

Supplement: The Austro-Hungarian red book.

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SUPPLEMENT TO "THE CONTINENTAL TIMES"

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK.

Diplomatic Documents Concerning the Relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy during the Period from July 20th, 1914 to May 23rd, 1915.

Austro-Hungarian government on the relations and negotiations with Italy, prior to the declaration of war by the latter, contains in all 205 documents and 16 appendices. During the period covered there were two successive Foreign Ministers in each country, -Count Berchtold and Baron von Burian in Austria-Hungary and the Marquis di San Giuliano and Baron Sonnino in Italy.

A natural division of the material is into that which belongs to the time when the first-named of each country was in charge of its foreign affairs and that which dates from the period when the last-named of each country occupied that office; although the administration of Count Berchtold overlaps for a few weeks that of Baron Sonnino in

To the world at large the history of the Balkan states and the dreadful witch-kettle of constant plots Servia became under the goading fires of Russia, is entirely unknown. Scant recognition is given to the fact that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake, that the patience and forbearance of a great civilized state in the face of constant outrage, murder and agitation on the part of a semi-savage nation such as the Servian, must finally come to an end. Austria-Hungary and its integrity had been plotted against for many years and as soon as it was discovered that it could not be detached from its faithful ally, Germany, it was included in the plots and machinations of the Triple Entente Powers. Servia was the rope with which Russia sought to strangle Austria Hungary. And attached to that rope by secret pledges and financial and political understandings, were France and Russia, with Italy already half purchased and suborned. History, impartial, cold and just, will decree before the court of humanity and the consciences of men, that Austria-Hungary like its great ally Germany, chose the only course left to nations forced to defend not only their existence but their honor.

We give herewith a synopsis of the principal contents of the book together with some explanatory and connecting remarks. Count Berchtold in Vienna and the Marquis di San Guiliano in Rome.

The very first paper contradicts the Italian statement that Italy had no idea that Austria-Hungary was about to take steps against Servia. Count Berchtold wrote to the Austrian ambassador at Rome Herr von Merey before the handing of the ultimatum to Servia (No. 1, July 20, 1914) as follows:

"In the course of the discussion that will possibly arise over the matter Your Excellency can provisionally, without being commissioned to do so, express your well-founded persuasion that even if peaceable means do not prove effectual, the Vienna Cabinet has no thought of a campaign of conquest or of an incorporation of any part of Servia territory". Count Berchtold mentions further in this note that the Italian minister had told him that "Italy needs a strong Austria-Hungary." And Italy caused it to be stated in Vienna after the outbreak of the war with Servia that. "Italy will in no wise take advantage of the fact that Austria-Hungary is at present otherwise occupied." (No. 29, Aug. 4.)

We further see that before the Ultimatum had been handed to Servia, Count Berchtold had given directions to Herr von Merey as to what he was to say in case Italy should demand compensation based on the much talked of Article VII of the Freaty of Alliance. The purpose of this article was to quiet Italy after the occupation of Bosnia by assuring her that she should be offered a corresponding compensation if the status quo in Turkey could not be maintained, and a further occupation of Turkish territory should be undertaken. That was an alternate obligation, which however could have no reference to a war waged by the Monarchy, without any intention of conquest, for the sake of its own safety against an independent Balkan state responsible for its actions.

Count Berchtold clearly sets forth in his note to Herr von Merey (No. 2, July 20) this well-understood reason for the article of the treaty, and the ambassador on the very next day had the opportunity of carrying out his instructions. (No. 3, July 21). The Italian minister thereupon said he wished a strong Austria-Hungary, but such as it was and with no increase in size. His sentiments however showed themselves when the ambassador told him that Austria-Hungary did not have the intention of capturing Lovcen, the height above Cattaro fortified by Montenegro. The interest of the minister was already at that time evident for the father-in-law of the king, for Cetinje and against any strengthening of the position of the Monarchy on the coast. Already at that time too the playing on popular feeling had begun, and San Guiliano said significantly: the nation was now liberal in politics, remembered its revolutionary (No. 20, Aug. 1).

The recently published Red Book of the | origin, and is always "in sympathy with | irredentist demonstrations". Herr von Merev reported by telegraph to Count Berchtold concerning this conversation: that he heard many friendly phrases and noticed many silent

> Rome was not surprised by the step Austria-Hungary had taken in Belgrade, and the Italian minister was informed the day before that the Monarchy intended to send an ultimatum to Belgrade along with a statement of its demands (No. 4, July 22). The next day July 23rd it was sent, and on the 25th the time limit expired. On the very same day (25th), the Duke of Avarna visited the Austrian Foreign Office and stated that the Italian government reserved for itself the right to compensation based on the treaty of alliance, and requested that an understanding be arrived at before an eventual occupation of Servian territory. "For the rest, the royal Italian government, in case of an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia, intends to assume a friendly attitude and one corresponding to its obligations under the treaty.' Ten Months of Negotiations over the Compensation Question.

Now began that long series of shifts and subterfuges which marks the course of the Italian in the negotiations for compensation based on article VII of the treaty of alliance. How his claims rose from a most modest beginning to a height of insulting presumption is plainly to be seen from the documents here brought together. Count Szogyeny reported from Berlin (No. 12, July 26): "The State Secretary told me to-day that my Italian colleague had expressed surprise over the fact that Your Excellency had not earlier communicated to his government, as an allied power, the steps we were taking in Belgrade." Herrv. Jagow answered that this was quite comprehensible and correct, for it concerns a matter between Austria-Hungary and Servia only. Count Berchtold and the Austrian ambassador in Rome seek to show in most excellently framed state papers, especially in No. 12 of July 26th that it is impossible the Monarchy should have been willing to conclude or had concluded a treaty hindering it from defending itself against evil-disposed neighbours. It is pointed out how obliging Count Aehrenthal and Count Berchtold were during the war between Italy and Turkey, which increased the power of Italy even in the Aegean Sea, and how they at that time rejected the English proposition to prohibit an attack upon the Dardanelles.

The matter was becoming earnest. Italy had on her part violated both the spirit and letter of the alliance in two respects: by refusing her military assistance and failing that by not observing an honourable and friendly neutrality (art. III and IV of the treaty of alliance). Germany already detected the evil disposition and wished to avoid the danger, or to delay its approach. Count Berchtold telegraphs to Herr v. Merey (No. 15. July 28): "By request of his government the Imperial German ambassador has urged me to come to an arrangement with Italy, if possible, concerning the interpretation of article VII of the treaty of alliance." The Italian ambassador in Berlin, Herr Bollati, declares: the attitude of Italy can be friendly only if the right to negotiate concerning the compensation is recognized. Upon this, Germany, in the effort to stifle the fire at its beginning, declares it will accept Italy's construction of the article in question regarding the duty of compensation. Count Berchtold makes a concession, and we have reached the first stage in the compensation question.

The First Declaration of Count Berchtold. "Should we see ourselves compelled, against our expectations, to proceed to a more than temporary occupation of Servian territory, we are ready in such a case to enter into an interchange of views with Italy in reference to compensation. But on the other hand, we expect from Italy that it will not impede its ally in the actions necessary to achieve its ends, but will rather steadfastly continue towards as the promised attitude of a friendly confederate". (No. 15, July 28.) The Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Rome, Herr v. Merey, to whom the above note was addressed, already began to observe at the time he made the communication requested, that the Italian, began to assume a blackmailing tone.

The Second Concession in the Compensation

Question. Count Berchtold wished to leave a pretext open to the wily Italian, and made the following statement to the Duke of Avarna concerning the question: "The construction put upon article VII by Italy and Germany is accepted by me under the condition that Italy maintains a friendly attitude towards the operations of the present war between Austria-Hungary and Servia and fulfils its obligations as an ally, in case the present conflict should kindle a general conflagration".

The Emperor Francis Joseph to the King of Italy.

On August 1st, the Austrian Emperor sent the following telegram to King Victor

"Russia, presuming to have the right to interfere in our conflict with Servia, has mobilised her army and navy, and threatens the peace of Europe.

In understanding with Germany I am determined to defend the rights of the Triple Alliance, and have ordered the mobilisation of my entire land and sea forces. Thirty years of peace and prosperity are owing to the treaty which unites us, the identical construction of which on the part of our governments I note with salisfaction.

In this solemn momen's I am fortunate in being able to count upon the assistance of my allies and of their brave armies, and I cherish the warmest wishes for the success of our weapons and for a glorious future for our countries". (No. 21, Aug 1).

On the next day come the answering telegram from the King of Italy: "I have received Your Majesty's telegram. I need not assure Your Majesty that Italy, who has made all possible efforts to uphold peace, and who will do that lies in her power to assist as soon as possible in the restoration of peace, will preserve towards its allies a position of cordial friendship corresponding to the Triple Alliance, her sincere feelings and the great interests which she must guard". (No. 23, Aug 2).

The Italian government did not confirm the words of its King, and Herr von Merey reported: "My impression both before and since is that we have to do with a case of extortion which has already for the most part succeeded.

Italy, in the case of a localised as of a general war, wishes to be paid in advance for the position she may take (No. 22, Aug. 1.) The Military Stipulations between the Austro-

Hungarian and Italian General Staffs. One of the most interesting of the despatches is that of Count Berchtold to Herr von Merey: "the inquiry of our Chief of General-Staff to the Chief of the Italian General-Staff in reference to the elaborating of the arrangements made between the allies to meet the case of war, has been answered as follows: Conferences would have no purpose since our Cabinet council has decided on the neutrality of Italy. Slight mobilisation ordered. If Austria-Hungary does not occupy Lovcen, and does not disturb the equilibrium in the Adriatic, Italy will never proceed against Austria-Hungary. Your Excellency will conclude from the above utterance how the extortion policy is being continued."

(No. 31, Aug. 4.) The Beginning of Military Preparation. At that time the Italian ministers were making use of pleasing phrases while waiting to see which side would make the best offer, or show itself the stronger. The military manoeuvres were alleged as a pretext for assembling troops on the Austrian frontier. and the Italian press began its work of trying to break up the Triple Alliance. A word was now spoken that did indeed lead to the ultimate rending of the Alliance. The Italian minister for foreign affairs declared that mutual mistrust would never cease so long as no understanding was arrived at concerning the concrete compensations to be offered. (No. 39, Aug. 20.) From this time on this expression "concrete compensations" becomes the key-word of the Red-Book till its very close. In order to hurry along these concrete compensations, San Giuliano told Herr von Merey that the Entente-Powers had made enticing offers. It seems that already at that time these believed in the possibility of Italy playing the traitor.

The Third Concession in the Compensation Question.

The Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin telegraphed on Aug. 22.: it was urgently wished there that the Monarchy would admit that it would seek no increase of territory in the Balkans, even if Italy should remain neutral, before an understanding was arrived at with her, and corresponding compensations agreed upon (No. 42).

Count Berchtold answered: we are ready to enter into a conference with Italy concerning the compensation matter for the case of a temporary or definitive occupation by us of any Balkan territory. The Monarchy is also ready to guarantee to Italy territorial acquisitions at the cost of others.

The Appearance of Sonnino. In October the Marquis di San Giuliano died, and the Italian foreign office was administered by the Premier Salandra until the appointment of Sonnino. Salandra gave the assurance that so long as he was at the head of the Cabinet, he would continue the course followed by San Giuliano. A sharper tone begins to be heard. The Duke of Avarna had a conversation with Count Berchtold, the gist of which was as follows: according to the view of the Italian government it is

necessary without loss of time to begin ! concrete negotiations, since a situation has been created which touches very closely the most vital political and economic interests. The Duke then referred to the unrest that had shown itself in the Italian parliament and to the public sentiment in I aly which manifested clearly the tendency of the national aspirations, and of which the government had to take earnest account. (No. 72, Dec.12.) This was a sign of an approaching earnest

Trentino Demanded.

The German ambassador in Vienna communicated to Count Berchtold the content of conversations which Prince Bulow who had been appointed German ambassador to Italy, had had with the Italian statesmen. We learn from this that Salandra and Sonnino held the view: Austria on account of its internal condition cannot carry on a war, and is destined to be overthrown. The Prince further reported that Trentino had been mentioned as territorial compensation and that the aspirations of some even reached to the acquisition of Triest. (No. 88, Jany 4.)

Baron Sonnino became ever more urgent. He said that Italy could not come out of this great crisis with empty hands. And now we reach the summit of hypocrisy: "He had resolved to have this painful conversation only in the interest of preserving the old relations of alliance which he considered the only right policy for Italy's interest; he had accepted the portfolio of office for the purpose of establishing harmony and setting aside the old causes of friction, and to find a healthier basis for our relations, and if he did not succeed in doing this he would retire." (No. 90, Jany 6.)

The Last Note of Count Berchtold.

Count Berchtold retired from office in January, and the last note of his in the Red-Book is directed to Baron v. Macchio the Austrian ambassador in Rome. (No. 95, Jany 12.) It is one of the most important in the book. The crisis had taken on a more serious form, Baron Sonnino telegraphed to the Duke of Avarna: "One must have the courage and the composure in the discussion concerning the compensations according to article VII, to touch upon the delicate question of the ceding a district belonging at present to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy."

The cat was out of the bag. Count Berchtold answered, in agreement with the wish expressed by Herr v. Jagow, that the Italian government had taken up a position which made it scarcely possible for Austria to enter into a conference; it had always been the purpose of the alliance to protect the territorial possessions of the allies. Two days later, on the 14th of January, the diplomatic contest between the new Austro-Hungarian Minister for foreign affairs, Baron Burian, and the Italian began. Notes continued to be exchanged, and the hand of the Italian government was more and more exposed. What it had at first only shamefacedly intimated, it began brazenly to demand; the concrete compensations were seen to mean a large slice of the ally's territory.

Baron Burian informed Baron v. Macchio on the 29th of Jany "that Sonnino had declared the time was pressing and urged that we take up the discussion on the basis of a cession of territory; Italy must not seek to get something from any other belligerent state, for that would be a breach of her neutrality, but we were free to give up something voluntarily, and his government proposed singly and alone a territorial grant from the possessions of the Monarchy." (No. 99.)

The Threats of Baron Sonnino.

The Italian foreign minister proceeded a little later to declare that much time had gone by, and the Monarchy had not yet answered definitely if it would discuss a cession of its territory, "therefore the Royal government may find itself obliged, for the protection of its dignity to withdraw all its propositions and suggestions and intrench itself behind the clear provisions of article VII, with the declaration that it would consider any military action of Austria-Hungary, whether against Servia, Montenegro or any other Balkan state as in open contradiction to the aforesaid article, if an understanding was not arrived at beforehand. If Austria-Hungary should withdraw itself from this obligation, it could lead to serious consequences for which the Royal government even now disclaims all responsibility." (No. 106, Feby 15)

Here we find the first allusion to the possibility of war, and Baron Macchio reported (No. 108, Feby 19): he had received information that the Salandra-Sonnino Cabinet had five days before determined that if no territorial concessions were received they would let the matter come to war.

Concrete Proposals of Baron von Burian. On March 28th (No. 131) Baron Burian informed the ambassador in Rome that Austria-Hungary had decided to offer the cession of Southern-Tyrol including the city of Trent (No. 205).

on condition that Italy would preserve a friendly neutrality and that the Monarchy should have a free hand in the Balkans. This was at once declared not enough, and Sonnino said that under the pressure of England he could not promise a friendly neutrality, but only an impartial one. That every suspicion of favouring the Central Powers would lead to reprisals on the part of England, and have as a consequence the closing of the straits of Gibraltar for Italian commerce. (No. 132.)

Meanwhile warlike preparations were being continued in Italy, and England was said to have offered to meet the cost of the war. The negotiations over the extent of the cessions to be made to Italy were further carried on. The telegram of Baron von Macchio to Baron Burian (No. 137, April 3) gives an idea of conditions in Rome: "The aim of Italy at first was to obtain an increase of territory at the expense of the Monarchy, but the Entente wanted war, in and for itself, to strengthen the ranks of the enemies of the Central Powers. The Entente at the beginning of March counted with certainty upon Italy's entering the war, for it never thought that we should accept the basis for negotiations demanded by her; our doing this was a heavy blow for the Entente, and it now seeks to represent to the Italian government that the position of the Monarchy is becoming daily more desperate. Herr Martini is said to have succeeded in procuring an interview for Barzilai, the leader of the Irredentists, with Sonnino in order to make it clear to the minister that his followers would only then acquiesce quietly in an arrangement with us, if the Adriatic aspirations were also satisfied. The government affected by all these influences is becoming continually more exacting in its demands, all the more since from the Russian reports of victories daily being sent in, it believes our strength is broken."

The Counter-Propositions of Sonnino. Since Sonnino was not satisfied with the cession of the Trentino, Baron Burian requested him to make proposals himself. This was done, and they are set forth in No. 141 of the Red-Book unter date of April 11th. These are already known from earlier publications; here it is enough to say that they consisted of eleven articles, and demanded, among other conditions, the cession of the Trentino, the cities of Gradiska and Görz, of the twelve-island group in the Adriatic, the turning of the city of Triest and district into an autonomous state and the renouncing of certain actions and interests in the Balkans. And for all this Italy would agree to remain neutral during this present war in respect of her allies, Austria-Hungary and Germany! Was there anything more shameful than such an unheard-of attempt at extortion?

Prince Bülow in Rome continued his efforts, under these difficult circumstances, to pave the way for an agreement. Baron Macchio did not believe they would be successful. He reported in a despatch to Baron Burian: "The chief factors domineering the Italian government remain the same: fear of England; fear of a revolution—the Court especially seems to fear this more than a war-, and on the other hand, uncertainty as to the relative strength of the two groups." (No. 143

Further negotiations followed and although Austria-Hungary finally accepted all of the propositions of Italy which it was possible for a self-respecting state to do considering its ethnographic, strategic and economic conditions (see Nos. 178, 185, 188), it was of no use, Italy had determined upon war, and other influences were at work.

The Entente-Powers at Work.

France were at work dangling baits of

During all this time both England and

various sorts before the Italian, at which he was beginning to snap. The English ambassador is said to have promised a cheap loan of two milliards, the fulfilling of Italian wishes in Asia Minor and in the twelveisland group and the hindering of any hostile movement on the part of the Senussi. The French ambassador visited Sonnino daily and offered large cessions in Tunis, if France recovered Alsace-Lorraine, and some square kilometres of territory through rectification of the frontier at Ventimiglia. (No.162.) These and other promises coupled with the network of lies, sensational reports and newspaper propaganda spread abroad and carried-

portunity to extort territorial concessions from an ally in difficulties had furthered. Italy had ceased to be true to anything but the national type represented by a man with a stiletto up his sleeve waiting to stab his friend in the back. On May 23rd 1915 the Italian ambassador

on by English and French influences, finished

the work which an attack of megalomania

had begun and a supposed favourable op-

in Vienna handed to Baron Burian the declaration of war and requested his passports

THE ART OF "SUPPRESSION".

A Study in International Macaulayism.

By Arthur B. Yolland.

The acute and analytical mind of Dr. Yolland has turned itself upon one of the most obvious, feeble, yet widely-accepted pieces of sophistry of the entire war. It appeared shortly after the beginning of the war in the "N. Y. Times." I ventured to point out at that time its impudent assumptions, its characteristic ignorance and shallow, unjudicial dishonesty. Beck, burning with ardour to support the cause of the Allies, an ardour no doubt stimulated by a fat fee, constituted himself "the Supreme Court of Civilization" before which, on a hasty reading of and a blind faith in the documents of official Entente diplomacy, he sought to arraign and condemn the Central Powers! But a little time and a few tests proved that the entire crude and clumsy legal botchery was not only Beck, but Pinchbeck. R. L. Orchelle.

be forgiven for yielding to the temptation of a prevailing fashion. "Pan-Germanism", "Pan-Slavism", "militarism", "Potsdamism", "Churchillism" (for an exact definition of the latter, consult the famous speech of the late First Lord in which the British public were informed that "all is well"): their name is legion.

I have just read a pamphlet*) which to my mind entitles its author to claim the proud position of the leading modern exponent of "Macaulayism". Particularly if we consider the international importance of the questions he professes to discuss.

We are in the midst of a conflict the violence of which is such as the world has never experienced before. At the request of the New York Times, a distinguished American lawyer sets himself the task of discovering the rights and wrongs of the quarrel, and of determining the amount of responsibility to be borne by the respective groups of combatants. In order to achieve his purpose, he decides to constitute an imaginary international court of morality. The intention of the author deserves all praise: unfortunately, however, his prejudices and prepossessions render him incapable of occupying the position he has reserved for himself. Even were he free from all traces of bias, he could scarcely propose to act simultaneously as sole judge of the imaginary court and as a barrister holding a brief for the "Entente", in particular for Great Britain.

The main charge against the Central Powers (the whole pamphlet is merely a collection of such charges, and any attempt on the part of the author's conscience to put forward arguments favourable to Germany or Austria-Hungary is promptly ruled out of court) is that of suppression. We are informed that every document calculated to prove the sincerity of Germany's efforts to maintain the peace of Europe has been suppressed: and we are led to presume that no such efforts were made. However, the author, who is unfortunately quite incapable of the self-suppression essential to the formation of a calm and unbiassed judgment, has suppressed the most significant-suppressions. We hear nothing of the military conventions made between Belgium and the "Entente Cordiale;" though in the light of these conventions the words of the Imperial Chancellor of Germany have a totally different significance to that attributed to them by Mr. Beck. We are not told why a certain document contained in the British White Book (the perfectly loyal request of Germany for information as to the conditions which Great Britain would stipulate as the sine qua non of her neutrality, the only answer to which was Mr. Asquith's famous Philippic) is still waiting for a reply. We are left in total ignorance as to the nature of the communications which passed between Belgrade and St. Petersburg during the fateful 48 hours (1914 July 23-25), and as to the nature of the instructions received by the late M. Hartvig. But the author is not concerned with the omissions of the "Entente" Powers: having set himself the task of proving the guilt of Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the basis of that system of international morality which is responsible for the latest definition of "neutrality" ("la neutralité est 'état lequel favorise l'entente"), he is compelled to resort to those expedients-suppressio veri and suggestio falsi-which make the essays of Macaulay so dangerous for ignorant and superficial readers.

He suppresses the all-important distinction between the defensive action of Austria-Hungary in taking up arms to protect herself against the inevitable results of hyperconciliation and the attempt on the part of Russia to convert the issue into a European one in order to save her henchman from the punishment he so fully deserved. Consequently, the author is incapable of understanding that the seeds of the European conflict were sown years ago, when the powers that be of Servia consented to act as the vanguard of Russian aggression: and that it follows that the "violation of the neutrality of Belgium" was merely a passing incident. In fact, considering that the "neutrality" of Belgium ceased to exist as far back as 1911. the crime of "suppression" will have to be answered, not by Germany or her ally, but by the very Power whose moral justification forms the mainspring of our author's undertaking.

The author's peroration is most significant as a proof of the source of his inspiration: it repeats the hackneyed protestations of a certain section of the British press. No doubt the sentiments expressed therein will appeal to the German people; but I doubt whether even the most sentimentally inclined will be-

*) "The Dual Alliance contra the Triple Entente", by James M. Beck, former Assistant Attorney-General of the United States. (Unfortunately I have only the French translation of the original—published in Lausanne—at my disposal.)

We live in an age of "isms". So I may | lieve in their sincerity. In fact, a certain passage in the pamphlet seems to contain a warning not to indulge in too much credulousness. I refer to the sentence in which the author prophetically anticipates the dastardly conduct of Italy ("une nation, comme un individu, peut poignarder son voisin en paix, tout en démand: "Es-tu en bonne santé, mon frère?" et même la paix de la civilisation peut être trahi par le baiser de Judas.")

The author qualifies all his statements relating to Germany and her ally by the use of abusive epithets. The ultimatum sent to Belgrade last July was "brutal in tone and unreasonable in its demands." The action of the Dual Monarchy in demanding the right to fight her own quarrels without interference on the part of the rest of Europe was equally "unreasonable" and "unjustifiable": the author naturally elects to forget the action of his principal client before the outbreak of the Boer War. In the case of Austria-Hungary Europe was entitled to play the role of step-mother: as for Great Britain, her affairs are no concern of others. We cannot but admire the facility with which our author establishes a twofold standard of suppression.

And the the talk about "the neutrality of Belgium" was only a pretext: it was no more the cause of the interference of England in the European conflict than was the revolution in Mexico! The real cause lies far deeper: and it is here that the art of suppression of our author rises to its highest level. He would have done well to postpone the sitting of his international court until after the investigation now proceeding of the secret archives of the Belgian Government: the evidence contained therein would have led even this adherent of the "Entente" to reflect on the true meaning of those preliminaries not a trace of which is to be found either in the British White Book or in the arguments put forward by Mr. Beck in his able defence of his clients. He would have been compelled to admit that "there are more things in heaven and earth" than are dreamt of in the philosophy of diplomatic briefs: and that even nations must beware of "the smiler with the knife beneath the cloak."

Our author admits that the action of Germany in attacking Belgium was not aggravated by the crime of hypocrisy. Hereby he has inadvertently set the conduct of his self-appointed adversaries miles above that of his own clients. Bernard Shaw has long since exposed the hypocrisy of his Government; even the Daily News has shown the absurdity of claiming for Russia a share in "the liberation of Europe"; more than one thinking Englishman has expressed to me his surprise that the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen still believe the war-cries of their press; those statesmen who had the hardihood to plunge Europe into a whirlpool of blood and mutual hatred in order to seize the "psychological moment" for the destruction of the rival whose progress they feared and whose spirit they misunderstood. do not possess the moral courage to stand forth before their countrymen and the world and confess their guilt: yet their apologist resorts to subterfuge, and would fain convince humanity that the deluge that has thrown half the world into mourning is the outcome of a want of sincerity on the part of-Germany and her allies, Austria and Hungary! He forgets that the same Government which had not the courage to inform the world of its secret treaty with Belgium, witheld from its own Parliament, not merely the true cause of its fateful step, but even the text of those secret compacts which forced its hand and compelled it to make Great Britain the cats-paw of Russian aggression. Here we have suppression carried to its utmost limits: yet no reproach is uttered; Mr. Beck chooses to throw a veil of benignant silence over the omissions of his clients, and endeavours to cast the blame for the most terrible catastrophe known to history on suppressions which have no earthly connection with the main issue.

There is too much of the lawyer, and too little of the critic. Our author runs the risk of seeing the writing on the wall, not only of his own house, but on that of his principal client. The legend is no pleasant onemene mene tekel upharsin—, but it may have to be faced: and we can only add that, as far as the national welfare of the British people is concerned, the sooner, the better. Procrastination is the thief of other things besides time: a little less suppression and a little more sincerity might have saved Europe the saddest tragedy of her history; it could certainly save the British nation the final act Suppression may be a fine art-for diplomatists: but it is scarcely calculated to produce the "deus ex machina" the co-operation of which is so implicitly reckoned upon by those statesmen who, having guided their

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GERMANY AND AMERICA.

By Ladislaus Baron von Hengelmüller, formerly Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Washington.

New York before the representatives of the Associated Press on April 20th in which he discussed American neutrality and the duties arising from it. Penetrated by the thought of the greatness of the tasks laid upon his country, he again enjoined upon his countrymen the observance of a true, just and impartial neutrality, and laid stress upon the fact that this must proceed not from indifference and selfishness, but from sympathy with all mankind, and can find its basis only in fairness, good will and impartiality in thinking and judging. He then pointed out that it was not so in all parts of the land, hut that the voice of the country was however only heard here and there, that its beart was as sound as over, and that he had full confidence in the great mass of the quiet Americans, who are not going about brawling out their opinions but are waiting to see clearly what their duties are in this regard, and then to fulfil them.

In view of the controversies pending between us and our ally on the one side and America on the other, these declarations of President Wilson have to-day also a most practical interest. We can only hope and desire that the spirit revealed in thems may direct the further attitude and the expected determinations of the Federal government.

The American public has indeed, up till now, only imperfectly responded to the admonition of their president to prepare themselves by a becoming reserve for the tasks awaiting their country. Not only the corner loungers, the agitators and the braulers, to which class the greater number of the New York pro-English newspapers belong, have raised their voices against us, but men prominent in the learned world and political leaders of the first rank have done the same thing, and taken sides passionately the our enemies. Their right to do so cannot be denied, but such demonstrations effect us here and in Germany so much the more painfully since there was no just occasion for them and since we cannot see what purpose, truly American, they serve.

The high value to be attached to a just judgment and a friendly attitude on the part. of America is quite evident. We have indeed enemies enough without desiring that the sympathies of the United States should be directed to them. In this connection however, I may mention that I spent more than twenty years of my life in America, country there, and from my knowledge of the United States and from information I am now receiving, I would state that the taking sides with the Entente powers and the animosity against Germany were, and are, not so general as one would suppose from the articles in the newspapers of the Eastern states. It is in the centres of industry, shipping and finance, and among a certain social coterie that we find pro-British feeling so pronounced. In all circles of the country however there is a sympathetic appreciation caused by the astonishing proofs that have been given of our endurance and vitality, and full admiration is bestowed upon the brilliant heroism of our troops and of the self-sacrificing patriotism of our whole people. A correspondent who inclines decidedly to the side of our enemies has written to me: "You are making a magnificient fight against tremendous odds."

The heart of the American people is, as President Wilson has rightly said, sound, and I would await with calm confidence their definitive judgment, if in the present condition of things there was not continually the danger of controversies arising, in which formal right, actual justice, and interest are all opposed to each other.

Two such questions have recently come up and stand just now in the forefront of public interest: one is that of the delivery from the United States of war-supplies to our enemies, the other that of the endangering of American travellers by the German suomarine warfare. The factors of right, of sentiment and of interest which come into consideration in both of these are very conflicting. What is common to both of them is that they owe their origin to the existing

country into the Slough of Despond by a policy of insincerity, and having duped half Europe into a belief in the sincerity of their protestations, would prolong the existence of their threadbare policy by persuading the remaining half of the world to accept their cause as that of the champions of-nonsuppression and sincerity, fighting against the demons, not merely of barbarism, but of falsehood and perversion.

"The wheels of God grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small." Our author is evidently a student of Tennyson: he might have quoted two other lines from the same poet, -lines equally expressive and equally applicable to the present crisis:-

"The old order changth, giving place to

And God fulfils Himself in many ways." And then what about "Darwinism?"

President Wilson delivered an address in I so-called international sea-right, whose provisions are directed to subjecting the interests and rights, not only of belligerents, but also of neutrals, to the will of the strongest seapower, that is to England's.

It is certain, that as things stand to-day, the freedom allowed to the export of American arms and ammunition favours our enemies alone, tends to the greatest injury of us and our ally, and consequently produces in us both great bitterness of feeling. It is also certain that the American government is not obliged to prohibit this export, according to the wording of the existing conventions on the subject. In its note of April 12th the American State Department even went so far as to assert that it was at present not justified in issuing such a prohibition, The untenableness of this position is conclusively shown in the Austro-Hungarian note of July 29th with its reference to the preamble to Convention XIII of the Hague Peace Conference.

The essential anomaly of the sea-right at present in force lies in this, that the hardships and injuries caused by it affect not only the belligerent powers, but also neutrals. If England puts stop to the oversea trade of Austria-Hungary and Germany, this is not our loss alone, but that of those neutral powers as well with which we have carried on this trade. What effects as is indeed a natural consequence of the War; as to what concerns neutrals however, their toleration of such wrongs is only to be explained by a consideration of the origin of the present system of sea-right, wich has been developed not from the principles of justice and equity, but according to the onesided dictation of England.

The natural fundamental-right had been that of having neutrals untouched by the effects of the hostile loperations and consequently the preserving for them of the unrestricted freedom of their trade and shipping, and thereupon could have followed, out of considerations of humanity and fairness, the limiting equally, in respect of all parties, of the delivery of certain warsupplies. On the other hand however, England has claimed the right from the beginning to destroy all over-sea trade of the nations at war with her and to extend the consequences of this claim in the fullest degree to the neutral countries. The concessions in this matter, granted under the well-known Declaration of Paris, appear to-day worthless and illusory because England has claimed the further right to establish arbitrarily the nature and extent of contraband and to exclude neutral ships from waters that do not lie in an effectively blockaded district. The United States, the neutral power most serionsly affected, has indeed made protest against these dictatorial pretensions of England. and Mr. Bryan, in the April note to England, said emphatically that the United States has yielded no single one of its rights as a neutral power, and the same thing has been declared in further correspondence (between the two countries) but yet, so far as I am informed, England has until now continued to answer President Wilson (with a polite bow) that means a recognition of the principle involved in the American point of view but nullifies in practice the acknowledged principle.

In any case all delivery of food supplies for the civil population and that of other goods which in no respect can be termed contraband, nay, all American trade of whatsoever kind with us and Germany has been remained impossible.

An earnest danger for German-American relations arose from the submarine warfare and out of the Lusitania case, as a consequence of it. This latter was indeed calculated to arouse a feeling of sympathy for the innocent, if also in the highest degree imprudent, passengers, and it was quite natural that in the United States such feelings were directed into a current of indignation against the causing of this disaster. It is also understandable that our enemies and their agents in America should became actively engaged in seeking to exploit this feeling, and to stir up the fires of passion against Germany. They succeeded in this, and the newspaper correspondents, and even many prominent personages, became quite hysterical in their utterances. "Pirates of the worst kind" was one of the mildest of the many abusive terms which were repeated again and again.

Piracy! Who has turned naval warfare into this, and continues to give it this character? In a war on land, the principle of the inviolability of private property has been recognized, even if it has not always been observed, but on the sea, this is not yet the case, and there is not the slightest probability that England will ever voluntarily allow it to be so because she is bent on destroying, not merely every hostile naval force, but also the commerce of every enemy. The German submarine would much rather have brought the "Lusitania" into a German port as prize than to have blown her up in Irish waters. If the German fleet carries on

warfare under the water instead of on the surface, it does this because of the numerical superiority of the English naval units. Moreover Germany began this form of conducting war at sea only after England had given it an abnormal character, through preventing the import of food supplies, and by closing the North Sea. In her attempt to overthrow Germany and ourselves by starving-out our civil population, England had certainly in mind no precept of humanity, but only of the effective-ness of her measures. Germany has there upon paid her back in her own coin, while she has always declared herself ready to discontinue the submarine warfare against merchant ships, if England was witling to give np her starving-out campaign.

The excitement at first aroused in the United States has since then cooled down and given place to a more objective consideration of the matter. The solicitude of the American government for the lives and safety of its citizens is justifiable and natural and every friendly power will certainly respect this but it must not go so far as to base on this solicitude the claim, that the presence of an American citizen upon a merchant vessel flying the flag of a belligerent shall serve as a safe-conduct for the ship.

In order to make it clear how entirely such a claim, made during the excitement of the moment, rests merely upon feeling and not upon proper deliberation, it is only necessary to propose the question how the American government and public opinion in the United States would have conducted themselves, if at the time of the French aeroplane attack on Carlsruhe, American citizens had been killed. Their right however to stay in undefended cities in belligerent countries is certainly more indisputable than that of making ocean voyages on luxurious English vessels.

However great may be the difference, from a humane point of view, between the death of passengers and their being carried off, interned and otherwise molested, yet there is properly speaking only a difference of degree and not of principle between the holding up and capturing of merchant vessels and the sinking of them. The obligation of giving warning in advance of attack and of securing the safety of passengers and crew cannot be carried out in submarine warfare, and the alternative is presented of either giving it up entirely, or of applying the principle ad impossible nemo tenetur. How a neutral power can demand the first from Germany is not to be conceived, when England does not accept the condition proposed.

Germany in her last note clearly bears testimony to the wish to meet the desires of the United States as far as possible and to provide for the safety of American citiz and their legitimate needs of transportation.

The task awaiting America is a great and important one. Whether upon the conclusion of peace a just and equitable reformation of the existing sea-right will take place, depends largely on her attitude.

The Absinthe Curse.

At Lunel, in Hérault in the south of France, a distiller who was found guilty of manufacturing absinthe was ordered to pay 2,019 fines aggregating over £120 quintuple excise duties amounting to £7,080, and to have his stock, valued at £2,000, confiscated. His attempt to defeat the law had cost him £9,200.

A Martyr to Truth.

The Military Court at Verona condemned a soldier named Gianotti to three years imprisonment for saying that Italy's taking part in the war was a treachery and an infamy.

A Little Common Sense.

Lady Helmsley wrote a suggesting that German music should be boycotted in England. Another correspondent replies:-Why should we discard anything that is beautiful and divine? Are we going to shut out the inspiration of Beethoven, the world's greatest musical genius, after he has taught us so much? Music is the universal language of the race, and nationality has therefore nothing whatever to do with it. Would we reject a German cure for consumption?

Helmets for the Trenches.

A new protective helmet is now being despatched in large quantities to the French troops at the front. The invention has a down-turned brim and has greatly reduced the risk of wounds in the head caused by shrapnel, spent bullets, and flying shell splinters.

A Last Opportunity.

The retreat of the Russians from Warsaw brings us face to face with the crisis of the war.

Now is given to Great Britain a last opportunity to awaken and to amend.

So far the tide of war has gone steadily against us and our Allies; all the fair promises of a vigorous offensive in the spring, the deliverance of Belgium from the invader. the taking of Constantinople from the Turk have vanished like the mirage of the desert as the due date of their accomplishment has drawn near. And to-day we are confronted with the withdrawal of our steadfast Allies behind the Vistula, the deadlock of Gallipoli, and the stalemate of the western front.

(Letter to Daily Mail.)