the Soviets, throughout the negotiations, had been generally cooperative. Mr. Harr said that although it was probably a purely State Department responsibility he thought it of extreme importance that a fresh, hard look be given the Conference as this international meeting provided us an unusually important public relations opportunity. If handled correctly, the US could be placed in a positive, enlightened and cooperative posture, indicating we are moving ahead in the resolution of international problems and serving as a case of deeds not words in the present East-West atmosphere. Mr. Murphy noted the Antarctica Conference preceded the reopening of the Geneva test ban negotiations by some twelve days and might give an indication of Soviet attitudes.

Mr. Daniels said last year the OCB had looked upon the Antarctica Conference as a good theme for propaganda. He felt it more important to get a good treaty first and then make propaganda. Mr. Harr agreed that it is best "not to kiss the cook until you taste the cookies." Mr. Daniels said he hoped it would be possible for the President to receive the delegates or participate in the Conference in some way.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

---

### 293. Editorial Note

The Conference on Antarctica met at Washington, October 15-December 1, with representatives of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Soviet Union, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States in attendance. Ambassador Herman Phleger, head of the U.S. Delegation, was elected chairman of the conference. The first plenary session was held October 15 from 11 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 3 to 4:30 p.m. in the auditorium of the Department of the Interior. For texts of the opening statements made by each delegation, see *The Conference on Antarctica, Washington, October 15-December 1, 1959* (Washington, September 1960), pages 2-30.

**294. Memorandum From the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 16, 1959.*

The Antarctica Conference met in plenary session at 11 A.M. It adopted the rules of procedure as submitted,<sup>2</sup> with an amendment to Article 37, eliminating the "in accordance with the purpose for which the conference is convened."

It then directed the constitution of two working committees and the allocation to each of specified subjects, these being the topics dealt with by the Preparatory Committee.

It also directed the Secretary General to submit as a conference document the draft articles contained in the working papers last considered by the Preparatory Committee.<sup>3</sup>

Committee One, meeting at 3 P.M., commenced the consideration of Topic 2 "Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica" and Topic 3 "International Cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica." The committee then adjourned until 10:15 A.M., Monday, October 19.

Committee Two is to meet at 3 P.M., Monday, October 19, to begin consideration of items commencing with "Use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes."

During the noon hour the French representative informed the United States and Australian delegations that he had received further instructions from his government respecting draft Article IV dealing with questions of rights and claims in Antarctica. This consisted of a draft proposal which followed generally the draft contained in the Preparatory Committee's draft, but with the significant omission of paragraph 1(c), which is a provision to the effect that parties to the treaty would not, by signing, recognize the claims of other parties not heretofore recognized. The U.S. delegation made clear to the French that it considers a provision as above mentioned to be essential in any treaty, pointing out that it was agreeable to appropriate provisions protecting the rights of claimants and that it expected similar appropri-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/10-1659. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 290.

ate provision maintaining the position and rights of those who would not recognize claims. It was suggested, and the French representative agreed, to take the matter up further with his government.

For the U.S. Representative:

**George H. Owen**<sup>4</sup>

*Alternate Representative*

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**295. Memorandum From the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 19, 1959.*

Committee I of the Conference on Antarctica met at 10:15 A.M. At the suggestion of the Argentine representative, discussion of the provision relating to scientific investigation in Antarctica was deferred until tomorrow in order to permit the Argentine delegation to distribute a proposal on this provision.

The provision on international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica was approved by the Committee substantially as set forth in Article II of the working paper draft, with modifications based on a New Zealand amendment to paragraph 3. The text as approved by the Committee is enclosed.<sup>2</sup>

Committee II met at 3 P.M. and considered the provision on peaceful use of Antarctica (Article I of the working paper draft). A Soviet proposal to add an enumeration of certain types of military activity that would be expressly prohibited was generally accepted, with some changes in wording. A Soviet proposal to restrict the proviso as to the use of military personnel and equipment to "scientific" rather than any "peaceful" purposes was in effect withdrawn by the Soviet delegation as a result of the discussion.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-1959. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher and Owen.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

In private conversation the French representative stated that his government's refusal to accept the stipulation as to non-recognition of claims (Paragraph 1(c) of working paper draft Article IV) could only be withdrawn if the matter were taken up with the French Government at a high level.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

---

296. **Memorandum From the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 20, 1959.*

Committee I met at 10:30 A.M. The United States representative expressed regret over an editorial in a Washington newspaper today, which referred to an alleged French attitude at the conference.<sup>2</sup> A policy of discretion in dealing with the press was emphasized.

In the discussion of the provision on freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica (Article II of the working paper draft), the Argentine representative proposed the following text:

"In order to achieve the greatest possible measure of freedom in scientific investigation in the area the high contracting parties agree to cooperate for this purpose subject to the provisions of the Treaty."

The New Zealand, Soviet and Japanese representatives stated that they considered the Argentine proposal too restrictive. The Soviet representative asserted that one of the main purposes of the conference was to establish freedom of scientific research in Antarctica for all countries. He stated that the Soviet delegation was prepared to accept the working paper draft of Article II. In an attempt to compromise the opposing points of view, the United Kingdom representative suggested wording that would provide for "freedom of disinterested scientific investigation in the Antarctic," subject to the provisions of the treaty, "in particular, Articles III and IV."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-2059. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to an editorial that appeared in the *Washington Post*, October 20, 1959, p. A12.



The Argentine delegate then suggested that there be a closed meeting of the heads of delegations to discuss the question. This was agreed to and the meeting was held from 12:00 noon to 1:00 P.M., to be continued at 10:00 A.M. tomorrow. At the closed meeting the Argentine delegate explained at length that any obligation stronger than an agreement to cooperate would not be acceptable to Argentina and, if insisted upon, would force Argentina to withdraw. Various language formulations were suggested in an attempt to meet the Argentine position but were not acceptable.

Committee II met at 3:00 P.M. and resumed discussion of the provision on peaceful use of Antarctica (Article I of the working paper draft), which was first considered yesterday. An Argentine proposal to prohibit nuclear tests and explosions of any type in Antarctica, regardless of their character and purposes, was withdrawn after discussion which pointed out that all weapons testing was already banned by Article I. In the discussion, concern over possible nuclear testing of a nonmilitary nature in Antarctica was expressed by the countries in the Southern Hemisphere represented at the conference, who suggested that no such tests should be undertaken by any country without some prior consultation with other countries directly concerned. It was agreed that a suggestion to report the concern of the conference on this question to the International Atomic Energy Agency and/or the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests should be taken up again at a subsequent meeting.

The following draft of Article I was approved unanimously by the Committee:

*"Article I*

"1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.

"2. The Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose."

In opening the discussion of the provision on rights and claims (Article IV of the working paper draft), the French representative submitted a proposal that would delete paragraph 1(c), which provides that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as recognition by any signatory of any other country's claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. The French proposal was opposed by the Australian, United States, Soviet, United Kingdom, Norwegian and

New Zealand representatives, all of whom stated the acceptance by their delegations of the substance of Article IV of the working paper draft. Discussion of Article IV was to be continued tomorrow.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

---

**297. Memorandum From the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 21, 1959.*

At the Conference of Heads of Delegations at 10:00 A.M., October 21, to consider Draft Article II and the Argentine objection thereto, New Zealand proposed the following substitute:

That Article II, as drafted, be eliminated and that the following be substituted as paragraph 1 in Article III:

"Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation towards that end, as initiated and applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue and be further encouraged subject to the provisions of the present treaty."

The Soviet suggested a reformulation as follows:

"Scientific cooperation on the basis of freedom of non-commercial scientific investigation as initiated and applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue and be further encouraged subject to the provisions of the present treaty."

The Argentinian expressed himself as opposed to the Soviet suggestion, but indicated that the New Zealand suggestion merited study and perhaps would prove acceptable. There seemed to be general sentiment that the New Zealand suggestion might very well prove to be a way out.

Committee I met at 11:00 A.M. At the suggestion of the Argentine representative discussion of Article II at this time was postponed.

Opening the discussion of the provision on inspection for purposes of ensuring peaceful use and observance of the treaty's provisions (Article V of the working paper draft), the UK representative

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-2159. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger and Fisher.

stated that since the reaction to the proposal his Government had put forth during the meetings of the Preparatory Committee to create a Committee of Inspection and Control had been generally unfavorable, the UK was not introducing that proposal. He proposed, however, that the following paragraph be added to Article V of the working paper draft:

“Each High Contracting Party will inform the other Parties of all expeditions and missions to Antarctica, whether scientific or otherwise, both current and intended, on the part of their vessels or nationals, or proceeding from their territories; and shall give details of all arms, aircraft and warships which it is intended to introduce into the region.”

In answer to the Soviet representative's inquiry regarding the reference to arms in the UK proposal, the UK representative stated this would apply to warships used for peaceful purposes and any arms used for policing purposes.

The U.S. representative observed that application of Article V should not be restricted to parties to the treaty as this proposed addition appeared to suggest. He also suggested that the UK proposal might be more properly considered in connection with the article on administrative measures.

Discussing Article V as a whole, the Soviet representative said his Government considered the working paper draft to be adequate. Representatives of South Africa, Norway, Belgium and Australia also expressed general agreement with the working paper draft. After several points of clarification regarding the UK draft, as well as observers and their functions, were raised, it was agreed to postpone further discussion of Article V until tomorrow.

Committee II met at 3:00 P.M. to resume discussion of Article IV. The South African, Japanese and Belgian representatives expressed opposition to the French proposal to delete paragraph 1(c) and stated their approval of the working paper draft. The Chilean representative said his delegation accepted the working paper draft of Article IV in principle, although he thought some of the wording might be improved. The Argentine representative expressed a similar view.

The French representative, who was alone in his opposition to the inclusion of paragraph 1(c) in Article IV, insisted that this paragraph implied a legal negation of France's rights in Antarctica and was, therefore, unacceptable to France. Several representatives of both claimant and non-claimant countries, including the Soviet representative, emphasized their belief that the inclusion of paragraph 1(c) was necessary to maintain the delicate balance in the treaty between claimants and non-claimants. The Australian representative, Mr. Casey, appealed to the French representative and through him to the French Government to reconsider the French objection.

After a brief recess it was agreed to defer discussion of this Article for several days.

The Soviet representative opened discussion of the provision pertaining to settlement of disputes arising under the treaty (Article VII working paper draft) by proposing the following amendment:

"In the last sentence of the Article replace the words 'at the request of any party to the dispute' with the words 'with the consent, in each case, of all the parties to the dispute.'"

The Argentine representative supported the Soviet proposal which he said reflected the traditional position of Argentina regarding the submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Chilean representative also supported the Soviet proposal.

The Australian, French, New Zealand, Japanese, South African, UK, Belgian, and Norwegian representatives expressed their approval of the working paper draft, which would require the submission of disputes to the ICJ at the request of any party to the dispute. The U.S. Representative pointed out that Article VII applied only to the limited subject matter covered by the Treaty and said he hoped that the article would be considered in that light.

At the suggestion of the Soviet representative it was agreed to defer further consideration of Article VII to a later meeting.

The United Kingdom representative submitted the following proposal for an article in the Treaty over jurisdiction of persons and offenses in Antarctica:

1. Any person in Antarctica shall be subject only to the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the country of which such person is a national.
2. In order to make this jurisdiction effective, the contracting parties undertake to cooperate with one another and to enter into mutual arrangements in respect of such matters as the arrest and transfer or extradition of persons charged with offenses, and for the service of documents in connection with any civil proceedings.
3. Pending the making of such other arrangements as the parties may subsequently agree upon, matters involving claims by nationals and organizations of one party arising out of acts or omissions in Antarctica by nationals or organizations of another party shall be determined in such manner as may be agreed upon by the parties concerned.

The Chilean and Argentine delegates stated that this was a very complicated question and requested that discussion be deferred in order to allow time to reflect on the UK proposal. This request was adopted.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

**298. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the Countries Participating in the Conference on Antarctica<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 24, 1959—4:39 p.m.*

535. Since opening on October 15 Antarctica Conference discussing in committee most topics contemplated Treaty using draft articles considered at preparatory talks as basis discussion (memo of 12 power meeting July 23, 1959 previously pouched<sup>2</sup>) with which United States generally agrees.

Matters of concern to U.S. at this stage, include:

1. Zone application (Article 6) Soviets, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina favor inclusion high seas south of 60 degrees. U.S. insisting on exclusion high seas areas. Extension treaty rules to high seas would conflict with established international law rules governing freedom and use of sea. Moreover, inspection provisions likely be ineffective on high seas. On balance free world gains less than Soviets by restriction on use any portion high seas.

2. Regarding relationship Treaty to countries not parties, U.S. has introduced provision committing parties exert "appropriate efforts" consistent UN Charter to end that no one engage in activities contrary Treaty. UK has similar proposal.

3. US has also introduced provision as follows: "Any benefits which may be established by the present Treaty shall apply in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner both to countries which are parties to the present Treaty and to other states which are members of the United Nations or of its Specialized Agencies and which respect the principles embodied in the present Treaty. Nothing in the present Treaty shall be construed as creating obligations on the part of the High Contracting Parties, other than to the High Contracting Parties." Purpose provision is make certain parties not required by Treaty cooperate in any way with unrecognized Communist regimes.

4. Soviets have proposed unlimited accession by other countries. U.S. can accept accession clause, but in no event can agree accession by other than members UN and Specialized Agencies. Further qualifications for accession such as active participation in Antarctica also desirable.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-2459. Confidential. Drafted by Owen and cleared with AF, ARA, EUR, and FE.

<sup>2</sup> Document 290.

5. Agreement indicated, including by Soviets, on inspection article providing unilateral right of each party inspect all areas and stations. France, however, wants limited number observers and suggests provisions which might impair unilateral right immediate inspection.<sup>3</sup>

Other matters are:

6. Provision on freedom scientific research in Antarctica (Article 2) opposed by only Argentina.

7. Provisions maintaining status quo on rights and claims so that Treaty implies neither renunciation nor recognition and that no new claims shall be made, accepted by all except France which to date objects to non-recognition clause.

8. Article 1 approved in committee with addition Soviet proposal enumerating types military measures specifically prohibited. Soviets, however, accepted inclusion broad provision this does not preclude use military personnel and equipment for peaceful purposes.

9. Article on scientific cooperation agreed in committee with slight change.

10. On settlement disputes (Article 7) all agree except Soviets, Argentina and Chile who oppose compulsory jurisdiction ICJ.

11. Provision for periodic meetings reps of parties for recommending further administrative measures generally accepted by all. Discussion this topic fragmentary as yet.

Foregoing mainly background information for use in your discretion in event of discussion Antarctica Conference with appropriate officials.

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> On October 22, the Department of State asked the Embassy in France to approach the Foreign Ministry concerning its position on inspection. (Telegram 1726 to Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-2259) The Embassy replied on the following day that the French said they would not be rigid and were sending their Legal Adviser to the conference. (Telegram 1790 from Paris; *ibid.*, 702.022/10-2359)

**299. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 26, 1959.*

Committee I met at 11 a.m. and began discussion of Article VI (zone of application of the treaty). The U.S. spoke in favor of the working paper draft, which includes the area south of 60° with the exception of the high seas, pointing out that the Conference was called to deal with Antarctica and not with the regime of the high seas.

Argentina spoke in favor of its proposal, quoted below, but said its position was flexible:

*"For the purposes of the present Treaty, Antarctica shall include all the lands, waters, and atmospheric space within the zone south of 60° South Latitude."*

Japan suggested that there may be a need to include those parts of the sea adjacent to Antarctica covered by ice at any time of the year. France also favored some form of definition based on the limit of permanent ice. The Soviet Union favored including the entire area south of 60°, claiming that the use of the high seas within this area for peaceful purposes would not contradict the regime of the high seas.

The Committee also opened discussion of Article IX (relationship of treaty to non-parties). New Zealand favored permitting accession on a wide basis to avoid giving the impression that the treaty is monopolistic, and to permit accession of countries having a genuine interest in Antarctica, provided they are members of the UN or its specialized agencies.

Speaking in favor of its proposal, quoted below, the Soviet Union favored opening accession to all countries carrying out scientific investigation in Antarctica, whether members of the UN or not:

*"The present Treaty shall be open to the adherence of any state carrying out scientific investigation in Antarctica."*

The Soviet Union insisted that the formula of restricting accession to members of the UN was designed to keep out certain socialist states such as the People's Republic of China, East Germany, etc., and was being relentlessly put forward as a consequence of the cold war, which the Soviet Union wanted to liquidate as soon as possible in accordance with its policy of coexistence and strengthening peace. It said the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-2659. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger and Fisher.

objection that the Soviet proposal would permit the accession of states not recognized by some signatories is without weight since participation in a multilateral international agreement does not constitute recognition and, therefore, entails no legal difficulties under international law.

Australia strongly supported the New Zealand proposal as a fair and reasonable one and stated that restriction of accession to members of the UN would exclude from Antarctica the conflicts of the cold war, which was one of the objectives of the treaty.

Committee II met at 3 o'clock and continued discussion of Article VIII (administrative measures). The discussion culminated in an agreement to send the Article, together with all proposals relating to it that have been submitted, to the Drafting Committee.

It was agreed to postpone discussion of the provision on jurisdiction until tomorrow, pending submission of a revised UK proposal.

Chile, supported by Argentina, proposed that the treaty include a time limit of ten years' duration. Australia, the UK, and Belgium opposed any period of duration for the treaty, arguing that it would create a bad psychological effect to suggest that the treaty was temporary in nature, and pointing out that the contemplated Administrative Committee would be able to make recommendations for changes in the treaty when considered necessary.

Ambassador Phleger met Professor Gros, Legal Adviser of the French Foreign Office; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Adviser of the British Foreign Office; and Ambassador Grigory I. Tunkin, Head of the USSR Delegation, at the French Embassy at breakfast at the invitation of Professor Gros.

Professor Gros expounded at length on the difficulty the French were having in accepting the draft of Article IV 1(c) which is designed to protect the rights of countries which do not recognize territorial claims. He admitted that it was appropriate that such claims should be protected by an appropriate provision. He said that his problem would be made much easier if the entire paragraph 1 of Article IV were put in a protocol. He agreed that the legal effect of putting the provision in the protocol would have to be exactly the same as if it were retained in the treaty.

The British representative produced a reformulation of subparagraph (c) which the French legal adviser thought was much more acceptable although it did not change the meaning. It was agreed that the British representative would draft a form of protocol to carry into effect the French proposal and circulate it. This was done and the draft follows:



"At the moment of signing the Treaty of this day ( date ) respecting (Antarctica), the undersigned plenipotentiaries duly authorized to that effect by their respective Governments, have agreed on the following Declaration, which shall have the same legal effect as the provisions of the Treaty:

"Nothing etc. . . . <sup>2</sup>

"a—without modification

"b—without modification

"c—prejudicing the position of any High Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other country's right to territory or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica."

Later, in response to inquiry, the French, British and Soviet delegates agreed that if a protocol as suggested were to be used, the treaty itself should provide that the treaty and the attached protocol which is an integral part thereof shall become effective when the treaty and protocol are ratified in accordance with the constitutional requirements, thus making the protocol and the treaty one and inseparable.

For the U.S. Representative:

**Wayne W. Fisher**

*Secretary*

---

<sup>2</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

---

**300. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) and the Head of the Soviet Delegation (Tunkin), Metropolitan Club, Washington, October 28, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

In the morning Mr. Tunkin approached Mr. Phleger and suggested that he would like to have a general talk with him regarding the Conference. Mr. Phleger responded by inviting Mr. Tunkin to lunch.

During the lunch Mr. Tunkin said that he would like to discuss the two United States proposals.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-659. Secret. Drafted by Phleger; initialed by Phleger and Daniels. The source text is a memorandum from Phleger to Herter, October 28. The conversation took place at a luncheon.

One, COM.I/P10,<sup>2</sup> provides that any benefits of the treaty shall apply to parties and other members of the UN and its specialized agencies and that nothing in the treaty shall create obligations on the part of the party other than to other parties.

With respect to this, Tunkin said that he did not see how the parties could take the position that they were granting benefits to third parties and then in a limited way. He said that the legal situation was that nothing in the treaty could limit the right of non-parties nor should the treaty create benefits for non-parties, adding that it was obvious that by the treaty the parties were only bound to each other. Therefore, he thought the provision was undesirable as granting benefits to non-parties as well as attempting a discriminatory application to non-parties. I pointed out the object of the United States in proposing this section; namely, to make it clear that the U.S. was not bound to anyone other than parties and that the benefit of the treaty would not be open to states which the U.S. did not recognize or have diplomatic relations with. Mr. Tunkin said he had not understood that this was the objective but if it was, he thought it could be reached by dropping the provision entirely. He said that as a matter of law, third parties were not entitled to any benefit under the treaty and that the parties were only bound to other parties. Therefore, there could be no claim by any non-party that it was entitled to any benefits under the treaty. He said this was perfectly clear as a matter of law and no one would deny this legal position.

I pointed out that other parties to the treaty had desired to extend its benefits to non-parties and if this were so the U.S. could not accept any provision which extended the benefits to non-parties except members of the UN and its specialized agencies, thus excluding non-recognized countries. Tunkin replied that he thought that the benefits of the treaty should be confined to the parties and that under such circumstances no provision was necessary in order to create a legal situation where treaty benefits were confined to parties and party obligations were limited to parties.

Mr. Tunkin also questioned U.S. proposal, COM.I/P9,<sup>2</sup> which provides that parties will exert appropriate efforts consistent with the UN Charter to it and that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the treaty principles. He said he thought this was a large undertaking when one realizes that the treaty parties have not under international law the jurisdictional control of Antarctica.

I pointed out that the purpose of the provision was to make clear that no party should assist a non-party to do things in Antarctica that parties had agreed they would not do. For instance, no party should

---

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

assist a non-party in non-peaceful use nor in laying the basis of a territorial claim. Tunkin agreed with this objective and said that he would like to study the language further. He expressed agreement in principle with the UN Charter provision under which parties undertake to see that the non-parties observe the principles of the UN Charter. He said there was no reason why the same principle might not be applied in Antarctica.

Throughout the discussion, Tunkin reiterated the position that benefits and obligations under the treaty were exclusively for treaty members. Also that treaty members could not by the treaty affect the rights of non-parties.

Tunkin further intimated, although in a very guarded way, that his delegation might accept an accession clause limited to UN members and members of its specialized agencies and, with some modification, a zone of application eliminating the high seas.

---

**301. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 28, 1959.*

Committee I met at 11:00 a.m. and resumed discussion of Article V. France repeated its preference that observers be appointed by the Administrative Committee and limited to a reasonable number. A U.S. interpretation to the effect that, in view of the practical difficulties involved, no country would be expected to send more observers anywhere than necessary and that there was no obligation to bear the costs of inspection carried out by other countries, met with no disagreement in the Committee.

The Soviet Union suggested that a revised UK proposal providing for the giving of advance information regarding expeditions, include the giving of information on military personnel as well as equipment. Chile, Argentina, and France reserved their position on this point. Subject to the foregoing comments, Article V was referred to the Drafting Committee.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-2859. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher.

Regarding Article VI (zone of application), the UK said it favored the working paper draft, but was willing to introduce the following proposal if the Committee desired:

"The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60° South Latitude, including all islands and ice shelves, but shall not apply to the high seas."

Discussion indicated a desire to study the UK proposal, which the UK agreed to introduce in writing.

The remainder of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the following Australian-Argentine proposal for a new article:

"No nuclear or thermo-nuclear experiments or explosions of a non-military nature, and no disposal of fissionable waste material, shall take place in Antarctica except after notice to and consultation among the High Contracting Parties."

It was agreed to change the initial clause to: "No detonations of nuclear or thermo-nuclear devices of a non-military nature." The Soviet delegation stated it could not define its position on this proposal at this time. Decision was deferred to a later date.

Committee II met at 3:00 p.m. Chile proposed that the treaty and instruments of ratification should be deposited with the U.S. Government rather than with the UN. This proposal was adopted by the Committee, with the provision that the U.S. furnish certified copies of these documents to each of the parties and present the treaty for registration at the UN.

The proposal made by Chile on October 26 for a 10-year duration clause in the treaty was debated.<sup>2</sup> Chile admitted that the period might be changed to more than 10 years, but argued strenuously in favor of a provision for review of the treaty after a specified period. Only Argentina supported the Chilean position.

The following provision regarding jurisdiction, prepared this morning by the Drafting Committee, was discussed:

"1. Observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article V and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph 2(b) of Article III of the present Treaty shall be immune from the jurisdiction of all High Contracting Parties other than that of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.

"2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article VIII, the High Contracting Parties agree that in order to avoid the occurrence of disputes with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica they will in any case in which such a dispute might arise immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution."

---

<sup>2</sup> See Document 299.

Australia and New Zealand favored extending immunity to personnel accompanying scientists; South Africa and the Soviet Union favored an even broader immunity on a basis of nationality, as provided in paragraph 1 of the UK proposal. France, Argentina and Chile supported the text submitted by the Drafting Committee. The U.S. made it clear that any proposal to cover certain categories of personnel, such as observers and scientists, should not be construed as impairing the position of non-recognizing countries, such as the U.S., which would wish to reserve the right to decide on matters of jurisdiction affecting its nationals anywhere in Antarctica.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

---

**302. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 29, 1959.*

Committee I met at 11:00 a.m. and resumed discussion of Article VI. The following UK proposal was considered:

"The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60° South Latitude, including all islands and ice shelves, but shall not apply to the high seas."

The UK explained that this was intended to include areas covered by more or less permanent ice. Subject to this clarification, the UK proposal was supported by Belgium, the U.S. and France.

The Soviet Union proposed orally the following text of Article VI:

"The zone of application of the present Treaty shall be the area south of 60° South Latitude without prejudice to any rights concerning the use by any country in accordance with international law of those parts of the high seas, excluding ice shelves, which are within the limits of that area."

At the request of Chile the discussion of this proposal was deferred to a later meeting.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source, Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-2959. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher.

Discussion turned to the relationship of the treaty to non-parties (Article IX), including the question of accession. The UK stated its opinion that the Soviet proposal discussed on October 26 was too wide and said accession should be confined to countries having a real and continuing desire to participate in scientific activity in Antarctica. If the IGY spirit is to be maintained, the UK said, it would be best not to introduce elements of tension into the Antarctic area. The UK expressed general agreement with a New Zealand proposal that would open the treaty for accession by any state which is a member of the UN or any of its specialized agencies, but would permit only those acceding states to participate in meetings of the administrative body which had demonstrated their interest in Antarctica "by maintaining national operations there." The UK favored confining Article IX to the relationship of the treaty to non-parties rather than including also the question of accession, and suggested that the following U.S. proposal form paragraph 1 of this Article:

"Any benefits which may be established by the present Treaty shall apply in a uniform and non-discriminatory manner both to countries which are parties to the present Treaty and to other states which are members of the United Nations or of its Specialized Agencies and which respect the principles embodied in the present Treaty. Nothing in the present Treaty shall be construed as creating obligations on the part of the High Contracting Parties, other than to the High Contracting Parties."

The following UK proposal, according to the UK, would form the second and final paragraph of Article IX:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that they will not for their part, either individually or collectively, assist or countenance, whether directly or indirectly, any action, activity or claim by any other country which would be contrary to or inconsistent with the principles or purposes of the present Treaty."

Chile argued that no article on accession was necessary since the Conference included all countries who participated actively in Antarctica during the IGY; the interests of other countries could be satisfied by a protocol, open to accession by other countries. Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand expressed the strong desire of his Government to have an unrestricted accession provision, with the qualification that continuing activity in Antarctica would be a prerequisite to participation in the meetings of the administrative body. (In the written proposal submitted by New Zealand accession would be restricted to members of the UN or its specialized agencies.) South Africa and Belgium generally agreed with the New Zealand position.

Committee II met at 3:00 p.m. M. Gros, Legal Adviser of the French Foreign Ministry, gave a detailed presentation of the French position with regard to Article IV, which included a suggestion that

paragraph 1 be withdrawn from the Article and placed in a protocol to the Treaty which would have the same legal value as the Treaty and which would have to be signed and ratified together with the Treaty. The other countries expressed the desire that the two paragraphs in Article IV not be separated.

It was agreed to refer Article IV to the Drafting Committee, together with certain changes in wording suggested by France and the UK; the decision as to whether this provision, in whole or in part, should be placed in an Article or in a Protocol was deferred pending return of the Article from the Drafting Committee.

A suggestion by the Chairman of the Conference that a meeting of Heads of Delegations be held tomorrow afternoon to discuss how best to complete the remaining work of the Conference was approved.

For the U.S. Representative:

**Wayne W. Fisher**

*Secretary*

---

**303. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 30, 1959.*

Committee I met at 11 a.m. and resumed discussion of Article VI. Chile submitted the following proposal orally:

"1. The provision of the present treaty shall apply on the lands, permanent ice (ice shelves) adjoining the land mass, floating ice (ice pack), waters and atmospheric space above the land within the zone limited by 60° South Latitude, without prejudice to the exercise by any country of rights exercised through international legislation with respect to the high seas.

"2. If, while exercising these rights, the principles recognized by the present treaty were to be affected, the representatives of the high contracting parties will consult among themselves in order to consider the situation that has arisen and to adopt adequate measures.

"3. In so far as the waters and aerial space above, up to fifty nautical miles from the land mass and the permanent ice adjoining the land mass, the high contracting parties agree in applying the provisions established in Articles I and V of the present treaty, without the limitations contained in paragraph 1."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-3059. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger and Fisher.

It was agreed to postpone discussion of this matter, pending submission in writing of the foregoing proposal and the proposal made orally by the Soviet Union yesterday.<sup>2</sup>

The text of Article V as submitted by the Drafting Committee was discussed.<sup>3</sup> France recalled that it had reserved its position regarding the authority to designate observers. Of the five paragraphs in the Article, the first four relate to inspection, while paragraph 5 relates to notification to be given regarding expeditions, stations, and military personnel or equipment. Chile favored separating this Article into two Articles, following the division of subject matter described above. It was agreed that a Chilean suggestion to stipulate that inspectors should present credentials, and that aircraft engaging in inspection should identify themselves, could be met by strengthening paragraph 1 of Article VIII.

There was considerable discussion of the wording of paragraph 5.(a), quoted below:

"5. Each High Contracting Party shall at the time of entry into force of the present treaty inform the other Parties, and subsequently keep them informed in advance, of

(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its vessels or nationals, or organized from its territory outside the region;"

There seemed to be general agreement to amend the final phrase of subparagraph (a) along the following lines: "or organized in or proceeding from its territory outside the region;". It was agreed that clarification of this wording, which involves difficulties in its translation into Spanish, might take place outside the Committee. In the discussion of this matter, the U.S. observed that the question of the relationship of the treaty to third parties had not yet been discussed thoroughly, and pointed out that if non-signatories were to enjoy any of the benefits of the treaty they should assume some of the burdens of the treaty, such as giving notice of their intent to send expeditions to Antarctica. Australia and Belgium expressed their opinion that the treaty did not give any rights to non-signatories and, therefore, it should not seek to impose any obligations upon them.

The Representatives met informally in closed session at 3 p.m., October 30, adjourning at 6 p.m.

They discussed the items of third parties and accession. There was unanimous agreement that the treaty imposed obligations only upon the parties and that the benefits of the treaty were solely for the parties.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding this proposal, see the memorandum, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.



They agreed that there should be an accession clause making accession open to any state which was a member of the UN or its specialized agencies, the USSR saying that in the spirit of compromise it could accept such a provision.

There was unanimous agreement that participation in the consultative group should be limited to parties who at the time were engaged in substantial scientific activity in Antarctica and also that the right to appoint inspectors should be limited to parties who were entitled to have representatives on the consultative group.

The New Zealand representative was asked to redraft his proposals in the light of these views and to circulate them informally amongst the representatives.

The question of Article II was discussed at length. Three alternative formulations prepared respectively by South Africa, Australia, and USSR, were discussed. The Argentine representative said that he, personally, could recommend the South African draft to his government for approval but that the Australian and USSR drafts were not acceptable. There was general agreement that the South African draft was acceptable, the Soviet Union being the only one who objected. Finally in a spirit of compromise, the Soviet representative said that he could recommend the South African draft with minor changes which he then indicated.

The South African draft is as follows with the suggested eliminations by the Soviet Union indicated by the words stricken out:

*"Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation towards that end, as ~~initiated and applied~~ during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue and ~~be further encouraged~~ subject to the provisions of the present treaty."*

The Argentine representative expressed the view that the suggestions of the Soviet Union could be accepted and all then agreed that the South African proposal, as altered by the USSR, was an acceptable formulation and the Argentine representative said he would send it to his government with his recommendation of acceptance.

All of the foregoing is of course subject to final approval and represents the preliminary agreement of the parties for the purpose of drafting.

It was agreed that the representatives should continue their meeting at 10:30 Monday morning, November 2, with Committee II meeting that afternoon at 3 p.m.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

**304. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 3, 1959.*

The Committee of the Whole met at 11:00 a.m. The entire meeting was devoted to a discussion of the following joint Australian-Argentine proposal for a new Article:

"No detonations of nuclear or thermo-nuclear devices of a non-military nature, and no disposal of fissionable waste material, shall take place in Antarctica except after prior notice to and consultation among the High Contracting Parties."

The Soviet Union favored terminating the proposal with the word "Antarctica." Inclusion of the second part of this proposal, it said, would undermine Article I and would complicate the problem of inspection. The Soviet Union also said it could accept a treaty which contained no Article on this subject.

Argentina also favored total prohibition of nuclear detonations but said that, failing general agreement on this point, it could accept the proposal as worded above.

Chile also favored prohibition of all nuclear testing in Antarctica, but expressed willingness to permit the use of atomic energy, subject to approval by all of the high contracting parties.

New Zealand announced four preferences, in the following order: (1) complete prohibition of nuclear detonations; (2) detonations after unanimous consent; (3) the foregoing Australian-Argentine proposal; (4) consideration of this matter by the consultative group.

It was agreed that in the future meetings of Committees I and II would be replaced by meetings of the Committee of the Whole, which was to meet again in the afternoon to discuss those items which have not yet been taken up. It was also agreed that there would be a meeting of Heads of Delegations tomorrow at 10:30 a.m.

The Committee of the Whole met at 3:00 p.m. and discussed proposals for a preamble submitted by New Zealand and Chile.<sup>2</sup> As a result of the discussion, Chile agreed to withdraw a reference in its proposal to the Rio Treaty of 1947. It was agreed to submit both proposals to the Drafting Committee to be combined into one text, in which there would be no mention of regional agreements.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-359. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

The working paper draft of the Modus Vivendi was considered.<sup>3</sup> Chile opposed such a document, claiming it would have the effect of a provisional treaty without ratification by the Chilean Parliament, and suggested another procedure, such as the addition of an interim article providing for consultation among the signatories through normal diplomatic channels. Argentina supported this suggestion. Australia recommended that the working group that met in Washington prior to the Conference be used as a multilateral diplomatic channel. Chile agreed to put its suggestion in writing, to be considered at the meeting of Heads of Delegations tomorrow morning.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

---

**305. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 4, 1959.*

[Here follows the record of decisions taken at the Heads of Delegation meeting on November 4.]

The Committee of the Whole met at 3:00 p.m. and resumed discussion of the joint Australian-Argentine proposal regarding detonations of nuclear devices of a nonmilitary nature. The UK expressed its approval of the Australian-Argentine proposal and disagreed with the Soviet statement made yesterday to the effect that either total prohibition of all nuclear detonations or total elimination of an article on this subject would be acceptable. The Soviet proposal, it claimed, would prevent any nuclear detonations for peaceful scientific use.

Referring to the two alternatives suggested by the Soviet Union, Australia stated that it would be unwilling to sign a treaty which made no mention of this question. Japan, Norway and France supported the Australian-Argentine proposal. Argentina said that while it opposed nuclear testing in Antarctica this did not mean that practical, peaceful application of nuclear energy should be banned.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-459. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher.

The Soviet Union stated the purpose of its proposal was to secure the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and that the Soviet Union had no intention of carrying out any nuclear experiments in Antarctica. It agreed that the use of atomic energy in Antarctica for peaceful purposes should not be prohibited but said that it was very difficult even for specialists to determine the difference between a military and a nonmilitary nuclear detonation; ambiguous statements which would undermine Article I and jeopardize one of the basic purposes of the treaty should be avoided.

Chile expressed its agreement with the Soviet Union and suggested that the proposal be divided into two parts: a clear prohibition of nuclear testing in Antarctica; and authorization to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes when approved by the high contracting parties.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

---

**306. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 6, 1959.*

The Heads of Delegations met November 6 from 10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. The Chilean representative reported that its attitude that the treaty should be subject to termination after a stated number of years by any party was unchanged, but that it had communicated with its home Government requesting further instructions in the light of the attitude of the other delegates favoring indefinite duration.

The Soviet delegate stated that he had received no instructions on the subject and therefore was unable to continue further discussion at this time of the item on relationship with third parties.

The Secretary General reported that he expected to have a working paper showing the present condition of draft articles and proposals ready for distribution before the end of the afternoon.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-659. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger and Fisher.

Article VII was then taken up and the Soviet Union and Chile reiterated that they could not agree to a compulsory reference to the ICJ. Thereupon the UK proposed that the draft Article VII provide that reference to the ICJ had to be by agreement by the parties to the dispute but that failure to reach agreement on reference to the ICJ did not absolve the parties from the responsibility of continuing to resolve it by other peaceful means. This was submitted to the Drafting Committee to redraft.

The question of interim arrangements was then discussed. The Australian and Chilean draft proposals were considered and the committee then resolved tentatively that the matter might be covered by a declaration in the final act of the conference. It was suggested that a formulation incorporating the matters discussed should be presented for further consideration.

Discussion then started on the article dealing with detonations of nuclear devices of a nonmilitary nature. Australia suggested certain changes. The U.S. representative stated that it seemed agreed that any such detonation should be confined to scientific investigation of Antarctica and its development. The UK then produced a draft which did not use the term "detonations" or "explosions." After discussion it was decided that an attempt should be made to combine the Australian and British drafts and add a provision that the use of fissionable material should be limited to scientific investigation of Antarctica and its development. The delegations were to consult their scientific advisers on this matter before the afternoon meeting.

It was agreed that an afternoon meeting of Heads of Delegations would be held at 3:00 p.m. and a Committee of the Whole meeting at 5:00 p.m. under the chairmanship of Argentina.

The Committee of the Whole met at 5:00 p.m. under the chairmanship of Argentina.

The Secretary General read the following summary statement of the preliminary agreements reached at the informal meetings of Heads of Delegations during the last three days (decisions taken on the morning of November 4 and on November 5 are incorporated in the memoranda reports of the same dates<sup>2</sup>):

*November 4 (P.M.)*

"1. The meeting considered the revised report of the Drafting Subcommittee regarding the Article on Jurisdiction (COM. W/DSC/1<sup>3</sup>) and, with amendments suggested by France and Australia, ap-

<sup>2</sup> An extract from the memorandum on the November 4 meeting is *supra*; a copy of the memorandum on the November 5 meeting is in Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-559.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

proved the text thereof and remitted it to the Drafting Subcommittee for a final report.

"2. In connection with Article II the draft informally presented by the South African Representative and amended by the USSR on October 30, was transmitted to the Drafting Subcommittee to serve as the basis for the first paragraph of a redrafted Article II or, alternatively, as a separate article. Argentina reserved its position on Article II."

*November 6 (A.M.)*

"1. The United Kingdom compromise proposal on Article VII was accepted, as amended, and referred to the Drafting Subcommittee for final report. In this connection it was suggested that the opening sentence might be redrafted along the lines 'any dispute which may arise, etc.'"

The Chairman of the Conference, Ambassador Phleger, stated that considerable progress had been made in the meetings of the Heads of Delegations during the last few days, but that agreement had not yet been reached on the following three items: (1) accession and the relationship of the treaty to third parties; (2) use of fissionable material; and (3) an article on the revision of the treaty. He said the Heads of Delegations would meet again Monday morning to consider these three items, and the Committee of the Whole would meet Monday afternoon to consider an up-to-date revision of the working paper draft of the treaty which was being prepared by the Secretary General.

Regret was expressed by both the Chairman and Ambassador Phleger over the departure tomorrow of Foreign Minister Casey of Australia, who stated that he was leaving Washington with both the hope and expectation that a worthwhile treaty would emerge from the Conference.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

**307. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, November 7, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Current Status of the Antarctica Conference

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Ambassador Phleger  
Ambassador Daniels  
G—Mr. Merchant  
ARA—Mr. Rubottom  
IO—Mr. Wilcox  
FE—Mr. Steeves  
AF—Mr. Penfield  
EUR—Mr. Kohler  
ARA—Mr. Hembra  
G—Mr. Long

Ambassador Phleger, after distributing copies of a working paper prepared by the Antarctica Conference Secretariat<sup>2</sup> showing the present status of the draft treaty provisions and proposals, thanked the Secretary for the opportunity to discuss with the Secretary the current status of the Antarctica Conference proceedings and the prospects for concluding a treaty. He pointed out that it became evident early in the Conference that no effective negotiation was possible in the formal plenary sessions where most of the delegates were speaking for the record but that very real progress had been made at informal Heads of Delegations meetings which were being held frequently and during which no verbatim transcript of the discussions was made. In view of the fact that next week (Nov. 8-14) would be the crucial one, he wanted to discuss the treaty as a whole as well as the critical points at issue and to receive instructions and guidance on the pending problems.

Ambassador Phleger noted that the three principal points still at issue were (1) future accession to the treaty; (2) obligations of parties toward non-parties who might perform acts contrary to the principles of the treaty; and (3) duration and revision of the treaty. As these points were discussed during the course of the meeting, the Secretary instructed Ambassador Phleger in his negotiations to insist (1) with reference to accession, that accession be limited to members of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-759. Confidential. Drafted by Long, initialed by Merchant and Phleger, and approved by S on November 18.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

United Nations and its Specialized Agencies; (2) with reference to the non-parties problem, that parties be obligated not to assist non-parties in actions contrary to the principles of the treaty; and (3) with reference to duration and revision, that some provision be made for future revision. It was decided that Ambassador Phleger would request further instructions should an impasse develop on any of these issues.

Ambassador Phleger went over the draft treaty point by point as follows:

*Article I—Peaceful Purposes*

There had been no major difficulty with this article.

*Article II—Freedom of Scientific Investigation*

Argentina had been particularly adamant on this article although it now appeared that some revised, watered-down language might be acceptable.<sup>3</sup> The Argentines feared that this clause might legitimize trespassing on their sovereign territory, but the head of the Argentine delegation now seemed a bit more tractable on this issue. It was pointed out that U.S. was committed at the time the treaty was signed to make an undertaking with Argentina and Chile to the effect that nothing in the treaty would prejudice the right of the U.S., Chile, and Argentina to take defensive action under the Rio Treaty. At this point Mr. Rubottom stated that he was convinced Argentina and Chile would hold the U.S. responsible for any future difficulties which might arise in connection with the Antarctica Treaty.

*Article II—Exchange of Scientific Information and Personnel*

This article was emerging substantially in the form of the original draft. In answer to a question by Mr. Kohler on the definition of "other international organizations", Ambassador Phleger stated it would be possible for a communist-front organization to be covered under this article but pointed out that the language was loose enough not to bind any party to cooperate with that type of organization.

*Article IV—Rights and Claims*

Ambassador Phleger pointed out that the French were obdurate on section 1(c) until the legal adviser of the French Foreign Office, who made a special trip to Washington on this point, was convinced that it

---

<sup>3</sup> On November 5, the Embassy in Buenos Aires had been instructed to approach President Frondizi on an "urgent basis" concerning the Argentine position on Article II. (Telegram 637 to Buenos Aires; Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-559) The Embassy reported later the same day that the Argentine position on Article II was still rigid, but Frondizi had stated the U.S. arguments in favor of the article "went far to meet Argentine objections and allay concern." (Telegram 746 from Buenos Aires; *ibid.*, 702.022/11-659)



should be included. In response to a question, Ambassador Phleger agreed that non-signatories were not bound by this article (which freezes claims and prohibits new claims by the parties) but stated that the important thing to consider was that the twelve nations most interested and most active in the area were bound by this article.

*Article V—Inspection*

Ambassador Phleger stated that, in addition to the original twelve parties, any nation which acceded to the treaty and was conducting substantial scientific activity in the area would have the right to designate observers.

This article had been accepted by the USSR ad referendum.

*Article VI—Zone of Application*

This Article as amended was finally agreed to by the Heads of Delegations.

*Article VII—Disputes*

Ambassador Phleger stated that it was impossible to get agreement on compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and that the article as written was the best compromise. The Secretary agreed.

*Article VIII—Administrative Arrangements*

Ambassador Phleger pointed out that the Argentines and Chileans wanted to avoid the creation of any group having administrative power in the Antarctic and that, therefore, the language of this article provided for a consultative group instead.

*Article IX—Obligations Toward Non-Parties*

Ambassador Phleger stated his feeling that the treaty should explicitly bind the parties not to assist non-parties in carrying on activities contrary to the principles of the treaty. He said New Zealand felt this idea was implicit in the other articles of the treaty but he had pointed out to the New Zealand delegate that if something was implicit, why not make it explicit. The USSR also had opposed this provision, partly, according to Ambassador Phleger, because this idea had not been developed by the preparatory committee and the Russian delegation had come to the United States evidently with instructions to accept the findings of the preparatory committee but not any new provisions. Mr. Kohler said that EUR felt a provision of this nature was mandatory. The Secretary observed that the more the Soviets object to this clause the more necessary its inclusion becomes and therefore instructed Ambassador Phleger to make a clause of this nature a sticking point in the negotiations.

*Article on Nuclear Testing*

Ambassador Phleger said that the nations physically close to Antarctica (particularly Argentina, Chile, Australia) were most insistent that Antarctica not be used as a nuclear testing range and had demanded an article to this effect.

*Article on Duration*

Ambassador Phleger said the Chileans were adamant on having a definite time limit, feeling that they could not accept a treaty in perpetuity even though the other delegations were tending toward an indefinite period. The Secretary pointed out that he thought some clause providing for revision in the future (which would therefore in effect counter any idea of a perpetual treaty) was desirable and he so instructed Ambassador Phleger.

---

**308. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 11, 1959.*

At the meeting of Heads of Delegations on the morning of November 11, the following took place:

1. The draft on the Final Act was examined and approved subject to minor drafting changes.
2. The Article on fissionable material was considered.

The Soviet representative stated that he now had instructions and he could only agree to an Article on fissionable material if it provided that there should be no nuclear or thermo-nuclear explosions in Antarctica. He said this was for the reason that it was impossible to tell between an explosion for military or peaceful purposes, and if the Treaty were to be effective there should be a complete ban on nuclear explosions.

The Argentine representative said he had just received word that the Argentine Parliament had passed a resolution yesterday to the effect that no nuclear explosions should take place in Antarctica, and that he must take account of this expression of public opinion.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1159. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger.

The Chilean and Australian representatives expressed approval of a ban on nuclear explosions, although later the Chilean said he thought there should be permission for peaceful explosions in connection with scientific investigation of Antarctica or its development.

The UK and US representatives expressed their objection to any prohibition of peaceful explosions for scientific investigation in Antarctica or its development. Later Argentina proposed, and the Soviet Union reluctantly agreed, that explosions might be permitted with the prior consent of all parties entitled to be represented under Article VIII.

3. It appearing that there was a complete impasse at this time, the Committee then proceeded to a discussion of the Article on Treaty jurisdiction.

The Soviet representative said he now had instructions and he was directed to state that the Soviet position was that there should be complete immunity for all persons from the jurisdiction of any country other than their own, which was the original UK provision. Chile, Argentina and France said this was utterly unacceptable. It was pointed out that the present provision was an immunity provision and was not a jurisdiction provision and had been the result of compromise in which the parties retained their position regarding jurisdiction, but agreed that there should be immunity for inspectors and scientists in order to make the Treaty effective.

At the afternoon meeting of the Heads of Delegations on November 11, the following took place:

1. *Jurisdiction.* The Committee agreed that the Article on jurisdiction was acceptable with the insertion at the beginning of paragraph 1 of the words "in order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the Treaty and without prejudice to the respective positions of the High Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica."

The Committee directed that the Article be approved with this alteration.

2. *Revision.* The revised draft on this Article came from the Drafting Committee. Thereupon the delegation of Chile stated that it had received definite instructions not to agree to a longer period than 30 years before which a revision conference could be held. The Heads of Delegations approved the draft of the Drafting Committee and directed that it be made officially approved by delegations with the 40 years in it, but with a note at the bottom that Chile and Argentina reserved their position and wished 30 years.

3. *Use of fissionable material.* The Soviet delegation pressed its position that it desired a new first paragraph which would read "nuclear explosions shall not take place in Antarctica," but that it was

willing to consider an addition reading "except with the prior consent of all the High Contracting Parties entitled to have representatives under Article VIII."

The Argentine then withdrew his earlier statement that "Antarctica shall not be used for nuclear or thermo-nuclear experimental test explosions."

The Argentine, Chilean and Australian delegations expressed themselves in favor of the Soviet draft, provided it contained the provision that such explosions could take place after unanimous consent.

The United States delegation reserved its position and stated that it did not believe that there should be a prohibition of peaceful detonations for the scientific investigation of Antarctica or its development.

The matter was left to be taken up tomorrow; the Soviet delegate agreed to submit the Soviet position in the form of a proposal.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

---

**309. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 12, 1959.*

It looks as though we were coming close to final agreement on a draft treaty. There is one item on which we have no instructions in our position papers. This has to do with the question of nuclear explosions in Antarctica.

Early in the conference, Argentina tabled a proposal that there should be no nuclear explosions in Antarctica.

A similar proposal is now being made by the U.S.S.R. on the ground that it is necessary in order to effectively police the ban on military testing.

Argentina, Chile, Australia and New Zealand are all strong for a provision banning all nuclear explosions and it would seem that there is not much chance of stopping such a provision.

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1259. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger.

I have kept Dr. Farinholt advised of the proposal, and both he and I have talked with Mr. Farley.<sup>2</sup>

The inclusion of such a provision might have the effect of making Argentina and Chile view the treaty as providing a positive benefit to protection against fallout, that might go far toward overcoming their objections to Article II which they regard as a derogation to their sovereignty.

The delegation would like your instructions on this point at your earliest convenience.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Farinholt's conversation with Farley is *ibid.*, 399.829/11-1159.

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum later in the day, Merchant authorized Phleger to accept a provision along the lines of the Argentine proposal provided that it permitted explosions for peaceful purposes by unanimous consent and provided further that in Phleger's estimation the treaty would fail without it. (*Ibid.*, 399.829/11-1259)

---

**310. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 12, 1959.*

At the Heads of Delegations meeting on the morning of November 12, the following action was taken:

- (1) The revised Final Act was agreed upon.
- (2) It was agreed that the place of initial meeting of the Consultative Committee under Article VIII would be Canberra.
- (3) It was agreed that Articles IX, X, and the Articles on revision and the Final Act would come before the Committee of the Whole this afternoon. The Soviet delegation stated that it was not prepared to discuss the jurisdiction Article at this time; that it withdrew its reservation to Article IX and would have an amendment to propose to Article X.

There was then a discussion on the Article on fissionable material, there being two proposals before the Committee:

- (1) The Australian proposal which New Zealand, South Africa, Norway, France, the UK and the US were willing to accept. Chile and Argentina said they could not accept Articles II and III unless a new Article banning nuclear explosions without prior consent of all was added.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1259. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger and Fisher.

(2) Soviet Russia said that it would not accept the Australian proposal but put forward its own proposal for an absolute ban on all nuclear explosions, stating, however, that it was willing to consider an amendment which would permit such explosions after prior unanimous consent.

It was agreed that there were now the following proposals; the Australian proposal and the Argentine-Chilean proposal for an absolute ban except with unanimous consent, and a Soviet proposal for an absolute ban.

The group adjourned until 3 o'clock, November 13, for further discussion on the remaining Articles; the Soviet representative and the Argentine representative saying that they expected to have instructions at that time on the remaining Articles.

The Committee of the Whole met at 3:00 P.M. under the Chairmanship of Belgium. The Secretary General read the following summary of the preliminary agreements reached at the meetings of Heads of Delegations on November 9, 10 and 11:

*November 9*

"The draft of the proposed Article on revision which was developed during the course of the discussions was transmitted to the Drafting Subcommittee for redrafting and return to the Heads of Delegations for reconsideration."

(Record of agreements reached on the morning of November 10 are incorporated in the memorandum report of the same date.)<sup>2</sup>

*November 10 (P.M.)*

"1. The draft Article on Revision was agreed in substance. The Drafting Subcommittee was requested to redraft the article so as to express the same substance, but in a simplified formulation, if possible. In paragraph 1, the period of two years should be referred to an appropriate starting date. The draft is to be returned to the Heads of Delegations for agreement prior to reporting it to the Committee of the Whole.

"2. The Report of the Drafting Subcommittee on Article IX (COM.W/DSC/11)<sup>3</sup> was remitted to the Subcommittee with minor changes, which should be reflected in a revised report.

"3. Article X was agreed and sent to the Drafting Subcommittee for issuance of its report to the Committee of the Whole (COM. W/DSC/12)."<sup>3</sup>

*November 11*

"1. The draft of the Final Act was agreed with minor modifications and was sent to the Drafting Subcommittee for report to the Committee of the Whole.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of the discussion at the November 10 meeting is *ibid.*, 399.829.11-1059.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

"2. The draft Article on Jurisdiction was agreed with modifications and was sent to the Drafting Subcommittee for consideration and report to the Committee of the Whole.

"3. The draft Article on Revision was agreed and remitted to the Drafting Subcommittee for report to the Committee of the Whole."

The Committee agreed to the following version of Article IX:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the Treaty."

At the request of the Soviet Union discussion of Article X (Accession) was postponed, pending submission of a Soviet amendment.

In a discussion of the Article on revision, Chile, supported by Argentina, favored reducing the period of duration after which any party could initiate action to revise the treaty from 40 to 30 years. A U.S. suggestion that the Committee approve the draft of this Article, subject to the period of duration being decided later, was adopted.

Subject to reservations on the first paragraph, and a suggestion for a minor change in wording which was referred to the Style Committee, the provision on the Final Act was approved by the Committee.

A suggestion by the U.S. that Canberra be the site of the first meeting provided for in paragraph 1 of Article VIII was unanimously adopted.

The Chairman announced that the Secretary General was preparing an up-to-date working paper draft of the treaty which should be ready tomorrow.

It was agreed that the Heads of Delegations would meet again tomorrow at 3:00 P.M.

For the U.S. Representative:  
**Wayne W. Fisher**  
*Secretary*

**311. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 13, 1959.*

At the meeting of Heads of Delegations this afternoon the Soviet representative introduced the following amendment to Article IV of draft Article X covering Accession:

"The present treaty shall be open for accession by any state which is a member of the United Nations or by any state which will be invited to accede to the treaty by unanimous vote of the parties entitled to appoint representatives under Article VII of the treaty."

This is an amendment to the draft Article which provides that accession shall be open to accession "by any state which is a member of the United Nations or a member of any of its specialized agencies." The effect of the amendment would be to eliminate accession by members of specialized agencies of the UN, without unanimous invitation by the treaty members.

During the discussion it was obvious that the Soviet Union had proposed this amendment in order to exclude countries which were members of the specialized agencies and not members of the United Nations and who were friendly to the west, such as West Germany, South Korea, and South Vietnam. He pointed out that the socialist countries had been denied membership in these specialized agencies and that, therefore, it was unfair to permit accession by the members of specialized groups.

Almost all of the representatives expressed disapproval of the Soviet amendment and said that they would refer the question to their governments. The Soviet representative appeared quite firm in his position and gave every indication that he intended to stick to his position.

The Heads of Delegations will meet again at 10:30 A.M., Monday, at which time Argentina representative will be able to express his Government's view on Article II and the Article on nuclear explosions which were not discussed this afternoon because the Argentine representative was attempting to reach the President of the Argentine on the telephone. He reported that he would be able to have a definitive reply by Monday morning.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1359. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger.



Five copies of a working paper showing the present status of all of the Treaty Articles<sup>2</sup> were delivered to your office earlier today.

---

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

---

**312. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 16, 1959.*

At the meeting of Heads of Delegations this morning the following matters were dealt with:

1. The Article on jurisdiction was agreed to subject to a final French check with its legal adviser.

2. Accession. In response to questions the Soviet delegate made clear that its amendment required that an invitation to other than a member of the United Nations could only be by unanimous act of the parties entitled to representation under Article VIII. Various delegates thought that it was better to make this clear in the article on accession than to attempt to cover it by an amendment to Article VIII. The U.S. reserved its position and so did some other delegations. However, it seemed rather clear that the accession formulation as above would meet with agreement by all parties if the U.S. were to accept it.

3. The Argentinian representative reported that he had been instructed to accept Article II as formulated provided there was an acceptable provision barring nuclear explosions. He then proposed a nuclear provision that would read:

“Nuclear or thermo-nuclear explosions shall not take place south of 60 degrees South except after unanimous consent of the contracting parties entitled to representation under Article VIII.”

It was pointed out that this formulation included the high seas south of 60 degrees South which had been excluded in the zone of application. There was considerable discussion on this point and the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Belgian, Japanese and French representatives indicated that they did not want the nuclear prohibition to apply to the high seas. The UK stated that it could accept a prohibition

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1659. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger.

limited to Antarctica but would have to ask further instructions on the Argentine proposal. The Soviet and Chilean representatives said they would accept the Argentine proposal.

All except the Soviet indicated that they desired the inclusion of a provision permitting nuclear explosions upon unanimous consent. The Soviet representative said that it was a complicated matter and he was not in a position to state his delegation's position at this time. He made an argument that the unanimous consent provision might not be desirable but it was clear that the other delegations held a contrary view.

The meeting adjourned until 10:30 tomorrow morning. It was hoped that all representatives would have further instructions at that time on the above items.

The U.S. delegation desires your instructions on both the above points.

---

**313. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 17, 1959.*

Subsequent to our telephone conversation this morning, Mr. Rubottom informed me that he had talked last evening to the head of the Argentine Delegation and had persuaded him to withdraw his proposal that the area in which nuclear explosions were prohibited should be extended beyond Antarctica to include the high seas south of 60°. <sup>2</sup>

I also raised with the Secretary the difficulty on the accession clause. Opinion is strong and widespread within the Department that this is extremely important and that we should not give easily on it. The Secretary agreed that at least through today's sessions you should maintain our position, indicating that you had not been able to obtain any change in your instructions. The matter can then be reconsidered tonight or early tomorrow morning when I indicated to the Secretary I would want to take up this matter with him again.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1759. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Merchant.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Rubottom's conversation with the head of the Argentine Delegation is *ibid.*

**314. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 17, 1959.*

At the meeting of Heads of Delegations this morning the following took place:

1. The Argentine representative withdrew his proposal that all the areas south of 60 degrees be included in the area banned for nuclear explosions. He agreed that such explosions should only be prohibited in the treaty area.

This would make the Argentine proposal read as follows:

"Nuclear explosions shall not take place in Antarctica except with the prior consent of all the high contracting parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided under Article VIII."

All the representatives except the Soviet Union approved this redraft.

The Soviet representative said he could not accept the provision that permitted such explosions with the prior consent of the contracting parties. He said he had definite instructions that such a provision should not be included. He stated that this was for the reason that the prohibition of nuclear explosions was a matter of principle and not subject to waiver, making reference to the Geneva meetings.

All other representatives made clear that the Soviet Union position was not supportable and it was quite clear that there was unanimous agreement that the Argentine proposal was acceptable and the Soviet one was not.

Then, in an endeavor to meet the Soviet proposal, the South African delegate proposed a formulation in substance as follows:

1. Nuclear explosions in Antarctica shall be prohibited.
2. Notwithstanding the foregoing and having in mind future scientific developments and international agreements relating to nuclear energy, it is agreed that such explosions for peaceful purposes may take place in Antarctica with the unanimous consent of the Article VIII parties.

The Soviet wished to place consent on the basis of amendment of the article covering prohibitions but this was opposed upon the grounds that it would amount to an amendment of the treaty and require ratification.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1759. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger.

The meeting adjourned to reconvene at 3:00 p.m. to consider proposals that might meet the Soviet point of view without sacrificing the right to have such explosions by unanimous consent.

2. The Soviet Union brought up the question of accession and produced a redraft providing for accession open to members of the UN and to others invited by unanimous act of the Article VIII powers. I stated the U.S. position was that it would accept the New Zealand proposal permitting accession by UN members and members of specialized agencies with the Soviet amendment adding states invited by unanimous consent of the Article VIII powers. The Soviet representative then entered into a long explanation of its position, saying that the formula for accession by members of specialized agencies discriminated against socialist states, citing the fact that it included West Germany and not East Germany and South Korea and South Vietnam and not the competing regimes. At this point we returned to a consideration of the article prohibiting nuclear explosions.

---

**315. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 17, 1959.*

The meeting of the Heads of Delegations at 3:00 P.M. continued the discussion on the banning of nuclear explosions. The UK, Argentina and South Africa presented proposals which banned nuclear explosions in Antarctica but in a subsequent paragraph provided that notwithstanding this prohibition and having in mind future scientific development and international agreements, the prohibition could be modified by the unanimous consent of Article VIII parties.

The Soviet representative said that these proposals were unacceptable but that he would make a proposal which, if it was accepted, he would present to his Government. The Soviet proposal was as follows:

“Nuclear explosions and disposition of radioactive material not resulting from nuclear processes in Antarctica shall be prohibited.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-959. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger.

"The present article, shall cease to be in effect if all the contracting parties to this treaty whose representatives are entitled to participation in the meetings provided for in Article VIII will become parties to a general international agreement which may be concluded in the future concerning the use of nuclear energy including nuclear explosions and disposal of radioactive material."

It was at once pointed out that this proposal had the effect of prohibiting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for all time in Antarctica no matter how desirable, unless and until there was general international agreement on the subject of nuclear explosions, which agreement might never be had.

Various delegations spoke in opposition to the proposal, saying that it tied the Antarctica situation to the world situation instead of dealing only with the situation in Antarctica.

The representative of the Union of South Africa said it was introducing the cold war into Antarctica.

I pointed out that while I was sure the Soviet representative had no such objective it was in fact endorsing in principle the Soviet position in the Geneva nuclear talks, namely, that nuclear explosions should be first banned, and then the parties should discuss the conditions under which they might be regulated and policed—the Western position being exactly the contrary, namely, that before nuclear explosions are banned the conditions under which nuclear explosions and other uses can be conducted and policed in the future should be decided on before the explosions are banned.

The Soviet representative did not budge and the meeting finally adjourned to meet again at 10:30 tomorrow morning.

Following the meeting I pointed out to the Soviet representative that its proposal was introducing into the Antarctica treaty, elements that had been the cause of differences between the Soviet Union and other nuclear powers and it was not helpful to introduce these differences here. I expressed the hope that the Soviet would see fit to change its position.

Two explanations of the Soviet position seem possible: (1) that the Soviet does not want any prohibition of nuclear explosions in the treaty, or (2) that if the subject is dealt with in the treaty it shall be dealt with in such a way as to improve the Soviet position at the Geneva talks. In the light of the Argentine position it is obvious that there can be no treaty unless there is a provision banning nuclear explosions in Antarctica.

At one stage this afternoon one representative suggested that we discuss the accession clause. I replied that under the circumstances this was not desirable and the matter was dropped.

316. **Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 18, 1959.*

At this morning's meeting of the Heads of Delegations the discussion continued on the article on nuclear explosions.

After much discussion the following draft was formulated, being a combination of South African and Japanese proposals:

"1. Nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal of radioactive waste material shall be governed by such rules as may be established under international agreements to which the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article VIII are parties concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material."<sup>2</sup>

"2. Pending the establishment of such agreed rules, nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal of radioactive waste material other than waste material resulting from nuclear processes in Antarctica shall be prohibited.

"3. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is agreed that the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article VIII may, by unanimous prior consent, grant a waiver from the application of the provisions of para. 2. Such a waiver shall relate exclusively to the furtherance of the scientific investigation of Antarctica or of its peaceful development or to the disposal of radioactive waste material."

The Soviet representative made comments indicating that this formulation, at least in part, might meet Soviet requirements but that his present instructions would not permit him to accept it. He said he would consult his government and request further instructions. The other delegates expressed approval subject to reference to their Governments.

The meeting adjourned until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

Tomorrow if the nuclear provision should be accepted, the question of accession will be pushed as it would then be the only remaining issue not agreed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1859. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger.

<sup>2</sup> Next to this draft paragraph on the source text Merchant wrote: "Farley thinks OK. 11/29."

**317. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 19, 1959.*

Further to our telephone conversation last night and your memorandum of November 18,<sup>2</sup> I have talked to the Secretary and you are herewith authorized to accept the formulation which you quote as a combination of South African and Japanese proposals with respect to nuclear explosions in Antarctica.<sup>3</sup> Language changes not affecting the substance of the proposal of course can be accepted by you in your discretion.

With respect to the matter of accession, for a number of reasons with which you are familiar we are anxious to secure the automatic eligibility of members of specialized agencies of the United Nations. We are not prepared, however, to wreck the conference and forego the treaty if after further effort you are satisfied that we cannot secure a provision for automatic eligibility described above. Accordingly we believe that a further effort to secure acceptance of our proposal should be made. You are authorized, however, in your discretion to yield on this point if thereby the treaty in its present form can be agreed by all participants through our acceptance of the last Soviet proposal on accession (or language having the same effect) and you further deem that continued withholding on our part would risk the achievement of this result.

The Secretary of course is currently familiar with the status of the negotiations on Antarctica and I suggest that if any new difficulty arises or you otherwise desire instructions you communicate directly with him in my absence.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1959. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Merchant.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> See Phleger's memorandum, *supra.*

318. **Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 19, 1959.*

At the meeting of the Heads of Delegations at 10:30 A.M., November 19, the following took place:

1. There was a continuation of the discussion on the Article on nuclear explosions. The draft considered at the last meeting, being a combination of the Japanese and South African proposals, was discussed at length. All present stated they favored it, with the exception of the Soviet representative who said he did not have his instructions on the subject as yet.

2. The question of accession was then discussed.

The U.S. representative stated that there were two proposals pending; one, the New Zealand proposal for accession by UN members and members of UN specialized agencies, the U.S. favoring this clause which had many precedents. It was willing, however, to enlarge this formula by adding part of the Soviet proposal, which was that additional states might be invited by unanimous consent of the Article VIII parties. The U.S. representative stated that this formula was similar to that employed in the atomic agency treaty<sup>2</sup> except that in the atomic agency treaty, invitation was by majority of the council. However, because of the Soviet desire for unanimity the U.S. was willing to accept the formula for unanimity.

The U.S. stated that the Soviet formula for admission limited to the UN and those invited by unanimous invitation of the Article VIII powers was not acceptable.

The Soviet representative then stated that it had instructions which would prevent it from agreeing to any proposal other than the Soviet proposal, namely with accession open to UN members and those invited by unanimous act of the Article VIII powers. He said that the Soviet opposed the inclusion of specialized agencies because the membership of the specialized agencies had been denied to numerous socialist states and, therefore, was a mechanism for discrimination against socialist states. The Soviet proposal was a neutral formulation which was not discriminatory. The Soviet representative said that this was a repetition of a statement he had made on numerous other occasions so he would not elaborate on it, but that his instructions were firm on this point.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-959. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency which entered into force July 29, 1957, see 8 UST 1093.



When the views of other delegates on this question were asked, none of the other delegates responded and after a considerable period it was decided to take up the question of future procedures in the event that agreement on the treaty was reached.

[Here follow three paragraphs on administrative matters.]

---

**319. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 20, 1959.*

At the meeting of Heads of Delegations at 10:30 this morning the French delegate brought up the question of the proper text in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV regarding claims. He stated that there had been an agreement on the French version and that this version had not been correctly translated into English and, therefore, the Style Committee was unable to produce in the four languages an acceptable text.

The French representative continued that the French version had been approved on the highest authority in France and it would be impossible to execute any treaty which had a different formulation.

It was then agreed that there had been a misunderstanding when Article IV was approved. The French, Belgian and Argentine delegates believed that the French version had been approved, whereas the U.S., Soviet, UK, Australian and other delegations had believed that the English text was what was approved. All agreed that the fundamental purpose of the Article was to preserve everybody's positions regarding the recognition or non-recognition of claims and that the treaty under no circumstances would be interpreted as prejudicing any party's position on this question. It, therefore, seemed that the question was one of formulating this principle in acceptable language.

After much discussion it was agreed by the French and Belgian representatives and accepted by the others that a correct English translation of the French formulation for Article IV 1(a) would read "a renunciation by any contracting party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica." The parties, without commitment, agreed that they would consider this formulation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-2059. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger.

The French representative said that he was perfectly willing that the record of the Conference would contain the French agreement that this was a correct translation and that the French formulation was not intended to prejudice in any way the position of parties who did not recognize the French or other claims to sovereignty.

---

**320. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 20, 1959.*

A meeting of the Heads of Delegations was held at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

The Soviet representative said he had no instructions yet on the Article on nuclear explosions.

The question of accession was then brought up and I stated the U.S. position was that accession should be open to UN members and members of UN specialized agencies and we were willing to add that accession would be open to states invited by unanimous vote of the Article VIII parties.

The U.S.S.R. then stated its position that it would not agree to any formula that would include UN specialized agencies, stating that this formula discriminated against socialist states. Then South Africa, Chile, Australia, and New Zealand made statements which indicated that while they did not like the Soviet formula they would, nevertheless, accept it, stating that what it really meant was a postponement of the final decision regarding accession, leaving it to unanimous agreement of the contracting parties. France, in a private note, stated that it was authorized to accept the Soviet proposal if the U.S. accepted it. Argentina supported the U.S. position, and stated that to drop the specialized agencies would be a bad precedent.

The Soviet Union said that dropping the specialized agencies would not be a precedent of any kind for this treaty relates only to Antarctica and is not a United Nations treaty. He pointed out that there were numerous conventions, such as the Geneva convention of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/11-2059. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger. A note on the source text indicates that a copy of the memorandum was delivered to the Secretary of State at 6:30 p.m. on November 20.

1949 that had no provision regarding specialized agencies and concluded that the Soviet had made its proposal in a spirit of compromise and that its real proposal was that accession be open to all nations.

After some further discussion the meeting adjourned until 10:00 A.M. on Monday.

---

**321. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 23, 1959.*

At the meeting of Heads of Delegations at 10:00 a.m. this morning, the following took place:

1. On the Article on nuclear explosions the Soviet representative stated that he had received instructions from his government that its final position was that it could not accept paragraph 3 of the South African draft, but would accept paragraphs 1 and 2 in principle. After some discussion as to whether paragraphs 1 and 2 were acceptable to the Soviet Union as they stood, the representative suggested reformulation of paragraph 1 so that the two paragraphs now read as follows:

"1. The use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material in Antarctica, shall be governed by such rules as may be established under international agreements to which the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article VIII are parties.

"2. Pending the establishment of such agreed rules, nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive material other than waste material resulting from nuclear processes in Antarctica, shall be prohibited."

The Soviet representative said that he would recommend this language to its government and he felt that it met the principles on which his government had given him final instructions.

Argument as to the unreasonableness of prohibiting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes except by amendment of the treaty produced no change in the Soviet position although the Soviet representative said it was willing to drop from the treaty all reference to nuclear explosions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-2359. Confidential. Drafted by Phleger.

The Argentine and other representatives stated that under no circumstances could they agree to a treaty that did not contain some regulation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As further discussion on the subject seemed fruitless and as the delegates stated that they would have to refer the matter to their governments, the discussion then turned to the item on accession.

2. The Soviet representative said with respect to accession he had received final instructions that no accession clause would be acceptable that included accession by the members of the specialized agencies.

It was then pointed out that the Soviet Union had stated two final positions which unless accepted would mean that there would be no treaty.

The meeting then adjourned until 10:30 a.m. tomorrow in order that the delegates might refer the matter to their governments.

From discussions following the meeting it seems reasonable to assume that the Southern Hemisphere countries would accept the Soviet formulation rather than have no treaty and I would judge that the same is true with respect to most other delegations.

As previously reported, it would appear also that the remaining delegations would also accept elimination in the accession clause of reference to members of specialized agencies.

It is requested that these questions have your prompt consideration and instructions.

I will hold myself available to discuss the matter with you at such time as you may appoint. Obviously you will wish to consult those interested in the atomic field.

P.S. Paragraph 3 which the Soviet demands be dropped reads:

"Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is agreed that the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX may, in specific instances and by unanimous prior consent, grant a waiver from the application of the provisions of para. 2. Such a waiver shall relate exclusively to the furtherance of the scientific investigation or peaceful development of Antarctica or to the disposal of radioactive waste material there."<sup>2</sup>

**Herman Phleger**

---

<sup>2</sup> Later in the day Herter transmitted a memorandum to Phleger authorizing the deletion of paragraph 3. (*Ibid.*)

**322. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 24, 1959.*

At the meeting of the Heads of Delegations this morning at 10:30, the following took place:

1. On the nuclear explosions Article the Soviet delegate stated that its final position was that paragraph 3 of the New Zealand draft would have to be dropped.

When pressed as to whether paragraphs 1 and 2 were acceptable, the Soviet delegation said they were in substance but had no final instructions on the acceptability of the exact language.

The U.S. Delegate then stated that as the Soviet position appeared final and it was a question of accepting that proposal or having no treaty, it was willing to accept the Soviet proposal.

Various delegations pointed out that they preferred the New Zealand draft, but on account of the insistence of the Soviet delegation and their desire to have a treaty, they would accept the Soviet draft.

2. On the accession Article the Soviet delegate repeated its insistence that the treaty be not open to accession by members of the specialized agencies. He repeated that the Soviet position was that the treaty should be open to accession by all states conducting scientific investigations in Antarctica and it had accepted a provision limited to UN members in a spirit of compromise. It was not prepared to further compromise by adding the members of specialized agencies, for this formula was only a method of discriminating against socialist states.

I then stated that the U.S. position was that members of specialized agencies should be eligible to accede, but in the light of the Soviet position, it was a choice of accepting the Soviet formula or having no treaty. As it considered a treaty of great benefit to the parties and to the world it was accepting the Soviet formula. Under the circumstances here where unanimity was required, this acceptance would be no precedent for other treaties or conferences.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-2459. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger and initialed by Herter. A copy was sent to Merchant.

<sup>2</sup> At the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting at 9:15 a.m. on November 25 the following discussion was reported:

"Mr. Kohler and Mr. Parsons expressed their unhappiness at our giving in to the Soviet position on the Accessions article, both feeling that it set a most unfortunate precedent which might be reflected at a Summit meeting. It was noted that several other delegations had held out although their position was now undermined by our concurrence in the Soviet position. Mr. Wilcox thought the activity by our delegation with other delegations had not been up to par. Mr. Berding outlined the plans for back-grounders and press releases in connection with the Treaty signing, if and when it occurs." (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

Other delegations, including Australia, South Africa, Belgium, New Zealand, France, Norway, and Chile made similar statements. Argentina, Japan and the UK said they had no instructions.

Several delegates stated that in a conference requiring unanimity it was expected that delegates would accept the overwhelming majority view and that adjustments would be made on this basis, but that in the present case it appeared that the overwhelming majority had to agree with the single nation which refused to alter its position.

The meeting then adjourned until 10:30 A.M. tomorrow to enable delegates to receive instructions.

The Committee of the Whole was scheduled to meet at 3:00 P.M. tomorrow and a Plenary meeting at 11:00 A.M. Friday in the hope that a treaty could be signed then.

---

**323. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 25, 1959.*

The Heads of Delegations met this morning to discuss the last unagreed Article, that on nuclear explosions.

At the last meeting all delegations agreed to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the South African formulation, with the exception of Japan and the UK, which had not yet received instructions. This agreement was on the basis that these paragraphs were acceptable in principle to the Soviet Union which had insisted, however, that it would not accept paragraph 3.

This morning the Soviet representative stated that he had received instructions that the only provision on nuclear explosions that it would accept was one reading as follows:

"No nuclear or thermonuclear experiments or explosions of a non-military nature and no disposal of fissionable waste material shall take place in Antarctica."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-1559. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger. Merchant wrote the following in the margin of the source text: "2:45 p.m. Talked to HP [Herman Phleger]. Bdg [Berding] thinks Soviet has decided it doesn't want a treaty. Told him to wait it out—if Sovs want to wreck treaty they are in a poor public posture. Wants to go home—has to. Will wait till Friday."

The Soviet representative further stated that a provision on nuclear explosions was really not appropriate in the treaty and should not be included, but if one was to be included it must be in the form suggested.

All the remaining representatives made clear their surprise at the Soviet position, stating that they had understood paragraphs 1 and 2 were, in effect, a Soviet proposal and acceptable to it and that they had received instructions to accept paragraphs 1 and 2 on that basis. They pointed out that the new formulation included experiments as well as explosions and was a total and final prohibition that would not be lifted by an international agreement, such as was envisaged in the earlier proposal.

The Soviet representative reiterated its stand that these were its instructions and that it could agree to a treaty with no provision on the subject or one with the provision which it had suggested this morning.

Each delegation then stated in succession its position:

(1) That there should be a provision regarding nuclear explosions in Antarctica in order to satisfy the Argentine, Chilean, and Australian requirements;

(2) That paragraphs 1 and 2 were acceptable; and

(3) That the Soviet proposal was unacceptable.

The Soviet representative was asked to communicate these views to his government and to request further instructions.

The meeting then adjourned until 10:30 on Friday morning in the expectation that instructions would be received by that time.

A communiqué was agreed upon to the effect that it had been hoped that at the meeting today final agreement would be reached and a treaty signed on Friday, but absence of instructions had prevented this.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, a further meeting would be held at 10:30 A.M. on Friday, at which time it was hoped that the necessary instructions would have been received.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> For text of the communiqué, see *The Conference on Antarctica, Washington, October 15-December 1, 1959* (Washington, September 1960), p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> At 10 a.m. on Friday, November 27, the Soviet Representative called Phleger to say that he still had not received instructions. The Heads of Delegation meeting at 10:30 agreed to adjourn until Saturday morning in the hope that he would receive them. (Memorandum from Phleger to Merchant, November 27; Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10-959)

**324. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 28, 1959.*

The Heads of Delegations met at 10:30 A.M. today and the following proceedings were had:

The Soviet Delegate reported that he had received instructions from his government on the nuclear explosion Article. He said that he had been authorized to agree to the pending proposal in substance but desired to make some textual changes. He then presented the following text:

"1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited.

"In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica."

There was discussion as to the changes this text had over the earlier text and it was agreed that the only difference was that the new text would require the disposal elsewhere than in Antarctica of radioactive waste material produced in Antarctica.

The Soviet representative and all present agreed that the text contained no prohibition whatever of the peaceful use of nuclear material in Antarctica other than for explosions.

It was agreed that the U.S. could make a statement in the meeting of the Committee of the Whole that its agreement was given because it was considered to be clear that the Article contains no prohibition on the peaceful uses of nuclear material in Antarctica other than for explosions.

I stated, as did several others, that this new text must be referred to my government for approval.

It was then agreed that a meeting of the Committee of the Whole should be held at 2:30 on Monday afternoon, November 30,<sup>2</sup> in the hope that the final text of a treaty could then be approved; to be followed by a Plenary meeting at 10:30 on Tuesday morning, December 1, following which it was hoped that a treaty could be signed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-2859. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Phleger. On the first page of the source text is a marginal notation by Merchant which states that he had talked to Farley who agreed to the new text of the article on nuclear explosions.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.



I am sending you a copy of the draft treaty<sup>3</sup> as it will be presented to the Committee of the Whole on Monday afternoon and request that I receive your instructions as to whether I am authorized in behalf of the United States to agree to it.

---

<sup>3</sup> A copy of the draft treaty is attached to a memorandum from Fisher to Phleger, dated November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/11-2859) Also attached is a memorandum from Phleger to Herter recommending approval of the draft treaty. It was approved on November 30 by Secretary Herter.

---

### 325. Editorial Note

The Treaty on Antarctica was signed at the final plenary session of the conference, December 1, 1959. A memorandum from Phleger to Herter describing this session is in Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/12-159. For texts of the closing statements by each delegation, the Final Act of the Conference on Antarctica, and the Antarctic Treaty, see *The Conference on Antarctica, Washington, October 15-December 1, 1959*, pages 43-67. On February 4, 1960, Secretary Herter transmitted the treaty to President Eisenhower, who on February 15 submitted it to the Senate. For texts of Herter's report to the President and Eisenhower's message to the Senate, see *ibid.*, pages 71-78. On August 8, the Senate ratified the treaty and it entered into force for the United States on June 23, 1961, following the ratification by the other 11 signatories. (TIAS 4780; 12 UST 794)

**326. Report by the Operation Coordinating Board<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 27, 1960.*

**REPORT ON ANTARCTICA (NSC 5905/1)<sup>2</sup>**

(Approved by the President: April 7, 1959)

(Period Covered: From January 22, 1959 through April 27, 1960)

***A. Adequacy of U.S. Policy on Antarctica (NSC 5905/1)***

1. The agencies represented on the Working Group on Antarctica have reappraised the validity and evaluated the implementation of the U.S. Policy on Antarctica (NSC 5905/1) in the light of operating experience. The Board notes that the NSC Planning Board has agreed to review the policy at an appropriate time in relation to the ratification of the Treaty. The OCB believes that from an operating point of view there is no need for the National Security Council to review the policy prior to that time. However, due to the significance of developments since the last Report on Antarctica, it is recommended that this Report be forwarded to the National Security Council for its information.

***B. Summary Evaluations of Progress Made in Accomplishing U.S. Objectives***

2. Major progress has been made since April 7, 1959, toward the achievement of United States policy objectives in Antarctica. This progress is reflected in the following developments.

3. *Antarctic Treaty.* Pursuant to the U.S. initiative of May 2, 1958, in proposing a Treaty on Antarctica for certain stated purposes, representatives of the countries concerned met regularly until September 1959 for preparatory negotiations which culminated in the convening of the Conference in Washington on October 15, 1959. The Conference terminated with the signing of the Antarctica Treaty on December 1, 1959, by all of the 12 countries having an active interest in Antarctica. Although the Treaty is now subject to ratification by the respective governments of the signatory countries before entry into force, it is believed that its provisions already influence the attitudes

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File. Secret. A cover sheet and a memorandum of transmittal, dated April 29, are not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Document 286.

and activities of the signatory countries with respect to pursuance of their national interests, and their relations with each other, in Antarctic matters. The Treaty provides, *inter alia*:

- a. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.
- b. Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica, subject to the provisions of the Treaty.
- c. International cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica.
- d. Prohibition of nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in Antarctica pending general international agreement on the subject.
- e. The right of each party to inspect and overfly all areas of Antarctica.
- f. Accession to the Treaty by any member of the U.N., and other states who are invited to accede with the unanimous consent of the signatories and those acceding states which are active in Antarctica.

In accordance with a provision of the Final Act of the Antarctic Conference,<sup>3</sup> representatives of the twelve signatories are meeting regularly in Washington to consult together pending entry into force of the Treaty.<sup>4</sup> At these meetings representatives of all of the countries have indicated there is a possibility that all signatories may ratify the Treaty before the next Antarctic season.

4. *Claims.* The policy provides that, if required at any time for the protection of U.S. interests, the U.S. would claim the unclaimed area of Antarctica and reserve U.S. rights or make claims in other areas. The Antarctic Treaty provides that it does not imply renunciation of basis of claims or asserted claims and it does not affect the position of any country as to recognition of claims. However, it does provide that no new claims will be made and that no acts or activities while the Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for a claim. Ratification and entry into force of the Treaty will protect U.S. interests with respect to the question of claims. However, in the event, which is considered unlikely at present, that the Treaty should not be ratified, and should it become necessary for the U.S. to assert claims and reserve rights in Antarctica in order to protect our interests, preparations have been continued to support such contingency action.

5. *Organizational Arrangements.* A review of current arrangements within the Executive Branch for conducting, coordinating and funding Antarctic activities in order to assure the most effective arrangements for determining the scope of and carrying out such activities has been accomplished. The conclusions and recommendations of this review,

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Final Act, see *The Conference on Antarctica, Washington, October 15-December 1, 1959* (Washington, September 1960), pp. 56-60.

<sup>4</sup> Summary records of the 10 interim meetings held by April 27 are in Department of State, Central File 397.022.

as subsequently approved, provided: (a) that an independent commission to deal solely with Antarctic matters should not be established; (b) that responsibilities of the National Science Foundation for the development and management of scientific and related programs in the Antarctic, and of the Department of Defense for planning and carrying out of operations in support of the scientific and other programs in Antarctica be continued; and (c) that the OCB is the appropriate body to define broad goals in interpretation of U.S. policy on Antarctica and to continue to review the totality of implementing programs on a schedule coordinated with the budget cycle.<sup>5</sup>

6. *Traverses.* In addition to the broad established programs in scientific disciplines which were carried out at the U.S. bases, the following traverses were successfully undertaken:

a. *Victoria Land Traverse:* gathered geophysical, glaciological, geological, meteorological, and cartographical data. Made contact with end point of French traverse (1957). Discovered new mountains in Victoria Land.

b. *Byrd Land Traverse:* gathered geophysical, glaciological, geological, meteorological, and cartographical data. Reached shore of Amundsen Sea.

c. *Airborne Traverse:* conducted aeromagnetic, airborne gravity, and other studies, as well as extensive program in Marie Byrd Land, including establishment of ground control point for air photography.

d. *"Mount Discovery Deep" Traverse:* currently operating in Ross Ice Shelf, conducting scientific observations as well as testing new model of Snocat type vehicle.

7. *Reconnaissance and Mapping.* Efforts were continued to obtain conventional mapping photography in selected areas. These included photographic coverages in Executive Committee, Sentinel, Horlick, Commonwealth, and Victoria Land Mountain Ranges. In addition, reconnaissance and photo mapping was accomplished on flights between South Pole, and USSR station, Vostok; Vostok and McMurdo; McMurdo and Wilkes; McMurdo and Cape Hallett; and to Coulman Island, Thurston Peninsula, and in Byrd Land (Byrd Station to Sentinel Mountains, Horlick Mountains and return), and along route of Byrd Land Traverse and Victoria Land Traverse. There remains, however, the urgent need to put our mapping efforts on a more systematic basis in order to achieve the required results. Such steps are being taken by the agencies concerned.

8. *Bellingshausen Sea Expedition.* After two previous attempts since inauguration of Deep Freeze, a successful penetration of the Bellingshausen Sea for the first time by any country afforded a two-week period of geographical and photographic (including establishment of

---

<sup>5</sup> A copy of the memorandum recommending these changes, dated November 19, 1959, is *ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File.

ground control) studies in Thurston Peninsula area, plus an initial program in hydrography, oceanography, meteorology, geology, and biology. In addition, the USS *Burton Island* conducted oceanographic surveys on its voyages to and from the Bellingshausen Coast area and stopped briefly at Peter I Island to afford brief scientific survey.

9. *Air Operations.* Experience gained in previous Deep Freeze operations helped the Air Force task unit to drop more tonnage (1331 tons (net) in 99 drops) in less time with the least amount of material loss (less than 1 per cent) to date. Operations with C-130 aircraft proved the feasibility of landing heavy 4-engine aircraft on snow air fields at the Pole and Byrd Stations, operating from an airstrip on the ice shelf near McMurdo Sound. Seven Air Force C-130s delivered a total of 400 tons of cargo to the inland stations.

10. *Rescue Missions.* Task Force 43 aided and helped to evacuate injured members of the New Zealand traverse party, and evacuated an Australian patient from Wilkes to McMurdo Sound, thence to New Zealand. The Bellingshausen Sea mission was cut short in order to respond to calls from the Argentine icebreaker *San Martin*, and the British ship *Kista Dan*, both of which were trapped by ice in Marguerite Bay off Palmer Peninsula. The U.S. icebreaker *Glacier* was successful in freeing the British ship *Kista Dan* after ice conditions had allowed the *San Martin* to extricate herself from the ice.

11. *Scientific Programs.* The summer and winter programs supported include observations and studies in aurora and airglow, the life sciences, cosmic ray, exploration geophysics, geodesy and cartography, geology, geomagnetism, glaciology, gravity, ionospheric physics, meteorology and climatology, oceanography, seismology and related advisory and special services. The programs have been carried out in the areas of our stations and in the field in Byrd Land and on the Victoria Plateau.

12. *Scientific Personnel.* A total of eighty-one scientific personnel for USARP '60, thirty-six winter-over and forty-five for summer work, gathered for a period of indoctrination and study before going to the field. Thirty-nine of these personnel are from Government agencies and forty-two from private institutions. The changeover of scientific personnel has been completed. Fifteen grants to Government agencies and thirty-seven to private institutions to a total of \$3,939,733 have been approved by the National Science Foundation in support of the U.S. Antarctic Research Program, USARP '61, in conjunction with support furnished under Deep Freeze '60. This total in dollar support represents approximately 50% of requests received.

13. *Cooperative Scientific Programs.* The joint administration of the scientific program at the U.S. Hallett Station with New Zealand continues as in the past with New Zealand supplying this year's Station Scientific Leader. The changeover of scientific personnel and resupply

of equipment has been accomplished at Wilkes Station, cooperatively administered with Australia. Due to severe ice conditions which prevented the Argentine resupply vessel from completing its mission, the changeover of personnel and resupply of Ellsworth Station could not be accomplished this season.

14. *Foreign Observers and Resident Scientist Exchanges.* Observers were exchanged during the summer support season with Argentina, Australia, Chile, and the United Kingdom. In addition, observers from Belgium and Japan participated in Deep Freeze operations while an American accompanied the Norwegian cruise to Queen Maud Land. A French observer participated in the U.S. Victoria Land Traverse. Exchange of scientists with the Soviet Union placed a Russian at McMurdo and an American glaciologist at Mirny for the coming winter.

15. *Improvement in Operations.* During the past year, closer coordination and more detailed operational planning between Task Force 43 and the National Science Foundation have resulted in considerable savings. More efficient utilization of personnel and resources has resulted in the conduct and support of a scientific program nearly double that previously accomplished within the same general level of effort. Indications are that this trend can continue in the future.

---

**327. Memorandum From George H. Owen of the Antarctica Staff to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Henderson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 24, 1960.

SUBJECT

Antarctic Developments (Briefing Memorandum)

*Interim Meetings.* Fourteen Interim Meetings of representatives of Antarctic Treaty signatories have now been held, including four since the first of May.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.022/6-2460. Official Use Only. Drafted by Fisher and initialed by Owen. Henderson wrote on the source text: "Mr. Owen, very good report. Thanks."

<sup>2</sup> Summary records of the four meetings in May are *ibid.*, 397.022.

Agreement has virtually been reached on the text of a recommendation designed to encourage SCAR to continue its present activities. The desire to avoid "officializing" SCAR had to be balanced against some representatives' insistence that something be done to dispel SCAR's anxiety that the treaty would create an organ to replace SCAR.

Agreement is also near on a tentative list of information to be exchanged regarding expeditions and stations. This exchange is required by the treaty, although the use of a detailed list is not. The problem here has been to maintain our public position in favor of agreements for broad disclosure (consistent with disarmament policy) and yet avoid imposing unnecessary administrative burdens on ourselves by too detailed requirements.

We have also had a number of conversations with representatives of embassies since May 1.

I have continued the "Advisers' Meetings" (S/SA, S/AE, L, CIA, and DOD) to develop U.S. positions for these negotiations.

*Ratification of Treaty by U.S.* On June 14 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty in both morning and afternoon sessions. Mr. Phleger was the witness for the Department. On June 21 the Committee reported the treaty out favorably, without a dissenting vote, and it should come up for a vote in the Senate soon. We prepared Phleger's statement, reviewed the transcript of the hearings and the Committee's report to the Senate, and have prepared material to be used in speeches by Senators.<sup>3</sup>

*Ratification of Treaty by Other Countries.* Two countries have already deposited their ratification of the treaty: the U.K. on May 31, and South Africa on June 21. Belgium has also ratified, and ratification by France is expected in July. We have heard of no significant opposition to ratification in any of the signatory countries.

*Ellsworth Station, Antarctica.* The U.S. gave custody of this station to Argentina in early 1959 but cooperates with Argentina in operating a scientific program there. One U.S. scientist is now at Ellsworth. Due to inability of the Argentine resupply mission to reach the station last season it has been necessary for the men to remain there for a second year. Several means of assuring that the American there is relieved next year have been discussed with the National Science Foundation and the Navy. Reduction or elimination of U.S. support is also being considered due to various difficulties created by Argentina. We will have to deal with the Argentine Embassy on this.

*Official Observer Program.* Notes were sent in early May to the 11 other countries active in Antarctica, inviting them to exchange official observers with Antarctic expeditions next season.<sup>4</sup> These invitations

<sup>3</sup> A draft of Phleger's statement, dated May 24, is *ibid.*, 399.829/5-2760. For the final text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1960, pp. 49-52.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

have been extended by the U.S. since the IGY. They were sent a month earlier than usual this year to permit time for replies and advance planning.

*OCB Working Group on Antarctica.* The Working Group met on May 31 and June 21.<sup>5</sup> Main topics of discussion at the May 31 meeting were implementation of the Operations Plan for Antarctica, and a Budget circular on the planning and conduct of the U.S. program for Antarctica. At the June 21 meeting principal discussion was of an Antarctic mapping program, and feasibility of operation of nuclear reactors in Antarctica.

*Organization for Antarctic Activities within U.S. Government.* The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held hearings on June 13 and 14 on two bills, one to create an "Antarctic Commission" within the Government, and one to assign broad functions to Defense. No vote on these bills will be taken this session. We prepared a letter to the Committee Chairman outlining the Department's position on these bills (against enactment).<sup>6</sup>

I attach memoranda of conversation, et cetera, turned out during your absence.

---

<sup>5</sup> Records of these meetings are in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430.

<sup>6</sup> A copy of this letter, dated June 8, is *ibid.*, Central Files, 397.032/6-860.

---

**328. Memorandum From the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board (Smith) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 9, 1960.*

**SUBJECT**

Appraisal of U.S. Policy on Antarctica (NSC 5905/1, dated April 7, 1959)

At their meeting on November 2, 1960, the Board noted that the agencies represented on the OCB Working Group had reappraised the subject policy and concurred in the judgment that on the basis of operating experience to date, a review of the policy at this time by the National Security Council is not required because of any problem related to U.S. scientific programs and current operations in Antarctica.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File. Secret.



The Board also noted that the NSC Planning Board had agreed to review the policy at an appropriate time in relation to ratification of the Antarctic Treaty. The Board further noted the suggestion that when the policy is reviewed, consideration be given to making the policy objectives, particularly paragraph 18-b, c and e, more specific to reflect the provisions of the Treaty, which provisions are interpreted by the U.S. as requiring that nothing in an agreement on Antarctica shall be construed as creating obligations on the part of the contracting parties other than to the contracting parties and to such other states as are members of the United Nations or of its Specialized Agencies and respect the principles embodied in such agreement.

This information is forwarded to you for possible use by the Planning Board.

**Bromley Smith**<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## LAW OF THE SEA

### 329. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to All Assistant Secretaries of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 3, 1958.

#### SUBJECT

Final Preparations for Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea

The President in his State of the Union message the other day took time to point out that the United States "must maintain the freedom of the seas."<sup>2</sup>

This means that for our national security we must do our utmost to secure approval of the United States position on the breadth of the territorial sea at this Conference which begins February 24, 1958.

It will not be enough to have new proposals rejected. We must recognize that Conference failure to produce generally acceptable documents will in itself affect the direction the law will take in the immediate future. Witness what has happened since a similar conference in 1930 at The Hague broke up without any agreement whatsoever. Failure again would encourage still further departures from the traditional principles.

This is not to say that the United States should at all costs seek agreement on the vital issues to be discussed. It does mean, however, that the United States must in the time remaining make an all out effort to convince other nations of the soundness of the United States positions on the crucial issues. This may be our last opportunity to get substantial agreement on the crucial issues.

Hence, in the few remaining weeks, all officers associated in any way with this subject should endeavor to come up with constructive ideas on how other nations can be induced to support the United States on those issues. Any such idea or other suggestions should be brought to the attention of Mr. William Sanders, the Coordinator (U/LS), who may be reached on extension 2325.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-358. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the State of the Union address, January 9, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 2-15.

I urge you, therefore, to impress upon your respective staffs the importance of this Conference to the United States.

---

**330. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs' Special Assistant (Sanders) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 5, 1958.*

SUBJECT

Diplomatic Preparations for the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea

I understand you would be interested in receiving a brief report on the diplomatic preparations for the subject Conference. This aspect of our preparations has been conducted primarily through our field posts but also in part through visiting field trips by specialists.

*Pre-Conference Diplomatic Discussions Through the Field Posts*

In May of last year all American field posts were alerted to the importance we attach to the Conference and to the need for reporting developments concerning the Conference on a continuing basis.<sup>2</sup> In November of the same year the posts were instructed to undertake discussions on the problems expected to come before the Conference of special interest to the United States.<sup>3</sup> The agenda of the Conference comprises the 73 articles of the Report of the International Law Commission<sup>4</sup> (covering the territorial sea, regime of the high seas, international fisheries rights and the continental shelf) and the special question of access to the sea on the part of land-locked countries. Out of this large number of issues the Department selected for diplomatic discussions the limits of the territorial sea and international fisheries rights, including the controversial question of the definition of the living resources of the continental shelf. To supplement the briefings on the territorial sea question, colored slides and detailed commentary

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files. 399.731/2-558. Confidential. Copies were sent to Becker, Wilcox, and to Director of Intelligence and Research Cumming. The source text bears the following notation by Murphy: "Gov. Herter may be interested."

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. xi, p. 570

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 597.

<sup>4</sup> For text of this report, July 1956, see *ILC Yearbook, 1956*, vol. II, pp. 253–255; for the 73 draft articles on the Law of the Sea, see *ibid.*, pp. 256–264.

were sent to the posts showing the adverse consequences to the security of the United States and of the free world of any extension of the territorial sea limits.

In view of the minority support expected at the Conference for the three-mile rule, and of the importance of ascertaining whether a compromise is within reach which would increase support for the rule, certain field posts were also requested to make discreet inquiries concerning the attitudes of governments toward the Canadian proposal. This proposal would retain the three-mile territorial sea but add nine miles of exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries. The remaining field posts were requested to submit their estimate of the attitudes of the respective governments toward the proposal.

The field posts in the twelve land-locked countries were instructed to indicate, at their discretion, our interest in the special problems of these countries. It is hoped that the majority of these countries will be persuaded to adopt attitudes favorable to our views at the Conference.

#### *Pre-Conference Diplomatic Preparations by Means of Field Trips*

To supplement the discussions undertaken by the field posts, officers of the Departments of State and Interior made trips for special briefings on the fisheries questions to Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Special discussions were also held in New York between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and of Canada. The latter were headed by Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs, R. G. Robertson. USUN has briefed representatives to the UN who are expected to attend the Conference.

A team of Naval officers also visited London, Oslo, Bonn and Madrid for a special showing of the slides on the security consequences of an extension of the territorial sea limits.

#### *Results of the Pre-Conference Diplomatic Discussions*

Reports have been received from all posts except those in Bulgaria, Nepal, Poland and Rumania. The Soviet bloc countries have not been approached. The Embassies in Mexico and Saudi Arabia considered it inadvisable to approach their respective governments.

The information received has greatly assisted the Department and other interested government agencies in preparations for the Conference. It is believed that these conversations have served to create a better understanding of the position of the US and of some of the highly technical problems involved in the fisheries question.

The tentative estimates of governmental attitudes on the question of the limits of the territorial sea and contiguous zones for fisheries which were sent to you with my memorandum of January 30<sup>5</sup> are based in large part on the pre-Conference diplomatic discussions.

I should add that the consultations on the Canadian proposal and on abstention (US proposal in the fisheries field) on which there are differences of view within the Government, were authorized by the Under Secretary.

WS

---

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

---

**331. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Dreier) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 11, 1958.*

SUBJECT

UN Law of the Sea Conference

The Latin American area presents some of the more serious problems for the U.S. Delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference, and ARA has followed closely developments in connection with preparations for the Conference. Earl H. Luboensky has been assigned the task of following ARA's interest in the Conference. He cooperates with Mr. William Sanders, who will be the Assistant Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, and has taken care of coordination in ARA of all instructions regarding consultations by our Embassies with Latin American Governments. The question of ARA representation at the Conference itself has not yet been settled as some last minute problems have arisen in this respect, but we are actively working on them.

Consideration has been given, and appropriate action has as far as possible been taken, to win support among Latin American countries for the U.S. position for a three-mile territorial sea and for the U.S. concept on the fisheries problem. The Department has been successful in the past months in favorably influencing Latin American govern-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-1158. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Luboensky and initialed by Dreier.

ments in some matters pertaining to the Law of the Sea. The Dominican Republic, which claims three miles territorial sea, has decided after reconsideration to send a delegate to the Conference though the invitation had already been declined. The Honduran Government has accepted flexible provisions in its draft constitution in the sections pertaining to territorial waters. President Somoza of Nicaragua has deferred until after the Conference presentation of a bill to Congress which would claim the waters over the continental shelf. The land-locked countries (Bolivia and Paraguay) are adopting policies in favor of the three-mile limit.

We are now prepared to go along with the Canadian proposal for nine additional contiguous miles for exclusive fishing jurisdiction for coastal states. The question is still pending at Under Secretary level whether the U.S. may start immediately to campaign for the contiguous zone concept or whether a determination must first be made at the Conference that a majority will support that formula. It would be preferable in our effort to win support among Latin American countries for us to indicate immediately that we will have a conciliatory negotiating position in regard to the economic needs of coastal states in off-shore fishing.

We could not expect to garner support for a nine-mile contiguous zone among the 200-mile claimants (Chile, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador, and Costa Rica). There are indications, however, of softening in the positions of some of these countries toward a three-mile territorial sea and a broad contiguous zone for exclusive fishing rights (perhaps less than 200 miles). An early approach on the contiguous zone concept might be expected to result in a favorable reaction among many of the other countries in Latin America and in conciliatory positions on their part. By demonstrating that we are aware of the economic needs of coastal states we should in turn expect a greater readiness on the part of others to go along with our security arguments favoring the three-mile limit.

I have discussed our general situation in Latin America, vis-à-vis the Law of the Sea Conference, with Mr. Sanders who feels things are in about as good shape as can be expected and that we are doing what is necessary to strengthen our position where possible. I have assured him of our desire to be of all possible assistance.

**332. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (McElroy) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 15, 1958.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 11 a meeting was held in the Office of the Under Secretary of State between representatives of the Departments of State, Interior, and Defense.<sup>2</sup> The meeting was also attended by the principal delegate of the United States to the forthcoming Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. One of the purposes of the meeting was to consider the position of the United States with respect to the Canadian proposal for a contiguous zone for fisheries.

At the meeting there was unanimity of agreement on the principle that the first objective of the United States delegation at the Geneva Conference was to preserve the three mile limit, which is vital to the security of the United States. It was also generally agreed that the valuable commercial interests of some United States nationals in certain areas off foreign coasts should be protected so long as this did not prejudice the preservation of the three mile limit.

On the basis of these considerations it was further agreed that the instruction on contiguous zones for fisheries as drafted by the Department of State would be interpreted as giving the chairman of the United States delegation discretion as to whether and at what stage the United States should support compromise proposals such as the Canadian proposal.

The purpose of this letter is to confirm the understanding reached at this meeting and to indicate my approval of the action of the Department of Defense representative in this regard.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,

**Neil H. McElroy**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-1558. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> No other record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Attached to the source text was a reply from Herter, dated February 20, which confirmed McElroy's understanding.

**333. Paper Prepared in the Office of the Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 20, 1958.*

**U.S. POSITION FOR THE UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA**

The basic issue facing this Government at the Conference will be how to maintain the cardinal principle of the freedom of the seas, which this nation has supported since its inception, in the face of demands of many coastal states for greater areas of sovereignty.

Attention will be principally focused on two currently vital and to some extent interwoven problems. These are:

1. Seaward extent of the coastal state's sovereignty (limit of internal waters and breadth of the territorial sea); and
2. Extension of the coastal state's jurisdiction to include exclusive fishing rights over areas of seas adjacent to its territorial sea.

In view of the need to maintain the freedom of the seas for the nation's security, retention of the three-mile breadth for the territorial sea is of paramount importance to the United States. Conference approval of that goal, however, is likely to require some accommodation of the concerted demands of an ever-increasing number of states for exclusive fishing rights beyond three miles from their respective shores.

So far as such demands by U.S. fishing interests are concerned the attached instructions call for the delegation to endeavor to obtain for the U.S. special rights with respect to those types of fish which the U.S., either by itself or in conjunction with other nations, restored to a fertile fishery after once having been nearly depleted. Under the U.S. proposal (the "abstention" formula), the U.S., by itself, or in conjunction with some other qualifying nation (such as Canada or the USSR) would have the exclusive right to take certain stocks of fish (such as salmon, halibut) regardless of where found.

This particular proposal is designed to operate only to the advantage of U.S. fishermen. If it were modified, however, and then adopted it could work serious harm upon some segments of the U.S. industry. But it has been determined the risk is worth taking in view of the potential benefits which would inure to the U.S. from adoption of the above noted formula. The entire industry favors the U.S. formula.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-2058. Secret. Drafted by Pender. The source text was Tab D to a memorandum from Wilcox to Dulles, dated February 21, which transmitted a delegation list and letters of accreditation and instructions for the head of the U.S. Delegation.



To meet other nations' demands for comparable rights, however, the delegation is authorized to agree to extend the coastal state's exclusive fisheries rights no more than nine miles beyond a three-mile territorial sea provided this move would preserve the three-mile territorial sea. This arrangement would protect U.S. security interests and give some added protection to U.S. fishermen operating close to our shores. It would operate to the disadvantage of that portion of the industry which fishes close to the shores of other nations. There is, however, only a minor amount of such fishing.

Less controversial but also important are the provisions on the coastal state's rights to explore and exploit the adjacent continental shelf under the high seas. Since the proposed measures conform generally to the present U.S. approach, their adoption would confirm the fact that the oil wells sunk into the earth beneath the oceans off U.S. shores are internationally valid operations.

The delegation, however, is to make certain the continental shelf approach is limited to living resources permanently affixed to the seabed in much the same manner as the subsoil mineral resources. This is an important point because some states will endeavor to expand their control over certain fishing resources by having the shelf doctrine apply to fish, such as shrimp, which live near the bottom of the ocean but are not permanently attached to the shelf itself.

Considerable dispute is anticipated with respect to some methods of determining the point from which the coastal state begins to measure its territorial sea. The problem comes up particularly in areas where there are numerous islands or in cases of bays and similar inlets. The more latitude a coastal state is allowed for drawing artificial starting points (or baselines) the easier it is to project seaward the outer limit of the territorial sea without any change in its breadth. This problem was highlighted recently by the Indonesian claim.<sup>2</sup>

The delegation's instructions on those points call for restricting those techniques to the utmost. In particular, the delegation will seek to have the straight baseline system restricted to situations like that already sanctioned by the International Court of Justice. And in the case of bays the delegation may accept closing lines which do not exceed 15 miles, although it is to endeavor to hold the line at 10 miles, the traditional U.S. position.

Most of the anticipated problems in the remaining two fields are essentially of a technical nature. These fields are:

- a. Rights and duties with respect to submarine cables and pipelines; and

---

<sup>2</sup> On December 13, 1957, Indonesia declared the 3-mile limit obsolete and proposed a more extensive territorial sea.

b. Rights over foreign vessels on the high seas, particularly the scope of limited jurisdiction that may be exercised for customs, fiscal and sanitary matters on a zone adjacent to the territorial sea.

The delegation will in general seek to have the rules on those matters square with existing U.S. laws and policy.

An appended item concerns the special problems of landlocked states who, at least in theory, are entitled to share in the freedom of the seas. Their principal special problem is getting access to the sea as a matter of right through neighboring countries. Since U.S. territory does not shut off any nation from the sea, the U.S. will endeavor to be as helpful as it can to these states, short of supporting the adoption of a new rule of international law giving them such access, in order to secure their block of votes.

Two non-agenda items are likely to be raised. One involves the legality of nuclear weapons tests; the other concerns the Gulf of Aqaba.

The delegation will endeavor to dispose of the weapons testing problem as an inappropriate policy question although it will, to the extent necessary, defend as valid our use of the high seas in connection with some of the tests.

On the Gulf of Aqaba, the delegation will endeavor to have the matter put off on the ground that this complex subject of multinational bays, gulfs and the like requires extensive study which the Conference is not equipped to undertake particularly in view of the fact that the International Law Commission and the Conference Preparatory Committee did not face into the subject.

---

### 334. Editorial Note

The First United Nations Law of the Sea Conference opened at Geneva on February 24, 1958, with 87 nations participating. In the first three plenary sessions, February 24-26, the representatives established a General Committee, Credentials Committee, Election Committee, and five substantive committees: First Committee: Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; Second Committee: High Seas: General Regions; Third Committee: High Seas: Fishing; Conservation of Living Resources; Fourth Committee: Continental Shelf; and Fifth Committee: Question of Access to the Sea of Land-Locked Countries. For summary records of these meetings, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.13/38. The U.S. Delegation transmitted brief accounts of these meetings in

telegrams 739, 740, and 742 from Geneva, February 26 and 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-2658 and 2758) Summary records for the sessions of the five committees are in U.N. docs. A/CONF.13/39-43.

Arthur H. Dean headed the U.S. Delegation which consisted of 36 political and technical officers. A copy of the complete delegation list and Dean's instructions are in Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-2258.

---

**335. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 3, 1958—9 a.m.*

757. From USDel Law of Sea. To Dulles from Dean. Head British Del UK Attorney General just returned from Cabinet meeting advised last night as follows:

(1) Cabinet cannot accept Canadian proposal for three miles territorial and nine-mile contiguous exclusive fishing zone or any exclusive fishing rights beyond territorial waters. Advised would ruin their commercial fishing off Iceland and northern Norwegian waters and seriously affect their fishing communities. (2) Will support US on three miles completely but believe without some concession we cannot marshal necessary one-third minority to defeat extension to twelve miles or even greater distance. (3) Their admiralty has advised cabinet that they could live operationally by extension to six miles with right to overfly and with innocent passage for warships without notification for outer three and wanted our consent to take up at Washington by head their government with ours. (4) We advised our instructions were to do all possible maintain three miles and any change would have to come from Washington. We further advised we did not believe going to six apart from difficult naval operational problems would give fishery people of other countries enough to sell them as it really solves no fisheries problems whatsoever. We stated that from fisheries' standpoint we dislike Canadian proposal as much as they do but it came down to question of what was necessary to satisfy those now seeking far greater extension fishery rights. (5) Joint meeting with British and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-358. Confidential; Niact. The telegrams from the delegation were numbered in the series of telegrams from the Consulate General at Geneva.

Canadians when head latter del returns from London Wednesday. Canadians have asked for more explicit instructions from Ottawa. (6) British most cooperative and cordial but abundantly clear their commercial fishery interests have forced admiralty to go to at least six miles; and that British cannot accept exclusive fishing jurisdiction of Canadian proposal on eve of their election.

---

**336. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 4, 1958.*

DEAR HAROLD: I understand that while both of our governments desire to retain the three-mile limit of territorial sea for security reasons and in accordance with their traditional views on freedom of the seas, both governments are agreed that some concession is necessary in order to prevent the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea from approving by a two-thirds majority a twelve-mile, or even broader, territorial sea. The United States view that no concession involving recognition of a territorial sea of more than three miles can be accepted is based squarely upon the security interests of the United States and the entire free world. Accordingly, I am gravely concerned at word that your Cabinet is unable to accept a Canadian compromise proposal retaining the three-mile territorial sea, but permitting a contiguous zone of an additional nine miles in which the coastal state would have exclusive control over fishing, because of the proposal's impact upon fishing interests and communities in the UK. The U.S. supports the Canadian proposal. The British alternative as we understand it is a six-mile territorial sea qualified by other nations' right of overflight of aircraft and of innocent passage of warships without notification as respects the outer three miles. My advisors are unanimous to the effect that the British alternative, even as qualified, is seriously in derogation of free world security interests. The U.S. military authorities feel strongly that they cannot accept any extension of the territorial sea beyond three miles in view of their heavy, world-wide responsibilities for the defense of the free world. This would, for example, afford Soviet submarines, in time of war, an important covered way through

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-458. Confidential; Presidential Handling. Transmitted to the Embassy in London at 6:35 p.m. in telegram 6205, which is the source text, for delivery to Macmillan. In telegram 815 to Geneva at 3:20 p.m., Dean was advised that this approach was being made. (*Ibid.*)

neutral waters that they do not now possess. It is the view of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference, shared in Washington, that any retreat from the three-mile limit, such as is involved in the British alternate proposal, will result in Conference approval of a twelve-mile territorial sea with serious damage to our security position vis-à-vis the Sino-Soviet bloc. The stakes are so great that, I suggest, neither of us should permit commercial considerations to control. I would be deeply appreciative if you and your Cabinet would reconsider your position on this point, if necessary, after urgent consultation between our respective military authorities.

As ever.

DE<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 6205 bears these typed initials.

---

**337. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 6, 1958—7 p.m.*

785. From Dean USDel Law of Sea. Lunch with Canadian Delegation. Drew just back from London seeing Rab Butler and Lord Home. British evidently did good job selling him that three-mile limit was not nearly as important as we are trying to establish. Drew said British political officers actively selling six-mile limit which causing some confusion among our friends. Drew did not disclose present Canadian proposal and is evidently impressed with British arguments and fact Canadian military has not been impressed with three miles as affecting our joint North American set-up as distinct from our own European and Pacific operational problems. We received impression from Canadians [17 words not declassified]. Plan speak Committee One next Tuesday expounding three-mile limit and Canadians will follow Wednesday but so far don't know their exact position. [25 words not declassified] Our relations most cordial. Wershof, their Permanent Representative here, suggested advisable I see Soviet Representative and attempt work out proposal conference can support as otherwise foresees disagreement. Arranging to have Drew see slides and selected

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-658. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:15 p.m.

charts this afternoon in effort impress them on three miles.<sup>2</sup> Cable follows suggesting further Canadian military briefing in Washington.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Dean is referring to a slide show with maps and charts which showed the effects of changing the three-mile limit.

<sup>3</sup> In his next telegram, Dean reported that the Canadians were either uninformed or not impressed by the implications of extending the limit of the territorial sea and recommended that the Department of Defense discuss this with the highest levels in the Canadian Defense Ministry. (Telegram 786 from Geneva, March 6; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-658)

---

### 338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Conference on the Law of the Sea<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 6, 1958—6:47 p.m.*

838. For USDel Law of Sea. Ref USDel tels 785, 786.<sup>2</sup> Gravely concerned both by Canadian position and by word British political officers actively selling six mile limit. Requesting through Defense Admiral Burke contact Canadian defense authorities on most urgent basis. Suggest requesting both British and Canadians not to retreat from three mile territorial sea until results Washington contacts London and Ottawa determined. Use utmost discretion reference precise nature of contacts but emphasize they are most urgent and at high level. Since twelve mile territorial sea would have same effect on British fishing as alternate Canadian proposal of three mile territorial sea plus nine mile contiguous zone, cannot understand why Canadians do not initially advocate latter alternative.<sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-658. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted, approved, and initialed for Dulles by Becker and cleared by EUR, IO, UNP, and the Department of Defense.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra* and footnote 3 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> On March 8, Dean was advised that as the result of "high level contacts" the British had been instructed to support the U.S. position. (Telegram 850 to Geneva; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-658)

**339. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>**

*London, March 8, 1958.*

DEAR FRIEND: Many thanks for your message of March 4<sup>2</sup> received through Whitney about the Law of the Sea. We are absolutely at one with you in trying to maintain three miles as the accepted limit, for fisheries as well as for other purposes. The leader of our delegation has already spoken strongly in committee in support of this principle.<sup>3</sup> He has made no suggestion of compromise, and I hope that both our delegation and yours will continue to adhere completely to this line.

As you say, however, some concession will probably be necessary, and I am considering with my colleagues the advice we have received from our Delegation at Geneva on the best way of handling this problem. I can assure you that we are as concerned about the security aspects as you. The problem for us is complicated by the probability that we stand to lose out whatever the outcome of the conference, either economically or strategically or, worse still, both. You ask that commercial considerations should not be permitted to control. It is not merely a matter of commerce, but of the livelihood of a large number of the people of this country. Arrangements which denied to our nationals our traditional fishing grounds on the high seas, as a general extension of fishery limits to twelve miles would do, would put in jeopardy the very existence of the most modern part of our fishing fleet, worth 150 million dollars or more, which is of great strategic importance to us in terms of both men and ships. It would also cause hardship and distress in areas where other employment is hard to find; and it would adversely affect our national balance of payments. We have to give great weight to this economic aspect, but we have given no less weight to the strategic and other considerations you mention.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–1058. Confidential; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in telegram 6362 to London, February 10, 6:32 p.m., repeated to Geneva as telegram 854 eyes only for Dean. Telegram 6362 is the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Document 336.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the British Representative's statement in the First Committee on March 5, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.13/39, pp. 7–10.

I will let you have our further views soon, but meanwhile let us both go on fighting as hard as we can for three miles without strings attached.

With warm regard,

Yours ever,

Harold<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 6362 bears this typed signature.

---

340. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 11, 1958—8:27 p.m.*

467. Law of Sea Conference. Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations have recently urged Canadian high level military to endeavor have Canada continue adhere three mile territorial sea. In order dispel any doubts US is endeavoring have Canada refrain from seeking resolve its fishery problems, should on urgent basis advise External Affairs in confidence that US convinced willingness important Western nations depart from three mile territorial sea would inevitably lead Conference approve extending sovereignty out to at least twelve miles. To avoid losing three mile territorial sea US will be prepared give vigorous support Canadian compromise proposal, that is, limit sovereignty three miles but accord coastal state exclusive fishing rights out to twelve miles, if necessary achieve retention three-mile territorial sea.<sup>2</sup>

Herter

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1158. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted, approved, and initialed for Herter by Pender; cleared by BNA, EUR, L, U/FW, UNP, Navy, and Defense; and repeated to London and Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> On March 12, the Embassy in Ottawa reported that it had given the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs a confidential aide-mémoire containing the substance of this telegram. (Telegram 690; *ibid.*, 399.731/3-1158)



### 341. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, March 12, 1958—7 p.m.*

836. Law of Sea. Believe Dept should have our present appraisal situation which follows:

In view of undersigned and principal advisers, while Ecuador proposal in Committee II to defer consideration Articles 1–3 and 66 to end (proposal quite likely of approval next week at beginning second stage committee work), will give US slight margin for an attempt work out compromise acceptable US on territorial sea issue, situation already beginning shape up in which time may run against us.

My statement in First Committee yesterday<sup>2</sup> appears to have had effect of showing up argumentation for three-mile rule but at same time leaving general impression we willing examine sympathetically problems it creates for individual states, with view to exploring possibilities for accommodations to meet special needs. A slightly more hopeful sentiment re possibility conference success this all important issue is in evidence and a number of delegates have approached me to ask whether Canadian proposal would not provide basis for conference agreement. Unfortunately Drew slipped on ice and broke a rib and cannot speak until early next week.

Lack of info from Canadian Del and enigma created by UK attitude generate uncertainty and much speculation which we are not in position to combat with definite program. In this situation anything can happen but unless a workable concrete formula can be developed soon and real leadership given to it situation may develop to our disadvantage. Our position will be really hurt if Canadians delay until after March 31 and UK delays decision on accepting Canadian proposal indefinitely.

We concerned at continued indication in UK Del of hope somehow agreement might first be reached re conservation and fisheries which would then facilitate agreement on territorial sea. We believe this is wishful thinking and longer UK postpones facing up to hard decision the more difficult it will be to keep those who want to help us in line. If no definitive Canadian proposal early next week believe Soviets or Indians may offer support Article 3(2) ILC draft, flexibility of which has great appeal and will be hard to offset without concrete proposal satisfactory to US.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–1258. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> For full text of Dean's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 7, 1958, pp. 574–581.

**342. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>**

*London, March 12, 1958.*

DEAR FRIEND: As promised in my message of March 8<sup>2</sup> about the Law of the Sea, my colleagues and I have now reviewed the whole situation covered by both the strategic considerations and the fishery considerations which as you know are of such vital national importance to us. We have had the benefit of the latest advice from the leader of our delegation to the Conference.

The conclusion we have reached is that at this stage of the Conference's proceedings it would be premature and even dangerous for any compromise to be put forward or discussed. We believe that there may be quite a measure of support for a three-mile limit for all purposes which we are agreed would be the ideal solution, and it would be a mistake to throw this away, as would undoubtedly happen if a compromise were suggested before the necessity really arose.

We also consider that mentioning a 12-mile (or any other) limit for fisheries would open the danger of getting this figure accepted for other purposes.

Our delegation is therefore being instructed not to put forward any compromise proposal for the time being and I hope you will agree that yours should do likewise. For the present I am sure that the best tactics are to press hard for the retention of a three-mile limit and to explore the possibility of adopting such fishery conservation measures as would take some steam out of the demand for wider fishery or territorial limits. I hope that both our delegations will keep in the closest touch with these objectives in view.<sup>3</sup>

As ever,

**Harold<sup>4</sup>**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1358. Confidential; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in telegram 6481 to London, March 13, 3:30 p.m., which is the source text. Repeated to Geneva as telegram 878 for Dean.

<sup>2</sup> Document 339.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 5417 from London, March 13, the Embassy reported that it had been told the substance of this message and that the British Delegation believed that a 3-mile rule would command support of about one-third of the delegations. The Foreign Office felt strongly that it would be preferable for the conference to adopt no rule rather than agree to the Canadian proposal or a 12-mile rule. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1458)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 6481 bears this typed signature.

**343. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 14, 1958.*

DEAR HAROLD: Our initial position at Geneva has been the same as your own—to support the three-mile limit without qualification, until it becomes clear that it will not be accepted.

While we are fully appreciative of the difficult decision that is to be made at Geneva, we are convinced that unless we are prepared to give vigorous support to a compromise proposal enlarging the coastal states' rights over nearby fisheries, we probably will not be able to halt the mounting momentum for Conference approval of a twelve-mile territorial sea. We are also convinced that fishery conservation measures alone will not solve the problem. Some concession in the nature of a special rights fishery zone for the coastal states is necessary and a nine-mile zone is the minimum likely to gain acceptance. This is the Canadian compromise proposal.

I am impressed by the statement in your message about the timing of the different steps that may become necessary during the proceedings of the Conference. My own feeling is, based upon the urgent advice of the United States delegation, that we have now reached the stage where inflexibility can damage us.

It seems to me, therefore, that within the next few days we shall be faced with the choice between three miles of sovereignty plus nine additional miles of fisheries control, or Conference approval of a twelve-mile limit which we find wholly inadequate for strategic reasons.

You should also note that the Canadian compromise proposal involves control over a contiguous fisheries zone by the coastal state, and does not necessarily involve the exclusion of all other nations. In Latin and South American waters, our fishing interests, as a *modus vivendi*, have negotiated licenses which permit them to fish without molestation within coastal areas claimed by those states and even up to the shore. If the Canadian compromise proposal is adopted and your government so desires, the United States would be prepared to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1458. Confidential; Priority; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in telegram 6517 to London, which is the source text, for delivery to Macmillan. On March 13, Becker had drafted a reply which included paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5. The third paragraph was inserted at the President's request. (Memorandum for the President, March 13, with attached draft; *ibid.*, 399.731/3-1358)

exert its good offices in an effort to assist the United Kingdom to obtain similar arrangements in areas of concern to your government.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike E.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 6517 bears this typed signature.

---

**344. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 14, 1958—7 p.m.*

862. Law of Sea.

Part One. Further to ourtels 836 and 850<sup>2</sup> last few days have seen definite swing toward Article 3(2) formula of ILC draft as "flexible compromise" alternative to "extremes" of rigid three-mile rule on one hand and greater limits of up to 200 on other. Our estimate is that 3(2) formula will continue to gain ground in absence vigorous support any new proposal, because of its apparent reasonableness, the blessing ILC has given it, the happy freedom of choice it gives to individual states already somewhat conditioned to idea three-mile rule constitutes criterion "imposed" by great maritime powers of a past era, and the idea that flexibility is progressive.

We have reported gains made by Article 3(2) formula among Afro-Asian-Middle East countries and certain LAs as well as its espousal by Soviet bloc. Calculating conservatively, can foresee early crystallization substantial vote for it in absence countervailing ideas with possibility of bandwagon movement bringing it dangerously close to two-thirds. In any event, it would marshal well over simple majority, which would greatly weaken our position after conf and afford ground for unilateral action by many states, perhaps beyond 12 miles.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1458. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 836 is Document 341; in telegram 850, March 13, Dean reported that a consensus of the Afro-Asian and Middle East groups at the conference favored the ILC draft of Article 3(2). (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-1358)

Sentiment growing among some three-milers as well as 200-mile extremists that perhaps it best for conf to end in failure on this point. In view USDel such failure quite likely lead results described last sentence previous paragraph.

In circumstances we concerned over ambiguous UK Del attitude. When conf started, they were pessimistic re ability to muster blocking minority; now, when tide is running strongly away from three miles, they profess more optimism that possibility. UK appears to be pursuing two lines of thought which seem to us patently unwarranted: first, that since we may get support for three-mile limit if we hold to that alone it is premature and dangerous to suggest an acceptable compromise; second, that a prior agreement on fishery articles (presumably Articles 48-59) would materially help in holding line on territorial sea question. We fear there is dangerous element wishful thinking in this.

Noteworthy that Fitzmaurice of British Del who has been here continuously and has many points of contact other dels, today expressed his personal surprise at almost fanatical opposition to three-mile limit and wondered whether even Canadian proposal could hold it.

Part Two. Had luncheon today with Sen of India and his principals. Cordial but not definitive. Sen had seen Drew in hospital this morning. Drew mentioned to him amending Article 66 to give nine-mile exclusive fishery jurisdiction in addition territorial waters and amending Article Three para 2 limiting territorial sea to three miles. Sen expressed himself as interested and said he was asking his govt for instructions.

Sanders and I saw Drew and Cadieux at Drew's hospital room this afternoon, he had fractured four ribs. Said definitely on Monday he would make proposal outlined above and in case his disability Cadieux of Canadian Del would make it. Planned to outline proposal over weekend to other dels and attempt line up support. He requested our cooperation to that end to which we agreed.

Believe foregoing only feasible method if three-mile rule to have fighting chance acceptance. If we were to withhold support believe proposal based ILC Article 3(2) would gain wide approval.

Will be problem to keep proposed Canadian amendments Articles 66 and 3 as package but believe can do so.

Drew and Cadieux most appreciative our support and most apologetic because delay in their presentation.

### 345. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, March 17, 1958—noon.*

870. Law of Sea.

1. Carefully canvassed possible voting situation here with Fitzmaurice Saturday and again Sunday morning.<sup>2</sup> Fitzmaurice in complete agreement our analysis. States personal opinion only, assumption stated in last message of London to Washington<sup>3</sup> was not based on reality or correct analysis conditions here. Only possible difference between his and our analysis is that he believes if Indians did not push actively for Article 3(2) of ILC draft, Soviets were to continue to push for straight 12-mile limit with extremely limited right if any of innocent passage and no right to overfly, and Canadian proposals previously outlined were not made, we might by sticking to 3-mile limit with no compromise possibly marshal 28 votes against other proposals. Fitzmaurice frankly admits problem certain nations abstaining from voting, attitude of west coast Latin Americans, problem of Arabs on Gulf of Aqaba, desire Southeast Asia nations for contiguous fishing zone as protection against Japan and attitude Europeans against fishery Articles 49-59 make voting calculations extremely difficult. On other hand Fitzmaurice personally believes Canadian proposal<sup>4</sup> most timely.

2. Attorney General, Fitzmaurice and Wall of UK Del dined with us last night on Attorney General's return from week in London. Attorney Gen made UK position crystal clear. Their position based on Cabinet decision that were they to support Canadian position might bring down govt and hence cannot support Canadian proposal for contiguous fishing zone under any circumstances. Attorney Gen agreed he would advise Cabinet his agreement our analysis that Canadian proposal timely and would not presently oppose and would continue support US on 3-mile limit issue alone if voted on separately from Canadian proposal. It is clear their admiralty does not see eye to eye with our Joint Chiefs that maintenance 3-mile limit is absolutely essential. According to UK Del, Mountbatten did not advise Cabinet going to 6-mile limit would be detrimental NATO operations despite previous advice to contrary. Attorney Gen insisted their opinion Cana-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1758. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> Dean reported a similar conversation with Fitzmaurice on March 15 in telegram 864 from Geneva, March 15. (*Ibid.*, 399/731/3-1558)

<sup>3</sup> Document 341.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the Canadian proposal, which was introduced in the First Committee on March 17, see U.N. doc. A/CONF13/5, sec. 2; for a summary of Drew's remarks at the time of its introduction, see *ibid.*, pp. 51-53.

dian proposal for 9-mile contiguous zone would fail and made successive and repeated attempts get our agreement to 6-mile limit as fallback position. We made it clear our instructions were to contrary and that we saw no possibility of 12-mile limit with right of innocent passage and right to overfly outer 3 either winning or being very successful as a tactical move.

Nevertheless Attorney Gen fears if conf fails may be general movement toward straight 12 miles with no right of innocent passage or right overfly, with blame being placed on major powers for intransigence insisting 3-mile limit, and wants to be free to put forward at strategic time 6-mile limit position when clear Canadian proposal has failed.

We urged they at least allow Canadian proposal to be launched with our support and without their active opposition and without their presently campaigning for a 6-mile limit, to which they agreed and said would so advise Cabinet.

Fact UK will keep silent may possibly hurt Canadian proposal's chances among some Europeans but may possibly help among newly formed nations in African-Asian group, who appear determined change 3-mile largely because British imposed it.

---

**346. Notes on the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, March 19, 1958, 9:15 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

*18. The Law of the Sea*

Mr. Becker reported the difficult position we are in which he anticipated would be resolved in the next week. He noted that the UK delegation apparently has agreed entirely with our position.

The Secretary noted that inherently we are up against a losing battle in this territorial limits problem since some 80 nations stand to enlarge their territories by the increased territorial limit and only 10 maritime powers stand to gain by maintenance of the 3-mile limit.

**Fisher Howe<sup>2</sup>**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Drafted by Howe.

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

### 347. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, March 19, 1958—5 p.m.*

897. Law of Sea—from Dean.

Deptel 923.<sup>2</sup> Have established friendly relations Indian Del. They presently publicly favor six-mile territorial sea with no right to overfly between three and six, and as indicated ourtel 881<sup>3</sup> they have been considering flexible formula three to twelve miles with right to overfly beyond six miles. Yesterday they had long meeting their del and we informed they have requested instructions permitting support Canadian proposal. They lunched with Canadians—noncommittal but cordial.

We thinking in terms broad co-sponsorship Canadian proposal, and India should be considered although possibility antagonizing Pakistan and Korea must be weighed.

I have reconsidered making public statement in support Canadian proposal at end general debate in Committee One today in order avoid appearance of "Canadian-American proposal". US public statement at this time in conjunction with active consultations in behalf Canadian proposal could have this result. It moreover evident further close consultations will be required, particularly with Europeans such as France, Portugal and Spain, to give them time face up difficult choice involved acceptance Canadian proposal. There is consternation among some dels whose fishing industry would be hard hit at sudden emergence Canadian proposal as concrete possibility having strong US support. It evident Canadian Del did not give them adequate advance notice as had been agreed with US Del.

We emphasizing as appropriate great economic detriment to US but that sacrifices must be made to reach acceptable compromise in order avoid failure of conference or greater evil represented possibility conference acceptance twelve miles territorial sea or flexible ILC Article 3 (2) formula which would amount to same thing.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1958. Confidential; Priority. Received at 2:50 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 923 to Geneva, March 18, stated that it would be "highly desirable" to have a prominent member of the Afro-Asian group as a coauthor of the Canadian proposal. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-1858)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 881 from Geneva, March 17, transmitted the text of a draft of Articles 2 and 3 which was being considered by the Indian Delegation. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-1758)



Ecuadorean proposal that discussion Articles One through Three and Article 66 be postponed until other articles assigned Committee One have been considered will probably carry and I plan publicly announce our position at first appropriate opportunity in order avoid speculation.

---

### 348. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts in the American Republics<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 19, 1958—5:54 p.m.*

868. Canada in Law Sea Conference Committee I March 17 spoke in favor idea contiguous fisheries zone beyond territorial sea out to total twelve miles from shore. As great concession and solely in order to obtain agreement Conference, U.S. disposed vigorously support compromise offered by Canadian proposal (see CA-4463<sup>2</sup>) as "package deal" three mile territorial sea plus nine mile contiguous zone for exclusive fishery rights coastal state. This package proposal offers best and perhaps only possibility agreement at Conference on joint problem territorial sea and fisheries rights. U.S. cannot agree broader territorial sea than three miles or contiguous fisheries zone more than nine miles additional in view heavy defense responsibilities for free world and other vital considerations national interest. In any event only small number nations urging more than twelve miles exclusive fishing rights.

Department desires all Embassies Latin America approach host governments highest level inform U.S. decision and make effort obtain support this compromise; if active support not possible such as in case legal barriers urge at least not to oppose in order this compromise may have chance success, thus making possible solution one most nettling problems this hemisphere. Countries with legal or constitutional barriers would probably find it easier make change later if Conference agrees on this compromise. Embassies may point out that in deciding support such compromise plan U.S. guided by statements many Latin American Governments to effect they were interested greater breadth territorial sea only for conservation and exercising control resources waters adjacent their shores. There is nothing to gain point view

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1958. Confidential. Drafted by Luboensky on March 18; cleared with L/SFP, U/FW, OSA, and MID; and approved and initialed for Dulles by Krieg. Repeated to Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XI, p. 597.

fisheries and resources conservation by holding out for twelve-mile territorial sea which could only inure benefit Soviet bloc and detriment security free world. Use again security arguments narrow breadth territorial sea CA-4339<sup>3</sup> stressing importance these considerations in situations less than all-out war.

U.S. Del Geneva already discussed compromise with many Latin American delegates and these intend seek instructions from governments. In separate communication initial reaction these delegates being pouched posts concerned.<sup>4</sup> Cable report discussion soonest.<sup>5</sup>

Dulles

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 584.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> Copies of the replies are in Department of State, Central File 399.731.

#### 349. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, March 20, 1958—8 p.m.*

908. Law of Sea. Fitzmaurice of British Delegation just called and advised Cabinet. After careful consideration, had voted not only not to support Canadian proposal but issued instruction to delegation to oppose it.<sup>2</sup> Fitzmaurice advised they would not publicly make their position known for time being but commented there was meeting Western European delegations tomorrow at which they would have to make their position known and would inform other delegations their position in private conversations. Stated definitely they would not continue advance 6-mile proposal for time being. Fitzmaurice, however, made it abundantly clear their admiralty still felt 6-mile limit imposed no operational difficulties but had bowed to our decided views in the matter. Fitzmaurice stated in addition to grave economic consequences to Britain's fishing industry of Canadian proposal fishing interests generally voted conservative and failure of government if question raised in House to state unequivocally they were against Canadian proposal might result in a vote of lack of confidence, which Cabinet felt it could not risk at this time. Fitzmaurice stated British

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2058. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:55 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> On March 21, the Counselor of the British Embassy left with Becker an aide-mémoire along these lines. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-2158)

Delegation here had repeatedly warned Cabinet this stand might result in conference accepting 12-mile proposal, which, for fishing purposes at least, is the same as the Canadian proposal; and that decision taken with full realization our position and the consequences.

In conversation today with Portuguese Ambassador, he reiterated Portugal's historic fishing rights off Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and emphasized cod, and especially dried cod, staple article of diet of Portugal's masses and that if government attempted dictate where Portuguese could fish or if cod were to be unavailable in Portugal, as formerly, would cause social revolution, which government just could not risk; and while they wished to cooperate USDel in every way they could not support Canadian proposal. We commented that perhaps Canadian assurances could be had that Canada would not, in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction for fishers over additional nine miles, restrict fishing rights of nations who had exercised them for many generations. Portuguese Ambassador commented this would be nice to obtain their vote, but that subsequently Canadian Parliament would probably ignore. Suggested might be useful at joint conference with Canadian Delegation to see if something with respect to historic rights could be worked out; to which we agreed.

Subsequently, had conversation with Spanish Delegation, who repeated almost verbatim what Portuguese Ambassador had said. They were critical in that we had induced them to agree to abandon six-mile limit in order to sustain validity of three-mile limit and now we were proposing to abandon the historic principle high seas to extent granting exclusive fishing jurisdiction in nine-mile contiguous zone.

Both Portuguese and Spanish Ambassadors stated France, Holland, Belgium, West Germany and possibly Sweden took same position. It may be that addition of an historic rights amendment to Canadian proposal would undoubtedly arouse ire of Iceland and might possibly lose vote Southeast Asian nations who wish to exclude Japan from fishing in proposed contiguous zone.

**350. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 25, 1958—8 p.m.*

957. Law of Sea. During talk yesterday Drew (Canada) informed me he had had conversation with Portuguese, Spanish, French and other Eur Dels to demonstrate that Canadian proposal would not affect their historic fishing off Canadian coasts. He said most fishing by these countries was in Grand Banks well away from proposed 12-mile contiguous zone and insofar as this was not so in the case of French their right to fish within 12 miles, and in fact within Canadian territorial sea was covered by treaty which would remain in effect in case Canadian proposal adopted. He recognized that even if Canada were able to satisfy Western Eur countries on basis of facts or through special undertakings or agreements, problem would still remain for these countries in areas close to Iceland, Norway, Denmark and North Africa (for French particularly off Tunisia). He said he disposed to do everything possible meet reasonable and legitimate concern of these countries.

He was noncommittal to idea of modification Canadian proposal in terms Art 66 to provide for regulatory powers rather than exclusive fishing rights (Deptel 951<sup>2</sup>). He more responsive idea working out practical solutions special problems or giving individual or public assurances to countries that adoption Canadian proposal would not be used to exclude interested countries from historic fishing areas. He agreed I should proceed to call series meetings with interested countries to clarify facts and explore possibility of some method gain their support proposal.

Drew said he had taken very strong stand with his govt on importance presentation their proposal and it had authorized him do so on his assurance US would make no concessions on three-mile rule because of security considerations with which Canada could not take issue. He said if US had any idea of compromise, such as six miles, he should be told at once, with full explanation of reasons in order that he might explain shift to his govt. I assured him there was no possibility of US shift.

It evident that essential first step is to determine facts concerning effects Canadian proposal on fishing off Canadian coast, following which consideration can be given to possibility modification Canadian proposal to take care of historic fishing rights or alternatively to bilat-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2558. Confidential. Repeated to London. Received at 3:36 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 951 to Geneva, March 22, transmitted the text of the British aide-mémoire cited in footnote 2, *supra*.

eral arrangements and public assurances which would enable Eur powers support Canadian proposal. It clear, nevertheless, that something more than promises required.

Pfeiffer (Germany) eager work out some formula that would enable his del and other Eur powers support Canadian proposal. Danish Del has indicated US Del they would be glad negotiate special agreements. Drew reports that Simonnet (French Minister Merchant Marine) much more objective than Gros and had considerably whittled down Gros' estimates of French catch in Grand Banks and adjacent areas.<sup>3</sup>

It present view US Del fisheries advisers that recognition historic fishing rights likely have no adverse effect on attitudes toward Canadian proposal of Afro-Asian countries, particularly Eastern Asians, because Japanese apparently do not generally fish within 12 miles their coasts. Tentative estimate is that Japanese could not benefit from any such qualification.

It unlikely that our conversations Canadians and Eur countries can progress rapidly enough to point where changes in Western Eur attitudes can be expected soon. Perhaps such point will not be reached until last two weeks conference. It likely we will not have their vote for crucial initial hurdle in committee.

In this fluid situation we concerned re possibility UK six-mile compromise move. Assuming Soviet formula or so-called flexible formula is defeated and Canadian proposal receives simple majority we will have some leeway attempt build up necessary two-thirds in plenary. Should no proposal receive simple majority in committee presumably at that point UK might make move. UK could also move compromise in plenary should Canadian proposal fail of two-thirds. US Del still of view that UK compromise, even assuming US support, has even less chance of acceptance than Canadian proposal. Introduction proposal at any stage prior to plenary consideration could have serious divisive effects adverse to Canadian proposal; if moved in plenary it would, adopting UK argument (para 4 Deptel 951) place on US rejecting last attempt secure agreement since we would have to oppose it.

---

<sup>3</sup> Simonnet, Gros, and other members of the French Delegation discussed the Canadian proposal with Dean late on March 21. Dean reported that they were "most deeply exercised" about the idea and stated that it would seriously affect French fishing practices. (Telegram 929 from Geneva, March 22; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2258)

**351. Memorandum of a Conversation Between John H. Pender of the Office of the Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems and the Counselor of the Portuguese Embassy (Abreu), Department of State, Washington, March 26, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

International Conference on Law of the Sea

Dr. Abreu called at his request for information on developments at the Conference on the Law of the Sea, and for an explanation of the United States' position on the Canadian compromise proposal for a three-mile limit on sovereign territorial waters, and control by the coastal state up to twelve miles on fishing.

At Dr. Abreu's request, Mr. Pender briefly reviewed the historical development of the concept of the three-mile limit, and the recent trend among a number of coastal states toward unilateral claims to much broader territorial waters. Mr. Pender indicated that the United States had first declared its support for the three-mile limit concept in 1793, and that this was still our basic policy. Our delegation to the Geneva meeting was not authorized to depart from this position. During recent years, however, and particularly since the failure of the 1930 conference at The Hague, a growing number of nations had unilaterally claimed territorial waters of varying widths, by legislation or through constitutional revision. The United States, therefore, believes that if the three-mile limit is to be preserved in international law in the face of this trend, it is essential that agreement be reached at this conference.

When the conference opened four weeks ago, the Soviet Union, with the support of the satellite nations, offered a formula by which every coastal state would be permitted to determine its own territorial sea in any width from three to twelve miles. By presenting this as the logical corollary of their newly-won independence, the Soviets quickly won the support of many Afro-Asian nations. A band-wagon movement was underway toward the Soviet formula which threatened the end of the three-mile concept.

In the face of this, Canada presented a proposal for the maintenance of the traditional three-mile territorial sea, with the extension of control of fishing up to twelve miles from the water-line. The United States supports this Canadian compromise, not so much because it believes it to be the best solution, but because it considers this to be the only chance to save the three-mile limit concept. For military and other reasons, we view the extension of sovereignty beyond three

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2658. Official Use Only. Drafted by Sacksteder.

miles with disfavor. The right of innocent passage by merchant vessels could be prohibited by a coastal state up to twelve miles, rather than three, effectively closing off certain areas, and thus impairing the freedom of the seas. Jurisdiction over aircraft overflying territorial waters could thus be extended four times as far as it now extends, with consequent hardship for all aircraft engaged in international traffic. And, from a military point of view, the extension of territorial waters could only favor the continental or land based powers (whose communications lines were internal) over the Free World nations whose links are mainly maritime.

The Canadian compromise, we believe, offers a reasonable hope for preserving the three-mile territorial sea and preventing the conference from ending in a deadlock. Many nations claim territorial waters greater than three miles chiefly because of their dependence on fish. Granting them the right to control fishing up to twelve miles would overcome much of these nations' fear for the depletion of off-shore fisheries resources. The Canadians were understood to be prepared to discuss with individual delegations measures which might be taken to protect what might be termed "historic" rights of many of the Atlantic nations, including Portugal, in the Newfoundland area. The rich fisheries of the Grand Banks, Mr. Pender pointed out, would, in any event, remain completely outside Canadian jurisdiction. The reasoning behind the United States' support of this compromise was quite clear to him, Dr. Abreu said.

Finally, we stated that the United States Delegation is exploring with the Portuguese, Canadian and other Allied nations delegations all avenues in the hope of achieving a workable arrangement for all.

---

**352. Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 27, 1958.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am writing to express my deep concern over the recent reports of further British vacillations with respect to the three-mile limit as specifically expressed in the British Aide-Mémoire of 21 March 1958.<sup>2</sup> Rear Admiral Chester Ward, Judge Advocate Gen-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–2758. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 349.

eral of the Navy, has discussed this matter with Mr. Loftus Becker of your department and I have been asked to comment on the security implications of the British six-mile proposal.

As you know, three weeks ago during the early stages of the Law of the Sea Conference, the British delegation in Geneva wavered in its support of the three-mile limit of territorial seas. In fact, they were reported to be actively promoting a six-mile limit. The position of this Government at that time, communicated to London in the form of an urgent request for reconsideration, was in substance as follows:

1. That any retreat from the three-mile limit by either the United States or the United Kingdom would have a serious and unacceptable effect upon the security position of the free world.

2. That U.S. military authorities feel strongly on point 1. in view of the burden U.S. naval and military forces bear in the defense of the free world. (In this connection, General Twining and I addressed personal messages to Marshal Dickson<sup>3</sup> and Lord Mountbatten,<sup>4</sup> respectively, urging that they persuade their political officials to hold the line on the three-mile limit.)

3. That a British compromise proposal for a six-mile limit would not relieve the fishing pressures from many coastal nations and might very well result in Conference adoption of a greater breadth, e.g., twelve miles or more. That, in addition, we saw little prospect of other nations agreeing to a six-mile limit with military conditions attached (right of passage in the outer three for warships and aircraft).

4. That the only method to retain the three-mile limit for sovereignty was to support a proposal which would separate fish from sovereignty, i.e., agree to extending a coastal state's exclusive fishing rights beyond the three-mile limit of territorial seas. Further, that the Canadian compromise proposal (3-mile territorial sea with a 9-mile contiguous zone for exclusive fishing) offered the most acceptable concession to the fishing interests and that this compromise would be supported by the United States and also, we hoped, by the British.

The preliminary reports which I received from London indicated that the British military authorities were in whole-hearted agreement that retention of the three-mile limit is essential to our security interests.

I understand that our delegation is now supporting vigorously the Canadian proposal. The British, however, as indicated in their Aide-Mémoire, apparently are not willing to separate fish from sovereignty and support the Canadian proposal. Further, they suggest that a six-mile territorial sea with rights of passage in the outer three might be a more acceptable compromise than the Canadian proposal or, at least, the means by which acceptance of a twelve-mile limit or a formula tantamount to a twelve-mile limit (optional selection in 3-12-mile range) could be blocked.

---

<sup>3</sup> Sir William Dickson, Marshal of the Royal Air Force.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.



In studying the Aide-Mémoire, I find no disagreement between the British and ourselves that, from a military operational standpoint, a six-mile territorial sea is better than twelve or greater. However, the fact remains that three miles is still better than six. The further out from shore the sovereign territorial sea is extended, the more significant is the impact on the mobility of our naval forces. For example, a six-mile limit would restrict mobility in areas of the Mediterranean, particularly in the Aegean Sea. The Straits of Bab El Mandeb, connecting the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea, would become completely territorial sea under a six-mile limit. Similarly, there would remain no area of high seas in the Straits of Gibraltar under a six-mile limit. By extending the territorial sea to six miles, the entire southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca would become territorial waters. The Tsugaru Kaikyo Strait between the Japanese islands of Hokkaido and Honshu would become entirely territorial under a six-mile limit. In like manner, the Gulf of Trieste would be officially territorial waters. These and other examples clearly indicate the impact on naval mobility in the sensitive areas of the world. [1 sentence (43 words) not declassified] Three miles remains essential to our security interests and we should continue to offer all reasonable concessions to other interests in order to preserve it. Our position with respect to the British six-mile proposal in paragraph 2 above is, in my judgment, still valid.

I believe that the British are wrong in believing that other nations will agree to their six-mile proposal with rights of passage in the outer three. In fact, I think there is every indication that if a six-mile limit is adopted, there will be no rights of passage in either the inner or outer three. Therefore, if these rights are, as the British state, indispensable to them from a strategic standpoint, they should support all measures to insure retention of three miles. Our feeling is that these rights of passage are not only indispensable in the outer three, but they are vital in the inner three also. Supporting a six-mile limit thus abandons any hope we may have in retaining these rights of innocent passage through a territorial sea of three miles.

I should also like to add that the British Aide-Mémoire in paragraph 5b assumes the strategic problem to be in somewhat more limited terms than I view it. The supervision which I perceive is that which embraces all non-friendly activities during a period of emergency which may endure indefinitely.

In closing, I should like to emphasize that, in my opinion, it is essential to the security interests of the United States and the free world that all steps be taken to preserve the three-mile limit. It may be that a later date will find us forced to consider acceptance of six miles in order to prevent Conference adoption of twelve miles, or a formula tantamount to twelve miles. However, in my opinion, that time has

not arrived. Again, may I express my concern over the recent British Aide-Mémoire and hope that you will be able to further persuade them to hold the line on the three-mile limit.

With warmest personal regards,  
Sincerely,

Arleigh Burke

---

**353. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 29, 1958—9 p.m.*

1005. Law of Sea. Reourtel 998.<sup>2</sup> At meeting we called for Drew with heads Belgian, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish Dels believe he surprised at vehemence their opposition to Canadian proposal and their concern its consequential effects on their fishing rights off other countries. At end of meeting there still some question concerning the facts of West Eur fishing within 12 miles of Canadian coast and effects proposal on port and other facilities of fishing vessels. It was agreed to have technical discussions these questions and to explore ways and means by which fishing rights now enjoyed by West Eur in northern Eur waters (Iceland, Norway, Denmark) could be protected. It was agreed we should call meeting Monday all West Eur fisheries experts together with those from northern Eur countries in endeavor ascertain facts and explore possibility of arrangements to mitigate harmful effects Canadian proposal.

During meeting we pointed out serious consequences conference failure on territorial sea issue. French, Port and Span Dels said that while they might recognize security considerations involved, they were not prepared to pay the high economic cost which meant depriving their population of greatly needed food. Moreover they saw no need to pay the price since conference failure would leave matters as they were at end Hague Conf 1930. Spain at end indicated would accept coastal state's right to regulate if no discrimination between national and non-national.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2958. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 998 from Geneva, March 29, transmitted a Canadian proposal for Articles 3 and 66 which provided that the coastal state could control misuse of marine resources in the contiguous zone. (*Ibid.*)

Before and during meeting I brought up this possibility with Drew but found him completely noncommittal. Canadian refusal accept our draft providing for regulatory powers coastal state and even Drew's draft providing exclusive fisheries rights demonstrate Canadians' strong present position favoring in effect sovereign rights over contiguous zones for fisheries and their present inflexibility toward West Eur position. Told Drew later in evening believe their proposal in for rough sledding unless they willing make some modifications. Without committing himself, he said he realized that. Perhaps present Canadian attitude dictated by political considerations arising elections March 31 and that more flexibility may be in evidence after elections.

While non-discriminatory principle would be helpful in enlisting West Eur support, it likely antagonize LAs now in favor Canadian proposal as well as SE Asians who wish exclude Japanese. As reported ourtel 957<sup>3</sup> Japanese appear to be doing comparatively little fishing within 12 miles other states but may be difficult convince others.

Foregoing shows need to walk tight wire between two camps, but believe Canadians must show some realization economic effect their proposals.

---

<sup>3</sup> Document 350.

---

### 354. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 30, 1958—5:42 p.m.*

6943. Law of Sea. Re Geneva's 996 to Department, 100 to London and Deptel 995 to Geneva, Deptel 6873 to London.<sup>2</sup> Department concurs Delegation assessment and therefore hopes UK can be induced defer switch to six miles. Accordingly deliver following Aide-Mémoire FonOff soonest:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2858. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Pender and Becker; cleared with BNA and SOA/NEA; and approved by Pender who initialed for Dulles. Repeated to Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 996 from Geneva, March 28, reported Dean's regret at the British decision to advance their proposal and suggested that they be asked to delay it. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 995 to Geneva, March 27, reported the British decision to advance their 6-mile proposal and inability to support the Canadian compromise. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-2758)

"The United States Government regrets the United Kingdom Government's decision to put forward early next week the United Kingdom compromise, involving a six-mile territorial sea, with rights of passage for warships without prior authorization and for aircraft between three miles and six miles.

At the time the United Kingdom Delegation informed the United States Delegation of the former's intention to make this compromise proposal, the United States Delegation was informed that the United Kingdom compromise would be advanced when failure of the Canadian compromise proposal seemed clear, but that in the meantime, the United Kingdom Delegation although opposing the Canadian compromise would give it a fair trial before advancing a six-mile territorial sea. It is the view of the United States Government that the Canadian proposal is still gaining favor. The United States Government trusts that the United Kingdom Government will at least delay advancing the United Kingdom proposal until the effect of a specific draft of the Canadian proposal, which it is expected will be put forward this week-end, has been fully absorbed.

The United States Delegation is seeking western Europe support for the Canadian proposal, or at least non-opposition, and met with the Canadian and western European Delegations on Friday<sup>3</sup> for this purpose.

It is the further view of the United States Government that if the United Kingdom Delegation puts forward the United Kingdom proposal at or about this time, there is a likelihood that a 'compromise' proposal covering both a six-mile territorial sea and six or nine-mile contiguous zone for fishing will result. This, of course, would combine the disadvantages of both the Canadian and the United Kingdom proposals. In this connection, it should be noted that the Indian Delegation, which originally favored a six-mile territorial sea, but is presently attempting to obtain authority to support the Canadian proposal, would be most likely to seize upon the argument that compromise on a six-mile territorial sea plus a contiguous fishing zone of six or nine miles is the only means of averting a failure of the Conference.

While a number of Asian and Latin American nations, who are reluctantly responding favorably to a three-mile territorial sea as part of the Canadian proposal, may welcome the United Kingdom compromise, they, also, would very likely insist upon an additional six or nine-mile contiguous fishing zone.

Accordingly, in the light of the circumstances now existing at the Conference, the United States is of the view that if the United Kingdom proposal is put forward at this time, its primary effect will be to increase the likelihood of adoption by the Conference of a 'compromise' proposal more disadvantageous than either the Canadian or the contemplated United Kingdom compromise. The United States, while it is fully aware of the reasons why the United Kingdom Government believes that it cannot support the Canadian compromise, nevertheless, urges the United Kingdom Government to defer advancing its compromise at this time."

---

<sup>3</sup> See telegram 1005, *supra*.

Copy of above will also be furnished British Embassy here earliest opportunity Monday morning.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> On March 31, the Embassy in London reported that it had delivered the aide-mémoire and that the British had agreed to leave the timing of their introduction to be worked out by the U.S. and U.K. Delegations at Geneva. (Telegram 5740 from London; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-3158)

---

### 355. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, April 1, 1958—9 p.m.*

1031. Law of Sea from Dean. Arranged with head UK delegation to meet with Drew, head Canadian delegation and ourselves 3:00 o'clock.<sup>2</sup>

Head UK delegation opened by stating he had specific instructions from his government to file British proposal before 1800 tonight and to explain it at the beginning of the debate on Articles 3 and 66 but he believed Indian delegation would support UK proposal 6-mile territorial limit with right of innocent passage and to overfly outer three with no further request for contiguous fishing zone. We showed him Indian proposal under yesterday's date giving coastal states exclusive 12-mile jurisdiction over fisheries, which he had not known about when he saw Sen, head Indian delegation yesterday.

Drew presented reasons for Canadian proposal clearly and forcibly and why tabling of British proposal would undermine support for Canadian proposal. At conclusion head UK delegation said nothing could change his instructions and that he would have to proceed. Drew urged him to telephone his government. Head UK delegation obviously disconcerted by Indian proposal for 12-mile exclusive fishery jurisdiction and with our consent telephoned Sen. Sen joined

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-158. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Ottawa, and Reykjavik.

<sup>2</sup> On the night of March 31, the head of the British Delegation, who had just returned from London, called on Dean and said that he would have to present the British proposal by April 1. Dean stressed the serious effect this would have on the Canadian compromise and that the U.S. Delegation could not support a 6-mile sea. Early in the morning of April 1 Dean talked with Drew who asked him to arrange a U.S.-U.K.-Canadian meeting as soon as possible. (Telegram 1023 from Geneva, April 1 (3 p.m.); *ibid.*)

meeting and stated his government had not made any decision support Canadian proposal [or?] to support British proposal and that he had cabled his government with respect British proposal yesterday but that if British proposal as outlined above were to be adopted by conference they would not continue support joint Indian-Mexican flexible proposal for territorial sea of 3 to 12 miles (see our telegram 1019<sup>3</sup>) and would withdraw Indian proposal for 12 miles exclusive fisheries. Sen stated he understood British proposal with right innocent passage and right overfly outer three was satisfactory to Americans and they might support as possible compromise.

We made abundantly clear all present British proposal could not be satisfactory to US delegation under any circumstances and that if Canadian proposal were defeated, under our instructions we would have to vote against British proposal and attempt defeat it. Head UK delegation and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice seemed considerably taken aback and head UK delegation pressed us at some length whether we would risk conference failure assuming Canadian proposal not passed rather than support British proposal.

Stated clearly and unequivocally we could not accept any proposal under any circumstances which changes 3-mile territorial limit. Head UK delegation then asked if conference failed whether we were prepared run risk of unilateral action after conference by substantial number of countries on basis Soviet proposal of straight 12-mile limit territorial sea with no right of innocent passage and no right to overfly and whether we were prepared to bear such consequences of failure conference.

We replied their failure to support Canadian proposal might be greater contribution cause to failure conference, if that should occur, but wanted no question in anyone's mind our position and stated again we would not consent any modification 3-mile territorial limits under any circumstances and that if conference failed at least change in limits territorial sea would not be brought about by any voluntary action on our part. Stated any extension territorial sea beyond 3-miles was not consistent with obligations we had assumed.

Sen also appeared surprised and quite disturbed at this statement.

Drew again made very forceful plea to UK delegation their failure to support Canadian proposal would bring about failure of conference and announcement their proposal and explanation would cause wide split. Head UK delegation said considered unfair our asking them not to table proposal.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated March 31. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-3158)

We stated we wanted to make our opinion as to result of tabling their proposal explicitly clear, but also wanted to make clear we were not asking them not to table their proposal as we did not want them to be able to say results of conference might have been different if we had not made such request.

Drew expressed considerable resentment on behalf of his government against British failure to support their proposal and of tabling British proposal.

Believe British had clearly banked on our supporting their proposal and iterated their suggestions we would be responsible if conference failed by our not agreeing and believe considerably dismayed our firm attitude in stating no change in any event in our position on 3-mile limit.

Committee I debating Articles 15, 17 and 18 at night session and debate on Articles 1–3 and Article 66 cannot, therefore, commence before tomorrow at earliest and see little possibility debate on these articles being concluded this week.

Had earlier informed head UK delegation, Chairman Committee I confirmed to me deadline for filing amendments Articles 1–3 and 66, 1800 Tuesday April 1 provisional only and he would accept amendments these Articles prior to commencement of taking of vote thereon.

---

**356. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 2, 1958—9 p.m.*

1053. Law of Sea. Our telegrams 1023 and 1031.<sup>2</sup> USDel continuing in conversations other delegates to take firm stand Canadian proposal offers only possibility successful conference solution territorial sea question. We explaining USDel proposal (our telegram 1041<sup>3</sup>) which with minor drafting changes duplicates Canadian proposal as move to give latter maximum US support.

For Department's information our proposal is in part tactical move to give UK Delegate control of proposal in event that should be necessary in confused and fluid procedural developments. We considered inclusion language similar to that suggested Department telegram

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–258. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London and Ottawa.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*, and footnote 2 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> Dated April 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–158)

1027<sup>4</sup> but concluded would undermine Canadian proposal and that we should rely on possibility persuading Canadians move on their own in that direction in view adverse developments represented by UK proposal and vital importance enlisting maximum West European support. Sweeping Conservative Party victory March 31 should help in this. We will continue with increasing insistence to press Canadians to make suitable amendment at appropriate moment. Suggest Embassy Ottawa be requested inform Foreign Office our analysis situation and diminishing chances Canadian proposal as now drafted.

We also continuing discussions with West European delegates to achieve more objective assessment effects Canadian proposal and ways and means adverse effects can be mitigated.

It evident, however, that UK proposal has seriously damaged chances Canadian proposal. UK proposal gives West Europe more palatable alternative than latter and gives India and other states another card to play for expanded jurisdiction coastal state. If we take Sen's statement at meeting yesterday (our telegram 1031) at face value, at minimum the possibility of India's support of Canadian proposal has been lost and with it that of other states that would have followed Indian though Drew still hopes for Indian support. Beyond that, possibility exists that Sen knows UK proposal has little or no chance even as last resort compromise and that India's co-sponsorship Mexican proposal and submission amendment to Article 49 designed lay basis conference compromise on flexible formula 3 to 12 miles territorial sea or 6 miles territorial sea plus 6 miles contiguous zone.

It obvious that UK proposal cannot compete with such proposals. We cannot avoid conclusion UK aware of this and that UK primary objective is to defeat Canadian proposal on theory that proposal offers only possibility successful conclusion and that conference failure with their gesture preferable to its adoption. This dangerous game since it will confuse and divide supporters 3 miles, seriously weaken thesis 3 miles essential for security and that fisheries jurisdiction and territorial sea questions separable, isolate US as last ditch defender of 3 miles, and opens door to adoption 12 miles or 6 and 6-mile formula either by conference or by unilateral action following failure of conference.

In view of these possibilities I recommend Department and Defense closely examine implications UK proposal with respect US and free world security considerations which are basic to our position. Although language UK proposal not clear, could be construed to say that existing rights on the high seas insofar as passage of aircraft and vessels, including warships, not affected within additional 3 miles. If

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1027, April 1, suggested that Article 3 might be amended with language along the following lines: "Territorial sea extends to three miles from baseline but without prejudice coastal state exercising exclusive rights with respect fishing up to twelve miles from baseline." (*Ibid.*)



this is not the intent, the concept could be made clear by drafting changes (such as substitution "navigation" for "passage"). The proposal would then affect only two of the stated freedoms of the high seas in Article 23 of ILC draft, namely fisheries and the laying of submarine cables.

We are still convinced that standing alone the UK proposal cannot compete successfully against other more far-reaching proposals. However, it could perhaps become a viable compromise if an additional 6 miles of exclusive fisheries zone were added at appropriate stage conference proceedings. It is obvious that such an amendment would make the proposal completely unacceptable to UK and to a number of West European states. It might, however, win some additional votes of delegates that for psychological and other reasons are adamant against voting for straight 3-mile territorial sea. UK Delegate has repeatedly argued that one of chief merits its proposal is that it avoids forcing delegates who emotionally and "fanatically" prejudiced against 3-mile rule from voting for it in return for fisheries contiguous zone.

Subject Department and Defense analysis UK proposal and its effects, I make foregoing suggestions only tentatively but it could be that in the end and only as last resort, UK proposal appropriately modified may offer basis for conference compromise and for final effort to stave off something worse.

---

**357. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 3, 1958—1:24 p.m.*

1052. Law of Sea. Under Secretary on Tuesday afternoon received following Congressmen on fisheries matters:<sup>2</sup> Pelly, Haley, Sikes, Boykin, Rogers, Fascell. Also present were four aides to Congressmen and aide to Senator Jackson. Also present were George Johansen, Alaska Fishermen's Union, Dayton Alverson, Washington State Department Fisheries, and Charles Jackson, National Fisheries Institute.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-358. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted and approved by Warren F. Looney (U/FW) who signed for Dulles and cleared by Pender and H.

<sup>2</sup> Similar briefings had taken place on March 25 (telegram 986 to Geneva, March 26; *ibid.*, 399.731/3-2158) and on March 31. (Telegram 1028 to Geneva, April 1; *ibid.*, 399.731/4-158)

Under Secretary and Becker explained situation facing Delegation at Geneva and inevitable necessity of Delegation support of Canadian proposal in order to save 3 mile limit. They explained 3 mile limit of territorial waters imperative for security purposes. Looney explained close working relationships with fishing industry of State Department.

Congressmen impressed. It is clear, however, that they will find it extremely difficult to support Delegation's action in Congress. Pelly seconded by Sykes spoke of shifting his vote on reciprocal trade legislation and cutting down contributions to UN.

Johansen in lengthy statement criticized State Department for failure to foresee losses to US from Conference. Said State Department in last few years has been prime mover in securing world conference. Jackson praised Department for cooperation with industry.

Congressmen asked that the following message be sent from them to Delegation: "It is imperative that Delegation preserve our historic rights in fisheries and secure abstention in fishery articles."<sup>3</sup>

Congressmen explored possibility sending House Member to Geneva on fishery matters. We understand they subsequently dropped project.

Today explored your suggestion re meeting Armed Services Committee with Congressmen from fishery constituencies. As House is adjourning today Pelly stated impossible to get the Congressmen together until after recess. He feels meeting would be helpful. We will act accordingly.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>3</sup> On April 2, Dean reported that he had received a telegram from Pelly on behalf of coastal Senators and Representatives strongly protesting the "giveaway of historic fishing rights" under the proposed 12-mile territorial sea. (Telegram 1036 from Geneva; *ibid.*, 399.731/4-258)

### 358. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 8, 1958—8:49 p.m.*

2639. Law of Sea. US has decided vigorously support Canadian compromise as only proposal with realistic chance averting result of 12-mile territorial sea. Since such latter result would affect surface and air navigation as well as fishing it would be economically harsher on countries of action addressees than would Canadian proposal and, in addition, would seriously impair defense capabilities US and free world. (Canadian formula would preserve three-mile territorial sea but would add 9-mile contiguous zone wherein coastal state would have full control over fishing. Retention three-mile territorial sea essential for US to carry out most effectively its burden defense responsibilities free world.) Practically all states pressing for extension territorial sea (except Soviet and Arab blocs) doing so to control adjacent resources. It appears they have good chance achieving at least 12 miles that purpose by one means or another.

Canadian proposal had begun make headway with that group and others when UK announced its six-mile compromise. As we see it UK compromise will not attract pivotal group and can only split forces who must pull together if 12-mile territorial sea is to be averted.

UK proposal likely encourage those willing to settle for Canadian formula to hold out for more. Anticipate move to blend Canadian and UK proposals so as to come out with six-mile territorial sea plus six-mile fishery zone.

Conference breakup in present temper undesirable since in such event very likely large number states would afterwards act unilaterally in way perhaps at least as seriously jeopardizing our interests as Conference adoption 12-mile territorial sea. E.g., FonMin Iceland recently announced whatever outcome Conference Iceland will extend its fishery limits.

Acceptance Canadian formula is least damaging course; offers only realistic hope Conference agreement which necessary avoid wholesale unilateral extensions.

US fully understands undesirable economic impact Canadian proposal particularly on those who have historically fished certain areas since US itself has similar problems off Canada and Latin America. US

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State: Central Files, 399.731/4-858. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Pender who signed for Dulles and cleared with Looney, UNP, and EUR. Also sent to Brussels, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Madrid, Paris, Rome, and The Hague, and repeated to nine other Western European capitals.

hopeful suitable arrangements can be worked out since states such as Canada, Ireland and Denmark have at Geneva confidentially indicated some willingness discuss measures to mitigate economic effects on fishing states. Believe something constructive can be achieved this respect provided states concerned avoid public emotional campaign. US must endeavor resolve problem satisfactorily through some technique in order meet needs US fishermen.

Meanwhile, Canadian proposal needs strong support in order avert result with graver economic and security consequences.

Dulles

359. **Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 9, 1958—10 p.m.*

1085. Law of Sea. I again spoke to Drew last night and today urging he take prompt action to amend Canadian proposal incorporating recognition historic rights in some form. He again said Canadian Cabinet considering matter but he raised certain practical difficulties in defining historic rights and danger losing other support, and continued express doubt its practicability and feasibility and whether for Canada did not take away attractive features their proposal.

If Ottawa's 755,<sup>2</sup> paragraphs 2 and 4, to Department is indicative extent Canadians will go on historic rights, it seems evident: (A) It too little and too late to achieve objective enlisting West European support at conference, (B) would not resolve problem US fishing off Mexican and Canadian coasts (last paragraph Deptel 1080<sup>3</sup>).

If foregoing estimate Canadian position correct, and it subject Department's view possibility persuading Canadian Cabinet make prompt and definite shift in form of proposal at conference rather than

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department State, Central Files, 399.731/4-958. Confidential. Repeated to Ottawa and Reykjavik.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 755, April 8, reported that in a conversation with an Embassy official, Cadieux had offered a 5-year continuation of historic fishing rights to Iceland, Denmark, and Norway and was considering approaching India on the idea of a flat 12-mile limit. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-858)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1080, April 7, reported that the Department of State had begun a program of regular congressional briefings and asked for a "realistic" assessment of resolving the question of U.S. historical fishing rights off Mexican and Canadian coasts. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-258)

attempt to negotiate bilaterally later (third paragraph Ottawa's 755), question arises whether time has not come for US to disengage itself from support Canadians and to regain our full freedom of action.

Assume basic US objectives are still first to retain three mile rule inform conference pronouncement its favor; by same token, second to avoid conference pronouncement favoring extension territorial sea and, third we would really prefer conference failure of breadth territorial sea to an actual extension thereof.

Assume also we still prepared to pay price in loss to commercial fisheries, if absolutely necessary for retention three miles involved in US decision support original Canadian proposal.

There no doubt Canadian draft cannot achieve our main objective of retention three mile rule since in present form it has little prospect acceptance by conference. It also doubtful it can serve purpose our first fall-back of avoiding extension territorial sea. With three mile states divided because of opposition to Canadian proposal and with UK proposal affording them vehicle for positive rather than purely negative position, chances Canadian proposal of competing against flexible or straight twelve mile proposals have very considerably diminished. Statement of Indian position today supporting flexible proposal with maximum twelve miles territorial sea and further statement cannot support either Canadian or UK proposal makes this conclusion all the more certain, especially as he stated neither Canadian nor UK proposal could at present obtain majority and urged necessity for compromise within maximum of twelve miles which may mean six and six.<sup>4</sup> In present mood of conference such a proposal might win. It would not be surprising if in end Canada switched to support straight twelve miles which was their original position taken in 1956.

Means for US independent course is available in US proposal which filed as previously reported in order to retain our freedom of action in case it necessary. US proposal could be used for this purpose either by: (1) Amending it to provide for appropriate recognition historic rights or (2) amendments along line suggested beginning paragraph 6 ourtel 1053,<sup>5</sup> with addition historic rights within contiguous zone of six miles.

In our view amendment along lines Portuguese proposal (our 1074<sup>6</sup>) not adequate in view of strong general sentiment in conference favoring extension jurisdiction coastal state.

---

<sup>4</sup> For a more extensive summary of this statement, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.13/39, pp. 118-119.

<sup>5</sup> Document 356.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 1074, April 8, provided that states with historic fishing rights would be able to continue to fish in the contiguous zone subject only to internationally recognized conservation procedures. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-858)

It could be expected that voting alignments at the conference would form over issues of limited as against extended territorial sea rather than over historic rights issue. Iceland and perhaps Canada would be exceptions. Opposition to either alternative would be centered in Soviet and Arab groups, LAs and Afro-Asians other than Arabs would probably in first vote be divided but general support might be forthcoming from members of these groups if proposals weathered initial heavy weather in committee. While support of Iceland would be lost WE support might be gained; Denmark and Norway might favor it as compromise and several WEs now opposed Canadian proposal and preferring conference failure to it might vote for either alternative. Same would hold for Australia, New Zealand and perhaps South Africa and Liberia.

In view of great importance of tactics involved in voting priorities, consider it advisable consider have both alternatives before the conference. The first could take the form of an amendment of US proposal providing for appropriate recognition historic rights. Subject Department and Defense views the second could take the form of a proposal perhaps by other delegations along lines suggested our 1053 with addition historic rights which could be submitted as last minute proposal to be voted upon last. Other delegations are urgently asking whether we really plan to stick to three mile limit and whether we plan make any compromise proposal and whether security aspects of three miles are really as serious as we have painted them. Voting in Committee 1 on Articles 1-3 and 66 may start at any time.

---

**360. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 13, 1958—1 a.m.*

1120. Law of Sea. Following result discussion Dean, Sanders, Yingling, Colclough, Becker after canvass current thinking conference: British proposal maximum eight in favor; Canadian compromise (without reservation historic rights) likely get maximum twenty-five in favor forty-seven against and fourteen abstentions. Numbers likely vary because of spotty attendance due colds, etc. Mexican-Indian proposal thirty-eight or more in favor with possible switch by Colombia

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1358. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

and Costa Rica; thirty-eight against; ten abstentions. Real possibility this proposal due to absences or abstentions will gain majority in committee. Some question here whether entirely new proposal can be made in plenary. As to combination British proposal with six-mile contiguous zone qualified by historic rights difficulty is with aversion Afro-Asian group to conditions of existing rights over-flight and passage in outer three miles British segment. Best estimate here is that only compromise likely obtain two-thirds majority is maximum six-mile territorial sea plus maximum six-mile fishing zone qualified by historic rights such rights to have been exercised "in recent years". Not certain historic rights qualification outer six miles can be sold but believe reasonable chance and willing try. If this compromise is to be sold it must be put forward prior to voting by Committee One on territorial sea, which means by Tuesday, April 15. Request Ward be consulted on urgent basis with word that this is last clear chance to forestall twelve-mile or complete disagreement. Postponement on breadth territorial sea seriously considered but best view here is that it would widely be interpreted as failure conference. Most important is that while postponement might gain some supporters for Canadian proposal (but not two-thirds) probability cannot be discounted that in meantime situation regarding twelve-mile limit would deteriorate. What is needed at this time is U.S. leadership toward real compromise not delay. If permission for this is not forthcoming we must face at best conference failure with unilateral extensions twelve-mile territorial sea—at worst two-thirds agreement on twelve miles.

---

**361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 13, 1958—2:33 p.m.*

1138. Law of Sea. Your 1112, 1118, 1120, 1123.<sup>2</sup> As result conference Navy you are authorized work for compromise suggested your

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–1358. Confidential; Niact. Drafted and approved by Raymond who signed for Dulles and cleared in draft with Ward, Looney, and Pender.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1120 is *supra*. Telegram 1112, April 12, transmitted a report on the work of all five committees on April 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–1258) Telegram 1118, April 12, transmitted a preliminary appraisal along the lines of that in telegram 1120. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 1123, April 13, transmitted a "tentative" draft of Article 3 encompassing two 6-mile zones and provision for historic rights. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4–1358)

1120 and 1123 subject to following comments. Any extension territorial sea particularly serious in light committee action on Article 24 especially in view defeat UK amendment re innocent passage warships through international straits without authorization. International Court in *Corfu Channel* case recognized such right of innocent passage without authorization in time of peace. If this point can be reopened you should make every effort preserve right of warships to navigate international straits without authorization. Suggest best chance of success might be by tying to ICJ decision. Also highly desirable assure aircraft passage through international straits without authorization. Possibly these rights could be recognized by resolution advanced in committee or plenary. However would not want to make record worse by having such resolution advanced and defeated.

Assume you would assess carefully chance of success of your compromise suggestion before formally introducing it as once we go on record favor extension territorial sea we would not want to be jockeyed into further concessions than you suggest. In advancing compromise we should make clear to others we intend to maintain three-mile position should conference not accept it. FYI We would prefer conference break up without agreement rather than adopting anything more drastic.

Dulles

---

**362. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 14, 1958—10 p.m.*

1132. Law of Sea. Deptel 1138.<sup>2</sup> We will report in separate tel on my initial conversations with view to preparation for introduction our new compromise.<sup>3</sup> Our assessment at present is that there is good chance for simple majority in favor of compromise in First Committee, and with hard work good chance build this up to two-thirds (assuming Soviet and Arab opposition and number abstentions) before plenary vote, and we are taking every measure to that end. We shall of course avoid being jockeyed into further concessions and will press for change in committee action on Article 24.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1458. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 365.



We hope Dept will urgently circularize all embassies except Soviet bloc, Arab States (unless Dept feels Iraq and Lebanon should be approached) and Iceland. We suggest missions be asked to approach govts at high level stressing this is last clear chance to obtain agreement which will establish stability in maritime law and make possible maintenance of overall free world interests in this important field. This especially important today when free world sorely pressed by Communist offensive. Only these paramount considerations have led US to consider departure from its hitherto inflexible insistence on three-mile limit.

Embassy should be requested to stress as appropriate locally:

1. Six-mile maximum territorial sea is major and unprecedented US concession.
2. Fishing provisions constitute sincere attempt to balance interests of coastal states and those of states primarily interested in overseas fisheries.
3. Existing and future bilateral and regional arrangements are fully recognized, thus permitting further equitable adjustments of national interests.
4. Conservation measures are expressly recognized.

We hope govts will appreciate we have made sincere effort to include in our compromise formula every possible means of accommodation to interests and views of our friends, even at considerable cost to ourselves, and trust that in interest of stable and fruitful international relations we will have sympathetic response to this final and extremely important step on our part.

---

**363. Letter From Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Senator Henry M. Jackson to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 15, 1958.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We are writing to you again in connection with the Conference currently being held in Geneva. As you know, the Conference, among other things, is seeking to reach agreement on the extent of our territorial sea. The position of the United States historically has been that the territorial sea extends three miles offshore. It's reported that other nations are urging a twelve-mile limit.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1558. Senator Magnuson was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

This Conference grows out of certain proposals made by the United Nations International Law Commission. Initially, we are sure, this Government had the choice of attending or not attending the Conference—initially, we had the choice of discouraging such a conference. It's our understanding, however, that the United States Government through the State Department indicated early in the game its willingness to participate and, since that time, has been active in bringing the Conference into being. We mention this because whatever encouragement or stimulation our Government has given to this meeting places a special responsibility upon our officials to insure that we are not putting our neck in a noose.

We have just returned from the Pacific Northwest. While there, we attended a meeting participated in by all segments of the fishing industry. We, and they, are extremely disturbed over unofficial reports reaching us regarding the progress, or lack thereof, being made in Geneva.

Over a year ago, on April 8th to be exact, Senator Magnuson, as Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Honorable Theodore Francis Green, expressing grave concern over the possible outcome of the proposed Conference. At that time, the Conference was scheduled in Rome rather than in Geneva. In that letter, Senator Magnuson expressed his conviction that the appropriate committees and members of the Congress should confer with State Department officials to insure that Congressional and industry views would be considered by the Department of State in formulating this country's position regarding the territorial sea.

On April 24th, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee responded to Senator Magnuson's April 8th letter, indicating that he, too, was much concerned over the position this nation might take at the forthcoming Conference. Senator Green stated further that he and members of his staff would confer personally with members of the State Department on the subject.

During the intervening months, we, together with other members of the Washington State Delegation, have held numerous conferences with Mr. Herrington, Mr. Looney and yourself regarding this matter. In addition, representatives of the industry have made special trips to Washington, D.C., to present the disastrous results which would flow to the fishing industry of the Pacific Northwest from any new agreement on a twelve-mile expanse of territorial sea.

We have been presented recently, through William Macomber, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, with the "Résumé of Law of the Sea Conference" through April 1, 1958.<sup>2</sup> In that résumé,

---

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

Mr. Macomber recounts the drive put on by the Soviet bloc for a twelve-mile limit. In addition, he discusses the so-called Canadian compromise which involves a three-mile limit for purposes of sovereignty, "but an additional nine-mile contiguous zone. . . .<sup>3</sup> over which the coastal country could exercise exclusive fishing rights." He further states that the United States Delegation "has been seeking with every means at its command to persuade other delegations to accept a qualification of the Canadian proposal under which United States fishermen could continue their activities in those areas off foreign coasts where they had historically taken fish." In another place in his résumé, Mr. Macomber alleges, ". . . the United States Delegation is pressing vigorously for Conference recognition of the *principle of abstention* so as to protect the salmon and other fisheries off our north-western coasts from depletion."

If we were to judge the position of our United States Delegation solely from the résumé just mentioned, we would be forced to conclude that our representatives at Geneva are doing everything within their power to protect the fishing industry of this country. Unfortunately, unofficial reports reaching us create the suspicion that the reports given to members of Congress by the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations do not square with what is actually going on.

A majority, if not all, of the members of Congress interested in this problem have consistently insisted that the United States should adhere to its historical position on territorial waters—namely, a three-mile limit. There is evidence coming out of Geneva, including the résumé above cited, which would convince any reasonable man that our delegation has fallen back to a second line, or even a third line of defense. The résumé states that our delegation is now pushing for the so-called Canadian compromise, with a provision that fishing grounds within the twelve-mile limit, historically explored and developed by United States fishermen, be protected. Later evidence indicates that the proviso has not been dropped and that our delegation is merely supporting the Canadian compromise with no protection to historical fishing grounds.

If such a position is maintained, and if an agreement along those lines is finally signed, the results will be disastrous, particularly to fisheries in the Pacific Northwest and in the Gulf. Along the Canadian coast, for example, fishermen from the Pacific Northwest would be virtually excluded from the fishing banks which they explored over fifty years ago and have been farming ever since. The bottom fisheries in that area would be reserved solely for Canadians, with the result that the United States fishermen would be put out of business and the

---

<sup>3</sup> All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

United States consumer of bottom fish in the Pacific Northwest would be purchasing the products not from American citizens but from Canadian citizens. We think such a result is indefensible.

Earlier, we quoted from Secretary Macomber's résumé a statement alleging that the United States Delegation in Geneva is "pressing vigorously" for the abstention principle. The abstention principle, of course, is vital to the preservation of salmon runs in Alaskan, Puget Sound and Columbia River waters. Again, unofficial reports coming to us create the strong suspicion that our delegation is not pressing for adoption of the abstention principle—that the abstention principle has been lost in the diplomatic maze.

If the agreement coming out of Geneva does not include the abstention principle, we and the entire fishing industry would be forced to exert every means at our command to prevent ratification of the agreement when it comes to the Senate.

Heretofore, we have made clear to representatives of the State Department our conviction that any agreement signed at Geneva by this country should be presented to the United States Senate for ratification in the form of a treaty or convention. We have been assured that this is your intent. To date, however, we have nothing in writing on the subject, and we wish to reiterate in strongest terms our belief that a matter of this importance to the security and fisheries of the nation must come to the Senate for action.

May we summarize by saying that we and the entire fishing industry are extremely disturbed at the direction the Geneva Convention is taking. We believe that the representations made herein are in accord with the views of Senators and Members of Congress from all Coastal States. We respectfully urge that you, personally, transmit to Mr. Herrington, who heads our delegation in Geneva, the views we have expressed to the end that he and our other representatives engaged in the actual negotiations will exert every possible means at their command to protect the United States fishing industry, in line with the commitments made to us repeatedly since April 8th of 1957.

Thank you for your cooperation. Warm personal regards.<sup>4</sup>

Sincerely,

**Warren G. Magnuson, U.S.S.**

**Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.**

---

<sup>4</sup> In a second letter later in the day, the Senators stated that they had heard the U.S. Delegation was going to propose the 6-mile limit with 6 additional miles for fishing and concluded that this position could not help the public interest. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1558)

In replies dated April 19, Herter stated that if the U.S. Delegation successfully carried out its instructions, the fishing industry would probably lose some of its privileges, but this would forestall far greater losses that would occur without the conference. (*Ibid.*)

### 364. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All American Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 15, 1958—8:54 p.m.*

965. Law of the Sea. Unless you perceive objection you are requested to convey immediately to FonMin, or highest official available, estimate of situation at Geneva and urge his support of compromise indicated below using arguments you believe most persuasive. We believe there is definite probability of breakdown of Law of Sea Conference over width territorial sea unless some compromise can be reached between British proposal for qualified six-mile limit, Canadian proposal for three-mile territorial sea plus nine-mile fisheries zone, and Mexican proposal (which Soviets are supporting) for flexible three to twelve-mile territorial sea which is twelve-mile sea in disguise. FYI. Flexible 3-12 proposal also being supported by India thus far. End FYI.

Breakdown would leave question width territorial sea and other important related aspects of law of sea in state anarchy from which all or most free world states will suffer. Only extremists could benefit.

To prevent this wholly undesirable consummation Conference, U.S. Del. after canvass of situation and discussion with many other Delegations believes some compromise between British proposal and Mexican proposal can produce Conference agreement. Such compromise must take account of widespread desire for special fishery zone and same time meet drive for wider territorial sea. Apparent now Canadian compromise cannot swing necessary votes away from twelve-mile territorial sea, particularly since introduction UK compromise proposal.

US believes this last clear chance obtain Conference agreement which would assure stability maritime law and yet would not give rise completely dire consequences twelve-mile limit would with respect maintenance overall free world interests.

Based on above US believes following package compromise proposal will work and hence willing support: Maximum six-mile territorial sea plus maximum six-mile fishing zone provided nationals other states fishing in outer six-mile zone regularly last ten years may continue do so subject right coastal state impose conservation measures.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1558. Confidential. Drafted by Looney and Pender; cleared with Raymond, Bacon, ARA, EUR, IO, L, NEA, and the Navy; approved by Pender who signed for Dulles. Also sent for information only to Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Mexico City, Cairo, Jidda, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, Beirut, Baghdad, Reykjavik, Geneva, Djakarta, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and San Salvador.

This would not affect existing or future bilateral or multilateral arrangements on fishery problems with respect to the parties to those agreements.

FYI. We estimate only two possible endings of Conference if our new compromise cannot win (1) acceptance of three to twelve-mile flexible provision or (2) adjournment of Conference in disagreement. In latter case this may mean twelve-mile limit territorial sea because number of states will immediately unilaterally claim twelve miles. End FYI.

Posts in countries supporting narrow territorial sea can emphasize that abortive conference is definite defeat of proponents of narrow territorial sea since this would mean we had failed twice in thirty years sell narrow territorial sea, and fresh outbreak extended unilateral claims would be inevitable. Furthermore, believe much better chance getting historic rights proviso tacked on outer six mile than on outer 9 of Canadian proposal.

Info addressees: Can raise the matter if it would prove useful purpose.

Dulles

---

**365. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 16, 1958—9 a.m.*

1154. Law of Sea. Coming at moment of deepest pessimism and frustration, new American proposal<sup>2</sup> has kindled imagination of delegates holding widely divergent views and revived hope for successful outcome of conference. While many delegates will need new instructions before they can commit their governments, and while we realize that the time for such instructions involving in many cases cabinet

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1658. Confidential. Received at 6:35 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the U.S. proposal, circulated as A/CONF.13/C.1/L.159, which called for a territorial sea of 6 miles and an additional 6-mile fishing zone subject to historic rights, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.13/39, p. 253. Text of Dean's statement made on April 16 introducing the proposal was transmitted in telegram 1152 from Geneva, April 16, and amended in telegram 1159 to Geneva of the same date. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1658)

decisions is very short, we are most encouraged by progress we have made since we began to discuss new proposal 36 hours ago. Following is summary of our most important discussions.

1. Late evening April 13 I had long and extremely frank session with Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller (UK), Drew of Canada and Bailey of Australia from which it quickly appeared that conclusion was inescapable that both Canadian and UK proposals were lost and that there was real danger of bandwagon movement toward Mexican-Indian proposal. I put to our guests the question what was the least that could be done to prevent a conference breakdown which would be most harmful to us all. In canvass of various possibilities it soon became apparent that six plus six with historic rights offered best hope. Since I had not yet been authorized to make new proposal I could not ask others to seek decisions from their governments, but it was obvious that Sir Reginald was personally much impressed and that Drew, while deeply disappointed, recognized the inevitable. Bailey made flat statement that in his opinion such a proposal could easily obtain two-thirds majority.

2. After receipt of authorization to proceed April 14<sup>3</sup> I at once informed Canadians and British. Canadians were downcast but appreciated we had given every support to their proposal as long as it had reasonable chance of adoption. Sir Reginald indicated he would personally support our proposal and would recommend that British Cabinet approve it, saying he would if necessary fly to London for purpose.

3. I thereupon informed Sen (India), who said he could make no immediate commitment but was obviously personally delighted. He said he would inform his government at once and thought that even Indian co-sponsorship might not be out of the question. Like a number of others to whom I spoke later in the evening he was high in praise of "constructive" US attitude. Same note was struck by number of delegates of various countries to whom I spoke at Ceylon reception evening April 14.

4. To head off possible complications I spoke to Sen morning April 15 re Indian proposal to amend Article 49 of ILC text in Committee III to include twelve-mile fishing zone. Sen agreed he would not push his amendment to Article 49 until he received instructions re our proposal.

5. I spent most of this morning seeing heads of Western European Delegations individually and explaining our proposal to them. Reaction most encouraging. Principal points as follows:

a. Denmark—Finds proposal very constructive but needs new instructions. Last Friday received instructions withdrawing support from Canadian proposal.

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 361.

b. Ireland—Believes proposal acceptable but needs instructions. Unhappy at six-mile provision since does not want responsibility for patrolling more than three miles.

c. Norway—Will probably accept if British accept and if Canadian proposal withdrawn.

d. Belgium, Holland, Sweden—Preliminary reaction favorable but Sweden raised problem of schools of fish which move substantial distances and which would not be covered therefore by provision for historic rights in zones.

e. Spain—Without instructions but personally favorably disposed.

f. Portugal—Proposal completely acceptable.

g. Germany—Could have accepted Canadian proposal with Portuguese amendment. Accept our proposal contingent upon formulation. Portuguese representative later informed US Del they had persuaded Germany in favor our proposal.

h. Turkey—Believes proposal acceptable to Turkey.

i. Greece—Favorably disposed but asking instructions.

j. Italy—Concerned about situation vis-à-vis Yugoslavia in Adriatic. Accepts our analysis conference situation. Probably will support.

k. Israel—Noncommittal but pointed out that cut-off date for established fishing will affect their decision.

6. At luncheon today (15th) I heard that the Indians had asked Stavropoulos for advice as to how we would feel if they amended our proposal to provide that any state which had had twelve-mile limit over a certain period of years or prior to a certain date would not be required to change it to six. Purpose of this amendment would be to get Soviet support for our proposal by in effect recognizing status quo as regards USSR. A number of delegates urged me strongly to see Tunkin and some were clearly hopeful of agreement on this basis. Naturally we expressed view this proposal totally unacceptable. Saw Sen later and pointed out that proposal to hand Soviets diplomatic victory would be sorry return for US demonstrated spirit of compromise.

7. Gros (France) inquired carefully whether there were qualitative or quantitative limits on historic fishing rights or subdivisions of contiguous zones to which historic rights would be limited. I assured him there were not. Although Gros made it clear French would prefer historic rights be linked to schools of fish wherever they migrated rather than to specific contiguous zones, he indicated French would support on this basis if "regularly" could be changed to "fair degree of regularity" because of bad seasons, etc.

8. Report circulated in conference this afternoon that Canadians planning to introduce new proposal consisting of straight six-mile territorial sea plus straight six-mile contiguous fishing zone without



historic rights. No such proposal yet tabled to our knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Will seek clarification from Canadians soonest. Further report indicated initiative came from Arabs who urging this course on Canadians.

9. Petren (Sweden) stated he was strongly in favor of our proposal in principle but doubted Swedish Cabinet could take decision to support it unless conference were adjourned for two weeks. Ruegger (Switzerland) thought we had made most constructive gesture but wondered whether there was time to sell it unless conference were adjourned for brief period. Krispis (Greece) said he was bound by instructions to three miles and was not sure that Greek Cabinet could approve change in time remaining to conference.

10. [paragraph (40 lines of source text) not declassified]

11. Manningham-Buller and I saw Tunkin this afternoon. Tunkin refused comment on proposal pending study and took position that only real compromise was for US to accept twelve-mile territorial sea. We urged postponement of voting in order permit states consider US compromise proposal. Tunkin pleasant but completely noncommittal.

12. Ceylon will support.

---

<sup>4</sup> For text of this proposal, which offered two 6-mile zones without historic rights, and which was introduced during the 50th meeting of the First Committee on the afternoon of April 16 and circulated as A/CONF13/C.1/L.77/Rev. 2, see U.N. doc. A/CONF13/39, p. 232.

---

**366. Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 16, 1958.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am writing to you again in connection with recent developments in the Geneva Law of the Sea Conference. As you know, on Sunday I gave Navy approval to a recommendation by Mr. Dean that our delegation be authorized to work for a new compromise, i.e., six mile territorial sea plus a six mile contiguous zone for fisheries, qualified by historic fishing rights. This decision on my part was made with a deep sense of the resultant loss to U.S. seapower. It was made solely to avoid the imminent probability of something far worse. I can assure you it was made with great reluctance.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1658. Confidential.

At the same time, I expressed my grave concern with the recent Committee action on Article 24 requiring advance authorization or notification for warships to transit territorial waters in general. I don't see how we can live with such a requirement. Even worse, however, is the additional action by the same Committee which casts doubt on the right of warships to navigate international straits compromising territorial waters without authorization. This is shocking and directly counter to established international law and practice—we cannot accept it. As you know, such a requirement would severely burden naval mobility and create all sorts of international complications and tensions.

I should think that if the U.S. is prepared to make a real sacrifice on the breadth of the territorial sea, we should be able to muster support for our position on the innocent passage issue, at least among our friends. However, a telegram received from Mr. Dean yesterday, 15 April (Embtel 1142<sup>2</sup>), casts serious doubt on this unless drastic action is taken. I can understand our inability to gain support from some of the countries mentioned, but it is inconceivable to me that we cannot count on our allies and friends when the chips are down on issues vital to security of the Free World. This is particularly true in the case of the Philippines, Korea and China. It is, in my opinion, truly a shocking situation.

Again, may I say that I reluctantly approved a real sacrifice on the breadth of the territorial sea. I urgently request that you use every means available to secure support for our delegation on these vital issues.<sup>3</sup>

With warmest personal regards,  
Sincerely,

**Arleigh Burke**

---

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1142 from Geneva, April 15, analyzed 7 votes in the First Committee which showed that 35 countries had not voted with the United States even once, and another 12 on only one occasion. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-1558)

<sup>3</sup> In replying for the Secretary of State on April 18, Herter explained that the U.S. proposal had been put forth only "with great reluctance," and the Department of State was working hard to reverse the decision on innocent passage. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-1658)

**367. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Legal Adviser (Becker) in Geneva and the Deputy Legal Adviser (Raymond) in Washington, April 16, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

## SUBJECT

Conference on Law of Sea

Mr. Becker stated the Indians, Canadians, and Mexicans had introduced a new proposal (see Geneva 1165<sup>2</sup>). He said that last night the Indians had suggested such a proposal and we had indicated to them that the introduction of such a proposal would ruin the Conference and we would consider it unfriendly. The Canadians did not tell us they were joining in it until after we had introduced our proposal and after Mr. Dean's speech in support of it. Mr. Becker felt this again was a very unfriendly act.

He stated that after the Conference broke up several of the representatives told us they were much irritated and upset by the action of the Canadians and Mexicans and our Delegation feels that this proposal may backfire to our advantage. However, if it seems likely to succeed, our Delegation intends to work to break up the Conference rather than to permit it to carry.

He asked that we get out a cable tonight to all Embassies to have them urge opposition to the Canadian-Mexican-Indian proposal and to support ours, emphasizing we had gone to great lengths to develop a compromise that would bring about agreement whereas the Canadian-Mexican-Indian proposal is designed to break up the Conference.<sup>3</sup> No European nation except Norway and perhaps Denmark has any use for it.

The Soviets strangely have opposed this new proposal on the ground that it is unfair to some nations—those that have claimed twelve miles before this Conference can continue it but no one else can get it. The voting begins Friday.

Mr. Becker also wishes highest representations to Canadians and Indians to present the way we view their action.

As requested by Mr. Allen, Mr. Raymond asked Mr. Becker to advise us next week as soon as it is clear what kind of documents are coming out of the Conference so that full powers may be obtained.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1658. Drafted by Raymond.

<sup>2</sup> Dated April 16. (*Ibid.*) For text of this proposal, which was circulated as A/CONF13/C.1/L.77/Rev.2, see U.N. doc. A/CONF13/39, p. 232.

<sup>3</sup> At 1 a.m. on April 17, Dean cabled a similar message, stating that the crucial moment for applying pressure through U.S. Embassies had arrived. (Telegram 1171 from Geneva; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1758) Circular telegram 973 instructing all posts along these lines was dispatched at 4:05 p.m., April 17. (*Ibid.*)

(Mr. Raymond immediately informed Admiral Ward, who suggested we emphasize the proposal would work to the advantage of the Soviet bloc, who have already claimed twelve miles.)

### 368. Telegram From the Embassy in Iceland to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Reykjavik, April 17, 1958—4 p.m.*

420. Law of Sea. Foreign Minister called me in this morning to express in strongest terms Iceland's shock and disappointment at US proposal, which he said was indistinguishable from British and utterly unacceptable to GOI. He warned public indignation at what universally considered betrayal Iceland's interests might do incalculable harm Icelandic-American relations and attitude toward NATO.

I explained proposal designed provide best possible compromise between conflicting views our friends and allies and avert breakup conference without agreement which would result in anarchic situation. I pointed out we had vigorously supported Canadian plan long as it appeared have chance acceptance.

He replied he believed Canadian proposal might still carry and Iceland continuing fight for it. If outcome conference unsatisfactory, he repeated, Iceland will proclaim 12-mile limit and attempt enforce it.

Foreign Minister said Hans Andersen indicated in phone conversation Wednesday US delegation considering some concessions GOI viewpoint and expressed hope US had not said its last word.

Foreign Minister's estimate gravity public reaction does not appear exaggerated. Prime Minister's organ *Timinn* carries savage editorial denunciation US and England. Headlines in all papers except Social Democrat *Althydubladid*, which under Foreign Minister's instructions lay off, echo "stab in back" theme. There is serious possibility some revival long-dormant anti-American and neutralist agitation if US unable make some concession Icelandic viewpoint.<sup>2</sup>

**Olson**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1758. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Geneva for Dean.

<sup>2</sup> On April 18, Dean reported that Andersen, Chairman of the Icelandic Delegation, had approached him along similar lines and that he had authorized Herrington to explore with other delegations the possibility of a formula to solve Iceland's special situation. (Telegram 1199 from Geneva; *ibid.*, 399.731/4-1858)

**369. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 21, 1958—11 a.m.*

1209. Law of Sea. Conference clearly reveals work of well planned, well organized, well disciplined blocs of USSR and its satellites led by Professor Tunkin of USSR working with Afro-Asian bloc led by Sen of India and following collapse of Sen's leadership because of his sponsorship of Canada, Mexico and Indian proposal (our 1165<sup>2</sup>) which shocked the conscience of the conference, by Loutfi of UAR and Shukairi of Saudi Arabia and with Latin American bloc led by Garcia Robles of Mexico. [2 sentences (11 lines of source text) not declassified] Cambodia in abstaining also indicated each member Afro-Asian group in caucus had been forced publicly to state they would vote with bloc and would not change vote even though they had previously indicated they were favorable to US. Even Barnes of Liberia who abstained on our proposal appeared badly intimidated by group tactics.

Bhutto of Pakistan who stood staunchly with US indicated group was trying to cause trouble for him at home.

Garcia Robles in asking for a roll call on our motion for priority (our 1207<sup>3</sup>) said he did so in order that opinion in Latin American countries might know where to place Latin American Delegates voting with US in asking for priority over Indian-Mexican Resolution.

Our support of Israel and situation in Gulf of Aqaba of course unites entire Arab bloc against US on twelve-mile limit.

This hardening of disciplined blocs who vote as unit on all questions without regard to merits particular issue raises most serious questions for United States policy. For even in countries where we have extended extensive aid and have long record of friendship with US apparently deem themselves bound as newly emancipated nations to vote solidly with their brethren against their former masters and those associated with them.

Speeches by French and UK Delegates were for most part received in sullen silence.

Even though differing from US and not supporting US because of bloc voting or because new nations without experience or little or no realization of the actual meaning of the three-mile breadth of territo-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–2158. Confidential; Niact. A retyped copy of this telegram was transmitted to President Eisenhower by Dulles on April 24. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4–2458)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 367.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1207, April 20, transmitted brief summaries of the three meetings of the First Committee on April 19 in which all four proposals on the width of the territorial sea lost. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–2058)

rial sea or the duties involved in adopting and policing a wider breadth of territorial sea, such newer nations favor the Indian-Mexican three to twelve-mile proposal supported by the Soviet and Arabs as a bloc because it gives such newer nations freedom to choose own breadth and regulation up to twelve miles of customs immigration and fishing without restraint in respect historic fishing rights and because seemed more consonant with their dignity and sovereignty as new nations.

Time and again the three-mile breadth was attacked and ridiculed not because it was inherently wrong but because the particular state was not in existence when it was adopted and they must have change labelled as progress.

Even though the unilateral extension to twelve miles and the closing of bays by the Soviet deprived millions of the right to free navigation and fishing it was regarded nevertheless as progress because it cut down the area formerly freely available to the large maritime powers who are deemed to be wholly selfish in wanting to come within three miles of any coast or to fish up to that distance and overfly high seas within that distance without express permission.

The ingenuity, ability, capital and markets of the older powers is resented and the use of large mother ships off coastal waters is frequently denounced as taking the bread out of the mouths of local coastal fishermen operating out of port on a small ship—on one day basis.

Freedom of the high seas instead of a common heritage is regarded as a legal fiction invented by the maritime powers or their lawyers in order to rob the populations of the newly created nations who, since there is no more land, wish to annex the high seas as their lawful right and who is to say to them nay except the greedy maritime powers.

It is readily apparent that a new social revolution is bursting forth and burgeoning among the peoples of the newly created states who will insist on re-examining all laws, customs and mores adopted by older civilizations before their birth as a nation and who now proclaim whatever is new is better than the old.

In other words—move over pleasantly or else.

In my judgment the implication of this moving social revolution of new nationalities must be studied with the utmost seriousness and concern and every effort made to understand it. For with bloc voting, constructive and imaginative proposals, supposedly persuasive speeches and ideas and the sacrifice of positions vital to US may not essentially change the voting results. Indeed the very positions may be ridiculed and lampooned.

Indeed in this conference quite apart from the ability of individual experts all positions are allotted on a bloc basis or five major power basis which puts US into the category of "has beens" since certain

positions in addition are allotted to the Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans, Afro-Asians and Latin Americans but none to North Americans.

It is, I think, clear that if the Greek proposal for three-mile territorial limit had come to a vote it would not have received over eight votes and the Swedish proposal for a straight six-mile territorial sea while not entirely conclusive received a maximum of sixteen votes.

Although our proposal with its reservation of historic fishing rights was not satisfactory to new nations who wanted at least 12 miles for an unrestricted territorial sea for security, fiscal, immigration, fishing and other reasons it was praised by many countries who, even though not favoring it, recognized it as a creative, bold and imaginative attempt to reach a solution.

Even though our proposal failed to receive a majority due to the defection of the Philippines, Korea and Liberia, El Salvador and Costa Rica, the failure to be present of San Marino and Laos, and abstention of Sweden we were praised for making it and practically every speaker praised the United States for its constructive, helpful and conciliatory attitude in trying to make the conference a success.

This illustrates, I believe, the need for US not to be too negative or stand pat in our approaches but to be thinking constantly of new and challenging ways to meet what will become an increasingly difficult problem.

The Soviet Union made no concessions here whatsoever. They operated almost entirely behind the scenes in blocs or through their very effective associates [16 words not declassified].

But they certainly can't claim any moral leadership in the public conference and so far the conference certainly has not enhanced their prestige.

The Indians and Mexicans will certainly press in plenary for a two-thirds vote for their 3- to 12-mile flexible territorial sea and the Canadians will press hard for six miles territorial sea and six unrestricted fishing zone or twelve miles unrestricted fishing zone overall. The proposal has its attractions. Our historic rights has its liabilities.

We have clearly stated we are for three miles and have made a forward looking, imaginative proposal for six and six restricted for which leadership we have been commended but now we are asked to go further.

Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon asked today for our further or new position and I stated we had already gone very far. I recommend we listen but continue to press for our proposal and that we make no further offers of compromise and that we do not accept the Canadian proposal of six and six unrestricted. The UK Delegation agrees.

The Canadian proposal means a tremendous loss to our fishermen and constitutes a great detriment to our merchant fleet and commercial aircraft as well as to defense and I doubt if public opinion would sustain it or further concessions. The Canadian attitude will undoubtedly hurt the extension of the reciprocal trade act or lead to tariff imposition on Canadian products which should be pointed out in Ottawa.

So I recommend we continue to press for our reasonable position and continue to appear patient and constructive but that we not yield further in order to get agreement at this conference unless you believe even further concessions are in order.

At present, the failure of the conference cannot be laid at our door. We have united our NATO allies and aside from effect of our proposal on Japan and Iceland, which is not remediable and the completely selfish attitude of Canada which is unfortunate in our over-all relations we have been able to accomplish a great deal of constructive work on fisheries and the Continental Shelf with Latin Americans and others.

We might, of course, have picked up certain Latin American votes by eliminating all reference to arbitration; or we might have attracted the vote of some of the newer nations if we had provided for the establishment of a base period on the percentage of fish caught by pounds or dollars; but the disruption of fishing fleets and gear during World War II and the multiplication of new nations not in existence in 1946-1950 and the difficulty of putting a ceiling on future development of larger ships, scientific development of fisheries, greater investment of capital and ideas, particular geographical zones, types of fish, exclusion of the products of the Continental Shelf, etc. Identifying the particular nations to whom the right accrued, etc. by a too rigid base period expressed in either tons, dollars or percentages might also have lost the votes of other nations and is too complicated to work out in remaining time.

Ecuador, for example, wanted historic rights to terminate after five years and Argentina wanted them established only by a prescriptive period under civil law which might have given the Japanese rights existing before World War II and would be difficult to prove.

The Swedes have been excluded from fishing in the Baltic by the Soviet and so were the Japanese by the establishment of the MacArthur line by SCAP but if we modify "regularly" by force majeure we open Pandora's box.

In future conference believe to maximum extent possible we should attempt iron out all differences of maritime powers in advance and not permit foreign office to advise abstention or negative votes on really important issues because of much less important matters pending between Department. We are only participant here who is not a



member of a bloc having group information on meetings. Time and time again our closest friends vote against us or fail to support us. As bloc voting increases we must do everything possible to avoid this.

If conference postponed for only short period believe issues may harden and blocs may well gain votes if time is not used to straighten out difficult issues. On many of them we don't appear to have reliable and up to date information and trade association information often appears exaggerated or possible losses stated at maximum.

Will continue explore situation most sympathetically but am saying we have put forward our very best proposition and we have no intention of bettering it and ball is now in field of twelve-mile extremists.

Expect continued tough in fighting on Articles 3 and 66 and strong attack our position in plenary.

---

**370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference of the Law of the Sea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 21, 1958—11:30 p.m.*

1218. Law of Sea. Urtels 1208, 1209, 1213.<sup>2</sup>

1. Appreciate greatly your careful and thorough analysis of underlying factors influencing work of Conference. This most helpful in understanding situation. Delighted with general reaction other Dels.

2. Agree you should reintroduce our compromise proposal in plenary (unless it goes there by virtue favorable vote on reintroduction in committee suggested ur 1224<sup>3</sup>) as best means having rallying point for opposition to other proposals and as only genuine compromise.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2158. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Raymond who signed for Herter and cleared in substance with Herter, Bacon, Hawley, Looney, Luboeansky, Admiral Ward, EUR, and NEA.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1209 is *supra*. Telegram 1208, April 21, summarized Dean's statement made in the First Committee on April 19 and stated that the U.S. objective should now be to prevent any conference conclusion and, if possible, prevent even a simple majority vote for extension of the territorial sea. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2158) Telegram 1213, April 21, summarized the approach that should be made to the European, Latin American, Middle East and African, and Far Eastern states in support of the U.S. position. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Dated April 21. (*Ibid.*)

3. Agree you should not compromise further, but seek defeat and prevention majority vote for flat 12, flexible 3-12, and 6 plus 6 without historic fishing rights. Lack of agreement is preferable alternative to these.

4. You should by all means seek defeat and prevention majority vote for second half Canadian proposal (12 mile fishing zone without historic rights).

5. If there is simple majority for any proposal to which we are opposed, or if no proposal receives majority, you should orally make clear this is not Conference agreement and that United States stands on statement made in Committee One quoted in 1208 that 3 mile limit is rule of international law in absence international agreement to contrary. However, do not believe desirable formalize as British suggest. Such document would stand chance only handful signatures, and if anything would tend support argument majority nations do not agree. Also might inspire similar documents by 12 milers who could probably obtain many more signatures.

6. If, in spite your efforts, undesirable proposal receives two-thirds you should report full details to Department and await instructions. Suggest telephone as well as cable.

7. Do not favor any move looking to adjournment for period time or new Conference. Positions would harden and our task become more difficult. Suggest you work for mere report of failure to agree on width territorial sea and close-in fishing rights.

8. Department soliciting support positions above paras 2 and 3 along lines suggested your 1213.

**Herter**

---

**371. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 26, 1958—11 p.m.*

1277. Law of Sea. For the Secretary. First reaction to events in conference re territorial sea April 25 among delegations and press is that US has scored substantial moral victory in obtaining greater meas-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2658. Confidential; Priority.

ure of support for its compromise than was received for any other proposal.<sup>2</sup>

Western Europeans are jubilant, particularly British, French, Swedes and Dutch and there is general feeling that NATO solidarity has been maintained and strengthened as result of our exercise.

Even with Iceland, as separately reported,<sup>3</sup> formerly existing resentment has been substantially moderated by our efforts help work out their problems here though they have consistently voted against our proposal. We were of course badly handicapped by solid Arab support twelve miles on Gulf of Aqaba and failure Congress remove tariff on foreign copper which lost Chile vote and provisions in constitutions certain Latin American countries.

On other hand, result of voting has been extremely sharp setback for Soviets, who cleverly attempted to remain in background and utilize nationalist sentiment and economic aspirations of new, underdeveloped countries in order to produce a triumph for twelve-mile theorists. Sharp rebuff to Soviet proposal indicates collapse of this strategy. It is also clear that conference has shown up extravagance of 200-mile CEP claims and greatly weakened future positions of these states. [2 sentences (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

One key factor in failure of our proposal to gain two-thirds majority was of course attitude of Canada. Canadian Del badly split and very unhappy.

We have refrained from suggesting that Department make representations to Ottawa in last few days because we did not think this would serve any useful purpose. Nevertheless Dept may wish at some appropriate time to inform Canadians that delegation, while appreciating that Canadians can act as they choose on any issue, after our offering complete cooperation on first proposal has been shocked by, first, Canadian action in moving its proposal without any prior consultation with us even though we had consulted most closely with them on our own developing strategy; second, by repeated, thinly veiled gibes at United States by Drew, though on our part we carefully refrained from any such innuendo or denunciation and constantly maintained friendly and constructive attitude which has paid dividends even with those voting against US; [28 words not declassified].

---

<sup>2</sup> In the plenary sessions on April 25, no proposal on Article 3 received the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption, although the U.S. proposal came closest, losing by 45–33–7. For a summary of the proceedings and the results of the roll-call votes on each proposal, see U.N. doc. 1/CONF13/38, pp. 35–47.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

We cannot avoid a certain satisfaction that, with all of Drew's maneuvering, the Canadian proposal on a contiguous fishing zone garnered fewer votes in plenary than it had in Committee One. This is generally interpreted as something of a setback for the Canadians and they fully realize it. [*1 sentence (8 words of source text) not declassified*]

Our inability to secure a two-thirds vote was due in last analysis to the effectiveness of strong bloc pressures on which I commented in my tel 1209.<sup>4</sup> Though we have no bloc ourselves, our general prestige is great enough to prevail over efforts of only one or two blocs. However, when preponderant members of three blocs—Afro-Asians, Latin Americans, and Soviet—form a tight alliance, and in view Israeli stand we have no negotiability the best we have been able to do is to obtain a standoff by mobilizing our friends in Western Europe and our especially close allies in Latin American and Afro-Asian areas.

As I stated in my 1209 I hope Department will be giving very serious consideration to methods for counteracting bloc pressures and the increasing trend toward bloc solidarity.

In this connection, in cases where political or economic interest unites US with Western Europeans, it will be important to induce them to get down into the arena and to fight hard instead of throwing up their hands in horror over "cynical" procedural maneuvers of the opposition and limiting their participation, after much soul-searching and vacillating to raising their hands in the vote.

This is what happened in Committee One, and as a result there were times when it appeared that the United States was carrying on a one-man campaign against a flood of opposition.

In fairness, I must except from this comment the British, French and Portuguese, the Turks, the Italians and Swedes who were very active in our support, even though in the special circumstances of this conference support by the British, French, and Italians was sometimes more of a liability than an asset due to antipathy newly created nations and fishing provisions in our proposal in WE favor.

In the light of all the foregoing I personally feel heartened by the result of the voting. We obtained forty-five votes for our proposal; we might have obtained fifty if at the last moment threatening tactics bloc pressure had not forced Afghanistan and Nepal to abstain instead of voting for US; [*33 words (4 lines of source text) not declassified*] if Panama had maintained attitude it finally took in Committee One and if Philippines or Korea had cooperated and Chile had not reneged because of copper tariff. With these eight votes we could have won two-thirds majority. However I believe that on balance we have made about as good a showing as possible.

---

<sup>4</sup> Document 369.

Finally, as the conference is likely to provide for a resumption of consideration of the territorial sea problem in the General Assembly and perhaps at a second conference, I would emphasize that we must not relax our educational efforts through our embassies and through the Department in Washington.

In recent weeks I have increasingly recognized both the value of the work we have done in the field and the crying and urgent need for very much more of this preparatory type of work as distinct from last minute needling.

As I understand it we have been discussing the major law of the sea problems with other countries in preparation for this conference for over a year; and yet it is utterly amazing to discover that a very high proportion of the individual delegates sent here even today have only the foggiest notion of the implications of what they are doing. Many of delegates here have never personally seen our slides or at least not heard presentation in own language and were not personally familiar with the problems inasmuch as many of them are ambassadors from neighboring countries.

We should I think do more to close the gap in information and thinking not only between the Department and other foreign offices but between ourselves and the men who actually do the voting in the meeting, where the results count.

Greatly appreciate strong and timely Department support and active work of embassies.

---

### 372. Editorial Note

The First Conference on the Law of the Sea held its final plenary session on April 27, and adopted conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and the Continental Shelf. The Conference also adopted a protocol and nine resolutions on various matters relating to the high seas. For text of the Final Act of the Conference, signed at Geneva on April 29, with the conventions, protocol, and resolutions attached as Annexes I-VI, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.13/L.58. For text of Dean's statement at the final plenary session, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pages 259-260.

373. **Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Law of the Sea Matters (Richards) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 19, 1958.*

SUBJECT

United States Position Regarding a Second Law of the Sea Conference

*Problem:*

To decide the United States position as regards the timing of a second Law of the Sea Conference.

*Background:*

On April 27, 1958, the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea referred to the General Assembly the question of convoking a second conference to consider the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and other matters which were left unresolved at Geneva, principally the fisheries rights of the coastal states. The question of the convocation of the second United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea has been placed on the agenda of the Sixth Committee (Legal). The recommendations contained in the draft position paper (Tab A) prepared by L for this agenda item have been agreed to, with the exception of the proposed date of the conference.

*Discussion:*

It is agreed that the United States objective is to obtain general agreement to a narrow territorial sea and minimum control over fisheries beyond the recognized territorial sea. It is also agreed that the best chance of obtaining such general agreement would be through another international conference. Unilateral acts by various states by which they claim areas hitherto considered as high seas are contrary to United States interests and are of increasing concern. It is recognized that active and time-consuming preparatory work will be required on a political level to assure that the maximum number of countries will support the United States position at a second conference.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/9-2258. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum for the record, dated September 22, which stated that at a meeting with Herter that day he had suggested surveying other countries regarding the date for the second Law of the Sea conference. The United States should, however, use August 1959 as the tentative date in its preparations for the conference.

ARA, EUR, FE, NEA, AF, IO and L (Tab B)<sup>2</sup> accept August 1959 as the target date for a conference. These Bureaus consider that the longer a conference is delayed, the more difficult it will be to reach agreement on terms favorable to the United States.

Treasury and Justice concur.

The United Kingdom favors a conference as soon as convenient and proposes July or August 1959. (Tab C)

U/FW is of the view that the key to a successful second conference lies in allowing time for effective preparatory work, namely composing and compromising, so far as possible, differences on fishing limits which prevented agreement at Geneva. U/FW considers that the scope of the required pre-conference work suggests a conference date no earlier than February 1960. U/FW recognizes, however, that the Icelandic fishing problem might ultimately dictate U.S. support of an August 1959 conference date. (Tab D)

The position of Defense is that a conference should not be held until there has been thorough political preparations calculated to attract the maximum number of votes for the narrow territorial sea concept. Defense doubts whether such preparation can be completed in one year, but will not object to a conference in 1959 if the judgment of State is otherwise. (Tab E)

Interior considers that the Iceland problem should, if possible, be disassociated from the question of another conference and that adequate preparations for a conference cannot be completed until 1960. (Tab F)

It is reported that the Soviet Union is contacting other delegations at the UN seeking to delay the convocation of the conference. (Tab G)

*Recommendation:*

That the United States Delegation to the United Nations be authorized to propose and support the convocation of a conference in August 1959.

---

<sup>2</sup> Tabs B-G are not printed.

**[Attachment 1]**

**Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>4</sup>**

SD/A/C.6/176

*Washington, September 8, 1958.*

**QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE BREADTH OF TERRITORIAL  
WATERS AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS**

*Problem*

On April 27, 1958, the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted a resolution noting that it had not been possible to reach agreement on "the breadth of the territorial sea and some other matters which were raised in connection with this problem" and requested the General Assembly of the United Nations to study, at its thirteenth session, the advisability of convening a second international conference of plenipotentiaries for further consideration of the problems left unsettled by the Conference.

*United States Position*

1. The United States delegation should propose a resolution con-  
voking an international conference of plenipotentiaries to study the  
question of the breadth of the territorial sea and fishing rights to be  
enjoyed by the coastal state, such conference to meet in August 1959,  
at a generally favored city having appropriate facilities. The text of  
such a proposal is attached.

2. The United States delegation should oppose efforts to broaden  
the scope of the conference to deal with other questions.

3. The United States delegation should act to assure that the states  
to be invited to the conference will be determined by the standard  
formula: States Members of the United Nations or the specialized  
agencies.

4. The United States delegation should oppose efforts to discuss  
the substance of this question within the General Assembly.

---

<sup>4</sup> Confidential. Prepared for the 13th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly. In a subsequent draft of this paper, dated October 6, the August 1959 date was omitted. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/10-1358)



*Comments*

In view of the diplomatic preparations necessary if agreement is to be reached on the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and related subjects, it appears unwise for the conference to deal with a variety of questions. A broad agenda would diffuse the preparatory efforts and make more difficult the success of the conference. Where two or more unrelated questions are considered at the same conference, decisions are likely to be reached on the basis of exchanges of support between the political groups rather than on the basis of the merits of the proposals. This is especially likely in the specific case of the historic waters question, where the political factors are strongly felt by some delegations.

While the delegation should not indicate an initial position as regards the site of the conference, New York would be preferable. Convocation of the conference in New York would make possible the use of the staffs of the permanent missions, and the established channels existing among them, for liaison among delegations, permitting the necessary negotiations to be conducted rapidly and effectively. Moreover, the experience of the United Nations indicates that the Secretariat can service large conferences more effectively and economically at the Headquarters of the United Nations. In evaluating proposed sites the delegation should consider the facilities afforded and the budgetary implications.

August 1959 is selected as the date of the conference since it embodies the most acceptable compromise between the need for sufficient time to conduct adequate preparations and the danger that the solution of the problems presented by this question may be prejudiced if the situations arising out of the failure of the Law of the Sea Conference to reach agreement on these issues are allowed to develop unchecked.

The states to be invited to participate in the conference should be determined by the standard formula: State Members of the United Nations or the specialized agencies. Use of this formula would exclude from the conference certain political entities not recognized as states by the United States. The delegation may point out that the use of the formula will avoid a serious conference disagreement which would prejudice the harmonious operation of the conference and might even prevent some members of the United Nations from attending.

**[Attachment 2]**

## RESOLUTION

*The General Assembly,*

*Having received* the Resolution adopted on April 27, 1958 by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, requesting the General Assembly to study at its thirteenth session (1958), the advisability of convening a second international conference of plenipotentiaries for further consideration of questions left unsettled by the Conference;

*Recalling* that the Conference made an historic contribution to the codification and progressive development of international law by preparing and opening for signature conventions on nearly all of the subjects covered by the International Law Commission's draft articles on the law of the sea;

*Noting* that no proposal concerning the breadth of the territorial sea or fishing rights in a contiguous zone received the two-thirds majority required for adoption by the Conference;

*Considering*, however, that both of these important matters were extensively discussed at the Conference so that nations are fully cognizant of each other's problems with respect thereto;

*Believing* that the desire for agreement on these two vital issues continues and that agreement thereon would contribute substantially to the lessening of international tensions and to the preservation of world order and peace;

1. *Decides* that a second International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea should be called for the purpose of considering further the questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and fishing rights to be enjoyed by the coastal state;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to convoke the conference in August, 1959 or as soon thereafter as possible, at \_\_\_\_\_;

3. *Invites* all States Members of the United Nations and States Members of the specialized agencies to participate in the conference and to include among their representatives experts competent in the matters to be considered;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to invite specialized agencies and inter-governmental bodies concerned with the matters to be considered to send observers to the conference;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the necessary staff and facilities which would be required for the conference, and to present to the conference recommendations concerning its methods of work and procedures, and other questions of an administrative nature.

6. *Refers* to the conference for its consideration the relevant records of the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

---

**374. Memorandum for the Files**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 21, 1958.*

SUBJECT

U.S. Position at the Second Conference on the Law of the Sea

At a meeting in Mr. Becker's office Friday, November 21, 1958 attended by:

L—Mr. Becker	U/FW—Mr. Taylor
U/LS—Mr. Richards	BNA—Mr. Mayer
L/SFP—Mr. Yingling	EUR—Mr. Nunley
U/FW—Mr. Herrington	Defense—Cmdr. Doyle
Interior—Mr. Terry	U/LS—Mr. Wright

agreement was reached on the following points and courses of action:

1. The Icelandic-UK fisheries dispute affects preparation of the U.S. position in these respects:

a. attempt should be made to accommodate Iceland's interests in the final U.S. position sufficiently to prevent an Icelandic break with NATO and/or giving any serious boost to the Icelandic Communist Party, the power of which has grown to threatening proportions,

b. to avoid prejudicing current moves to bring the UK and Iceland together in a settlement of the dispute, talks with selected countries preparatory to the Second Law of the Sea Conference should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid causing indirect effects on the disputants,

c. any general formula arrived at at the conference will have to make exception for the Icelandic settlement or, alternatively, any pre-conference Icelandic settlement will probably have to be provisional or subject to an option to revise depending upon the outcome of the conference.

2. *[paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]*

3. Although for tactical reasons it might be desirable initially to propose a three-mile territorial sea, the three-mile territorial sea has no chance whatsoever of success at the conference and a serious effort to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11-2158. Confidential. Drafted by Wright on November 24 and copies sent to Becker, Yingling, Herrington, Admiral Ward, Nunley, and Terry.

push it would be harmful. Whether a three-mile proposal should even be used tactically is doubtful. Consultation with the UK and others should precede a final decision on this question.

4. As a practical matter, a 6-plus-6 formula offers the only hope for successfully staving off a general twelve-mile territorial sea rule and in pre-conference preparations effort should be directed toward developing a formula for outer-6-mile fishery jurisdiction which can command two-thirds support. The forthcoming talks in London and on the continent should be directed to this goal.

5. With an extension of the territorial sea to six miles the problem of overflight rights above several important straits arises. It is probably desirable that discussion of this issue be avoided at the conference, but since it may be raised by other countries a well-prepared U.S. position is necessary. [1 sentence (25 words) not declassified]

6. Any agreement with the UK in respect to the pre-conference and conference selling job should not preclude U.S. discussions wherever the U.S. may choose. The U.S. will undoubtedly have to take responsibility for lining up most or all of Latin American support, while the UK should probably concentrate on Western Europe and the Commonwealth. However, neither should be precluded from contacts generally.

7. Care should be taken to encourage designation of well-selected and pre-instructed delegations from those friendly nations which should have cooperated with the U.S. at the last conference but did not, e.g., the Philippines and Korea.

---

### 375. Background Memorandum on the Law of the Sea<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 27, 1959.

1) At the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference held in Geneva early in 1958, agreement was reached on a number of significant matters (see State Department *Bulletin* of June 30, 1958). How-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/1-2959. Drafted by Richards. Attached to a letter from Richards to J. Harold Shulaw, First Secretary at the Embassy in London, which stated that it had been prepared to assist in briefing U.S. Ambassadors and other officials interested in Law of the Sea. Copies of the memorandum were sent to 20 Latin American posts on January 30 as an enclosure to circular airgram 6460. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/1-3059) A copy of a revised memorandum, April 3, which includes more detail on some of the subparagraphs, is *ibid.*, 399.731/4-859, attached to a memorandum dated April 8. It was transmitted to 63 posts worldwide as an enclosure to circular airgram 9156, April 22. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-2259)

ever, two important and troublesome questions, the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery rights in a contiguous zone, were left unsettled.

2) The UNGA, recognizing the need for general agreement on these two important subjects, agreed on December 10, 1958, to convene a Second Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva during March–April 1960. The vote was 71 for, none opposed, and 6 abstentions. Although the United States had favored holding the Conference in the summer of 1959, it voted with the majority (see State Department *Bulletin* of January 12, 1959).

3) In the debate preceding the UNGA vote a number of speakers made the point that all nations should work for success at the Second Conference and that actions in the interim which would make agreement less likely should be avoided. There was no dissenting voice. Thus the US considers that it was implicit in the UNGA action that unilateral acts which might prejudice the outcome of the Conference should be avoided by all. The action of the Panamanian Government subsequent to the UNGA debate to claim broader territorial seas was protested by the US and other States.

4) The US holds that meanwhile the 3-mile territorial sea is established international law and that unilateral acts of states claiming greater territorial seas are not only not sanctioned by any principle of international law but are, indeed, in conflict with the unanimously accepted principle, freedom of the seas.

5) The US believes that a narrow territorial sea is in the interest of all countries of the Free World because:

(a) The non-Communist world is an oceanic grouping of states; it depends for its life on control of the seas. The navies of the Free World keep the seas free. To do so they require maximum areas for maneuvers and for dispersion.

(b) Each extension of the territorial sea is an encroachment on the high seas and reduces the area which all agree should be "free".

(c) Any reduction in the area of the high seas results in a corresponding increase in the possibility of restrictions on freedom of navigation and trade which are the life-blood of the world.

(d) A broad territorial sea would increase the hazards of navigation by increasing the difficulties and uncertainties of visual piloting where vessels chose because of harassment or were required to remain beyond territorial limits.

(e) Broad territorial seas would impose burdens on all nations effectively to administer and patrol a wider area; also to provide additional aids to navigation.

(f) Any extension of the breadth of the limits of territorial seas would increase correspondingly the risk that the neutrality of the seas of non-belligerents would be violated in the event of a future war. Thus the likelihood that non-belligerents would become involved in the conflict would be increased.

(g) Conventions adopted by the First Law of the Sea Conference provide that coastal states shall exercise jurisdiction *beyond the limits of the territorial seas* over the resources of the continental shelf and over such matters as customs, immigration and sanitary measures. Likewise fishery interests are, or can be, protected by conventions or agreements without the extension of territorial seas.

(h) Aircraft, whether military or civil, have no right of "innocent passage" as do ships. Thus an extension of the limits of territorial seas to 12 miles would seriously restrict the freedom of flight, especially in areas which are dotted with islands. Likewise in the case of warships the right of innocent passage is not clearly established except through international straits.

6) The following are arguments which have been put forward by those who oppose a narrow territorial sea.

(a) Except for the Soviet bloc and the Arab States, most coastal states which favor a wider territorial sea apparently do so in order to obtain jurisdiction over fisheries near their shores.

*Comment:* It is the US view that fishery jurisdiction can be separated from sovereignty over sea areas, just as are administrative arrangements regarding customs, sanitation and immigration, and that special rights in offshore waters may be recognized without changing their character as high seas.

As regards conservation, the US believes that the most effective approach is through special arrangements or agreements between the parties concerned dealing exclusively with these problems.

(b) The Sino-Soviet bloc maintains that the determination of the breadth of the territorial sea (up to 12 miles) is the prerogative of each independent nation.

*Comment:* The US believes that the high seas are the common property of all and that no state can expropriate any of this common property by unilateral act. Further, the common interest and proximity of states makes uniformity as regards territorial seas necessary.

(c) The Arab bloc has favored a 12-mile limit principally in the hope that it would prevent traffic through the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel.

*Comment:* The following are provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea which was adopted by the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva on April 29, 1958:

#### Article 14 (1.)

"Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."

Article 16 (4.)

“There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State.”

This Convention has not been signed by the Arab States.

(d) Almost 40 states now claim territorial seas of various widths greater than 3 miles. This fact is cited to refute the argument that the 3-mile rule is “established international law.”

*Comment:* The 3-mile limit has long had general acceptance as a rule of international law. Despite recent defections more states still recognize the 3-mile limit to the territorial sea than any other single breadth.

(e) Narrow nationalism has caused some of the newer states to claim broad territorial seas. They reason that since the 3-mile rule was established and is favored by the old colonial powers it must ipso facto be repudiated as contrary to the interests of the newly independent nations.

*Comment:* Logic and facts will probably convince few who put forward this emotional argument.

(f) A few states argue that a territorial sea limit of more than three miles is written into their constitutions or laws and is therefore unalterable as far as they are concerned.

*Comment:* There are legal and constitutional problems in several countries. However, the United States does not accept that these are insurmountable. In fact the very purpose of the Second Conference is to bring conflicting practices and laws into harmony.

7) At the Geneva Conference the US put forward a compromise proposal which in essence would have provided for a six-mile limit to the territorial sea plus an additional six-mile exclusive fishing zone, subject to fishing rights of other states established in the outer zone through fishing in the area during the preceding five years. This proposal received more votes than did any other put forward at the Conference, but failed to receive the required two-thirds of the votes cast. The US thereupon announced that, as its compromise proposal had failed of adoption, it would continue to adhere to the three-mile limit for the territorial sea as established by international law. (State Department *Bulletin* of June 30, 1958.)

8) The Department is actively preparing for the Second Law of the Sea Conference in the anticipation that agreement will be achieved on the territorial seas and fisheries issues. The US position will be flexible to the extent possible in relation to our overall interests. It is recognized that to be accepted by the required two-thirds majority at the Conference a formula must be found which will attract more support

than did the US compromise proposal at Geneva. The US looks forward to an atmosphere of accommodation and conciliation during the period of the very necessary preparations which must precede the Conference and will encourage and participate in a free exchange of views to the end that a formula acceptable to the required majority may be developed. The US will approach the Conference in a spirit of good will and compromise. It is hoped that other countries will do likewise.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Attached to the source text were 2 pages which showed voting patterns on the limits of the territorial sea at the First Law of the Sea Conference.

---

### 376. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 16, 1959<sup>1</sup>

#### SUBJECT

Meeting on Further Talks with Other Countries on Law of the Sea

#### PARTICIPANTS

Defense—Adm. Chester Ward, USN  
 Defense—Capt. Leonard Hardy, USN  
 Defense—Capt. Rafael Benítez, USN  
 Defense—Cmdr. James Doyle, USN  
 Interior—Mr. Wm. M. Terry  
 L—Mr. Becker  
 L/SFP—Mr. Yingling  
 U/FW—Mr. Herrington  
 U/FW—Mr. Taylor  
 U/LS—Mr. Wright  
 U/LS—Mr. Richards

A meeting in Mr. Richards' office was called Monday, March 16 at 10:30 a.m. for the purpose of considering the order and timing of further talks with other countries within the next two to three-month period. It was agreed at the outset of the meeting that, to judge by the response to the recently completed trip in Latin America,<sup>2</sup> talks with other countries gave promise of being extremely helpful and should be

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1659. Confidential. Drafted by Wright and Richards on March 23.

<sup>2</sup> Richards, Herrington, and Benitez visited seven Latin American countries, February 10–March 5. A summary of the results of their visit was transmitted to all Latin American posts as an enclosure to circular airgram 8033, March 20. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-2059)



pursued as soon as feasible. Specific countries that might be visited and the views expressed by those at the meeting concerning the desirability and timing of talks with those countries were, briefly, as follows:

*Canada:* After noting the unsatisfactory outcome of recent UK-Canadian talks,<sup>3</sup> those present agreed that in view of the UK intention to follow up with additional talks during the visit of Prime Minister Macmillan, any US approach to Canada was unnecessary for the time being. The view was generally expressed that in any case there was little prospect of Canadian support for a US-UK proposal *until* the Canadians became convinced that such a proposal had a good chance of succeeding at the Conference. It was suggested that Mr. Arthur Dean might consider discussing the matter with Prime Minister Diefenbaker on the basis of their personal friendship.

*United Kingdom:* The agreement in London last December that US and UK representatives would meet again in March or April to discuss the results of talks with other governments was recalled. It was agreed a further meeting with the UK, though desirable, would not be particularly useful until the UK had completed talks with other countries in addition to Canada.

*Norway:* There appeared to be no immediate urgency for talks with Norway. Such talks would not be particularly productive, it was felt by Mr. Yingling, until, as with Canada, we could show sufficient support for a less-than-exclusive 12-mile fishing formula to overcome their belief that only a straight 12-mile fishing formula has a chance of winning.

*Mexico:* Several present at the meeting had not yet received the text of the Mexican Memorandum denying the existence of any understanding in the UN, informal or otherwise, that unilateral action should not be taken prior to the Conference.<sup>4</sup> The consensus of the meeting was that in view of this complicating factor the question of talks with Mexico would need special study. Capt. Benítez suggested that the possibilities of working *with* Robles had not been fully exploited.

*Other Latin American Countries:* Approaches reasonably soon to the remaining Latin American countries were desirable, it was agreed, including Chile, Ecuador and Peru. Mr. Yingling felt there was some possibility of a favorable response in Chile if the US presentation were made on a Soviet-bloc-versus-free-world basis and stated he had recently received information to this effect. Special care, it was agreed, would have to be given to the best method of approaching Venezuela.

<sup>3</sup> These talks took place in Ottawa, February 4–5.

<sup>4</sup> No copy of this memorandum has been found, but telegram 827 from USUN, March 27, dates it March 11, 1959, and gives a summary of its contents and the reasons behind its transmission. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2759)

*April SEATO Meeting:* It was agreed it would be desirable to support an Australian initiative to approach SEATO countries in good time. The US would not raise Law of the Sea in the SEATO meeting in April. The Navy representatives thought advantage could be taken of large-scale sea exercises planned during the April meeting to make a pitch for the need to keep free world sea power maneuverable. In response to Mr. Richards' request this be done, Capt. Hardy replied he anticipated there would be no difficulty as previous demonstrations in the area had been used for this also.

*Australia:* With the Australians apparently eager to make independent approaches to South Asian countries, the Navy is cooperating with their military by supplying territorial sea material. It was agreed however that it was desirable the Australians be fully briefed on the problems connected with a compromise fishing rights formula so that their activities would not inadvertently be embarrassing to us. Mr. Richards reported the UK intends to consult with New Zealand and Australia, apparently in the next few days, but suggested that it might be desirable in any case that we talk to the Australians also. Mr. Herrington particularly thought this would be wise.

*The Arab States:* There was no consensus of feeling among those at the meeting concerning the question of talks with various Arab states. Mr. Herrington expressed the view we had everything to gain by such talks, and Capt. Hardy and others felt we certainly had nothing to lose by them. Mr. Becker and others believed that such talks would necessarily fail as we had *nothing to offer* the Arabs. The subject was not pursued.

*Visit of King Hussein:* Since Jordan is the Arab state most likely to support us, if any do, it was agreed King Hussein's visit next week should be utilized to advantage. At Mr. Becker's suggestion, Mr. Becker and Mr. Richards agreed they would bring the matter personally before Governor Herter.

*Iran:* Mr. Yingling stated that in his opinion talks with Iran should be held but that they could be deferred until later. Mr. Terry's opinion was that talks with Iran would definitely be helpful, that greater and certainly smoother cooperation could have been secured from Iran at the last Conference had there been prior consultations with the Iranians on fishery matters.

*Philippines, India and South Asia:* There was general agreement it was important a US (as well as an Australian) team visit this area, that in fact, while encouraging others to be active we could not afford to rely on their efforts. The importance of assuring Indian support in particular was recognized by all present.

*Timing and Details of Talks:* The advantages in a 3-member team seemed apparent and in fact it was agreed any other composition seemed undesirable. Mr. Richards stressed the importance during fu-

ture talks of having someone of Capt. Benítez's rank, ability and experience representing Defense. Mr. Taylor stated that the last two weeks of April would be "impossible" for Mr. Herrington (who had previously left the meeting) because of negotiations with Canada which were scheduled for then. Mr. Terry stated he would also be tied up during the Canadian talks but there was some possibility he might get away for part of that time. It was agreed that further talks should be undertaken as soon as feasible, but that this might mean after May 1 in view of the short time remaining before Mr. Herrington's and Mr. Terry's commitments.

---

**377. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, July 10, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Assessment of United States Position on Law of the Sea and Reply to Canadian Proposal

**PARTICIPANTS**

L—Mr. Becker  
L/SFP—Mr. Yingling  
U/FW—Mr. Herrington  
U/FW—Mr. Taylor  
U/LS—Mr. Richards  
U/LS—Mr. Wright

*Defense:*  
Admiral Chester Ward, USN  
Capt. Leonard R. Hardy, USN  
LCDR Harold L. Hoag, USN  
RAdm. R. C. Benitez, USN (ret.)  
*Interior:*  
Mr. William M. Terry  
Mr. Donald L. McKernan

At a meeting to assess and take stock of the US position with respect to the Second United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, following completed consultations with some 35 countries, and to decide what course of action the United States should take with regard to a secret proposal of the Canadian Government,<sup>2</sup> the following conclusions were reached:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/7–1059. Secret. Drafted by Wright on July 13. A similar memorandum of this conversation drafted by Yingling is *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> This proposal called for a territorial sea of 6 miles with an exclusive 6-mile zone subject to the exercise of historic rights for 5 years. (Telegram 3417 to Athens, June 27; *ibid.*, 399.731/6–2759)

1) A careful tabulation of probable conference voting on the US-UK revised formula<sup>3</sup> indicated prospects that the proposal would achieve a two-thirds conference majority were remote. A tabulation prepared by U/LS, substantially identical with one recently prepared by the United Kingdom, indicated of some 14 countries whose votes were most in doubt, the proposal to win would need to receive affirmative support from 12 of these countries, the other 2 abstaining; if any *one* of the 14 voted against the US-UK proposal it appeared a two-thirds majority for it would be impossible.

2) Agreement between the US, UK and Canada on a formula would not ipso facto assure its adoption at the Conference. However without agreement between the three on a proposal there would be little practical chance that agreement would be achieved at the Conference.

3) The recent Canadian overture should be followed up on a high priority basis therefore. Effort should be directed both at clarifying the meaning of the Canadian secret proposal and at exploring the limits of Canadian flexibility. While every effort should be made to bring about desirable changes in the Canadian position, the US should enter the discussions realizing that the price of failure to reach agreement would be very high in terms of over-all US interests.

4) The US should first however concert with the UK, if possible to arrive at a common understanding and common approach, before entering talks with Canada. Whether it would be preferable for the talks with Canada to be bi-lateral or tri-lateral would be decided later, in consultation with the UK.

5) The agreement with Canada should preferably be one the Canadians would be willing to reveal and publicly support prior to the Conference, though this admittedly would be difficult to obtain. A secret agreement to be invoked tactically at the Conference might only repeat the unfortunate career of the secret agreement at the last Conference; further, during the Second Conference, which would be of relatively short duration, it would be particularly difficult to obtain effectively changes in delegation instructions.

6) While the US was attempting to reach agreement with Canada it would remain fully committed to the present US-UK proposal.

---

<sup>3</sup> The U.S.-U.K. revised formula, agreed in talks at London in December 1958, called for a 6-mile territorial sea with foreign fishing in the next 6-mile zone restricted to past levels. (*Ibid.*, Office of the Historian, Research Project No. 1031-A, June 1973, p. 17)

**378. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 25, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Fishing Industry Views on Law of the Sea

PARTICIPANTS

Under Secretary Dillon  
U/LS—Mr. Richards, Mr. Wright  
U/FW—Mr. Herrington, Mr. Blow  
L—Mr. Raymond, Mr. Yingling  
H—Mr. White

Messrs. George Steele (National Cannery Association), Charles Jackson (National Fisheries Institute), Harold Lokken (Fishing Vessel Owners Association), Charles Carry (California Fish Cannery Association), W.M. Chapman (Tuna Research Foundation), William R. Neblett (National Shrimp Congress), Thomas Rice (Massachusetts Fisheries Association), and Roy Duggan (Southeastern Fisheries Association)

As spokesman for the industry group, Mr. Steele noted the great importance to the fishing industry of the law of the sea and of the forthcoming 1960 conference on this subject. He said the industry had always realized that security interests were necessarily paramount in the United States position and that at the 1958 Geneva Conference the industry had accepted the decision that it was necessary to give up all fisheries within 12 miles of the coasts of other countries. Reviewing the developments in the U.S. position at the 1958 conference, he remarked that when we conceded 12 mile fishery jurisdiction we had given away too much fish and when we changed to our final position we took too much back. He expressed the view that these results of that conference had shown that there was a maximum point beyond which we should not go in offering fishery concessions because of the danger of antagonizing other important fishing countries, and that there was also a minimum point below which we should not attempt to withhold such concessions because of the consequent danger of losing votes of coastal countries. He noted that the U.S. industry obviously does not want to see any sacrifice of its interests not essential to the broader interests of U.S. security. Mr. Steele then distributed copies of a memorandum incorporating a study made by his group and discussed the recommendations made in this paper (extract attached).

In response to Mr. Steele's request for information on the status of planning for the 1960 conference, Mr. Dillon said that we would, of course, be glad to provide this and would be interested in studying the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/9-2559. Official Use Only. Drafted by Blow, approved by Brewster on September 2, and cleared by Richards and Yingling.

group's memorandum in connection with consideration of the U.S. position for the coming conference. He noted that the industry group's study apparently had not considered an aspect which we considered very important, that is, the likelihood, in event of conference failure, of the gradual acceptance of a 12-mile limit as the result of further unilateral actions.

Mr. Richards reviewed the consultations which had taken place, including the activities of the two teams which had visited some 30 countries. These consultations had been useful and the results had been encouraging to a certain extent. However, it was questionable as to what extent the position of other countries had actually been changed in our favor. With respect to prospects for the various major proposals, there seemed no reason to believe that either a 3-mile limit or a 12-mile limit could gain a two-thirds vote. Some dangers were seen from the proposal for an optional three- to twelve-mile limit, which had an attraction for many, and the Canadian proposal also held dangers because there are more non-fishing states than fishing states. Mr. Richards agreed with Mr. Steele that there was considerable difficulty in arriving at any proposal which could be expected to win a two-thirds majority. When asked if the Department's position was that the only way to obtain agreement on a relatively narrow territorial sea was to make concessions on fishing, Mr. Richards pointed out that, considering all factors, no U.S. compromise on a territorial sea of more than 6 miles was possible, and that fisheries, therefore, seemed to present the only area of compromise.

The Under Secretary noted the timeliness of the group's paper since the point had been reached where serious intra-governmental consideration must be given to a decision on the U.S. position. He assured the group that we had no desire to concede more fishery interests than absolutely necessary.

Mr. Steele said that his group would be available for further consultation at any time.<sup>2</sup> In closing he called attention to the forthcoming 11th Inter-American Conference at Quito, February, 1960 and

---

<sup>2</sup> The fishing industry representatives met with a similar group on September 16. After a briefing by Admiral Ward on the significance of the territorial sea to U.S. security and some discussion of the industry memorandum, the representatives discussed voting at the coming conference. A memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, 399.731/9-1659.

the possible danger of some move being made by certain Latin American countries at this conference which would be adverse to the U.S. position on the law of the sea.

### Attachment

*August 25, 1959.*

## MEMORANDUM ON THE LAW OF THE SEA<sup>3</sup>

### Recommendations

1. The United States enter the 1960 conference where it left off the last, with a firm three mile resolution for its position.

2. The United States correlate its military aid, foreign aid, and other international policy actions as closely as is feasible with the necessity of winning votes on this issue or winning votes against the 12 mile proposal at the 1960 Conference on Law of the Sea.

3. The United States coldly estimate during the preparatory phases of the conference and during the conference the possibility of the following position receiving a  $\frac{2}{3}$  majority vote at the conference:

“That there be a six mile territorial sea plus a six mile zone of special fishery jurisdiction. In the six mile fishery zone foreign countries be permitted the same volume (or percentage) of fish catch that they have enjoyed during a base period (say the preceding five years). Disputes arising as to the volume (or percentage) be referred to the compulsory arbitral proceedings provided for in ‘Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.’”

We are very doubtful that this proposal is capable of winning a  $\frac{2}{3}$  majority. We believe that this position will, however, command the highest vote which any position involving a six mile territorial sea and a special fishery zone is capable of commanding. We are exceedingly skeptical that the six mile territorial sea position in this proposal has any greater vote getting ability than a three mile territorial sea provision plus a nine mile special fishery zone would have. We believe that as one retreats from this position toward the 1958 United States proposal one will lose Afro-Asian and Latin American non-fishing country votes, and that as one retreats from this position toward the Canadian proposal of 1958 one loses Western European fishing country votes. We believe that a proposal which phases out the historic rights granted in the above position will have little or no greater vote getting ability than the Canadian proposal.

---

<sup>3</sup> Official Use Only. The source text is labeled “Extract”.

Accordingly we recommend that, unless a cold analysis of the vote getting ability of the above cited proposition indicates by the latter stages of the 1960 conference that it has a reasonable chance of winning a  $\frac{2}{3}$  majority, the United States stand firmly by the position in the first recommendation above.

4. Envisioning the possible lack of a  $\frac{2}{3}$  majority for any solution to the breadth of the territorial sea at the 1960 conference, the United States begin energetic efforts to resolve disputes among its allies involving fishing rights on the high seas within the purview of the "Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas" adopted by the 1958 conference.

5. The United States prepare appropriate defensive action on this issue at the 11th Inter-American Conference to be convened in Quito, Ecuador, February, 1960.

---

**379. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 26, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

U.S. Position During Anticipated Discussions With Canada Regarding 1960 Law of the Sea Conference

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Acting Secretary  
Mr. Arthur H. Dean  
Defense—Capt. L.R. Hardy, USN  
Defense—Capt. W.A. Hearn, USN  
Defense—LCdr. H. Hoag, USN  
Interior—Arnie J. Suomela  
Interior—William M. Terry  
L—Col. Raymond  
L/SFP—Mr. Yingling  
U/FW—Mr. Herrington  
H—Mr. White  
U/LS—Mr. Richards  
U/LS—Mr. Wright

The Acting Secretary stated, as he understood it, we faced something of a dilemma in our preparations for the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference: while it was desirable tactically our first position at the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/8-2659. Confidential. Drafted by Wright on August 28 and approved by Dillon on September 2.



Conference not be our last, on the other hand, having a complex or difficult formula to sell, it was desirable we do this as much in advance as possible.

Mr. Richards agreed with this statement. Specifically, the issue before the group, he said, was whether, since in our estimate the present US-UK proposal to win needs affirmative votes from virtually all of the 14 countries *uncommitted* to one or another position, we therefore should "offer more fish" to improve the likelihood of conference agreement. And if so whether we should do so *now* or later. (On a subsidiary issue, whether agreement at the Conference was desirable, that such agreement is desirable for defense purposes was accepted by the group as not disputed, but as regards fishing interests, the industry, Mr. Herrington said, felt agreement was desirable only if the contents of the agreement were favorable.)

Mr. Dean stated an important factor to be considered was the duration of the Conference. At the last Conference, which lasted 10 weeks, he found that having to work with our embassies to get the facts put across to Foreign Offices had proved extremely difficult. The reasons for our shifts of position were not well understood and caused confusion. If our approach is to "trade" at the Conference it will take time to do this; he understood the second Conference was expected to last however only three or four weeks. If the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was still that 12 miles would harm our security, Mr. Dean said he felt we would have the best chance of preventing this if we could get together before the Conference with the Canadians and the UK. Capt. Hearn assured Mr. Dean the views of the Joint Chiefs were unchanged and that, further, Defense was seriously worried that unless we came up with an attractive proposal to put forward at the Conference the Mexican 3-to-12-mile proposal would win.

The Acting Secretary asked whether we would lose, rather than gain, votes for our proposal if we went too far with fishery concessions. At this point Mr. Herrington distributed a paper listing considerations against abandoning the US-UK position at this time.<sup>2</sup> Among the considerations was that those in favor of abandonment were proceeding on the *assumption* the Western European fishing states would follow along; he questioned this assumption. In concluding several other points as well, he stated while it was true this Conference would be shorter than the last, its issues would be fewer. Much educational work besides had already been done, he said. Col. Raymond stated he had observed the last Conference closely from Washington and he had been impressed with how complicated it was to get votes shifted and delegation instructions changed. He doubted if there would be time for

---

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

delegations to seek and receive revised instructions at the next Conference. Therefore issues and positions should be clear in advance of the Conference.

The Acting Secretary remarked it appeared to be a question of judgment how the votes of the Western European states would go at the Conference. There was, in any case, he felt, not too much difference in basic position in the group. Even the fishing industry spokesmen who had called on him yesterday,<sup>3</sup> he said, indicated they appreciated the defense arguments and would not be uncooperative—though the paper they left was “tighter”, he had noticed. Mr. Dean remarked the fishing industry people had been helpful in the past and he was confident they would continue to be. The Acting Secretary noted, continuing, U/FW and Interior were willing to *explore* possibilities with Canada and make soundings in Western Europe. In reading over the “recommendations”, L, U/LS and Defense appeared to be asking for immediate agreement with the Canadians, which we would then take to other countries. The Acting Secretary felt that an ad referendum basis would be sounder. Mr. Yingling said L’s position was not meant to exclude an ad referendum basis, which in fact he approved. The issue, however, was whether we would have anything to *say* to the Canadians when we went. Purely exploratory talks would be useless if we were not prepared to be forthcoming. If *we* were not, we could hardly expect the Canadians to be.

Mr. Terry said he wished to disassociate himself from Mr. Richards’ remarks made at the beginning. In his view the US–UK proposal, as it presently stood, had a reasonable chance of winning. As long as it did, it would not be defensible for him to agree to further fishery concessions, which, further, he said, would be politically unwise. He argued that five of the 28 countries regarded as opposed or probably opposed to the US–UK formula might be persuaded not to oppose (identified as Norway, Ecuador, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan) which would change the picture considerably. So far as congressional pressure went, Mr. Dean interjected, it was to be found on both sides. Several congressmen had remarked to him, after the last Conference, fish should not be allowed to obstruct security. Capt. Hardy stated if the validity of 28 countries in the “against” column was to be challenged the validity of 44 in the “for” column could be challenged as well. Many of the countries listed as now supporting the US–UK formula were simply not going to do so, he said.

The Acting Secretary concluded he was in favor of “talks” with the Canadians but did not like the U/LS, L, and Defense recommendations. He said he felt we would want to be able to say to the Canadians “this has to be sold to the Western Europeans”. Capt.

---

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

Hearn suggested we would not want to lose sight of a need for the proposal being supported by the Afro-Asians and Latinos. The Acting Secretary agreed we would also, of course, want to keep this in mind. But in his view it was desirable at this time to go up and explore, to make only tentative concessions to be checked with the Western Europeans—that we should enter into no agreement with the Canadians until we found out how Western Europe would act.

Mr. Suomela said he had spoken to Secretary Seaton only a few minutes earlier and had been authorized to say that the Secretary concurred in the view that we should not enter into concessions, for the moment, beyond our present position. Secretary Seaton had invited Mr. Dillon to discuss this matter with him if he wished. The Acting Secretary said he felt it would not be necessary at this time since a "consensus" had been reached at the meeting.

To clarify the decision, Capt. Hearn asked if it was understood that we would not "just talk" but that the discussions with Canada would be seriously directed at achieving an early common position. "Between the US, UK and Canada", the Acting Secretary added, agreeing. Upon mention of "phasing out" by Mr. Dean in connection with the attitude of the Portuguese, the Acting Secretary stated he could not see that this was any good, that it was in effect the same as the Canadian proposal. Capt. Hearn said he wished it to be recorded, though he would not press the point at the moment, that the Defense view was that nothing *less* than phasing-out had any hope of adoption at the Conference. As the meeting was ending, Mr. Yingling asked if the decision was to be taken as meaning that "anything pertinent" could be discussed with the Canadians. The Acting Secretary agreed.

---

### 380. Editorial Note

On August 28, Richards transmitted a memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State requesting that the President send Prime Minister Diefenbaker a letter proposing U.S.-Canadian talks on the Law of the Sea. Dillon forwarded the request in a memorandum to Eisenhower, September 8, along with a draft of the letter. The President made some revisions in the draft, and the letter, proposing that Dillon visit Ottawa, was transmitted on September 10. Copies of these documents and telegram 154 to Ottawa, September 11, which instructed the Embassy to suggest September 23 or 24 for the visit, are in Department of State, Central Files, 399.931/9-859.

In a subsequent exchange of letters the President and the Prime Minister agreed on October 23 for the visit and that Murphy would replace Dillon. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/9-1759 through 399.731/9-2259)

---

**381. Letter From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Gates) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 19, 1959.*

DEAR BOB: Attached is a copy of a Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum dated 14 October 1959, stating their position concerning the impact upon United States security of any extension of territorial sea limits. The Department of Defense is in full accord with the conclusions expressed therein and believes they should form the basis of the United States position at the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

I am advised that on 26 August 1959, Mr. Dillon determined that United States pre-Conference negotiations "should be conducted with a view to incurring minimum damage to United States fishing interests."<sup>2</sup> It is understood that one of the primary reasons for the claims of many states to an extensive territorial sea is their demand for exclusive control over fishing near their coasts, and that some of these states would accept a narrower territorial sea if this demand for exclusive fisheries control were satisfied. It is recognized that establishment of such control would be contrary to United States fishing interests in waters off the coasts of other countries. It would appear, however, that a policy of minimal concessions to this demand for coastal fishing control may jeopardize the security interests of the United States by increasing the risk of unsatisfactory Conference action with regard to the breadth of the territorial sea.

I believe that the question of the relative weight to be accorded to our security and fishing interests in determining United States policy, in the event it is not clear that both can be fully served without serious risk, is of such importance that it should be referred to the National Security Council. I would appreciate your comments with regard to this course of action.

Sincerely yours,

**Thomas S. Gates**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/10-1959. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 379.

[Enclosure]

**Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McElroy)<sup>3</sup>**

JCSM-424-59

*Washington, October 14, 1959.*

SUBJECT

Extension of Territorial Sea Limits

1. With reference to United States participation in the United Nations sponsored Conference on the Law of the Sea to be held in Geneva in early 1960, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that:

a. Any extension of the breadth of the territorial sea seriously and adversely affects the security interests of the United States.

b. The United States should strive to achieve agreement on as narrow a territorial sea breadth as possible but in any event not to exceed 6 miles.

c. The United States should strive to settle, separately, issues which may be raised at the Conference, which are severable from the question of the breadth of the territorial sea, in order that the security interests of the United States may not be unnecessarily jeopardized.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**N. F. Twining<sup>4</sup>**

*Chairman*

*Joint Chiefs of Staff*

---

<sup>3</sup> Confidential.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**382. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain European Missions<sup>1</sup>**

CG-296

*Washington, October 29, 1959—4:70 p.m.*

The Department has accepted an invitation by the UK to send representatives to meet in London on November 16 to discuss preparations for the second Law of the Sea Conference. The US delegation

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/10-2959. Confidential. Drafted by Richards; cleared with Taylor, Nunley, Yingling, and NEA; sent to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Lisbon, Madrid, Paris, Rome, and The Hague; and repeated to London, Ottawa, New York, Copenhagen, Dublin, Oslo, and Reykjavik.

will be headed by the Honorable Arthur H. Dean. Other countries invited and expected send representatives are: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

*FYI Only:* The Law of the Sea was discussed between US and Canada at meetings held in Ottawa on October 23.<sup>2</sup> Following is text of "Summary of Conclusions" of these meetings:

"(I) Canada and US will enter into bilateral discussions in November 1959. These discussions will be designed to achieve bilateral agreement on a tapering off period for exercise of traditional fishing rights. The entering into such an agreement would be conditional on straight unqualified 6 plus 6 formula being adopted by Conference.

"(II) The US will attempt to gain support of European countries on November 16 for a straight 6 plus 6 formula to be supplemented by bilateral agreements—conditional on straight 6 plus 6 formula being approved by Conference.

"(III) Canada will approach Norway, Denmark, Ireland and possibly Iceland in order determine whether they would accept this plan.

"(IV) On broad basis, an informal network of undertakings would be established—all conditional on straight 6 plus 6 position being adopted at 1960 Conference."

In informing British Chargé October 28 of "Conclusions" reached at meetings in Ottawa, Under Secretary Murphy said it clear Conference failure would result in acceleration trend toward 12-mile territorial sea by unilateral acts with consequent threat free world security and damage to US and foreign fisheries. Though US/UK formula probably acceptable to as many or more countries than any other so far considered it now apparent this formula unlikely command safe margin support at Conference. In fact US now considered it probable Conference would adopt no formula which would provide for foreign fishing in outer zone in perpetuity. Agreement on a narrow (not greater than 6-mile) territorial sea was overriding US objective. It sought achieve this objective with minimum damage traditional fisheries. US had reluctantly concluded formula along lines "Conclusions" offers best (and possibly only) chance to accomplish this. Canadians had accepted necessity work out network of pre-Conference bilateral arrangements as regards continuation fishing; also Canadian position would be public thus making possible open US, UK, Canadian collaboration which would increase chances acceptance formula by Conference. He sincerely hoped UK would support the US/Canadian agreement and would continue lend its great influence to Conference success.

---

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum, to which is attached a U.S. talking paper for these meetings, is *ibid.*, 399.731/10-2359.

Referring to paragraph (II) of "Conclusions" Mr. Murphy suggested UK inform countries invited to London meeting in advance of substance of US/Canadian agreement.<sup>3</sup>

End FYI.

As suggested by Mr. Murphy, UK expected inform addressee countries of substance US/Canadian agreement quoted above. Embassy should *not* take initiative this regard.

Embassy requested however report promptly any information which may be developed as to probable attitude of addressee countries at London meeting on November 16; also names and positions officials to attend meeting.

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> On October 30, the Embassy in London reported that the working level in the Foreign Office considered the U.S.-Canadian agreement "not at all satisfactory." (Telegram 2323; *ibid.*, 399.731/10-3059) A similar reaction was reported to Richards by the Second Secretary of the British Embassy on November 2. (Memorandum of conversation, November 11; *ibid.*, 399.731/11-259) On November 6, the Department cabled further that the conclusions should not be distributed before the London meeting. (Circular telegram 627; *ibid.*, 399.731/11-659)

---

**383. Message From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 11, 1959.*

DEAR SELWYN: I appreciate your recent message<sup>2</sup> giving us the benefit of your views on the thorny problem of our approach to the 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea. Your letter gives me a welcome opportunity to review our position and to clarify certain aspects of the "Conclusions"<sup>3</sup> which resulted from our meetings with the Canadians in Ottawa, which aspects, I fear, were not adequately cov-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11-1159. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Richards on November 9; cleared by Taylor, Nunley, Hager, and Pender; and initialed by Herter. Transmitted in telegram 3816 to London, which is the source text, for delivery. Telegram 3816 was repeated by pouch to Ottawa and to USUN for Dean.

<sup>2</sup> Dated November 5; in it, Lloyd advised Herter that the United Kingdom could not support the U.S.-Canadian proposal (see *supra*) and regretted that it had been made without prior consultation with the British. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

ered in official communications. This is especially opportune as Arthur Dean will be in London within a few days to discuss prospects for the Conference.

Our thinking has gone through several phases. After the defeat of our final proposal at the 1958 Conference at Geneva we were of the view that in order to achieve success at a subsequent conference we should in the interim press for resolution of the bilateral and regional fishery problems, which existed among members of the North Atlantic community and which were such a divisive influence. We had concluded that it was almost impossible to write a general formula which would take cognizance of these particular problems and yet be sufficiently simple and politically attractive to marshal the necessary widespread support, especially from the Latin American and Afro-Asian countries.

Later, however, we once again began to reflect on the possibilities of a formula which would achieve much the same end as the one we sponsored finally at Geneva, but so modified as to meet some of the objections which prevented some countries from supporting it at Geneva. Your experts and ours developed such a formula and during the past year we both have been discreetly sounding out numerous other countries to ascertain whether such a formula was likely to be accepted by the required two-thirds.

The results of our efforts in this direction have not been encouraging. After a hard and soul-searching look at the situation we have reluctantly come to the conclusion that no general formula which provides for traditional foreign fishing in a so-called outer 6-mile zone in perpetuity is likely to be accepted by the required majority. In addition we have reverted to the view we held at the end of the first Geneva Conference that the soundest approach may be through bilateral or regional arrangements as regards fisheries.

The "Conclusions" reached in our talks with the Canadians reflect this line of thought, that broad support for a formula providing a narrow territorial sea is our principal objective, that such support can be achieved only through suitable accommodations on fisheries in the North Atlantic area, and that the best chance for achieving such support now appears to lie through the bilateral or regional approach. It is therefore our intention to explain the "Conclusions" reached at Ottawa and the considerations involved to the conferees at London and to elicit their views. Further steps in the plan of action outlined in the "Conclusions" and any ultimate obligations resulting from such steps, must depend upon and be conditioned by the reactions of the participants at the meeting in London.



I am quick to admit that I share your concern as regards tactics with respect to the 1960 conference. It may be desirable that any agreed proposal be managed so as to give it the earmarks of a fallback or compromise position, although such a tactic presents obvious difficulties.

As regards your request that we do what we can to discourage the Canadians from making their proposed approach to Norway, Denmark, Ireland and possibly Iceland, I am not sure at the moment just how far the Canadians may have already gone. It appears that they have already talked to the Norwegians at least. However, we shall suggest to the Canadians that they will be better able to approach the others later and that meanwhile it is in our common interest to handle the matter most discreetly. For our part, as you request, we shall refrain from circulating in advance of the London meeting the proposed memorandum embodying the "Conclusions".

As you point out, the Atlantic community should stand together. We have the widest area of common interests and hence if we cannot settle our differences among ourselves the chances of success at the Conference will be critically reduced if not eliminated altogether.

I trust that the foregoing will enable you to see our recent activities in a better light. In any case we shall, as you request, hold our hand until Arthur Dean has an opportunity to explore the whole situation thoroughly with your people in London.

With warmest personal regards,  
Most sincerely,

Chris<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 3816 bears this typed signature.

---

**384. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, November 17, 1959—8 p.m.*

2615. From Dean.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11-1759. Confidential. Repeated to Ottawa.

<sup>2</sup> Dean headed the U.S. Delegation to the Law of the Sea meeting at London, November 16–20. A copy of his instructions is *ibid.*, 399.731/11-1359. Summary records of the sessions on November 16, 17, and 18 are *ibid.*, 399.731/11-1859 through 399.731/11-2059. The texts of "Alternate Proposal A", which proposed 6-plus-6 with

*Continued*

(1) At plenary session this afternoon ten European states were unanimous they would not accept Canadian formula and they believe they can prevent its receiving two-thirds majority at Geneva.

(2) British chairman made clear this was exploratory session only and no Government was committed to expressions of view.

(3) British expressed view their modified UK/US formula limiting tonnage of vessels future fishing for same class of fish taken in base period and averaging of years for base period would not command more than approximately 45 votes with approximately 29 votes against, and that this modified formula would have to be made substantially more attractive in order to command two-thirds majority.

(4) All Europeans dislike in principle idea of terminating fishing rights by phasing out but all recognize inherent importance six mile maximum territorial sea and danger both to security and fishing rights if in event conference failure there is substantial unilateral movement to 12 miles, or if it proves impossible prevent conference agreement on some more unfavorable proposal.

(5) Professor Gros of France expressed strong disapproval for termination of fishing rights exercised for five centuries but finally said as bad solution to dangerous problem would undertake to discuss with his government phasing out period of 25 years.

(6) Belgium, Portugal and Italy also dislike any ending fishing rights but seem inclined concur with Professor Gros.

(7) Western Germany, Holland and Turkey believe modified US/UK formula with appropriate phasing out period can command two-thirds majority vote. But Germany believes modified UK formula should be put to conference first and then phase out formula presented only to prevent conference failing. Turkish Delegate on other hand believes essential to move to phase out formula immediately in order to discuss and line up necessary vote. Greece dislikes phase out intensely but believe would probably go majority.

(8) All dislike intensely fact Canadian formula terminates fishing rights as matter of international law and that their fishing rights would only continue for reasonable period while bilateral agreements were being negotiated, but rights would definitely terminate if bilateral agreement not concluded.

(9) All insisted wording of formula at Geneva must recognize fishing rights as matter of international law even though they are to be limited and are to be phased out.

**Whitney**

---

limited historical rights in perpetuity, and "Alternate Proposal B", which proposed 6-plus-6 with limited historical rights terminated after a finite period, were transmitted in airgram G-407 from London, November 20. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/11-2059) The conference agreed to support Alternative A and use Alternative B as a fall-back position.

**385. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, November 20, 1959—6 p.m.*

2686. From Dean.

(1) Met with Drew, Canadian High Commissioner, former chairman Canadian Delegation at Geneva, this morning. He most cordial and very pleased I called.

(2) Explained we had made commitment at Ottawa conference to present their case for maximum six-mile territorial sea and adjacent six-mile fishing zone with no traditional rights in fishing zone but with obligation on side coastal state to negotiate reasonable period for termination all fishing rights. Stated we had vigorously presented this view for two days but neither UK nor any of countries represented would accept.

(3) Explained Canadian proposal based on premise bilateral agreements would be worked out before Geneva but that all present insisted no opportunity to do so before March 17 and no chance to do so with other coastal states. Informed him all agreed they could not vote for a formula which deprived them of fishing rights as matter of international law and then if no agreement in bilateral negotiations their rights would cease.

(4) Said we had urged on meeting here that with UK, Western Europe and our support hoped to make their formula one which would get two-thirds at conference but without UK and Western Europe support and with solid Soviet and Arab blocs against anything less than straight twelve-mile territorial sea did not see how he could get more than approximately forty-four votes plus or minus one or two for new Canadian formula.

(5) He evidenced disappointment but not I think surprise. He insisted main key to success at Geneva conference was first working out formula acceptable to Iceland and was strongly critical of British use of warships and insisted this had united small nations almost solidly against any proposal UK might make. Also said was afraid Soviets would support Icelandic position at conference and therefore Canada felt it had to place itself in the lead for smaller nations with formula providing for definitive ending so-called historic fishing rights.

(6) Pointed out as neighbors we had pooled naval, air force and early warning defense, that our joint security could not survive territorial sea beyond maximum six miles and that if UK and Western Europe

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11-2059. Confidential. Repeated to Ottawa.

would go to modified UK proposal plus reasonable phase-out Canada would get everything in substance it wanted, although procedure for obtaining quite different.

(7) [1 sentence (18 words) not declassified] Told him thought importance of problem transcended personal considerations, was essential we and Canada, UK and Western Europe should work together to get realistic formula acceptable to Asian and African coastal nations, and that he had great opportunity to bring his unity about and to prevent dissension and possibly bitter litigation with Western Europe. He stated UK had recently rejected his formula and had merely offered to keep problem in status quo and then to negotiate and if no agreement status quo ante would be restored, and that he did not believe UK was prepared to negotiate realistically and that any formula which was presented to conference as preserving UK's rights against smaller nations, and in particular UK's rights against Iceland, could not get two-thirds. Told him present meeting was exploratory with no one committed and consequently could make no prediction, but that if UK and Western Europe could accept reasonable phase-out we would think would have a workable formula which Canada could accept and explained special situations formula we had handed to UK. [1 sentence (34 words) not declassified]

(8) While not committing himself in any way he was quite obviously interested and said he would report in full to his Minister and wanted to know if I would be available to come to Ottawa if his Minister requested it and I said yes. He suggested technical conference scheduled for November 24 be postponed until we have further word to report as to UK and Western Europe attitude toward phase-out.

(9) Said he would like to correspond with me personally about situation and asked me to keep him in touch, which I agreed to do.

(10) This afternoon called on Hare, UK Minister Agriculture and Fisheries.

(11) While he in no way committed his government to phase-out, he was obviously interested but said effect on fishing industry in UK might impel them to put forward their modified UK formula only for the present and assuming ultimate Cabinet approval of phase-out to accept addition of phase-out with reluctance at Geneva and wanted to know my reaction.

(12) Again said we were concerned about shortness next conference, possible bloc decisions before Geneva and inability of delegations to get instructions on fall-back brought forward, and that we preferred present realistic formula on which we could immediately get no work and line up votes.

(13) He argued on other hand we would be free to argue we favored UK modified formula plus phase-out with Asian and African nations and could promise to try to bring UK to this position at Ge-

neva and formula which presently did not have UK and Western European support at beginning of conference might be more palatable to Asian and African nations.

(14) Said he would consider matter carefully and asked us to do the same and indicated that at Cabinet meeting present opinion of fishing industry might require him to argue against present approval of phase-out theory even though it might be subsequently approved.

(15) Expressed desire to work closely with us at all stages.

Whitney

---

**386. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Ottawa, November 27, 1959—6 p.m.*

339. From Dean. Reported Canadian Secretary External Affairs results London negotiations and stated UK and western Europeans considering whether they could accept some phase out proposal in addition to 6 mile territorial sea and 6 mile exclusive fishing zone for coastal state and that without their cooperation and with 18 Soviet-Arab votes against US with possible maximum of 89, we did not see how Canadian proposal of straight 6 plus 6 [with?] bilaterals could get necessary two-thirds. Stated we understood their and our defense people were in complete agreement on absolute necessity maintain maximum territorial sea of 6 miles.

They are apparently leading group of smaller states including Iceland, Denmark and Norway and Asian-African states some of whom they insist will not vote for any proposal which recognizes existence of historic or traditional fishing rights in exclusive fishing zone but are willing to negotiate bilateral agreements in good faith if the formula itself terminates the historic or traditional fishing rights. We pointed out great difficulty politically for nations to vote for formula which completely terminated their fishing rights without knowing specifically what they could get in return, whether agreement could be reached on bilateral and whether bilaterals would be ratified. They appear to believe they can split western Europeans and get some for their formula and while they did not claim that their formula would necessarily get two-thirds vote they insisted that they thought it

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department State, Central Files, 399.731/11-2759. Confidential. Received November 28, 3:06 a.m.

had a better chance than ours. Quite apparent they are leaders of this bloc and have done considerable work lining up nations for their formula and are not willing at this point to abandon this leadership.

Pointed out we both were in agreement on absolute necessity on getting successful formula which would maintain territorial sea with maximum 6 miles, that our formula would give them in substance everything that they wanted without litigation and even assuming that they got two-thirds without acquiescence commercial fishing states they might still have long period of litigation and disagreement among allies.

They asked if we were still willing to attempt negotiate bilateral on phase out period with straight 6 plus 6 formula and we answered that we could not at this point. Said we wished to continue to work very closely with them and to continue exchange views. Believe they might come to our formula at conference as fallback but are not prepared to do so now.

**Wigglesworth**

---

**387. Memorandum by the Special Assistant for Law of the Sea Matters (Richards)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 14, 1959.*

**SUBJECT**

Position on Law of the Sea

Following a meeting with Mr. Hager, Mr. Dean gave instructions along the following lines:

1) As a matter of principle, the US must get a formula which will keep the territorial sea limit at a maximum of 6 miles and get two-thirds vote for that formula at the Conference.

2) From the standpoint of the US overall interests it is more important to prevent Conference going to 12-mile territorial sea or flexible 3-12 mile formula than it is to worry about getting ratification for the above expressed formula later. The US Government cannot be intimidated in the discharge of its duties by the comments on this position by a private group.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12-1159. Confidential. The source text is a memorandum of a telephone conversation, December 11, which has Dean, Hager, and Richards as participants.

3) Defense interests are paramount. Last year we tried as hard as we could to protect fishing interests before departing from 3 in order to go to our 6 and 6 plus historical rights. Later the same fishing interests which criticized us for making this move said that the formula was too little and too late and that we could have done better if we had moved to it earlier.

4) We must not be deterred in getting what we want for national defense by allowing private interests, however important, to dictate the terms on which they will allow the Department to negotiate or to dictate the precedents of presenting alternatives.

5) The Department will have to determine the formula after giving the maximum consideration to the fishing interests' rights. If we are successful in getting a two-thirds vote for our formula, the fishing interests will acquiesce. If we are unsuccessful and other nations unilaterally go to 12 miles so that we lost on fishing rights as well as security, they will be the first to criticize and blame the Department for listening to them.

6) We recommend that we take the following action: On the trip Mr. Pool and Mr. Herrington should sound out the Latin American nations on the modified UK proposal that is, "Alternative A", while at the same time sounding them out on "Alternative B" as a possible fallback so that they can get flexible instructions for the Conference. We recommend against trying to sell "Alternative A" alone now without also trying to get their vote for "Alternate B" if necessary. We do not wish to be put in the position of trying to sell "Alternate A" in such a way as to be deemed anti-Icelandic or to be spokesman for the fishing interest of the Western European nations or to have anyone understand that we promised to introduce and fight for "Alternate A" first and will only use "Alternate B" as a last resort. If someone else introduces "Alternate A" first, we do not wish to have to vote for it, or to continue to support it, in such a way as will damage our prestige for Conference purposes or our negotiating ability. We should say that we are for a formula which will achieve a 6-mile maximum width of the territorial sea for the protection of the Free World and that we are for any formula that will preserve that, and at the same time preserve the maximum interests of the fishing industry. We definitely should not promise not to present "Alternate B" first, if we come to the conclusion that that is the best formula to present.

7) We should definitely try to discourage (a) 12-mile territorial sea or (b) Canadian formula of 6 plus 6 without any fishing rights, (c) the Mexican formula for a flexible 3-12, or a 3 plus 9, or 3 plus 12.

8) We should tell the fishing group that we do not think that they should be arguing with other nations against their going to "Alternate B" if we come to the conclusion that that is the formula we must fight for.

*Note:* Mr. Dean said that the foregoing should be restricted to internal use within the Government; it should *not* be made known to persons outside the Government.

---

### 388. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>

CA-5340

Washington, Decemeber 31, 1959.

## REFERENCE

CA-9156, April 22, 1959; CA-4756, December 8, 1959<sup>2</sup>

## SUMMARY

This Circular requests the Embassy to begin discussions immediately with the host country to sound out its probable position concerning the issues to be considered at the Conference, to set forth, and seek support for, U.S. views, and to report promptly by telegram whether special efforts may be needed to secure support for positions acceptable to the U.S.

1. The following guidance should be followed by the Embassy when discussing orally the US position vis-à-vis various proposals likely to be put forward at the 1960 Conference.

2. The overriding US objective at the 1960 Conference is to achieve Conference agreement on a narrow (6-mile) territorial sea. Failure to achieve such agreement at the Conference would have serious adverse effects on US and non-Communist world security. A number of proposals are likely to be pressed vigorously at the Conference. These are summarized and evaluated in the following paragraphs:

Proposals providing for or permitting a 12-mile territorial sea:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12-3159. Confidential. Drafted by Richards and Arneson; cleared in draft with Herrington, Pender, Terry, Hager, Dreier, AF, EUR, FE, NEA, and Defense. Sent also to Florence and Nice, but not to Addis Ababa, Amman, Beirut, Colombo, Conakry, Djakarta, Kabul, Katmandu, Khar-toum, Phnom Penh, Rabat, or Tunis. Repeated to Hong King, Singapore, Baghdad, CINCNELM, CINCPAC, USRO, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> CA-9156 transmitted the text of the revised background memorandum, Document 375 (*ibid.*, 399.731/4-2259); CA-4756 transmitted a summary of the main issues at the upcoming conference on the Law of the Sea, the proposals of the participants, and the position of the United States. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/12-859)



(a) *A straight 12-mile territorial sea*: This formula would be contrary to the security as well as the fishery interests of the non-Communist world. It will be strongly opposed by the US and others which favor a narrow territorial sea for reasons given in CA-9156 and CA-4756. US estimate is that it will not receive two-thirds majority.

(b) *A 3- to 12-mile territorial sea at the option of the coastal states*: This is an insidious formula which is being energetically pressed by Mexico. It is superficially attractive to many uncommitted states. It would be as damaging as a straight 12-mile rule and should therefore be as vigorously opposed for reasons given in CA-9156 and CA-4756. US estimate is that it is unlikely to receive two-thirds majority, but it is dangerous since uninformed delegates might vote for it under mistaken impression that it represents a genuine compromise.

Proposals preserving a narrow territorial sea: (All will be opposed by the Communist Bloc and by all or most of the Arab states):

(c) *6 plus 6 (unqualified)*: (See CA-4756.) This formula which is being actively sponsored by Canada has considerable appeal to states wishing to end foreign fishing near their shores, particularly the Afro-Asians and some Latin American states. Is favored by Iceland and Norway. Has merit of preserving 6-mile territorial sea, but would offer no protection to traditional fishing near foreign shores. US estimate is that it is unlikely to receive two-thirds majority because it is firmly opposed by the US and by Western European and other "fishing" states.

(d) *6 plus 6 with continuation of limited "historic" fishing rights*: This is the present UK formula and is a substantial modification of the final US proposal at the 1958 Conference. Described in Paragraph III., A., 4. of CA-4756. A reasonable and equitable formula which would preserve both narrow (6-mile) territorial sea and traditional fisheries *at same level in perpetuity*. Strongly favored by the US and UK, by "fishing" states of Western Europe, and by a number of other states. *FYI*: Support for this formula by foreign states should be encouraged. US estimate is, however, that it is likely to be opposed by enough states to prevent its adoption at the Conference. Because of this US may ultimately support proposal set forth in Paragraph (e), which follows. *End FYI*.

(e) *6 plus 6 with cut-off of traditional fishing after an agreed period of years*: Described in Paragraph III., B. of CA-4756. An *ultimate* compromise fall-back formula which, though preserving a 6-mile territorial sea, would be damaging to traditional fisheries and thus would not be favored by the US or other "fishing" states. It would be attractive to Afro-Asians, some South Americans, and others who seek end to foreign fishing rights within 12 miles of shore. The US believes that this ultimate compromise formula may prove to have the best (and possibly only) chance of two-thirds approval at the Conference. Therefore, *in the end* it would be supported by the US, probably by the UK and most of the Western Europeans, and possibly even by Canada, as last-ditch position to prevent Conference failure.

3. In any discussions Embassy should emphasize strong US preference for proposal in Paragraph (d) and should seek support for it. *FYI*: US estimate that this proposal is unlikely to attract required support should *not* be revealed at this time. To do so would encourage

immediate move to formula in Paragraph (e), thus destroying its character of an *ultimate* fall-back position and increasing danger Conference would turn to formulas even less favorable on fishing issue. Embassy is cautioned against discussing the foregoing tactical considerations with foreign official. *End FYI*. Embassy should say that US does not favor proposal in Paragraph (e). However, US is prepared to give it serious consideration only because the formula in Paragraph (d) is not *certain* to succeed. Embassy should urge that Conference delegates be given instructions sufficiently broad and flexible to permit support of both proposals (Paragraphs (d) and (e)).

4. Whether the proposal in (d) or in (e) is adopted, the US recognizes that some special arrangement will probably have to be made with regard to Iceland and a few other areas which are uniquely dependent on fishing.

5. *Action Requested*: The Embassy is requested:

(a) unless serious objection is perceived, to start discussions immediately on the basis of the foregoing to sound out the probable position of the country to which accredited and report by telegram;

(b) to advise the Department promptly by telegram what manner or method of persuasion, specific tactics, or concession the Department might undertake or authorize to assist it, *if needed*, in securing support from the host country to positions acceptable to US. Such importance is attached to this matter in the US Government as to warrant full consideration of any suggestions made;

(c) to advise the Department promptly by telegram whether the Embassy desires the assistance of representatives from Washington in this regard.

6. As need be, the Embassy may expect final instructions aimed at securing the requisite support from the host country to be issued in the near future following receipt of Embassy telegraphic reports requested in 5. above.

7. *Embassies in NATO Countries* will recall that the Secretary made a brief statement in the NATO Ministerial Meeting on December 17 stressing the security aspect of the territorial sea issue and the related fisheries issue. It is planned to discuss these issues in the North Atlantic Council in January and Embassies in NATO countries may wish to delay any approach until after report from USRO that subject was raised in NAC.

8. *Embassies in Countries Which Attended the London Meetings* (DepCirTel 627, Nov. 6, 1959 to certain posts<sup>3</sup>) should in any discussions emphasize that US, as a "fishing" state, is most sympathetic to their problem and is no less eager than they are to retain traditional fishing rights within 12 miles of foreign shores. However, the US has reluctantly reached the conclusions outlined in Paragraphs (d) and (e)

---

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 382.

above. Countries which attended London meetings should be impressed with necessity to be prepared ultimately to go to some compromise formula such as that outlined in (e) if necessary to prevent Conference failure.

9. *Soviet and Eastern European Capitals*: The Department transmits this message to most missions in this area for information only. However, the voting record of both Poland and Yugoslavia at the 1958 Conference diverged sufficiently from the straight bloc line to raise the question whether one or both might not in the end vote for, or at least abstain on, moderate 6 plus 6 proposals such as (d) and (e) above. If the Embassy in Warsaw and in Belgrade share this view, they may in their discretion raise the issue with the respective Foreign Offices and seek a sufficiently flexible attitude to permit support for, or abstention on, the proposals outlined in Paragraphs (d) and (e).

10. *ARA Posts*: The Department would appreciate receiving comments and suggestions or counter-proposals from those Embassies which have as yet not replied to CG-371.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>4</sup>CG-371, December 11, sent to all posts in the American Republics, asked for proposals that would enhance the likelihood of a favorable attitude by Latin American countries at the second Law of the Sea Conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12-459)

---

**389. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Assistant for Law of the Sea Matters (Arneson) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 1, 1960.*

SUBJECT

Status Report: Law of the Sea Conference, March 17, 1960

Following the Secretary's decision at a meeting on November 25, 1959<sup>2</sup> that the United States should support the proposal developed at the London meeting called "Alternative B" (6-mile territorial sea plus 6-mile fishing zone in which *limited* historic rights would be *terminated* in X years) and press for its adoption, all posts were given

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-160. Secret. Drafted by Wright.

<sup>2</sup>No record of this meeting has been found.

instructions (CA-5340, December 31, 1959—Tab A<sup>3</sup>) designed to accomplish this objective. For tactical reasons posts in most countries were instructed to emphasize the United States' strong preference for Alternative A, urging that country delegations be given Conference instructions flexible enough to permit voting for Alternatives A or B, however, as the only proposals likely to garner the requisite two-thirds majority.

Plans have been made to have the territorial sea and fishing limits issues discussed in the NAC to stress the security importance of maintaining a narrow (6-mile) territorial sea and the necessity for compromise among NATO members on the fishing issue to achieve this overriding objective. Meanwhile, the British Cabinet has decided Alternate A (6 plus 6 with limited historic fishing rights in perpetuity) has no realistic chance of adoption and has authorized a UK initiative with the Western European fishing states urging an affirmative decision now to support Alternate B early in the Conference if necessary. Pending the outcome of this initiative, now in progress, NAC consideration has been postponed and we have instructed our posts in these capitals to support the UK approach (Tab B<sup>4</sup>).

The UK and Iceland have privately accepted the good offices of Spaak and Lange<sup>5</sup> in an attempt to find a *modus vivendi* to tranquilize the UK-Icelandic dispute prior to the Conference, without prejudice to respective legal or other rights.

Arthur Dean, Arthur Richards, Admiral Kivette (Commander, Seventh Fleet) and an Interior representative are now in the Far East urging the support of Indonesia, the Philippines, China, Korea and Japan for the US position. Mr. Herrington is scheduled to visit six northern and eastern European (Poland, Yugoslavia) countries within the next two weeks for the same purpose.

Canada continues to campaign vigorously for its 6 plus straight 6 proposal and has published and distributed a pamphlet supporting this proposal, under the signature of Mr. Green. There have been indications received recently that India may decide to support the Mexican flexible 3-12 formula. It is reported Krishna Menon is strongly urging this course. The Indian Cabinet is to consider the matter imminently. Both of these proposals continue likely to have sufficient Latin American, African and Asian support to prevent adoption of other proposals including Alternate B.

---

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Circular 964, January 28, reported on the British switch to Alternative B and also that the United States concurred in the change and instructed seven European posts to concert with their British counterparts on approaches to their host countries. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.73/2-160)

<sup>5</sup> Paul-Henri Spaak, NATO Secretary-General, and Halvard Lange, Norwegian Foreign Minister.

The prospects of success at the Conference are so precarious that it probably will be necessary to undertake extraordinary measures, including unusually strong diplomatic representations in countries with extremist positions, if US objectives at the Conference are to be realized. Subject to developments over the next few weeks, it may well be necessary to propose that the Secretary give consideration to the question whether our Delegation will need to have, as a precautionary measure, instructions broad enough to permit US support for the Canadian proposal as the means for securing Conference adoption of a 6-mile territorial sea.

---

### 390. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 4, 1960.*

#### SUBJECT

Message to Prime Minister Nehru Concerning the Forthcoming Second Conference on the Law of the Sea

When you talked with Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi last December,<sup>2</sup> you raised the question of the forthcoming Conference on the Law of the Sea, and said you hoped Mr. Nehru could support our "six and six" formula. Mr. Nehru indicated that he saw no objection but could not commit himself until he had talked with Mr. Sen, the Law Minister.

Since your talk with Mr. Nehru, American officials have discussed the matter with Indian officials on several occasions. The Government of India is shortly to decide, at the Cabinet level, the position it will take at the Conference. Our Embassy in New Delhi reports that it appears doubtful whether this decision will be in support of the compromise proposal put forward by the United States.

It is of vital importance to the United States that the Conference reach agreement on a breadth of territorial sea no greater than six miles, in conformity with our proposal. India's position at the Conference may have great influence on other Afro-Asian states. I believe that a personal message from you to Mr. Nehru would be the most effective means to influence the Indian Government in this matter. I

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-460. Drafted by Horgan (NEA/SOA) and cleared by Admiral Ward, Hager, Taylor, and NEA.

<sup>2</sup> Documentation on Eisenhower's visit to India, December 9-14, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume xv.

recommend, therefore, that you send a message to him along the lines of the enclosure, which I submit for your consideration.<sup>3</sup>

This message, if approved, would be sent by the Department to the Embassy in New Delhi, with instructions for its personal delivery to the Prime Minister, indicating to him we do not intend to make the letter public.

**Christian A. Herter<sup>4</sup>**

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. For text as sent, see *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**391. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister  
Nehru<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 5, 1960.*

DEAR PRIME MINISTER: You will recall that, during our talks in New Delhi last December, I mentioned the forthcoming conference in Geneva on the Law of the Sea. I expressed the hope that you would be able to support a compromise formula of a six-mile territorial sea, coupled with a six-mile contiguous fishing zone. With the gratifying support of the Indian Government, such a proposal came close to adoption at the last conference in 1958.

You were good enough to say that you saw no objection to India's giving renewed support to such a compromise, but added that you could not commit yourself without discussing the matter with your cabinet colleagues.

I understand that since our talks the United States position has been explained to the Indian Government in some detail by Ambassador Bunker and other American officials. I know that Mr. Bunker would be glad to talk to you further if you so desire.

I am writing to you now, as the time for the conference approaches, because it seems to me especially important that our two governments work together for its success. I hope that, since the occa-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-2060. Confidential; Presidential Handling. Transmitted to New Delhi in telegram 3014, February 5, which is the source text, with the caution that the White House did not intend to make it public. Except for the complimentary close, it is the same as the draft attached to Document 390. In telegram 3015 to New Delhi, also dated February 5, the Department transmitted the text of an aide-mémoire to accompany the letter which explained the U.S. position. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/2-560)

sion of our talks, the Indian Government will have found it possible to support such a compromise proposal as I mentioned. Our information indicates that a formula along some such lines affords the only probable basis for a conference agreement.

The Law of the Sea is a troubled area of international law, where much can be accomplished in removing a serious cause of international tensions if agreement is reached. The contribution which India can make in securing conference agreement is enormous. I hope that your government's delegation will work, as will mine, for the adoption of a sound and realistic limit to the territorial seas and a successful Conference.

With best wishes and warm personal regard,  
Sincerely,

**Dwight D. Eisenhower**<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 3014 bears this typed signature.

---

**392. Letter From Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Senator Henry M. Jackson to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 11, 1960.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to the second world conference on the Law of the Sea which will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, beginning in March. The important matter coming before this conference is the breadth of the territorial sea. In the last conference the participating nations were unable to agree by a majority decision and, consequently, this problem will again be discussed.

We are fully aware of the national security questions involved in this issue—the need of securing agreement on the narrowest territorial limits possible. We have been briefed by the Navy Department in this respect. However, the matter of fisheries is also involved. The United States fisheries are a part of our national security, and therefore, we deem it important to outline to you our position in this regard.

Over a period of years, the United States fishermen have utilized specific fishing grounds. They have acquired historical rights which cannot be ignored in any proposed solution to the breadth of the territorial sea. While we are fully in favor of cooperating with the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2–1160. Drafted by Magnuson. Attached to Document 394.

government on necessary security limits, we are not in favor of agreeing to a political expedient which would secure defense objectives at the expense of fisheries.

This is our position and we are deeply distressed that it apparently is not shared by your associates. We refer to newspaper accounts of proceedings at a meeting on the territorial sea in Seattle,<sup>2</sup> called by State Department officials. At this meeting, such reports indicate, your representatives publicly offered compromises which would destroy the bargaining position of the United States in relation to its common fisheries with Canada. These compromises, if accepted by the United States, would put the Pacific Northwest out of business insofar as its bottom trawl and salmon troll fisheries are concerned. It is our position that we should not surrender before negotiations are even underway.

As indicated earlier, we recognize many of the problems our negotiators will confront in Geneva. Further, we are fully aware of the position the Canadian government has taken in regard to the territorial sea. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that our government should achieve an understanding with the Canadians before we go to Geneva, and that understanding should preserve the status quo on our common fisheries until a mutual agreement can be formulated and signed. The formal agreement might be consummated subsequent to conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva.

The United States and Canada have many close ties—many mutual interests. The trade between the two countries is vital to the economies of both. Surely vigorous representations by our Department of State to the Canadians could achieve a mutual recognition of this fact. Such an objective cannot be accomplished, however, if representatives of the State Department telegraph their punches in advance, as was done in the Seattle meeting to which we have already referred.

May we urge you to consider this proposal and to initiate steps to effectuate it before our negotiating team goes to Geneva.

By this time I am sure you understand that we are strongly opposed to the compromises discussed in Seattle. We would caution against any agreement which sacrifices the historical rights of American fishermen.

If you disagree basically with any of the views herein expressed, we would be most pleased to meet with you to further explain our position.

Sincerely,

**Warren G. Magnuson**

**Henry M. Jackson**

---

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.



P.S. On behalf of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, I want to thank you for your affirmative response to my request that an observer from our Committee attend the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva. We intend to have a technical consultant on the ground to represent the Committee, and at the moment there is a good possibility that at least two of us will accompany him.

W.G.M.

---

**393. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Paris, March 9, 1960—9 p.m.*

Polto 1785. NAC meeting March 9th—Law of the Sea Conf. Council held full and, we believe, useful exchange of views on issues confronting forthcoming Law of Sea Conference.

While some delegations had not received instruction due late distribution IS paper (PO/60/268<sup>2</sup>), all generally expressed support for US view on importance of maintaining 6-mile territorial sea for NATO security and that NATO countries should establish contacts at Geneva with view to securing acceptable solution of problem. However, statements of country positions revealed little change in known views re extent fisheries limit. Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland indicated, with varying nuances, support of 6 plus plain 6 solution. With exception Portugal and Turkey which had no instructions, and Luxembourg, which made no statement, all others came out for 6 plus 6 with maintenance of historic rights with various qualifying suggestions. At conclusion of discussion, it was agreed there was no need for further Council consideration of this item at this time but option left open to bring matter back to NAC if developments during Geneva Conference made this desirable.

After chairman (Casardi) explained purpose of discussion in terms promoting NATO unity at Law of Sea Conf, US made statement essentially as contained CA-5339<sup>3</sup> with some revisions largely in interest

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-960. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva and the other NATO capitals.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> CA-5339, December 31, reviewed the U.S. position on the Law of the Sea and transmitted a draft of a statement for Burgess to make at a Council meeting devoted to the subject. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12-3159)

of avoiding unnecessary duplication of points international staff paper. (Text of statement which was circulated being pouched separately.<sup>4</sup>)

Germany expressed agreement in principle with Secretariat paper and willingness to discuss 6 plus 6 territorial sea and fisheries limit but pointed out its interest in maintaining certain historical "uses" in outer 6-mile zone for unlimited time. France stated its support for 6-mile territorial sea and could accept additional 6-mile fisheries zone with maintenance historic rights but not 6 plus plain 6. Matter should be further discussed at Geneva Conference and if no solution attainable there Council might take up matter again to see if compromise could be effected.

Canada expressed strong support for US view security factor of major importance in NATO approach to Geneva Conference and agreed overriding consideration was to maintain 6-mile territorial sea. In seeking solution, however, must think in terms of settlement which would appeal to 89 countries participating in conf and not necessarily one which emphasizes non-security interests of NATO countries. Felt Canadian proposal for 6 plus plain 6 solution was only one acceptable to conference. It was also prepared to offer bilateral arrangements with countries whose fishing interests were affected.

Norway shared Canadian view. Agreed with US views on importance of security factor but pointed out NATO success in maintaining its security would depend on how fisheries question treated. Canadian proposal only one with chance of being accepted by conference. According Norway's figures, 25 states already had 12-mile fishing limits and easy therefore for them to secure necessary 29 votes for blocking third. Norway, while it would try to get as much support as possible for Canadian proposal, understood position of other countries if 12-mile fishing limit were accepted at conference. Norwegian Government would be also prepared, therefore, to take up these problems with affected states and try to find solution serving best interests of all concerned.

Iceland stated willingness support any extent of territorial sea provided fishery limits problem dealt with adequately. Supported Canadian proposal wholeheartedly "in principle". Could not, however, accept maintenance of historic rights in outer 6-mile zone which merely added up to 6 plus 6 minus 6. Re their acceptance Canadian proposal in principle, they could make no exceptions and, in addition in view Iceland's dependence on fishing, felt special exception would have to be made for Iceland. Thus, even if Canadian proposal accepted, would like to have something additional done for Iceland.

---

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

Italy and Belgium stated support for 6 plus 6 with maintenance historic rights. Belgium indicated that like other countries, it was prepared to establish contacts at Geneva with view to developing tactical position. Netherlands said it had no instructions but Dutch preference for 6 plus 6 with maintenance historic rights well known. Emphasized need to find solution acceptable to all to bring order into an international situation that might otherwise degenerate into chaos and anarchy. Expressed importance from security point of view of working for solution at Geneva. Turkey and Portugal, having no instructions, did not express a position on this subject.

UK indicated its approach to problem was much like that of the US. Felt there was overriding need for international decision in territorial seas and fisheries problem in order to ensure "rule of law". Hoped all would go to conference with this in view for if no agreement reached, international anarchy would result. UK supported 6-mile territorial sea and was prepared to agree to additional 6-mile fishing zone but felt measures should be taken to ensure some fair preservation of historic rights in this zone.

US expressed view discussion had been useful and had brought out meeting of minds on security factor involved in Law of Sea Conference. Felt discussion had been carried as far as possible in Council and matter now should be left delegations at Geneva with option to bring problem back to Council if Geneva developments made this desirable. After Canada had pointed out undesirability of having discussions carried on simultaneously at Geneva and in NATO, Casardi summarized as follows: 1) there should be no further discussion in Council, 2) delegations should report views expressed discussion to their govts so that they can be taken into consideration at Geneva, 3) governments recognize that close contacts should be maintained at Geneva and 4) if developments at conf demand it, matter could be taken up again in Council.

**Burgess**

**394. Letter From the Secretary of State to Senator Warren G. Magnuson<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 10, 1960.*

DEAR WARREN: Thank you for your letter of February 11, 1960 with its frank expression of your views concerning the position which should be taken by the United States at the coming Conference on Law of the Sea, particularly with respect to traditional fishing rights.

The Department is well aware of the importance of the fishing carried on by our Northwest fishermen off the coast of Canada within twelve miles of the shoreline, as well as the importance of fishing off foreign coasts to other segments of our fishing industry. Representatives of this Department and of the Department of the Interior have held repeated consultations with advisors from the fishing industry for the purpose of determining the nature and importance of such fishing activities so that these interests can be given the fullest consideration in any decisions made by the United States Government.

I am glad that you have had the opportunity to be briefed by the Department of Defense with respect to the importance of a narrow territorial sea to United States security interests. The importance of these considerations has led the Executive Branch to the inescapable conclusion that the overriding objective of the United States at the coming Conference must be to secure agreement on a territorial sea of not more than six miles. On the basis of extensive consultations we have had with other governments we have been forced to conclude that it would be impossible to get such agreement without making some concessions involving fishery jurisdiction in a zone contiguous to the territorial sea. In these consultations with other governments we have sought a formula which would attract the necessary support for a narrow territorial sea with minimum concessions regarding fishing jurisdiction. In the circumstances, the United States favors a territorial-sea formula which provides for a territorial sea of six miles with the coastal State having jurisdiction over fisheries in an additional six miles, with the proviso that countries which have fished in the outer six miles during the five years immediately preceding the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference may continue to do so at a level not exceeding that prevailing during such base period. However, since we have not been able to obtain reasonable assurance that such a formula will attract the necessary two-thirds support, we have urged countries espousing

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/2-1160. Drafted by Herington on February 25 and cleared with Richards, Yingling, BNA, and H. Attached to the source text were: a nearly identical letter to Senator Jackson, Magnuson's February 11 letter (Document 392), and a memorandum of a telephone conversation, February 19, in which Herter offered to discuss the question further with Magnuson.

other formulas to enter the Conference with such flexibility in their positions as will enable them to support some compromise. In line with this appeal we have found it necessary to be willing to have the same degree of flexibility in the United States position. It is necessary to follow this line of action in order to minimize the possibility that delegations will enter the Conference with instructions so rigid as to leave them unable to cooperate in working out an acceptable compromise during the course of the Conference.

In your letter you refer to statements made by representatives of the Department in the course of a meeting with fishing industry and State officials at Seattle which indicated a spirit of compromise that seemed to destroy the bargaining position of the United States in relation to the fishing jurisdiction problem. Since in the consultations we have held with other countries, including Canada, to develop a territorial-sea proposal which would receive the necessary support the United States has emphasized its overriding interest in a successful Conference and, to this end, has evinced a willingness to consider possible compromises that have prospects of success. I do not believe that the statements at the Seattle meeting revealed information of which other governments were not aware. The Seattle meeting served primarily to acquaint the concerned people in that area with the security and other considerations which have led the United States to its present position, as well as to give them some forewarning of the possible results of the Conference and reasons therefor.

In your letter you urge that the United States Government should achieve an understanding with the Canadians before the Geneva Conference which would preserve the status quo on common fisheries until a mutual agreement can be formulated. In consultations with Canada we have sought to achieve a common position which would safeguard our historic fisheries but so far have been unable to do so. Canada adheres to its original position, which includes twelve miles of exclusive fishery jurisdiction. I assure you that our interest in working out such an understanding with Canada continues and that we will take advantage of any opportunity prior to or during the Conference to do so. Furthermore, I believe it most likely that any proposal agreed to at Geneva will provide for or permit the working out of separate fishing arrangements between countries.

Finally, I assure you that in seeking agreement on a narrow territorial sea the Department will continue to work for a formula which would have minimum effect on the United States fishing industry.

As indicated in our telephone conversation on February 19, 1960. I will be glad to discuss this matter with you if you wish.

With warmest personal regards,  
Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

### 395. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

US/2nd CLS/S.POS/1 (Revision 2)

Washington, March 14, 1960.

#### BASIC U.S. POSITION

##### *Recommended U.S. Position:*

1. The basic U.S. objective is to achieve Conference agreement on a territorial sea of not more than six miles in breadth. Failing this objective, the Delegation should strive to prevent agreement on a territorial sea greater than six miles in breadth, even if this should be at the expense of Conference failure.

2. In pursuing the basic U.S. objective, the U.S. Delegation should strongly support, as the preferred U.S. formula, a revision of the 1958 U.S. proposal which would provide for: (a) a 6-mile territorial sea, and (b) a 6-mile contiguous fishing zone in which foreign fishing currently pursued in this zone would continue at a level equal to but not above that prevailing in a pre-Conference base period. The Delegation should encourage support for this proposal to the maximum practicable extent. Should it become clear that this proposal is unlikely to be successful, it may indicate, however, that the U.S. is prepared to consider other 6 plus compromise 6 proposals, in the interests of achieving Conference agreement.

3. In pursuing the objective of the U.S., the Delegation should seek to maximize the protection to be accorded foreign fishing in a contiguous fishing zone not exceeding six miles in breadth.

4. The Delegation should make clear that a territorial sea of three miles serves the best interests of the international community. However, in view of the fact that such a proposal is considered to have no chance of winning the support necessary for approval, the U.S. Dele-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1660. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was attached to a memorandum from Wilcox to Herter, dated March 16, together with the delegation's instructions and eight other position papers. No copy of the first draft of the paper has been found.

gation should refrain from introducing a three-mile proposal and should discourage any such proposal by other countries, so as to avoid antagonizing many States which might otherwise be disposed to support a satisfactory six-plus-six formula. Moreover, the Delegation should discourage bringing any three-mile proposal to a vote in view of the great risk of its formal rejection and the difficulty such rejection would pose for continued assertion of the three-mile rule in the event of Conference failure.

5. In the event deemed necessary by the Delegation to achieve the basic U.S. objective, the Delegation may shift from public support of the proposal above and support openly a 6 plus compromise 6 proposal which would limit traditional fishing more severely, though such an arrangement would be damaging to U.S. fishery interests. It is contemplated such alternative proposal would provide for foreign fishing rights within twelve miles to terminate after "x" number of years. (If other 6 plus compromise 6 proposals appear to have a greater likelihood of adoption, the Delegation may, in its discretion, support such alternative proposals.)

Should it be deemed necessary by the Delegation to achieve the basic United States objective, that it support such an alternative proposal providing for a termination of foreign fishing rights after a short period of years, or another 6 plus 6 compromise proposal of equivalent effect, then prior to such support, provided that in the judgment of the head of the Delegation such a course would not endanger the achievement of the basic U.S. objective, and without restricting the above delegation of authority, the Delegation shall inform the Department, and shall endeavor to negotiate with the Canadian and Mexican Delegations commitments for post-Conference bilateral agreements with the U.S., which would continue traditional United States fishing at a mutually agreeable level indefinitely, or, as a minimum, for a period of years sufficient to provide for an orderly and equitable adjustment of fishing practices. In approaching these Delegations for this purpose, the Delegation should emphasize the domestic political difficulties which such support would generate in the United States.

6. In the event it is determined by the Delegation that support of the Canadian 6-plus-plain 6 proposal is the only alternative to Conference failure, or to agreement on a territorial sea greater than 6 miles in breadth, the Delegation may support such proposal. In such eventuality, and prior to such support, but without restricting the above delegation of authority, the Delegation shall inform the Department, and shall endeavor to negotiate with the Canadian and Mexican Delegations, in consideration of such support, commitments for post-Conference bilateral agreements with the U.S., which would continue traditional United States fishing at a mutually agreeable level indefinitely, or, as a minimum, for a period of years sufficient to provide for an

orderly and equitable adjustment of fishing practices. In approaching these Delegations for this purpose, the Delegation should emphasize the domestic political difficulties which such support would generate in the United States.

7. In accordance with the foregoing conditions, the Delegation shall have discretion to adopt such tactics at the Conference as appear best calculated to achieve U.S. Conference objectives.

8. If there appears to be a reasonably good possibility of reaching agreement at the Conference on a 6-mile territorial sea, without simultaneously reaching agreement on a contiguous fishing zone, the Delegation shall have discretion to support a separate convention on the question of the breadth of the territorial sea. The Delegation should vigorously oppose separate agreement at the Conference, however, on the question of fishing rights in a contiguous zone.

9. In the event that the U.S. and its supporters cannot prevent a two-thirds majority from voting for some proposal which would authorize a wider than 6-mile territorial sea, the U.S. should vote against any such proposals and use every effort to have as many other States as possible vote against any such proposals.

---

**396. Letter From the Under Secretary of the Interior (Bennett) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 14, 1960.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I should like to place on record the views which I expressed in a telephone conversation on March 12 with Mr. Eric Hager, regarding paragraph 5 of the basic instructions to the United States Delegation to the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.<sup>2</sup>

Among other things, this paragraph authorizes the Delegation, should it deem such action necessary to the achievement of the basic United States objective, to support a six plus compromise six proposal which would result in the termination of foreign fishing rights in the contiguous zone after a period of "x" years. This Department foresees the possibility that several such proposals might be put forward providing for varying periods of years. We also foresee the possibility that

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1460. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> No record of the March 12 telephone conversation has been found; for the basic instructions, see *supra*.



the Delegation, while it would of course support the proposal providing for the longest period of years, might conclude that this proposal had no chance of obtaining the required two-thirds majority, and therefore would be prepared to support a proposal providing for a shorter period.

We consider it most important, should such an eventuality arise, that the Delegation vote for the proposal providing for the longer period of years, as well as for the proposal which offered the better prospects. We can envision no circumstances in which the Delegation should vote against or abstain from voting on the former proposal if it were put to a vote. We think that it would be a serious error for the Delegation to do so.

We recognize that circumstances could arise in which it would be desirable to prevent a vote on a proposal of the kind envisioned in paragraph 5 which the United States preferred, but which stood little chance of succeeding. We would expect the Delegation in these circumstances to make every effort to prevent a vote. Should these efforts fail, however, and the proposal be put to the vote, the Delegation should support it. We think it desirable that the Delegation be so instructed.

Alternatively, the Delegation might be instructed to seek the views of the interested Departments in Washington, should the circumstances which we foresee arise. We think it will be able to anticipate events and do so.

Sincerely yours,

**Elmer F. Bennett**

---

**397. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, March 16, 1960<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Law of the Sea Conference

**PARTICIPANTS**

Mr. Rae, Chargé d'Affaires, Canadian Embassy  
Mr. Nutt, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1660. Confidential. Drafted by Williamson on March 18 and approved in U on March 21. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to the Delegation at the Second Law of the Sea Conference in telegram 2044 to Geneva, March 21. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-2160)

Under Secretary Dillon  
Mr. Arneson, U/LS  
Mr. Willoughby, BNA  
Mr. Williamson, EUR

Mr. Dillon opened the conversation by saying that he had asked Mr. Rae to come in in order to review our positions at the forthcoming Law of the Sea Conference, and perhaps discuss just where we go from here. Mr. Dillon said we believe that  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the conference can be brought to agreement on a 6-mile territorial sea. The question of fishing rights in an outer zone is more difficult and will require compromise if agreement is to be reached. We felt that some states which initially would support a 12-mile territorial sea might at a later point in the conference switch their vote to support a six-plus-six formula in the interest of reaching an agreement. The Indian position, for example, remains unclear. To our mind, at the present time, the question of fishing rights in the outer six miles is the crucial problem. While our initial position at the conference will be a slight variation of our former proposal for continuing fishing rights in the outer six miles, we recognize that our chances of achieving a two-thirds majority for this position are not very good. As we see it, we will have to move beyond this position, and our analysis is that some sort of phase-out position in the outer six zone is most likely to get a two-thirds agreement at Geneva. We would hope that the Canadians in the interest of conference agreement could modify their position on the outer 6-mile zone and come to some agreement on a phase-out period. We realize there is some chance that the Canadian proposal might be adopted at the conference, and Mr. Dillon said that it was this possibility that he wished to speak about. He felt that if the Canadian proposal was adopted we would want to reach some firm prior understanding on bilateral agreements which would protect our own fishing industries. He thought that adoption of the Canadian proposal without firm agreement on these lines would have unfortunate repercussions on the economic relations between our two governments which we must both strive to avoid. He believed that it would be most unfortunate to have new economic problems between ourselves just when we have arrived at happy solutions to our earlier difficulties in this field. Mr. Dillon noted that while our fishing industry did not have a great economic position in the country as a whole, it was of great importance in certain localities where it was able to muster considerable political and emotional pressures. Unless some accommodation either through a phase-out period agreement at Geneva, in the first instance, or through bilateral negotiations was reached, the Department of State would be in a very difficult position. We would feel pressures which could threaten our present bilateral agreements with Canada in a broad way. Most certainly we would find pressures to limit our importation of fish from

Canada. Another thing he wished to mention, although there is no direct connection between the two, is the fact that many people consider that the logic behind the Canadian position on oil exports to the US (which we had accepted) is quite similar to that underlying the American position on fisheries. That is to say, both these items represent resources developed on a joint basis which are now threatened by nationalistic pressures. It was striking also that the same area of the US was involved in both these matters, that is, the Pacific Northwest. Mr. Dillon reiterated that it was difficult to foresee the end result of the Law of the Sea Conference but that he thought it useful to bring up these questions now for mutually sympathetic and unhurried consideration rather than have them come up in a crisis atmosphere at the conference. He felt we should make a strong effort between the two of us which would prevent our fishing industries from throwing a pall over the good relations now existing between our two countries.

Mr. Dillon and Mr. Rae then discussed Mr. Murphy's visit to Canada last fall.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Rae observed that at that time the Canadians had offered bilateral negotiations with the US and that he understood that pressure from our Western European allies had forced us to refuse the Canadian offer. Mr. Dillon agreed and then went on to note that Mr. Murphy had stated during his trip to Canada that our fishing interests off Canadian shores were minimal and that it was security interests that were our primary consideration at the Law of the Sea Conference. Mr. Dillon wished to reaffirm that in terms of dollars and cents it was true that our fishing interest off Canadian shores was small, particularly when one compared it with our interests off Mexico. However, local interest in fishing rights off Canada was very high and existed on both coasts, although the West Coast was much more excitable and vocal about the issue than the East. He noted that Senator Magnuson of Washington, who has a direct interest in this matter, was Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the Senate and, hence, was in a position to make his views felt.

Mr. Rae said he would report this conversation immediately to Ottawa. Mr. Dillon asked him to emphasize the friendly spirit in which these views were presented, the seriousness with which we view this matter, and the fact that we feel we must have some satisfaction from the Canadians on this subject. Mr. Nutt asked as a matter of clarification whether we looked upon the two zones (6-mile territorial sea and 6-mile fishing limit) as separable propositions. Mr. Dillon said we did not, and indicated that whatever formula of 6 and 6 we get at the conference must somehow satisfy our fishing industry or we would find ourselves in grave internal difficulties. Another reason for

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 382.

asking the Canadians to enter into bilaterals, if the contingency arose, was that this would certainly strengthen our hand when we came to deal with the Mexicans where our economic interests are larger.

Mr. Nutt then queried Mr. Dillon as to whether we envisaged these bilateral negotiations being conducted at the same time as the conference in Geneva. Mr. Dillon said we would of course prefer this but the time might be too short during the conference to negotiate the kind of full and firm agreements that we feel are necessary. In any event we would require a firm agreement in principle at the conference with detailed negotiation to follow immediately thereafter. Mr. Willoughby then asked if agreement on the Canadian proposal would affect our existing fishing treaties. Mr. Nutt said he personally thought that these were two separate matters and that our fishing rights would remain intact as guaranteed by treaty. He admitted, however, he had no answer to the question of whether, as a practical matter, Canadian and American fishermen could continue a 50-50 split of the catch of the fish covered by these treaties, particularly as regards trolling. In response to a direct question from Mr. Nutt as to whether the US industry could accept a phase-out of fishing rights, Mr. Dillon said he thought they would if they were convinced this was necessary to achieve our security objectives and if we could show that both sides were negotiating in good faith and with intent to meet our industry half way. After all, our industry did accept the fact that there were overriding security interests involved in this matter. Both sides agreed that it was most desirable for our delegations in Geneva to keep in close touch and for Mr. Dean to make the same points to the Canadian delegation there that Mr. Dillon had made here. Mr. Nutt asked whether Mr. Dillon thought that these bilateral or multilateral negotiations should be held outside the convention or should they be a part of the general rule adopted by the convention. Mr. Dillon indicated that our preference was for multilateral negotiations within the rule adopted by the conference. We regard bilateral negotiations as a very last resort. We intend to start with our own proposal of some limited form of fishing in the outer 6-mile limit, make a very serious effort to see that it is adopted, and leave to our delegation the decision as to which tactics to adopt in order to reach a position most in our own interest. We realize that the Canadians prefer bilateral and multilateral negotiations on this subject outside the rule, but that we feel we should, if possible, negotiate these agreements within the rule adopted at Geneva. Mr. Dillon said it was our view that this matter should be handled from here on out by our delegations at Geneva but we had wanted this meeting to emphasize to the Canadian ministers responsible the importance of reaching an amicable agreement on this matter.

**398. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 17, 1960—9 p.m.*

1340. Law of Sea. Meeting with Stavropolous 16 March. Tunkin (USSR) and Garcia-Robles (Mexico) told Stavropolous they have blocking third any six-plus-six proposal and claimed United States "be begging on knees for twelve-mile territorial sea within three years". USSR wants Poland and Albania as Vice Presidents Conference and Glaser (Roumania) Rapporteur Committee of Whole.

Mexico intends propose four changes rules of procedure:

- (1) In event President incapacitated, Chairman Committee of Whole replace him.
- (2) All proposals be voted on in Committee.
- (3) Reconsideration in Committee require two-thirds majority.
- (4) Verbatim records plenary and Committee meetings.

After discussion, Dean undertook discuss with Garcia-Robles possibility US agree all proposals be voted on in Committee if other proposals dropped.

Shukairy (Saudi Arabia) and Gundersen (Norway) reported opposed to Committee of Whole unless two-thirds voting majority required therein. Concensus conference decide in favor Committee of Whole.

USSR indicated Stavropolous Chinese representation question handled by simple statement their position as at first conference. US indicated it will make short reply. Inability European and Asian-African groups agree on candidates may necessitate postponement Vice-Presidential elections until 28 [18?] March. Japan, Liberia, Viet-Nam, UAR, Philippines, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, Norway have announced candidacies for Vice President to date.

Meeting heads principal delegations to discuss slates scheduled noon 17 [18?] March.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1760. Confidential.

**399. Editorial Note**

The Second Law of the Sea Conference met at Geneva March 17–April 26, with 88 nations represented. Arthur H. Dean again headed the U.S. Delegation. For summary records of the plenary meetings, meetings of the Committee of the Whole, and the texts of the various proposals submitted, see *Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records*, U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8.

---

**400. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 19, 1960—10 p.m.*

1364. Reference our telegram 1360<sup>2</sup> Law of Sea. Each amendment proposed by Mexico related to particular parliamentary dispute between Garcia Robles (Mexico) and Bailey (Australia) who was chairman First Committee 58 Conference. [6 words not declassified] His proposals indicated his conclusions 3-to-12 mile proposal unlikely win and he determined prevent conference agreement on any other proposal. Voting on amendment indicated close and effective cooperation between Mexican and Soviet delegations which influenced Africans and certain number among Latin Americans. Garcia Robles had clearly solicited support for his amendments prior their distribution, while those who might have opposed had no opportunity seek support their views. [1 sentence (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

[14 words not declassified] Turkey, Pakistan and Denmark have instructions vote initially for Canadian proposal. This means that it could in end get about 51 votes if supported by US. This figure might be increased to possibly 55 votes if Canadian proposal were be amended to provide effective date cut-off of say 12 to 15 years or if that defeated possibly 58 votes for Alternative B<sup>3</sup> with phase-out of about 10 years.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–1960. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1360, March 19, reported that at the plenary meeting the morning of March 18 several Mexican-sponsored amendments to the conference rules had been passed, but that the proposal to provide for verbatim records had been withdrawn. (*Ibid.*) For a summary of the discussion at the plenary, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, pp. 3–6.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding Alternatives A and B, see footnote 2, Document 384.

Canadians are using argument Alternative "A" is typical imperialistic proposal which can only benefit possibly 15 to 16 nations in perpetuity as against interests other 73, whereas nations unable to qualify under base period theory can never achieve reciprocal rights in the outer 6 miles of the 15 nations no matter how powerful their fishing fleets may become in future. In contrast Canadian proposal without discrimination gives every nation, large or small, old or new, immediate control over 12 miles off its coast with no possibility of fishing state tying coastal state up in expensive arbitral proceedings for years while it continues to fish. This similar argument used in 58.

Gros (France) advised me yesterday they would like be sponsor Alternative A but would gladly accept our advice not sponsor if we thought their co-sponsorship detrimental. He also said he had no instructions authorizing him go to B except after failure of A after maximum effort and then only on basis cut off after long period years. Petren (Sweden) advised they favor Alternative A but not B.

At lunch with Hare (UK) and Drew (Canada), Drew indicated great confidence they could get two-thirds without help from US and at least did not wish discuss possible collaboration now. In my view this unrealistic because with US and key Western Europeans opposed Canadian proposal unlikely attract more than 28 votes. Gros (France) asked Cadieux (Canada) for terms proposed bilateral treaties if Canadian proposal voted and Cadieux declined information.

Pakistan's instructions now preclude them as Asia co-sponsor possibility Malaya and Thailand may co-sponsor but little likelihood any substantial Latin American will do so. Alternatives are sponsorship Alternative A by US alone or by US joined by several West Europeans. Possibly most effective method would be for US to sponsor alone.

Easter this year comes late, April 17, and conference apparently plans adjourn Thursday, April 14, until Tuesday, April 19, and Stavropoulos advises many delegates may not come back. Because of this and because it takes approximately 6 to 10 days for most delegates obtain new instructions if required, think Alternative A should be tabled soonest regardless of co-sponsorship. As you are aware, present plan after bona fide effort for A is to go from Alternative A to Alternative B with appropriate phase-out and, if that fails, in accordance Dept. tel. 2006,<sup>4</sup> would then go to Canadian proposal, after attempting to negotiate bilaterals; but in view fact only 3½ weeks remain before Easter adjournment, time table may have to be re-studied.

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2006, March 17, transmitted the text of the second paragraph under point 5 of the Basic U.S. Position (Document 395). (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1760)

In view well-organized Mexican-Soviet on one hand and determined Canadian efforts on other, it clear we face exceedingly tough fight to save 6-mile limit.

---

**401. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 22, 1960.*

1386. Law of Sea. Second meeting Committee of Whole morning March 22.<sup>2</sup> General debate speeches by Tunkin (USSR) and Garcia Amador (Cuba).

Tunkin made for most part familiar arguments on behalf 12-mile maximum territorial sea, as provided in Soviet proposal submitted previous evening to conference (reported our 1383<sup>3</sup>). In explanation change in Soviet proposal, Tunkin noted wording of 1958 Soviet proposal referring various historical, geographical and other factors and containing words "as a rule" was considered by many delegations not sufficiently explicit. Revised language intended take account these views. Explanation for inclusion exclusive fishing zone provision for states claiming less than maximum territorial sea avoided. Stressed that only through enjoying complete sovereign rights over coastal waters could states realize their exclusive rights exploit biological resources and prevent navigation and maneuvers of warships. IncurSIONS of warships with intent of exercising pressure on the coastal state stressed as a reason why Soviet proposal ensured the security of such states. Observed opponents of 12-mile limit were prepared admit side range of rights in 12-mile zone so long as warships and aircraft could navigate freely. Said 12-mile limit would reduce sources of international tension. Concluded by saying trend of times was toward extensive coastal state sovereignty and any agreement reached at conference which did not so recognize would be a dead letter; agreement which did would guarantee the success of the conference. Did not comment on new Mexican proposal.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2260.

<sup>2</sup> For the summary record of the first meeting, March 21, which was summarized in telegram 1375 from Geneva, March 21 (*ibid.*, 399.731/3-2160), see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, pp. 37-38. For the summary of the second meeting, see *ibid.*, pp. 38-41.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1383 from Geneva, March 22, transmitted texts of the Soviet and Mexican proposals printed *ibid.*, pp. 164-165.



Garcia Amador said Cuban Delegation wished submit certain considerations and conclusions to conference. On territorial sea said 3-mile limit no longer valid, believed there general agreement however new limit should not exceed 6 miles. Believed conference primarily concerned with fishing rights. While agreeing that coastal state had special interest in offshore areas which should be given liberal interpretation also believed *res communis* and historic rights entitled consideration. Objection to exclusive fishing zones that they did not result in optimum sustainable yield, would be detrimental to interests humanity in production of food. Believed proper solution to think in terms preferential, with historic rights, particularly where existed on small scale, long-pursued, and not a threat to the resource. This should not be achieved through a contiguous zone, however, but through a conservation system limiting the total catch, where necessary, to obtain the optimum yield, and according preferential treatment in circumstances indicated.

Chairman announced next meeting morning March 23.

---

**402. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 22, 1960—6 p.m.*

1387. Law of Sea. It is my plan to table our preferred proposal, Alternative "A" on Thursday at which time I shall speak seeking support for it. As things now stand it seems clear that Alternative "A" is unlikely to attract even a simple majority; in fact our estimate is that initially it may receive between a minimum of 23 and a maximum of 36 votes, assuming that the Canadian and other extreme proposals remain to be debated and voted upon. Initial strength of Canadian proposal somewhat less and no present indication of willingness to compromise. While psychologically it could be damaging to our position to sponsor a proposal which we know won't win, on other hand we believe there are compelling tactical reasons for introducing "A" without delay and to build support for it. To do so may demonstrate that the strength of the "fishing" states is at any rate sufficient to convince "coastal" states that some concession on their part is necessary if conference is to reach agreement.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2260. Confidential.

It is now apparent that we will have to be prepared to move to support of Alternative "B" and I consider that paragraph 5 of the Basic US Position Paper<sup>2</sup> gives me authority to do so when I deem such action necessary. The outlook for "B" seems tactically good and we believe it should eventually command more support than either the Canadian proposal in its present form or any other proposal now envisaged.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Document 395.

<sup>3</sup> At the Secretary's Staff Meeting on March 22, Hager noted: "Mr. Dean has recommended that we now sponsor a 6-plus-6 formula with no cut-off of fishing rights in the outer six. We have agreed to his recommendation." (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

For text of the proposal as introduced by the U.S. Delegation on March 23, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, pp. 166-167.

---

#### 403. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, March 23, 1960—6 p.m.*

1398. Law of Sea. Last night Correa gave Armour<sup>2</sup> his estimate LA support in event Alternative B tabled by "third" country and assuming (1) Soviet proposal already defeated and (2) Alternative A and presumably Canadian proposal already tabled but not voted on. In these circumstances Correa believes Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay will definitely support Alternative B. Cuba, Mexico and Peru will definitely oppose. Bolivia and Costa Rica were question marks. Chile may support as Melo<sup>3</sup> believes Chile should. (This confirmed by Melo independently to delegation officer yesterday. [1 sentence (16 words) not declassified] Colombia will probably support.

(This confirmed by Emiliani<sup>4</sup> (Colombia) yesterday who told US conference must succeed and if B only solution he was convinced Colombia would support although they would have to speak up strongly against "historical rights".) Correa said Ecuador would vote for the Soviet proposal, but if B submitted he would say Ecuador

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-2360. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Norman Armour, Jr., member of the U.S. Delegation.

<sup>3</sup> Luis Melo Lecaros, head of Chilean Delegation.

<sup>4</sup> Raimundo Emiliani, Colombian Ambassador to Switzerland and head of the Colombian Delegation.

would not "oppose" compromise and, therefore, would abstain on B. El Salvador and Guatemala were doubtful. Panama, he thought, was almost hopeless, Venezuela was doubtful but might be influenced by Colombia's position.

Correa concluded from above that situation for B moderately good but said US must get together with Canadians at earliest opportunity and subsequent tactics must be worked out carefully, for as soon as any agreement between Canadians and US became known Garcia Robles would go to work immediately in LA capitals to achieve defeat of B. He said he does not believe A or Canadian proposal should be put to vote as he fears this will play into Garcia Robles' hands as latter will then try and put his proposal to vote as compromise and obfuscate situation. He recommends Soviet proposal be put to vote providing opportunity for LA twelve milers to vote in favor. Then with defeat of Soviet proposal they are in better position from viewpoint home public opinion to vote for B as only way of saving conference. He is aware pressures for vote on A but believes necessity not "rocking boat" [*11 words not declassified*] Correa said he believes the fishing interests of countries such as Peru and Mexico are determined to wreck the conference, and they can be very dangerous unless tactics for Alternative B are effectively worked out and worked out quickly.

Foregoing views of Correa reported fully because as Chairman Committee of Whole he receives much information and many confidences. His estimates of voting are less optimistic than ours in that we hope for ultimate support from those he regards as doubtful and possibly support from those he lists as opposing. However because of Correa's position we believe his views deserve careful attention and weighing.

404. **Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Dillon) to the Under Secretary of the Interior (Bennett)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 28, 1960.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your letter of March 14<sup>2</sup> setting forth your views on how the United States Delegation should vote in certain contingencies apt to arise at the Law of the Sea Conference.

I think you will agree our Delegation will certainly vote in favor of every proposal actually put to a vote which offers protection to our fishery interests. Such action would carry out the letter and spirit of the existing instructions, which expressly provide that our fishery objective is to achieve maximum protection possible for United States fishery interests.

On the other hand, it is impossible to foresee the right answer to every tactical problem that is apt to arise at a Conference like this. I had felt, in view of paragraph 7 of the "Basic U.S. Position" paper, that it was generally recognized that it would be unwise and perhaps harmful to our fishery and security objectives to attempt to deal with tactical details in advance from here. I believe that this approach is basically sound and that it would therefore not be prudent to amend the position paper to impose binding instructions of this kind.

I share, however, your desire that every effort be made by the Delegation to achieve the maximum possible protection for our fishery interests, consistent with attainment of the agreed basic United States objective, and I am therefore sending a copy of your letter to Arthur Dean for his personal information so that he may have first hand the benefit of your views.

In this connection, you will be interested to know that on March 16 I had a long talk with the Canadian Chargé here (the Ambassador being absent in Canada) on the lines indicated in my letter to you of March 14.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,

**Douglas Dillon**<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1460. Confidential. Drafted by Arneson on March 23 and cleared with Hager and U/FW.

<sup>2</sup> Document 396.

<sup>3</sup> For a memorandum of this conversation, see Document 397; Dillon's letter of March 14 is in Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-1460.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**405. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, March 30, 1960<sup>1</sup>***1. Briefing on the Conference on the Law of the Sea*

Mr. Gordon Arneson, Deputy Special Assistant for Law of the Sea to the Under Secretary, spoke to the OCB on developments at the Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Chairman, Mr. Gray, emphasized that, not only had the Board expressed an interest in various elements with which the Conference was concerned, but he wished to be sure that all interested US agencies were "on the same wave length" with regard to the position taken by the US delegation at Geneva.

In his presentation, Mr. Arneson said the Conference was a crucial meeting. Its main purpose was to define the breadth of the territorial seas and delimit fishing rights. The US faces three major difficulties: 1) Prevent the extension of territorial seas to twelve miles; 2) keep the Conference from failing, since failure would undoubtedly result in the eventual unilateral adoption of the twelve-mile limit; and 3) resolve "family fights" with such nations as Canada and Iceland. Mr. Arneson described the proposals thus far tabled at the Conference and the problems they pose for the US. He closed by saying he was professionally hopeful that the US position would garner the required two-thirds majority. He answered various questions from members of the Board and noted some additional problems ahead such as those posed by the "archipelago theory" advanced by Indonesia and the Philippines.

Mr. Gray cited the interest of the OCB in assuring that the US position was properly coordinated. Mr. Arneson noted that our delegation had received useful suggestions from other agencies. Mr. Gray said there was agreement that it was not necessary for the OCB to undertake coordinating actions in support of the US position. He thanked Mr. Arneson and offered the Board's cooperation if required. Mr. Merchant said the Department would be happy to make periodic reports to the Board on the progress of the Conference.

[Here follows discussion of Poland, the Philippines, and Pioneer V.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text.

**406. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 31, 1960—9 p.m.*

1478. Law of Sea. On present basis, voting in Committee of Whole will start April 6 and because of amendments to rules reported our 1360<sup>2</sup> proposals defeated in Committee cannot be re-introduced except on basis two-thirds vote. At present time because nature of Soviet proposal with respect to possible 12-mile fishing zone and nature of instructions of delegates who would prefer to work with US on compromise proposal on voting in Committee, Soviet proposal may obtain approximately 40-43 votes, which because of abstentions, could conceivably constitute majority in Committee. At present writing approximate vote for American proposal is 23-34 and for Canadian proposal 23-28. Such a vote for Soviet proposal might give them strong rallying base and may enable them to prevent any split in an Arab vote or Africa-Asia vote and would enable them to continue to gain further adherence during time Committee of Whole functions and before proposals can be introduced in plenary. During this period delegates will remain confused as to precisely where US and Canada stand. Consequently concerned lest small votes on an American proposal might discourage success on possible compromise and will freeze situations so that ultimate success  $\frac{2}{3}$  vote on compromise might not be obtained in plenary. Western Europeans other than UK still allergic putting in compromise proposal in Committee though individually all except Sweden recognize some time limitation on historical rights inevitable. Continuing highly confidential daily conversations with Drew (Canada) and Hare (UK) and am negotiating possible joint Canadian-US proposal. So far have been trying for time limitation of at least 15 years and so far Drew not willing to go over 10. If proposal initially tabled<sup>3</sup> time limitation 10 years, Western European cooperation difficult but believe can if time limitation longer. Have been working closely with Asafu-Adjaye and Quarshie (Ghana) in effort get them propose 6 plus 6 proposal with historical rights terminating at end of 15 years but their proposal may take form of 12 miles territorial sea proposal with innocent passage ships same as inner six with unrestricted aerial overflight in outer 6 and innocent passage in territorial straits and they may balk at anything over ten years. Negotiations delicate since there is considerable split of opinion in Ghana Del itself and with Asian-African group. Have been pressing for split without so

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3-3160. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 400.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Canadian proposal, introduced on March 24, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, p. 167.

far being too argumentative over details lest we lose them entirely, though naturally concerned lest distinctions become so refined there is not much distinction between such proposals and 12-mile territorial sea. While Western Europeans would not welcome withdrawal our proposal believe very bad psychologically for US to take decisive defeat in first voting at conference in Committee and may recommend withdrawal and introduce in Committee joint US-Canadian proposal with such Latin American, African and Asian support as we can muster. With 9 Soviet votes, 12 Arab votes and Garcia Robles commanding at minimum Mexico, Peru and Panama and possibly Burma, Philippines and Indonesia, situation is very tight and possibility for maneuver extremely limited. If both US and Canadian proposals were to come to vote in Committee, we would of course hope that combined vote on separate proposals would exceed vote on Soviet 12-mile proposal. But even this is by no means a certainty. Since any US-Canadian proposal would have to be tabled at latest by 5th and we would have to have liaison officers working at least 48 hours before voting starts, may have to move fairly swiftly.

---

**407. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 1, 1960—10 p.m.*

1494. Law of Sea. Am conferring constantly with Drew (Canada) in effort to work out joint US-Canadian proposal. Such a formula would probably provide for termination of traditional fishing in out [our] 6-mile continuous zone after 10 years from time convention comes into force and would eliminate such provisions as "groups of species", "practice of fishing", "annual average level of fishing" as well as provisions for settlement of disputes, all of which provisions appear complicated and confusing to many less sophisticated states and would adopt language and simplicity of Canadian proposal plus time limit in view attacks of Sen (India) and Gundersen (Norway) on these provisions as unworkable. Things are moving fast and it may be necessary for US to take firm decisions within few days or even over

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-160. Confidential; Priority. Received at 7:44 p.m.

weekend, as Drew insists on firm answer. Failure to give may reduce chances of successful agreement and increase confusion as liaison officers presently handicapped.

It may be possible to reach some agreement in principle with the Canadians here as regards bilateral in addition to 10 years but can't guarantee it. In view [6 words not declassified] emphasis three- to twelve-mile territorial sea and even greater exclusive fishing limits, believe most unrealistic to believe we could get any commitment from the Mexicans as regards bilateral. Any such approach would be regarded as sign of weakness and Garcia Robles (Mexico) has refused Amador (Cuba) any such assurance.

Am proceeding on assumption I have full authority under paragraph 5 of Position Paper 1 (revision 2) to proceed with negotiations looking toward a joint proposal with Canada and possibly others which would terminate foreign fishing rights after a period of years and have fully notified Dept. Am also proceeding on theory may be extremely prejudicial allow present US proposal to come to vote before introduction joint proposal with time limit in Committee of the Whole. Present estimate Soviet 12-mile proposal at least 43 votes or 20 more than our estimated minimum on present proposal. Western Europe extremely averse to our withdrawing present proposal and some may not vote for compromise until present proposal defeated. Per contra Latin Americans consider non-withdrawal in committee may be fatal to ultimate compromise in plenary because of psychological impact of Soviet victory in committee on those wishing wide fishing limits. Please advise promptly if my assumption correct.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> At 8:24 p.m. on April 1, Dillon cabled Dean that he had been following closely his efforts to reach a joint U.S.-Canadian proposal, and stated: "I would agree completely with your analysis that it would prejudice ultimate success to have Soviet proposal initially obtain substantially more votes than either our proposal or Canadian." (Telegram 2194 to Geneva; *ibid.*)



**408. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 5, 1960—6 p.m.*

1538. Law of Sea. At meeting with Hare and Fitzmaurice (UK) and Drew and Cadieux (Canada) this afternoon the following was agreed to:

(1) Chairman of Committee of the Whole will announce all proposals for that committee must be filed by Friday noon and voting in committee will start Wednesday at 3:00 pm.

(2) By Friday noon present US and present Canadian proposals will be withdrawn and simultaneously joint Canadian-US proposal will be filed providing for six miles territorial sea and six-mile outer fishing zone and termination of historical rights at end of ten years.

(3) At later conference with above mentioned Correa (Ecuador) Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and undersigned, we outlined possibility of not tabling above proposal in Committee of the Whole but circulating it to conference before April 14 so delegates could cable its contents to respective departments over Easter weekend, then not tabling it until plenary. Raised with chairman question whether if we followed this procedure there was possibility of Soviets and Mexicans withdrawing their proposals in voting in Committee of the Whole and he believed there was grave possibility of this. If this occurred, there would then ensue jockeying as to whether Soviet or joint Canadian-US proposal would be filed first and unless twelve-milers comes up first and is clearly defeated, large number of delegations who are favorably disposed toward joint proposal could not vote for it until it has been demonstrated there is no possibility of twelve-mile proposal winning. Consequently are working on text joint proposal which we will cable Department so it can be sent all Embassies with request they attempt obtain support for it.

Plan tomorrow to pool work of UK, Canada and US liaison officers in support of proposed joint proposal.

Plan explain Western European group tomorrow we tried to get Canada accept 15-year termination and that we have made two concessions, namely, that there should be a termination limit for historical fishing rights and that the limit should be 10 rather than 15. Canada will join with US in statement that neither will accept any amendment attempting to lower 10-year period. Will attempt get Western Europeans to ask for instructions to vote in favor of proposed joint proposal

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-560. Confidential; Priority.

when it comes up in Committee of the Whole. Correa (Ecuador) advised us redouble our efforts in Latin America as he advised others are working exceptionally hard. He believes Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, Philippines, Indonesia, nine Soviet votes and possibly at least nine Arab votes plus Iran will stay with twelve miles throughout. Consequently every affirmative vote is of the utmost importance.

Drew and undersigned<sup>2</sup> plan to speak for joint proposal Friday afternoon.

---

<sup>2</sup> Arthur H. Dean.

---

#### 409. Proposal by the Delegations of the United States and Canada<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, April 8, 1960.*

1. A state is entitled to fix the breadth of its territorial sea up to a maximum of six nautical miles measured from the applicable baseline.

2. A state is entitled to establish a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea extending to a maximum limit of twelve nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured, in which it shall have the same rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of the living resources of the sea as it has in its territorial sea.

3. Any state whose vessels have made a practice of fishing in the outer six miles of the fishing zone established by the coastal state, in accordance with paragraph 2 above, for the period of five years immediately preceding January 1, 1958, may continue to do so for a period of ten years from October 31, 1960.

4. The provisions of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, adopted at Geneva, April 27, 1958, shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the settlement of any dispute arising out of the application of the foregoing paragraphs.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-660. Transmitted in priority telegram 1549 from Geneva, April 6, which is the source text. The proposal was circulated as U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/L.10, and jointly introduced on April 8.

#### 410. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, April 8, 1960—2 a.m.*

1576. Law of Sea. Request above Embassies be instructed urge support US-Canada compromise proposal<sup>2</sup> using arguments below:

(1) US and Canada proposal follows realistic acceptance here that neither immediate cut-off of present fishing rights (Canadian proposal) nor perpetual fishing rights for a limited number of states (US proposal) can command required two-thirds majority. Proposal worked out in recognition danger involved of 12-mile proposals or conference failure with probable unilateral adoption of 12 miles by large number of countries. As practical matter, to be successful in plenary, proposal must receive more votes in committee than 12-mile proposals. This will require full support from states committed to 6-mile limit. Proposal supported by states with widely divergent interests including US and Canada, UK, Germany, Norway, Ireland, China, Pakistan, Israel, Brazil, etc.

(2) If argument is made proposal is too early, the following information may be useful:

(A) Committee vote now fixed for April 13-14 with April 8 the last day for submitting proposals though amendments can be submitted through Tuesday noon, April 12.

(B) Conference failure would probably lead to 12-mile territorial sea by unilateral action. New states expected to be created in next two or three years would almost certainly adopt a 12-mile sea, so that majority might favor 12 miles in case matter raised in ICJ. This conference may therefore be last hope for retaining 6-mile limit and additional 6-mile contiguous fishing zone. Historical rights of fishing, no matter how ancient, within three miles of another nation's coast cannot in view present world opinion be enforced by admiralty as British experience Iceland shows. Many countries, namely Iceland, Chile, Peru, might extend fisheries jurisdiction still further in the absence of agreed limitation. Meanwhile fishing, airline and defense interests would be lost at same time.

(C) Only three possible results from conference are acceptance joint US-Canadian proposal for 6-mile territorial sea plus six miles additional fishing jurisdiction for coastal state with continuation of fishing rights for those fishing states who have made a practice of fishing in outer zone for five years prior to January 1, 1958 with such right phasing out after ten years, which, with support, we believe, has good chance; alternatives are 12-mile territorial sea or conference failure with probable chaotic conditions. [1 sentence (23 words) not declassified]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-860. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, The Hague, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Brussels, and Stockholm.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*. The Embassies are listed in footnote 1 thereto.

(D) Good spirit here and most states are relying on us to bring about conference success and if there is conference failure, blame will probably be placed on military powers.

(E) With 12-mile proposal now supported by 16 Afro-Asian states<sup>3</sup> plus India and Philippines and with proposal obtaining initial support from those who hope support US-Canadian proposal later may initially receive 40 to 43 votes should it receive more votes in committee than US-Canadian proposal, pressure in plenary will be for some settlement of 12-mile territorial sea or possibly 9-mile territorial sea with no fishing rights, with some gesture toward continued fishing for a limited number of years. Both Canadian delegation and US will state publicly no further reduction can be considered in cut-off time.

(F) Considerable time required for many delegations, particularly Far East, Latin America and Afro-Asians to seek new instructions. Failure US compromise to obtain two-thirds in 1958 largely attributable this factor.

Where appropriate, defense arguments and NATO position should be reviewed.

Copenhagen should probably avoid Icelandic issue because of Faros.

Re Latin American countries, we believe following steps would be helpful:

(A) Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Guatemala, El Salvador. These countries will probably have to vote for Afro-Asian 12-mile proposal first but attempt should be made to persuade them after vote in Committee of Whole to abstain on 12 miles in plenary. They should also be persuaded that failure to support US-Canadian proposal will seriously prejudice chances of conference success. Since Ecuador expected possibly abstain special efforts might possibly be made there. Reference Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Peru these countries probably hard core of opposition but attempt still might be made at Embassy discretion influence them by above arguments.

---

<sup>3</sup> For text of the 16-nation Afro-Asian proposal, April 6, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, pp. 167-168.

**411. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 9, 1960—3 p.m.*

1603. Law of Sea. [5 words not declassified] Melo (Chile) had insisted in Latin American meeting Latin Americans not accept informal proposal we had made Secretariat that all heads delegations informally consent each proposal be voted on as a whole and that amendments would not be made attempting to divide up into paragraphs. Garcia Robles (Mexico) had urged that 6-mile territorial seas, 6-mile contiguous fishing zone our proposal be voted separately as he believed in view general LA instructions to support 12 miles we could not muster majority vote on this point. Assuming 6-mile territorial sea stricken, they would then proceed to vote for 12-mile exclusive fishing zone so that end result conference would be 12-mile exclusive fishing zone for coastal state with defeat for 6-mile territorial sea. Support of all delegations on procedural matters in Committee of Whole will be as important initially as support on substantive matters and would appreciate all embassies be alerted importance support on such procedural matters. Melo (Chile) insists he must vote against joint proposal as has no instructions as does Correa (Ecuador).

Correa (Ecuador) informed us that Latin American group would not vote for US-Canadian proposal unless we would consent that coastal states could levy taxes on fishing for ten years within outer six-mile zone and could regulate such fishing in same manner as could regulate domestic fishing size of trawlers, gear, nets, etc. Advised him all nations now fishing in high seas constituting outer 6-mile zone had absolute right to fish there and were offering compromise giving coastal state exclusive 12-mile fishing zone and surrendering absolute rights fishing outer six after 10-year period, consequently could not consent further diminishment such rights during ten-year period. Correa (Ecuador) insists we must make some concession on this point to obtain Latin American support. We are studying Cuban proposal. Latin American bloc lead by Pablo Pardo (Argentina) Ulloa (Peru) and Garcia Robles (Mexico) also are demanding amendment that beyond 12 miles coastal states have absolute preferential right of fishing. Pointed out that in North Sea and other seas and oceans would be impossible to administer and completely destructive doctrine freedom of high seas and believe part of Garcia Robles (Mexico) tactics to cut down vote for proposal.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-960. Confidential.

[*name not declassified*] informed us Bajpai (India) had told him they had absolute and explicit instructions do utmost to defeat any proposal which did not provide for consent of coastal state to passage of foreign warships both in inner six-mile territorial sea and outer 6-mile fishing zone or assimilation rights in outer six to rights in inner six so that if latter falls former falls also and in addition had explicit instructions to vote against any 6-mile territorial sea proposal. [*name not declassified*] had told Bajpai (India) that these were contrary to statements Sen (India) had previously made to him that India could vote for reasonable compromise but Bajpai insisted Krishna Menon himself had dictated these instructions and that Sen had no discretion. Bajpai also insisted they could carry Ghana with them on warship point though Quarshie (Ghana) informs us he is willing accept notification. Pfeiffer (Germany) concerned about notification with respect East Germany in connection operations in Baltic since they do not recognize East Germany. [1 sentence (4 lines of source text) not declassified ]

[*name and 1 word not declassified* ] we are facing intensive hard in-fighting on procedural matters and that [*names not declassified*] determine wreck conference and then offer straight 9-mile territorial sea at end of conference. Garcia Robles (Mexico) and Tunkin (USSR) confer daily. Still believe USSR proposal will be withdrawn in favor of 16-nation Afro-Asian proposal and that sometime on Tuesday April 12th Garcia Robles will propose some merger Mexican and 16-nation proposal and will also attempt by some parliamentary maneuver have twelve-mile proposal voted after joint US-Canadian proposal though at present we are L.10 and therefore we are last proposal to be voted on basis present filing. Order of voting extremely important as many cannot vote for US joint proposal until 12-mile proposal, Quarshie (Ghana) extremely skeptical whether nations at same session can quickly switch from approving 12-mile proposal to 6-mile fishing zone proposal and urges voting delay, which doesn't seem feasible but we are studying.

**412. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, April 11, 1960, 5:45 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Law of the Sea Conference

PARTICIPANTS

C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State  
A.D.P. Heeney, Ambassador of Canada  
Jim S. Nutt, First Secretary, Embassy of Canada  
Eric H. Hager, The Legal Adviser

Mr. Dillon advised Ambassador Heeney that Arthur Dean had told Mr. Hager by telephone from Geneva over the weekend that Ambassador Drew, Chairman of the Canadian Delegation at the Law of the Sea Conference, had given Dean his personal assurance that after the success of the joint US-Canadian proposal at the Conference, Canada would commence good faith negotiations with the United States looking toward a bilateral agreement with respect to United States fishing rights. Mr. Hager elaborated on his conversation with Mr. Dean. He said that Mr. Dean had advised him that the bilateral agreement would relate to an additional period after the 10-year period of the Conference formula.

Ambassador Heeney said that he had not seen anything about such a bilateral negotiation in any of the messages which they had received relating to the Conference. Mr. Dillon said that Mr. Dean was relying upon Ambassador Drew's assurance, and not pressing any bilateral negotiations at this time, because both nations had all they could do to rally support for their joint proposal without taking time out to negotiate with each other. He said that the Department approved of Mr. Dean's decision.

Mr. Dillon then advised that Mr. Dean had also told Mr. Hager that Ambassador Drew had given him his personal assurance that Canada would not, during the 10-year period, adversely affect or limit the rights of the fishing nations in the outer 6-mile zone by new regulations not previously imposed, such as rules limiting the right to fish to any area, or limiting the size of trawlers or gear or the types of nets, etc. Mr. Dillon said that Mr. Dean did not believe it desirable to spell these matters out by amendment to the joint US-Canadian proposal, since specification of these matters would foster debate and lose

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1160. Official Use Only. Drafted and initialed by Hager and approved by Dillon on April 22. The conversation was held in Dillon's office. A briefing memorandum for the meeting is *ibid*.

support for the proposal. He therefore felt that he should rely upon Ambassador Drew's assurance in this regard, and the Department approved of his decision.

Mr. Dillon suggested that Ambassador Heeney convey the substance of this meeting to his Government and the Ambassador said that he would.

---

### 413. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, April 12, 1960—10 a.m.*

1633. Law of Sea. As expected, now that US-Canadian proposal tabled, Latin American States demanding higher price their support, this price being preferential rights coastal state beyond 12 miles as expressed in Peru and Argentine proposals, our 1629 and 1631.<sup>2</sup> In addition, for what I believe to be essentially political reasons, Cuba has made similar proposal, our 1630.<sup>3</sup>

While I most anxious obtain support these States in committee for our proposal, am concerned that US acceptance any of these proposals likely lose more European votes than it will gain Latin American votes, result in poor vote our proposal in committee and certain conference failure. Canada and UK equally concerned problem obtaining substantial majority committee and suggest we deal with problem now by attempting convince Latin American States their resolutions certain result conference failure, and offering seek solution in plenary in exchange their vote in committee. Specifically UK and Canada willing we offer resolution along lines 58 South African resolution<sup>4</sup> and this failing, offer further additional resolution referring problem "special situations" UN for study by ECOSOC and FAO and possibly later technical conference this question. We and UK anxious specific offers not be made prior plenary fearing premature move will only encourage greater demands.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1260. Confidential; Niact.

<sup>2</sup> Both dated April 11. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-1160)

<sup>3</sup> Also dated April 11. (*Ibid.*) For text of the Cuban resolution, which was circulated in the Committee of the Whole as A/CONF.19/C.1/L.9, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, pp. 171-172.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the South African resolution, April 25, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.13/38, p. 114.



I am inclined take firm line Latin American States, pointing out that without question to press their proposals is to insure conference failure since fishing states which under US-Canadian proposal are giving much, will prefer conference failure to giving more. I question that such States as Argentina wish conference failure and am hopeful firm approach will be productive. Believe I should be prepared however to indicate willingness offer resolutions in plenary along lines suggested Canada and UK as something they can take home. Am extremely reluctant do this since I consider it breach in 12-mile fishing limit wall and contrary interests US fishing industry.

My view, present instructions do not authorize me offer or support resolutions along lines set out above. Accordingly urgently request authorization do so should I consider it necessary achieve basic US objectives. Wish point out fish people here concur this request only with great reluctance.

Iceland has also submitted special situation proposal, our 1560,<sup>5</sup> but I consider this of different type and believe current instructions adequate.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Dated April 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-760) For text of the Icelandic proposal, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, p. 168.

<sup>6</sup> On April 14, the Department authorized Dean to offer or support a proposal along the lines of the South African resolution and other "special situations" if necessary to assure the requisite vote. (Telegram 2345 to Geneva; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1360)

---

#### 414. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Hager) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 13, 1960.*

SUBJECT

Law of the Sea Conference

I have just received a report over the telephone from Arthur Dean regarding the results of the voting in the Committee of the Whole, which began at 9 a.m. this morning, Washington time.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1360. Drafted and initialed by Hager and also sent to the Under Secretary. Initialed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of the discussion and voting in the Committee of the Whole on April 13, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, pp. 144-155. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a record of the voting and an explanation of the votes of "more than routine interest" in

*Continued*

*12-mile Proposals.*

The Mexican and Soviet 12-mile proposals had been withdrawn before the voting commenced. The sole remaining 12-mile proposal, sponsored by 18 African, Asian and Latin American nations, was defeated by a vote of 36 for, 39 against, and 13 abstaining.

*Special Icelandic Situation.*

An Icelandic proposal which would give States overwhelmingly dependent on nearby fisheries additional rights outside the 12-mile zone was adopted by a vote of 31 in favor, 11 against, and 46 abstaining.

*Amendments to US-Canadian Proposal.*

Argentina withdrew that portion of her amendment to the US-Canadian proposal which would have required a nation to have fished in the outer 6-mile zone for an uninterrupted period of 30 years (instead of 5 years as in the US-Canadian proposal), in order to be eligible to continue fishing during the 10-year phase-out period. Argentina did not, however, withdraw that part of her amendment which would have given the coastal State preferential fishing rights in the high seas adjacent to its exclusive fishing zone. This amendment was therefore put to a vote, and was defeated.

*US-Canadian Proposal.*

The US-Canadian proposal was then adopted by the Committee of the Whole with a vote of 43 in favor, 33 against, and 12 abstentions.

*Submissions to Plenary.*

The US-Canadian proposal will therefore be the only territorial sea proposal to be recommended by the Committee to the plenary session. The defeated 12-mile proposal may not be submitted to the plenary session by any nation without the prior approval of a  $\frac{2}{3}$ s vote in plenary. However, any other territorial sea proposal may be submitted to the plenary session without any such prior approval, provided it differs sufficiently in substance from the defeated 12-mile proposal so as to constitute a new proposal in substance.

*Recess.*

The Conference has recessed until 10:30 a.m. Tuesday, April 19, at which time the plenary session will commence.

---

telegram 1662 from Geneva, April 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1360)

*Prospects.*

Arthur Dean advises that he hopes that 10 of the nations which *abstained* from the vote on the US-Canadian proposal will favor it. Belgium, France and Sweden all abstained in Committee but have promised to vote in favor of our US-Canadian proposal in the plenary session. Dean also hopes that 6 of the nations which *voted against* the US-Canadian proposal can be persuaded at least to abstain in plenary, and if possible to vote in favor.

89 nations are attending the Conference, although only 88 seem to have been present at the voting today. Mathematically, we must obtain 60 votes for a  $\frac{2}{3}$  majority if all nations vote one way or the other, less  $\frac{2}{3}$  of a vote for every nation which abstains.

---

**415. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 14, 1960—6 p.m.*

1678. Law of Sea. For the Secretary from Dean.

As I informed the Department yesterday (mytel 1662<sup>2</sup>) the voting in the Committee of the Whole on the joint US-Canadian proposal was 43 for, 33 opposed and 12 abstentions. This means that in order to get a two-thirds majority in plenary it will be necessary to reduce the number opposed by at least six as well as to persuade the abstainees to vote for our joint proposal to make certain that no stone is left unturned to insure the adoption of the joint proposal. We believe that there is a good possibility that this can be accomplished by a combination of maximum effort here, by a few constructive concessions which we hope can be worked out, supplemented by a personal letter from you to the premiers or foreign ministers of selected countries which may possibly be favorably influenced. The general stress of these letters it seems to me should be that a successful conference is vital if there is to be an orderly law with respect to the sea and if worthy UN objective of development and codification international law is to be furthered. Failure of the conference or further delays would create chaos. It is important that each country contribute to a successful

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1460. Confidential; Niact.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

conference by realizing what failure of the conference would mean not only to law of sea but to belief of newer nations these matters cannot be worked out by compromise with older nations.

Timing of voting in plenary makes it essential that your letters be transmitted telegraphically not later than April 18 if they are to be effective.

My specific suggestions as regards these letters follow:

Ghana—Ghanian Delegation here has endeavored play leading role in development of compromise which might ensure conference success within context of Afro-Asian solidarity. They were visibly disappointed when neither US and Canadians nor rest of Afro-Asians seemed willing build on their suggestions. Canadian Foreign Minister reportedly addressing Nkrumah, and believe it would be most helpful for you to do likewise, stressing constructive role played by Ghanian Delegation (which abstained on US-Canadian proposal).

Guinea—[1 sentence (4 lines of source text) not declassified] Guinea's chief preoccupation, in strongly anti-colonial context, has been with possible intensive French fishing claims off Guinean shores. Nevertheless believe there is disposition compromise, and would urge personal letter from you to Toure in this sense. [1 sentence (10 words) not declassified] Re communications difficulties mentioned reftel would seem no reason not telegraph pertinent instructions en clair.

Ethiopia—Considering Emperor's personal interest in territorial sea (cf Addis Ababa tel 623 to Department<sup>3</sup>) we believe only possibility moving Ethiopia's position to abstention or perhaps even affirmative vote would be by personal letter from the President, stressing vital importance we attach to 6-mile territorial sea. It might be noted in this connection that Ethiopian Delegation here has been friendly and cordial, and has repeatedly hinted at possible eventual compromise to ensure conference success. [4 sentences (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

Libya—Although Libya voted consistently with Arab bloc, Libyan Delegate Kabazi [Caabasi] two weeks ago personally volunteered to US suggestion that, once 12-mile proposal had been demonstrated incapable achieving requisite two-thirds majority. There would be real opportunity to put across compromise solution based on merger of original US and Canadian proposals. Since then there has been polarization of sentiment around 18-power proposal (of which Libya co-sponsor) and US-Canadian proposal. The latter failed to secure a simple majority (36 for, 39 against, and 13 abstentions) in committee, whereas the joint US-Canadian proposal was approved, by a vote of 43 for, 33 against, and 12 abstentions, most of whom are for our

<sup>3</sup> Dated January 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/1-960)

proposal or will vote for it in plenary. We believe Kabazi well disposed, and letter from Secretary to GOL as possibly strengthening his hand.

Tunisia—Despite relative disposition to compromise shown by GOT (of Tunis 1452 to Department<sup>4</sup>), Tunisian Delegate Bouziri has been among most vehement partisans of 12-mile position plus additional rights in Gulf of Gabes. Strongly recommend letter from you, or possibly even from President, to Bourguiba personally in order win his support for, or at least absention on, our compromise proposal.

Morocco—Moroccan Chief Delegation (Driss Slaoui) left conference after third day, and Morocco has been represented here since then only by its chargé at Berne (Hadj Nassar), who has played no significant role in conference. Nevertheless he told US ten days ago that if 12-mile proposal defeated, he would ask for new instructions with view to working out compromise along lines present US-Canadian draft. His principal concern seemed to be with Spanish and Portuguese fishing in Moroccan waters.

Sudan—Sudanese Delegate (Ambassador El Bakri from Paris) was elected President not only of African sub-group but of overall Afro-Asian group at this conference. Considering that Sudan only decided attend at last moment (for reasons Arab League Solidarity) and had no particular axes to grind (either defense or fisheries), El Bakri has played remarkably effective role here, not only in leadership his power bloc but also, we believe, for relative moderation within group. He has repeatedly stressed importance of compromise to achieve conference agreement, and we suspect he might now be toying with some nine-mile formula. He has himself privately suggested to US desirability démarches by our Embassies to Afro-Asian governments, especially at Cairo and Accra. Afro-Asians are insistent play decisive part in outcome this conference, and we may still have to find means of gaining support of at least African Arabs in order carry eventual two-thirds majority.

India—Success of conference depends upon agreement on US-Canadian proposal which was only one that received majority in committee; has assurance of increased support as the conference moves to plenary sessions, and is the only one that can possibly be expected receive two-thirds in plenary. 12-mile territorial sea definitely no longer issue at conference as it failed even receive majority in committee.

Iraq—Same as India.

Iran—

(A) Same as India.

<sup>4</sup> Dated April 12. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-1260)

(B) Fact that Iran has 12-mile limit no bar to voting for US-Canadian proposal. Other countries that have 12-mile limit voted for US-Canadian proposal. Iran could make suitable reservation in explanation of vote if thought necessary.

(C) At very least Iran should abstain.

(D) Suggest Ambassador make following comment orally: "On security issue Iran completely out of line and Daftary's statement here (ourtel 1643<sup>5</sup>) completely inconsistent for CENTO nations. There seems to be no reason why Iran should follow Soviet line with respect need for 12 miles for 'security.'"

Jordan—

(A) Same as India.

(B) At very least Jordan could abstain to help conference succeed.

Lebanon—

(A) Same as India.

In view Aman's 1779<sup>6</sup> that Jordan can abstain if joined by any other Arab States would hope this could be brought attention GOL. Jordan and Lebanon seem most likely Near Eastern Arab States abstain and if they do so there might be possibility others might also do so to prevent conference failure.

UAR—Same as India.

France and Belgium—The importance of a 6-mile limit of territorial sea for defense purposes needs no reiteration.

It has been agreed not only by our two governments but was also generally supported by members of the NATO Council.

The US-Canadian proposal was widely recognized as the best hope of protecting the NATO position. Iceland opposed the proposal for fishery reasons as anticipated. With that exception, Belgium and France were the only NATO countries which did not cast an affirmative vote in committee. While not unmindful of the reasons for this action, other NATO countries, which are also making considerable sacrifices to achieve our common goals, would find it hard to explain any lack of support.

Sweden—The contributions of the Government of Sweden to orderly solutions in the field of international law are already well-known. This conference offers the last realistic opportunity for regulating a situation which is becoming more chaotic as time goes on. Many states including the US are making substantial sacrifices in order to arrive at a solution. It is, however, perfectly clear that unanimous support is needed from all states which are supporters of the rule of law. It is not an exaggeration to say that the success or failure of this

<sup>5</sup> Dated April 12. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>6</sup> Dated April 11. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-1160)

conference may hinge on a single vote. For this reason we would urge that the Government of Sweden support the US-Canadian proposal in the plenary voting.

Chile, Ecuador and Peru—We should add we are particularly aware their special problems and prepared consider any suggestions they have to make which might obtain conference support and enable them support US-Canadian proposal in plenary. Furthermore Delegation Geneva now intensively studying proposals they have already made to determine what might be worked out to increase acceptability of the proposal approved in committee.

Mexico, Venezuela—We could point out 18-power proposal defeated even with Soviet bloc support. Therefore, in belief they wish conference succeed we hope they can now support Canadian-US compromise.

El Salvador—This country is a real possibility of winning over to our joint proposal. The impressions from our conversations with this delegation have convinced US of this. Your letter should stress the delicate balance of the vote—a balance which can be tipped in the direction of success or failure. El Salvador is in the position of tipping that balance, and by tipping it in our favor will demonstrate high degree of statesmanship.

Burma—US-Canadian proposal is compromise of various viewpoints of traditional positions, economic sacrifices and difficult political decisions on part of many states. Many of Burma's Asian neighbors voted for this compromise, including Ceylon, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Malaya.

We are confident Burma desires contribute to adoption by this conference of proposal on which at least two-thirds of states can agree. Adoption of such proposal would go long way toward reducing friction between states which inevitably result from absence of any generally accepted rule. Conditions now favorable for this progressive step. If we fail to reach agreement here, present chaotic situation giving rise to innumerable disputes will continue for many years to come. Particularly noteworthy is compromise involved in grant of exclusive fishing jurisdiction in 12-mile zone to coastal state. This proposal would prevent additional states fishing in the zone and would terminate present fishing by foreign states with a ten-year period to adjust their fishing to new grounds.

Phillippines—While we appreciate reasons why Filipino Delegation abstained in committee on US-Canadian proposal, in plenary every possible affirmative vote must be mustered. Now that Philipines no longer involved as co-sponsor of proposal, we are counting on affirmative vote. Phillipine security interests as key member SEATO require narrow territorial sea and we believe Philipines can

vote for US-Canadian proposal without affecting their position concerning historic waters, a subject not within terms reference this conference.

Suggest additionally that you might make appeal for support at SEATO Ministerial Conference which we understand to be held in Washington April 15. Philippines only SEATO member not supporting US-Canadian proposal.

Cambodia—Cambodia seems to us susceptible of being moved towards affirmative vote. Personal letter from you to Prime Minister would therefore appear justified, stressing immediate exclusive fish control in 12 miles where no qualification under base period of 5 years, and the relatively short period of time during which foreign craft can continue to fish off Cambodian coast should prove qualified under formula. Since Cambodia originally favored straight Canadian 6 plus 6 and does not seem insist on wider territorial sea, our present US-Canadian compromise would appear small sacrifice asked in order reach conference agreement.

Indonesia—In view Indonesia's historic dependence on sea communications and fishing and her great potentialities as a maritime power, it is very much in her interest to have general agreement on width of territorial sea and fisheries limits. Failure of conference would be harmful to all, but particularly those states whose welfare is so intimately bound up with the sea as Indonesia. Since US-Canadian proposal is only one with prospect of support from two-thirds of states at conference it should be very much in Indonesia's interest to support. Such support need not affect Indonesia's "archipelago" claims which not at issue at this conference.

*[Paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]*

---

#### 416. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Gates) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 15, 1960.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The probabilities of a failure of the present Law of the Sea Conference to adopt a territorial sea limit are significant. The United States Delegation has been instructed to support only

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1560. Confidential. Attached to the source text was a short reply from Herter, dated April 21, which stated that Dean's instructions allowed him to make such a statement if the vote went against the United States.



proposals which will provide for breadth of territorial seas of not more than six miles. Although it is uncertain that the United States will be able to muster sufficient support among other nations to achieve its goal, it is reasonably certain that sufficient support is available to prevent any greater limit than six miles from being adopted.

The 1958 Conference having failed to adopt any territorial sea limit, Ambassador Dean made the following remarks, as part of his closing address:

"Furthermore we have made it clear that in our view there is no obligation on the part of states adhering to the 3-mile rule to recognize claims on the part of other states to a greater breadth of territorial sea. And on that we stand."

The 1958 Conference ended with a resolution recommending to the UN that a second conference (the present one) be convened in an attempt to establish a territorial sea limit and resolve fishing rights acceptable to a majority of the nations. The present conference, quite probably, will not produce another such resolution, if it fails to resolve these issues.

Therefore, it is, in our opinion, necessary that the United States be prepared to make a firm announcement of its views and understanding that the territorial sea limit remains at three miles under established international law until such time as a change is brought about in the governing rules of international law.

Accordingly, we recommend that preparation of such a statement be instituted now, with a view to having it available for immediate promulgation in the event of Conference failure.

Sincerely yours,

**Thomas S. Gates**

---

#### 417. Editorial Note

On April 15, the Department of State transmitted to the White House a memorandum asking the President to send personal messages to Prime Minister Nehru, the Shah of Iran, the King of Morocco, Emperor Haile Selassie, and President Bourguiba of Tunisia requesting support for the U.S.-Canadian proposal at the Law of the Sea Conference. The same memorandum noted that Secretary of State Herter was sending similar messages to 20 Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1560)

The texts of the 5 Presidential messages and the 20 sent by Herter were transmitted telegraphically to the appropriate posts on April 15 and 16. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-1560 and 4-1660)

---

**418. Letter From Representative Thomas M. Pelly and Senator Warren G. Magnuson to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 19, 1960.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We are writing you with regard to the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, because we are greatly disturbed at reports which reach us pursuant to the compromise proposal submitted by the United States and Canada. This proposal provides for a six-mile limit plus a six-mile exclusive fishing zone with historic rights to expire in the outer six miles after ten years.

Specifically, we are reliably informed that the American delegation has been attempting to "buy" votes of nations heretofore abstaining from voting, as well as the votes of those in opposition, with additional concessions and further compromises involving extension of additional rights beyond the twelve-mile limit. In short, we believe that Chairman Dean and the United States delegation propose a policy of settlement at any price. We are convinced the United States delegation is disregarding the rights of American citizens in its frantic efforts to obtain the necessary two-thirds votes required for agreement.

If the United States delegation is successful in implementing such a sell-out agreement, which would in effect abrogate the historic rights of its own citizens, it will force us to initiate legislative measures for the protection of the United States fishing industry and the fishermen who depend on it for their livelihood.

As you must be well aware, Mr. Secretary, the United States ground fish imports are more than double our own domestic production. Canada is making a serious mistake when she disregards the fact that her exports of ground fish into this country substantially exceeds the amount harvested by our own fishermen. This irreparable injury to the rights of the American fishermen by the United States delegation at Geneva would mean turning over a rich multi-million dollar industry to Canada, the production of which would in all probability be added to Canada's exports to the United States, and our own Pacific Northwest fishing industry would be put out of business.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1960.

Very frankly, we assure you we will not be a party to this international giveaway. Moreover, the Representatives in Congress of the areas affected will do everything within their power to prevent ratification of any such agreement arrived at in Geneva. Certainly you can expect protective tariff retaliations and embargo efforts on our part.

Months prior to the convening of the Law of the Sea Conference, the fisheries advisor to the State Department publicly declared that the United States would compromise in Geneva. The world knew this, and we are now seeing the obvious come to pass with outright capitulation to foreign interests.

In desperation, Mr. Secretary, we appeal to you to immediately communicate with Chairman Arthur Dean and find out what is transpiring at Geneva. There must be some way of preserving our historic rights short of selling out at any price. Nations that have no sea coast at all have equal voting status with us in these important matters. At this late hour we hope that you will take immediate action and save an important segment of the American fishing industry from total destruction by the ill-considered action of our own Government.

Sincerely,

**Thomas M. Pelly**

**Warren G. Magnuson**

---

**419. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 19, 1960—11 a.m.*

1711. Law of Sea. FYI Approval of Icelandic proposal in committee (31 affirmative 11 negative 46 abstaining including US) confronts US with necessity determining its position on proposal when subject arises in plenary. Arguments for support are: (1) Iceland has meritorious case as exceptional situation overwhelming dependence on fisheries; (2) both in general debate and when introducing joint US-Canada proposal US referred to need for conference consideration such situations and to willingness US entertain proposals to meet them, hence conference (and Iceland) has been led expect sympathetic action our part so that integrity of US would be called into question if US does

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1960. Confidential. Received April 20 at 1:36 a.m.

not now support some realistic proposal for special situations, particularly Iceland's; and (3) US opposition could have severe political repercussions for US-Icelandic relations as well as on other small countries viewing Icelandic problem sympathetically with adverse implications for NATO, particularly if Soviet bloc supported or abstained and possibly on attitude small countries on passage of warships in outer six. Important Soviet fishing interests require defeat of Icelandic proposal but USSR might abstain instead of voting against as in 1958, if confident US and Western Europe would mount blocking third.

On other hand, following outlines argument against US support of the proposal:

(1) UK Del unhappy with the limited opposition to Icelandic proposal, particularly with abstention by US though they were fully advised in advance and know reasons. UK believes proposal may well get two-thirds in plenary unless US votes and works against it. If approved in plenary would become part of 1960 convention (which would include US-UK proposal). UK and Iceland continuing discussion and on return Hare (UK) from England may have something to report.

(2) If amended to broaden criteria by removing "overwhelming dependence", or to make applicable to coastal communities or parts of a state, it would pose threat to some US fisheries.

Discussing whole situation in detail with head UK Del and will advise.

---

#### 420. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, April 20, 1960—11 a.m.*

1713. Law of Sea. With respect to position paper No. 4 on "Iceland and Other Special Situations"<sup>2</sup> in order to reach agreement at the conference it may be necessary to work out some formula with Ecuador, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and Argentina which would recognize that there are special situations beyond 12 miles to be carefully defined other than those in which the coastal state is "overwhelmingly dependent" upon fishing both as a means of economic existence and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2060. Confidential. Received at 8:22 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of this paper, dated March 8, is attached to a memorandum from Wilcox to Herter, March 16. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/3-1660)

as a means of supplying food to its population. Would attempt to have this carefully circumscribed and to have existence of such special situations determined by impartial tribunal on basis of evidence in accordance with defined terms. In view New Delhi telegram 9<sup>3</sup> setting forth position of India may be essential in order to obtain necessary "yes" votes to work this formula out in manner mutually satisfactory to Latin American countries [38 words not declassified].

Am constantly trying to protect fishing interests to the maximum consistent with achieving basic US objective. Fishing advisers have raised question as to extent my authority, and, since negotiations may have to be entered into on a relatively fast basis, would appreciate instructions.

Believe some such concessions essential to achieve basic Six plus Six formula, especially since both Latin Americans and Africans think some public gesture of their position must be made at the conference.

If we cannot obtain the necessary two-thirds, believe Garcia Robles (Mexico) and Tunkin (USSR) and Shukairy (Saudi Arabia) at last minute will move for nine-mile territorial sea or will move for adjournment of conference to New York in September or for 12-mile exclusive fisheries jurisdiction and for postponement any agreement on breadth territorial sea.

Believe with this negotiating freedom there is excellent chance of obtaining two-thirds, but if instructions are to be read strictly, believe my hands would be unduly tied.

---

<sup>3</sup> Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 3516, April 19. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/4-1960)

---

#### 421. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, April 20, 1960—2 p.m.*

1720. Law of Sea. In general committee this morning it was voted that all new proposals and amendments to recommendations of the Committee of the Whole must be filed not later than Friday 3:00 p.m. April 22; amendments or revisions or proposals must be in not later than noon Monday April 25; voting will start Tuesday April 26 10:30

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2060. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:46 a.m.

a.m., which was also fixed as closing date conference with signature Wednesday evening April 27. Believe USSR is planning to table proposal for 12-mile exclusive fishing zone with no vote at this conference on breadth of territorial sea. Tunkin (USSR) has advised Argentina that if their proposal respecting preferential rights is introduced in plenary Soviet bloc will support. Am considering following as a possible substitute for Cuban-Peruvian-Argentine-Icelandic proposal:

"Whereby reason of the special conditions which may be found to exist in areas of the sea near the coasts of a country, the fisheries, the livelihood of the population and the national economy are so manifestly interrelated that, in consequence they are dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of the sea in the said areas, and it becomes necessary, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, adopted at Geneva, April 27, 1958, to limit the total catch of a stock or stocks of fish in the said area, all as scientifically determined by the impartial Commission referred to above after a duly noticed hearing at which both the coastal state and fishing states concerned shall have the right to present evidence as to the existence of the special conditions aforesaid through technical, geographical, biological and economic studies and surveys prepared with the participation of specialized agencies of the United Nations and received in evidence by the Commission.

"The coastal state, to the extent and for the period of time determined by the Commission, shall have preferential rights under such limitations and to the extent that the Commission determines to be necessary by reason of the dependence of the coastal state on the stock or stocks of fish.

"In case of disagreement any interested state may initiate the procedure provided for in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas adopted at Geneva, April 27, 1958."

---

**422. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 20, 1960—10 p.m.*

1726. Law of Sea. Garcia Robles (Mexico) proposes to table tomorrow 18-power proposal providing for (1) 12-mile exclusive fishery jurisdiction coastal state; (2) no agreement at this conference on breadth territorial sea; (3) postponement of conference for five years;

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2060. Confidential; Priority. Received at 5:39 p.m.

(4) freeze of existing territorial sea limits for five years although Tunisia, which has not yet gone to 12 miles may oppose freeze.<sup>2</sup>

Further conferences with Ghana and Sudan and somewhat hostile attitude Ethiopian representative and fact members Arab League feel bound by Arab League votes and members of African League feel bound by African League votes makes it somewhat difficult to plan with any degree of certainty on African votes.

Father Riedmatten (Holy See) and Ambassador Quiroga (Spain) both told me heads Latin American Delegations extremely anxious to vote with US and to make conference a success but that we would have to accept Ecuadorian and Chilean proposal outlined by our tel 1713.<sup>3</sup>

While we could probably accept the Ecuadorian amendment, UK feels Iceland would push for extension historical rights in cases where any state had gone beyond 6 miles prior to convening of present conference, which would, of course, eliminate most of 10-year fishing for Western Europeans and Israel whereas our principal sacrifice would be off coast of Mexico. Shrimp representatives here find it exceedingly difficult to agree to 10-year cut-off coupled with Ecuadorian amendment. Don't know as yet whether proposal my tel 1720<sup>4</sup> would be acceptable Europeans though UK view it favorably as possibly solving Icelandic situation.

Herrington, Suomela<sup>5</sup> and delegation fishery advisers strongly oppose such revision in view negation results US efforts past ten years to protect US fishing industry and long-range claims of coastal states and possible imposition unacceptable burden on US industry. It is their view that some other means must be found to obtain critical Latin American votes. If Western Europeans cannot accept Ecuadorian proposal outlined our tel 1713, we are exploring possibility of our negotiating bi-lateral agreements with Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala and El Salvador that US would claim no historical rights their outer six miles and seeking to obtain similar agreements between Uruguay and Brazil on the one hand and with Argentina on the other. However believe we must have fairly free hand to negotiate if we are to be able to get  $\frac{2}{3}$  majority in this critical phase of the conference.

All proposals must be tabled by noon Friday after having been cleared with Latin Americans and Western Europeans. In view complete uncertainty African situation and in view opposition Pakistan and West Germany to accept notification of warships in outer 6, be-

---

<sup>2</sup> For text of this proposal, which was sponsored by 12 states and circulated as A/CONF.19/L.9, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, p. 172.

<sup>3</sup> Document 420.

<sup>4</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>5</sup> Arnie J. Suomela, Commissioner, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior.

lieve acceptable arrangements with Latin Americans constitute our best hope, and choice is between attempting to save conference on some practical basis or continuing a generally fearful attitude which is bound to cause conference failure. Would appreciate instructions.

In reference our tel 1720 change "above" after "referred to" to "provided for in Article 9 of the aforementioned Convention."

---

**423. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 20, 1960—8:02 p.m.*

2426. Law of Sea. Geneva's 1675 to Dept., 4 to Manila; Geneva's 1664 to Dept.<sup>2</sup> In view statements made by various Dels re their own country's special claims which US does not recognize, important record not give impression US position softening in respect thereto. However, unless US Del believes state of record requires specific refutation those claims, general disclaimer at appropriate point would seem sufficient. Such statement might follow line that although many of the special claims which various Dels felt compelled to reiterate pertain to matters not before Conference, US Del did not wish its silence to be construed as reflecting any basic change in US views.

[Here follow two paragraphs on Philippine treaty claims and the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States of 1898.]

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1460. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Pender and cleared in draft with Arneson, Bacon, Hager, and SPA. Repeated to Manila.

<sup>2</sup> Both dated April 14; they discussed various aspects of the Philippine position on waters in their archipelago. (*Ibid.*)



**424. Memorandum of Conversations, Department of State,  
Washington, April 21, 1960, 10:15 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Law of the Sea Conference

PARTICIPANTS

*Department of State:*

L—Mr. Hager

L/SFP—Mr. Pender

L—Mr. vanHeuven

U/LS—Mr. Arneson

U/FW—Mr. Blow

*Department of Defense:*

Admiral Ward

Captain Neese

*Department of the Interior:*

Mr. McKernan

Mr. Wright

Mr. Arneson opened the meeting by reviewing the various proposals which have been or are now before the Conference. These proposals include those of Peru (Geneva 1629), Cuba (Geneva 1630), Argentina (Geneva 1631), Ecuador (Geneva 1714), Chile (Geneva 1704), Iceland (Geneva 1645), the proposal of Ambassador Correa (Geneva 1727), and also the proposal regarding technical assistance by TAB and FAO (Geneva 1709).<sup>2</sup>

With respect to Ambassador Dean's request for guidance regarding the latter proposal it was agreed that Ambassador Dean would be informed that he could support this proposal in substance. Mr. Arneson undertook to draft a cable and to clear it with Interior.

The meeting next considered the proposal by Ambassador Dean for the inclusion of an additional paragraph in the United States-Canadian formula. This proposal would provide that coastal states would have preferential fishing rights beyond 12 miles under special conditions and carefully prescribed circumstances, and subject to determination by an arbitral commission, all in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea adopted in 1958 (Geneva 1720<sup>3</sup>). Mr. McKernan stated that Interior would not be able to accept the idea of preferential fishing rights beyond 12 miles. Admiral Ward, who was about to leave the meeting early, restated the position of the Defense Department to the effect that it [31 words not declassified]. He commented that, from a tactical point of view, it would be preferable to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2160. Confidential. Drafted by van Heuven. The conversation took place in Hager's office.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding telegrams 1629-1631, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 413; telegrams 1704, 1709, 1714, and 1727, dated April 19-21, are in Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1960 through 399.731/4-2160; for text of the Icelandic proposal transmitted in telegram 1645 (*ibid.*, 399.731/4-1260), see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, p. 169.

<sup>3</sup> Document 421.

have conference failure as a result of an inability to agree on a fixed breadth of the territorial sea rather than to have conference failure as a result of our inability to go along with a consent requirement.

Mr. Hager pointed out that the procedural situation in plenary requires at present that our proposal be voted on first. In that case, if our proposal fails, it would be very difficult to control what the conference might decide on. It might in fact agree upon proposals which would be far worse from our point of view than the one suggested by Ambassador Dean (Geneva 1720).

At this point telephone connections with Geneva were established and Mr. Arneson and Mr. McKernan talked with Ambassador Dean.

After Mr. McKernan had talked with Ambassador Dean for a brief period Mr. Hager joined the conversation and Ambassador Dean reviewed briefly the two questions that Mr. McKernan had asked and the answers he had given. These were as follows:

1. Mr. McKernan had asked whether the fisheries advisers had moved from their opposition to the proposal in Geneva's 1720 as reported in Geneva's 1726.<sup>4</sup> Dean said that he thought that they were still opposed, but that they considered it as a better alternative than the Icelandic proposal and accordingly were "reluctantly going along with it."

2. Mr. McKernan asked whether Ambassador Dean had taken any action in connection with the proposal in Geneva's 1720. Ambassador Dean stated that he had agreed with Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala and El Salvador that the proposal would be incorporated into the US-Canadian proposal and had initialled drafts with those five States. He said that he had taken this action on his own responsibility because it was essential that agreement be reached promptly on account of the time factor involved in preparing the necessary documents before the deadline for filing, and because he had considered it vital to arrest the growing sentiment in favor of the more extreme Latin American proposals. He advised that this action was acceptable to the United Kingdom, Canada and the Western European nations, including Portugal.

He said that he had, with the approval of the fisheries representatives, also agreed with the above five Latin American States that the U.S. would enter into bilateral agreements with them to the effect that it would not initiate the procedures under the 1958 Convention relating to Fisheries and Conservation for the establishment of U.S. historical rights in the outer 6-mile zone, which meant in effect that the U.S. would not assert its historical rights in that zone with respect to those five States. He indicated that the fisheries representatives were of the opinion that there were no such historical rights in most areas, and that where there were any, they were of little value to the industry. He

---

<sup>4</sup> Document 422.

said that as a result of these agreements, Ecuador and El Salvador would abstain and Argentina, Guatemala and Chile would vote for the U.S.-Canadian proposal.

In answer to questions as to the order of voting, he said that under the normal voting order the Icelandic proposal and the US-Canadian proposal, both of which had been reported to the plenary by the Committee of the Whole, would be voted upon before any new proposals introduced in the plenary. On this basis, the rumored new Mexican proposal would be voted on after ours. He said that he was considering a possible procedural maneuver whereby we would seek to have our proposal voted on last, in the hope of obtaining some support from those nations which were committed to vote for 12 miles in the plenary but which had instructions broad enough to permit them to vote in favor of our proposal after defeat of any 12-mile proposal. He did not go into detail, but indicated that the success of this maneuver would depend upon our being able to obtain a majority vote in favor of it. He added that he understood that the Mexican proposal was encountering some difficulty, the list of co-sponsors having dropped from 18 to 12.

When asked about the general chances of success for our proposal, he indicated that it was still too early to tell, but that he hoped that Ghana would vote in favor and that possibly Liberia, Tunisia and Libya might abstain, and that on that basis he expected that the vote might be 54-27-7 or 52-26-10, which would barely carry our proposal in the plenary.

He said that Belgium was still proving extremely difficult. He understood that our representatives and others had put so much pressure on the Foreign Minister that he had left town for three days. He said that the Minister of Agriculture was at present the responsible Minister in the matter and he suggested we consider approaching him. He understood that this Minister was under considerable pressure from the Belgian fishing industry. Ambassador Dean suggested that it might be most helpful if the Minister of Agriculture could be approached by President Hoover, who was revered in Belgium, or by Baron Silvercruys, for many years the Belgian Ambassador to the United States.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Hager stated that he would report the substance of the telephone conversation to Under Secretary Dillon as promptly as possible.

Mr. McKernan said he would talk with the Secretary of the Interior this afternoon and recommend to him that Interior do nothing to "rock the boat" at this stage of the proceedings.

---

<sup>5</sup> At 5:32 p.m. on April 22, the Department transmitted to Brussels a letter from President Eisenhower to the Belgian Prime Minister appealing for support of the U.S.-Canadian proposal. (Telegram 1235; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2260)

**425. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Legal Adviser (Hager) and Donald L. McKernan, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, Washington, April 22, 1960<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. McKernan telephoned Mr. Hager this morning to express alarm at reports that they were receiving at Interior from fisheries representatives to the effect that the State Department had authorized Ambassador Dean to go further than the position outlined in Geneva telegram 1720.<sup>2</sup> Mr. McKernan said that they were being given the impression that the State Department had therefore not been fully honest with the Interior Department at the meeting in Mr. Hager's office on Thursday morning, April 21.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Hager stated that to his knowledge there was absolutely no truth to these reports. He said that the only communication that he knew of that had taken place between the State Department and the delegation since the telephone conversation with Dean Thursday morning in which Mr. McKernan had participated, had been a telegram authorizing the action described in Geneva telegram 1709,<sup>4</sup> which, Mr. Hager reminded Mr. McKernan, had been agreed upon at the meeting Thursday morning. Mr. McKernan acknowledged that the authorization of 1709 had been agreed upon.

Mr. Hager said that the State Department was about to telegraph Dean that he was authorized to take the action outlined in Geneva telegram 1720. He then paraphrased for Mr. McKernan the intended telegram of instruction.<sup>5</sup> Mr. McKernan said that Interior could not concur in such an instruction. They were going to recommend to Secretary Seaton, however, that, while Interior did not concur in the authorization to proceed as outlined in Geneva telegram 1720, nevertheless it felt that this was essentially a matter for judgment in the field, that Interior was represented in the field, and therefore no action should be taken by the Interior Department to stop the action contemplated in 1720.

Mr. Hager reiterated that he was sure that the State Department had not authorized Dean to go beyond 1720, but he promised to check at once to make certain that this was true and said that he would telephone Mr. McKernan promptly if he found that he was mistaken.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2260. Drafted and initialed by Hager.

<sup>2</sup> Document 421.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> The authorizing telegram has not been identified further; telegram 1709, April 19, transmitted the text of a resolution on technical assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1960) For text of the resolution, adopted on April 26, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, p. 176.

<sup>5</sup> *Infra*.

Mr. McKernan thanked Mr. Hager and said he would advise callers that it is not correct that Ambassador Dean had been authorized to go beyond 1720

---

**426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 22, 1960—1:05 p.m.*

2446. Law of the Sea. From Under Secretary for Ambassador Dean. Understood from Dean-Hager telecon<sup>2</sup> there is widespread and rapidly crystalizing sentiment for some Conference provision on preferential rights for coastal states among number of delegations in addition Iceland and that this sentiment being fanned by hard-core 12-milers for divisive purposes in hope this would wreck Conference and thus prevent an agreement which would hold line against extremist proposals on territorial sea and fisheries.

We concur in US Del dislike for Icelandic and other such preferential rights proposals put forward by Cuba and Peru which would give coastal state right to move unilaterally in the first instance and which would accord special rights for situations defined in extremely loose language under which it would be most difficult to challenge validity unilateral action. Under circumstances we concur in need for immediately utilizing proposal in your 1720<sup>3</sup> which we understand acceptable to Canada and UK and other WE's in order to head off extremist proposals and in order serve as rallying point for those willing work put across US-Canadian proposal.

You, therefore, authorized incorporate such provision in joint proposal in order help assure conference agreement on best terms possible US interests.

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2060. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Pender on April 21; cleared by Hager and Arneson (in draft) and with Interior, Navy, and Blow, who were advised of its contents; and approved by Dillon.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 424.

<sup>3</sup> Document 421.

**427. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Dillon) to Representative Thomas M. Pelly<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 25, 1960.*

DEAR MR. PELLY: I have read with interest your letter of April 19, 1960,<sup>2</sup> also signed by Senator Magnuson, concerning the Law of the Sea Conference, and I appreciate the frank expression of your views.

As you know, the overriding objective of the United States at the Second Law of the Sea Conference must be to obtain agreement on a relatively narrow territorial sea. At the same time, our Delegation is under instruction to strive for an agreement providing the maximum protection possible for United States fishery interests. To achieve these objectives, a joint United States-Canadian proposal has been worked out which the Delegation believed could obtain approval in the Committee of the Whole and draw enough votes away from proposals for a twelve-mile territorial sea to enable them to be defeated.

The estimates made by the United States Delegation in its efforts to attract a following sufficient to attain a two-thirds vote have proven to be very accurate. The United States-Canadian proposal was the only one to receive a majority of the votes cast in the Committee. As the balloting was very close, the Delegation was still faced with the need for extra votes to gain the required two-thirds in the plenary session.

At the same time, there has been a strong and growing trend at the Conference for a provision according further rights over fishing to coastal countries in special situations. Some proposals have been put forward which would recognize the preferential rights of a coastal state in this regard and would allow it to move unilaterally to claim such rights in the first instance, and which would accord special rights for situations defined so loosely that it would be difficult to challenge the validity of unilateral action. We therefore believe it necessary to hand off extremist proposals and to retain and encourage support for a six-plus-six formula. For example, a preferential rights proposal submitted by Iceland which was so broad that it could not obtain fishing-nation support nevertheless did achieve a substantial majority of the votes cast in the Committee. Furthermore, an amendment to the United States-Canadian joint proposal which we consider extremely dangerous was submitted by Argentina. It failed to pass by only four votes, with the entire Soviet bloc abstaining. The Soviet delegate now, however, has urged the Argentine representative to reintroduce this

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-1960. Drafted in U/LS and cleared in draft with Blow, Pender, EUR, and H. An almost identical letter, which was attached to the source text, was sent to Senator Magnuson.

<sup>2</sup> Document 418.

amendment in plenary, and has offered Soviet support. The Argentinians have been dissuaded from doing so only by the introduction of a more limited proposal by Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay,<sup>3</sup> put forward as an addition to the joint United States-Canadian proposal. This package proposal is acceptable to Canada, the United Kingdom, and other fishing nations, as well as to most Latin American countries. The United States Delegation believes it essential for the United States to support this combined proposal to achieve Conference success on the best terms possible for United States interests. We have therefore authorized the Delegation to support this package proposal. Its text is enclosed.

We recognize that the amendment could pose further problems for United States fishing interests. A close study of it, however, will reveal how carefully qualified it is, in order to reduce to a minimum the possibility of its working any hardship on our industry. It does not, for example, give coastal states preferential rights, but only the faculty for claiming such rights; and the claim would have to be scientifically established before and approved by the kind of special commission which was provided for in the high seas fisheries convention at the last Geneva Conference, largely at our insistence. In some respects, moreover, it would offer legal protection that does not now exist for a fishing state. During the past few years, as we know, the trend has been for coastal states to attempt unilaterally to establish preferential rights in large areas of the high seas, and a rather far-reaching resolution supporting the idea of such rights was adopted at the last Conference. Consequently, approval of the proposed amendment would mean that preferential rights would exist only after a bona fide need has been established in a particular case through the mechanism which the amendment provides. For the immediate future, it should set at rest the efforts made for the extreme proposals.

Finally, I would like to point out that if the Conference on the Law of the Sea should fail to reach agreement, there is every reason to believe that a number of other countries would now freely proclaim a territorial sea extending well beyond six miles, with fishing jurisdiction over a wide area. Their proclamations could be justified on the basis that proposals for a narrower territorial sea and fishery zone had received insufficient support at the Conference to warrant being considered as a principle of international law.

---

<sup>3</sup> For text of this proposal, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, p. 173.

I assure you that we continue to have the interests of the United States fishing industry fully in mind, both here and in Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

**Douglas Dillon**<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The enclosed text of the U.S.-Canadian proposal as amended by the proposal of Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay is not printed.

---

**428. Editorial Note**

At the 13th Plenary Session, April 26, the Second Law of the Sea Conference failed to adopt the U.S.-Canadian proposal as amended by a vote of 54-28-5. A motion to reconsider the proposal also failed 50-29-8. For a summary of the statements at the plenary and a breakdown of the voting on the U.S.-Canadian proposal and other conference documents, see U.N. doc. A/CONF.19/8, pages 27-32.

---

**429. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, April 28, 1960—2 a.m.*

1887. Attention: Secretary. Law of Sea. Would like to express appreciation of wonderful backing received your Department and of magnificent cooperation of Embassies and Ambassadors. Fully realize enormous burden hurry-up calls from conference such as this place on Embassies which have other important matters between countries to negotiate.

Sincerely sorry wording we finally worked out and hoped would satisfy Philippines could not bring them from an abstention to a "yes" vote, which would of course have carried the conference as we only lost by one vote.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4-2860. Confidential. Repeated to Tehran.



In Committee of the Whole Argentina had presented an amendment to joint U.S.-Canadian proposal that coastal state had absolute preferential rights in coastal waters beyond twelve miles, which failed to carry with Soviet bloc abstaining.

Tunkin (USSR) then went to Pablo Pardo (Argentina) and stated that if Argentine amendment introduced in plenary Soviets and Arabs would support. Since many states had instructions to vote for such preferential rights and fishing interests were against, such an amendment might have crippled our proposal. Consequently called meeting several Latin American Ambassadors and worked out what subsequently became Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal, or L.12 in plenary, that commission set up by Article 9 of Fishing Convention of 1958 would have jurisdiction to pass on coastal states preferential claims beyond twelve miles after hearing views fishing states involved, to which Argentina, Chile and Guatemala pledged support and Ecuador and El Salvador pledged abstention. Placing Cuba's name as sponsor on this and by treating it as an amendment to other report of the Committee of the Whole rather than as an amendment to the U.S.-Canadian proposal. Garcia Amador (Cuba) was able to stay as sponsor and to vote "yes" on L.4 (second) in plenary, being U.S.-Canadian proposal as reported by Committee of the Whole as amended in plenary by Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal [4 lines of source text not declassified]. After working out terms of Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal Correa (Ecuador) and Ponce-Carbo, Under Secretary Ecuadorian Foreign Office then insisted on further amendment that if coastal state during base period of five years, in our proposal 1953-58, had passed its own internal law extending its territorial sea beyond six miles then fishing states involved would have to agree they acquired no historical rights to outer six mile zone under such circumstance. When fishing states refused such amendment, I undertook write letter that U.S. would not as executive member take steps to prove any practice of fishing by American vessels in outer six mile zone Ecuadorian waters in base period and that consequently Paragraph 3 U.S.-Canadian proposal not apply as between Ecuador and U.S.A. Immediately drafted agreement to this effect and submitted to Correa and Ponce Carbo and shook hands on basis Ecuador would abstain.<sup>2</sup> Two days later Ponce Carbo (Ecuador) demanded I waive, release and quit claim to Ecuador all claims U.S. Government and American nationals against Ecuador by virtue Ecuadorian enforcement of its 200-mile territorial sea. Explained Congress alone could do this and had no authority sign such an agreement and would be fraudulent if I did. Then delegated Wainhouse to work this matter out finally and up to 1 a.m. Tuesday,

---

<sup>2</sup> Text of this agreement was transmitted in telegram 1868 from Geneva, April 28. (Ibid.)

April 26 Ecuadorians were still contending for this clause. At 1:15 a.m. politely but firmly told them we could not grant. At 10:30 a.m. while in Assembly Hall after plenary voting session called to order by Prince Wan, Correa (Ecuador) sent me note "must see in corridor," where he and Ambassador Trujillo and Ponce Carbo insisted I sign document with above-mentioned release in it immediately or Ecuador would vote "no." As I was explaining why this could not be done received message from Prince Wan he was holding up voting because I was not in my seat. Thereupon left to re-enter Assembly Hall. Upon leaving, saw Correa summon Melo-Lecaros (Chile) shake hands with him and say "it is a deal." Whereupon as I resumed seat in Assembly, Melo-Lecaros approached me and said that although he had agreed vote "yes," he had just received instruction President Alessandri (Chile) to vote "no" and could not change them.

After Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal, L.12 plenary, received two-thirds vote with Paragraph 5 of proposed amended U.S.-Canadian proposal L.11 in plenary having been substituted for Paragraph 1 of Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal in order to meet insistence of Italians and Koreans they had to have Paragraph 5 in order to vote "yes." Japan then told us instructions were for her to abstain on U.S.-Canadian proposal as amended by Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal because her fishing interests strongly objected to commission created Paragraph 9 Fishing Convention 1958 having jurisdiction to grant preferential rights coastal state beyond twelve miles. Consequently on voting on our proposal as amended Ecuador and Chile voted "no" and Japan abstained increasing "no" voting by two and reducing "yes" vote by one.

Burma despite strenuous Commonwealth efforts, voted "no" and Guinea, despite suggestion just before voting might abstain.

India voted "no" because Sen had received cable from Krishna Menon, Minister of War, instructing him to vote "no" unless we accepted prior authorization passage of warships in entire twelve-mile zone and prohibition against assembling or maneuvering of war vessels in such zone, Prime Minister Nehru having ignored personal message from Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower received during Chou En Lai visit New Delhi.

*[Paragraph (17 words of source text) not declassified]*

Melo-Lecaros (Chile) subsequently insisted Chile could not get written release of 1952 agreement with Peru and that *[36 words not declassified]* this "no" vote was actually on explicit instructions from President Alessandri.

Wish to emphasize significance at conference of being able to break Arab bloc despite solemn Arab League agreements vote as unit and should especially commend Tunisia and Jordan for voting "yes" and Lebanon for abstaining or more accurately for absenting themselves from voting due to threats.

Also consider significant Ethiopia and Ghana voted "yes".

Impossible to describe third degree methods, threats of personal violence, threats of ostracism on returning to their own country and other methods [9 words not declassified] used in effort not to get them to vote "yes" and believe threats of personal violence on his return Lebanon had effect on Fattal's absenting himself entirely. Think special efforts should be made to thank countries voting "yes" for their steadfastness and where Presidential messages previously sent Presidential appreciation should be expressed.

Ambassador Sohn, Kim and Han (Korea) very helpful and steadfast throughout and would appreciate McConaughy be advised at Seoul.

In State Department and Navy announcements and in State Department bulletins believe emphasis should be laid on fact international law is what majority of countries say it is and that this constituted a vote of 54 with 28 against and 5 abstentions for six miles as compared to vote of 39 in 1958 for 12 miles. In 1960 twelve miles were only able to muster 31.

Guinea representative advised that when they chose independence from French union within 48 hours all French officials and entire governmental records withdrawn from country and credits closed. Consequently there is great bitterness against France and because of Algerian war and possible incursion of French vessels into Tunisian or Libyan waters and explosion second French bomb there is a source of great feeling against France.

Sharpeville incident in Union of South Africa shortly after conference began had profound effect upon Africans forcing Union of South Africa delegate to withdraw from speaking and explosion of second French bomb in Sahara almost caused similar incidents against France, and boycotting of UAR ship *Cleopatra* in New York harbor caused tensions of that delegation to arise.

Since we started without agreement with Canada and with their proposal providing for no phase-out and we were able to table joint proposal with ten-year phase-out and did not have to grant either authorization or notification to warships either in inner six or outer six mile zone and we in statement made clear we only voted for Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal giving Commission under Article 9 fishing convention authority pass on coastal state's preferential claims beyond twelve miles as means to obtaining agreement on breadth territorial sea and fishing zone and that we did not stand for such

proposal standing alone and also explained we would adhere three mile limit despite failure of conference by one vote on the whole believe we emerge from conference relatively unscathed and with our data considerably advanced.

In forthcoming months or years USSR, Saudi Arabia and Mexico will of course do everything possible promote 12 mile territorial sea and emergence of new members of United Nations will make solution this problem more difficult as months go by.

Witman did yeoman work with Ethiopia, Ghana and Tunisia and was untiring in his efforts to convince Guinea and Libya, and believe would be helpful to have him write memorandum on how we can work with African States and what should be done to improve our working relations.

Since uncommitted nations may regard this as a military and diplomatic defeat by the Soviet Union of the US, every effort should be taken to point out nations such as Japan, Philippines and India who did not support us the fundamental importance of a narrow territorial sea although naval exposition with charts on this question at Delhi undoubtedly contributed to Krishna Menon's instructions as Minister of War though Menon insisted that their demand on authorization passage warships was at insistence Asian-African nations.

Baig (Pakistan) informs me all of Sen's (India) efforts on this score here were received coldly.

Ago (Italy), Quiroga (Spain) and Bailey (Australia) have suggested 54 nations would themselves sign convention or multilateral treaty in form present text US-Canadian proposal as amended by Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal, deposit it in United Nations and ask all others to join. Bailey (Australia) also wants to promote this idea at meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London next week and asked me to have Secretary of State give matter his careful attention.

Throughout conference in effort to avoid embarrassing noncommitted nations, in all my speeches, talks and discussions, I have carefully refrained from talking defense matters, referring to Russian submarines or to have provided enemy submarines by wider territorial sea in time of war and many uncommitted nations have complimented us on this attitude.

On other hand Shukairy (Saudi Arabia) and Garcia Robles (Mexico) in close and daily conferences Tunkin (USSR) and Shukairy as representative Saudi Arabia, where we have air force base, continued repeated bitter attacks on USA and peaceful aims of USSR gloated over our defeat and filibustered against further action. This may have repercussions in capitals of uncommitted countries and Embassy Jidda may wish consider mentioning Saudi Arabian Prime Minister that [14 words not declassified] sale of their oil wealth is dependent on contin-

ued good economies in USA and Western Europe and narrow territorial sea essential to transportation. [1 sentence (27 words) not declassified]

These parliamentary tactics of delay, confusion and distortion are exceedingly confusing and disturbing to small uncommitted nations. They are I believe a part of much larger Soviet tactics to permit no constructive agreement on any subject to lull the world into a false sense security by a constant Pollyannaish manner of sweetness and light, to attack the capitalistic countries as war mongers and profiteers and to lead the world up the garden path of a do-nothing summit and hence build up a sense of discouragement at the inability of the free world's leaders to come to grips with problems both domestic and foreign so people will complain about the burden of taxation and armaments.

Bailey (Australia) is convinced impossible to work out legal agreements at UN conference and strongly urges signing convention among Commonwealth countries, Scandinavian countries, USA, Latin America, Western European and such Asian and African countries as wish to join. Drew (Canada) agrees. [2 sentences (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Would like to compliment entire staff for loyal, devoted unflagging work day and night and for a wonderful spirit of cooperation. Consulate and Moore and Owsley most helpful and considerate. All liaison officers did splendid job. Please thank Admiral Burke for work of Admiral Colclough and Captains Hearn and Hardy and Commander Hoag and for service of Consulate Marines. Please thank Seaton and Interior for splendid cooperation and work of Suomela, Terry and Taylor and Fishery advisers. They with Herrington attended all meetings, were freely and constantly consulted and gave unstintingly of their time. They were fully consulted in working out Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal and though they did not approve, they thoroughly understood my reasons and strategy. In conference of 88 countries with things moving and breaking fast and where instantaneous decisions must be made, it is not always possible to keep everyone advised throughout every hour of the day and of necessity much of work has to be done in cooperation Western Europe, Afro-Asians, and Latin American groups who will only talk to head of delegation. They all assure me of their complete satisfaction with consultation and with spirit of cooperation. Herrington, as usual, turned in an indefatigable, fine performance and naturally must fight hard and long for fishing rights. Richards made splendid vice chairman. Wainhouse, Yingling, Wright and Kerley were most helpful. This is a technical difficult and exceptionally complicated subject requiring the constant conjuring up of new solutions, careful drafting and constant examination of implications of other proposals both legally, economically and politically on

all countries together with constant study of conference rules and possible parliamentary maneuvering, which may be of more immediate importance than substance. Recommend careful course in this for all liaison officers as well as careful exposé voting technique, such as obtaining adoption of proposals by wide abstentions as in the case of Iceland's first proposal in committee. Much impressed by liaison work of Clough, King, Owsley, Roberts and Witman. Doctor Percy and Miss Lucas very helpful.

Regret necessity of voting against Iceland's proposal on special fishing rights and amendment taking away historical rights from our proposal and were it not for necessity obtaining Dr. Garcia Amador's "yes" vote on committee proposal and his joint sponsorship of Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay proposal as amendment to committee report would have moved to consider committee report last, in which event in case adoption Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay proposal there would have been no necessity voting on Icelandic special rights proposal.

Peru withdrew its proposal L.5 and I urged Dr. Garcia Amador to withdraw L.6, to which he agreed but after failure committee report as amended by Brazil-Cuba-Uruguay amendment he insisted on having L.6 voted on and we led in having it defeated for which Tunkin (USSR) taunted him.

*[Paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]*

Constantly pressed UK for Icelandic solution and if this had occurred before conference would have had Icelandic vote and would have avoided conference sympathy for small nation's problems. Icelandic Delegation hurt but they voted throughout with USSR despite NATO commitments. Andersen, Icelandic Ambassador, believed UK proposal good but officials would not accept and run risk home displeasure.

Support of fishery interests for new proposals in all countries is slow, sullen, grudging and generally too late for effective conference action and this hampered UK, Japan, France, Belgium and Norway as well as ourselves.

Correa (Ecuador) conferred his country's highest medal on Garcia Robles (Mexico) while here. Latter skilled, tricky and smart parliamentarian with thorough knowledge of all conference's rules, loopholes and devices.

Wiener of USIS very helpful throughout.

*[Paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]*

**430. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Special Assistant for Law of the Sea Matters (Richards) and the British Minister (Hood), Department of State, Washington, May 10, 1960<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

The Law of the Sea

Lord Hood called to present the attached paper.<sup>2</sup> He observed that this represented a British proposal for a two-pronged approach to the question of the Law of the Sea. The first aspect of the approach is a proposed convention which would establish the joint US-Canadian proposal of six-plus-six with some sort of phase out as to the law of the sea on this subject. The second aspect would be a North Atlantic fishing pact which would attempt to settle all the special problems which were presently alive between the various fishing nations of this area. This fishing pact would be within the ambit of the proposed convention. Lord Hood said the British would welcome our views on this proposal.

Mr. Richards said that, of course, he could give only his own personal, initial reactions, but he thought it would be difficult to persuade our fishing people to adhere to a convention which would only be to their disadvantage. He also thought it would be difficult to get many of the nations which supported our proposal at Geneva to adhere to such a convention. He noted, parenthetically, that this could in effect weaken our legal position, for at present we can truthfully say that a clear majority of the nations of the world have signified their willingness to recognize six-plus-six as the legitimate law of the sea. It is quite possible that less than a majority would adhere to such a treaty. Mr. Richards said he would undertake to ascertain the US position on this matter and would inform the British later. In the meantime, he would inform Mr. Dean of this approach. Mr. Dean will be travelling to London over this week-end on personal business but while he is there he will have a meeting with Mr. Hare and perhaps they may wish to discuss this problem.<sup>3</sup>

Lord Hood said he wished to emphasize that the UK does not wish to play a lone hand in this matter. They would like the US and Canada to take the initiative in the matter of an over-all treaty. He noted that they have already sounded out Mr. Diefenbaker at the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/5-1060. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Williamson.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> On May 10 the Embassy in London reported that it had been approached by the British along similar lines. (Telegram 5399; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/5-1060)

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Diefenbaker was guarded in his response to these soundings, saying that this was, of course, a matter for the Canadian Cabinet to consider. As to the proposed fishing pact, the UK had talked informally with the Norwegians. The legal adviser of the Norwegian Foreign Office had privately agreed that there was a need for such a pact and thought the Norwegian Government would be sympathetic to any attempts in this direction. In response to a question, Lord Hood said that the British Government finds itself under pressure to make some sort of announcement in parliament which would indicate that the government was in consultation at least with Denmark, Norway and Iceland, on the question of fishing rights. The British Government finds itself pressed to make an early statement to such effect by the fact that a strike is called for May 15 at Grimsby. The masters of the fishing trawlers of this city wish the government to exclude the landing of Icelandic fish in the UK and further to assert the rights of the UK fishermen to fish within three miles of the Icelandic coast. The government is afraid that this strike will spread and is meeting with the masters on May 12 in an effort to dissuade them from striking. Lord Hood said the government felt that if they could make a statement indicating that they were entering into negotiations before this date it would be most helpful. Mr. Richards and Mr. Williamson both said that they doubted it would be possible to give the British any sort of answer by that time.

---

<sup>4</sup> Held May 3-13 at London.

---

**431. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, June 6, 1960<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Law of the Sea: Multilateral Convention

**PARTICIPANTS**

Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State  
Ambassador Heeney, Canadian Embassy  
Jim S. Nutt, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy  
R. Gordon Arneson, U/LS

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/6-660. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Arneson on June 7, and approved in U on June 10.



Ambassador Heeney said he was under instruction to express Canadian disappointment at the negative response of the United States to the Canadian suggestion that the United States join Canada and the UK in taking soundings with other countries as to their interest in signing a multilateral convention embodying the provisions of the Canadian-US proposal at Geneva.<sup>2</sup> His Government believed that unless the United States expressed a willingness in principle to sign such a convention (given the requisite widespread support of other countries) and unless it were willing to participate in the canvass, the project was doomed to failure. Canada felt that initial soundings with Western European countries would, in effect, result in a veto on the whole project.

Mr. Dillon said that the United States had vigorously pressed for Conference adoption of the Canadian-US proposal at Geneva primarily for security reasons and had been willing to accept fishery provisions less than ideal from the United States point of view in order to achieve agreement on a 6-mile territorial sea. In examining the post-Geneva situation, there appeared to be considerable doubt whether a multilateral convention as suggested would, in fact, advance United States and free-world security interests. The Navy, which was executive agent for the Department of Defense on this matter, believed that United States security interests would not be advanced by such a convention. Unless there was some change in this security assessment of the problem, the United States would not favor the multilateral approach.

Ambassador Heeney expressed some skepticism as to whether the current security assessment was accurate. He thought that if as many as 45 representative countries would adhere to such a convention the project would have positive security value for the free world. Mr. Dillon replied that the question of numbers was the key question and that in the absence of soundings it would be difficult to say just how many countries would be willing to sign up. He understood that the Navy believed that no more than 32 would be interested and that among these would be countries representing parts of the world where naval mobility was not a problem, whereas the non-signers would represent more critical parts of the world from this point of view, e.g., Indonesia, the Philippines, the Middle East. The Navy was also concerned that a move to open up a multilateral convention for signature might well lead to counteraction by the 12-milers so that the end result would be two competing norms, neither one of which having greater weight than the other.

---

<sup>2</sup> On May 18, Cadieux and Nutt had approached the Department of State about pursuing a multilateral convention along the lines of the U.S.-Canadian proposal. (Memorandum of conversation, May 18; *ibid.*, 399.731/5-1860)

Ambassador Heeney noted that the United States seemed to have lost its "evangelistic zeal" on this matter. In response, Mr. Dillon said that our "evangelism" at Geneva had been based on security considerations. If the security reasons disappeared, "evangelism" disappeared too.

In a general discussion of the problem of counteraction on the part of 12-milers, Ambassador Heeney expressed doubt whether the Soviet Union would want to bind itself to any particular agreement in this field. Mr. Arneson suggested that the Soviet Union might prefer, in order to leave itself uncommitted and free to act in any way it chose, to persuade other countries to move unilaterally to 12 miles with resulting disadvantage to the free world.

As to the primary objective motivating the various countries in this matter, Mr. Dillon reaffirmed that the security interest was paramount as far as the United States was concerned, and inquired what the Canadian interest was. After some hesitancy, Ambassador Heeney said that he thought Canada's prime interest was in the codification of international law in this field. In response to a question from Mr. Dillon, Mr. Arneson expressed the opinion that the British interest seemed to be centered primarily on a desire to solve fishing problems.

Ambassador Heeney, in citing possible support for the convention, said he understood that Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay would be interested. Mr. Arneson said that according to information available to the Department from the Embassy in Buenos Aires, the Argentine proposal was, in fact, quite different from the Canadian-US proposal at Geneva. It could be more aptly characterized as the original Canadian proposal plus; not only would it provide no phase-out period in the outer six but it would also give preferential fishing rights to coastal states beyond 12 miles in the first instance. He went on that the Argentine case indicates a danger to be reckoned with; various states might be willing to sign a multilateral convention, subject, however, to certain changes being made either in favor of coastal states or in favor of fishing states, with the result that we would be faced with a problem of endless renegotiation. Ambassador Heeney stressed that it would be essential, if a joint canvass were to be undertaken, that it be understood that the Canadian-US proposal was being offered without modification. Similarly, it would also be essential that the United States, UK and Canada agree in advance on the minimum number of signatories required, as well as their representative character, before any one of them would be committed to sign.

Mr. Dillon said that he was seeking at an early occasion to re-examine the security aspects of the problem with Admiral Burke and that as soon as he had had occasion to do this he would be in a position to talk further with the Canadian Ambassador.

**432. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, June 16, 1960<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Law of the Sea: Prospects for a Multilateral Convention

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary (Mr. Dillon)  
Admiral Arleigh Burke  
Mr. Arthur H. Dean  
Mr. Eric Hager (L)  
Mr. R. Gordon Arneson (U/LS)

Admiral Buke said that the chances of getting a sufficient number of signatories to a multilateral convention (embodying the provisions of the final Canadian-US proposal at Geneva) were so slight that he was against initiating the project. The Acting Secretary commented that the important question was what constituted success and what constituted failure. In his view, if a sufficient number of signatories could be obtained it would be worthwhile to proceed from the security point of view even though the fisheries provisions would cause some unhappiness. Admiral Burke's estimate was that a multilateral would attain 30 to 40 signatories at most and there was danger that the Soviet Union and others would drum up sentiment in favor of a 12-mile territorial sea convention. Moreover, there would be difficulties with Indonesia and the Philippines, which would want special consideration for their archipelagoes. As a result, the chances of holding to the 3-mile limit would be diminished.

The Acting Secretary said that an estimate of 45 might well be on the optimistic side and that the Soviet Union, Mexico, and others might be able to garner as many as 30 votes for a 12-mile regime. The many newly emerging countries, especially in Africa, might well opt for 12 miles, so that in the end the proponents for the 12-mile sea might be greater than those favoring a six-plus-six formula.

Admiral Burke was also worried that a program to establish a multilateral treaty would have the effect of establishing the validity of such an instrument, upon which, of course, the 12-milers could also capitalize. To this point, Mr. Dean said there was no magic about a convention signed at Geneva as opposed to a multilateral treaty of the sort envisaged provided it got a majority vote. He pointed out that Oppenheim, whose works he had just consulted, maintains that a

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/6-1660. Secret. Drafted by Arneson on June 20 and approved in U on July 2. A memorandum for the record of this meeting, which is the same in substance but arranged differently, is in Naval History Center, Burke Papers, Originator's File.

multilateral treaty signed by a majority of the countries would have the same force as a convention signed at Geneva. The theory behind requiring a two-thirds majority under United Nations rules was that there was inevitable shrinkage between signature and ratification and that experience had shown that a majority of ratifications was likely if only as many as two-thirds of the countries signed the convention.

Mr. Dean reported that the Australians, the Canadians, and the South Africans all seemed to have strong desires to move along with the multilateral. Mr. Bailey (Australia) was particularly concerned that Mexico and the Soviet Union might well introduce the ten-power proposal of Geneva in the General Assembly this fall. Mr. Dean said that according to the UN Secretariat there would be sixteen new nations eligible for membership in the United Nations by the end of 1961. Bailey had also pointed out that the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation which was signed in 1944 started out with only 20 ratifications; it now has more than 70. Mr. Hager said the Chicago Convention had no rival convention in the field to contend with. As to the new nations coming along, Mr. Bailey believed that if they had a six-plus-six standard to which they could repair they would be less likely to go to a 12-mile regime. Mr. Dean thought it would be useful if the US would sound out the sentiment of some of its closest friends in this matter, such as Professor Gros of France and Riphagen of the Netherlands. He believed that we could probably get some 40-plus countries to sign. He agreed with Admiral Burke that anything less than 40 plus, i.e., 30 to 35, would not be enough. Admiral Burke expressed concern that if on taking soundings there was not enough support, where would this leave us: would we be in a stronger or a weaker position? He believed that the latter would be the case.

The Acting Secretary thought that France was probably a key country and that it would be useful to take soundings with France to find out its attitude concerning the prospects of getting widespread support and also to get from it some idea of other criteria to be applied in determining whether the project was worthwhile. He said that his own guess was that France would probably not be interested. Admiral Burke also thought that France would say no. On the other hand, if France did express interest, what happened then? Would one then wish to sound out Belgium?

Mr. Dean said he understood from Hare that the UK was actively negotiating with Belgium and Iceland concerning fishing problems. If these negotiations turned out favorably, he thought that there was some hope that Belgium and Iceland might go along on a six-plus-six multilateral. He thought that countries in Latin America would be favorably disposed, with the exception of Mexico, Venezuela and Panama. In his considered view, the 3-mile rule probably cannot be maintained for more than another two or three years. In this regard, the ILC

statement about territorial seas from 3 to 12 miles was not, in fact, very helpful. He believed that our position on the 3-mile limit was subject to disintegration in a very short time. Admiral Burke agreed that the disintegration process was inevitable. The real question, therefore, was which way do we lose least, i.e., by holding firm to the 3-mile rule as long as possible or by seeking to establish the six-plus-six regime by multilateral convention. Mr. Dean thought that the multilateral convention might well attract the support of a number of new nations. On the other hand, he realized that one could not recapture the enthusiasm which had been capitalized on at the Conference. He reported that Mr. Drew, of Canada, estimated that as many as 48 countries might be interested but he had not seen the details on this estimate. The Acting Secretary asked why Canada, the UK and Australia felt so strongly on this issue and at the time were unwilling to take soundings with France. Admiral Burke said that he was clear in his own mind that the UK interest was on the fisheries aspect. He understood that the British Admiralty was opposed to present UK support for a six-plus-six convention.

Admiral Burke said that as far as the US Navy was concerned, it would of course go along with the multilateral proposal if it were possible to make it stick. The Navy agreed that it would become increasingly difficult over the years if we do nothing. On the other hand, in the present situation, Navy could keep forcing the issue of the 3-mile limit, recognizing no other breadth, and do its best to hold the line.

The Acting Secretary said that if the multilateral convention showed a fair chance of success he would be willing to undertake the project and be prepared to deal with the opposition that would be engendered from fisheries interests. On the other hand, if the prospects of success were poor there would be no point in stirring up a "ruckus". He favored a discreet and confidential sounding out of the French, making it clear that US interest was heavily dependent on the number of countries that might be induced to support such a convention. He would leave the decision as to whether to proceed further dependent on the reaction we get and the amount of likely support. He would favor a program of sounding out certain key and representative countries. On the specific question of soundings with France, Mr. Hager asked with whom we should be in touch. Was Professor Gros good enough? Mr. Dean thought that soundings should be taken with Professor Gros in the first instance, with further soundings up the line if they seemed indicated.

The Acting Secretary suggested that two alternatives might be put to Canada and the UK. One would be that the UK and Canada approach the French indicating that US interest was dependent on a sufficiently large amount of support from other countries. Under this

course of action, the US itself would want to double-check the Canadian report of French reaction. The other alternative was for the US to approach the French, in keeping with the Eisenhower-*de Gaulle* understanding<sup>2</sup> to be in touch on matters of common concern. It might be best to approach Couve de Murville first on a completely frank basis, mentioning the Canadian and UK interest in the project and our concern that the present 3-mile position will erode unless something is done. We should say that we would be interested in going forward only if a majority of the countries represented at Geneva proved interested, that the project obviously had certain disadvantages from the point of view of fisheries interests, but that in any case the US would like to know what the view of France was. The consensus of the meeting was that a direct approach by the US to France would be preferable.

The Acting Secretary said there seemed to be no difference as to objective among those represented at the meeting, i.e., that the multi-lateral convention would be desirable if it got sufficient support.

Admiral Burke said the issue of soundings would be easily resolved if we got a definite indication of no interest from France. In that case, the matter should be dropped. On the other hand, if France indicated support, it would be necessary to sound out other countries and he feared that each additional step would amount to more and more commitment on the part of the US to go ahead. In response to an earlier question from Admiral Burke, Mr. Dean agreed that the sounding-out process might leave us worse off than if we had taken no step in the event it showed that we could get the support of no more than 30 to 35 countries. He was, however, still of the opinion that we can do better with something than with nothing.

The Acting Secretary urged that a limited program of soundings be undertaken with certain key countries. The important question, of course, was how to lay out the steps in the most effective way. Mr. Dean thought that the sounding-out process might well take the following countries, in order: France, West Germany, Belgium, Holland, Spain; then certain key Latin American countries and certain countries in the Far East, Southeast Asia and Africa. As regards Latin America, he believed that if some crack could be made in the united CEP front (Chile is particularly anxious to break away from the 1952 Declaration), he thought the chance of carrying Latin American support would be greatly enhanced. He mentioned that the Latin American countries were very much pleased with the provisions of the final Canadian-US proposal at Geneva which provided machinery for adjudication of

---

<sup>2</sup> Documentation on the Eisenhower-*De Gaulle* understanding is scheduled for publication in volume VII.

preferential rights beyond 12 miles. He thought this aspect of the proposal would go a long way to bring the Latin American countries along.

The meeting concluded on the following suggestions of the Acting Secretary: 1) that the Navy review the situation once again (in Admiral Burke's absence Admiral Lee would come up with the Navy point of view), 2) that we hold off sounding out the French until we had a better idea of what we would do next, and 3) that Navy should, in addition to making its current assessment of the number of countries likely to be interested, suggest the sequence in which countries would be sounded out. Pending the results of the Navy resurvey, no further action should be taken at this time.

---

**433. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Interior (Seaton)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 16, 1960.*

DEAR FRED: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of May 31, 1960<sup>2</sup> regarding the problems confronting the United States fishing industry following the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

We are certainly agreed on the dangers to our national interests arising from the failure of the 1960 Geneva Conference. We are also aware of the difficulties caused by the efforts of others to turn to their advantage the fishery proposals supported by the United States at that Conference. We are considering ways in which these problems can be minimized.

As you mention, we have been approached by other Governments regarding the possibilities of United States support for multilateral conventions which would include the fishery provisions of the United States-Canadian proposal at Geneva. Our response has been that our support at Geneva for these provisions was given only in connection with their relationships to international agreement on a narrow territorial sea and that we would not consider participating in conventions which would include these provisions in dealing solely with fisheries matters.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/5-3160. Drafted by Blow and Herrington on June 14 and cleared with Arneson, Yingling, Rubottom, and Kohler.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

Beyond this, however, it would be difficult to justify our urging other nations to refrain from mutual agreements incorporating such provisions when they consider such agreements would further their own interests—unless, of course, we can suggest and perhaps actively promote another course of action which would be more effective from their point of view and from ours as well. As you know, our Government has a significant political and security interest in encouraging the settlement, on any terms not measurably injurious to United States interests, of certain fisheries disputes that have plagued the NATO alliance.

In the specific case of Mexico, I should like to point out that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Tidelands Oil Case May 31, 1960 raises especially difficult problems. This decision may be interpreted by Mexico as a confirmation of its position on the Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty, which it cites in support of its claim to a nine-mile territorial sea vis-à-vis the United States.

With respect to the seizure by foreign states of United States fishing vessels in high seas areas off the coasts of other countries, we are undertaking a thorough-going study of this problem with a view to the possible development of more effective means for the protection of United States interests. Such a study will take into consideration the entire range of measures which may be available, including the possibility of bilateral arrangements. We will, of course, have to weigh carefully in the study, and in any position arrived at as a result thereof, the whole range of our international political and economic relations both on a world-wide basis and with individual countries.

I appreciate the frank expression of your views. As our consideration of these problems continues, we shall certainly hope to have the advice of members of your Department.

With best wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Douglas Dillon**<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



**434. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Assistant for Law of the Sea Matters (Arneson) to the Acting Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 8, 1960.*

**SUBJECT**

Law of the Sea: Multilateral Convention and Alternative Possibilities

As promised by Admiral Burke in his meeting with you on June 16, 1960 (Tab A<sup>2</sup>), the Navy has considered again the possibilities of a multilateral convention from the security point of view. The results of this re-examination are embodied in a letter from Admiral Lee to you dated June 30, 1960 (Tab B). Navy estimates that no more than 32 countries would be interested in signing such a convention; 14 are considered doubtful, and 41 of those present at Geneva would not be expected to sign (see Tab C for a comparison of the Navy's estimate, the estimate of U/LS, and that of Mr. Arthur Dean). Accordingly, Navy does not favor the project.

U/LS's estimate is of the same general order as Navy's; however, we do boost the total from 32 to 36 of those likely to sign initially with several more likely to sign at a later date. Mr. Dean is considerably more optimistic than either Navy or U/LS. His total of early signers plus those who might sign later comes to 62. (See Tab D for Mr. Dean's commentary on the Navy estimate with reasons why he thinks certain countries would sign. See also Tab E on the same subject.) I believe this estimate to be unrealistically high, based somewhat, I fear, but understandably, on a carry-over of Conference psychology developed at Geneva.

Meanwhile, both the British and the Canadians continue to press us to support a multilateral convention, at least in principle, and to join them in making a canvass of possible interest. In order to relieve the pressure from these quarters but more particularly to help satisfy ourselves that the project would not gain the necessary support, it is suggested that discreet high-level soundings be taken with France. Such approach should be completely frank, indicating our doubts as to the desirability of the convention, the interest shown by the UK and Canada, and our desire for a frank expression of view from the French Government, as well as an objective appraisal from them as to the number of countries which might be interested. The approach should stress that the United States is not committed to support of the idea but that the French view would weigh heavily in our calculations.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/7-860. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Arneson and cleared by Hager and EUR.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 432. Tabs B-F are not printed.

Without prejudging the outcome of such an approach, it might be observed that the UK has already had some preliminary indications that France would not, in fact, be interested in supporting a multilateral convention (Tab F).

While Admiral Burke expressed some concern at the meeting on June 16 that taking soundings with even the French might be disadvantageous, I have now been informed that Navy would not object to such an approach provided it were done circumspectly, preferably with Couve de Murville himself. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Navy list of 32 prospective signers includes both France and Belgium. I believe Navy is mistaken in both cases. In any event, the way to find out is to approach the French in the first instance, leaving aside for the present whether any further soundings should be taken until the French reaction is known. If, contrary to expectations, the French indicate support for the idea, we might consider whether further soundings should then be taken within NATO.

*Recommendations:*<sup>3</sup>

1) That, after informing the UK and Canada of our intention to do so, you authorize Ambassador Houghton to discuss frankly with Couve de Murville the idea of a multilateral convention and determine whether France would be willing to support it, as well as the French estimate of the number of countries likely to be interested; and

2) That, with the tacit support already given by the Navy to the above approach, no further clearance be sought at this time on the ground that the sounding is without commitment and does not involve policy considerations.

*For Your Information Only:*

One further item: Navy is seriously examining other territorial sea formulas that might be of net advantage to the national security. [1 sentence (4 lines of source text) not declassified] A preliminary estimate of the Navy staff is that this sort of formula would be to the net security advantage of the United States and the free world and would be supported by at least 60 countries. Thus far, no consideration has been given to the fisheries provisions (if any) of such a proposal, but presumably one might consider a ten-year phase-out period for fishery rights on the lines of the Canadian-US proposal at Geneva. While it is premature to say what fate this formula or any other may have as it is staffed out, I thought you would be interested in knowing how thinking is going at the moment in the Navy.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dillon initialed his approval of both recommendations on July 9.

435. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Paris, July 23, 1960—1 p.m.*

363. From Dillon. Law of the Sea. In private meeting with Couve I raised law of the sea problem in accordance U/LS memo July 8.<sup>2</sup> Couve said this was new idea and France had been thinking of fishery convention to cover Atlantic area so as to solve this particular problem. He said that in North Atlantic Fishery Convention France would be prepared to accept something along lines of Canadian-US proposal. He said France would also wish to have a separate fishery convention for the North Sea and the channel which would allow continuance of the present fishing rights for sole and lobster off coast of England. Couve also said he doubted strategic value of going ahead with treaty since countries in whose waters we would be primarily interested in time of emergency would in all probability not sign up. He fully agreed that situation would get progressively worse as new countries came into being.

I gather from this that France would be prepared to sign treaty embodying Canadian-US proposal but only on consideration that there be a prior and satisfactory agreement with UK regarding North Sea and channel fishing rights. I assume this would also be Belgian position. When I reported this to Amory<sup>3</sup> he said he was not prepared to talk with Couve and in any event had no intention of giving away part of North Sea. Gore-Booth<sup>4</sup> who arrived later told us he was instructed to follow this matter and we are passing this information on to him and suggesting he follow up with French.

Until progress is made on bilateral Franco-British problem I see no possibility of further progress on treaty.

**Houghton**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/7-2360. Confidential. Repeated to London and Ottawa.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Derick H. Amory, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.

<sup>4</sup> Paul H. Gore-Booth, British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

436. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel,  
New York, September 20, 1960, 12-1 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SecDel/MC/6

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

Secretary Herter

Livingston T. Merchant

Foy D. Kohler

*Canada*

Howard Green, Minister of External  
Affairs

Arnold Heeney, Ambassador of  
Canada, Washington

SUBJECT

U.S.-Canadian Relations

[Here follows a general discussion of U.S.-Canadian relations.]

Mr. Green then went on to say that the Canadians were worried about the U.S. position on the law-of-the-sea. They did not understand why, after we had worked out a joint position with the Canadians, we now objected to conducting a canvas with a view to the conclusion of a convention embodying this position. The Secretary said that we had no objection to a Canadian canvass of views but that we were not willing to join in lobbying for a convention after the failure of the joint proposals in the recent conference. Mr. Merchant elaborated that our view was that a "bob-tail" convention would be so partial in nature that it would just firm up positions in opposition and not result in the establishment of any real international agreement on the subject of the law-of-the-sea. We felt in this situation that it was better to have no convention at all. Mr. Green said that the Canadians felt it was not realistic to try to hold to the three-mile limit. The Secretary then commented on the strength of the fisheries lobbies in the U.S. They had an emotional approach and were powerful out of all proportion to their value to the overall economy. Mr. Green repeated that he thought that all the principal maritime countries would sign up if the U.S. joined in the effort to obtain a convention, and the discussion of this subject terminated on that note. As the meeting ended, the Secretary expressed his appreciation for the frank exchange of views and said that he would be interested in having further discussions any time this week at the convenience of Mr. Green.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 599, CF 1766. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler and approved by S on September 23. Herter was in New York for the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

## OUTER SPACE

### 437. Memorandum of Discussion at the 357th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 6, 1958<sup>1</sup>

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2. For item 1 on Antarctica, see Document 268. Item 2 was an oral briefing by Allen Dulles on "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

#### 3. *U.S. Objectives in Space Exploration and Science* (NSC Action No. 1859<sup>2</sup>)

General Cutler introduced Dr. Killian, who stated initially that the reports to be given by himself, Dr. Purcell and Dr. York were in the nature of informal reports and would not contain specific recommendations. Next, Dr. Killian undertook to explain the main motives behind the development of space technology and space exploration. These he listed as, first, natural human curiosity about the nature of the universe; secondly, military considerations; third, U.S. prestige vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and other countries; and fourth, scientific observation and experiment. Space travel, thought Dr. Killian, may or may not have material and practical values, but the space programs that would be discussed at this time must, all of them, be based on the above-mentioned four motivating factors.

Dr. Killian then indicated that various programs of differing size, shape and cost would be presented to the Council in order to provide the basis for a subsequent choice of a U.S. national outer space program. Dr. Killian, in this context, pointed out the need for a balanced outer space program—one which would take into due account the other great national security programs, inasmuch as any effective outer space program was bound to prove very costly.

Thereafter Dr. Killian called on Dr. Purcell, who discussed with the Council his views on space science and the objectives of space science. At the end of his discussion, these objectives were summarized on a chart which was divided into three time-periods: Early (first

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on March 7.

<sup>2</sup> Dated February 6 and approved by the President on the following day, it noted that Killian would submit his recommendations on a U.S. space program to the Council early in March. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

years), Later (two to five years), and Still Later (five to fifteen years). Dr. Purcell concluded his remarks with comments on the military application of space exploration. He listed on a chart (1) communications; (2) reconnaissance (optical, radio, infrared); (3) early warning; (4) meteorological.

At the conclusion of Dr. Purcell's remarks, the President inquired whether Dr. Purcell thought it would be a good idea if there could be more public education with respect to the matters in his report. The general view seemed to be in the affirmative.

The President then inquired of Dr. Purcell whether the distant planets of which he had spoken rotated on their own axis as did our earth. Dr. Purcell replied that most of them did, but that there were some we could hardly see and could not determine whether they rotated or not.

Dr. Killian next introduced Dr. York, who, he indicated, would discuss various illustrative space science programs designed to achieve the objectives of space science which had just been outlined by Dr. Purcell.

Dr. York spoke first, using a chart, of the vehicles which would be used in the exploration of outer space. The first usable vehicles would be the IRBMs—Jupiter and Thor—with added stages. Such vehicles would be available late in 1958 or early in 1959. They would eventually be able to carry a pay-load (instrumentation, etc.) weighing 500 pounds.

Later on in the process, Dr. York indicated that ICBM vehicles would become available for space exploration. Either Titan or Atlas could be used, perhaps in 1961, with a third stage added to them. The pay-load carried by these vehicles would be much larger than that which the IRBMs could carry. The pay-load for an earth satellite could be as large as 6500 pounds if fluorine were used for fueling, or 3800 pounds if the ICBM were fueled with liquid oxygen (lox). For a moon-hit or a Mars-hit, a pay-load of 2150 pounds with fluorine and 1000 pounds with lox could be carried.

Dr. York cautioned that even an ICBM vehicle was not sufficiently powerful to get a man to the moon. To do this we would have to construct a very large new rocket with a weight of 1.5 million pounds gross. He estimated the cost of developing such a new rocket as lying somewhere between \$500 million and \$1 billion.

After describing the various sample or illustrative space science and exploration programs, Dr. York turned to the subject of the approximate costs of such programs. The cost of any effective space exploration program would begin at \$275 million a year, and would be likely to reach a cost of \$650 million a year by 1965. Such figures, moreover, said Dr. York, were minimal.

Dr. York pointed out that a probing of the planet Mars, which might be achieved by the United States in 1962, would probably be the first achievement we could count on doing before the Russians, because they were so far ahead of us in big boosters.

The final section of Dr. York's report dealt with the possible effects to be achieved by exploiting [*exploding?*] very large megaton bombs at various heights above the earth's atmosphere. If sufficiently powerful, such explorations [*explosions?*], he believed, could inhibit all space travel, including intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In bringing the report to a close, Dr. Killian, followed by Secretary Quarles, stressed the security aspects of the information which had been provided for the Council, most particularly with respect to the final portion of Dr. York's presentation. Dr. Killian also indicated that time would not permit him to go on with a discussion of the organizational aspects of a U.S. program for space science and exploration. This subject would be discussed by Dr. Killian at a subsequent Council meeting.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Noted and discussed a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, assisted by Drs. Edward Purcell and Herbert York of the President's Science Advisory Committee, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1859-b, on U.S. objectives in space exploration and science, and examples of possible programs designed to achieve these objectives.

b. Noted that the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology would make a subsequent report to the Council on the organizational aspects involved in pursuing U.S. objectives in space exploration and science.

*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

**S. Everett Gleason**

**438. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, March 20, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

## SUBJECT

Outer Space

## PARTICIPANTS

Sir Leslie Munro, Ambassador, New Zealand  
Mr. H. P. Jeffery, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Walmsley, IO  
Mr. Becker, L  
Mr. Spiers, S/AE

Sir Leslie called at his request to discuss the problem of control of outer space. He noted that he had been making public statements on this subject which he did not believe were inconsistent with the position of the United States, referring in this connection particularly to the Secretary's National Press Club speech and to President Eisenhower's letter of January 12 to Bulganin.<sup>2</sup> He felt, however, that if he was going to say anything more which would be useful on the matter in his capacity as President of the Twelfth General Assembly, he should understand the main lines of the US Government's views on the subject.

The Under Secretary said that the subject of outer space control was in the forefront of our thinking at the moment. The subject was full of difficulties and uncertainties. Mr. Becker had, for example, been trying to develop a definition of "outer space" and had found nothing but disagreement among legal authorities. The USSR is using the term "cosmic space". An early problem is to get a common understanding of what we are talking about.

Sir Leslie said that the approach taken by John Cooper<sup>3</sup> that the area above the lowest altitude at which an object can be put into orbit should be subject to international control commended itself to him. Aside from the problem of control of missiles, there was a possibility of a measure of agreement issuing from this approach. He recalled that he had in January proposed the convening of an international conference to consider the matter. This suggestion might not appeal to the United States, but he believed that outer space would inevitably be a major subject of discussion at the next General Assembly. (He noted parenthetically that no one he had talked to wanted a special session

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/3-2058. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Spiers and approved by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> For texts of Dulles' speech, January 16, and Eisenhower's letter, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 713-730.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.



of the Assembly for this purpose.) He felt that steps should be taken to ensure that the West has firm ideas before October. Too often we are unready with definite proposals, much to our disadvantage. He felt a personal responsibility to maintain a momentum and keep the issue active, and hoped to receive sympathetic support from the United States.

The Under Secretary reviewed the past US proposals for peaceful use of outer space, and affirmed that this was our continuing objective. The question of the relationship of outer space cooperation to control of missiles and the general problem of disarmament was a difficult one. The Soviets' linking of this matter with withdrawal of US forces from bases abroad demonstrated that the issue of separability was a real one. He agreed with Sir Leslie's observation that it was incumbent upon us to urge the USSR to separate these two aspects of their proposal.

Mr. Becker stated, as a personal view, that we should separate the problem of control of orbiting objects from the broader question of disarmament. He saw as a possibly useful precedent the approach developed by Ambassador Daniels in connection with the Antarctic. This problem was being handled outside the United Nations framework, away from the veto. Following this approach, the nations having a capability of launching an orbiting object could agree to forego military uses of these objects, holding the information gained from them in trust for the nations of the world.

Sir Leslie pointed out that an effort established on this basis could be related to the UN system without running into the veto problem, mentioning the IAEA as a successful example. An international organization or group could, he suggested, develop a system of advance notification and registration of orbiting flights.

The Under Secretary said that we were devoting considerable thought to a range of alternative ways of dealing with outer space control and cooperation. We were trying to get the best possible scientific advice available to us before we decided on a specific program.

Sir Leslie emphasized the need to treat the problem with urgency so that technical developments did not outdistance our capacity to deal with them politically. He hoped that he would be able to keep in touch with the Department so that his activities would be, insofar as possible, consistent with our views. He reiterated that the 13th General Assembly would be upon us before we knew it, and that we must soon know where we are going. If our proposal was to be a limited one—for example, dealing only with orbiting objects—it might be wise to consider convening an international conference before this next Assembly, where we would have less control over the direction the discussions might take.

Mr. Becker observed that the problem of classification might make it difficult to deal meaningfully with outer space control at an unrestricted international conference. Private negotiations might allow more progress to be made.

Sir Leslie expressed his appreciation for this opportunity to canvass the subject. He stressed, in closing, that there was a great sense of confusion about what to do about this problem. People were groping for answers and ideas. The only certainty was that the issue would be debated in public with increasing vigor. The USSR had captured the initiative with its new proposal:<sup>4</sup> its request for a new agenda item on outer space, together with the text of its proposal, had been circulated to every member of the United Nations as an official document. The Western powers must be prepared to move soon with new and specific ideas. He was ready to help in floating any suggestions which may merit attention, and would be prepared to discuss the matter with Mr. Herter before taking any independent action.

---

<sup>4</sup> For text of the Soviet memorandum to the U.N. Secretary-General, March 15, on cosmic space, see U.N. doc. A/3818.

---

#### 439. Editorial Note

On May 14, Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, testified before the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics concerning U.S. policy on space. After stressing that the immediate need was to insure the peaceful use of outer space, Becker then discussed international cooperation and international law. He concluded by stating that the United States would "make every effort to insure that the keynote of space internationally is peace and cooperation rather than strife." For the full text of Becker's testimony, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1958, pages 962-967.

On August 26, in an address before the 81st Convention of the American Bar Association, Becker discussed further U.S. policy with regard to outer space, stating:

"From the viewpoint of the United States proposed solutions must reflect our policy aims to develop systems of institutional adjustment conducive to long-range objectives. These objectives include the demilitarization of space and its devotion to peaceful purposes, the encouragement of scientific research and the rapid achievement of practical benefits from such science to increase human welfare, and the encouragement of international cooperation and institutions of world community."

For full text of his address, see *ibid.*, September 15, 1958, pages 416-420.

---

**440. Memorandum of Discussion at the 371st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 3, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, a brief discussion of Korea.]

**2. U.S. Policy on Outer Space (NSC 5814; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 2, 1958<sup>2</sup>)**

General Cutler briefed the Council in very great detail on the contents of the proposed U.S. Policy on Outer Space (NSC 5814). His briefing included the reading of numerous paragraphs of the policy statement, and he also stressed the differences of view among the agencies, particularly with respect to appropriate objectives for U.S. policy on outer space. He noted that there were other differences of view among the agencies, but suggested that before the conflicts were resolved, the Council should hear the general reactions to the paper. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.<sup>3</sup>)

When General Cutler had finished briefing the Council, the President requested that when the new paper was finally issued, Annex B, entitled "Tentative Schedule of U.S. Vehicle Launchings", should have added to it the department or agency responsible for each of the projects listed in the Tentative Schedule.

General Cutler then called on Dr. Killian, who commenced by expressing his belief that the Planning Board had formulated a magnificent statement of policy on a very difficult and novel subject. It was, nevertheless, a fundamental point which the Council needed to consider—namely, whether it had been wise to include in NSC 5814 policy with respect to ballistic missiles. He and his associates thought it unwise to include ballistic missiles in an outer space policy because such inclusion would create ambiguities. There was, after all, a distinc-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on July 5.

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5814, June 20, is the same in substance as Document 444 with the changes noted below and *infra*; a copy of the July 2 memorandum is in Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5814 Series.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

tion to be made between ballistic missiles and other vehicles in outer space. Thereafter, Dr. Killian read a prepared statement of his views with respect to NSC 5814. (A copy of Dr. Killian's statement is filed in the minutes of the meeting.<sup>4</sup>)

General Cutler said he had at hand answers to the arguments presented by Dr. Killian, but before giving them he felt it would be desirable to hear from other members of the Council their general reaction to the proposed policy on outer space. He then called on Secretary Quarles.

Secretary Quarles said he wanted to join Dr. Killian both in latter's commendation of the Planning Board paper and also in the view that it would be confusing to include ballistic missiles in a general policy on outer space. He noted that this view would also apply to anti-missile missile systems. Ballistic missiles and anti-missile missiles may or may not traverse outer space in the course of their flight.

Secretary Quarles was followed by Secretary Dulles, who also warmly complimented the Planning Board on the quality of their draft statement of policy. He added that he was not a partisan with respect to the issue as to whether or not guidance on ballistic missiles should be included in a U.S. policy on outer space. He would, however, express the opinion that a different degree of urgency existed with respect to ballistic missiles as opposed to other outer space vehicles. Of all portions of the papers, he was most concerned with the statement of objectives as set forth in paragraph 43 of NSC 5814, reading as follows:

"43. The fullest development and exploitation of U.S. outer space capabilities as needed to achieve U.S. scientific, military and political purposes<sup>5</sup> as follows:

"a. A technological capability to meet the requirements of b, c and d below.

"b. A degree of competence and a level of achievement in outer space basic and applied research and exploration which is at least on a par with that of any other nation.

"c. Applications of outer space technology, research and exploration to achieve a military capability in outer space sufficient to assure the over-all superiority of U.S. [outer space]<sup>6</sup> offensive and defensive systems relative to those of the USSR.

"d. Applications of outer space technology, research, and exploration for non-military purposes, which are at least on a par with any other nation.

"e. World recognition of the United States as, at least, the equal of any other nation in over-all outer space activity and as the leading advocate of the peaceful exploitation of outer space.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> Budget proposes to delete "the fullest" and all of the paragraph after "purposes". [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>6</sup> Defense-JCS proposal. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

"[43. The establishment of the United States as the recognized leader in the over-all development and exploitation of outer space for scientific, military and political purposes.]"<sup>7</sup>

This Secretary Dulles believed to be the most controversial portion of the paper. He said that, as written, paragraph 43 seemed to insist on the point of the United States requiring either superiority over or parity with the USSR in all outer space activities. Such an objective would commit us to expenditures and efforts in outer space almost without limit and certainly without a suitable and strictly U.S. criterion for the required capability. Secretary Dulles believed that we should have a capability in outer space adequate for our own U.S. purposes, but not necessarily superior or equal to the capability of any other nation. The criterion of parity with or superiority over any other nation was dangerous, inasmuch as our intelligence information is not sufficient to keep us precisely informed about what our rivals might be doing in terms of outer space activity. In short, such a criterion could lead us down a false trail. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles said he would recommend that paragraph 43 be toned down somewhat to indicate that the United States should have its own adequate program for outer space activities, rather than a program developed in terms of U.S. capabilities in outer space relative to the capabilities in this area of other nations.

Secretary Dulles warned that he was by no means attempting to downgrade other aspects of outer space exploration and exploitation than the aspect of ballistic missiles. He did, however, doubt the wisdom of a policy which committed the United States to ape whatever we imagine any other nation is doing or is going to do in its outer space programs.

The President at first misunderstood the Secretary's view, by indicating that Secretary Dulles apparently agreed with the formulation of paragraph 43 suggested by ODM-NACA-USIA. Secretary Dulles corrected the President by pointing out that in fact he was closer in his sympathies to the wording of paragraph 43 proposed by the Bureau of the Budget.

Dr. Waterman followed Secretary Dulles. He began by complimenting the Planning Board and expressing his agreement with the recommendations of Secretary Quarles and Dr. Killian that the policy guidance on ballistic missiles in NSC 5814 be omitted. He stressed the importance of paragraph 42 as being basic to his own point of view because it pointed out that the potentially great importance to U.S. national interests of outer space activities would require taking risks in allocating resources to research and development activities, the suc-

---

<sup>7</sup>ODM-NACA-USIA alternative paragraph 43. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

cess or ultimate utility of which could not be definitely foreseen. As yet, said Dr. Waterman, we know too little about activities in outer space, and we therefore require flexibility in our programs. Dr. Waterman warned of actual danger to human life on this planet if certain possible activities in outer space were accomplished.

As to the question of whether the United States should have as an objective in outer space superiority over or parity with any other nation, Dr. Waterman pointed out that because the USSR had had such a long head-start in outer space activities, it would require a really determined effort by the United States even to reach parity with the Soviet Union in achievements in outer space.

General Cutler next called on Mr. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, who said that his remarks would be directed largely to support of the proposal submitted by the Bureau of the Budget for paragraph 43. We in the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Stans continued, thought that there were four good reasons in support of the brief text of paragraph 43 proposed by the Budget in NSC 5814. First, over past years we have always designed our national security policies to meet our own national objectives rather than the objective of some other country—that is, we have considered our objectives in terms of the totality of the U.S. national interest.

Secondly, paragraphs 40 and 41 of NSC 5814, which constituted a comparison of U.S. and Soviet outer space activities, as well as Annex A on the Soviet space program, revealed the sheer difficulty of trying to determine what the Soviet outer space program is actually going to consist of. If we set our objectives in terms of superiority over or parity with the Soviet Union, we would find it literally impossible to set up matching programs unless we knew what the Soviets themselves were actually engaged in. The only other alternative would be to spend incredible sums of money to match every program that we could conceive that the Soviets were going to launch in the future.

His third point, said Mr. Stans, really spoke for itself. Paragraph 41 of NSC 5814 indicated the capabilities of the Soviet Union in outer space activities. It also pointed out that no matter what we do, the Soviets will maintain their lead over the United States in outer space activities for at least two years. Accordingly, we could not possibly achieve even parity with them within this time limit.

Fourthly, Mr. Stans said that the Bureau of the Budget believed that if the whole emphasis of our policy on outer space was placed on competition with the USSR in the military aspects of outer space activity, all the programs for the peaceful use of outer space would tend to suffer.

For all these reasons the Bureau of the Budget believed that its brief and general statement of U.S. objectives in outer space was preferable to the more limiting terms suggested by the various other

agencies. It was Mr. Stans' inclination to support Dr. Killian's proposal for eliminating policy guidance on ballistic missiles, and he further suggested that NSC 5814 be returned to the Planning Board for revision in the light of the Council discussion.

At this point, Dr. Killian made it clear that in suggesting the omission of policy guidance on ballistic missiles in a revision of NSC 5814, he was by no means recommending that the revision exclude any military activities in outer space other than ballistic missile activities. Secretary McElroy commented that he was glad to hear this expression of Dr. Killian's viewpoint, with which he heartily agreed.

General Cutler warmly defended the Planning Board's action in including in NSC 5814 policy guidance with respect to ballistic missiles. In this defense he pointed out the virtual impossibility of making a meaningful distinction between the military uses of outer space and the peaceful uses of outer space. The President reminded General Cutler that Dr. Killian wanted to exclude only ICBM activities and not other military uses of outer space.

General Cutler went on in his defense of the inclusion of ballistic missiles by pointing out that the Planning Board had apparently been much more moved than the gentlemen around the Council table by the effect on the world of the launching of the Sputnik. Accordingly, the Planning Board had sought to promote a sense of urgency so that the United States would catch up with the USSR as rapidly as possible. He drew an analogy with the history of the development of the thermonuclear bomb. In any case, he said, for these reasons the Planning Board had felt that the policy statement on outer space should be all-inclusive. If one were fearful that ballistic missiles might lose their primacy and their high priority (which General Cutler said he certainly didn't want to see happen), it would only be necessary to strengthen the language of paragraph 50, which was put into NSC 5814 to indicate that primary emphasis should be placed on activities related to outer space necessary to maintain the over-all deterrent capability of the United States and the Free World. He also called attention, in this connection, to NSC Action No. 1846, establishing "Priorities for Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Programs", copies of which Action had been passed out to the Council members. (A copy of NSC Action No. 1846 is attached to this memorandum.<sup>8</sup>)

Despite the strength of his views, General Cutler conceded that the President's advisers on the Council believed that we should adopt Mr. Stans' proposal that NSC 5814 be referred back to the Planning Board for revision. If this were adopted, however, General Cutler hoped that we would have very precise recommendations for amending NSC 5814 from the Department of Defense and from Dr. Killian.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

In closing his remarks, General Cutler said he thought that the Secretary of State had not fully apprehended the majority Planning Board view as to the objectives set forth in paragraph 43. The majority view in the Planning Board called for a U.S. military capability which should be superior in the *over-all* to the over-all military capability of the Soviet Union. The majority Planning Board view did not require the United States to be superior to the Soviet Union specifically in outer space military capabilities. He very much hoped, said General Cutler, that the maintenance of over-all military superiority over the USSR would continue to be a basic U.S. national security policy.

The President said that in spite of General Cutler's long and eloquent defense of the inclusion of policy guidance on ballistic missiles in NSC 5814, there was a real difference between missiles shot from the earth to another target elsewhere on the earth, and vehicles that are launched into outer space and remain there. The President thought we could and should differentiate policy guidance on these two classes of outer space vehicles. General Cutler repeated the view that military and peaceful outer space vehicles were inextricably involved with each other, citing as examples the reconnaissance satellites and propulsion systems. Unconvinced, the President said he still made a distinction between ballistic missiles and other outer space vehicles.

General Cutler, turning to the Secretary of State, asked him whether he still felt that the Budget proposal for the statement of objectives in paragraph 43 was the most desirable statement. Secretary Dulles replied that he would combine the Budget statement with certain parts of the statement proposed by ODM-NASA-USIA, and read the following text of paragraph 43 based on such a combination:

"Development and exploitation of U.S. outer space capabilities as needed to achieve U.S. scientific, military and political purposes, and to establish the United States as a recognized leader in this field."

Secretary Dulles' proposal met with general agreement, and Dr. Killian and Secretary Quarles indicated that they would provide the needed amendments to NSC 5814 as a result of the deletion of the policy guidance on ballistic missiles.

Secretary Quarles said that there was one point that he wanted to labor a little. There were, he said, practicable ballistic paths which would not go higher than 100 miles from the earth's surface. Accordingly, we must not let ourselves be trapped into the feeling that all ballistic missiles must necessarily traverse outer space.

Secretary Dulles said that with respect to the legal aspects of the outer space policy set forth in NSC 5814, he would like authority to go ahead and begin to develop some of the suggestions set forth in the report.



*The National Security Council:*

a. Discussed the draft statement of U.S. Policy on Outer Space contained in NSC 5814; in the light of the views of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 2, 1958.

b. Tentatively adopted the following statement as the first paragraph under "Objectives", in lieu of any of the alternative versions of paragraph 43 of NSC 5814:

"Development and exploitation of U.S. outer space capabilities as needed to achieve U.S. scientific, military and political purposes, and to establish the United States as a recognized leader in this field."

c. Agreed that NSC 5814 should be referred back to the NSC Planning Board for revision to eliminate from the paper statements of U.S. policy on ballistic missiles and anti-missile missile defense weapons systems.

d. Requested the Department of Defense and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology to transmit, for consideration by the NSC Planning Board on July 15, 1958, proposed specific amendments in NSC 5814 designed to carry out c above.

e. Noted a statement by the Secretary of State that the Legal Adviser of the Department of State would be an appropriate Chairman for the group to make the study called for in paragraph 59 of NSC 5814.

f. Noted the President's request that Annex B to NSC 5814 be revised to indicate the agency responsible for each of the projects listed therein.

*Note:* The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items concerning satellites, significant events affecting U.S. security, implications of cost trends, and U.S. economic defense policy.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

**441. Memorandum of Discussion at the 376th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 14, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1 concerning Canada.]

2. *Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space* (NSC Action No. 1846; NSC 5814; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 2 and August 4 and 12, 1958; NSC Actions Nos. 1940 and 1956<sup>2</sup>)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council, explaining the nature of the revisions in NSC 5814 which had been made by the Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1940-c. He described at length the point made by the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the revised statement of policy did not reflect the proper balance between military and non-military interests in outer space. The Chiefs wished to indicate the relative priority between military and non-military activities in outer space, and for this purpose wished to include a revision of the bracketed paragraph 50 on page 12 of NSC 5814. At this point Mr. Gray indicated that Secretary McElroy had suggested a further slight change in the language proposed by the Joint Chiefs for the revision of paragraph 50. He distributed a new version of paragraph 50, reading as follows:

"In the absence of a safeguarded international agreement for the control of armaments and armed forces, activities related to outer space necessary to maintain the over-all deterrent capability of the United States and the Free World will receive priority."

Contrary to the views of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Gray pointed out the majority view of the Planning Board that no paragraph 50 was really necessary in the light of the footnote to the subheading "Priority and Scope of Outer Space Effort", reading as follows:

"Nothing in this paper shall be construed as affecting priorities established under NSC Action No. 1846 (Priorities for Certain Missile and Related Programs) or future priorities approved by the President."

(A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.<sup>3</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on August 15.

<sup>2</sup> NSC Action Nos. 1846, 1940, and 1956, dated January 22, July 3, and July 31, respectively, are in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95; copies of the three memoranda are *ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 1814 Series.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

When Mr. Gray had completed his briefing, he called on Secretary McElroy, who said that he had very little to add to Mr. Gray's very fair exposition of the views of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. In answer to the aforementioned argument of the majority of the Planning Board, Secretary McElroy expressed the opinion that a basic national security policy such as NSC 5814 should be complete in itself and not be dependent for an understanding of its contents on other papers or NSC actions. Asked for his comments, General Twining said that he had nothing to add to those just made by Secretary McElroy.

The President observed that as we became involved in the business of setting up our space agency and facing the problems of outer space, we could not initially always state our propositions as clearly as we should like, because so much of the problem of outer space was new and vague. Initially, however, the President felt that we should put, so far as possible, all space projects under the space agency.<sup>4</sup> Clearly, not all of these space projects were going to turn out to have military implications, at least at the outset. The space agency must prove the military practicability or feasibility of a given space project or activity before the Defense Department takes over such a project or activity. Secretary McElroy expressed doubt that the agencies of the Defense Department would be willing to wait until the space agency proved that a given project had clear military potentialities before undertaking to develop such potentialities themselves.

The President said that nevertheless he still doubted the value of trying to make clear distinctions in language in the matter of what the priorities in space activity ought to be. He stated that once a space project or activity is known to have a military use or value, such a project or activity should be given a very high priority. But again, said the President, not every activity in outer space is going to turn out to have military use.

Secretary McElroy undertook to summarize the position of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs, by saying that their objective was simply to try to stake out an important military interest in outer space. Certainly the Defense Department didn't want to proscribe any space activity by virtue of its suggestions for revising the policy statement.

The President replied that he couldn't at this time help but look upon these initial activities in outer space as we used to look at wild-cattin in oil in a former day. Certainly he wanted to avoid unnecessary duplication and the useless spending of millions of dollars in outer space activities. Secretary McElroy replied by pointing out to the President that all the proposed activities in outer space were now

---

<sup>4</sup> For text of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, July 29, 1958, which established the National Aeronautics and Space Council, see 72 Stat. 426.

centered in the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). It was ARPA which designated which of the military services was to carry out which project.

Dr. Killian inquired whether paragraph 47 of NSC 5814 ("Priority and Scope of Outer Space Effort") did not adequately cover the military activities in outer space about which Secretary McElroy was so concerned. Dr. Killian expressed the opinion that this paragraph safeguarded appropriate military priorities. He added that he did not like either the older version of paragraph 50 proposed by the JCS, or Secretary McElroy's new version of paragraph 50 which had been handed out at the meeting. He felt that the adoption of either version of paragraph 50 might put a stop to very important scientific space activities. Beyond this, Dr. Killian insisted that so new was the problem that we were not yet in a position to identify which space activities actually contributed to the maintenance of our over-all deterrent capability.

After hearing Dr. Killian, the President counselled that the problem should be left alone for the moment, until we could see what would happen in the future. The policy statement could be changed if it were later found to be necessary. Secretary McElroy concurred in this judgment by the President, but General Twining spoke up to re-emphasize the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the contents of paragraph 50. They felt that such a paragraph was vital, and that many of our scientists were not really in sympathy with the military objectives in the exploration and exploitation of outer space. To General Twining's argument the President replied that if we hoped to obtain the advantages which can be provided to us by our U.S. scientists, we must go to them and not to the military. Dr. Killian added the remark that fifty percent of our American scientists were now working in one way or another for the military services.

The President once again stated his belief that the Council should go slow on issuing directives and trying to stake out a clear system of priorities in outer space programs. Secretary McElroy concurred, and added that if Defense felt that the problem of military priorities in outer space activities needed subsequent reconsideration, Defense would simply come back to the NSC and present the problem.

At this point, Mr. Gray raised the question as to what agency should be charged with the coordination of NSC 5814, suggesting his own view and that of the Bureau of the Budget that the Operations Coordinating Board should be charged with this responsibility. There was no dissent from this proposal.

Mr. Gray then said that he understood that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget wished to make certain comments about the space paper before the Council completed its consideration of NSC 5814. Mr. Stans observed that although the Bureau of the Budget had

now withdrawn a previous split of views which it had sponsored, and while the Bureau agreed in general with the policy set forth in the present paper, he did feel that the first six paragraphs of NSC 5814 greatly overstated the case for outer space exploration. Inclusion of these six paragraphs deprived the paper of a proper perspective, and Mr. Stans cited various sentences to illustrate his point. He then went on to say that the only danger in these six paragraphs lay in the possibility that Government officials who worked in this area would take their cue from this flamboyant language. This conceivably could call for programs and expenditures on outer space beyond all reason.

The President commented that he certainly saw no need to introduce purple prose in any national security policy paper. When Mr. Gray pointed out that Mr. Stans had withdrawn any specific objections to the paper, the President reiterated his agreement with Mr. Stans that purple prose had no place in any NSC paper.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Discussed the draft revisions of NSC 5814, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1940-c and on the basis of recommendations by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 4, 1958; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the referenced memorandum of August 12, 1958, and of the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the light of a revision of paragraph 50 distributed at the meeting.

b. Adopted the revisions of NSC 5814, subject to the deletion of paragraph 50.

c. Noted the comments of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, with respect to what he described as the overstatements in the introductory paragraph 1-6 of NSC 5814.

*Note:* NSC 5814, as amended and adopted, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5814/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President, with the understanding that the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will be invited to participate with the Board on this subject.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

**442. National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>**

NSC 5814/1

*Washington, August 18, 1958.***STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY U.S. POLICY ON OUTER SPACE****Introductory Note**

The USSR has surpassed the United States and the Free World in scientific and technological accomplishments in outer space, which have captured the imagination and admiration of the world. The USSR, if it maintains its present superiority in the exploitation of outer space, will be able to use that superiority as a means of undermining the prestige and leadership of the United States and of threatening U.S. security.

This statement is concerned with U.S. interests in outer space activities, including their international aspects. The policy deals with artificial earth satellites (including reconnaissance satellites), lunar and interplanetary vehicles, and other vehicles and objects whose activities relate to the utilization and exploration of outer space and the psychological impact thereof. Although the technological relation between such space vehicles and ballistic missiles is recognized, U.S. policy on ballistic missiles is not covered in this policy statement and anti-missile missile defense weapons systems are also not so covered.

This statement is designated "preliminary" because man's understanding of the full implications of outer space is only in its preliminary stages. As man develops a fuller understanding of the new dimensions of outer space, it is probable that the long-term results of exploration and exploitation will basically affect international and national, political and social institutions.

**General Considerations****Introduction***Significance of Outer Space to U.S. Security*

1. More than by any other imaginative concept, the mind of man is aroused by the thought of exploring the mysteries of outer space.
2. Through such exploration, man hopes to broaden his horizons, add to his knowledge, and improve his way of living on earth. Already, man is sure that through further exploration he can obtain

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret. A cover sheet; a memorandum of transmittal, dated August 18, which noted that the President had approved NSC 5814/1 on that day; a table of contents; and Annex B, entitled "Tentative Schedule of U.S. Vehicle Launchings, as of June 30, 1958," are not printed.

certain scientific and military values. It is reasonable for man to believe that there must be, beyond these areas, different and great values still to be discovered.

3. The technical ability to explore outer space has deep psychological implications over and above the stimulation provided by the opportunity to explore the unknown. With its hint of the possibility of the discovery of fundamental truths concerning man, the earth, the solar system, and the universe, space exploration has an appeal to deep insights within man which transcend his earthbound concerns. The manner in which outer space is explored and the uses to which it is put thus take on an unusual and peculiar significance.

4. The beginning stages of man's conquest of space have been focused on technology and have been characterized by national competition. The result has been a tendency to equate achievement in outer space with leadership in science, military capability, industrial technology, and with leadership in general.

5. The initial and subsequent successes by the USSR in launching large earth satellites have profoundly affected the belief of peoples, both in the United States and abroad, in the superiority of U.S. leadership in science and military capability. This psychological reaction of sophisticated and unsophisticated peoples everywhere affects U.S. relations with its allies, with the Communist Bloc, and with neutral and uncommitted nations.

6. In this situation of national competition and initial successes by the USSR, further demonstrations by the USSR of continuing leadership in outer space capabilities might, in the absence of comparable U.S. achievements in this field,<sup>2</sup> dangerously impair the confidence of these peoples in U.S. over-all leadership. To be strong and bold in space technology will enhance the prestige of the United States among the peoples of the world and create added confidence in U.S. scientific, technological, industrial and military strength.

7. The novel nature of space exploitation offers opportunities for international cooperation in its peaceful aspects. It is likely that certain nations may be willing to enter into cooperative arrangements with the United States. The willingness of the Soviets to cooperate remains to be determined. The fact that the results of cooperation in certain fields, even though entered into for peaceful purposes, could have military application, may condition the extent of such cooperation in those fields.

---

<sup>2</sup> Communist China has announced, furthermore, an intention of proceeding to launch its own earth satellite in the near future. Such a development, which could only result from USSR assistance, would tend to enhance the prestige of the Chinese Communist regime throughout Asia and among the less-developed countries, and could further undermine the reputation of the West for technological leadership unless the accomplishment were matched by a Free World ally. [Footnote in the source text.]

*Problem of Defining Space*

8. Many names for the various regions of the earth's atmosphere and the divisions of space have developed over the years. The boundaries of these regions and divisions cannot be precisely defined in physical terms, and authorities differ widely on terminology and meaning.

9. The term "air space" has been used to denote the layer of atmosphere surrounding the earth in which military and civilian air vehicles operate. Although national policies and international agreements have dealt extensively with air space and expressly assert the sovereignty of each nation over its air space, the upper limit of air space has not been defined.

*[Paragraphs 10-11 (1 page of source text) not declassified]*

12. Because the question of rights in "outer space" will undoubtedly arise at the UN General Assembly in September 1958, perhaps in international discussions on post-IGY activities, and perhaps in other international negotiations, it would appear desirable for the United States to develop a common understanding of the term "outer space" as related to particular objects and activities therein.

13. For the purposes of this policy statement, space is divided into two regions: "air space" and "outer space". "Outer space" is considered as contiguous to "air space", with the lower limit of "outer space" being the upper limit of "air space".

*Relationship Between Space Vehicles and Missiles*

14. The technology associated with the development of space vehicles and ballistic missiles is similar. In fact, the majority of U.S. presently proposed space vehicles will make use of ballistic missile system components, particularly for propulsion and guidance. As space exploration becomes more extensive, it is probable that the technical requirements of the two programs will tend to diverge. For example, extensive space exploration will require propulsion systems much larger and more powerful than those now in development. Ballistic missiles as they are developed further may or may not require comparably large systems.

## Use of Outer Space

*General*

15. Outer space can be used:

a. By vehicles or other objects that achieve their primary purpose in outer space; such as

(1) Vehicles or objects that remain in an area directly over a nation's own territory, such as sounding rockets;



- (2) Vehicles or objects that orbit the earth;
- (3) Vehicles that traverse outer space enroute to the moon, other planets or the sun;

b. For the transmission of electromagnetic energy for such purposes as communications, radar measurement and electronic counter-measures;

c. By vehicles which traverse outer space, but which achieve their primary purpose upon their return to air space or earth.

16. There are many uses of outer space for peaceful purposes, such as exploration, pure adventure, increase of scientific knowledge, and development and applications of technology. Any use of outer space, however, whatever the purpose it is intended to serve, may have some degree of military or other non-peaceful application. Therefore, U.S. policies relating to international arrangements on uses of outer space for peaceful purposes will have to take into account possible non-peaceful applications in determining the net advantage to U.S. security.

#### *Science and Technology*

17. Outer space technology affords new and unique opportunities for scientific observations and experiments which will add greatly to our knowledge and understanding of the earth, the solar system and the universe. These opportunities exist in many fields, including among others:

a. *Geophysics*: Three-dimensional mapping of the earth's gravity and magnetic field.

b. *Physics*: Cosmic ray measurements above the earth's dense atmosphere and experiments in the theory of relativity.

c. *Meteorology*: World-wide cloud-cover mapping for improved forecasting of weather and measurements of incoming and outgoing heat energy which will allow a better understanding of weather.

d. *Biology*: Possible living organisms in space and the effects on man of prolonged exposure to radiation and weightlessness.

e. *Psychological* response of man to a space environment.

f. *Astronomy*: The universe as seen from beyond the earth's atmosphere and measurement of stellar radiation.

g. *Lunar investigations* including the moon's gravity, mass, magnetic field, atmosphere, surface, core and original state.

h. *Nature of the Planets*.

The foregoing studies would be conducted by means of sounding rockets, earth satellites, lunar vehicles, and interplanetary vehicles.

18. Outer space activity and scientific research would have both military and non-military applications. Examples are satellites as navigational aids; and satellites as relay stations to receive and relay television or radio signals and improve world-wide communications.

19. It is not possible to foresee all applications of outer space activity which may be developed, but our ability to achieve and maintain leadership in such applications will largely depend on the breadth of the scientific research which is undertaken and supported.

### *Military*

20. There are important present and foreseeable military uses for outer space vehicles and also speculative military uses. The military uses of outer space vehicles (some of which have peaceful applications) may be divided into the following three general categories:

#### *a. Now Planned or in Immediate Prospect*

(1) *Military Reconnaissance.* (See "Reconnaissance Satellites" section, paragraphs 21-24)

#### *b. Feasible in the Near Future*

(1) *Satellites for Weather Observation.*

(2) *Military Communications Satellites.*

(3) *Satellites for Electronic Counter-measures.*

(4) *Satellites as Aids for Navigation, tracked from the earth's surface visually or by radio.*

#### *c. Future Possibilities*

(1) *Manned Maintenance and Resupply Outer Space Vehicles.*

(2) *Manned Defensive Outer Space Vehicles,* which might capture, destroy or neutralize an enemy outer space vehicle.

(3) *Bombardment Satellites (Manned or Unmanned).* It is conceivable that, in the future, satellites carrying weapons ready for firing on signal might be used for attacking targets on the earth.

(4) *Manned Lunar Stations,* such as military communications relay sites or reconnaissance stations. Conceivably, launching of missiles to the earth from lunar sites would be possible.

### *Reconnaissance Satellites*

21. Reconnaissance satellites are of critical importance to U.S. national security. Those now planned are designed: (a) [4 lines of source text not declassified] Reconnaissance satellites would also have a high potential use as a means of implementing the "open skies" proposal<sup>3</sup> or policing a system of international armaments control.

22. As envisaged in U.S. plans, the instrumentation of reconnaissance satellites would consist primarily of [remainder of paragraph and paragraph 23 (37 lines of source text) not declassified]

<sup>3</sup> For text of the "Open Skies" proposal, July 21, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. v, pp. 450-453.

24. Some political implications of the use of reconnaissance satellites may be adverse. Therefore, studies must be urgently undertaken in order to determine the most favorable political framework in which such satellites would operate.

#### *Manned Exploration of Outer Space*

25. In addition to satisfying man's urge to explore new regions, manned exploration of outer space is of importance to our national security because:

a. Although present studies in outer space can be carried on satisfactorily by using only unmanned vehicles, the time will undoubtedly come when man's judgment and resourcefulness will be required fully to exploit the potentialities of outer space.

b. To the layman, manned exploration will represent the true conquest of outer space. No unmanned experiment can substitute for manned exploration in its psychological effect on the peoples of the world.

c. Discovery and exploration may be required to establish a foundation for the rejection of USSR claims to exclusive sovereignty of other planets which may be visited by nationals of the USSR.

26. The first step in manned outer space travel could be undertaken using rockets and components now under study and development. Travel by man to the moon and beyond will probably require the development of new basic vehicles and equipment.

### Other Implications of Outer Space Activities

#### International Cooperation and Control

##### *General*

27. International cooperation in certain outer space activities appears highly desirable from a scientific, political and psychological standpoint and may appear desirable in selected instances with U.S. allies from the military standpoint. International cooperation agreements in which the United States participates could have the effect of (a) enhancing the position of the United States as a leader in advocating the uses of outer space for peaceful purposes and international cooperation in science, (b) conserving U.S. resources, (c) speeding up outer space achievements by the pooling of talents, (d) "opening up" the Soviet Bloc, and (e) introducing a degree of order and authority in the necessary international regulations governing certain outer space activities.

28. Various types of international cooperation may be possible through existing international scientific organizations, the United Nations, multilateral and bilateral arrangements with Free World nations and NATO, and U.S.-Soviet bilateral arrangements. International co-

operation by the United States in outer space activities might, as consistent with U.S. security interests, include (a) the collection and exchange of information on outer space; (b) the exchange of scientific instrumentation; (c) contacts among scientists; (d) participation of foreign scientists in U.S. space projects; (e) planning and coordination of certain programs or specific projects to be carried out on a fully international basis (some of which might be: a large instrumented scientific satellite, communication satellites, and meteorological satellites); (f) establishment of regulations governing certain outer space activities; (g) provision and launching of scientific satellites in support of international planning of a program of satellite observations.

29. Under present conditions, the extent of international cooperation, particularly in fields having important military applications such as propulsion and guidance mechanisms, will have to take into account security considerations (see paragraphs 7 and 16).

#### *U.S. Position*

30. In January 1957 the United States initiated international discussion of the control of outer space by proposing in the UN General Assembly that the testing of outer space vehicles should be carried out and inspected under international auspices. This proposal was based on a policy decision<sup>4</sup> to seek to assure that, as a part of an armaments control system, the sending of objects into outer space should be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes and that, under effective control, the production of such objects designed for military purposes should be prohibited. It was thought, at the then state of the art, that a control of testing would have precluded development until more comprehensive controls could be agreed upon. The U.S. proposal was altered with the passage of time and, as presented on August 29, 1957 as the Four-Power Proposal in London,<sup>5</sup> calls for technical studies of the "design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes." In his letter of January 13 [12], 1958, to Bulganin,<sup>6</sup> the President proposed, as part of a five-point

<sup>4</sup> With reference to the relation of the use of outer space to an armaments control system, the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553 (November 21, 1956) provides:

"5. It is the purpose of the United States, as part of an armaments control system, to seek to assure that the sending of objects into outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes and that under effective control the production of objects designed for travel in or projection through outer space for military purposes shall be prohibited.

"Therefore, the United States to propose that, contingent upon the establishment of effective inspection to verify the fulfillment of the commitment, all states agree to provide for international inspection of and participation in tests of outer space objects." [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 1316-1323.

<sup>6</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, 1958, pp. 713-721.

program relating to control of armaments and armed forces, that "we agree that outer space be used only for peaceful purposes" and inquired "can we not stop the production of such weapons which would use or more accurately misuse, outer space . . . ?"<sup>7</sup> In his later letter to Bulganin, dated February 15, 1958,<sup>8</sup> the President proposed "wholly eliminating the newest types of weapons which use outer space for human destruction."

31. a. Earlier this year question was raised as to whether it is feasible to devise procedures to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. Initial studies<sup>9</sup> concerning the monitoring of long-range rocket tests have concluded that under the guise of a peaceful space program much of the test information required to develop a ballistic missile system could be obtained, because of the present common technology of space vehicles and ballistic missiles. Further consideration of U.S. policy concerning the scope of control and inspection required to assure that outer space could be used only for peaceful purposes, as well as the relationship of any such control arrangement to other aspects of an arms agreement, is deferred pending the recommendation of the Special NSC Committee established to make preparations for a possible Summit Meeting (NSC Action No. 1983<sup>10</sup>). It is understood that the Special NSC Committee will also consider possible interim and more limited arrangements, and take into account the technical feasibility of assuring that outer space can be used only for peaceful purposes.

b. The most recent statement of basic policy relating to the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments appears in paragraph 40 of NSC 5810/1 (May 5, 1958).<sup>11</sup>

#### *USSR Position*

32. The USSR has proposed an agenda item for the next UN General Assembly meeting calling for the banning of the use of "cosmic space" for military purposes, the elimination of foreign bases on the territories of other countries, and international cooperation in the study of "cosmic space". The Soviets envisage an international agency with the following functions: development and supervision of an international program for launching intercontinental and space rockets

<sup>7</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

<sup>8</sup> *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 745-750.

<sup>9</sup> Report of the NSC Ad Hoc Working Group on the Monitoring of Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement, March 26, 1958, circulated to Council Members by Memorandum from the Executive Secretary dated March 28, 1958. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>10</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

<sup>11</sup> This paper, "Basic National Security Policy," is scheduled for publication in volume III.

to study "cosmic space"; continuation on a permanent basis of the IGY "cosmic space" research; world-wide collection, exchange and dissemination of "cosmic" research information; and coordination of and assistance to national research programs.

#### *United Nations Role*

33. The Soviet position makes certain that outer space questions, probably including peaceful uses, control, and organization, will be discussed in the UN General Assembly in September, 1958. The rapid pace of outer space achievements in past months has aroused great interest among all UN members concerning the role of the United Nations in the various aspects of outer space. The maintenance of our posture as the leading exponent of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes requires that the United States take in the General Assembly an imaginative and positive position.

#### *Legal Problems of Air Space and Outer Space*

34. *Numerous legal problems* will be posed by the development of activities in space. Many of these cannot be settled until we gain more experience and basic information, because the only foundation for a sound rule of law is a body of ascertained fact. It is altogether likely that some issues in the field of space law which will be practical questions in the future are not even identified today. This is not to say that there is an entire lack of international law applicable to activities in space at the present time. For example, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack. Clearly this right is available against any space activities employed in such an attack.

35. *International Geophysical Year.* From the arrangements and announcements made in connection with the International Geophysical Year, there may be a general implied consent that scientific satellites be launched and orbited during the IGY. Such implied consent does not necessarily mean, however, that assent has been given to the launching and orbiting of other types of satellites or missiles, or that the assent with respect to scientific satellites extends beyond the IGY. It remains to be determined what rules will apply to subsequent satellites; what limitations will govern the types and purposes of satellites in the future. The United States, as well as other countries, has not yet taken positions on these questions and, here again, the answer will depend not only upon what others are likely to do but also upon what activities the United States wishes to be free to engage in.

36. *A problem of jurisdiction in space* on which the United States reserves its position at present is whether celestial bodies in space beyond the earth are susceptible to appropriation by national control or sovereignty.

37. *The problem of legal definitions* is unsolved. As indicated above, there is as yet insufficient basis for legally deciding that air space extends so far and no farther; that outer space begins at a given point above the earth. Because, for some time to come, at least, activities in outer space will be closely connected with activities on the earth and in the air space, many legal problems with respect to space activities may well be resolved without the necessity of determining or agreeing upon a line of demarcation between air space and outer space. If, by analogy to the Antarctic proposal of the United States,<sup>12</sup> international agreement can be reached upon permissible activities in space and the rules and regulations to be followed with respect thereto, problems of sovereignty may be avoided or at least deferred.

38. *Problems of liability* for injury or damage caused by activities in space or by re-entry will also arise. No nation has as yet taken a position as to whether due care against negligence should be the standard or whether liability should be absolute. Here again future experience, and the development of agreement among the nations, will be necessary. Absolute liability as respects objects landing on the United States will have to be weighed against absolute liability for U.S. objects landing on other nations.

39. *Problems of national and international regulation* over activities in space will also arise. There is already the need to assign telecommunication wavelengths to communications with satellites and space objects. Other types of regulations having serious security implications will have to be worked out for the identification of space objects and for some type of traffic control to prevent congestion and interference.

40. *Generally speaking, rules will have to be evolved gradually and pragmatically* from experience. While the nations engaging in space activities will play an important role in this field, it will have to be recognized from the nature of the subject that all nations have a legitimate interest in it. The field is not suitable for abstract a priori codification.

#### Comparison of USSR and U.S. Capabilities in Outer Space Activities

41. Conclusive evidence shows that the Soviets are conducting a well-planned outer space program at high priority. The table below attempts to estimate the U.S. and USSR timetables for accomplishment of specific outer space flight activities.

---

<sup>12</sup> Regarding Antarctica, see Documents 264 ff.

a. Soviet space flight capabilities estimated in the table reflect the earliest possible time periods in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished.

(1) The space flight program is in competition with many other programs, particularly the missile program. The USSR probably cannot successfully accomplish all of the estimated space flight activities within the time periods specified. The USSR will not permit its space flight program to interfere with achieving an early operational capability for ICBM's (which enjoy the highest priority).

(2) The USSR is believed to have the intention to pursue both an active space flight program designed to put man into outer space for military and/or scientific purposes, and further scientific research utilizing earth satellites, lunar rockets, and probes of Mars and Venus; but it cannot be determined, at this time, whether the basic scientific program or the "man in space" program enjoys the higher priority and will, therefore, be pursued first.

b. U.S. space flight capabilities indicated in the table reflect the earliest possible time periods in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. Not all of the indicated activities could be successfully accomplished within the time period specified. It must also be recognized that the accomplishment of some of the activities listed would impinge upon space activities already programmed, or upon other military programs.

42. If the USSR high-priority outer space program continues, the USSR will maintain its lead at least for the next few years, as shown in the following table.

#### Earliest Possible Time Periods of Various Soviet and U.S. Accomplishments in Outer Space

(Note: Generally, Soviet vehicles will be of substantially greater orbital payloads than U.S. vehicles. It should be noted, however, that the comparative capabilities of the United States and the USSR should not be measured by orbital payloads alone. The United States is estimated to be considerably ahead of the USSR in miniaturization of missile and satellite components, and therefore the effectiveness of U.S. satellites on a "per pound in orbit" basis is estimated to be greater than that of the USSR.)

[Here follows a table listing estimated target dates for completion of various activities in outer space.]

#### Level of Effort

43. a. Because of the highly speculative nature of future activities in outer space, decisions as to the priority and extent of U.S. outer space programs will obviously be a judgment based on limited knowl-



edge. Some activities in outer space would be expedited by the allocation of additional financial resources; others would not, being dependent on research progress. The potentially great importance to U.S. national interests of outer space activities, however, requires taking risks in allocating resources to research and development activities, the success or ultimate utility of which cannot be definitely foreseen.

b. The level of material and scientific effort to be expended on outer space activities must nevertheless be related to other national security programs to ensure that a proper balance is maintained between anticipated scientific, military and psychological gains from outer space programs and the possible loss resulting from reductions in resources allocated to other programs.

#### Objectives<sup>13</sup>

44. Development and exploitation of U.S. outer space capabilities as needed to achieve U.S. scientific, military, and political purposes, and to establish the U.S. as a recognized leader in this field.

45. As consistent with U.S. security, achievement of international cooperation in the uses of and activities related to outer space for peaceful purposes, and with selected allies for military purposes.

46. As consistent with U.S. security, the achievement of suitable international agreements relating to the uses of outer space for peaceful purposes that will assure orderly development and regulation of national and international outer space programs.

47. Utilization of the potentials of outer space to assist in "opening up" the Soviet Bloc through improved intelligence and programs of scientific cooperation.

#### Policy Guidance<sup>13</sup>

##### *Priority and Scope of Outer Space Effort*<sup>14</sup>

48. With a priority and scope sufficient to enable the U.S. at the earliest practicable time to achieve its scientific, military and political objectives as stated in paragraph 44, develop and expand selected U.S. activities related to outer space in:

a. Basic and applied research, and exploration required to determine the military and non-military potentials of outer space.

b. Research and technology required to exploit such military and non-military potentials.

<sup>13</sup> See paragraphs 30 and 31 for statement of the status of policy on the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments in relation to outer space. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>14</sup> Nothing in this paper shall be construed as affecting priorities established under NSC Action No. 1846 or future priorities approved by the President. [Footnote in the source text.]

c. Application of such outer space research, technology, and exploration to develop outer space capabilities required to achieve such objectives.

49. In addition to undertaking necessary immediate and short-range activities related to outer space, develop plans for outer space activities for the longer range (through at least a ten-year period).

50. Study on a continuing basis the implications which U.S. and foreign exploitation of outer space may hold for international and national political and social institutions. Critically examine such exploitation for possible consequences on activities and on life on earth (e.g., outer space activities which affect weather, health, or other factors relating to activities and life on earth).

#### *Psychological Exploitation*

51. In the near future, while the USSR has a superior capability in space technology, judiciously select (without prejudicing activities under paragraph 48) projects for implementation which, while having scientific or military value, are designed to achieve a favorable worldwide psychological impact.

52. Identify, to the greatest extent possible, the interests and aspirations of other Free World nations in outer space with U.S.-sponsored activities and accomplishments.

53. Develop information and other programs that will exploit fully U.S. outer space activities on a continuing basis; especially, during the period while the USSR has superior over-all outer space capabilities, those designed to counter the psychological impact of Soviet outer space activities and to present U.S. outer space progress in the most favorable comparative light.

#### *Reconnaissance Satellites*<sup>15</sup>

54. In anticipation of the availability of reconnaissance satellites, seek urgently a political framework which will place the uses of U.S. reconnaissance satellites in a political and psychological context most favorable to the United States.

55. At the earliest technologically practicable date, use reconnaissance satellites to enhance to the maximum extent the U.S. intelligence effort.

---

<sup>15</sup> The priority and scope of operational capabilities of reconnaissance satellites are established in NSC Action No. 1846, January 22, 1958. [Footnote in the source text.]

*International Cooperation in Outer Space Activities*

56. Consistent with the objectives in paragraphs 43 and 44, and as a means of maintaining the U.S. position as the leading advocate of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, be prepared to propose that the United States join with other nations, including the USSR, in cooperative efforts relating to outer space. Specifically:

a. Encourage a continuation and expansion of the type of cooperation which exists in the IGY programs, through non-governmental international scientific organizations such as the International Council of Scientific Unions; including cooperation in the design of experiments and instrumentation, exchange of information on instrumentation, scientific data and telemetry, exchange of instruments, and in the use of scientific satellites and other scientific vehicles in support of international planning for exploration of outer space.

b. Recognize UN interests in outer space cooperation, but do not encourage precipitous UN action to establish permanent organizational arrangements. To this end consider: (1) establishment of an ad hoc UN planning committee to formulate recommendations to facilitate international cooperation and appropriate UN organizational arrangements; and (2) in the interim, participation in those joint projects for cooperation and exchange of information for which UN auspices are desirable.

c. Invite scientists of foreign countries, including the Soviet Bloc in general on a reciprocal basis, to participate in selected U.S. programs for the scientific exploration of space.

d. Propose specific bilateral arrangements with other nations (including the USSR) for cooperative ventures related to outer space, provided that the combined existing competence might achieve meaningful scientific and technical advance.

e. Propose to groups of nations and international organizations independent outer space projects which would be appropriate for multilateral participation.

*Limited International Arrangements to Regulate Outer Space Activities*

57. Propose international agreements concerning appropriate means for maintaining a full and current public record of satellite orbits and emission frequencies.

*International Outer Space Law*

58. [remainder of paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

59. Reserve the U.S. position on legal issues of outer space, but undertake on an urgent basis a study of the legal issues that will arise from national and international outer space activities in the near future.

*Interim Position in International Negotiations*

60. In negotiations with other nations or organizations dealing with outer space (pending the results of the study referred to in paragraph 59), seek to achieve common agreement to relate such negotiations to the traversing or operating of man-made objects in outer space, rather than to defined regions of outer space.

*Security Classification*

61. In considering whether U.S. outer space information and material requires classification under Executive Order No. 10501,<sup>16</sup> take special account of the lead achieved by the USSR in outer space activities and the advantages, including more rapid progress, which could accrue to the United States through liberalizing the general availability and use of such information and material.

**Annex A****THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM**

1. *Objectives and Scope of Program.* Conclusive evidence shows that the Soviets are conducting a well-planned space flight program at high priority. This program is apparently aimed at placing both instrumented and manned vehicles into space. Certain successes have been exhibited already in the instrumented vehicles category (including the orbiting of three earth satellites, one containing a dog) and we believe they are fully capable of achieving manned space flight within the next few years.

2. *General.* Evidence of Soviet interest in space flight dates back to a publication in 1903 of a paper, "Investigation of Universal Space by Means of Rocket Flight", by the eminent Russian scientist Tsiolkovsky. This highly scientific treatise for the first time mathematically established the fundamentals of rocket dynamics and included a proposal for an artificial earth satellite. Reactive motion (rockets) was seriously engaged again in the latter '20s and in the '30s. In April 1955, the Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications was formed under the Academy of Sciences to establish an automatic laboratory for scientific research in cosmic space as a first step in solving the problems of interplanetary travel. Since early 1955 several hundred articles on space research, earth satellites and space flight have

---

<sup>16</sup> Executive Order No. 10501 ("Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States"), Section 3 provides in part that: "Unnecessary classification and over-classification [of information or material] shall be scrupulously avoided. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

been published in the USSR. Many of the articles have been written by high-caliber Soviet scientists and most deal with the theoretical principles of space flight.

3. *Capabilities.* The Soviet Union dramatically demonstrated its interest and current capability in space flight with the launching of two earth satellites in October and November 1957, and a third in mid-May, 1958. The complex facilities and skills needed to operate the large rocket vehicles required for the launching of a satellite or space vehicle are apparently available within the Soviet military. Thus, although the first space flights were doubtless under whatever psychological and political advantage would accrue, the Soviet military department, by intimate participation of its hardware and personnel, is in the position to utilize immediately such knowledge for the enhancement of the Soviet military position and objectives. The realization of even more advanced space projects, particularly those involving manned flight, must be preceded by a vast amount of systematic and well-coordinated scientific and technological work directed toward the development of practical space vehicles, the determination of basic operational requirements and limitations, and the creation of an environment and equipment capable of sustaining human life in outer space. Such a program embraces virtually all fields of science and engineering and the following fields were particularly examined for evidence of Soviet technical capability: guided missiles, re-entry vehicles, propulsion, electronics, space medicine, astrobiology, internal power supplies, and celestial mechanics. While firm association of these areas with a space program varied considerably, it is noted that the state of Soviet art in all sciences required in a space program was such that no scientific barriers of magnitude were detected. Four areas critical to a space program have apparently received considerable attention by the USSR, e.g., development of large rocket-engine propulsion systems, space medicine, cosmic biology and celestial mechanics. We believe the depth and advancement of their research and development make them world leaders in these areas. In particular their work in space medicine and cosmic biology are strong indicators of their serious intent to put man into space at an early date.

#### 4. *Time Scales.*

a. The following milestones are considered at least partially affiliated with a space program and indicate historically the long-term interest of the Soviet Union in this endeavor:

1903	Initial treatise on space flight
1923	Soviet Institute on Theoretical Astronomy founded

1929	First significant rocket studies conducted. "Group for the Investigation of Reactive Motion" founded
1934	Government-sponsored rocket research program established
1940	Flight of first Soviet rocket-powered aircraft
1946-47	Rocket-propelled intercontinental bomber program organized
1953-55	Systematic investigation of moon flight problems undertaken
1955 (Apr.)	Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications established
1955-58	Over 500 Soviet articles published dealing with space research, earth satellites and manned space flight
1957 (Oct.-Nov.)	First artificial earth satellites orbited

b. *Future Capabilities.* Soviet space flight capabilities estimated in this section are the earliest possible time periods in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. It is recognized that the space flight program is in competition with many other programs, particularly the missile program, and that the USSR probably cannot successfully accomplish all of the estimated space flight activities within the time periods specified. We believe the USSR has the intention to pursue an active flight program designed to put man into space for military and/or scientific purposes. We also believe they have a definite intention to pursue further scientific research utilizing earth satellites, lunar rockets, and probes of Mars and Venus. We cannot, at this time, determine whether the basic scientific program or the "man in space" program enjoys the higher priority and will, therefore, be pursued first. Whichever approach is adopted will probably result in some slippage in the capability dates indicated for the other program. We believe the Soviet ICBM program still enjoys the highest priority and that the USSR will not permit its space flight program to interfere with achieving an early operational ICBM capability.

(1) *Unmanned Earth Satellites.*

(a) Based on current estimates of Soviet ICBM capabilities, it is estimated that the USSR could orbit scientific satellites weighing on the order of 5,000 pounds within the next several months. The USSR could probably continue to place into orbit more and perhaps larger satellites throughout the period of this estimate. As additional scientific data is obtained, the USSR could refine or develop new scientific instrumentation to be placed into satellites.

(b) It is believed that the USSR could place into orbit and recover aeromedical specimens from satellites early in the period of this estimate. Early recovery of a biological specimen from orbiting satellites is essential and could advance Soviet knowledge of recovery techniques and provide indications of adverse effects of a space environment for man.

(c) The USSR could probably orbit surveillance satellites capable of low resolution (approximately 100-200 feet) at any time within the next year to obtain weather data and perhaps some additional data of military intelligence value such as fleet movements. More sophisticated surveillance satellites, involving improved photographic or TV reconnaissance, infrared photography and/or Elint, could be developed within a year or two following an initial success. These latter satellites containing this more advanced instrumentation could be capable of providing more diverse scientific and military information. Should they elect to do so, the USSR could also develop a communications relay satellite within the period of this estimate.

(2) *Lunar Rockets.* The USSR has had the capability of launching a lunar probe toward the vicinity of the moon since the fall of 1957 as far as propulsion and guidance requirements are concerned. A Soviet program of lunar probes could commence with experimental rockets followed by rocket landings on the moon with increasingly heavy loads containing scientific and telemetering equipment. Placing a satellite into orbit around the moon requires the use of a retro-rocket and more accurate guidance. It is believed that the USSR could achieve a lunar satellite in late 1958-1959 and have a lunar soft landing about six months thereafter.

(3) *Manned Earth Satellites.* Sufficient scientific data could probably have been attained and recovery techniques perfected to permit the USSR to launch a manned satellite into orbital flight and recovery by about 1959-1960. A manned capsule-type satellite as well as a manned glide-type vehicle appear to be feasible techniques and within Soviet capabilities. However, it is believed that the first Soviet orbital recovery attempt will probably be with the manned capsule.

(4) *Planetary Probes.* Planetary probe vehicles could utilize existing Soviet ICBM propulsion units for the first stage and presently available guidance components. It is believed that the USSR could launch probes towards Mars and Venus with a good chance of success. The first launchings toward Mars could occur in August 1958, when Mars will be in the most favorable position relative to the earth. More sophisticated probes could occur in October 1960, when Mars will again be in a favorable position relative to the earth. Probes toward Venus could probably occur in June 1959, and more sophisticated probe vehicles could be launched in January 1961.

(5) *Manned Circumlunar Flights.* Contingent upon their success with manned earth satellites and the development of a new, large booster engine, and concurrent advances in scientific experimentations with lunar rockets, the USSR could achieve a capability for manned circumlunar flight with reasonable chance for success in about 1961-1962.

(6) *Manned Lunar Landings.* It is not believed that the USSR will have a capability for manned lunar landings until some time after 1965.

(7) *Space Platforms*. There is insufficient information on the problems as well as the utility of constructing a platform in space to determine the Soviet capability. It is believed, however, that they are capable of placing a very large satellite (about 25,000 pounds) into orbit in 1961-1962 and that this vehicle could serve some of the scientific functions of a large space platform without the difficulties of joining and constructing such a platform in space.

---

#### 443. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 18, 1958—9:53 p.m.*

156. Re US Initiative at 13th GA re Outer Space.

1. Dept has developed plan for US initiative re outer space at 13th GA. Plan involves:

(a) Announcement by the Department at the earliest practicable opportunity to obtain maximum impact for our initiative that US requesting inclusion of an important and urgent item on outer space entitled "Program for International Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space";

(b) Submission by Ambassador Lodge of item for inclusion agenda as important and urgent matter together with usual explanatory memorandum;

(c) Subsequent initiation of consultations by USUN on basis draft resolution being sent next following telegram.<sup>2</sup>

2. Our objectives are:

(a) Reassert US leadership in this field and counter Soviet initiative in seizing 13th GA with outer space question;

(b) Ensure that GA consideration of outer space will be within framework US initiative rather than within scope of Soviet item.

3. US approach based upon firm conviction, made after careful consideration, that consideration of disarmament aspects and peaceful uses aspects of outer space can be separate. Under this item GA would consider peaceful uses aspect of outer space and not disarmament aspects which would be discussed within framework of usual disarma-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/8-1858. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Sisco and Marcus on August 14; cleared with Becker, Brode, Elbrick, Farley, and Smith (S/P); and initialed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*.



ment item which is already on GA agenda. GA should not wait for conclusion disarmament agreement before preparing recommendation for separate international program for peaceful uses of outer space.

4. Re membership proposed Committee: (See following telegram) You undoubtedly will wish consult with Chairman LA caucus before finalizing LA membership on Committee. You will of course also wish consult prospective members of Committee to assure their willingness to participate. FYI Dept considering possible Committee of twelve representative members including many most active in IGY outer space program such as France, India, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, UAR, UK, US, USSR and two LA's such as Argentina and Mexico. End FYI.

5. In separate telegrams are suggested explanatory memorandum<sup>3</sup> and draft resolution.

6. As soon as Dept decides on timing US initiative, you will be advised when to take steps outlined above.

7. Department considering other possible steps on outer space. You will be advised any decision to this effect.

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in telegram 155 to USUN, August 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/8-1858) For text of the memorandum, which was transmitted to the Secretary-General on September 2, see U.N. doc. A/3902.

---

**444. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 18, 1958—9:54 p.m.*

157. Re US Initiative on Outer Space.

Following is suggested draft resolution referred to in previous telegram.<sup>2</sup>

*"The General Assembly,*

*Recognizing that outer space is a matter of common interest to mankind as a whole,*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/8-1858. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Sisco and Marcus; cleared with Becker, Elbrick, Farley, Brode, and Smith; and initialed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

*Wishing* to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new frontier,

*Desiring* to promote energetically the fullest exploration and exploitation of outer space solely for the betterment of mankind,

*Conscious* that these developments have added a new dimension to man's existence and opened new possibilities for the increase of his knowledge and the improvement of his life,

*Noting* the success of the scientific cooperative program of the IGY in the exploration of outer space and the decision to continue and expand this type of cooperation,

*Recognizing* that it has not yet been possible to achieve a comprehensive disarmament agreement which would include appropriate international control of outer space,

*Believing* that the absence of such a disarmament agreement should not delay the development of a separate program of international and scientific cooperation in the field of outer space,

1. *Establishes* an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ and requests it to report to the Fourteenth General Assembly on the following:

(a) the activities and resources of the United Nations and its specialized agencies relating to outer space;

(b) the nature of specific projects of international cooperation in outer space which could be undertaken under UN auspices;

(c) the future UN organizational arrangements to facilitate international cooperation in this field;

2. *Requests* the Secretary General to render appropriate assistance to the above-named Committee and to recommend any other steps that might be taken within the existing United Nations framework to encourage the fullest international cooperation for the peaceful uses of outer space."

**Herter**

---

#### 445. Editorial Note

On September 2, Ambassador Lodge in an address to the 40th Convention of the American Legion announced that the President had instructed him to include the subject of outer space at the next regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. He concluded that

section of his address by saying that he hoped the U.S. proposal would get the support of other nations. For text of his address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 22, 1958, pages 448-151.

---

**446. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, October 15, 1958<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows discussion of items 1-7: international fairs, Yemen, the Pioneer lunar probe, nuclear tests, South Africa, Burma, and Jordan.]

*8. Preliminary U.S. Programs for International Cooperation in Outer Space Activities*

(The OCB Working Group on Outer Space had prepared a draft report<sup>2</sup> for possible use in instructing the USUN delegation. At a pre-meeting briefing, a working group draft was discussed by Under Secretary Herter with senior representatives of L, IO, S/AE. It was their determination that the views expressed could be taken into account in a redraft of the paper for the October 22 meeting.)

The Board had a general discussion of the subject, including certain procedural aspects of the Space Council-OCB relationship. It was noted that the Space Council will meet on October 28 and that Under Secretary Herter would probably report to it the action taken by the OCB at its next meeting.

Governor Herter opened the discussion by pointing out that we are entering a new field and the present knowledge of it does not permit the giving of guidance in more than general terms. Mr. Franklyn W. Phillips (NASA) concurred in this view. He thought, for example, that rather than now issue an invitation to foreign scientists to participate in some of our programs, we should only express a readiness to extend such invitations.

Mr. Harr, Vice Chairman, said he did not see how the U.S. could avoid being confronted at the UN with two basic views which would be expressed by a majority: (1) outer space should be reserved for peaceful uses only, and (2) nothing in outer space can be appropriated or claimed by any nation. He also said he saw no effective way for the U.S. to counter the UN Secretary General's suggestion that the UN

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

"look ahead toward agreement on a basic rule that outer space and the celestial bodies are not considered as capable of appropriation by any state." He said he had heard the views of Mr. Becker, Legal Adviser of State, that the U.S. should not acquiesce in having the UN try to make international law on outer space on which the facts are few and our defense needs therein unclear but that it should become formed by the usual process based on facts and issues. He was in agreement with the legal soundness of such views but thought the U.S. would be politically vulnerable in the UN if it should seek to uphold it.

Governor Herter thought it not possible in the present state of knowledge of outer space to set down detailed instructions for U.S. representatives but welcomed ideas. Mr. Allen (USIA) said the U.S. would look "foolish" if it should say that "no one owns the moon." Mr. Gray suggested that we might wish to reserve on stating a firm U.S. position on outer space, pointing out, with a smile, the impropriety of citing the NSC policy paper<sup>3</sup> to the UN.

It was agreed that the Working Group should revise the draft report in the light of the discussion and that the public members of the Space Council should be given a copy of it in its final form prior to the Council meeting.

---

<sup>3</sup> Document 442.

---

#### 447. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 11, 1958—2:07 p.m.*

Gadel 98. Re: Outer Space (Delga 377<sup>2</sup>). Department believes essential you consistently maintain separation principle in outer space resolution. As appropriate, indicate US unwilling accept references to control outer space in our resolution, as would confuse issue and bring

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-1158. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum and Marcus on November 10 and cleared by Spiers, Meeker, and Breithut. Approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 377, November 7, reported that the delegation had given out the text of a draft resolution and that the Soviet Union was preparing its own draft. (*Ibid.*, 701.022/11-758) The U.S. draft was transmitted in Delga 378, November 7. (*Ibid.*) The Soviet draft was transmitted in Delga 453, November 18. (*Ibid.*, 701.022/11-1858) For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, p. 1426.

difficult and contentious disarmament question into development peaceful uses cooperation. Present preambular paragraphs 2 and 6 as far as we consider wise to go in view purpose resolution.

Proposals re ensuring outer space be used exclusively for peaceful purposes more appropriately matter for reconstituted Disarmament Commission to consider rather than proposed Ad Hoc Committee which dealing with program of International Cooperation separate from aspects of disarmament. You may add US proposal discuss disarmament aspects outer space with Soviets still stands, as does recommendation GA Resolution 1148 (XII).<sup>3</sup> US hopes Soviets will agree necessary technical talks and is willing consider suggestions re encouragement negotiations this matter in appropriate forum.

Moreover, discussion use outer space for military purposes in UN at present undesirable, as this raises questions likely be covered as part Geneva talks re surprise attack on which GA has already adopted resolution. GA should avoid any action that might prejudice or prejudice success these talks.

Coordinate responses re this topic with UK.

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated November 14, 1957; see U.N. doc. A/3805.

---

**448. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, November 12, 1958—10 p.m.*

Delga 407. Re: Outer Space.

1. Lodge met with Freitas-Valle (Brazil) and Amadeo (Argentina) this afternoon on their proposed amendments to outer space resolution. He gave them our suggestions as received by telecon.<sup>2</sup> After conferring together, they agreed to accept our new preamble, including suppression of their amendment to operative para 1-d, but they felt very strongly about wording of their suggestion for para 1-b. In light of their agreement on our rephrasing of legal points, as well as fact UK had previously told US it regarded LA language as innocuous,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-1258. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

Lodge accepted their amendment to para 1-b as shown in new draft of resolution (Delga 408<sup>3</sup>).

2. Dixon and Scrivener (UK) asked to see us before co-sponsors meeting. They agreed to suggested changes in resolution, including version of Argentine-Brazilian amendments upon which we had agreed, except for new first preambular paragraph re use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. Their instructions were to oppose this para strongly, because they feared it might be used to prevent us from using outer space for military defense. London argued it would prevent launching IRBM's, for example. Dixon said inclusion of paragraph might prevent UK co-sponsorship. We replied that if we thought para raised problems he saw, U.S. could not support it either. It was only pious wish, but it was important to state this principle as matter of practical politics in UN debate in order to counter attack on our resolution from Soviets. Idea of new para was one fully in accord with U.S. policy, and we understood also with UK policy, since we all sought agreement to prohibit use of outer space for military purposes.

3. At meeting of co-sponsors there was general agreement on revised text, including LA amendments. France and Belgium were inclined share UK misgivings about new first preambular para, but most others supported inclusion this idea as political necessity to meet Soviet propaganda campaign effectively.

4. After co-sponsors meeting, Scrivener suggested rephrasing of "peaceful uses only" concept, in form included new penultimate preambular paragraph (Delga 408), and that we revert to original first preambular paragraph. We accepted idea of new preambular paragraph but decided we should also retain this idea in first preambular paragraph. We agreed with UKDel on version contained Delga 408.

5. We plan submit draft text as contained Delga 408 after co-sponsors meeting tomorrow morning.<sup>4</sup>

**Lodge**

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated November 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-1258.) For text of the U.S. resolution, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1431-1432.

<sup>4</sup> The delegation transmitted a brief report on this meeting in Delga 419, November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-1358)

**449. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, November 18, 1958—8 p.m.*

Delga 454. Re: Outer Space.

1. Zorin (USSR) asked to see me this morning to give me "revised" Soviet draft resolution on outer space.<sup>2</sup>

2. He said it was now apparent that we would not reach agreement on mutually acceptable disarmament program on outer space and Soviet resolution therefore was confined to peaceful uses. He said he would introduce resolution this afternoon. Although he would have to say things in his speech about U.S. position which we would not like, he emphasized that last half of his speech would be "constructive". I told him that I would of course have to answer anything he said.

3. Zorin said he had asked to see me and wanted me to have resolution first because cooperation in outer space could only be meaningful if U.S. and USSR were in agreement. However, since I was tied up with Senator Johnson, he did not wait and he saw Argentina, India, UK and UAR. Difference between Soviet resolution and U.S. resolution<sup>3</sup> was that U.S. (20-power) draft called for a study to determine what UN might do, while Soviet draft called for decision in principle now to establish "International Committee" on outer space and for appointment of preparatory group to work out its program and rules of procedure. Soviet draft also listed functions which "International Committee" should have.

4. In response to my question he said approach USSR had in mind was substantially same as that in establishment of IAEA. Preparatory group would be appointed this year to work out plans for "International Committee", and it would report to GA next year for final decisions. Committee would not become "operational" until after that time. In response to question whether he had specialized agency type organization in mind, he said this was something to be worked out by "preparatory group". (Soviet draft implies they may have in mind giving committee status similar to IAEA.) However, Zorin did say committee should be more closely linked with UN than IAEA.

5. Zorin said that Soviet ideas on composition of preparatory group were: Big Four: 3 neutrals—India, Sweden and UAR; 3 members of "Socialist camp"—Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania; and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/11-1858. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 447.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, *supra*.

one Latin American—Argentina. He stated this composition should not prejudice eventual composition of projected "International Committee". (He put this composition in his revised text.)

6. I told him I thought this new resolution was interesting proposal and that nothing could please me more than to achieve agreement with USSR on issue of such importance to peace and welfare of mankind. We would study Soviet resolution carefully and immediately. We would consult with our cosponsors and we would see him again just as soon as we had a position.

*Recommendation:*

1. Soviet resolution will be attractive to many GA members, especially because it shows apparent Soviet flexibility and willingness to participate in UN program on peaceful uses of outer space. It is being hailed by many as a Soviet retreat. Some accommodation therefore seems necessary.

2. I suggest we include in 20-power draft paragraph in which UN takes decision in principle now that there should be UN body sometime providing one means for international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space (i.e., the concept in paragraph 1 of Soviet draft), but that committee to be appointed forthcoming year otherwise retain character intended in our resolution and not be "preparatory commission".

3. We should also incorporate such other aspects of Soviet draft in 20-power draft as we can with view toward obtaining Soviet concurrence, e.g., preambular reference to IGY research activities.

4. We should hold firm line on composition of committee against new Soviet "parity" approach. (Their proposed committee includes 4 Western Powers, 4 Communists, and 3 "neutrals".)

Instructions requested urgently so that we can talk with Russians and cosponsors tomorrow.

**Lodge**



#### 450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 19, 1958—7:54 p.m.

Gadel 126. Re Outer Space. Delga 453, 454, 455.<sup>2</sup> Department views Soviet move as major effort to wrest initiative from US in field peaceful uses outer space. Fact that our initiative has forced Soviets to our view, i.e. that program of international cooperation this field should be separated from disarmament aspects is clear indication of political importance which Soviets attach to leadership in this field. It represents substantial gain for our approach to problem. It is also recognition strong UN interest this matter and Soviets probably wish avoid putting themselves in defensive position in which they were in 1953 when US made atoms for peace proposal.<sup>3</sup> In light above therefore, Department agrees with your view that some accommodation to Soviet initiative necessary. Department believes Lodge statement of yesterday welcoming Soviet initiative provides basis for accommodation.<sup>4</sup>

1. We agree fully you should hold firm line against "parity" approach in Committee composition. We expect serious fight in GA on this aspect of issue.

2. We agree also that character of our Committee should be retained rather than concept of preparatory commission.

3. Main objective Soviet resolution appears be to get UN to take decision in principle that there should be UN body providing means for international cooperation in peaceful uses outer space. We are convinced that strong UN interest in this matter will manifest itself in future towards strong drive to set up appropriate organizational arrangements within UN framework. We believe we can meet this view without prejudging form of organizational arrangements by addition following preambular paragraph in 20-power resolution: "Considering that an important contribution can be made by the establishment of an appropriate international body within the UN framework for cooperation in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes". Inclusion of

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/11-1858. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Farley, Wilcox, Becker, Kohler, Nunley, and Farinholt; and approved and signed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Delga 453, see footnote 2, Document 447. Delga 455, November 18, transmitted recommendations to be considered in responding to the Soviet resolution. (Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/11-1858)

<sup>3</sup> For text of President Eisenhower's atoms for peace proposal, December 8, 1953, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 813-822.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Lodge's statement on November 18, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 15, 1958, pp. 980-981.

above in preamble would not in our judgment constitute GA decision in principle and would not prejudice study of organizational arrangements recommended in operative paragraph 1c of 20-power resolution.

4. In order show added flexibility, you authorized add to preamble of 20-power resolution first two preambular paragraphs of new Soviet resolution (changing word "cosmic" to "outer". Make same change elsewhere in resolution where appropriate.).

5. We believe it also important we take starch out of Soviet operative paragraph 3 without prejudging study. We believe this can be done by adding following after word "development" in operative paragraph 1b of 20-power resolution: "taking into account the discussions in this committee and proposals made by various members." FYI You should inform co-sponsors foregoing language is as far as we consider wise to go toward meeting the specific programs recommended in operative paragraph 3 Soviet resolution. We do not wish weigh views of Ad Hoc committee in favor specific proposals advanced by USSR in view problems they pose for us but find it difficult advance alternative suggestions. If, however, your discussions with co-sponsors reveal strong feeling we would suffer set-back if res fails include concrete suggestions and if strong pressure to do so exists you may as fall-back position accept following language after word "development" in par 1b 20-power resolution: ", taking into account the following proposals among others: continuation on a permanent basis of the outer space research now being carried on within the framework of the international geophysical year; organization of mutual exchange and dissemination of information on outer space research; and coordination of national research programs for the study of outer space and rendering all possible assistance and help towards their realization." End FYI.

6. You undoubtedly will wish concert as appropriate with UK and other co-sponsors. We agree with your recommendation that GADel talk directly to Soviets on this matter as soon as you in position do so. We do not believe it advantageous allow Indians get in middle.

7. In general we believe it important that US maintain control and carry forward momentum initiated in Lodge speech American Legion and Secretary's general debate statement and carried forward by Lodge and Johnson speeches in Political Committee.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>5</sup> Regarding Lodge's speech, see Document 445; for text of Dulles' general debate statement, September 18, see Department of State *Bulletin*, pp. 525-530; for Lodge's statements on November 11 and 12 and Senator Johnson's statement on November 17, see *ibid.*, December 15, 1958, pp. 972-981.

#### 451. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, November 20, 1958—8 p.m.*

Delga 480. Re Outer Space.

1. Following first meeting with cosponsors (Delga 479<sup>2</sup>) we gave revised text<sup>3</sup> to Zorin (USSR). Lodge explained we had made major effort to include important elements of Soviet text. He emphasized particularly inclusion of penultimate preambular paragraph. He also pointed out addition to paragraph 1 (b) as representing effort to include Soviet proposals specifically within work of committee.

2. Zorin requested translator to go over entire text in Russian. After commenting he would wish to give text careful and detailed study, he added at first glance it looked as if text could serve as basis for further discussions. Zorin said it appeared to have omitted certain vital elements in Soviet proposal. He noted particularly absence of specific reference to way in which work of ad hoc committee would be carried on, both in substance and in method of development. Soviet draft included substantive paragraph giving direction in which body should develop. Lack of this was "shortcoming" which should be corrected. He urged us to add three specific tasks Soviet text gave committee. While he recognized our desire to reflect principal points of both drafts, he felt this had produced too long and repetitive preamble. We asked whether he had any specific suggestions. Zorin thought third preambular paragraph referring to "present national rivalries" might create advance impression of an existing unhealthy conflict, which was not true, and which it would be most undesirable to reflect in unanimous resolution.

3. Zorin noted absence of reference to composition of committee and inquired whether this meant we accepted Soviet slate. Lodge immediately said, as Zorin undoubtedly already recognized, we could never accept parity. We felt criteria of technical capacity and representative character should be followed. Zorin explained USSR proceeded from fact U.S. and USSR, as only two countries actively carrying forward programs in outer space, constituted "two sides", which

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-2058. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 479, November 20, reported that, at a cosponsors' meeting during the morning of November 20, revisions were made in the U.S. draft incorporating some of the points from the Soviet draft. The telegram also reported that after Lodge met with Zorin, he again consulted with the cosponsors who agreed to further changes in the preamble and the operative paragraphs, but all of the cosponsors remained firm on the composition issue. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

should have equal representation. In addition Soviet slate included several neutral countries from different parts of world so that general composition of committee would embrace principal areas of world.

Lodge said although he could not accept concept of parity even in disarmament field, it was at least understandable why USSR thought it applicable in that area. On other hand, it was not pertinent in field of outer space where need was to bring best brains together to insure exploration of this new field for benefit of humanity. This made "two sides" concept totally irrelevant. He added that Zorin's own objections to reference to national rivalries in third preambular paragraph applied equally to parity approach. U.S. had in mind 9-member committee with following composition: France, UK, U.S., USSR, 1 LA, 1 Afro-Asian, and 3 from WE and old and new Commonwealth. Zorin said if we insisted on this slate, there could be no committee. Zorin repeated his idea of "two sides" stemmed from fact Soviet Union and U.S. were only countries practically exploring outer space. This gave both basis on which to resolve question of composition and organization of future work of any body to study outer space.

Lodge repeated that no power struggle or national rivalries were involved. U.S. did not wish to see question of outer space develop in this direction. We therefore should not seek establish new international body on basis two rival groups trying to outvote each other. Zorin replied we were establishing interstate committee rather than scientific body. Ultimately new international organization would be established in which question of relations between states would be of importance. On such body Soviet Union should occupy definite place along with countries linked with it. U.S. had same right. Zorin observed that during consideration of establishment of IAEA U.S. had proposed list of countries and told USSR if it wished it could join or agency could be established without USSR. In this case USSR had proposed its slate not only to U.S. but to UN as whole and "was willing to listen to reasonable remarks and proposals as well". He emphasized that outer space committee could be established only with mutual consent of U.S. and USSR or otherwise there would be no cooperation.

Lodge pointed out that during six years he had served at UN never once had three EE countries included in Soviet slate voted differently from USSR, whereas there was not one single country which had voted consistently with U.S. Zorin rejoined U.S. was "playing democracy" in these questions and when it was necessary on matter U.S. regarded as important, it had complete unity with its close allies. He asserted such complete support from its allies was "quite natural" and had "nothing shameful about it" since close allies should act in common. Lodge rejoined UK, France and Israel had invaded Egypt, although they knew we strongly opposed this.

Lodge reminded Zorin radiation and peaceful uses committees were not constituted on parity basis. Zorin's response was these two bodies had scientific representatives, whereas projected space committee was interstate committee. As far as USSR could see, its future work would have great political importance. He insisted USSR not interested in dominating group but merely interested in maintaining "usual rights". We did not pursue composition beyond this point.

4. Zorin said again he would give test careful study and be in touch with us as soon as his views were formulated. We told him we hoped arrange adjournment of First Committee to Friday afternoon in order permit completion negotiations on resolution. He agreed this procedure reasonable and satisfactory.<sup>4</sup>

**Lodge**

---

<sup>4</sup> At another meeting with Zorin at noon on November 21, Zorin stated that agreement on the text of the resolution could be reached only after the composition issue had been resolved. A lengthy discussion followed in which neither side conceded any ground. (Delga 492 from USUN, November 21; Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-2158) Following the meeting with Zorin, the cosponsors met three times to discuss the composition of the committee. (Delga 493 from USUN, November 21; *ibid.*)

---

**452. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 22, 1958—2:27 p.m.*

Gadel 138. Re Outer Space (Degal 499<sup>2</sup>). If USSR announces it refuses participate in ad hoc committee as constituted 20 power res, you should, nevertheless, proceed on basis 20 power res.

Dept believes overriding consideration this regard is not what ad hoc committee can accomplish if Soviets do not participate but, rather, that UN shall not be frustrated if USSR demands on representation question not met. Dept fears if UN does not proceed on basis envisaged in 20 power res because of Soviet obstruction, impression will inevitably be given that USSR has, in effect, veto power over UN

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/11-2158. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buffum; cleared with Breithut and Nunley; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 499, November 21, speculated that the Soviet Union might not serve on the ad hoc committee proposed in the U.S. resolution and requested instructions on the U.S. position if this happened. (*Ibid.*)

action in outer space activities. We consider withdrawal of proposal for ad hoc committee in favor formula such as suggested in Delga 499 would be regarded as capitulation to Soviets.

Moreover, we consider it would be most unfortunate for US give any appearance of backing down after strong initiative taken in this field by Secretary, Lodge, and Johnson.

Dept believes USSR very vulnerable on issue "parity" re outer space problems and fully concurs with argumentation you have been using against this concept. We consider Soviets have picked particularly bad time and issue to insist on parity and believe they are on defensive.

Finally, Dept questions whether USSR will boycott outer space committee. We consider it possible that as with IAEA, after initially balking, USSR may decide in own best interest to participate.

As to utility of study without Soviets, you may wish to make point that while ad hoc committee's study would probably be better with Soviet participation and cooperation, this not essential precondition. Number of committee members, in addition to US, in position to make worthwhile contributions so that study would undoubtedly contribute to progress in field.

**Herter**

---

**453. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 11, 1958—4:56 p.m.*

Gadel 185. Re: Delga 683 and Delga 690.<sup>2</sup> Re: Outer Space.

1. Dept not inclined to view latest USSR approach via Swedes as meaningful indication (Gadel 151<sup>3</sup>) that they are in fact prepared to agree to anything less than parity in the composition of the outer space committee. While recognizing difficult to estimate ultimate USSR posi-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/12-1058. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Grand on December 10; cleared by Bacon, Kohler, Breithut, Farinholt, and Becker; and approved by Walmsley who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 9 and 10, respectively, they reported on activities by the British Delegation to resolve the question of the composition of the ad hoc committee. (*Ibid.*, 320.11/12-958 and 320.11/12-1058)

<sup>3</sup> Gadel 151, November 23, advised the Mission that in the absence of any meaningful Soviet indication on the parity issue, the United States should not compromise on the composition question. (*Ibid.*, 320.11/11-2658)

tion, based on tenor of Soviet views as reported by GADel (particularly Delga 482 and 636<sup>4</sup>) evidence so far available to Dept insufficient to modify its conclusion that USSR not prepared to accept anything less than parity in committee.

2. View foregoing Dept believes other nation negotiations re composition although designed to insure USSR committee participation, may prove counter-productive unless evidence develops that USSR is prepared in fact to abandon parity concept.

3. Accordingly, Dept reiterates previous view that at this juncture we should neither encourage nor discourage other nation initiatives in negotiating new committee composition.

4. However, as fall back position and only after assurance that USSR will meaningfully participate in work of committee, GADel authorized to accept following changes in committee composition:

a) Committee to be enlarged by addition of Rumania, Austria, and Western European who supports US on Chi rep issue and provided such augmentation does not open entirely question of composition;

b) If foregoing insufficient, we would agree to addition of Rumania and Austria or Rumania alone;

c) Dept will not agree to USSR desire to eliminate Australia or otherwise to reduce size of Committee.

Herter

---

<sup>4</sup> Dated November 20 and December 5, respectively, they reported on efforts by other delegations to resolve the composition question. (*Ibid.*, 320.11/11-2058 and 320.11/12-558).

---

**454. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, December 12, 1958—2 a.m.*

Delga 706. Reference: Outer Space.

1. Following Zorin remark today in Hungary statement to effect that USDel lacked time for serious negotiations while having time make propaganda on Hungary, I sent word that I always had time for serious negotiations and a meeting with Zorin this evening re composition outer space committee ensued.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.11/12-1258. Confidential; Priority.

2. After claiming US broke off previous negot (which I immediately denied) Zorin suggested we start on basis not of 18 but of 14 which represented his "compromise" on original Soviet proposal of 12 and our proposal of 13. Zorin said it would be impractical to talk on basis 18 since this would require large addition in order to reach "balanced" composition. 18 itself was not proper basis since it one-sided with 12 in our favor, and had been "imposed". Later he specified that 6 more states would have to be added to 18 to reach "balance" and since these 6 would all have to be "on our side" (USSR's side) this would be "artificial".

3. He insisted we speak in terms of 3 groups: Great Powers; ASAF's, and LAS. In addition Zorin said if US agreed on EE's he would agree on members from Commonwealth; but they should be Ceylon and Canada.

4. I stated I could not act as though proposal of committee of 18 did not exist and asked why he unable to consider increase.

5. Zorin rejected increase on basis 12 members still committed to US by military alliances. He returned to 14 and asked why I could not accept this. I said I could not ask any members of 18 to leave and asked which ones he would propose to delete.

6. I then offered to add Austria and Roumania, which he rejected. He then elaborated his 14 proposal: Argentina, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Mexico, Poland, UK, USSR, UAR, US, Sweden, Roumania, Ceylon, Canada. He called this "balanced" slate; Sobolev said it did not give USSR voting control. I stated I unable accept reduction from 18 and pointed out his proposal was less favorable to US than Soviet proposal on DC last year. I urged he consider increase which, I pointed out, gave him one more Soviet bloc and one neutral. We parted with understanding we would meet tomorrow after each had considered the other's position.

7. Immediately following this, I talked with nearly complete group of outer space res co-sponsors and informed them in detail of this conversation while pointing out that Zorin's proposal had effect of removing from 18 Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Iran, Italy and Japan. Group agreed generally that reduction from 18 inadmissible, that Soviet two-sides approach unacceptable, but that exercise of one last negot with Zorin was worthwhile in demonstrating our flexibility and desire for Soviet participation.

8. I plan to see Zorin briefly tomorrow to see whether he has changed his mind and then go ahead with the present slate.<sup>2</sup>

**Lodge**

---

<sup>2</sup> Zorin concluded a meeting on December 13 by saying that his country would not participate in the committee. (Delga 713 from USUN, December 13; *ibid.*, 320.5701/12-1358) On the same day, the U.S. (20-power) resolution was adopted by a vote of 53

*Continued*



**455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 18, 1958—8:44 p.m.*

571. Re (Delga 718<sup>2</sup>) Outer Space. Department concurs fully with Mission view that Ad Hoc Outer Space Committee should become operative as soon as feasible. US deeply committed politically to demonstrate UN Ad Hoc Committee can make useful study with or without Soviet participation. It clear that Soviet political tactic is to repeat with Ad Hoc Committee their tactic with former DC boycott of which influenced other members to be cool to idea of convening group. Secretary has felt that Soviets thereby achieved effective veto over UN machinery to consider disarmament. It essential this not be repeated in Outer Space Committee. Not only would it have significance in terms of US leadership in outer space field, but also would solidly establish principle that no UN committee could be constituted and do good job unless Soviets agree to committee and are participants, directly or indirectly. Moreover, drive for "parity" by Soviets in UN would have been given substantial boost.

Our overall objective will be for Committee to make constructive survey on basis present terms of reference so that it will provide basis for further positive initiative by US and at same time constitute added pressure on USSR to cooperate in UN with Ad Hoc Committee and participate in UN activities this field. In view of foregoing, Department believes important that: US maintain leadership and initiative in this important field; insure success of Committee operations; and negate Soviet efforts to impose veto on General Assembly actions in this field. At same time, Department policies and instructions will also seek to protect important interests of US scientific community.

Department tentatively is considering possibility of Committee organizational meeting about middle of January. However, pending resolution of many problems which Mission aware exist in formulation of well-coordinated and integrated program of action, for time being Mission should not initiate discussions with SYG or other members of Committee re organizational or substantive aspects future Committee

---

to 9 with 19 abstentions. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1431-1432.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-1458. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Grand; cleared by Breithut, Farinholt, Meeker, Wilcox, and Nunley; and approved by Murphy who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 14. (*Ibid.*, 320.11/12-1458)

operations. Department would appreciate, however, USUN views re level of political representation on committee, slates, and other organizational aspects.

Herter

---

456. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 30, 1958—8:30 p.m.*

647. Re: Outer Space.

1. Dept has noted recent USUN Daily Classified Summary<sup>2</sup> comments reporting views other nations questioning ability Ad Hoc Committee do meaningful work without USSR participation.

2. Dept presently studying alternative methods implementing UK suggestion additional approach be made induce USSR participate.<sup>3</sup> Dept will inform Mission when decision reached.

3. Whether or not additional approach results USSR participation (and Dept believes such participation useful) even without Soviet participation Dept foresees likelihood effective Committee operation within terms resolution which limits Committee action to reporting back to 14th GA on four aspects outer space problems.

4. We believe it is important to counter view that Committee could not do effective job without Soviet participation. Following background for Mission use in discussing this. Specifically, Committee required to:

(a) Prepare survey activities and resources UN or specialized agencies and other international bodies involved peaceful uses outer space. Dept already has completed preliminary survey UN and specialized agencies resources and activities and with cooperation National Science Foundation survey activities non-governmental interna-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/1-2059. Confidential. Drafted by Grand; cleared by Becker, Murphy, Farinholt, Nunley, and S/AE; and approved by Bruns who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Copies of the Mission's Daily Classified Summaries are *ibid.*, 310.5; but the particular summary has not been identified.

<sup>3</sup> On January 9, C.D. Wiggin, First Secretary of the British Embassy, informed the Department of State that one more effort should be made to secure Soviet participation in the committee before its first meeting. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, 320.5701/1-959)

tional groups, i.e., ICSU and COSPAR, presently underway. All this information available and can easily be included in solid Committee report without USSR participation.

(b) Suggest possible programs which might be undertaken by UN this field. US proposals being developed cooperation with NASA and National Academy Sciences. Although USSR contribution this area would be useful, lack USSR participation no way bars Committee studying and effectively surveying wide-range programs all of which could be described in full in Committee's report. Moreover, many Committee members besides US are in position contribute knowledge and ideas on wide range of subjects within Committee purview.

(c) Make recommendations future organizational arrangements within framework UN to handle outer space problems. Dept exploring various organizational possibilities and preliminary position paper in process formulation. Lack USSR participation insofar making recommendations next GA concerning possible future UN organizational structure provides no impediment.

(d) Identify nature legal problems involved outer space. Dept with NASA presently preparing survey and believes Committee can make useful report on this aspect to 14th GA with or without USSR participation.

5. Dept believes political objective of negating Soviet efforts impose boycott on GA actions can be accomplished by Committee producing useful work within terms resolution. This apparently lost sight of by some Committee members who overlook limitations placed on Committee by resolution, i.e., that Committee prepare surveys and recommendations for consideration next GA.

6. Dept believes that should Committee make meaningful recommendations to 14th GA resulting passage new resolution designed implement Committee recommendations, lack of USSR participation whatever subsequent organization designated carry out recommendations could be critical since lack USSR participation such organization could conceivably limit effectiveness. However, this is future problem and useful work present Committee may well serve convince USSR that it is in their own interest participate implementation this Committee's recommendations. In fact, experience indicates best prospect securing eventual Soviet participation would be demonstration UN capable fruitful work outer space field regardless Soviet participation. This point made evident history IAEA development. If such recommendations reasonable and useful, USSR failure participate might be interpreted as display intransigence and petulance and publicly demonstrate real lack interest furthering peaceful uses outer space.

Dulles

**457. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, March 19, 1959—7 p.m.*

791. Re: Outer Space.

1. On 16 March I informed Sobolev (USSR) that although we aware Soviet position re outer space committee we view Soviet as member and hope they will participate. I then outlined our views re manner in which we believe committee should accomplish its work and said U.S. proposes committee be convened in April.

2. Sobolev asked clarification of how much of committee work we proposed Secretariat undertake. I spelled out our suggested assignment of resolution<sup>2</sup> paragraph 1-a to Secretariat, resolution paras 1-b and 1-d to separate working groups, and delay on 1-c. I also explained I expected sit as USDel to first meeting of committee and thereafter U.S. would be represented on working groups by Dryden and Becker.

3. Sobolev expressed appreciation my bringing these views his attention. He said he aware "importance of committee's work" and would report our views to Moscow. He said he did not think our views would result in change of Soviet attitude towards committee but he would inform us if this occurred.

4. We plan inform committee members who ask us of above. UKDel has been informed and they considering informal approach to Soviets to express hope our agreed plan of work will bring about Soviet participation in committee. UKDel reported FonOff interested in knowing whether or not Department still considering approach along lines considered before Mikoyan visit.<sup>3</sup>

**Lodge**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/3-1959. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 448.

<sup>3</sup> Mikoyan visited the United States, January 4-20, but the subject of outer space was not raised in conversations held during his stay. In telegram 763 to USUN, March 20, Lodge was informed that the United States planned no additional approaches to the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/3-1959)

**458. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions<sup>1</sup>**

CA-9326

Washington, April 28, 1959.

SUBJECT

OCB Operation Plan for Outer Space<sup>2</sup>

Forwarded herewith for your information is the first operations plan for outer space prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board. The plan covers United States activities in two major areas: (1) technical activities including space science, military and non-military satellite applications, and advanced space technology; and (2) international activities respecting establishment of a legal and political framework for accomplishment of U.S. objectives in outer space and respecting cooperation in outer space programs. In addition to the specific international activities outlined in the plan, your attention is called to the general summary of the Department's responsibilities shown on page two.

Two organizational arrangements affecting activities of the Department in the outer space field may be of interest in connection with your examination of the plan. The Secretary is a member of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which was established by the Congress in 1958. The Space Council is chaired by the President, and, in addition to the Secretary of State, its membership currently includes the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Chairman of the AEC, the Director of the National Science Foundation, the President of the National Academy of Sciences, and two members from private life. The Space Council meets periodically to discuss with and advise the President concerning all aspects of outer space programs. Within the Department, responsibility for coordinating the Department's activities in the outer space field has been assigned to the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.

A significant step being taken toward implementation of United States international objectives in outer space is the forthcoming initiation of the work of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which is currently scheduled to hold its first meeting May 6. During the 13th General Assembly, the United States took the initiative in securing establishment of this committee, which is to study activities and resources of the United Nations and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/4-2859. Secret. Drafted by Gathright (S/AE) on April 13; cleared with Bacon, Farinholt, Murphy, Nunley, ARA, AF, IO, NEA, and U/OP; and approved by Farley. Transmitted to 22 posts worldwide.

<sup>2</sup> Dated March 18. (*Ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5814 Series)

other international bodies relating to peaceful uses of outer space, areas of international cooperation which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices, future organizational arrangements within the framework of the United Nations, and the nature of legal problems which may arise.

Ambassador Lodge will be United States representative to the ad hoc committee. Deputy representatives will be Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA; Mr. Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser to the Secretary; and Mr. Joseph Barco, Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations. Other countries represented on the ad hoc committee are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the USSR, the UAR, and the UK. The three Soviet bloc members opposed the committee's establishment on the grounds that "parity" of representation was not afforded between East and West, and they evidently do not plan to participate in the ad hoc committee's work. Of the three "neutral" members, only Sweden has definitely expressed the intention of participating.

The Department expects that the work of the ad hoc committee will provide an opportunity for effectively continuing leadership of the United States in international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. In this connection it should be noted that while the United States currently suffers from technological disadvantages in the outer space field, it has a clear advantage in its willingness to make the results of its scientific space programs widely available and to take constructive measures respecting international cooperation. An example of the latter is the United States' recent offer to launch a scientific payload to be recommended by the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) which has been established by the International Council of Scientific Unions to carry on international scientific cooperation of the type initiated during the International Geophysical Year.

It can be anticipated that technological disadvantages of United States outer space programs will be substantially reduced during the next several years. However, in the interim, it appears likely that the Soviet Union will continue to achieve some important "firsts" in the field. Consideration is currently being given to whether meaningful steps can be taken to minimize the impact of such continued achievements of the Soviet Union. Certainly the most effective approach for the United States to take will be to proceed with its own efforts in outer space in as efficient and rapid a manner as feasible. The operations plan makes clear the fact that a well-conceived technical program is under way.

Among the projects noted in the operations plan are certain military applications of space vehicles. The Department believes that such applications will present problems from the political point of view

(especially if the Soviet Union refrains from utilizing space vehicles for such purposes) and is considering measures which might assist in securing acceptance of such programs by foreign countries. Your views with respect to potential local official and public reaction to use of space vehicles for military applications would be helpful in analyzing these problems. In this connection, the Department wishes to point out that the summary of United States space program objectives shown on page 21 of the operations plan includes objectives which are possible but are not currently planned. Of the military projects listed in this summary, the last three ("Strategic Weapons Delivery (Prototype)", "Military Space Platform", and "Satellite Interceptor") fall in the category of possible rather than currently planned objectives.

The Department requests appropriate reporting concerning local activities in the outer space field and significant local reaction to United States and Soviet Union outer space efforts.

**Dillon**

---

**459. Editorial Note**

In conformity with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met in New York May 6-June 25. Although five designated members, Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United Arab Republic, declined to participate, the committee established legal and technical committees of the whole to consider various aspects of the use of outer space. The United States was represented by Ambassador Lodge, Loftus Becker (Legal Committee), and Hugh L. Dryden (Technical Committee). For text of the report of the committee to the 14th session of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted June 25, see U.N. doc. A/4141.

**460. Position Paper Prepared for the Fourteenth Regular Session  
of the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

SD/A/C.1/491

Washington, September 9, 1959.

(PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD  
OF OUTER SPACE)

*The Problem*

The General Assembly will have before it the report prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which was established by the last General Assembly in resolution 1348 (XIII). This report covers:

- a. The activities and resources of the UN, its specialized agencies, and other international bodies relating to the peaceful uses of outer space;
- b. The area of international cooperation and programs in the peaceful uses of outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices;
- c. The future organizational arrangements which might be established within the framework of the UN to facilitate international cooperation in this field; and
- d. The nature of the legal problems arising as a consequence of the exploration and use of outer space.

The Assembly must decide what action should be taken on this report and the nature and extent of future UN activities in this field.

*United States Position*

1. The United States should take the view that the peaceful uses of outer space should continue to be considered separately from the disarmament aspects.

2. The United States should make every effort to keep the discussion of this item on an objective, non-political basis, seeking if possible to obtain unanimous action on this item.

3. The United States, with representative cosponsors, should introduce a draft resolution which:

- a. *accepts* the report of the Ad Hoc Committee;
- b. *calls for* the establishment of a General Assembly Committee whose members would serve until the Sixteenth General Assembly to:

(1) Review, as appropriate, the subject matters entrusted by the General Assembly to the Ad Hoc Committee established in resolution 1348 (XIII);

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 71 D 440, 14th GA. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text.



(2) Study practical and feasible means for giving effect to programs of international cooperation including those indicated by the Ad Hoc Committee in its report under paragraph 1 (b) of the resolution;

(3) Consider means, as appropriate, for studying and resolving legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of programs for the exploration of outer space;

(4) Report, annually, to the General Assembly on its activities in implementation of the foregoing;

c. *requests* the Secretary General to organize a small unit within the Secretariat which will in concert with the Committee provide a focal point for facilitating international cooperation with respect to outer space activities undertaken by governments, specialized agencies, and international scientific organizations; and provide appropriate assistance as the Committee may require.

4. The United States should be prepared to consult with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after consultations with our key allies, on the composition of such a committee. The proposals to be made and the tactics to be pursued are contained in the discussion section.

#### *Comment*

At the Thirteenth General Assembly, the United States, together with nineteen other states, sponsored a resolution on the peaceful uses of outer space. The resolution established an Ad Hoc Committee of eighteen members to provide the next General Assembly with information it needed in order to proceed with measures designed to further international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The United States, in submitting the original agenda item on the peaceful uses of outer space, explained that it believed that the disarmament aspects of outer space could be dealt with separately, and that failure to make progress in this area should not be permitted to prevent the United Nations from taking constructive action on the peaceful uses of outer space. The Soviet Union, which had submitted a separate proposal linking the peaceful uses of outer space to disarmament and to the question of overseas military bases, eventually agreed to deal only with the peaceful uses aspect. The ensuing discussion revealed that there was no real disagreement in substance between the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The key question arose with respect to the composition of the committee that would begin substantive work. The Soviet Union insisted that there must be balanced representation from the Soviet bloc and the free world ("parity"). The United States insisted that the committee should be composed on a representative basis, taking appropriate account of technical capacity. The General Assembly

adopted this approach and on December 13, 1958, established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, consisting of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

Following this action by the Assembly, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Poland all announced that, although they had been named to this committee, they would not participate in its work.

Prior to the convening of the committee in the spring of 1959, the United States endeavored unsuccessfully to convince the Soviet Union to participate. India and the UAR, after extensive consultations, also decided not to attend. They argued that the matter had now become a "cold-war" exercise. They also contended that without the U.S.S.R. the committee could not carry out its mandate.

In May 1959, the committee began its work with thirteen of the eighteen members participating. Space scientists, legal experts and others, combined their efforts in committee and sub-committee discussions which lasted over a month. The resulting report, which fully carried out each of the directives of the resolution, was adopted unanimously and is now before the Fourteenth General Assembly.

The report is objective and factual. It was drafted in such a way as to leave political decisions to the General Assembly. It has been reported that the Soviet Union does not consider the report to be objectionable. However, if a resolution which states that the General Assembly "accepts" the Ad Hoc Committee's report should prove to be an obstacle in obtaining Soviet agreement, the United States should propose that the General Assembly "notes" rather than "accepts" the report. (First word, sixth preambulatory paragraph, subparagraph (1) of the draft resolution.)

The crucial issue will undoubtedly continue to be the problem of composition of any United Nations body in this field. Although the U.S.S.R. may continue to insist upon "parity", the United States cannot accept "parity" because (a) we cannot accept the proposition that the world is divided into two equal power blocs for this concept denies the basic Charter principle of the equality of all members, and runs counter to the principle of geographical representation; and (b) it ignores the fact that the peaceful uses of outer space are of interest to all of the members of the United Nations and that many states are involved in outer space activities.

As the achievements of the Soviet Union in this field are outstanding, the United States believes that a committee established by the United Nations to facilitate international cooperation in the field of

the peaceful uses of outer space should reflect somewhat greater Soviet bloc participation than would be warranted on the basis of geographic representation in the United Nations.

In negotiating with the Soviet Union, we should propose a composition of nine free world states (Canada, Japan, US, UK, France, Italy, Australia, and two Latin American states as selected by the Latin American caucus, preferably Mexico, and Brazil or Argentina), four Soviet bloc states (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania) and four neutrals (India, United Arab Republic, Sweden and Yugoslavia), giving a composition of 9-4-4. If this formula is not acceptable to the Soviet Union but there is indication that they are prepared to negotiate in good faith on this question in order to establish a committee, the United States would be prepared to consider some modification of this formula. The Department should be kept currently informed of the progress of negotiations on this question. Because of Mexican participation in Project Mercury, the United States should encourage Mexico to advance its candidacy in the Latin American caucus.

After appropriate consultations with other members of the Assembly, we should be prepared at the proper stage to negotiate composition with the Soviet Union directly in accordance with the tactics outlined above.

The United States, in its initial presentation of this subject in the Committee, should be prepared to indicate specific projects which can be taken up by the Committee once it is established. Such delineation of areas which are appropriate for early consideration and action will serve both to maintain our initiative in this field; and to forestall other, less profitable initiatives.

It should also be made clear that the United States remains ready to discuss the disarmament aspects of outer space within the proper context. The decision to proceed with measures designed to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space recognizes (1) that these two aspects of outer space can be considered separately, and (2) that purposeful action in the area of peaceful uses need not await solution of the complex problems relating to disarmament.

**[Attachment]**

**DRAFT RESOLUTION**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recognizing the common interest of mankind as a whole in furthering the peaceful use of outer space,*

*Believing* that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind,

*Desiring* to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new frontier,

*Noting* the continuing programs of scientific cooperation in the exploration of outer space undertaken by the international scientific community,

*Believing* that the report prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in implementation of Resolution 1348 (XIII), provides useful information for future international cooperation in this field,

*Believing also* that the United Nations should continue to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space,

1. *Accepts* the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space;

2. *Expresses* the appreciation of the General Assembly to the scientific and legal experts who participated in the preparation of this report;

3. *Establishes* a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, consisting of: \_\_\_\_\_<sup>2</sup> (states) whose members will serve until the Sixteenth General Assembly to:

a. Review, as appropriate, the subject matters entrusted by the General Assembly to the Ad Hoc Committee established in Resolution 1348 (XIII);

b. Study practical and feasible means for giving effect to programs of international cooperation including those indicated by the Ad Hoc Committee in its report under paragraph 1 (b) of the resolution;

c. Consider means, as appropriate, for studying and resolving legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of programs in the exploration of outer space;

d. Report to succeeding General Assemblies on its activities in implementation of the foregoing;

4. *Requests* the Secretary General to organize a small unit within the Secretariat which will in concert with the Committee provide a focal point for facilitating international cooperation with respect to outer space activities undertaken by governments, specialized agencies, and international scientific organizations; and render appropriate assistance to the Committee.

---

<sup>2</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

#### 461. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, September 18, 1959—1 p.m.*

Delga 16. Re: Outer Space. Successful Soviet moon shot<sup>2</sup> coinciding with start of Khrushchev visit to US<sup>3</sup> can be expected to give added impetus and urgency to demands for international action to regulate activities in outer space. To date, US has provided leadership in UN consideration of space question, and our efforts have borne sound fruit in report of UN ad hoc committee. We will also face difficult problem in negotiations with USSR at this GA on composition of continuing UN body to deal with space problems. Believe it would be greatly to US advantage again to take lead, on substantive as well as other aspects of outer space item in 14th GA.

Accordingly, recommend for Department's consideration following elements for inclusion in US presentation;

1. Celestial bodies: Successful moon shot is great achievement and will be followed by ever-increasing and expanding ventures in space exploration. Now that international community is thus on threshold of space age, US proposes that nations of world follow up their recognition that man's entry into outer space is a concern of Earth as a whole by adopting practical measures to promote scientific progress in harmony among the nations. Specifically, US proposes that (a) exploration and activities in connection with celestial bodies shall not lead to claims of sovereignty by any nation; (b) that such bodies in outer space shall be considered as open to all on a non-exclusive basis so long as a particular planned activity would not interfere with some other project already undertaken; (c) that an international clearing-house be set up for consultation on all activities be undertaken only after consultation through this clearing-house and in a spirit of harmonious cooperativeness. US suggests that continuing UN body to be set up by GA give early attention to working out of suitable steps and arrangements in implementation of these proposals.

2. Identification and registration of all satellite launchings. US believes UN body should also study means for providing appropriate system of identification for all objects placed in orbit around Earth. Here again international clearing-house could be useful mechanism. US also proposes consultation through [UN body.?] Such consultation could aid in operating identification system and in avoiding cluttering of tracking devices. UN body could also usefully consider means that

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/9-1859. Confidential. Herter was in New York for the 14th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly.

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union launched Lunik II on September 12 and it struck the Moon on the following day.

<sup>3</sup> Documentation on Khrushchev's visit to the United States, September 15-27, is scheduled for publication in volume x.

might be adopted for removal of spent objects from orbit or at least termination of their radio transmissions when purpose fulfilled and usefulness ended.

3. Liability. US proposes study of practical measures to deal with instances that may occur of damage caused by accidents involving space vehicles. Such study could be undertaken by continuing UN body or by group of experts which might be recommended by UN body.

4. Disarmament aspects. US along with other countries has long recognized problem of potential uses of outer space for weapons purposes. US nearly three years ago proposed study of means to assure use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. It is our belief that such study should be undertaken in connection with other questions of disarmament where problem of inspection to verify compliance with obligations is common to all. However, US would not make disarmament measures for outer space conditional on agreements elsewhere in disarmament field. And, of course, US does not intend to make other proposals on outer space (outlined in paragraphs 1 to 3 above) dependent on any agreement in disarmament field.

These proposals stand on their own, and independently of each other. US hopes all or at least some of these will continue to give UN activities in space field sound direction; (b) [*sic*] impress upon world statesmanlike and enlightened attitude of US; and (c) identify to USSR with greater particularly [*particularity?*] projects we have in mind for continuing UN body.

Herter

---

462. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, November 4, 1959—8 p.m.*

Delga 326. Re: Outer Space.

1. Lodge spoke this afternoon with Kuznetsov and Sobolev (USSR) and gave them draft resolution for their comments.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-459. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> In a series of meetings during October, the United States discussed its draft resolution (see attachment to Document 460) with other members of the ad hoc committee. The draft given to Kuznetsov was the same in form as the original U.S. draft but contained several wording changes. (Delga 340, November 5; *ibid.*, 320.5701/11-559) Reports on the meetings with the members of the committee are *ibid.*, 320.5701/10-659 through 320.5701/10-3059.

2. After reading text Kuznetsov noted that idea of accepting report of ad hoc committee as well as expression of appreciation to committee for its work was problem for USSR. Any reference dealing with previous committee created difficulties for USSR. For this reason he wondered whether it might not be better to have separate resolutions, one dealing with previous committee and other with any new body and its terms of reference.

3. Kuznetsov pressed us for US views on composition. Lodge said we were entirely satisfied with composition on present committee. Sobolev jokingly said it was "good composition but one-sided". Lodge immediately pointed out we had no satellites on whose votes we could count at all times. Lodge repeated that we liked present composition but were not unwilling to consider other possibilities; otherwise we would not be entering into negotiations. Kuznetsov recalled Soviet proposal of last year on composition and also noted that new 10-nation disarmament group and composition of conference on surprise attack, both of which involved parity, were satisfactory to US. Sobolev added that USSR liked this principle. Lodge recalled that last year USSR had objected to certain states, such as Brazil, Australia, and Belgium. Kuznetsov brushed this point aside. However, after Lodge recalled that USSR had been opposed to inclusion of countries with which it did not have diplomatic relations, Sobolev volunteered that this was only one consideration and noted problem had now been resolved with respect Australia. Kuznetsov thought it was difficult to discuss specific countries and preferable to exchange views on basis of principles.

4. Kuznetsov questioned wisdom of operative paragraph 4. He thought it was not proper time to organize or set up other bodies to deal with outer space or to go into details such as would be involved in creation of small unit in Secretariat. It was better to concentrate on committee. Other ideas should be considered later after more fundamental points were resolved.

5. Kuznetsov specifically requested US views on possibility of separate resolutions on present committee and on future arrangements. Lodge said personally he did not think was unreasonable suggestion but would have to refer it to Washington for instructions.

6. Kuznetsov recalled reference in his general debate speech to international scientific conference and gave us draft resolution (transmitted by separate telegram<sup>3</sup>) covering Soviet proposal. Lodge said we were favorably disposed toward idea of international conference and would study resolution. However, he wondered whether this idea needed to be dealt with separately since it could be included in over-

---

<sup>3</sup> Text of this draft was transmitted in Delga 327 from USUN, November 4. (*Ibid.*, 320.7501/11-459)

all resolution. Kuznetsov thought separate resolution definitely preferable. (Department will note advisory committee in Soviet text reflects parity.)

7. We agreed meet again after USSR has had opportunity to study our text and we have received instructions on Soviet points.

8. Department's comments and instructions requested. We are planning to inform members on outer space group of this conversation tomorrow and will report their reactions.

Lodge

---

**463. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 6, 1959—7:02 p.m.*

Gadel 93. Re Outer Space (Delgas 326, 327, 340).<sup>2</sup> Pending receipt from Kuznetsov of specific comments on our text, Department transmits following interim guidance:

1. Our impression is that Soviets wish separate conference proposal from question of Committee and future arrangements. In this way Soviets could press hard for unanimous adoption of their conference proposal which would be clearly identified as Soviet initiative. Moreover, separating out conference proposal in another resolution would appear give Soviets freer hand to oppose or not support our resolution relating to Committee's work and future arrangements and thereby not jeopardize directly in one and same resolution conference proposal made by Soviets themselves. It would also lead to voting situation in which Afro-Asians could more easily vote for conference resolution as generally-supported affirmative measure on international cooperation in outer space while abstaining on US resolution, which would thus receive much smaller majority. In our resolution, Outer Space Committee is given job of making necessary arrangements for conference. As indicated in Gadel 70,<sup>3</sup> we are prepared include such language as means making Soviet participation in future work of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-659. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco on November 5; cleared by Meeker, Nunley, and Gathright; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 326 is *supra*; regarding Delgas 327 and 340, see footnotes 2 and 3, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Gadel 70, October 28, transmitted instructions and specific language on the question of an international scientific conference on outer space. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/10-1959)



Outer Space Committee more attractive since Committee, among other things, would have task of implementing Soviet proposal for conference.

2. Department believes therefore you should insist for time being at least that all three elements (Committee report, future arrangements, and conference) be included in same resolution. If Soviets voice serious objections to inclusion of references to ad hoc committee in resolution you may (a) drop preambular paragraph 5 of our resolution; (b) eliminate word "*accepts*" and substitute word "*notes*" in operative paragraph 1; and (c) drop operative paragraph 2. You are further authorized at your discretion and if necessary to suggest that we would be willing break up three principal elements into parts A, B and C of one resolution. This would give Soviets certain amount of separation between Committee report on one hand and future arrangements on other. We recognize there are other ways to do this and Department does not at this stage wish preclude other possibilities. As we see it, separation of elements is not crux of problem. Crux is whether Soviets intend try to find acceptable composition formula, such as that indicated US position paper, as basis on which they would be willing participate in Outer Space Committee. Naturally, if Soviets first agree to participate in Outer Space Committee based on reasonable composition, question of form of resolution, one or several, is secondary. We note Kuznetsov said it was better to concentrate first on question of Outer Space Committee. We agree with this.

3. With respect to resolution contained Delga 327, Department authorizes you to include in our own resolution all preambular paragraphs. We can accept operative paragraph one if words "*interested states*" are replaced by words "*members of UN or specialized agencies*". We cannot accept second operative paragraph which establishes Advisory Committee based on parity. Operative paragraph 3 obviously is superfluous in light of language in our text re arrangements for international scientific conference. As you are aware, we attach great importance to avoiding hard parity and believe stongly that Outer Space Committee with reasonable composition should be group that is given job of making arrangements for conference.

Herter

464. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New York, November 14, 1959—2 p.m.

Delga 429. Reference: Outer Space.

1. Kuznetsov came to see Lodge this noon. At outset he repeated USSR desired two resolutions. First would deal with international scientific conference; second with composition and terms reference of new committee. They reiterated Soviet desire to establish committee. Second resolution could be based on US text which was in principle acceptable except for references to 1958 ad hoc committee. Kuznetsov gave US revised text contained Delga 430.<sup>2</sup>

2. Lodge replied we could probably reach agreement easily on other points, provided we solved composition problem.

3. After short exchange in which Kuznetsov sought our views on composition first, he put forward Soviet proposal. He said USSR did not think committee should be "big". Membership should be based on understanding "interested countries should be present" and there should not be any "discrimination".

4. Thereafter Kuznetsov made two specific proposals. First would include US; UK; France; three additional countries "on recommendation of Western Powers"; UAR; India; USSR; five additional countries "on recommendation of socialist countries". Second listed same countries but provided for four countries "on recommendation of Western Powers" and five<sup>3</sup> members "on recommendation of socialist countries".

5. Sobolev added "of course, if US were prepared to accept committee smaller than fourteen that would be agreeable", and they would be glad to have our proposal.

6. Lodge saw problem in dropping off members of previous committee and thought UN reaction to Soviet proposals would therefore be bad. Both Sobolev and Kuznetsov immediately rejoined their proposals did not "drop" anybody. They were just disregarding previous committee which "after all had been established for one year badly [only?]" In same way new committee proposed by USSR had two-year term, after which membership would be subject to revision.

7. Lodge suggested it might make better impression in UN if we began with last year's list, to which we could add Romania and Bulgaria. Kuznetsov immediately said this "wouldn't work" since it would mean "same discrimination in composition" as before. Sobolev

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-1459. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Dated November 14. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> On November 16, Lodge cabled that the number five should be changed to six. (Delga 435; *ibid.*)

stressed we were now talking about new committee since ad hoc committee's term had been for one year only, there should be nothing embarrassing about considering entirely new body.

8. Lodge said although legally speaking Sobolev was correct, practically speaking this would mean cutting people out. He thought best way to proceed now was for him to put Soviet suggestions up to our group and obtain their views. He would ask them specifically how they would feel about being dropped from new committee.

9. At close of conversation Kuznetsov emphasized USSR was willing to cooperate and that its desire was to reach agreement.

10. We agreed meet again as soon as we had opportunity consult our group and obtain their views.

11. Department will note that Soviet proposals involve 6-6-2 and 7-7-2 proportions. We asked them directly whether "on recommendation of socialist countries" meant only countries allied with them, and Kuznetsov confirmed this interpretation. We believe this is first bargaining position. USSR probably aiming for agreement on so-called "soft parity".

12. On Soviet initiative we agreed not to inform press of meeting. However, we said that, although we would urge our group not to leak any information to press, we feared something might come out after we met with them.<sup>4</sup>

**Lodge**

---

<sup>4</sup> On November 16, Lodge met with the 12 other country representatives who had participated in the ad hoc committee. In the discussion, a consensus emerged in favor of expanding the committee and there was complete agreement that parity was "totally unacceptable." (Delga 446 from USUN, November 16; *ibid.*, 320.5701/11-1659)

**465. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 20, 1959.*

SUBJECT

United Nations Outer Space Committee Composition Negotiations

*Discussion*

Our U.N. Delegation has been negotiating with the USSR, in consultation with our allies, concerning the composition of the U.N. Outer Space Committee. The position paper<sup>2</sup> prepared for our Delegation's use authorized a composition of 9 (Western), 4 (Soviet), and 4 (neutrals). It was indicated in this paper, however, that if the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate seriously, we would be prepared to consider other proposals. As a consequence of consultations with our allies and other members of the former ad hoc committee on outer space, our Delegation has maintained the position that the composition of an outer space committee should have as its base those countries which were members of last year's committee, which had a composition of 12 Western, 3 Soviets and 3 neutrals.

Kuznetsov, after first making a series of obviously unacceptable proposals of parity or near parity, suggested to our Mission yesterday a composition of either 12 Western, 9 Soviets and 4 neutrals, or 11 Western, 8 Soviets and 3 neutrals.<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Lodge indicated that we might be able to consider a composition of 11-6-4 or 12-8-3 or 12-9-2. Both negotiators said they would seek instructions. Ambassador Lodge now recommends that he be authorized to offer 12-8-4 on the understandings that (1) Hungary will not be a member and that Soviet insistence on Hungary would be a breaking point, and that (2) two of the four "neutrals" would be taken from among Austria, Ireland, Jordan, Malaya, Sweden and Tunisia.

All of the various formulas referred to in Delga 487 (Tab A)<sup>4</sup> would provide the Soviet Union with a highly disproportionate share of the representation in comparison with the concept of equitable geographic representation. (The Soviet bloc forms slightly less than

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-2059. Confidential. Drafted by Cargo and Grand and initialed by Wilcox.

<sup>2</sup> Document 460.

<sup>3</sup> Lodge reported on this meeting in Delga 487, November 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-1959)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3 above.

1/8 of the total membership of the United Nations.) While we have recognized that the formation of a U.N. Outer Space Committee will require some departure from proportionate geographic representation in a direction favorable to the USSR, this should be held to a reasonable minimum. The formula of 12-8-4, recommended by Ambassador Lodge, is open to the objection that the Soviet bloc would emerge with a disproportionate number of seats, 8 out of 24. Moreover, we question the desirability, both on its merits and as a precedent of including virtually all of the Soviet bloc members in the membership of a U.N. committee. We therefore think the direction of our negotiating effort should now be to reduce the number of Soviet bloc states being considered in the various formulas which have been advanced and to increase the number of states which would fall in the so-called "neutral" segment. This would serve both to reflect more adequately the true geographic representation of the U.N. and to improve the voting margin which the Western countries would have in the Committee.

#### *Recommendation*

It is recommended that our Delegation be authorized to propose a composition of 12 Western, 5 Soviets and 6 neutrals, and that, as a fall-back position, the Delegation be authorized to accept a composition of 12 Western, 6 Soviets and 5 neutrals. It is further recommended that we advise our Delegation that, as a tactical move to seek a reduction in the number of Soviet bloc members, the Delegation should initially propose a composition of 11 Western, 4 Soviets and 6 neutrals. In any of these formulas we would, of course, insist upon a reasonable share of "friendly" neutrals along the line of Ambassador Lodge's recommendation in paragraph 13 of Delga 487. Our Delegation should also be instructed to make clear to the Soviets that we would not be prepared to accept Hungary in any formula for composition.<sup>5</sup>

#### *Concurrences*

S/AE—see attached memo (Tab B)<sup>6</sup>

EUR—Mr. Kohler<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Herter initialed his approval on the source text.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. In it Farley recommended that the 9-4-4 position be explored with the Soviet Union with the aim of keeping membership on the committee as low as possible. In a handwritten notation on the memorandum, Wilcox stated that eliminating three friendly governments was not politically feasible and would cost dearly at the United Nations.

<sup>7</sup> Mr. Kohler made his concurrence in this memorandum subject to his view that the position recommended above should be the "absolute maximum position and that we are prepared to break off if not accepted." [Footnote in the source text. Below this note Herter had written: "I concur in above."]

**466. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 23, 1959—6:16 p.m.*

Gadel 138. Re: Outer Space, Delga 487.<sup>2</sup> For Lodge from Secretary.

1. Although Dept recognizes Kuznetsov's composition proposals outlined reftel represent first serious offer re composition from Soviet's since beginning GADel's negotiations this GA, we believe all formulae contained reftel would provide USSR with highly disproportionate share of representation, in comparison with concept of equitable geographic representation. Moreover in context outer space question it is demonstrable fact that nations other than those possessing satellite launching capability are making meaningful contribution to international cooperation in peaceful uses outer space.

2. Dept prepared, in order obtain USSR participation UN outer space committee, make departure from strict proportionate geographic representation in direction favorable USSR but we believe this must be held reasonable minimum. Moreover, question desirability both on merits and as precedent of including virtually all Soviet bloc in membership of any UN committee.

3. In light foregoing GADel should now direct negotiating effort toward reducing number of Soviet bloc states in various formulae which have been advanced and of increasing number of states which would fall in so-called neutral category. As first step for this purpose we recommend that you advance composition proposal of 11 Western, 4 Soviet and 6 neutrals.

4. If proposal para 3 above not accepted, GADel authorized propose composition of 12 Western, 5 Soviet and 6 neutrals and as fallback should accept composition of 12 Western, 6 Soviet and 5 neutrals. FYI Fallback position as I now see it is maximum and if not acceptable to USSR we see no alternative but to break off negotiations on this point. End FYI.

5. If any formulae indicated paras 3 and 4 above accepted, GADel should insist upon reasonable share of friendly neutrals along lines outlined para 13, Delga 487. GADel should also make clear to USSR we will not accept Hungary in any agreed to composition formula.

**Herter**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-1959. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cargo and Grand on November 21, cleared by Wilcox and Kohler, and approved by Calhoun who signed for Herter. Repeated to Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, *supra*.

**467. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, November 24, 1959—2 p.m.*

Delga 517. Re: Outer Space; Gadel 138.<sup>2</sup>

1. I believe it would be undesirable for me to speak to Kuznetsov about composition problem on basis Dept's latest instructions. If this was our position we should not have started to negotiate at all. In light of conversations I have already had with him it is clear that USSR will not agree to any composition placing combined Soviet bloc and neutral members in unfavorable proportion to countries associated with US.

2. However, if we are in position to accept comite of 24 composed on 12-6-6 basis (which we have some indications may be acceptable to Soviet Union), I can see tactical reasons for moving to this proposal in stages. It could help US maintain satisfactory relation between Communists and neutrals. At same time I believe we should not prolong negotiations by sticking now on proposal we know is unacceptable. To do so risks embarrassing public disclosures by Kuznetsov re earlier discussions which could seriously affect our position with other delts.

3. I therefore recommend I be authorized to proceed as fols:

A. Propose as first step 12-5-6.

B. When Kuznetsov rejects this, suggest 12-6-5.

C. Assuming Kuznetsov again responds negatively, indicate that in interest of reaching agreement we are prepared agree on comite of 24 members. In this way we would appear reasonable in agreeing to size of comite proposed by Khrushchev and could take precisely same line as reported in Delga 487 that only question remaining is what states should be members. I would then go on to propose composition of 12-6-6. I think we have definitely reached point where any proposal should be specific. Therefore I believe I should propose list including 12 present members of comite (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, US, UK, France, Japan, Iran); 6 neutrals (India, UAR, Sweden, Austria, Tunisia, Malaya); and 6 Communist states (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania).

4. I recognize that this formula gives Soviet Union disproportionate share of representation. My estimate is that it will nevertheless be acceptable to other UN members who are anxious to obtain Soviet participation and who want a UN body on outer space. If negotiations break down on 12-6-6 proposal, we are in strong public position. If

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-2459. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

this should happen, I believe we should put this composition into our res and go ahead with it. In such circumstances I think Soviet Union would be in extremely vulnerable position and we could expect other UN members to put pressure on them to participate.<sup>3</sup>

Lodge

---

<sup>3</sup> On November 25, in a telegram cleared by Wilcox, Kohler, and Herter, Lodge was authorized to accept 12-6-6 as the final U.S. position. (Gadel 146; Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-2459)

---

**468. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, November 26, 1959—2 p.m.*

Delga 544. Re: Outer Space.

1. Pursuant to Gadel 146<sup>2</sup> Lodge made appointment for noon today with Kuznetsov. Lodge told Kuznetsov US could accept comite of 24 on basis 12-6-6 and was prepared, as indicated in Khrushchev statement,<sup>3</sup> to discuss individual members of 24-member comite. Lodge gave him proposed membership.

2. Kuznetsov immediately expressed surprise that our position had changed since last meeting when it seemed to USSR we were only one state apart since USSR proposed 12-9-3 and Lodge had mentioned 12-9-2. Total of 24 was all right. He asked why we willing accept only six Eastern European countries, which he described as "step backward". Lodge replied it seemed to US from UN standpoint this represented approximately right proportion. We pointed out in fact this was far more favorable proportion than total of nine in comparison with 82 UN members and that US had gone considerable distance in accepting 24.

3. Kuznetsov asked whether we could add Hungary, Ukraine and Byelorussia and drop three neutrals. Lodge said immediately Hungary not acceptable and that its inclusion would not make good impression in US. Kuznetsov noted US had diplomatic relations with Hungary

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-2659. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> At the meeting on November 19, Kuznetsov read a statement by Khrushchev agreeing to a 24-member committee and leaving its composition to be the subject of mutual agreement. (Delga 487 from USUN, November 19; Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-1959)



and Hungarians would welcome visit from Lodge. Lodge repeated we certainly could not take Hungary now. Kuznetsov argued whether we liked particular countries was not right way approach membership problem. There were countries among present 12 which Soviet Union did not particularly like.

4. Kuznetsov turned to neutrals. After indicating India, UAR and Sweden were acceptable, he rejected Tunisia and Malaya as not "very neutral". Better countries, he said, would be Iraq, Indonesia, Finland or Afghanistan. Lodge emphasized we were flexible on choice of neutrals and thought possibly we could agree to substitute Finland and Iraq for Tunisia and Malaya, respectively. Both Kuznetsov and Sobolev said inclusion of six neutrals would not work because it meant too large a proportion of neutrals. Kuznetsov went on to say we should recognize only two countries, US and USSR, actually making contributions to progress in outer space, and there should be parity recognizing this fact. He also observed Byelorussia and Ukraine were doing comprehensive work in outer space.

5. When Sobolev began to press 12-9-3 again, Lodge said we had made our proposal on basis Khrushchev statement that composition of 24 was to be worked out by mutual agreement. Kuznetsov consulted his own papers and confirmed our interpretation.

6. Continuing discussion about neutrals, Kuznetsov said while neutrals meant countries not committed to any military bloc, plain fact was on majority of problems, many of these countries were on Western side. When Lodge pointed out that many abstained, Kuznetsov retorted this did not help Soviet Union either.

7. Kuznetsov said they would think over our proposal and consult Moscow. Meantime he wondered about our thoughts on reses, particularly res on international conference. Lodge said we agreed in principle on idea of conference but could not accept comite constituted as Soviet res proposed. We thought outer space comite should have this task. Kuznetsov said it was acceptable to him but he would have to take it up with Moscow. Lodge suggested conference might be included as second part of basic res and Kuznetsov seemed favorably disposed toward this idea.

8. Kuznetsov said two of ad hoc comite's recommendations, consultative comite for SYG and small unit in Secretariat, were not acceptable. At this stage both were premature, as well as question of setting up particular subcomites. All work should be concentrated in comite which could consider all subjects and make recommendations. He emphasized, however, Soviet opposition to these ideas now did not mean Soviet Union would necessarily be against such proposals in future; comite should work these ideas out. He asked whether US wanted separate res on ad hoc comite. Lodge said we would not insist upon it but other members might.

9. Kuznetsov asked whether we could not jointly work on perfecting texts of reses while we were still engaged in discussions of composition. We agreed do this.

10. Before meeting Kuznetsov Lodge told Dixon (UK) what we planned do. Dixon thought proposal all right, but after hearing list commented UK did not like Albania but would go along.

Lodge

---

**469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 30, 1959—9:03 p.m.*

Gadel 154. Re Outer Space (Delga 560<sup>2</sup>).

1. As stated Gadel 146<sup>3</sup> we are unwilling go beyond 12-6-6 formulation in order achieve agreement with Soviets on UN Outer Space Committee. We believe this is reasonable proposal which is wholly defensible in public forum and should receive substantial support in resolution. You should therefore once again reiterate firmly to Kuznetsov that we will not go beyond this proposal even if it means break in negotiations. 12-7-5, 12-8-4 and 12-9-3 are unacceptable.

2. You should focus discussion on size of Soviet bloc representation and Soviet insistence on more than six as inequitable and totally unacceptable. While not changing our position on Hungary you should subordinate this issue basic question of total size of Soviet contingent.

FYI If break with Soviets necessary, Department wishes issue be Soviet insistence on gross over-representation and not inclusion of Hungary. If Soviets were to accept 12-6-6, but insist on Hungary, we would wish examine this question further with our Allies. End FYI.

3. As to Soviet unwillingness to agree to Tunisia and Malaya, you authorized accept substitution of Finland for Tunisia but you should continue insist on inclusion Malaya.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11-2859. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and cleared with Kohler, Wilcox, and Farley. Approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 560, November 28, reported on a meeting that day between Lodge and Kuznetsov at which Kuznetsov argued for 12-9-3 or 12-8-4 composition while Lodge made clear that his instructions did not permit him to go beyond 12-6-6. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 467.

4. Re cosponsorship believe you should insist on small representative group on ground that there are number of other states who have interest in this matter other than US and USSR. Department continues believe that you should press for maintaining all three elements (reference to work of Ad Hoc Committee, establishment Outer Space Committee and Conference) in one resolution. We believe Delga 558<sup>4</sup> does this satisfactorily. If it appears agreement will be achieved, we could agree on separating out element relating to past work of Ad Hoc Committee. We believe continued insistence on inclusion Conference and UN outer space proposals in one resolution tactically desirable.

5. Department attaches considerable importance to Conference participation being limited to UN members or members of specialized agencies. Soviets should not be given any reason to believe otherwise.

6. Department will send you specific comments on resolution in Delga 558 as soon as we have completed our study.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

<sup>4</sup> Delga 558, November 28, transmitted the text of a draft resolution which Lodge had given to Kuznetsov on November 28. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>5</sup> Apparently this had already been done, since Gadel 153, sent at 7:28 p.m. on November 30, transmitted specific comments on the draft resolution. (*Ibid.*)

---

**470. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, December 2, 1959—11 p.m.*

Delga 598. Re: Outer Space.

1. Kuznetsov asked to see Lodge this afternoon. After welcoming what he termed "little step forward from your side", namely that countries from EE side should be recommended by USSR, Kuznetsov proposed formula of 12-7-5, including as neutrals Sweden, UAR, India, Indonesia and Iraq, and omitting Byelorussia and Ukraine.

2. Lodge replied immediately he had no authority beyond 12-6-6 composition but would of course report proposal to Washington.

3. Kuznetsov recalled that when we had emphasized problem we would have in eliminating any of present twelve members, USSR had given matter thorough consideration and had responded favorably. He

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-259. Confidential; Priority.

wanted us to know same problem caused USSR "very big headache" with respect to EE countries. Lodge noted USSR had not proposed 7 EE countries last year. However, he could see how it might be easier to omit Byelorussia and Ukraine. Sobolev and Kuznetsov confirmed that this was something which could be managed but to eliminate any other EE countries was real problem.

4. Lodge repeated U.S. did not wish go beyond 6 EE countries. He also observed [8 words not declassified]. He recalled Austria and Finland had been on previous list.

5. Sobolev pointed out Austria and Finland both European countries, and USSR considered European representation on comite was already too heavy in comparison with other regions such as Asia and Africa.

6. Lodge said we thought Malaya was excellent Asian neutral. Kuznetsov reminded us USSR had already said it was unacceptable. Lodge asked about substituting Jordan for Iraq. Kuznetsov immediately responded negatively and suggested Guinea. Lodge noted Guinea was unknown quantity. We did not pursue subject further.

7. Lodge repeated he would consult Washington and get in touch as soon as possible.

8. We have now just about run out of time in discussions with USSR prior to commencement of debate on outer space.

9. There is one further proposal we could make, while adhering to 2-1-1 ratio. This would be to propose 14-7-7 to USSR. Colombia and Uruguay, for example, could be added to our 12 (LAS would be under-represented in 24-member comite); and neutrals we could propose might be India, UAR, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Malaya, and Indonesia.

10. This composition would dispose of evident difficulty USSR claims it has in dropping one satellite. In return USSR might be persuaded agree to Malaya, to which they have so far objected. If necessary, I would be prepared take Burma instead of Malaya.

11. Above formula would produce comite of 28, which is admittedly over-large. However, this is also true of 24, and addition of 4 more members does not make a crucial difference. It retains balance favorable to us.

12. In order avoid collapse of negotiations when gap is narrow, recommend I be authorized proceed as above indicated. Believe it is in our interest do this rather than begin comite discussion with composition issue unsettled, at which point we could expect third parties seek to find common ground between USSR and U.S. This course might confront U.S. with clearly unacceptable proposals for composition in

circumstances where it would be much more difficult to demonstrate that it was Soviet intransigence that blocked agreement on composition.

Lodge

---

471. **Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge), December 7, 1959, 10:30 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador Lodge telephoned with regard to the composition of the Outer Space Committee. Lodge said he wanted to be sure that the Secretary and others in the Department were aware of two important factors in this problem, i.e. that we don't have a veto power, and there is a big chance the Assembly will take this over and make a decision against us. Lodge said he thinks in the Department it is felt quite logically that because we have given in on Hungary and 2-1-1, that in the U.N., therefore, they should sympathize with us, but Lodge said as a matter of fact they don't. Lodge said he saw Kuznetsov yesterday and they are very close.<sup>2</sup> Lodge said the tendency will be to take it out of our hands, and he thinks we would be better off agreeing to 12-7-5. Lodge said with this ratio we would keep our list intact because we will always have 13 votes.

The Secretary said what bothers him about the 12-7-5 is that they have their entire Bloc, with the exception of Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine which are phoney, and the neutrals have comparatively little as does the free world. The Secretary said this gives the Soviets a great preponderance and, from their point of view, they have everything.

Amb. Lodge asked if the Secretary had seen his telegram of last night on this, outlining what the Soviets feel they have given on this.<sup>3</sup> Lodge said the Secretary's argument was quite valid but another argument can also be made. Lodge said as far as the public opinion is concerned, we can argue that we can't be outvoted under 12-7-5, and Lodge thinks the 12-7-5 is so close to 12-6-6 that it wouldn't be worth the risk of having Sweden take it out of our hands. On the 5,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Lodge reported on his December 6 meeting with Kuznetsov in Delga 639, December 6. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 320.5701/12-659) The telegram indicated that neither side had changed its position on the composition of the committee.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably another reference to Delga 639.

Lodge said we would have India, Sweden, UAR, Austria and either Finland or Indonesia, [9 words not declassified] Lodge said if we handle it right with the public by listing the countries alphabetically, and giving a press backgrounder to the press putting this in its proper context, he thinks it would be all right.

The Secretary agreed to think the 12-7-5 ratio over and let Lodge know.

---

**472. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 7, 1959—6:01 p.m.*

Gadel 172. For Lodge. Re Outer Space Delga 639.<sup>2</sup> We understand that our allies favor going back to Kuznetsov on 12-7-5 formula.<sup>3</sup> In these circumstances, Department reluctantly concurs.

In view 12-7-5 composition, plus fact Kuznetsov has informed you he willing to accept any neutrals we suggest, Department believes essential that Malaya be included in addition to India, UAR, Sweden and Austria.

Following are Department's instructions re other parts of resolution:

Department insists upon retention language in section B Delga 558 limiting outer space conference to "members of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies". Formulation limited to "UN Members" or "interested states" is clearly unacceptable. Nor are we prepared to leave conference composition to be worked out by new committee. Antarctic Treaty formula does not constitute precedent.

Language relating to legal problems contained Delga 558<sup>4</sup> should be retained in view strong LA feelings.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-659. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Eisendrath and Sisco; cleared by Kohler, Wilcox, and S/AE; and approved and signed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> In a telephone conversation at 1:05 p.m., December 7, Herter suggested to Lodge that he discuss the composition question with the 12 countries which had participated in the ad hoc committee. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) At 4:50 p.m., Lodge called Herter to report that the 12 were unanimous that 12-7-5 should be accepted. (*Ibid.*) Lodge transmitted a detailed report of the meeting with the 12 in Delga 642, December 7. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 320.7501/12-759)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 469.

Dept also leaves to your discretion whether separate resolution or present language Delga 558 is most appropriate for recognition work of Ad Hoc Committee.

Herter

---

473. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 9, 1959—1:36 p.m.*

Gadel 176. For Lodge. Re Outer Space Delga 658.<sup>2</sup> Evident that negotiations have reached crisis point. On assumption Austria is fourth neutral, as indicated Delga 658, agreement to Indonesia as fifth neutral would leave too narrow margin in Committee on questions relating to ChiComs. Such composition would put almost intolerable pressure on Austria. Moreover, we see no useful purpose to be served in seeking commitment from Sweden since in Department's judgment commitment of type described in recommendation 3 Delga 658 would not be forthcoming, or if it was, it unlikely to be supported by Swedish public opinion, given fact Sweden recognizes Communist China.

It clear that Soviet objective is to create situation in Committee and/or Conference where some form of ChiCom participation can be achieved, or at least create situation where West German and ChiCom participation can be bargained.

In light these considerations and those outlined in detail in Gadel 174,<sup>3</sup> Department cannot accept Indonesia as fifth neutral and we must continue insist upon UN member and Specialized Agency formula for Conference. Following, therefore, are further instructions for your next meeting with Kuznetsov.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-859. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Kohler, Wilcox, FE, and S/AE; and approved and signed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 658, December 8, reported in detail on a meeting between Lodge and Kuznetsov during the afternoon. Lodge started by agreeing on the 12-7-5 formula providing all other issues were settled first. A lengthy and unproductive discussion followed. At the end of the cable, Lodge recommended accepting Indonesia if Austria was the fourth neutral and suggested that this appeared to give the United States a safe margin on the Chinese representation question. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Gadel 174, December 8, provided Lodge with instructions for his next meeting with Kuznetsov. (*Ibid.*, 320.5701/12-759)

1. You should inform Kuznetsov that negotiations have reached crisis stage and you want to be sure he fully realizes this. He should understand that we have not agreed to 12-7-5 and agreement is possible on this formula only if satisfactory agreement reached on neutrals and composition of Conference. US agreement to 12-7-5 formula would be major concession which we would be unwilling make unless Soviet reciprocate. US wants to reach agreement, but not at price of making further concessions Kuznetsov should at this point understand that if we cannot reach agreement, we consider all aspects of this question as open, and in particular question of Hungarian participation, which is another offer of major magnitude which we have expressed willingness to make. FYI You may read this paragraph to Kuznetsov if you believe it will have desired effect. End FYI.

2. You should inform him that you cannot accept Indonesia. If Soviets willing accept, however, either Jordan, Liberia, Lebanon or Tunisia as fifth neutral, we would be willing agree to paragraph in resolution minus our desired phraseology on understanding we would arrange for introduction appropriate amendment and campaign vigorously for its adoption. If USSR unwilling cosponsor or to agree to have others cosponsor on basis this understanding, you should indicate US sees no possibility agreement on resolution, since US unwilling abandon "UN member and Specialized Agency" formula which is firmly established in UN tradition, or abandon position on neutrals.

3. You also authorized make following alternative proposals: (a) US would agree to Indonesia on understanding Soviets would agree to have us add one Latin American to list of 12 free world members; or (b) US would agree to Indonesia provided USSR willing add sixth neutral (Jordan, Liberia, Lebanon, all of whom vote affirmatively on Chi Rep, but not Tunisia under this formulation since it abstains). Re (a) above, we do not believe Soviets will accept such proposal. As far as (b) concerned, vote on Chi Rep questions would normally be 14 in favor, 11 against which would provide acceptable margin and avoid putting Austria in position of being crucial balancing vote in any future situation. Of course, possibility of changes must be borne in mind.

Department assumes from Delga 658 that you are confident that amendment on UN Member and Specialized Agency formula as it relates to conference would have required votes in GA. If this not case in your judgment, Department could not agree to having you make proposal contained recommendation 2 of this telegram.

FYI Department undertaking contingency planning for possible break, and in particular development of best arguments as to reasons for break for use with our allies and in public GA forum. Would appreciate any advance thoughts GADel may have in this regard on contingent basis. End FYI.

Herter



474. **Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, December 9, 1959—9 p.m.*

Delga 665. Eyes only for Secretary from Lodge. Re Outer Space.

1. Only issue which now separates US from agreement with Russians on outer space is choice of one neutral state—they will accept Finland or Afghanistan instead of Indonesia, while we propose Lebanon, Jordan or Liberia. Kuznetsov clearly showed today that USSR wanted to reach agreement and join committee. He is prepared to have resolution amended in first comite to assure conference is limited to states members of UN and specialized agencies. (In 6th comite this session identical language received vote of 51-21.)

2. From Gadel 176,<sup>2</sup> especially para 2, I understand sole reason which Dept had for rejecting Indonesia was desire that minimum vote on ChiRep be 12-10 (or 13-10-1 if Tunisia is included) instead of 13-11. I do not think we would be supported in UN if we refused to reach agreement with USSR on this basis and thus perpetuated Soviet boycott of Outer Space Committee. Basis of disagreement would be bound to become public, and majority would resent intrusion of ChiRep issue in case where likelihood of its arising virtually non-existent because China is not member of comite. Moreover if it did, we would have majority of at least 12 to 11 with 1 abstention.

3. Soviet willingness to vote for whole res after adoption of amendment to restrict participation in conference, plus fact China not member of Outer Space Committee, remove only significant ChiRep problems from comite's jurisdiction. Furthermore, comite may only "study" and "review". It cannot act on its own and all its work must go to GA for approval and action. If anything should arise in comite we retain majority there anyway.

4. Finland would be definite gain over Indonesia in all voting except ChiRep [7 words not declassified].

5. In circumstances I recommend we accept this proposal and finish GA with initiative on outer space still in US hands instead of in Soviet hands, as would be case if we break at this point.

If we fail to reach agreement on composition of comite, USSR will submit res on international scientific conference as separate proposal. It seems certain to receive overwhelming support. Conference, publicized as Soviet initiative, would be widely attended and would afford USSR excellent opportunity for Soviet achievements. UN comite pro-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 902.802/12-959. Limited Official Use; Niact; Eyes Only. Received at 9:13 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

posed by US might not be established by GA in view of clear prospect that Soviets and various neutrals would not participate. US would thus be abandoning political initiative in outer space field to USSR.

6. To summarize, I feel the real risks to US position lie in our refusal accept Finland among neutrals rather than in any risks on Chinese question. I urge you consider this again.

Lodge

---

**475. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, December 9, 1959—9 p.m.*

Delga 666. Re: Outer Space.

1. Pursuant Gadel 176.<sup>2</sup> Lodge saw Kuznetsov late this afternoon. He emphasized negotiations had reached crisis point and as authorized read pertinent language from instructions and made proposals para 2, reftel. Kuznetsov immediately characterized US position as "big step backward".

2. Lodge went on to make alternative proposals described para 3 reftel. These were also received dejectedly, Kuznetsov remarking "whole structure is going to fail". He said he could only draw one conclusion: that US did not want agreement. He asked about Finland which had been previously mentioned. Lodge said he was not authorized to accept Finland. Lodge also rejected Iraq and Afghanistan again. Turning to alternative proposals in para 3 reftel, Kuznetsov commented that meant we would have 13, in which case 8 socialist countries should be included.

3. Kuznetsov referred again to issue of participation in conference and urged res not pre-judge matter but leave it to decision in comite. Lodge repeated this was not acceptable. Kuznetsov tried unsuccessfully to argue that Soviet agreement on Austria was on understanding we would agree to such language on conference. Referring to Lodge's comments on representation questions affecting selection of neutrals, Kuznetsov asserted repeatedly comite was not body that would be confronted with ChiRep question. He asked us to consider Afghanistan or Finland instead of Indonesia.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-959. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:01 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Document 473.

4. In response to alternative proposal whereby we would add last state to present 12, Kuznetsov said he would then have to insist on 8 socialist countries and 5 neutrals with Indonesia, Finland or Afghanistan included.

5. Kuznetsov seemed definitely upset and commented sadly that everything was going to fail at last moment because of US position. Actually there would be 13 states on our side at all times, in his view, if not more. He referred to problem of participation in conference and made completely clear that if amendment with standard language were proposed, which he knew would carry easily, USSR would acquiesce and vote for res as amended. However, 5th neutral must be Finland or Afghanistan. He referred again to COSPAR formula and to 5-5 composition of disarmament comite, arguing that these precedents made it difficult to explain Soviet agreement to 12-7-5 in Outer Space Comite.

6. Lodge reviewed in detail various concessions we had made. Kuznetsov enumerated Soviet concessions and contended Soviet agreement to 12-7-5 after initially proposing 6-6-2 was "biggest concession" of all; US had started with 12-3-3.

7. Barco inquired whether, if we were able to accept Finland or Afghanistan as 5th neutral, USSR would agree to standard language in res on participation in conference. Soviet Reps rejected this suggestion, repeating they could not cosponsor res with this language but could acquiesce in amendment procedure. They argued again that it was better to leave this matter to comite. Kuznetsov said if we failed to reach agreement, USSR would submit res on conference separately but recognized even then USSR could not prevent amendment on participation.

8. We agreed to give Washington all Soviet comments and particularly its proposal have Finland or Afghanistan as 5th neutral, together with Soviet acquiescence in amendment procedure on conference participation issue.

9. Conversation was concluded by Kuznetsov saying that if US felt it could not now "go to comite with more or less properly adjusted composition including Finland or Afghanistan or Indonesia," USSR would be obliged to conclude we were not yet ready to have comite. He added that after Soviet Union had agreed with US Reps on 3-3-1 in COSPAR and 5-5 in disarmament group, it was very difficult to understand why US was "so stubborn on this very minor matter."

10. Russians appeared genuinely distressed at prospects our talks were going to collapse and there would be no agreement. They were incredulous when we gave representation issue as basis our position on composition.

**476. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 10, 1959—4:19 p.m.*

Gadel 179. Re Outer Space. Department has studied carefully results your latest discussions with Kuznetsov.<sup>2</sup> Our impression is that Kuznetsov realizes fully we are now at near breaking point. While we appreciate tedious nature discussions and difficulties involved in having to cover same ground over and over again, we nevertheless believe it important for you to follow up your discussion of yesterday by repeating firmly same proposal to Kuznetsov as was made yesterday. We believe Soviets are not in any better position to break on this matter than we are and yesterday's discussion might have shaken Kuznetsov. In your discussion:

1. You should first ask Kuznetsov whether he has anything to say in light yesterday's conversations or has any new proposal to make.

2. After that, you should inform him that you have transmitted results your two discussions with Kuznetsov yesterday and Department position remains as stated yesterday.

3. Indonesia, Finland or Afghanistan as fifth neutral unacceptable. We note in this connection that Kuznetsov had said he fails understand why US was "so stubborn on this very minor matter." We do not view this as minor matter, for reason already stated. If this minor matter and Kuznetsov "incredulous" that ChiCom issue is of central importance, why are Soviets refusing to make concession? We doubt they want an agreement. With exception of Austria (which still appears unsettled, since Soviets are linking it to Conference issue), and possibly Finland, Soviets have not been willing either to accept or propose any neutral which it does not believe to be more favorable to its own viewpoint than to ours. (FYI Those neutrals proposed by Soviets include Indonesia, Finland, Afghanistan, India, UAR, Sweden, all of whom vote negatively on Chinese representation issue. On assumption that Austria and one of our three-named neutrals was accepted, balance of neutrals on basis of Soviet view is three to two in their favor. End FYI.)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-1059. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Farley, Nunley, Wilcox, and FE; and initialed by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*. Lodge also met briefly and without success with Kuznetsov during the morning of December 9. (Delga 669 from USUN, December 9; Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-1059)

4. As minor matter you should recall Kuznetsov has objected to para 1 (iii). Accordingly, believe you should seek modifications previously authorized in Gadel 153.<sup>3</sup>

5. If Soviets put forward no new proposal or are unwilling accept our proposal, you should urge Kuznetsov to seek further instructions.

6. If Kuznetsov does not accept our proposal of yesterday, you authorized at stage you deem appropriate (either at same meeting or at subsequent meeting) to put forth proposal contained in next following telegram.<sup>4</sup>

Herter

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated November 30. (*Ibid.*, 320.5701/11-2859)

<sup>4</sup> Gadel 180, December 10 (4:21 p.m.). (*Ibid.*, 320.7501/12-1059)

---

**477. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, December 10, 1959—9 p.m.*

Delga 677. Re: Outer Space.

1. Lodge met this evening with Russians. He began conversation by explaining he had received reaction from Washington to yesterday's discussions and that Washington still believed US proposals on composition were right. He also confirmed that we were prepared agree have text of res on conference participation go in without standard language and arrange for introduction of appropriate amendment, provided USSR agreed on Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia or Tunisia as 5th neutral. He added that Soviet comments on operative para 1 (III) had caused US take second look and proposed substituting "encouragement" for "coordination", to which they eventually agreed.

2. Kuznetsov responded that they had been carefully considering various suggestions and comments made previously and asked for our reaction to Finland or Afghanistan. Lodge said we preferred our four candidates. Sobolev immediately asked whether use of word "preferred" meant we would concede Finland or Afghanistan. Lodge said he was not authorized to accept them. Sobolev suggested adding them

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-1059. Confidential; Priority.

to our four and then going through process of elimination. Lodge rejected this idea. Kuznetsov again claimed Austria involved big step on part of USSR.

3. Lodge pointed out that every neutral USSR proposed voted with it on ChiRep. Both Sobolev and Kuznetsov immediately said ChiRep issue would not arise and that comite would not be engaged with solution of question of China. Sobolev added USSR would be willing state it would not raise this question in comite.

4. Kuznetsov argued that choice of Finland or Afghanistan would more or less balance other neutrals. Both were good countries which USSR would like have on comite. Sobolev noted Finland always abstained on any sharp division between US and USSR. Lodge admitted Finland was possibly better than Indonesia. Kuznetsov replied USSR preferred Indonesia and had instructions to insist on its inclusion. However, as conciliatory step to meet US half-way Finland or Afghanistan could be substituted. Lodge said it sounded to him as if question of composition would have to be decided by first comite.

5. Kuznetsov regretted he had agreed to Austria since these discussions showed it should have been saved as last country. He repeated that outer space comite would be busy with other problems and would not become involved in ChiRep. He referred again to composition this comite as being very difficult for USSR to explain since on technical basis USSR entitled to parity and there were more favorable precedents in COSPAR and disarmament. He urged US take Finland or Afghanistan and reach agreement.

6. Sobolev observed that of four countries we proposed USSR had diplomatic relations only with Lebanon. Soviet list of neutrals included only countries with which US had diplomatic relations. Lodge countered that he would have thought Lebanon was good country from Soviet viewpoint since Lebanese people voted for govt which told American forces to leave. Lebanon was very friendly to USSR and neutral on its side. He inquired what was wrong with Lebanon. Kuznetsov said Lebanon was not bad country but his instructions called for Finland or Afghanistan. Lodge suggested that as person of influence and authority he might get instructions changed. Kuznetsov again pressed Finland, suggesting jokingly Lebanon might be selected after two years. Barco observed First Comite more likely support Lebanon than Hungary.

7. Lodge enumerated various concessions US had made, emphasizing Washington considered we had been giving constantly with nothing in return. Kuznetsov denied this. He asserted we had large majority on all issues, probably 17-7, and asked why we worried about Finland. He contended if comite established by mutual agreement, it would do its work with spirit of cooperation and perform outstanding job. There was much interesting work to be done.

8. We discussed ChiRep problem again. Kuznetsov contended that, since amendment on conf participation would carry, he saw no reason for concern. USSR could not understand why US approached comite from standpoint of voting; USSR was approaching it from different position, which was that outer space was worldwide problem which required mutual efforts of many countries. He felt confident spirit of friendly cooperation and understanding would prevail in comite and there was no cause for worry. Sobolev repeated question of ChiRep in UN would not be raised.

9. At this point Lodge suggested possibility of amendment authorized by Dept in operative para 1, thereby making quite clear comite authorized deal only with members of UN and SA's. Kuznetsov immediately responded negatively and said "do not complicate matters" with amendment. He did not wish to discuss it; it was unnecessary. Lodge pointed out similar provisions included in other res's and asked why same thing should not be done here. In such circumstances US might possibly be able consider Finland if USSR agreed to such amendment. Russians said this was definitely unacceptable.

10. Lodge said that of course if USSR willing accept one of neutrals we proposed, such as Lebanon, he would not press this amendment. Issue of conf participation would of course have to be settled by amendment.

11. We then argued at considerable length, with no apparent effect, merits of amendment in first operative para, res A, pointing out since this was UN comite entirely proper it should be concerned only with states within UN framework. Moreover, differences on membership issues were well known and should not be permitted to intrude into this comite. Sov Reps made quite clear they could not acquiesce in amendment of this character even at price of our taking Finland.

12. Sobolev returned to voting problem and inquired how USSR could ever get majority for its position. At best, he asserted, there would be 12-12 tie but US in his view could always count on at least majority of one.

13. Lodge emphasized great efforts he had made with Washington in effort produce constructive results. He had never pushed Dept as hard on anything else. He regarded these instructions as absolute maximum, and he had really thought USSR would accept additional amendment if we took Finland. Their reaction was most disappointing. Kuznetsov said amendment was simply "new obstacle".

14. Kuznetsov asked whether, if USSR accepted Lebanon, US could agree not to submit amendment re conf participation. Lodge made plain he could not do this. Kuznetsov argued comite could solve problem and he assumed US thought inclusion of Lebanon provided proper voting balance. He expressed willingness to discuss acceptance of Lebanon without amendment with allies. Lodge repeated this

would not do and that it was desirable to settle this matter in GA res. Kuznetsov pressed hard on dropping idea of amendment and urged Lodge to put this proposal to Washington. Lodge expressed willingness to inform Washington but emphasized repeatedly his absolute certainty that we must retain right to offer amendment on conf participation and would do so. Kuznetsov contended this was "very small matter", particularly with Sov agreement on Lebanon. Lodge repeated that even if USSR accepted Lebanon, amendment would undoubtedly be required. We agreed we would be in touch tomorrow morning.

15. As meeting broke up Kuznetsov asked see Lodge alone. [3 sentences (8 lines of source text) not declassified] He asked Lodge again whether we could agree to omit amendment procedure which involved "needless worry." Lodge emphasized this was US Govt position and he could not honestly say there was any chance of our not pressing for amendment in B. Lodge expressed hope USSR would accept Lebanon and acquiesce in amendment. Kuznetsov smiled and promised to call first thing tomorrow morning. [1 sentence (31 words) not declassified]

Lodge

---

478. **Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, December 11, 1959—midnight.*

Delga 689. Re: Outer Space. Kuznetsov called on Lodge this morning. After certain amount of preliminary bantering about possible shifts in US position and after Lodge pressed Kuznetsov to accept Lebanon, latter expressed agreement on Lebanon as 5th neutral. Regarding amendment on conference participation, which Lodge repeated we must have, Kuznetsov said that he would speak against it and vote against it but if amendment adopted, USSR would nevertheless vote for res and participate in comite. Russians produced typewritten text, including names of countries which we checked together.

Lodge expressed his pleasure at results of negotiations which he hoped augured well for future cooperation between US in outer space field as well as in other areas.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12-1159. Confidential.



Lodge then reviewed cosponsorship to which we had previously agreed and suggested addition of Japan. Kuznetsov agreed and proposed Romania also be added. Lodge agreed. We told Kuznetsov we would wish to inform our group of results of our discussions and would then be prepared to submit res early in afternoon. (This mtg reported Delga 690.<sup>2</sup>)

Res submitted to Secretariat immediately after lunch.<sup>3</sup>

Lodge

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 11 (midnight). (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> For text of the two-part resolution (1472A and B (XIV)), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on December 12, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 1396-1397.

---

#### 479. Report by the National Aeronautics and Space Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 26, 1960.

### GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

#### *Scope of Policy*

1. This policy is concerned with U.S. interests in scientific, civil, military, and political activities related to outer space. It deals with sounding rockets, earth satellites, and other space vehicles, their relationship to the exploration and use of outer space, and their political and psychological significance. Although the relation between outer space technology and ballistic missile technology is recognized, U.S. policy on ballistic missiles is not covered in this policy. Anti-missile defense systems also are not covered except to the extent that space vehicles may be used in connection with such systems.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Outer Space. Secret. The cover sheet, memorandum of transmittal, note from the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and the table of contents are not printed.

On December 17, 1959, the National Aeronautics and Space Council transmitted a draft of this report to the National Security Council. Designated NSC 5918, it was considered by the Council at its 321st meeting on January 12, 1960, and minor revisions and deletions were made. A copy of NSC 5918 is *ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1; the memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. For a personal account of the discussion of NSC 5918 on January 12, see George B. Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), pp. 225-226.

*Significance of Outer Space to U.S. Security*

2. Outer space presents a new and imposing challenge. Although the full potentialities and significance of outer space remain largely to be explored, it is already clear that there are important scientific, civil, military, and political implications for the national security, including the psychological impact of outer space activities which is of broad significance to national prestige.

3. Outer space generally has been viewed as an area of intense competition which has been characterized to date by comparison of Soviet and U.S. activities. The successes of the Soviet Union in placing the first earth satellite in orbit, in launching the first space probe to reach escape velocity, in achieving the first "hard" landing on the moon and in obtaining the first pictures of the back side of the moon have resulted in substantial and enduring gains in Soviet prestige. The U.S. has launched a greater number of earth satellites and has also launched a space probe which has achieved escape velocity. These U.S. activities have resulted in a number of scientifically significant "firsts." However, the space vehicles launched by the Soviet Union have been substantially heavier than those of the U.S., and weight has been a major point of comparison internationally. In addition, the Soviets have benefited from their ability to conceal any failures from public scrutiny.

4. From the political and psychological standpoint the most significant factor of Soviet space accomplishments is that they have produced new credibility for Soviet statements and claims. Where once the Soviet Union was not generally believed, even its baldest propaganda claims are now apt to be accepted at face value, not only abroad but in the United States. The Soviets have used this credibility for the following purposes:

a. To claim general superiority for the Soviet system on the grounds that the Sputniks and Luniks demonstrate the ability of the system to produce great results in an extremely short period of time.

b. To claim that the world balance has shifted in favor of Communism.

c. To claim that Communism is the wave of the future.

d. To create a new image of the Soviet Union as a technologically powerful, scientifically sophisticated nation that is equal to the U.S. in most respects, superior in others, and with a far more brilliant future.

e. To create a new military image, of the vast manpower of the Communist nations now backed by weaponry that is as scientifically advanced as that of the West, superior in the missile field, and superior in quantity in all fields.

5. Soviet efforts already have achieved a considerable degree of success, and may be expected to show further gains with each notable space accomplishment, and particularly each major "first."

6. Significant advances have been made in restoring U.S. prestige overseas, and in increasing awareness of the scope and magnitude of the U.S. outer space effort. Although most opinion still considers the U.S. as probably leading in general scientific and technical accomplishments, the USSR is viewed in most quarters as leading in space science and technology. There is evidence that a considerable portion of world leadership and the world public expects the United States to "catch up" with the Soviet Union, and further expects this to be demonstrated by U.S. ability to equal Soviet space payloads and to match or surpass Soviet accomplishments. Failure to satisfy such expectations may give rise to the belief that the United States is "second best," thus transferring to the Soviets additional increments of prestige and credibility now enjoyed by the United States.

7. To the layman, manned space flight and exploration will represent the true conquest of outer space and hence the ultimate goal of space activities. No unmanned experiment can substitute for manned space exploration in its psychological effect on the peoples of the world. There is reason to believe that the Soviets, after getting an earlier start, are placing as much emphasis on their manned space flight program as is the U.S.

8. The scientific value of space exploration and the prestige accruing therefrom have been demonstrated. The scientific uses of space are a potent factor in the derivation of fundamental information of use in most fields of knowledge. Further, the greater the breadth and precision the knowledge of the space environment, the greater the ability to exploit its potentials.

9. Among several foreseeable civil applications of earth satellites, two at present offer unique capabilities which are promising in fields of significance to the national economy: communications and meteorology. Other civil potentials are also likely to be identified.

10. The great importance of certain military utilization of outer space already has been recognized; however, the full military potential of outer space remains to be determined by further experience, studies, technical developments and strategic considerations. Space technology constitutes a foreseeable means of obtaining increasingly essential information regarding [20 words not declassified]. Space technology is being further utilized with the intention of more effectively accomplishing other military functions by complementing or extending non-space capabilities. In addition, as space technology and resulting uses of outer space expand, new military requirements and opportunities for development of new military capabilities are likely to materialize.

11. Space vehicles may also have important application and may play a key role in the implementation of international agreements which may be concluded respecting the reduction and control of armaments, cessation of atomic tests, and safeguards against surprise attack.

12. Outer space activities present new opportunities and problems in the conduct of the relations of the U.S. with its allies, neutral states, and the Soviet bloc; and the establishment of sound international relationships in this new field is of fundamental significance to the national security. Of importance in seeking such relationships is the fact that all nations have an interest in the purposes for which outer space is explored and used and in the achievement of an orderly basis for the conduct of space activities. Moreover, many nations are capable of participating directly in various aspects of outer space activities, and international participation in such applications of space vehicles as those involved in scientific research, weather forecasting, and communications may be essential to full realization of the potentialities of such activities. In addition, an improvement of the international position of the U.S. may be effected through U.S. leadership in extending internationally the benefits of the peaceful uses of outer space. The fact that the results of arrangements in certain fields, even though entered into for peaceful purposes, could have military implications, may condition the extent of such arrangements in those fields.

### *Use of Outer Space*

#### *General*

13. As further knowledge of outer space is obtained, the advantages to be accrued will become more apparent. At the present time, space activities are directed toward technological development and scientific exploration; however, it is anticipated that systems will be put into operation, beginning in the near future, that will more directly contribute to national security and well-being and be of international benefit.

14. Present and planned outer space activities will require the use of the following classes of vehicles:

a. *Sounding Rockets*<sup>2</sup>—Vehicles that are launched vertically or in a ballistic trajectory to heights well outside the earth's atmosphere and return to earth.

b. *Earth Satellites*—Manned and unmanned vehicles that orbit the earth.

---

<sup>2</sup> Sounding rockets have also been defined as those vertically launched rockets that do not penetrate outer space beyond one earth radius, approximately 4000 statute miles. [Footnote in the source text.]

c. *Space Probes and Interplanetary Space Vehicles*—Manned and unmanned vehicles that escape the earth environment to traverse interplanetary space.

15. It is not possible to foresee all the uses of outer space, but the ability to identify and develop such uses will be significantly influenced by the breadth of the exploratory scientific research which is undertaken.

*Scientific Research and Exploration*

16. Space technology affords new and unique opportunities for immediate and long-range scientific observation, experimentation, and exploration which will add to our knowledge and understanding of the earth, the solar system, and the universe. Immediate opportunities exist in many areas, including among others:

a. *Atmosphere*—Study of the structure and composition of the earth's outer atmosphere.

b. *Ionosphere*—Measurement of the electron density of the earth's outer ionosphere and its temporal and spacial variations.

c. *Energetic Particles*—Measurement of cosmic ray intensity, radiation belts, and auroral particles and their variations with time and space in the vicinity of the earth and moon.

d. *Electric and Magnetic Fields*—Measurement of the magnitude and variations of the earth's magnetic field and the associated ionospheric electric currents.

e. *Gravitational Fields*—Study of the detailed motion of existing and special satellites with the object of determining a more detailed picture of the earth's and moon's gravitational field.

f. *Astronomy*—Preliminary investigation of the moon; and measurement of spectra, especially in the ultraviolet and X-ray regions, including the brightness and positions of interesting regions of the sky.

g. *Bio Sciences*—Investigation of the effects of outer space on living organisms, especially those which have most application to the manned exploration of outer space.

h. *Geodesy*—Measurement of the size and shape of the earth, and location of land masses and water.

17. Future possibilities for scientific research and exploration include: continuation on a more sophisticated basis of the measurements of atmospheres, ionospheres, electric and magnetic fields, and expansion of such measurements to Mars and Venus and ultimately throughout the solar system; astronomical observations from points beyond the earth's atmosphere; manned and unmanned exploration of the moon and the planets; advanced experiments designed to test certain predictions of the theory of relativity and other theories relating to the fundamental nature of the universe; investigation of the occurrence of biological phenomena in outer space.

*Operational Applications of Space Technology*

18. All applications of the technology of outer space that now show promise of early operational utility for military or civilian purposes are based on the earth satellite. These applications ultimately will have to meet one of several criteria if they are to survive in either the defense program or the civilian economy. They will either have to make possible the more efficient operation of an existing activity, the effective extension of an existing activity, or the creation of a new and desirable activity. It is expected that benefits will be gained from these applications, but the full extent of their military, economic, political and social implications has yet to be determined. Military applications are designed to enhance military capabilities by fulfilling stated requirements of the Military Services and are currently being developed for use as operational systems. The applications that are expected to be available earliest are as follows:<sup>3</sup>

a. *Meteorology*—Satellite systems to provide weather data on a global scale, making use of such techniques as television, optics, infra-red detectors and radar. Information on cloud cover, storm locations, precipitation, wind direction, heat balance and water vapor would permit improved weather forecasting, including storm warnings, useful in a variety of civil activities such as agricultural, industrial and transportation activities, and would provide weather information to meet military operational needs.

b. *Communications*—Satellite systems to improve and extend existing world-wide communications. For the Military Services, such systems would provide more effective global military communications for purposes of command, control, and support of military forces. Civil applications will benefit through more prompt service, increased message capacity, and greater reliability. Direct world-wide transmission of voice and video signals is envisaged.

c. *Navigation*—Satellite systems to provide global all-weather capability, for land, sea and air vehicles, which will permit accurate determination of position; in the case of the military, secure operations would be possible.

d. *Mapping and Geodetic Control*—Satellite systems to produce accurate, world-wide mapping data of economic, military and political importance and to provide geodetic control data such as those required for missile operations.

e. [paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

f. *Early Warning*—Satellite systems to provide, through the use of infrared techniques, early warning that a missile attack has been launched.

g. *Inspection and Control*—Satellite systems to enforce possible international agreements respecting the control of armaments, cessation of atomic tests and safeguards against surprise attack.

<sup>3</sup> Order of listing does not indicate anticipated order of availability. [Footnote in the source text.]

19. In addition to continued improvement of the foregoing systems, future military possibilities under study include: passive and active defense systems to detect and to destroy enemy missiles or space vehicles; [4 lines of source text and a footnote not declassified]

#### *Manned Space Flight and Exploration*

20. It is expected that manned space flight will add significantly to the effectiveness of many of the scientific, military and civil applications indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. There are a number of important reasons why manned space activities, including the initial step of placing a man in orbit, are being carried out. Primary among these are:

a. To the layman, manned space flight and exploration will represent the true conquest of outer space. No unmanned experiment can substitute for manned exploration in its psychological effect on the peoples of the world.

b. Man's judgment, decision-making capability, and resourcefulness will ultimately be needed in many instances to ensure the full exploitation of space technology.

Moreover, manned space flight is required for scientific studies in which man himself is the principal subject of the experiment, because there is no substitute for the conduct in outer space of essential psychological and biological studies of man.

#### *International Principles, Procedures and Arrangements*

21. National policies and international agreements have dealt extensively with "air space" and expressly assert national sovereignty over this region; however, the upper limit of air space has not been defined. The term "outer space" also has no accepted definition, and the consequences of adopting a definition cannot now be fully anticipated. Although an avowedly arbitrary definition might prove useful for specific purposes, most of the currently foreseeable legal problems of outer space may be resolved without a precise line of demarcation between air space and outer space.

22. The U.S. has advanced and a number of states have accepted the view that outer space is not wholly without law inasmuch as the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice are not spatially limited. Furthermore, the principles and procedures developed in the past to govern the use of air space and also the sea may provide useful analogies. However, many problems of outer space will be unique in character.

23. An initial problem, in which all states have an interest, involves the permissibility of various activities in outer space. With respect to this problem, the report of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space expresses the following view which the U.S. has supported:

"During the International Geophysical Year 1957-1958 and subsequently, countries through the world proceeded on the premise of the permissibility of the launching and flight of the space vehicles which were launched, regardless of what territory they passed over during the course of their flight through outer space. The Committee, bearing in mind that its terms of reference refer exclusively to the peaceful uses of outer space, believes that, with this practice, there may have been initiated the recognition or establishment of a generally accepted rule to the effect that, in principle, outer space is, on conditions of equality, freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with existing or future international law or agreements."<sup>4</sup>

In this connection, it should be noted that definitions of "peaceful" or "non-interfering" uses of outer space have not been advanced by the United States or other states.

24. Although the U.S. has not to date recognized any upper limit to its sovereignty, a principle of freedom of outer space, such as that expressed by the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee, suggests that at least in so far as peaceful exploration and use of outer space are concerned, the right of states to exclude persons and objects may not obtain. However, the full implications of a principle of freedom of outer space, in contrast with a principle of national sovereignty over outer space, remain to be fully assessed.

25. It is possible that certain military applications of space vehicles may be accepted as peaceful or acquiesced in as non-interfering. On the other hand, it may be anticipated that states will not willingly acquiesce in unrestricted use of outer space for activities which may jeopardize or interfere with their national interests.

26. There is frequent and sharpening concern on the part of world opinion over the military implications of unchecked competition in outer space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and there is an accompanying interest in international agreements, controls or restrictions to limit the dangers felt to stem from such competition. With regard to the armaments control aspects of outer space, the United States first proposed in 1957, in connection with international consideration of an armaments control system, that a multilateral technical committee be set up to attempt to design an inspection system to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the United States has of-

<sup>4</sup> For text of this report, see U.N. doc. A/4141.



ferred, if there is general agreement to proceed with this study on a multilateral basis, to join in this study without awaiting the conclusion of negotiations on other substantive disarmament proposals. There has not, to date, been multilateral agreement to proceed with such a study, and U.S. policy has not been determined concerning either the scope of control and inspection required to ensure that outer space could be used only for peaceful purposes or the relationship of any such control arrangement to other aspects of an arms agreement.<sup>5</sup>

27. Exploration and use of celestial bodies require separate consideration. Neither the U.S. nor any other state has yet taken a position regarding the questions of whether a celestial body is capable of appropriation to national sovereignty and if so what acts would suffice to found a claim thereto. It is clear that serious problems would arise if a state claimed, on one ground or another, exclusive rights over all or part of a celestial body. At an appropriate time some form of international arrangement may prove useful.

28. Other problems in which all states have an interest arise from the operation of space vehicles. The following problems appear amenable to early treatment with a view to seeking internationally a basis for orderly accomplishment of space vehicle operations: (a) identification and registration of space vehicles; (b) liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicles; (c) reservation of radio frequencies for space vehicles and the related problem of termination of transmission; (d) avoidance of interference between space vehicles and aircraft; and (e) the re-entry and landing of space vehicles, through accident or design, on the territory of other states.

29. Although only a few states may be capable of mounting comprehensive outer space efforts, many states are capable of participating in the conduct of outer space activities, and active international cooperation in selected activities offers scientific, economic, and political opportunities. Continuation and extension of such cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space through a variety of governmental and non-governmental arrangements should further enhance the position of the United States as the leading advocate of the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit of all. Where space vehicles are employed for military applications, some degree of international cooperation may also prove useful. Any international arrangements for cooperation in outer space activities may require determination of the net advantage to U.S. security.

---

<sup>5</sup> Basic national security policy with respect to disarmament is stated in paragraph 52 of NSC 5906/1. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 5906/1, Basic National Security Policy, August 5, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume III.]

30. The role most appropriately undertaken by the United Nations with respect to the foregoing matters appears to lie in performing two principal functions: (a) facilitating international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space, and (b) providing a forum for consultation and agreement respecting international problems arising from outer space activities. Future developments may make it desirable for additional functions to be performed by or under the auspices of the United Nations.

### Objectives

31. Carry out energetically a program for the exploration and use of outer space by the U.S., based upon sound scientific and technological progress, designed: (a) to achieve that enhancement of scientific knowledge, military strength, economic capabilities, and political position which may be derived through the advantageous application of space technology and through appropriate international cooperation in related matters, and (b) to obtain the advantages which come from successful achievements in space.

### Policy Guidance

#### *Priority, Scope and Level of Effort*

32. While relating the resources and effort to be expended on outer space activities to other programs to ensure that the anticipated gains from such activities are properly related to possible gains from other programs which may be competitive for manpower, facilities, funds or other resources, commit and effectively apply adequate resources with a priority sufficient to enable the U.S. as soon as reasonably practicable to achieve the objectives as stated in paragraph 31.

33. In addition to undertaking necessary immediate and short-range activities related to outer space, develop goals and supporting plans for outer space activities for the longer range, through at least a ten-year period.

34. Study on a continuing basis the implications and possible consequences which United States and foreign exploitation of outer space may hold for international and national political and social institutions. Critically examine such exploitation for possible consequences on activities and on life on earth (e.g., the use of nuclear energy for auxiliary or main power sources or for other applications in outer space which may affect health, or other outer space activities which may affect weather or other factors relating to activities and life on earth).

35. Periodically evaluate and compare the space activities of the U.S. and USSR with a view to determining, in so far as possible, the goals and relative rate of progress of each country's program.

*Psychological Exploitation*

36. To minimize the psychological advantages which the USSR has acquired as a result of space accomplishments, select from among those current or projected U.S. space activities of intrinsic military, scientific or technological value, one or more projects which offer promise of obtaining a demonstrably effective advantage over the Soviets and, so far as is consistent with solid achievements in the overall space program, stress these projects in present and future programming.

37. Identify, to the greatest extent possible, the interests and aspirations of other Free World nations in outer space with U.S.-sponsored activities and accomplishments.

38. Develop information programs that will exploit fully U.S. outer space activities on a continuing basis; especially develop programs to counter overseas the psychological impact of Soviet outer space activities and to present U.S. outer space progress in the most favorable light.

*[heading and 2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]*

*Manned Space Flight*

41. Starting with the recovery from orbit of a manned satellite, proceed as soon as reasonably practicable with manned space flight and exploration.

*International Principles, Procedures and Arrangements*

42. Continue to support the principle that, in so far as peaceful exploration and use of outer space are concerned, outer space is freely available for exploration and use by all, and in this connection: (a) consider as a possible U.S. position the right of transit through outer space of orbital space vehicles or objects not equipped to inflict injury or damage; (b) where the U.S. contemplates military applications of space vehicles and significant adverse international reaction is anticipated, seek to develop measures designed to minimize or counteract such reaction; and (c) consider the usefulness of international arrangements respecting celestial bodies.

43. Taking into account, among other factors, the relationship of outer space capabilities to the present and future security position of the United States:

a. Study the scope of control and character of safeguards required in an international system designed to assure that outer space be used for peaceful purposes only; include in this study an assessment of the technical feasibility of a positive enforcement system and an examination of the possibility of multilateral or international control of all outer space activities.

b. Study the relationship between any international arrangement to assure that outer space be used for peaceful purposes only and other aspects of the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments.

c. In connection with the prosecution of studies enumerated in 43 (a) and (b), give full consideration to the requirements of U.S. security interests.

44. In the interest of establishing an international basis for orderly accomplishment of space flight operations, explore the desirability of and, where so indicated, seek international agreement on such problems as: (a) Some form of identification and registration of space vehicles which is to the net advantage to national security; (b) liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicles; (c) reservation of radio frequencies for space vehicles and the related problem of termination of transmission; (d) avoidance of interference between space vehicles and aircraft; and (e) the re-entry and landing of space vehicles, through accident or design, on the territory of other nations.

45. Seek to increase international cooperation in selected activities relating to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space by such means as: (a) Arrangements within the framework of the international scientific community including the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of International Council of Scientific Unions, and (b) bilateral and multilateral arrangements between the U.S. and other countries including the Soviet Union. International arrangements for cooperation in outer space activities should consider the net advantage to U.S. security.

46. Support the United Nations in facilitating international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space and in serving as a forum for consultation and agreement respecting international problems arising from outer space activities.

47. Develop means and take appropriate measures to insure that the U.S. leads the USSR in making the scientific and technological information from its outer space program available to the world at large.

#### *Security Classification*

48. In implementing security classification regulations, take special account of the lead achieved by the USSR in outer space activities and the advantages to the U.S. which result from the maximum availability and use of scientific and technological information and material.

## Annex A

### THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

1. *Soviet Objectives:* The USSR has announced that the objective of its space program is the attainment of manned interplanetary travel. At present, the program appears to be directed toward the acquisition of scientific and technological data which would be applicable to Soviet space activities, their ICBM program, and basic scientific research. While the space program was undoubtedly initiated to serve scientific purposes, one of the primary underlying motivations which continues to give it impetus is the promise of substantial world-wide political and psychological gains for the USSR. Military considerations may have little bearing on the decision to develop certain types of space vehicles, although the successful development of these vehicles may result in military applications. Thus, it can be concluded that the Soviet space program has four major objectives. These objectives will have varying priorities as the program itself progresses and as new political and military requirements develop:

- a. Manned space travel
- b. Scientific research
- c. Propaganda
- d. Military applications

Of the above, it appears now that flight test priority has been on the scientific and propaganda objectives rather than on man-in-space or military applications.

2. *Background:* Russian interest in space flight dates back to 1903 when a scientific paper was published entitled: "Investigation of Universal Space by Means of Rocket Flight," by the eminent Russian scientist Tsiolkovsky. Several other Russian actions took place during the succeeding years to the present which have been identified as at least partially associated with a space program. These have included the founding of the Soviet Institute of Theoretical Astronomy in 1923, establishment in 1934 of a government-sponsored rocket research program, flights of animals in vertical rockets since the early 1950's, and systematic investigations of moon flight problems starting in 1953. The establishment in early 1955 of the Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications was indicative of the Soviet realization that theory and capability for space flight were both feasible and that accomplishment of a long cherished ambition was within sight.

3. *Priority:* The Soviets have demonstrated that they are conducting a well-planned space flight program. The importance attached to this program is illustrated by the high quality of the scientists assigned to its direction, by the broad range of facilities and specialists

engaged in its implementation, and by the wealth of theoretical and applied research being conducted in its support. However, the numbers of space vehicles actually launched over the past few years have not been as numerous as had been expected and it is apparent that their actual flight program is proceeding at a fairly deliberate pace. While there is no direct evidence on the priority of the over-all Soviet space program vis-à-vis the military missile program, it is believed that any interference between the two would be resolved in favor of the missile program. To date, however, there is no indication that the space program has interfered with the missile program.

4. *Capabilities:* The Soviet Union dramatically demonstrated its interest and capability in space flight with the orbiting of two earth satellites in the fall of 1957, and a third in May 1958. These were followed by the launching of three lunar associated vehicles in 1959. Evidence indicates that the Soviet space program has been built on the foundation of military rocketry and guidance systems, with military and other facilities probably engaged dually in supporting tests of military ballistic missiles and space experiments. Thus, although these first space flights were doubtlessly undertaken for the furtherance of scientific knowledge and for whatever psychological and political advantage would accrue, the Soviet military, by intimate participation of its hardware, personnel, and facilities, has been in a position to utilize immediately such knowledge for the enhancement of the Soviet military position and objectives. The realization of more advanced space projects, particularly those involving manned flight, must be preceded by a vast amount of scientific and technological work directed towards the development of useable space vehicles, the determination of basic operational requirements and limitations, and the creation of an environment and equipment capable of sustaining human life in outer space. Since such a program embraces virtually all fields of science and engineering, the following areas were particularly examined for evidence of Soviet technical capability: guided missiles (including vertical rocket launchings), re-entry vehicles and techniques, propulsion, guidance, communications, space medicine, internal power supplies, and celestial mechanics. While firm association of these fields with a space program varied considerably, it is noted that the state of Soviet art in all the sciences required in a space program is such that no scientific or technical barriers of magnitude have been noted. Four areas deemed critical to a space program have apparently received considerable attention by the USSR; e.g., development of large rocket-engine propulsion systems, vertical rocket flights with animals (including recovery devices), space medicine, and celestial mechanics. There are indications that Soviet advanced thinking and study in astro-biology apparently have been de-emphasized in favor of providing an artificial environment within a vehicle suitable for manned space flight.

### 5. Future Capabilities:

a. There is no firm evidence of Soviet future plans for the exploration of outer space with either unmanned or manned vehicles. It is believed they will continue and expand their scientific research with further unmanned earth satellites, lunar probes (including satellites and soft landings), solar and planetary probes. Manned experiments will probably be conducted in earth satellites, circum-lunar flights and soft landings on the moon. It is expected that all manned flights into outer space will be preceded by similar tests with animals, unless for political purposes the Soviets attempt a high risk program. Man-in-space programs are confronted by many problems or hazards, the most immediate of which are recovery and life support over extended periods. While data which might lead to solutions or better understandings of both can be obtained from instrumented packages which are orbited and recovered, accomplishment of the same test with animals would provide data of more direct application to subsequent attempts with man.

b. The dates estimated for specific Soviet accomplishments in space represent the earliest possible time periods in which each specific event could be accomplished. It is recognized that the various facets of the space flight program are in competition not only among themselves, but with other priority programs, and that the USSR probably cannot undertake all the space flight activities described below at the priority required to meet the time periods specified. At this time it cannot be determined which specific space flight activities enjoy the higher priorities and will be pursued first.

c. No attempt has been made to estimate manned space missions beyond the earth-moon realm. The time periods in which the successful development of sub-systems essential to planetary flight activities can be brought to fruition and integrated into a complete space flight system cannot be foreseen.

d. Similarly, considerations of military applications have been limited to earth orbiting types of space vehicles. Missions beyond this realm are considered only in the scientific or exploratory sense because we believe they cannot be successfully accomplished in the time period considered.

6. An estimate of a possible Soviet space development program is as follows:

#### Possible Soviet Space Development Program

*Space Program Objectives*

*First Possible  
Capability Date*

These dates represent the earliest possible time period in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. However, competition between the space program and the military missile program as well as within the space program itself makes it unlikely that all of these objectives will be achieved within the specified time periods.

*Unmanned Earth Satellites*

5,000–10,000 pounds, low orbit satellites 1959  
 Recoverable (including biological) satellites 1959

*Military Satellites*—The dates shown are the earliest in which feasibility demonstrations could begin. Generally, militarily useful vehicles would be available 2–3 years after the feasibility demonstration.

[4 lines of table not declassified]

*Unmanned Lunar Rockets*

Biological Probe 1959  
 Satellite of the Moon 1959  
 Soft Landings 1960  
 Lunar Landing, Return and Earth Recovery 1963–1964

*Planetary Probes*

Mars about Oct. 1960  
 Venus about Jan. 1961

*Manned Vertical or Short Down-Range Flight* 1959

*Manned Earth Satellites*—The specified time periods for manned accomplishments are predicated on the Soviets having previously successfully accomplished a number of similar unmanned ventures.

Capsule-type Vehicles<sup>6</sup> Mid-1960–mid-1961

Glide-type Vehicles 1 to 2 years  
 after above

Maneuverable (minimum: conventional propulsion) 1963

Maneuverable (nuclear propulsion) about 1970

Space Platform (minimum, non-ecological, feasibility demonstration) 1965

Space Platform (long-lived) about 1970

*Manned Lunar Flights*

Circumlunar 1964–1965

Satellites (temporary) 1965–1966

Landings about 1970

<sup>6</sup> Recovery would probably be attempted after the first few orbits but life could probably be sustained for about a week. [Footnote in the source text.]



## Annex B

ESTIMATED FUNDING<sup>7</sup> REQUIREMENTS

## Summary

	Fiscal Year				
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>
NASA	524.0	802.0	1031.0	1171.0	1350.0
AEC	46.7	41.5	66.0	60.6	55.2
Defense	483.8	480.7	747.5	750.0	728.0
Total	<u>1054.5</u>	<u>1324.2</u>	<u>1844.5</u>	<u>1981.6</u>	<u>2133.2</u>

[Here follow tables with breakdowns of the estimated funding requirements of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and military programs using space sub-systems (4 lines of the last table were not declassified).]

<sup>7</sup> Figures are in millions of dollars. More detailed agency estimates given on following pages. [Footnote in the source text.]

# Index

- Abbas, Ferhat, 38, 287  
Abdoh, Djalal, 51, 67  
Abreu, Dr., 669-670  
Achilles, Theodore C., 351-352, 363  
Ackerson, Garrett G., Jr., 308  
Acly, Austin R., 183n  
Adamiyat, Fereydoun, 51  
Adams, Ware, 14n, 18n, 20n, 25n, 28n  
Adeel, Omar Abdel Hamid, 459  
Aden, 107, 244  
Adjei, Ako, 165  
Adoula, Cyrille, 437  
Adriatic Sea, 695  
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 843  
Afghanistan, 32-33, 152, 155, 162, 173, 282, 290-291, 707, 904, 913-917  
African countries (*see also* Geographical distribution principle *and* Parity issue *under* United Nations; Nonaligned countries; *specific countries*), 214, 254, 306, 318-319  
Algeria, 37, 247, 403  
Chinese U.N. representation, 232, 238, 239n, 242, 330-331, 414-415, 449, 452  
Colonial issues, 165-166  
Congo, Republic of (Leopoldville), 347, 418, 441  
Neutralism among, 213-214, 258-259, 361-362  
Regional grouping proposals, 361-362  
Soviet bloc, relations with, 146, 261-262  
United States, relations with, 232-233, 252, 261-264, 404n, 438-439  
U.S. racism, 254, 362, 438-439  
Afro-Asian countries. *See* African countries; Asian countries; Nonaligned countries.  
Aiken, Frank, 136, 190-191, 199, 217, 223  
Air Force, U.S. Department of the, 533, 551  
Aklilou Abte Wold, 330, 415  
Alaska Fishermen's Union, 680  
Albania, 12, 32, 152, 282, 285, 311, 326-327, 388, 764, 902, 905  
Alfaro, Dr., 153  
Algeria, 38, 180, 213, 235, 247, 286-287, 390, 403, 422, 455  
U.N. role, 29, 37-38, 106, 159-160, 241-242, 244, 262, 286-288, 443, 445  
Allen, George V., 467, 500, 502, 549, 579-580, 698, 867  
Alphand, Hervé, 70n, 81, 87, 223n, 351, 510  
Alverson, Dayton, 680  
Amadeo, Mario, 202n, 396, 868-869  
Ammoun, Fouad, 405  
Amory, Derek H., 826  
Andersen, Hans, 699  
Angola, 244, 426  
Antarctica:  
Argentine interest in, 473-474, 476-477, 496-497, 510, 523-524, 550, 636-638  
Australian draft declaration, 495-496  
Australian interest in, 465, 476, 523-524, 527, 561, 637  
Belgian interest in, 477, 481, 534  
Brazilian interest in, 522  
British interest in, 473-474, 476-477, 496, 510, 636  
Chilean interest in, 473-474, 476-477, 496-497, 510, 550  
Condominium. *See* International administration *below*.  
Demilitarization, 41-42, 471, 473, 491, 498, 504, 518, 573, 577

## Antarctica—Continued

## Demilitarization—Continued

- Argentine position, 540-542, 584
- Australian position, 473, 508, 519, 535, 539-540
- Inspection and control, 471, 475, 519, 535-536, 541-542, 546, 567, 574-575, 577, 588
- Australian position, 495, 509, 542, 562, 586
- British position, 496, 542, 585-586
- Chilean position, 542, 569, 599
- French position, 589, 594, 599
- Nonsignatory participation and, 510-511
- Soviet position, 541-542, 564, 571, 586, 594, 608
- International administration and, 484, 488, 492
- JCS position, 468-470
- Peaceful use of military personnel, 519, 535, 539-540, 564, 570, 573, 577, 582, 589
- Soviet activities and, 468, 508
- Soviet position, 519-520, 539-540, 563-564, 570, 579, 582, 589
- Wartime restriction, 507-509, 535
- Economic exploitation, 491-492, 496-497, 535, 560
- French interest in, 476
- Indian interest in, 522
- International administration (*see also* Demilitarization *above*; Nuclear conference *below*; Nuclear power in *below*; Scientific cooperation *below*; Scientific research freedom *below*)
  - Airspace, inclusion of, 545-546, 598
  - Argentine participation, 473-474, 478
  - Argentine position, 482, 489, 495, 509, 543, 545-546, 569, 587, 588-590, 591, 608, 614
  - Australian participation, 478
  - Australian position, 482, 496-497, 507-509, 543, 545-546, 568, 587-588, 591, 600
  - Belgian participation, 478
  - Belgian position, 541, 544-545, 571, 586, 587, 591, 596-597, 599, 616, 629
  - British participation, 478
  - British position, 466, 471, 474, 478, 482, 496, 509, 540-543, 545-546, 571, 587, 591, 595, 605

## Antarctica—Continued

## International administration—Continued

- Chilean participation, 473-474, 478
- Chilean position, 482, 489, 495, 509, 540, 546, 587, 589, 598, 602, 604, 608
- Claimant countries participation, 478, 482, 492*n*, 493*n*
- Claimant countries positions, 481-482, 489
- Costs of, 488
- Demilitarization and, 484, 488, 492
- Dispute settlement, 536, 546, 568, 571, 574, 578, 579, 587, 589, 604-605, 608
- Duration, 591, 595, 603, 606-607, 614
- French participation, 478
- French position, 540, 544, 546, 587, 590, 596, 602, 610, 612, 616, 629
- High seas, inclusion of, 507-508, 518-519, 545-546, 567, 569, 574, 579, 588, 590, 594-595, 598
- Indian position, 481, 489
- International Geophysical Year and, 464, 467, 482, 484, 489
- Japanese participation, 464, 478
- Japanese position, 510, 541-542, 544, 546, 562, 570, 586-587, 590
- JCS position, 465, 467-470, 472-474, 479, 485*n*
- Jurisdiction of, 492, 536, 541, 569, 575, 578, 587, 596, 604-605, 610, 612, 614, 616
- New Zealand participation, 478
- New Zealand position, 482, 497, 509, 543, 545-546, 584-585, 587-588, 596
- Nonsignatory participation, 507, 519, 535, 543-545, 560, 562, 568, 570, 578-579, 605, 608, 617, 622
- Australian position, 510-511, 544-545, 572, 591, 599, 625, 629
- British position, 496, 544-545, 562, 568, 588, 597
- Chilean position, 510, 544, 597, 625, 629
- New Zealand position, 544, 590-591, 597, 600, 608, 619, 623, 625, 629
- South African position, 225, 544, 597, 629

## Antarctica—Continued

International administration—  
ContinuedNonsignatory participation—  
Continued

Soviet position, 544, 564-565, 571, 588, 590-591, 593-594, 597, 600, 608, 612, 614-616, 619, 623, 625-628

Unrecognized Communist regimes, 511, 562, 588, 590-591, 619

Norwegian participation, 478

Norwegian position, 540, 542-545, 571, 584-585, 587, 602, 612, 629

South African participation, 478

South African position, 545, 587, 600, 605, 612, 618-623, 626, 629

Soviet activities and, 468, 490, 493-494

Soviet bloc representation in, 529

Soviet participation, 472-475, 477, 478-479, 481, 484-485, 489, 492-494, 556

Soviet position, 489, 508, 545-546, 588, 590, 594, 596, 610, 612

Territorial claims and, 478, 484, 488-490, 497-498, 573-574, 577, 584-585, 634

Argentine position, 540, 555-556

Australian position, 497, 555-556, 562, 584-586

British position, 584-585, 591-592

Chilean position, 555-556, 586

French position, 510, 518, 535, 540, 581-586, 589, 591-592, 597-598, 607-608, 624-625

South African position, 541, 586

Soviet position, 511, 518, 535, 541, 561-562, 564, 570-571, 579, 584-585, 592

U.S. position, 486, 488

U.N. role in, 496, 498, 536, 595

Soviet veto power and, 482, 557

U.S. position, 474-475, 478, 481-482, 484, 488-489, 492, 494, 557, 560

U.S. position, 464-465, 473-474, 490-492

U.S. scientific community position, 470

U.S. territorial claims and, 557-558, 634

U.S.-Australia-New Zealand discussions, 464, 469

## Antarctica—Continued

International administration—  
Continued

Zone of application (*see also* High seas, inclusion of *above*), 508, 545-546, 569-570, 574, 577, 598, 608

British position, 568, 571, 596

Exclusion of disputed areas from, 473-474, 476, 485*n*

International conference (*see also* International administration *above*), 580

Australian position, 518, 521

British position, 506, 518, 521

Chilean position, 502

Date for, 505-506, 509, 513, 518, 520-522, 563, 565

New Zealand position, 469, 495

Participants, 42, 492*n*, 493*n*, 502-506, 512, 519, 534

Preliminary meetings, 505-506, 509, 512-513, 518-520, 534-535, 555, 566-573, 578-580

Publicity, 500-503, 520, 579-580

South African participation, 492*n*, 493*n*, 502

Soviet participation, 469, 486, 492-494, 514-515, 534

Soviet position, 519, 521, 534, 565

U.S. position, 41-42, 469, 486, 495, 498-501

U.S.-Soviet consultations, 500-502, 563-565

Working papers, 535, 539-547, 561-562, 567-576

Italian activities in, 522

Japanese activities, 477, 481, 561

Mapping of, 515-516, 522-523, 526, 530, 532-533, 559

Military bases in, 473-475

New Zealand interest in, 464-465, 476, 561, 636

Norwegian interest in, 476, 529, 534

NSC report, 479-494

Nuclear power in, 514-515, 527, 532, 605

Argentine position, 584, 595, 601-603, 609-612, 616-619, 627, 630

Australian position, 595, 601-604, 609-613, 616, 630

British position, 604, 610, 612, 616-617, 619

Chilean position, 601, 603, 609-613, 617, 630

## Antarctica—Continued

- Nuclear power in—Continued
  - Japanese position, 602, 616, 621-623
  - New Zealand position, 601, 611-612, 616, 628
  - Soviet position, 595, 601-603, 609-611, 613, 617-621, 623, 626, 628-631
- Official observer program, 524-525, 573, 637
- Polish activities in, 514, 522, 526, 529, 532, 534
- Scientific cooperation, 471, 491, 498, 501, 503-504, 511-512, 518, 523-524, 573, 575, 577, 582, 589
  - Australian position, 495
  - Soviet position, 520, 540, 579
- Scientific research freedom, 485, 498, 560, 573, 575, 577, 600, 605
  - Argentine position, 540, 583-585, 589, 600, 605, 607
  - British position, 540, 583
  - Chilean position, 540, 607
  - Japanese position, 583
  - New Zealand position, 540, 583, 585
  - Soviet position, 579, 583, 585, 600, 605
- South African activities in, 477, 481
- Soviet activities in, 464-465, 477, 479, 493, 514-517, 521-522, 525-534, 536, 555-556
  - Argentine position, 514, 528
  - Australian position, 480, 514
  - Chilean position, 514, 528
  - Earth satellites, 514, 527, 530, 538
  - International Geophysical Year and, 480
  - JCS position, 468-470, 474
  - Latin American positions, 528
  - Mapping, 515, 523, 526, 530, 532, 559
  - Norwegian position, 531
  - U.S. activities and, 522-523, 528, 532-534
  - U.S. scientific community position, 537
  - U.S. territorial claims and, 528
- Whaling, 480-481, 527, 531-532, 556
- Treaty of (*see also* International administration, International conference, and *specific issues above*), 632-634, 637-638
- U.N. discussion, 42, 468, 471, 489, 493, 495, 506, 510, 521-522, 543, 556

## Antarctica—Continued

- U.S. activities in, 465, 477-478, 515-517, 520-521, 554, 635-637
- Argentine/Australian cooperation, 523-524
- Costs of, 466, 487-488, 517, 525
- Earth satellites, 537, 550-551
- International administration and, 520
- Mapping, 532-534, 537-538, 559, 560, 635
- Official observer program, 524-525
- Organizational arrangements, 484, 486-487, 517, 523, 536-537, 551-553, 559, 561, 634-635, 639
- Soviet activities and, 522-523, 528, 532-534
- U.S. scientific community position, 537
- U.S. policy, 471-472, 497-499, 503-505, 639-640
- U.S. territorial claims (*see also* Territorial claims *under* International administration *above*), 464, 475, 477, 483-484, 486, 547-548, 557-559, 634
  - Australian position, 466
  - Documentation, 520
  - International Geophysical Year and, 464, 466-468, 477, 480, 482-483, 558
  - JCS position, 465, 467-470, 472-473, 485*n*, 547-549
  - New Zealand position, 466
  - Soviet activities and, 465, 480, 528
  - Soviet territorial claims and, 468-469, 477, 483, 548-550
  - U.S. scientific community position, 550
- U.S.-Australia-New Zealand joint territorial claims, 465
- Apartheid. *See* South Africa, Union of.
- Appling, Hugh G., 443
- Aqaba Gulf, 649, 661, 700, 706, 717
- Arab-Israeli dispute, 19-20, 41, 163-164, 240, 254, 292-293
- Arab League (*see also* Arab States), 58-59, 279
- Arab States:
  - General Assembly, Heads of State participation, 318-319
  - Law of the Sea, 685, 687, 696, 700, 706, 717-718, 721, 773, 777, 787, 789, 798, 808, 810-812
  - Soviet bloc, relations with, 109

- Arab States—Continued  
 U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, 163  
 U.N. representation, 14-15, 17, 18-20, 27, 128, 250, 274
- Arab Union, 14-16, 19-20
- Arenales Catalán, Emilio, 94-95
- Argentina (*see also* Antarctica; Latin American countries), 32, 68, 162, 395-397
- Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 62, 151, 238, 281, 331
- Law of the Sea, 703, 769, 780, 783, 785, 795, 797-798, 800-802, 805-806, 808, 817
- Outer space, 285, 868-869, 871, 879, 885, 889-890, 902
- Armitage, John A., 318*n*, 365*n*, 422*n*, 430*n*, 462*n*
- Armour, Norman, Jr., 769
- Army, U.S. Department of the, 484
- Arneson, R. Gordon, 743*n*, 746-748, 761, 771*n*, 772, 799*n*, 800-801, 804*n*, 815, 817-818, 822*n*, 824-825
- Asafu-Adjaye, Edward O., 773
- Asian countries. *See* Geographical distribution principle *and* Parity issue *under* United Nations; Nonaligned countries; *specific countries*.
- Atomic energy. *See* Nuclear power.
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 884, 936
- Atomic weapons. *See* Disarmament.
- Audland, Christopher, 494
- Austin, Vice Adm. B.L., 465
- Australia (*see also* Antarctica), 34, 53-54, 74, 119-120, 390, 447*n*
- Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 151, 267-268, 269*n*, 281, 414, 451
- Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 385-386, 393, 395, 397
- General Assembly rules of procedure amendment proposal, 182-183
- Law of the Sea, 685, 694, 721, 765, 811-812, 819-820
- Outer space, 285, 878-879, 885, 889-890, 894, 902
- Austria, 31, 63, 150, 152, 157, 173, 197, 282, 293-294, 432
- U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 285, 878-879, 899, 902, 907, 909-910, 915, 917
- Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos, 386-388, 396
- Ayub Khan, Gen. Mohammad, 320, 333
- Azkoul, Karim, 10, 11
- Bacon, Ruth, 1*n*, 10*n*, 25*n*, 28*n*, 50*n*, 56*n*, 60*n*, 66*n*, 71*n*, 76*n*, 83*n*, 84*n*, 86*n*, 87*n*, 101*n*, 130*n*, 131*n*, 134*n*, 140*n*, 142*n*, 146, 167*n*, 168*n*, 172*n*, 178*n*, 179*n*, 182*n*, 187*n*, 191*n*, 199*n*, 205*n*, 208*n*, 209*n*, 216*n*, 219*n*, 232*n*, 238*n*, 258*n*, 266*n*, 269*n*, 272*n*, 292*n*, 295*n*, 297*n*, 299*n*, 561*n*, 704*n*, 799*n*, 877*n*, 884*n*
- Badibanga, Samuel, 417-418
- Baig, M.S.A., 811
- Bailey, K.H., 694, 765, 811-812, 819
- Bajpai, Sir Girja, 781
- Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D., 320
- Bandung Conference, 450
- Bane, David M., 144*n*, 203*n*, 219*n*, 297*n*, 313*n*, 423*n*, 424*n*
- Barbour, Walworth, 219*n*
- Barco, James W., 131*n*, 143*n*, 171, 211, 213-214, 443, 885, 914, 917
- Barnes, R.C., 700
- Barnes, Robert G., 324*n*
- Barthelmy, Marcel, 566, 570
- Bartos, Milan, 153, 279
- Beale, Howard, 343-344, 375, 507
- Becker, Loftus, 27*n*, 77*n*, 84*n*, 107*n*, 642*n*, 653*n*, 658*n*, 674*n*, 863*n*, 864*n*, 872*n*, 877*n*, 881*n*
- International Court of Justice, 93
- Law of the Sea, 662, 665*n*, 671, 681, 685, 698, 714, 719, 721-722
- Outer space, 831-833, 867, 883, 885-886
- Beeley, Harold, 217*n*, 219*n*
- Belaunde, Victor Andrés, 52, 62, 130-132, 150, 178, 180, 211
- Belgian Congo (*see also* Congo, Republic of (Leopoldville)), 108, 238
- Belgium (*see also* Antarctica), 95, 120, 150, 279, 290, 426, 443
- Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63, 151, 180, 281
- Law of the Sea, 666, 673, 695, 733, 737, 754, 789, 802, 813, 819, 821, 825
- Outer space, 285, 869, 879, 885, 889, 894, 902
- Bell, James D., 384*n*, 422*n*
- Bellingshausen, Fabian Gottlieb von, 474, 477, 480, 493, 556

- Benest, D.L., 567  
 Benitez, Rafael C., 719-720, 722  
 Bennett, Elmer F., 537-538, 759-760, 771  
 Berding, Andrew H., 317n, 321, 327n,  
 333, 335n, 345, 628n, 629n  
 Berg-Nielsen, Christian, 461  
 Berlin, 98, 240, 300-303, 352, 357-358,  
 368  
 Bernau, Phyllis D., 85n  
 Berry, J. Lampton, 14n, 66n  
 Bhutto, Zulfiquar Ali, 396-398, 700  
 Bianchi, Manuel, 566, 569-570, 572  
 Blow, Stuart, 724, 800, 804n, 805n, 822n  
 Bock, Benjamin, 1n, 25n, 101n, 180n,  
 232n, 266n, 299n  
 Bohlen, Charles E., 300n, 345, 353-354,  
 371, 373, 385n, 421n, 430n, 435n,  
 446n, 450n, 453n, 455-457  
 Boland, Frederick H. (*see also* General As-  
 sembly: Irish presidency), 420, 443,  
 446n  
 Bolivia, 31, 150, 151, 153, 211, 281, 331,  
 645, 769  
 Bomboko, Justin, 346-347, 417, 437-438  
 Booker, Malcolm R., 53-54, 494-497, 507,  
 510, 512, 566, 569, 572  
 Border, Lewis H., 494, 507  
 Boster, Davis E., 269n, 324n  
 Bottomley, J.R.A., 494  
 Bourguiba, Habib, 394, 788, 792  
 Bouziri, Mejib, 788  
 Bovey, John A., Jr., 58n  
 Boykin, Frank W., 680  
 Brazil, 33, 150, 153, 162, 279, 320, 522,  
 532  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 151,  
 180, 281  
 Law of the Sea, 769, 778, 798, 806, 808-  
 813, 817  
 Outer space, 285, 868-869, 879, 885,  
 889-890, 894, 902  
 Breithut, Richard C., 867n, 876n, 877n,  
 880n  
 Brewer, William D., 58n, 318n  
 Brewster, Robert C., 724n  
 British Guiana, 107, 244  
 British Honduras, 107, 244  
 Brode, Wallace R., 863n, 864n  
 Brosio, Manlio, 8, 96n, 226-227, 443-445  
 Brown, Elizabeth A., 22, 50, 53, 136, 225,  
 339n  
 Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 661-662  
 Bruns, William H., 14n, 179n, 180n, 201n,  
 881n  
 Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 517, 538, 547-  
 549, 551, 836-839, 843-844  
 Buffum, William B., 84n, 258n, 303n,  
 360n, 365n, 366n, 399n, 867n, 876n  
 Bulganin, Marshal Nikolai Aleksan-  
 drovich, 3, 5-6, 35, 172, 831, 851-852  
 Bulgaria, 32-33, 152, 278, 282, 285, 897,  
 902  
 Bunker, Ellsworth, 136-139, 749  
 Burdett, William C., Jr., 343n  
 Burgess, W. Randolph, 365, 752-754  
 Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 372-373, 464-  
 465, 468-470, 474, 653, 670-673, 696-  
 697, 812, 817-822, 824  
 Burma, 33, 119, 123, 150, 155, 162, 269,  
 291, 790, 809, 907  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152,  
 282  
 Burris, Philip, 173n  
 Bustamante y Rivero, 279  
 Butler, Richard A., 652  
 Byelorussia, 32, 152, 282, 903, 906-908  
 Byrd, Adm. Richard E., 483n, 558n  
 Caabasi, 787-788  
 Caccia, Harold A., 70n, 338, 351, 449,  
 456n  
 Cadieux, Marcel, 660, 683n, 766, 816n  
 Calhoun, John A., 7n, 66n, 87n, 94n, 184n,  
 224n, 226n, 901n  
 California Fish Cannery Association, 724  
 Cambodia, 32, 63, 111, 152-153, 155, 282,  
 291, 456, 791  
 Cameroons, British (*see also* Nigeria), 95,  
 103, 107, 112, 164-165, 451  
 Cameroun, French (*see also* Cameroun,  
 Republic of), 95, 103, 119, 165-166,  
 238  
 U.N. membership, 107, 109, 112, 173,  
 178, 213-214, 219, 244, 258, 273  
 Cameroun, Republic of, 341, 404n, 414,  
 441, 452  
 Canada, 33, 41, 87, 162, 278, 290, 320,  
 363-365, 372, 456  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63,  
 151, 281  
 Law of the Sea (*see also* Canadian sub-  
 headings under Law of the Sea),  
 720, 727-731, 733, 764, 812, 819  
 Outer space, 285, 879, 885, 889-890,  
 902  
 Security Council membership issues,  
 153, 192-193, 196-198  
 Cang, Truong, 153

- Caprio, Gene F, 322n, 330n, 381n, 394n, 451n
- Cardoso, Mario, 437
- Cargo, William I., 59n, 71n, 81n, 84n, 99n, 119n, 146n, 168n, 172n, 178n, 183n, 191n, 192n, 202n, 219n, 222n, 228n, 230n, 236n, 237n, 238n, 265n, 295n, 297n, 299n, 309n, 313n, 318n, 322n, 381n, 394n, 399n, 421n, 422n, 430n, 432n, 433n, 439n, 441n, 448n, 451n, 461n, 462n, 899n, 901n
- Security Council presidency, 51
- Carry, Charles, 724
- Carson, James L., 330n, 334n, 335n
- Casardi, 752, 754
- Casey, Richard G., 53, 507-512, 605
- Castro, Fidel, 310-311, 321, 325-327, 356, 364, 402
- Central African Republic, 107, 244, 258, 273, 331, 342, 404n, 414-415, 438-439, 452
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 514, 525-534
- Ceylon, 34, 54, 111, 155, 162, 290, 296, 310, 320
- Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282
- Law of the Sea, 696, 702, 790
- Security Council membership, 176-177, 195, 213
- U.N. committee membership, 33, 153, 278, 879
- Chad Republic, 244, 273, 331, 342, 404n, 414-415
- Chamoun, Camille, 52
- Chapman, W.M., 724
- Chehab, Gen. Fuad, 52, 55
- Chelli, Zouhir, 461
- Chile (*see also* Antarctica), 31, 151, 162, 228-229, 278-279, 281, 290
- Law of the Sea, 645, 706-707, 720, 769, 778-780, 790, 795, 798, 800-802, 808-809, 821
- China, People's Republic of (*see also* Chinese U.N. representation; Tibet), 25, 126-127, 169, 323, 388, 398, 405-406, 449, 764, 846n
- Antarctica, 511, 562, 588, 590-591, 619
- Soviet Union, relations with, 323, 338, 352-353, 373, 387, 422
- China, Republic of (*see also* Chinese U.N. representation), 1-3, 120, 124-125, 150, 180, 274, 278-279, 290, 764, 778
- China, Republic of—Continued
- African relations with, 140, 146, 232, 238
- Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands, 64-65
- Chinese U.N. representation, 211, 242
- African positions, 232, 238, 239n, 242, 330-331, 414-415, 449, 452
- British position, 101-102, 124-127, 140-141, 267-268, 448-449
- Chinese People's Republic position, 323
- Chinese People's Republic relations with Tibet and, 138-140, 281, 323
- Congo, Republic of, U.N. membership and, 347, 446
- French position, 180, 232-233, 268
- General Assembly exclusion of discussion, 371
- General Assembly presidency and, 130-131, 136, 142-143, 198-199
- Greek position, 387
- Hungary and, 25, 50, 97, 133
- Indian position, 25, 32, 63, 66-67, 101-102, 138, 151, 180n, 268, 281, 299-300, 330, 398
- Indonesian position, 132, 403
- Irish position, 130-131, 136, 142-143, 146
- Khrushchev General Assembly participation and, 330
- Latin American positions, 233n, 248-249
- Lebanese position, 406
- Malayan proposal, 266-269
- Moratorium proposal, 62-63, 130, 145-146, 180, 299, 347, 403, 413-414, 451-452
- African positions, 238, 239n, 330-331, 394, 414-415, 451-452
- British position, 32, 141, 146, 151, 152, 281-282, 414, 448n, 449, 451
- French position, 281, 414-415
- Guinea amendment, 381-382
- Indian position, 32, 152, 281-282
- Irish position, 143
- Latin American position, 62, 140, 180, 238
- Lebanese position, 405
- Norwegian position, 322-324
- Soviet position, 152, 282
- Tunisian position, 282, 394, 414, 451
- U.S. position, 31-32, 65, 140-141, 151-152, 172-173, 282



- Chinese U.N. representation—Continued  
 Nepalese position, 299-300  
 Nonaligned countries membership and, 110-111, 232-233, 248-249  
 Security Council membership and, 41, 154, 156, 172-173, 176-177, 280  
 Soviet position, 32, 41, 102, 124-125, 154, 156, 172-173, 280-281, 316, 322, 373-374  
 U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space membership and, 910-913, 915, 917-918  
 U.N. council enlargements and, 40-41, 154, 156, 172-173, 280  
 U.S. position, 1-3, 25-26, 31-32, 50, 64-65, 101-102, 140-142, 238-239, 338, 387, 404-406
- Cho Bong-am, 167  
 Chung Whan Chi, 314, 423-424  
 Chuong, Tran Van, 83  
 Chyung, Yil Hyung, 425  
 Ciselet, Georgette, 150  
 Clark, Grenville, 184-186  
 Clough, Ralph N., 813  
 Cohen, Sir Andrew, 447  
 Colclough, Adm. Oswald S., 685, 812  
 Colombia, 31, 32, 151, 162, 281, 290, 685, 769-770, 779  
 Commerce, U.S. Department of, 516, 552  
 Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), 882, 885, 914, 917  
 Commonwealth countries, 28, 147, 245, 274-275, 424-425, 875, 879  
 Congo. *See* Belgian Congo; Congo Republic (Brazzaville); Congo, Republic of (Leopoldville).  
 Congo Republic (Brazzaville), 244, 273, 331, 342, 404*n*, 414, 418, 441, 452  
 Congo, Republic of (Leopoldville):  
 U.N. membership, 244, 258, 273, 340, 341-342, 346-347, 417-418, 429, 437-443, 446  
 Unrest in, 316-317, 327, 341, 359, 403  
 Soviet role, 316, 365, 368, 392-393, 422  
 U.N. intervention, 240, 349, 360-361, 368, 385, 391, 393, 408-409  
 U.N. membership and, 340, 417-418
- Congress, U.S.:  
 Acts of:  
 Connally amendment, 92-94, 186*n*  
 National Aeronautics and Space Act, 1958, 842*n*  
 Senate Resolution 94, 93-94
- Congress, U.S.—Continued  
 Acts of—Continued  
 Senate Resolution 196. *See* Connally amendment *above*.  
 Antarctica, 579, 638-639  
 Hungary, 86  
 Law of the Sea, 680-681, 688-691, 729  
 Outer space, 833-834  
 Cooper, John, 831  
 Coote, Wendell B., 346*n*, 366*n*, 462*n*  
 Cordier, Andrew W., 135, 143*n*, 234, 335*n*  
 Corea, Claude, 278, 702  
 Cornut-Gentile, Bernard, 81, 82*n*  
 Correa, José, 131*n*, 769-770, 776-777, 780, 800, 808-809, 813  
 Costa Rica, 31, 151, 281, 290, 414, 451, 645, 686, 702, 769  
 Couve de Murville, Maurice, 81, 82*n*, 181, 223*n*, 224-225, 226*n*, 286*n*, 351, 356, 821, 825  
 Cuba, 228, 278-279, 310-311, 321, 325-327, 364, 390-391  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 62, 146, 151, 282, 413, 452  
 Law of the Sea, 768-769, 780, 783, 797, 800, 804, 806, 808-813  
 Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., 642*n*  
 Cutler, Robert, 448*n*, 472-475, 500-502, 828, 834-835, 837-839  
 Cyprus, 29, 38-40, 146, 296, 331, 404*n*, 415, 452  
 U.N. membership, 107, 244, 258, 273, 342  
 Czechoslovakia, 32, 37, 42, 60, 150, 152, 233*n*, 234-235, 282  
 General Assembly presidency, 190-191, 208-209, 212, 222-224, 226-227, 341, 459  
 Czech withdrawal, 233*n*, 234  
 Rotation proposal, 171, 179, 191, 205, 229  
 Soviet position, 135, 212, 229, 237  
 U.S. position, 134-136, 142-143, 171, 198-199, 205, 216-218, 230-231, 237, 277  
 Outer space, 285, 870, 879, 885-886, 889-890, 902
- Daftari, M., 279  
 Dahomey Republic, 244, 258, 273, 331, 341, 404*n*  
 Dalai Lama, 294  
 Daniels, Paul C., 471*n*, 497*n*, 503*n*, 518*n*, 561*n*, 592*n*

- Daniels, Paul C.—Continued  
 Antarctica, 466, 468, 473, 494, 514-515, 563-566, 606  
 International administration, 464-465, 467, 470, 497, 507-512, 547, 578-579  
 International conference, 469, 495, 501, 512-515, 567-568, 570, 572, 579-580
- Davies, Richard T., 325*n*
- Davin, Thomas P., 566, 570
- Davis, Richard H., 207*n*, 360*n*
- Day, Arthur R., 140*n*, 198*n*, 435*n*
- De Gasperi, Alcide, 293-294
- De Gaulle, Charles, 38, 286-287, 338, 456
- De la Grandville, Jean, 70*n*, 81*n*
- De La Mare, Arthur, 448
- De Leuses, Pierre, 351
- Dean, Arthur H.:  
 Law of the Sea:  
 First U.N. Conference, 650-653, 656, 663-664, 674*n*, 676-678, 681*n*, 685, 693*n*, 696-697, 698*n*, 699*n*, 704*n*, 792  
 Multilateral convention proposal, 814, 818-821, 824  
 Second U.N. Conference, 720, 727-730, 733, 738-741, 743, 747, 763-765, 769*n*, 775*n*, 784  
 U.S.-Canadian proposal, 777, 782, 786, 801-802, 804
- Defense, U.S. Department of:  
 Antarctica, 484, 486, 500, 508, 517, 520-521, 523, 536, 538, 540, 552, 559, 561, 635  
 Law of the Sea, 643, 646, 653*n*, 679-680, 685, 710, 722, 729, 731, 755, 800, 816  
 Outer space, 841-843
- Delgado, Francisco, 398
- Denmark, 24, 32, 34, 152-153, 162, 279, 282, 323  
 Law of the Sea, 643, 667-668, 673, 683, 685, 694, 698, 733, 736, 740, 752, 765, 815
- Development Loan Fund, 45
- Dia, Mamadou, 457
- Diallo, Telli Boubacar, 75, 81
- Dickson, William, 671
- Diefenbaker, John G., 320, 333, 363-365, 372, 403, 720, 730-731, 815
- Dillon, C. Douglas, 99-101, 346-347, 360, 416-417, 548-551, 804*n*, 884-886
- Dillon, C. Douglas—Continued  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 145-146, 180, 299-300, 322-324, 330-331, 394, 403, 448-449, 451-452  
 Colonial issues, 399-400, 450-451  
 Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 386*n*, 400-401, 403  
 General Assembly, 15th session, 325-328, 343-346, 365-366  
 General Assembly presidency, 131-132, 142-143, 216-218  
 Law of the Sea, 724-725, 727-730, 746, 759, 761-763, 771, 775*n*, 782-783, 802, 805-807, 815-824, 826  
 U.N. membership issues, 144-145, 167, 176-178, 297-298, 339-340, 425, 437-438, 441
- Dimechkie, Nadim, 54-55, 405
- Disarmament (*see also* Demilitarization *under* Antarctica; U.N. Disarmament Commission), 34-35, 247, 262, 283-284, 391  
 Geneva Nuclear Test Talks, 35-36, 149, 156-158, 242, 276, 584  
 Ten-Power Committee, 197, 241, 271, 276, 334, 428  
 Soviet walkout, 271, 276-277, 283, 351, 367, 377, 385
- Indian position, 359
- Khrushchev proposal, 186
- Nuclear weapons testing, 35, 37, 241-242, 649
- Outer space, 36, 391, 832
- Soviet position, 157-158, 262, 276, 282-285, 316, 324, 334, 349-350, 365, 372-373, 398, 406, 419
- U.S.-British test ban announcement, 158, 242
- U.S. position, 149, 283-285, 359, 369
- U.S.-Soviet agreement, 242
- U.S.-Soviet summit proposals, 35-36, 868
- Dixon, Sir Pierson, 15-16, 18*n*, 19*n*, 78-79, 869, 905
- Djuanda, 385
- Dominican Republic, 31, 151, 281, 290, 303-304, 320, 645, 769
- Dorman, John R., 257*n*, 258*n*
- Dorsinville, Max, 94-95
- Dowling, Walter C., 269
- Doyle, Cmdr. James, 714, 719
- Dreier, John C., 198*n*, 644-645, 743*n*

- Drew, George A., 652, 660, 667-668, 673-674, 676-678, 683, 694, 706, 738-739, 766, 773-777, 782-783, 812, 820
- Driscoll, Elizabeth C., 146*n*, 272*n*
- Dryden, Hugh L., 883, 885-886
- Dufek, 483*n*, 558*n*
- Duggan, Roy, 724
- Dulles, Allen, 500, 502, 517, 538, 550
- Dulles, John Foster, 3, 10-11, 17, 18*n*, 26, 58-59, 61-62, 66, 71-72, 93
- Antarctica, 473-479, 497*n*, 502-505, 518
- Hungary, 50, 73, 75*n*, 78, 82-84, 85-86, 88, 96-97, 103-105
- Law of the Sea, 646, 647*n*, 650, 653, 662, 664-665, 670, 674-676, 680-683, 686-687, 692-693, 696, 700*n*
- Outer space, 831, 835-836, 839-840, 873, 877, 881-882
- U.N. membership issues, 9, 11, 14-15, 18-20, 27, 50, 63*n*, 66-67, 81-82, 101-102
- East-West relations, 42-43, 61-62
- Eastern Europe. *See* Soviet bloc.
- Eaton, Cyrus, 361
- Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 13
- Ecuador, 153, 162, 173, 406
- Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 151, 238, 281, 413, 452
- Law of the Sea, 645, 656, 664, 703, 720, 729, 769-770, 776-777, 779-780, 790, 795, 798, 800-802, 808-809, 813
- Egypt. *See* United Arab Republic.
- Eisendrath, Craig R., 146*n*, 168*n*, 258*n*, 909*n*
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 4, 92-94, 300*n*, 314*n*, 416-417, 438-439
- Antarctica, 474-476, 519, 549-553, 560
- Chinese U.N. representation, 145, 404
- Colonial issues, 426, 455-457
- Disarmament, 35-36, 158, 283*n*, 359, 391
- General Assembly:
- Heads of State participation, 305, 311, 312-313, 317-318, 320, 322, 327, 328*n*, 334-335, 339, 340-341, 364
- Khrushchev speech, 355, 358-359, 361-336
- Presidency, 216, 223
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued
- General Assembly—Continued
- Speech, Sept. 22, 1960, 332-333, 344-345, 353, 358-359, 365-366, 391, 403
- U.S. policies, 317*n*, 338-339, 402-403
- Hungary, 75*n*, 82-83, 85, 86*n*
- Law of the Sea, 651-652, 654, 657-659, 700*n*, 730-731, 748-750, 792-793, 802, 809
- Macmillan meeting, 360*n*, 361-362
- Nonaligned countries U.N. membership, 361-362, 404
- Outer space, 391, 829, 831, 834, 836, 838-840, 842-844
- Soviet Union, 35, 168, 174, 275-277
- Bulganan correspondence, 3, 5-6, 35, 172, 851-852
- Khrushchev meeting proposals, 353-354, 364-365, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401
- U.N. Secretariat review, 358-359, 363, 391
- Eisenhower, John S.D., 310, 317*n*, 335*n*, 338
- El Salvador, 31, 151, 191-192, 279, 281
- Law of the Sea, 645, 702, 770, 779, 790, 795, 798, 801-802, 808
- Elbrick, C. Burke, 7*n*, 68-70, 863*n*, 864*n*
- Ellsworth, Lincoln, 483*n*, 558*n*
- Emiliani, Raimundo, 769
- Esin, Seyfullah, 211
- Ethiopia, 33, 146, 213, 279, 290, 787, 792, 810-811
- Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63, 146, 151, 282, 330, 413, 415, 452
- Export-Import Bank, 45
- Farinholt, Larkin H., 612, 872*n*, 877*n*, 880*n*, 881*n*, 884*n*
- Farley, Philip J., 612, 621*n*, 631*n*, 863*n*, 864*n*, 872*n*, 884*n*, 900*n*, 905*n*, 915*n*
- Fascell, Dante B., 680
- Fawzi, Mahmoud, 52, 459
- Fédération de Libération Nationale (FLN) (Algeria), 38
- Feld, Nicholas, 94*n*, 119*n*
- Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., 75*n*, 81*n*, 86*n*, 87*n*, 306*n*
- Fessenden, Russell, 343*n*, 365*n*
- Filippov, Yuri V., 563-565, 567, 570-572
- Finland, 32, 152, 153, 162-163, 197, 279, 282, 290-291

- Finland—Continued  
 Outer space, 904-905, 907, 909, 912-919
- Fisher, Wayne W., 566*n*, 567, 582-587, 590-592, 594-605, 609-614, 632*n*, 637*n*
- Fishing Vessel Owners Association, 724
- Fitzmaurice, Gerald, 280, 591, 660-661, 665-666, 677, 776
- Fleck, Benjamin A., 136
- Ford, Alan W., 9*n*, 14*n*
- Foreign Ministers meeting, Geneva, 149, 158
- France (*see also* Algeria; Antarctica; Cameroon, French; Security Council; *France and French subheadings under other subjects*), 21, 41, 150, 235, 274, 279, 347, 360, 422
- Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 151, 281
- Colonial issues, 107, 109, 443, 447*n*, 456
- Guinea U.N. membership, 75, 81-82, 87-88
- Hungary, 73-74, 117, 290
- Law of the Sea, 663, 666-668, 673, 695, 706-707, 733, 737, 753, 766, 787, 789, 810, 813, 819-822, 824-826
- Outer space, 285, 869, 875, 879, 885, 889-890, 897, 902
- U.N. Trusteeship Council, 119-121, 123, 166, 184*n*, 210
- Franklin, Derek, 566, 570
- Freimarck, George S., 188*n*, 202*n*
- Freitas-Valle, Cyro de, 202*n*, 868-869
- French Equatorial Africa, 107
- French Togoland. *See* Togolese Republic.
- French West Africa, 107
- Frondizi, Arturo, 519, 607*n*
- Fulbright, J. William, 93, 184*n*
- Gabon Republic, 244, 258, 273, 331, 342, 404*n*
- Gallin-Douathe, Michel, 438-439
- Gamboa, Melquiades J., 414
- Garcia, Carlos P., 268, 269*n*, 781
- Garcia Amador, F.V., 768, 808, 813
- Garcia Robles, Alfonso, 700, 720, 764-765, 770, 780, 796, 797, 811, 813
- Garroway, Dave, 321
- Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 457, 731, 791-792
- Gathright, Wreathram E., 895*n*
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 44
- General Assembly (*see also* U.N. and *United Nations headings and subheadings under other subjects*):  
 African presidency, 214  
 Australian rules of procedure amendment proposal, 183-184  
 Czech presidency, 190-191, 208-209, 212, 216-218, 222-224, 226-227, 341, 459  
 Czech withdrawal, 233*n*, 234  
 Soviet position, 135, 212, 229, 237  
 U.S. position, 134-136, 142-143, 171, 198-199, 205, 216-218, 230-231, 237, 277
- Czech presidency rotation proposal, 171, 179, 191, 205, 229
- Expanded membership. *See* Nonaligned countries: U.N. representation.
- 15th session (*see also specific country presidency entries*):  
 Afro-Asian world peace resolution, 421  
 Castro speech, 402  
 Eisenhower participation, 305, 312-313, 317-318, 332-335, 344-345, 391  
 Eisenhower speech, 332-333, 344-345, 353, 358-359, 365-366, 391, 402  
 Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403  
 French policies, 356, 360  
 Heads of state participation, 305-307, 310-314, 317-321, 324-329, 333, 340-341, 343-346, 364, 405, 411  
 Indian policies, 362  
 Khrushchev participation, 305-307, 310-314, 321-322, 324-327, 330, 333, 335-337, 340-341, 355, 364, 371-373, 383, 398, 407, 419-420, 444  
 Khrushchev speech, 347-350, 355-356, 358-360, 363, 365-366, 402  
 Macmillan speech, 371, 403, 407  
 Philippine speech, 398  
 Postponement proposals, 220-221  
 Resumption deferral, 453-454  
 Soviet policies, 314-317, 332, 351-353, 365, 371-372, 388-389, 394, 401-402, 407-408, 422  
 U.S. anti-Soviet resolution, 366-369, 407-408

## General Assembly—Continued

## 15th session—Continued

- U.S.-British cooperation, 333-334,  
361-362, 372, 403
- U.S.-Canadian cooperation, 363-365,  
372, 403
- U.S. policies, 272-295, 315-316, 366-  
369, 388-391

- General Committee membership, 12,  
30-31, 150-151, 233*n*, 234-235,  
238, 277-278

Ghanian presidency, 459

Icelandic presidency, 230-232, 236, 265,  
271-272, 277, 341

Indonesian presidency, 131-132, 459

Irish presidency, 135, 190-191, 198-199,  
208-209, 212, 214, 217-219, 222-  
227, 229, 237*n*, 277, 341

British position, 143*n*, 190, 208, 217,  
222-223

Chinese U.N. representation and,  
130-131, 136, 142-143

French position, 222-225

Icelandic candidacy and, 230-231,  
265, 271-272

Italian presidency, 208-209, 216-218,  
222-228

Lebanese presidency, 8, 10-11, 17-18,  
26, 30, 52-53, 55, 58*n*, 59-60, 131-  
132, 150

New Zealand presidency, 10, 30, 52,  
131-132, 150

Peaceful and Neighborly Relations  
item, 169-170

Peruvian presidency, 52, 62, 130-131,  
150, 178

Postponement proposals, 53-55

Procedural reform, 410-413

## Resolutions:

- 136 (XII), 155
- 510 (VI), 357
- 684 (VII), 411
- 1133 (XI), 33
- 1142 (XII), 164
- 1144A (XII), 61
- 1144B (XII), 56
- 1148 (XII), 868
- 1150 (XII), 35
- 1166 (XII), 45
- 1179 (XII), 47, 161, 289
- 1184 (XII), 37-38
- 1188 (XII), 47
- 1190 (XII), 41
- 1192 (XII), 30

## General Assembly—Continued

## Resolutions—Continued

- 1219 (XII), 43
- 1236 (XII), 170
- 1239 (XIII), 62*n*
- 1243 (XIII), 164
- 1248 (XIII), 160
- 1252 (XIII), 157
- 1264 (XIII), 166-167
- 1299 (XIII), 154
- 1300 (XIII), 154
- 1301 (XIII), 170
- 1302 (XIII), 161, 289
- 1312 (XIII), 91-92
- 1325 (XIII), 92
- 1346 (XIII), 92
- 1348 (XIII), 886-887, 891
- 1349 (XIII), 165
- 1350 (XIII), 165
- 1351 (XIV), 180*n*, 281-282
- 1353 (XIV), 190*n*, 295
- 1375 (XIV), 288
- 1378 (XIV), 282
- 1404 (XIV), 192*n*
- 1420 (XIV), 242
- 1424 (XIV), 242
- 1427 (XIV), 242
- 1454 (XIV), 263*n*, 290
- 1455 (XIV), 291
- 1456 (XIV), 292
- 1457 (XIV), 290
- 1460 (XIV), 289
- 1474 (ES-IV), 349
- 1476 (XV), 342
- 1477 (XV), 342
- 1478 (XV), 342
- 1479 (XV), 342
- 1480 (XV), 342
- 1481 (XV), 342
- 1482 (XV), 342
- 1483 (XV), 342
- 1484 (XV), 342
- 1485 (XV), 342
- 1486 (XV), 342
- 1487 (XV), 342
- 1488 (XV), 342
- 1489 (XV), 342
- 1490 (XV), 342
- 1491 (XV), 342
- 1492 (XV), 407
- 1493 (XV), 413*n*
- 1498 (XV), 446*n*
- 1514 (XV), 450-451

- General Assembly—Continued  
 Resolutions—Continued  
 1542 (XV), 447, 450-451, 454-458,  
 460-462  
 Special session on the Suez Crisis, 49,  
 67  
 Sudanese presidency, 58-60, 459  
 Tunisian presidency, 214, 235  
 U.S. policies, 28-49, 173-175, 178-179,  
 239, 241-243, 272-295, 315-316,  
 366-369, 388-391  
 "Open world" theme, 146-170, 332  
 United Arab Republic presidency, 459  
 Uniting for Peace resolution, 445  
 Veto power, 61  
 Yugoslav presidency, 51-53, 58*n*  
 Gennotte, Ivan, 566, 569  
 George, Zelma Watson, 461*n*  
 Gerig, O. Benjamin, 119*n*, 183*n*, 430*n*,  
 433*n*, 435*n*, 450*n*  
 German unification, 369  
 Germany:  
 Foreign Ministers meeting, 149  
 Four-power meeting, 377-378, 386  
 Germany, Democratic Republic of (*see also*  
 Berlin), 511, 562, 588, 590-591, 619,  
 781  
 Germany, Federal Republic of (*see also*  
 Berlin), 25, 269  
 Law of the Sea, 643, 666, 668, 695, 733,  
 737, 753, 778, 781, 798, 821  
 Ghana, 33, 112, 155, 165, 176, 279, 290-  
 291, 438, 460  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152,  
 282, 415  
 Congo, Republic of, 418, 440  
 Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev  
 meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-  
 380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-  
 401, 403  
 Guinea U.N. membership, 87, 112  
 Law of the Sea, 773-774, 781, 787, 802,  
 810-811  
 U.N. Secretariat review, 356, 363-364  
 Glaser, Edvin, 764  
 Glass, Leslie Charles, 333  
 Gleason, S. Everett, 472-476, 536-538,  
 547-553, 828-830, 834-844  
 Glennan, Keith, 537  
 Goedhart, L.J., 460  
 Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 80  
 Goni, Santos, 566, 569  
 Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 305*n*,  
 310, 312-313, 355*n*, 361-362, 370*n*,  
 375-380, 395*n*, 416*n*, 454, 457  
 Gore-Booth, Paul H., 826  
 Grand, Stanley I., 877*n*, 880*n*, 881*n*, 899*n*,  
 901*n*  
 Gray, Gordon, 536-537, 547-549, 551-  
 552, 580, 772, 841-843, 867  
 Greece (*see also* Cyprus), 33, 175-177, 181,  
 239-240, 395-396, 643, 695-696, 702,  
 733  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63,  
 140, 146, 152, 281, 414, 451  
 Green, Howard C., 193, 196-198, 204,  
 269, 363, 747, 827  
 Green, James F., 119*n*, 131*n*, 134*n*, 140*n*,  
 142*n*, 146*n*, 172*n*, 176*n*, 179*n*, 182*n*,  
 183*n*, 187*n*, 191*n*, 198*n*, 205*n*, 208*n*,  
 209*n*, 258*n*, 306*n*  
 Green, Theodore Francis, 689  
 Gromyko, Andrey Andreyevich, 322*n*,  
 354  
 Gros, André, 591, 597-598, 607, 668, 695,  
 737, 766, 819-820  
 Gruber, Karl, 293-294  
 Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty, 823  
 Guatemala, 31, 33, 150, 151, 281  
 Law of the Sea, 770, 777, 779, 795, 798,  
 801-802, 808  
 Guerrero, Judge, 153  
 Guinea, 165-166, 290-291, 417-418, 438,  
 440, 455, 787, 810-811, 907  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 282, 381-  
 382, 414-415  
 U.N. membership, 75-76, 81-83, 86-89,  
 92, 112  
 Gulf of Aqaba. *See* Aqaba Gulf.  
 Hager, Eric H., 184*n*, 734*n*, 741, 743*n*,  
 748*n*, 771*n*, 782, 799*n*  
 Law of the Sea, 769*n*, 782, 784-786,  
 800-804, 818-820, 824*n*  
 Hagerty, James C., 502  
 Haile Selassie I, 792  
 Haiti, 31, 94-96, 151, 153, 165, 184*n*, 281,  
 290, 347, 769  
 Haley, James A., 680  
 Hammarskjöld, Dag (*see also* U.N. Secre-  
 tariat), 54, 91*n*, 163, 234, 250, 302,  
 334-337, 345, 372, 866-867  
 Arab Union, 15*n*, 16, 17, 18*n*, 19*n*, 20*n*  
 Congo, Republic of, 361, 429, 463  
 General Assembly presidency, 135,  
 143*n*

- Hammarskjöld, Dag—Continued  
 U.N. Emergency Force, 48, 162  
 U.N. Secretariat review, 189, 355, 358,  
 383-384, 392
- Han, Pyo Wook, 810
- Hanes, John W., Jr., 26n, 53-55, 56n, 335n,  
 345
- Hardy, Capt. Leonard, 719, 721-722, 727,  
 729, 812
- Hare, John, 739-740, 766, 773, 776, 795,  
 814, 819
- Hare, Raymond A., 317n, 318n, 321, 327n,  
 343n, 356
- Harper, D.G., 566
- Harr, Karl G., Jr., 500, 502, 514, 517, 536,  
 538, 579-580, 866-867
- Harriman, W. Averell, 418
- Hartley, Virginia F., 7n, 10n, 11n, 17n,  
 18n, 20n, 56n, 58n, 59n, 60n, 66n,  
 83n, 131n, 134n, 142n, 144n, 167n,  
 172n, 176n, 178n, 179n, 182n, 184n,  
 187n, 191n, 192n, 199n, 202n, 205n,  
 206n, 208n, 209n, 216n, 219n, 222n,  
 224n, 228n, 230n, 236n, 237n, 265n,  
 269n, 271n, 295n, 297n, 309n, 339n,  
 441n, 461n
- Hungarian revolution, 53
- Hawley, Charles F., 71n, 86n, 136, 203n,  
 221n, 257n, 704n
- Hearn, Capt. W.A., 727-730, 812
- Heaney, Arnold D.P., 782, 815-817, 827
- Hekmat, M. Ali Asghar, 66
- Hemba, Alton W., 606
- Henderson, Horace, 94-96, 637
- Henderson, Loy W., 91n, 187n, 209-210,  
 356
- Herrarte, Alberto, 150
- Herrington, William C., 743n, 755n, 822n
- Law of the Sea, 689, 691, 699n, 714,  
 719, 721-722, 724, 727-728, 742,  
 747, 798, 812 Herter, Christian A.,  
 17n, 107n, 168n, 184n, 292-294,  
 303-304, 417n, 421, 427n, 518n,  
 795n, 903n
- African countries, 232-233, 238, 258-  
 264, 286-288, 407, 418n
- Antarctica, 466, 471-472, 500-501, 515-  
 517, 536-537, 582, 583, 585, 588-  
 590, 606, 608-609, 612, 615-617,  
 625n, 626, 627n, 628, 632
- Chinese U.N. representation, 1-3, 25-  
 26, 124-126, 127n, 172-173, 198-  
 199, 232-233, 238, 266-269, 387,  
 405-406, 449
- Herrington, William C.—Continued  
 Chinese U.N. representation—  
 Continued  
 Moratorium proposal, 140-142, 238-  
 239, 281-282, 331, 381-382, 394n
- Colonial issues, 430-436, 447, 454-458,  
 461-462
- Congo, Republic of, 349, 385, 429, 438-  
 441, 443, 446
- Disarmament, 282-285, 349-350
- Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting pro-  
 posals, 354, 375, 377-379, 385-387,  
 393, 396-398
- Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, 360n,  
 361-362
- General Assembly, 183-184, 220-221,  
 351, 362, 422, 453-454
- Heads of state participation, 305-306,  
 310-313, 316-322, 324n, 325,  
 328, 334-337, 340, 345, 348-350,  
 355
- Presidency, 51-53, 179, 190, 198-199,  
 205, 208-209, 222, 223n, 224-  
 228, 236, 237, 265, 271-272, 277
- U.S. policies, 28-49, 146-167, 272-  
 295, 333-334, 338
- Hungary, 76-78, 84-85, 103, 104, 117-  
 118, 201, 290-291
- International Court of Justice, 93, 279-  
 280
- Korea, 60-61, 83, 86-87, 203-204, 219-  
 220, 291-292, 295-296, 309-310,  
 313-314, 423-425, 432-433
- Law of the Sea, 266, 655, 680-681,  
 691n, 697n, 704-705, 799, 827
- Second U.N. Conference, 709, 732-  
 736, 743-746, 748-749, 755-757,  
 784n, 791n, 792-793, 804
- Lebanon, 405-407
- Nonaligned countries U.N. member-  
 ship, 75-76, 83, 87-88, 273-275,  
 342, 461-462
- Outer space, 285-286, 831-832, 863-  
 864, 866-868, 872-873, 876-878,  
 880-881, 892-893
- U.N. Committee parity issue, 895-  
 896, 899, 900n, 905-906, 908-  
 912, 915-916
- Security Council membership issues, 7,  
 181n, 181, 182-183, 187, 193-196,  
 199-200, 202, 228-229, 278-279,  
 441-442
- South Africa, 288-290

- Herrington, William C.—Continued  
 Soviet bloc, 90-91, 168, 173-175, 207-208, 275-277, 387  
 U.N. Charter review, 184, 186*n*  
 U.N. council enlargements, 134-135, 172-173, 191-192, 280-281  
 U.N. Secretariat review proposal, 188-189, 202-203, 348-349, 363-364, 374*n*, 384, 392-393, 422-423  
 U.N. Trusteeship Council, 94, 119-123, 183-184, 206, 257  
 U.S. general U.N. policy, 173-175, 178-179, 275-277  
 Vietnamese U.N. representation, 56-57, 83, 86-87, 309-310
- Herz, Martin, 216*n*, 232*n*, 238*n*, 272*n*, 430*n*, 433*n*, 440*n*, 447*n*, 448*n*
- Hewitt, Warren E., 432*n*, 446*n*
- Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 83*n*, 85
- Hickerson, John D., 268, 269*n*
- Hoag, Harold L., 722, 727, 812
- Home, Lord, 333-334, 338-340, 351, 360*n*, 361-362, 376-377, 379, 386, 448*n*, 497*n*, 652
- Honduras, 31, 151, 281, 290, 645, 769
- Hood, Samuel, 22-24, 70*n*, 78*n*, 103*n*, 126*n*, 216-217, 223, 494, 496, 814-815
- Hope, A. Guy, 299*n*, 386*n*, 388, 396*n*, 398, 405
- Horgan, Rogers B., 748*n*
- Hoshi, Bunshichi, 395-396
- Houghton, Amory, 825-826
- Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 441
- Howe, Fisher, 662
- Hubbard, Wharton D., 269*n*
- Humphrey, Hubert, 93
- Hungary, 32, 117, 152, 282, 369  
 ILO credentials rejection, 23-24, 69, 86  
 Kádár General Assembly participation, 308, 310-311, 321, 325-327, 364  
 Nagy and Maleter executions, 22-23, 34, 68, 77, 153  
 Outer space, 215-216, 285, 899-901, 903, 905, 908, 917  
 U.N. sanction proposals, 96-98, 104, 118, 132-134, 201, 211, 242, 247, 263, 290-291  
 British position, 22-25, 73-74, 78-80, 103-105, 201, 290  
 Credentials rejection, 22-25, 33-34, 73-74, 78-80, 92, 104
- Hungary—Continued  
 U.N. sanction proposals—Continued  
 Credentials rejection—Continued  
 U.S. position, 50, 54, 68-70, 73-78, 82-86, 88-89, 96-98, 118, 133, 154, 304  
 General Assembly Resolution 1312 (XIII), 91-92, 103, 153-154  
 General Assembly Resolution 1346 (XIII), 92  
 General Assembly Resolution 1454 (XIV), 263*n*  
 Munro mission, 92, 96, 103-105, 117-118, 154, 215-216, 290-291  
 U.N. Special Committee, 22-23, 33-34, 54, 91
- Hussein, King, 387, 721
- Huston, Harris H., 321
- Iceland:  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63, 152, 282  
 General Assembly presidency, 230-232, 236, 265, 271-272, 277, 341  
 Law of the Sea, 815  
 First U.N. Conference, 643, 666-667, 673, 682, 683*n*, 685, 699, 703  
 Second U.N. Conference, 265*n*, 266, 710, 733, 736, 740, 744, 752-753, 778, 789, 794-795, 797, 800, 805, 813
- Ifeagwu, C.O., 460
- Imru, Mikael, 415
- India, 136-139, 155, 163, 269, 279, 319-321, 344, 358-359  
 African countries, 95, 161, 165, 246, 289-290, 359  
 Antarctica, 42, 481-482, 489, 522  
 China, People's Republic of, 139, 323, 398  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 25, 32, 63, 66-67, 101-102, 180*n*, 281, 299-300, 330  
 Disarmament, 157, 359  
 Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403  
 Korea, 204, 291  
 Law of the Sea (*see also* *Indian subheadings under* Law of the Sea), 643, 656, 660, 663, 683*n*, 684, 721, 792, 811



## India—Continued

- Security Council membership proposals, 56, 60, 144, 167
- U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 170, 285, 870, 879, 885-886, 889-890, 897, 902, 906-907, 909, 915
- U.N. Trusteeship Council membership, 153, 184*n*, 211
- Indonesia, 33, 111, 150, 155, 158, 163, 269, 290-291, 402, 418, 422-423
- Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282, 403
- Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403
- General Assembly, 131-132, 344, 459
- Law of the Sea, 648, 764, 772, 777, 791, 816
- Outer space, 904, 906-907, 909-915, 917
- Security Council membership issues, 56, 60, 144, 187
- Informal Working Group on Antarctica, 563-576
- Inter-American Conference, Quito, 1960, 725-727
- Interior, U.S. Department of the:
  - Antarctica, 484, 516, 537-538, 552
  - Law of the Sea, 643, 646, 729, 747, 800, 802-804, 812
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 12, 43, 124-127, 584, 870, 875, 882
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 45
- International Commission of Jurists, 139
- International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), 858, 882
- International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1-3, 92-94, 101, 153, 279, 294, 297-298, 926
  - Antarctica, 568, 571, 578-579, 587, 604, 608
  - Enlargement of, 40-41, 154, 192
  - Law of the Sea, 648, 687, 778
- International Development Association, 242*n*
- International Geophysical Year (IGY), 36-37, 41, 464, 466-468, 477, 480-482, 484, 489, 853, 858, 864, 871, 885
- International Labor Organization (ILO), 23-24, 69, 86, 262
- International Law Commission, 642, 649, 656, 659-661, 663, 689, 819-820
- International Red Cross, 2, 368
- International Whaling Commission, 532, 534
- Iran, 31, 151, 239, 274, 279, 282, 433*n*, 450, 460
  - Law of the Sea, 721, 777, 788-789, 792
  - Outer space, 285, 879, 885, 889, 902
  - Security Council membership, 32, 50-51, 58, 66, 67
- Iraq (*see also* Arab Union), 9, 16, 19, 27, 32, 87*n*, 155, 235, 240, 278, 290-291, 318-319
  - Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63, 152, 282, 331
  - Law of the Sea, 764, 788
  - Outer space, 904, 906-907, 913
- Ireland, 33, 158, 163, 290, 294, 431-432, 899
  - Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 146, 152, 282, 331
  - General Assembly presidency, 135, 190-191, 198-199, 208-209, 212, 214, 217-219, 222-227, 229, 237*n*, 277, 341
  - British position, 143*n*, 190, 208, 217, 222-223
  - Chinese U.N. representation and, 130-131, 136, 142-143
  - French position, 223-225
  - Icelandic candidacy and, 230-231, 265, 271-272
  - Law of the Sea, 683, 695, 733, 736, 778
- Israel (*see also* Arab-Israeli dispute), 32, 152, 282, 290, 330, 347, 695, 707, 717, 778
- Italian Somaliland. *See* Somaliland.
- Italy, 24, 74, 117, 163, 279, 290, 293-294, 368*n*, 522
  - Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 151, 282
  - General Assembly presidency, 208-209, 216-218, 222-228
  - Law of the Sea, 673, 695, 707, 733, 737, 754, 764, 811
  - Outer space, 285, 879, 885, 889-890, 902
  - Security Council membership, 7-8, 10, 17-18, 32-33, 68
  - U.N. Trusteeship Council, 94-96, 119, 121, 166, 210
- Ivory Coast Republic, 244, 258, 273, 331, 341-342, 404*n*

- Jackson, C.D., 85-86, 312  
 Jackson, Charles, 724  
 Jackson, Henry M., 680-681, 688-691, 750-751, 755*n*  
 Jakobsen, Odd G., 566, 570  
 Jamali, Mohamed Fadhil, 16  
 Jandrey, Frederick W., 17*n*, 81*n*, 87*n*  
 Japan (*see also* Antarctica), 10, 87*n*, 139, 157, 242, 274, 278, 347, 395-396  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63, 151, 282  
   Colonial issues, 431, 450-451  
   International Court of Justice membership, 153, 279  
   Law of the Sea, 661, 666, 668, 674, 703, 764, 809, 811, 813  
   Outer space, 285, 879, 885, 889-890, 902, 920  
 Javits, Jacob, 186*n*, 441-442  
 Jawad, Hashim, 27  
 Jebb, Hubert Miles Gladwyn, 75*n*  
 Jeffrey, H. Peter, 495, 831  
 Jha, L.K., 136-137, 139  
 Johansen, George, 680-681  
 Johnson, Lyndon B., 460, 873, 877  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 338, 372-373, 728, 731-732, 841-844  
   Antarctica, 464-465, 467-470, 472-474, 479, 547-548, 552  
 Jones, G. Lewis, Jr., 295*n*, 313*n*, 317*n*, 318*n*, 320, 388, 398, 405, 424*n*, 441*n*  
 Jordan (*see also* Arab Union), 9, 111, 163, 181, 240, 279, 290  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 151, 282  
   Law of the Sea, 721, 729, 789, 810  
   Outer space, 899, 907, 910-912  
 Joyce, James, 514  
 Justice, U.S. Department of, 710  
 Kádár, Janos, 308, 310-311, 321, 325-327, 364  
 Kamil, Dato Nik, 330  
 Kanza, 417-418  
 Kasavubu, Joseph, 347, 403, 417-418, 437-443, 446  
 Kaur, Rajkumari Amrit, 138  
 Kefauver, Capt., 517  
 Kennedy, John F., 346  
 Kenya, 107, 244  
 Kerina, Mburumba, 460  
 Kerley, Ernest L., 28*n*, 146*n*, 272*n*, 303*n*, 812  
 Ketchum, 483*n*, 558*n*  
 Khrushchev, Nikita (*see also* General Assembly: 15th session: Khrushchev participation; U.N. Secretariat: Soviet criticisms), 35, 302*n*, 333, 352, 384, 902-904  
   Disarmament, 35-36, 186, 349-350, 372-373  
   Eisenhower meeting proposals, 353-354, 364-365  
   Five-Power General Assembly resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401  
   General Assembly, 318, 351-353, 388-389, 394, 407  
   U.S. visit, 168, 171, 174, 241, 275-276, 892  
 Killian, James R., Jr., 512, 517, 537-538, 550-551, 828-830, 834-836, 838-839, 843  
 Kivette, Adm., 747  
 Kohler, Foy D., 73*n*, 77*n*, 84*n*, 86*n*, 90*n*, 134*n*, 198*n*, 216*n*, 317*n*, 325*n*, 335*n*, 365*n*, 366*n*, 430*n*, 435*n*, 822*n*, 872*n*, 877*n*, 901*n*, 903*n*, 905*n*, 909*n*, 910*n*  
   Antarctica, 606-608, 628*n*  
   Colonial issues, 356-357  
   General Assembly, 223*n*, 229, 306-307, 324, 325*n*, 338, 351-352  
   Law of the Sea, 827  
   Outer space, 900  
 Koirala, Bishweshwar Prasad, 300*n*, 319  
 Koo, V.K. Wellington, 1-2  
 Korea, Democratic Republic of (*see also* Korean U.N. representation), 511, 562, 588, 590-591, 619  
 Korea, Republic of, Law of the Sea, 663, 702, 707, 715, 810  
 Korean U.N. representation, 89, 242, 309-310, 314  
   Canadian position, 203-204  
   Khrushchev General Assembly participation and, 313  
   Nonaligned countries U.N. membership and, 247, 297, 424  
   Republic of Korea position, 296*n*, 297, 423-424  
   Soviet position, 60, 89, 144, 204, 296-298, 309  
   U.S. position, 60-61, 83, 86-87, 144-145, 147, 167, 178, 219-220, 295-298, 424-425  
   Vietnamese unification and, 432-433  
 Korean unification, 29, 145*n*, 166-167, 291-292, 295, 298, 314, 333, 433

- Korean war, 240, 281, 350, 369  
 Krebs, Max V., 195*n*, 384*n*, 385*n*, 386*n*  
 Kreisky, Bruno, 294  
 Krispis, Elias, 696  
 Kuriyama, Judge, 153  
 Kuznetsov, Vasily V., 72, 893-899, 901-920
- Lall, Arthur, 66-67, 136-137  
 Lambie, James M., Jr., 401-404  
 Lane, George M., 83*n*, 144*n*, 203*n*  
 Lange, Halvard, 237*n*, 747  
 Laos, 111, 197, 240, 255, 274, 702, 790  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282, 331, 413, 452
- Latin American countries (*see also* Geographic distribution principle *under* United Nations; Nonaligned countries; *Latin American subheadings under other subjects; specific countries*):  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 62, 65, 140, 146, 180, 233*n*, 238  
 Colonial issues, 431-432, 451  
 Dominican Republic U.N. credentials rejection proposal, 303-304  
 Hungary, 24, 50, 79, 97  
 Law of the Sea, 644-645, 659, 661, 685, 715, 719-720  
 Nonaligned countries U.N. membership, 112, 248  
 Outer space, 864, 867-869, 871, 875, 879  
 Security Council membership issues, 66, 129, 153, 177*n*, 228  
 South Africa, 160, 288  
 Soviet Union, relations with, 368  
 U.N. representation, 28-29, 52, 130-132, 150, 153, 205, 235, 273, 275, 864, 871, 875, 879
- Lauterpacht, Sir Hersch, 278, 280
- Law of the Sea:  
   British position, 694, 706-707, 710, 778, 783, 795, 806, 814-815, 820, 824  
   British 6-mile proposal, 653, 665, 668, 671-680, 682-686, 694  
   British 6/6-mile proposal, 739-740  
   Canadian-Indian-Mexican proposal, 698-701  
   Canadian position, 676, 678, 694, 706, 738-739, 744, 766-767, 815-817, 820, 824, 827  
   Canadian secret 6/6-mile proposal, 722-723
- Law of the Sea—Continued  
   Canadian 3/9-mile proposal, 643-646, 648, 658-659, 664-665, 668, 674-675, 680-683, 685-686, 694-695, 707  
   British position, 650-657, 660-662, 665-666, 670-671  
   Historic fishing rights issue, 663, 666-670, 673-674, 682-684, 693  
   Indian position, 660, 663, 677, 679, 684  
   U.S. fishing industry position, 690-691  
   Canadian unrestricted 6/6-mile proposal, 695-696, 702-703, 705, 738, 742, 744, 747-748, 758, 761, 765, 769-770, 773  
   Western European position, 720, 737, 744, 752-753, 766  
   Continental shelf, 642, 645, 648, 703  
   First U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1958 (*see also specific issues*), 649-708  
   Diplomatic preparations, 642-644f  
   U.S. policy, 641-642, 647-649  
   General Assembly discussion of, 711, 783  
   Hague Conference, 1930, 641, 669, 673  
   Historic fishing rights issue (*see also specific proposals*), 49, 693-696, 702-703, 705, 726, 735, 737, 739-741, 768  
   British 12-mile proposal, 686  
   Canadian 3/9-mile proposal, 663, 666-670, 673-674, 682-684, 693, 726  
   U.S. fishing industry position, 681, 690-691, 742, 750-752, 755-757, 793-794, 798  
   U.S.-Canadian discussions, 730, 733, 739, 756, 760-763, 782-783  
   Icelandic-British fishing dispute, 714, 738-739, 747, 778, 795, 815, 819  
   Indian position, 656, 661, 677, 684, 694-695, 748-750, 761, 774, 779, 781, 788, 796, 809  
   Indian 12-mile proposal, 676-677  
   Innocent passage, 661-662, 670-672, 675-677, 686-687, 697, 717-718, 781, 798  
   Inter-American Conference, Quito, 1960, 725-727

## Law of the Sea—Continued

- International fishing rights (*see also* Historic fishing rights *above*; *specific proposals*), 647, 680-681, 690-691, 814-815, 826
- Dependent coastal states, 785, 794-798, 800-801, 803-806, 808-813
- Landlocked countries, 643, 649
- Latin American positions, 644-645, 659, 664-665, 674-675, 703, 725-726, 735, 744, 747, 765, 769-770, 779, 819, 821
- Mexican flexible proposal, 686, 692, 725, 741-742, 744, 765, 776, 781, 785
- Indian position, 677, 679, 684-685, 694, 702, 747
- Mexican proposal, 797-798, 802
- Multilateral convention proposal, 814-817, 818-823, 824-827
- Nonaligned countries positions, 659, 662, 668-669, 674-675, 686, 700-702, 707, 718, 726, 735, 744, 747, 765, 773, 778
- Nuclear testing, 649
- Overflight rights, 661-662, 670-672, 675-677, 686-687, 715, 717
- Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1960 (*see also specific issues*), 49, 265*n*, 266
- Delegation reports, 764-770, 773-781, 783-791, 794-799, 807-813
- Diplomatic preparations, 709, 712, 715, 719-723, 727-734, 736-750, 752-754
- Participants, 9, 711-712, 764
- Timing of, 709-710, 712
- U.S. policy, 711-715, 718-719, 726-729, 731-732, 741-743, 757-760, 772, 791-792, 799
- 16-nation Afro-Asian 12-mile proposal, 779, 781, 785
- Southeast Asia, 661, 666, 668, 674
- Soviet bloc positions, 656, 659, 661, 692, 698-699, 710, 717, 764, 767
- Soviet 12-mile proposals, 661, 668-669, 677, 690, 701, 706, 767, 769-770, 773-776, 781, 785, 797
- Submarine cables and pipelines, 648, 680
- Territorial waters, limits of (*see also specific proposals*), 648, 656, 659, 661, 663, 716-717
- U.N. role, 811

## Law of the Sea—Continued

- U.S.-British discussions, 651-652, 654-655, 657-659, 715, 720, 723, 731, 734-736
- U.S.-British 6/6-mile proposals, 723, 728-730, 733, 735, 738-740, 744-750, 755, 757-769, 773-774, 776-767
- Latin American positions, 730, 742, 744, 769-770
- Nonaligned countries positions, 730, 739-740, 744, 748, 773-774
- Western European positions, 737, 740-741, 744, 752-754, 766, 773-775
- U.S.-Canadian 6/6-mile proposal, 773-778, 783, 786, 807, 814-822
- Dependent coastal states amendments, 781, 788, 794, 796-797, 800-801, 803-806, 808-813
- Latin American positions, 777, 779-780, 783-785, 790, 798-802, 806, 808-809, 821-822
- Nonaligned countries positions, 787-791, 798, 809-811
- U.S. fishing industry position, 793-794, 798, 801, 805-806
- U.S.-Canadian bilateral agreement and, 775, 782-783
- Western European positions, 778, 786, 798, 802
- U.S. fishing industry positions, 680-681, 688-691, 724-727, 729, 731, 771, 796, 803, 814, 822-823
- U.S. 6/6-mile proposals, 687-688, 691*n*, 692-697, 699-702, 704-707, 715, 718, 726-727, 742
- Latin American positions, 700, 703, 706-707
- Soviet bloc position, 695-696, 700, 702
- Western European positions, 661, 663, 666-668, 680, 694-696, 698-699, 706-707, 726, 728-730
- Lay, James S., Jr., 639
- Lebanon, 155, 163, 240, 290-291, 318-319, 405-407, 789, 810
- Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 151, 282, 331, 405-406
- General Assembly presidency, 8, 10-11, 17-18, 26, 30, 52-53, 55, 59-60, 131-132, 150
- Outer space, 285, 911-912, 916-919
- Lebel, Claude, 223

- Lee, Adm., 822, 824  
 Lewis, Samuel W., 443  
 Liberia, 33, 150, 155, 165, 213, 274, 450,  
 460, 911-912, 916  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63,  
   151, 180, 282, 451  
   Law of the Sea, 685, 700, 702, 764, 802  
 Libya, 111, 140, 146, 155, 278, 290-291  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63,  
   146, 152, 282, 330, 414, 451  
   Law of the Sea, 787-788, 802, 811  
 Lie, Trygve, 350  
 Liem, Channing, 423  
 Lind, Per, 392  
 Lindstrom, Ulla, 62  
 Lindt, Auguste R., 46  
 Lloyd, Selwyn, 76-80, 84-85, 88, 96, 103-  
 105, 117, 181, 208, 449, 734  
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 3-4, 137, 168-170,  
 211, 220-221, 234-235, 283*n*, 286,  
 302*n*, 313*n*  
   Arab Union, 15*n*, 15-17, 19*n*, 20*n*  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 62-65,  
   67*n*, 124, 126-127, 141  
   General Assembly presidency issues,  
   131*n*, 135-136, 190-191, 199*n*,  
   205*n*, 212, 219*n*, 222-224, 225*n*,  
   227, 231  
   Hungary, 34, 69-70, 74, 83*n*, 85-86, 97,  
   132-134  
   New nonaligned U.N. membership,  
   105-106, 258*n*  
   Outer space, 863, 865-866, 868-879,  
   883, 885-886, 893-895, 897-900,  
   902-909, 912-914, 916-920  
   Security Council membership issues,  
   21, 192-193, 199*n*, 202, 211  
 Lokken, Harold, 724  
 Long, Edward T., 351, 606  
 Looney, Warren W., 680*n*, 681, 682*n*,  
 686*n*, 689, 692*n*, 704*n*  
 Lopez, Salvador P., 150, 235, 278  
 Loutfi, Omar, 700  
 Lowell Thomas Committee, 139  
 Luboensky, Earl H., 494*n*, 495, 505-506,  
 512*n*, 644, 664*n*, 704*n*  
 Lucet, Charles, 351  
 Ludlow, James M., 1*n*, 18*n*, 20*n*, 28*n*, 58*n*,  
 66*n*, 86*n*, 101*n*, 130*n*, 131*n*, 134*n*,  
 146*n*, 172*n*, 176*n*, 179*n*, 182*n*, 183*n*,  
 187*n*, 191*n*, 198*n*, 199*n*, 202*n*, 205*n*,  
 208*n*, 209*n*, 216*n*, 238*n*, 272*n*, 339*n*,  
 433*n*, 450*n*  
   Arab Union, 14*n*  
 Ludlow, James M.—Continued  
   General Assembly postponement, 54  
   Soviet Union, 168*n*  
 Lumumba, Patrice, 403, 418, 439-441  
 Luns, Joseph, 348*n*  
 Luxembourg, 31, 151, 282, 290, 752  
 McBride, Robert H., 75*n*, 81*n*, 223*n*, 225*n*,  
 226*n*, 339*n*, 343*n*, 440*n*, 443  
 McClintic, Stephen H., 462*n*  
 McConaughy, Walter P., Jr., 297*n*, 810  
 Macdonald, Donald S., 424*n*  
 McElhiney, Thomas W., 84*n*  
 McElroy, Neil, 476-479, 646, 732, 838,  
 841-843  
 McIntosh, A.D., 384  
 McKernan, Donald L., 722, 800-804  
 Macmillan, Harold, 333, 356, 360-362,  
 372, 375-379, 385-386  
   General Assembly participation, 320,  
   333, 340-341, 344, 371, 403, 407  
   Law of the Sea, 651, 654-655, 657-658,  
   720, 809  
 McNutt, Louise, 25*n*, 119*n*, 183*n*, 203*n*,  
 448*n*, 451*n*  
 Macomber, William B., 184*n*, 321, 441-  
 442, 689-691  
 McSweeney, John M., 229*n*, 306*n*, 324-  
 325, 334*n*, 335*n*  
 Madagascar, 107  
 Magheru, Mihai, 135  
 Magnuson, Warren G., 688-691, 750-752,  
 755, 762, 793-794, 805  
 Mahgoub, Mohammed Ahmed, 58-60  
 Mak, Dayton S., 343*n*  
 Makarios, Archbishop, 40  
 Malagasy Republic, 238, 244, 258, 273,  
 341, 404*n*, 414, 452  
 Malaya, 28, 108, 112, 268, 274, 290, 294,  
 431, 790  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63,  
   151, 266-269, 282, 413, 452  
   Outer space, 899, 902, 904-905, 907,  
   909  
 Maleter, Gen. Pal, 22-23, 34, 68, 77, 153  
 Mali Republic, 244, 258, 273, 339, 342,  
 404*n*, 413-414, 418  
 Malik, Charles. *See* General Assembly:  
   Lebanese presidency.  
 Manhard, Philip W., 295*n*  
 Mann, Thomas C., 320-321  
 Manningham-Buller, Reginald, 694, 696  
 Mansfield, Mike, 83*n*, 85, 316  
 Marcos, Ferdinand E., 414

- Marcus, Melvin M., 863n, 864n, 867n  
 Massachusetts Fisheries Association, 724  
 Matsch, Franz, 150, 172  
 Mau, Frank A., 422n  
 Mauritania, 244, 258, 453, 461-462  
 Meeker, Leonard C., 9n, 73n, 191n, 199n, 257n, 327n, 433n, 437n, 867n, 880n, 895n  
   General Assembly, 388-391, 410-413  
   International Court of Justice, 93  
   U.N. Trusteeship Council, 206  
 Meir, Golda, 330  
 Melekh, Igor Y., 427  
 Melo Lecaros, Luis, 769, 780, 809  
 Mendenhall, Joseph A., 56n, 83n  
 Menemencioglu, Turgut, 461  
 Menon, V.K. Krishna, 66-67, 137, 397, 747, 781, 809, 811  
 Menshikov, Mikhail A., 229, 311, 563-566  
 Menzies, Robert G., 268, 269n, 333, 341, 343-344, 375-379  
 Merchant, Livingston, 87n, 127-130, 215, 239n, 269-270, 317n, 327n, 335n, 433n, 435n, 443-445  
   Antarctica, 606, 611, 612n, 617-619, 621-625, 629, 631  
   Colonialism, 356-357  
   General Assembly, 216-219, 229n, 230-232, 306, 325n, 351-353, 356-357, 372-373  
   Law of the Sea, 772, 827  
 Mestiri, Mahmoud, 50, 213, 214  
 Mexico, 153, 158, 379, 532  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 31, 63, 146, 151, 282, 413, 452  
   Law of the Sea (*see also Mexican sub-headings under Law of the Sea*), 683, 720, 764, 767, 769-770, 777, 779-780, 790, 796, 811, 813, 818-819, 823  
   Outer space, 285, 879, 885, 889-890, 902  
 Mezincescu, Eduard, 419-420  
 Michalowski, Jerzy, 202n, 211  
 Middle East. *See Arab States; Arab-Israeli dispute; Israel; specific countries.*  
 Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, 883  
 Millar, Frederick Hoyer, 219n, 351  
 Mindszenty, Jozsef Cardinal, 80, 104  
 Mobutu, Col., 347  
 Mongolian People's Republic. *See Outer Mongolia.*  
 Monsma, George N., 9n, 10n, 28n, 71n, 86n, 94n, 130n, 131n, 134n, 142n, 146n, 172n, 176n, 179n, 182n, 183n, 191n, 199n, 205n, 208n, 209n, 216n, 228n, 238n, 272n, 303n, 339n, 433n, 435n, 168n, 450n, 461n  
 Moor, Carol C., 180n, 201n  
 Moos, Malcolm C., 312  
 Morelli, Gaetano, 279  
 Morocco, 111, 150, 155, 462  
   Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282  
   Congo, Republic of, 347, 418, 440, 443  
   Law of the Sea, 729, 788, 792  
 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 661, 671  
 Mozambique, 244, 426  
 Mueller, Frederick H., 552  
 Muirhead, David, 567-569, 571-573  
 Munro, Sir Leslie:  
   General Assembly presidency, 10, 30, 52, 131-132, 150  
   Hungary, 92, 96-98, 103-105, 117-118, 154, 215-216, 290-291, 308  
   Outer space, 831-833  
 Murphy, Robert D., 7n, 75n, 76n, 87n, 140n, 176n, 192n, 466n, 471n, 505n, 880n, 881n, 884n  
   Antarctica, 464-465, 468-470, 501-502, 512, 518-519, 561, 580  
   Hungary, 68, 70n  
   Irish General Assembly presidency, 130-131  
   Law of the Sea, 641-642, 731, 733-734, 762  
   Security Council membership, 175-176, 193, 197  
   Soviet bloc, 91n, 127  
   U.N. Charter review, 184-185  
 Murrow, Edward R., 321n  
 Nagy, Imre, 22-23, 34, 68, 77, 154  
 Nash, Walter, 193n, 384, 385, 440, 497n  
 Nassar, Hadj, 788  
 Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 318-320, 344, 356, 362, 364  
   Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403  
 Nasution, Gen., 385  
 National Academy of Sciences, 882, 884  
 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 839

- National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 866, 882, 884, 936
- National Aeronautics and Space Council, 842, 866-867, 884, 920-936
- National Cannery Association, 724
- National Fisheries Institute, 680, 724
- National Science Foundation, 515-517, 521, 552, 559, 635-636, 638, 881, 884
- National Security Council:
- Actions:
- No. 1553, 851*n*
- No. 1738, 472
- No. 1846, 838, 841, 856*n*, 857*n*
- No. 1869, 476-479
- No. 1940, 841
- No. 1956, 841
- No. 1983, 852
- No. 2050, 547
- Antarctica, 464-465, 472-479, 500, 536-538, 547-553
- Directives, No. 5427, 207-208
- Documents:
- NSC 5715/1, 472-479
- NSC 5804, 472-473, 476-479
- NSC 5804/1, 476, 479-494, 500, 515, 519, 536, 547
- NSC 5814, 834-845
- NSC 5814/1, 845-863
- NSC 5905, 547, 549, 552-553, 560
- NSC 5905/1, 554-561, 633, 639
- NSC 5906/1, 928*n*
- NSC 5918/1, 920*n*
- Meetings:
- 321st, January 12, 1958, 920*n*
- 357th, March 6, 1958, 472-479, 828-830
- 371st, July 3, 1958, 834-840
- 376th, August 14, 1958, 841-844
- 397th, February 26, 1959, 536-538
- 401st, April 2, 1959, 547-553
- Outer space, 828-830, 834-863
- National Shrimp Congress, 724
- Navy, U.S. Department of the:
- Antarctica, 465, 484-485, 516-517, 523, 551, 579, 638
- Law of the Sea, 686, 696, 721, 810, 816, 820, 822, 824-825
- Neblett, William R., 724
- Neese, Capt. William, 800
- Nehru, Jawaharlal (*see also* India; *India and Indian subheadings under other subjects*), 67, 137-139, 305*n*, 319-321, 344, 358-359, 362, 384
- Nehru, Jawaharlal—Continued
- Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403
- Law of the Sea, 748-749, 792, 809
- Neidle, Alan, 495, 509
- Nepal, 111, 163, 187, 278, 291, 319, 323, 707
- Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282, 299-300
- Netherlands, 31, 151, 163, 279, 282, 290, 447*n*, 460
- Law of the Sea, 643, 666, 673, 695, 706, 733, 737, 819, 821
- Neutralism. *See under* Nonaligned countries.
- New Guinea, 390
- New Zealand (*see also* Antarctica), 33, 42, 119-120, 193, 384, 685, 721, 831-833
- Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 63, 151, 282, 413, 452
- Colonial issues, 95, 107, 165, 244, 439-440, 447*n*, 460
- General Assembly presidency, 10, 30, 52, 131-132, 150
- Newlin, Michael H., 22, 50*n*, 68*n*, 73*n*, 76*n*, 96*n*, 201*n*, 215*n*, 258*n*, 303*n*
- Nicaragua, 32, 151, 282, 290, 645, 769
- Nicosia, 415
- Niger Republic, 244, 258, 273, 331, 341, 404*n*
- Nigeria, Federation of, 404*n*, 413-415, 450, 452, 460
- U.N. membership, 107, 109, 173, 178, 244, 258, 273, 296, 407, 413*n*
- Nixon, Richard M., 93, 168-169
- Nkrumah, Kwame, 356, 362-364, 374-376, 787
- Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403
- Nonaligned countries (*see also* African countries; Asian countries; Geographical distribution principle *and* Parity issue *under* United Nations; Latin American countries; *specific countries*)
- Afro-Asian world peace resolution, 421
- Chinese U.N. representation, 140, 242
- Colonial issues, 430-432, 447, 450-451, 454-458, 460-462
- Congo, Republic of, crisis, 418

- Nonaligned countries—Continued
- Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 395-397, 402
  - General Assembly Committee I presidency, 234-235
  - General Assembly vice presidency, 150
  - Guinea U.N. membership, 87*n*
  - Hungary, 79, 242, 263
  - Korean U.N. representation, 204
  - Law of the Sea, 659, 668, 685-686, 700-702, 740
  - Neutralism among, 109-110, 114, 243, 246, 250, 274, 389
  - Security Council membership, 182, 390
  - South Africa, 160, 288
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 114, 233, 261-262, 276, 356, 361, 365, 371, 389, 530
  - Tibet, 263
  - U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 870-871, 875, 879
  - U.N. council enlargements, 40, 191-192, 280-281
  - U.N. representation, 28-29, 107-109, 244-246, 258, 273-274, 372
    - Border disputes, 247, 254
    - Chinese U.N. representation and, 110-111, 232-233, 248-249
    - Colonial issues, 106, 109, 113, 115, 242, 246-248, 252, 274
    - Council enlargements and, 134, 281, 444-445
    - Human rights issues, 274
    - Indonesian proposal, 422-423
    - Italian position, 443-445
    - Korean U.N. representation and, 247, 297, 424
    - Law of the Sea and, 811, 819
    - Limitation proposals, 105, 111-113
    - Soviet bloc position, 112
    - Soviet policy in the General Assembly and, 352, 365, 372, 394, 422
    - U.N. Secretariat review and, 252-253, 359
    - U.S. policy in the United Nations and, 113-116, 129-130, 247-256, 332, 339, 388, 443-445
    - U.S. position, 105-106, 147, 249-250, 259
    - U.S.-Soviet relations, 113-116, 173-174
    - Voting patterns, 109-111, 148, 246-248, 250, 255, 258-260, 274-275, 895
- Non-self-governing territories. *See* United Nations: Colonial issues.
- Nordic Foreign Ministers Meeting, 236, 271
- North Atlantic Council. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 38-40, 193, 230-231, 262-263, 302, 316, 323-324, 850
  - Colonial issues, 389, 427, 463
  - Law of the Sea, 661, 703, 745, 747, 752-754, 789, 795, 813, 825
- Norway (*see also* Antarctica), 2, 42, 163, 395-396, 461, 476, 532
  - Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282, 322-324
  - Law of the Sea, 643, 667, 673, 683*n*, 685, 695, 698, 815
  - Second U.N. Conference, 720, 729, 733, 736, 744, 752-753, 764, 774, 778, 813
- Nosek, Jiri (*see also* General Assembly: Czech presidency), 150
- Nuclear power (*see also under* Antarctica), 338
- Nuclear weapons. *See* Disarmament.
- Nugroho, 422-423
- Nunley, William T., 10*n*, 18*n*, 28*n*, 50*n*, 60*n*, 68*n*, 84*n*, 99*n*, 101*n*, 119*n*, 127*n*, 130*n*, 131*n*, 134*n*, 142*n*, 146*n*, 172*n*, 176*n*, 179*n*, 182*n*, 183*n*, 191*n*, 199*n*, 202*n*, 205*n*, 208*n*, 216*n*, 224*n*, 229*n*, 230*n*, 232*n*, 236*n*, 237*n*, 238*n*, 258*n*, 271*n*, 272*n*, 322*n*, 339*n*, 366*n*, 399*n*, 430*n*, 433*n*, 447*n*, 448*n*, 732*n*, 734*n*, 872*n*, 876*n*, 880*n*, 881*n*, 884*n*, 895*n*, 915*n*
  - Hungary, 22, 24-25, 215
  - Law of the Sea, 714
  - Soviet Union, 168*n*
- Nutt, Jim S., 760, 762-763, 782, 815, 816*n*
- Nyasaland, 107, 244
- Oakley, Robert, 421*n*, 432*n*
- Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), 839
- Okala, Charles, 441
- Okinawa, 455



- Olympio, Sylvanus, 362
- Omar, Hajji Farah Ali, 460
- Operations Coordinating Board (OCB):  
 Antarctica, 464, 466, 469-470, 478-479,  
 499-502, 514-517, 519-538, 551,  
 578-580, 633-637, 639  
 Law of the Sea, 772  
 Meetings, 499-502, 514-517, 578-580,  
 639, 772-773, 866-867  
 Outer space, 843, 866-867, 884
- Organization of American States (OAS),  
 364
- Ortona, Egidio, 7-8, 17*n*
- O'Sheel, Patrick, 203*n*
- Outer Mongolia, 269-270, 296, 309, 453,  
 461-462
- Outer space (*see also* U.N. Committee on  
 the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space):  
 Ballistic missiles, 834-836, 838-839,  
 845, 847, 852, 920  
 British position, 868-869  
 Chinese People's Republic programs,  
 846*n*  
 Definitions of, 831, 847, 926  
 Disarmament (*see also* International co-  
 operation and control *below*), 36,  
 391, 851-852, 867-868, 872, 888,  
 893, 927-928  
 U.N. role, 832, 863-864  
 General Assembly discussion, 831-833,  
 851-852, 863-866  
 International conference, 285-286, 831,  
 894-897, 918  
 International cooperation and control  
 (*see also* Disarmament *above*), 831-  
 833, 850-854, 858, 863, 867, 870-  
 871, 892-893, 926, 928, 931  
 Military uses, 868-869, 927  
 Nonaligned countries U.N. membership  
 and, 247  
 NSC discussions, 828-830, 834-840  
 Nuclear explosions, 830  
 Soviet position, 833, 852-853, 863, 870-  
 871, 894-897  
 Soviet programs (*see also* U.S.-Soviet  
 competition *below*), 514, 527, 530,  
 846, 859-863, 892, 932-935  
 U.N. role in, 850, 853, 858, 870, 928  
 U.S. policy:  
 Military projects, 835, 838-839, 841-  
 844, 848-849, 925-926  
 National Aeronautics and Space  
 Council report, 920-936  
 NSC report, 845-863
- Outer space—Continued  
 U.S. policy—Continued  
 Organizational aspects, 830, 842-843,  
 866, 884  
 Propaganda, 857, 930  
 U.S. programs (*see also* U.S.-Soviet  
 competition *below*), 537, 550-551,  
 828-830, 845, 849-850, 855-856,  
 857, 885-886, 923-926, 936  
 U.S.-Soviet competition, 149, 828, 830,  
 835-839, 845-846, 854-855, 857,  
 885-886, 921-922, 927, 929
- Owen, George H., 507*n*, 518*n*, 539-547,  
 567, 581-582, 588*n*, 637-639
- Pachachi, Adnan N., 235, 278
- Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of the, 121
- Pakistan, 153, 161, 262*n*, 274, 290, 320,  
 396-398  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 63,  
 146, 151, 282, 451  
 Law of the Sea, 643, 663, 700, 765-766,  
 778, 798, 811
- Pal, Radhabinod, 279
- Palar, Lambertus Nicodemus, 150
- Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC),  
 292
- Palmer, Nathaniel B., 483*n*, 558*n*
- Panama, 153, 278, 532, 716, 770, 777,  
 779, 819  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152,  
 282, 413-414, 451-452
- Panama Canal, 390-391, 455
- Paraguay, 32, 119, 123, 152, 279, 282,  
 645, 769
- Parsons, J. Graham, 140*n*, 167*n*, 175*n*,  
 176*n*, 181*n*, 198*n*, 266*n*, 269*n*, 317*n*,  
 448*n*  
 Antarctica, 628*n*  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 145*n*, 330,  
 449*n*  
 Korean U.N. representation, 145*n*, 219
- Patterson, John, 549, 551
- Pearcy, Dr., 813
- Pella, Guiseppe, 208, 223*n*, 224, 226-227
- Pelly, Thomas M., 680-681, 793-794, 805
- Pender, John H., Jr., 647*n*, 655*n*, 674*n*,  
 680*n*, 682*n*, 686*n*, 692*n*, 734*n*, 743*n*,  
 799*n*, 804*n*, 805*n*  
 Law of the Sea, 669-670, 800
- Penfield, James K., 306*n*, 330*n*, 346*n*,  
 394*n*, 435*n*, 450*n*, 606
- Perrone-Capano, Carlo, 443
- Peru, 163, 279, 406

## Peru—Continued

- Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 62, 63, 152, 180, 282
- General Assembly presidency, 52, 62, 130-131, 150
- Law of the Sea, 645, 720, 769-770, 777-780, 783, 790, 797, 800, 804, 809
- Petrén, Bror Arvid Sture, 279, 696, 766
- Philippines, 33, 139, 150, 235, 274, 278, 290, 455
  - Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 268, 269*n*, 282, 414, 451
  - Law of the Sea, 702, 707, 715, 721, 764, 772, 777, 779, 790-791, 799*n*, 807, 811, 816
- Phillips, Franklyn W., 866
- Phleger, Herman, 579-580, 581*n*, 582-587, 590-632, 638
- Piccioni, Attilio, 209, 227
- Pillai, N.R., 137
- Plimsoll, James, 415, 507
- Poland, 80, 271, 277, 296, 310, 745, 764
  - Antarctica, 514, 522, 526, 529, 532, 534
  - Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282
  - ECOSOC membership, 153, 182, 187
  - Outer space, 285, 870, 879, 885-886, 889-890, 902
  - Security Council membership, 181*n*, 182-183, 187, 190, 192-200, 202, 209-211, 242, 279
- Polyakov, Vladimir S., 567
- Ponce Carbo, 808-809
- Pool, John C., 742
- Portugal, 32, 152, 163, 274, 278-279, 282, 290, 390
  - Colonial issues, 108, 389-390, 426, 435-436, 443, 445
  - Law of the Sea, 643, 663, 666-667, 669-670, 673, 684, 695, 707
  - Second U.N. Conference, 730, 733, 737, 752, 754, 788
- Primožic, Franc, 51-53
- Profumo, John, 201
- Protitch, Dragon, 206
- Puhan, Alfred, 188*n*, 202*n*, 207*n*
- Purcell, Edward, 828-829
- Pyman, T.A., 53
- Quaison-Sackey, Alex, 415, 460
- Quarles, Donald A., 474-475, 830, 835, 839
- Quarshie, 773, 781
- Quemoy, 64

- Quiroga, José Aniel, 798, 811
- Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 138
- Rae, S.F., 760, 762
- Rahman, 266-269
- Rahmena, Majid, 460
- Ramsbotham, Peter, 351-353
- Raymond, John M., 90*n*, 686*n*, 692*n*, 698-699, 704*n*, 724, 727-729
- Reis, Herbert K., 297*n*
- Republic of China. *See* China, Republic of.
- Rewinkel, Milton C., 203*n*, 230*n*
- Rhodesia, 107, 244
- Riad, Gen. Mahmoud, 20*n*, 459
- Rice, Thomas, 724
- Richards, Arthur L., 715*n*, 732*n*, 734*n*, 741*n*, 743*n*, 755*n*
  - Law of the Sea, 709-710, 714, 719, 721-722, 724-725, 727-730, 747, 812, 814-815
- Riedmatten, Father, 798
- al-Rifai, Samir, 16
- Rio Treaty of 1947, 601, 607
- Robertson, Norman, 193, 196*n*, 204
- Robertson, R.G., 643
- Robertson, Walter S., 180*n*, 561-563
- Robinson, H.B., 363
- Rogers, William P., 93
- Romania, 32, 34, 135, 152, 282, 764
  - Outer space, 285, 870, 878-879, 890, 897, 902, 920
- Ronne, 483*n*, 558*n*
- Rosen, Arthur H., 101*n*, 232*n*, 322*n*, 451*n*
- Rossel, Agda, 234-235, 392-393
- Rountree, William M., 10*n*, 17*n*, 26*n*, 54-55, 58*n*, 58-59, 66*n*
- Roux, Jacques, 143*n*
- Ruanda-Urundi, Trust Territory of, 108, 244
- Rubottom, Roy R., 228*n*, 501, 606-607, 617, 822*n*
- Ryukyus, 455
- Sacksteder, Frederick H., Jr., 669*n*
- Salaam, Saleb, 318-319, 405-407
- San Marino, 702
- Sanders, William, 641, 642-645, 685
- Sapena Pastor, Raúl, 279
- Sastroamidjojo, Ali, 459
- Satterthwaite, Joseph C., 168*n*, 317*n*, 415, 418*n*, 437*n*, 440*n*
- Saudi Arabia, 32, 152, 155, 282, 290-291, 331, 414, 451, 700, 764, 796, 811

- Scandinavian countries (*see also specific countries*), 2, 79, 112, 153, 236, 271, 274, 431-432
- Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR), 511, 516, 522, 526-527, 534, 540, 638
- Seaton, Frederick, 730, 812, 822
- Sebald, William J., 268, 269*n*
- Security Council:  
 Congo emergency session, 327  
 Enlargement of, 116, 134-135, 154-155, 176, 182, 191-192, 195, 280-281, 444-445  
 Chinese U.N. representation and, 41, 154, 156, 172-173, 280  
 Soviet position, 12, 40-41, 134, 154-156, 172-173, 176, 182  
 Geographical distribution, 11, 249  
 Iranian membership, 21, 32, 50-51, 58, 66, 67  
 Italian membership, 7-8, 10, 17-18, 32-33, 68  
 Membership issues, 32, 68, 153, 176-177, 181, 195, 197, 210, 228-229, 278-279, 390  
 Nonaligned countries U.N. membership and, 210, 255, 444-445  
 Polish membership, 181*n*, 182-183, 187, 190, 192-200, 202, 209-211, 242, 279  
 RB-47 incident, 368  
 Soviet bloc representation, 12, 41, 182, 194, 209  
 Special session on the Suez Crisis, 28, 29  
 Tunisian membership, 21, 50-51, 58, 66*n*, 67-68, 213  
 Turkish membership, 181-183, 187, 192-200, 202, 209-211, 242, 279, 424, 433  
 United Arab Republic membership, 278-279, 321, 441-442  
 U.S. nonpermanent member proposal, 211  
 Veto power, 5-7, 11, 61
- Segni, Antonio, 208
- Seip, Peter A., 216*n*, 384*n*, 385*n*, 386*n*, 396*n*
- Sen, B.R., 660, 676-677, 694-695, 748, 774, 781, 809
- Senegal Republic, 339, 342, 404*n*, 413-414, 452, 462*n*
- Serrano, Felixberto M., 414
- Shaha, Rishikesh, 278, 299-300
- Shanahan, Foss, 439, 460
- Shcherbakov, D.I., 528-529
- Shehu, Mehmet, 311, 326-327
- Shepley, James, 312
- Shukairy, Ahmad, 700, 764, 796, 811
- Shulaw, J. Harold, 715*n*
- Sierra Leone, 107, 244
- Sikes, Robert L.F., 680-681
- Silberstein, Joseph A., 228*n*
- Silvercruys, Baron, 802
- Sisco, Joseph J., 26*n*, 58*n*, 66*n*, 99*n*, 119*n*, 131*n*, 140*n*, 144*n*, 176*n*, 181*n*, 184*n*, 188*n*, 198*n*, 199*n*, 202*n*, 205*n*, 208*n*, 219*n*, 220*n*, 228*n*, 265*n*, 271*n*, 272*n*, 295*n*, 303*n*, 309*n*, 330*n*, 334*n*, 339*n*, 136, 138-139, 346*n*, 366*n*, 422*n*, 423*n*, 429*n*, 433*n*, 451*n*, 453*n*, 461*n*, 863*n*, 864*n*, 872*n*, 895*n*, 905*n*, 909*n*, 910*n*, 915*n*
- Slaoui, Driss, 788
- Slim, Monghi, 21, 214, 234-235, 331*n*, 394, 396, 459
- Smirnovsky, Mikhail N., 563, 565
- Smith, Arthur R., 63
- Smith, Bromley, 639-640
- Smith, Gerald C., 184*n*, 312, 322, 863*n*, 864*n*
- Snow, William P., 644
- Sobolev, Arkady A., 879, 883, 893-894, 897, 904, 907
- Sohn, Lewis, 184-186, 810
- Somali Republic, 95, 166, 331, 404*n*, 460  
 U.N. membership, 107-108, 112, 119, 173, 178, 244, 258, 273, 341
- Somaliland. *See* Somali Republic.
- Somoza, Luis, 645
- Sorensen, Max, 279
- Soustelle, Jacques, 38
- South Africa, Union of (*see also* Antarctica), 42, 160-161, 164, 288-290, 426, 477  
 Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282  
 Law of the Sea, 685, 783, 784*n*, 810, 819
- South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 262-263, 721, 791
- South Tyrol, 293-294
- South West Africa, Territory of, 164, 247, 460
- Southeast Asia (*see also* Asian countries), 661, 666, 668, 674, 721
- Southeastern Fisheries Association, 724

- Soviet bloc (*see also* Geographical distribution principle *and* Parity issue *under* United Nations; Soviet Union; *Soviet and Soviet bloc subheadings under other subjects*), 46, 99-101, 140-141, 162, 207-208, 240, 276, 291, 373, 856
- Law of the Sea, 659, 685, 687, 707, 765
- Security Council enlargements, 155, 176, 182
- Security Council membership, 12, 176, 182, 209
- U.N. representation, 28-29, 41, 134, 150, 365
- Parity issue, 11-14, 35, 128, 148-149, 182, 209, 427-428
- U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 149, 159, 285, 870-872, 874-880, 888-889
- U.S. position, 109-110, 127-130, 134-136, 142-143, 149, 182, 237, 248
- Soviet Union (*see also* Antarctica; Geneva nuclear test talks *under* Disarmament; Hungary; Parity issue *under* United Nations; Security Council; Soviet bloc; *Soviet, Soviet bloc, and Soviet Union subheadings under other subjects*), 52, 124-125, 150, 153, 239, 261, 279, 333, 347, 369, 422
- Berlin, 301, 352, 368
- Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 323, 338, 352-353, 373, 387, 422
- Congo, Republic of (Leopoldville), 418, 446n
- Law of the Sea (*see also* *Soviet subheadings under* Law of the Sea), 656, 661, 764, 796, 811, 817-819
- U.N. Disarmament Commission, 35, 157, 316, 379
- U.N. Trusteeship Council, 120, 210-211
- United States, relations with, 35, 168-170, 275-276, 326, 367, 384, 427
- Eisenhower visit proposal, 168, 174, 275-276
- Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting proposals, 353-354, 364-365
- Five-power General Assembly resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395-397, 399-403
- Khrushchev General Assembly participation, 305-307, 310-313, 321-322, 324-327
- Soviet Union—Continued
- United States, relations with—Continued
- Khrushchev visit, 168, 171, 174, 241, 275, 892
- New nonaligned U.N. membership and, 106, 113-114, 173-174, 246, 249
- RB-47 incident, 315, 324-326, 350, 364, 368, 385
- U.N. mission demonstrations, 4-5, 22, 65, 72, 90-91
- U.N. policy and, 240-241, 243, 256
- U.S. anti-Soviet U.N. resolution, 366-369, 407-408
- U-2 incident, 276, 282, 315, 324
- Spaak, Paul-Henri, 747
- Spain, 32-33, 108, 152, 282, 290, 414, 426, 435-436, 451
- Law of the Sea, 643, 663, 666-667, 673, 695, 733, 788, 798, 811, 821
- Sparks, Edward J., 238n
- Special Committee on Antarctic Research, 529
- Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 11-3-58, 472
- Spiers, Ronald I., 146n, 831n, 867n
- Sprague, Mansfield D., 469-470, 500, 502
- Spruks, H. Charles, 90n, 207n
- Standby Peace Force, 114
- Stanger, Ernest L., 124n
- Stans, Maurice, 538, 838, 843-844
- Stavropoulos, Constantin A., 27, 695, 764, 766
- Stebbins, Henry E., 299n, 300n
- Steele, George, 724-726
- Steeves, John M., 219n, 232n, 266n, 343n, 606
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 343n, 345n, 356n, 360n, 366n, 370n, 416n, 430n, 433n, 453n, 463n
- General Assembly, Heads of State participation, 310, 317n, 320-322, 324
- Subandrio, 422-423
- Sudan, 32, 58-60, 111, 152, 155, 278, 282, 291, 459, 788
- Suez Crisis, 28-29, 48-49, 240
- Sugihara, S., 566, 570
- Sukarno, Ahmed, 344, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403
- Sullivan, William H., 313n, 322n, 330n, 346n, 381n, 394n, 399n, 422n, 423n, 424n, 430n, 432n, 433n, 439n, 446n, 448n, 450n, 451n

- Summit meeting, 1960, 5-7, 11, 13, 35-36, 149, 158, 265, 276, 367
- Sumulong, Lorenzo, 419-420
- Suomela, Arnie J., 727, 730, 798, 812
- Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich, 74, 134
- Sweden, 2, 32, 46-47, 157, 163, 234-235, 279, 392-393
- Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 62, 152, 282
- Law of the Sea, 643, 666, 695-696, 702-703, 706-707, 766, 773, 789-790
- Outer space, 285, 870, 877, 885, 889-890, 899, 902, 907, 909-910, 915
- Switzerland, 279, 696, 764
- Syria (*see also* United Arab Republic), 16, 32
- Szarka, 74, 311
- Tacla, Philippe, 319*n*, 405
- Tamayo, Marcial, 150
- Tanaka, Tokaro, 279
- Tanganyika, 107, 244
- Taylor, Fred E., 714, 719, 722, 732*n*, 734*n*, 748*n*, 812
- Tchichelle, Stéphane, 441
- Terry, William M., 714, 719, 721-722, 727, 729, 743*n*, 812
- Thacher, Nicholas G., 50, 447
- Thailand, 33, 131, 163, 176, 181, 242, 274, 643, 790
- Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 268, 269*n*, 282
- Thompson, Llewellyn, 4, 72, 74, 314-317
- Thors, Thor, 230-232, 236, 265, 266, 271-272, 277, 341
- Tibet, 138-141, 146, 190, 242, 263, 281, 294-295, 323
- Timmons, B.E.L., 392
- Tito, Josep Broz:
- Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403
- General Assembly participation, 320, 344, 364
- Togoland. *See* Togolese Republic.
- Togolese Republic, 166, 238, 362, 404*n*, 414, 452
- U.N. membership, 107, 109, 112, 119, 173, 178, 244, 258, 273, 341
- Toure, Sekou, 75
- Treasury, U.S. Department of the, 710
- Tron, René, 257*n*, 346*n*, 399*n*, 430*n*, 433*n*, 446*n*, 447*n*, 450*n*
- Trujillo Molina, Hector Bienvenido, 304, 320, 809
- Tunisia, 21, 34, 111, 213-214, 220, 233*n*, 234-235, 274, 296, 310, 396, 459
- Chinese U.N. representation, 282, 331, 394, 414, 451
- Colonial issues, 431, 460
- Law of the Sea, 729, 788, 792, 798, 802, 810-811
- Outer space, 899, 902, 904-905, 911-912, 916
- Security Council membership, 21, 50-51, 58, 66*n*, 67
- U.N. Trusteeship Council, 210, 257
- Tunkin, Grigory I., 279, 591-594, 695-696, 764, 767, 781, 796, 808, 811, 813
- Turkey (*see also* Cyprus), 32, 152, 274, 282, 290, 431-432, 450-451, 461
- Law of the Sea, 643, 695, 707, 733, 737, 752, 754, 765
- Security Council membership, 181-183, 187, 192-200, 202, 209-211, 242, 279, 424, 433
- Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 372, 467-468, 470, 476-479, 548-549, 551, 671, 732, 842
- Uganda, 107, 244
- Ukraine, 32, 152, 282, 903-904, 906-908
- Ulloa, Alberto, 780
- U.N. Advisory Committee on Budget and Administrative Questions (ACBAQ), 203
- U.N. Charter, 11, 46-49, 61, 101, 240, 255, 263, 291, 297, 375
- Antarctica, 471, 504, 588, 593-594, 614
- Apartheid, 160-161, 288-289
- Chinese U.N. representation, 172, 281, 387
- Colonial issues, 426, 434-436, 444, 451, 456
- Council enlargements, 40, 154-156, 172, 182, 445
- Geographical distribution, 182, 210, 229
- Hungary, 23, 104, 133
- Nonaligned countries U.N. membership, 111, 113, 253
- Outer space, 853, 926
- Review of, 40, 154-156, 172-173, 184-186, 253, 445
- Security Council membership and, 199, 210
- Trusteeship Council, 121-122, 210

- U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), 167, 291
- U.N. Commission on International Commodity Trade, 45
- U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 36-37, 158-159, 211, 215-216, 285-286, 867-868, 880-881, 884-885, 895-896
- Indian boycott, 139, 170
- Latin American representation, 864, 871, 875, 879
- Parity issue, 149, 159, 242, 870-872, 874-880, 885, 888-889, 894, 897-920
- Soviet bloc boycott, 149, 159, 286, 881-883, 885-886
- Soviet proposals, 833, 852-853, 863
- U.S. draft resolutions, 863-865, 867-868, 870-873, 882, 887-888, 890-891
- U.N. Convention on Freedom of Information, 46-47
- U.N. Disarmament Commission (*see also* Disarmament), 12, 34-35, 157, 282-283, 316, 379, 868, 880, 914, 917
- U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 1-2, 44, 47-48, 242-243, 262, 278-279, 783
- Enlargement of, 116, 134, 191-192, 195, 280-281
- Chinese U.N. representation and, 41, 154, 156, 172-173, 280
- Soviet position, 40-41, 154-156, 172-173, 176
- Membership, 1-2, 12, 33, 153, 182, 187, 194, 278-279
- U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 12, 262, 449
- U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF), 29, 48-49, 99-101, 161-162, 211, 261, 369, 391
- U.N. Expanded Technical Assistance Program (ETAP), 29, 43-45, 100, 261, 408
- U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 783
- U.N. Fund for the Congo, 349
- U.N. General Assembly. *See* General Assembly.
- U.N. Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, 164
- U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 45-46
- U.N. International Children's Fund (UNICEF), 133
- U.N. Law of the Sea Conferences. *See* First U.N. Conference and Second U.N. Conference *under* Law of the Sea.
- U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 162
- U.N. Office of Public Information (OPI), 203
- U.N. Peace Force proposals, 162-163
- U.N. Refugee Fund (UNREF), 45-46
- U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), 41, 163-164, 292-293
- U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 37
- U.N. Secretariat (*see also* Hammarskjöld, Dag), 252-253, 359, 422-423, 427
- Soviet criticisms, 188-189, 202-203, 211, 347, 366, 374-375, 380-381, 389, 391-393, 422-423
- Ghanian proposals, 356, 363-364, 374-376
- Hammarskjöld responses, 189, 355, 358, 383-384, 392
- Indian position, 358-359, 362
- U.S. position, 188-189, 211, 348-350, 356, 358-360, 363, 369, 372, 376, 392
- U.N. Secretary-General (SYG). *See* Hammarskjöld, Dag; U.N. Secretariat
- U.N. Security Council. *See* Security Council.
- U.N. Social and Humanitarian Committee, 243
- U.N. Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, 22-23, 33-34, 54
- U.N. Special Projects Fund, 29, 43-45
- U.N. Trusteeship Council (*see also* United Nations: Colonial issues), 33, 94-96, 119-123, 153, 166, 183-184, 206, 210-211, 257, 430
- U.N. Working Capital Fund, 100
- Uden, Osten, 392-393
- Unger, Leonard S., 268, 269*n*
- Union of Central African Republics, 258
- Union of South Africa. *See* South Africa, Union of.
- United Arab Republic, 16, 37, 155, 246, 290-291, 362, 379, 459
- Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152, 282, 415
- Congo, Republic of, 418, 440, 443

## United Arab Republic—Continued

- Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-401, 403
  - General Assembly, Nasser participation, 318-320, 344, 364
  - Law of the Sea, 9, 700, 764, 789
  - Outer space, 170, 285, 870, 879, 885-886, 889-890, 897, 902, 906-907, 909, 915
  - Security Council membership, 278-279, 321, 441-442
  - U.N. membership, 9, 15, 28
  - U.N. Trusteeship Council membership, 33, 119, 123
- United Kingdom (*see also* Antarctica; Cyprus; Security Council; *British, United Kingdom, and U.S.-British subheadings under other subjects*), 41, 46-47, 75, 87, 103, 119-123, 153, 172-173, 180, 274
- Arab Union U.N. representation, 14*n*, 15-16, 19
  - Chinese People's Republic, 25, 32, 126-127, 152, 352, 449
  - Colonial issues, 447, 455, 457
  - General Assembly, 150, 205, 320, 333, 340-341, 344
  - Law of the Sea (*see also* *British subheadings under Law of the Sea*), 643, 819
  - Outer space, 285, 868-869, 875, 877*n*, 879, 881, 885, 889-890, 897, 902, 905
  - Security Council membership issues, 66*n*, 177
  - Soviet Union, 333, 385-386, 395
- United Nations (*see also* Chinese U.N. representation; General Assembly; Security Council; *U.N. and United Nations headings and subheadings under other subjects*):
- Anniversary celebration, 416-417
  - Arab-Israeli dispute, 240, 254
  - Berlin, 301-303, 357
  - Colonial issues (*see also* Nonaligned countries; *specific colonies*; U.N. Trusteeship Council), 389, 427, 443, 447, 455-457, 463
  - Afro-Asian resolution, 447, 450-451, 454-458, 460-462

## United Nations—Continued

- Colonial issues—Continued
    - Nonaligned countries U.N. membership and, 106, 109, 113, 115, 242, 246-248, 252, 274
    - Soviet proposals, 349-350, 356, 393, 399, 419-420, 425-426, 430-432, 450
    - U.S. position, 47-48, 356-357, 389-390, 399-400, 425-427, 430-436
  - Geographical distribution principle (*see also* Nonaligned countries; Parity issue *below*; Soviet bloc), 30-31, 108, 203, 245, 249, 277, 280, 901
  - General Assembly presidency, 171, 179, 191, 205, 229
  - Security Council, 11, 182, 210
  - U.N. Charter provisions, 182, 210, 229
  - Headquarters transfer proposals, 300-301, 347, 358, 379, 402
  - Korea, 29, 166-167, 240, 281, 291-292, 295, 350, 369
  - Membership issues. *See specific countries.*
  - Parity issue (*see also* Geographical distribution principle *above*; Nonaligned countries; Soviet bloc):
    - Soviet position, 11-13, 35, 128, 148-149, 157, 159
    - U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 149, 159, 870-872, 874-880, 885, 888-889, 894, 897-920
    - U.S. position, 13-14, 148-149, 183, 252, 427-428
  - Suez Crisis, 28-29, 48-49, 240
  - Tibet, 294-295
  - U.S. general policy in, 3-4, 71-72, 173-175, 178-179, 239-243, 254, 264, 362, 463
    - Nonaligned countries membership and, 88, 113-116, 247-256, 332, 339, 443-445
  - World economic development, 44-45, 115, 242-243
- United World Federalists, 185
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 47, 161, 289
- Upper Volta, Republic of, 244, 258, 273, 331, 341, 404*n*, 414
- Uruguay, 32-34, 54, 152, 282, 290
  - Law of the Sea, 769, 779, 798, 806, 808-813, 817

- U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 579, 813, 839
- U.S. National Hydrographic Organization (USNHO), 533
- U.S. presidential election, 1960, 389, 416, 448
- Valdes, Philip H., 224*n*
- Van Heuven, Marten H.A., 119*n*, 265*n*, 800
- Vandenberg Resolution, 1948, 112
- Vatican, 798
- Vedeler, Harold C., 215*n*
- Venezuela, 33, 278
  - Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 146, 152, 180, 238, 282, 413, 452
  - Law of the Sea, 720, 770, 777, 779, 790, 819
- Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 511, 562, 588, 590-591, 619
- Vietnam, Republic of (*see also* Vietnamese U.N. representation), 764, 790
- Vietnamese U.N. representation, 83, 86-87, 89, 144, 147, 178, 219-220, 296
  - Soviet position, 56-57, 89, 309-310
- Vietnamese unification, 432-433
- Virgin Islands, 451, 455
- Vitelli, Girolamo, 95-96
- Vogt, Nils, 566
- Voice of America (VOA), 321-322
- Wadsworth, James J., 50-51, 53*n*, 313, 350, 395-396, 404, 417*n*, 419, 427-428, 459
  - Chinese U.N. representation, 373-374, 413-415
  - Colonial issues, 425-427, 458, 460-461
  - Congo, Republic of, 403, 408-409, 417-418, 443
  - General Assembly, 320, 332-333, 335*n*, 355, 364, 402, 407-408
  - U.N. Secretariat review, 350, 374-375, 383
- Waggoner, Edward L., 14*n*, 18*n*
- Wagner, Robert F., 90, 91*n*
- Wainhouse, David, 812
- Wallner, Woodruff, 178*n*, 179*n*, 202*n*, 203*n*, 205*n*, 215*n*, 219*n*, 224*n*, 226*n*, 228*n*, 258*n*, 271*n*, 295*n*, 324*n*, 330*n*, 334*n*, 335*n*, 339*n*, 343*n*, 346*n*, 360*n*, 366*n*, 394*n*, 399*n*, 416*n*, 429*n*, 430*n*, 433*n*, 437*n*, 439*n*, 440*n*, 447*n*
  - Colonial issues, 357
  - General Assembly, 220-224
- Wallner, Woodruff—Continued
  - Security Council membership, 441-442
- Walmsley, Walter N., 1*n*, 10*n*, 50*n*, 60*n*, 73*n*, 75*n*, 81*n*, 87*n*, 90*n*, 119*n*, 130*n*, 131*n*, 140*n*, 144*n*, 172*n*, 877*n*
  - Antarctica, 539
  - India, 136-138
  - Outer space, 831
  - Security Council membership, 7-8
  - Soviet Union, 168-170
- Wan Waithayakon, Prince, 33-34, 131, 154, 308, 809
- Ward, Rear Adm. Chester, 670-671, 686, 699, 704*n*, 714*n*, 719, 722, 725*n*, 748*n*, 800
- Washburn, Abbott, 321
- Washington State, Department of Fisheries, 680
- Waterman, Alan T., 466-467, 515-516, 836-837
- Wershof, M.H., 652
- West Indies, 107, 244
- Western Samoa, 107, 244
- Westfall, Virginia C., 28*n*, 146*n*, 202*n*, 272*n*
- Wexler, Harry, 514, 516
- White, G.D.L., 495, 497, 724, 727
- White, Ivan B., 209*n*, 223*n*, 224*n*, 269*n*, 343*n*
- White, Lincoln, 501
- White, Gen. Thomas D., 373, 469
- Whitman, Ann C., 355
- Whitney, John Hay, 78-79, 201, 338, 736-740
- Wieland, William A., 228*n*
- Wieschhoff, H.A., 184
- Wiggin, Charles D., 22, 121*n*, 881*n*
- Wigglesworth, Richard B., 193, 740-741
- Wilcox, Francis O., 9*n*, 22*n*, 27*n*, 59*n*, 66*n*, 71*n*, 77*n*, 84*n*, 86*n*, 90*n*, 99*n*, 101*n*, 107*n*, 134*n*, 140*n*, 173*n*, 182*n*, 188*n*, 199*n*, 202*n*, 208*n*, 209*n*, 216*n*, 222*n*, 230*n*, 236*n*, 237*n*, 238*n*, 239*n*, 258*n*, 265*n*, 297*n*, 303*n*, 309*n*, 317*n*, 327*n*, 642*n*, 757*n*, 795*n*, 867*n*, 872*n*, 876*n*, 880*n*, 895*n*, 901*n*, 903*n*, 905*n*, 909*n*, 910*n*, 915*n*
  - Antarctica, 606, 628*n*
  - Colonial issues, 420
  - Congo, Republic of, 463
  - General Assembly presidency, 190, 229
  - Hungary, 22-24, 68-70, 73-75, 86, 215-216
  - India, 136-137, 139



- Wilcox, Francis O.—Continued  
Law of the Sea, 647*n*  
Outer space, 899-900  
Security Council membership, 17-18,  
181, 192-193  
U.N. Charter review, 184-186  
U.N. representation issues, 11-13, 63*n*,  
83*n*, 105, 145*n*, 330, 331*n*, 407  
U.N. Trusteeship Council, 96*n*
- Wilkes, Charles, 483*n*, 558*n*
- Williamson, Larry C., 265*n*, 309*n*, 450*n*,  
760*n*, 761, 814*n*, 815
- Willis, Frances E., 237, 272*n*
- Willoughby, Woodbury, 265*n*, 269*n*, 761,  
763
- Witman, William, II, 813
- Woodruff, Arthur H., 429*n*, 439*n*
- Working Group on Antarctica, 466
- World Association of Parliamentarians for  
World Government, 185
- World Bank. *See* International Bank for  
Reconstruction and Development.
- World Health Organization (WHO), 262,  
449
- Wright, Edward E., 714, 719, 722, 727,  
746*n*, 800, 812
- Wright, Thomas K., 16
- Yang You Chan, 83, 145*n*, 167
- Yeh, George, 330
- Yemen, 32, 152, 155, 282, 290, 291
- Yingling, Raymond T., 685, 714, 719-720,  
722, 724, 727, 729-730, 732*n*, 755*n*,  
812, 822*n*
- York, Herbert, 828-830
- Yugoslavia, 33, 52, 109, 155, 157, 163,  
197, 290-291, 345-346, 890  
Chinese U.N. representation, 32, 152,  
282  
Five-power Eisenhower-Khrushchev  
meeting resolution, 370-371, 375-  
380, 385-387, 393, 395, 397, 400-  
401, 403  
General Assembly, 51-53, 58-59, 278,  
320, 344, 364  
International Court of Justice member-  
ship, 153, 279  
Law of the Sea, 695, 745
- Yun, Suk Hyun, 297
- Zanzibar, 244
- Zorin, Valerian A., 4-5, 117, 870-871, 874-  
876, 878-879
- Zorlu, Fatin Rustu, 181*n*
- Zulueta y Dato, Eduardo de, 376

