

Drinking and Dynamite: Revolution and Social Struggle in a Bolivian Mining Town, 1900-1992

By

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation traces the relationship between indigeneity and working class identity in a copper mining camp in rural Bolivia over the course of the twentieth century, highlighting the large and small conflicts over race, gender, and working class citizenship that helped produce an unprecedented social revolution in 1952. During the first half of the twentieth century, I show how workers, local merchants, and nationalist intellectuals came to believe that nationalizing Bolivia's mineral wealth would be a panacea for the economic, social, and cultural problems besetting the country. These resource nationalists aimed to reverse generations of colonial inequality by turning "backwards," rebellious, Indians into "modern," worker-citizens with fertile wives and healthy children. After the 1952 Revolution, this coalition created a welfare state around the mines, offering workers and their families access to unprecedented material wealth and social capital in exchange for assimilation and political loyalty. In the 1950s, certain kinds of socially mobile men, mostly literate mestizo youths with ties to both mining and commerce, used revolutionary worker citizenship to assert their dominance within communities like Corocoro, alienating in the process both members of their own families and their more traditionally respectable neighbors.

After the revolution, I show how this partial welfare state sowed the seeds of discord within the communities it sought to protect as women and indigenous men fought over access to goods and services within the *pulpería* (the company store), schools, and hospitals. During the 1960s, these spaces often became the sites of conflicts between miners and the increasingly counterrevolutionary state over failure to comply with revolutionary promises from the 1950s. My dissertation sets these macro-level conflicts in conversation with deeply personal disputes between neighbors, friends and families. The intermingling of coercive and redistributive functions within

the mining company and its social worlds produced new divisions within rural Bolivian society, ensuring that the revolutionary consensus would fall apart, not at the hands of dictators, but through the struggles of neighbors and communities to render revolutionary promises tangible and citizenship meaningful over the course of the 20th century.

Introduction: Drinking and Dynamite



Image 0.1 Corocoro Heroic Miner Sculpture, Author Photo (2013).

In 2013, a few weeks before Carnival, I visited a private mine near the Cerro Rico de Potosí. Run by a partnership with the Bolivian government and a European mining firm, this modern surface removal enterprise involved little traditionally associated with the dangerous work underground that has made Potosí legendary among travelers and academics alike.¹ The mine itself was closed to visitors, but I was able to travel in with the local representatives of the union for rituals surrounding the Día del Compadre.² Arriving shortly after dawn, I helped union leaders distribute coca, beer, and decorations to the various worksites in the mine. In each site, the same ritual was reenacted: each section provided at least one llama, or at the very least, a

¹ For example, Sara Shahriari, “Bolivia’s Cerro Rico, the ‘Mountain That Eats Men’, Could Sink Whole City,” *The Guardian*, January 10, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/10/bolivia-cerro-rico-mountain-sink-city-potosi>.

² This holiday, associated with the preparations for Carnival, celebrates coworkers and asks for blessings for the work environment.

sheep, for sacrifice. The llama had been killed, skinned and gutted by dawn. When we arrived, workers, members of management, and union representatives spread blood on the mining machinery and created altars of the entrails. These they piled with offerings of alcohol, cigarettes, and coca, usually in a wheelbarrow pertaining to that section of the mine. Workers and management alike took turns burying the altar, and finally, dancing under the llama skin to tamp down the earth above the offering.

The moment I remember most strikingly was when the new mining engineer, freshly imported from Argentina, donned the mantle of bloody llama skin and began to dance. This mine is one of the most technologically advanced, not to mention safest, in Bolivian history. Miners here no longer need to stave off cave-ins by placating the *tío*, the devil spirit that used to rule life and death underground. On this day, however, they still asked for blessings from the Pachamama (earth) to make sure they had permission to mine. During this festival of the workplace, the miners used the llama sacrifice to ask for success despite cutting-edge mining technology, while the new engineer and manager understood that he had to cement a reciprocal, ritual relationship with the workers and the land in order to effectively manage his modern enterprise. My dissertation seeks to answer why this would be the case.

Many who participated in the revolution of 1952 did so in the hopes of eradicating “indigenous” rituals like this from the mining landscape. These cultural practices are visibly different from what most businesses in the US or Europe understand to be modern industrial practice; they are visibly indigenous. These kinds of practices, as will be shown below, were also protection rituals, tangible evidence of the danger, poverty, and instability of life—and of the inadequacy of the state to respond to the needs of its citizens. My dissertation argues that elite reformers and worker revolutionaries did not simply hope for indigenous assimilation during the

revolution of 1952. By embracing a language of modernization and development, these men and women hoped to change the conditions of life and labor in Bolivia such that indigenous practice would no longer need to exist; magical or spiritual appeals to the devil for protection would no longer be required by Bolivia's workers. The ritual I witnessed in 2013 highlights the failure of this attempt, but also calls attention to the ways in which indigeneity itself formed a part of working class identity over the course of the twentieth century. In this way, my dissertation suggests that the contradictions of the welfare state helped define the identity politics of indigenous resistance currently harnessed by Evo Morales. Ultimately, I ask whether modern states can respond to their citizens' needs in a sustainable way, without resorting to coercion or corruption or assimilation.

Since the country's independence, Bolivian elites had understood the nation's indigenous majority to be an obstacle to progress and development, an anti-modern holdover from the colonial past. The Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) of the 1940s and 1950s attempted to break with this tradition, with mixed results.³ I argue that the nationalist coalitions of workers and reformers in 1952 believed that indigenous Bolivians were not only capable of being modern citizens but central to Bolivia's shot at prosperity and global participation. MNRistas believed that elite landowners and foreign corporations, and not indigenous backwardness, had prevented Bolivia's success as a nation. By building state resources that could incorporate popular groups, the MNR hoped to bring about the regulation and conversion of Bolivia's "natural" resources, both human and mineral, into national resources that could become foundations for a modern, prosperous republic.

³ Portugal and Macusaya suggest that the MNR had neither a clear idea of what the "problem of the indian" might be, nor of how to solve it. Pedro Portugal Mollinedo and Carlos Macusaya Cruz, *El Indianismo Katarista, Una Mirada Crítica* (La Paz: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016), 103. I suggest that their sense of the problem was one of underdevelopment, and thus looked for solutions in mechanisms of transformation.

Nationalizing the mines and creating a welfare state that could provide workers with access to the trappings of modern citizenship—education, healthcare, purchasing power, political voice—provided a revolutionary solution to the contradictions of Bolivian nationhood. The revolution embraced by the miners had similar a utopian vision: eradicating the poverty and instability that had plagued Bolivia since the first silver mines came to the attention of the Spanish crown in 1545. In both of these goals, the revolution unarguably failed. While the revolution did radically change Bolivia, it did not, and could not, fundamentally change the fact that the mines are dangerous, damaging places to work, linked to an unequal global system of markets. Nor did the revolution successfully change the demographic character of Bolivia to a modern, prosperous society of workers and citizens where class replaced racial difference.

The central problem of the revolution was how to organize a political system that could resist, on ideological, structural, and social levels, the troubled associations between indigeneity and poverty, and between cultural difference and anti-modernity that haunted postcolonial Bolivia. For a time, the nationalist politics of the mid-century MNR attempted to solve this problem by tying the fate of the mines to all of Bolivia. By nationalizing mineral resources, the peoples of Bolivia could be united in a project of national prosperity. The miners then became ministers to the prosperity of the nation as a whole, mediating the dangerous world of chance on behalf- not just of their families but of Bolivia itself.⁴ It is for this reason—part ideology, part economy—that Bolivian miners exercised an out-sized influence on the imaginary of the revolution, despite the fact that they were never a majority of the working population.

⁴ The phrase ministers of the devil comes from Pascale Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo: El Trabajo Y Sus Representaciones En Las Minas de Potosí* (La Paz Bolivia: PIEB, 2005).

Workers used a class-based identity to mark their own transformation away from the rural indigenous cultures to which their families had belonged, but this identity, which I call worker citizenship, was not entirely “western,” either in the eyes of workers or in their middle-class allies. The multi-class coalition that fostered this nationalist vision created a new political consensus that radically changed Bolivian society in the decades after 1952, but also set the stage for the dissolution of this consensus in the economic and political turmoil of the 1980s. Both the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) government and the reactionary military dictatorships that followed attempted to use mining communities such as Corocoro as experiments in assimilationist state-building. By linking natural resource control to national political control over indigenous Bolivia, these governments initially won and ultimately lost the allegiance of rural families in places such as Corocoro, associating the state with violent repression and setting the terms for the instability and political struggles of the twenty-first century.

Although the MNR government fell to a military coup in 1964, popular memory puts much greater emphasis on the massive shutdown of government mines in 1985 as the end of the revolutionary dream. 1985 was the year of *relocalization*, a euphemism for massive layoffs, which many Bolivians believe were symptoms not of the mines’ economic inefficiency, but of a political choice to end the revolution. By contrast, the military dictatorships that had killed miners and suppressed worker politics had at least kept the company running. My dissertation asks then, what changed and when? I argue that the miners understood politics to entail making devil’s bargains and demanding concessions from powerful but untrustworthy governments whether civilian or military. Many miners did buy into the revolution and the project of worker citizenship. They did not, however, expect that governments would take their interests into

account unless forced to do so; they expected to fight to keep governments on track. The repression of the 1960s and 1970s did not change this expectation, they simply made the negotiations harder. Such an understanding allowed the dream of the revolution to survive the coups of the 1960s and 1970s.

This devil's bargain had its own costs: worker political visions became less rather than more expansive in this period, tending towards defending limited social gains against encroachment, both from the state and from non-worker neighbors who might compete for resources. Worker citizenship, meant originally as an inclusive and transformative identity, became another way to draw lines of exclusion around the deserving—that is culturally non-indigenous and politically connected—among Bolivia's poor. Even this exclusive definition of worker citizenship was too radical for many in the middle classes and urban elite, who saw worker citizenship as too socially and economically destabilizing to be incorporated into the civilian governments of the 1980s. Having spent much of the twentieth century rejecting indigeneity in favor of class-based revolution, the workers shorn of their middle-class allies found themselves unable to comfortably accommodate the powerful rural peasant and indigenous political movements that might have been better comrades against neoliberal reforms and structural adjustment in the 1980s.⁵

⁵ Not for lack of trying. The Katarista movement emerged during the 1970s out of campesino movements unwilling to integrate with the MNR state. The Katarista movement in particular sought to incorporate leftist intellectuals, trade unions, and indigenous politics, while indianista currents favored more isolationist responses. For the history of such movements, see: Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos: luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980* (Ginebra: Instituto de Investigaciones de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Social, 1986); Xavier Albó, "From MNRistas to Kataristas to Katari," in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World - 18th to twentieth Centuries*, ed. Steve J. Stern (University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Waskar Ari, *Earth Politics: Religion, Decolonization, and Bolivia's Indigenous Intellectuals* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2014); Portugal Mollinedo and Macusaya Cruz, *El Indianismo Katarista, Una Mirada Crítica*. Workers and rural peasant movements sometimes did support each other, but the miners in this period saw themselves as leaders, not collaborators in this process.

In this dissertation, I set the MNR revolutionary project of 1952 in the context of a long history of reformist movements in mining communities, mirroring economic boom and bust cycles that, since 1545 at least, have been crucial to the demographic landscape of Bolivia.⁶ In each of these struggles, I highlight the moments in which the miners believed they formed part of a future-oriented project of development and the moments in which they rejected participating. My dissertation resists simple narratives of working class formation, seeing miners not as rural Indians on the precipice of proletarianization, but savvy players of several economic games, hoping for prosperity for their families. For nearly five hundred years, certain members of indigenous communities have traveled to the mines, under more or less coercion, to help their families accumulate resources. For nearly five hundred years, these workers have participated in the development of a distinctly *minero* cultural identity, and some of these men and women have stayed to give this culture an urban life of its own. For much of the twentieth century, this *minero* culture and identity formed the basis of a revolutionary nationalist vision of a more inclusive Bolivia built on what I call worker citizenship. But worker citizenship had very specific racial and geographic origins that made it inaccessible or undesirable for many in Bolivia's rural indigenous majority who saw *minero* culture as just one more form of racist assimilation. Moreover, even though it *was* an assimilative vision of citizenship, worker citizenship could not erase either the racial or geographic stigma attached to miners who remained indigenous in the eyes of their more urban or more elite neighbors throughout this period. Eventually, some miners decided to embrace this identity as well; returning to indigenous communities, or at least rural

⁶ Similarly, Boyer proposes thinking about changes in Mexico as a series of cycles, or periods of stagnation and expansion of intensive human intervention. Christopher R. Boyer, *A Land Between Waters: Environmental Histories of Modern Mexico* (University of Arizona Press, 2012), 3.

life, has always remained an option well understood by urban workers, as many fired workers learned in the 1980s.

Although my dissertation spans much of the twentieth century, the central questions of this dissertation do arise out of the complicated historiographical trajectory of the MNR revolution. As James Dunkerley has noted in his retrospective on the 60th Anniversary of 1952, while no one has been satisfied with the outcome of the revolution, neither scholars nor activists can agree on what this outcome actually was.⁷ As a result, historians still very much disagree about the extent to which the conflict was a revolution and how much it changed Bolivia's political, social, and economic life. Did the agrarian reform and nationalization of tin mines in the country restructure relations of power in Bolivia, or did replacing one set of local power-holders with another represent merely another form of colonial domination for the country's indigenous majority? Did the MNR betray itself and its own revolution or did the US and the International Monetary Fund destroy the revolution through the Alliance for Progress? Most recent Bolivian scholarship emphasizes the failure of the state to create an inclusive national community out of incredibly diverse and contentious populations over the course of the twentieth century.⁸

These questions derive in part, I believe, from the fragmented and regionally specific experience of politics and state engagement in Bolivia. Although one of the goals of the MNR Revolution was expanding the central state's reach into the countryside, they were more equipped to carry this out in some places than in others. In general, the MNR expanded most

⁷ James Dunkerley, "The Bolivian Revolution at 60: Politics and Historiography," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 45, no. 02 (May 2013): 325–50. Dunkerley also argues that a consolidated scholarship on the revolution is incredibly recently, dating to the essays in, René Zavaleta Mercado, ed., *Bolivia, hoy* (Siglo XXI Ediciones, 1983).

⁸ Ari, *Earth Politics*.

readily where peasant unions were willing to work with the state to secure their own local power or where industrial enterprises provided an existing infrastructure for political operatives to build upon. Corocoro, a highland market town with mining infrastructure, was one such place the MNR could reach relatively easily, which means that Corocoro became one of the frontlines of experimental revolutionary state-building.⁹ Other communities, for example, with *ayllus* (indigenous extended kinship groups) that resisted unions or had no industrial ties, remained entirely beyond the reach of the MNR.¹⁰ These cleavages in experience and representation allowed the revolution to continue in some places while rolling back gains in others. Most crucially, differing experiences of revolution meant that Bolivian citizens of similar economic opportunity had radically different experiences of integration into and resistance against the state.

From the academy outside Bolivia, historians such as Malloy and Dunkerley have emphasized the limits of the MNR's revolutionary aspirations, particularly in the context of US-backed loans and the strictures of the Cold War.¹¹ These historians saw the peasants as largely quiescent allies of the MNR, and the workers as the most radical wing of the revolutionary coalition.¹² Explorations of the role of the working class in these periods were usually situated in

⁹ The first historians of the MNR revolution belonged to the MNR. Among these, Rene Zavaleta Mercado and Luis Antezana did not idealize the revolution as perfect, but they were invested in the MNR's role in fundamentally altering Bolivia. From the perspective of the workers and the lowlands respectively, Guillermo Lora and various conservative critiques found it wanting. Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958); Guillermo Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Sándor John, *Bolivia's Radical Tradition: Permanent Revolution in the Andes* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009); Carlos Meyer Aragón, *Bolivia ensombrecida: la dictadura terrorista y los negociados del régimen movimientista* (Editorial Neupert, 1965).

¹⁰ José M. Gordillo, *Campesinos Revolucionarios en Bolivia: Identidad, Territorio y Sexualidad en el Valle Alto de Cochabamba, 1952-1964* (La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores, 2000); Ari, *Earth Politics*; Maria Carmen Soliz Urrutia, "Fields of Revolution: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Bolivia, 1935-1971" (Ph.D., New York University, 2014).

¹¹ James Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985* (New Brunswick U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 1988); James Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982* (London: Verso, 1984).

¹² Herbert S. Klein, *Orígenes de La Revolución Nacional Boliviana: La Crisis de La Generación Del Chaco* (La Paz: Librería y Editorial "Juventud," 1968); James V. Kohl, "Peasant and Revolution in Bolivia, April 9, 1952-

the moments of solidarity in the 1960s and 1970s when the miners were battling military governments and peasant syndicates were assumed to be pacified by the Military Peasant Pact (Pacto Militar Campesino, PMC).¹³ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui led the first wave of critiques of these early histories, corresponding with a fluorescence of historical production in Bolivia among a new generation of Aymara students, particularly by scholars associated with the Universidad Mayor San Andres in La Paz and the Taller Historica Oral Andina.¹⁴ The purpose of these works was first to reclaim indigenous historical agency and second to show how the MNR had failed to truly changed conditions for indigenous Bolivians, despite the land reform. Recently, José Gordillo and Laura Gotkowitz have expanded upon these studies to take seriously indigenous agency in shaping MNR policy in the Cochabamba valley.

Since the rise of Evo Morales and MAS in 2005, there has emerged a generation of scholars both inside and outside Bolivia rethinking the nature of the 1952 state and resource nationalism.¹⁵ These authors argue persuasively for the active role of the MNR in shaping

August 2, 1953,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 58, no. 2 (May 1978): 238, doi:10.2307/2513087; Lawrence Whitehead, “Sobre El Radicalismo de Los Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia,” *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia* 42, no. 4 (1980): 1465.

¹³ Jorge Dandler, *El Sindicalismo Campesino En Bolivia: Los Cambios Estructurales En Ucureña*, 1. ed., Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. Serie Antropología Social, 11 (México: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1969); Jorge Dandler, *Campesinado Y Reforma Agraria En Cochabamba (1952-1953): Dinámica De Un Movimiento Campesino En Bolivia*, Cuadernos de Investigación 9 (La Paz: Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado, 1975); Richard W. Patch, *Glossary of Terms Related to Land Tenure and Labor under Special Tenure Situations in Bolivia* ([Madison: Mimeographed by Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1963).

¹⁴ Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*; Steve J. Stern, ed., *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World - 18th to twentieth Centuries* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Gordillo, *Campesinos Revolucionarios en Bolivia*; Laura Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007); Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson, *Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics* (London: Verso, 2007); John Crabtree, *Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present*, Pitt Latin American Series (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).

¹⁵ Stephen Conrad Cote, “The Nature of Oil in Bolivia, 1896-1952” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Davis, 2011); Kevin Young, “Blood of the Earth: Natural Resources, Economic Visions, and Revolution in La Paz, Bolivia, 1927-1971” (Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Stonybrook, 2013); Sarah Hines, “Dividing the Waters: How Power, Property and Protest Transformed the Waterscape of Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1879-2000” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2015).

conditions both inside and outside Bolivia after the revolution, noting particularly the regional divisions created by the MNR style of resource distribution.¹⁶ While still critical of the failings of the revolutionary MNR, these scholars believe that the revolution of 1952 does matter for our understandings of the current political climate of Bolivia. A spate of recent books also question the past consensus surrounding MNR submission to the will of the United States, showing in particular how much leeway Paz Estenssoro had, throughout much of the 1950s, to negotiate aid packages and possibilities for development between the US and the Soviet Union.¹⁷

However, very few of these works have taken the state building project of the MNR seriously in terms of either its stated goals or its unintended effects, particularly in the communities assumed to be its major protagonists and beneficiaries.¹⁸ Did conditions of life change substantially in mining communities? How substantial a break were the military dictatorships that followed the revolution? My work shows that in mining communities like Corocoro, the revolution profoundly, and unequally, altered relations of social and political power after 1952, creating new divisions in an attempt to erase older hierarchies of race and culture.

¹⁶ Hernán Pruden, “Cruceños into Cambas: Regionalism and Revolutionary Nationalism in Santa Cruz de La Sierra, Bolivia (1935-1959)” (Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Stonybrook, 2012); Soliz Urrutia, “Fields of Revolution.” Matthew Gildner, “La historia como liberación nacional: Creando un pasado útil para la Bolivia posrevolucionaria.” *Revista Ciencia y Cultura* 29: 103–24 (2012).

¹⁷ Glenn J. Dorn, *The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy* (Penn State Press, 2011); James F. Siekmeier, *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present* (Penn State Press, 2011); Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

¹⁸ The exception is Nicole Pacino, “Constructing a New Bolivian Society: Public Health Reforms and the Consolidation of the Bolivian National Revolution,” *The Latin Americanist* 57, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 25–56; Nicole Lohman Pacino, “Prescription for a Nation: Public Health in Post-Revolutionary Bolivia, 1952--1964” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2013). Pacino’s work takes an institutional focus to questions of the welfare state, whereas I emphasize the interactions between institutions and particular communities.

The MNR had declared tin nationalization to be the panacea for Bolivia's economic troubles since at least 1942.¹⁹ After nationalization, the state mining company COMIBOL became a vehicle for social change as well. In the early years of the revolution, the MNR preferred rapid results to sustainability; in order to expand state services quickly, the MNR used existing institutions to render these legal promises concrete. Bolivia's largest mines had been legally required before the revolution to operate schools, hospitals, and company stores. With COMIBOL in charge, these became de facto outposts of the welfare state, but outposts that only bestowed resources on industrial workers and their families. After decreeing universal suffrage in 1952 and nationalization in 1953, the MNR reformed the education code (1955), health codes (1956) and national insurance and pension schemes (1957) and created a ministry for industrial workers and housing. Each of these decrees offered new kinds of resources to the families of miners, rail workers, and other industries in exchange for political loyalty.

The revolutionary appeal of working for the mines attracted a group of young radicals and old miner veterans to white collar management positions in COMIBOL's schools and hospitals. For at least the first decade of the revolution, workers also had veto power over decisions in the company, which meant that workers themselves exercised partial control over these quasi-state auxiliary institutions. COMIBOL's schools particularly were known for their radical education and services provided to miners' children, such as free books and free breakfasts. In places like Corocoro with a substantial population of non-miners, other children could and did attend these schools. However, they did not qualify for free breakfasts or subsidized school materials or university scholarships. The same was true of the company

¹⁹ COMIBOL remained a panacea, many of its profits being used by the MNR state as a general development fund, see Melvin Burke and James M Malloy, "From National Populism to National Corporatism: The Case of Bolivia, 1952-1970," *Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. Studies in Comparative International Development*, 9, no. 1 (1974).

hospital.²⁰ As a result, the nationalized industrial economy, particularly around the mines, created a class of citizens whose living and working conditions were not radically different from its neighbors, but whose expectations of access to resources, political voice, and economic prosperity was completely distinct, even after the revolution fell to military dictatorships in 1964. By tracing the social life of the miners and their neighbors in the 1950s and 1960s, I show how this cleavage within communities had political consequences, causing the revolutionary coalition to fall apart slowly over the course of the century, ultimately undermining the viability of a worker-peasant coalition after the return to democracy in 1982.

The mines became centers of anthropological and historical inquiry during the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s, as scholars committed to recovering the voices of the impoverished, the resistant, and the potentially revolutionary found willing collaborators in the mining communities. Standout works such as June Nash's *We Eat the Mines* and life history of miner Juan Rojas as well as Domitila Barrios de Chungara's *Let Me Speak* (edited by Brazilian anthropologist Moema Viezzer) offered a compelling picture of Bolivian miners as indigenous would-be proletarians, facing unending poverty and military repression.²¹ Even the best and most nuanced of this scholarship has tended to understand indigenous cultural practices and

²⁰ The existing works on revolutionary institutions: Guillermo Bedregal, *COMIBOL: Una Verdad Sin Escándalo; La Furia Impotente Del Fascismo Contra Una Empresa Del Pueblo* (La Paz, Bolivia, 1963); Guillermo Bedregal, *COMIBOL, Una Historia Épica*, 1a ed (La Paz: Fondo Editorial de los Diputados, 1998); Jorge Lazarte R, *Movimiento Obrero Y Procesos Políticos En Bolivia : Historia de La C.O.B. : 1952-1987* (La Paz: ILDIS, 1989).

²¹ Domitila Barrios de Chungara, *Let Me Speak! Testimony Of Domitila, A Woman of the Bolivian Mines*, ed. Moema Viezzer, First Edition (Monthly Review Press, 1978); June Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); June Nash, *I Spent My Life in the Mines: The Story of Juan Rojas, Bolivian Tin Miner* (Columbia University Press, 1992). Building on this tradition, Olivia Harris and Xavier Albo, *Monteras Y Guardatojos: Campesinos Y Mineros En El Norte de Potosí* (La Paz: CIPCA, 1986); Iván Jiménez Chávez, *Mujeres de Las Minas de Bolivia*, 1a ed. (La Paz Bolivia: Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano Secretaría de Asuntos Etnicos de Género y Generacionales Subsecretaría de Asuntos de Género, 1997); Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*; Magdalena Cajías de la Vega, *El Poder de La Memoria: La Mina de Huanuni En La Historia Del Movimiento Minero Y La Minería Del Estaño: 1900-2010* (La Paz , Bolivia: Plural Editores, 2013).

incorporation into modern political and economic systems as incompatible in the long term, however.

Despite Nash's nuanced assessment of miner culture, the scholarship she inspired has often failed to live up to her high standard, contributing to an oversimplified understanding of the ways that race and indigeneity work in the Andes.²² This is partially attributable to the miners themselves. Operating between an elite culture that equated indigeneity with a lack of education or political sophistication and a Marxist-inflected political resistance that did the same thing, the miners marked their own cultural practices as distinct from indigenous communities. However, they also traced the history of oppressive labor practices in Bolivia to the institutions of colonialism that brought indigenous Andeans into forced labor in the mines. This gave miners the means to claim an indigenous past, but until recently, not necessarily an indigenous present.²³ Miners' cultural practices, however, were sufficiently alien in the eyes of observers outside Bolivia (and elites within Bolivia), to be unrecognizable as modern, and thus *assumed to be* indigenous.²⁴ For sympathetic outside observers, indigenous practices signaled an "instinctive"

²² Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*; Gustavo Rodríguez Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952* (La Paz: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, 2014).

²³ As Portugal and Macusaya suggest, worker is a economic category that is not opposed to indigeneity as such, and yet this economic category is racialized within Bolivian society. Portugal Mollinedo and Macusaya Cruz, *El Indianismo Katarista, Una Mirada Crítica*, 48. Activists from indigenous communities remember being treated like servants by the leadership of the miners' unions as late as the 1980s during moments when workers and campesinos were supposed to be working towards the same goals. Luciano Tapia, *Ukhamawa Jakawisaxa (asi es nuestra vida): Autobiografía de un Aymara* (La Paz: Hisbol, 1995). Even within mining communities, hierarchies existed between those who seemed "more western" and those whom dress, language and comportment marked as more indigenous. Andrew Canessa, ed., *Natives Making Nation: Gender, Indigeneity, and the State in the Andes* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005); Maria Lagos, *Nos Hemos Forjado Así: Al Rojo Vivo Y a Puro Golpe: Historias Del Comité de Amas de Casa de Siglo XX*, 1. ed. (La Paz, Bolivia: Asociación Alicia "Por Mujeres Nuevas" Plural editores, 2006). However, in the 2000s, many cooperative miners and some state miners began to embrace the political potential of indigeneity as a resistant identity. See Filemón Escóbar, *De La Revolución Al Pachakuti: El Aprendizaje Del Respeto Recíproco Entre Blancos E Indianos*, 1. ed. (La Paz Bolivia: Garza Azul, 2008).

²⁴ Latin American subaltern studies scholar Javier Sanjines, argues that miners' cultural distance from indigenous communities, or rather their own conception of that difference, did not actually result in miners being understood as not indian by elites, or for that matter, foreigners. When miners left indigeneity behind, in the eyes of themselves and rural communities, they did not thereby become legibly modern to the state: "By becoming the Tío, the miner ceases being a peasant, but that does not mean he takes on the spirit of a bourgeois or that he becomes a city-dweller

resistance to the conditions of global capital that were consuming communities. Something between Indian and not Indian, academics have used miners as examples of proletarianization, labor alienation, and commodity fetishism during global crises of Marxism.²⁵ Yet for indigenous communities who experienced racist treatment at the hands of miners, even culturally resonant practices did not forge an automatic kinship, as the struggling union movement discovered during the structural adjustment and relocalization of the 1980s.²⁶

The cultural isolation of the miners of COMIBOL at the end of the twentieth century has influenced the way historians think about their relationship to the revolution. Most scholars have assumed a constant level of militancy and rebellion among the revolutionary workers of mid-century Bolivia, but my research suggests that rebelliousness varied from mine to mine and across time. There is a dearth, in other words, of works that actually put the miners' experience

like any other. Hence the miner's ambiguous nature: he is an ex-peasant, a "refined Indian," which confirms his marginal character." Sanjines argues that Bolivian miners have a history resistant to totalizing, universal narratives. Rather than see a labor force in the process of movement between rural and proletarian modes of existence, Sanjines notes that the miners become something inescapably different from peasants, but not thereby modern or easily assimilable into the nation. A refined Indian, as he suggested, remained marginalized. Miners, he argues, are an example of an Andean production of modernity unrecognized as modern by the national government or Western teleologies more generally. Javier Sanjinés C., *Embers of the Past: Essays in Times of Decolonization* (Duke University Press, 2013), 121. Taking Sanjines' insight seriously, however, also means taking seriously the ways in which the Bolivian miner's conception of themselves as participants did change Bolivia's racial and political landscape over the twentieth century.

²⁵ For examples of the first, see much recent scholarship. For militant workers, see John, *Bolivia's Radical Tradition*, 2009; Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971*; Robert Smale, *I Sweat the Flavor of Tin: Labor Activism in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010); Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*. For examples of the latter, see Whitehead, "Sobre El Radicalismo de Los Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia"; Michael Taussig, *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Pr., 1990); Erick D. Langer, "The Barriers to Proletarianization: Bolivian Mine Labour, 1826-1918," *International Review of Social History* 41, no. Supplement S4 (December 1996): 27-51; Alvaro García Linera, *La Condición Obrera: Estructuras Materiales Y Simbólicas Del Proletariado de La Minería Mediana (1950-1999)*, 1. ed. (La Paz Bolivia: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociológicas (IDIS) - UMSA ; Muela del Diablo Editores, 2001).

²⁶ Lesley Gill, "Relocating Class: Ex-Miners and Neoliberalism in Bolivia," *CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY* 17, no. 3 (1997): 293-312; Harry Sanabria, "Resistance and the Arts of Domination: Miners and the Bolivian State," *Latin American Perspectives* 27, no. 1 (2000): 56; Anne Marie Ejdesgaard Jeppesen, "Using the Past to Construct Present Identities: Memories of Bolivian Ex-Miners," *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina Y El Caribe* 15, no. 1 (June 2004): 141-64; Juan Arbona, "Sangre de Minero, Semilla de Guerrillero: Histories and Memories in the Organisation and Struggles of the Santiago II Neighbourhood of El Alto, Bolivia," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 24-42.


of revolution into a holistic national narrative of change. In this dissertation I situate the particularity of the miners struggle in Corocoro in the context of Bolivia more generally. For this reason, my work does two things not usually associated with the study of the mines. First, while I look comparatively at these communities, I am not primarily concerned with the most iconic of mining communities such as Llallagua and Catavi. Secondly, I am not dealing with a community of tin miners at all, but rather a copper mining community in the Aymara highlands.²⁷

Why Corocoro

Situated in the altiplano at an altitude of 4050 meters, Corocoro is one of the highest mines, not to mention cities in the world. Just 100 km from the capital of La Paz, much of it on unpaved roads, Corocoro stands surrounded by low hills just off the now-defunct Arica-La Paz railroad line. The city stretches down a few cobbled streets on a slope between by the former entrances to the Viscachani and San Angel copper mines. On the top of the hill rests the Plaza 6 de Agosto, where the provincial courts and municipal government, as well as the only internet café and regional bus line share space with a 19th century church. A little downhill are single-room, concrete-walled shops surrounding the Plazas commemorating the veterans of the Wars of the Pacific (1880s) and Chaco (1930s), and finally the veterans of the Revolution in an homage to the Miners of 1952. Around the Plaza Minero reside the ruins of mid-twentieth century

²⁷ Histories of silver and tin mining communities, emphasizing Potosí, Oruro, and later the Catavi-Llallagua complex: Ismaél Villavicencio Chumacero, *Esquema histórico, económico y social de la Empresa Minera Catavi*, 1976; Roberto Querejazu Calvo, *Llallagua: Historia De Una Montaña* (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1977); P. J Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain Indian Labor in Potosí, 1545-1650*, 1st ed (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984); Ann Zulawski, "Wages, Ore Sharing, and Peasant Agriculture: Labor in Oruro's Silver Mines, 1607-1720," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 67, no. 3 (1987): 405; Oscar Cornblit, *Power and Violence in the Colonial City: Oruro from the Mining Renaissance to the Rebellion of Tupac Amaru, 1740-1782* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Smale, *I Sweat the Flavor of Tin; Ensayos Históricos Sobre Oruro*, Colección Cuarto Centenario de La Fundación De Oruro (La Paz: IEB, 2006); Luis Oporto, *Uncía Y Llallagua: Empresa Minera Capitalista Y Estrategias de Apropiación Real Del Espacio (1900-1935)* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2007). A masterful recent historical work following a less iconic mining community that has become increasingly important to Bolivia's mining politics over the course of the twentieth century, Cajías de la Vega, *El Poder de La Memoria*.

development: the large municipal market, a hospital, and a cinema. At the bottom of the hill, the offices of COMIBOL form the other node of economic and social power in the town. Where the main municipal road meets the mines, a road runs off to the east leading to the Tarapacá army barracks, sports fields, and the primary and secondary schools. Further down are the remains of the railway station and hospital, and finally a road leading to the treatment plants where copper ore is turned into sheets of metal.



Map Courtesy of UW Cartography Lab, 2016

A city that combined a strong mining heritage with close ties to both indigenous agricultural communities and international merchant families, Corocoro was a microcosm of Bolivian processes of revolutionary change at a national level. Most historians of the 1952 revolution, and particularly the role of the miners within it, have focused on major sites of union

radicalism such as the tin mines of Llallagua and Catavi. These camps experienced the extremes of ideological engagement, activism, and repression during the tumultuous twentieth century, but also for this very reason are exceptional in Bolivian history: Catavi experienced the worst, and best publicized massacres at crucial moments of change for the revolution, such as 1942 and 1967. However, the Bolivian national revolution succeeded and failed in communities more like Corocoro, integrated into the rural and urban circuits of the nation, and subject to the vicissitudes of transport, border disputes, and political patronage networks that kept the MNR alive. Corocoro is emblematic of the tension Bolivia experiences between centrality and distance to the centers of global financial exchange, between rural and urban forms of political and social organization, and most particularly of the precariousness of economic and social survival in the highlands.

The history and geography of Corocoro speak to the dangers of a teleological vision of growth and progress, as it has grown and withered several times over the last two centuries. During the colonial period, Corocoro was not a center of population, but a rural district of Caquiaviri, but by the late 19th century Corocoro was one of the most important urban and commercial centers in the country. The town of Corocoro was founded in 1856 on a site that had long been exploited for its easily accessible copper deposits and became a mid-century boomtown.²⁸ In 1868, Corocoro became the capital of the province Mejillones and later Pacajes.

²⁸ Local historian Luis Fornier Terán claimed that the population of Corocoro was as high as 22,000 people with immigrants from all over Europe and the Middle East in a 1995 pamphlet. The high population figure I have been unable to verify with census records. See also “Corocoro Languidece Por el Olvido de Autoridades” *El Diario*, November 15, 2004. Pacajes province, of which Corocoro is currently the capital, stretches west of La Paz in the altiplano and has since before the arrival of the Spaniards been a center of indigenous population. Klein notes that 42,000 indigenous peasants were listed in the 1786 census in the province alone, mostly engaged in herding and tuber production. (196) Unlike Oruro and Potosí, Corocoro was never a significant mining center in the colonial period, although copper from Corocoro was known to both the Incas and the Spanish in Potosí. The Aymara kingdoms of Lacareja and Pacaxe were located in this region. Klein notes that in the 18th century, the vast majority of the population in this region lived in free communities, or ayllus, or occasionally haciendas. Very few Spaniards lived in Pacajes during the colonial periods, and the vast majority of the population was engaged in subsistence

In November 1895, president Mariano Baptista declared Corocoro a city. In these years, Corocoro was a regional transport hub and one of the first mines to adopt steam engines to transport ore, and its population surged to about 5,000. It was here that, according to historian Rodríguez Ostría, workers led the first strike in Bolivian history.²⁹

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Corocoro represented hopes for a modern, cosmopolitan Bolivian future. It was a birthplace of presidents, a magnet for foreign merchants and miners, and a center of both copper production and contraband trade from Chile. The city has the distinction of being the home town of the most powerful union leader, and indeed one of the best loved politicians in Bolivian history, Juan Lechín Oquendo.³⁰ Luciano Tapia, one of the founders of the Katarista movement for indigenous rights in the 1970s was also born in Corocoro.³¹ This early twentieth century dream suffered heavily in the aftermath of World War I however: in the 1930s, Corocoro was nearly abandoned; both Tapia and Lechín left Corocoro during the depression and started their political careers elsewhere. The population of Corocoro peaked again at about 5,000 in the 1950s, but began to decline again thereafter. Labor historian and activist Guillermo Lora, writing at the end of the 1970s saw Corocoro as a washed-up site of radicalism, resting on past laurels and immune to evidence of its current decline.³²

production. Herbert S. Klein, "Hacienda and Free Community in Eighteenth Century Alto Peru: A Demographic Study of the Aymara Population of the Districts of Chulumani and Pacajes in 1786," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 7, no. 02 (November 1975): 193–220.

²⁹ Rodríguez Ostría notes that this uprising was already anti-gringo. Ostría, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 68.

³⁰ Born 1914 'in the copper mining town of Corocoro in what was then one of the most important mining centres in the country, where an enormous number of workers was concentrated and where progressive ideas were widely diffused.' But he was not linked to the worker movement there. Lora, *History of the Bolivian Labor Movement*, 297. Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971*.

³¹ Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Así es nuestra vida)*.

³² Guillermo Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano: 1933-1952* (Los Amigos del Libro, 1980), 176.

Corocoro's cycles of expansion and decline are emblematic of Bolivia's historical fortunes generally.³³ Corocoro was a site of encounter between the modern, the urban, the progressive, and the traditional, the timeless, rural, the other. Its history is marked by floods and dust, wheat shortages and contraband trades, by boom and bust, by revolutionary dreams and bureaucratic stagnation. The nearest industrial water source is the Rio Desaguadero, located several kilometers away. Every mining company hoping to extract the native copper deposits has had to negotiate challenges of altitude, transportation, and water, and maintaining adequate water supplies has long been a concern of municipal governments. In such a small community, it is possible to see that Bolivia's process of twentieth century nation building as well as revolution has been an encounter between perceived incompatibilities, a dance that indigenous communities would call the tinku, but political philosophers might see as a dialectic.

For example, every time I visited Corocoro, one of the first documents local historians would produce for me was a photocopy of the presidential decree from 1895 that designated Corocoro as a City, not a town. Why, I asked, was this particular date so important in a town full of military, economic, and cultural contributions to Bolivian history? The answer of course is that a city is more than just a population center; it is a place of designated importance, a potential driver of the economy and the future. A city, in other words, is a state of mind. These days, Corocoro is not a very convincing *important place*, and it is not very well integrated into the national imaginary of urban, metropolitan places. In the early twentieth century, however, Corocoro was closer to the center than the periphery. Residents of Corocoro believed themselves

³³ Potosí, for example, was one of the largest cities in the world prior to the 17th century and lent its name not only to mining towns throughout the western hemisphere but a saying from Don Quijote, no longer captures the imagination of the world. Ediciones El País, "Eso vale un Perú y un Potosí," *EL PAÍS*, July 4, 1999, http://elpais.com/diario/1999/07/04/andalucia/931040545_850215.html.

to be the vanguards of a project of modernization that could transform Bolivia itself into a more modern, more cosmopolitan participant in the community of nations.

Why Drinking and Dynamite?

This dissertation is about revolutionary change and the participation of mining communities in a project of radical, state-directed modernization. In his 2011 AHR article on modernity, Dipesh Chakrabarty notes that the concept of *modernity* and processes of *modernization* are not equivalent terms. The structures and institutions that correspond to a place undergoing modernization, that is, may preexist or come into being after the existence of people in that place who are profoundly concerned with the self-reflexive, critical project of what it means to be modern.³⁴ In Corocoro, the promise of modernity postdated by several centuries Bolivia's integration into global markets, but arrived at a moment of profound change in the way the state thought about its own relationship to both local prosperity and global participation.³⁵ For this reason, the promises of modernity profoundly structured political and cultural life in the city. Corocoro can tell us a lot about the trajectory of "modernity" as both a concept and a state over the course of the twentieth century.

³⁴ Modernity is a slippery concept, and attempting to offer a completely satisfying definition could take up the entirety of my dissertation, but at its core is an awareness of living in a society structured by profound change or rupture from what came before. The "new" of the modern is brought about by reorganization of political and economic systems to integrate with global markets, and is therefore likely to reorganize understandings of time and space to be more translatable across these markets. Modern consciousness, as Chakrabarty noted, is marked by a profound awareness of what is different *now* than there was *before*. This awareness produces both anxiety and optimism about the pace of change, but is always generated by the proximity of the pre-modern as a point of comparison. "One's sense of being modern did not always follow the chronology of modernization. ... Their desire for modernity thus often preceded the modernization programs..." Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Muddle of Modernity," *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 671.

³⁵ Both Chakrabarty and Carol Gluck ask postmodern scholars to remember that for all its faults and exclusivity, there was a time when importing a form of modernity understood to be western in origin was sincerely desired by many reformers in the global south. Carol Gluck, "The End of Elsewhere: Writing Modernity Now," *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 676–87, doi:10.1086/ahr.116.3.676; Chakrabarty, "The Muddle of Modernity."

One characteristic of modernizing ideologies is their tendency to cast harnessing change, rather than maintaining stability, as a good. In Bolivia, the spaces in which Bolivians tried to make modernity were full of Indians, so embracing change meant finding a way to reconcile the indigenous present with a western future.³⁶ Middle class reformers coming out of these spaces therefore decided that the indigenous majority, under certain conditions, could be the object of transformation and development. The MNR revolution converted past sources of threat, particularly instability and worker unrest, into drivers of a revolutionary future.³⁷ Nevertheless, the actors of the MNR and the Bolivian state believed in unidirectional development that would ultimately destroy vestiges of indigeneity associated with the colonial past. They measured progress towards modernity as away from the ayllu and the countryside. Colonial legacies of power made it difficult for these modernizers to accept forms of change that looked culturally indigenous or that operated by logics perceived as non-Western.³⁸

Modernity, for all its faults, offered new ways of thinking about difference in cultural practices across both space and time, particularly in places like Bolivia where cultural

³⁶ “In its rationalist guise, modernity sought above all to harness the threatening, seemingly uncontrollable forces of change, to ensure these transformations served the best interests of the newly valued, self-reliant, and forward-looking individual.” Nicolas Kenny, *The Feel of the City: Experiences of Urban Transformation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 8, <http://www.deslibris.ca/ID/448425>; E. Gabrielle Kuenzli, *Acting Inca: National Belonging in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia*, 1 edition (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013). Kuenzli points out that in building La Paz into the center of the nation, the liberals actually could not pretend indigenous Bolivians weren’t there, and thus had to incorporate in some way indigenous Bolivia into their plans for Bolivia’s future.

³⁷ Kuenzli, *Acting Inca*, 60–1. Also, “These liberal intellectuals may have deemed the Indian race a problem, but the spectrum within the category of “Indian” served as an indicator for the broader civilizing process designed for Indian improvement from “Aymara” to “Inca.” Although the majority of the indigenous population was deemed unfit to receive the benefits of citizenship in the early twentieth century, constructionns of Indian identity remained at the heart of national discourse in Bolivia.” 11.

³⁸ Sanjines “Our difficult task of state building emerged from the fact that soon after independence was achieved, the supposedly “universal” concepts of modernization ran up against societies that remained colonial.” 99 For this reason, coloniality did not disappear at independence. Similarly, Aníbal Quijano (2001) says Bolivian society remained structured by the “coloniality of power.” Sanjinés C., *Embers of the Past*; Anibal. Quijano and Michael. Ennis, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 3 (2000): 533–80.

differences were both visible and proximate. Here, I think, Corocoro's preoccupation with being a cosmopolitan city exposes its history of cultural and social ferment. Cities are profoundly modern spaces not so much because of size or well-regulated traffic and tall buildings as the friction caused by diverse groups of people living on top of each other. The modern city provides a space where order and disorder run up against each other constantly. Corocoro was in this sense modern, and because of the trajectory of mining booms and busts, each generation of workers had to build their relationship to the city anew. For this reason, in each of my chapters I try to recuperate what living in Corocoro felt like, with particular attention to how urban residents perceived the forces of order and disorder within the town. In my first chapter I show how workers' Carnival dances fore-grounded anxieties about foreign presence in the community, while elite Corocoreños worried about these same practices because in Carnival, masks and costumes threatened distinctions of dress and race that ordered the urban space. In my second chapter, unknown young men drinking in the workers' neighborhood sparked a political crisis, as tight-knit barrios increasingly came to structure class and belonging. In my third and fourth chapters, clubs, sports fields, and especially the company store became critical sites where workers policed belonging and difference after the MNR took power in 1952. In the fifth chapter, I situate political uncertainty within and among families, as the politics of repression was expressed through the regulation of intimate violence and personal tragedy. Finally, I explore the experiences of children in mining communities who negotiated belonging and exclusion at the end of the MNR's revolutionary dream.

The community I am exploring provides a case where permanence over stability is another important question of analysis: the revolutionary state, and many within it, sought economic and social stability through adherence to a western, modern model of structuring

society. As my dissertation argues, the Revolution manifested itself in Corocoro as a new attempt at stability through state regulation, welcomed by workers and elites alike after the turmoil of the depression, Chaco War, and repressive Sexenio regimes in the 1940s. After the revolution, the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s continued and improved upon the MNR's project of building an effectively coercive state apparatus. During this period, the state consistently moved to punish and exclude popular groups for acting in ways that they believed constituted democratic political engagement through unions and political parties. Increasingly, therefore, popular groups turned to creating intentional disorder and evading the state entirely as a form of opposition. The twenty-first century popularity of the road block as a protest tactic is heir to this period where preventing the state from carrying out its functions was the only viable form of protest. Of course, road blocks and sieges date back to the colonial period as methods of protest, but political insurgents have in different moments attempted both participation and evasion as viable political alternatives since this time.³⁹ My dissertation traces the rise and fall of state participation as a valued strategy during the twentieth century, but it resists proposing a teleological replacement of one strategy over the other.⁴⁰

Building on this concern for order and disorder, the title of this dissertation invokes two of the most visible components of Bolivian miners' reputations, whether positive (as working

³⁹ Sinclair Thomson, *We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency*, Living in Latin America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002); Hylton and Thomson, *Revolutionary Horizons*.

⁴⁰ Daniel Goldstein's work on Cochabamba and Sian Lazar on El Alto have both emphasized the culture of lawlessness that characterizes modern Bolivian cities. Goldstein in particular argues that many Bolivians exist outside the law, or find the law itself to be a force of disorder in their lives. Daniel M. Goldstein, *The Spectacular City: Violence and Performance in Urban Bolivia* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2004); Sian Lazar, *El Alto, Rebel City: Self and Citizenship in Andean Bolivia* (Duke University Press, 2008); Daniel M. Goldstein, *Outlawed: Between Security and Rights in a Bolivian City* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2012). In tracing the development of a coercive state apparatus that built directly on structures of revolutionary engagement, I hope to offer a history that makes sense of current conditions without assuming they are unchanging or recent inventions of neoliberalism.

class vanguards of revolution) or negative (as unruly thugs or degenerate hedonists).⁴¹ Both drinking and explosions of dynamite recur in this dissertation in moments where the contours of the social order are most up for grabs; both were productive of, as well as threats to modernity and the stability of the revolutionary social order. Drinking and dynamite have also been symbols of both indigenous and mestizo cultural celebrations over the course of Bolivian history, exposing the fundamentally slippery nature of identities in communities such as Corocoro.

Dynamite explosions are ambiguous events; their meanings shift based on circumstance. Consider the examples of fireworks during a parade celebrating Bolivian Independence, bombs and mines lit off to defend the democratically elected government from a military coup, and finally the charge that kills a suicidal miner who believes his girlfriend is being unfaithful. Similarly, drinking can be a crucial component to social bond formation, ritual, and celebration in Bolivia. Drunkenness is also connected to most of the social conflicts that enter the realm of the courts, and most of the personal abuse and violence that occurs in these community. In both cases, excessive, unruly deployment of alcohol or dynamite can be a threat to the social order, but the meaning of excess depends on the beholder. In tracing a history of drinking and dynamite I hope to expose the changing fortunes of a working class vision of decency and citizenship over the course of the twentieth century.

Theory and Method

My dissertation intervenes in three broad theoretical literatures. First of all, in a methodological sense, I explore the limits of court cases as historical sources as they have

⁴¹ Only the most recent example is that on September 1, 2016, in response to the death of a Bolivian official in a dispute with cooperative miners, the MAS government passed a law banning the use of dynamite in public parades or demonstrations. Perhaps not suprisingly, one of the “tags” that the La Razón website uses to identify mining related articles is “dinamita,” Baldwin Montero, “Gobierno Revierte Concesiones Y Fija Nuevas Reglas Para Las Cooperativas,” *La Razón*, September 1, 2016, http://www.la-razon.com/economia/Bolivia-cooperativistas-mineros-concesiones-decretos-dinamita_0_2556344383.html.

emerged in the literatures on citizenship, decency, and modernity in the Americas. Here I will draw out several common themes in these literatures, suggesting that court cases can help expose the locations where communities, institutions, and new political visions collide in postcolonial states. Second, my dissertation explores the gendered, classed, and racialized construction of a maternalist, assimilationist welfare state in Bolivia. Here will I reframe the Bolivian revolution, situating the labor politics of the Bolivian state and the miners in the context of literatures on Latin American eugenics, maternalism, social welfare policies. I show how miners themselves deployed the welfare state to bolster their own claims to political and economic privilege for the first time in their history, using class to overcome old boundaries around decency and creating in the process new kinds of political and social exclusions. Finally, by looking at dynamics of integration and exclusion in revolutionary politics, my dissertation questions whether state-centered political movements are *ever* capable of living up to the promise of their initial visions.

Court Cases and the Institutions of Citizenship

Since the Spanish first set up courts to adjudicate claims, Andeans have used the legal system as a means to hold powerful local and regional figures accountable for abuses.⁴² Those Bolivians who entered into the court system sometimes did so in the hopes of resisting the state, but most often to define their rightful place within it. They entered the court system to assert their citizenship and demand the rights they understood this to entail.⁴³ This means that, although

⁴² This willingness to critically engage the state in the twentieth century was not new; since the era of the Republica de Indios, Andeans have been notably litigious, and have used the legal system creatively to leverage resources and protections for themselves. Steve J Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982). For the twentieth century, see Laura Gotkowitz, "Trading Insults: Honor, Violence, and the Gendered Culture of Commerce in Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1870s-1950s," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 83, no. 1 (2003): 83–118; Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*; Luis Manuel Sierra, "Indigenous Neighborhood Residents in the Urbanization of La Paz, Bolivia, 1910-1950" (Ph.D., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2013).

⁴³ Indigenous Bolivians are very aware that much of the structure of oppression has historically resulted from lack of access to the protections of laws that do exist, rather than legal structures that excluded them entirely. Abstract inclusion with practical exclusion Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. "El Mito de La Pertenencia de Bolivia Al «mundo

the judicial system exists to coerce and restrain, we cannot assume that the language of the court cases only reflects the language of oppression. The revolution, however, did change the moral and political frameworks upon which these critical interactions between the state and communities took place. In the court cases of the 1950s and 1960s, we can see state institutions interacting with individuals and families in the most intimate conditions. Court cases are thus an ideal resource for understanding how, and when, relationships between the state and miners changed.

In the chapters that follow, I use court cases involving criminal as well as civil disputes to understand the terrain of family-state negotiations over citizenship, rights, and belonging. Criminal disputes, in general, suggest the limits of acceptable violence in the eyes of the state. In rare cases, such as the Luciano Mamani murder trial explored in Chapter 3, these cases expose differences between community and institutional norms of violence at a time when the post-revolutionary state was looking for institutional legitimacy within mining communities. Civil cases, on the other hand, tend to highlight the nature of familial and financial obligation between individuals and families, and in general, what constitutes the appropriate behavior of urban citizens.

My use of court cases here is indebted to Nayan Shah's exploration of migrant life in the early twentieth century Pacific Northwestern United States as well as William French's

Occidental». *Requiem Para Un Nacionalismo*." *Temas Sociales*, 2003, 64. Sanjinés C., *Embers of the Past*, 99. My work thus intervenes in an ongoing conversation about the role of political, legal agitation in postcolonial states. John L Comaroff, Jean Comaroff, and American Bar Foundation, *Criminal Justice, Cultural Justice: The Limits of Liberalism and the Pragmatics of Difference in the New South Africa* ([Chicago, Ill.]: [American Bar Foundation], 2001); Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10183506>; Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). Uday Chandra, in a call to move beyond the insights of subaltern studies to rethink resistance as negotiation, asks social scientists to remain attentive to the ways that subalterns use moral frameworks and legal-political structures created by the state to demand a more inclusive or just place within unequal postcolonial societies. Chandra, Uday. "Rethinking Subaltern Resistance." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 45, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 563–73.

exploration of popular literacy through the Mexican court system.⁴⁴ In *Stranger Intimacy*, Shah argues that historians have a bias towards certain conceptual stabilizations— permanence over transience, for example— that limit our ability to understand the dynamics at play during certain historical moments. In this work I explore more fully this binary. In places like Corocoro, and in Bolivia more generally, the tension between permanence and transience created many of the conflicts that defined the twentieth century. Shah uses court cases to explore the material conditions that constrained everyday life across borders and in frontier zones, which resist stabilization long after an initial colonial encounter or economic transition. Shah’s research, I believe, can help scholars think a different kind of frontier, but one every bit as concerned with order and disorder: the transition that was in an earlier historiographical moment called proletarianization, but can also be understood as assimilation.

⁴⁴ “As an archival sources, legal cases provide a rich and untapped resource, which I analyze for competing understandings of honor, ethics, gender roles, friendship, and kinship within which the rich web of social and economic dependencies necessary for survival. The legal record is a challenging source with which to interpret the experiences of marginalized and aggrieved communities because of how the documentation scripts and judges the relevance of evidence, shapes procedural argument, and influences the outcome of justice. However, the collation of testimony, legal arguments, and court decisions also reveals contradictory and suppressed perspectives and narratives of everyday life. In rule-of-law governance, the legal judgments and prohibitions often subtly uncover the material conditions of encounters and networks that suture divergent social worlds.” Nayan Shah, *Stranger Intimacy: Contesting Race, Sexuality, and the Law in the North American West* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 9; William E. French, *The Heart in the Glass Jar: Love Letters, Bodies, and the Law in Mexico* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015). Shah’s cautious use of the court cases makes sense for those people who found themselves unwillingly enmeshed in legal trouble. But I think Shah’s formulation risks reifying transience as resistance. Following French, who explored cases of seduction and kidnapping as moments when families used the state to fill in when the social contract broke down in communities, my examples look at court cases from the perspective of not just those who sought to avoid the state but those who willingly brought the state down into their lives, either to hold abusers accountable, to stop aggressive behavior, or to force compliance to a contract. This requires an analysis of the different forms of legal enmeshing that can happen within a community. Stern also argues for the utility of court cases as repositories of social information about norms, beliefs, and fears in everyday life. In colonial Mexico, “The main attraction of these records lies in the extremely rich quality of the depositions and testimonies given by poor women and men, including Indians and *castas*.” Steve J. Stern, *The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 38.

I use the term citizenship to connote the lived experience of being a protected and valued member of a particular community with delineated rights and responsibilities.⁴⁵ The boundaries and hierarchies of citizenship are always sites of contestation and renegotiation. However, during moments of revolutionary upheaval, ideas of belonging and proper participation are particularly fluid. In Bolivia, the 1952 revolution remade the rules of belonging and participation for some groups of poor Bolivians, while excluding and neglecting others. I use worker citizenship to talk about this process because I believe the national revolution was a sincere attempt to replace policing the boundaries of decency around race and culture with creating an integrated national citizenry. Many scholars of the Revolution argue that it was precisely in this that it failed, as indigenous Bolivians continued to exist outside of citizenship's protections, experiencing only its drawbacks.⁴⁶ The racialized components of decency and exclusion in the Andes are complex,

⁴⁵ In his work on 19th and twentieth century New Mexico, Pablo Mitchell provides a very helpful explanation of this "feeling" of citizenship. Citizens, he argues, are those who, "command respect and dignified treatment in the most basic aspects of their lives, whose ideas receive attention and respect, who walk the streets and enter businesses without special scrutiny; whose economic and political activities find favor in the courts, banks, and newspapers; whose births, marriages, and deaths are reported in the press; whose ailments find speedy and dignified treatment; whose children's peccadilloes amuse rather than enrage the judiciary; whose labor is acknowledged and well rewarded; whose tragedies are made not the stuff of jokes, but of sympathy; whose sex lives remain discreetly hidden." Pablo Mitchell, *Coyote Nation: Sexuality, Race, and Conquest in Modernizing New Mexico, 1880 - 1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 9; Evelyn Nakano Glenn, "Constructing Citizenship Exclusion, Subordination, and Resistance," *American Sociological Review* 76, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 1–24. Recently, social scientists have taken up and interrogated the meaning of pluricultural citizenship in contemporary Bolivia, showing how neoliberal reforms have offered new means of accessing and contesting the state, Nancy Postero, *Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia*, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 2006); Bret Gustafson, *New Languages of the State: Indigenous Resurgence and the Politics of Knowledge in Bolivia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). I hope my work, alongside historians like Matthew Guildner who explore the history of multiculturalism in Bolivia, can help elucidate the trajectory of the meaning and boundaries of citizenship beyond simply exclusion prior to the neoliberal politics of pluriculturalism.

⁴⁶ My work also intervenes in longstanding debates in Latin American scholarship on decency and honor ordering social life from the colonial era to the present. Caulfield, Sueann, Sarah C. Chambers, and Lara Putnam. *Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America*. Duke University Press, 2005. Findlay, Eileen. *Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870-1920*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999. Appelbaum, Nancy P., Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, eds. *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America*. Chapel Hill: Univ of North Carolina Press, 2003. Caulfield, Sueann. *In Defense of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity, and Nation in Early-Twentieth-Century Brazil*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000. Christiansen, Tanja. *Disobedience, Slander, Seduction, and Assault: Women and Men in Cajamarca, Peru, 1862-1900*. University of Texas Press, 2010. Chambers, Sarah C. *From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, Peru, 1780-1854*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. French, William E. *The Heart in the Glass Jar: Love Letters, Bodies, and the Law in Mexico*. U of Nebraska Press, 2015. Twinam, Ann. *Public Lives*,

fraught issues, and have produced a correspondingly large body of scholarship.⁴⁷ However, most of these scholars have focused more on the content of racial exclusions than what it means to experience such exclusions. I ask, what kinds of politics do these feelings of exclusion produce?⁴⁸

In this case, I do not assume the natural fit of either “indigenous,” “worker,” or some kind of hybrid identity, but ask where and when miners saw themselves as members of a political, social, and cultural community and on what terms. Bolivia’s recent history has been marked by the coexistence of contradictory forms of political organizing, identity, and social change, rather than the resistance of a single group to a totalizing institutional power such as the state. For this reason, I think using the methods of queer theory in the Bolivian case can offer a helpful corrective to queer scholarship that has fallen into the trap of idolizing the subaltern,

Private Secrets: Gender, Honor, Sexuality, and Illegitimacy in Colonial Spanish America. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999. This bibliography is somewhat smaller in Bolivia. Some scholars, such as Rossana Barragan and Pilar Mendieta, have explored notions of citizenship and belonging, mostly in the 19th century. Rossana Barragán R., *Espacio Urbano Y Dinámica étnica: La Paz En El Siglo XIX*, Serie Etnografía Urbana 2 (La Paz: Hisbol, 1990); Marta Irurozqui, “A Bala, Piedra Y Palo”: *La Construcción de La Ciudadanía Política En Bolivia 1826-1952*, Nuestra América 8 (Sevilla: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 2000); Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “El Mito de La Pertenencia de Bolivia Al «mundo Occidental». Requiem Para Un Nacionalismo,” *Temas Sociales*, 2003, 64; Pilar Mendieta Parada, *Indígenas en política: una mirada desde la historia* (La Paz, Bolivia: Instituto de Estudios Bolivianos, 2008). Silvia Rivera offers useful ways of conceptualizing different relationships to power and to the state through her analysis. Waskar Ari also expands on this by tracing a history of indigenous intellectuals engaging with the state, as does Gabrielle Kuenzli, Kuenzli, *Acting Inca*; Ari, *Earth Politics*.

⁴⁷ Marcia Stephenson, *Gender and Modernity in Andean Bolivia* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999); Marisol De la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919–1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Mary Weismantel, *Cholas and Pishtacos: Stories of Race and Sex in the Andes* (University of Chicago Press, 2001); Josefa Salmón and Guillermo Delgado, *Identidad, ciudadanía y participación popular desde la colonia al siglo XX* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2003); Javier Sanjinés C., *Mestizaje Upside-down: Aesthetic Politics in Modern Bolivia*, Illuminations (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Andrew Canessa, *Intimate Indigeneities: Race, Sex, and History in the Small Spaces of Andean Life* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2012); Laura Gotkowitz, *Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Ximena Soruco Sologuren, Institut français d’études andines, and Programa de Investigación Estratégica en Bolivia, *La ciudad de los cholos: mestizaje y colonialidad en Bolivia, siglos XIX y XX* (Lima; La Paz: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos ; PIEB, 2011).

⁴⁸ Following Jose Muñoz, who asked somewhat cheekily, “how does the subaltern *feel*?” J. E Muñoz, “Feeling Brown, Feeling Down: Latina Affect, the Performativity of Race, and the Depressive Position,” *SIGNS -CHICAGO-* 31, no. 3 (2006): 675–88.

operating under a conceptual binary that reifies difference and defiance to a totalizing state. The example of Bolivian miners suggests, rather, that miners helped create the world they lived in, even when such participation occurred on unequal terms.

The Bolivian national revolution was a period of intense renegotiation of citizenship in which middle class reformers and their peasant and worker allies used discourses they understood to be modern: nation, class, and family to order and incorporate a population of diverse genders, races, and cultures into a more inclusive social and political unit. As many scholars have noted, the modernizing and developmentalist projects characteristic of mid-twentieth century Latin America often reworked early colonial and republican discourses of civilization versus barbarism into ideas about proper and improper citizenship. Within small, peripheral urban communities like Corocoro particularly, colonial and early republican discourses of civilization in the face of barbarism mixed with preoccupations of becoming a modern and cosmopolitan city in ways that invested ideas of urban decency and citizenship with a great deal of ideological and social weight for workers and municipal officials alike. At the same time, nationalist and populist discourses dating back to the Chaco War offered local intellectuals and workers new vocabularies for understanding groups long considered indecent, such as workers and indigenous communities, to be exemplars of a modern kind of citizenship.

This worker citizenship posited that male workers and secondarily their families were not just members of the national community, they were crucial to the production of prosperity and the reproduction of the social order. From this, reformers and workers alike argued that workers deserved protections from the state as well as a share of the prosperity their production created. The idea that workers were the means to transform backwards Bolivia to the modern future and for this reason should be encouraged in their class identity found favor among the workers

themselves.⁴⁹ During the 1940s and 1950s, political parties looking to expand their electoral bases used such understandings to recruit workers to socialist and nationalist parties.⁵⁰ Working families and particularly young, socially mobile men appropriated and articulated these ideas to create their own definitions of revolutionary citizenship during and after 1952, while women and children struggled to assert their place in such a vision. Rural indigenous communities, by and large, found these vocabularies less useful for articulating their communities to the state in ways that allowed for both autonomy and prosperity, although some communities in Cochabamba particularly, did.⁵¹ Even the Bolivian military participated willingly in a joint project of modernization and development in which they understood themselves as workers and protectors of Bolivian future prosperity.⁵² Each of these groups had their own particular understandings of the development project the MNR would carry out. As I argue in my fourth and fifth chapters,

⁴⁹ For example, Kevin Young noted the widespread resonance of resource nationalism among anarchist and socialist workers as well as the reformist middle classes the early twentieth century. Young, "Blood of the Earth."

⁵⁰ Laurence Whitehead, "Miners as Voters: The Electoral Process in Bolivia's Mining Camps," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 13, no. 2 (1981): 313. There is a robust literature on the intersections of class and gender in shaping political coalitions in twentieth century Chile. Tom Klubock explores political and community formation in the Teniente Copper mines in, Thomas Klubock, *Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile's El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904-1951* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998). Karin Roseblatt explores the role of gender and class in popular front welfare politics during the 1930s and 1940s in Karin Alejandra Roseblatt, *Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920-1950* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2000). Both of these authors show that discourses of proper class and gender comportment were central to working class sociability as well as ideas of national belonging and citizenship. They were also both incredibly contested sites of negotiation among popular groups and elite institutions/politicians. Like the Chilean popular front, Bolivia's MNR revolutionary period was marked by conflictual alliances between middle class reformers and working class groups. As with the Chilean popular front period, much of the literature surrounding the Bolivian revolution is also concerned with whether the working class was coopted or autonomous and supportive in this period. Roseblatt rightly notes that alliance as well as antagonism marked the interaction of elite and subaltern agents and that while popular front coalitions did not create working class hegemony, they did allow for significant non-elite negotiations with governing coalitions. This is the case for the early period of the Bolivian MNR government as well. In a move that would be impossible in Bolivia, both of these authors largely exclude race from their accounts, citing the lack of sizeable indigenous populations in these particular working class communities. While it is clear that race is actually incredibly pertinent to the Chilean case, both race and indigeneity are indisputably crucial axes around which Bolivian gender and class divisions are constituted.

⁵¹ Gordillo, *Campesinos Revolucionarios en Bolivia*.

⁵² Elizabeth Shesko, "Conscript Nation: Negotiating Authority and Belonging in the Bolivian Barracks, 1900-1950" (Duke University, 2012); Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*.

the fortunes of the revolution depended on the MNR keeping a balance between the demands and aspirations of each of these groups, which it did by combining the coercive and redistributive institutions of the revolution into the entity of COMIBOL itself. Eventually, the state's coercive and redistributive wings forced miners to choose between their allegiance to worker citizenship and the complexities of indigenous identity, and the fallout from this choice helped break apart the revolutionary coalition itself.

Gender, Families, and the Revolutionary Welfare State

Most histories of the Bolivian Revolution, particularly of the miners, take for granted a certain political lens of masculine struggle. In this narrative of the revolution, the MNR party armed the workers, who then forced the MNR to push through more radical political and economic changes than they would have liked throughout the years between 1952 and 1955, but whose influence was severely curtailed at the national level after 1956. However, the Bolivian MNR was profoundly concerned with the lives of women and children, as were the miners' unions themselves. Both groups believed that one of Bolivia's greatest obstacles to development was a low birth rate and a high infant and child mortality rate, and saw the social security legislation as making Bolivia a global leader in family protection.⁵³ As I argue in Chapter 4, while it was dismantling worker political power at the level of the state, the MNR was also enacting a radical social security law that expanded workplace protections and guaranteed family subsidies to industrial and salaried workers throughout Bolivia. The history of family protections and family subsidies offers an alternate timeline to the revolution itself, helping to explain the continued loyalty of some male miners to the state as well. Long after the miners lost political

⁵³ For the way in which the state saw health interventions, see Pacino, "Constructing a New Bolivian Society." For the ways in which rural and urban Bolivians alike were concerned with population rate, see Molly Geidel, "'Sowing Death in Our Women's Wombs': Modernization and Indigenous Nationalism in the 1960s Peace Corps and Jorge Sanjinés' Yawar Mallku," *American Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2010): 763–86.

access to the revolutionary state, family policy ensured a certain degree of engagement from workers, because these men and women shared a profound desire to protect the livelihoods of future generations.

The Bolivian state hoped to regulate family life, in order to produce healthier, better educated, Spanish speaking citizens. In so doing, they often found mining wives and mothers to be the idealized working class citizen, and many state policies in fact distributed resources favorably to women in domestic disputes.⁵⁴ For this reason, the 1956 Social Security law had profound effects on Bolivian family, both intended and otherwise. It encouraged some women to turn to the state for protection and financial support when their male partners refused to support their children, laying the basis for a more effective police state in the 1970s but giving more power over daily family decisionmaking to women.⁵⁵ Within a culture that defined family

⁵⁴ In this way, Bolivia's welfare state policies were reminiscent of some of the eugenicist maternalist projects attempted by populists in Brazil and the revolutionary Mexican state in the 1940s, Nancy Stepan, *"The Hour of Eugenics": Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Alexandra Minna Stern, "Responsible Mothers and Normal Children: Eugenics, Nationalism, and Welfare in Post-Revolutionary Mexico, 1920–1940," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 12, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 369–97; For more on the politics of maternalism in Bolivia specifically, see Erica M Nelson, "Birth Rights : Bolivia's Politics of Race, Region, and Motherhood, 1964-2005" (University of Wisconsin, 2009); Kathryn N. Gallien, "Delivering the Nation, Raising the State: Gender, Childbirth and the 'Indian Problem' in Bolivia's Obstetric Movement, 1900-1982" (Ph.D., The University of Arizona, 2015).

⁵⁵ Here too my projected is indebted to queer theory in its critiques of the coercive power of family politics. In 1998, Lee Edelman provocatively encouraged scholars to examine repressive logics within future-oriented revolutionary projects based on providing for the emblematic "child," suggesting that all such politics justify repressing demands in the present, since who would be willing to resist a political coalition that exists to protect the future? Where does this critique of revolutionary projects leave those actively fighting for survival such as Bolivian miners? As Andrea Smith has argued persuasively, for communities who have been relegated to the ranks of those without a future, such as indigenous peoples throughout the Americas, fighting for a future and for children as a protected subject can indeed be emancipatory. Edelman's critique of "the Child" around whom all emancipatory projects are built ignores, Smith suggests, the construction of particular children through time as more worthy of protection. Furthermore, populations faced with radical precarity, either through military violence, economic scarcity or climate change, may find value in a collective struggle for the future. Lee Edelman, "The Future Is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive," *Narrative* 6, no. 1 (1998): 18–30. "A politics of "opting out" clearly privileges those who are relatively more comfortable under the current situation. For indigenous peoples, however, who face genocide, as well as all peoples subjected to conditions of starvation, violence, and war, opting out is simply not an option." Andrea Smith, "QUEER THEORY AND NATIVE STUDIES The Heteronormativity of Settler Colonialism," *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 16, no. 1–2 (January 1, 2010): 48, doi:10.1215/10642684-2009-012.

hierarchies through class and racial divisions as well, the Bolivia state's emphasis on the well-being of children caused a silent revolution in family life, which altered but did not eradicate hierarchies of intimate and affective power in rural Bolivia.⁵⁶

Family is a crucial unit of social structure in Andean mining communities, and unions, militias, and mines are structured through their relationships to the families that sustain them. In rural cities with large industrial and agricultural bases, and particularly in mining barrios, multiple kinds of families existed alongside each other, and multiple understandings of gender meant that masculinity and femininity, particularly during times of political struggle, were sites of contestation.⁵⁷ The law intervened and altered these ties, privileging some above others. Social benefits offered some degree of financial and social security for working families who remained loyal to the state, but did not offer those benefits to their rural neighbors and kin. Increasingly, the law also provided encouragement for miners and industrial workers to sever ties with rural families in a way that had not happened previously during periods of intense rural to urban

⁵⁶ Family dynamics in Bolivia also contain profound racial and cultural hierarchies. Marisol de la Cadena first noted the idea that in the complex and shifting system of racial/cultural hierarchy in the Peruvian Andes, women are considered "more indian," because of the way gender helps construct interactions with nation and markets, which in turn construct ethnic and cultural identities in the Andes. For Bolivia, Andrew Canessa argues that military service helps construct national belonging among Bolivian men, who then consider themselves to be superior to their "more indigenous" wives and female family members. See de la Cadena, "'Women are more Indian': Ethnicity and Gender in a Community near Cuzco" in Brooke Larson, Olivia Harris, and Enrique Tandeter, eds., *Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and Anthropology* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); De la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos*; Canessa, *Intimate Indigeneities*; Shesko, "Conscript Nation."

⁵⁷ Scholars of childhood and family in Latin America have begun to study illegitimacy as a condition that exists alongside and produces legitimacy, rather than something that signals the failure of modern family structures. Milanich suggests that the study of children and families themselves offers a queering lens onto the reproduction of deviance and the simultaneous existence of regulatory orders and conditions that patently exceed them in Latin America: "If the deviance/conformity binary does not adequately describe family patterns in Latin America, nor can evolutionary visions of family change account for them. In other words, the persistent coexistence of popular realities and elite prescriptions poses a powerful counterpoint to modernization theory." Nara Milanich, "Whither Family History? A Road Map from Latin America," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 2 (April 2007): 451; Bianca Premo, "How Latin America's History of Childhood Came of Age," *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 63–76, 161. In my project, I highlight the struggles over legitimacy that helped produce and reinforce worker citizenship during and after the revolution.

migration. In this way, social security contributed to the fragmentation of cross-class solidarity between miners and their rural neighbors.

Finally, my research shows that the history of gendered activism within working class communities long predates the formation of the Comité de Amas de Casa, the most famous organization of working class women.⁵⁸ Investigating the activism of women and children reveals how and when solidarity broke down within families and between mining families and their rural extended kin, and how mining communities attempted to rebuild this solidarity through social and political reforms. My dissertation explores how activism took on gendered forms in response to the changing national and international political order. In the 1960s and 1970s, militant miners became the first soldiers against military dictatorship, suffering on the frontlines the earliest blows against democracy. By their own accounts, the wives of these militant miners were simply “innocent” victims in these struggles. But this image, carefully constructed by the women in the mines and their families, is misleading.⁵⁹ Starting in the 1970s and gaining strength during the 1980s, women were able to use international feminist networks to gain an audience when their worker husbands could not. It was four women of the mines whose hunger strike brought down the Banzer dictatorship, after all.⁶⁰ By engaging, albeit

⁵⁸ Ineke Dibbits and Bolivia) Taller de Historia y Participación de la Mujer (La Paz, *Polleras libertarias: Federación Obrera Femenina, 1927-1964* (La Paz: Taller de Historia y Participación de la Mujer, 1986); Ana Cecilia Wadsworth and Ineke Dibbits, *Agitadoras de buen gusto: historia del Sindicato de Culinarias (1935-1958)* (La Paz: TAHIPAMU : HISBOL, 1989).

⁵⁹ Domitila Barrios de Chungara, *Si Me Permiten Hablar: Testimonio de Domitila, Una Mujer de Las Minas de Bolivia* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1977); Gloria Ardaya, “La Mujer En La Lucha Del Pueblo Boliviano : Las Barzolas Y El Comité de Amas de Casa,” *Nueva Sociedad*, 1983, 126.

⁶⁰ Building on relationships with a Brazilian anthropologist, representatives of the Comité de Amas de Casa helped make a documentary about conditions in the mines, attended the World Conference on Women in Mexico City, and made connections with religious and human rights organizations in Bolivia. Chungara, *Si Me Permiten Hablar*; National Union of Mineworkers., *Trade Union and Human Rights in Chile and Bolivia : Report of the National Union of Mineworkers Delegation*. (London: NUM, 1977); Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia., *Huelga de Hambre*. (La Paz: Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos en Bolivia, 1978); Norma Chinchilla, “Working-Class Feminism: Domitila and the Housewives Committee,” *Latin American Perspectives* 6, no. 3 (1979): 87; Domitila Barrios de Chungara, *Aquí También, Domitila!: Testimonios (Historia Inmediata)* (Siglo

critically, with international activist networks of feminist and human rights organizations, these women carried the miners' struggle to new arenas. Even as it brought the plight of the miners to international attention, however, this activism helped reinforce changed political order where middle class activists spoke on behalf of miners, undermining the practice of worker citizenship.

Integration and Exclusion in the Revolutionary Project

In my dissertation, I explore the limits of revolution explicitly as a tension between coercion and redistribution on the part of the state and participation and rejection on the part of its citizens. These tensions produce ambivalent effects among adherents of worker citizenship after 1952. In *Violencias (Re) Encubiertas*, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui refers to chains (cadenas) of domination that structure the internal colonialism of Andean societies. Within these links, mediating groups such as cholos and mestizos are not hybrid communities, but exist in a profoundly overdetermined space of reduced political horizons, as both oppressors and oppressed.⁶¹ Bolivian miners, I will argue, were the subjects as well as objects of a sincere utopian modernist project that was nonetheless coercive and oppressive, especially to those who did not fit within state structures of cooptation. The miners were also forever haunted by an association between indigeneity and illegitimacy which threatened to overshadow any project of critical resistance to the state.⁶²

Veintiuno Editores, 1985); Jean-Pierre Lavaud, *La dictadura minada la huelga de hambre de las mujeres mineras, Bolivia, 1977-1978* (La Paz, Bolivia: IFEA : CESU-UMSS : Plural Editores, 2003).

⁶¹ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Violencias (re) Encubiertas En Bolivia* (La Paz, Bolivia: Mirada Salvaje, 2010).

⁶² Other critiques of leftist politics have emerged from indigenous and feminist communities in Latin America. Saldaña-Portillo argues, for example, that many twentieth century revolutionary projects that idealized such male heroes as Che Guevara failed to think beyond racist and developmentalist ideologies that excluded poor and rural subjects from being able to enact their own change. Maria Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development*, Latin America Otherwise (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). In a similar vein, Sanjines indicts revolutionaries wedded to historical materialism for refusing to see beyond teleological narratives of unidirectional progress and thus could not see indigenous categories as productive of revolution or change. Sanjines C., *Embers of the Past*.

Examining the hopes, compromises, and everyday violence of the MNR state is crucial to understand the world that came after. The MNR attempted to carry out state capitalist development in the idiom of Marxist revolution; the workers who participated in this project couched their own assimilationist project in terms of the revolutionary left. Both of these factors contributed to the rise of neoliberal decentralization as an appealing political model for those indigenous communities excluded from the state project. While many contemporary scholars (particularly anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists) highlight *new* forms of chaotic and precarious economic and political organization in the twenty-first century, I suggest that such practices have always existed at the margins of more ordered spaces, and have always come to the fore in moments of insecurity or austerity.⁶³ In providing a history of disorder and violence in tension with projects to control this order, my work suggests why the same groups might swing, in different moments, away from participation in state-directed revolution and chose instead to reject such projects completely.

Working within scholarship on political and personal violence in Latin America, I look at the effects violence and precarity have on temporal horizons and utopian revolutionary projects for the miners.⁶⁴ I make two arguments. First, I suggest that the miners come from a long history of communities who recognize that prosperity is fleeting and expect the recurrence economic,

⁶³ In the Bolivian case: Goldstein, *The Spectacular City*; Postero, *Now We Are Citizens*; Lazar, *El Alto, Rebel City*; Goldstein, *Outlawed*.

⁶⁴ In this I build on some suggestive work by the authors of Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph, eds., *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin America's Long Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). These authors suggest taking violence seriously as an agent in its own right, a category that produces escalatory effects that derive from the historical context in which it operates, but that has its own drives that transcend ideology and context. Even so, I was unsatisfied with the conclusions that the authors were able to produce by investigating violence as an analytic category unto itself. The most useful contributions came from Carlota McAllister's "A Headlong Rush into the Future: Violence and Revolution in a Guatemalan Indigenous Village," which captured the way that time and space collapse in certain political moments, foreclosing possibilities and producing new kinds of actions that would have been unthinkable in "normal" politics and moments of change.

climactic, or political rupture at any time. In this context, the period of military dictatorship was a kind of expected cataclysm, and that the miners had strategies to prepare for these kinds of violence. I show how the miners collaborated with the state to turn a shared resource nationalism into worker citizenship in the 1940s and 1950s. Second, I suggest that the 1960s and especially the 1970s eroded that faith in state-led progress among the miners. The expectation among miners was no longer that engagement with a powerful and corrupt state could offer some form of prosperity, but rather was likely to lead to potential disaster. In this way the everyday effects of unmitigated danger and poverty slowly reduced the revolutionary horizons in the mining communities, first to the restoration of democracy, and culminating in abandoning a state-development led revolutionary project altogether.⁶⁵ While state violence was part of the oppression faced and expected by miners, it was at a vastly different scale than faced by workers in the Argentine or Chilean dirty war dictatorships. Corocoro, for example, never experienced a military occupation until the late 1970s. The immediate effects of conflicts with the state were galvanizing for miners used to political struggle. However, the long term effects of the policies of these military governments changed the nature of political legitimacy so as to exclude the miners from the possibility of power.

By speaking to questions of belonging and participation, my work also forms a part of continuing and parallel debates about resistance and integration occurring in both the fields of subaltern studies and in queer theory. To some extent, these debates over the possibility of

⁶⁵ I make use here of Nixon's concept of slow violence, which is in many ways the opposite of McAllister's headlong rush into the future. Building on earlier theories of hidden forms of structural violence inherent in, say, austerity measures, Nixon uses slow violence to highlight questions of temporality and movement, arguing that slow violence does cause radical and profound change, but that its moment-by-moment effects are often imperceptible as violence. Nixon also highlights the "representational bias against slow violence" that contributes to the erasure of parts of the globe as casualties that do not count (or cannot be counted). In my own work, I find slow violence a useful means of capturing the ways that struggles against dictatorship and neoliberal democracy alike were struggles against both specific policies and against becoming unaccountable in the national imaginary. Rob Nixon, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor* (Harvard University Press, 2011), 13.

resistance and autonomy rehash earlier debates, particularly in Latin American history, that foreground contentious participation and political compromise.⁶⁶ Both subaltern and queer theorists note that colonized and queer subjects are forever considered to be outside the present, and in many cases, written out of the future as well.⁶⁷ In the case of colonized peoples, a certain out of time-ness has been imposed from without, by a state that measures its own participation in the modern world by distance from indigenous culture. Andean scholars such as Rivera Cusicanqui have long noted the multiple temporal horizons that coexist in the Latin American present.⁶⁸ These exclusions have the paradoxical effect of creating another world, however, a temporal horizon outside of itself that has the potential to inspire revolutionary visions for change and struggle. If modernity pointed the way towards the future, then a culturally vibrant contemporary indigenous Bolivia was a contradiction in time, a past that refused to remain

⁶⁶ For this earlier scholarship on resistance and popular participation, see Stern, *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World - 18th to twentieth Centuries*; Daniel James, *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976* (Cambridge University Press, 1994); Florencia E. Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," *The American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (December 1, 1994): 1491–1515, doi:10.2307/2168386; G. M Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994); Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); James E Sanders, *Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

⁶⁷ For example, in a recent special edition rethinking resistance and integration in subaltern studies, Uday Chandra argues that despite decades and waves of research on the subject, scholars still have trouble understanding politics from within as a form of resistance alongside politics from without. Uday Chandra, "Rethinking Subaltern Resistance," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 45, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 563–73. There is a great deal of resonance between the Subaltern Studies Group's formulation of the colonized other as forever the imperfect subject of the modern state, as the community forever not-ready for modernity, and those abjected from heteronormative political, temporal, and social structures. Queer theorists such as José Muñoz explicitly highlight the queer subject as that which does not fit within, but also does not entirely reject, the social structures that have oppressed and excluded them. José Esteban Muñoz, *Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

⁶⁸ Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*; Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*; Hylton and Thomson, *Revolutionary Horizons*; Rivera Cusicanqui, *Violencias (re) Encubiertas En Bolivia*; Sanjinés C., *Embers of the Past*. This haunting of the present by the past finds resonance. Similarly, many feminist and queer scholars speak of a queer nostalgia, or yearning for the past as a political orientation away from the present that characterizes the experience of being queer. Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Muñoz, "Feeling Brown, Feeling Down"; Heather Love, *Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).

teleologically bound. And yet indigenous Bolivians did not assimilate or disappear while the revolution that hoped to assimilate them fell apart under the weight of its own utopia. A conversation between queer theory and Andeanist scholarship helps reveal the ways in which even a profoundly unequal global system was unable to be completely totalizing and regulatory. The persistence of the queer and the plural, and in fact the unregulate-able in the modern world is not a failure of modernity but a feature.⁶⁹

By exploring violence and exclusion as the underside of developmentalist revolutionary projects in Corocoro, I ask not only whose future belongs to the revolution, but whose violence is authorized and celebrated in revolution and reaction alike. As I will explore more in the first three chapters of my dissertation, times of excess and festivity were considered dangerous to urban modernity by some, but seen as constitutive of solidarity and citizenship itself by others. In my fourth and fifth chapters, I show how structural adjustment programs were understood by politicians as stabilizing the state by restricting unruly populism, but imposed a violent disorder on poor mining communities. In my sixth chapter, miners defended their own vision of order at all costs, even at the cost of allies against neoliberal reforms. Violence as disorder and as order emerge repeatedly in the Bolivian twentieth century, in both contests over the regulatory capacity of the state and as the certain threat of imminent disaster.

Chapter Outline

My first chapter explores early twentieth-century dreams of cosmopolitanism and development in Corocoro, a small city on the high mountain frontier between Bolivia and Chile. I suggest that the MNR's unique ideological vision, which combined resource nationalism

⁶⁹ Daniel Heath Justice, Mark Rifkin, and Bethany Schneider, "Introduction," *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 16, no. 1–2 (January 1, 2010): 5–39, doi:10.1215/10642684-2009-011; Smith, "QUEER THEORY AND NATIVE STUDIES The Heteronormativity of Settler Colonialism."

with a Marxist language of class, developed out of the crisis of the 1930s in peripheral mining communities. Caught between the twin threats of economic downturn and periodic indigenous uprisings for rights and land, local elites and workers had to create new ways to dream of liberal modernity and development. Placing local reformist movements in the context of demographic, economic and social shifts in the early decades of the twentieth century, I emphasize the articulation of ideologies of resource nationalism, social welfare, and development that enabled Corocoro reformers to create a viable political project supported by both working-class and middle-class voters during this period.

My second chapter traces the nationalization of local projects for reform. I compare records of anti-foreign agitation in the 1930s and 1940s in Corocoro and other mining communities to the writings of *indigenista*, nationalist, and Marxist intellectuals responding to the disastrous Chaco War (1932-5) and the global upheaval leading to World War II. I show how resource nationalism and concerns about social welfare merged in these decades through the figure of the oppressed miner. Marxist explanatory frameworks proved attractive to politicians of the left as well as the center in this era, as they provided a means of explaining Bolivia's continued poverty and military defeat, while offering a route to assimilation of Bolivia's indigenous majority through work. The problematic slippage between "revolutionary unrest" and barbarous Indian uprising was a constant tension for military socialists, middle class reformists, and working class movements in this period, and this chapter highlights the way the idealization of mineworkers by the MNR after 1942 helped resolved these tensions while sidelining the political demands of indigenous communities themselves.

Returning to Corocoro, my third chapter explores changes in social and political life during the revolution of 1952. I argue that the revolution consolidated itself in places like

Corocoro through the state run mining company, which functioned as an alternative state structure, distributing resources and offering miners new avenues for social prestige and political power. The MNR was deeply ambivalent about the miners' exercise of national political authority, but the creation of worker control over company decisions and peasant and worker militias did fundamentally change the local exercise of power immediately after the revolution. As the MNR retreated from its initial radical phase however, the nationalized mining company helped consolidate a bureaucratic class of local elites out of the most literate, affluent miners as well as those families most likely to have social connections before the revolution (merchants, white collar workers). Particularly, the revolution enabled social and political mobility for certain kinds of young men with ties to both merchant and mining networks that were able to use the figure of the masculine, revolutionary mining hero to legitimate their exercise of power after the revolution at the expense of poorer, more culturally indigenous mining families. These men would become the local bureaucrats against which the next generation would have to fight.

My fourth chapter highlights a rarely noted contradiction of the Bolivian revolution: the MNR's goals of fostering development by protecting mothers and children often clashed with its valorization of working class masculine autonomy and privilege in this period. This contradiction helps explain the curious fact that the MNR passed ambitious social welfare legislation exactly at the moment when it also agreed to scale back worker power and social benefits in exchange for a US-backed loan from the International Monetary Fund in 1956-1957. While most historians see this period as the Thermidorian reaction to the 1952 revolution, I tell a more complicated story. The MNR did roll back the rights of workers, but in exchange for maintaining or increasing valuable social protections that had always been integral to the shared revolutionary goals of the resource nationalist coalition. I use judicial records of divorces,

pension and inheritance disputes, and child custody battles to explore how social benefits formed the crucial nexus between mining families and the state. The expansion of state services offered marginalized groups such as women and children new ways to hold abusive community elites (such as those empowered by 1952), absent fathers, and disruptive individuals accountable. At the same time, national disputes over the direction and future of the revolution played out in struggles over who had rights to social benefits from the state. During an era of rampant inflation and a rightward-moving nationalist government, conflicts over pensions and child support became particularly acute. I suggest that these conflicts changed the nature of leftist political opposition in this period, as unions had to work to maintain solidarity within and among mining families. The creation of the famously radical Bolivian Housewives' Committee in 1961 was one such effect. Even within the Committee, opposition to particular state policies did not lead to a rejection of the state itself as driver of revolutionary change—at least not at first.

In my fifth chapter, I argue that the Bolivian national revolution of 1952 died, not with a bang in the 1964 coup, but with the whimpering slow violence of poverty and dangers of life in the mines. In fact, from the perspective of communities like Corocoro, the revolution did not end with the military coup of General Banzer in 1964, but continued to hold promise for the future until well into the 1970s. Bolivia's military dictators, in power from 1964-1982, never closed the state mining company and thus never completely ended the promise of the MNR to reward the workers for their sacrifices in 1952. Even under military rule, I show how the revolutionary project of making the mines safer through social benefits and regulation was still a concern of both the miners and the government and point for negotiating access between them. Nonetheless, the way in which Barrientos and subsequent governments expanded of police, military, and even COMIBOL's regulatory bureaucracy in the name of "restoring" the revolution shifted the terrain

upon which miners could engage with the state. Building on the repressive apparatus begun by the MNR, each military government tried to close down the alternative means for miners and rural Bolivians to make demands on the state. I show how national political change was mirrored on a local level by the increase in the state's ability to do things like regulate traffic and commerce and maintain control during periods of festivity, which often also became periods of political unrest. This had the effect of personalizing political violence as intimate disorder and poverty as personal failing. While this did not stop the workers from fighting against the state, this shifting of the horizons of revolutionary struggle had long term effects, undermining both solidarity and the legitimacy of the revolution.

In my sixth chapter, I show how the exclusions produced by the revolutionary state enabled military governments of the 1970s and 1980s to decentralize and deregulate both labor and labor and community organizations. I argue that in the face of years of state oppression and neglect, as well as dropping mineral prices, young miners who once subscribed to ideas of sacrifice for the good of nation and family, for the future, embraced a culture of immediacy, risk taking, and valorizing danger. Only by embracing fortune, by making an individual rather than collective devil's bargain, could miners now hope for a better future.

Cooperatives and neighborhood committees subsidized by NGOs began to compete with COMIBOL and undermine the project of state-led resource distribution in this period. In this way, the state became not a reluctant provider of security, but an agent of control, blocking access to a better life. As cooperative labor and contraband trade became more profitable than engaging in labor on the "formal" market, COMIBOL miners also moved to defend their dwindling privileges against neoliberal encroachment. Seeking to re-impose a model of worker citizenship and vanguardism inherited from 1952 by leading the fight for return to democracy,

miners alienated many of their would-be allies. These struggles occurred alongside an increasingly powerful political movement emerging out of the indigenous communities in the neighboring countryside that rejected leftist revolution in favor of a distinctly indigenous brand of Andean revolution. While indigenous movements, workers, and middle class human rights activists were able to bring about the return to democracy in the years between 1978 and 1982, the divergent expectations unacknowledged within the terms of this return broke apart the workers' movement more effectively than any army massacre could have done. I end with a short "Epilogue to the Revolution" highlighting the struggles of the miners to defend their sources of labor in 1985 and 1986.

Sixty years after the revolution, the alternative epistemologies associated with indigenous cultures now seem to offer a way out of the contradictions of redistributive politics and nationalist revolution; a future beyond the end of history produced by the Cold War. My project asks us to look carefully at such epistemologies. By tracing a long arc over the twentieth century, I hope to emphasize the similarities between contemporary decolonizing projects and those modernizing projects of the MNR in their use of an idealized subject to resolve the seemingly irresolvable, to break from the present knot into the future.

Chapter 1: A Decidedly Promising City, Corocoro 1909-1930¹

*Corocoro became a ghost town [after 1930]... I believe that my hatred for gringos began here...*²

*Corocoro, with a history of more than a century of its existence devoted to the arduous extraction of its inexhaustible mineral wealth, primarily exploited by foreign capitalists, is an insignificant town where Progress has never planted her productive machinery, and where any idea of development is irrelevant.*³

In 1930, Enrique Linares wrote in to the Ministerio Publico of Corocoro, a small copper mining town 90 km southwest of La Paz: “You, sir, are aware of the events in the middle of the night last 26 June, in this city and in the house inhabited by high ranking employees of the mining company Corocoro United Copper Mines, Ltd. (CUCM), ...which to the public has been given the name ‘Attack of the Indian Miners on the Company’...”⁴ Linares indignantly continued, lest the judge believe any of these accounts, “What a falsehood!”

Linares argued that the attack had been perpetrated, not by Aymara Indians, but by the mine owners themselves. In a document that stretched to 8 pages and listed at least a dozen witnesses from all over the community, the lawyer accused young, white collar employees of the

¹ Portions of this chapter previously appeared as Elena McGrath “Prehistories of Revolutionary Nationalism and the Welfare State: Corocoro, Bolivia 1918-1930” in Stefano Agnoletto, Brian J Griffith, and Cristina Palmieri, eds., *Zapruder World: An International Journal for the History of Social Conflict* 3 (2016), available from <http://www.zapruderworld.org/pre-histories-revolutionary-nationalism-and-welfare-state-corocoro-bolivia-1918-1930>, ISSN: 2385-1171.

² Juan Lechín Oquendo, *Memorias* (La Paz, Bolivia: Litexsa Boliviana, 2000), 33.

³ Corocoro, contando como cuenta, más de un centenar de años de existencia dedicados al laboriosísimo trabajo de sus inagotables productos mineros, explotados esencialmente por capitalistas extranjeros, es una población insignificante donde el progreso jamás ha puesto su planta benefactora, y donde toda idea de adelantamiento es nula. Eduardo A. Lima L., *Corocoro: Apuntes, Críticas Y Observaciones* (La Paz: Escuela Salesiana, 1918), 10.

⁴ “Enrique Linares vs Jorge Lebrun” June 27, 1930 Archivo Juzgado de Pacajes, Archivo La Paz (ALP PJAC) Caja 120.

mine, both Bolivian and gringo (North American and European), of sneaking around the town the night of the 26th in ponchos and shawls in the colors of neighboring indigenous communities. These young men, he argued, armed with guns as well as homemade bombs made from jam jars and tea tins, attacked and set fire to their own living quarters, killing a neighboring indigenous man named Mateo Chipana in the process. Linares suggested that this plan was premeditated, with high ranking officials spreading rumors that they feared an attack well in advance.

What are we to make of this criminal complaint? Why would mine owners seek to destroy their own business? In his denunciation, Linares suggested that the attack was made to solidify community support around the mine owners at a time when the CUCM had almost completely shut down production due to the falling price of copper. He believed that the company didn't want to pay the pensions owed to miners debilitated by mine labor, so they hoped to discredit the miners as an "Indian horde:"

This plan was put into effect, with abuses, lowered salaries, and even stealing the money that many contract mineworkers had already earned. It enraged hundreds of workers, who had nowhere to turn to avoid or reduce the tendency of the capitalist to silence them through hunger. In this city there was no one to help them- The sub-prefect of the province who could be mediator to temper this hostility, was someone who always took the part of the company, turning deaf ears to the pleas of workers and miners.⁵

Despite Linares' dismissal, there was some truth to the CUCM's account: the price of copper had plummeted precipitously since 1929 and the firm was losing money.⁶ In the context of international financial crisis it is not surprising that the French-British mining company would be firing workers and reducing expenditures. It is also not surprising that labor unrest would be the

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Kelly, T.D., and Matos, G.R., comps., 2014, Historical statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United States (2016 version): U.S. Geological Survey Data Series 140, accessed September 15, 2016, <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/historical-statistics/>.

result, as indeed there was in Corocoro and tin mining centers like Oruro in this period.⁷ I have found no documents establishing for certain what happened on the night of June 26th, aside from notes of a police investigation of the company. Earlier court cases suggest that the CUCM was in both financial and labor trouble throughout 1930, and that CUCM employees sometimes ran afoul of the municipal authorities, as in a hit and run incident involving the same mining engineer Lembacher. What interests me is that Linares took the side of this maligned “Indian horde” at all.

I found in the municipal archives of Corocoro during the early 1930s evidence of a campaign to hold foreign mining company officials legally accountable for excesses and abuses in new ways, in which elite residents cast themselves as interlocutors for indigenous community members, and the indigenous community functioned as a stand-in for the polity of Corocoro as a whole. In the Linares dispute particularly, his defense of workers was based around literal rewriting of the narrative of “barbarous Indian rebellion” into one of “powerless, exploited workers and victims of global capital”. The Linares dispute integrates key ideological components of what would become the national revolution of 1952 by proposing a multi-class alliance based around resource nationalism as a means to develop Bolivia, using class terms to erase ethnic divisions. These are often regarded as the product of widespread social discontent in the aftermath of the Chaco war, but these moments of anti-foreign nationalism date back, in places like Corocoro, to long before the war.⁸ In this chapter I hope to reconstruct the process by which the workers came to be the heroes and the victims of this criminal complaint, rather than

⁷ Pilar Mendieta, ed., *Vivir La Modernidad En Oruro 1900-1930*, Colección Relaciones Interétnicas (La Paz: Instituto de Estudios Bolivianos, 2011), 50.

⁸ Rodríguez Ostria argues that worker unrest in Corocoro, since the 1850s, has taken the form of anti-foreign agitation, against Chilean and especially European mining officials. Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 67. For an example of this in the 1899 Civil War, see, footnote 21, below.

perpetrators of crimes against civic order.

In this chapter, I explore the birth of an ideology of resource nationalism that allowed mineworkers and middle class reformers alike to envision a collective, inclusive future for the Bolivian nation. I argue that the crisis of liberalism experienced by Bolivia between the First World War and the war of the Chaco brought contradictions between two differing narratives of modernity and national development espoused by Bolivian elites—cosmopolitan versus nationalist visions of progress—to a head. While cosmopolitan ideals of progress linked Bolivia’s development to foreign capital, foreign technology, and indeed the presence of a mix of cultures in urban cities, national modernization sought create a nation that was itself modern and uniquely Bolivian. Both of these narratives operated within a context of internal colonialism and racial hierarchies that saw indigenous Bolivians as barriers to modernization, however.⁹ During the prosperous phase of the 1920s, development tied to external markets seemed to offer Bolivians access to global modernity. By the 1930s, Bolivia was caught between the promise of capitalist development linked to foreign exploitation of resources and the reality of foreign abandonment, facing the realization that the Bolivian government as it currently operated could or would not protect its citizens from this hardship.

The MNR coalition that later came to dominate Bolivian politics found its origins in the shock of the Great Depression, and especially in the Bolivian state’s disastrous response to economic collapse. The crucial components of the 1952 revolutionary ideology put forth by the

⁹ For more on ways elite Bolivians attempted to resolve a perceived incompatibility between indigeneity and modernity, see Kuenzli, E. Gabrielle. *Acting Inca: National Belonging in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia*. (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013). Seemin Qayum “Nationalism, Internal Colonialism and the Spatial Imagination: The Geographic Society of La Paz in Turn-Of-The-Century Bolivia.” Seemin Qayum, “Nationalism, Internal Colonialism and the Spatial Imagination: The Geographic Society of La Paz in Turn-of-the-Century Bolivia,” in *Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America*, ed. James Dunkerley (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2002), 279.

MNR, combining resource nationalism with state directed development and expansion of state institutions, emerged as a response to the failures of the Bolivian state and economy in this period. Although the MNR was not Marxist, it was through a Marxist inflected language of class exploitation, in which workers came to represent the role of Bolivia on the international stage, that Bolivian elites and would-be reformers found the tools to resolve the contradictions of both the Liberal and Republican promises of development in the early twentieth century.

Key to my project, therefore, is an investigation of what modernity meant to early twentieth century Bolivians: what did it look like, was it achievable, and what specific changes would make Bolivia a modern, prosperous nation? To do this, my chapter examines municipal documents from the period between the establishment of the La Paz-Arica railroad to the financial crash of 1930 in which local elites elaborated visions of progress and modernity. I set these in the context of memories of the community from a later generation of political activists who were part of the mining diaspora caused by the closure of the CUCM mines, as well as labor disputes during the period. Finally, I will examine evidence of worker popular culture, most notably the Ch'uta Carnaval dance, which also originated in Corocoro in this period, as an example of a working class response to these same forces. In Corocoro, I contend, both elites and mineworkers were undergoing a process of thinking about what it meant to be modern subjects, and trying to make Corocoro, and thereby Bolivia, into a modern place.

Since independence, Bolivian elites had seen the indigenous majority of the country as an obstacle to progress and modernity because of its intransigent otherness, autonomy, and resistance to regulation. In the early twentieth century, workers had not yet come to be seen as different kinds of subjects than indigenous Bolivians. This division, I argue, was a product of the nationalist opposition cultures that came about in this period. The genius of the nationalist

discourses of class that would ultimately influence the MNR lay in tying worker militancy to modernity, not indigenous difference and backwardness. The association between class formation and national belonging through worker militancy were produced first in peripheral mining communities like Corocoro, which functioned as frontiers between Bolivia's urban centers and the countryside. The mestizo national culture which was later associated with the 1952 revolution finds its roots here, not so much with the Chaco War as with the boom and bust cycles of the mining economy.¹⁰

Many scholars have traced the origins of the revolutionary nationalist coalition that came to power in 1940s and 1950s Bolivia to the generation of men that came of age during the Chaco war, from 1932 to 1935. These scholars rightly note that The Chaco War circulated critiques of global capitalism and national political corruption to a national audience, while the experience of frontline hardship cemented a total lack of faith in the Bolivian government among students, artisan, workers, intellectuals, and indigenous men drafted for military service.¹¹ But this account fails to explain why mineworkers, who were mostly out of work and disorganized politically during the Chaco conflict, became the heroes of the revolution twenty years later. By tracing the pre-Chaco history of multi-class nationalist coalitions in a small mining community, I hope to

¹⁰ The idea that the Chaco War created a lost generation which then found solace in resource nationalism is most effectively developed in, Klein, *Orígenes de La Revolución Nacional Boliviana*; René Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo Nacional-Popular En Bolivia*, 1a ed, Sociología Y Política (México, D.F: Siglo Veintiuno, 1986). I, along with Whitehead, argue that this interpretation, while narratively satisfying, misses crucial aspects of the crises that Bolivia experienced in this period without understanding the impact of the depression itself. Lawrence Whitehead and Mario R. dos Santos, "El Impacto de La Gran Depresión En Bolivia," *Desarrollo Económico* 12, no. 45 (April 1972): 49.

¹¹ The period between the Chaco War and the Revolution is one of the best studied and still elusive periods in Bolivian history, from Herbert Klein and Rene Zavaleta, who trace the emergence of non-traditional, nationalist parties after the Chaco War, to Laura Gotkowitz, who recenters indigenous radicalism as a driver of revolution. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution*; Luis Peñaloza Cordero, *Historia del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, 1941-1952* (Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1963); Klein, *Orígenes de La Revolución Nacional Boliviana*; Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo Nacional-Popular En Bolivia*; Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, eds., *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

reconstruct the process by which the workers came to be the heroes and the victims of this criminal complaint, rather than perpetrators of crimes against civic order.

Finally, my aim is to recuperate a moment in the early part of the twentieth century when nationalism and nationalization were not synonymous, to understand the process by which miners became symbols of national transformation, as they later would be in April 1952. Class struggle, I suggest, offered a lens to view violent uprisings in the countryside as indicators of, rather than barriers to, modern development. Miners, assumed to be undergoing a process of proletarianization in this period, were key symbols of a distinctly Bolivian form of modernization because they were both linked to indigenous rural communities and recognizably western subjects.

Ascendant Liberals: Turn of the Century Corocoro

After the triumph of the Liberal faction in the civil war of 1899, Bolivia's political and economic center of gravity shifted to urban centers affiliated with the tin, wool, and copper trade of La Paz and Oruro. Elites in these regions saw their task as the creation of a modern Bolivia for the new century. Progress and prosperity would be the hallmarks of this new century, bolstered by urban construction, integration with global markets, and the expansion of modern state structures into the countryside. President Ismael Montes, Corocoreño by birth and wealthy landowner, opened the twentieth century by negotiating a controversial treaty with Chile, which had occupied Bolivia's only stretch of coastline since the War of the Pacific two decades before. The treaty that Montes signed (along with fellow Corocoreño lawyer Pedro Kramer) ceded any rights Bolivia might claim over the stretch of land between Arica and Antofagasta in exchange for a Chilean-financed railroad from La Paz to Arica and duty free exports from the port. Corocoro, as capital of the department of Pacajes, controlled the new border crossing at Charaña

and benefited from a trunk line into the center of town.

For this reason, the turn of the twentieth century looked particularly bright for the small community of 4,000 miners, merchants, and agriculturalists nestled at 12,000 feet above sea level. Corocoro, which had been a mining center since the 1850s, officially became a city in 1895, and after the completion of the railroad in 1912, counted on direct, fast service to both the coast and the capital. While the town itself had been a center of agricultural production, commerce, and mining even in the 19th century, both elites and urban workers subscribed to the liberal party's promises of a prosperous future tied to urban, cosmopolitan growth.¹²

The early twentieth century was a time of transition from artisanal to industrial mining production in many parts of Bolivia.¹³ Engineer Jose Sossi founded the Ingenio Minero de Bolivia in 1909, and in 1909 the Corocoro United Copper Mines Ltd were incorporated by a conglomeration of British and French investors out of the Chilean holdings of JK Child & Co. This became the largest mine in the region, followed by the Chilean-owned Compañia Corocoro. In 1916, during World War I's boom in mineral prices, there was a flurry of interest from European and North American companies in copper investments. Corocoro's were singled out as "decidedly promising" in the American Mine Register, though the assessor noted they suffered from lack of access to water and a lack of lumber for fuel and construction.¹⁴

The general assessment of Bolivia's copper mines as promising but lacking infrastructure characterized foreign and elite prescriptions for Bolivia as a whole. Marie Robinson Wright,

¹² The 1899 battle between conservative Alonsista soldiers and liberal miners and indigenous townsfolk will be discussed further in the chapter. Morales, Ramiro Condarco. *Zarate, El Temible Willka*. La Paz, Bolivia, 1965, 215-8.

¹³ Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971*, 48.

¹⁴ *Mining and Scientific Press*, 1917, 463; Horace Jared Stevens et al., *Mines Register: Successor to the Mines Handbook and the Copper Handbook ... Describing the Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Companies in the Western Hemisphere* (Mines Publications, Incorporated, 1910).

North American travel writer and National Geographic correspondent, visited Bolivia during the presidency of Ismael Montes. Thoroughly impressed by the Montes family and their political associates, she wrote, "Never in the history of the republic have conditions been more favorable, politically and financially, for national development and prosperity." Under leadership like Montes's Bolivia, she argued, was well positioned to lead a "Golden Age of the New World."¹⁵ Wright's account reflects the liberal biases of her close relationship with the Montes family as well as a general American elite preference for cosmopolitanism defined as European-ness. In general, Bolivia's cities were noted by observers in the early twentieth century for their lack of cosmopolitanism, as remarkably unlike European cities, with La Paz particularly representing this difference.¹⁶

La Paz as a region and a city was a quandary for Bolivian elites who wanted to ascribe to technocratic and cosmopolitan visions of modernity. Although the de facto center of government and home to many industries after 1899, La Paz continued to be Bolivia's most visibly indigenous city, having as well some of the highest rates of illiteracy and lowest rates of foreign residence.¹⁷ La Paz was growing in prosperity and economic importance, but the city has always been visibly marked by its geographic isolation from the coasts and proximity to some of the most densely populated indigenous regions in the country. This sense of enclosure marked both Oruro and La Paz in their attempts to market themselves as modern cities, though Oruro, as flat, logically laid out grid, central to railroads, trade routes, and mining commerce, was a more

¹⁵ Marie Robinson Wright, *Bolivia: The Central Highway of South America, a Land of Rich Resources and Varied Interest* (G. Barrie & sons, 1907), 87.

¹⁶ Dunkerley, ed, 276.

¹⁷ Bolivia, *Censo General de La Población de La República D Bolivia Según El Empadronamiento de 1. de Septiembre de 1900*, 2. ed. (Cochabamba: Editorial Canelas, 1973), 126.

familiar place for visitors like Wright.¹⁸ During the 1920s, moreover, Oruro counted 30% of its residents as foreign-born, boasting its own Arabic club, German bakeries, Spanish plazas and districts for migrants, while in La Paz, the figure was closer to 10%.¹⁹

Corocoro, while not as big as La Paz, also played host to a high number of foreign residents and visitors, notably merchants from Germany, Chile, and the former Ottoman Empire. Labor leader Juan Lechín Oquendo, who led the mineworkers union and later the Central Obrera Boliviana from 1952-1987, was the child of a “turco” merchant who worked in a number of mining camps and a Corocoro market vendor.²⁰ Mining engineers from Western Europe (particularly France and Germany) and later North America also lived and worked in Corocoro.²¹ Among the provincial cities of the overwhelmingly rural La Paz region, Corocoro residents understood themselves as participants in the same revitalization of urban modernity as Oruro and La Paz, but this vision may have been lost on European visitors. Corocoro shared the characteristics of many of Bolivia’s expanding mining towns: nascent worker’s and artisans organizations with optimistic names such as The Worker’s Society of the Future (Sociedad de Obreros “El Porvenir”) and the Humanitarian Worker’s and Artesan’s Society (1912).²² Corocoro also had a thriving foreign merchant community and a press circulation larger than any

¹⁸ La Paz the city actually counted fewer people in the 1900 census (53,000 residents) than the population of the countryside of Pacajes (78,000 residents) and neighboring Omasuyos province (92,000 residents). In these provinces, Achacachi and Corocoro formed the biggest nucleated settlements, neither over 5,000 urban dwellers. Ibid., 126.

¹⁹ Ibid, 126. Mier, Adolfo. *Prefectura de Oruro: Su Pasado y Su Presente*, (Oruro: 1930), 30. See also, Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*.

²⁰ Lechín Oquendo, *Memorias*.

²¹ See, for example, the petition by Vicente Miguel, of Lebanese descent, for naturalization in 1938. ALP PJAC 1938, Caja 160. Local lore also has it that one of Corocoro’s important contributions to Bolivian culture was the popularization of the Christmas panetón. Interview, Eusebio Sarmiento, August 2013.

²² J Luis Fournier Terán, Veteran. Introduction to Pamphlet, 1995. “Programa de Festejos en Homenaje al Centenario de Bolivia, 6 de Agosto 1925”


mining town outside of Potosí and Oruro, including, by the 1920s worker's papers such as "El Deber" and the liberal paper "La Acción."²³ Wright's account of Corocoro is scarce in detail on the city itself but lavish in its praise of the copper wealth in the region. What her account lacks in social detail is compensated for by several pictures and an abundance of technical details on the process of staking a claim and investing in Bolivian mines.²⁴ Wright clearly saw Corocoro as a promising site for businesses, but Corocoro as yet had few attractions to tempt the worldly visitor.



TRANSPORTATION OF COPPER FROM THE COROCORO MINES.

²³ "Corocoro" Revista Bocaminas (La Paz: COMIBOL, 2011).

²⁴ Wright, *Bolivia*, 360.



THREE PRINCIPAL MINING ESTABLISHMENTS OF COROCORO: CHILD, CARERAS, AND MALACATE.

Images 1.1 and 1.2 Reproduced from Wright, Marie Robinson. *Bolivia: The Central Highway of South America, a Land of Rich Resources and Varied Interest*. G. Barrie & sons, 1907, pgs 359 and 361.

In general, popular memory of Corocoro in this period oscillates between seeing the community as a thriving contributor to Bolivian prosperity, or a poor backwater unlinked to the wider world. There is truth- and falsity- to both accounts. Two of Corocoro's most famous sons, Juan Lechín and Katarista organizer Luciano Tapia were born to mining families in Corocoro around 1914. Their memories of the community highlight the tension experienced by many Bolivians in urban centers between worldliness and isolation, contradictory aspects of Corocoro's role in twentieth century processes of nation building. Tapia, who published a testimonio in 1995 reflecting on his experiences organizing the Katarista movement, remembered Corocoro as a place where the word "union" had no meaning, the Bolivian government existed only as a foreign oppressive force, and the indigenous workers had no protection against either the government or the foreign company. He contrasted the oppression of

the mining camp with the relative harmony and independence of his father's ayllu, where he moved after the mines closed down in 1930.²⁵

Lechín, on the other hand, highlighted Corocoro's links with foreign commerce and centers of business through his father. Emphasized in Lechín's account, and in direct contrast with Tapia's, is the centrality of Corocoro to the contentious politics of Bolivian nation-building. Lechín opened his 2004 memoir, "I was born in Corocoro, pueblo rebelde," calling forth images of both worker unrest and the 1899 battle against Conservative forces in the civil war.²⁶ Later, in praising the role of the tin miners of Siglo XX in the revolutionary history of Bolivia, he recalled that "the tin miners of Siglo XX also had a history of courage, like the copper miners of Corocoro."²⁷

Eduardo Lima's bid for national prosperity

Towards the end of the 1910s, Bolivia's Liberal oligarchy faced increasing pressure from dissident elites in the Republican Party, armed uprisings and legal rebellions in the countryside, and early attempts at organizing workers by anarchists and socialists. After World War I ended, declining copper and tin prices caused further economic and political turmoil. Some Bolivian elites, especially in the Republican Party, began to temper their excitement over foreign development with the idea that Bolivia's own national government could take as much interest in the vast resources within its borders as foreigners seemed to. Moreover, the plant, animal, and human resources of the country, as well as the borders of Bolivia, needed to be understood to be governed adequately. While the Republicans were most consistent in courting popular support

²⁵ Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Así es nuestra vida)*, 33.

²⁶ Lechín, *Memorias*, 14.

²⁷ Lechín Oquendo, *Memorias*, 48.

against the ruling liberal government around these ideas, by the end of World War I both liberals and republican reformers understood modern development to require a more responsive state. Eduardo Lima was one of many local governing officials who were interested in promoting the Corocoro mines through international investment combined with national development.

In 1918, Lima wrote and published a pamphlet addressed to newly elected Liberal President José Gutiérrez Guerra, an Oxford educated landowner who succeeded Ismael Montes's second presidency. His prefatory comments proposed that it was the duty of any patriotic citizen and supporter of the regime to give account of his region and its potential contributions to the incoming government.²⁸ Like Wright, he saw Corocoro and Pacajes as a region with great potential for development, but severe problems with infrastructure and corruption. Most significantly, although Corocoro had every reason to attract national interest, Lima argued that the town had more fame in international financial circles than in the national imaginary. This foreign interest, to Lima, was a mixed blessing. Corocoro's contribution, he argued, was in the development of a nationally-recognized mining center as a way to encourage "the entrepreneurial spirit missing from our character," to improve the stock of Bolivia as a whole.²⁹

Seemin Qayum has written persuasively about the links between the impulse to know, define and delineate geographic space and the impulse to civilize and regulate unruly indigenous communities that were critical to the post-colonial process of nation building in Bolivia.³⁰ In Corocoro, these two processes were inextricable from the need for developing industrial

²⁸ Lima L., *Corocoro*.

²⁹ "el espíritu de iniciativa ausente de nuestro carácter," Ibid., 8.

³⁰ Seemin Qayum: "the links between geography and culture, between territory and identity, are as key to nation-building as they are to the construction of colonial and imperial spaces and subjects. Moreover, these two processes are not necessarily antithetical." in Qayum, "Nationalism, Internal Colonialism and the Spatial Imagination: The Geographic Society of La Paz in Turn-of-the-Century Bolivia," 278.

resources in such a way that they benefitted the national community. This articulation of production, social regulation, and territorial control emerged out of precisely the conflicts within liberal ideologies of modernity and progress.³¹ Lima's work fits well within the intellectual world that produced the Geographic Society of La Paz: his description of Corocoro ranges from the sociological—for example, in a section on “Promiscuity in the Mines”—to the technical, but for the most part his suggestions revolve around three key points: bringing education to indigenous communities, particularly women, expanding the state presence through the police and regional authorities, and improving the working and living conditions in the mines. Lima believed, for example, that an expanded police force, working with indigenous leaders in the countryside, could help enforce compulsory military service and the *prestación vial*, which he argued were crucial to building a sense of civic identity in indigenous communities but largely resisted by them. This, in turn, would keep down the periodic “*sangrientas conflagraciones indigenas*” that he noted, in passing, were endemic to the region.³²

So what about these “*sangrientas conflagraciones indigenas*” to which Lima referred? As a provincial capital and market town Corocoro was the site of legal and commercial interface between urban and rural Bolivia in Pacajes province. Indigenous communities, both independent *ayllus* and *colonos* working on haciendas, vastly out-numbered urban residents of Corocoro (and

³¹ Qayum characterizes the Geographic Society of La Paz, founded in 1889 (and of which Marie Robinson Wright and Ismael Montes were both members) as the intellectual wing of the turn of the century Liberal party. The Geographic Society was also the crucible out of which Republican opposition to the liberal project was formed. Future president Bautista Saavedra also was a member of this circle, and in fact published a study of the Bolivian *ayllu* around the time Ismael Montes signed the treaty with Chile. *Ibid.*, 292; “Mrs. Marie R Wright Dead; Author and Historian Who Made Record Trip Across the Andes,” *The New York Times*, February 3, 1914; Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 58.

³² “bloody indigenous uprisings,” Lima L., *Corocoro*, 17. The liberal government had decreed universal military service in 1907. See also, Shesko, “Conscript Nation.”

indeed all other cities of the province, including La Paz) in this period.³³ The town was itself the site of indigenous uprisings against the European operators of the Chilean Compañía Corocoro that generated national and international attention in 1899. Corocoreños also witnessed the neighboring community of Calacoto rise up in 1914 under Martin Vasquez.³⁴ Within a few years of the publication of *Apuntes*, the Pacajes countryside would be rocked by an indigenous uprising centered in a community about 40 kilometers from Corocoro known as Jesus de Machaca. In this uprising a local *cacique apoderado* named Faustino Llanquis overthrew local authorities and killed an abusive Corregidor.³⁵

In Bolivia, both Republicans and Liberals had a history of cultivating dissident among indigenous factions while they were in opposition to the existing government.³⁶ When in office, Republicans and Liberals both saw indigenous demands as threats to the established order, violently repressing their former allies.³⁷ Republican President Saavedra backed a mandatory

³³ Bolivia, *Censo General de la Población de La República de Bolivia Según el Empadronamiento de 1. de Septiembre de 1900*, 126.

³⁴ The 1899 dispute also prefigured the worker unrest discussed in this chapter, as it was directed not only at Alonso's conservative troops, but took the form of legal action against two foreigners, Solstad and Torjenson, including the Gerente General of the Compañía Corocoro, culminating in their controversial suicides in April 1899. These deaths had been reported as defense against assault or worse from menacing indigenous communities (memorialized in: A. V. L. Guise, *Six Years in Bolivia, the Adventures of a Mining Engineer* (London: Unwin, 1922).) Also prefiguring the 1930 dispute, the mayor of Hachiri Dionisio Mollinedo and the lawyer Pedro Kramer wrote in to the paper *Los Debates* on April 11, 1899 to clarify that these deaths were not the results of an attack by the indigenous residents of Ninoca, Laura, and Collana. "Remitidos: Martes 2 de Mayo, 1899" *Los Debates*. For more on the 1914 rebellion, see Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, 101.

³⁵ Roberto Choque Canqui, *Jesús de Machaca: La Marka Rebelde*, Colección Historia Y Documento 46- (La Paz, Bolivia: CEDOIN : CIPCA, 1996); Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 46–48. Caciques apoderados were self-appointed indigenous leaders, typically organizing in defense of land claims in this period. Corregidores, whose position dates back to colonial times, was in the early twentieth century concerned mostly with rural tax collection. For greater discussion of the early twentieth century movement, see Ari, *Earth Politics*.

³⁶ An example of this allyship in opposition was lawyer Pedro Kramer's defense of the indigenous communities of Ninoca, Laura, and Collana in 1899.

³⁷ Bautista Saavedra himself, as a young lawyer, had defended indigenous communities during the post-1899 trials of Aymara communities implicated in civil war violence on the grounds that they were oppressed but pre-political, too backwards to be tried for crimes against the Bolivian state. For more on these trials, see Kuenzli, *Acting Inca*; Ramiro Condarco Morales, *Zarate, El Temible Willka* (La Paz, 1965).

rural education bill, which had the support of many indigenous communities, but also used the military to quell indigenous protest. Bautista believed both that indigenous communities were oppressed and that they were backwards institutions destined to become extinct. His support of education rights, access to land, and legal challenges to hacienda owners were all in service of turning indigenous Bolivians into assimilated Bolivians.³⁸ As a reformer, Bautista expected loyalty for paternalist assistance, assumed he knew what kinds of reforms were best for Indians and workers alike, and punished both when they demanded more. Eduardo Lima, like Bautista, was a strong supporter of indigenous education and worker reform. In fact, it was particularly the least enfranchised Bolivians that most deserved an education for Lima: because they raised the next generation of citizens, Lima argued, indigenous mothers should be the first priority of the state's educational program.³⁹

Lima's view of education was similar to his support of compulsory military service and enforcement of the *prestación vial*: he believed that both were productive of nationalist impulses, and therefore positive social behavior. The *prestación vial*, which was an obligation to assist the state with road construction introduced after 1899, was in theory demanded of all Bolivian men and in practice demanded of indigenous men disproportionately. Indigenous communities resisted both *prestación vial* and compulsory military service in this period, and the state mostly

³⁸ "Indigenista Statecraft and the Rise of the Caciques Apoderados" in Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*. Writing his memoirs in the 1990s, Luciano Tapia remembered his experience of education in this period as oppressive, a colonial maintenance of ignorance for the poor and indigenous. He argued that schools in Corocoro believed, despite the government, that school wasn't really intended for Indians. Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa = Así es nuestra vida*, 47. His narrative forms part of an Aymara backlash against the colonizing practices of education, but in the early twentieth century, education was a tool indigenous Bolivians could use to better protect their communities against hacendados and the state. Eduardo Nina Quispe encouraged indigenous Bolivians to fight this oppressive tendency by creating their own lawyers and teachers. See, Ramiro Condarco Morales, *Educación indígena: ciudadanía o colonización?* Ediciones Aruwiwiri, Taller de Historia Oral Andina, 1992; and Ticona Alejo, Esteban. *Saberes, Conocimientos Y Prácticas Anticoloniales Del Pueblo Aymara-Quechua En Bolivia*. La Paz: Plural Editores, 2010.

³⁹ Lima L., *Corocoro*, 110.

lacked the resources to enforce either of these laws consistently.⁴⁰ Lima believed that indigenous unrest could be tamed through better policing, which would also increase participation in these regulatory state structures. Once indigenous Bolivians saw themselves as members of a shared national community, such services would cease to appear onerous.⁴¹ Increasingly, I will argue in the next chapter, minework came to be understood in terms equivalent to military service, *prestación vial*, and education as an experience productive of the consciousness of citizenship and national belonging.

Good government, for Lima, was an answer to the threats of both indigenous insurgency and foreign exploitation. Lima wanted the national government in La Paz to restructure the provincial hierarchy to place rural *corregidores* under greater scrutiny of municipal officials, who would also control the police force. In this way, he hoped to remove corruption in rural officials granted too much autonomy, increase contact between indigenous authorities and the state, but also to assure that the Bolivian government had control over foreign businesses in the region.⁴² According to Lima, by 1918 Corocoro had a police force of eight men plus an officer controlled by the municipality, with another twenty men stationed in the border region of Charaña. Lima added, however, that the mining company had offered to help finance cavalry mounts for the border police, a proposition which he found generally favorable but worried that it might

⁴⁰ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*; Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*. Lima may have also been anxious of the fact that the Corocoro mining companies were complicit in keeping their workers out of the *prestación vial*, by offering a cash payment to the government. Robert Smale, "Above and below: Peasants and Miners in Oruro and Northern Potosí, Bolivia (1899-1929)" (2005), 187.

⁴¹ Lima, 97-8.

⁴² In his *Orígenes del Poder Militar*, James Dunkerley mentioned Corocoro as an example of the absent state in much of rural Bolivia, which had no stable no stable police force until the CUCM mining company paid for one. James Dunkerley, *Orígenes del poder militar: Bolivia 1879-1935* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 1987), 111. Rodríguez Ostria, on the other hand, identifies Corocoro as one of the first mining communities to institute a mining police force in 1856, expressly for the purpose of compelling workers to show up on time, putting a stop to the "San Lunes" tradition of absenteeism and of ore-theft. Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 55.

“compromise the integrity” of the force.⁴³ The perception of state monopoly on power was as much at stake for Lima as actual power, for the prestige of a modern nation, he argued could only be built on the prestige of its authorities.⁴⁴

In Lima’s text, therefore, we can see the development of a nascent liberal nationalism, not hostile to foreign interests, but not completely subservient to them either. Above all Lima wanted the Bolivian national government to regulate foreign interests in rural areas. Lima’s account was in fact very concerned with foreign influence in Corocoro, but used this fact to propose that the Bolivian government develop its own resources rather than remove foreign influence completely. The alternative, he suggested, was to face ridicule or worse, from the rest of the world. He never proposed direct government control of mining, rooting Bolivia’s prosperity in its ability to recruit foreign capital, but he concluded his *Apuntes Criticos* with the suggestion that the most progressive step the national government could take for the good of the country would be nationalizing the railroads.⁴⁵

Linares’ nationalism was also closely, though ambivalently, linked to the idea of an exploited working class. He also dedicated his pamphlet to the working classes of the community, declaring that in the reform of their living and working conditions Bolivia’s progress could be measured: “work is the factory in which the truest prestige of a nation is always forged, through the irreplaceable efforts of the working class.”⁴⁶ And yet, workers also presented Lima with the paradox of his region’s resistance to modernity. Lima also spent chapters of the same work arguing that mineworkers were profoundly lazy by nature and needed discipline.

⁴³ Lima L., *Corocoro*, 13–17.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 119.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 70.

⁴⁶ “el trabajo es el gran taller donde se forja perpetuamente el más verdadero prestigio de una nación, y cuyos imprescindibles labores son los obreros.” Ibid., 21.

Ultimately, Lima believed in the redemptive and transformative power of labor, like the civilizing potential of the army and the *prestación vial* to create modernity for Bolivia as a whole, using the unruly working class as a metaphor for the unruly Bolivian nation as a whole.

As the next several chapters will show, this move is a critical component of the nationalist discourse that later made the MNR such a powerful force in Bolivia. Lima offered beginnings of this narrative, praising the noble sacrifice of the poor workers in his bid for the Bolivian government to take better care protecting them. He also made sure to note examples of “complacent” workers gratefully accepting a recent wage increase.⁴⁷ However, Lima’s workers were always tainted with their ties to indigenous communities, rendering their work ethic and national consciousness most suspect in moments of festivity and unrest. Lima makes no mention, for example, of the successful strike campaign waged for an eight hour day by the anarchist Federación Obrera Internacional in La Paz and Corocoro, or of the 1912 and 1918 strikes that rocked Pacajes province.⁴⁸ His “complacent” workers, moreover, would face the army in a series of strikes shortly after *Apuntes* was published, in January of 1919.⁴⁹ It would take the profound upheavals of the 1930s to consolidate a nationalist discourse where unruly, striking workers could be seen as also sacrificing themselves for the good of the nation.

As in the rest of Bolivia, the 1920s for Corocoro were years of economic development, faith in future progress, and cautious interest in the region’s natural and human resources. Mineral prices for both tin and copper were at an all-time high in this period, and production

⁴⁷ Ibid., 44.

⁴⁸ Guillermo Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano: 1900-1923* (Editorial "Los Amigos del Libro, 1969), 81; Shesko, “Conscript Nation,” 129; Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*.

⁴⁹ “Sobre los Sucesos de Corocoro” *El Diario*, January 16, 1919.

soared for the CUCM and other companies.⁵⁰ Local elites had faith that industrial development could be used to develop the nation's infrastructure as well as transform its indigenous community into a more modern citizenry. Both of these trends allowed for a kind of optimistic, partial embrace of indigenous communities as part of Bolivia's unique contribution to the world. For this reason, elites and writers in this period were able to envision educated indigenous Bolivians as potential participants in national progress. Bautista's educational reforms reflect this optimistic assessment of Bolivia's future. President Saavedra also introduced a compulsory worker savings program, and a local Corocoro Republican earned his electoral win by backing accident protections and pensions for workers, the mine union supported his candidacy.⁵¹

On August 6, 1925, Bolivia celebrated its hundredth year as a republic with two weeks of civic festivities. Each day featured parades with "allegorical floats," and speeches, including a "Patriotic Conference in the Aymara Dialect" given by Señor Enrique Linares in the Plaza Colon on behalf of the "indigenous class."⁵² Local centenary celebrations offered a collective moment of reflection on Bolivia's past, present, and future. Corocoro's municipal government understood the Centenary celebrations to be an opportunity to honor the distinguished residents of the town, recognize the features of the community that made Corocoro important, and finally, to cultivate the participation of youth, workers, and artisans as junior participants in the civic project. In this climate of optimism, municipal festivals and civic rituals offered useful locations to incorporate and regulate indigenous symbolism into the national imaginary-usually at a safe distance from

⁵⁰ Kelly, T.D., and Matos, G.R., comps., 2014, Historical statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United States (2016 version): U.S. Geological Survey Data Series 140.

⁵¹ Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 127.

⁵² Municipio de Corocoro, 'Homenaje Al Centenario de Bolivia, 6 Agosto 1925', 1925.

the indigenous present.⁵³

The city also used the centenary as an excuse to accelerate the infrastructural development of the town. For example, municipal authorities paved the central streets of the town and issued ordinances demanding that homeowners paint their houses before August. The town also singled out the newly built military base and hospital as locations of festivity and municipal largesse, as in a symbolic donation of clothes the city dedicated to the nursing staff. Throughout the city, civic societies hosted public lectures, dances, and expositions. Encouraged by schoolteachers, Corocoro's youth offered demonstrations of learning and athletic ability, and the Club Calavera Sports Club offered tournaments in imported British sports such as "Foot Ball" and "Tennis." Artisanal and worker groups participated in the parades with their own floats, as did the local Bakers' Union, and several merchant societies. Authorities also threw a picnic and a dance for workers and miners, and invited "El Porvenir de la Juventud Obrera" to participate in the flag raising ceremony.⁵⁴ In highlighting the order, progress, and cosmopolitanism of the town through these celebrations, the municipality marked both its distance from the colonial past and projected hopes for the modern Bolivian century to come.

Rebellious Indians and Workers

Notably absent from the Centenary celebrations were agricultural collectives, laborers,

⁵³ The idea of a worker as a redeemable Indian was not the first or only attempt to recast Bolivia's indigenous population- or some subset of it- as more amenable to national citizenship than others. Kuenzli's *Acting Inca* explores the way that Aymara and Creole intellectuals alike in this period cultivated an Inca (as opposed to Aymara) identity to distance themselves from those groups associated with barbarity in the 1899 civil war. Kuenzli's work enables us to understand "Indian" identity as a category with multiple meanings and multiple deployments within a racist society where some forms of indigenous cultural expression were more problematically Indian than others. Kuenzli, E. Gabrielle. *Acting Inca: National Belonging in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia*. (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013).

⁵⁴ This organization was associated with the La Paz Federación Obrero de Trabajo, which later sent delegates to the Comintern, but in this period was primarily anarcho-syndicalist. Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1969, 186.

and the Aymara Indians themselves upon which Linares discoursed. Although Corocoro's geographic and political location meant that rural, indigenous Bolivians were a constant presence within the city, municipal authorities maintained a kind of official silence around this presence.⁵⁵ Notable too in these celebrations of Bolivia's past was an erasure of indigenous military participation in many of the very events that made Corocoro central to the liberal nation.⁵⁶ As Lima's asides about "conflagraciones" attest, despite its optimism for a developed and prosperous future, the city's elites were keenly aware of the threat posed by the indigenous present.⁵⁷ What is certain is that in places like Corocoro, elites perceived a threat of indigenous violence against urban residents from workers as well as rural Indians, feeling besieged both from within and without.⁵⁸

Although Corocoro's mineworker population grew to an all-time high of about 4200 in 1917, it was not until the 1920s that mine workers were consistently understood—both among themselves and by elites—as a group constitutionally different from rural indigenous laborers.⁵⁹ The beginnings of this distinction can be found in the proto-populist republicanism of Hernan

⁵⁵ Tapia, *Asi es nuestra vida*, 56.

⁵⁶ Morales, Zarate, *El Temible Willka*.

⁵⁷ One observer, for example, in the civil wars of 1899 said that conservative forces fleeing indigenous attacks took refuge in the plaza of the city of Corocoro in January, as Indians massed on the hills above town, and the miners of the Empresa Unificada de Corocoro "who were members of an Aymara community" attacked them with rocks, sticks, and dynamite Bocaminas ("Corocoro: Cuna del Cobre" 2011) For more accounts of this particular uprising, see also Lora, 101; Dunkerley, James. *Orígenes del poder militar: Bolivia 1879-1935*. Plural editores, 1987; Smale, "Above and Below," 177. For an account of the trials surrounding the 1899 "race war," see, Kuenzli, *Acting Inca*.

⁵⁸ Shesko writes that in the period of 1911-1925, the army was called out to deal with indigenous uprisings in La Paz province alone at least 40 times to protect property and lives from the "victimization" of Indians, and at least 5 times against striking miners. Shesko, "Conscript Nation," 129.

⁵⁹ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui "Notas Sobre el Proceso de Proletarización de la mina de Corocoro" (1985), found that these workers came from the expansion of the hacienda in La Paz, or were enganchados from the Cochabamba valley. Rivera also suggests that local indigenous communities maintained houses in Corocoro especially for the use of their community members during stints as temporary laborers. Both Guillermo Lora and Rodríguez Ostría identify the transformation of miners into a class *for themselves* (clase por si) as well as a class in themselves beginning with the movement for the eight hour work day in 1919. I am more concerned here with the visibility of the workers as a class, not only to themselves, but to other observers and would be allies. Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1969; Ostría, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 113.

Siles and Bautista Saavedra. Once again, Lima's writings suggest the work that had to be overcome to valorize worker dissent: while Lima, like novelist Jaime Mendoza in his *Tierras de Potosí*, characterized indigenous workers in the countryside and the mines as prisoners of exploitation, he also understood them to be fundamentally lazy, lacking in the kind of work ethic that produces great workers for a great nation.⁶⁰ Lima believed this laziness to be the result of both exploitation and lack of education. But relieving the poor working conditions experienced by indigenous Bolivians for Lima did not mean allowing them autonomy or independence: Lima believed free ayllu communities to be as much prisoners of their own ignorance as their hacienda colono counterparts were of exploitation.⁶¹ Rather, Lima argued that indigenous Bolivians needed to be incorporated into the nation through disciplinary structures like the army and the *prestación vial*.

It was, ironically, precisely the first manifestations of a working class culture in Corocoro that troubled observers like Lima. Both Marie Wright and Lima agreed that indigenous workers were so incorrigibly lazy that even civic holidays were dangerous for them, for they would use both religious and civic days as an excuse to "truly go on strike" in Lima's words, and spend as many days recovering from their drunken stupor as they had actually engaging in festivities.⁶² Lima singled out Carnival, which was famous in Corocoro in the early twentieth century as it was in Oruro, and the independence holiday of August 6. This association between civic and

⁶⁰ Jaime Mendoza, *En las tierras del Potosí: novela* (Los Amigos del Libro, 1976). See Anne Zulawski's discussion of gender and race in Mendoza's novel, in which she argued that indigenous women were seen to be obstacles to their husbands' modernization. Ann Zulawski, "Hygiene and 'The Indian Problem': Ethnicity and Medicine in Bolivia, 1910-1920," *Latin American Research Review* 35, no. 2 (January 1, 2000): 122.

⁶¹ Lima L., *Corocoro*, 94.

⁶² Wright, *Bolivia*, 360; Lima L., *Corocoro*, 112. Wright: "Mine owners say that the native labor, although at times somewhat limited, is not so unsatisfactory as might be supposed, the Indians and *cholos* working steadily and peaceably as a rule, though they spend a great deal of time in their numerous *fiestas*, when they always require an extra holiday for getting sober and ready for work again."

religious festivities and public disorder appears again and again in municipal records. Ramiro Cusicanqui, explaining the significance of Carnaval to Corocoreños, has suggested that it often functions as a sanctioned time of Rabelasian disorder where anything can happen.⁶³ But in fact, from the point of view of elites and municipal officials in Corocoro (as in other communities), Carnaval was a time of profound anxiety over disorder.

Both in the accounts of Lima and Wright and in the eyes of municipal officials, there was an implicit association between worker rebellion and religious festivals, especially Carnaval. Of particular concern was the legality of wearing disguises during the Carnaval season- year after year around this time the municipal government wanted revelers to register disguises or face penalties.⁶⁴ Rodríguez Ostría noting that the Spanish term “huelga” was synonymous with words for celebration in, for example, the works of Guaman Poma, argued that concerns over excessive festivity, and workers taking “extra” holidays were issues of labor regularization dating back to the mid-19th century in Corocoro as well as in Oruro.⁶⁵ This may explain why the worker’s federation in Corocoro emphasized, in the 1916-1919 period, the creation of May 1 as a worker’s holiday as one of its priority demands.⁶⁶ Similarly, as they gained local power, unions defended the rights of workers to drink: Rodríguez Ostría found a news item in the Corocoro paper *El Deber* in which the newly formed miners’ union successfully agitated for a worker who had been

⁶³ Mario Chuquimia Duran, July 29, 2014, personal communication. See also “Bolivia: Sábado de Carnaval En Corocoro. - El Alto,” accessed August 7, 2015, <http://elaltobolivia.blogspot.com/2009/02/bolivia-sabado-de-carnaval-en-corocoro.html>. See also Ramiro Cusicanqui, “Orígenes de La Danza Del Ch’uta: Bolivia: Corocoro Inició Histórica Exportación de Cobre,” *Orígenes de La Danza Del Ch’uta*, February 7, 2011, <http://chutaboliviano.blogspot.com/2011/02/bolivia-corocoro-inicio-historica.html>.

⁶⁴ See for example, “Ordenanza Municipal” February 1938, ALP PJAC Caja 140.

⁶⁵ Ostría, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 123.

⁶⁶ Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1969, 146. See also Enrique G. Loza, “Visión del Porvenir”, Iquique, 1916.

fired for excessive drinking be reinstated to work.⁶⁷ Although the union defended rights to celebration, the socialist party in this period was officially in favor of temperance.

This implicit association between strikes and festivals became explicit in February of 1930, when during the Carnaval holidays the new Manager Lebrun complained to the police that labor leaders had sabotaged the mines intentionally so that the workers could have a holiday.⁶⁸ A newspaper report noted that Lebrun had tried to do away with the longstanding custom of company officials buying alcohol, coca, and animals for the Carnaval holidays, as well as limit days of celebration taken by workers. Workers responded by sabotaging a passage in his Vizcachani mine shaft to guarantee that they could have a holiday.⁶⁹

Fears of worker unruliness, which could quickly spill over into political unrest during times of festivity, mirrored fears of indigenous uprising and contamination of urban centers around the same time period and in the same region. Holidays were the time when workers took over the public space in a way that most threatened modern conceptions of public order. At these times, workers looked most indigenous to elites: most unruly, most “ritualistic,” and indeed, most drunken. In this period we see Lima’s and liberal elite fears of “a tenacious lack of discipline among the Indian masses” that always carried with it a latent threat of rebellion, convert into a threat of disciplined labor rebellion, which never entirely shook colonial associations with the violent *indiada*.⁷⁰ These moments of festivity were also, however, moments of the consolidation of a worker culture that was in the process of becoming distinctly non-Indian in its own eyes. In Corocoro’s Carnaval celebrations, as in its efforts to position itself as

⁶⁷ 16 Diciembre, 1923, *El Deber*, cited in Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 111.

⁶⁸ “Lebrun Denuncia Sobre Sabotaje” February 1930, ALP PJAC Caja 119.

⁶⁹ *La Razón*, July 29, 1930.

⁷⁰ “una tenaz indisciplina entre la indiada” Lima L., *Corocoro*, 113.

center of modern innovation, urban residents ambivalently embraced and attempted to regulate the problem of unruliness and non-European cultural production.

This lack of distinction between workers and Indians of the countryside derives in part from the conditions of mining around the turn of the century, which only underwent a concerted process of industrialization after World War I. Until the formation of the Corocoro United copper holdings in 1909, most mines in the region were small, un-technical affairs with limited capacity to drill deep into the mountain worked by a small contingent of laborers who kept ties to the countryside. Both hacienda and free ayllu workers were incredibly prone to work stoppages and simply leaving, particularly, as he noted, during Carnaval, Corpus Christi, Easter, and the August 6th independence celebrations.⁷¹ These laborers were usually paid partially in kind and received kajcha benefits- that is, ore sharing agreements. Even the famously proletarianized tin mines of Llallagua and Uncía didn't have a stable workforce until migrations of Cochabamba peasants replaced local ayllus as the main worker population.⁷² Similarly, it was only after the 1930s that Corocoro first developed a population, about 2,500 out of the urban population of 5,000, who saw themselves as full time mineworkers, who lived in company housing, and bought goods from company stores, and were thus wholly dependent on the mines.⁷³

⁷¹ Hoping to limit the damage to productive time, a local priest in Corocoro reportedly tried to consolidate the holidays workers were allowed to take throughout the year into a single period during Carnaval. Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 56.

⁷² As Erick Langer suggests in his study of regional variations among southern Bolivian tin and silver mines, most smaller enterprises relied on seasonal contract laborers (or, if they were more wealthy, laborers from their own haciendas) to both work in the mines and transport ore. Langer, "The Barriers to Proletarianization"; Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*.

⁷³ Langer refers to hacienda-mines in the Chichas region with company housing and stores, but even these latter were ill stocked and subject to competition with the food the workers grew- and transported- themselves. Given its proximity to Arica and the Chilean border, this was probably a similar situation to Corocoro's, pre-1952, where company houses and stores did exist, but without the same kind of prominence as after 1952. Langer, "The Barriers to Proletarianization," 41. Lima notes that Corocoro workers in the early twentieth century often refused to use Company housing. Lima L., *Corocoro*, 48. See also Nancy Egan's forthcoming dissertation on 19th century Corocoro.

Around this time too, the first cultural productions associated explicitly with the miners emerged in Carnaval celebrations, in a dance known as the ch'uta.⁷⁴ Now practiced throughout Bolivia, particularly in the Carnaval parades in La Paz and Oruro, the ch'uta is a dance that originated between 1900 and 1920 in Corocoro, as the story goes, to mimic the dancing of a drunken pongo mocking the urban residents of the town. Pongeuaje was an institution of hacienda labor, abolished for good in 1952, where hacienda workers owed a period of unpaid domestic service to the master's house in town. In this way, the dance represented an indigenous worker's critical engagement with the culture of the city. Danced particularly by miners, this enactment of agricultural service work suggests a recent rural origin story for many of the miners. As the dance became more popular, the costume of the ch'uta dancer took on very specific forms: the dancer wore a mask with a "Germanic" beard and piercing blue eyes, and danced in a manner alternately threatening and seductive with a Bolivian cholita. In other words, this dance performed a critical—sometimes mocking, sometimes wary—acknowledgement of the conditions of a frontier mining town: partially acculturated indigenous Bolivians in a town full of potentially dangerous, but also alluring foreign influences.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Waskar Ari defines ch'uta as someone who has recently become a cholo, that is, an indigenous person attempting to live an urban, more culturally mestizo life. Ari, *Earth Politics*, 122. There is a lively debate over the true "cuna" (cradle) of the dance, whether the ch'uta originated first in the 19th century among agriculturalists in neighboring Caquiaviri or in the early 20th century in Corocoro. See Henry Stobart and Michelle Bigenho, "Grasping Cacophony in Bolivian Heritage Otherwise," *Anthropological Quarterly*, June 1, 2016, 25. Without taking too firm a side on this debate, my inclusion of the Corocoreño version here is used to support the idea that the ch'uta was created in encounters with urbanity either way. Whether the dance originated in Corocoro or Caquiaviri, the tradition traveled outside of Pacajes with the miners, and became a part of miner culture at a time when working class urban identity was being forged in new ways.

⁷⁵ Cusicanqui, Ramiro "Origen del Ch'uta" (La Paz: MUSEF, 2011). Ramiro Cusicanqui, *Corocoro, Cuna Del Chuta: Patrimonio Intangible de La Paz* (La Paz: publisher not identified, 2009).



Images 1.3 Celebrations at the Yanabarra/Viscachani mineshaft, 1920 (photo above).

Photographs from from pamphlet on origins of Ch'uta, available electronically:

<http://ciudaddecorocoro.blogspot.com/2013/01/el-origen-del-chuta.html>



Image 1.4 Sr. Macelino Altamirano y Sra. 1930, costumes by Juan Altamirano

Carnaval celebrations, much like *tío* worship, have a long history in Bolivian mining communities, but took on new forms with the development of a class of mineworkers. Langer,

for example, (like Lima and Marie Wright) has characterized the indiscipline of workers during Carnaval as primarily a consequence of the failure to develop proletarian labor discipline, while municipal officials and company managers at the time saw a dangerous association between worker rebellion and religious festivals such as Carnaval. I suggest that these practices help construct working class forms of resistance to industrial modernity, and because of their distance from modern European practices, they were they were coded as the “wrong” kind of worker solidarity by local observers too.⁷⁶

While many observers at the time and continuing to the present see indigenous cultural practices as signs of failure to conform to the process of proletarianization, the miners were in fact creating new cultural forms that distinguished themselves from their indigenous neighbors and families. An example of this kind of “indigenous” practice is the worship of *tío* in mines throughout Bolivia. While many observers take this practice as evidence of continuity with pre-colonial understandings of cosmology and space in the Andean world, many indigenous Bolivian nonminers see *tío* as a particularly Catholic or European import, a concept that only exists in Bolivia with the miners.⁷⁷ Observers like Tapia, who used to be a miner himself, saw the *tío* as a kind of outsider or usurper, using power against the interests of the indigenous community.⁷⁸ My concern is not whether there is an Andean origin for these practices, but rather that they are practices specifically designated as products of modern encounters, that is, as markers of working class belonging.

The 1920s were a time throughout Bolivia of the creation and consolidation of local

⁷⁶ Observers in Bolivia as well as abroad have noted similarities between the German mine demon the cobalt and the Bolivian *tío*. Indeed, one of my informants claimed that *tío* was simply cobalt, brought over by German mining engineers. Interview Mina Bolivar, conducted July 2011. Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*, 5.

⁷⁷ Nash, *We Eat the Mines*.

⁷⁸ Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*; Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Asi es nuestra vida)*, 41.

working class cultures, both of resistance and celebration. Mining towns such as Oruro, Uncía and Potosí founded worker federations and libraries, and Corocoro and Uncía each were sites of strikes against the Bautista government in 1919 and 1921.⁷⁹ Corocoro had a short-lived workers federation in this period, which sent delegates Ezequiel Aguilar and Juan Valdarrama to the second worker's congress in Bolivian history in La Paz in 1925.⁸⁰ Workers were also critical to the Republican election of Constantino Carrión to congress in 1925. La Paz and Cochabamba each had large populations of factory workers and market venders who federated in mostly anarchist unions around this time.⁸¹ While there were certain moments of cross-regional and indeed cross-industrial organization, most notably in the organizing around Oruro that led to the Chayanta uprising among both workers and indigenous communities in 1927, these expressions of worker solidarity had yet to consolidate into a nationally shared experience.

As I will show in my next chapter, the depression of 1930 created a diasporic community of fired workers- primarily miners, who began to share stories, experiences, and political tracts and reproduce them in other mines as well as outside of the mining communities.⁸² This was also the period in which the ch'uta Corocoreño became a fixture of Carnaval dances throughout Bolivia, as miners brought cultural expressions from home into new neighborhoods.⁸³ The Chaco

⁷⁹ Smale, *I Sweat the Flavor of Tin*; Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1969; Guillermo Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano: 1923-1933* (Los Amigos del Libro, 1980); Steven Sandor John, *Permanent Revolution on the Altiplano: Bolivian Trotskyism, 1928--2005* (ProQuest, 2006); Oporto, *Uncía Y Llallagua*; Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*.

⁸⁰ Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980, 15.

⁸¹ Dibbits and Taller de Historia y Participación de la Mujer (La Paz, *Polleras libertarias*).

⁸² Absi notes that miners in particular had a tendency to circulate between mines during times of financial –or personal– upheaval, sharing a general culture of work that included both tio worship and rituals of festivity. The depression, by contrast, encouraged movement out of the mines and into shantytowns in La Paz and uncultivated lands in the agricultural valleys of the Yungas, much like what happened in the 1980s. Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*.

⁸³ Cusicanqui, “Orígenes de La Danza Del Ch'uta.”

war exacerbated this demographic upheaval by drafting unemployed workers, labor organizers, agriculturalists, and finally the patriotic youth of the middle classes to fight together in the eastern lowlands. These demographic upheavals, particularly the depression, were a precondition for the formation of national labor federations in the 1930s and 1940s.

Alongside working class cultural expressions, elite and middle class reformers began to articulate new forms of political discontent by the late 1920s, influenced particularly by the revolutions in Mexico, Russia, and indigenista movements coming out of Peru. The most famous and influential of these intellectuals was Gustavo Navarro, who began his political life in the Bautista Saavedra coup, but by 1926 had adopted the nom de plume Tristán Marof and was travelling in more Marxist circles (literally, in the company of José Carlos Mariátegui).⁸⁴ From Belgium in 1926 Marof published his first explicitly socialist call to arms, *La Justicia del Inca*:

We have been fighting to the death for more than a century in homicidal combat for a political slogan or the convenience of a cacique. We want to build a sturdy republic on the basis of speeches; by charlatans... meanwhile, sharks of a difference kind reap profit from the suffering backs of the people and the indigenous class, the [family] Montes, the Patiño, the Aramayo, the Escalier, the Loayza, the Frenchman Soux, the Mendieta, the Chilean companies, the Americans, and thousands of lords of domains great and small. The only solution is this: land to the people and mines to the State.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ José Carlos Mariátegui, “La Aventura de Tristán Marof” *Variedades*: Lima, 3 de Marzo de 1928. A few writers have noted the irony of Marof’s choice of nom de plum reminiscent of a French-Russian aristocrat. Navarro’s career in fact traversed ideologies; as a teen he published an anarchist/literary idealist magazine indebted to Tolstoy; as a youth joined the Republican cause. This ideological promiscuity is absolutely characteristic of the political fermentation in Bolivia in this period, and his role in inspiring both the Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) and equally promiscuous Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) is thus not an anomaly. Nivardo Rodríguez Leytón, *Un Anarquismo Singular: Gustavo A. Navarro--Cesáreo Capriles, 1918-1924*, Colección Noveles Investigadores 4 (Sucre: Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia, 2013); John, *Permanent Revolution on the Altiplano*.

⁸⁵ “Estamos luchando a muerte desde hace cien años en combate homicida por una frase política o por la conveniencia de un cacique. Queremos edificar una república sólida sobre la base de discursos; de charlatanes... Mientras se hace todo esto, detrás de las espaldas sufridas del pueblo y de la clase indígena, se reparten las ganancias, tiburones de diferente bando: los Montes, los Patiño, los Aramayo, los Escalier, los Loayza, el francés Soux, los Mendieta, las compañías chilenas, las americanas y miles de patrones en mayor o menor escala según su rango. La única fórmula salvadora es esta: tierras al pueblo y minas al Estado” Tristán Marof, *La justicia del inca*. (Bruselas: “La Edición Latino Americana,” Librería Falk Fils, 1926).

In this text, Marof claimed, like the Peruvian indigenistas, a pre-Colombian tendency towards socialism in the Bolivian ayllu structure.⁸⁶ Marof put this theory to the test the next year when he helped organize (and was imprisoned for) an uprising in the Oruro region orchestrated by networks of caciques apoderados.⁸⁷ While indigenismo did not find as ready an audience in Bolivia as in Peru or Mexico, Marof's articulation of a class of people, both foreign and domestic, who were actively anti-national, whose business and political interests could only hold back Bolivia's development found a ready audience among both nationalist and socialist dissidents in this period. This vision built on the critiques of Republican (and later Republican Socialist) governments of the late 1920s such as that of Hernan Siles, but was explicitly oriented towards class war and Marxism.⁸⁸ Marof's nascent Marxism, rather than his indigenismo, is what resonated with later generations. Marof's formulation became especially crucial, as we can see, in communities directly affected by global industries after the crisis of 1929.

Corocoro in the 1930s: The Chaco and the Great Depression

The nationalist vision of economic progress and expansion shared by many elites and workers in the 1920s hit a crisis in the 1930s. Copper and tin prices dropped precipitously and many mines, including CUCM, closed down production completely.⁸⁹ Although Tapia and

⁸⁶ In this Marof was corresponding explicitly with Peruvians such as Valcárcel and Mariátegui, though he was never as analytically rigorous as the latter's *Siete Ensayos De Interpretación De La Realidad Peruana*, Colección Literatura Latinoamericana (La Habana: Casa de las Américas, 1973).

⁸⁷ Forrest Hylton, *Ya es otro tiempo el presente: cuatro momentos de insurgencia indígena* (La Paz, Bolivia: Muela del Diablo Editores, 2005); Hylton and Thomson, *Revolutionary Horizons*.

⁸⁸ Stephen Cote argues that in the late 1920s, the Bolivian government provoked the crisis of the War of the Chaco as a means of exerting more control over Standard Oil in this period. While the Bolivian state had granted Standard Oil a concession in 1923 in the hopes of using increased oil production to lower costs of production in other industries, notably mining, Standard Oil kept Bolivia's oil deposits intentionally under-productive, as a reserve to be developed during times of greater scarcity, and therefore higher prices. Cote, "The Nature of Oil in Bolivia, 1896-1952."

⁸⁹ USGS historical prices data suggests that Copper prices fell from 405 USD/ton to 292USD/t, falling further to 185 in 1931 and 128 in 1932, and not recovering until after World War II. This represented a 68% drop in production over 3 years from 1929 levels. For tin the number is 51% though prices had been falling since a peak of 1927.

Lechín offered radically different accounts of pre-1930s Corocoro, both agree that the depression of 1930 turned Corocoro into a ghost town.⁹⁰ Most working class Corocoreños moved to La Paz, Oruro or agricultural valleys of the Yungas, as larger mines temporarily halted production and smaller ones closed down completely. The school Lechín attended closed for lack of students. Both Luciano Tapia and Juan Lechín's families left Corocoro around this period, because as Tapia suggested, the community had been "destroyed."⁹¹ As late as 1940, Corocoro's fate was unstable enough that a resident suggested moving the town to a location less susceptible to flooding during the rainy season.⁹²

Around this time too, CUCM started looking to sell the mine. By the end of the decade Corocoro copper was a subsidiary of the American Smelting and Refining Company.⁹³ In this climate, elite Bolivians who hoped for progress and change through the mining economy came face to face with the realization that Corocoro was not, in itself, important to the foreign corporations that mined its ores. Many began to believe that foreign companies would not contribute to the prosperity of Corocoro in times of hardship. Encouraged by radicalized elites, municipal officials began to take action against mining company executives and the privileges they were used to exerting in the town. This is the context for the "Indian Attack on the Mines" dispute that begins this chapter.

There are several notable pieces to Linares' account of the mining company attacking its own building. First, unlike Lebrun and the local press, he pointedly did not refer to the workers

⁹⁰ Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Asi es nuestra vida)*, 56; Lechín Oquendo, *Memorias*, 33. Lechín notes: "Corocoro se convirtió en un pueblo solitario... creo que mi odio por los gringos comienza allí"

⁹¹ Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Asi es nuestra vida)*, 55.

⁹² ALP PJAC Caja 160.

⁹³ Marcossion, Isaac Frederick. *Metal Magic: The Story of the American Smelting & Refining Company*. (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1949) 171.

in this account as indigenous. Instead they were the “elemento trabajador,” the working class, “tacado por mal de mina,” wasted away by lung diseases earned through their sacrifice to the mines. Despite the recent spate of firings, which Linares took pains to establish as both unnecessary and immoral; these workers were not protesting or causing civic disturbances. Rather, those who still had jobs, such as security guards, were doing their best to protect the mines. Above all, he characterized the workers as victims and not agitators. It was the foreign engineers who were donning masks and making bombs from old tins of Quaker oats and tea “in order to burn down Corocoro.” Not only were the companies taking advantage of the workers, its own employees were running a risk to the town. In this way, Linares establishes a boundary between workers for the national good, and betrayers of that good among both the Bolivians and the foreigners of the company.

Linares’ prominent mention of silicosis and the Company’s unwillingness to pay its legal share of reparations for the disease also spoke to a growing consensus among public officials that Bolivia was undergoing a health crisis that it did not have the resources to fix.⁹⁴ The early decades of the twentieth century in Bolivia had seen several attempts to create a public health service that could keep records of and respond to the health concerns of the public. However, no government until the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) of the 1950s effectively created a public health service that could expand into rural regions and build hospitals where

⁹⁴ Zulawski notes that fears of rural contagion in the cities were instrumental in setting up many campaigns against diseases like yellow fever, typhus, and tuberculosis. However, these campaigns also drove public awareness about the living conditions of poor Bolivians. Zulawski identifies the Chaco War as a turning point in national health campaigns, although through the 1940s the Bolivian government had to rely on foreign institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation to provide doctors and clinics. Ann Zulawski, *Unequal Cures: Public Health and Political Change in Bolivia, 1900–1950* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2007). Similarly Mendizabal Lozano notes that the Dirección General de Salud was refounded three times between 1906 and 1929 in order to better provide healthcare, but that rural regions still lacked coverage, and that in 1929 president Hernando Siles asked the League of Nations to send technical assistance to help assess and improve Bolivia’s health system. Gregorio Mendizabal Lozano, *Historia de La Salud Pública En Bolivia: De Las Juntas de Sanidad a Los Directorios Locales de Salud* (La Paz: OPS:OMS, 2002), 128.

there were none before. Campaigns of hygiene and vaccination against infectious diseases in early twentieth century Bolivia often emphasized domestic sanitation and blamed poor health on the cultural resistance of indigenous Bolivians to western medicine, but increasingly by the 1920s, but doctors such as Jaime Mendoza, who spent time in mining communities began to articulate another explanation for the unhealthy living conditions of Bolivian workers: extreme poverty. In his writings starting with the 1911 novel *Las Tierras del Potosí*, Mendoza suggested that the mining companies were to blame for poor living and working conditions, and that the state failed to protect miners and their families.⁹⁵ This simultaneous concern with cultural education, domestic conditions, and workplace protections became consolidated in the socialist proposals of the generals who took power after the Chaco War in the 1930s. These provisions were to be carried out with the assistance of municipalities such as Corocoro, which by the 1930s shared financial responsibility for the Mining Hospital serving the city.⁹⁶

In bringing forth this denunciation, Linares made sure to position himself as a representative of the city, not the miners. He identified himself not by his profession, as was common of the working classes, but as a “vecino” of Corocoro, essentially claiming membership of the decent urban strata of the town. He cited workers who were present at the attack as witnesses, but made sure to include non-mining vecinos like himself. He also referred to conversations overheard on the soccer field in which these “gringo bandidos” had bragged they were not afraid of the miners. Essentially, Linares was creating a division, not between foreigners and locals, but between national and anti-national interests. Linares also listed the house in the city where many of the young engineers lived. Throughout, the atmosphere of this

⁹⁵ Zulawski, *Unequal Cures*, 45.

⁹⁶ See for example, 1930 municipal paychecks for nurses, ALP PJAC Caja 143.

complaint is one of social conviviality between foreign mining engineers and citizens like Linares. Linares, however, was a Bolivian, and a nationalist. It was the job of the city, he argued, to initiate judicial action against the rapacious foreigners and protect the workers and their families. The city seemed to agree. The local judge ordered an investigation and went so far as suggesting taking chief engineer Lebrun into custody. After more confrontations in which workers, merchants, and local lawyers tried to run the mining engineers out of town, the Municipality and even Ministry of Government intervened to bring about a settlement between the company and the workers.⁹⁷

Lebrun and several other foreign engineers cited in this document were a constant presence in the court system in 1930. Aside from the Carnival denuncia, earlier in June, one of the men named in the dispute, Swiss mining engineer Lembacher, was charged with hitting an indigenous man Santiago Cruz with his car early in the morning. Cruz had been walking with his llama herd at the time, and broke his arm in the accident. The charge was brought by vecino Elias Guzman, who did not seem to be party to the dispute at all, and in fact incorrectly remembered the indigenous man's name as Benito. He suggests that although Lembacher took the man to the hospital, he should still be charged. Moreover, he suggests that a mine employee came by claiming (with no proof) to be a compadre of Cruz's, tried to settle the matter on his behalf without charges. As with the false attack later in the month, a well-to-do citizen without seeming association with the case took on the legal representation of an indigenous man,

⁹⁷ After I found court records of this case in the Archivo La Paz, I found other references to it in Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 154–164; Marie-Danielle Demélas, *La invención política: Bolivia, Ecuador, Perú en el siglo XIX* (IFEA, Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 2003), 528. News of the attack made it to the La Paz newspapers and the French government, *La Razon*, July 29, 1930, La Paz. I am indebted in particular to Rodríguez Ostria's exhaustive research into worker consciousness in the first half of the twentieth century. However, I want to understand how it came to be that Corocoro United and Lebrun came under fire from local elites as well as workers, and why Linares is so committed to proving that the attack wasn't made by 'indios.' Enrique Linares, Expediente 130 'Sobre Los Sucesos Que Ocurieron 26 Junio', 1930, ALP PJAC Caja 120.

demanding that local authorities hold the mining company responsible.⁹⁸ In this case, Guzmán understood his role as speaking for the oppressed indigenous man, protecting him from foreign assault. The municipal government seems to have agreed. From the existing documentation, it does seem that Lembacher was charged in this case.

Both the Linares and the Guzmán disputes can be read as attempts by local elites to impose control over foreign corporations who threatened municipal interests during the 1920s and 1930s. Through nationalist encounters with foreign corporations and conflicts with residents, over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, urban residents in places like Corocoro began to understand both indigenous and working class residents on new terms. In the context of financial crisis, elites began to side with workers who protested firings rather than companies that did the firing. This changed the nature of political participation in Bolivia, as middle class political parties increasingly saw common ground—and potential voters—among mining communities specifically.⁹⁹

By speaking up on behalf of the workers, Linares prefigured a multi-class alliance with these “sons of labor” based around national control of resources for the common good.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, by highlighting the sickness and weakness of these workers as a problem, he posited that the government should be responsible for the lives of its citizens.¹⁰¹ Finally, Linares skirted racial anxieties around indigenous unrest by refusing to call them anything other than workers, using class terms to erase ethnic divisions. This process of selective incorporation of

⁹⁸ “Elias Guzman vs Ernesto Lembacher” June 1, 1930. ALP PJAC Caja 120.

⁹⁹ Laurence Whitehead, “Miners as Voters: The Electoral Process in Bolivia’s Mining Camps,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 13, no. 2 (1981): 313.

¹⁰⁰ Enrique Linares, Expediente 130 ‘Sobre Los Sucesos Que Ocurieron 26 Junio’, 1930, ALP PJAC, Caja 120.

¹⁰¹ Lima also had noted that, although workers had access to some local medical professionals, it cost a great deal of their wage and was insufficient to local needs. Lima L., *Corocoro*, 46–9. See further discussion of healthcare in Chapter 2.

working class groups into the imagined community of the city was a modernizing project, like building hospitals and schools, and depended on positioning local elites as protectors of subaltern groups from foreign interests. Each of these three claims would be crucial to national movements for reform that lasted from the 1940s through the 1970s in Bolivia.

In this dispute, most importantly, we can see the fruition of Lima's fears that Bolivia as a nation could be measured wanting by its lack of authority over its own peoples. This fear became the centerpiece of Tristán Marof's *Justicia del Inca*, and particularly his 1934 tract *Tragedía del Altiplano*, which I will take up in the next chapter. Marof co-founded the first viable socialist party in Bolivia, and through his influence Marxism was used generally among the opposition groups of the 1930s and 1940s to explain the unequal relations of power that characterized Bolivia's entry into the world economy. Like Lima, Marof was centrally concerned with the idea of Bolivia in the world. More explicitly than Lima, he saw in socialism a means to incorporate Bolivia into modernity, because it could replace the feudal conditions imposed by the hacienda owners. For Marof and people like Linares, the worker represented Bolivian modernity and the hacienda owners represented Bolivian backwardness. This reversal allowed for valorizing rural unrest as part of the nation-building process, while using indigenous histories of rebellion to argue that places like Bolivia were ripe for revolution. In this vision, the mines were the contradiction of Bolivian life that would bring about socialism and the new order, the diesel motor bringing indigenous people into the modern world.¹⁰²

Marof's most lasting contribution to Bolivian ideologies of revolution in this period, however, was the coining of the phrase "Lands to the People, Mines to the State!" in *Justicia del Inca* in 1926. One of the earliest explicit calls for nationalization of the mines, this formulation

¹⁰² Tristán Marof, *La Tragedia Del Altiplano* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Claridad, 1934).

was taken up the next year by university reformers in Oruro and socialist parties generally in Bolivia. The trajectory of this phrase deserves some comment here, because it is generally remembered and attributed to Marof as “Lands to the Indian, Mines to the State.”¹⁰³ This slippage between people and Indian is characteristic of both Marof’s writings and the ways that nationalist and Marxist ideas were consolidated after the 1930s into a semi-coherent ideology. The Bolivian people, in a global sense, were “Indians,” but the effects of that indigenous difference were also the problems of feudalism and repression. By remedying unequal land distribution and converting natural resources (both human and mineral) into national ones, the “Indians” would become a generalized Bolivian people. Just as indigenismo functioned as a way to valorize regional claims to authentic representation in Peru among Cuzco’s elite, and in Mexico served to reify the revolutionary state, Marof’s “tierra al indio/pueblo” was an attempt to use Bolivian difference to articulate Bolivia’s place in the world by both embracing, erasing, and co-opting acceptable forms of indigeneity.¹⁰⁴

This is a similar move to the way in which the 1899 rebellion in Corocoro has been remembered by union leaders such as Lora as a proto-worker uprising, but identified by contemporaries as an indigenous uprising. As workers became, in this period, legible political subjects, old kinds of unrest could be read as new political struggle.¹⁰⁵ In both municipal documents and elite writings in this period, writers increasingly distinguished between worker

¹⁰³ I am very grateful to Kevin Young for drawing my attention to this slippage, which he discusses in Young, “Blood of the Earth.”

¹⁰⁴ De la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos*; Alexander Dawson, “From Models for the Nation to Model Citizens: Indigenismo and the ‘Revindication’ of the Mexican Indian, 1920-40,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 30, no. 2 (1998): 279–308.

¹⁰⁵ For example, while Lora identified the 1920s as a moment in which tactics long used to repress indigenous uprisings were increasingly used to suppress worker unrest, both the Jesus de Machaca uprisings and those of Chayanta in 1927 (linked to Tristán Marof) were accused of communism by the Bautista government. Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971*, 167; Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980, 27; Dunkerley, *Orígenes del poder militar*, 117.

unrest and indigenous uprisings, using Marxist discourses of class to understand worker participation as political interventions, and indigenous rebellions as race war. This is also a moment in which worker groups increasingly understood their struggles in class terms, and addressed themselves to the company, would-be allies, and the government in those terms. Like Carnaval, these cultures of worker organizing were shared after the depression, resulting in the emergence of a visibly cohesive working class community associated with the mines.

Conclusions

What Marof and other elites saw in a Marxist language of class exploitation was an ordering of the world in which workers came to represent the role of Bolivia on the international stage, as a modern but oppressed underclass. Here, Bolivian elites and would-be reformers found the tools to resolve the contradictions of both the Liberal and Republican promises of development in the early twentieth century and create a shared national project. The nationalistic vision of state-controlled resources and multi-class alliance which was later associated with the 1952 revolution had its roots here in the boom and bust cycles of the mining economy, which attracted rural residents, tried to acculturate them to urban environments, and periodically sent waves of unemployed, but culturally distinct miners and their families to be absorbed by the cities or the countryside. Before the intense dislocations of the Chaco War, there was the mining economy, and both in the early 1930s contributed to a reshuffling of Bolivia's rural and urban populations, leading to the nationalist political parties of the 1940s. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the contradictions between the promise of capitalist development linked to foreign exploitation of resources and the inability of the Bolivian government to protect its citizens from this hardship became too obvious to ignore. Instead of giving up the project of modernity altogether, the next chapter will argue that workers and elites both worked to create a narrative of

modernization that put Bolivia as a center and driver of change and development. The echoes of this narrative are far reaching; they resound in Bolivian politics to this day.

In the 1930s and 1940s, military officials, intellectuals, and workers alike experimented with the new forms of political articulation that could be capacious enough for the urban workers and vecinos in this chapter, finding their most successful expression in the ideologically promiscuous nationalist visions of the MNR, founded in 1942. Corocoro rebuilt itself during and after the depression with the cautious help of the American Smelting Company, who bought into the copper mines previously held by the CUCM. As in decades previously, however, the municipal government's attempts to regulate itself and build upon the prosperity of the town brought them into increasing conflict with the Compañía, as it was called, while merchants found themselves competing with the company for consumers and resources. Nationalism, and increasingly, nationalization, came to be the language through which these disputes played out. All of these conditions helped create, during the global convulsions of the Second World War, a nationalist critique of global capitalism that centered Bolivian miners as heroes and agents of development of the nation.

This strain of modernist thought was capable of incorporating popular groups as workers in a shared national project of progress and development in corporatist and paternalist political structures, and was an organic outgrowth of the linking of modernity with control over the countryside, regularization, and infrastructure. Nevertheless, indigenous people always represented the uncontrollable, particularly in their potential for uprising, laziness, festivity to the state. Taking on the mineworkers as allies resolved a number of these threats by posing the possibility of indigenous incorporation by a process of changing cultural expression. Thus indigenous groups who remained visibly not proletarian, or proletarians who remained visibly

indigenous, posed a continued threat to nationalist politics and were only problematically included in this project. The future envisioned by this nationalist politics was shared by all Bolivians, but only on terms of assimilation.

Chapter 2: “Solo Mineros,” Workers as National Resources, 1930-1952

The problem for Bolivia is the problem of Hamlet: to be or not to be. In a country of three million inhabitants, two and a half live in a cultural and social backwardness of 5 or 6 thousand years-- malnourished, subdued, and stupefied beyond belief. The shadow of the pongo¹ kissing the hand of the tormentor that lashes him falls on our international politics as well, which is the politics of subservience and submission. Bolivia is sick from servility, the terrible affliction of the pongo.²

In truth, they were not human beings; they were merely toiling machines in the service of the few aristocrats who had guided history down to that time. The industrial revolution has simply carried this out to its logical end by making the workers machines pure and simple, taking from them the last trace of independent activity, and so forcing them to think and demand a position worthy of men.³

In 1938, during the era of military Socialist reform in Bolivia, the mayor of Corocoro, Lieutenant Teofilo Caro, wrote an angry letter castigating Compañía de Smelting chief engineer

¹ Pongo, deriving from the Quechua word “punku,” for door, tends to mean indigenous servant in Bolivia and Peru. Until the middle of the twentieth century, Andean hacienda laborers were obligated to provide free domestic labor for a period of time each year to the landlord upon whose land they resided. By the early twentieth century, reformers used the terms pongo and pongueaje as a kind of shorthand for feudalistic land tenure relationships generally, and eventually to characterize the relationship between indigenous and white or mestizo Bolivia on a national level, as Moisés does here. While this rhetoric helped reformers establish a clear sense of injustice against indigenous communities, using the pongo as a metonym for indigenous Bolivia generally obscured both ongoing political agitation among hacienda laborers and the substantial population of independent indigenous communities (ayllus) that fought for greater rights and land protections but were not living under servitude.

² “Este problema para Bolivia, es el problema de Hamlet: Ser o no ser. En un país de 3 millones de habitantes, 2 y medio viven en un atraso cultural y social de 5 o 6 mil años. Desnutrido, sometido y embrutecido hasta lo increíble. La sombra del pongo besando la mano del verdugo que lo azota, se refleja hasta en nuestra política internacional que es política de pongueaje y sometimiento. Bolivia está enferma de servilismo, el terrible mal del pongo.” Gabriel Moisés, *Resumen Del Discurso Del Diputado Por Dalence, H. Gabriel Moisés, Pronunciado En La Célebre Interpelación Al Gabinete Por La Masacre de Catavi, Planteada Por Los Diputados Del P.I.R. (Sesiones Del 31 de Agosto Y 3 de Septiembre de 1943)*, Serie Documentos Parlamentarios (Bolivia: Editorial “La Paz,” 1943), 33.

³ Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, ed. Victor Kiernan and Tristram Hunt (London: Penguin Classics, 2009), 52. I have placed these these quotations at the beginning of this chapter to highlight the contrast between the consciousness and humanity granted industrial laborers versus the assumed blind servitude of laborers outside of industry. Engels believed that labor had produced consciousness among the workers of Europe by taking away their humanity. Operating within a racist history that had long declared indigenous Bolivians outside of modernity and political consciousness, socialists such as Moisés saw industrialization as a means to redeem the humanity of indigenous Bolivians, thus curing the affliction of the nation as a whole.

Thomas for refusing to take part in the Department-wide celebrations of July 16, commemorating the historic battle of Ingavi against the Spanish.⁴ Caro bristled especially at the company's individualistic ideals that equated "progress" with order, sobriety, and productivity among the workers and townsfolk. In a noted contrast to earlier observers who saw in miners' celebrations, even of civic holidays, a sign of their lack of modernity, Caro argued that it was both inherently Bolivian and in the interests of the collective good to remember such a historic battle for liberation with drunken celebration. Caro called in to question the national loyalties of the foreign mining engineer, suggesting the Company misunderstood its own relationship to the community and was obligated to honor and help celebrate Bolivian holidays. Finally, Caro threateningly indicated that the Company's reluctance to do so had been "noted" by local authorities, implying to company that they might bear in mind the fate of Standard Oil's Bolivian fields, nationalized only the year before by the military socialist David Toro.⁵

⁴ Teofilo Caro a J Thomas, Gerente Cia Smelting, July 13, 1938, ALP PJAC Caja 160. "I have read your memorandum from July 11, in response to the memorandum sent by the Municipality, with all the emotion of a Bolivian and of the chief authority of Pacajes Province, to be insulting to the honor and civic engagement with which we must celebrate the memorable actions of the people of the great department of La Paz who how to face the struggle for Freedom against the Spanish yoke with great civic spirit. However, the opposition of the Management is childish, not least because there cannot exist a single Bolivian that would limit these celebrations; you have also said that limiting festivities is a progressive measure, which is simply the belief of private interests. The management has an incorrect understanding of their own interests by assuming they are in the collective interests, which actually lie in the remembrance of the great hour of this part of Latin America. The Municipality has taken careful note of your refusal to take part in the July 16th Festivities, despite the fact that the Management is not only obliged but called upon to fulfill the demands of the various festivities planned to make for exceptional patriotic events." "He dado lectura á su oficio del once de Julio, en respuesta al oficio dirijídole [sic] por ésta Alcaldía, con el mas profundo sentimiento de Boliviano y primera Autoridad de la Provincia Pacájes, por ser hirientes al Honor y encaje cívico con el que deben ser recordados siempre los actos memorables de los pueblos que como el gran Departamento de La Paz, supo afrontar con altura cívica [sic] la lucha por la Libertad frente á la opresión del yugo español. El empero [sic] que há opuesto esa Gerencia, es infantil, por lo mismo de que no puede existir un solo boliviano que decee [sic] limitar festividades; dice Ud. También que la limitación de festividades es un progreso ende [sic], convicción de intereses particulares, la gerencia está en concepto erróneo de que sea intereces [sic] particulares, las que superpongan los intereses colectivos, cual es la recordación de las horas magnas de esta parte de la América Latina. La Alcaldía toma debida nota de su no concurso á las solemnidades de "16 de Julio", a pesar de que la Gerencia, no solo que esta obligada sino que esta llamada a cumplir con las exigencias que le imponen las distitas [sic] festividades programadas para dar exeptional [sic] realice a las fiestas patrias."

⁵ Teofilo Caro a J Thomas, Gerente Cia Smelting, July 13, 1938. Herbert S. Klein, "'Social Constitutionalism' in Latin America: The Bolivian Experience of 1938," *The Americas* 22, no. 3 (January 1966): 258.

In this chapter I move away from an exclusive focus on Corocoro to show how local forms of agitation against foreign exploitation interacted with national reformist projects throughout the rest of Bolivia to produce the particular articulation of nationalist industrial development, authoritarian populist politics, and assimilative mestizaje that carried the Movimiento Revolucionario Nacionalista (MNR) to power during the Revolution of 1952. I suggest that components of this revolutionary vision were shared by all of the opposition parties during the 1940s, which like the MNR saw their role as protecting and “civilizing” Bolivia’s rural indigenous population as a means to improve the Bolivian nation itself.⁶ While the early decades of the twentieth century had induced a subset of Bolivian elites to embrace laws promoting educational, medical, and workplace reform in order to protect the country and modernize its peoples, the period between the Chaco War (1932-1935) and the tumultuous regime of President Gualberto Villarroel (1943-1946) demonstrated to Bolivians that the state could not adequately achieve these goals without fundamentally altering the relationship between the government, national capital, and global markets. Legal reform was inadequate without a state that could and would carry laws out; in order to create such a state, the country needed a revolution.

Many scholars of postcolonial nation-making have noted persistent contradictions between projects to civilize native peoples into the nation and campaigns to prevent this inclusion from ever taking place, sometimes within the very same governments and social

⁶ Laura Gotkowitz argues that a regional discourse of mestizaje produced in Cochabamba became nationalized through the MNR in this period. Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 171. I suggest that this discourse of mestizaje resonated with a political vision of class transformation in the mines, where migrant Cochabamba peasants often travelled for work during this period. This resonance helps explain how miners took on such a symbolically large role in the revolution with such a small demographic presence.

movements.⁷ In Bolivia, both exclusive and assimilative projects have been particularly fraught with anxieties of contamination because elites have long understood that their own position in international circles was inextricable from the perception of indigenous peoples: as representatives of South America's most indigenous and least stable country, even the whitest of Bolivians was not "modern" enough for most of the world.⁸ Paradoxically, Marxism became the language through which a shared nationalist project could be forged: by casting the nation itself as the exploited class producing value for a global capitalist system, elite Bolivians dreamed of revolution against dependence on foreign assistance and foreign markets, without fully relinquishing their own claims to power. Marxism allowed elite Bolivians to see uprisings and instability as signs of modernity and progress rather than lamentable backwardness.

In order to make room for this multi-class paternalist revolution, local elites, merchants, and the middle class had to do two things: cast obstructionist national elites into traitors, to unite the country around a common external foe and redefine Bolivia's indigenous majority as modern workers. Would-be reformers redefined Bolivian elites as foreigners because of their lack of fidelity to national interests, and then suggested that they could replace this foreign elite with a middle-class leadership that was national in spirit and in birth. Corocoro, as one of the few important centers of mining owned by purely foreign interests, became a template for future

⁷ Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*; Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910* (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Sanders, *Contentious Republicans*; Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁸ In this way, my work engages with recent scholarship on rural education and healthcare that prioritized assimilating rural indigenous communities while keeping them in their place in the countryside. Brooke Larson, "Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds: the Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s-1940s" In Andrew Canessa, ed., *Natives Making Nation: Gender, Indigeneity, and the State in the Andes* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005, pp. 32-59; and "Redeemed Indians, Barbarianized Cholos: Crafting Neocolonial Modernity in Early twentieth Century Bolivia" In N. Jacobsen and C. Aljovín, eds., *Political Cultures of the Andes, 1750-1950* Durham: Duke University Press, 2005, pp. 230-252; Zulawski, *Unequal Cures*.

agitation. In this way, the nationalist multiclass agitation adopted by Corocoro's pueblo rebelde inspired similar revolts against national elites throughout Bolivia.

Why and how did the miners and their union become the imagined "vanguard" of the labor movement? Most historians have found it self-evident in this period that the industrial workers so central to Bolivia's economy would be the drivers of working class politics.⁹ But the miner federation that dominated Bolivian labor politics after 1952 was only born in 1944, and miners throughout the twentieth century never represented more than 5% of the working population. Moreover, the workers who led the experiments in Chaco War resistance and military socialism in the 1930s were in fact print-makers unions and other urban groups tied more firmly to anarchist and syndicalist positions.¹⁰ It was only in the 1940s that all three populist revolutionary parties championed miners as the oppressed workers of the nation in need of change. Beyond economic explanations, miners came to wield outsized political influence for two ideological reasons: the mines' explicit link to Bolivia's dependence on the global economy and subsequent exposure of the weakness of the national government in protecting citizens from this economy, and the miners' position as a proletarianizing, culturally recognizable working class that could drive demographic change by bridging the gap between rural and urban Bolivia, converting indigenous subjects into worker citizens.

The emphasis on Bolivian miners as agents of change was a particularly ingenious way to envision Bolivian progress and solve the problems of colonial and neocolonial inequalities. The miners, newly integrated into capitalist forms of production and in the process of literally

⁹ Klein, *Orígenes de La Revolución Nacional Boliviana*; Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980; Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo Nacional-Popular En Bolivia*; Robert Jackson Alexander, *A History of Organized Labor in Bolivia* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005); S. Sándor John, *Bolivia's Radical Tradition: Permanent Revolution in the Andes*, Reprint edition (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012); Smale, *I Sweat the Flavor of Tin*.

¹⁰ Waldo Alvarez España, *Memorias Del Primer Ministro Obrero: Historia Del Movimiento Sindical Y Político Boliviano, 1916-1952*, 1a ed (La Paz, Bolivia: s.n, 1986); Young, "Blood of the Earth."

transforming themselves from Indians into workers, now had a historic destiny that was eminently modern. An autochthonous Bolivian modernity was thus created out of the raw material of indigeneity- much like national prosperity could be smelted out of Bolivian ores. Moreover, the experience of the miners extended by analogy to the whole nation such that Bolivia itself could be seen as undergoing a process of proletarianization. Four centuries of exploitation by at the hands of foreign governments and corporations had caused Bolivian backwardness, but could also lead to a revolutionary consciousness among sectors not traditionally considered revolutionary: Bolivian intellectuals and the middle class could lead the way towards modernity through socialist revolution.

This chapter, rather than reconstruct all of the events that led to the revolution, therefore, emphasizes the interplay between the national narrative and the particular the experience of change in a rural city undergoing transitions in both its commerce and industrial makeup. The changes that produced the 1952 Revolution in Bolivia also fundamentally remade local power in Corocoro, marginalizing it, in many ways, from its previous importance in La Paz and national politics. Corocoro rebuilt itself during and after the depression with the cautious help of the American Smelting Company, who bought into the copper mines previously held by the CUCM. As in decades previously, however, the municipal government's attempts to regulate itself and build upon the prosperity of the town brought them into increasing conflict with the *Compañía*, as it was called, while merchants found themselves competing with the company for consumers and resources. Nationalism, and increasingly, nationalization, came to be the language through which these disputes played out. All of these conditions helped disseminate, during the global convulsions of the Second World War, Corocoro's nationalist critique of global capitalism that centered Bolivian miners as heroes and agents of development of the nation.

Such a vision of transformation through labor was also appealing to the miners themselves. The corporatist vision put forth by the MNR and the calls for perpetual global revolution of the POR most closely resembled the miners own visions of themselves as veterans of the global tin (and copper) economy, as well as their class-based visions of personal and national transformation. Miners saw themselves as different from both their urban allies and their rural, indigenous neighbors. The final section of my chapter examines this political culture embraced by workers to better understand how nationalist, class-based revolution celebrating miners became a common explanatory tool for certain sectors of the Bolivian middle, elite, and working classes alike.

The Chaco War and the Great Depression

Bolivia experienced two disasters in short order in the early 1930s: the stock market crash of 1929 and the War of the Chaco from 1932-1935.¹¹ The global depression was devastating to the Bolivian economy, especially for communities like Corocoro. For workers and elites tied to mineral and petroleum interests, the Depression clarified Bolivia's sense of being at the mercy of foreign capital and foreign imperialism. It also highlighted the weakness of the state and traditional parties in the face of such economic shocks. Even worse, however, was the Salamanca government's response to this crisis: provoking a war with Paraguay over the Chaco region in 1932.¹² Intended to restore national confidence and prosperity the Chaco War ended up being

¹¹ Herbert Klein has suggested that the underdeveloped nature of Bolivia's economy protected many, especially in the middle classes, from feeling the worst shocks of the great Depression. Klein, Herbert S. *Origenes de La Revolución Nacional Boliviana: La Crisis de La Generación Del Chaco*. La Paz: Librería y Editorial "Juventud," 1968. See also, Klein, *Origins of Social Revolution*, 108. In the mining camps, intimately tied to global markets, this was simply not true. See, Lawrence Whitehead and Mario R. dos Santos, "El Impacto de La Gran Depresión En Bolivia," *Desarrollo Económico* 12, no. 45 (April 1972): 49.

¹² Depending on the sources used, the war either began in 1928 or 1932. I use the latter because while skirmishes occurred before this year, large-scale mobilization was avoidable until 1932. Roberto Calvo Querejazu, *Masamaclay: Historia Política, Diplomática Y Militar de La Guerra Del Chaco* (La Paz: Gráfica E. Burillo, 1965); Bruce W. Farcau, *The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932-1935* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996); Ange-

Bolivia's most disastrous attempt at exerting territorial control since the War of the Pacific. With a better airforce, larger army, and stronger economic base, Bolivia expected to dominate its lowland neighbor. While no one emerged better off from the conflict, which killed 100,000 people and lost Bolivia most of its territory in the Chaco region, Bolivia unquestionably lost.

Ever since the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), in which the nation lost its only sea coast to Chile, Bolivian politicians had been looking for a convenient way to transport goods and materials to the ocean. As Bolivia began to reach eastward with colonization and oil development initiatives, conflict arose in the Chaco region between Bolivia and its neighbor Paraguay, especially between the Pilcomayo and Paraguay rivers. Bolivia's portion of this region was sparsely populated in this era, but increasingly home to Paraguayan settlers. In the 1920s, both countries had begun to fortify where they believed, or hoped, the borders resided, occasionally skirmishing with each other, culminating with Bolivians taking the Paraguayan fort of Boquerón in 1928. League of Nations and Pan American League intervention kept the conflict from spreading until 1932, when Bolivians took another Paraguayan fort near Lake Pitiantutá. When Paraguay mounted an assault to recapture the fort, Bolivia declared war.

Historians and popular memories of the War of the Chaco disagree on its causes, but all accounts suggest a corrupt national leadership as the primary cause of Bolivia's defeat. To this day, Bolivians widely believe that the war was provoked by Standard Oil and Dutch Shell as a means of gaining access to oil deposits in the region, while historians generally accept that Bolivian president Salamanca provoked the war (even against the wishes of the military high command) in the hopes of disabling the political opposition and gaining territory— specifically

François Casabianca and Cristina Boselli Cantero, *Una Guerra Desconocida: La Campaña Del Chaco Borea* (Asunción, Paraguay: El Lector, 1999).

access to a deep water port on the Paraguay River, which could provide access to the Atlantic.¹³

However, after three years of disastrous campaigns, hunger, thirst, and disease, in what many writers termed the “War of Thirst,” Bolivian generals forced a peace agreement that saved Bolivia’s oil rich territory but lost a great deal of land to Paraguay.¹⁴

Although Standard Oil did not provoke the war itself, oil has everything to do with both the way the war was waged and its impact on Bolivian politics. Historian Stephen Cote argues persuasively that Bolivia provoked the conflict at least in part because it wanted greater control over how oil was produced and developed in the region. While Standard Oil held rights to Bolivian oil fields, it generally thought that these were more profitable as reserves to be developed during a period of global scarcity when prices would be higher. The Bolivian government, on the other hand, hoped to profit from increased productivity immediately, using oil produced locally to lower transport costs for Bolivia’s other industries, such as mining. The governments of the 1920s had seen granting Standard development rights, along with encouraging European migration to the region, as a means to modernize and develop the country.¹⁵ By the early 1930s, this strategy seemed naive, even to much of the Republican Party. As in the case of foreign mining companies, the Depression brought to crisis point the contradictory impulses of European and nationally-directed development, and the Chaco War was an ill-advised attempt to resolve these crises. Regardless of the causes of the war, Bolivia

¹³ There are no oil deposits in the actual Chaco region. Nonetheless, by the end of the conflict, Paraguay had pushed the Bolivian army so far back that Bolivia feared losing its Andean oil fields. See Stephen Cote, *The Nature of Oil*, 2011. Actually: Paraguay did discover oil here, see article in *La Nacion* (Argentina) 12 Nov 2012

¹⁴ The classic English language account of the conflict is Zook, David H., Jr. *Conduct of the Chaco War*. New Haven, CT: Bookman, 1960.

¹⁵ Cote, “The Nature of Oil in Bolivia, 1896-1952.”

was explicitly fighting to keep its oil deposits by 1935, and civilians and army officials both suspected Standard Oil of collaborating with, and perhaps supplying oil to, Paraguay.

The immediate result of these crises was a period of radical experimentation among both the older civilian politicians of the liberal era and the workers and military officers who sought to replace them in power. Several new parties were formed, the Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) in 1935, the Soviet-influenced Partido Izquierdista Revolucionario (PIR) in 1938, and the corporatist Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in 1942. These parties fought each other and the old order, above all over who should participate in directing the Bolivian state. Although suffrage was one component of these conflicts, more important were the struggles over the right to organize, the conflict between public interest and private property, and the duty of the state to provide protections and well being for its citizens.

The Chaco War completely reorganized the question of the relationship between state and nation, left unresolved during the liberal and republican eras of Bolivian government. All of the opposition parties had populist intentions in this period, but each struggled with the paradox of how to contain and direct popular participation itself. The exigencies of full wartime mobilization in a region with neither road nor rail access (not to mention sources of local food and water) profoundly changed the way that the state could relate to citizens, resources and organizations within the country. Some of these changes tended to repress popular mobilization in this period: Salamanca outlawed political organizing, strikes, and instituted a draft which targeted both indigenous communities and political activists.¹⁶ Other changes accelerated development, as for example, road-building projects into the eastern lowlands and the beginnings of serious inquiry into tropical diseases in Bolivia. Finally, the war allowed the state to redefine

¹⁶ Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980.

its relationship to foreign companies, allowing for the first time the serious possibility of nationalization of major industries. During the course of the war, the military took control of Standard Oil's fields to direct production to the war effort more efficiently. After the war, Bolivian military governments saw state-directed development as a means to control production of a peacetime economy.¹⁷

On a popular level, the Chaco also changed how Bolivians understood national belonging and national territory. This had a great deal to do with the way in which Bolivian conscription processes worked. In theory, all Bolivian men owed military service, but in practice conscriptions were selectively enforced among indigenous and rural populations. Wealthy Bolivians could afford to pay out instead of service, and poorer men who could manage it took jobs in mines to avoid military service as well.¹⁸ At the beginning of the war, Salamanca used conscription to round up labor and student organizers, and a general call to patriotism brought in a number of middle class students and intellectuals. As a result, the front lines were made up of the most radical popular sectors alongside those most able to engage in vocal oppositional politics. Around 5,000 men from the Pacajes region fought in this conflict, out of a total population of about 30,000 people. Most of these soldiers were young men from indigenous communities or the mining camps used to high altitude, arid conditions and highly susceptible to tropical diseases, humidity, and thirst. Alongside these young men were idealistic middle class youths who volunteered out of patriotic fervor. These two groups, experiencing together starvation, thirst, and disease on the front lines, began to understand themselves to have a

¹⁷ Cote, "The Nature of Oil in Bolivia, 1896-1952."

¹⁸ Oporto, *Uncía Y Llallagua*, 133. There were some draft dodgers in Corocoro. Shesko, "Conscript Nation," 267.

common enemy in aristocratic civilian politicians such as Daniel Salamanca. Shared hardship and alienation then ended up creating the conditions for nationalist popular politics generally.

The Chaco thus provides a compellingly neat story of the development of nationalist politics out of national defeat, much like the Treaty of Versailles offered a compellingly neat scapegoat for German nationalist politics in the 1930s. This historical explanation also carries with it a common Latin American trope of the nation that does not know itself and therefore cannot unite and win a war.¹⁹ Many accounts of the Chaco refer to indigenous Bolivians who had never left their home communities suddenly sent to die next to workers and young patriots in a jungle they never imagined was part of their own territory, asking who the Paraguayans and who the Bolivians were.²⁰ While there is some truth to this account—the Chaco was a region unfamiliar to the vast majority of Bolivia's inhabitants, unlinked by roads or waterways and scantily populated—rural Bolivians in this time period were neither provincial nor sedentary.²¹ Ultimately, even poor and indigenous Bolivians were a mobile and unstable population.²²

¹⁹ Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*. See also Seemin Qayum's "National Geographic Association of La Paz" in Qayum, "Nationalism, Internal Colonialism and the Spatial Imagination: The Geographic Society of La Paz in Turn-of-the-Century Bolivia."

²⁰ Luis Toro Ramallo, *Chaco, Novela (del Cuaderno de Un Sargento)* (Santiago, Chile: Nascimento, 1936); Carlos Montenegro, *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*. (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pleamar, 1967); Cordero, *Historia del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, 1941-1952*; Harold Osborne, *Bolivia, a Land Divided*, 3d ed, Chatham House Latin American Studies (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

²¹ Since before the arrival of the Spaniards, Andean communities have relied on cultivating the vertical ecology of the Andes to diversify risk and sources of income. Under the precolombian system identified by John V Murra, *Formaciones Económicas Y Políticas Del Mundo Andino*, Historia Andina 3 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1975). Highland ayllus typically maintained colonies in the agriculturally fertile lower valleys of the Yungas, sending extended family members to work and reside in different regions or conduct trade for goods not locally available. Under the Inca Empire, forced resettlements of entire communities and empire-expanding expeditions into the lowlands meant that regions like the Chaco were known to exist. During the colonial period, existing migratory practices survived but were layered with coercive labor mobilizations such as the mit'a, as well as coercive taxation practices that encouraged people to flee their communities of origin and become forasteros in other areas. Larson, Harris, and Tandeter, *Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes*. 170.

²² Bolivia, *Censo Demográfico, 1950* ([La Paz: Editorial "Argote," 1955]; Bolivia, *Censo General de La Población de La República D Bolivia Según El Empadronamiento de 1. de Septiembre de 1900*. In the 18th and 19th centuries, seasonal cycles of mine employment and economic cycles of periodic mass firings, as happened in the Depression, created a circulation of workers who maintained ties to their home communities but worked and lived elsewhere, sometimes for generations. Moreover, forms of cultural production related to civic festivities- Saints Days,

Rather than introducing Indians to their homeland, therefore, the Chaco raised the question of belonging in new ways. Because Bolivia had nominal compulsory male conscription since 1907, a booklet of military service was required at this time for any man who wanted to get a job, have a civil marriage, or vote. Citizenship, therefore, was explicitly tied to military service.²³ Before the Chaco War, the Bolivian government was notoriously bad at enforcing these provisions, but developed greater capacity to compel compliance as a result of the war. The wartime expansion of conscription was based on the idea of collective sacrifice from all regions of Bolivia for a projected future good.²⁴ When, during the course of the war, the Bolivian state proved itself unworthy of such collective sacrifice, this mobilization produced a nationwide questioning of who could legitimately exercise political power. In the post-Chaco period, being a conscript was strongly correlated with the ability to make claims as a citizen, and veterans groups became some of the most vocal and effective political organizations on a grassroots level.²⁵ On an ideological level, the near-routing of the Bolivian army explicitly linked three

Independence Day, Carnival, in both working class and agricultural communities explicitly referenced this mobility (as the Carnival Ch'uta dance demonstrates) as in the case of coca farmers whose dance referenced their migratory origins as miners. In sum, the soldiers drafted to fight in the Chaco may not have had a sense of where they were fighting or why they were on the side of the Bolivian government, but held their own relationships to region, place, and collective belonging. The idea that Bolivian Indians, for example, were isolated or never got a wider sense of the world than their own llama fields is as false coming from nationalists and historians as it is from social Darwinists.

²³ The army was also where many Bolivians without access to schools learned to read and write. Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Así es nuestra vida)*, 163–173.

²⁴ By the 1940s, this idea of collective sacrifice for future good associated during the Chaco period with veterans became part of both the MNR idealization of miners as a class and miners' own understanding of their role in the nation: venturing into the unknown and risking life for a deferred collective benefit. After the 1952 revolution, when miners actually formed militias and fought on behalf of the MNR, this sense of mining and fighting as parallel activities was further reinforced.

²⁵ Young, "Blood of the Earth." Also, Brooke Larson, "Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds: the Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s-1940s" In Andrew Canessa, ed., *Natives Making Nation: Gender, Indigeneity, and the State in the Andes* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005, pp. 32-59.

things: popular sacrifice, government malfeasance, and the need to control national resources and direct them to the public good.²⁶

Military Socialism

By the second year of the war, universal opposition to Salamanca and anyone loosely affiliated with his government existed among the general population. In 1934, military officers led by Colonels David Toro and Germán Busch forced Salamanca to resign when he visited their field headquarters in the Chaco, beginning five years of experimentation with military populism and military socialism. Initially, the military was content to replace the largely incompetent Salamanca with another, more politically astute Republican, Luis Tejada Sorzano. Tejada Sorzano helped negotiate a peace settlement and began a process of negotiating with dissident sectors of the population, but when in 1936 the workers of La Paz brought the entire government to a halt with a general strike so thorough that the unions, not the police, were keeping order in the cities, the military intervened once more to govern directly.²⁷

Remembered as a period of military radicalism, this period was in fact one of populist experimentation primarily geared at corralling and containing the popular forces unleashed by the war.²⁸ In this way, many of the reforms of the military socialist period foreshadowed the changes pushed through by the 1952 revolution. Soldiers, workers, and the middle class all agreed that something had to change, and even the traditional parties in this period participated in

²⁶ The tensions produced by both war and international economic recession heightened both of the narratives of need for modernization and need for reform. The War of the Chaco came to embody "the failure of the liberal republic, that is, the violent, sudden frustration of [the nation's] association with imperialism." René Zavaleta Mercado, *Bolivia: Crecimiento de La Idea Nacional* (Havana: Casa de las Américas, 1967), 24.

²⁷ An account of this uprising can be found in: Alvarez España, *Memorias Del Primer Ministro Obrero*.

²⁸ Klein says that fear of being held accountable for war crimes was a major factor in the military taking power in this time. Klein, "'Social Constitutionalism' in Latin America"; Herbert S. Klein, "German Busch and the Era of 'Military Socialism' in Bolivia," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 47, no. 2 (May 1, 1967): 166–84, doi:10.2307/2511478.

the general call for radical reevaluation of Bolivian society and a greater commitment to national development. Two popular groups emerged in this period, demanding greater access to power, the La Paz-based Federación Obrero de Trabajadores (FOT) and the Legiones de Ex-Combatientes, (LEC), who capitalized on their status as veterans to make demands on the state. Both groups were explicitly unaffiliated with any of the parties in or outside of government, though many called themselves socialists and both were willing to negotiate with military presidents. This created a situation where the military leaders of this period understood that in order to maintain any kind of control, they had to give in to some kind of worker demands.

In a direct contrast to the Salamanca period, President Toro granted workers the right to unionize and strike, although always with the provision that their unions and strikes were mediated and authorized by the executive branch. Workers were also given regulation of the work day, of working conditions, and of a minimum wage. The first worker's savings and social security funds were created around this time, although these were forced-savings plans, rather than government administered funds. The government-sponsored Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia (CSTB) was the first national labor coalition, prefiguring the to the post-1952 Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) coalition, and in many ways the military government in this period set a precedent for corporatist populism that the MNR would later follow. The generals called for a new constitution, allowed radical labor ministers affiliated with the urban anarchist movement to sit as both ministers and constitutional conventionists, and refused to ally with any of the traditional parties.²⁹

²⁹ Alvarez España, *Memorias Del Primer Ministro Obrero*.

The state in this period also increasingly saw its mandate as intervening to improve the daily lives of poor Bolivians in both the home and the workplace.³⁰ Following the bifurcation of elite understandings of Indian and worker as two different kinds of population during the 1920s, the reforms of the 1930s also took on gendered and raced forms. The reforms of the military governments linked healthcare, education, and proper comportment through a series of workplace regulations in the city, and household regulations in the countryside. General David Toro, for example, placed his Department of Health and Hygiene under the control of the Ministry of Labor, while rural education reforms targeted the “hogar campesino” as the locus of not only educational, but of hygiene and medical improvement.³¹ The labor code authored by President Germán Bush in 1938 took this process even further, combining in a single article (124) that the government should regulate and ensure that workers, “whether in the mines or the campo” have access to medical care, education, and clean living conditions. Specific demands were only delineated in this code for industrial workers, however, leaving rural communities without clear ways of demanding state protection.³²

The government also expanded its record-keeping functions in this period, in an attempt to better understand the health and social problems facing the country. Municipal governments such as Corocoro’s were charged with enforcing compulsory registration of school aged children

³⁰ In part this was a response to demands made by popular groups, as well as the trauma of the Chaco war, in which more soldiers fell to disease than to battlefield wounds. See: Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and Denise Y. Arnold, *Ser Mujer Indígena, Chola O Birlocha En La Bolivia Postcolonial de Los Años 90* (Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, Secretaría Nacional de Asuntos Etnicos, de Género y Generacionales, Subsecretaría de Asuntos de Género, 1996); Zulawski, *Unequal Cures*, Chapter 2.

³¹ Mendizabal Lozano, *Historia de La Salud Pública En Bolivia: De Las Juntas de Sanidad a Los Directorios Locales de Salud*. Larson, “Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds: the Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s-1940s.”

³² Bolivia, *Código Busch (Decreto-Ley de 24 de Mayo de 1939. Elevado a Rango de Ley General Del Trabajo En 8 de Diciembre de 1942)* (La Paz: Gran Editorial y Librería “Popular” Pérez Velasco, 1943), <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006526345>.

for urban residents as well notifying officials of children who died before they were old enough to attend.³³ At the same time, the military governments were keenly aware of their inability to respond to Bolivia's health crises without outside assistance. With a single medical faculty, Bolivia simply could not produce enough doctors to fulfill urban, much less rural health needs. During the War, the Bolivian government had requested international aid for rebuilding its health infrastructure, eventually resulting in the involvement of the Rockefeller Foundation. Zulawski notes that while the Rockefeller Foundation's health centers were initially welcomed in the country, by the 1950s these too became focal points for anti-foreign agitation.³⁴

At the same time, this period of radical transformation of political discourse fell short of revolutionary for two reasons. First, despite a few radical legal changes, the Bolivian state remained too weak to ensure that new laws and constitutional provisions were followed in rural areas. Second, the military socialists and deputies alike demonstrated a deep distrust of popular power, particularly in rural areas. In a constitutional convention that saw the CSTB and the Legion de Ex-Combatientes treated as parties, campesino organizers were only represented by a single delegate. Even the inclusion of worker and veterans' organizations in government was calculated to contain popular militancy. Toro and particularly his successor Busch showed a marked preference for corporatist integration of organizations like the Legion, with government authorization but also no explicit affiliation, to sectarian political parties.³⁵ Nonetheless, for the first time in Bolivian history, political parties making a mass appeal dominated the political debates, united around the idea of fundamentally altering the state in order to produce a better

³³ In Corocoro, these can be found in Ordenanzas Municipales, Archivo de La Paz, P J Alcaldia Corocoro, Caja 140.

³⁴ Zulawski, *Unequal Cures*.

³⁵ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 115–8.

Bolivian nation. This was also an initial forum in which future members of the MNR could identify and refine their visions for change.

On a local level, however, this created an alternate avenue for the miners to exercise political power directly, and as in the Linares dispute in 1930, once again this power was articulated, in Corocoro through agitation against abusive foreign management. Corocoro miners participated heavily in the government-sponsored CSTB, sending delegates to every regional worker federation in this period. In a meeting with president Busch, for example, that informed the writing of the Labor Code in 1938, only Corocoro was singled out for a particular demand by the CSTB: alongside calls for cost-of-living pay increases, equal pay for women, the workers requested that “the foreigner Niedemayer, administrator of Corocoro” be prosecuted for his abuses against miners.³⁶ Even as the American Smelting Company held most of the power in the town, this kind of direct political link to the national executive made mineworkers bolder in making local demands. By the early 1940s, workers’ organizations considered themselves participants in the exercise of local government. Newly formed unions informed the mayor of the town that they should be consulted on any matters relating to the working class.³⁷

Many of the changes in this period also responded to demands from single and married women, particularly urban market vendors and culinary workers. Some of these changes were indeed radical in their implications for family dynamics, prefiguring once again the impact family welfare legislation would have in urban communities after the revolution. For example, the Toro government granted legal recognition to children born out of wedlock.³⁸ At the

³⁶ Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980, 77.

³⁷ “Esperando de su digna Autoridad, nos reconosca y nos admita en cualquier gestión que pudiera hacer éste directorio en pro de la clase trabajadora.” Federación Obrera de Trabajadores al Alcalde Municipal, April 27 1942 ALP PJAC Caja 142.

³⁸ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 122.

beginning of the Chaco War, Bolivia had passed its first divorce law, granting several kinds of situations in which women (and men) could legally terminate a marriage.³⁹ The Busch labor code provided for the principle of equal pay for equal work and limited working hours for both women and children. Early social security legislation also provided benefits to partners and children of working men.⁴⁰ When, in 1945, Villarroel legalized common law marriage (concubinaje), these benefits extended to a wide sector of poor and working class women, whether or not they were married.

The military socialist government also expanded Bolivia's suffrage in limited but significant ways. Busch granted literate and propertied women the right to vote in 1938 but fell short of removing property restrictions and literacy requirements, effectively keeping most of rural and poor Bolivia out of the polls. Even propertied women, in fact, did not get to exercise the right to vote in municipal and regional elections until 1945, and national elections until 1952. Many labor unions, military governments, and even civilian regimes in this period considered the extension of suffrage to women as sign of civilization and development. In her study of gender and political power in Latin America, Towns argues that during the mid century in Latin America women's suffrage became something that was associated with modernization and development. In a time when expanding suffrage to Indians and the rural poor was a fraught proposition for Latin American states, women provided a useful way of expanding suffrage without radicalizing the electorate, in theory.⁴¹ By the end of this period, miners too became

³⁹ Daniel Salamanca, *Ley de 15 de Abril de 1932 Sobre Divorcio Absoluto*, 1932.

⁴⁰ Bolivia, *Código Busch (Decreto-Ley de 24 de Mayo de 1939. Elevado a Rango de Ley General Del Trabajo En 8 de Diciembre de 1942)*.

⁴¹ Ann E. Towns, *Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 110–111. In fact, many rural and urban working class women were very politically active in this period, although these anarchist organizations explicitly rejected the idea of suffrage. Dibbits and Taller de Historia y Participación de la Mujer (La Paz, *Polleras libertarias*).

preferred popular allies, and in fact many of the voting reforms of the 1930s period expanded suffrage to the literate working class in the mines.⁴² The more significant reform of this period was the removal of requirements that votes had to be cast in provincial capitals. More than anyone else, this benefited the miners, and the political parties that could cultivate their electoral support.

In the early 1940s, leftist and nationalist political parties increasingly looked to the mines as a potential electoral base. The Bolivian electorate, less than 50,000 in 1900, by 1950 had expanded to 200,000 people, a tenth of whom were in mining communities.⁴³ Whitehead, in his study of voting patterns among miners, argued that the miners voting blocs had more influence, in a purely electoral sense, prior to the 1952 revolution, which formally expanded suffrage to women, illiterate, and rural voters.⁴⁴ From the perspective of emerging opposition parties, several factors made mining towns promising locations for campaigns: because industrial plants and businesses with more than 200 employees had to provide schools and housing for their workers the mines themselves had a comparatively high number of literate potential voters who could be mobilized easily within neighborhoods.⁴⁵ In Corocoro, the American Smelting company was the first to hire sufficient numbers of workers that company housing on a large scale was mandated by law. Although these houses lacked basic sanitation facilities and often had no electricity, the close quarters and shared conditions of these neighborhoods, called ranchos, bred intense social

⁴² Whitehead, "Miners as Voters."

⁴³ Ibid., 319.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 321. By the same token, Corocoro's relative electoral importance for the working class declined in this period, as even before the electoral reforms Corocoro miners had qualified as electors and were living close to the polls.

⁴⁵ Joint Bolivian-United States Labor Commission and International Labour Office, *Los Problemas Del Trabajo En Bolivia; Informe de La Comisi n Mixta Boliviano-Estadounidense Del Trabajo* (Montreal: Joint Bolivian-United States Labour Commission, 1943).

and political cohesion. These groups could be mobilized as a unit, and were, in the case of Corocoro, already present in the provincial capital on election day.⁴⁶

MNR histories of the national revolution emphasize their own introduction of universal suffrage in 1952 as the first time poor and rural Bolivians had a voice, and workers a representative in government.⁴⁷ The rise of the MNR obscures an earlier era in which workers exercised important influence in the national government, but did not consistently exercise this influence at the level of occupational federation or political party.⁴⁸ In Corocoro itself, the miners did not federate into their own separate union until the 1940s. In 1938 the dominant union in the city was the Sindicato de Obreros Mixtos, which participated in the Socialist Front governing coalition with General Busch. This federation was replaced in 1942 by the Union de Trabajadores Sindicales, and the Federation of Miners around 1946. It was only after 1949 that the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB) affiliate became dominant in local politics.⁴⁹

Despite their popularity, both David Toro and Germán Busch faced difficulty maintaining themselves in power once they turned reformist impulses towards the mining economy. Both presidents raised taxes on mining companies and tried to control the flow of money out of the

⁴⁶ One of the founding members of the Workers' Union in 1942, for example, was an elector listed in the 1938 rolls. ALP PJAC 160, 1938 and 176 1943.

⁴⁷ Guillermo Bedregal, *La Ruta Histórica de La Revolución Boliviana*, Documentos Para La Historia Del M.N.R 3 (La Paz, Bolivia: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1958); Chumacero, *Esquema histórico, económico y social de la Empresa Minera Catavi*.

⁴⁸ Gotkowitz, following Guillermo Lora, has argued that because the PIR dominated the CSTB, the MNR looked to create a labor federation through the miners that could counteract the influence of this party. Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980; Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

⁴⁹ Corocoro also sent delegates to the government-sponsored CSTB Conventions in La Paz and Santa Cruz, and was present during the early attempts to form a National miners Union in 1939. The participation in the CSTB reflects regional divisions in organizing experience in this period. Although many miners from all over the country attended, Llallagua and Catavi were notably absent from these union proceedings, according to Lora. Ultimately, the CSTB's affiliation with urban anarchist and socialist groups meant that it was eclipsed by the creation of the MNR-backed FSTMB in 1944 and the rise of Juan Lechín. Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980, 67–70.

country from the mines by creating a minerals purchasing bank through which profits had to be directed. These reforms, especially the increases in taxes and curbing corporate influence, were popular but threatened economic interests of mining elites. The three major tin producers in the country, the Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild mines were unused to this level of state intervention in their affairs, and in fact, state attempts to control revenue flows. Interestingly, the precedent of government intervention in economic and industrial matters in fact predated the war. During the tin crisis of 1929, Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild asked the Bolivian government to regulate production quotas because they could not enforce voluntary cutbacks among themselves.⁵⁰ This rather unusual request set a direct precedent for state intervention in pricing and production levels of mineral exploitation, and at the same time created a much more direct incentive for the major tin mining companies to intervene in Bolivian political life.⁵¹

The Tin Barons, or Rosca, as they were called, form one of the crucial pieces of revolutionary mythology. By the 1930s they did, in fact, exert a great deal of national influence, owning all three major newspapers. As David Toro learned, every government between the Chaco War and the 1952 revolution faced the threat of falling if they took too strong a stance against these companies. It is a mark of the influence of these Bolivian companies that in 1936, faced with increasing instability, Toro first tried in court and then nationalized an American oil company in a last ditch effort to bolster popular support for his government.⁵² The military

⁵⁰ Herbert S Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, Cambridge Concise Histories (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 179.

⁵¹ Lawrence Whitehead and Mario R. dos Santos, "El Impacto de La Gran Depresión En Bolivia," *Desarrollo Económico* 12, no. 45 (April 1972): 49.

⁵² Nationalizing Standard Oil deposits made a great deal of political sense, given Bolivians' widespread belief that Standard had been smuggling oil to Bolivia's enemies during the War. The Bolivian military, having taken over Standard Oil's production during the War, decided that it could also run peacetime production in such a way to develop and expand Bolivia's industries. For a thorough and fascinating account of this period, see, Cote, "The Nature of Oil in Bolivia, 1896-1952."

socialist period thus witnessed the nation's (and in fact, Latin America's) first experiment with nationalization of an entire industry. Toro's reforms were wildly popular among non-elites, and not nearly so popular among elites, not least among whom were mine owners who clearly understood the stakes of a government prepared to cultivate popular sentiment by nationalizing industry.

Stephen Cote argues that the fact of oil being nationalized before tin suggests that oil was, in fact, seen as more crucial to the national interest in this period. I believe that Standard Oil, an American company in a region over which Bolivia felt it needed to exert state control was an easier and more clear-cut target in this period, and it would take the creation of a widespread nationalist consensus that Bolivian-owned companies (as all three major mining corporations were) could also be threats to the state, as happened in the 1940s, to make nationalizing the mines a real possibility. In Corocoro, by contrast, the copper company was bought by a subsidiary of the American Smelting and Refining Corporation (ASARCO) in 1934, with North American managers and offices in Chile.⁵³ The Cia Smelting, as it was called, then became an easy nationalist target for workers and disaffected local elites alike.

Despite their use of the revolutionary rhetoric of Bolivia's socialist parties, the military governments of Toro and Busch, like the Villarroel period from 1943-6, sought to legally reform

⁵³ ASARCO bought a lease option on the Corocoro mines in 1934 and achieved sole possession of the mines in 1947. Isaac Frederick Marcossan, *Metal Magic: The Story of the American Smelting & Refining Company* (Farrar, Straus, 1949), 171. Founded in 1899 by a group of US-based industrialists including the Rockefeller, Lewisohn, and Guggenheim families, ASARCO is now a Mexican-owned company with mines all over the world. The company in this period dominated copper deposits in the North American west but also had substantial holdings in Peru and Chile. For a nuanced history of an ASARCO affiliated company town in the North American context, see Monica Perales, *Smeltertown: Making and Remembering a Southwest Border Community* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). For histories of miners in ASARCO mines in Chile and Peru, see Florencia E. Mallon, *The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition, 1860-1940* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1983); Janet L. Finn, *Tracing the Veins: Of Copper, Culture, and Community from Butte to Chuquicamata*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 1998); Thomas Klubock, *Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile's El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904-1951* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998).

Bolivia without changing the essential economic and structural conditions of the country. By calling a constitutional convention, however, they did open up debate as to the meaning of citizenship, property, the role of the state, and the rights of women, workers, and indigenous Bolivians. Finally, in addition to providing protections for workers and families, the legislative changes of this period laid the basis for revolutionary Bolivia by redefining property as a social, not an individual, right, and by articulating a fundamental principal that social welfare of the entire population was a primary concern of the state. While neither Busch nor Toro considered nationalizing the mines, military governments were the first in Bolivian history to defend a popular mandate for reform against foreign or domestic corporations. This project was taken up, in greater or lesser degrees, by every subsequent government, whether reactionary or reformist. Each of these governments ran up against the reality of the weakness of Bolivia's state, especially in the countryside. Ultimately, the question of whether the state could enforce the laws it passed demanded, as an answer, the fundamental restructuring of economic and political power in the country. It demanded, in short, a revolution.

In Corocoro, military governments proved bolder than civilians in holding mining companies responsible for their actions, and increasingly conflicts emerged between local governments and the companies they worked with over taxes, municipal fees, and land use. The military socialist period helped create out of fractious workers a new contingent of citizens who believed in their own right to exert authority over the town. Miners from Corocoro went on strike for higher wages almost as soon as production resumed in the town and participated in the general strike of 1936 that brought Toro to power.⁵⁴ The mayor of Corocoro in this period was a military man representing the state's Frente Unico Socialista who governed with the assistance

⁵⁴ Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980, 17.

of the Legion de Ex Combatientes and the Sindicato de Obreros.⁵⁵ The military government in Corocoro was able to join workers and merchants in a shared antagonism to the foreign corporation that could not yet be generalized to Bolivia as a whole, since the vast majority of Bolivian mines were domestically owned.

Minor disagreements between city and company could turn quickly in this atmosphere into tests of loyalty to the Bolivian nation. For example, Lieutenant Teofilo Caro, who threatened the Compañia in 1938 for reluctance to let workers celebrate the Battle of Ingavi July 16th, at the beginning of this chapter, was not simply a fan of worker rights to carouse. Caro had issued rules regulating public disorder during the February Carnaval celebrations, limiting worker drunkenness and mask wearing.⁵⁶ As his angry missive to the Company suggested, July 16th was a national holiday, however, and his military sensibility believed this day deserved special consideration. Moreover, lurking behind this conflict were ongoing negotiations with the Company over paying taxes and license fees, particularly for foreign engineers. In the context of General Busch's battle against the tin magnates in this same period, Caro's letter carried a real threat.

Postwar Corocoro

Corocoro was nearly destroyed by the depression, but after the War of the Chaco, the town began to revive, economically and demographically. This process of crisis and revival produced in urban elites and workers alike a local version of the military socialists' re-articulation of both state and property and citizen and state. A Chilean subsidiary of the

⁵⁵ Draft of letter from Alcalde Teofilo Caro a Secretario de Gobierno de Sindicato de Obreros, 3 Marzo, 1938, ALP PJAC Caja 160.

⁵⁶ Teofilo Caro a J Thomas, Gerente Cia Smelting, July 13, 1938; Ordenanza Publico Sobre Carnaval, both in ALP PJAC Caja 160.

American Smelting and Refining Corporation (hereafter referred to as the Cia Smelting) bought out CUCM around 1936, and the ramping up of a new global conflict spurred copper production by the end of the 1930s. Returning miners and veterans swelled the ranks of workers. Corocoro rebuilt itself with an eye towards future growth in this period, but also with a keen sense of the dangers of dependency on a foreign corporation.

What had happened with the financial crisis and demographic collapse was in fact a collapse of the distance between urban elites and urban poor.⁵⁷ In the early days of the depression, Corocoro was so abandoned that locals were scavenging wood from the mineshafts themselves. The city made its income by collecting taxes from smaller municipalities and particularly taxing livestock sales and imports on the railroad, such as wheat and wine. Neither the company nor the city could recuperate demographic and financial losses when people simply left. In 1932, for example, the CUCM tried to use the municipality to enforce payments for rent and electricity, but the tenants had fled to La Paz.⁵⁸ In such a financial climate, it became easier for elites to see themselves in community with working class residents of the town, particularly those whose culture was demonstrably urban, and who were increasingly living in company-provided housing, dressing in “western” clothes, and literate.

After the war, Corocoro immediately began rebuilding for the future. Municipal records suggest that reconstructing the moral and the social order were central concerns of both local

⁵⁷ Corocoro downsized its police force from 4 to 1, for example, over these years, lost one of its two high schools, and reduced the hospital staff to one. My calculations for relative wages are based the municipal budgets for the years 1930-1935, ALP PJAC Cajas 140-3. In 1930, the director of the high school took home a salary of 270 bs a month, and a male professor 150, but by 1931 that figure had dropped to 150 and 100 respectively. The mayor, doctor, and police intendentes lost wages from around 150 to 100 in this period, while municipal agents saw their wages fall from 75 to 40 bolivianos in this period. In 1932, by comparison, a miner made between 15-20 bolivianos a month.

⁵⁸ In this period the city paid for the hospital and the police force but the company paid for electricity. Valentin Terrazas vs Benedicto Saavedra, 18 Feb 1932, ALP PJAC Caja 143

officials and military governments. The promise of new economic growth propelled an ambitious wave of construction in the town: municipal documents show plans for the construction of technical schools and teacher training institutions, plazas, a sports arena, and a rebuilt bridge over the Rio Desaguadero.⁵⁹ Corocoro's second high school reopened, with three grades at the primary and six at the secondary level, and separate schools for men and women.⁶⁰ The hospital, which had hired an administrator and multiple nurses during the war, further expanded in this period with doctors paid for by the Cia Smelting.⁶¹

The Smelting Company brought with it both the promise of development and threats to municipal authority when it began to expand operations in this period.⁶² The Company brought jobs, built new neighborhoods, and helped fund both the hospital and the local police force. Urban elites felt keenly this new dependence. In a town as small as Corocoro, this dependence was reinforced with the visible presence of an expansive new enterprise with better technology, American engineers, and access to higher quality, imported foods and equipment. Unlike the majority of the tin mines in Bolivia, which were in fact owned and operated by Bolivian nationals, (although operating multi-nationally), the American copper mines were easy targets for nationalist discontent. The very existence of the Cia Smelting in the town helped consolidate generalized distrust of the global markets into a multi-class nationalist alliance based on the demand to control natural and municipal resources.

⁵⁹ "Presupuestos Municipales 1931-5," ALP PJAC Caja 142.

⁶⁰ "Presupuestos Municipales 1934-6" ALP PJAC Caja 142

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² The Joint Bolivian and American Investigation into working conditions in the mines, ordered during the height of the Second World War, makes a related criticism about Busch-era laws requiring all companies with more than 200 employees to provide schools; this law, it argued was prejudicial to free and unbiased education in these communities. Joint Bolivian-United States Labor Commission and International Labour Office, *Los Problemas Del Trabajo En Bolivia; Informe de La Comisi3n Mixta Boliviano-Estadounidense Del Trabajo*.

Perhaps this dependence explains a curious petition from 1940. After a sinkhole opened up in the middle of town, causing severe property damage, lawyer Miguel Quisbert asked the city to assist affected property owners not only in rebuilding, but in moving the town.⁶³ Noting both that mining had destroyed much of the city and that the richest veins of copper ore were in fact underneath the town center, Quisbert suggested that municipal authorities take the opportunity to move Corocoro entirely, compelling the mining company to buy out the property owners and expropriating land in the nearby zone of Puchuni [sic: possible Putuni] to found a New Corocoro. Citing concerns far from environmental, Quisbert spent much of the petition blaming the Cia Smelting for destroying commerce in the city with competition from its company stores and for enriching itself without giving back to the community. Quisbert hoped to solve recent natural and economic disasters alike by making the company pay for the city's recovery. By moving on the company dime, Quisbert hoped to re-found the town on terms more favorable to accountability and local prosperity.⁶⁴

The threat posed to local commerce by the Cia Smelting's company stores was substantial. While the city hoped to rebuild after the depression, many merchants struggled to reestablish markets and distribution networks damaged since 1929. These struggling merchants had neither the resources nor the economies of scale necessary to weather the turbulent 1930s. If the company stores monopolized distribution of vital staples, how could local elites compete?

⁶³ Ya que la población está en total decadencia, sus casa [sic] totalmente destruidas, ya que el comercio en esta ciudad totalmente decaída, a causa del establecimiento de las pulperías en los establecimientos mineros, y Corocoro jamás ha recibido ninguna protección del estado a pesar de la gran entrada que desde hace un siglo ha percibido, por la exportación de nuestro cobre, ni las empresas mineras jamás han hecho ninguna obra en favor de este bendito suelo que ha producido tanta riqueza, algunos vecinos perjudicados con nuestras casas destruidas, hemos acordado hacer gestiones ante las cámaras a reunirse en agosto próximo, queremos prepara la documentación necesaria para el mejoramiento de la ciudad y el reembolso de nuestras casas. Miguel Quisbert, 7 May, 1940 ALP PJAC 160.

⁶⁴ See also Elena McGrath, "Mining for Change in Bolivia," *Edge Effects* (blog), University of Wisconsin Center for Culture, History, and the Environment, November 1, 2016 <http://edgeeffects.net/mining-bolivia/>

Merchant elites who might in the past have found themselves supporting the American company, now believed that it had better access to international markets and an array of imports, directly threatening their distribution capacity. For most of the twentieth century, Corocoro's economy lived by contraband and commerce as well as mining. Thus, the new mining company had to contend not only with fractious workers, but also with increased demands for accountability and profit sharing from local business owners.

Over the course of the 1940s, the municipality of Corocoro began to take seriously the idea of a strong local government to develop Corocoro and the surrounding environment. According to Bolivia's constitution, the municipal council was supposed to be composed of five members elected biannually, but in practice these elections had not been held in many regions since the beginning of the Chaco conflict.⁶⁵ In 1942 the city elected an advisory council to assist the mayor with his duties, and this council began to be more proactive about regulating and imposing taxes. Two taxes particularly stand out in this period: import duties on products coming in from the border, and professional licensing fees. Each of these was levied on top of national fees and taxes, and was destined for the coffers of either Pacajes province or the municipality of Corocoro itself.

Of these taxes, the merchants were most affected by duties, while the Smelting Company, with its engineers, doctors, and lawyers, paid the bulk of the patents. Building on the nationalist antagonism between foreign and local elites, the city charged twice as much for foreign as for local patents. In 1942, citing increasing costs, the company served notice to the city and its own employees that it would no longer pay these fees. The employees, in turn, petitioned both the local and the national government for a subsidy or extension on payment. The city advisory

⁶⁵ Nels Andrew Nelson Cleven, *The Political Organization of Bolivia* (Washington, D. C., 1940), 189.

committee, citing the high wages paid to foreign nationals, argued that charging these engineers double was entirely within reason.⁶⁶ This fight against foreigners did not, it seems, have as its target earlier waves of merchants from, for example, the Middle East, who came under Eduardo Lima's scrutiny in Chapter 1. In this context, we can see the case of Vicente Miguel, white collar employee of the mines, and originally of Lebanese descent, who petitioned the municipality for citizenship, having lived in Bolivia for 28 years and married and raised children with a Bolivian woman.⁶⁷

The structure of the town, then, was dual: as the municipality attempted to expand infrastructure and assert greater control over the region, the Cia Smelting hoped to expand its operations and control conditions of production. These two goals were not always aligned, and in this period, neither company nor municipality had a monopoly of authority. The company-funded Policia Minera still operated alongside Agentes Municipales, and the company shared responsibility for funding the hospital and city's generators.⁶⁸ While the company and the city collaborated on a number of projects in this period—exploratory drilling, bridge repairs, street repaving—it is clear that these two bodies often saw each other as adversaries.⁶⁹ In 1942, perhaps as a result of Teofilo Caro's threats, the company did participate in the July celebrations of the Battle of Ingavi, but ultimately, this tentative peace could not be sustained over the course

⁶⁶ In 1942, for example, the city charged 500 bolivianos for a professional patent for a Bolivian mining engineer; for a foreign-born engineer, the fee was \$1,000. (Letters May 21, August 24, and September 5, 1942; ALP PJAC Caja 187)

⁶⁷ Petición de Vicente Miguel, 8 Enero, Gerente General al Alcalde Municipio, and Patentes Profesionales for 1942, ALP PJAC Caja 160.

⁶⁸ See, for example, the charges brought against a former mayor by the VP of the PURS party for failing to properly document money transfers; or the note from the Alcalde asking that the policia minera help the carabineros regulate the saturday market from the same caja.

⁶⁹ The city also requested increased electrical service from company generators in April 1942, but the company says, "as we have mentioned previously, this increase in voltage simply isn't possible." April 30, 1942.

of the 1940s. Moreover, national elites began to use the template created by Corocoro's workers and elites and cast the mining companies owned by Bolivian nationals as fundamentally foreign. Helped along by nationalist intellectuals from the Chaco Generation such as Tristán Marof and Augusto Céspedes, who believed that landowners and mineowners were the true villains of Bolivian history, the parties of the 1940s used a brutal confrontation between miners and the army to turn Bolivian mining magnates into betrayers of the national good.

The Bloque Minero Parlamentario

General Busch, faced with an increasingly fractious populace and antagonism from the large mining communities, took his own life dramatically in 1939. In the long term, Busch's suicide cemented his status as a heroic precursor and martyr for national revolution, but in the short term it brought about an era of conservative civilian government. The early 1940s were a transformative time for Bolivian politics. While the 1930s had seen the emergence of organized leftist parties (the POR and the PIR) calling for revolution and military reformers calling themselves socialist, it was in this period that an explicitly *nationalist* opposition threatened the hegemonic liberal/conservative rivalry that had dominated Bolivian politics for decades. In this period, an upstart political party calling itself the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) emerged from a few reformers in urban areas to capture the presidency through alliance with progressive military forces under Gualberto Villarroel.

Many of the worker unions in La Paz and other union centers were anarchist through the 1950s, and for this reason, hard to organize electorally.⁷⁰ The parties that were the most

⁷⁰ See Dibbits, Ineke, and Taller de Historia y Participación de la Mujer. *Polleras libertarias: Federación Obrera Femenina, 1927-1964*. La Paz: Taller de Historia y Participación de la Mujer, 1986; Wadsworth, Ana Cecilia, and Ineke Dibbits. *Agitadoras de buen gusto: historia del Sindicato de Culinarias (1935-1958)*. La Paz: TAHIPAMU : HISBOL, 1989.

successful in this period were those that invested themselves in the unions. The MNR, the Trotskyite POR, and the Stalinist PIR all competed, in this era, for worker votes. Building on the homegrown nationalism of places such as Corocoro, the socialists were the first to make inroads into the working classes, but several important national and international crises resulted in the MNR dominating these groups by the end of the 1940s. The event that largely helped catapult the MNR from breakaway to opposition party was the massacre of miners at Catavi in December 1942.

After Busch's suicide in 1939, a series of more conservative military and civilian governments attempted to slow the pace of change. These governments maintained a commitment to the liberal principals of limited democracy and constitutionalism while acting to suppress radicalism and popular militancy. At the same time, the demographic and political changes begun in the 1930s meant that significant sectors of the voting classes were radicalized. For this reason, the first democratically elected congress of this period was one of the most radical in Bolivian history. In terms of the presidency, Bolivia in 1942 and 1943 looked reactionary, but was in fact a crucible of nationalist opposition and unrest. In order to understand the ideologically heterodox revolutionary nationalist movement that would come to dominate Bolivian politics, it is important to understand the interaction between international and national crises that allowed class struggle and the struggle for national regeneration (in other words, socialist and fascist-leaning ideologies) to come together in an assimilative project for economic independence and development by 1952.⁷¹ This project came to combine with, and ultimately surpass the cosmopolitan nationalism produced in places like Corocoro out of the great

⁷¹ This is similar to an early and mid-twentieth century project characteristic of much of Latin America that Florencia Mallon has termed eugenic national development. I use resource nationalism in this dissertation to emphasize the specificity of Bolivia's articulation of social development and economic nationalism, which Bolivians believed could be rapidly achieved precisely because of the process of mining itself.

depression after the revolution.

The primary international crisis that helped structure Bolivian opposition movements in this period, of course, was the Second World War. While not involved militarily, Bolivia was one of three major producers of tin in the world, and the only major producer in the western hemisphere. Bolivian tin was thus vital to the Allied wartime machine.⁷² The tin barons Simon Patiño, with financial interests in both the United States and the United Kingdom, and Mauricio Hochschild, nationalized Bolivian but of German Jewish heritage, both had vested interests in ensuring continued tin production for Allied armies and supply chains as well. Bolivia's participation was so crucial that after a major strike resulted in a massacre, Bolivia and the International Labor Organization sent down a commission to investigate conditions in the mines. The United States and the United Kingdom were particularly concerned that Bolivian generals had ties to the German army, and prominent members of the officer corps sympathized with fascist governments in Italy and Germany. Bolivian governments in this period, however, understood the value of maintaining ties with the United States, and therefore joined the allied cause. This situation resulted in a government bound by both national elites and international interest to guarantee tin and copper production and therefore much more inclined to break strikes and work stoppages, particularly in the mines.

Among the political parties vying to capture the Bolivian opposition, the war also limited political options. For its part, the PIR, which started out the decade as the most powerful socialist movement in the country, followed the Stalinist line in supporting the Allied war effort after 1941. This meant that the PIR -controlled CSTB labor federation had to carefully negotiate its

⁷² The Dow Jones reported that tin was the commodity of greatest concern for the Allies in 1940, second only to rubber. The US was particularly worried about the susceptibility of Malaysian tin to interception by Axis ships, making Bolivia the only reliable US source of tin. "Total War and Commodities" *Barrons Magazine*, Dow Jones & Co., May 13, 1940.

support of work stoppages in critical industries during the war, and in fact had a great deal of trouble organizing in the mines. In the early war period, neither the Trotskyist POR nor the nascent MNR could compete with the PIR in representing La Paz-based workers. However, because both the MNR and the POR refrained from engaging with the Allied cause, they were free to encourage strikes and labor unrest in mining communities. These parties explicitly identified production for the Allied war effort as a symptom of Bolivian dependence on foreign governments and international corporations, and workers demands as evidence of Bolivia's national self interest exerting itself.⁷³

In Corocoro, the major political oppositions of the 1940s seem to have been between the Republicans, reformed for the post-Chaco era as the Partido Unico Republicano Socialista and, after 1942, the MNR. The growth of unions created a new kind of mobilized community that was not necessarily affiliated with any one political party. Outside of Corocoro, miners throughout the country were in the process of federating regional unions into a national organization that could coordinate political strategy and combat local forms of abuse and “electoral management” on the part of mine owners.⁷⁴ In this period, too, the Union began to style itself as a central player in town politics. On April 30th, 1942, several empleados and mineros of the Cia Smelting founded the Union Sindicalista de Trabajadores, Simon Bolivar as their president, and the next day held May Day celebrations, complete with an address from the local priest and a football game between The Strongest (the local football team) and a team comprised of teachers from the local schools.

⁷³ The MNR newspaper *La Calle*, in this period, was notably antipathetic towards the Allied cause, and occasionally anti-semitic as well. For more debates on this, see: Christopher Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule*, Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government (New York ; London: Praeger, 1977).

⁷⁴ Whitehead, “Miners as Voters,” 321.

If the United States and the United Kingdom were wary of Bolivian army sympathies for the Axis cause, they were firmly convinced that the MNR was a fascist organization. They were so convinced, in fact, that they manufactured a fascist plot to encourage the Bolivian government to expel MNR leaders from government in 1942.⁷⁵ This was a major liability for early organizing for the MNR, but ultimately gave these politicians more freedom to court mineworkers and cultivate a general aesthetic of disruption and militant opposition. Guillermo Lora recounts that not only did MNR activists in the mining communities provide an impulse for the formation of the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB) as a national federation, but MNR deputies such as Paz Estenssoro first earned national recognition excoriating the 1942 Bolivian government for the handling of the 1942 massacre at Catavi. In this period, the MNR and the Trotskyist POR (Partido Obrero Revolucionario) were actively sending organizers into the mines and competing for worker allegiance.

In fact, political organizers were sometimes members of both the POR and MNR simultaneously, as was the case with FSTMB leader Juan Lechín.⁷⁶ In the 1940s, the POR often accused the MNR of reformism, but it also showed itself more willing to work with the nationalist and reformist party than the PIR. Despite their commitment to permanent revolution, POR intellectuals were often speech-writers for the MNR during this period.⁷⁷ In general, despite

⁷⁵ Bethell and Roxborough, *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948*.

⁷⁶ Guillermo Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 243 In addition to writing many of the early FSTMB theses, Lora has prolifically documented the history of the Bolivian labor movement until his death in 2009. Here, I primarily use his 1971 volume edited by Laurence Whitehead on the early history of the POR and MNR.

⁷⁷ John's book is a celebratory account of Trotskyism's influence in Bolivian politics. Operating primarily from leftist journals and interviews with Lora and other POR organizers, John provides a detailed account of early POR and MNR organizing in the mines. His analysis stays mostly within the confines of interpreting political conflicts on the left from the perspective of the Fourth International. What does not emerge in John's study, and I would like to explore, is the way in which the particularly Bolivian version of a Trotskyist imaginary (however un/orthodox) was a powerful motivating ideology that could be combined with or work along side other, competing political frameworks throughout this period. I suspect that some of the policy unorthodoxies and allegiances that trouble John in the Bolivian POR and FSTMB are responsible for the surprising longevity and influence of PORista ideology in

their ideological differences, the MNR found the POR's Marxist rhetoric useful in recruiting popular support for their nationalist program, and thus both groups found themselves working on similar projects.⁷⁸ Thus, the MNR, the POR, and the FSTMB began their political lives working together.

At the level of rank and file and leadership, the miners in the FSTMB embraced Marxism, and particularly the idea of permanent revolution, as a means to respond to the brutal conditions in the mines. Written by Lora, the Thesis of Pulacayo described Bolivia as a link in the chain of world capitalism in which a capitalist system coexisted uncomfortably with other, pre-capitalist relations of production. It called for the arming of the working classes to fight against imperialism, fascism, and for worker, particularly miner, control of the workplace. The document also explicitly identified the FSTMB as an independent entity and called for a national labor union that would reject links "to the bourgeois sectors, to leftist reformism, and to the government."⁷⁹

In general, Lora describes a pattern within the FSTMB congresses in which the miners supported a contradictory mix of nationalist, pro-government, and Trotskyist resolutions, although the Trotskyists often ended up writing the theses and other important documents. Under this procedure of maintaining ties with governing structures while pushing for revolutionary

the twentieth century. Sándor John, *Bolivia's Radical Tradition: Permanent Revolution in the Andes* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009), 88.

⁷⁸ The BMP was eventually expelled from the legislature because its members, per FSTMB statutes, also held posts in the union leadership. Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971*, 255.

⁷⁹ "a los sectores burgueses, al reformismo de izquierda, y al gobierno." Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, *Evaluación de la lucha política de los trabajadores mineros* (La Paz Bolivia: Ediciones Gráficas "E.G.," 1992), 23. This document, published at a time when the miners and the FSTMB had become a much-diminished force in Bolivian politics, compiles major theses proposed by the FSTMB between 1942 and 1992, notably those later adopted by the COB as governing or guiding principles. For the purposes of this chapter, these include the "Thesis de Pulacayo" of 1946, the founding documents of the COB, the "Tesis Socialista" of 1970 and the 1983 plan to reorganize COMIBOL.

changes, the FSTMB could expect to push, to some degree, politicians whose rhetoric perhaps targeted the working class but whose policies were not in their best interest. In this context we can understand the reverence among the labor movement for the Thesis of Pulacayo, the most famous (and widely distributed) of the miner's theses, which, although firmly on the side of permanent revolution, did not preclude an engagement with the government, even by its staunchest supporters.⁸⁰

The MNR that took power in 1952 was neither a fascist nor a socialist organization, but its early tendency towards collaborating with both fascist and socialist thinkers was crucial to its development as a broad-based political party.⁸¹ Beyond ideological heterodoxy, this capacity of the MNR to embrace both socialist and fascist members is important, but obscures a larger tension inherent to all political groups that emerged in this period between authoritarianism and rank and file radicalism. For this reason, in this next section I will explore the ways the MNR adopted both socialist and fascist ideas of progress and development to create a revolutionary but ideologically slippery revolutionary nationalism.

Catavi and the Revolutionary Miner As Ideal

In December 1942, workers in the Siglo XX and Catavi mines owned by Bolivian Simón Patiño went on strike, demanding a substantial increase in wages. In order to maintain production schedules for the Allied Forces, the Peñaranda government could not tolerate such a work stoppage. His government sent the military to pacify the miners, in the process killing 400 men,

⁸⁰ Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971*, 246.

⁸¹ Many historians have accused the MNR of fascism, or at least having in Montenegro's group a fascist wing. Charles Weston, for example, identified the MNR as having a fascist and an anti-fascist wing, but ultimately saw the fascist sympathies as situational, and considered Peronism to be a better model through which to understand the MNR of the 1950s. Charles Weston, Jr., "An Ideology of Modernization: The Case of the Bolivian MNR," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 1968): 95, doi:10.2307/165060.

women, and children in Catavi. While the initial response to this massacre was the quiescence of the miners, all of the revolutionary parties born out of the 1930s responded with fury, provoking a crisis in the civilian government and vaulting the MNR to power for the first time. These parties understood the Catavi tragedy as a distillation of all of the problems facing Bolivia in that moment.

As I suggested in my first chapter, contradictory impulses towards state-building and integration with global markets among Liberals after the Civil War provoked a sense among many elites that the Bolivian government was incapable of protecting its citizens from exploitative relationships with foreign corporations. Municipal and provincial elites in places like Corocoro developed local variations of a nationalist critique of earlier forms of development tied to a weak state, while workers in industrializing cities such as La Paz organized against the state itself in a series of anarchist labor federations. The Chaco War circulated these critiques to a national audience, while the experience of frontline hardship cemented a total lack of faith in the Bolivian government among students, artisans, workers, intellectuals, and indigenous men drafted for military service.⁸² The explicit link between Bolivia's wartime alliance with the United States and United Kingdom and a massacre of Bolivia's workers provided the final ideological link required for national revolution: if neither the Bolivian government nor the Bolivian Simon Patiño cared about Bolivian citizens, then they could not seriously be Bolivians. Over the course of the next decade, the *event* of Catavi helped to catalyze multiple revolutionary

⁸² The period between the Chaco War and the Revolution is one of the best studied and still elusive periods in Bolivian history, from Herbert Klein and Rene Zavaleta, who trace the emergence of non-traditional, nationalist parties after the Chaco War, to Laura Gotkowitz, who recenters indigenous radicalism as a driver of revolution. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution*; Cordero, *Historia del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, 1941-1952*; Klein, *Orígenes de La Revolución Nacional Boliviana*; Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo Nacional-Popular En Bolivia*; Bethell and Roxborough, *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948*; Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

impulses into a coherent national discourse a series of ideas and problems that had been circulating among the radical opposition since the depression.⁸³

The leftist PIR, most closely tied to the Soviet Union of all Bolivian parties, struggled to both support the working class as its ideology predicted and also support the war effort, tied in the Bolivian case to the support of elites and mine owners. Nonetheless, in 1942 and 1943, they joined with radical members of congress moving to censure the minister of labor and government who had ordered the troops into the mines.⁸⁴ In their debates, the miners became a figure for understanding all of Bolivia's problems distilled into foreign dependence and national complicity. More than this, the miners became conceptually linked to the heroic victims of the 1930s, the Chaco War veterans, as both groups were losing their lives in a selfless struggle bring Bolivia both prosperity and modernity.

In August 1943, a socialist deputy from the province of Dalence, home of the Huanuni, Morococala, and Santa Fe tin mines, addressed the Bolivian congress, calling for censure for the government ministers responsible for ordering the military to Catavi.⁸⁵ In a speech that ran to 50 pages, Gabriel Moisés brought together a scathing critique of foreign corporate greed, government ineptitude, and military violence that had brought Bolivia- uniquely gifted with territorial bounty, patriotic citizens and natural mineral wealth- to its state of present degradation. Bolivia had never been governed honestly or productively, he suggested, and it was time for a

⁸³ I take my understanding of "event" from Sinha's investigation of the political consequences produced by the publication of the book *Mother India* in 1929. Like that publication, Catavi allowed nationalist movements in Bolivia to articulate connections between the specific material conditions of Bolivia in relation to the rest of the world and the discursive possibilities available locally, regionally, and globally, producing a highly contingent coalition of revolutionary and nationalist actors in this case. Mrinalini Sinha, *Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 17–19.

⁸⁴ Jerry W. Knudson, "The Impact of the Catavi Mine Massacre of 1942 on Bolivian Politics and Public Opinion," *The Americas* 26, no. 3 (January 1, 1970): 254–76, doi:10.2307/980077.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

change. The heroes of Moisés's speech (aside from the socialist deputies who defended them) were the miners of his district and others who had peacefully protested against foreign abuses and been cut down by their own government.

Moisés elaborated the horrific conditions of life and labor in the mines, calling their daily struggle for existence "the most important social drama on the planet." This social drama, he argued, was critical to all Bolivians, because "the exploited and oppressed classes, when they fight for their own betterment, are also fighting to elevate the level of life of all of human society together, thus performing an enormous service for the progress and well-being of humanity."⁸⁶ Compared to all of the corrupt, feudal governments that came before, the miners had a belief in and commitment to national progress. Furthermore, Moisés believed strongly that due to resource wealth, Bolivian greatness could be easily achieved, if Bolivians could control the terms of their own production.⁸⁷ In his diatribe, Moisés drew a direct line from Spanish colonial abuses to the Chaco conflict to Catavi, which the PIR characterized as the worst crime in Bolivian memory. He contrasted the "potency" and patriotism of the workers, like the soldiers of the Chaco, against the corruption and indecency of government officials, arguing that Bolivia started off a great nation and could still become one, under a responsible government. Responsible, patriotic, government was in this case characterized by the heroic PIR deputies, whom he

⁸⁶ "las clases oprimidas y explotadas, al luchar por su mejoramiento, están luchando también, por elevar el nivel de vida de toda la sociedad humana en su conjunto, prestando así, un servicio enorme al progreso y bienestar humanos." Moisés, *Catavi*, 11.

⁸⁷ "Our country has remained relegated to a position of simply providing raw materials. We are not permitted to smelt even a single kilo of tin in our own land. If we were to develop tin and other ore smelting facilities in Bolivia, we would in only a few years become the most prosperous nation in America, as our riches and possibilities are vast. But this would not suit the interests of the foreign owners of Bolivia, who always prefer us backwards and poor so they can exploit us better forever." "Nuestro país ha quedado reducido a la condición de simple fuente de materias primas. No se nos permite fundir ni un solo kilo de estaño en nuestro propio territorio. Si iniciáramos las fundiciones de estaño y otros minerales en Bolivia, en pocos años nos convertiríamos en la nación más próspera de América, pues nuestras riquezas y posibilidades son enormes. Pero eso no conviene a los intereses de los amos extranjeros de Bolivia, a quienes siempre les interesa que estemos atrasados y pobres para explotarnos mejor y por siempre." *Ibid.*, 33–4.

described as fighting off fascist mobs with pistols and harsh rhetoric to make the crimes of Catavi more widely known.⁸⁸

Building on an opposition developed by Corocoro elites in the early twentieth century, Moisés's contrasts between helpless miners and rapacious foreign capital enabled by a corrupt state were essentially shared by the foundational documents of the POR, such as Marof's *Tragedia del Altiplano*, as well as the MNR, such as Augusto Cespedes's *Nacionalismo y Coloniaje*, and even the Guillermo Lora-penned *Tesis de Pulacayo* of the miners' federation in 1946. In this period, for the first time, the Bolivian mineworker transformed in the eyes of middle class intellectuals from a helpless victim of capital to a soldier for national prosperity. As in the War of the Chaco, thanks to the failures of the state, the Bolivian miner had as much to fear from his work environment as from any bullet: Moisés spent several pages describing what he considered to be "the most tremendous social drama on the planet," that is, the everyday struggles of the Bolivian miners to survive. Miners fought for their lives and livelihoods on three fronts, he suggested: against the cold, harsh mountain climate, against the constant risk of cave-in or equipment failure, and against the bullets of their own army. In many ways, though, the most direct threats to the miners' lives *as described by Moisés* came from the nature of the mineral production process itself, regardless of the intentions of the Bolivian state or the mining companies.

In this way, many of Moisés's criticisms of the corrupt Bolivian state actually called for greater state intervention in the lives as well as livelihoods of the miners, hinting at the future development of a revolutionary welfare state. In a long tangent apparently unrelated to the massacre itself, Moisés described a fourth threat to miners: contaminated meat from company

⁸⁸ Moisés, *Catavi*.

stores run by corrupt and heartless officials. Descriptions like this, emphasizing the inherently brutal conditions of minework, can be found throughout Bolivian political and protest literature of the twentieth century. Rather than undermining Moisés's central concern with government culpability, however, this passage plays a critical role in bolstering the repeated association throughout the speech of miners with Chaco War veterans, and in the need for the state to attend to its citizens' welfare more assiduously. This comparison is no small feat in a speech condemning the military for its actions against these miners.⁸⁹ Both gave their lives willingly for a doomed enterprise, rendered more dangerous by the corruption of their own government. Both, Moisés and other nationalist politicians of this period argued, were truer citizens of their country than these government officials as a result of this sacrifice.⁹⁰

In all these constructions, it is crucial to understand what the miners *meant* to this narrative of a Bolivia betrayed. The mystification and poetic veneration of the cruel conditions of mine labor, while certainly based in truth, performed an important task for the politicians responding to the Catavi massacre (and many on the left since). Sensuous descriptions of physical toil and hardship created a kinship between the starvation, thirst, and environmental hazards of the Chaco conflict, while at the same time constructing a figure of the Bolivian miner as one of the strongest, most driven, most powerful workers in the world.⁹¹ This narrative provided both an explanation for the failures of the Bolivian nation to thrive despite resources,

⁸⁹ Moisés differentiates the PIR's position from that of the MNR's Paz Estenssoro by emphasizing that he does hold the military accountable for this crime.

⁹⁰ Moisés, Gabriel. Resumen Del Discurso Del Diputado Por Dalence, H. Gabriel Moisés, Pronunciado En La Célebre Interpelación Al Gabinete Por La Masacre de Catavi, Planteada Por Los Diputados Del P.I.R. (Sesiones Del 31 de Agosto Y 3 de Septiembre de 1943). Serie Documentos Parlamentarios. Bolivia: Editorial "La Paz," 1943.

⁹¹ Dávila M., Oscar. *Espirales de Viento: Historia Novelada de La Minería Del Est año En Bolivia*. 1. ed. La Paz, Bolivia: Muela del Diablo Editores, 1999. For an exploration of the ways in which bodily suffering enabled Bolivian women to make political claims, see Stephenson, *Gender and Modernity in Andean Bolivia*.

and a source of inspiration for the future in the robust, masculine, potent, but poorly treated mine worker.⁹² In contrast to the *Arielismo* of many of Bolivia's early twentieth century intellectuals, the cult of the male mineworker foregrounded risk and violence in producing greatness.⁹³

The veneration of the male mineworker relied on an ideological balancing act for several reasons. First, because it lay in acknowledging mining as an inherently exploitative process where conditions of labor are almost uniformly bad, no matter the ideological inclinations of the state or company. Secondly, like any martyr for a revolution, there was a tension between emphasizing the hardships faced by the group in question and making these actors seem powerless. In Chapter 1, a series of elites in Corocoro took on the "indigenous mineworkers" as victims to be championed, but without attributing to them agency or celebrating their rights to militancy. By the 1940s, versions of this discourse allowed workers to be powerful in their own right, but emphasized how the company and government sought to enervate the workers through, as cited earlier, feeding them starvation rations and sickly meat, and by supplementing these meager portions with coca, which he called the "best friend of the exploiters," and which degenerated workers into mindless automata.

A secondary feature of this mythology was the mining woman, impoverished mother who by virtue of her partner's low wages, had to work as a *palliri*, crushing tin or copper ore outside the mines. One of the heroines of Catavi, one of the few named martyrs of the massacre, was one such woman. Maria Barzola, *palliri* and mother of six, was killed alongside her children carrying the banner of the miners' struggle. While Barzola did not figure in Moisés's speech, most

⁹² Ava Baron, "Masculinity, the Embodied Male Worker, and the Historian's Gaze," *International Labor and Working-Class History*, no. 69 (April 1, 2006): 143–60.

⁹³ Rodríguez Leytón, *Un Anarquismo Singular*; Porfirio DÍAZ MACHICAO, *La Bestia Emocional*, n.d.

subsequent retellings of the massacre name Barzola and no one else.⁹⁴ Barzola became crucial to MNR-specific remembrances of Catavi because she, like Catavi itself, could become a nexus of representation of larger issues. As a working mother, Barzola represented extremes of poverty and raised questions about the role of government in protecting or harming its own citizens. At the same time, unlike the male miner, she posed no threat in her militancy, hers was a militancy bred of love for her starving family.⁹⁵ As I will argue below, offering protections to support women and children and better the health of Bolivia's families was a crucial, if understated, shared vision of the left and right wings of the MNR. In 1953, the nationalization decree was declared on a field named after Barzola, and the MNR's ladies auxiliary was named after her.⁹⁶

A final, yet crucial component of Moisés's imagery of degeneration and enervation was an equation of symbols of indigenous culture with the colonial period, feudalism, and oppression. The sources of worker enervation and degeneration, in Moisés's discourse, like in Marof's *Tragedia del Altiplano* were capitalist, but resulted in the maintenance of colonial patterns that could be read in Bolivia's indigenous present. In a section labeled "Pudrideros Humanos" (human waste-heaps) Mendoza described the miners' company houses "where the Bolivian people is rotting like trash and degenerating mentally and physically."⁹⁷ Moisés's use of degeneration refers back to currents of both indigenismo and Marxism that attributed indigenous

⁹⁴ Galeano mentions Maria Barzola, Eduardo Galeano, *Las venas abiertas de América Latina* (Siglo XXI, 2008), 174. As does June Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, 42.

⁹⁵ Similarly, Zulawski points out that Socialist novelist Jaime Mendoza, for example, saw miners as modern but their indigenous wives as backwards, even among families of the same cultural/racial/linguistic background. Even Eduardo Lima saw the education of indigenous mothers as crucial to producing modern citizens. Women in their roles as wives and mothers provided a bridge between the indigeneity and the modernity of the miners. Mendoza, *En las tierras del Potosí*; Lima L., *Corocoro*; De la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos*.

⁹⁶ Knudson, "The Impact of the Catavi Mine Massacre of 1942 on Bolivian Politics and Public Opinion."

⁹⁷ "donde el pueblo boliviano esta pudriendose como basura y degenerandose fisica y mentalmente..." Moisés, *Catavi*, 14.

poverty to colonization and four centuries of oppression causing a once great civilization to decline.

In this, Moisés built on generations of intellectuals who associated Bolivian poverty with indigeneity. This narrative reclaimed a propensity for civilization and development among both Aymara and Quechua peoples in the past but refused to allow for greatness in the indigenous present.⁹⁸ Moisés did not refer to indigenous Bolivians explicitly, but his cultural markers make clear that degeneration was linked with signs of indigeneity. The pudrideros, he noted, were built in the centuries old indigenous style and not updated since. Moisés's critique of coca similarly coded indigenous traditions as symptoms of oppression, or as signs of progress impeded by the Spanish and their modern day counterparts. One of the major flaws of the companies, then, was that they prevented the natural course of modern development among the workers.

At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, Moisés also created a shared history of rebellion that integrated indigenous struggles for liberation into a socialist history of worker uprisings. His speech in the Bolivian congress in fact began by drawing a direct parallel between the massacres of Catavi and those of both Uncía and Jesús de Machaca in 1921, perpetrated by "The same assassins in all times and places!"⁹⁹ This paradox is emblematic of the kind of revolutionary politics that emerged out of peripheral mining centers such as Corocoro in the early 1920s. Like Linares, Moisés was a socialist deputy in a rural region dominated by mining towns whose claims to represent the poor in his community were threatened by the control mining companies exercised in the police departments and in local governments. For this reason the concrete pieces of evidence Moisés waved in front of the congress in August 1943 were not

⁹⁸ Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*; Saldaña-Portillo, *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development*.

⁹⁹ "¡Los mismos asesinos de todas partes y de todas los días!" Moisés, *Catavi*.

testimonies of fights against the army, but records of meat and salaries in the company store. His nationalism was stung by the fact that Bolivians (whether workers or non-mining elites) could not get good meat, but gringo employees of the mine could get the finest imports from Europe and North America.¹⁰⁰

Local grievances such as these created a class of small-town elites, merchants competing with the mines, and disaffected intellectuals and writers who could all agree on a shared symbol of Bolivia's oppression. Juan Lechín's claims that his hatred of gringos dates back to his childhood notwithstanding, Guillermo Lora argues that the radicalization of the future labor leader occurred when he was appointed a regional authority in the government of Villarroel, and had trouble enforcing the laws against mining companies.¹⁰¹ Out of local experiences like these, the MNR learned first-hand that exercising state control meant neutralizing the power of regional elites in the countryside: the mine owners and the hacendados. Because of Catavi, these regional complaints coalesced into a narrative that could drive a multi-class, nationalist revolution.

The 1940s were a time of nearly constant agitation among indigenous communities. Both rural peasants and workers were, in fact, increasing their demands on the Bolivian state at this time. Moisés's invocation of the Jesus de Machaca uprising raises the question, why did the MNR prefer miners, and not indigenous Bolivians, as the revolutionary heroes of Bolivia? In his study of peasants in revolutionary Bolivia, James Kohl argued that the MNR saw peasants and indigenous Bolivians as unpredictable and untrustworthy.¹⁰² Several MNRistas were in fact concerned with the repercussions of "unleashing" peasants on the countryside and thus land

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980; Lechín Oquendo, *Memorias*.

¹⁰² James V. Kohl, "Peasant and Revolution in Bolivia, April 9, 1952-August 2, 1953," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 58, no. 2 (May 1978): 242, doi:10.2307/2513087.

reform. Although land reform became one of the most significant legacies of the 1952 government, nobody in the MNR wanted to endorse land division formally prior to 1952.¹⁰³

Even those who considered it, such as Walter Guevara Arze and Paz Estenssoro did in the 1938, preferred to solve the “problem of the Indian” with acculturation first.¹⁰⁴ For the MNR, worker reform was a solution to the problem of indigeneity as well, and many hoped that simply by creating a consciousness of class, indigenous Bolivians would cease to be a distinct “problem” facing the country. As stated earlier, while many recall Marof and the POR’s rallying cry as “tierras al indio”, his original formulation was “tierras al pueblo.” Like Marof and the POR, the MNR hoped to turn indigenous Bolivians into western subjects first before granting them political rights and local autonomy. As Gotkowitz noted, Guevara Arze “augured a nation of enterprising communities immersed in the market but managed, modernized, and sheltered from uncertainties by the state.” With this rhetoric, the leaders of the MNR made political inroads in the mines, but not among the networks of caciques apoderados and indigenous leaders who had been willing to organize into cross-class regional federations in the 1920s.

The First MNR Regime of Gualberto Villarroel

The MNR learned to negotiate with these networks of indigenous organizers as a result of the dictatorship of Gualberto Villarroel. The most radical experiment with authoritarian populism in this period was the Villarroel government from 1943 to 1946. Villarroel was an officer prominent in the Razon de Patria military group during the military socialist years, but he was not a war hero. In 1943, building on the anti-government opposition after Catavi, he took power in a coup orchestrated with the help of some of the members of the MNR. This was the MNR’s

¹⁰³ Weston, Jr., “An Ideology of Modernization,” 98.

¹⁰⁴ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 124.

first taste of national political power, and it taught them a great deal of the risks of both geopolitics and populist agitation. Villarroel's politics and the perception of fascism in the MNR meant that Villarroel entered office at a disadvantage among both the urban (non-mining) labor movement and the United States war machine. His solution was to cultivate vertical links with popular sectors such as the miners and indigenous communities, but to violently suppress unauthorized agitation.¹⁰⁵ Like Toro and Busch, Villarroel tried to reform the legal system, creating a new Bolivia by reaffirming many of the commitments and ideas made during the 1938 constitutional convention. Like Toro and Busch, Villarroel was also radicalized in his interactions with popular actors, and learned the price of unleashing popular forces without sufficient state authority to control and channel this unrest.¹⁰⁶ Throughout the 1940s, the MNR had been locked out of national power but able to cultivate a regional base by emphasizing local elections and ties to opposition movements in the countryside. Thus, when Villarroel took power, the MNR sought above all to put pro-worker officials in local government offices. Juan Lechín, a young football star and MNRista but not yet a labor leader, benefitted from one of these appointments, becoming a prefectural authority in 1943 with the rise of Villarroel.¹⁰⁷

On a national level, two of the crucial reforms passed by Villarroel were the abolition of pongueaje, or forced labor requirements on haciendas, and legalization of common-law marriage (concubinaje). Both of these reforms continued the social legislative policy of the 1938 Convention, expanding their provisions and giving enforcement more teeth. Finally, both may

¹⁰⁵ In this, he was not entirely dissimilar from Paz Estenssoro's later government, as will be explored in Chapters 4 and 5. See also Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*.

¹⁰⁶ Gotkowitz' *Revolution for Our Rights* shows how indigenous activists forced both political recognition and the right to apply new laws *as they understood them*, rather than how landlords hoped to interpret them in this period. See chapter seven, "The Indigenous Congress of 1945" in Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

¹⁰⁷ Lechín Oquendo, *Memorias*, 111.

have contributed to his downfall in 1946.¹⁰⁸ The 1938 constitution had recognized both legitimate and illegitimate children by offering legal protections and welfare benefits to the unmarried partners of workers. Villarroel's decree, passed during the May 1945 Indigenous Conference, simply recognized as legally married all those who had constituted a home together, shared resources, and especially had children for a period of two years. While Villarroel legalizing common law marriage understood this reform as supporting marriage, in fact imposing legal marriage on couples after two years, he set the conditions for a relationship between poor women and the state in which women could use legal protections to secure resources and welfare whether or not their partners (or former partners) were willing.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, since "concubinaje" was a common practice among both rural indigenous and rural mining families, this decree was seen as threatening the existing social order, legitimating practices heretofore excluded and looked down upon by the urban elite and the church. Many upper class women found this reform offensive, and protested against Villarroel. Among the working class after the revolution, however, this law became a crucial site of contestation among working class families, because the legislation explicitly sanctioned (and assumed) paternity obligations, inheritance, and workers' rights to women, regardless of whether they were legally married or not. They had

¹⁰⁸ Gotkowitz persuasively argues that Villarroel welcoming indigenous leaders into the cities and especially his encouragement of indigenous legal authority provoked the angry mob that brought his downfall. This reform, which implicitly targeted indigenous communities as well, was part of this threat. Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*; Pablo Stefanoni, *"Qué hacer con los indios--": y otros traumas irresueltos de la colonialidad* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2010), 77.

¹⁰⁹ Luis Oporto, *Las Mujeres En La Historia de Bolivia: Imágenes Y Realidades Del Siglo XX (1900-1950): Antología*, 1. ed, Colección La Mujer En La Historia de Bolivia 3 (La Paz: Sol de Intercomunicación : Grupo Editorial Anthropos, 2001). "Man does not live under the law alone, nor is this his destiny. There is something greater to the individual that drives him to look for the company of woman: the survival of the species. Matrimony is, for this reason, a fact, a natural law, and not a creation of the legislature. It is the basic institution of the family and thus the basis of all social organization." "El hombre ante el derecho, no vive solo, ni a ello está destinado. Hay algo superior al individuo que lo lleva a buscar la compañía de la mujer; la conservación de la especie. El matrimonio es, pues, un hecho, un ley natural, no es una creación del legislador. Es la institución base de la familia que a su vez es la base de toda organización social." Cristóbal Suárez Arnez, *Reflexiones Sobre El Matrimonio Y El Divorcio ...* (Sucre, Bolivia: Imprenta y litografía Salesiana, 1940), 11.

to be linked, sexually, to a male partner to receive these benefits, but after the passage of both divorce laws and legal recognition of concubinaje, women did not lose such benefits upon the dissolution of that relationship, which allowed women crucial leverage over family resources in this period.

Villarroel was a populist, and many of his reforms were admired among the miners and, especially after the indigenous congress of 1945, agricultural communities. Indeed, Villarroel was the first government since Saavedra to seriously court rural indigenous support. The fact that Villarroel was willing to integrate new groups—poor women and indigenous Bolivians—into the ranks of citizens with rights won him the ire of many middle class and elite Bolivians disaffected with the status quo but wary of too much social openness. Villarroel also alienated urban workers such as teachers, marketwomen, and generally members of the socialist opposition by instituting wage freezes in some regions and violently repressing, even killing, outspoken members of the opposition. For all his populism, Villarroel did not create a political coalition that could articulate a shared national project of social change, casting foreigners as the villains against whom development must be waged, and channeling popular upheaval in such a way that even elites could see its value.

Ultimately, Villarroel's combination of fomenting rural unrest and violently alienating potential supporters provoked a violent reaction of its own. In 1946, urban workers allied with the PIR and what was left of the pre-Chaco parties, with the tacit support of the tin barons, united to overthrow Villarroel, and in fact hung his body from a lamppost in the style of Mussolini (or, as is common in Bolivian cities, in a warning to potential thieves).¹¹⁰ This revolt set off another

¹¹⁰ Augusto Céspedes, *El presidente colgado: historia boliviana* (Librería Editorial "Juventud," 1979). This warning to thieves may represent how urban Bolivians wanted to warn indigenous populists away from the city. For anthropological investigations of the contemporary practice of colgando thieves, see Goldstein, *The Spectacular*

round of uprisings in cities and the countrysides, several attempts by the MNR to provoke a revolution, and increasingly futile attempts by the Conservatives and Republicans to instill some kind of order. This period has often been characterized as an era of reaction, where the old parties allied with the oligarchy attempted to “turn the clock back,” but in fact it was a time of huge upheaval in which all sectors of Bolivian society- from indigenous caciques apoderados allied to anarchist unions to the mining companies themselves attempted to assert power through what was left of Bolivia’s political system.¹¹¹

The Sexenio was a period of strange alliances: PIR ministers ordering troops to contain miners’ protests, Republican politicians enforcing Villarroel era restrictions on hacienda labor. On a local level, this was a time of violence, rebellion, and the explicit negotiation of new kinds of politics. It was never a real return to conservatism, it was the last gasp of reform within the old order. The creation of a resource nationalist consensus, visible by the foundation of the MNR in the early 1940s, did not result in a uniform acceptance or encouragement of worker unrest. A series of incidents of civil unrest in the late 1940s suggest, however, how thoroughly the social landscape was changing. The only party to emerge out of this violent, contradictory period with a coherent proposal to stabilize and improve the country was the radicalized MNR, under the leadership of Victor Paz Estenssoro and Juan Lechín.

The Sexenio in Corocoro

Corocoro and Pacajes province itself were hotbeds of rural and worker unrest during the

City; Lazar, *El Alto, Rebel City*; Goldstein, *Outlawed*; Mark Goodale, *Dilemmas of Modernity: Bolivian Encounters with Law and Liberalism* (Stanford University Press, 2008).

¹¹¹ For example, a retrospective of the strikes and massacres of “El Periodo Pre-Electoral del PURS” in 1949 run by *La Nacion*, September 1, 1956, during a tumultuous moment for the new revolutionary government.

1940s.¹¹² In contrast to the 1930s, when a few lawyers, intellectuals, and merchants brought lawsuits on behalf or against indigenous Bolivians, the workers themselves as a social unit became protagonists in municipal disputes and legal proceedings. For example, in 1946, an American mining official accused workers of sacking the offices of the Cia Smelting's San Angel mine and assaulting a "viejo minero" who worked there, threatening to kill the engineer as well. These workers were identified by name and by association with the union.¹¹³ Shortly after the Carnaval Celebrations of 1949, several white collar and artisan urban residents of Corocoro reported hearing dynamite in the middle of the night. When the court investigated, several responded that "only miners could commit such an attack on the tranquility of the neighborhood."¹¹⁴

This court case is worth exploring in some detail because it shows how worker solidarity interacted with local powerholders in this period. Residents of Corocoro awoke in the early hours of the morning to explosions of dynamite calculated, according to the police report, to "sow terror" among the population. The next morning, several leaders of the miners' union came to offer an explanation for the disturbance, signing their own names to the "denuncia" filed against them by the civic authorities.¹¹⁵ Mariano Silva, Juan Ramirez, and Lorenzo Rodriguez told the police that they had been warned the night before of agents arriving from La Paz to arrest Silva.

¹¹² Corocoro was, as in the 1920s, surrounded by indigenous uprisings tied to urban anarchist movements in 1947 alone, and miners from Corocoro were reported to have assisted with a hacienda uprising in neighboring Anta. See Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, 126. For more on the "The 1947 Cycle of Unrest," see Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*. A mark of the extent of civil disorder can be found in the lack of civic records from 1947 and 1948. In this period, Corocoro, miners were known even as far as the US State department to be particularly prone to revolt. Kevin Young, "Total Subversion: the Formation of an Urban-Rural Alliance in La Paz, Bolivia, 1946-7" Paper Presented to Latin American Studies Association in Chicago, 2014.

¹¹³ Denuncia por Donald Wilson, ALP PJAC 176 1946

¹¹⁴ "solo mineros pueden cometer semejante atentado contra la tranquilidad del vecindario." MP vs Mariano Silva, ALP PJAC Caja 176.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

They set off the dynamite to cause a distraction while Silva fled the city.¹¹⁶

Although the MP scribe seemed skeptical of Silva's story, the subsequent investigation made clear that Silva and the miners had cause for worry. City officials conducted interviews with several women who reported hearing a group of men of unknown identity carousing drunkenly and making vague threats about running "el viejo" out of town.¹¹⁷ These women also reported that strangers in question made reference to an earlier attempt to intimidate Silva that had failed. The people involved in this dispute are two groups who will come to dominate the next several chapters: the workers and families of the miners' barrio, and the more geographically and socially mobile young men of the artisan and merchant classes. The men making threats against Silva were students and empleados, some from Corocoro and some from outside, carousing and wandering between dance halls and clubs (Club Carrasco) and stalls that sold alcohol¹¹⁸. When questioned by the police, these men claimed they were denied drinks at the Club del Sindicato, and end up wandering through Rancho Toledo, the miners' barrio, making idle boasts.

Municipal authorities and the local commander of the Sucre Battalion also went to Rancho Toledo, the miners' encampment, to interview witnesses who could corroborate either the young men or Mariano Silva's story, and then spent the next few days trying to figure out what had happened. The police investigation reveals that Corocoro had a working class neighborhood in the Rancho Toledo. As in Catavi, most workers lived in small, one room row

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Testimonies of Marcelina Cusi, Concepción Cruz, Maxima Mendoza and Vicenta Rodriguez. ALP PJAC Caja 176.

¹¹⁸ Testimony Maxima Mendoza, ALP PJAC Caja 176.

houses with common bathing facilities and little in the way of running water or electricity.¹¹⁹

Luciano Tapia, a young man in this period, remembers a community so close knit his mother would leave him at home with the other Rancho children when she went to work in the mines.¹²⁰

One of the women interviewed by the police could not remember which number her house was-identifying the source of the conflict as, “over by Marcelina’s place, next door.”¹²¹

Their shared walls helped create a shared sense of collective struggle against poverty and oppression, but it also meant that neighbors could listen in on each others’ conversations. These people were intimately involved in all aspects of each others’ lives. The streets were small and voices carried. In this case, the young men carousing in the miners’ barrio immediately attracted attention. Everyone on the street was listening to the conversation, and most had a sense for who was talking. The women interviewed by the police expected to recognize the voices of any young men carousing in their streets. When they did not, they identified the “huayluchos” (wayward youths, hoodlums) as a threat, and warned the member of their community they believed to be a target.¹²² Moreover, everyone in this community knew who Mariano Silva was (even when the “huayluchos” referred to him obliquely) and several people went to go warn Silva.

The Silva dispute makes clear the demographic and political changes that constituted the new, post-1935 Corocoro. By 1949, the miners’ union, now affiliated with the FSTMB, was an established enough force in the town that it felt comfortable walking into the police station to

¹¹⁹ Joint Bolivian-United States Labor Commission and International Labour Office, *Los Problemas Del Trabajo En Bolivia; Informe de La Comision Mixta Boliviano-Estadounidense Del Trabajo*.

¹²⁰ Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Asi es nuestra vida)*.

¹²¹ MP vs Mariano Silva, ALP PJAC Caja 176

¹²² One of the woman actually did know the people involved. She identified the “sobrino de la Andrea” who worked as a telegrafista and was brought in for questioning as well. MP vs Mariano Silva, ALP PJAC Caja 176.

account for its actions. Mariano Silva was also a recognized political actor in the city.¹²³

Although the miners were characterized as violent and unruly in this report, both the police and the merchants saw them as identifiable members of the urban community, one of several interest groups within the town. The young men making threats understood the miners to be a distinct group from the neighboring agricultural workers, though they could not necessarily tell them apart. This fact alone may have marked these young men off as foreigners.¹²⁴ This case also shows political shifts in the town: the decision to set off dynamite and the decision to hide in the mines were coordinated responses to a credible political threat. The case of “disturbance” demonstrates the formation of working class solidarity in the face of repression, though it is not clear whether the municipality was yet acting as friend or foe to the miners.

The military battalion in charge of investigations was also a new presence in town. Gotkowitz argues that one of the reasons the 1947 and 1949 cycles of unrest in rural Bolivia were so violent was because of the efforts of the Villarroel government to expand the military’s reach into the countryside.¹²⁵ Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, Corocoro had expanded its own police force, but so had the state extended its reach into mining communities. During the Villarroel period, the MNR and Radepa had begun to use the Corocoro military base as a prison for political dissidents, a practice that would carry through the revolutionary period.¹²⁶ Although the miners were not local targets of this repression, the repressive capacity of the state was

¹²³ In 1938, this does not seem to have been the case. Candelaria Cruz complains that although she had been given custody of their children, they had suffered poor treatment at his hands, and that he had sent them to work as servants in La Paz. (Candelaria Cruz vs Mariano Sirpa o Silva, 29 Marzo 1938) ALP PJAC Caja 160.

¹²⁴ One of the woman reported that her brother in law had been stopped by the young men, none of whom he could recognize, and asked whether he was a miner or a laborer on a neighboring indigenous community. Testimonio de Concepcion Cruz.

¹²⁵ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 256.

¹²⁶ Thomas Field, personal communication: August 2015.

higher than it had ever been.

At stake here in the assault on civic tranquility were competing notions of right and respectability. While merchants and office workers complained of their restful sleep being interrupted, so too did the women in the mining camp resent “these vagabonds” who drank and boasted loudly outside their houses. The men in question claimed to be students, whose right to waywardness was also a privilege of not being working class, while the women made a claim to working class decency in the face of middle class dissolution.¹²⁷ Mariano Silva himself was a white collar employee, but he was organizing among the workers in the Rancho Toledo. In this dispute there are also hints of association between popular politics and illegitimate demagoguery or caudillismo. For example, one of the carousing young men made reference to money that Silva was allegedly receiving on behalf of the mining community.¹²⁸

The year 1949 was marked by near constant uprisings, recalled as a “Civil War”, sparked by the elections in May, in which left wing parties and the MNR won increasing shares of the electorate. During the elections of 1949, Corocoro featured in the La Paz newspaper *El Comercio* (owned by?). Gabino Apaza, Coordinator of Campesino Relations, wrote

I had the opportunity to be in Corocoro during election day and what I saw there cannot be called anything other than violent and unconstitutional: truly avalanches of drunk people throwing stones at vehicles, sowing panic, shooting firearms, setting off dynamite, threatening the sub-prefectural authorities and the Election Coordinator was completely unable to put a stop to the abuse.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Vicenta de Rodriguez, casada, labores de casa, “Vivo en el Rancho Toledo, no me acuerdo el número, el día domingo 15, entre nueve y media de la noche, esos yualauichos huaylaychos, vagabond, que decian ser estudiantes, parecian estar borachos...” ALP PJAC Caja 176.

¹²⁸ Lista de Empleados, January 1949, ALP PJAC Caja 167. Testigo de Marcelina Cusi, ALP PJAC Caja 176.

¹²⁹ “Tuve la oportunidad de estar en Corocoro, para el día de las elecciones y lo que vi allí no se puede calificar sino de brutal y anticonstitucional: Verdaderas avalanchas de individuos en estado de completa ebriedad apedreaban los vehículos, sembraban el pánico, disparaban armas de fuego, reventaban dinamitas, ultrajaban a la autoridad subprefectural y el señor Mediador Electoral se hallaba incapaz de contener tanto abuso.” Article found in Jorge Sologuren contra Gabino Apaza, ALP PJAC Caja 187, May 5, 1949

Apaza went on to argue that only this anti-democratic drunkenness explains the “imposition” of the MNR candidate, Angel Lopez Estrada, as deputy for the province. In his complaint, he conceded that the mayor, doctor, even the chief of the police were supporters of the party. While Angel Estrada may have been, the MNRista mayor, Jorge Sologuren, was certainly not a figure “imposed” from outside; Sologuren had been on the voting rolls for Corocoro since the 1930s, when he belonged to the Republican opposition that renamed itself the United Republican Socialist Party (PURS).

The sitting president at the time, Enrique Hertzog, was a member of the PURS party and had been elected in 1947. Hertzog tried to maintain the status quo ante by reaching out to workers but keeping mining and agricultural elites happy, but by 1949 the PURS no longer believe it could conciliate and pacify the insurgent workers, peasants, and the left.¹³⁰ Hertzog was forced to resign in favor of his vice president Mamerto Urriolagoitia, who was willing to take a much harder line against populist groups. Urriolagoitia presided over the last gasp of the Bolivian oligarchy. When, in the elections of 1951, even with property restrictions and literacy requirements in place, the MNR candidate Paz Estenssoro actually won the presidency, Urriolagoitia asked the military to take over rather than honor the results of the election. Victor Paz Estenssoro won Corocoro with 858 votes, nearly all of the electors in this town of 2,500.¹³¹ In other words, by the end of the 1940s local elites and miners alike had settled on the MNR as

¹³⁰ Hertzog came to visit Corocoro shortly after the 1949 elections. The miners union was asked to host the drivers and subaltern delegates of his party. This they did in the workers' café, and sent the city the bill. Sindicato de Mineros a Alcalde, Mayo 1949.

¹³¹ Whitehead, “Miners as Voters,” 343. In fact, Whitehead argues that the FSTMB was probably in direct control of about 10% of the electorate by the 1951 elections. He argues that miners were proportionally more influential over the government before the 1953 revolution when the extension of universal suffrage reduced their proportion of the vote to about 4%- in line with the number of miners in the population. By similar logic, Corocoro itself, as a provincial capital that was also a mining center, lost relative importance and radical influence over the course of this period, first with the 1938 expansion of voting booths outside of provincial capitals and finally with universal suffrage in 1952.

the strongest opposition movement for creating a new, revolutionary Bolivia, while the civilian politicians of the old order had no means of asserting control.

In March 1952, a Bolivian official of the mining company named David Salazar sent his teenage servant to the company store to pick up his rations, where she was refused service by the woman running the store, Fanny Alanes. He returned later with his wife to ask why, and Alanes responded that she neither wanted nor was required to serve the girl. While Salazar went to complain to the Company offices, Alanes attacked his wife, calling her a dressed-up Indian girl with “peeled skin” while hitting her with the lid of a trash can.¹³² Later in the dispute, the vendor also accused the official of robbing the company store to run his own business, run by his merchant wife, and called him a coward, a deserter, and a disgrace. Such an accusation shows how working class articulations of national betrayal by elites were becoming more widespread in this period. However, this accusation also demonstrates something new: Alanes’s articulation of thief, *k’ara*, and deserter as equivalent insults showed her conflation of racial and national pride in terms of policing proper behavior in the store and community. Only a deserter and a coward would have a “peeled” wife, and only such a disgraceful pair would rob the company for their own benefit.¹³³ In the period of rising nationalist fervor immediately preceding the revolution, Fanny Alanes was calling Salazar to account for not fulfilling his duty as a Bolivian citizen.

Conclusions

After the crash of tin and copper prices worldwide, which resulted in both the Chaco War and a massive demographic and economic restructuring of Corocoro, local elites and workers alike began to articulate a shared national project predicated on modernizing indigenous Bolivia,

¹³² A slang word for non-Indian people, “*k’ara*” literally means peeled, and its use here suggests that the official’s wife had tried to hide or shed her indigenous status.

¹³³ David Salazar vs Fanny Alanes, 1952 ALP PJAC Caja 203

with foreign mining corporations as the foil and working class miners as the hero. There were two sets of ideological experiments in this period, both nationalist, involving the military, and using socialist discourses to critique existing structures of power (both also incorporating fascist corporatist elements). The military socialist period in the 1930s paired the military with an ideological commitment to socialism but an ambivalent understanding of what structural reform would actually look like. The revolutionary nationalist period of the MNR and Villarroel sought to create a civilian coalition that could reform the government from the inside out. Both of these experiments were haunted by the contradiction of wanting to encourage popular participation and while harboring a deep fear of the consequences of popular militancy. After the failed experiment of Villarroel, it was the revolutionary miners, I suggest, who offered a way out of this conceptual bind.

Corocoro participated enthusiastically in these experiments in military socialism and military populism because local elites could see a direct connection between foreign dependence and local underdevelopment. During the rise of the MNR party, the area around Corocoro experienced extreme levels of repression of rural indigenous and anarchist movements. At a municipal level, government decrees were also applied piecemeal, and periodic attempts by the national state to exert greater control over the mining industry found local support as well among merchants who felt out-competed by the foreign-owned company stores. Mineworker barrios grew significantly in this period as unrest from the countryside brought new workers into the city. This allowed for a resurgence of miner organizing that dovetailed with local elite interests in political coalitions that would bring the state into regulation and development. At the same time, the repression helped weed out political alternatives to the MNR among the urban anarchists and affiliated rural movements.


On a national level, the MNR firmly allied itself with the forces of the Nation by taking on the miners as heroic allies. Building on the Chaco War associations of military sacrifice for the national good, transforming Indian recruits into Bolivian citizens, mineworkers came to represent rural workers who became citizens through the sacrifice of their labor underground. Against the specter of indigenous uprising, workers were seen as a particularly tractable kind of popular force, one that could be cultivated by political elites and disciplined to support certain kinds of projects for the nation.

Finally, gender is critical to the process of reform that shaped the Bolivian 1930s and 1940s, but hasn't been systematically addressed by most histories of the period. The years between the depression and the April Revolution saw radical shifts in family life, legislatively marked by the legalization of divorce in 1932 and universal suffrage in 1952. The military populists of the 1930s and 1940s wrote into Bolivian law for the first time legal recognition of women's work and family rights. This period too saw consistent organizational efforts by anarchist working women in the cities for political power (explicitly rather than the vote) and for the vote by upper and middle class women in progressive cities like Oruro and La Paz. Tracing women's rights in this period highlights the way that incorporating new groups into the ranks of suffrage was thinkable in Bolivia before the revolution- provided they were literate, Spanish speaking, and decent. It also highlights the ways that protecting families would become a shared project among both wings of the MNR, one of the few examples common ground between socialist and corporatist revolutionary visions.

Every reformist government in this period ran up against the essential weakness of the Bolivian state in the face of economically dominant (Bolivian) mine owners tied to global markets. Only by committing to nationalization could the MNR fundamentally restructure the

balance of economic, social, and ultimately political power in the country. Once in control of resource production, moreover, the MNR believed it could direct these profits and the very infrastructure of the country into a modernizing project that would serve only the national interests. The next chapter will show how the nationalized mining company combined a social and an economic purpose by providing a structure through which the state could expand its social welfare and provisioning projects.

Chapter 3: Worker Citizenship and Revolution, 1952-1964



In November of 1960, in a butcher shop run by the Corporation Minera de Bolivia's (COMIBOL) Corocoro Mine, a woman named Guadalupe Mamani de Valeriano asked for her family's ration of meat. The worker in charge, Carlos Condori, refused to serve her. According to Condori, she became enraged at this and proceeded to berate him, calling him a liar and an insolent "boy."² Mamani, for her part, reported that Condori had lied to her in saying there was no meat at all, and that this was not the first time he had refused her. She added that he often kept cuts of meat back from the working families, and most egregiously, he had called her a whore. In their testimonies, both agreed that at some point in the exchange, she hit him with a rock (although she called it a "small blow" and he claimed it happened twice), and that later her husband, Celso Valeriano, came in and entered the dispute as well. At this point, Condori threatened to call the police, and Valeriano told him he didn't care, since, "Nadia manda sino Mario Durán": nobody but Mario Durán is in charge here.³

In this case, as in the dispute that ended Chapter 2, working class Bolivians insisted upon

¹ Image 3.1 Telegram, Alcalde Municipal a MinGobierno, May 1952, ALP PJAC Caja 199.

² Llocalla, literally, "youth" in Aymara.

³ "Carlos Condori vs Guadalupe Mamani de Valeriano y otros" (Archivo Historico La Paz, Juzgado de Pacajes Judicial Files (ALP PJJ) 1960 Caja 377.

not only their rights to the material benefits of the revolution, but to the kind of respect due to decent citizens. When Fanny Alanes had accused David Salazar of being a traitor and a thief with a dressed up Indian wife in early 1952, she expressed a revolutionary sentiment that asserted her own claims to national belonging and decency at the expense of his. At the same time, by insisting on her right to determine proper behavior in the company store, she also insisted on a definition of power that prioritized the domestic and the intimate as arenas of revolutionary struggle.⁴ This chapter and the next will explore these domestic and intimate arenas of revolutionary struggle, showing how the state built by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) consolidated power after the revolution by helping construct a new kind of Bolivian with powerful ideological resonance: the worker citizen.⁵ Citizenship, in this case, meant particularly that workers got to determine the deployment and meaning of material resources, violence, and sexuality within communities. Through bar fights, pulpería arguments, and negotiated relationships of patronage with merchants and other members of Corocoro's *gente decente*, mine workers insisted on their own place in both local and national life, and in turn their own right to police the boundaries urban decency and revolutionary citizenship.

⁴ David Salazar vs Fanny Alanes, 1952 ALP PJAC Caja 203.

⁵ Discussions of citizenship that articulate a difference between legal and substantive citizenship are more developed outside Bolivia. These studies have used a number of qualifiers, including "social citizenship," and "worker citizenship." For a discussion of worker citizenship and the meaning of substantive citizenship in the United States, see: Evelyn Nakano Glenn, *Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor* (Harvard University Press, 2004); Mitchell, *Coyote Nation*; Glenn, "Constructing Citizenship Exclusion, Subordination, and Resistance." In Bolivia, more academic work has focused on identity and the limits of inclusion of the state, emphasizing deep skepticism of political citizenship as an existing category for most Bolivians. I believe that it is important to explore the social meanings of citizenship in the Bolivian case, paying particular attention to those who are included as well as excluded in expanded definitions of belonging. For the construction of political citizenship and identity in Bolivia, see: Irurozqui, *A Bala, Piedra Y Palo*; Salmón and Delgado, *Identidad, ciudadanía y participación popular desde la colonia al siglo XX*; Vibeke Andersson and GDS., *Citizenship and State-Building in Contemporary Bolivia : Politization of Cultural Identity* (Aalborg: GDS ;Department of History International and Social Studies Aalborg University, 2009).

In this chapter I will trace the process of revolutionary change locally, using the years of the MNR revolution in Corocoro to explore the creation of new categories of enfranchised urban citizens. The nationalist narrative that valorized male mineworker cultures of working class solidarity allowed certain kinds of young men and their families to enter into powerful positions within the community. In this context, Mario Durán, Guadalupe Mamani, and Celso Valeriano were part of a generation of socially mobile working men and women who used the revolution to recast local expectations of decency and civic participation as well as to ensure their own economic mobility and the future opportunities of their children. I use the case of Mario Durán and his social world in Corocoro to explore both the economic and political dynamics of this shift. In peripheral urban communities like Corocoro, I argue, it is easiest to trace the frictions of revolutionary change, especially in the intersection between newly powerful groups and older elites and in the struggles of poor families to make the revolution live up to its promises. In these conflicts too, the young revolutionaries set in motion both the high expectations for change and the raced and gendered exclusions that would come to haunt the revolutionary project in the decades to come.

So who was Valeriano invoking when he referred to Mario Durán? The local hero of the revolutionary miners, Durán is emblematic of the new kind of revolutionary citizen this chapter will explore. Durán was the twenty-one year old secretary general of Corocoro's union in April, 1952.⁶ During the revolution, Durán personally stormed the municipal government offices, sending a word to the new Minister of Mines and Petroleum, union leader and former Corocoreño Juan Lechín Oquendo, that he was now mayor and would carry out the revolution

⁶ He was not, however, a miner: in 1951 he was listed as an *oficinista* in the company electrical plant. He was also probably a newcomer to union politics. Through the 1940s, a Mariano Silva led the miner's union, though he disappears from the record in 1949, and may well have died in the general repression of that year. See ALP PJAC Caja 167. A "Cesar Durán" is listed as a union leader in a 1951 *La Razon* article (BDIC).

locally.⁷ Although he was only formally mayor for eight days in 1952, he held many positions in the MNR and the miners' union during the 1950s: first as secretary general, then secretary of culture, head of one of the MNR's regional action committees, sub-prefect of the province, and finally head of Worker's Control at the Corocoro mine. It was in this latter capacity that Celso Valeriano invoked him against the police.⁸

Though Durán only had a brief tenure as mayor he cast a long shadow over municipal power relations. Durán's career is thus emblematic of the way in which the revolution played out in Corocoro, and reflects larger processes of revolutionary change occurring throughout Bolivia at this time. Although historians often narrate the MNR revolution in terms of the four days of fighting in major urban areas that brought the party to power in April, 1952, I argue that the legacy of revolutionary change was set in the aftermath of the violence, when workers and peasant unions demanded new kinds of access to political power in national as well as local terms.⁹ It is my contention in this chapter that the nationalist revolution begun by the MNR fought its most important battles outside the Plaza Murillo, and indeed far from La Paz itself. The MNR reluctantly armed its working-class cadres in order to win the street battles in La Paz in April. Over the next year it attempted to selectively incorporate workers and peasants into the power structure of the state itself, initiating a decades-long struggle over the definitions of citizenship, belonging, and the proper behavior of urban residents and citizens. It was in these battles, where municipal governments, bureaucracies, and institutions fought over the terms of

⁷ "Ordenanza del Municipio" 1960 ALP PJAC Caja 229.

⁸ Celso Valeriano was active in the union, his name also appears on a document in 1963 in which the union asked the municipality to rent them the local dance hall for Todos Santos ALP PJAC Caja 237.

⁹ No one in town can remember significant fighting in Corocoro. On the contrary, miners from Corocoro marched to La Paz, and most of the violence was there during the April 9-13 period. Interview with Eusebio Sarmiento, September 9th, 2013. The countryside around Corocoro, by contrast, was the site of much rural unrest before and after 1952.

inclusion and “worker control,” that the MNR won- and eventually lost- its revolution.

It was not primarily the working class that benefited from the MNR revolution, in Corocoro, but a subset of mestizo men, mostly children of merchants and traders, who straddled a line between white collar and blue collar worker. As youths, they often worked in offices as well as the interior of the mine. Literate and well connected, they could translate this experience into union or municipal careers as they got older, taking advantage of COMIBOL, the nationalized mining company’s expanding aboveground infrastructure.¹⁰ During their time in the mines themselves, these men lived and worked alongside indigenous men and some women who mostly came from rural communities and had neither the urban connections nor formal education to move into safer, more comfortable office jobs. The upwardly mobile urban young men and recent rural migrants formed bonds of solidarity within the miner’s housing encampment, in football games, and the social clubs that sprang up along the streets that led to the COMIBOL mines.

During the revolution, these groups both experienced some degree of social mobility and political and economic advancement. However, in the decades after the revolution, the boundary between those who entered the mines from the city and the countryside became less porous, and the scarcity of benefits provided by the company served primarily to enforce an exclusive rather than inclusive definition of urban citizenship. Like the indigenous rural miners, women sometimes benefited from the revolution’s altered power relations, but their economic and political power was always more precarious than the men, as I will explore more fully in the following chapter. This chapter explores both the promise and betrayal of solidarity in the

¹⁰ Like that other famous Corocoreño, Juan Lechín, Durán was a white collar employee at the time he entered union politics. He is listed as an “oficinista” in a court case in ALP PJAC Caja 214. Pre-revolutionary union leader Mariano Silva was also listed in the rolls of empleados of the Smelting Company in 1949, when he was secretary general of the union. “Empleados de la Compañía Smelting, Enero 1949” ALP PJAC Caja 187.

context of social disputes: cases of libel, slander, bar fights, and other forms of verbal and physical violence that came to the attention of the courts in the decade after the revolution.

The April Revolution of 1952

The MNR government headed by Victor Paz Estenssoro came to power as a result of a coup and four days of fighting in La Paz in April 1952, overthrowing the General Hugo Ballavián's military junta that had ruled since the year before. Although the revolt began as a counter-coup to protest against cancelled elections, when the MNR discovered it could not count on the army's support, it distributed arms to worker and peasant militias, which the party had been organizing since the 1940s. Mining communities near La Paz and Oruro sent worker militias to fight in the revolution, and Corocoreños were among them.¹¹ Only 90 kilometers by road and rail from La Paz, Corocoro was relatively well-connected to events in the capital, and as Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate, the fighting in April was not the first time that miners or Corocoreños took part in either battles or national politics. Still, the fighting did not extend to the city itself, and in fact for the first few months of the MNR regime, most Corocoreños saw the events of April as continuity of rural and urban unrest that had been growing since the 1940s, rather than a moment of revolutionary change.¹²

After six years of attempted uprisings by the MNR, followed by military coups and counter coups, savvy politicians and local elites had no reason to expect the April Revolution to

¹¹ My intention in this chapter is not to re-narrate the days of revolutionary fighting as they played out in La Paz, but to determine what the effects of the revolution looked like on a local scale. For this reason, I leave more thorough accounts of April 1952 to those who have already told this story. For example, Mario Murillo, *La bala no mata sino el destino: una crónica de la insurrección popular de 1952 en Bolivia* (La Paz, Bolivia: Plural : Piedra Rota, 2012). There is a growing scholarly community looking anew into the legacy and meaning of the revolution, as discussed in my introduction, and also in Dunkerley, "The Bolivian Revolution at 60."

¹² Municipal records show a great deal of pro-MNR agitation in the late 1940s, but less after the oppressive Urriolagoitia regime cracked down on agrarian and worker unrest in 1949.

last. The mayor in this period, Humberto Terán Tejada, did not immediately address the new government, and in fact used the excuse of the Easter holidays to cancel a visit to a Government Minister in La Paz.¹³ The most important concerns of the municipality at this time were the same as they had been in the winter of 1951: the recurrent food shortages and the fact that many of the bakers and vendors in town seemed to be hoarding wheat, sugar, and other necessities; the strikes that continued through April against the Compañía Smelting; and constant but relatively small scale property attacks on rural landowners.¹⁴

Like many municipal elites in this period, Terán was moderately nationalist, and was working to levy greater taxes on foreign enterprises and demand more local accountability from foreign companies and the Compañía Smelting in particular.¹⁵ The municipality and the company also worked jointly with the new national government during those first few months to negotiate prices at the company store to fight inflation.¹⁶ It is possible that Terán would have continued to work as amicably with the Paz Estenssoro regime as he had with the Ballivián, Hertzog and Urriolagoitia governments before them, had the mineworkers not taken over the city hall in May, but the national government needed loyal MNRistas to carry out its revolution.

The miners provided the catalyst for this power shift. Mario Durán's May 31 telegram, informing the Minister of Mines and Petroleum that he had taken the city government and offering his full support to the revolution, set off a period of negotiation between local

¹³ Telegram, Alcalde Municipal a MinGobierno, May 1952, ALP PJAC Caja 199.

¹⁴ By April 22 Terán noted that the union had negotiated a settlement with the American Smelting Company and the miners were returning to work. Caja 199 but also letters to the municipality found in caja 200

¹⁵ A document from March, 1952 suggests that the alcaldía was attempting to collect eighteen years of rent from the Compañía for the location of the Escuela Minera.

¹⁶ Letters from Cia Smelting to Alcalde Corocoro, May 1952. ALP PJAC Caja 200.

merchants, landowners, and miners that culminated in Terán's downfall.¹⁷ During the months of June and July the municipality entered a period of restructuring, converting the office of Municipal Interventor to Alcalde Municipal, and hiring a new local police force.¹⁸ Corocoro's MNR party members and miners convened a revolutionary assembly and decided that Durán would lead this body.¹⁹ It is not clear whether Durán or the union had intentions to keep active control over the government; nevertheless, in June, he stepped down to allow MNRista Diego Blanco Rodriguez to become mayor.²⁰ Other members of the municipal government, such as the treasurer, remained the same throughout the revolutionary upheaval of 1952, but most municipal offices and all positions within the local police changed hands at least once between May and August 1952.²¹ Corocoro had experienced seismic political changes before, so while the events of April and May 1952 did alter municipal power relations, the lasting effects of this shift and the durability of the revolutionary coalition were not immediately apparent to local elites.

If the workers brought about the revolution, why did Mario Durán lose power after May?

A document from the same period, signed by the directorate of the Sindicato de Trabajadores Mineros de Corocoro (STMC), provides some insight into the nature of the political coalition

¹⁷ "Hoy horas once tomé posesión cargo alcalde municipal stop ofrezco maxima colaboración Gobierno Nacional atentamente, Mario Durán, Alcalde Municipal" 31 May 1952 Archivo Historico La Paz, Alcaldia Corocoro, Juzgado de Pacajes (ALP PJAC) Caja 199.

¹⁸ There also seems to be some confusion about whether the Alcalde was a provincial or municipal official during the early months of the revolution, as evidenced by a program for patriotic festivities that used both designations interchangeably, Programa: Homenaje de la Alcaldía Municipal de la Provincia Pacajes al CXLIII Aniversario del Primer Grito Libertario Americano. Gloria a los Protomartires de la Independencia. Corocoro 16 de Julio de 1952, ALP PJAC Caja 200.

¹⁹ Eusebio Sarmiento Interview, September 6, 2013, Isaac Hurtado Interview, October 22, 2013 Corocoro.

²⁰ Diego Blanco was not native to the city himself, and does not appear in municipal documents prior to 1952. He was originally from Ulloma, a small community not far from Corocoro with about 1500 residents. Nonetheless he seems to have set up residence in the city thereafter, emerging in the records of the parents' association of the Pedro Kramer high school in the 1960s. He also moved up in the MNR ranks after the revolution: by 1955 he was subprefect of the province. ALP PJAC Caja 223; List of MNR officials, ALP PJAC Caja 209.

²¹ Both Luciano Tapia and a relative of Juan Lechín Oquendo served briefly on the police force in 1952, but do not remain thereafter, ALP PJAC Caja 199, Municipal Records 1952.

created by the MNR. In this document, also dated from May 31, the future Alcalde Municipal Diego Blanco promised to provide free electricity to the houses of each member of the union leadership for the duration of his term as mayor, and subject to negotiation with the city thereafter. This kind of benefit, heretofore reserved for high company or government officials, was both a financial boon and a measure of the seriousness with which the MNR courted the mineworkers' support. This recognition also extended publically: the mayor's office also included the STMC directorate, and particularly Mario Durán, in civic organizing committees alongside wealthy families, lawyers, and regional politicians. Most crucially, the miner's union changed the tone and frequency of its communications to city officials in this period, referring to itself as holding an active advisory role within the municipality.²² As with the revolutionary fighting in La Paz, the STMC takeover forced an abrupt change that more moderate MNR officials could then take over in the name of compromise. As was the case in the National revolution, however, the miners and their union expected to be central players in this new compromise state.

The changes in Corocoro city government mirror similar coalition building through networks of patronage on a national level.²³ These networks of patronage were built on symbolic as well as material rewards. It is clear from both the memories of city officials and the existing documentation that on both local and national levels, the miner's union was singled out for a

²² Some of this language suggests that the union was unused to or unsure of the extent to which they could press their demands. For example, in city files there exist two drafts of the same letter from the union, one of which contains the redacted sentence "Mucho tendríamos que avisar a esta municipalidad que es la interesada pero nos reservamos para futuras consecuencias y orientaciones" and warns against a "consorcio" of actors in the city opposed to their interests. Sindicato Minero al Municipio, 15 Julio 1952, ALP PJAC Caja 200.

²³ The extent to which miners were singled out for special treatment can be inferred from an anecdote, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui recalls that Minister of Campesino Affairs Nuflo Chavez after the revolution insisted on fumigating peasant leaders before meeting with them to discuss land reform. Rivera Cusicanqui, *Violencias (re) Encubiertas En Bolivia*, 65. The Minister of Mines, on the other hand, was former miner Juan Lechín.

starring role in the action that became memorialized as the April Revolution and an honored place in the imagined revolutionary pantheon.²⁴ Over the next several years, local municipal governments in each mining town built nearly identical statues honoring the miners' revolutionary heritage, drill in one hand and rifle in the other. In Corocoro, the city began to emphasize less its cosmopolitan connections to Chile and Europe, and more its status as the "Copper Capital of Bolivia." Corocoro's mining statue was built in 1956 and can still be seen in the Plaza Minero today. In July of 1952, Mario Durán served as vice president of the organizing body of the Independence Day celebrations (an honor he had not held in a similar ceremony honoring local hero Eduardo Abaroa in March), alongside town dignitaries. Significantly, neither the baker's union nor the association of merchants, which exercised an important role in city life to the miners before the revolution, received similar treatment in the 1952 celebrations.²⁵ During the lead up to the revolution, their national loyalties had become suspect as the city investigated hoarding and contraband allegations. Neither, furthermore, could make the same claims to masculine sacrifice on behalf of the nation.

Both city officials and the MNR as a party needed the support of the miners to stay in power long enough to consolidate their revolutionary goals. A court case that took place a few months after the revolution highlights the sense of instability that marked the early years of the MNR government. In November of 1952, the mayor himself brought in a denunciation against one of his own police officers, Pacífico Escobar, for attempting to rob materials from the city.

²⁴ In general, civic organizing committees ballooned in this period from a few members of the city government and the Neighborhood Committee to incorporate unions, schools, and social clubs, nonetheless, the STMC as active presence in the town is new to the 1952 period, and received more favor than other workers and artisanal organizations of the time, such as the association of bakers and breadmakers. The STMC also seems to have taken on the role previously played by multi-industry Sindicatos Mixtos before the revolution.

²⁵ Programa: Homenaje de la Alcaldía Municipal de la Provincia Pacajes al CXLIII Aniversario del Primer Grito Libertario Americano. Gloria a los Protomártires de la Independencia. Corocoro 16 de Julio de 1952, ALP PJAC Caja 200.

When the courts investigated, they found this robbery was part of a larger power struggle between factions within the Alcaldía. Vicente Ajata, the janitor of the Alcaldia, had been woken in the middle of the night by a group of inebriated men, one of whom was Escobar. They entered his room and offered him a drink, commiserating with Ajata about his low salary. Escobar offered Ajata a promotion, perhaps to the police force, and then suggested that the current municipality was looking for reasons to fire Ajata, and “everyone knew it.” At this point, Escobar became less friendly and coerced Ajata into helping him rob materials from the building. At some point Ajata changed his mind and went to find Diego Blanco, the mayor.²⁶

When he was confronted, Escobar pleaded drunkenness and possibly a fight with his political rivals, but his defense was unsuccessful: he was relieved of his office before the end of 1952, whereas Ajata remained janitor through the entirety of 1953. This suggests the precarious nature of MNR control over local municipalities in this period.²⁷ During 1952 alone, there were five different police chiefs and three mayors in the town. Escobar’s threat to Ajata underscores

²⁶ Fortunately for Ajata’s story, he had a witness in Manuel Lequema Apaza, an eighteen year old brickmaker’s apprentice from Ajata’s native Callapa, whom he had asked to stay the night for safety or comfort. The men who came to threaten the janitor called him a *llocalla* and told him to go home, and ordered Ajata to lock Lequema in another room when he refused. However, Ajata refrained from doing so, and the young man feigned sleep. The court also interviewed Lequema, wondering why he was there in the first place: “Question: Why did you go to spend the night in the Alcaldia with the porter? Answer: I went to sleep with the porter because he had given me reason to believe he was afraid to sleep alone and he brought me from my house around 9:30 and when we were about to go to sleep, Mr. Escobar the intendant of the city police, and the porter opened the door.” “Pregunta: Por que razones Ud fue a dormir a la Alcaldia con el portero? Respuesta: yo he ido a dormir con el portero, por que me [h]a insinuado diciendo que tenia miedo dormir solito y me llevo de mi casa, a las 9 y 30 más o menos y cuando nos estuvimos [sic] ya por acostar, tocó la puerta principal el señor Escobar Intendente de la policia municipal y abrió la puerta el portero.” Diego Blanco vs Pacífico Escobar, November 21 1953, ALP PJAC Caja 201

²⁷ Nonetheless, the story shows both the potential for social mobility that the revolution brought to men like Ajata and Lequema, and the precarity of that mobility. Rural migrants to Corocoro from the neighboring villages could often find unskilled or apprentice work around the municipality and the mines, mostly on a contract basis. Municipal records suggest that as a janitor Ajata was paid relatively well: 2,800 bolivianos in early 1953 as compared to Escobar’s 5,000 and the mayor’s 10,000. The master brickmaker, whose surname, Bolivar, suggests he was mestizo and urban, made 90 bolivianos a day, his official assistants less than half of that. Lequema was not listed on the city payroll at all. The court case also highlights another threat: inflation and the difficulty of distributing resources in a revolution. A sense of the inflation of the times comes from comparing the values above with those of August 1952, when the mayor made bs 8,000, the portero bs 2,000, and the intendente bs 3,500. From municipal payroll records 1952 and 1953, ALP PJAC Cajas 199, 200.

the importance of patronage during an atmosphere of political uncertainty in this period; the vulnerability of Ajata's position is evident from the fact that Escobar felt he could keep him quiet and recruit his assistance by insinuating that Ajata's tenure as janitor would be short-lived unless he joined in Escobar's political rivalry. Ajata, in deciding to join his fate to the current government, felt the need to go directly to the mayor and not the police in order to secure his position of innocence in the robbery. The MNR, in late 1952, did not have the institutional presence and longevity that it would exercise over the next several decades of Bolivian politics.²⁸

Workers used the changing political order to settle old scores from before the revolution, as in this protest submitted on October 25, 1953 suggests:

We present this protest against Juan Acarapi, unfaithful element of the working class in general, and specifically for the following charges which establish him as a person of poor conduct and abusive nature: in the former Smelting Company, associated with the Urriolagoitia regime, this man was one of the hired thugs, carrying out many hits for the aforementioned company. Acarapi's work consisted in attacking those of us who sought social justice of the kind we have today. Safe in the protection of the Company and the regime, Acarapi committed a series of attacks accompanied by his friends and family armed with rocks, sticks, and brass knuckles against the following workers...²⁹

A list of several workers followed, with the dates of their injuries and their position in the mines. The men listed in this particular complaint were mostly perforistas, drivers, mechanics, or section bosses within the mine: those who commanded places of respect within the hierarchy of belowground workers, and were likely to be labor leaders. The document was signed by union officials, including Durán. Acarapi in this document was referred to as a traitor to the working class, but in other court records he called himself a merchant, whereas prior to the revolution,

²⁸ As late as 1954, the municipal government was having trouble keeping a monopoly on weapons in Corocoro, as a case by the local government against former MNR mayor Octavio de la Barra for keeping his weapon after he left office suggests. 4 de Febrero 1954 ALP PJAC Caja 212.

²⁹ "Acta de Protesta Contra Juan Acarapi" 25 Octubre 1953, ALP PJJ Caja 215.

Juan Acarapi was listed as an employee of the Compañía Smelting.³⁰ What is clear from the court records is that the Acarapis formed a socially important family in the 1950s with extensive contacts among both miners and merchants, and which was notably inclined towards both bar fights and libel suits.³¹

This case is important because it highlights a shift in social and political power unleashed by the revolution that is not immediately visible just from looking at lists of political offices in this time. The Acarapis never held municipal offices in Corocoro, but their family's network of economic and social power was extensive. Although the cases that I observed involving the Acarapis as plaintiffs never specifically mentioned politics (though one revolved around the proper discharge of religious obligations), one of the specific complaints levied against Juan Acarapi was that he was a puppet of the Urriolagoitia regime, and had, prior to the revolution, abused his neighbors under the protection of the mining company. It was under this pretext that he and his family menaced below-ground workers- for both political and personal reasons, the union argued. As a result of this complaint, it Juan Acarapi was imprisoned briefly after the revolution, but thereafter continued his career as a merchant.

The importance of this document lies in the fact that it was not precipitated by a specific recent abuse. Rather, the union judged that the post-revolutionary courts were a place where old scores could be settled; a place in which the police and the authorities would respect their collective demand for justice. The rise to power of the miners' union did not drive the Acarapis

³⁰ "Empleados de la Compañía Smelting, Enero 1949" ALP PJAC Caja 187. In these cases, merchants were the most likely to use multiple designations, and in fact hold several positions within the community, often with the company. Empleados, office and administrative employees, were distinguished here from obreros, or workers in the plant or the mine itself.

³¹ There are at least twelve separate cases between 1953 and 1963 involving Acarapi, his wife, son, and in-laws in my records alone. These contacts included Celso Valeriano and Guadalupe Mamani "Celso Valeriano v Manuel Calle" ALP PJAC Caja 222.

out of town, but it did ensure that these kinds of abuses no longer received protection from the company or state. To be sure, the Acarapis still menaced their neighbors (and his son's ex-wife's family particularly, in this case). They could not, however, assume that they would be exempt from justice. Juan Acarapi died in the early 1960s, and his son Humberto, though an employee of COMIBOL, never attained the kind of social prominence that allowed him to wage personal vendettas against his social enemies. With the death of Juan, the Acarapi clan began to fade from the judicial record.

This case and the Ajata case before it are also important because they emerged out of a moment when the MNR state was not yet consolidated nationally, when popular unrest was most uncontained. Over the next year the MNR would hit upon a successful combination of distributing resources, patronage, and autonomy in such a way that would keep relative order and maintain the party in power for the next twelve years. In mining communities like Corocoro, this would mean cultivating the most upwardly mobile sector of the miners, men like Mario Durán, and offering them local power in exchange for loyalty. On a national level, it was nationalization of the mines and agrarian reform, both begun in earnest in 1953 and carried out for the rest of the decade, that allowed the MNR to build bridges and institutionalize itself in rural parts of Bolivia.

The Material Effects of Revolution: Nationalization and COMIBOL

For Corocoro, the most important revolutionary shift took place on October 31, 1952, when the MNR nationalized tin deposits held by the three largest mining families, Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild. Supreme Decree 3223 also provided for the nationalization of smaller, but valuable holdings such as the copper mines in Corocoro, although it was not until 1953 that COMIBOL took full operational control of the American Smelting Company's San Angel and Yanabarra/Viscachani deposits, which became the Empresa Minera Corocoro

(EMC).³² Nationalization did more than simply place mineral profits in the hands of the state. This act also initiated a huge shift in institutional control over distribution of food and commercial goods, healthcare, education, and electricity. For example, as part of its restructuring of the mining industry, COMIBOL also took control of the company store (*pulpería*), bakery, butcher shop, movie theater, radio station, and worker housing.

These institutions were part of a general pro-labor platform of the early MNR, but they also contributed to the expansion of state presence in the countryside. The MNR also used COMIBOL to expand services to aid the Bolivian worker, such as company-run hospitals and schools in mining communities throughout the country, as well as a summer camp and orphanage for miners' children. For mining camps such as Siglo XX in Potosí province, these schools and hospitals built on existing legislation enacted by Germán Busch, requiring mining companies with more than 200 employees to provide services to workers, and simply centralized state control over these institutions.³³ In Corocoro, as in larger towns such as Oruro and Potosí, this meant negotiating control over existing institutions first, and building new schools and health facilities later.³⁴ Also under negotiation were the power generators confiscated by the municipality from the American Smelting Company in 1952 and the mining security forces that had operated before the revolution.³⁵ In this way COMIBOL inserted itself into both the social and municipal lives of small communities throughout Bolivia, and created alternate channels linking these communities to the national government. Since control over these functions fell to

³² The Balance General, COMIBOL, 1953 lists Corocoro as “alquilado” from the Cia Smelting by this time, suggesting that the arrangement for payments were still under negotiation.

³³ Bolivia, *Código Busch (Decreto-Ley de 24 de Mayo de 1939. Elevado a Rango de Ley General Del Trabajo En 8 de Diciembre de 1942)*.

³⁴ For example, COMIBOL did not take over the municipal hospital in Corocoro fully until 1958. [Archivos de COMIBOL (AC) Balance General, EMC 1958]

³⁵ Letters between COMIBOL and Alcaldia Municipal, ALP PJAC Caja 200.

the national government, and not the municipality, this did not immediately ensure a harmonious relationship between COMIBOL and local elites, however.

COMIBOL brought two new groups of actors into municipal politics: miners' union representatives and EMC administrative personnel. As COMIBOL took over and expanded state institutions in the 1950s and 1960s, it became a primary employer of white collar workers and bureaucrats needed to run the aboveground institutions that came under the control of the mining company. Some of these people were locals, but many more were brought in from other parts of the country to replace the loss of foreign administrators, creating new kinds of rivalries that paralleled resentment against Smelting Company officials from an earlier era. The new Gerente of the EMC, Elí Sotelo was an engineer from Santa Cruz who was not automatically welcomed in the town by workers.³⁶ All of these employees, whether administrators or drillers, benefitted from the company store, the company hospital, and company schools, and through COMIBOL had a direct source of authority from the national government not mediated by the municipality. As later chapters will show, COMIBOL kept up this mandate of providing and expanding resources within mining companies well after the MNR fell from power. This created a parallel governing structure for miners that tended to be more consistently responsive than other state or municipal institutions, creating a clear channel of communication and distribution of resources exclusively available to members of the community dependent on the mines.

Nationalization caused demographic changes for mining communities as well. The 1950 census listed 11,000 foreigners in the province of Pacajes (not broken down by city or

³⁶ Sotelo stayed at Corocoro until 1959 and ultimately developed a fairly good working relationship with the Corocoro workers by sponsoring the construction of an Olympic swimming pool and coaching a swim team for the sons and daughters of workers. Magda Böhr de Sotelo, *Mi Experiencia En Las Minas: 1953-1971* (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: [publisher not identified], 2001).

community), with 400 listed as working in mining, and just over 2,000 involved in commerce.³⁷ After nationalization, nearly all of the foreigners employed by mining companies left the country, as had many of the foreign merchants who were not naturalized.³⁸ This initially created a scarcity of trained management staff, but also put a halt to the cosmopolitan cultural exchange of which Corocoreños had been so proud. Similar changes were happening to Oruro and Potosí at this time, with foreign communities leaving the city for friendlier national environments.³⁹

Nationalization also began a huge restructuring of the Bolivian economy, not simply in terms of export production, but in terms of imports and internal markets. For a city such as Corocoro, which derived its livelihood from trans-border commerce and contraband as much as from mining, nationalization affected the population in many ways. Starting in June of 1953, the company stores stocked necessities (“artículos de primera necesidad”) such as clothing, rice, lentils, flour, gas, cooking oil, pots, pans, chocolate, and cigarettes in a series of store fronts adjacent to the mines. This in itself was not radically different from the American Smelting Company, which had started to run its own stores in the 1940s, causing local discontent.⁴⁰ The crucial difference was in the scale of provision and the degree of control over prices. In 1950, the city had a population of around 4,200 people, with 660 men (out of a population of 1,500 adult men) and a few women working in the mines.⁴¹ Assuming that each worker had an average of at

³⁷ Bolivia, *Censo Demográfico, 1950*.

³⁸ C. C. Huston and Associates, *Report on the Major Mines of Corporacion Minera de Bolivia*, Inter-American Development Bank (Washington, D.C., 1960), 7.

³⁹ This is not to suggest that Corocoro was a complete backwater. Court records suggest that as early as 1958, there was a Club Rock and Roll in Corocoro, which suggests some degree of global cultural awareness, but both in terms of exchange and in terms of population, the revolution did begin a process of provincialization, for Corocoro especially, that fed on the anti-foreign agitation of the 1940s addressed in Chapter 1. May 10, 1958 ALP PJAC Caja 221.

⁴⁰ See Chapter 4, particularly the complaint from 1940 from ALP PJAC Caja 160.

⁴¹ This was roughly as many men as worked in commerce in the entirety of the Provincia Pacajes, but was a tiny fraction of the 25,000 Pacajes residents working in agriculture. An idea of the number of the mine's dependents can be found from the ratio of workers to the number of dependents COMIBOL considered under its purview found in

least 3 dependents, roughly half of the community access to COMIBOL stores.⁴² The actual number of dependents is likely to have been much higher, as suggested by memories of long-term town residents, who recall that nearly everyone had some form of access to the store.⁴³ By any measure COMIBOL was immediately a huge force in the town. After the revolution, as the state fixed the prices and determined contracts, the going rates in the pulpería tended to fix prices for the community generally, as well as altering the balance of imports from Chile. Many of the items in the company stores generally had markups of 5-6% of purchasing cost, but several items were held at or below cost, including four items specifically controlled throughout the country: meat, milk, sugar, and rice. In the Corocoro pulpería, salt, bread, national brand cigarettes, and certain kinds of liquor were also sold at cost.⁴⁴ For all of these items, then, merchants would face the choice of lowering their own prices or being unable to sell to a majority of the town.

Although they represented a majority of the population, the fact that only miners and their families had a right to purchase items at the store caused an internal contraband market in times of financial hardship, whereby women with pulpería access would buy and resell goods from the company stores. A subset of miners and particularly their female family members used pulpería connections to resell items to non-miners in the city and the countryside at a profit. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, wheat shortages had been endemic to Corocoro. In the post-

company records. During the late 1950s, when COMIBOL provided child and family subsidies to any women and children who could prove matrimonial or common law ties to a worker, the average ratio of worker to dependents remained steady at 1:5. Bolivia. *Censo Demográfico, 1950*. [La Paz: Editorial “Argote,” 1955. Provincia Pacajes

⁴² A similar figure would indicate around 3,300 total people, or 79% of the population of Corocoro, had access to company benefits at the time of the revolution. Balance General EMC, Archivos de COMIBOL. Using a lower average family size of 3.5 people in the 1950 census produces an estimate of 2,310 people eligible, still 55% of the town population (Corocoro had 662 single men, 692 married men, and 219 men who were living with a partner out of wedlock).

⁴³ Interview, Doña Albertina, October 2013.

⁴⁴ Balance Corocoro, 1958.

revolutionary economy, these shortages continued but were now under the purview of the national government rather than municipal authorities.⁴⁵ Pricing in the stores, and the ability to access them, became a primary organizing concern among the miners' union and a primary social concern among urban families. As inflation rapidly decreased the real value of wages in the years after the revolution, purchasing power in the company store became critical to family survival.⁴⁶

By providing goods, and controlling access to health and education, COMIBOL and nationalization responded not just to the resource nationalism that had become a key component of MNR rhetoric, but the social welfare policies of mid-twentieth century reformers that linked rural hygiene and health to national development.⁴⁷ The MNR's commitment to resource nationalism as a means of ending foreign dependence and generating state revenue combined with an ambitious project of expansive social welfare ensured that COMIBOL became a primary agent in addressing Bolivia's problems of development.⁴⁸ Although the MNR government saw providing state resources to rural communities as crucial to its national vision of social change,

⁴⁵ See letters between Alcaldía and COMIBOL in 1953 as well as 1955, ALP PJAC Cajas 204 and Balance General de COMIBOL, 1953 in the Fondo Sinforoso Cabrera

⁴⁶ A consulting firm hired by the Bolivian Government to assess the potential growth of the mining industry noted with alarm the pace of inflation in Bolivia. Ford, Bacon, and Davis, and Bolivia. *Mining Industry of Bolivia; Report. December 3, 1956*. New York, 1956, 40. The situation, by the Mamani/Valeriano/Condori dispute of 1960 was even more extreme.

⁴⁷ For an account of the MNR's commitment to health and medical reform in the country, see: Pacino, "Constructing a New Bolivian Society."

⁴⁸ For more on the intersection of state institutions, revolutionary and reformist political movements, and what Florencia Mallon calls, "eugenic national development," in Latin America (personal communication), see Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics; Educación indígena: ciudadanía o colonización?* (Ediciones Aruwiwiri, Taller de Historia Oral Andina, 1992); Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, eds., *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill: Univ of North Carolina Press, 2003); Zulawski, *Unequal Cures*. "Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds: the Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s-1940s" In Andrew Canessa, ed., *Natives Making Nation: Gender, Indigeneity, and the State in the Andes* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005), 32-59; "Redeemed Indians, Barbarianized Cholos: Crafting Neocolonial Modernity in Early twentieth Century Bolivia" In N. Jacobsen and C. Aljovín, eds., *Political Cultures of the Andes, 1750-1950* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 230-252.

the state at the time of the revolution did not have a lot of resources at its disposal to effect this kind of change.⁴⁹ COMIBOL was ideally situated to capitalize on the existing infrastructure surrounding mining camps in isolated rural regions in a way that the early MNR state could not. In so doing, both the MNR and COMIBOL were complicit in redrawing more expansive but still exclusive boundaries around meaningful citizenship in Bolivia, granting unequal access to the benefits of the revolution to workers.

COMIBOL also tried to improve the living conditions of workers by granting their family members, particularly children and the elderly, a chance at safer jobs outside of the mine itself, both through promotion, “inherited” positions, and education for technical posts. Older men and widows had a long history of employment on the peripheries of underground mine operations as guards and varying kinds of contract ore recuperation. The idea that a man’s dangerous work underground could grant future members of his family the opportunity to work elsewhere became one of the central ideological components of belonging to the revolutionary mining community in this period.⁵⁰ Court records show that many of the external or “above-ground”

⁴⁹ See particularly discussion of state health infrastructure in, Mendizabal Lozano, *Historia de La Salud Pública En Bolivia: De Las Juntas de Sanidad a Los Directorios Locales de Salud*; Zulawski, *Unequal Cures*.

⁵⁰ Nash discusses the practice of job inheritance in, June C. Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 206. Almost immediately, local as well as international observers worried about the viability of COMIBOL under such conditions. American consulting group Bacon and Davis, brought in by the MNR in 1956, blamed many of COMIBOL’s financial woes to a preponderance of aboveground workers. Bacon and Davis particularly worried about worker control and undue influence of organized labor, who would fill above ground jobs with aging miners who could no longer be productive below ground. An often-cited statistic in the narrative of COMIBOL’s bureaucratic inefficiency is that by 1960, nearly 2/3 of COMIBOL’s workforce could already be found above ground. What most repetitions of this statistic fail to mention is the expansion of institutions formally under the purview of COMIBOL in this period. COMIBOL ran hospitals and health clinics in nearly every major mining center, as well as primary, secondary, and technical schools, care facilities for children, bakeries, butcher shops, and pulperías. COMIBOL also attempted, with varying degrees of success, to expand the mines’ productive capacity by building smelters and mills where possible, and these workers would also have been included in the roster of above-ground workers. While it is undoubtedly true that workers with a bit of influence and clerical skill would have attempted to find safer office jobs, the figure cited above also included a huge, and new, workforce enabled by COMIBOL’s quasi-state commitment to improving living conditions in the mining communities. Ford, Bacon, and Davis, and Bolivia. *Mining Industry of Bolivia; Report. December 3, 1956*. New York, 1956.

institutions that grew up around COMIBOL mines, particularly the schools, hospitals, and markets offered employment to the daughters, wives, and girlfriends of underground miners. This benefit not only secured the loyalty of mining families to the state, it also, as we shall see in the rest of this chapter, expanded the definition of “mine worker” to include many individuals not traditionally considered working class: teachers, low-level administration, merchants, and engineers.

The MNR also managed labor unrest by granting workers greater control over their own working lives through worker control at high levels in both company and state. At the height of MNR post-revolutionary radicalism between 1952 and 1955, the MNR put workers into ministerial positions in government, particularly the ministry of labor and the ministry of mines and petroleum, and ensured that the national workers’ federation, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), maintained a significant role in national politics. In so doing, the MNR set up a great deal of expectation of authority and autonomy for workers, promising them, in effect, decision-making power over the Bolivian economy. This promise was delivered by appointing the same workers to both MNR cabinet offices and the COB, however, rather than setting up a formal structure by which the COB could determine policy. Ultimately, neither the MNR nor the US government helped sustain the Bolivian economy in this period seriously desired the workers to keep such national power. Increasingly, as the MNR confronted a budget shortage and severe inflation, and particularly as it experienced international disapproval resulting from nationalization, it began to temper these political concessions to workers. Although popular and powerful MNR labor leaders continued to hold positions in government, by 1957 worker co-government was threatened both domestically and internationally by the right wing of the MNR.

The COB held its first worker congress in 1954 in La Paz, inviting worker federations to

submit economic, cultural, and political proposals for the direction of Bolivia, but leaving it up to the inclinations of individual MNR members to respond to the COB's theses and resolutions.⁵¹ Future congresses would be used to try to corral intransigent unions into collaborating in economic restructuring and ratifying government plans to cut benefits to workers.⁵² The vague definition of the COB's actual mandate, beyond coordinating labor unions, would become both an asset and a liability as the MNR government moved rightward after 1956 and especially during the series of military dictatorships that took power after 1964. The political theater of COB congresses felt like participatory democracy to the workers who participated, without any of the binding decisions.

Through Worker Control, on the other hand, workers were given huge symbolic authority and some material authority within COMIBOL itself, even after the MNR's rightward turn. Decree 3586 of December 1953 stipulated that two of seven directors of COMIBOL and one of the general managers of each mine had to be an elected labor representative. These representatives had the authority to veto decisions involving working conditions, benefits, and personnel changes, though their mandate supposedly prevented them from interfering with technical matters.⁵³ Worker Control representatives tended to be relatively literate, urban skilled workers who sometimes worked above ground or had tenure as white collar employees and thus could communicate well with both municipal and COMIBOL authorities. They maintained

⁵¹ COB congresses in the 1950s were important pieces of revolutionary nationalist fever and worker inclusion. The La Paz conference, for example, treated visiting representatives as foreign dignitaries, offering translation services, laundry services, parades and celebrations in their honor, and personal welcomes for the president of the Republic. See "Programa del Iro Congreso del COB" 1954, ALB, FSC.

⁵² Particularly the II Congreso del COB, documents for which can be found in the ALB FSC.

Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, "Charity, Rights, and Entitlement: Gender, Labor, and Welfare in Early-Twentieth-Century Chile," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 81, no. 3 (2001): 555–85.

⁵³ Melvin Burke, *Combined International Assistance to a Nationalized Industry: A Case Study of the Corporación Minera de Bolivia* (Orono, Me.: University of Maine, 1974), 4.

support in the union by curbing the influence of abusive mine administrators. Directly after the revolution, they played a vital role in keeping production going, as the miners claimed that many companies and their officials used the transfer of power during nationalization to rob the mines of construction materials and work equipment. Afterwards, they kept workers invested in production quotas. In this way, COMIBOL proved to be the location where the MNR maintained its strongest commitment to increased worker representation in politics.⁵⁴

Worker Control was a means of exerting real power, but it was also a means of producing investment in the state project. In mines such as Siglo XX, the worker control representative controlled the hiring process itself, maintaining personal lists of unemployed miners.⁵⁵ The role of Worker Control established itself as one of the highest forms of defense of the revolution, not only from the company and the fascists “those from before 1952 who would sabotage”, but from the impatience and demands of the workers themselves.⁵⁶ Union representatives took very

⁵⁴ “The COB actually became the real government of Bolivian Labor, and through it, the economy. Indeed, it had all the symbolic and functional characteristics of a sovereign-like entity, including executive, deliberative, and judicial organs; a defined area of authority and constituents; and most important, armed forces... The FSTMB, in turn, was the most powerful and radical group in the COB, and when all was said and done, the most powerful group in the entire immediate configuration of power and interest... What actually transpired was that the MNR officially assumed the power and the responsibility of state government, but the COB constituted itself as an unrivaled center of initiative and veto power.” Malloy’s characterization of the early years of the revolutionary period as chaotic and marked by power struggles between the left and right wing factions of the MNR is helpful to understand the context in which this legislation was passed. In a period in which the Bolivian right wing was actually fairly disorganized, the labor left showed a marked unity of purpose and intent: at its most basic, to create a socialist state. That is, even though the president was negotiating with the US, whose demands increasingly included slashing social service provision, the legislature was radical in its intent. Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*, 187.

⁵⁵ These lists were also therefore lists of miners who wanted to keep the favor of worker control representatives. Felix Muruchi remembers political rivals trying to maintain their political influence through these lists as late as 1965. Benjamin Kohl, Linda C. Farthing, and Félix Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets: A Bolivian Activist’s Life* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2012), 62. The daughter of a man who had been the Worker Control for Huanuni explained: “su mision fundamental era mantener la disciplina laboral y los niveles de produccion y de costos, tambien tenia la finalidad de evitar cualquier sabotaje por parte del viejo personal de antes del ‘52. Federico Escobar jugó ese papel en la Mina Siglo XX y Sinforoso Cabrera en el Ingenio de Catavi.” *Libres!: testimonio de mujeres víctimas de las dictaduras* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2010), 186. Sinforoso Cabrera later went on to be a worker minister and director of COMIBOL itself, while Federico Escobar, killed by the state, remains one of the popular heroes of the miners.

⁵⁶ June Nash, visiting workers after Worker Control had been abolished, but with efforts to reinstate the position on the table, recalled workers characterizing “Control Obrero” similarly: workers could keep management from corruption and make sure production decisions kept the workers’ interests in mind. This, of course, caused some

seriously the charge of keeping the mines running and the nation running. As one former resident of Huanuni recalled, the point of having workers in the mines was twofold: to make sure the mining companies were making decisions in the workers' best interest, but also to make sure the workers maintained levels of production and discipline.⁵⁷ In other words, via Worker Control, the MNR had enlisted the miners to help keep the social peace even in the face of rank and file dissent.

For this reason, it was usually respected labor leaders and men popular within the community that became worker control representatives: in the case of the Huanuni mines, "thanks to his talent at the charango and singing, as well as his great social sensitivity," a miner named Murillo established himself first as Secretary General of the union, and then later was elected to be Worker Control.⁵⁸ Siglo XX's Escobar was seen as a "tireless administrator" whose house was besieged by workers in crisis and whose powerful presence in the town kept workers' demands on the company agenda.⁵⁹ In Corocoro, the position of Worker Control was similarly a reward enjoyed by MNR and union leaders. Mario Durán, after an illustrious career as Secretary of the Corocoro Miners' Union, followed by several local and then regional political posts with the MNR, returned to the mines in the early 1960s as Worker Control. Luis Villegas, who was also the representative of Worker Control in this period, traded with Mario Durán the leadership

resentment among management, who believed CO representatives themselves to be power hungry, withholding signatures on vital work and supply orders to ensure their demands were met. In general, this narrative of worker control corruption, intransigence, and excessive power became one of the arguments the right used to dismantle the political rights of workers after 1965. June Nash, Jorge Dandler, and Nicholas S. Hopkins, *Popular Participation in Social Change: Cooperatives, Collectives, and Nationalized Industry* (Walter de Gruyter, 1976), 572.

⁵⁷ See also Escóbar's defense of Worker Control as helping, not hindering production in the mines: Filemón Escóbar, *Testimonio de Un Militante Obrero: La Frustración de La Dirección Revolucionaria En Bolivia a Traves de La Crisis Del POR* (La Paz, Bolivia: Hisbol, 1984), 166.

⁵⁸ "Gracias a su habilidad para el charango y las coplas, también por su gran sensibilidad social," *Libres!*, 186.

⁵⁹ Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*, 28.

of the union and also briefly served as Press Secretary of the national FSTMB in 1959.⁶⁰ Finally, both Hugo Parrado and Cesar Rodriguez transitioned from Worker Control positions to later becoming Alcalde Municipal in the 1960s and 1970s after the fall of the MNR.

Worker Control lasted longer than most pro-labor policies under the MNR. Although its scope was curtailed in 1963 and the position formally abolished in 1965, the institution began a practice of miners intervening into the municipal administrative life of Corocoro that took much longer to dismantle.⁶¹ Even after the MNR fell from power, Worker Control representatives continued to exert influence inside as well as outside the mines.⁶² Even more than the COB, therefore, through Worker Control COMIBOL offered an alternate political voice to some portions of the mining community after the revolution that remained outside formal structures of government, but carried significant weight in local municipal affairs, and effectively took on many state-like functions.

In Corocoro, as in Siglo XX, Oruro, and Huanuni, the Worker Control representative negotiated directly with the company and the union as well as with the municipality itself to address safety concerns, working conditions, and matters of social life. As Worker Control in Corocoro, Luis Villegas not only oversaw decisions of company management, he inserted the workers into the governing structure of the town, as when he asked the city to donate bulls and

⁶⁰ Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano*, 1980, 188.

⁶¹ As Chapter 5 will address, forms of renewed worker control were proposed during moments of crisis in which Bolivian governments sought to regain popular support of the worker movement, as for example during the dictatorship of JJ Torres in 1971 and the UDP government in 1982. These proposals were not universally welcomed even by workers, however. See Nash, Dandler, and Hopkins, *Popular Participation in Social Change*; Jeroen Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*, Colección Tiempo de Historia (La Paz, Bolivia: Sistema de Documentación e Información Sindical, 1986); Enrique Rojo, "The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left (1982-1985)," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, no. 1 (2000): 175.

⁶² Letters between the Municipality and the EMC always went through Worker Control in this period. At least one Worker Control representative, Cesar Rodriguez, became mayor briefly in 1964, see chapter 5, also Documentos Municipales, ALP PJAC Caja 237 (1963-5).

help coordinate charity for Corocoro's children at Christmas.⁶³ Hugo Parrado made sure a widow of a mineworker was guaranteed free electricity from the municipality when he was Worker Control representative in 1963, and that workers' relatives were treated in the company hospital.⁶⁴ Since the company was in charge of schools, movie theaters, radio, the major hospital, security forces, and distribution of consumables within Corocoro, and also provided funding for many private groups such as sports clubs, Worker Control ensured a union voice in civic matters as well.⁶⁵ Thus, although Worker Control representatives technically only intervened in company affairs, the vital social and economic role played by the EMC in the daily life of the town allowed mine leaders to demand a prominent role in municipal political affairs.

In this context, the threat implicit in Valeriano's comment from the beginning of this chapter, "Nadie manda sino Mario Durán!" becomes clear. Valeriano asserted that Durán ran affairs in the company store at least, and in the town itself had more claim over the miners than the police did. In many ways, Durán was more powerful than the police because of his direct tie to the national government and the company. The butcher Carlos Condori clearly took the comment about Durán seriously, or expected the police to do so, or he would not have reproduced it in front of a judge. Valeriano, Condori implied, was claiming that the union had more authority than municipal officials in the town. And indeed as subsequent chapters will argue, the year 1960 was a particularly embattled moment for the national government trying to curtail excessive worker demands. While the municipality eventually became a place that offered

⁶³ CO 122/61 and TM 21/61, ALP PJAC Caja 229. The notation system used by both the city and the company allows for some sense of worker control's interest in participating. While TM, the municipal treasurer, had written 21 official correspondence documents by July, CO had written 122.

⁶⁴ 21 Enero 1963 img 7325, Caja 237.

⁶⁵ "Designacion de Nuevas Autoridades" from November 17th, 1964, suggests that union representatives expected the Barrientos government as well as the MNR to give them a governing role in town affairs. ALP PJAC Caja 237.

only temporary or subaltern positions for mine workers and union officials, at least for the 1950s and early 1960s the union had a real presence and authority in the company through Worker Control.

Pulpería Politics

State institutions are particularly embattled sites for negotiating social respectability and the boundaries of race, class, sexuality, and gender.⁶⁶ In Bolivia, scholars have been more likely to emphasize the colonizing, oppressive nature of state institutions, or the failure of such institutions to fulfill their stated functions than investigate the ways these institutions shape positive conceptions of citizenship, and in turn have been shaped by popular engagement and popular understandings.⁶⁷ While revolutionary governments and unions explicitly negotiated the terms of inclusion of mining men (and women generally) into political life, women and children as well as men sought to recast the social order in schools, hospitals, welfare offices, and company stores.

During the revolutionary period in Bolivia, both institutionally and socially, the pulpería and the company were very much sites of struggle over the social order. Through arguments and insults in the bars, plazas, and commercial establishments, young men and women attached to the mines claimed respectability that had heretofore been denied them by celebrating their status as workers. As part of this claim to respectability, they also sought to impose limits of their own

⁶⁶ See Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, "Charity, Rights, and Entitlement: Gender, Labor, and Welfare in Early-Twentieth-Century Chile," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 81, no. 3 (2001): 555–85; Laura Gotkowitz notes that economically mobile women in particular were likely to get involved in disputes over respectability, race and comportment in twentieth century Cochabamba. Laura Gotkowitz, "Trading Insults: Honor, Violence, and the Gendered Culture of Commerce in Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1870s-1950s," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 83, no. 1 (2003): 83–118.

⁶⁷ The literature here is most developed about education policy. *Educación indígena*; Postero, *Now We Are Citizens*; Gustafson, *New Languages of the State*. For medical care generally, Zulawski, *Unequal Cures*. And finally, for legal institutions, Irurozqui, *A Bala, Piedra Y Palo*; Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

on members of the community they considered to be unworthy of respectability; these exclusions came out of existing racial and cultural anxieties around rural, indigenous bodies in urban spaces. In Corocoro, the sites of respectability assertion and policing were very nearly on top of each other: the company store, COMIBOL office, hospital, social security office, movie theater, and union office all shared space at the intersection of Avenida 6 de Agosto and Calle Carrasco, while the municipal market, comedor, and worker's club surrounded the Plaza de Minero, just uphill on 6 de Agosto.

In these conflicts, store owners and patrons fought over who had the right to access company food supplies and who was using this right properly. In the context of endemic food shortages and rampant inflation, the logistics of who was owed how much food at what price were matters of some urgency. However, the fights themselves very often expressed these anxieties in the vocabularies of race-, gender-, and class-policing, and concerned the delineation of urban space, as the Mamani/Condori/Valeriano dispute from the beginning of this chapter attests.

By creating a substantive population of residents who were both merchants and company employees, COMIBOL complicated class distinctions between shopkeepers, market vendors, and workers.⁶⁸ In the dispute that opened this chapter between Salazar and Alanes, the store vendor demanded that a company official request the rations himself or not be served, she implied that Salazar was her equal, not his serving girl. The 1960 interaction between Condori and the Valerianos broke down because of differing opinions about the degree of respect that was proper

⁶⁸ Epifania could write her name at her defense hearing, and herself seems to have come from a family of some standing but probably not the kind that Salazar held: a Pedro Alanes served on one of the electoral mesas in the 1930s, and at the time of the revolution had abandoned his wife and children and ran a shoe store in Oruro. *Lista de Mesas Electorales*, 19 caja 140.

between a customer and a shopkeeper.⁶⁹ Condori, like Valeriano, was an employee of COMIBOL, and entitled to the same pension rights and company benefits. But he was an *empleado*, an aboveground worker, whereas Valeriano worked in the mineshaft itself. A great deal of Guadalupe Mamani's complaint, and the testimony provided by her witnesses, had to do with the fact that Condori was not properly respectful of underground workers.⁷⁰

The distinction between blue collar and white collar worker in a place like Corocoro had always been small, but significantly drawn in terms of cultural comportment and material effects. If Condori felt disrespected, he could literally withhold from Mamani her ability to feed her family. He also exercised control over a staff of *pulpería* workers, as Guadalupe Mamani accused him of pressuring his subordinates to testify on his behalf.⁷¹ For residents of this community, distinctions between *empleado* and *obrero* were both material and visible. Above-ground workers, shopkeepers, and *oficinistas* at the start of the revolution were more likely to be able to read and write, to live outside the mining encampment (but still within the town), and to socialize with merchants in the social clubs. After the revolution, when free schooling for children of miners became the norm, young men whose parents worked in the mines often became white collar employees in an attempt to avoid the dangers of mining accidents and silicosis. Especially after the revolution, such divisions were crosscut and complicated by the fact that above-ground and below-ground workers received similar wages, the same state benefits and the same access to literacy and medical care. Class distinctions became more porous as a result of the revolution, but for this reason more important to assert.

⁶⁹ And in fact, in the Condori/Mamani/Valeriano dispute nine years later, it was David Salazar, now Jefe de Pulpería, who signed an affirmation of good conduct for Carlos Condori, ALP PJJ 377.

⁷⁰ At least one other miner and one other woman attested to Condori's attitude of contempt toward workers in the interior of the mine.

⁷¹ "Carlos Condori vs Guadalupe Mamani de Valeriano y otros" ALP PJJ Caja 377

In this dispute, as in many that took place in the streets and shops of Corocoro in this period, Celso Valeriano and Guadalupe Mamani were both particularly concerned that Carlos Condori should acknowledge their working-class respectability as a family. This fight was not, then, just about social class or labor. By demanding her preferred cut of meat, Guadalupe Mamani insisted upon her rights as a consumer with agency in a context in which the shopkeeper understood her solely as a beneficiary of the state.⁷² The case of the pulpería fight demonstrates that women and children as well as men had a stake in revolutionary discourses of right, responsibility, and respectable citizenship. In fact, it was Guadalupe Mamani who particularly concerned herself with policing working-class respectability and its acknowledgment.

The Valerianos also believed that being respectable citizens allowed them to reprimand others for exceeding its bounds. Two years prior to the pulpería dispute involving Guadalupe Mamani and Celso Valeriano, the couple was involved in a fight with their brother in law Manuel Calle in which Mamani also called the younger man *llocalla* and hit him with rocks. She did so, she argued, because he was insufficiently grateful and respectful of Valeriano's efforts to keep him out of legal trouble. This fight took place on the night before May Day in the Plaza Minero while Mamani's husband was hanging out in the "Rock and Roll" club with other union leaders.⁷³ As he crossed the plaza, Valeriano saw his brother-in-law come to blows with another worker over whether or not to shout vivas to the leader of the labor federation or the current president of the republic, Hernan Siles Zuazo. When Valeriano attempted exercise his rights as a

⁷² In the Chilean context, Roseblatt articulates a similar distinction between rights and charity in working class urban communities. In her case, entitlement to social benefits as an earned right was a male privilege established by socialist and popular front governments, contrasting with charity which a gift, not a right. Karin Alejandra Roseblatt, "Charity, Rights, and Entitlement: Gender, Labor, and Welfare in Early-Twentieth-Century Chile," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 81, no. 3 (2001): 555–85.

⁷³ As I will explore in my fourth chapter, many personal and intrafamilial disputes took place in the celebrations surrounding political holidays, just as many strikes and political actions took place on religious feast days.

man of consequence and break up the fight, Calle turned on Valeriano and accused him of being an assassin and a thief of materials from the mines. Guadalupe Mamani intervened at this point, attacking Calle and threatening to expose *him* as a thief, while recruiting another worker to take her husband home, which she did, she claims, to save Calle from further trouble.⁷⁴ Although this particular court case was fought between Valeriano and Calle, and the legal authorities seem primarily concerned with Valeriano's conduct, it is clear that the actual action took place between Calle and Valeriano's wife, Guadalupe Mamani.⁷⁵ Mamani saw herself as exercising control over an extended family network of workers, who owed proper respect to her union husband, and whose political and social disputes were closely linked.

Much of the testimony in this and the other dispute was directed towards establishing that each of the litigating parties were known for good or correct conduct in their daily lives.⁷⁶ When Calle called Mamani "*imilla*" and Valeriano "thief," both Mamani and the legal system potentially had to intervene. As noted earlier, "*llocalla*" and "*imilla*" are gendered Aymara terms referring to a youth, essentially a person who has not reached full adulthood. In many Andean communities, a major component of achieving adult status is marrying and establishing an independent nuclear family.⁷⁷ In an urban community such as this, the racial connotations of the word also give it a meaning comparable to the English word "boy," when used, for example, by a white adult in reference to an adult African American man. Notably, when Fany Alanes insulted David Salazar's wife, she used *imilla* to suggest the impropriety of Sra. Salazar's high social

⁷⁴ "para que le lleve mi marido a casa para evitar consecuencias en Calle que seguía insultando como mujer" "Roberto Calle vs Celso Valeriano, por injurias graves" May 10, 1958 ALP PJAC Caja 221

⁷⁵ See also, Celso Valeriano vs Roberto Calle" May 2, 1958 ALP PJAC Caja 222.

⁷⁶ Gotkowitz similarly calls the courts an "open forum where social identities were formed and contested." Gotkowitz, "Trading Insults," 88.

⁷⁷ Olivia Harris, *To Make the Earth Bear Fruit: Essays on Fertility, Work and Gender in Highland Bolivia* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2000).

standing. In the May Day dispute, Calle and Mamani traded Aymara insults freely, essentially labeling each other as not-yet-adult and lacking respect, each claiming authority within a working-class field of sociability.

In the case of the pulpería dispute, by contrast, Condori did not insult Mamani using an Aymara term; he called her “*puta*.”⁷⁸ Here Condori made use of a different kind of familial insufficiency: the logical conclusion of calling Mamani a whore was establishing that she was not equipped to be a wife and mother, and thus not deserving of company benefits. Used between a white collar worker and a working-class woman, moreover, the linguistic provenance of these terms is telling. Condori was using a Spanish term to exclude Mamani from urban respectability while maintaining his own distance from the cultural markers of indigenous culture. Mamani, on the other hand, emphasized the inadequacy of Condori’s respectable adult comportment in such a way that foregrounded his, and her own, indigeneity. Essentially, she was calling him an Indian. Given that Condori was a white-collar employee, she was claiming an alternate source for why her behavior was acceptable and his was not.⁷⁹

Improper adulthood had very gendered, as well as racial, connotations in these communities. Condori called into question Mamani’s status as a wife and mother in an effort to chastise her for her insolence towards him, but because Mamani’s ability to access company goods was predicated precisely on her status as wife and mother, in doing so he also called into

⁷⁸ “Carlos Condori vs Guadalupe Mamani de Valeriano y otros” ALP PJJ Caja 377

⁷⁹ Both Mamani and Condori are common indigenous surnames, which along with Quispe have incredibly high representation in this part of the Andes. Out of the 47 boxes of urban court cases dating from 1952 to 1954 that I examined, 23 contained at least one court case concerning a “Condori,” and 30 contained at least one “Mamani.” In the context of the Andes, racial divisions are culturally inscribed: education and language use are key dividers. See for example in the case of Peru, Sarah Chambers, “Little Middle Ground,” in Appelbaum, Macpherson, and Roseblatt, *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America*, 33; Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919–1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

question Mamani's very right to demand resources from the company.⁸⁰ Women, in other words, could not automatically assume access to the financial and social benefits of the revolution's celebration of the urban working class. For men, access to resources was predicated on performing the role of worker honorably and diligently. Accusations of thievery from the company were both personal attacks and questions of loyalty to the job and the community. For this reason it was very common in these cases for women to be called whores in the same context that their male partners were accused of thieving from the company, as in the case of Mamani and Valeriano vs Roberto Calle. Rufina Mamani was accused of "living with *yocallas*" in 1964, and considered this insulting enough to bring suit against her attacker, the widow Rosa de Gutierrez.⁸¹

Since the stakes of decency were shifting after the revolution of 1952, accusations of moral or social failure were often explicitly political as well as personal. For example, in 1964, Leonor Rivera de Rodriguez wrote in to say that her dignity as a person had been called into question by the Guzmán family, members of whom had publically and repeatedly called her a whore. The Guzmáns had also called her husband a thief and a pimp, but they went further, in this context, to threaten to denounce him as a *falangista*, a member of the right-wing Catholic party whose members were trying to organize coups against the MNR in this period.⁸² Norberto Hurtado wrote into the courts, that same year, to say that his brother in law Demetrio Alcón had accused him of stealing from the mines where he worked as a driller, and called him a bastard, a

⁸⁰ This particular equation of proper femininity with ability to access resources will be central to Chapter 3, in which accuses of conduct in divorce and custody battles very literally determined which women and children could access resources on what terms.

⁸¹ Rufina Mamani vs Rosa v de Gutierrez, March 1964, ALP PJJ Caja 397

⁸² Leonor v de Rodriguez vs Martha y Edgar Guzman, 3 Febrero 1964, ALP PJJ 398. For further on this case and repression against the Bolivian right, see Chapter 5.

pimp, a little Indian, and his wife an Indian and the “great whore of Catavi” who had miscarried a child (indicating this as a further sign of her immorality). Alcón’s defense, in this case, was to repeat the charge of theft in front of the courts.⁸³ In each of the cases cited above, political disorder and economic uncertainty expressed themselves as disputes over proper civil conduct, here defined as fulfilling the requirements of a raced and gendered concept of adulthood. In revolutionary Corocoro, “unruly youths,” “Indians,” failed mothers, and promiscuous women were equally threatening to the social order as fascists.

Unruly Youths and Traitors to the Working Class

Youthful expressions of masculine violence and sexuality were threatening in this revolutionary period because they highlighted the rapid changes to the social order that a politics of working class respectability might bring. Proper expression of adult masculinity and proper use of company resources were particularly fraught issues for white collar workers and union leaders because these two categories were becoming increasingly murky as the MNR consolidated its hold on local and national power. The MNR symbolically honored workers as revolutionary heroes while granting more power to their white collar neighbors. White collar employees, meanwhile, shored up their revolutionary credentials by casting themselves as nationalist workers, as both Alanes and Condori did in their disputes. After the revolution, white collar had better jobs than underground workers, but the same access to company benefits. While they could more easily interact with state institutions and existing elites, they could not access the hyper-masculine working class sociability of the underground workers in the union.

Young men in particular were attracted to the sociability that cast underground miners as

⁸³ Norberto Hurtado vs Demetrio Alcón, May 1964, ALP PJJ 398.

a powerful social and, later, political force, especially after the revolution. The paradox of mining masculinity was this: before the revolution, a young man could earn more, faster, below ground than in an office, and yet, if he stayed in the mines too long, he was unlikely to survive to old age due to frequent accidents and lung diseases such as silicosis. After the revolution, drillers still made more money than cart loaders or assistants, but did not have the ability to strike rich on a single vein, as cooperative miners would later. And, while all categories of workers received greater benefits and services than before, set wage schemes meant that young men did not necessarily earn more below ground. Finally, wages set by the government were extremely vulnerable to political change, as workers would learn in 1957 and later 1965, and in the context of rightwing governments, white collar workers often retained their wages when workers took a pay cut.⁸⁴ For all these reasons, men who could travel between white and blue collar jobs were more able to take advantage of the cultural capitals of miners after the revolution.

Returning to the Acarapi family, whose patriarch was imprisoned for being traitor to the working class, we can see the consolidation of a new social group in the early 1950s who would later come to dominate town politics in the 1960s and 1970s, under both revolutionary and repressive regimes. Humberto Acarapi, 19 at the time of the revolution and thus a contemporary of Mario Durán's, socialized with a mixed group of merchants' sons, office workers, students, and at least one local police officer, Felix Luna, in the Club Carrasco. They played on football teams patronized by municipal and provincial officials, and nearly all of them were listed as mine employees at one time or another in the 1950s. Miner Roberto Calle, who fought with Guadalupe Mamani de Valeriano, had previously been in trouble for borrowing Humberto

⁸⁴ For this reason, ambitious workers who leveraged their early prowess at the drill into a union career wanted to keep their white collar job and their working class persona intact: they reaped the benefits of safety and increased earning ability. Balance General: Sección Corocoro, 1953 Archivos de COMIBOL.

Acarapi's bicycle, but when he was accused of stealing it, Acarapi testified on Calle's behalf (noting that it was at the behest of Guadalupe Mamani). Court records of a dispute with another mineworker show an underground miner, Bonifacio Mamani, and his wife, a *palliri*, among those accused of fighting on the side of the Acarapis.⁸⁵ They also socialized in shops run by miners and their families, such as those of Rufina Mamami and Victor Astorga. While many held positions in the company themselves, they seem to have related with some friction to newcomers in the high ranks of the company, much as their fathers had with American Smelting officials.⁸⁶

Could all miners access these spaces with the same ease as the merchant's sons? Local court records suggest that increased access for workers and increased tolerance for the unruly aspects of youthful masculine sociability was the order of the day. Celso Valeriano and Mario Durán frequented the worker's club run by the union as well as Club "Rock and Roll", but Club Carrasco seems to have been more selective in its clientele. In a case brought by a merchant's son against an office worker, the Club opened its doors to a victorious football club and its supporters one evening, which resulted in a brawl and the expulsion of the drunks. Even so, the dispute would probably not have made it to the attention of the courts except that one of the youths bit off a piece of another's nose, a clear violation of norms of acceptable conduct, even in drunken brawls.⁸⁷ Vicente Sierra, the company employee responsible for the "mordisco," was not a local, and he wrote in to complain that the Judge, who shared a surname with one of the boys he attacked, and who also happened to be a local police officer, was biased against him.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Palliris were woman who worked on the outskirts of the mines, breaking up waste ores for secondary processing and ore recuperation.

⁸⁶ Justo Terrazas vs Hugo Peñaloza y otros, November, 1955, ALP PJAC Caja 213.

⁸⁷ Enrique Coriza vs Vicente Sierra, June 1953, ALP PJAC Caja 205

⁸⁸ Sierra was not, as far as I can tell, a member of the Uruguayan football team, but was a mining engineer from Potosí.

This case does not contain any mention of the Acarapis, but involves nearly every one of Humberto Acarapi's close associates, including his brother in law, Ranulfo Coriza, the young man who lost parts of his nose in the fight. Of the eight men involved, five were or later became city officials, and at least three were employed in the mines as drivers or mechanics, at least one of whom must have worked inside the mines as he died four years later in an accident. As far as I can tell, none of the miners within this case were actively involved in union politics, however they shared a social milieu with those who were. Coriza later married a woman who had been involved with Mario Durán, and a bar fight involving Humberto Acarapi that was denounced by the union took place in a store owned by the girlfriend of another of the young men. In a community as small as Corocoro, social and conjugal ties bound people across political disputes.

The Acarapis and their associates wielded power before the revolution as a result of their ties in commerce. In the years after the nationalization of the mine, the commercial enterprises of the EMC competed with these men for economic space, and through 1964 at least (and sporadically thereafter), the union competed with municipal officials for political space. After the revolution, mineworkers and union men became the ones who could leverage company resources and government contracts to gain both wealth and respectability. The union provided a new medium of legitimation for those young men with few notable relatives to claim the status of *gente decente* within the town, but it was most effective as a vehicle for those men who could access both working class sociability belowground and civic respectability above. Mario Durán, for example, used his political contacts to secure a contract supplying beef to the company store by the early 1960s.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ See, for example, letters between the Alcaldía, EMC, and Alberto Durán negotiating this transaction, Caja 229, Municipal Documents for years 1962-1965.

Big Deals: Revolutionary Masculinity in Corocoro

Most of the really successful Bolivian union leaders, including Mario Durán and Juan Lechín Oquendo, straddled the line between below- and above-ground worker. Lechín, who was COB president and Secretary General of the miners' union from 1952 to 1986, recounted in his memoirs that he got an office job in the Siglo XX mining camp through the influence of his merchant father, but as a teenager was unhappy that he was not allowed the more dangerous but more lucrative perforista job inside the mine. In his version of events, Lechín disregarded company officials' advice, and apprenticed himself to the best driller in the mines, quickly earning the respect of both workers and administration. It was this mastering of the requirements of both working-class and white-collar idioms of respectability that allowed him to become section chief in the mines and later labor representative.⁹⁰ Also helpful was Lechín's sexual and athletic prowess; Lechín also joined the soccer league around this time, quickly earning a spot on the best local team representing the Catavi mines. Lechín was not the only person to suggest that his popularity as a sports star as well as his ability to network with political elites that made him an ideal union leader.⁹¹ Durán was not a soccer star, but he was popular, and certainly participated in a culture of youthful masculinity that both solidified the approval of his worker peers and drove him into conflict with both family decency and the law.

As the Calle/Mamani/Valeriano dispute shows, the mining company enabled the policing of decency in any location where public concerns and municipal or state institutions intersected. In 1951, just months before the revolution, mining company administrator Ricardo Luna took Mario Durán to court for seducing and impregnating Luna's underage daughter. At this stage,

⁹⁰ Lechín Oquendo, Juan. 2000. *Memorias*. La Paz, Bolivia: Litexsa Boliviana, 44-50.

⁹¹ Corocoreños like to remember their town as a significant exporter of 19th century national politicians, football stars, and Juan Lechín. Eusebio Sarmiento, personal communication, September 23, 2013.

Durán was still an office employee in the (non-nationalized) company, and Luna a propertied company official.⁹² He accused Durán of pursuing Nely Luna relentlessly and eventually taking advantage of a moment when “everyone” was in the local cinema, where she worked.⁹³ As was common in seduction cases in this period, Luna wanted Durán punished and held financially responsible for the child.⁹⁴

The legal dispute quickly became a battle to assert respectability between Durán and the Lunas, particularly Nely. Durán’s defense was to claim his own honor at the expense of hers: he mustered a number of witnesses to testify first, that Nely Luna was “very fickle (“veleta”) and accustomed to having conversations with various men, military as well as civilian, in private locations, generally at night” and that she caused a public scandal in the railway station with Señora Nattes [the wife of a municipal official, and one of the city boys mentioned above] over a question of jealousy.” He never addressed the actual events of the assault, except to say in a general sense that they were false accusations. In his next statement before the court he made his point even more clearly, asking the witnesses to state whether she “has the bad habit of groping with men in remote places, day and night” and having witnesses affirm, in contrast, “I am a man, honored, a worker, with recognized morality in my daily conduct.” This kind of defense was common in both rape and seduction cases in this period, most of which, like this one, involved families of some social standing and young men who inhabited a nebulous space between poverty and social respectability. This case, however, straddled the revolution, and by its end

⁹² In 1957, Ricardo Luna died in a traffic accident. He is listed alternately as a mechanic and as in the administration of the mining company. Mechanics in general seemed to occupy relatively privileged positions in the Corocoro working class. “Declaratoria de herederos” August 5, 1957 ALP PJJ 372.

⁹³ Expediente sin numero, “Ricardo Luna vs Mario Durán” 13 Diciembre 1951, ALP PJAC 214.

⁹⁴ For more on the way seduction operated as a social and legal force in Bolivia, see Elena McGrath, “Seduction and Power in Revolutionary Bolivia” *Notches: (re)marks on the History of Sexuality* (blog) October 15, 2015, <http://notchesblog.com/2015/10/15/seduction-and-power-in-revolutionary-bolivia/>.

Durán was a man of some local importance. He was, in fact, never prosecuted in the case, though he did pay a fine to the courts. Nely Luna also remained influential in town politics and later became treasurer and interim mayor for a brief period during the tumultuous period of military socialism in the 1970s.⁹⁵

In 1957, Mario Durán, now married, was called back into court. This time, vecina Adelaida Ochoa brought suit against him for attacking her daughter Rosa, Durán's wife. Ochoa noted particularly her shock that Durán would hit his wife in public view of the police, and suggested that maybe he could do it because "he thinks he's a big deal now because he is a member of the Miner's Union." Ochoa provided a doctor's certificate attesting to injury, which Durán actually used in his defense, saying that her state of injury could not be that bad, because the doctor stipulated that Rosa would recover in "barely" six days. The case did not go to resolution because Rosa herself wrote in, de-authorizing her mother to levy the complaint, given that she was a married woman, and noting that "in every household there exist minor inconveniences that are of no interest to anyone, particularly the courts." She asked that the case be dropped, and it was.⁹⁶

These court cases highlight conflicting normative systems of responsibility and right that competed for space during the years after the revolution, and were based on differing conceptions of how to construct the social body and on what terms.⁹⁷ In the 1960 pulpería dispute, Celso Valeriano asserted his membership in an alternate social body that did not

⁹⁵ "Ricardo Luna v Mario Durán" ALP PJAC Caja 214.

⁹⁶ Expediente 040373 "Adelaide Ochoa vs Mario Durán" 20 Septiembre 1957 ALP PJJ Caja 372.

⁹⁷ I am indebted in this discussion to Steve Stern's explorations of gendered rights and responsibilities in colonial Mexico, particularly in my understanding of the way that struggles between competing patriarchal power structures emerge from domestic court cases. Steve J. Stern, *The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

necessarily take orders from the police. In these cases, Mario Durán asserted the honor due him as a young working man, demanding a right to social and sexual interactions with the respectable families of Corocoro. Respectable men in Corocoro could get away with domestic disputes and impregnating unmarried women from good families, pre-revolutionary workers could not. While Mario Durán himself was not from an impoverished background, given his last name, literacy, and employment status at the time of the revolution, he was also not one of the wealthy circle of merchants and municipal officials who exercised a monopoly on moral urbanity before the revolution, like the Lunas or the Ochoas. In 1951, he was a 20-year-old youth called to order by the courts. By 1957, he was a “big deal.” Moreover, Durán exerted his claims to morality, honor, and authority in a context of bringing other working men into the realm of urban power and respectability: his was a collective vision of masculine right and privilege.

In the case of mineworker Isaias Mamani Apaza, plausible claims to working class urbanity may have significantly changed the outcome of the case. In November of 1952, Mamani initiated a libel suit from prison (his case file is marked: “in custody”), where he had been held on suspicion of robbery, and where he was subjected to tortures and electrical shocks in an attempt to make him confess. Although he made a formal complaint against this treatment, he was equally offended that his accusers had done so publicly, that although he could never have committed thievery because “I am a worker of the local mining company, where I have always distinguished for my honor and reliability,” yet, “they have claimed publicly that I was a thief.” He continued: “My accusers must know my correct conduct because I live in the same house as they do. With this libelous accusation and its repetition they have done my honor enormous harm, even putting me at risk of losing my job.”⁹⁸ Mamani asked for 10,000 bolivianos from his

⁹⁸ “en los calabozos de la Policia de Seguridad de esta ciudad donde he sido objeto de torturas y aun sometido a la corriente eléctrica, para que confesara un delito que no lo he cometido y que no lo podía cometer nunca pues soy

accusers for his days lost at work and damages. While both Mamani and Villacorta bristled at the very possibility that they could be accused of a crime, the Villacortas in particular with their merchant connections could claim greater access to protections from the state.⁹⁹

This is one of the more thoroughly documented cases in this period, and offers an unusually clear timeline of what happened between the Mamanis and Villacortas over the course of November and December 1952. In October, Isidora Villacorta and her grandson Nicanor saw Isaiah (referred to by the Villacortas as Isaac) Mamani and Antonio Flores hanging around after someone stole clothes, livestock, and 20,000 bolivianos from their house. They made formal accusations, and the two were taken into custody. At this point both the Mamani and Flores/Chambi families filed suit against the Villacortas. In late November, the brothers Luis and Lorenzo Manzaneda, who owned the house in question, were apprehended and admitted to the robbery, returning some of the money. At this point, Nicanor Villacorta signed a statement vouching for the innocence of “Cesario Flores” and “Isidro Mamani,” and stipulating that the Manzanedas should pay damages to Mamani and Flores. This settlement did not sufficiently address the affront to Mamani’s dignity, however: in December, Isaias Mamani wrote to the courts to continue the suit against the Villacortas, noting that the declaration of innocence effectively proved his charge of calumny.¹⁰⁰

trabajador de la empresa minera de esta localidad, donde distinguí siempre por mi cumplimiento y honradez. Además, los sindicatos me han hecho objeto de injurias graves, por que en todas partes han manifestado que soy un ladrón. Mis calumniadores, están convencidos de mi correcta conducta, puesto que vivo en la misma casa donde ellos habitan. Con este calumnia y sus vociferaciones me han hecho un daño enorme en mi honor, además me han puesto al borde de perder mi trabajo” Isaias Mamani Apaza vs Nicanor Villacorta, 1952 ALP PJAC 203.

⁹⁹ Over time both the Mamani and Villacorta shared similar fates: in 1965, Nicanor Villacorta was fired from the mines for political reasons. His name appears on a list of *Mineros Retirados* in ALP PJAC Caja 229, Año 1965. The case file from 1952 also included paperwork from another of the accused robbers’ mothers, Antonia de Chambi, also suing for calumnia against her son. Isaias Mamani Apaza vs Nicanor Villacorta, 1952 ALP PJAC 203.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. This discussion is based on an examination of more than 400 court cases taking place in Corocoro and the surrounding province spanning the years 1930 to 1986 and housed in the Judicial Archives of the Provincia Pacajes at the Archivo La Paz, Universidad Mayor San Andres. In most civil and criminal disputes, each party began their statements and declarations with a statement specifying their social location. Usually this contained a reference to

This case is notable because Nicanor Villacorta was an urban miner with a non-indigenous name and merchant connections, and Isaias Mamani, while a miner, was a migrant from the countryside. Mamani's case is striking particularly because his suit was so successful. Before the revolution, men like Isaias Mamani rarely entered the judicial record speaking for themselves.¹⁰¹ In this case, his voice was still mediated by urban prejudices. Indeed, though Mamani protested his innocence explicitly in terms of his honor as a worker, the courts identified him as a "labrador" (a rural worker) and native of Caquingora, not an "obrero", his identifier of choice in the earlier document. Nonetheless, on December 22nd, the judge took his complaint

current residency, place of birth, and often employment. Isaias Mamani, for example, began his statement, "Isaias Mamani Apaza, legally competent, worker in the mines, with legal residence in this city, before Your Honor with all due respect." "Isaias Mamani Apaza, habil por derecho, trabajador en minas de esta localidad, con residencia en esta ciudad, ante Ud con el debido respeto digo..." By contrast, Isidora Villacorta identified herself as "vecina" and Nicanor simply as "legally competent." In general, men and women of social standing identified themselves as "vecinos" or "propietarios" of "this city" and urban residents of the working class by explicitly identifying both their place of birth and their profession. Vecina/o literally means neighbor, but carries a connotation of social propriety and land ownership. Miners used "minero", "obrero", and "trabajador" interchangeably, though increasingly favored "obrero" after the revolution. Urban working-class women used "works at home" (labores de casa) or a specific profession such as "weaver" (tejedora). Those who came from Corocoro identified themselves as "native to this place" (natural de esta). Rural men and women most often used "contributor" (contribuyente) and identified the "former indigenous community" (ex-comunidad) from which they came, although sometimes the men identified themselves as simply a "laborer" (labrador). These terms come from legal categories specific to indigenous land tenure and taxes. Community, for example, referred specifically to a type of collective landholding that had been abolished in the late 19th century, but continued to exert social importance. A contribuyente paid taxes on this communal land and received in return usufruct rights. See for further discussions, chapter 4 and Dwight B. Heath, ed., *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, Publishers, 1969). In the years before or immediately after the revolution, as in this case, miners with connections to the countryside used and were referred to as "labrador" as well. In the case of Isaias Mamani, the presence of both terms and his status as resident rather than "native" placed him an itinerant, rather than generational miner, who probably worked seasonally in the mines to supplement the rural land allotment of his family. While some of these men stayed in the city, married urban woman and left their communities, many saw mining as only a seasonal or temporary income strategy and centered their identities, social networks, and community ties around the countryside. The process by which these rural miners did or did not become proletarianized will be discussed in the context of property and inheritance disputes in the next chapter. In the post-revolutionary period of social mobility, these men had the most trouble accessing the social prestige attributed to miners, but the early years of the revolution did offer new kinds of space for them to do so.

¹⁰¹ The two cases explored in depth in Chapter 1 provide useful counterexamples: in each case, abuses against Indians and workers were denounced by lawyers and urban officials in their own names, rather than denuncias (while almost certainly penned by lawyers as well) filed in the name of the offended worker or Indian himself. See "Elias Guzman vs Jorge Lebrun" and "Enrique Linares vs Jorge Lebrun and Cia Smelting" 1930, ALP PJAC Cajas 119 and 120.

seriously and ordered that Nicanor Villacorta be detained pending further investigation.¹⁰²

Villacorta, clearly shocked at his own treatment but unconcerned that he had unjustly caused Mamani's imprisonment, was held in jail for a few days in December 1952 because he made claims damaging to the honor of a rural miner with an indigenous last name. Isaias Mamani successfully, at least for a time, claimed the status of worker, and the attendant respect it demanded.

Not every rural laborer was as successful as Mamani in claiming the protections of the courts. Those who had less protection were generally those who could not, unlike Isaias Mamani, write or speak Spanish. These men and women emerge less frequently in the record, and then usually only as defendants, because they could neither afford their own lawyers nor defend themselves effectively in front of the courts. Except in cases of property and inheritance disputes over *sayañas*, (rural land plots), less evidence is available to comment on the social worlds of these part-time urban residents. The case at the beginning of this chapter, with janitor Vicente Ajata and his companion Miguel Lequema is more typical of the kind of scenario that would bring a rural laborer to the attention of the courts, and then allow him to disappear from the municipal record without further trace.

“Un Golpe Malhadado de Destino”¹⁰³

The most singular claim to working class respectability that I encountered in the archives, signed and quite possibly authored by Mario Durán himself, was found in a homicide case concerning miner Lorenzo Mamani. This case most forcefully demonstrates that crucial to the

¹⁰² Villacorta then complained that calumnia was not covered in those crimes that require preventative detention, and the juzgado agreed, releasing him. At this point, the documentation for the case ceases. Isaias Mamani Apaza vs Nicanor Villacorta, 1952 ALP PJAC 203.

¹⁰³ Testimony of Lorenzo Mamani, ALP PJJ Año 1962 Caja 386.

exercise of respectability and social citizenship are the linked rights of determining acceptable levels of violence and acceptable exercise of sexuality. In September of 1962, the Corocoro police arrested Mamani for killing his wife in a drunken stupor. He turned himself in willingly, stating when asked who was responsible, “I am” (yo soy el autor). As his testimony would demonstrate, Mamani believed that while he was technically responsible, he was neither legally nor morally culpable in her death.

In order to demonstrate this, Mamani began his testimony several days before the incident, when he and his family were drinking at the house of a comadre. At some point, Lorenzo Mamani says he discovered his daughter Bertha in the lavatory in the arms of her boyfriend. The sight of such a disgrace disturbed this father so immensely that he resorted to drink. For the next two days Mamani, by his own account was either drunk or at work, occasionally coming home but mostly staying at the homes of friends. After two days, Mamani was at work when he received word that his wife was in the hospital, so he immediately asked his supervisors for permission to leave. However, “in light of the fact that my four-year-old son was sick, I stayed home to care for him rather than go to the hospital.” When he finally came to visit his wife the next day, she had already died, “*possibly* due to the blow with the bottle that I had given her.” [emphasis mine]¹⁰⁴

Over the course of his confession Lorenzo Mamani offered a carefully crafted argument for social respectability predicated on his fulfillment of social and familial responsibilities. His testimony first established that he was a very reliable and conscientious worker; second, that his drunkenness was in the exercise of social obligations due at the death of a close family friend; third, that he put the interests of his children before all else; and finally, that his wife had been

¹⁰⁴ Expediente 76 “Homicidio Contra Lorenzo Mamani” ALP PJJ Año 1962 Caja 386

trying to prevent him from exercising authority over his daughter's sexuality. Moreover, by establishing the beginning of the events at a wake, Mamani suggested that his duties to the social family (his co-madre, his workmates) required that he be drinking with an expectation of total inebriation. Thus, during the fight itself, Mamani was so drunk as to not be aware or in control of his actions. Lorenzo Mamani told the court, "if some degree of blame falls on me in this incident, it is purely attributable to my absolute state of unconsciousness."¹⁰⁵

Each of these pieces helped construct a narrative of social propriety that could outweigh the violence and disorder of his wife's death. Each time he admitted unconscious culpability, he paired this admission with testament to his proper conduct as a family man, such as, "to this effect I offer these witnesses declaring, we got married twenty years ago and have lived together since, we have nine children together, and from my work as a miner I have humbly and caringly provided for them, our household has never been object of scandal." He also asked the witnesses to comment to the fact that his wife's death left his children with no one but him to care for them. Particularly, Mamani's testimony needed to offer reasons for his neither being at home for the nights leading up to his wife's death nor visiting her in the hospital, while maintaining his status as a loving, proper husband. He concluded, "I have never been a perverse person, especially not in the home."¹⁰⁶ Mamani argued in this way that his family obligations generally outweighed his obligations to his spouse, even in the event of her death. His witnesses, workers in the interior of the mine and the copper smelter, corroborated his story: saying for the last

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Perversity and violence were often paired in domestic disputes that fell outside legal and social boundaries, such as *abuso deshonesto*, custody and divorce cases, most often wielded by men against other men or against women they wanted to discredit as mothers. Mariano Condori Cochi, vs Macedonio Linares (*abuso deshonesto*), Expediente 60785 24 Marzo 1954 367; Expediente 179110 8 Octubre 1963 (see also exp 179124 caja 396) Domingo Huanca sues for custody of his 11 month old son, accusing mother Gumercinda Ramirez of ill treatment; Sebastiana Choque vs Fernando Quispe, Expediente S/N, (*divorcio*) Sept 1950, Caja 365.

point: “he’s a good man.”¹⁰⁷

The only testimony to enter the record against Mamani was that of Alberto Ticona, his daughter’s boyfriend, also a miner. He had asked for Bertha’s hand in marriage, but Lorenzo accused him of being poor and not having any land. According to Ticona, Justa Mamani, the deceased, had begun to defend Ticona, which enraged Lorenzo. Alberto tried to come to her defense, at which point Lorenzo Mamani hit her with a bottle.¹⁰⁸ In this case, Ticona made a bid for his own status as a respectable suitor, and established his own allegiance with Justa Mamani, who was simply defending her daughter’s choice. As Krista Van Vleet notes in her exploration of violence among female family members in highland indigenous communities, violence in intrafamilial conflicts often emerged in situations where the proper hierarchical order within a family has been called into question. What she calls “successful kinship” was predicated on the maintenance of such hierarchies.¹⁰⁹ Ticona, in this case, was also a miner, but he was an interloper in the familial order, and did not muster nearly as much authority or evidence of his successful completion of inter and intra-familial kinship requirements. These, as we shall see, were crucial to the outcome of Mamani’s case.

Included in the court file was a note from the miner’s union, arguing for provisional liberty for Lorenzo Mamani. The union stated that Mamani was a worker for the Corocoro copper mines, and as such he could not earn money for his family without going to work. It affirmed that Mamani had many children depending on his support, and that he was an upstanding member of the community. The document continued: “We also need to point out that

¹⁰⁷ Expediente 76 “Homicidio Contra Lorenzo Mamani” ALP PJJ Año 1962 Caja 386.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Krista E. Van Vleet, “The Intimacies of Power: Rethinking Violence and Affinity in the Bolivian Andes,” *American Ethnologist* 29, no. 3 (2002): 580. See also, “The Art of Family Politics” in Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*.

the incident for which our affiliate is incriminated cannot be considered a crime given that the death of brother Mamani's wife is simply, *in public opinion*, an accident."¹¹⁰ The document was signed by two leaders of the union, including Mario Durán. Bail was set at 200,000 bolivianos, but by December, Mamani had been released completely from custody. The case ends without a legal judgment against the defendant.

Mario Durán, here, was arguing explicitly for the right of his union brothers to exceed the bounds of what was legally acceptable conduct at the time. His defense of Mamani, as a hard worker who has always provided for his family, and needs to continue providing for his family, corresponded with Mamani's own justification for not having visited his wife. Mamani believed, as Durán believed, that workers who were reliable in their jobs and provided for their children had a right to blow off steam, in this case get black-out drunk, for days, on special occasions. In short, the need for Mamani to properly perform as a member of the social-familial body of the mining community was so important that acceptable levels of collateral damage included the life of his wife.

This defense also implicitly critiqued longstanding pathologization of indigenous communities as well as miners as drunken and rife with domestic violence. In fact, these particular social diseases were understood in early twentieth century Bolivia as signs that Bolivia's working classes were too indigenous to be modern subjects without significant state intervention and reform.¹¹¹ The invisibility and legal sanction of violence within and among

¹¹⁰ "Asimismo, debemos hacerle notar que el hecho por el cual se lo incrimina a nuestro afiliado no puede considerarse un delito ya que simplemente y, de acuerdo a la opinión pública se trata de un accidente el fallecimiento de la esposa del c. Mamani." Expediente 76 "Homicidio Contra Lorenzo Mamani" ALP PJJ Año 1962 Caja 386.

¹¹¹ Ann Zulawski, "Hygiene and 'The Indian Problem': Ethnicity and Medicine in Bolivia, 1910-1920," *Latin American Research Review* 35, no. 2 (January 1, 2000): 107-29; Jaime Mendoza, *En las tierras del Potosí: novela* (Los Amigos del Libro, 1976). Originally published 1911. Modern urban Bolivians still stereotype both indigenous men and miners as normative domestic abusers, indeed, joke about domestic violence being understood within

some social groups at the expense of others is one of the hallmarks of social citizenship, and Durán's letter demanded exactly this privilege. By the same token, while drinking intentionally to the point of unconsciousness has a ritual component present in both rural religious ceremonies and worker holidays in Andean social cultures, excessive drunkenness is not an activity monopolized by a particular ethnic group or class within or without Bolivia. The letter submitted by Durán both normalized such behavior asserted this kind of festivity as a right and obligation.

As Mamani's testimony shows, establishing who fell within the limits of social propriety, that is, who was exercising proper sexuality and violence was crucial to asserting a working class version of decency. The preponderance of libel and calumny cases in the Juzgado de Corocoro during the 1950s and 1960s suggests that public assertions of sexual and familial impropriety were incredibly threatening to urban workers. For example, in the local bakery, Laureano Pomar, [another associate of Humberto Acarapi's] was dishonored by the suggestion that his wife had thrown him out because he was living improperly with his mother.¹¹² In another case a drunken union leader, Francisco Ticona, accused mineworker Gustavo Gutierrez of living with his sisters-in-law, and maintaining illicit relationships with both. The public nature of both these assertions (the latter occurred in the pulpería and the Club Obrero) required either violence or legal, acknowledgment of their falsehood.¹¹³

As many of these cases indicate, this assertion of working-class decency often came at

indigenous culture as signifying a happy marriage. Van Vleet, "The Intimacies of Power," 575. As Van Vleet notes, domestic abuse and domestic violence are not confined to one ethnic group or class in Bolivia.

¹¹² "¿Acaso no hay hombres en Corocoro para que la madre de Laureano Poma viva con su hijo?" Rosa V de Pomar vs Juana de Poma, October 1953 ALP PJAC Caja 201

¹¹³ Francisco Ticona vs Gustavo Gutierrez, 1958, ALP PJAC Caja 221. Most of these cases, though they requested fines and punishments to be meted out for the offenses, never went to a final resolution. Indeed, the point of bringing suit may well have been to harass the offending party into ceasing their actions or making private restitution. Often bringing these cases to the attentions of the court resulted in the arrest or temporary detention of the accused in order to gather testimony, causing problems at work or with other family members.

the expense of less privileged groups within the working class, particularly single women. In the next chapter I will turn my attention to the ways that the expansion of state services through COMIBOL both opened up and closed off venues for women to acquire economic and social resources from men and independently. Like rural miners and residents of the city, women also were able to claim working class decency to a limited degree, and in incredibly contested ways. Unprotected women who called masculinity into question were particular targets for violence by men who felt their position in society was under threat. In another fight at the pulpería, Silvestre Mendoza was so upset about being called a ladrón in front of fellow workers that he attacked a pregnant woman and had to be physically restrained by other workers.¹¹⁴ Her father brought the case to the attention of the courts, noting that her husband was in another province and unable to do so. In an extreme case, a miner was so troubled that his wife snapped at him in the pulpería that he decided that she must be sleeping with someone else, and attacked her. In the aftermath of this domestic dispute, in which she called neighbors and friends for help, he committed suicide with a triple charge of dynamite. He left two suicide notes: one to the godfather of his marriage, and the other to Mario Durán.¹¹⁵

Conclusions

Within a changing social order, these court cases were fundamentally about what kind of body (individual or plural) had primary agency and power in very material and embodied ways: who had the right to demand a choice cut of meat in the store, who had the right to exert what kind of power and violence over what kind of subordinate, whose drunkenness could occur at the expense of others. The revolutionary state attempted to impose certain norms of political and

¹¹⁴ Jose Condarco vs Silvestre Mendoza on the part of Basilia C de Cochi, ALP PJAC Caja 205

¹¹⁵ Ministerio Publico vs Elisa Morales v de Ramos, 22 Marzo 1953, ALP PJAC Caja 212.

social behavior on those it wanted as its citizens, creating out of a heterogeneous and unregulated social and geographic body a modern and developing nation. As the state expanded its material reach and ideological role in this period, communities such as Corocoro were the literal battlegrounds of this revolution.

On a local level, miners in places like Corocoro saw the revolution as a chance to change the terms of what constituted decent, sanctioned social behavior in the city and in the political arena more generally. They did so in ways that profoundly altered the social and political landscape of the country. In so doing, however, these workers also distanced their own respectability from that of rural indigenous groups. Subsequent chapters will show how this failure of inclusion doomed the ability of the revolutionary government or the working class to maintain a revolutionary coalition in the face of economic and political precarity.

After the revolution, the MNR state abolished restrictions on indigenous mobility (for example, the right to enter public plazas and ride trolleys) and abolished forced labor requirements. When they gave women, men and indigenous peoples the right to vote, they redefined Bolivian citizenship in a formal sense. But legal reforms, in a country like Bolivia, meant very little without a state apparatus robust enough to carry out such reforms. In places like Corocoro the MNR's project found its most receptive audience: the state achieved a lasting presence in the countryside only in those cases where it could build on existing mining or peasant union infrastructure. When the government built statues in every mining town celebrating the role of miners in the revolution, each a shirtless man with a gun in one hand and a drill in the other, when they offered free education and subsidized food and medicine (only) to mining families, and scholarships for children of company workers, the MNR revolutionary coalition opened up a process of redefining citizenship and decency that would profoundly

change the Bolivian social landscape in both radical and unequal ways. These benefits were part of a process whereby working class Bolivians claimed urban space as respectable and powerful citizens and reconsidered the role of indigenous and lower class peoples in the social order. The MNR government saw itself as molding and shaping proper, modern citizens out of unruly groups of rural indigenous peoples and workers. Those who participated in this project received concrete economic and social benefits: social mobility, and for a time, significant political access. But the workers and rural subjects who engaged in this process were not simply passive recipients of state discipline or “civilizing” norms. These individuals and families pushed to define the contours of urban respectability in their own terms even after the MNR attempted to set limits on such practices, as the next chapter will argue.

Chapter 4: Domesticating the Revolution: Mining Families and the Welfare State, 1956-1965

“The genesis of all the militant actions that had taken place in the mining communities was based in the home.”¹

In June of 1955, Isabel Quispe and her daughter Josefa, indigenous weavers from the rural agricultural community of Aypa Paruyo, appeared in front of the authorities in Caquiaviri to say that a young man from nearby Khari Baja named Nicolás Alanoca had seduced the minor Josefa with promises of marriage.² Josefa had just given birth to a little boy named Fermín, and she wanted Nicolás to help support his son, even though he was now married to another woman.³ Nicolás admitted that he had both slept with Josefa and conceived a child with her.⁴ He added however, “I have no interest in recognizing [Fermín] because his mother, who was my girlfriend,


¹ Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, xxix.

² ALP PJAC Caja 227: Petición Alimenticia, Nicolás Alanoca vs Isabel Quispe, 6 Junio 1955. The original charge had been estupro (rape), but became thereafter a child support case. Each of the testimonies in this case have been mediated a Juez Parroquial, and handwritten (in Caquiaviri) by a testigo actuario. Once the case travelled to Corocoro, the papers were filed through a lawyer at a charge of 50+ bolivianos, and the testimonies have been typewritten. Nicolás Alanoca was literate enough to write his name throughout this period, but none of the women who primarily litigated this case in the beginning were able to sign theirs. The story begins in the countryside outside of Caquiaviri, the old provincial capital and cathedral town of Pacajes from colonial times, was politically under the jurisdiction of Corocoro but actually a greater center of population throughout this period. Cause of some rivalry. Here, as in all future court cases, I assume that the text of the complaint has been written by a lawyer or court scribe and that at least some of the language reflects strategic choices designed to render the complaint more acceptable in the eyes of the courts. In part, these kind of acceptable narratives are what concern me here: how did individuals fit their individual experiences into the rubrics provided them by the state. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of personal detail that emerges from each case. After comparing the specific language in this demand to common tendencies in divorce and pension disputes, I have highlighted turns of phrase or details that seem to fall outside the pattern.

³ At this time under Bolivian law, Nicolás could decide whether or not to recognize his son for inheritance purposes. This would not necessarily obligate him to pass child support payments to Fermín’s mother, however. The only way in which Josefa could legally demand support from Nicolás was through a settlement for seduction charges. After the 1956 Social Security Law was passed, any recognition by an employee of the mines entitled that child to support.

⁴ “Que efectivamente tuve una relación amorosa y con character de tomar el enlace matrimonial con Josefa Quispe, en el tiempo de nuestra relación lo hice concebir al menor Fermín,” “a quien no tengo gana de reconocer porque la madre que ha sido mi querida me hizo una demanda fraudulenta, y que por otra parte como en el día soy casado con otra mujer que a la fecha recién hace un par de semanas.” ALP PJAC Caja 227: Petición Alimenticia, Nicolás Alanoca vs Isabel Quispe, 6 Junio 1955.

has rejected me, and additionally two weeks ago I married another woman.” In Nicolás’ mind, Josefa’s rejection of his proposal, not to mention his legal attachment to another woman, meant that he was under no obligation to support the child.⁵ In 1955, the Caquiaviri courts set Nicolás’s child support payments at 3,000 bolivianos a month, but provided Josefa and Isabel no means to enforce these payments until he moved to the Corocoro mines in 1958.



Map of sections of Corocoro and Caquiaviri province, showing home communities of Alanoca and Quispe families from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2000.

⁵ Several family members weighed in, offering their versions of events to the courts. Nicolás’ mother, Petrona Tarqui viuda de Alanoca, appeared in his defense, saying that Josefa and her son had been in a sexual relationship, that she had come to live with their family, but that a diviner, a local yatiri had told Josefa that she would have no luck in marriage with Nicolás, and she had returned to her own family, telling Nicolás to “marry whoever you want.” Petrona argued that this was a suspicious case of too little too late, since she should have sued for recognition during her pregnancy, not after Nicolás had married another woman. Her exact words: “despues de azno muerto, pide cebada” referenced the saying, *A burro muerto, la cebada al rabo*. Nicolás’ brother helpfully testified to the fact that Nicolás and Josefa were sweethearts, that Nicolás talked all the time about Fermín being his son, and finally added, “I have no idea why he married someone else.” Legally, if Josefa had been asking for maintenance from a common law marriage, Nicolás’ argument had some legal basis in divorce law: if a woman left her husband willingly without good cause, this would affect her ability to ask for his resources. However, in the case of child support, the only question in the eyes of the state was whether Nicolás acknowledged biological responsibility for the child, which he had done only a moment before declining to “recognize” the child. The state agreed with Josefa and set child support payments at 3,000 bolivianos a month. *Alanoca v Quispe*, June 6, 1955, ALP PJAC Caja 277.

In the years between 1955 and 1958, Josefa and Nicolás sued each other repeatedly, fighting out the legal contours of Nicolás's paternity obligation. Both Nicolás and Josefa's families saw child support payments as a crucial family resource in financially precarious times. In the course of their arguments, they revealed the life and death stakes of revolutionary rights and benefits: the meaning of property under agrarian reform, a woman's right to reject a relationship without terminating the father's obligations to support his child, and the responsibilities of an "respectable man" (*hombre de estado*) to his nuclear and extended family. Once Nicolás moved to Corocoro and began work in the mines, the state was able to enforce child support obligations through wage withholding. At this point, his dispute with Josefa demonstrates how the relationship between the state, the worker, and the MNR revolution's commitment to welfare and worker citizenship was articulated among working class men and women. This case, and the thousands of others like it that flooded mining and urban courts in the years after the revolution, capture how local legal and social cultures in both the city and the countryside responded to the changes of the revolution of 1952. This chapter will use the experiences of families like the Alanocas and Quispes to explore the how MNR's state-building project was experienced in the mines as well as the countryside, how it was contested, and under what conditions it broke down.

This chapter demonstrates that the revolutionary family was central not only to the distribution of resources under the MNR, but the maintenance of consent for state expansion and centralization itself. I explore the state-building pretensions of the MNR through the establishment of welfare institutions such as COMIBOL and the Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social. By tracing their development in Corocoro, the chapter exposes how these institutions redefined the boundaries of citizenship and offered rewards for loyalty to the MNR project even

after the fall of the MNR. These cases highlight the fact that the MNR state carried out its mandate for social change by combining coercive and redistributive functions within its most revolutionary institutions. This twinning of coercion and redistribution of the spoils of revolution fragmented families along gender as well as rural/urban lines over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. Although the MNR revolution caused the dissolution of many pre-revolutionary hierarchies, it also drew new boundaries around race and class to create a group of citizens who looked and acted like they were living rich off the revolution, but felt poor, oppressed, and betrayed by the revolution they had fought for.

The mines and the countryside were linked together through complex financial and familial ties in this period, with competing sets of norms around property, social obligations, and family hierarchies. One of the claims of this chapter is that the revolutionary state intervened decisively in this complex interaction, helping to consolidate new norms of family and gender life after 1952 that prioritized the rights of women and children over *patria potestad*.⁶ For example, Nicolás believed that Josefa's unwillingness to marry him alongside with his obligations to his own family entitled him to dictate where to spend whatever subsidies the state gave him. Josefa's claim, that paternity obligations were inviolable and a certain level of maintenance was unrelated to her willingness to be in a relationship, represented a new cultural definition of family particular to mining communities. In this vision, mothers of children in industrial working class communities came to believe themselves participants in the revolutionary project just as their miner partners and spouses did, with rights to protection and

⁶ In the same year that Fermín was born, the MNR also passed a Bill of Rights of the Child. Among articles declaring the right of children to education, idleness, and protection by the state, this Bill declared the fundamental rights of children to know who their parents were and carry their name. This provision threatened the ability of a father to determine his level of engagement with an illegitimate child. "Bill of Rights of the Bolivian Child" 1955. For full text of the law, see Appendix 3.

resources offered by the state. The way in which women and families were incorporated the state, however, also helped encourage entrance of the MNR revolution's coercive apparatus into community life, setting the stage for future clashes between miners and the state, and threatening solidarity within families.

The state, in other words, created new ways for men and women to gain economic and social power through participating in industrial institutions such as COMIBOL, but the mandate of these institutions to improve social welfare through regulation tended to create fixed categories of social belonging in the process. The result of these intersecting social processes was a newly inscribed divide between those who fell within the protective mandate of the MNR state and those who fell without. This division was influenced by, but did not entirely reproduce either divisions between the city and the countryside or between mestizos and indigenous Bolivians. Notably, these divisions were gendered as well as classed. For those within the revolution, ties to the mines or the state through peasant syndicates offered new opportunities for women and less affluent men to leverage resources within families or to contest the power of abusive paternal figures.⁷ As the next chapter will argue, the military regimes that replaced the MNR in power after 1964 and attempted to "correct" the course of the revolution simply built on the existing coercive structures that these individuals had welcomed into their families in the 1950s and early 1960s.

⁷ Alexandra Minna Stern similarly notes that the maternalist policies pursued by Mexico's revolutionary welfare state helped construct a discourse of female national belonging and participation through motherhood. In Bolivia, I argue, specific kinds of mothers in industrial working class communities came to be constructed as participating in the revolution itself through motherhood. Stern, "Responsible Mothers and Normal Children," 376.

Miners in the Land Reform

The multiple identities inhabited by men who worked in the mines but retained ties to rural communities created complicated legal and social entanglements in this period. Many families from Caquiaviri, Caquingora, and neighboring communities sent their children to Corocoro to work in the mines on a temporary basis, in order to raise money for a wedding, for example, while others moved to town on a more permanent basis in response to hacienda expansion in the region. While some of these migrants always stayed in Corocoro, joining the semi-permanent urban working class, most returned home after months or years, or maintained homes in both the city and the countryside. The transition zone between mines and countryside became more entangled after the revolution as the state sought to categorize constituent groups like miners and peasants and incorporate them separately into the revolutionary governing coalition.

Since well before 1952, young Bolivians moving from the countryside to the city had found themselves relatively more free from traditional obligations towards extended kin and concomittantly more dependent on horizontal social bonds between coworkers and neighbors, at least until they returned home to their rural communities. This pattern was reinforced and altered by the social welfare and pro-development policies of the revolutionary MNR which sought to replace traditional kinship ties with dependency on state protection. The state also attempted legally to fix and regulate kinship and social relationships in this period in the name of protecting poor families and increasing the birth rate. Under rural kinship systems, Nicolás had good reason to expect that he could choose when and how to contribute to Fermin's well-being without obligation to his child's mother and without losing his status as father. Once he migrated to the city, Nicolás experienced both the benefits and drawbacks of greater engagement with

state disciplinary apparatuses: while he received increased pay for his work for every child legally recognized, for example, he also lost control over how to distribute these resources to his children and when. In the eyes of the state, once legal paternity was established through evidence of a sexual relationship or social recognition, both the state and Nicolás owed social and economic debts to Fermin's mother and guardian, Josefa.

Nicolás, and others like him, were members of both a fraternity of male miners and extended kinship networks in the countryside, with benefits and responsibilities to both. As the eldest son of a large family that had access to community land from before the revolution through his ayllu, Nicolás' obligations, in his mind, were to his legal family at home.⁸ However, the state saw Nicolás primarily as a miner, with children to support in the city as well. While some, like Nicolás, might try to inhabit both roles, most found that the demands of the city after the revolution made retaining control over rural resources increasingly difficult. These identities shifted depending on the legal and social circumstances: Nicolás claimed to be both as a landowner from Caquiaviri, suggesting that he retained control of his family's sayaña, and a miner in town.⁹ In 1955, authorities in Caquiaviri had referred to him as “el campesino Nicolás Alanoca,” whereas authorities in Corocoro listed him by his name simply, or as a worker. Nicolás referred to himself as “a man of importance” (*hombre de estado*) when establishing his obligations to his family and an impoverished miner, hoping for a sympathetic understanding from the judge of the “dire straight the miners were in these days” to suggest that he could not afford to give up child support to Josefa.

⁸ Like most agriculturalists in the area of Corocoro, Nicolás had an indigenous community plot, not a hacienda, and his land was now recognized by the Agrarian Reform commission as the sayaña Condiriri. An explanation of the state of pre land reform tenure in Pacajes province can be found in footnote 12.

⁹ It is unclear where his wife lived in this time, although it seems likely that his wife had her own house in Caquiaviri and was not living with him in Corocoro, as sometimes was common.

Poor families like Josefa's could exploit tensions within the MNR's revolutionary project and reinterpret both established traditions and revolutionary decrees to survive in the precarious landscape of the post-revolutionary highlands. In a traditional case of seduction, Nicolás would pay a fee or a lump sum to Isabel's family to discharge his obligations to her honor, and if he wanted to recognize the child at any point, he might determine his level of involvement in the child's life. Isabel and Josefa Quispe were single women living without spouses and supporting themselves as weavers, with access to wool from pasturing livestock on the lands of extended kin. Revolutionary welfare decrees offered them new avenues to enforce claims on Nicolás, and the social benefits that came along with his job in the mines could make a huge difference in the lives of these women.¹⁰ Because the state wanted poor children like Fermín to receive care and resources, it tended to reflect the priorities of his mother, Josefa, although it also struggled encourage these women to marry the fathers of their children.

The permeable boundary between worker and campesino in this revolutionary context resulted in very creative re-appropriation of revolutionary decrees designed to benefit both workers and indigenous peasants.¹¹ After the initial child support payments were set at 3,000 bolivianos a month, Josefa's mother wrote in arguing that since Nicolás was a wealthy man, with a fertile *sayaña* (communal plot) and a great deal of livestock, he should pay more to support his child.¹² When Nicolás responded that all of this land belonged to his mother, and that he was

¹⁰ Expediente s/n, 31 enero 1957, ALP PJJ Caja 372. This case concerns a fight between two campesino women, Paulina Condori de Ramos (de la estancia Condor-Uta de la ex-comunidad Guana Grande del Canton Callapa) and Serapia C de Flores because Paula has convinced her brother Rufino Flores to leave Sarapia, his spouse, and not pass her any of the social benefits he gets from working in the mines, she now lives in her Estancia en Callapa.

¹¹ Gotkowitz shows how creative appropriation of legal decrees was crucial to political claims made by rural actors in the 19th and twentieth centuries, suggesting that the Quispes were drawing on a long tradition of legal awareness and legal reinterpretation. Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

¹² A *sayaña*, according to Jorge Dandler and Richard Patch's "Glossary of Terms Related to Land Tenure and Labor Under Special Tenure Situations in Bolivia" (1963: Land Tenure Center, UW Madison Libraries) was the plot of land granted to a hacienda colono for his or her personal use. Rivera Cusicanqui also uses this definition in Rivera

merely a worker contributing to the support of his parents, six siblings, and legal wife, Isabel retorted: “Nicolás is the only one who works the land called Condoriri, which is rich in pasture for livestock and sweet potatoes and *according to the national agrarian reform service, dictated by the supreme decree of October 15, 1953, the land belongs to those who work it*, which means that the woman Petrona Alanoca is nothing more than a member of his family...” [emphasis mine]¹³ In other words, Isabel argued that the agrarian reform, which was written to grant hacienda tenants legal rights to the land they had worked for a land owner, in fact abolished any kind of collective ownership of family land in favor of a regime of private property giving title to only the adult male who worked the land.

This imagined intergenerational redistribution of land rights, as Nicolás pointed out to the courts, had no actual basis in the way the law was written or enforced, “for there is no law that

Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*. However, within court records the communities around Corocoro use *sayaña* not simply to refer to hacienda plots but to usufruct land held within indigenous communities (legally, ex-communities after the 1868 law abolishing collective ownership). These litigants used the term more akin to McBride’s 1921 definition of *sayaña* as a pre-conquest term denoting “a yearly allotment of cultivable land that each head of family received” within a community. George McCutchen McBride, *The Agrarian Indian Communities of Highland Bolivia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921), 6. López also equates *sayañas* with *ayllus* rather than with hacienda holdings. Eliseo Quispe López, *Tierra y territorio: thaki en los ayllus y comunidades de ex hacienda* (FUNDACION PIEB, 2002), 9. Isabel Quispe called Condoriri a *sayaña de originario*, whereas Nicolás Alanoca called his property a *sayaña de agregado*. Within indigenous communities, *agregados* were not considered original members and thus had less social and economic status within the agricultural community than did *originarios*. Quispe probably used *originario* to bolster her claim that Alanoca was rich, whereas Alanoca used *agregado* to claim the opposite ALP PJAC Caja 227: Petición Alimenticia, Nicolás Alanoca vs Isabel Quispe, 6 Junio 1955.

¹³ “Nicolás Alanoca is the only one who works the *sayaña de originario* called ‘Condoriri,’ rich in pasture for raising cattle and sweet potatoes. According to the National Agrarian Reform Service, as dictated by the Supreme Government on October 15, 1953, the campesinos who work the land are its owners, in other words the woman Petrona Alanoca is merely a member of the family, and since she only dedicates her labors to pasture on a large scale...” “Nicolás Alanoca, es el unico que trabaja en la *sayaña de originario* denominada “Condoriri” *sayaña* que es rica en pastales para crianza de ganado ovino y cultivo de papa dulce y segun el Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, dictado por el Supremo Gobierno el 15 de Octbre de 1953 años, los campesinos que trabajan sus tierras son los propietarios, de manera que la mujer Petrona Alanoca es simple componente de la familia, y solamente dedica sus actividades al pastoreo de ganado ovino en gran escala ...” ALP PJAC Caja 227: Petición Alimenticia, Nicolás Alanoca vs Isabel Quispe, 6 Junio 1955. In communities near Corocoro, *sayañas* were generally held by the eldest married male member of the family, shared only among unmarried members. In this way, Quispe’s argument has traditional resonance as well: legally as well as customarily Nicolás was the owner of the land. Nicolás’ mother may well have controlled the family budget, however. For discussions of patrilineal *sayaña* distribution in Jesus de Machaca, see López, *Tierra y territorio*; Andrew Orta, *Catechizing Culture: Missionaries, Aymara, and the “New Evangelization”* (Columbia University Press, 2012), 186.

stipulates that the child should strip ownership of the land from his parents while they are still alive,” (“pues no hay ley que disponga que el hijo despoje a las padres sus tierras mientras vivan...”)) but it did represent a creative application of revolutionary statutes to bolster Josefa’s case. It also suggests the extent to which revolutionary decrees granting dignity and belonging to workers could travel through society, with unpredictable results. As happened with many male mineworkers, revolutionary decrees made certain members of the community appear to have a great deal more access to resources from outside, without much changing their material circumstances from their own perspective.¹⁴

The Agrarian Reform decree of 1953 in fact recognized the rights of indigenous communities to keep their lands communally and assign usufruct rights rather than private property, but it also provided legal structure for those who might wish to exert their right to private property. Since land rights could be traced both to occupation at the time of the decree and historic rights of communities that had been usurped by haciendas, multiple groups of poor, indigenous peasants often claimed the same land. Adding to this confusion were the urban miners who had left their lands in the care of relatives operating under longstanding relationships of reciprocity, and who saw themselves as workers rather than landowners. The understaffed and underfunded Agrarian Reform Service, tasked with carrying out the redistribution of land and titles, often had very little sense for how to resolve competing claims to property ownership.¹⁵ In

¹⁴ Each family in this case belonged to a different, and quite possibly rival “ex-comunidad” indígena. 19th century liberal reforms had abolished the legal recognition of indigenous communities, and although reform decrees in the Villarroel period reinstated legal recognition, many communities were used to this terminology in legal matters. See Tristan Platt, “Liberalism and Ethnocide in the Southern Andes,” *History Workshop*, no. 17 (April 1, 1984): 3–18.

¹⁵ Dwight B. Heath offers a very good account of the struggles of the Servicio Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (SNRA) to account for the competing systems of land tenure in the department of La Paz, as well as the lack of resources, especially after the Plan Eder went into effect in 1957. He notes that SNRA officials sometimes shared offices with the command of the local MNR, which means that the extent of the agrarian reform depended on the willingness of local officials to go beyond the call of duty. Stern, *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World - 18th to 20th Centuries*. In Corocoro, the municipal government sometimes received

an article on the land reform in the Norte de Potosi Goudsmit suggests that those with slightly more resources than their neighbors could use the agrarian reform to their benefit and actually take land that had previously belonged to their neighbors.¹⁶ He explains that petty landlords in the Norte de Potosi often worked in the mines and used this extra money to extend their holdings after the revolution, at the expense of neighbors and poorer kin. Similarly, Heath observed that miners with access to pasturage could afford to invest cash in maintaining livestock on land that their neighbors could not maintain.¹⁷

While Isabel Quispe offered a particularly creative case of interpreting the agrarian reform, she was not the only litigant in the Corocoro courts to call upon the agrarian reform law to mediate disputes between family members. In 1959, the families of two brothers disagreed over the ownership of a pair of cattle. Geronimo Alacama and his wife Juana filed a complaint in the La Paz offices of the Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos for violating the Agrarian Reform Law. Geronimo claimed he had taken care of his brother Benjamin's cattle when he found them abandoned in the communal pasturage, and for this service, Benjamin had offered to split the earnings from selling the livestock. When, on the advice of his relatives, Benjamin reneged on this agreement, Geronimo charged him retroactively for the wages the Agrarian Reform decree stipulated laborers be paid for all agricultural work. Benjamin Alacama was arrested and forced to pay these wages by the offices of his employer, COMIBOL. On his release, Benjamin charged his brother with theft of the livestock, citing the "inveterate customary practices" of employing a

petitions to redistribute land, though no record exists of their interest in responding. See for example, municipal documents, see letters in ALP PJAC Caja 204, 1953.

¹⁶ Goudsmit, Into A. "Exploiting the 1953 Agrarian Reform: Landlord Persistence in Northern Potosí, Bolivia." *Journal of Latin American & Caribbean Anthropology* 13, no. 2 (November 2008): 361–86.

¹⁷ Heath, *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia*.

yuntero, and arguing that his brother had in fact sold his cattle at a premium and returned a pair of older, worn out animals in their stead.¹⁸

Several miners, urban residents, and agricultural workers alike wrote in to clarify the custom, through which a landless worker cared for someone else's animals, with no pay, but could keep the money he earned from renting the animals out to others. This practice was fair, noted the observers, because the owner took on the costs of both the animals' original purchase and provided the land and the forage for their care. Benjamin had left to work in the mines, leaving family members to care for his land in a way that had been culturally recognized among rural communities for a long time but was also somewhat exploitative. In 1959, this kind of practice now fell within a gray zone of forced labor practices abolished by the revolution.¹⁹

Local customs such as hiring a *yuntero* did not entirely disappear during the revolution, but the revolution offered competing sets of authority to which complainants could appeal. At Benjamin's request, Geronimo was held by the Corocoro authorities for theft in October, though he filed another claim in the La Paz offices in November. Finally, at the end of 1960, Benjamin wrote into the courts to say that the brothers had come to a mutually satisfactory financial agreement, and he wished to formally desist from his charges against Geronimo.²⁰ The revolution, in other words, offered tools to bolster claims by both competing factions within these families, each of which felt poor and exploited by the other, but looked comparatively rich to the other, and could be interpreted as exploitative or exploited in the eyes of the law. As the

¹⁸ Geronimo Alacama vs Benjamin Alacama, 1959, in ALP PJJ Caja 375 and Benjamin Alacama vs Geronimo Alacama, April 1960, ALP PJJ Caja 377.

¹⁹ Exactly the situation that Jorge Dandler and Richard Patch's "Glossary of Terms Related to Land Tenure and Labor Under Special Tenure Situations in Bolivia" (1963: Land Tenure Center, UW Madison Libraries) hoped to clarify.

²⁰ Geronimo Alacama vs Benjamin Alacama, 1959, in ALP PJJ Caja 375 and Benjamin Alacama vs Geronimo Alacama, April 1960, ALP PJJ Caja 377.

fortunate sons of the revolution, the miners like Nicolás and Benjamin often took on this position of relative privilege despite continued exploitation, which complicated attempts at community solidarity and fractured coalitions built up during the revolutionary nationalist period leading up to 1952. This process would be exacerbated by the twin effects of the CSS and the stabilization plans of the 1956-1961 period.

Marriage De Facto and De Jure in Pacajes Province:

Throughout their case, Nicolás, and Josefa, and their mothers argued over the relationship between biological paternity and cultural norms of kinship and obligation. Nicolás and his mother believed that recognition of paternity was predicated on the maintenance of continued ties of kinship and dependence, and that Josefa's rejection of a willing offer of marriage before she knew she was pregnant was a rejection of the bonds governing paternity.²¹ At this moment, Nicolás and his mother well understood that legally acknowledging paternity would enmesh him in a series of legal and social obligations toward the caregiver of his child.²² Nicolás' argument does correspond to the social norms of rural communities in the La Paz region, which recognized a form of trial marriage, or rather an extended process of courtship that included sexual relations and cohabitation for a period of time before entering into formal marriage (which could, but did not necessarily, involve legal or church rites). Fully completed marriage rites were incredibly difficult to disentangle, so communities had systems for governing

²¹ Nicolás Alanoca added in his testimony that it would be his pleasure to legally recognize both women, but that the state only allowed a man to have one, and that perhaps the government should look into this matter. Nicolás then added: "I would recognize both women but for the fact that the government only allows me to recognize one..." "sería a mi gusto el querer reconocer a las dos mujeres para lo que el Gobierno ampara que un hombre puede tener hasta cuantas mujeres uno..." On the legal concept of amparo in indigenous communities, see Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 4–5.

²² Also confusing in this case is the fact that in at least two legal documents, Nicolás asserts that his relationship was with Isabel, not Josefa. It is unclear whether these are transcription errors on the part of the courts or suggestions of a whole other kind of family conflict. Finally, in one set of documents, Isabel gives her surname as Alanoca. This case contained dozens of court filings, and the vast majority are clear on the names of the actors.

what Carter and Bolton, in their study of peasant communities in Pacajes province in the 1960s called “failed marriage rites.”²³ In cases where the woman returned home after living with her partner’s family, the young man often paid a one-time settlement to her family. This would end the obligations between the two families and offset somewhat the cultural and financial burdens that she would incur raising any child conceived in that time. Only occasionally were the authorities brought in to enforce this kind of arrangement, giving the young man a great deal of social power in such situations.

In mining camps and cities, on the other hand, parents often had less oversight over their children's marriage arrangements, and in closely packed mining barrios, a couple's domestic concerns became public very quickly. In Corocoro, police were rather more willing and more likely to intervene than in the countryside.²⁴ Since common law marriage had been recognized in 1945, the police took it upon themselves to intervene in cases where two unmarried young people separated from each other. As the law regularizing common law marriage had the effect of imposing legal marriage on de facto living arrangements, some legal record of when an unmarried couple separated could become increasingly important. Police used “good conduct

²³ In *Andean Kinship and Marriage*, Carter and Bolton argue that indigenous marriage practices were characterized by many stages culminating in the formation of a family with house, land access, and a series of mutually enmeshing kinship obligations that made divorce harder to contemplate. For most of these communities, legal or church marriage was the final step in the process. Living together and sexual relationships occurred fairly early in the process, leading to a situation where outside observers assumed indigenous Bolivians practiced “trial marriages.” Carter or Maybe Bolton further notes that when men from the community he studied, in La Paz province near Viacha (neighboring Corocoro) left home for work, they often continued these practices with slightly less parental input. The experience of Luciano Tapia, whose father married an urban girl and brought her back to his family in the countryside, bears this out. Carter, in Bolton, ed, *Andean Kinship and Marriage*, 1977, pg 179. Nash (and Bolton, 231) agree that the major difference between these kinship practices in the city and the countryside were that parents lost their influence in the city. Once a man earns his independent wage, he can determine his own marriage partner Nash, *We Eat the Mines*.

²⁴ This is ALP-JPP 361 036602 8 January 1952. Even before the revolution, the courts in Corocoro would sometimes help track down wayward husbands: in divorce proceedings between Pastora Toledo de Alanes and Pedro Alanes, Pastora asked the courts to help find her husband who had disappeared from Corocoro without a trace but now was rumored to own two shoe stores in Oruro. Pastora told the courts he fled there to avoid paying pensions and asked the judge to please notify the police of Oruro to make him remember his kids.

agreements,” signed in front of witnesses and family members in cases where legal divorce would not apply. Sometimes police even intervened between married couples, demanding that they keep the peace, at least in public.²⁵ Sixto Condori complained that this amounted to an abrogation of his own rights, because, although he had demanded that the police compel his girlfriend to come home after she left him, the police instead took her part in the dispute and confirmed their separation.²⁶ Furthermore, Condori complained that the police forced him to agree to monthly payments of \$200 bolivianos, noting that since the couple did not have kids together, the police did not have the legal right to impose such a sanction. Like Nicolás Alanoca, Sixto Condori was upset that he was forced to support someone who had abandoned a relationship with him. Because they had no children, however, Sixto was legally in the right.²⁷

Since before the revolution, the mines had always been a space of relatively greater engagement with the regulatory arm of the state. After the revolution, in the name of protecting women and children, this regulatory apparatus extended further into the countryside through the extended kinship networks of male mineworkers, resulting in increasingly curtailed young

²⁵ Pedro Achu Quispe vs Justino Quispe Cochi, ALP PJJ Caja 386 Octubre 1961 contains a copy of a good conduct agreement signed in Chojlla between Pedro Achu Quispe and his wife Rosa Mamani de Acho [sic], promising that they would refrain from fighting in public.

²⁶ “I have not voluntarily agreed to this separation, but rather was made to answer to the police for the fact that my girlfriend without my permission left my household during Carnaval, without even leaving me with any food while I worked days. Finally, this woman presented herself with a jealous eye and in a state of drunkenness, for which I reprimanded her, receiving in response this summons by the police by means of a notice that she would separate herself from my side, which proves that this was not an agreement entered into by both persons.” “No he pactado dicha separación voluntariamente, sino que habiendo hecho constar a la policía que mi concubina sin hacer caso a mis indicaciones ha abandonado mi hogar durante los días de carnaval, sin que me atendiera con la alimentación mientras yo seguía trabajando dichos días, habiendo finalmente presentase [sic] esta mujer con el ojo verde y en un estado de borrachera, por lo que reprendí esta actitud, recibiendo en respuesta la demanda ante la policía mediante un memorial en el que dice terminamente [sic] que se separará de mi lado, lo que demuestra que no es acto pactado entre ambas personas.” Exp 179144 13 Marzo, 1963, Lucia Condori de Condori vs Sixto Condori. ALP PJJ Caja 392.

²⁷ They later married, and then finally divorced. Expediente de (ripped cover) 16 de Febrero 1967 410 Divorcio: Sixto Condori vs Lucia Condori This divorce case spans at least 11 years. ALP PJJ, Caja 410.

masculine autonomy.²⁸ The revolution did have an interest in formally offering rights to women, and used the Código de Seguridad Social (CSS) passed in 1956 to build on previous reformist legislation regarding the family and consolidate these rights.²⁹ Specifically, Villarroel's 1945 legalization of the practice of "concubinato" by imposing common-law unions on unmarried partners began a practice of the state protecting poor children by giving women more recourse in cases of abandonment. Villarroel's reforms also served to legally recognize indigenous and non-elite cultural practices: while in respectable families, no sexual contact between partners before marriage was the public norm throughout most of the 20th century, indigenous and lower class mestizo families practiced convivencia or concubinaje as standard.³⁰ In 1956, Paz Estenssoro built on these laws by offering new pressures to regularize and register marriages through the Código de Seguridad Social.³¹

²⁸ Company regulations encouraging marriage were common in early twentieth century industrial enterprises such as mines. Management often believed that married men were a more tractable labor force than unruly single men. See for example, Klubock, *Contested Communities*; Finn, *Tracing the Veins*.

²⁹ The two most important of the earlier laws had been the Ley de 15 Abril 1932 law regulating divorce and the 1945 decree imposing common law marriage on cohabitating partners who were not legally bound. Daniel Salamanca, *Ley de 15 de Abril de 1932*, 1932, <http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-19320415.xhtml#dcmi>; Gualberto Villarroel, *Constitución política del Estado*, ed. Ciro Félix Trigo (La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Cruz del Sur, 1945). The divorce law was an example of legislation, like Seguridad Social, that brought together multiple class interests but aimed to empower women in a situation where men traditionally had more authority. Although some forms of legal separation had existed since colonial times, the divorce law promulgated in 1932 expanded the rights of women to demand a divorce, and responded to the agitations of both feminists and anarchists in urban communities, unlike voting rights for women.

³⁰ Though young men in wealthy families could expect to have sexual relations with lower class and chola women. Barragán characterizes 19th century family dynamics in Bolivia as governed by patria potestad and violencia legitimada against women who acted out, suggesting that divorce would have been a very difficult prospect for women before 1932. Ana María Lema et al., eds., *Historias de mujeres: mujeres, familias, historias* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Editorial El País, 2011), 176; Barragán R., *Espacio Urbano Y Dinámica étnica*. See also Oporto, *Las Mujeres En La Historia de Bolivia*, 56. In my research, as well as a team of researchers looking at cases from the early years of divorce cases in La Paz, women instigated more often than men, suggesting that this legal recognition was a powerful tool for women. Llanqui, Rocío Mamani, Lupe Mamani, Elisa Ticona, Uchanier studied 299 cases over ten years of divorce in La Paz after the promulgation of the law. Most common, among both men and women, was maltratos. Although for men, about equal cases of adultery, abandono, and free separation were secondary causes of divorce, for women adultery was a clear second. Twice as many women alleged maltratos as men. In total, 68% were initiated by women and 32% by men, of those, less than half came to a conclusion within the legal system Lema et al., *Historias de mujeres*, 201–10.

³¹ In *Andean Kinship and Marriage*, Carter and Bolton argue that indigenous marriage practices were characterized by many stages culminating in the formation of a family with house, land access, and a series of mutually enmeshing

Women were not the only ones to attempt to use the state to enforce the conduct of their spouses, although men generally had better results with extralegal social pressures. In November 1954, a young man who had married a woman from a neighboring province left to join the army battalion. When he returned for a visit in 1956, he discovered that she had abandoned his house with many of their shared possessions. He asked for her return but she told the police that she wanted to go home to her parents.³² Marital law in Bolivia at this time did allow a husband to ask for reconciliation if his wife left their home without cause, and so police would sometime visit a woman at her parents' house to deliver such a request. Women could claim abuse or neglect as causes for separation, however, and I found no police records of women being forced to return home in these cases. This absence may in fact reflect the substantial pressures women faced to make the relationship work, often from her own family and friends, that required no police intervention to enforce; only by going to legal extremes could women make an extreme break. One particularly unfortunate wife found that her husband refused to take her back after she was hospitalized for six months with complications from tuberculosis. Her husband accused her of abandoning their marital home, and was outraged when she sued him for a pension, because five years later he was also in the hospital with complications of tuberculosis.³³

Divorce, like popular understandings of marriage, was a process rather than a simple event. Analyses of court cases suggest that less than half of divorce cases, even after the 1932

kinship obligations that made divorce harder to contemplate. For most of these communities, legal or church marriage was the final step in the process. Living together and sexual relationships occurred fairly early in the process, leading to a situation where outside observers assumed indigenous Bolivians practiced "trial marriages." Carter further notes that when men from the community he studied, in La Paz province near Viacha (neighboring Corocoro) left home for work, they often continued these practices with slightly less parental input. The experience of Luciano Tapia, whose father married an urban girl and brought her back to his family in the countryside, bears this out. Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Asi es nuestra vida)*.

³² Expediente 089188 Divorcio Andres Cussi vs Juana Colqueguanca, 5 Nov 1956, ALP PJAC Caja 214

³³ Expediente 57915 Divorcio Ayda Tarquino de Alanoca vs Jorge Alanoca Vallejos 24 Abril 1957, ALP PJAC Caja 219.

law, were carried through to sentence, suggesting that many families used the threat of legal divorce (and the pension order that would almost certainly result) as a means to compel resolution outside the courts.³⁴ As in marriage practices, the first set of strategies available to unhappy spouses were extralegal, involving parents, godparents, and neighbors. Even here, urban couples were relatively more likely to have the state involved, as couples often replaced family members with coworkers or union leaders in guardianship roles.³⁵ For men, a happy home depended on the care and dependence of a spouse who stayed home, made dinner, and cared for the children. Women expected, more than anything else, for their husbands to provide financially for them and their children, and not have children with anyone else. When they did not do this, the CSS allowed women to ask for help from the state. Women could flee the house, usually returning to their parents. Men, in turn, could get up and leave, either temporarily for work, or more permanently. In both cases the state could, at this point, become involved, but most cases suggest several attempts at separation before court officials stepped in. Police often went to the aid of husbands to request their wives return to them, but increasingly also forced young men not yet married to sign legal obligations of child support or alimony for the common law spouses they abandoned. A wife, in turn, might institute divorce proceedings in the hope that her husband would prefer to return home than give over part of his paycheck to her independently. From a

³⁴ This was very common, as suggested by the the survey of early divorce cases in Lema et al., *Historias de mujeres*.

³⁵ Nash suggests that in cases of divorce, couples or community members would call for the intervention of the padrinos of the marriage. Only when the advice or coercion of the padrinos was not enough to resolve conflict did the courts or the police intervene. Nash also noted that court documents were very expensive on a miners' salary. Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, 76. Because the divorce law provided different kinds of obligations for abandonment, mutually consented separation, and ill treatment, husbands often responded to accusations of the latter by trying to cast doubt on the moral decision-making capabilities of their wives. Many responses began with the legal formality, "My unfaithful spouse, surely under the bad counsel of her parents," "Mi infiel esposa, seguramente mal aconsejada por sus padres," attempting to leverage legal control against the intervention of families. Nonetheless, family and padrino intervention was a community accepted norm, in which the partners in a marriage only after a series of years, constitute their own home independently and establish their own social networks, in order to become autonomous from their parents. These divorce cases reflect that this process continued among these communities, but could interact with the court system when familial mediation broke down.

formal perspective, the law seemed more concerned with protecting women and children's rights to maintenance than compelling women to come home.

In divorce cases, both men and women established themselves as the moral party by asserting their intentions to create a happy home. In this case, they also hoped to establish their own authority over and above that of the parents. We can see both discourses of morality and autonomy playing out in a dispute from just after the revolution. In late 1954, Clemente Condori Tola, having secured the promise of marriage from Juana Villa as well as her parents, left for Aguas Calientes in Chile to make money to set up an independent home for them both. Upon his return, however, he found that she had forgotten him completely. He had not been in her presence, he claimed, since October of the year before, so it was a "complete shock" ("verdadera sorpresa") when learned of Juana giving birth to a child in November 1955, and that he was supposed to be the father. He was writing in to the courts because he had heard she was instigating a case against him. In making his claim, Clemente took pains to establish that he had entered into this relationship with both official parental sanction and an earnest intention towards marriage. He also acknowledged, however, that the judge might not see it this way, apologizing to the judge for using the word concubine in his presence. Unfortunately for Clemente, the night watchmen of the mining company saw the couple together on Carnival.³⁶

Before COMIBOL regularized wage garnishing, women had tried to force compliance with child support in numerous ways, most of which were extremely disruptive to public order. For example, in January 1956, Pedro Maldonado, who had been a witness in the seduction case

³⁶ Fortunately for Clemente, Juana Villa filed suit not for paternity but to have him return some of her things that he had kept from her. These he later returned, as his mother attested. ALP PJAC Caja 213, Expediente 0120456 Clemente Condori Tola vs Juana Villa 24 Enero 1956. This is one of several cases where one of the parties, hearing rumors of potential legal action against them, preemptively sued the other party. In this case, we see Clemente assumed he would be held responsible for paternity, but Juana suing to get her property back.

against Mario Duran in 1951 (from Chapter 3), claimed that his ex-girlfriend had attacked him, landing him in the hospital, and was now stealing his things and menacing his children.³⁷ This was almost certainly an attempt on her part to force his hand in the case of paying child support, because the case file also contains a number of receipts for payment signed by the defendant. In the case of the railway worker Juan Leandro Huchani, when Maria Mamani found she could not use the courts or the company to enforce child support payments, she decided to use a more direct method: with her son Macario, now going by her surname rather than his, she broke into Leandro's house and stole his property.³⁸

Sometimes the changing fortunes of a couple after the revolution could cause disputes, particularly if the woman earned an independent paycheck. Although the nationalization of the mines formally excluded women from working underground, the expansion of care work and clerical work in both the local offices of the CNSS, hospitals, and COMIBOL offered more opportunities for work for women.³⁹ Women's work was incredibly common in Bolivian mining communities, but women's *waged* labor was more threatening to the hierarchy of care and autonomy that prioritized the labor of union working men. This was part of the problem in the

²⁶ Expediente 066521 Pedro Maldonado vs Tomasa v de Calderon 6 Enero 1956 Pedro Maldonado, detained in the prison of this city, worker in the Empresa Minera de Corocoro. He argued that his health was weakened by treatment and she had accused him of calumny. Pedro Maldonado also had a child support case brought against him by his next partner Flora Mamani, in 1961. ALP PJAC Caja 234.

³⁸ See Expedientes 160933 7 Octubre 1961, 166901 26 Mayo 1962, ALP PJJ Caja 386.

³⁹ While some scholars (and popular memory) suggest that COMIBOL refused to hire women formally, even those who had been working underground for years, there is some reason to suspect that women's labor underground, while not uncommon, was recognized by the company. As Nash noted, women worked in concentration plants until the 1957 introduction of mechanized "Sink and Float" machinery into the Siglo XX and Oruro mines. In Corocoro, women appeared to have been employed by the company outside the mines, especially food production. These jobs were nonetheless formally affiliated with the company and subject to benefits, as in the case of Anastasio Yampa, a miner who asked to be declared beneficiary of his mother's social benefits earned as a worker of the Corporación Minera in 1957. Her marriage certificate, from 1915 shows that she was, at age 18, a butcher and her husband, 25 worked inside the mines. Yampa wanted to be declared heir, "especialmente de those social benefits that my mother earned as a worker in the Corocoro Mining Company." "muy especialmente sobre los beneficios sociales a que tiene derecho mi madre como trabajadora que era de la Empresa Minera de Corocoro." ALP PJJ 372.

García/Ferrufino dispute, because Ignacio argued that he should not pay her a pension, since she earned more than he did. In general, men were reluctant to pay child support to women who earned more than they, as in the case of Anibal Titirico in 1954, who disputed both maintenance and custody, noting especially that Guillermina Apasa had a job at the COMIBOL hospital that paid more than his. Manuel Calle Candia told the courts that his ex-girlfriend earned more than he did, and disputed paying child support on these grounds. Manuela Callizaya pointed out that, not only was her wage less than his, this argument was irrelevant because he was “charging” child support to the company for their child Arminda. Both of these cases dealt with jornaleros, that is, regular workers underground, whose partners worked in the hospital and could support themselves.⁴⁰ The 1956 law hoped to regulate precisely these kinds of families by offering a single child support benefit in the cases of both spouses working, paid to whoever kept custody of the child.

Women’s waged labor also had implications for child custody. Both Anibal and Guillermina deployed language essentializing motherhood, first as Anibal argued that she could

⁴⁰ Exp 806 1 Feb 1954 Anibal Titirico Alacama vs Guillermina Apasa Sarmiento, Manuel Calle Candia vs Manuela Callisaya. Candia made bs \$9,611 per month as a jornalero. Manuela Callizaya made 9,288 a month. Manuela Callisaya wrote in to say that Manuel Calle had asked for exoneration based on Art 22 de la ley de 15 abril de 1932, which is absurd because I am asking for a pensión alimenticia and not a divorce. “Beyond this, I have presented a list of the children that receive subsidies according to the certification of the Mining Company where he works, demonstrating by this means that he receives these benefits, which does not relieve him of the duty of caring for his legally recognized daughter Arminda, ...as regards my current employment, given that I work so I do not die of hunger, and because naturally I have expenses for which I expend all of the fruits of that employment, and given that the statute he is using to apply his exonerating petition is not applicable in this case, I will make reference to the statute that ‘if both partners do not have custody of the child, the father is nonetheless always responsible for the sustenance.’ ” “Además, había presentado una nomina de hijos los que perciben subsidies, según la nota Certificada de la Empresa Minera donde presta sus servicios, demostrando de esta manera que goza de este beneficio, lo que no exime de la obligación de atender a su hija Arminda, legalmente reconocida... En cuanto a mi trabajo actual, es evidente, pues si no trabajara habría terminado por morir de hambre, y naturalmente tengo necesidades en las que invierto la totalidad del fruto de mis trabajos y aunque el artículo en el que apoya su petición de exoneración de pensiones no es aplicable en el caso de autos, de mi parte he de apoyarme también a dicho art ‘SI AMBOS ESPOSOS NO LO TUBIESEN [sic] EL MARIDO CULPABLE SIEMPRE ESTA REATADO A LA OBLIGACION ALIMENTICIA’ ” Manuel’s character witnesses seemed to agree with Manuela, telling the courts that he had other child support debts, but he also “has to take care of his daughter as well.” “tiene que mantener tambien su hija.” ALP PJJ Caja 367.

not both work and care for the children at the same time, and Guillermina to defend her legal right to keep them. Guillermina Apaza argued that under the divorce law, to take daughters away from their mothers, her husband had to prove that she has been an immoral woman, and she is convinced that her actions in marriage will fully exonerate her.⁴¹ The state tended to err on the side of keeping children in the care of their mothers, with two exceptions: in the case of immorality, and occasionally, to have sons raised by their fathers after they were old enough to not need a mother's care.⁴² Single mothers who brought their children with them, or indeed left them at home to work were at times accused of immoral mothering practices, as in the case of Hilaria Tancara.⁴³

The revolution itself caused rifts and changes in family life, and the 1956 law was also an attempt to regularize experience across a population facing rapid social dislocation. The revolution offered some men and women new opportunities to make names for themselves, but this often resulted in leaving families behind. In April 1954, Flora Mamani wrote in to say that although she and Rafael Condori Ramos had been married since 1947, in the span of the two years since he had joined the army he had “forgotten the duties of fatherhood,” and had not sent

⁴¹ Expediente 806, 1 Feb 1954 Anibal Titirico Alacama vs Guillermina, ALP PJJ Caja 367.

⁴² For example, In the case of a child custody battle from November 1959, Luciano Choque, a mechanic, argued that his ex-girlfriend had kidnapped their child from the house he shared with his new wife in Yaribay. He protested to the Intendente de la Policia de La Seguridad, but they granted custody to the mother, “without taking into consideration that I as the father who has legally recognized my child have the proper duty of seeing to the maintenance, education, and above all else the legal custody of my child.” “sin tener en cuenta que yo como padre, que lo reconocido en forma legal, tengo la justa obligación de velar por el en su manutención, educación, y fuera de todo el cuidado de el con amplia potestad de padre.” Luciano tried to prove that the mother was an immoral working woman, and for this reason that he should raise his son. Caja ALP PJJ 375. Expediente 40707 Nulidad de Documentos Entrega de hijo Antonia Zamora vs Luciano Choque 10 Dic 1960 ALP PJAC Caja 277. Nicolás Alanoca also believed that after the first 5 years of a child's life, male children should be raised by their male parent, and he began to demand custody on this account when Fermín turned 5. Both were eventually successful in these custody petitions.

⁴³ Expediente 082340 1 Abril 1967, Luciano Mamani Alfaro vs Hilaria Tancara ALP PJJ Caja 409.

her a single cent of his paycheck.⁴⁴ In this case, Flora Mamani used gendered language commonly deployed by abandoned husbands, calling Rafael's decision to join the army "a frivolous pretext for abandoning the marital home." Rafael did not contest the claim and began paying support out of his soldier's paycheck.⁴⁵ In some cases, this abandonment may have been more of a ruse used by the wife to demand more control over the family resources: in November of 1953, Raymunda García sued her husband for divorce, saying that she had been abandoned and left penniless. Her husband, Ignacio Ferrufino, responded to say that he was a manager of the mines now, and working long hours he comes home to find his door locked against him! After 40 years of marriage, he suggested his wife was crazy but that he was resigned to divorce.⁴⁶ In both of these cases, the men in question were engaging in activities labelled heroic by the coalition that came to power in 1952, but as we shall see, became increasingly threatening to the MNR's ability to govern in the late 1950s. In these cases, the interests of the state in regulating families coincided with their interest in maintaining social order by curbing the autonomy of young men.

Over the course of the Condori dispute (which dragged into the 1970s), it is possible to trace the effects of increasing state presence in families. In March of 1963, Lucia Condori, now

⁴⁴ Expediente 57779 28 Abril 1954 ALP PJJ Caja 367 Rafael Condori Ramos does not seem to contest these accusations. His superior officer does write to specify that his salary is \$10,500 bs plus food and clothing. Her pension is set at 6,000 bs a month, and in January 1955, he pays three months of this ordered support.

⁴⁵ "My husband without reason has abandoned the marital household, looking for work with the national guard Regiment Waldo Ballivián, earning a salary of twelve thousand bolivianos, and in the space of two years has forgot his duties as a father and has never during the time of his absence passed me even a cent to feed myself and our children... for this reason I am asking that the courts set forth the amount of alimony payment that my husband Rafel Condori Ramos should pay for myself and our two children." "Mi esposo con pretextos frivolos se ha ausentado de la casa conyugal, habiendo buscado trabajo en el Regimiento Escolta Waldo Ballavian contratado en calidad de clase, ganando un salario de mas de DOCE MIL BOLIVIANOS, hace el espacio de dos años que ha olvidado los deberes de padre de familia y durante el tiempo de su ausencia, no me pasa un solo centavo para mi mantención y de mis dos hijos... solicitando en definitiva se fije la pencion alimenticia para mi y mis dos hijos que debe abonarme mensualmente mi esposo Rafael Condori Ramos."

⁴⁶ Exp 24 Nov 1953 ALP PJAC Caja 203. On the other hand, he wrote in later to argue against paying a pension, because Raymunda made more money than he did.

married to Sixto, wrote that through their marriage a year before, she had hoped to create a happy home, but that since they married he had been inhumanely cruel and beat her. Moreover, Lucia was outraged that he had not shared a penny of his earnings, bonuses or salaries, and told her explicitly "these do not belong to an old woman like her."⁴⁷ Although she says he left her originally, he wrote back offering a formal reconciliation, which she rejected. At this point, the state intervened through COMIBOL. In December, the company notified the city that it was keeping 60,000 bolivianos of his paycheck for Lucia and her daughter, and the city certified a document listing his back child support payments at 400,000 bolivianos. By the end of the month, Lucia and Sixto had reconciled once again, and the company stopped withholding his child support payments. In this case, I want to make clear that Lucia Condori was probably not manufacturing her claims against Sixto, but rather once she could compel the company to withhold parts of his paycheck, he may have been more willing to alter the dynamics of their relationship, making the reconciliation on her terms.⁴⁸

The Código de Seguridad Social: Piecemeal State-Building

Child pension disputes such as the Alanoca/Quispe family were further complicated after the passage of the MNR's landmark social welfare law in 1956. On February 23, 1956, *El Diario* ran an article informing readers that president Paz Estenssoro was drafting a new social security law with provisions that would make Bolivia "one of the most advanced nations of the world."⁴⁹

⁴⁷ "The bad character of my partner is unacceptable given that during his employment in the mining company of this city he has never given me a cent of his salary, subsidies, or bonuses, telling me that I am an old woman that he does not want anymore and that he was willing to legally separate." "El mal carácter de mi conyuge ya es inaceptable, en la condición de trabajador en la Empresa Minera de ésta localidad jamás me ha hecho conocer un centavo de sus salarios, subsidios, y aún los aguinaldos que percibía concretándose a decirme que yo era una mujer vieja que no le correspondía y que él estaba dispuesto a buscar la separación en forma voluntaria." Exp 179144 13 Marzo 1963 Lucia Condori de Condori vs Sixto Condori, ALP PJJ Caja 410.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ This law would govern worker benefits, compensation for death, illness, and accident, and also the distribution of family subsidies. According to the United Nations, this made the new Bolivian law the most socially advanced in the

For most of the next several months, the Law of Social Security dominated the headlines of the MNR-sympathizing newspaper, *La Nación*, and other dailies such as *El Diario* and *Ultima Hora*, as politicians speculated on who would be included in the benefits and protections of the law, and on what terms.⁵⁰ Would white collar workers receive the same benefits as industrial trades, such as mining? What kinds of subsidies could families get, and under what conditions? In the fall, the COB's paper *La Rebelión* ran a flow chart establishing who would be covered in these laws (see Appendix 3). In June, *La Nación* ran the full text of the law, which was indeed incredibly ambitious in scope and intent. Noting the "social needs" of the workers and the burdens created by being the head of household, ("sostén de familia") and particularly the need to reduce infant mortality, the June decree created a regime of family and marital subsidies for all categories of worker save two: agricultural and service workers.⁵¹ By the end of the year, Hernan Siles and Paz Estenssoro had passed two more laws, governing low-cost housing and social security and retirement payments. All together, these formed the Código de Seguridad Social of December 1956.

Perhaps since its most clear application was for children and families of workers, most historians of the political evolution of the revolution have overlooked the importance of the Social Security law of 1956. This narrative obscures the profound desire for socially conscious national development that drove the MNR to power and continued to affect its development, as

world. "El Nuevo Seguridad Social, que se Implantará en Bolivia es de los más avanzados del mundo" *El Diario* 23 Feb 1956.

⁵⁰ Sinforoso Cabrera, in charge at this point of worker affairs at COMIBOL kept the press coverage, which is now available at the Archivo Nacional Biblioteca Legislatura. See for example, *La Nación*, 4 June 1956 "Fueron aprobados por el Gobierno dos importantes Decretos Sociales" refers to a law decreeing asignaciones familiares and especially the subsidio de natalidad, which will be 13% of the monthly salary. The news report goes on to explain the economics behind the funding of the subsidy.

⁵¹ *La Nación*, 8 June, 1956 Art 4 says "initially, this decree will not cover agricultural workers and those in domestic service." "Inicialmente no estarán sujetos al campo de aplicación de este régimen los trabajadores agrícolas y del servicio doméstico."

well as the extent to which the Bolivian government was able to play the US and the USSR off each other before 1961. While Malloy and Patch in particular see the revolution as reformist because it did not try to remake the symbolic and legal order, I argue that the revolutionary vision of the MNR saw as absolutely essential the creation of a state that was capable of enforcing laws and distributing resources, staying faithful to the principles that earlier Bolivian reformist governments had betrayed. As earlier chapters have shown, the CSS was not the first legislation of its kind in Bolivia. The extent to which the MNR was able to enforce the legislation in the 1950s and extend its reach into the countryside was, however, unprecedented. In a country where progressive, socially minded laws were inconsistently (if at all) enforced and state power ill-distributed, constitutionality with teeth was in fact revolutionary.

The CSS was thus important for three reasons. By defining a set of social obligations for the Bolivian state towards the productive working family, this legislation put forth both an ideological vision of who belonged in the new and improved Bolivian nation and created a set of material institutions and benefits that came with it. Secondly, the legislation tied workers and their families to the state in new ways, through the institution of COMIBOL that took over not only the social, but some of the political functions of the state. Finally, the way the MNR state enforced such legislation and distributed resources had profound effects on the way the revolution was experienced socially and regionally, intervening in family power dynamics and contributing to the solidification of boundaries between rural and urban Bolivia. The social security legislation was an attempt to codify and enshrine the vision of a revolution at a moment when its direction –left or right, allied with Soviet or US interests, radical change or stasis—was most up for grabs. For this reason, the CSS was the culmination of a revolutionary nationalist project to strengthen the state that held the left and right wings of the MNR party together until

the 1960s. In many ways the Código was also a compromise that enabled the rightward turn of the MNR that followed.⁵²

This comprehensive structure for the distribution of benefits helped regulate social disorder among families after the revolution, attempting to put a stop to conflicting uses of revolutionary decrees as the Quispes had done at the beginning of the chapter. Returning to the Acarapi family whose legal embroilments played so prominent a role in Chapter 3, we can see how this regulation played out: In June of 1956 Delfina Coriza initiated divorce proceedings against her husband Humberto (son of Juan) Acarapi. In addition to listing all of the ways in which her husband was abusive and neglectful, Delfina Coriza explained what she considered to be the wealth of her husband: a white collar employee's wage of 48,000 bolivianos a month plus "social benefits," which she identified as: work bonuses, a subsidy for their child on top of that, and access to subsidized food at the company store. Humberto was charging the company for a child subsidy, she suggested, "cynically," despite the fact that he was not actually caring for or supporting their daughter.⁵³

⁵² Perhaps because the debates over this legislation occurred during the crisis of direction of the first presidential election of the revolution, and during the historic advisory visit of George Jackson Eder to Bolivia, and perhaps because it centrally concerned the treatment of women, children, and the infirm, rather than the men traditionally considered to be agents of revolutionary change, neither Malloy, nor Klein, nor Dunkerley mentions the passage of this momentous legislation. Following Malloy, most historians of the 1952 Revolution mark 1956, and especially the assumption of the presidency by Hernan Siles Zuazo, as the beginning of the MNR's move rightward, capitulating to the demands of the US and IMF lenders who were bankrolling the revolution. Richard W. Patch, *The Last of Bolivia's MNR? Tensions between Personalities and Party in Politics*, Reports Service: West Coast South America Series, v. 11, no. 5 (New York, 1964); Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*. For another historian of social and welfare policies that shares my view, see Nicole Pacino, Nicole. "Constructing a New Bolivian Society: Public Health Reforms and the Consolidation of the Bolivian National Revolution." *The Latin Americanist* 57, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 25–56.

⁵³ 20 June, 1956 Delfina Coriza vs Humberto Acarapi, ALP PJAC Caja 219 "Also if your honor would please order the Mining Corporation of this city to make sure the subsidy that corresponds to my son is paid to me, given that as his mother I have rights to receive it, and please also indicate to Huberto Acarapi that he should return to me what he has cynically received from the company since the birth of our son and which he has cruelly denied his child..." "También se ha de dignar su autoridad ordenar a la Corporación Minera de esta localidad para que el subsidio familiar que corresponde a mi hijo, me sea pagado, puesto que yo como madre que cuido tengo derecho a ello, así como también se le notifique a Humberto Acarapi mi devuelva lo que ha cobrado desde el día que nació mi hijo que

The divorce law, as she noted, entitled her to maintenance from her ex-husband, which he could well afford to pay. Since she was an artisan, she did not need the maintenance, but she demanded that his family subsidy be remitted directly from the company payroll to her on behalf of their child. Humberto, for his part, seemed unable to provide any witnesses for his claim that he was a good husband, and so did not contest the divorce. He did contest the child support, however, by declining it from the company after January of 1956, “para no cometer un cobro anormal de la Corporación.”⁵⁴ Humberto believed that by denying it to himself, he could prevent Delfina from receiving benefits on his account. However, the state law gave precedence to claims on behalf of children, even if that meant giving the mother a wage directly from the company. It was situations like this that the Código Seguridad Social of 1956 hoped to fix, and Delfina Acarapi, or her lawyer, well knew it.

MNR President Paz Estenssoro believed that addressing Bolivia's health and demographic crises was both a “primordial” concern of the state and a means to overcome dependency.⁵⁵ State-building, economic development, and social welfare for Bolivia's workers were the three key pieces of revolutionary modernization as envisioned by the MNR, and these all coalesced in the institution of COMIBOL, which became a kind of panacea for curing Bolivia's backwardness. As my second chapter suggested, state-building is hard in a country as poor, diverse, and geographically challenging as Bolivia, and the MNR faced a lack of institutional experience, and particularly a lack of an army to expand its reach. The compromise pursued by the MNR was to build on or take over existing infrastructure such as that found in

según la nota de la gerencia de la Corporación, con la desvergüenza y cinismo mas grande cobra y goza de ese beneficio quitando de la boca de su hijo, acto de crueldad...”

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Pacino, “Prescription for a Nation,” 38.

mining companies. Building on earlier legislation that had required private companies to build schools and hospitals, MNR pursued a similar strategy in regards to the CNSS, intermingling the mandate of the state (CNSS) and state-owned company (COMIBOL) as semi-autonomous structures dependent on each other to function.

In the text of the law, Paz Estenssoro specifically wanted to create a single state structure that would regulate all kinds of social welfare payments and services to industrial workers, in order to avoid what had happened before: worker's rights became a farce in practice without an institutional presence in workers' lives.⁵⁶ The Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social, or CNSS, would offer these services, but as we shall see, the enforcement and distribution of these services fell very often to the employers and companies for which industrial workers labored, such as COMIBOL. This created a de facto state of hierarchy among poor Bolivians, as not only did the law not apply beyond industrial workers, state reach in all forms was weaker in rural communities without industrial ties.⁵⁷ At the same time, the law changed the power dynamics among and within Bolivian families by, first of all, encouraging more dependence on the mines themselves, breaking ties to the countryside, but also providing women more access to resources whether or not they stayed with their families. Benefits became a heritable form of property, which had wide ranging effects on local economies of reciprocity and obligation, as well as the distribution of land among indigenous communities. Perhaps most importantly, social benefits gave some poor Bolivians the appearance of relative prosperity in a time of profound scarcity, even if they did not feel it.

⁵⁶ "To make sure the rights of the worker are not taken advantage of." "evitar que sean burlados los derechos del trabajador." *La Nación*, June 9, 1956.

⁵⁷ The campesinos, by contrast, experienced state development projects coordinated by the military, and thus developed a different kind of alliance to the revolutionary government, which depended less on the MNR and paved the way for the populist military government of General Barrientos in 1964. Field talks about this in *From Development to Dictatorship* (2014).

In creating the Código, Paz Estenssoro built on the experiences of the military socialist regimes of the 1930s and the Villarroel Era of the 1940s, whose progressive labor codes and protections often went unheeded in practice because they relied on private companies or regional authorities to carry out legal and structural changes.⁵⁸ These previous laws had been mostly ignored by the mining companies, as Juan Lechín discovered when he was tasked with enforcing them in the 1940s.⁵⁹ Nationalizing the mines helped in two ways: provision and enforcement. In this way, COMIBOL became an executive as well as redistributive wing of the state. The Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social, which was given new structure by this law, was in fact a creation of conservative presidents Ballivian in 1949 and Urriolagoitia in 1951, whose law transferred Busch's obligatory savings bank and provisions for sick and injury pay from the workers and patronos respectively to the state.⁶⁰ The expansion of the CNSS to be, more or less, a public health care service was also an invention of the revolution. The 1956 law radically reorganized the CNSS to be a national health service, to extend throughout the country, provide medical services, family subsidies, and subsidized housing as well.⁶¹ Through COMIBOL and CNSS, the Código de Seguridad Social created Bolivia's welfare state.

⁵⁸ See discussion of the labor code of 1938 in Chapter 2. German Busch, *Código Busch: (decreto-ley de 24 de mayo de 1939 elevado a rango de Ley general del Trabajo en 8 de diciembre de 1942)* (La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial "Trabajo," 1945); Gualberto Villarroel, *Constitución política del Estado*.

⁵⁹ Juan Lechín Oquendo, *Memorias* (La Paz, Bolivia: Litexsa Boliviana, 2000). pg 101-105 "Subprefecto de Uncía." This is a foundational narrative of the MNR, when middle class Bolivians discovered the extent to which their government did not take care of any of its citizens.

⁶⁰ Ley de Seguridad Social General, 23 Dec 1949, Hugo Ballivian and Decreto Ley #2789, 11 Octubre 1951, Mamerto Urriolagoitia.

⁶¹ The CNSS also helped administer the law of affordable housing, also passed in 1956, by selling off plots and construction materials to workers and miners particularly. In this, the CNSS and COMIBOL often carried out similar functions, with jurisdiction largely determined by whether the community was attached to a mine or not. For this reason, CNSS build a Hospital Obrero in La Paz, and several hospitals in Cochabamba, while COMIBOL built health clinics and hospitals in more remote places like Catavi, Caquiaviri, and Viloco. Gregorio Mendizabal Lozano, *Los Principios de Organización Y Los Elementos de Administración En Salud Pública* (La Paz, 1964), 195. In Oruro and Potosí, as well as Corocoro, COMIBOL took over company hospitals while CNSS operated new clinics in the town. FSC "La Caja de Seguridad Social hace seria refutación a Mister Eder sobre su idea de rebajar cargas sociales" June 11, 1957 *Ultima Hora*.

The CNSS was governed by representatives of major stakeholders: the state, technical, medical, and financial advisers, but also representatives of both the industries affected and the workers in those institutions. In this, miners received more favor than other workers: two representatives of COMIBOL and two representatives of the FSTMB sat on the directing board of the CNSS, compared to one each of other industries such as railroads, factory workers, bankers, etc. The CNSS would be funded by a combination of payroll taxes, taxes on the profits of the companies themselves, and state support, with additional taxes on copper and tin profits funding specifically maternity and sickness pay. The workers, initially, paid 10% of their salaries into the Caja, compared to the company paying 37.5% of worker salaries. Mineworkers paid 12.5%, as did any others if they worked in an industry that was big enough to have a company store with subsidized merchandise.⁶² In mining communities, COMIBOL and CNSS worked closely together, and in fact funded each other, as COMIBOL paid both direct and indirect taxes to the CNSS coffers and CNSS in turn helped subsidize the company store (pulpería).⁶³

Like the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), CNSS and COMIBOL were institutions in which miners' representatives expected veto power over government economic decisions. Even once formal co-gobierno between the workers and the government was ended when President

⁶² Ley 6 Nov 1945 Provided articles of primero necesidad at 10% above cost to workers in companies with more than 200 employees. The companies themselves were tasked with paying for and enforcing this provision.

⁶³ Mitchell, in his study of populism in Bolivia, fairly characterizes the MNR policy in the post-revolutionary period as one of cultivating links with existing popular sectors by incorporating local leadership in an autonomous collaborative relationship that rewarded loyalty with material benefits and the “parceling out” of authority over decisions affecting their particular interest group. Officials were thus often simultaneously party, union, and government leaders, as in the case of Juan Lechín, who was by 1956 Executive Secretary of the COB, Minister of Mines, and Comando Partido Nacional for the MNR. Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia*, 45–51. This structure of governance proved incredibly effective for the rapid distribution of quality-of-life improvements for many different groups within the population. Both nationalization of the mines and agrarian reform can be largely traced to popular sector demands, rather than a preexisting MNR policy commitment, for example. On a small scale, too, this policy allowed for the rapid encouragement of creative impulses towards national economic development. Coordinating national economic growth, wage increases, and stabilization, however, proved impossible, especially when the MNR could not count on the loyalties of its constitutive sectors in times of crisis.

Siles Zuazo removed worker ministers from the state in 1956, the symbolic power of labor as a participating and in fact directing voice in the affairs of government had lasting effects for how Bolivian workers understood the revolution. Workers were willing to compromise on many of their most radical demands if they could be part of the conversations directing Bolivian government.⁶⁴ Both CNSS and COMIBOL provided both the continuation and the moderation of the revolution by giving the workers a direct link to the state, and both also agitated on behalf of workers publicly when the government appeared to be less than committed to worker health and security.

While COMIBOL's extension of CNSS benefits linked miners more strongly to the government, it also had lasting effects on how rural, indigenous communities perceived the MNR and the potential for worker-agricultural laborer solidarity. The Social Security decree, though it eventually extended to many professions, excluded both agricultural laborers and service workers explicitly. While there were certainly logistical reasons for this, the effect of this legal boundary drawing was to separate these categories of poor Bolivians from the ranks of the "productive" working class. When, after the revolution, the MNR appointed worker ministers,

⁶⁴ It is a mark of how desperately the MNR needed its labor base that in the initial years after the revolution, the government helped set up a labor federation that in many ways created its own worker state. After its creation in 1952, the Central Obrera Boliviana demanded representation in executive and legislative branches, co-governance and the right to veto for all matters pertaining to the economy. As Malloy notes, "The COB actually became the real government of Bolivian Labor, and through it, the economy. Indeed, it had all the symbolic and functional characteristics of a sovereign-like entity, including executive, deliberative, and judicial organs; a defined area of authority and constituents; and most important, armed forces... The FSTMB, in turn, was the most powerful and radical group in the COB, and when all was said and done, the most powerful group in the entire immediate configuration of power and interest." Malloy's characterization of the early years of the revolutionary period as chaotic and marked by power struggles between the left and right wing factions of the MNR is helpful to understand the context in which this legislation was passed. In a period in which the Bolivian right wing was actually fairly disorganized, the labor left showed a marked unity of purpose and intent: at its most basic, to create a socialist state. That is, even though the president was negotiating with the US, whose demands increasingly included slashing social service provision, the legislature was radical in its intent. Malloy also notes, however that given the way the MNR delegated authority, the COB didn't actually have a formal mandate over a particular set of institutions. The COB "had governing power, but not responsibility... What actually transpired was that the MNR officially assumed the power and the responsibility of state government, but the COB constituted itself as an unrivaled center of initiative and veto power." Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*, 186–7.

they appointed a Minister of Labor, a Minister of Mines and Petroleum, and a Minister of Campesino Affairs— from the ranks of the workers. In so doing, the government signaled that the COB and the unions were to be the highest representational body of all poor Bolivians, even though they did not provide for actual self-representation of these groups.

The MNR that emerged from multi-class nationalist alliances in the 1930s and 1940s sought to define the *urban* Bolivian working family as widely as possible. As such, the social security law itself defined working families in wide, but proscriptive ways. This law hoped to create a regularized working class with middle class aspirations through a system of integration and financial rewards for productivity, stability, and service. First of all, as long as the enterprise was institutionally connected to the state, any employee, from bankers to miners, was eligible for disability payments, provided that they had worked long enough to make 180 monthly contributions (essentially, to have worked in a regular institution for around 15 years). Notably, this requirement was lessened for mineworkers in recognition of the fact that they so rarely survived that long. Secondly, families were defined in terms of an aspirational nuclear model: a male worker and his partner and recognized children. The law made several concessions to the realities often faced by Bolivian families, noting that parents and minor siblings sometimes lived at the expense of a worker, and that workers might sometimes be female, supporting either children or husbands assumed to be infirm. While the goal was to eradicate these forms of family organization, the net effect was to give resources, and hence social recognition to these kinds of families.

The content and scope of welfare laws suggests some of the priorities of the revolutionary government, tying maternalist protections to celebrations of industrial workers.⁶⁵ Social security

⁶⁵ Bolivia believed throughout this period that one of its major problems was lack of population, linked to the equally threatening problem of high rates of infant and child death. A 1962 report on conditions in the countryside

provided for retirement and temporary pay benefits for sick, injured, or incapacitated workers. The family subsidies provided workers extra pay incentives for legally marrying and having children, breastfeeding children, and even provided a cash subsidy for burying a child who had died young. Most crucially, the law set up a system whereby payment of family and child subsidies was guaranteed to the mother regardless of whether she was married to or living with the father as long as she could prove paternity and wasn't living with another man. In other words, while the Revolutionary government clearly wanted to encourage certain kinds of regulated family practices such as marriage, the government recognized that extramarital cohabitation was commonplace in mining communities; the government's commitment to protecting women and children outweighed its desire for marriage.⁶⁶ Essentially, in conjunction with the company's wage office, CNSS and the municipal government could become a punitive wing on the masculine privilege of workers to dictate the contents and uses of their paycheck.

Although it provided for extramarital relationships, the laws explicitly encouraged both civil marriage and claiming paternity by offering monthly subsidies for being legally married and for each minor child recognized as belonging to the worker. These were monthly bonuses of 2,500 Bolivianos for each child (and for simply being married), as well as offering to pay the marriage costs of those living in common law unions. At the same time, the law encouraged engagement with state health institutions and raising children to state norms by requiring inscription in the CNSS in order to receive benefits. The law also provided for a one-time cash

found that just under 50% of children born lived to age 15, *Desarrollo Rural* (La Paz, 1964). For more on the maternalism of Bolivia's national revolution, see, Molly Geidel, "Sowing Death in Our Women's Wombs"; Molly Geidel, "The Point of the Lance : Gender, Development, and the 1960's Peace Corps" 2011; Pacino, "Constructing a New Bolivian Society."

⁶⁶ Within limits: if the mother or her family could not prove paternity, however, she had very little recourse. This provision also set up a very clear double standard in relation to extramarital relationships. While infidelity by either spouse was grounds for divorce, cohabitating with a man who was not the father was one reason a woman might lose her right to child support, whether or not this new partner was contributing to the maintenance of the children.

payment of 5,000bs for the birth of a recognized child in a CNSS hospital along with a gift of child-rearing supplies as determined by CNSS health officials. Under the new law of social security, women could take 12 weeks of paid time off before and after the birth of the child, provided she visited medical officials during that time. Finally the law offered lactation subsidies of 2,500 a month for children under one year.⁶⁷

Because of their generous scope, and the fact that family subsidies did not require the worker to have paid dues for 15 years, these subsidies came to represent the most important face of the CNSS for most of the working class, although retirement and widow and orphan payments were also important. At its core, then, the Social Security code hoped to create a situation where no worker would have to raise a child in complete precarity, and gave incentives for proactive engagement with the state, while at the same time offering new opportunities for the state to insert itself into the regulation and maintenance of small rural cities such as Corocoro.⁶⁸ This project of regulation, while it did not explicitly articulate an anti-indigenous commitment, operated on an assumed equation between regulation, proletarianization, and the loss of autonomous indigenous identity.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ These benefits were nearly doubled to account for inflation by the end of the year. *La Nación*, June 9 1956, also Código de Seguridad Social, 14 Diciembre 1956.

⁶⁸ This kind of welfare state expansion through the valorization of the working class was common among populist governments throughout Latin America, as the cases of Chile's Popular Front, Brazil's Vargas regime, Argentina's Peronist experiment, and in the Mexico of Cardénas. See, John D French, *The Brazilian Workers' ABC: Class Conflict and Alliances in Modern São Paulo* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); James, *Resistance and Integration*; Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, *Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920-1950* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Heidi Tinsman, *Partners in Conflict: The Politics of Gender, Sexuality, and Labor in the Chilean Agrarian Reform, 1950-1973*, Next Wave (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). In many ways, the Mexican case is the most comparable, because the Bolivian experiment in regulatory state-building was also a project of defining Bolivians in terms of class rather than race, thus de-culturing indigenous Bolivians. Christopher R Boyer, *Becoming Campesinos: Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacán, 1920-1935* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003).

⁶⁹ Recently, Bolivian scholars have criticized these the colonizing and assimilationist impulses within the MNR revolution, for example: *Educación indígena*; Rivera Cusicanqui, "El Mito de La Pertenencia de Bolivia Al «mundo Occidental». Requiem Para Un Nacionalismo"; Escóbar, *De La Revolución Al Pachakuti*; Sanjinés C., *Embers of the*

In the case where both partners worked, men were assumed to be the primary *sostén de familia* and given control over the resources, with two notable exceptions. First, in all cases, the subsidies for lactation were paid directly by the Caja to the mother, even in cases of divorce, abandonment, or death of the spouse. Second, in cases of divorce or abandonment, legally recognized children of workers continued to receive family subsidies through whichever adult became their primary caregiver. This means that workers who abandoned their children not only lost control over their family subsidy (which until that point had been a part of their paycheck), but mothers understood themselves to be earning a monthly wage from the state for being the caretaker of a worker's child, even if living alone. These were not just idle decrees, they had material effects on how women understood their relationship to both the state and the company. When Maria Mamani wrote to the courts asking for her husband's family pension, she argued, "because the family subsidy is a social benefit entirely belonging to the minor children [of the worker], I request your Honor to order that this benefit in the future be garnished from my husband's paycheck by the section of the railroad company where he works, and paid directly to me on their behalf."⁷⁰ In this way, the law created a vast class of state beneficiaries who, though deriving their benefits from a loosely paternal relationship to a male worker, sometimes could exercise control of those benefits autonomously. As I have argued in the previous chapter, these benefits came to define not only the contours of class belonging, but also a kind of alternative definition of citizenship that fragmented rural cities such as Corocoro. Finally, although these laws were intended to bolster and encourage the maintenance of stable male-headed nuclear

Past; Ari, *Earth Politics*. In Corocoro, these biases built on and codified already existing cultural separation between rural and urban workers within mining communities, defining who "belonged" within the state and who did not.

⁷⁰ "El subsidio familiar, siendo un beneficio social, netamente pertenece a favor de los hijos menores, solicito a su digna justificación se sirva ordenar, que en lo sucesivo se me cancele este beneficio para mis hijos, mediante descuento planilla y por el departamento respectivo de la Empresa Ferroviaria de donde es dependiente mi esposo..." Maria Mamani de Leandro vs Juan Leandro Huchani, 1961, ALP PJJ Caja 386.

families, they provided a set of resources and legal tools for those at the margins of these families. In this way, the child support stipulation also potentially threatened working class family solidarity in times of scarcity.

Pride and Benefits: Changing Moral Economies in the Revolution

The Código de Seguridad Social was the culmination of three decades of attempts to create a social safety net for poor Bolivian families. The welfare state did not simply add resources to families, it became part of an ongoing process of negotiating property and wealth distribution that marked the interface between city and mines. Two trends—the equalization of pay across ranks and the codification of benefits as heritable—created increasing pressures towards what might be called proletarianization, or at the very least remaining tied to urban life. This preference for urban culture strained relationships to the countryside that often provided a safety valve in times of scarcity before the revolution. These laws also catalyzed an ongoing clash between the social responsibilities as envisioned by workers and as envisioned by rural families. The end result was often that families who could leverage ties to the mines became more urban and more dependent on the state, while families who could not had to look for other sources of social and political support. For a sense of how this process worked, I would like to return to the saga of Josefa and Nicolás.

The provisions of the CSS built on goals shared by the MNR and miners' unions alike. Male miners wanted the state to provide resources to their families, but not to determine how those resources were allocated. Nicolás alternated between acknowledging Fermín and asking for him to be transferred to his own care as soon as he was old enough to leave his mother, and denying that he had any sexual relationship at any point with Josefa. These two claims, often made simultaneously, suggest two things: Nicolás firmly believed that the state's money was his

to direct, and not Josefa's (regardless of who was caring for the child), and believed that the child Fermín was not a financial burden on the mother. This latter perception, among noncustodial fathers, was widespread among the divorce cases I examined, suggesting that mothers' care for their children went unrecognized by workers as a kind of work itself, and reflected an idea that children were a source not a drain on resources common to mining communities.⁷¹ Throughout the case, however, the law remained resolutely on the side of Josefa, articulating a direct relationship between Nicolás' biological paternity and his obligation for child support.⁷² In October of 1958, the Judge issued a warrant for Nicolás' arrest when he fell behind on these payments.

The intervention of the state offered single mothers new ways to make a living without maintaining ties of dependence on male mine workers, especially among urban women.⁷³ While Nicolás stayed in the country, he could often avoid paying child support unless the police made an effort to compel compliance, as they sometimes did. When he moved to Corocoro, this

⁷¹ Nash notes with surprise this attitude among Bolivian (male) miners, and suggests that pro-maternalist policies on the part of the state contributed to the fact that while abortifacients are not uncommon in peasant communities, mining communities did not tend to have access to these medical provisions. Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, 212.

⁷² In an era before DNA testing, what constituted legal recognition? The most common factor seemed to be whether the father inscribed the child in his place of employment, that is, whether he was collecting benefits on the child's behalf. Courts used three other sources to determine paternity, with varying results: baptismal records, birth certificates (after 1945, carried more weight than baptisms), and legal agreements between unwed couples. In a dispute between Paulino Maldonado and Trinidad Marzo, all three came in to play. Like Nicolás, Paulino was aware that Trinidad was pregnant with his child, as he admitted in a certificate of good conduct signed 13 September 1958, agreeing to a separation and that he would pay for the "The costs that are imposed upon her, and upon receipt of the bill he agrees to pay for the medical costs of the doctor or midwife who attends her at birth." "los gastos que le ocasionará se desembarazo, y el ya mencionado concubine se compromete cancelarle los gastos una vez que ella le presente el recibo del medico o matrona que le atiende en su alumbramiento." As well as in a baptismal certificate. He argued that this did not constitute legal recognition, and when authorities found that his name on the *birth certificate* had been forged by Trinidad, they agreed. She continued to appeal however. This case suggests the changing weight state bureaucratic structures carried in legal disputes in this period, though her appeal suggests room for interpretation.

⁷³ In this my analysis actually differs from Nash, who suggested that the breaking of family ties from the countryside and COMIBOL firing of women miners from their jobs relatively decreased women's bargaining power within families. Both dynamics were occurring at the same time, offering women with children certain leverage over the fathers, but not women who could not prove paternity or who had no children.

changed for two reasons: first, Corocoro, as the provincial capital, was more concerned with institutional compliance, and second, as a salaried worker, he was subject to wage garnishing by COMIBOL. Isabel wrote in to the courts to say that for a number of years in which Nicolás paid no money, she was unable to raise enough money to bring suit against him in rural Caquiaviri. However, in Corocoro she had found a lawyer willing to help, and in the course of just three months, the police issued three warrants for the arrest of Nicolás Alanoca for back pay of child support. Isabel and Josefa both were able to make use of company records to settle the matter of how much money Nicolás made and how much he should pay. By 1957, the Company had an official policy on the subject of withholding child support payments.⁷⁴ Had they been living and working in Corocoro from the beginning, she may have been able to claim her own access to the pulpería or receive payments directly from the Caja of the company, rather than suing Nicolás repeatedly for back payments.

The Alanoca/Quispe dispute also allows us to trace what happened to families as they negotiated times of economic scarcity or social upheaval, such as happened in the revolution, as well as offers some indications of increased pressures in the aftermath of the Revolution to stay in the city. In times of scarcity, or in cases where a young man hoped to earn enough to achieve economic independence, men like Nicolás often ended up leaving their communities to work either in the Corocoro mines or in Aguas Calientes, in Chile, for a period of several years.⁷⁵ In

⁷⁴ See also Expediente 446 11 Enero 1961 Petición de Alimentos Documento 27 Marzo, 1962: Señor Juez: Ref Trabajador Manuel 2nd Vicuña. "In response to your memo JIP6/62, we attest to the following: The worker in question receives a daily wage of \$9,740 bolivianos. The family subsidies will be retained from the month of April of this year, since they have already been distributed for the month of March." "En respuesta a su oficio JIP6/62, informamos lo siguiente: El trabajador del rubro percibe un jornal diario de bs \$9,740. Los subsidios familiares serán retenidos a partir del mes de abril del presente año, por estar pagados adelantados hasta marzo."

⁷⁵ Just as women often returned home to their parents to force change in their marriages, men often used work in other locations as a pretext for leaving marriages with which they were unhappy. Wives, like husbands, also expected their husbands to stick around to some extent. Several divorce cases resulted from the husband leaving for La Paz, Chile, or other mining communities, and expecting their wives to wait upon their return. Some of these

1958, Nicolás did both, ending up as a regular laborer in the Corocoro mines by the end of the year. In doing so, as Nicolás attested to the courts, he acquired enough money to set up his wife and children in a separate house from his parents, becoming by his own reckoning an “hombre de estado.” This did not mean, in his eyes, that he was prosperous enough to give up child support payments (and the child subsidy he received on behalf of Fermín) to his illegitimate son.⁷⁶ Building on the reciprocal expectations of Andean family men he argued, in fact, that his new respectable status conferred many more financial obligations than Josefa’s status as a single mother, and that therefore she was in a better economic situation than he. When the state ruled (again and again) in favor of Josefa, it intervened in the social fabric that tied cities like Corocoro to the rural communities that surrounded them.

On an ideological level, Nicolás’s insistence that the family subsidy was his to control and not Josefa’s also reflected a common understanding among miners in this period that the family subsidies were rewards or bonuses granted to *them* for their service in the mines. For example, when arguing why he should not pay his ex-wife a pension, Jorge Alanoca wrote movingly:

What’s more, I’ve suffered for my labors, with lesions on both lungs for which I am now in expensive treatment, leaving me only a small sum of that which I earn in my sacrificial profession, which I cannot leave for fear of death by malnutrition; I also have obligations to care for my mother, who has been under my care since my wife inhumanely abandoned us...⁷⁷

separations appear to have been mutually consented to, but in general wives expected access to the wages of the husband so long as they were charged with the care of children.

⁷⁶ Nash notes that before the revolution, young men willing to work long hours in risky mines could earn a windfall if they got lucky, before the revolution equalized wages for hours worked rather than productivity of ore. After the revolution, men could accumulate sums of money more reliably by staying in the mines. Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, 59.

⁷⁷ Expediente 57915 Divorcio Ayda Tarquino de Alanoca vs Jorge Alanoca Vallejos 24 Abril 1957 “Aun mas, yo he sufrido por mi trabajo, la lesión de dos pulmones, por lo que me encuentro en tratamiento para cuyo fin hago erogaciones considerables, quedándome un pequeña suma de lo que gano en mi sacrificado profesión, que no la abandono por no dejar de existir, por desnutrición, teniendo por otra parte la obligación de atender a mi madre, quien se ha hecho cargo de mi atención desde el inhumano abandono de mi esposa...” ALP PJAC Caja 219.

The workers understood their subsidies and pulpería benefits as tradeoffs for supporting the government during stabilization, as the next section will argue.

This understanding did not always align with the mothers' counter-argument that this money was designated in advance as for the child's needs. Mothers increasingly used the legal framework of child subsidies to argue for their own value as producers for the nation, arguing that both family subsidies and food subsidies were wages for motherhood, which they had the right to dispose of.⁷⁸ Nicolás, and many other fathers contesting child support payments, genuinely thought that young children did not constitute a significant drain on household incomes, and that they should only pay a portion of the family subsidy outside their own homes (this argument appears repeatedly). For both families, control over the rewards of the state was a crucial issue, but for Josefa, her only link to the state came from her child. Again, the state was largely unsympathetic to Nicolás' claims, because the state saw family subsidies not as a right won by workers but as part of a state-paternalist effort to better the lives of infants and children in this period.

The ideological stakes of the child pension were also high for the men who worked in the mines, because the men believed the pensions were revolutionary bonuses paid by the state to those most deserving. When women used the leverage of the state against them, men often felt

⁷⁸ The question of who had rights to control the money could emerge between mothers and fathers, but also between fathers and independent children. In 1964, Clemente Vega wrote in to say that his daughter was now living in La Paz, working as a maid and living in a common law marriage with Macario Jurado, and as he was old and sick from working in the mines so long, he could not pay the subsidy as before. In light of his new marriage and young children, he asked to be exempted from paying for his eldest daughter's pension: "my daughter no longer requires my protection "mi hija ya no necesita mi protección." Clemente also asked the witnesses to attest that he was a "day laborer in the mines who only earns \$9,400 bolivianos a day." "minero jornalero[o] que gana solamente la suma de Bs 9400 diarios." His ex-wife Justina argued that obligation to take care of his children until their age of majority was sacred, even if the daughter had been raped and was now sexually active. "Apoya ese incidente el caso de que mi hija menor Elena hubiera sido estuprada, caso que no es una causal por la edad que tiene mi hija inculpada." In 1967, the dispute continued as Fabiana Mamani, the grandmother, wrote in to say that she had both children in her care and would like to continue pressing for subsidies. Expediente 061561 18 Diciembre 1957, ALP PJJ Caja 372.

the state itself was being abusive: in 1959, Casimiro Limachi complained to the courts that not only did his wife kick him out of the house, she also sent the police after him, and he worried this was affecting his “honest reputation” at work.⁷⁹ Like Nicolás Alanoca, Huberto Acarapi was more concerned with preventing the mother from exercising her financial right than with making sure the child had the financial resources the state argued belonged to him or her. The rights of the worker versus the rights of the family were often in dispute in these cases, and in the case of the CNSS, what supported working families did not always support the male mineworkers’ idea of autonomy.

Women's access to the company store, like the impulse to protect children, was something that miners and the state both agreed on in theory, although not always in practice. While men earned the paycheck through labor, women in mining communities were expected to cook and feed their husbands and make sure the household was well-provisioned. Men in mining communities often used the claim that their wives had failed to do so for justifying divorce. Women who lived in the countryside while their partners worked in the mines, as was relatively common, were in charge of everyday affairs of the house and land, including decisions involving livestock and planting. This normative assumption about women and provision also bolstered abandoned or independent mothers' claims to access the paycheck and company benefits due to the fathers of their children. Sometimes this financial access could be leveraged along with a divorce or pension claim to renegotiate the terms of a relationship. Justina Quispe de Vega used the mining company as leverage in a dispute with her ex-husband, Clemente Vega. Vega, she argued, had abandoned his two children, and she asked COMIBOL to tell the authorities where he could be found. She also continued taking out necessities from the company store using

⁷⁹ Casimiro Limachi vs Raymunda Valeriano, Expediente 38815, 31 de Julio 1959, ALP PJJ Caja 375.

Vega's credit, as the pulpería affirmed in a letter to the courts specifying her bill for 150,000 bolivianos worth of clothing. Shortly after this, Justina accepted an offer of settlement from Clemente of 100,000 bolivianos up front plus 50,000 a month and family subsidies for the children. When he did not actually pay her this agreed upon amount, she turned to the judge, who ordered COMIBOL to pay her instead.⁸⁰

Both the Quispe/Vega and the Quispe/Alanoca family disputes also vividly suggest the degree of inflation that mining families lived through in the period between 1956 and 1961. When Justina Quispe and Clemente Vega first began divorce proceedings in 1951, the judge set her pension at 200 bolivianos a month. In 1958, when they began divorce proceedings for a second time, Vega's *daily* wage was 7,450 bolivianos. The judge set his new pension at 60,000 bolivianos a month and ordered him to pay back 420,000 bolivianos he owed for the past seven months. Similarly, while in 1955, Nicolás (rarely) paid 3,000 a month to support his child, in 1958 the courts adjusted this to 40,000 bolivianos, taking into account his 280,000/month wage as well as increases in costs of living. Struggles over child support were rendered more acute because although the state promised ample protections and subsidies for workers, inflation and scarcity undermined the ability of everyone to survive. Nicolás probably could not afford to pay because he was genuinely poor, and the family subsidy he charged from the company in Fermín's name helped cover other expenses required for his current household. Like Nicolás Alanoca, Clemente Vega was also legally married to another woman, with three children who also required food and clothing in addition to the two Justina Quispe was raising on her own.

In the context of out-of-control inflation, miners could no longer expect to support their families through a single wage alone. Despite a general inclination toward male-headed, single

⁸⁰ Justina Quispe vs Clemente Vega, Divorcio, 18 December 1957, ALP PJJ Caja 372.

wage families among both the state and the union, therefore, women's work outside the home became the de facto arrangement throughout mining communities in Bolivia. Women often made up the difference, either by working directly for the mines, as in the cases mentioned above, or by running their own commercial operations. Women with means often kept stores where alcohol was sold, while less prosperous women cooked food that men and children could pay for if they had no one making food at home. Finally, women often ran moneymaking operations out of the pulperías themselves, by purchasing bulk items at cost, and then selling these to rural families without access to company store prices. Women with connections in the countryside often ran their own distribution rings, bringing in produces from their families.⁸¹ Access to the company store meant access to food at non-market prices, which could be the difference between survival and starvation. For this reason, court battles over inheritance, child support, and pensions were not always about payment itself: the stakes were in fact access to the protections the state could offer against inflation.⁸² For this reason too, the political organization of women in the mines became a critical issue, both to maintain family solidarity and also to make sure families had access to the resources promised them.

Mitchell argues that, although inflation ultimately undermined quality of life for most of the working and middle classes, those who had ties to the MNR, including miners, could make profits from the price differences generated by widespread inflation. Party officials with money and connections could secure dollars and preferential rates, even during the height of inflation, for example. Miners, whose pulpería benefits included frozen prices on meat, salt, flour, and

⁸¹ This practice is described in both Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia*; Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*.

⁸² For example, in Expediente 479474, which Manuela Machicado viuda de Valeriano filed to declare herself heir to her husband in the case of death of miner Leandro Valeriano, she asked the courts to render judgement "sobre los bienes, derechos, y acciones y muy especialmente de los beneficios sociales" ALP PJJ Caja 372.

milk, could sell food at much higher prices in the cities if they had distribution connections. As the family court cases suggest, many mining families did have these connections, and the unequal distribution of state benefits led to resentment within poor communities over relative wealth and access. These inequalities were most pronounced between rural and urban workers, but occurred between industrial sectors too: when factory workers saw their real value of wages decline over the course of the 1950s, some of them blamed miners, whose pay increases had kept up better with inflation.⁸³

Revolution Under Pressure: Inflation, Plan Eder, and Mining Families

COMIBOL, as noted in the last chapter, became a kind of panacea for all of Bolivia's problems in the eyes of both the MNR and the miners. The nationalist coalitions of the 1940s had argued that if Bolivia's wealth lay in mineral production, then nationalizing that wealth would create a nation of prosperous citizens. COMIBOL served two functions in this respect. First and foremost, it directed profits toward the national bank, which in this period meant that COMIBOL subsidized many of the social and development projects throughout the country. Secondly, as we have seen, COMIBOL was created in such a way as to direct resources towards and encourage the quality of life of its own workers. Thirdly, and increasingly, COMIBOL's profits were understood to be spoils of the revolution, paid not just to workers but to reward political loyalty. As the highest-cost major producer of tin in the world, Bolivia's mineral production profits could not actually support all of these burdens, even though the price of tin was generally rising throughout the 1956-65 period.⁸⁴ Bolivia's singular reliance on tin also meant that even a

⁸³ Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia*.

⁸⁴ Most sources note that COMIBOL operated at an official loss until 1965. Jorge Espinoza Morales, *Minería boliviana: su realidad* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2010). On the other hand, in his investigation of the same period, Burke noted that COMIBOL was actually profitable in most of the period that it showed losses, if money that was diverted to YPFB and other development projects in the 1950s is taken in to account. Burke and Malloy, "From National Populism to National Corporatism"; Melvin Burke and Corporación Minera de Bolivia, *The Corporación*

nationalized company and a nationalist government could not completely render itself independent from the largest consumer blocs in the world: the smelters in Great Britain and manufacturers in the United States.⁸⁵

The United States government, for its part, was cautiously predisposed to work with the MNR, provided the government agreed to indemnify mine owners for nationalization.⁸⁶ Unlike in Guatemala under Arbenz or Chile during Allende, nationalization of major industries did not directly affect major US business interests. The Corocoro copper mines owned by American Smelting and Refining Corporation were, of course, an exception to this, but they were not substantial; the American Smelting Company at this time had such widespread and productive mines throughout the world that losing a small mine affiliated with the Chilean office was not worth drawing down the Marines.⁸⁷ Furthermore, in the escalating Cold War tensions of the 1950s, the MNR's vaguely Nazi associations from the Villarroel era helped shape State Department understandings of Bolivia's revolution. The State Department, in this case, was not wrong in its assessment that the MNR was out-competing strictly communist parties in Bolivia in this period. Indeed, first Eisenhower and later Kennedy offered a great deal of financial and development support, IMF loans, and food assistance. These measures helped prolong the MNR in power for the 1956-1964 period. Starting in 1956, the US was actually funding a substantial

Minera de Bolivia (Comibol) and the Triangular Plan: A Case Study in Dependency (Meadville, Pa.: Allegheny College, 1987). See also, George Jackson Eder, *Inflation and Development in Latin America; a Case History of Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia*, Michigan International Business Studies, no. 8 (Ann Arbor: Program in International Business, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, 1968), 40. See also Baldwin, *The World Tin Market*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1983), 136. Nash also discusses MNR leadership pocketing profits in *We Eat the Mines*, suggesting that this was a widely held understanding among the miners.

⁸⁵ Though see Young for more on the way the MNR did resist in this period: Young, "Blood of the Earth."

⁸⁶ Coverage in the New York Times was generally favorable, for example see "High Bolivian Seeks Anti-Marxist Aim" April 10, 1953. See also William Rosenberg's "Democracy in the Andes" for the August, 2, 1952 edition of *The Nation*.

⁸⁷ It was, in fact, barely noted in a company report from 1953. American Smelting and Refining Company, "Annual Report" (New York, NY, 1953).

component of Bolivia's national budget itself. These measures, of course, came with an ideological price tag: indemnification of the mining companies, removal of worker ministers, and economic stabilization.

In 1956, George Jackson Eder travelled to La Paz to study conditions in the country and make economic recommendations, to much public fanfare.⁸⁸ Generally, Eder considered the Bolivian revolution to have created an extreme surplus of social spending and a dangerous sense of entitlement in the workers. Point 16 of his 50 Step Plan to address inflation in Bolivia addressed the Código de Seguridad Social, demanding essentially that government and company payments into the Caja be reduced from their nearly 37.5% to somewhere between 4 and 7.5%. Eder also hoped to remove subsidies of food in the pulperías.⁸⁹ Ultimately, Eder wanted to shut down COMIBOL and other state enterprises in favor of private ownership. While he was unable to shut down COMIBOL, the later conservative turn of the MNR has meant that most historians assume Eder was successful in completely reducing social security benefits to workers. My research suggests that over the course of 1957, both the MNR and the workers compromised on the Plan, leaving everyone a little bit unhappy but the Código largely intact. In fact, the Código became the ground on which the MNR maintained its commitment to revolution while rolling back everything else.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ "El Sr Eder Examino ayer el CNSS" *El Diario*, October 17, 1956; La Paz Caja Nacional de Seguro Social, George Jackson Eder, and Congreso Nacional de Trabajadores de Bolivia, *Observaciones de la C.N.S.S. a los planteamientos de Mr. Eder: informe de labores de la institución al 2. Congreso de Trabajadores de Bolivia* (La Paz: CNSS, 1957).

⁸⁹ Eder, *Inflation and Development in Latin America; a Case History of Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia*, 635.

⁹⁰ See plans to fix a salario mínimo vital 31 dic 1956 ALB FSC #9.274, but also a decree, after the plan was signed by Paz, to increase family subsidies, reported *El Diario* "Se ha dictado el Decreto aumentando los subsidios de Asignación Familiar" 29 Sept 1956 This decree set company support at 13% and raised the subsidies for marriage to \$3500bs and the bonus at birth of a child to \$40,000bs. Similarly, Kevin Young and Field note that the US and Eder's demands were constrained by maneuverings in the MNR, who refused to back down from state capitalist enterprises like COMIBOL, Young, "Blood of the Earth," 105.

The Plan Eder, also known as the Plan Estabilización, was signed by Paz Estenssoro shortly before leaving office, exactly as the Social Security legislation was also put into effect. Concretely, the Plan Eder demanded a reduction in social service spending and of the social service sector, and withdrawing food subsidies, in exchange for a small wage increase among certain industrial groups like the miners. It also established a single exchange rate for the Boliviano at 7,700 to the dollar, which in practice meant that miners earned less than a \$1 a day in 1957.⁹¹ While Paz Estenssoro signed the recommendations, it would be up to Hernan Siles Zuazo, who had won the June 1956 elections along with Vice President and Campesino Affairs Minister Nuflo Chavez, to carry out both of these programs, somehow enforcing discipline upon a revolutionary coalition that had been built upon expecting material rewards for party loyalty, and which had also destroyed any effective coercive mechanism in the armed forces.⁹² For the next several months the Plan created a crisis in Bolivia, not just for the MNR, but for the COB and the CNSS as well.

While Eder demanded a reduction in social services, even Eder's extensive press coverage and propaganda campaign in favor of stabilization suggests that he found hard limits on the topic of Social Security for workers. In an article *El Diario* ran 29 May of 1957, essentially a conversational editorial written by Eder himself, "Eder Considera Insoportable el Aporte del 37.5% a la Caja Nacional de SS: Recomendación la Rebaja al 4 o 7.5%," he asked workers to consider whether they wouldn't just like to be paid more for producing more and remove the Caja entirely. In the next sentence, however, he backtracked from this extreme, simply saying that in the US "we have realized we are not sufficiently rich to support welfare more than 4%."⁹³

⁹¹ Eder, *Inflation and Development in Latin America; a Case History of Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia*.

⁹³ *El Diario*, 29 Mayo 1957.

Bolivians argued back in an editorial two days later quoting Raúl Prebisch and suggesting that the CNSS could be paid for with taxes. The CNSS itself argued against the Plan in a series of editorials in *Ultima Hora* and *La Razón* in early June.⁹⁴ In general, the MNR pursued a strategy of trying to be all things to all parties: allowing some state institutions like the CNSS to dissent against the plan and defend the miners while privately courting labor leaders to accept compromise, and agreeing provisionally to the Plan long before it had nationwide support. It was this kind of governing that allowed the MNR to maintain its revolutionary coalition for so long.

Ultimately, however, the government was able to persuade both Lechín and the COB by pointing out the low productivity of COMIBOL. Editorials penned by MNR officials and president Siles Zuazo argued that both benefits and salaries could be raised if COMIBOL produced more, suggesting the plan would help with this.⁹⁵ Workers could contest the economics of COMIBOL's profit margins, but the subtext of arguments over productivity cut straight to the heart of the revolution: in 1957 and again in 1961, Lechín urged workers to stand down and compromise with the government so that the nationalized mine would not be privatized. By the end of June, the CNSS moved to support the plan, with some compromises on the level of state support.⁹⁶

In these debates, the COB (like the CNSS) tried to formulate a moral claim against Eder's plan, while coming up with their own economic alternative that still involved restructuring

⁹⁴ Newsclippings from the Fondo Sinforoso Cabrera, in the ABHB. 21 May 1957, *La Razón* 6 June 1957, "We oppose the reductions of CNSS" "Oponemos Los Reducciones del CNSS *Ultima Hora*," 6 June, *Ultima Hora* 11 June 1957: CNSS Claimed that 494,044 workers and families were receiving their support and that Eder's plan would result in closing hospitals and cutting services. *Ultima Hora* June 17, 1957 "Oficialmente la CNSS señala las consecuencias que tendria la disminuicion de aportes patronales y laborales"; "Las bases financieras de la Seguridad Social no pueden estar sometidas al regateo de la oferta y demanda." *Ultima Hora* June 10, 1957 "El Señor Eder, los Seguros Sociales en Estados Unidos y el Caso Boliviano" June 13, 1957 *Ultima Hora*.

⁹⁵ *Ultima Hora* was the most moderate on this "Profits Not High Enough" 14 June, 1957 and "Una Explicación del Plan" 15 June, 1957.

⁹⁶ *El Diario*, 29 June, 1957. "Renuncia Control Obrera de CNSS" June 25, 1957 *El Diario*.

COMIBOL for greater profitability.⁹⁷ The lives of Bolivians, these organizations argued, should not be dependent on the supply and demand for tin. In these debates, the living conditions of the miners specifically were often overrepresented to explain the conditions of the working class in general. The metal workers' union provided an estimated cost of living that showed a daily cost of 11,200 bolivianos for a mining family of 5, noting that no worker earned more than 7,000 per day. whereas the campesinos federation calculated a family of four consuming 446,000 bolivianos per month, or 63 days of work at a miner's wages of 7,000 bolivianos a day. Benefits and price fixing were how the miners survived this period.

Many historians and politicians have repeated the idea that riotous intransigent workers were unwilling to accept financial stabilization arguments. But in the face of rampant inflation, shortages, and low production, even the left recognized the need for some stabilization, and certainly for restructuring COMIBOL. Moreover, miners in particular were deeply concerned with production levels, understanding keenly what a noncompetitive industry or a failed COMIBOL would mean for their job security. Like the state itself, the mineworkers and the COB were profoundly concerned with how to keep the economy running, and some were not opposed to stabilization plans.⁹⁸ During June and July 1957, during which the COB met for its second general congress, there was furious debate about the provisions of the Eder plan that related to Social Security. The collective national project was not completely out of favor.⁹⁹ A

⁹⁷ *Ultima Hora* June 17, 1957 "Oficialmente la CNSS señala las consecuencias que tendria la disminucion de aportes patronales y laborales." Also the COB released a manifesto during the Second COB Congress in 1956, declaring that reducing state support would kill the CNSS, Central Obrera Boliviana, "Misc Docs from II Congreso Del COB," May 1957. FSC 116.

⁹⁸ The COB II Conference contained Economic Plans put forward by both the Confederation of Campesinos, the Confederacion of Railway Workers, and Metalworkers. While the mineworkers contained the largest single bloc of voting delegates (67), the campesinos had the second, 56, and other industries combined to outvote the miners. *Programa del II Congreso del COB*, Imprinta Grafica, La Paz, 1957.

⁹⁹ "Los Trabajadores Confian en el Éxito de Estabilización" *La Nación*, June 9th, 1957.

faction led by the miners threatened to strike against the Plan, but ultimately were not able to convince the rest of the unions to go along. Lechín, at heart, was not willing to break completely with the MNR without the full backing of the COB behind him. The miners (along with the bakers) found themselves on the losing side of a Plan Restructurador Coalition, and the COB voted to accept the Eder plan, as long as certain components of workers' rights were kept.¹⁰⁰

On June 29, CNSS workers also agreed to conditionally support the Plan.¹⁰¹ The compromise in this case, was in the details of the family subsidy, which was increased using COMIBOL as the major source of income. On 24 July, the CNSS fixed a new minimum wage of 7,000 bs per day, or 875 per hour for men and women, although women could work only 6.5 hours in a day. This meant that the government could comply with Eder on percentages, but keep family subsidies and wages as tools to placate workers. By August, family subsidies had been increased by another 50%.¹⁰² The state reduced its percentage of support to CNSS, but COMIBOL did not. COMIBOL continued to protect mineworkers from the worst of these changes, as the Balance General for the company shows the stores in the mines selling goods at cost until 1959, and maintaining an employer contribution to CNSS of 30% through this period.¹⁰³ The fallout from this compromise was significant, and the next few years were some of the most strike-ridden and conflictual of the MNR's short life, but ultimately both the workers and the state got something they wanted: in exchange for keeping CSS and COMIBOL, the

¹⁰⁰ Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia*, 69.

¹⁰¹ This vote was not without dissent: on June 25th, a worker control officer representing the mines resigned from the CNSS saying that his role had been relegated to secondary. *El Diario*, July 7, 1957.

¹⁰² These amounts were published in *La Nación*, August 23 1957.

¹⁰³ Balance General, 1953-1959, Archivos de Comibol, La Paz.

workers would be restrained. The US got some, but not all, of what the MNR had promised: in October 1957 COMIBOL laid off 5,200 workers.¹⁰⁴

Kevin Young argues that the plan Eder was a moral crusade to alter the priorities of government, but it is clear that competing visions of the state itself were present both within the MNR and among the general population in these debates.¹⁰⁵ Organized labor, through the COB, believed that it should have a governing stake in the coalition led by the MNR, while the MNR needed to be able to control popular unrest in order to govern. The MNR was terrified that the middle class was increasingly fleeing to the Falange Socialista Boliviana. The MNR did not cause the first inflation crisis in Bolivian history, but the 1952-57 period was one of the most severe in Latin America at the time. By 1958, cost of living had risen to fifty times its 1952 levels, and inflation was well above 4,000%. In addition, the agrarian reform carried out in 1953 helped create a food shortage in the cities and the mines. The central bank and the Banco Minero had no control over their own employees, now federated into a powerful union of their own, much less over the popular groups whose leaders were now charged with a great deal of public spending.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ A man accepting the lump sum for retirement could have negative effects on the women and children who depended on the mines for support, as the retired miner's partner and children would no longer qualify for family subsidies or child support, as happened in the case of Renulfoo Coriza and Nely Luna. Expediente 76946 Homologación Renulfo Coriza y Nelly Luna 19 Junio 1959. The father of her child took the offer of voluntary retirement for a lump sum.

¹⁰⁵ See for example an editorial by Edwin Moller, Secretario de Organización of the COB, who argues that the role of CNSS and the COB together should be educating and creating a better working class. Feb 3 1957. Sinforoso Cabrera's files also contain a book of Actas Directorio Comibol from this time that reveal company officials were worried about the working family's continued access to subsidies.

¹⁰⁶ Press clippings from *El Diario* and *La Nación* in the late 1950s reveal near constant strikes among not just industrial groups, but bank workers, municipal workers, and medical professionals as well. Though integrated into the COB, the bankers in particular did not always share tactical or material interests with other groups of workers. See, for example "Actitud Separatista Desquiciaría el Código de la Seguridad Social" criticising the bankers for wanting their own system, from *La Nación*, July 2, 1956; "Solucionose Conflicto Planteado Por Empleados del Banco Minero" *La Nación*, January 15, 1957; "Los Empleados del Estado Están a Punto de Declarar Huelga General Que Paralizaría a la Administración" *El Diario*, March 4, 1957; "La Central Obrera Boliviana en Virtual Desbande" *El Pueblo*, March 16, 1957.

Although US aid had helped sustain the MNR from the beginning, after 1959, the US government was more committed to breaking Paz's ties with the labor left than developing the country. After the compromise on economic stabilization, US and IMF observers considered COMIBOL the major roadblock to dismantling worker control and price protections. These observers formulated a new plan in 1961 to use joint US, IMF, and West German investment to reinvigorate COMIBOL. This offer, known as the Triangular Plan, made harnessing the labor movement a precondition for aid not because of economic concerns about the viability of COMIBOL, but because the US believed a chastened labor union lessened the chances of Communist takeover during periods of instability.¹⁰⁷ In this way, both worker control and *beneficios sociales* were critical, not just to Cold War maneuverings, but to the exercise of power in Bolivia. For, as long as the miners believed themselves to be rightful participants in Bolivian politics, there was always the chance that the government would turn to the labor unions to bolster the government in times of instability, as indeed happened during the regime of Military Dictator JJ Torres in 1971.¹⁰⁸

Although the MNR was not willing or able to shut down COMIBOL and its social mandate in this period, the party did set up an institutional competitor for COMIBOL that would come to increasingly matter in future struggles over state and company obligations to miners and their families. In 1958, President Hernan Siles Zuazo signed the Ley General de Sociedades

¹⁰⁷ As Thomas Field (and Melvin Burke before him) suggest, the Stabilization Plan and the subsequent Triangular Plan to restructure COMIBOL equated dismantling worker control and wage and price protections with stable development, even without economic data backing up this equation. Burke, *Combined International Assistance to a Nationalized Industry*; Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*. Historians and activists alike have blamed the United States and the IMF for turning Bolivia's developmentalist revolution into a coercive state betraying the workers. Kevin Young and Thomas Field argue persuasively, however, that Paz Estenssoro and the MNR were very effective in playing the United States, Cuba, and at times, the Soviet Union off each other, maintaining the MNR as both the legitimate party most friendly to communism and as the last defense against Bolivian Communism.

¹⁰⁸ See Chapter 5.

Cooperativas. Article 34 of this law stipulated that state mineral holdings would be preferably operated in the future by small groups of miners organized into cooperatives of socios with no fixed income, but with shared risk and shared reward. These workers would receive no institutional benefits from COMIBOL, but would rent out space from the state mines.¹⁰⁹ While this did not immediately impact production in COMIBOL mines, over the course of the 1960s, COMIBOL increasingly ceded marginal production areas to cooperatives rather than investing in new exploration for the state.¹¹⁰ In 1961, Paz Estenssoro explicitly envisioned cooperative mining as a palliative for the workers that would be fired from COMIBOL as a result of his next stabilization plan.¹¹¹

In 1961, learning its lesson from the compromises of the stabilization plan, the MNR and the United States decided to reinvigorate COMIBOL, not shut it down as Eder had hoped.¹¹² By targeting COMIBOL specifically, this plan attacked directly the social scope of the revolutionary government in a more fundamental way than had stabilization. The Plan also took advantage of the social scope of COMIBOL on the Bolivian economy, demanding that a significant portion of loans to COMIBOL be used to buy US imports, such as wheat.¹¹³ The debates and unrest surrounding the Triangular Plan were also more targeted so as to isolate communities of miners from each other. While the MNR did some campaigning on behalf of the Triangular Plan in Corocoro, and allowed worker control a freer hand in municipal affairs in this period, Paz

¹⁰⁹ Hernan Siles Zuazo, Decreto Ley 5035, "Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativistas," September 13, 1958.

¹¹⁰ Morales, *Minería boliviana*, 233.

¹¹¹ Victor Paz Estenssoro, "Estatuto de Cooperativas Mineras," 1961 as reproduced in COMIBOL, *Organización Y Funcionamiento de Cooperativas Mineras* (La Paz, Bolivia: COMIBOL, 1969), 126.

¹¹² Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*, 299.

¹¹³ Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia*, 89. Burke and Malloy show that US loans throughout the 1960s treated "fostering Bolivian development" as encouraging the purchase of US imports. Burke, *Combined International Assistance to a Nationalized Industry*, 59.

Estenssoro targeted Siglo XX and Catavi for greater repression, arresting leaders Pimentel, Escobar, and Reyes as part of a communist plot. The fight against the Plan Triangular was the beginning of a new kind of struggle for the miners: a struggle against community fragmentation that emerged out of both the experiences of intra-familial struggle and rural/urban divergence that I have explored in this chapter.

The 1956-1961 period witnessed both government repression and a sincere attempt to extend and protect some of the benefits of the revolution. The government moved to placate the miners in this period and unions who stayed loyal to the MNR continued to receive material benefits through their ties to the MNR. For example, in 1961, the Oruro miner's union received a shipment of winter coats and cash in exchange for breaking the 1961 strike against the Triangular Plan.¹¹⁴ Corocoro was one of these mines; in 1960, *El Diario* reported that Corocoro was one of several communities to receive housing plots in El Alto, sold by the government to miners at low prices. In this period, Mario Durán also returned to prominence in Corocoro's municipal affairs, and became Control Obrero for the EMC.¹¹⁵ In fact, in Corocoro, Durán as Control Obrero seems to have exerted relatively greater local power than he had in the late 1950s, suggesting that Control Obrero was not so much abolished by the Plan Triangular, as reduced in scope to social and diplomatic affairs, such as negotiating support for the mining company's football clubs, and ensuring housing and electricity for workers. Once again, social provision through COMIBOL became the place where the miners kept their revolution and the prestige they earned through it, alive.

¹¹⁴ Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*, 29.

¹¹⁵ Various letters. ALP PJAC, Municipal documents for 1960-2, Box 233, 1963-5, Box 237. Frequent letters between Control Obrero, the union, and the municipality carry on through the mid-1960s, even after Durán died in 1965 from a lightning strike.

The family impacts of the social security law among miners help explain why the FSTMB union kept engaging with and supporting the MNR government through the 1960s. The Plan Triangular of 1961 that pledged the Bolivian government to rid the government of worker representatives and COMIBOL of union militants was provisionally accepted by the mining communities at the conference of 1960. The most radical of the FSTMB locals in Siglo XX and Catavi, who vocally rejected this plan, were outvoted by the more collaborationist, MNR-led unions such as Oruro. And yet, the social security law and COMIBOL remained. The Social Security law, and the company benefits that came along with it, helped stabilize some mining families through the worst of the inflation of the late 1950s and helped these same families keep faith with the revolution, in the name of revitalizing COMIBOL and investing in the future.

While the stabilization plan did change the relationship between popular sectors and government, reducing the direct control miners and peasant unions had over the direction of the economy and government, certain state structures such as CNSS and COMIBOL remained, as did the commitment to their social service functions. The Stabilization Plan and Triangular Plan both reduced the amount the state paid into the coffers of the CNSS, but not the CNSS' mandate to subsidize the livelihood of workers itself, setting up an economic crisis for the future as tin prices dropped, but maintaining the social peace in the short term.¹¹⁶ Finally, while the government did change the relationship to popular sectors and generally moved towards encouraging private development at the expense of public, the rightward turn of MNR and subsequent governments never eradicated the possibility of nationalization as a tool for recruiting populist support in Bolivia, as the Ovando and Torres governments discovered in 1969 and 1970.

¹¹⁶ According to COMIBOL records, even after the Stabilization Plan, the state contributed 30% to CNSS, but in 1961-2 the support from COMIBOL itself dropped from 30% to 12% (Balances Generales Corocoro, 1959, 1961 and 2), Archivos de COMIBOL.

This continued potential for the state to act as revolutionary agent is crucial for understanding the appeal of the MNR's state project long after 1956. Even as it sought to dismantle worker power, the government broadcasted a social commitment to working families, singling out especially those families in mining and other industrial communities.

The Keepers of Revolutionary Faith: Mining Amas de Casa

Of course, there is another side to this story: the simultaneous passage of the Stabilization Plan and Social Security Law helped to actually *destabilize* mining families, and both offered concrete benefits for some members of the community, such as abandoned mothers, to bring in the repressive arm of the state against others, such as nonpaying fathers. By creating provisions for paying mothers directly via pulpería (company store) access and docking wages from unsupportive fathers, the Social Security law bolstered the MNR's goals of protecting women and children and lifting a generation of Bolivians out of poverty. It also gave women the sense that their participation in the reproduction of the social life of mining communities was, in itself, a revolutionary act. By giving women financial leverage, however, this law also threatened the very base of solidarity within mining communities at a time when the union was losing its own political leverage nationally. These contradictory messages set up the conditions for a clash of social norms as new legal provisions gave sanction to certain kinds of relationships (maternal rights and obligations to children) above others (paternal rights to dictate obligation).

The increasing precarity of the miners, competition between families over resources, the growing tendency of the MNR after 1960 to send the army in to crush strikes, and the Plan Triangular all created a situation in which worker community solidarity could easily fragment completely. In Corocoro, this solidarity did break down repeatedly over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, as the next chapter will show. In some communities, specifically those most isolated

from rural indigenous communities and local merchants, the miners rallied around a surprising new revolutionary vision in the 1960s: gendered co-government within families. Helped out by three new proselytizing forces in the mines—the communist party, the newly radicalized church, and a generation of Bolivian and Latin American academics invested in continued working class cohesion—the more isolated tin mining communities created a woman-centered movement in support of class solidarity to combat the forces of community breakdown. In 1961, a group of miners' wives and daughters in Siglo XX and Catavi formed the Comité de Amas de Casa, the Bolivian Housewives Committee, affiliated with the national Miners' Federation.

The Comité de Amas de Casa began expressly as a response to the failure of the MNR to live up to its revolutionary promises. While most historians of labor in the mines recall that the Amas de Casa formed first to demand the release of individual activists' husbands such as Federico Escóbar and Irineo Pimentel from prison and exile, the women themselves remember their politicization as a response to the state's failure to provide medicine and food to mining families. The founding narrative of the Amas de Casa traced this link explicitly:

In the year 1961, the bourgeois government of the MNR, completely compromised by imperialism, began a ferocious attack against the mine worker's movement that, beginning in 1957 and more clearly in the Second Congress of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), began to separate itself from the official line and break with the myth of worker co-government. The platform of struggle, which the working class had elaborated to earn better salaries, demanded a system of health and production bonuses, and *most importantly the frozen prices of the four products in the company store: meat, sugar, bread, and rice*. Without doubt, the housewives were the most affected by the politics of starvation of that government. This fact slowly woke the political consciousness of the mining women. [emphasis mine]¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ “El año 1961, el gobierno burgués del MNR, abiertamente comprometido con el imperialismo, desató una feroz persecución contra el movimiento obrero de las minas que, a partir del año 1957 y mas concretamente del Segundo Congreso de la Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), había empezado a separarse del carro oficialista y romper el mito del co-gobierno. La plataforma de lucha, que había elaborado la clase obrera era para conseguir mejores salarios, una sistema de bonos de salubridad y la producción, y ante todo el congelamiento de los cuatro artículos de pulpería: carne, azúcar, pan, y arroz. Sin duda, las amas de casa eran las más afectadas con la política hambreadora de tal gobierno. Ese fue despertando poco a poco la conciencia política de las mujeres mineras.” Lagos, *Nos Hemos Forjado Así*, 34. Similarly, Domitila Barrios de Chungara traces her politicization, not to protecting her husband

Throughout the struggles of the Amas de Casa in the 1960s, calls for greater provision of resources were inextricable from demands to release political prisoners; both of which were understood to be crucial to maintaining family survival. For example, in 1961, and again in 1963, miners and their wives occupied pulperías in San Jose, Catavi, Quechisla, Huanuni because the government wasn't delivering on promised provisions and was keeping their husbands in prison. When this didn't work, the women took American engineers hostage, vowing to protect them from their husbands' wrath but not release them until the government responded. These kinds of actions provoked situations that the strike-weary Bolivian press could not ignore: in the first of these struggles, the press reported somewhat alarmingly that 20,000 women from the mines were threatening to descend on La Paz if mine leaders were not released.¹¹⁸

The messaging of the Comité de Amas de Casa and indeed the miners' union itself always linked the protection of male miners from the state with provision and control over resources. For its part, the government responded to these women on the battlefield of hunger as well: by cutting off supplies of medicine and food to pulperías. In 1961, in response to the siege waged by the government against their mines, the Siglo XX union conspired to try to hijack a train carrying wheat from the Argentine border. Again and again, fights over the political direction of the revolution were carried out through what one activist called "the politics of hunger" against the families of miners.¹¹⁹ All of this made women's economic and political solidarity with the miners and their union more visible and crucial to the outcome of the

(since her activism actually cost him his job) but to protecting her children's access to housing and food. Chungara, *Si Me Permiten Hablar*.

¹¹⁸ John, *Bolivia's Radical Tradition*, 2012, 171; Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*, 29. On the vizibilization of hunger politics in the pro-democracy struggles of the late 1970s, see Stephenson, *Gender and Modernity in Andean Bolivia*, 187.

¹¹⁹ Lagos, *Nos Hemos Forjado Así*, 34. The woman of the Amas de Casa were under no illusions of this politics as anything other than violent: see 129 "El hambre es una experiencia violenta."

revolution. The restructuring of the economic basis of family life in the 1952 revolution helped generate a very powerful women's movement tied to the mines, dedicated to protecting male members of the miners' union in exchange for substantial political power and relative autonomy within their own families.

In places like Siglo XX and Catavi, the Comité Amas de Casa was founded to help create an alternative narrative of solidarity within working class mining communities to combat increasing fragmentation between wives and husbands and extended kinship groups around resource lines. When these women talk about the hard road they fought, and the blood they spilled to create the Housewives Committee, some of the fights were against their own husbands. As much as the political violence that will be explored in the next chapter, the family subsidy provisions of the Social Security Law of 1956 sowed the seeds of the Comité de Amas de Casa in Siglo XX in 1961. The Amas de Casa took miners' demands for co-participation and co-gobierno within the state and company and extended them to their own families. In doing so, they effectively tied mining communities back together by rendering visible social and domestic reproduction as an integral component of production, valuing women as workers within the home. In Corocoro, where women were more cohesively integrated into merchant and rural producer networks than their Siglo XX counterparts and the miners' union was relatively less militant, the Comité de Amas de Casa never took hold until the brutal struggles of the late 1970s for democratic political opening, as the next chapter will suggest. Instead, Corocoro women counted on relatively greater protections from the municipal authorities, less at the mercy of either the army or the miners' union itself.

Conclusions

After 1952, the MNR sought to contain and direct the social forces it had unleashed when it armed workers and peasants to take over the government through two means: offering social benefits to those who participated in the state revolutionary project, and limiting autonomous channels of political dissent. COMIBOL, and the welfare institutions that the MNR used to carry out its social programs, combined both of these tactics into a single project of creating a well-regulated, healthy labor force. Many of the reforms carried out in the name of the miners responded to needs and demands that mining families made themselves, but the manner in which these reforms were carried out did not always support the autonomy or political power of male mineworkers and the Federation of Bolivian Mineworkers, (FSTMB). As the state grew more repressive towards workers over the course of the 1960s, control over the distribution and nature of social benefits such as healthcare, education, and subsidized food became the terrain upon which miners fought to keep the dream of MNR radicalism alive.

One of the more stunningly effective pieces of MNR revolutionary ideology was the creation of worker citizenship as a meaningful social category in Bolivia, linking common sacrifice in the mines and the battlefield to a future vision of prosperity for Bolivia as a nation and miners' families specifically. When miners protested against the state in the 1950s and 1960s, they did not question the legitimacy of the state project of development itself. Instead, they demanded adequate reward for their good faith sacrifices of life and resources to it. Notably, family legislation allowed women and children to interpret their own poverty and the work done to reproduce the social unit in mining communities as part of this collective sacrifice as well.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ In this way, Bolivian mining communities were markedly different from agrarian indigenous communities in the Cochabamba Valley incorporated into peasant syndicates after the revolution, where women did not derive comparative economic leverage from state reforms. See, Gordillo, *Campesinos Revolucionarios en Bolivia*. In the La Paz area, indigenous men, even outside of peasant syndicates derived a comparative sense of their citizenship

The MNR pursued a strategy of trying to keep faith among the workers through periodic distribution of benefits like housing and bonuses as a reward for loyalty during times of national crisis. For their part, as long as the FSTMB and the COB that it controlled believed it was being consulted as part of the governing coalition, the miners were willing to accept a certain amount of antagonism and even repression from the government. Even opposition to the Triangular Plan was couched in a shared idea of development: the miners thought it was a misguided attempt at necessary reforms rather than an unnecessary intrusion.

When June Nash first lived in Oruro for her fieldwork in 1969, she entered into mining communities that were suffering the effects of five years of dictatorship, although benefitting from a brief window of potential labor alliances with the dictator Ovando. When she asked the miners about the 1956-1961 period, they often marked it as the beginning of a government betrayal of the revolution. In this chapter I suggest that this period only looked like the end of revolution in retrospect. After the Eder Plan was put into effect, miners lost some of their wages and political links with the government, but maintained their social security benefits as well as several institutions such as the COB, CNSS, and COMIBOL itself that could be used to pressure the government to return to form. In 1964, the MNR faced general strikes, uprisings, and coup attempts supported by the left and the right because the Bolivian public believed the government had gone off course. The workers had not lost faith in the viability of the revolution itself, nor in the idea that the state could and should intervene in the daily lives of its citizens in order to make Bolivia a more prosperous, equitable country.

through compulsory military service but believed their wives to be “more indigenous” and more outside of the realm of national participation. Canessa, *Intimate Indigeneities*.

After the revolution, the worker left saw its mandate as the conditional support of the revolutionary state, while always pushing for greater social and economic rights within it. The break with the MNR came slowly and regionally as the state increasingly frustrated workers' attempts to help determine the course of the revolution. Although the break with Siglo XX happened in 1961, willingness to work with the state was widespread in mines like Corocoro through at least 1964, and arguably through 1971. General and Vice President Barrientos benefitted from this belief as he executed his coup against Paz Estenssoro's 1964 government, as he promised to wage a "Revolución Restauradora" against the excesses, but not the institutions themselves, created by the MNR. Even after the break with the MNR, the idea that the MNR had betrayed the revolution but someone else might be able to keep the revolution running meant that the Bolivian left and right each had a stake in the Barrientos presidency. The coup that ended MNR rule would not necessarily, in the eyes of the Bolivian left, end the revolution. In the next chapter, I will trace the end of the revolution in Corocoro, not as a clean break during the Barrientos or Banzer coups, but in the slow intertwining of political and personal violence that broke apart faith in the revolutionary state as a possibility.

Chapter 5: The Devil in the Mines: Personal and Political Violence, 1961-1969

Working inside the mines is frightening. It's like signing a suicide pact with an indefinite term.¹

At the moment I know what I'm doing and I remember what I've done and I know what I'm going to do. But to speak truthfully a miner is de-memorized. The memory of the miner is lost. So when a miner speaks it's not with fidelity. The memory of a miner is not fixed. No it's not fixed. Many times he speaks and does not remember. If he remembers for an instant, most of the time he forgets thereafter. Why? Because the brain of the miner is perturbed by the crackling of the machinery, withered by the explosions of the dynamite and the gas of the tin. This is what I want to explain to you about my situation.²

Ponciano Mamani and the Futility of Revolution

In November of 1967, less than a month after the Bolivian military hunted down Che Guevara in the jungle near Ñancahuazú, and several months after the Massacre of San Juan, the bloodiest conflict between miners and the military in 25 years, Secretary General of the Corocoro mineworker's union fell to his death. Twenty-three-year-old Ponciano Mamani had been a driller in the Toledo mine as well as the leader of the federation at the time of his death. Mining accidents happened routinely in Corocoro, but in Mamani's case, police and company officials quickly intervened, sending a telegram to the central offices of COMIBOL within hours of the death and opening an investigation. They did not intervene on behalf of his family or the union, however: authorities needed to determine, and quickly, that they could not be blamed for the accident. Coming as it did at the end of a crucial year in the consolidation of the military government, the timing of this accident meant the forces of order had to establish a non-political

¹ Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*, 83.

² Nash, *I Spent My Life in the Mines*, 478.

narrative for the deaths. No other drillers had seen the accident, so police submitted sworn statements from shift supervisors and administrative personnel to the municipal courts.

After an extensive inquiry, police determined that Ponciano Mamani and his partner Juan Fuentes had failed to secure their drill before ascending, which caught on a protrusion of rock as the Skips car ascended and threw them down several hundred feet of mineshaft.³ In other words, the miners' deaths, while certainly lamentable, were their own fault. In this chapter, I will argue that the political repression and change in relations between the state and the miners in the post-MNR period of 1964-1978 should not be measured in extreme events such as massacres or political disappearances, but in the individualization of the violence of everyday life. This connection between state-level political repression and everyday, personal violence helps explain the erosion of the MNR's revolutionary dream over the 1970s and 1980s.

The desire of the military state to impose control over an unpredictable landscape and assign blame in cases of "accidents" emerged out of the same impulse that had caused the MNR to build a more effective central state with the capacity to impose order on an unruly population. Dictatorships maintain order, in part, by controlling the narrative of life such that politics or dissent become unthinkable, or at the very least, impossible to enact. Controlling the narrative of blame while removing those state protections that had once offered workers the hope that they might count on economic prosperity or political voice allowed military dictators such as Banzer to maintain stability at the cost of political hope. The effects of military violence upon the social and emotional landscape of communities has been more thoroughly explored in countries more

³ This kind of accident was not uncommon. The wife of the Gerente from 1953-1959, Elí Sotelo, related a similar story of loose drills overturning the jaula, or elevator platform. In this case the miner's life was saved by the winch operator stopping the machine in time. Böhr de Sotelo, *Mi Experiencia En Las Minas*, 18.

firmly associated with extraordinary repression in dirty war dictatorships.⁴ In the Bolivian case, the military state was never completely able to exert control over the countryside. But the dictators of the 1960s and especially 1970s were able to redefine the state as an agent of repression without redistribution; something to be avoided rather than engaged. This meant that in these decades, the end of revolution came about more from hunger than from fear of the police.

During the Barrientos and Banzer years, miners in Corocoro were far more likely to die from accidents and lung diseases than from political violence. There was less visible disorder than in the MNR period, but miners could no longer expect their children would earn a better life through their labor, or that their concerns would be a priority of the state. Rather, the state became an agent of exclusion, coercion, and control. Increasingly, the state also sought to impose a narrative of unruliness and disorder as inherent to mining camps, essentially blaming the miners and their unions for any violence. It is for this reason that the ambiguous nature of Mamani's death is useful for understanding the fundamental instability of the revolution's promises in a place like Corocoro.⁵

Why were Mamani and Fuentes riding in an open cart using dangerous technology that had not been updated since before 1952? Why did the police interview only supervisors and not coworkers of the pair? Why did the police keep such careful records and then give them to the

⁴ For example, attempts to control the narrative of social change and disallow politics in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina: Marguerite Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Florencia E. Mallon, *Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolás Ailio and the Chilean State, 1906–2001* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Steve J. Stern, *Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London, 1998* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006); Greg Grandin, "The Instruction of Great Catastrophe: Truth Commissions, National History, and State Formation in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala," *The American Historical Review*. 110, no. 1 (2005): 46; Lessie Jo Frazier, *Salt in the Sand: Memory, Violence, and the Nation-State in Chile, 1890 to the Present* (Duke University Press Books, 2007).

⁵ DIC Investigation into Ponciano Mamani, November 1967, ALP PJJ Caja 399.

municipality to misfile them in a series of unrelated municipal documents? Why did Mamani's mother fight so hard in court to keep his accident pay out of the hands of his girlfriend and son? This chapter argues that these questions are fundamental to understanding the changing exercise of state power in Bolivia. I will begin by exploring the expansion of police presence in Corocoro in response to local abuses of power, local moments of disorder, as well as the perceived excesses of the MNR military period. I will highlight the targeted nature of this bureaucratic expansion towards the same communities that had been the loci of reform and uplift during earlier regimes. My focus will pair what is considered to be political violence—firings, arrests, and the erosion of political rights—with instances of personal violence such as domestic violence, sexual assault, and suicide; I suggest that these personal conflicts are important to record because they rendered visible the precarity and instability of life between increasing regulation and increasing poverty.

This chapter makes a distinction between the 1964-1971 cycle of dictatorships (Barrientos, Ovando, and Torres) who sought in various ways to “restore” a revolutionary balance of power, and those of 1971-1982 (Banzer, Natusch Busch, and García Meza) who most effectively shut worker politics out of the functioning of the Bolivian state. The first three tried, to varying degrees to coopt and contain worker politics, whereas the latter did not. All of these governments benefitted from the institution-building and repressive mechanisms that the MNR constructed during its time in power, however. I will end by exploring how and whether resistance was possible in the face of these changes in daily life in Corocoro, exploring two common responses to the political repression: retreating into reactive defenses of the remaining spoils of revolution and fleeing from the gaze of the state itself. Both responses helped lay the groundwork for the end of the revolution in the neoliberal democratic turn in the 1980s.

Fighting for their survival every day, a new generation of Bolivian miners ceased to believe that belonging to the company and sacrificing their lives in the present would bring future benefits to their families. Once contraband trade became more profitable than engaging in labor on the “formal” market, the state became not a provider of security, but an agent of control, blocking access to a better life. This generation found allies and inspiration in indigenous communities in the countryside that rejected engagement with the state in favor of political autonomy. I argue that the Bolivian state, whether led by the MNR or the military dictators that came after, used the revolutionary credentials of social welfare reforms and institutions such as COMIBOL to maintain popular engagement and support, even when it was arresting and killing those who dared protest against it. By linking the repressive apparatus of the state to the revolutionary assimilationist aspirations of COMIBOL, the military dictators set the terms for both the end of the revolutionary dream and the explicitly indigenous, anti-globalization politics of the twenty-first century. Under these conditions, a politics of anti-politics flourished in informal economies and intentional provincializing of local governments. What most scholars have failed to recognize is that this move away from inclusion in the national government was partially initiated by the communities that surrounded the miners themselves.

Bolivian mining communities have long been aware of the social dynamics of political repression. In their insistence on the violence of “white massacres,” (also known as layoffs), in their use of hunger strikes and political action by mothers and children to highlight oppression, miners and their unions intentionally foreground this connection. However, most academic and journalistic observers insist on separating political repression from the violence of poverty in

everyday life.⁶ This chapter refuses to see these two categories as distinct. Sometimes the link between political and personal is explicit and direct: a case of domestic violence, as we will see later in the chapter, one man was accused not just of threatening to kill his girlfriend, but of violently suppressing members of the local political opposition. His accusation in front of the police for the former offense signaled the end of the era in which his position with the revolutionary government enabled him to perpetrate the latter. This chapter will also insist on the political meaning of everyday danger at work and home by linking mining accidents, silicosis, and suicide as indicators of the failure of the revolutionary project. Finally, in associating all these forms of violence, this chapter returns to the theme of Chapter 4, which demonstrated that family subsidies, food, and welfare were critical to the exercise of state power after the revolution. In the case of Ponciano Mamani, the mining accident that took the life of a labor leader also set off a crisis in his family, as the state decided which of the many individuals who had depended on Mamani could continue to benefit from his association with the mines, and who could not.⁷

The End of the MNR Revolution, 1961-1964

The last four years of the MNR government were strike-ridden, conflictual, and unstable, leading to a general sense among Bolivians that the MNR revolution, as it stood, could not continue. The extreme inflation of the late 1950s had eroded middle-class wealth and middle-class faith in the ability of the MNR to govern. COMIBOL, despite rising tin and copper prices,

⁶ A white massacre is a politically motivated series of layoffs. For an example of such an analysis is that of Lavaud, *La dictadura minada la huelga de hambre de las mujeres mineras, Bolivia, 1977-1978*.

⁷ While the everyday poverty and danger of mining communities is a common theme in anthropological work about mining communities, to my knowledge no historical or political analysis has argued explicitly for the personal and familial as the realm of political struggle in these communities. For some works in which the theme is most developed: Nash, *We Eat the Mines*; Harris and Albo, *Monteras Y Guardatojos*; Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*.

had not turned a profit since 1957, because of declining ore content and high overhead costs.⁸

The MNR was losing its urban base to the religious right in the Falange Socialista Boliviana, and the newly rebuilt military had begun to flex its muscles and take seriously the idea that it should direct a more significant part of Bolivia's revolution.⁹ Facing increased political opposition among all sectors of the population, President Paz Estenssoro saw that he had a choice between cultivating the left and working-class support as in the early 1950s or moving to the right in an attempt to regain the middle classes for the MNR. As the last chapter suggested, pressure from the United States to move rightward made the choice easier.

At a national level, Paz's rightward shift meant the government was becoming less friendly to worker and peasant protest, but the instability of the MNR generally meant that at a local level, miners' militias, unions, and peasant militias were able to consolidate power increasingly in the early 1960s. Although most historians see this period as a repressive low point in the MNR revolution, the years 1961-4 in fact allowed for a florescence of worker citizenship as an accepted feature of mining cities like Corocoro, built on a coalition of local elites and the most upwardly mobile of the mining leadership. This resulted in contradictory effects: while local authority for the unions caused rightwing and moderate politicians to fear increased lawlessness, the implication of the miners in the exercise of power at the end of the MNR period caused resentment on the part of the rank and file against their own leadership.

⁸ There is a fair amount of disagreement about the exact causes of COMIBOL's financial troubles in the 1950s, but declining mineral content meant that even though the workers were processing a greater tonnage of raw ore than they had been before the revolution, they were producing less copper and tin. Morales, *Minería boliviana*, 156-161. For a sense of how declining mineral content and incessant striking together made COMIBOL profits scarce in this period, see table in Appendix 5.

⁹ For an examination of the way the military saw itself as participating in the revolution, see, Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*.

Paz Estenssoro's approach to governing since 1952 had been to use material rewards to secure vertical loyalty to the MNR but horizontal rivalry among constituent groups.¹⁰ This had the effect of creating local fiefdoms throughout Bolivia that were led by individuals directly responsive to Paz Estenssoro himself, provided he had the power to keep offering them incentives. This was a highly successful system while the economy supported these incentives. The local power and autonomy that workers and peasant militias exercised limited the ability of MNR leadership to moderate the radical direction of social change. In years such as 1961 and 1963, both years in which pieces of the Triangular Plan went into effect, when well over half of the working year was lost to strikes, workers were largely in control of whether COMIBOL mines operated on a day to day basis.¹¹ This caused concern within the moderate wing of the MNR, as with outside observers in the United States. For its part, the military was also concerned that in some parts of the country, worker and peasant militias outnumbered service men and police. The military began to consider whether a civilian government of the MNR was capable of maintaining control over the population. Paz Estenssoro hoped that bringing the military into his government would forestall a coup, so in the 1964 elections he passed over Juan Lechín as his next Vice President in favor of General René Barrientos. This gambit did not work: Vice President Rene Barrientos waited only a few months before launching a coup against his own government, taking power in September 1964.

¹⁰ For example, as Chapter 4 suggested, in nationalizing the mines the MNR had created not only loyalty to the state, but rivalry with peasant groups who did not immediately receive the same social welfare package as the workers. By contrast, peasant unions in the Cochabamba region were granted monopoly over the exercise of violence in their local communities, in exchange for sometimes lending their support to repressive efforts of the state. See Gordillo, *Campesinos Revolucionarios en Bolivia*. Personal communication with Bridgette Warner, August 2016.

¹¹ In 1961, 210 labor days were "lost" due to striking activity in COMIBOL mines, while in 1963, this loss was 194.5 days. In the relatively quiet year of 1962, COMIBOL mines only lost 37.5 days to strikes. See table of strikes and lost man-hours, Appendix 5.

In mining communities like Corocoro, the years 1961-1965 resulted in an increase of the visibility of the union in the municipal and governing life of the town, not a decrease. In this period, city correspondence reflects a continuation of the revolutionary policy of valuing workers as citizens and as neighbors. On a local level, Alcalde Alberto Rios Villa addressed working class members of Corocoro as *compañeros* in official correspondence, and members of the Sindicato de Trabajadores Mineros de Corocoro (Corocoro Miners Union, STMC) and Worker Control returned the favor.¹² In other mining communities, this control was even more extreme: In Siglo XX, the miners' union controlled hiring and housing decisions, organized ore theft expeditions from the mines to fund arms for the workers' militia, and organized their own networks of commerce and food provision to lessen their dependence on the pulpería (and thus the state).¹³ Control over the union could result in lucrative business for those with merchant or agricultural connections. In this period, the municipal government contracted out Empresa Minera Corocoro's meat supplier for the pulpería to the highest bidder.¹⁴ As had happened since 1952, unrest at a national level allowed the workers to take direct control of the government in exchange for loyalty to the MNR.

Nonetheless, the workers felt that Paz Estenssoro and the MNR were veering dangerously off the revolutionary course. In May 1964, this tenuous state of crisis came to a head when workers and students called a general strike protesting the fraudulent elections, anti-worker

¹² This form of address was most pronounced in letters between alcaldía and the STMC in the years 1961-1964, ALP PJAC Caja 229.

¹³ Chungara, *Si Me Permiten Hablar*; Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*, 26. Field talks about Siglo XX as a "Communist Country" of its own. Corocoro was MNR territory, on the other hand, which may explain why it did not feel the effects of Paz's initial purge in 1963.

¹⁴ The highest bidder, in this case, was none other than former Secretary General Mario Durán Choque. Magda Böhr de Sotelo recalled that when the Gerente of the EMC Corocoro questioned such arrangements, he faced a near mutiny from the workers. Böhr de Sotelo, *Mi Experiencia En Las Minas*, 22. This transaction caused complications for Mario's brother Alberto when Mario Durán died in 1965. See letters between Alberto Durán, the EMC, and the Alcaldía, ALP PJJ Caja 229, Año 1965.

measures and general repression. The MNR called a state of siege and maintained control over the government during this conflict, but only barely. As in previous periods of national unrest, workers took advantage of the chaos to insert themselves more firmly into local politics. In Corocoro, the Secretary General of the STMC, Cesar Rodríguez, became mayor of the city, bringing the union to direct control of the Alcaldía once more. Unlike in 1952, when Mario Durán was mayor for just 9 days, Rodríguez remained in charge of the municipal government through November of 1964, until Vice President Barrientos launched his coup.

Rodríguez was no Federico Escóbar, the radical folk hero who lead the union in Siglo XX in the early 1960s. He had been involved in city politics since before the revolution and made no effort to overturn relations of power once mayor. Although he did not try to overhaul power substantially in Corocoro, he did ensure that the city made worker quality of life a priority, and insisted on the centrality of the working class to the identity of Corocoro itself. When as mayor, Rodríguez earmarked city funds for a worker library, he agreed with the union representative that such an institution would contribute to the moral education of the town itself.¹⁵ During this period, Rodríguez also made sure that relatives of workers benefitted from medical services at the Company Hospital at the expense of the city treasury.¹⁶

The rise of Cesar Rodríguez in 1964 reflected a new political consensus that had developed in Corocoro since the revolution. As Chapter 3 suggested, after the revolution, the

¹⁵ “Since attending to the Library of the Federated Union of Corocoro Mineworkers is critical for the moral education of the workers and truth be told the town itself, given that the majority are residents of Corocoro, we do not doubt that you will favor our request and we await your response with high hopes of counting on your forceful and efficient cooperation, given you are known for your decisive spirit and acuity.” “Como quiera que, la atención de la biblioteca por parte del Sindicato de Trabajadores Mineros de Corocoro es de imperiosa necesidad para la educación moral de los trabajadores y por que no decirlo del pueblo, puesto que la mayoría forme parte del pueblo de Corocoro, no dudamos de su respuesta favorable y quedamos con firme esperamos de contar con su valiosa y eficaz cooperación, ya que le caracteriza su espíritu decisivo y de comprensión.” ALP PJAC, Caja 229: Img 5539, Sept 22 1964 STMC-67/64

¹⁶ ALP PJAC Caja 237, 1964. TM-64

union became a new route to political power and authority in Corocoro. The workers, once unruly forces of disorder on the outskirts of town (as in chapter 2), or impoverished symbols of a failed state (as in chapter 1), were now seen as the core of the town itself, even if the rank and file still needed moral education.¹⁷ Thus, Cesar Rodríguez's assumption of the duties of mayor represented not a takeover, as Mario Durán's had been in 1952, but a reshuffling of power among several key groups of lawyers, merchants, and upwardly-mobile miners, all of whom were integrated into the MNR, and all of whom expected, like Hernan Siles, Juan Lechín, and Victor Paz Estenssoro, to share power in succession as the particular needs of the nation shifted. After Barrientos, miners began to be excluded at a national level from this political coalition, but it took longer in mining cities like Corocoro for this exclusion to be felt.

While the Secretary General of the local union was obviously an important interlocutor in town politics, the most respected and important position in most mining communities was that of Worker Control representative to the mines.¹⁸ The existence of workers who could make decisions for a company on the level of managers or engineers became emblematic, for many on the right and in the US, of the general populist excesses of the MNR.¹⁹ As the most visibly powerful position for workers, and the most obvious place where workers intervened in the economy, Worker Control was also one of the most contested pieces of legislation between the US and the MNR.²⁰ One of the first attempts to undermine worker political participation in fact

¹⁷ Notably, however, some of this demand for "moral education" came from the union itself, which saw one of its duties as contributing to the assimilation and integration of workers into the state, as the quote from footnote 12 suggests.

¹⁸ As with the position of treasurer of the municipality, Worker Control positions did not change hands as quickly as those of Alcalde or Secretary General.

¹⁹ One example can be found in Universidad Privada de Santa Cruz rector José Antonio de Chazal Palomo's prologue to the mining memoir of Magda de Sotelo, which blamed worker control for obstructing work, Böhrst de Sotelo, *Mi Experiencia En Las Minas*.

²⁰ See for example, "¿Quién Controla a los Controles Obreros?" 29 Sept 1959 *La Nación*.

came from Paz Estenssoro himself. In 1963, Paz Estenssoro sought to restrain worker authority by removing the legal right of Worker Control representatives to veto company decisions, but maintained the existence of the position itself. This decree represented a symbolic shift away from worker governance, placating US advisors somewhat, but in fact meant that in mining communities, Worker Control representatives carried on their functions much as before, especially in places like Siglo XX, until the Barrientos coup.²¹

Focused as they were on the specter of Communist Worker Control representatives in Siglo XX, the politicians and economists that sought to curb the institution of Worker Control may not have realized the extent to which the position actually could maintain centrist loyalty, not only to the MNR government, but to the mines as sites of production as well.²² Worker Control representatives were by their very position deeply concerned with maintaining production and order, that is, labor discipline.²³ June Nash, visiting workers after Worker Control had been abolished, was told that workers believed they could keep management from corruption and make sure production decisions kept the workers' interests in mind through worker control. This, of course, caused some resentment within the management, who believed worker representatives to be power hungry, withholding signatures on vital work and supply orders to ensure their demands were met. Nash also noted, however, that some workers themselves

²¹ "Fue Cancelado ayer el control obrero con derecho a veto" *El Diario* August 4, 1963.

²² Federico Escóbar, Worker Control representative for Siglo XX, was a member of the PCB. In neighboring Catavi, however, the Worker Control representative was an MNR man, as was the case in Corocoro. Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*, 29. Felix Muruchi remembers how closely these two men worked together, even during the early 1960s: Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*.

²³ When workers accepted the Triangular Plan in 1961, they did so as co-managers who, through exposure to the company's financial and logistical decision-making process, accepted the need to sacrifice some of their own interests for the long term viability of the company. During the radical XXII Congreso Nacional de Mineros in Colquiri, maintaining production schedules and quotas was as central to discussion as cost of living. Documentos del XXII CNM, 1963, Fondo Sinforoso Cabrera, Archivo y Biblioteca Nacional Legislativa de Bolivia (FSC ABNLB).

believed the practice to be a corrupting institution, because leaders could maintain themselves in power indefinitely, without accountability to the community.²⁴ In 1970, when the Popular Assembly debated whether to bring back worker control, they explicitly changed the institution so that a committee of workers would instead exercise a co-managing role within the company. Even this position was ambivalently embraced by the rank and file, which still considered this involvement to be dangerous.²⁵ After Barrientos, this narrative of worker control corruption, intransigence, and excessive power became one of the arguments the right used to dismantle the political rights of workers after 1965.²⁶

Over the course of the next eighteen years, Bolivians experienced an incredible range of styles of military dictatorship, from quasi-socialist revolutionary populist, a la Peru's Velasco regime (JJ Torres), to authoritarian right wing participant in Operation Condor, such as Banzer. Most historians argue that the miners were the first to experience the MNR's Thermidorian reaction, and consequently the first to notice that the revolution was over. But for the miners, Paz Estenssoro and Hernan Siles had been steering the revolution in a questionable direction since

²⁴ Nash, Dandler, and Hopkins, *Popular Participation in Social Change*, 572.

²⁵ Nash, Dandler, and Hopkins, *Popular Participation in Social Change*; Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*.

²⁶ Even leftist radical and child of miners Carmen Murillo de Castillo admitted that the power structure of COMIBOL allowed for the bureaucratic excesses that led to COMIBOL's downfall, although she also contrasted the spirit of the rank and file against this excess: "In the administrative process, small groups with ties to the governing party made their own business transactions, provoking a great bureaucracy and the worst inefficiency. At the level of popular opinion, COMIBOL was nicknamed 'I ate-Bolivia' (comí Bolivia) because of the effects of corruption. The high bureaucracy, the low productivity, and the soaring costs of production proved the mismanagement of the state; by contrast what the workers had done from the beginning was donate a day of labor to help the new government that had nationalized the mines. Especially during the first two years of nationalization, the workers labored under the slogan, 'maintain production levels of the Patiño mines while reducing costs.' [There existed among the workers] a self-imposed ethic of discipline and an unassailable honesty." "En el plano administrativo, pequeños grupos ligados al partido de gobierno hicieron sus negocios personales provocando una gran burocracia y una nefasta ineficiencia. A nivel popular se apodaba a la COMIBOL Comibolivia por los efectos de la corrupción. La alta burocracia, la baja productividad y los altísimos costos de producción demostraban el mal manejo de la empresa desde el Estado; en contraste con lo que los trabajadores hicieron desde el principio: regalar una jornada de trabajo para apoyar al nuevo gobierno que nacionalizó las minas. Especialmente, durante los primeros doce años de la nacionalización, los mineros trabajaban bajo la consigna de: 'mantener la producción de la Patiño bajando los costos.' Una disciplina consciente ya no impuesta y una honestidad a toda prueba." *Libres!*, 187.

1956. While the miners hoped to correct the wayward MNR, increasingly, participation in the government meant that the leadership of the union was complicit in this shift.²⁷ What the miners experienced after this period was exclusion at the national level while, at a local level, changes in community life produced a slow fracturing of the conditions that had produced their solidarity.

The End of the Durán Era in Corocoro

Mario Durán did not much outlive the MNR revolution itself. Just five months after the Barrientos coup, in March 1965, the 34-year-old union leader was celebrating Carnival when he climbed a hill alone and was fatally struck by lightning.²⁸ The city held two days of mourning, and the new Mayor Vicente Miguel offered condolences to the family.²⁹ But the moment in which a young miner and union man could make himself rich, marry well, and expect the city to honor him for his revolutionary service was passing. Although he was not killed by the dictatorship, Durán's death came at a moment in which the revolutionary coalition that had brought the miners, and especially people like Durán, to power both locally and nationally was falling apart. In July, General Barrientos removed workers from the governing board of Corocoro, fully abolished Worker Control, reduced wages, and brought the army to the mines when workers protested. At a local level, the mayor renegotiated the Durán brothers' cattle contract, rescinding both the political and economic preference owed to the family.³⁰

²⁷ See, for example, the anger directed at Juan Lechín during the popular assembly in 1971. Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*.

²⁸ Böhr de Sotelo, *Mi Experiencia En Las Minas*, 23.

²⁹ Alcalde Municipal Vicente Miguel, "Decreto 8 Marzo, 1965" ALP PJAC Caja 229.

³⁰ Alcalde Municipal a COMIBOL, re:Alberto Durán, N. A.Mpl.39-65, May 8, 1965 and May 10, A Mpl No 40/65, ALP PJAC Caja 229.

Lightning, like conquest, is something that brings power to some and death to others.³¹

But in many parts of the Andes, a place where someone has been killed by lightning is considered dangerous from that point onward for everyone in the region. Andeans like to think of systems in terms of analogous systems: as disorder in the human or animal body is linked to disorder in the social body (sickness is linked to social strife in Andean medicine), so political organization is literally mapped onto geographic organization.³² In other words, the lightning-related death of a union leader could be mapped on to the end of the revolution in 1964, symbolizing the end of the revolutionary political order and the rise of a new group to power. Very clearly, after the fall of the MNR and the death of Durán, the position of union leader had become more dangerous.

The dictatorship of General Barrientos changed life in the mines, but it was not immediately evident that Barrientos assuming the presidency meant the defeat of the miners' vision of revolutionary co-government. Playing into the image of the reformist military heroes of the 1930s and 1940s, Barrientos cast himself as a "Restorer" of a revolution that had lost its way, and in the months leading up to his coup had been courted by civilians of all political parties to

³¹ The altiplano is subject to fast moving, violent thunderstorms, especially during the tail end of the rainy season, March. First of all, it is associated with moments of transition and danger, moments like the rainy season, which are both necessary and yet hazardous because of things like flooding. There is an Andean god of lightning, whose Quechua name (Illapa) also shares etymological roots with the word for glory or fame, and who has been associated in some regions with both Santiago, St James, and with conquest itself. Gow notes that powerful healers would sometimes attempt to be struck by lightning, which was supposed to give greater power, if the attempt should be survived. Isbell also noted that lightning in Inca mythology was paired as a kind of binary opposite with choquechinchay, dangerous vapor that escaped from the earth, and certainly has something to do with mining (Gow, 1980, pg 283); Billie Jean Isbell, *To Defend Ourselves: Ecology and Ritual in an Andean Village* (Prospect Heights, Ill: Waveland Pr Inc, 1985); Paul Richard Steele and Catherine J. Allen, *Handbook of Inca Mythology* (ABC-CLIO, 2004), 199; Canessa, *Natives Making Nation*, 85.

³² Andean healers sometimes try to intentionally get struck by lightning to become reborn and augment their power. Joseph William Bastien, *Healers of the Andes: Kallawayas Herbalists and Their Medicinal Plants* (University of Utah Press, 1987).

perform this function.³³ Members of the Bolivian left as well as right welcomed Barrientos's military coup against MNR president Paz Estenssoro in the hopes that he might be more amenable to popular demands, and miners had no reason to believe they would lose out heavily in the transition to military dictatorship. In terms of the mining communities, the radical camps of Siglo XX and Llallagua became lightning rods for military repression in the 1960s, and as such have attracted the bulk of scholarly investigations into this era. But not all the mining camps were as radical, or as critical of the state, as Siglo XX. In more moderate cities like Corocoro and Oruro, which derived their livelihoods as hubs of transport and commerce as much as mining, miners retained some degree of protection from the military and maintained engagement with municipal politics for much longer. In Corocoro, at least, the workers in fact did collaborate with General Barrientos, with union leaders Hugo Parrado and Luis Villegas offering a suggested list of appointees to regional positions, in the name of democracy, for the newly restored revolutionary government.³⁴

³³ Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*, 77. But see also: A note about Christmas celebrations 1964 is signed "Por la revolución restauradora" ALP PJAC, Caja 229.

³⁴ November 17, 1964 to Ministro de Estado Tcnl Oscar Quiroga Teran: "*In this democratic climate, and making use of civil liberties* obtained thanks to the Restorative Revolution of November 4th, 1964, in the locality of Corocoro, en General Assembly of the Mine Workers and in a meeting of the townspeople of the Open Assembly, we have begun the process of nominating new Provincial Authorities, among those who enjoy the respect and confidence of both the workers and the people of Corocoro, whose names include the following: Vicente Miguel as Provincial Governor, Policarpio Alvarez, sub-prefect of the Province, Jose Mollinedo, Oficial of the Civil Registry. Signed, Luis Villegas, Secretary General and Hugo Parrado, Secretary of Government of the Federated Union of Mine Workers of Corocoro." [Emphasis mine.] *En un ambiente democrático y en uso de las libertades ciudadanas*, gracias a la revolución restauradora del 4 de Noviembre de 1964, en la localidad de Corocoro, en Asamblea General de Trabajadores Mineros y en reunion del pueblo en Cabildo Abierto, se ha procedido al nombramiento de nuevas autoridades de la Provincia, recaido en personas que gozan del respeto y confianza, tanto de los trabajadores como del pueblo todo de Corocoro, siendo los siguientes ciudadanos: Vicente Miguel, Alcalde Municipal de la Provincia; Policarpio Alvarez, Sub-prefecto de la Provincia; José Mollinedo, Oficial de Registro Civil. Firmado: Luis Villegas, Secretario General, Hugo Parrado, Secretario de Gobierno, STMC." ALP PJAC Caja 237 "Ref: Designación de Nuevas Autoridades." Both of these men would be fired from their jobs six months later in the first wave of layoffs decreed by Barrientos, but the tone of this letter suggests they had good reason to expect they would be called upon to help restore order in a military-worker coalition government.

From the standpoint of everyday life in the mines during this period, the revolution, though never quite living up to its promises, was still up for grabs as late as 1965, and even after. The miners felt that Paz Estenssoro and their own Juan Lechín had betrayed the revolution after the Triangular Plan in 1961, but still believed that the MNR— or someone else leading the state—could be convinced or coerced into returning to the fold. Miners still considered themselves participants in the national conversation of revolutionary life. But things had started to change. Since 1952, the MNR had focused more on building the capacity of the state to care for and repress its constituents than in deepening revolutionary transformations. Inasmuch as some of these reforms improved quality of life, the miners approved of some of these measures and suffered greatly from others, but the stakes of the fall of the MNR were not clear in late 1964.

That Barrientos did not carry out a worker-military revolution does not lessen the fact that it was a historical possibility in 1965. When Villegas and Parrado wrote to the Barrientos government, they referred to their “use of civil liberties” granted them in this newly “democratic climate.”³⁵ Barrientos and the miners agreed that the waning MNR had been violent and corrupt and decreasingly democratic, but Barrientos saw the visible presence of workers in positions of authority over production and civil life as evidence of this excess, even as the workers

³⁵ Union leadership in Corocoro also invited the new mayor Vicente Miguel to take part in union celebrations: From STMC 19 Feb 1965 “Al Alcalde Vicente Miguel, Ref. Realización Sorteo Philips.” In this message, we have the great honor to convey our sincere invitation to honor us with your important presence in the Philips lottery which will take place from 6pm in our union hall. To carry out the aforementioned lottery, we asking all public authorities to attend in order to legally and properly verify the lottery to which we refer, given the importance of the event we consider essential the attendance of the provincial authorities.” “Por intermedio del presente, tenemos el grato placer de dirigirnos a Ud con objeto de hacerle llegar nuestra sincera invitación, para vernos honrados con su valiosa presencia en el sorteo Philips que se realiza de horas 6pm en nuestro local sindical. Para llevar a cabo el sorteo mencionado, estamos haciendo llegar nuestra invitación a todos los autoridades públicas para contar con la presencia de ellos con el fin de verificar en forma legal y correcta el sorteo a la que nos referimos, puesto que siendo de importancia consideramos imprescindible la asistencia de las Autoridades Provinciales.” Firmado Luis Villegas, Sec General, Nicanor Cladera Ll, Sec Relaciones. ALP PJAC Caja 229.

themselves believed that they had been selflessly forbearing greater reward in the name of sustaining the revolution. Barrientos used his restorative revolution to carry on the MNR project of strengthening the state to the detriment of democratic participation, but unlike the MNR specifically excluded workers from participating in his restorative revolution. Starting in 1965, but really only gaining speed later in the decade in mining cities such as Huanuni or Corocoro, Barrientos's consolidation of the state contributed to a total erosion of the security of life, in terms of financial protections, workplace protections, and political voice.

Rather than dismantle the revolution completely, Barrientos moved to "restore" the revolution to its true course against the excesses of the MNR. The distinction here is a crucial one: Barrientos envisioned on some level, as had the MNR, a shared national project of development and progress undergirded by strong state institutions. The MNR had allowed too much personalist power, inefficiency, and corruption into the running of the state. On a local level, Barrientos's restauration meant dismantling the power of the MNR's allies and COMIBOL and strengthening the institutional power of the military and police. When Barrientos decreed that the national mining company should cut personnel, half of those fired in Corocoro were prominent union leaders. Local men accused of being part of the "repression" of the revolutionary years faced charges from the Department of Criminal Investigations, a national (not locally governed) police body responsible to Barrientos, which increasingly intervened in the local life of Corocoro. On a local level as well as national level, restoring the out of control political violence of the MNR was the narrative of the day. This political transition opened the door to the consolidation of a bureaucracy of mechanics and merchants, linked to the miners but less politically beholden to them.

Although Barrientos's reforms were carried out in the name of restoring order and rationalizing the economy, many of his acts in fact contributed to lining the pockets of a stable class of bureaucrats outside of the miners' union, who could make use of COMIBOL's coffers to fund their own personal projects. While Barrientos cut salaries and benefits for workers in the name of efficiency, his government saw an expansion of the administrative apparatus of COMIBOL from under 1500 to more than 1700 over the course of the 1960s. Beginning with the Triangular Plan, and carrying on through the 1980s, successive governments raided the profits of COMIBOL for their own gain while blaming the workers for COMIBOL's flagging production.³⁶

Reckoning with the Excesses of the MNR, 1964-1969

In many cases, Barrientos's reforms actually corresponded to local demands to hold corrupt or violent officials accountable and to enforce order in the town. In this way, national shifts in political power could speak to disputes that were incredibly personal. For example, on April 22, 1966, twenty-eight-year-old Rufina Chambi came to the offices of Corocoro's Department of Criminal Investigation (DIC) to report that her ex-boyfriend, thirty-three-year-old Eloy Candia, had drunkenly attempted to kill her, throwing rocks at her house and menacing her neighbors with a handgun. Candia, she told the police, had threatened and assaulted her several times before this. She also told the police that he had been bragging to her and others that he was a big man about town, as he was one of the repressive agents of the deposed MNR government.³⁷

³⁶ Central office staff for COMIBOL, whose numbers had remained under 700 until 1957 (that is, before Plan Eder's supposed efficiency reforms doubled the number of administrators), climbed from 1465 to 1597 in the years 1964-1966. Morales, *Minería boliviana*, 159.

³⁷ "It has been my misfortune to maintain illicit relations with the individual who responds to the name Eloy Candia Plata, *formerly a repressive agent of the deposed MNR government*, to the point where we had two children together. At the moment, Your Honorable Chief of the DIC, ...in order to protect my physical well-being, I had to leave my eternal tormentor, given that he also was governed by an irascible attitude inclined towards arrogance and violence,

The chief investigator, Eustaquio Loza Santos, visited Rufina Chambi's house, found the rocks mentioned and spoke to a teenaged boy who lived in the same building to confirm her statement. At this point, he issued a warrant for the arrest of Eloy Candia. In many ways, this case, a violent domestic dispute between young, unmarried partners, was absolutely typical of life in Corocoro. Rufina Chambi was able to make use of shifts in political power to protect herself, however. Her voice in the archive is indicative of the changes that Corocoro underwent during the transition to military dictatorship, first in 1964 and later, more forcefully, in August 1971.

First of all, Chambi's claim that Candia was a repressive agent of the fallen revolutionary government mirrors the complaint from chapter 3, in which miners used the revolutionary government to curb an abusive power holder, accusing merchant Juan Acarapi of carrying out personal vendettas under the protection of the repressive Urriolagoitia regime. This time, however, it was the revolution itself that had provided cover for Eloy Candia's actions. Rufina Chambi's claims resonated in a political climate in which many believed that the MNR government under Victor Paz Estenssoro had become authoritarian and repressive, either losing the thread of the revolution or carrying it too far. The miners, particularly, bore the brunt of this reputation.³⁸ The link between political regulation and "rationalization" of the mining economy

to which the entire town can attest. Moreover, respected Chief of the DIC, this man for very many years has ignored his duties as a father, that is to say he has never deigned to give me the resources needed by his children, even though it pleases his vanity to be a prestigious 'gentleman.'" "Mi desgracia ha hecho que mantenga relaciones ilícitas con el individuo que responde al nombre de Eloy Candia Plata, *ex agente represivo del gobierno depuesto del MNR*, hasta el extremo de llegar a procrear dos hijos. Al presente señor Jefe de la DIC, ...en resguardo de mi integridad física tuve que verme obligada a separarme de mi eterno verdugo, ya que también por otra parte primaba en él un actitud irascible del que hace gala, proclive a la violencia, como consta a toda la vecindad de Corocoro. Por otra parte respetado señor Jefe de la DIC, este individuo desde hace mucho tiempo atrás ha descuidado sus obligaciones como padre, es decir que jamás se ha dignado en darme el sustento necesario para sus hijos, no obstante de que se da ínfulas de ser "caballero" [sic] y de reconocido prestigio. Rufina Chambi de Mamani vs Eloy Candia "Tentativa de Asesinato," 22 Abril, 1967: Caja 409 Expediente 058822.

³⁸ ALP PJJ Caja 383, Expediente 259: January 23, 1961. "Ministerio Público contra Jose Condarco (alcalde de la cárcel), Document 19" Jose Condarco told the courts: "On January 16, taking advantage of the lack of security at the Corocoro jail, the detained Juan and Julian Mamani disappeared and have not yet been found, despite having done everything possible in order to capture them and make them return to the detention to which they have been subjected." "En el 16 del mes en curso, aprovechando de la poca seguridad del Penal de esta ciudad, los detenidos

pursued by Barrientos can be found in a list of laid off miners from June 1965, on which Candia's name appears along with several union leaders, local powerholders, and worker control representatives such as Luis Villegas and Hugo Parrado.³⁹

One of the major examples members of the right and the left used about the violence and excesses of the MNR revolution was Paz Estenssoro's personal police force, known as Control Político (CP). CP agents were known for brutal crackdowns against Paz's political opponents involving kidnapping and sometimes murder.⁴⁰ Control Político did not operate directly in Corocoro, but the proximity of La Paz meant that CP became a threat that locals with connections to the MNR could use against their neighbors: in 1964, a dispute between two families that shared the same company house turned political when one woman accused her neighbor of immorality. Hugo Michel, the accuser's husband, then threatened to go to La Paz in order to denounce the couple as Falangists in front of Control Político.⁴¹ The wife of the supposed Falangist, hoping to protect her husband, reported this threat to the police. As with the companions of Mariano Silva in Chapter 2, the accused Rivas de Rivera was using the local police to protect his family from government agents in La Paz. If Eloy Candia was in fact part of Control Político, that may help explain how quickly and thoroughly he disappeared from the municipality once charges emerged against him.

Juan Mamani y Julian Mamani han desaparecido no pudiendo ser habidas hasta el presente, no obstante de haber hecho lo posible para procurar su captura y hace que vuelvan a la detención a que estaban sujetos.”

³⁹ “Retirados” June 29, 1965. Hand-written note, ALP PJAC Caja 229.

⁴⁰ CP was run by a “Nazi” loyal only to Paz Estenssoro named San Ramón. See Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*, 168.

⁴¹ “Hugo Michel left this morning to go to La Paz and denounce [your husband] as a Falangist in order to bring CP agents to apprehend him and beat him up.” “Hugo Michel había viajado en la mañana de hoy a la Ciudad de La Paz a denunciarlo de FALANGISTA y que traerá agentes del Control Político para aprearlo y sentarle la mano” Expediente 009368 3 Febrero 1964, Caja 396.

For most of the 1950s, Paz Estenssoro had reserved his most brutal repression for right-wing dissidents, especially among the Catholic Fascist-leaning Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB). After 1954, the MNR sent Falangist activists to detention camps in the highlands and particularly to those located in communities of militant miners. Corocoro was notorious on the right for hosting one of these camps along with rural mining cities such as Llallagua, Uncía, and Curahuara de Carangas, south of Corocoro, near Volcán Sajama.⁴² According to Falangist lore, local police and “burly miners” collaborated in Corocoro to mentally and physically torture as well as kill political prisoners in what they termed concentration camps. Falangist Felix Mena was the most famous of these, and disappeared in Corocoro in 1963.⁴³ In these accounts, the idea that miners were carrying out repressive violence against middle-class rightwing activists distilled all of the fears of MNR revolutionary overreach into a single, unacceptable, reversal of the social order.

After the Barrientos coup, the right wing and falangist-sympathetic press ran several news stories about the “totalitarian” MNR regime and its “concentration camps” to support the Restorative rightward trend of Barrientos’s revolution. Around this time, several Falangist activists also published memoirs and accounts of their torture at the hands of the MNR. In 1966, *La Presencia* ran one such account, saying that the remains of eight men had been discovered in “the well-known concentration camps of Corocoro,” including one wearing a carabinero’s uniform.⁴⁴ Local authorities, however, were not behind the discovery, and remained skeptical in

⁴² Wife of the superintendent, Magda Böhr de Sotelo spent much of her time in Corocoro tending to the first wave of prisoners in 1954, who were often friends of family members and school-mates. Böhr de Sotelo, *Mi Experiencia En Las Minas*, 28–36.

⁴³ Mario Peñaranda Rivera, *Entre los hombres lobos de Bolivia: En las prisiones de la dictadura totalitaria del M. N. R.* (Instituto de Ediciones Americanas, 1965).

⁴⁴ *La Presencia*, 9/11/66. Control Político, in other words, was not affiliated with the local police, who were not necessarily themselves partisan to this discrediting of the MNR.

fact that the graves even existed. The news article became part of a case file in the DIC's archives, but the investigation was never carried out. It is clear that while the Barrientos regime benefitted from exposing excessive MNR violence, it was not inclined to either investigate or bring to justice local officials who may have been involved, likely because these camps had actually been run, in Corocoro at least, by local police. The concentration camps have become part of the popular lore of Corocoro, although not of the Bolivian left more broadly, and Corocoro ceased to be a place where prisoners were held after 1964.⁴⁵

Despite Paz's willingness to use Control Político against political opponents, his instinct for maintaining popular support meant that the miners themselves did not experience repression at the hands of Control Político for the most part, although by the early 1960s the miners did clash with pro-government peasant militias and the military in Siglo XX.⁴⁶ The early years of the Barrientos dictatorship signaled a shift at the national level whereby right wing groups found relatively less hostility from the government and the press and leftists and workers particularly found a great deal more repressive attention. The process by which the right devalued the revolutionary state and sought to cast its violence as illegitimate is part of the transition of the military dictatorship, and was aided by local disputes such as that of Chambi and Candia. The spate of Falangist-sympathizing publications in 1965 and 1966 are evidence of the political shift,

⁴⁵ Continuing its practice of divide and conquer, the MNR seems to have meted out distinct treatments to disparate groups, sending political dissidents to regions where they were unlikely to have allies. So, for example, it sent right wing, middle class opponents to hostile mining communities, and left wing opponents to lowlands prisons. This practice also spread out complicity with political repression throughout Bolivia and contributed to future divisions, allying each group with the state against a particular enemy in exchange for political benefits. Personal Communication, Thomas Field, August 2015. On the other hand, it is unclear how much of a "concentration camp" Corocoro ever had. My evidence suggests that Corocoro simply used its military base to house prisoners periodically.

⁴⁶ "Laines y Jucumanis Reiteraron su Adhesion al Gobierno del Presidente Paz" *El Diario* 6 July 1961 and "Es Grave la Situacion en Siglo XX" 8 July 1961.

but as the police response suggests, on a local level, Corocoro maintained something more akin to a status quo ante. The most important shift in this period was an extension of reforms of the MNR period: a more effective and robust police presence and the reduction of the purview of workers over conditions of daily life.

The transitions between governments in 1964-1965 offered opportunities for referenda on the direction of the revolution itself. In their accusations over the totalitarian nature of the MNR and the concentration camps in Corocoro, middle class urban residents marked their concerns the legitimacy of worker ministers, union co-gobierno, and mining militias. Since 1952, the miners had forged a new definition of decency and status for themselves on both the local and national levels, but the experience of worker revolution threatened the nationalist cohesion that had previously made allies of miners, urban middle class actors, and small town elites.

The use of words like “massacre” and “concentration camp” in the press and in memoirs of this period were pieces of ammunition in a battle over legitimacy between left and right, but also between different sectors of the popular classes. While miners used terms such as massacre to describe battles with the military (as in the case of Catavi in 1942, and as would happen again in Siglo XX in 1965) and white massacre (for layoffs that happened around the same time) to call out a government that would not protect its workers, the right deployed the figure of the concentration camp to signal the absolute political atrocity of subjecting middle class opposition figures to the control of the workers and the unsympathetic army. The miners did not hide their participation in these forms of political violence during the MNR regime. The miners saw their complicity in MNR violence against the FSB as part of Worker Control; it bolstered their sense of being revolutionary actors and defenders of the nation itself.

By publicizing MNR repression, Barrientos was also able to mask his own increased use of the police and the military against critics of his own regime, who were now more likely to be imprisoned on the Island of Coati in Lake Titicaca or in the lowland strongholds of the FSB. It is thus no surprise that the military state wanted to publicize the violence of the defunct MNR camps in the highlands. The military state wanted to dismantle the apparatus that valued miners, including reorganizing municipal government, but kept the security state and the DIC and the army in place. By discrediting the violence of the MNR, they reinforced their own images of stability and order, while delegitimizing particular kinds of violence: those exercised by empowered workers. Corocoro was increasingly marginalized, both on the left as it did not carry a stronghold of the PCB, and by the right, as it fell from importance with the MNR.

A key component of Barrientos's "Restorative Revolution" was curbing another excessive outgrowth of the MNR's brand of populism: COMIBOL. As the previous chapter suggested, since at least 1956, the United States and the Bolivian government had been concerned with the extensive bureaucracy and lack of profitability of the nationalized mining company. The power of the workers, and particularly worker control, was saddled with most of the blame for this excess.⁴⁷ Barrientos pledged to "rationalize" the mining industry by cutting unnecessary personnel and costs. Barrientos put military men into the top leadership positions of COMIBOL itself, turning the company into an enemy of its workers once again.⁴⁸ Decree 07171

⁴⁷ The workers themselves were profoundly concerned with COMIBOL's economic woes, although they disagreed that they were to blame. For this reason, the mineworkers as a whole had voted to accept the provisions of the Triangular Plan, although they were able to prevent certain of its provisions from taking place as long as the MNR remained in power, and they continued to offer their own plans for production. For example, the miners argued that their own productivity had gone up, but not enough to account for the falling ore content of the overworked mines, management excesses, and lack of investment. Nash, Dandler, and Hopkins, *Popular Participation in Social Change*, 566–577.

⁴⁸ In Corocoro in 1966, he brought in an Interventor Militar named Armando Loayza de la Vega to take over the EMC, which up until then had been run by a stable assortment of civilians from outside Corocoro. See ALP PJAC Caja 229.

of 1965 revoked the mandates of all union leaders to represent workers. In June, Barrientos reduced wages by 40%, reduced food subsidies and began a series of layoffs that targeted politically involved miners and powerful union members starting in May 1965. In Corocoro, for example, 26 men were fired, including the Union Secretary General, two other union secretaries, and the president of the indigenous community of Callirpa. Although these layoffs were carried out in the name of rationalization, they were very clearly targeted at reducing union control over the mines. Nationally, the number of men working inside the mines was reduced from 9,348 in 1964 to 8,167 in 1966, and exterior workers from 13,412 to 12,652.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the municipality of Corocoro in this period took a similarly cost-cutting approach to governance. Mayor Vicente Miguel cut down government expenditures by reducing the number of intendents to one and cutting funds for the worker library.⁵⁰ Barrientos also introduced the practice of Block Caving in the largest mine at Siglo XX, which involved dynamiting vast tracts of mountain at once, allowing for even greater ore processing at once. This rationalization did not reduce bureaucracy, but it did lower personnel costs: in 1966, COMIBOL ran a profit for the first time since 1957.

⁴⁹ Morales, *Minería boliviana*; Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*. Spread over the entirety of COMIBOL's holdings, local layoffs could be rather small. They were targeted at union workers and quite likely, trouble-makers. Of the 26 men fired in June of 1965, I have identified 16. Half of these were involved in the union in some official capacity (had signatures on decrees, were invited into Juntas Consultativas, or held elected positions, including two secretary generals and the workers' control representative). One was a peasant leader from the early 1950s up through 1965. At least twelve of the 16 I identified were also present as witnesses or litigants in court cases involving domestic or social disputes. 7 involved as perpetrators in violent disputes: 4 bar fights, 2 counts of domestic violence, one abuso deshonesto, all before 1965. No bar fights after. One man was accused of theft from the company. Two continued to be involved in the miners' union in the 1970s, and two men were involved in the municipal government in the 1970s. Retired Miners, ALP PJAC Caja 229.

⁵⁰ AM 5-65, suggests that removing funding for the worker library was one of the very first initiatives pursued by Miguel, a Lebanese merchant who became a naturalized Bolivian citizen in 1937. Miguel also ceased the practice of adding Vivas to the Revolution to his municipal decrees, as had Alberto Rios Luna, but emphasized urban renewal and order. Miguel demanded that Comibol fix the city's electrical generators. AM44-1965, ALP PJAC Caja 229; See Caja 237.

The net effect of all of these reforms was lowering the quality of life for workers while maintaining or even increasing the distance between workers and management in terms of salaries and benefits. As Morales noted in his history of Bolivian mining, while COMIBOL had raised workers' salaries by 54% in the inflationary years 1957-1964, the central office saw its employees' earnings increase by 142%. Thus the July 1965 wage cuts brought workers down under their living standard in 1957, but did not hit central office workers nearly so hard.⁵¹ In the mining communities, both military officials sent to keep order and company management benefitted from differential access to goods and services at the company store, including increased access to meat, allocations of cigarettes, and free tickets to the local cinema.⁵² Thus the social benefits originally intended to reward mine workers for their hard work and risk became luxuries of the military and bureaucratic classes.

While Paz Estenssoro had tried to reduce the power of the workers by removing authorization for veto power over economic decisions in 1963, Barrientos abolished the position of Worker Control entirely in 1965. When unions protested his reforms, he sent the army in to control the most militant and autonomous of the mines, particularly Siglo XX. It was in the context of both political "restoration" of order and economic "rationalization" against the workers that Rufina Chambi filed her complaint.⁵³ By removing Worker Control, Barrientos removed a crucial tie that bound the company, the workers, and the state, in a shared project, and thus also lost the potential for compromise with the workers. Control Obrero had implicated the

⁵¹ Morales, *Minería boliviana*, 161.

⁵² Lora, *A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971*, 272.

⁵³ Rationalization in Corocoro also meant, as was noted in document 5542, that the city abolished on of the municipal intendent positions within the police department for budget reasons. In the same year, the mayor discontinued financial support for a worker's library, again citing budget. ALP PJAC Caja 229, 1965.

workers and the union itself in the personnel and safety decisions of the mines.⁵⁴ Control Obrero was supposed to make sure that the company took good care of its workers, and thus it took on responsibility, albeit indirectly, for the safety of the men in the mines. Barrientos also brought in the practice of installing government loyalists as the heads of “yellow unions,” which seem to have coexisted in Corocoro and other mining communities along side the more oppositional leadership.⁵⁵

At the same time, Barrientos neither privatized COMIBOL nor completely dismantled the social welfare institutions that had grown up around the mining corporation in the 12 years of the revolution.⁵⁶ The number of CNSS health workers and teachers attached to the COMIBOL mines continued to grow through the 1970s. This created a contradictory set of political arrangements in a place like Corocoro, which did not see direct military repression to the same degree as Siglo

⁵⁴ June Nash suggests that Control Obrero functioned primarily in Oruro as a check on the power of administrators in this period. This is probably true, and as she noted, probably did limit production, or at least the ability of workers and administrators to work together. Nash, *We Eat the Mines*, 265. Removing Control Obrero increased massacres, and decreased worker oversight over their own safety and conditions were thus all part of the same experience of political loss.

⁵⁵ A series of letters from Alcalde Vicente Miguel reflect that the mayor took a renewed interest in who was in charge of the union in 1965, rewarding some workers and attempting to exclude others. “This is to certify: Mr. Armando Mendoza was today elected as a member of the Strike Committee on the date of May 19 of the present year, although this worker has not taken any strike-related activities and has not even attended the meetings called by the Federated Union of Mineworkers of Corocoro.” “Certifica: En cuanto puede y el derecho le permite, que el señor Armando Mendoza efectivamente fue elegido como miembro del Comité de Huelga en fecha diecinueve de mayo del presente año, pero dicho obrero no tubo [sic] ninguna actividad huelgística y menos asistió a las reuniones convocadas [sic] por el Sindicato de Trabajadores Mineros de Corocoro.” Alcalde Municipal, Vicente Miguel, May 1965, ALP PJAC Caja 229. Also, at the same time that Luis Villegas claimed leadership of the Corocoro union, Vicente Miguel wrote to company management to allow Julio Condarco to take time off to travel to La Paz, claiming that he was Secretary General. 5544 AM-38/65 Sr Arturo Saunero C, Adm General de la Empresa Minera Corocoro. “Debiendo viajar a la ciudad de La Paz, como integrante de la delegación del pueblo ante el Gobierno, ruego dar licencia al señor Julio Condarco, Secretario General del STMC, a partir del día lunes 26 del presente, mientras dure dicha comisión.” This discrepancy may reflect the creation of a parallel leadership structure: one official and one clandestine in this period. However, given that Condarco was also fired in 1965, this probably reflects instead a conflict between wings of the labor union at this time.

⁵⁶ Barrientos privatized oil production, allowing Gulf Oil to contract out oil production in this period, but did not touch the mines. See Cote, “The Nature of Oil in Bolivia, 1896-1952.” Incidentally, neither did Banzer, nor any of the other military governments, though he took initial steps in this direction by introducing private-public mining concerns.

XX, but nonetheless curbed the local influence of the miners in their own lives and the political life of the nation. Furthermore, witnessing the FSTMB leadership's complicity in the end of the MNR, as well as Barrientos's curbing of local abuses, created a growing sense among the rank and file that the labor leadership empowered by the MNR had betrayed their base. The rank and file thus agreed, to a point, with the middle class critique of the union bureaucracy: this personalist power and corruption did need curbing. This sense of popular resentment would explode after Barrientos's death, when subsequent military commanders tried to channel unrest into worker democracy in 1969-1970.

Death by Bureaucracy: The Expansion of the Police into Daily Life

Barrientos and subsequent military governments benefitted greatly from a consolidation and enhancement of the forces of law and order, the military and the police, that had actually begun under Paz Estenssoro. Among the tenets of the Stabilization Plan of 1957 had been increased funding from the United States to rebuild the military, but on his own initiative, Paz Estenssoro reconstituted the Police with a presidential decree in 1961, creating the DIC units that now came to Corocoro to investigate crime where before intendents had maintained public order. These DIC agents were organized directly under the president's jurisdiction rather than the municipality. The law of 1961 also created new police judges charged with making decisions about criminal offenses. After the coup, Barrientos simply expanded and modernized the functioning of the DIC, such that after 1965 they became the major regulators of public order in places like Corocoro, rivaling but not replacing the judges and civic organizations that had previously held sway in the city.⁵⁷


⁵⁷ This was part of a larger move to centralize power: in this period, Barrientos also restructured the provincial and cantonal units of Bolivia, which created a new canton of Villa Anta in a location that had previously pertained to the city of Corocoro. "Villa Anta, 1 Nov 1967" ALP PJJ Caja 399. Vicente Miguel's previously mentioned reduction of

One of Barrientos's most pressing concerns was disarming the peasant and miner militias that continued to hold sway over particular communities, especially in the Cochabamba valley and among mining camps. Disarming the miners' militias meant registering gun owners and limiting future access to weapons. So, for example, Rufina Chambi's claim that Eloy Candia had menaced her neighbor with a gun was a claim the police were inclined to take seriously.⁵⁸ While handguns were still relatively rare, some Chaco veterans and militia members did have access to weapons. Dynamite was a greater concern of the police in this period. Both the municipality and COMIBOL sought to curb the excessive use of dynamite on the part of miners, which they explicitly tied to urban disorder during times of festivals. In this way, the military and its allies in the municipality fostered a return to earlier associations between miners, disorderly festivities, and political violence, since miners often brought dynamite to their rallies against the government and military.⁵⁹

the municipal intendentes may have thus corresponded to national initiative that sought to centralize executive powers in the national government.

⁵⁸ Guns were not widespread in Corocoro, but members of the public did have them. Very few of the cases of violence in the Corocoro judicial system concerned guns. I found two in the city itself aside from the Chambi dispute: A case in May 1965 about a gunshot heard in the neighborhood, ALP PJJ Caja 400. In a later case, mining company empleado Nelberto Maya Choque was killed by gunshot, see autopsy report from the Direccion Regional de Investigaciones Criminales, July 8, 1968, ALP PJAC Caja 228. Choque may have been killed in an attempt to rob the mines. Img 5487. Outside of Corocoro, there was at least one other gun-related homicide from Canton Callapa, see pictures below, ALP PJJ Año 1969, Caja 416.

⁵⁹ "Empresa Minera Corocoro Intervencion Militar Corocoro" 15 June, 1965: "Given that the country is under a State of Siege and the Nationalized Mines are under a process of complete restoration, in the interests of the economic situation of the EMC and the security and tranquility of the population of Corocoro, which has changed since [the military coup of] November 4th of last year, dynamite and the use of explosives in general are completely prohibited, even if they are for special events or religious uses. The person or persons who break this rule will face strict sanctions according to law. The subprefect of the Province and the heads of each section and department of the EMC are charged with making this law known. Signed, General Armando Loayza de la Vega, military comptroller for the EMC." "Encontrandose el país en Estado de Sitio y las Minas Nacionalizadas en plena restructuración, velando por la economía de la Empresa Minera en esta capital y la seguridad y tranquilidad de la población, alterado hasta el 4 de Noviembre del año pasado, se prohíbe terminantemente el empleo de dinamita y explosivos en general, ya sean en acontecimientos particulares o religiosos. El contraventor o contraventores a la presente disposición serán pasibles energicas [sic] sanciones conforme a Ley. Los señores subprefecto de la Provincia, Jefes de Departamento y Seccion de la Empresa Minera Corocoro, quedan encargados de hacer conocer la presente disposición. Gral Armando Loayza de la Vega, interventor militar en la EMC, fdo." ALP PJAC Caja 229. Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*; Chungara, *Si Me Permiten Hablar*.



Images 5.1 and 5.2 Investigative Rendering of a homicide in Canton Callapa, where a man accused of robbery was shot by his irate and inebriated victim, using the rifle he was issued by the army during the Chaco War (1932-5). DIP agents confiscated the weapon and arrested its owner, sombrero José Ramos Mamani. The case was then transferred to the Corocoro Courts. Expediente Sin Numero, ALP PJJ Caja 1969.

As my third chapter suggested, the forging of worker citizenship had, as a central component, a celebration of working class masculinity and privilege which included rights to determine legitimate and illegitimate deployments of sexuality and violence. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the state prioritized protecting working families in ways that offered women new ways to protect themselves in cases of spousal abuse or violence. Worker disputes over sexuality could become explosive, literally, as Norberto Aliaga responded to being called a cuckold with threats to blow up the house of his accuser.⁶⁰ One of the most common types of court dispute in this period was the accusation of sexual assault, which was typically brought to the attention of the courts in this period by the father or husband of the victim. As noted in

⁶⁰ ALP PJJ Caja 397 Expediente 006725 14 Mayo 1964 Demetrio Alcón Colque responded that Aliaga was his in-law, and, “since he is a worker inside the mines, he has often taken stolen sticks of dynamite from the mines under his armpits, moreover, in many times he has threatened me, however this is the first time that surprisingly he has come to the authorities as a victim.” “como es trabajador de interior mina muchas veces le han sacado cartuchos de dinamita de las axilas, ademas, el en reiteradas veces me ha agredido, pero sin embargo es el primero en sorprender a las autoridades haciendose la vicima.” Aliaga had also threatened to blow up Alcón’s house. One of the witnesses, dynamite expert Celestino Mamani, 21, affirmed that Alcón had called Aliaga’s wife “a giant whore,” “una gran puta” and Aliaga himself “a stupid cuckold, his wife’s pimp” “sonzo cachudo, alcahuete de su mujer.” Demetrio Alcón also claimed that one of the witnesses against him was his “greatest enemy” because he had stopped helping her husband with his festival duties in the local band.

chapter 3, cases of seduction that came to the attention of the courts tended to be cases in which patriarchs had lost control over their families and could no longer exercise their expected degree of control over the sexuality of their daughters or curb the access of wayward young men. In other words, the police did not instigate these kinds of investigations without invitation from community members to do so. Many of these cases involved extended family members or trusted neighbors, and the courts and police were brought in to resolve a situation that had extended beyond the abilities of the family to deal with internally.⁶¹ In this period police expansion channeled both middle class anxieties over worker unruliness and local elite and even local worker concerns about masculine sexual threats to their daughters to welcome, to some degree, an increased state presence in the intimate life of these communities.

A comparison of case files from the late 1950s heyday of the MNR and the Barrientos regime (1964-1969) demonstrates the expansion of police presence in peripheral cities in the 1960s. Through the early 1960s in Corocoro, a criminal complaint would be addressed to a judge, accuser and accused would present their own evidence, list of witnesses, and questions for examination. The litigants themselves, in other words, did most of the investigative work. Thus, if one member of a criminal dispute had more resources or friendly witnesses at his or her

⁶¹ In these cases, “estupro” increasingly became the charge, rather than “abuso deshonesto.” Whereas abuso deshonesto usually meant a courtship process that had broken down, estupro more specifically referred to a forcible assault. In the 1960s, estupro cases particularly increase in the court files of the Corocoro jurisdiction. For example in 1961, miner Mariano Chura Tarqui brought charges against his son in law Nicolas Flores for assaulting Chura’s 14 year old daughter on his land in Guallatiri Chico, bringing in witnesses to attest to her resistance to the assault. Flores was taken into custody twice for the crime, once in September and once again the following March. Expediente 85618, September 25, 1961, ALP PJJ Caja 383. In June 1963, miner Laureano Mamani brought charges on behalf of his 16 year old daughter against Victor Gonzales for both breaking into his house and assaulting the girl while he was at work in the mines. In this case, Gonzales was also arrested, but pleaded with the courts to release him without bail given the “well-known financial situation of the miners.” This request was successful, as Mamani had to remind the courts to find Gonzales again the following year as he had still not paid restitution. Expediente 202429, 4 Junio 1963, ALP PJJ Caja 392. One exception, in which an outsider was brought to court on charges of abuso deshonesto: Expediente 084390 10 Abril 1965, ALP PJJ Caja 400. Case brought by Ninoca resident and Labrador Ponciano Alcón against Justo Tola (estudiante) on behalf of his 18-year-old daughter Gerarda. In seeking to prove the charge, she was asked by the judge why she did not resist Tola.

disposal, it would be very difficult for the other party to win the case.⁶² Outside of Corocoro itself, which as noted in chapter 1, had a police force partially due to the subsidies of foreign mining companies in the city, this means that investigative capability in the Pacajes countryside was low. The MNR had addressed this scarcity of institutional presence by combining political party and state-building functions: In 1957, a murder case in provincial Pacajes had been sent to the Comando of the MNR, because there was no other authority to whom they could turn.⁶³

The new law incorporated local police forces into departmental command units directly responsive to the executive branch, with departmental and provincial command centers and a military-style hierarchy. In so doing, Paz created the ability to replace the existing police organizations with a more formally regulated and centralized body, giving to the police some of the responsibilities previously held by judges.⁶⁴ Articles 123 (misdemeanors) and 125 (more serious crimes) also established police judges, specifically concerned with resolving and issuing sanctions in criminal rather than civil disputes. For many kinds of crimes, the Ministerio Público now became the prosecuting party in these cases, and the police themselves carried out standard investigations and asked standardized questions of witnesses, accusers, and defendants. As a result, case files became much more detailed and expansive affairs in this period. The detailed notes about how many stones fell in what locations and with what velocity around Rufina Chambi's house is testament to this fact. The form used to establish the events of Eloy Candia's

⁶² For example, the child support case from Chapter 4 was unresolved for years until Nicolas Alanoca placed himself directly into the regulatory arm of the state; that is, began working at COMIBOL.

⁶³ From ALP PJJ, Caja 372 Expediente 04763 12 Marzo 1957, A murder case was sent to the Comando of the MNR in Kellacani "because no other authority exists here" "por no existir otra autoridad en el lugar." The resolution was a private settlement acknowledging the drunken accident and asking the accused to pay an indemnization of several hundred thousand Bolivianos. Ten years later, the son of the deceased was still petitioning the courts to make the accused pay the agreed upon sum.

⁶⁴ Ley 18 Dic 1961, Art 122. Although this law was passed in 1961, its effects were not felt in Corocoro until Barrientos's reforms in 1965.

attack on Rufina Mamani, for example, did not exist in the Corocoro court system prior to 1964.⁶⁵

In other cases, municipal police and DIC agents could work alongside the National Guard to restore order, even for trivial affairs like injurias and “scandal.” In October 1968, after being publically called a *grandísima puta*, *mujer sucia*, and unnamed insults she considered to be even worse, Guadalupe Cala de Adrian decided she was tired of the aggressive way Guadalupe Mamani de Valeriano (whose quarrels played an important role in chapter 3) treated the residents of the Barrio Campamento Toledo. Citing concern for herself as well as her neighbors, she asked the police to make sure Mamani desisted from her behavior in the future. In direct contrast to 1961, when Carlos Condori had to bring his suit to court himself, the chief of the local national guard made his own investigations, declaring “the author of these crimes” to be Guadalupe Mamani, and encouraging the local police to enforce her good behavior.⁶⁶ In this case, a woman in the mining camp welcomed the police presence in the name of stability against the family of a union official whose local power had gone too far.

The laws that reorganized the police in 1961 provided for a future of economic clashes with miners when they specifically suggested that one of the functions of the DIC was to regulate mining policy.⁶⁷ Building on his rationalization of COMIBOL, one of Barrientos’s stated reasons for increasing police presence and military presence in the mines in 1965 was to control ore theft

⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the Código Penal remained unchanged from reforms in the early twentieth century until Banzer revised the *Código de Procedimiento Penal* in 1972. See Appendix 6 for a sample investigative form from the Barrientos period.

⁶⁶ Guadalupe Cala de Adrián vs Guadalupe Mamani de Valeriano, October 24, 1968. However, by November, Mamani had still not responded to requests to offer testimony, which suggests either that the local police were less concerned than the national guard to enforce this kind of affair or that her husband Celso Valeriano still held sway in the neighborhood. ALP PJJ Caja 415.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, art 6f. Also, while the *policía minera* continued to exist as a separate body, in Corocoro at least it came under the jurisdiction of the *Guardia Nacional* by the late 1960s.

(jukeaje).⁶⁸ This again was political, as miners in Siglo XX had been organizing coordinated jukeaje in order to fund arms for their militia.⁶⁹ This may have been going on in Corocoro as well, since one of the miners laid off from the Corocoro mines in June of 1965 had been accused of stealing construction material from the company. Jukeaje, which had a long and semi-official status in the mines since the colonial era, was in fact at its lowest levels directly after 1952, as Company workers felt an imperative to keep production officially sanctioned and equitably remunerated.⁷⁰ Felix Muruchi, who entered the mines around the time Barrientos took power, noted that once he grew up, he rejected jukeaje in favor of actual Company employment, which he saw as a route to respectability and financial stability. However, as the mines and the state became increasingly associated with repression and failure to provide an adequate living for the miners, worker support for and inclination towards jukeaje increased again.⁷¹

‘Proclive a Violencia’: Suicide, Domestic Violence, and Sexual Assault

The period between 1964 and 1969 saw the re-establishment of a narrative of criminality that had been abolished by the nationalist coalitions of the 1930s and 1940s: that the miners were

⁶⁸ Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*, 68. Barrientos also put the Policía Minera for Corocoro under the control of the National Guard in this period, as a case in which two high ranking workers were assaulted by young men in the Plaza Minera, their families took their complaints to the national guard. Expediente 165750 Fidel Chavez Ávila vs Teodosio Arcaya y Otros, 18 Mayo 1968, ALP PJJ Caja 415.

⁶⁹ Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship*, 25.

⁷⁰ Kajcheo (free-time labor) and Jukeaje (ore-theft) were practiced since colonial times by those living on the margins of mining communities. These individuals often negotiated a contractual relationship with companies who could not manage to eradicate the practice. In the colonial period, jukeaje may have started with mita laborers pocketing ore to supplement their earnings, while Absi believes that kajcheo was mostly undertaken by the family members of company miners (as had Muruchi). Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*, 22. Smale identifies this practice since colonial times in Oruro. Robert Smale, *I Sweat the Flavor of Tin: Labor Activism in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 13. Kajcheo was also an established tradition in Corocoro from its earliest days. Ostria, *Capitalismo, modernización y resistencia popular 1825-1952*, 46.

⁷¹ Writing in the 1970s, Filemon Escóbar saw the continued practice of jukeaje as directly related to the economic policies of the dictatorships. Escóbar noted that the late twentieth century cooperativistas, llameristas, and palliris were essentially engaging in contractual jukeaje in the colonial mold. *La mina vista desde el guardatojo*, 43-4.

unruly, inherently violent, and obstacles to progress. Elites and military officials combined this idea of mining violence with assertions that union workers were being too greedy, that they defended their own good at the expense of the nation. What was needed to correct these too-powerful miners was a strong state dedicated to maintaining public peace. With the increase in police violence, peasant unrest, and revolutionary guerrilla groups in this period, local elites may have felt legitimately under siege.⁷² However, the kinds of violence that characterized life in Corocoro and were investigated by the DIC (traffic accidents, mining accidents, and even filicide) were mostly effects of poverty and the absence of an effective welfare state, as will be demonstrated by three cases in the following section. Under Barrientos and even more so Banzer, the state used the DIC to impose a narrative of personal responsibility in these communities, casting criminals as people who were “proclive a violencia” and thus threats to the public good.⁷³ This characterization has stuck to miners particularly, who after the 1980s flooded cities and caused urban elites to fear their supposed violent, drunken character.⁷⁴

⁷² For example, in Expediente 077078 6 Noviembre 1967 Nestor Palero, President of the Sindicato Agrario contra Antonio Mollo sobre heridas, concerned an attack on local rural officials by community members. ALP PJJ Caja 409.

⁷³ For example, the Alcaldia Municipal referring to tax evaders as having “a violent disposition”: Expediente 058804 16 Junio 1967, ALP PJJ Caja 409 “Resistencia de pago impuestos, Alcaldia Municipal vs Lorenzo Franco y otros.” Alcalde Justo Cusicanqui told the courts that the salt-makers of Yaribay, for many years have tenaciously resisted paying municipal taxes on the exploitation and extraction of salt, governed by the bad temper and poor manners that characterize them. In the past this community has threatened the aforementioned with legal action if they do not comply with these obligations, however, given their *violent proclivities* they have resisted the required payments of Municipal Taxes, once hiding themselves maliciously and other times dragging their feet.” “Los Saleros de Yaribay, de esta jurisdicción, desde hace varios años atrás se resisten en forma tenaz a cancelar a esta comuna sus impuestos municipales por concepto de explotación y extracción de “Sal”, prevalido del carácter atribiliario y nada correcto que les caracteriza. En retiradas oportunidades esta Comuna ha conminado a los nombrados anteriormente para que cumplan con sus obligaciones, empero, dado el carácter proclive a la violencia se resisten al pago ineludible de los Impuestos Municipales, unas veces ocultándose maliciosamente y otras haciéndose los reacios.”

⁷⁴ Pascale Absi on the present: “The rejection of the miners by the ‘good society’ of Potosí, that thinks of them as alcoholic and violent Indians, as well as the lack of trust of the campesinos in the mine workers both define, in a negative sense, the contours of identification of the miner.” “El rechazo de los mineros por parte de la ‘buena sociedad’ potosina, que los califica de indios alcohólicos y violentos, así como la desconfianza de los campesinos frente a los trabajadores de las minas, también definen, por la negativa, los contornos de la identificación como minero.” Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*, 12. Felix Muruchi and Carmen Morelos, who were each children of miners in this period or, in Muruchi’s case, had children himself, recall experiencing prejudice against miners as

This phenomenon is a crucial but unexamined way in which the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s used the revolutionary state apparatus to dismantle the revolutionary vision of the MNR. The military excluded miners in the name of bringing bureaucratic order to commerce, transportation, and municipal life. By bringing the perception of law and order to the countryside, and using law and order as a counterpoint against worker protest, the governments of the 1960s and 1970s undermined union legitimacy much more effectively than could have been done by exercising state violence directly. Over the course of these decades, the miners and their families became associated not with order and progress, as they had during the nationalist coalitions of the 1930s to the 1950s, but with disorder, violence, and the breakdown of the community.

In consolidating a more visible presence, the police often responded to the sense among community elites that the MNR had not effectively kept public order. In April of 1965, for example, rural officials were jailed for allowing campesinos to be released when they were supposed to be transferred to Corocoro for trial.⁷⁵ In 1967, the DIC made a local Jefe de Transporte explain to the courts why he was in La Paz instead of being on duty, and therefore wasn't available to attend to the scene of a traffic accident.⁷⁶ Prior to Barrientos's reforms, police officials could be very partial in their enforcement of regulations: In the estupro case referenced earlier, Victor Gonzáles defended himself against these charges by referring to his honor as a worker and his reputation in the neighborhood. When he was provisionally jailed during the investigation, he further invoked his status as a miner in lieu of bail. The judge seems to have

violent, abusive, and uneducated, particularly in 1980s. *Libres!*, 184; Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*, 77.

⁷⁵ See for example, a case where local officials released men who were supposed to be headed to Corocoro for a trial in the county seat. Expediente 103636 3 Abril 1965, ALP PJJ Caja XXX.

⁷⁶ Ministerio Publico vs Desiderio Choque y Roberto Fernandez, ALP PJJ Caja 407, February 1967.

taken his worker's honor into consideration because a few months later, Laureano Mamani had to write in to say that while the miner was still at liberty, he had never paid his bill.⁷⁷

The rise of the DIC helped regularize criminal investigations and streamline investigative processes, but it required the wholesale restructuring of local authorities to work. Before Barrientos, the DIC or the municipal police operated haphazardly and only investigated municipal disturbances in Corocoro when a citizen brought a demand to them. For example, in late May, 1962, "la anciana" Berna Mamani found an abandoned fetus near the Verdecilla mine. She found a white collar employee of the mines, rather than a police officer, and it was this official who brought the report to the police. Police found without too much difficulty the probably culprit: a local woman, 24-year-old seamstress Remedios Alcón, who lived with her parents. In her testimony she claimed that the child was the product of an affair with a married man, and two weeks previously she had accidentally given birth while relieving herself outside of town. She had abandoned the child in an effort to keep her parents from knowing her secret.⁷⁸ Her father, a miner, testified on her behalf, asking that Remedios be released from police

⁷⁷ "However, Your Honor, it has been absolutely impossible to comply with making the payment in the agreed upon time, for reasons that are known to everyone, that the miners such as myself have suffered an acute economic crisis, at the same time that the strike called in the mines has paralyzed the economic life of all the workers since we have not received our daily wage and the Mines that employ us are bankrupt." "Empero señor juez, me ha sido absolutamente imposible cumplir en el lapso señalado con el deposito de referencia, en razón de que es de todo conocido, que los trabajadores mineros entre los que me cuento, hemos sufrido una crisis económica aguda, la misma que por la huelga decretada en las minas, ha paralizado la economía de todos los trabajadores al no haber obtenido el pago de nuestros jornales, y las Empresas que agrupan a los trabajadores se encuentran en falencia." Expediente 202429 4 de Junio 1963, Caja 392. Laureano Mamani vs Victor Gonzales Condori. In this dispute, the courts dropped the case when it became clear the victim had been living with another man.

⁷⁸ "I left the house of my father to attend to my necessities on the mountain, and just in that moment when I was attending to these necessities all of a sudden I gave birth to a child, half scared and stupid and more than anything so as to not anger my parents I decided to leave it there and not say anything about what happened. The next day, the 7th of this month, I went to the pulpería and upon my return I was surprised to learn they had discovered my crime." "Salí del cuarto de mi papá para ir hacer mis necesidades al cerro, en preciso momento en que estaba haciendo mis necesidades, en forma improvisada he dado a luz a una criatura, media asustada y atontada y mas que todo para que no se me enfaden mis padres decide abandonarlo y callar de todo lo ocurrido, al día siguiente o sea el 7 de los corrientes me fui a la pulpería y al regresar me sorprendí que habían descubierto mi delito." Expediente 18 Mayo 1962 Filicidio, ALP PJJ Caja 386.

custody, since she had been convinced to abandon the baby by her seducer. Finally, he claimed that his daughter had been “abnormal” from birth, and was, in effect, mentally incapable of understanding the nature of her crime. He asked that a medical exam be performed on his daughter to confirm these facts, and Remedios herself corroborated his argument by claiming in a further interview that she had suffered an attack and was “inconciente” at the time she abandoned her child.

The medical exam was never performed, since Juan Alcón could not afford to pay for this service. This is the kind of detail that Barrientos’s DIC, after 1965, might have investigated more fully, especially since two of the witnesses brought to defend Remedios’s honor mentioned multiple previous pregnancies that resulted in children who did not live, no record of whom existed in municipal files. In this case, on the testimony of her father Remedios was provisionally released, and the court record went no further. By 1962, the DIC was beginning to concern itself with new kinds of private matters, finding culpability and imposing responsibility on the kinds of disorder, violence, and extralegal resolution that had always been part of life in a rural, impoverished town. It also shows, however, the limits of the police interest in such private affairs, as Remedios Alcón’s father and neighbor’s word was enough to end the matter.

In another case in which a miner killed himself with dynamite, this time shortly after the Barrientos coup, DIC agents did not get involved until several weeks later when the tragedy turned into a public fight between two of the affected parties. On March 8, Teodoro Quenta Huari had asked his coworker Manuel Ticona and Ticona’s wife Tomasa to come to his house, where his mistress Rufina Aquize was preparing a picante and drinks. Both couples and Ticona’s son spent the day drinking. Tomasa and Manuel recalled that they fell asleep, and then woke to Teodoro Quenta arguing with and beating his mistress. Tomasa took Rufina back to her house to

protect her from further violence, while Manuel and his son stayed behind to put Teodoro to bed. They left him sleeping, and returned to their own house. Around dawn, Pablo Calle, who was in charge of the Carnival celebrations, saw a column of smoke emerging from Teodoro's house and went to find city officials and Rufina.⁷⁹

At that point, rumors began to fly around the mining encampment. Rufina returned home in time for her neighbors to blame her for leaving and enabling Teodoro's death, while others opined that Manuel and Tomasa had killed Teodoro because of an affair between Tomasa and the deceased. Rufina and the Ticonas exchanged lawsuits based on these rumors, but it was only in April, when Teodoro's ex-wife got involved, that the police came to arrest Manuel and Tomasa. At the time of their arrest, Manuel and Tomasa were able to rally both merchants and miners to their defense, saying that they were good and honorable people who had no quarrel with the deceased, and furthermore that the fact that Quenta's death had been suicide was common knowledge.⁸⁰ The dispute, and the requirement that DIC get involved to regulate it, reinforced ideas of mining men in particular as unstable, violent, and threats to public safety.

After 1965, the DIC did manage to reduce the number of incidents that exposed decent citizens to the unruly festivity of the miners. Citizens would call the police when they felt legitimately threatened by the perceived or actual impunity and violence of young male miners, at the same time that these same miners were losing both public support and protections from political repression. The miners did not accept this attack on their status as privileged citizens quietly. One of the first consequences of the reorganization of the police was in fact a greater public outcry against the police. As more people were locked up for offenses that would not have

⁷⁹ Expediente de 128133 15 Junio 1965, ALP PJJ Caja 401.

⁸⁰ The various cases involved in this dispute can be found in: Expediente 108322 7 Abril 1965, ALP PJJ Caja 399; Expediente 128133 15 Junio 1965, ALP PJJ Caja 401; Expediente 046420 9 Abril 1965, ALP PJJ Caja 402.

brought them into much trouble previously, men, and particularly miners complained.⁸¹ In the case of miner Santiago Huanca, who claimed he had been falsely accused of a crime, where earlier he would have sued his accuser for defamation, in 1967 he sued the DIC for brutality during his arrest.⁸² In this case, the municipality sued back.⁸³ In the case of Juan and Gregorio Villca, a miner attempted to use the Judicial system against the DIC, claiming they had overstepped their jurisdiction by compelling his son to pay damages. Like so many of the cases in the previous chapter, this was a case of local police enforcing a young man's obligations to a pregnant girl. Juan told the civil courts that the DIC had been threatening his son Gregorio with beatings because of a false charge of seduction filed by Angelino Quisbert. Rather than saying the charges were without merit, he argued that the DIC did not have jurisdiction to compel his son to appear, especially while they were still disputing the charges in a civil court.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Expediente 135587 15 Junio 1965, ALP PJJ Caja 400. "Feliciano Acho, of the jurisdiction of Callapa: I have been summoned by the National Guard of Public Security of Corocoro by Manuel Cochi, for the imagined crime of seduction against his spouse, a crime which I did not commit and to the contrary accusing me of this crime has exposed me to beatings and inhumane treatment thanks to which I have been bedridden for a long time." "Feliciano Acho, de la jurisdicción de Callapa: En la Guardia Nacional de Seguridad Pública de esta ciudad he sido demandado de parte de Manuel Cochi, por el supuesto delito de abuso deshonesto en la persona de su esposa, delito que no se ha cometido y al contrario imputándoseme ese delito he sido atropellado y inhumanamente maltratado y de cuyas consecuencias he sido postrado en cama por mucho tiempo."

⁸² Expediente 161704 23 Nov 1967 "Santiago Mamani Huanca vs DIC sobre heridas," ALP PJJ Caja 410.

⁸³ Expediente 160911 8 Nov 1967 "Ministerio Publico contra Pedro Huanca Carpio por difamación contra el DIC." ALP PJJ Caja 410.

⁸⁴ Expediente 116466 26 Septiembre 1967 pics 6518-6525, ALP Notificación a DIC por Juan Villca "The DIC has no authority to impose upon me and their assumption of the case has been without jurisdiction or purview, because cases of seduction should be prompted by the ordinary courts, in this case under the Judiciary which is in the charge of Your respected and worthy Honor. ... For this reason, since it is not in the jurisdiction and power of the DIC to determine the damages awarded [to the victim], and in this case it is completely voluntary, nor can they enforce alimony payments, please consider this motion to dismiss the case brought by the DIC against myself and my son Gregorio Villca." "La imposición hecha a mi parte de parte de la referida repartición ha sido sin que tenga jurisdicción ni competencia la DIC ya que no compete a dicha autoridad y el caso de abuso deshonesto debería ser instada ante la justicia ordinaria, en esta caso que es de competencia del Juzgado que está a su merecido y respetado cargo. ... Por esta razón y no siendo de la jurisdicción y competencia del DIC la determinación de reconocimiento, ya que este caso es netamente voluntario, ni menos a disponer el suministro de ninguna pensió, ocurro ante su respetada autoridad disponer la inhibitoria del DIC en el conocimiento de la acción intentada en mi contra y la de mi hijo Gregorio Villca."

In these cases, the DIC began to regulate and publicly impose a resolution on conflicts that previously had been conducted privately, or at least outside of the eyes of the court. The DIC began to act not just as enforcer, but as arbiter, which combined with the regulatory apparatus of COMIBOL itself to threaten the rights of men to order their affairs as heads of household. In this way, increased state regulation and control over the private concerns of families and social life helped exacerbate a crisis in masculinity and social prestige among workers whose conditions of life were now much more precarious and less rewarding than their fathers' had been.

Barrientos was not the first president to try to reform government to impose order on an unruly Bolivia. Like the MNR and local elites since the beginning of the twentieth century, the military government of Barrientos saw regulation as the path to progress and modernity.

However, the way in which the DIC carried out this regulation signaled a new kind of relationship between state and citizen: rather than addressing structural causes of disorder like colonialism and indigenous barbarism (as had elites before the MNR), or poverty, lack of education, and poor working conditions on the other (as had the MNR and various Marxist Parties), the DIC of Barrientos would punish disorder individually. Many historians have noted the increasing repression against political unrest during the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s.⁸⁵ Historians have remarked less on the secondary effects of these governments' attempts to impose a culture of regulation and lawfulness through the DIC on local municipal politics. On a symbolic level, the function of the DIC was to attribute causality and apportion blame in incidents of public disorder, disaster, and chance. The DIC became a party to cases where blame or victimhood was unclear and the government thereby tasked itself with apportioning responsibility. This changed the political order of the town because it addressed

⁸⁵ Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the Veins*; Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*.

what the revolution had hoped but failed to achieve: the management of danger and social peace. Cases such as suicides, traffic accidents, and even in specific cases mining accidents came under the jurisdiction of these new authorities. Fundamentally, the MNR state had failed to establish that public order could be maintained, and that disasters could be averted. The MNR had tried to do this by altering conditions of life in the mines, but had in the process also given miners the sense that they could make demands on the polity. For many elite Bolivians and some non-elites as well, Barrientos and his successors were more effective than the MNR in maintaining order, in part because they found a suitable explanation for public disorder, disaster, and poverty: the miners themselves.

Regulating Accidents

One measure of the increased presence of the DIC and the state drive to regulate disorder can be found in the sudden appearance of traffic accidents in the municipal court system around 1966 where they had rarely been merited the attention of authorities before.⁸⁶ Before this time, only in extraordinary circumstances did traffic accidents enter the judicial record: for example, in 1930, an indigenous man hit by a mining engineer's car required the intervention of a respectable citizen to bring charges on his behalf, as I suggested in Chapter 1. Even during the era of the MNR, when an accident in 1957 caused the death of a prominent citizen, it created no lasting record in the court and municipal documents.⁸⁷ By contrast, municipal and judicial files began to

⁸⁶ See also 1966 ALP PJJ Caja 405, photo 4804-16 Feliciano Vicente vs DIC Vicente. held for an accident. The rise in traffic accidents is also probably caused by an increase in truck traffic on the Corocoro Viacha highway, a road that had been the target of a USAID development project in 1963, because it was in such disrepair, see letter from Fed de Campesinos al Alcalde, ALP PJAC Caja 237. Trucking increased in Bolivia in this period due to generally better roads and increased availability of personal vehicles.

⁸⁷ Expediente 22163 August 5, 1957 ALP PJAC Caja 214. Ricardo Luna, de trabajo Maestranza de la Corporacion Minera, died in a traffic accident. His death entered the public record when his wife asked for a court-certified declaration of heirs.

fill with matters related to traffic accidents after 1966, by which time the DIC in Corocoro had its own section for Corocoro transit. Much as the rationalization of the mines, the interest in regulating traffic stemmed from a perpetual concern with modernity based on the establishment of order as a precursor to development: the municipal files of Corocoro contain a document from the national government stating that 1967 was to be the year of “transport and communications,” showcasing Barrientos’s ability to modernize the country.⁸⁸ It is no surprise that Corocoro, with its position on the Arica-La Paz railroad and relatively well maintained roads to both Oruro and La Paz, as well as long-standing merchant and contraband trade would come under scrutiny by transit authorities in this period.

There were two accidents in early 1967 that caught the attention of the DIC and then the courts because of disputed culpability. The first happened in February, and occasioned a police report primarily because the driver fled before the DIC could arrive on the scene. The DIC hoped to charge the driver of the car for causing the damage, but eventually determined that the probable cause of the accident was mechanical failure. Needing a guilty party, they brought charges against the vehicle’s owner. In this, they opposed local sentiment, which favored not charging the owner of the machine because he had not been driving.⁸⁹ The owner made a show of offering to pay the medical bills of all the passengers to demonstrate magnanimity even though he believed he was not at fault, but the hospital staff later told the courts that Fernandez had never actually paid.

In the second accident, the chain of culpability played in to the increasing public sense that miners were disorderly and threats to public order. On May 1, 1967, a drunk driver carrying

⁸⁸ ALP PJJ Caja 407.

⁸⁹ “Ministerio Publico vs Desiderio Choque y Roberto Fernandez por accidente de tráfico” Criminal 13 Febrero 1967, ALP PJJ Caja 406.

a load of firewood and several passengers from Topohoco lost control of his vehicle, causing the death of his assistant and injuring several passengers. In the course of the police investigation, the driver filed a report arguing that he had been forced to drink by one of his passengers, and that this man should be charged with homicide instead. The passenger, the miner Jose Alcón, had been traveling with his wife and child back to Corocoro, when, noting that it was the Day of the Worker, insisted that the driver stop for beers with him. The miner kept buying rounds, so that the driver had a total of eight drinks by the point they resumed their journey. The driver insisted that the cause of the accident had been when Alcón pulled out a bottle of liquor during the drive, however, and tried to force him to drink once more. Noting that the miner had fled the scene of the accident, the police agreed that this was criminal behavior and wrote in their report:

Responsible: with 100% culpability for the accident, the driver Primo Gutierrez and the passenger Jose Alcón Sillerico. Primo Gutierrez for breaking the laws cited above, and Jose Sillerico Alcón [sic] for committing the serious crime of insisting that the driver drink alcohol and facilitating the flight of the same [from the scene of the crime].⁹⁰

In this case, the audacity of the miner in “forcing” the driver to drink—demanding that the driver and the passengers respect and celebrate his worker’s holiday—caused the death of a young man and the destruction of property.

Unspoken in this case was the general assumption that if the miner insisted on buying drinks, the driver could not possibly refuse.⁹¹ This claim, while supported by working class

⁹⁰ “Responsabilidades: con el 100% de culpabilidad los señores Primo Gutierrez y el pasajero José Alcón Sillerico. Primo Gutierrez por infringir en los artículos mencionados mas arriba, José Sillerico Alcón por cometer el grave delito de insistir a beber al conductor y por facilitar la fuga del mismo.” Expediente 058818 8 Mayo 1967, ALP PJJ Caja 407. “MP vs Primo Gutierrez y José Alcón por un accidente de tráfico.” 13 Febrero 1967, ALP PJJ Caja 406.

⁹¹ There are several cases in which one of the witnesses asks the judge to accept that he was forced by social custom to imbibe to the point of blackout intoxication. For example in Expediente de 03938 4 Mayo 1964 German Mamani Vargas vs Maximo Huallpa Cruz, Mamani had to explain away his own inebriation at the time of his wife’s sexual assault in order to justify how Cruz was able to enter his house while he was present. Mamani told the judge that as Cruz was the boyfriend of his sister, social norms would not allow him to easily refuse a single, or several, drinks. ALP PJJ Caja 398. For this reason, Gutierrez had good reason to expect that the judge might take seriously his claim that refusing the miner Alcón’s drink(s) on May Day would be unthinkable.

custom, was also convenient in that it assigned culpability to worker festivity for public disorder. While the police did charge the driver, they held the passenger equally accountable. Alcón and the driver then both begged to be released, the miner citing his honor as a worker and the fear that he would lose his job as evidence that he did not need to be held without bail, and the driver insisting on his general innocence. The need to apportion blame convincingly had social consequences. Apparently, unmoved by the idea that the driver had been forced to drink, the family of the young man killed began to threaten the driver, who had hired him as a driving assistant who was killed in the accident.⁹²

As with traffic accidents, mining accidents became something of a bureaucratic concern in this period. In this case, the police were not as concerned with regulating accidents as was COMIBOL. Increasingly in the 1960s and 1970s, COMIBOL kept statistics on workplace health and safety and periodically released internal reports on the well-being of the labor force. Although the “Bio Estadísticas” department of COMIBOL kept health and safety statistics on file, these records were often geared towards proving improvement rather than reflecting continuing problems. Like the DIC, these records suggest that COMIBOL began to try to shift its relationship to workers by regulating and assigning blame in the case of mining accidents. On a statistical level, this probably helped demonstrate an improving safety record.

YEAR	FATAL ACCIDENTS	YEAR	FATAL ACCIDENTS
1965	30	1970	31
1966	28	1971	29
1967	20	1972	32
1968	26	1973	29
1969	31		

Table 5.1 Source: COMIBOL, and Departamento de Sanidad, Información Cuantativa de Servicios. *Anuario Bioestadístico*. La Paz: COMIBOL, 1973.

⁹² Witnesses also attested to the miner Alcón fleeing the scene and verbally abusing witnesses who came to offer assistance to the wounded after the accident. The driver had also fled the scene because he was afraid that locals in the area of Chapi Chipiña would detain and possibly beat him. Ibid.

COMIBOL's official records of fatal accidents are somewhat at odds with my own investigations into the safety of Corocoro's mine. 1967, by company accounts, was a relatively low year for workplace accidents, with 20 fatal accidents listed nationally. At the same time, municipal records for Corocoro show at least 6 different families pursuing inheritance claims on behalf of 7 miners who had died during the year due to an "accidente de trabajo."⁹³ COMIBOL reports for 1973 listed 16 mining centers or complexes for which it collected statistics during the 1960s. If the figure of 20 fatalities were true, this would mean that Corocoro had a much higher than average incidence of accidents for that year than any other mine, in fact accounting for over a third of all fatal accidents nationally. In 1965, a different COMIBOL report, this time listing all accidents, including nonfatal ones, noted that Corocoro's accident rate was, on average, about half that of more dangerous mines such as Potosí.⁹⁴ Two possible answers suggest themselves:

⁹³ I came up with this number by looking through all archived civil claims for the municipality during the 1960s. All inheritance claims had to establish the cause of death, so I noted each case file that mentioned cause of death as "accidente de trabajo en la mina." This means that my figure does not count miners whose cause of death was workplace related, for example silicosis or tuberculosis, but was not caused by a physical trauma. National health reports from this period note that the primary cause of death in this part of the highlands was respiratory ailments, including tuberculosis and silicosis. Guillermo Jaúregui Guachalla, *Desarrollo Rural* (La Paz: Ministerio de Salud Publico, 1962); Bastien, *Healers of the Andes*, 50. I can only estimate, therefore the lowest possible number of accidental deaths, assuming that not every miners' family filed claims and some claims may have been lost. The cases are: Caja 409, Expediente 077081 8 Marzo 1967 "Eugenia Villa Carrillo declaratoria de herederos sobre muerte de Primitvo Chapi"; Expediente 077044 14 Julio 1967 "Eulogio Fructuoso Pari Muñoz sobre declaratoria de herederos al fallecimiento de su padre Mariano Pari Sirpa, un minero a consecuencia de un accidente de trabajo"; Caja 407 Expediente 058793 27 Abril 1967 Justina v de Mancachi declaración de herederos despues del muerte de Benjamín Mancachi Alanoca (Mining Accident) IMG 5220; Caja 411 Expediente 077064 13 Abril 1967 "Declaración de herederos. Mining accident Albertina v de Vargas (Felix Vargas Cardoso)"; Expediente 077018 18 Febrero 1967, "Declaración de Herederos Francisca viuda de Sirpatico, después del muerte de su esposo Bernabe Sirpatico Mamani, accidente de trabajo en las minas." ALP PJJ Año 1967 Caja 410; ALP PJJ Año 1967 Caja 409 "Expediente 130615 17 Nov 1967, Declaratoria de Herederos, Manuela Ticono de Mamani (see documents surrounding investigation of death of Ponciano Mamani, caja 399) al fallecimiento de su hijo en un accidente de trabajo"; Expediente 161724 6 Dic 1967 "Antonia de Alacama sobre declaratoria de herederos al fallecimiento de su esposo minero de tuberculosis." Juan Fuentes Villca died in the same accident as Ponciano Mamani, but left no heirs, suggesting that the number of accidents could have been higher.

⁹⁴ This report calculated mining accidents (including nonfatal accidents) per 1,000 man hours worked at 16 different mining complexes. Corocoro, which had 237 nonfatal accidents and 908 workers, had 22 accidents per 1,000 man hours, came in under the average of 28 for all of COMIBOL, much lower than the rate of more dangerous mines such as Colquiri and Unificada (46 and 51 respectively). COMIBOL and Departamento de Sanidad, Información Cuantativa de Servicios, *Anuario Bioestadístico*, 1965, 1965. The same report listed 58 deaths total for the year 1965 in the company hospital, which provides a sense for the general population's (4470) mortality rate.

either in the 1973 report (the first issued by the Banzer dictatorship), COMIBOL was fabricating its safety record or, since there is proof that the deaths of at least two miners at Corocoro in that year were telegraphed directly to the central offices, these statistics may have only counted fatal accidents that were not attributable to worker error.⁹⁵ A report for 1977-8 had 6%, or around 1576 deaths in the COMIBOL hospitals attributed to “accident in general.” We can assume that many, but not necessarily all, of these were mining accidents, because the hospitals did sometimes treat the general population.⁹⁶

On a municipal level, the regulatory concern was less with apportioning blame, and more with setting limits on who could claim benefits. Workers who died as a result of their labor could pass on benefits and protections to their families, just as the wives of veterans could claim benefits from the state once widowed. As with divorce laws and pensions discussed in the previous chapter, the change after the revolution was partially due to new laws governing inheritance, but mostly due to the ability of poor people to make claims on the state using the resources of COMIBOL: one woman noted shortly after the revolution, “I hope to inherit [my husband’s] benefits, but it is hard to find the paperwork because he worked at so many mines.”⁹⁷ The infrastructure of COMIBOL, in theory, changed this, because a singular company with common paperwork could easily keep track of and provide proof for a man had who worked at Chollja, Unificada, Uyuni and later Corocoro.

The financial stakes of claiming inheritance were huge in a community like Corocoro, which means that that for the most part, the best record of mining accidents comes through the

⁹⁵ COMIBOL and Departamento de Sanidad, Información Cuantativa de Servicios, *Anuario Bioestadístico: 1973*, 1973.

⁹⁶ COMIBOL and Departamento de Sanidad, Información Cuantativa de Servicios, *Anuario Bioestadístico: 1977-8*, 1978. Corocoro’s population in 1978 was 4824.

⁹⁷ ALP PJJ Caja 367 Expediente 93922 20 Agosto 1954 Venancia Chambi v de Alave Declaratoria de Herederos.

courts and not the company. To get benefits, family members filed inheritance claims, which gave the name and time of death of workers, as well as affirmative testimony from coworkers about the circumstances of death. For example, when Bernabe Sirpatico Mamani died from a head injury in the Toledo shaft in February, 1967, his wife Francisca wrote in to ask that while he had left no will, she and their four children be named heirs of his *beneficios sociales* as well as the *sayaña* he owned in the countryside and two bulls. Two fellow miners offered testimony on her behalf. Pedro Paredes Muñoz told the courts, “It is clear that Bernabe Sirpatico Mamani died in a mining accident in the Toledo Shaft of Corocoro on the date of January 12th of this year. I attest that Bernabe Sirpatico Mamani worked with me in the mines.”⁹⁸ In this case, witnesses were helpful, as was any company documentation of his family benefits claimed, since Bernabe Sirpatico also had a legal wife named Manuela Copa, whom he had married in 1946, who upon his death had also filed a claim for benefits for herself.⁹⁹ These records cannot account for all accidents, but suggest that accidents happened at a rate of at least 3 per year in Corocoro.¹⁰⁰

When driller Ponciano Mamani and his assistant Juan Fuentes fell down the mine shaft on November 14, 1967, the EMC did not just take note of the accident for COMIBOL’s statistics. In this case, they telegraphed COMIBOL headquarters in La Paz to advise that the secretary general of the Corocoro miners’ union had just been killed in an accident. They also

⁹⁸ “Es evidente que Bernabe Sirpatico Mamani ha fallecido en un accidente de trabajo en la mina en el Pozo Toledo de esta asiento minero en fecha doce de enero del presente año. Me consta que Bernabe Sirpatico Mamani, trabajaba justamente conmigo dentro del mina.” Expediente 077005 17 Enero 1967 “Solicitud de Retencion Ramona Sirpatico re: mining accident de Bernabe Sirpatico”; Expediente 077018 18 Febrero 1967, “Declaración de Herederos Francisca viuda de Sirpatico, después del muerte de su esposo Bernabe Sirpatico Mamani, accidente de trabajo en las minas.” ALP PJJ Año 1967 Caja 410.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ For comparison, I found three inheritance claims filed on behalf of fallen miners in 1954. On the other hand, no one seems to have claimed benefits on behalf of Juan Fuentes, suggesting that any estimate of accidents from my court cases has to be a low one.

took several steps to make sure a clear, apolitical narrative of the accident reached the public and the authorities: the EMC informed the DIC of their investigation, who later filed a report of their own with the judge. The intervention of the DIC, in this case, is very significant, because mining accidents were typically not investigated as criminal matters. The police report was filed with the city with the testimonies of the employee who reported the accident, the head engineer of the safety department, and the safety inspector. Each of these men concluded that Mamani and Fuentes had committed safety violations by failing to remove the head of the drill or secure their equipment before entering the “Skips,” or open car that would transport them between levels. Because of this, as the two men travelled from level 12, about 150 meters from the bottom of the mine shaft, the head of the drill wedged in the wooden frame, causing the car to swing and throw them against the walls of the mine. Mamani and Fuentes probably died instantly from this impact before falling to the bottom of the shaft.¹⁰¹ Additional evidence of Ponciano Mamani’s death emerges in the municipal record as Mamani’s mother and girlfriend fought each other over his meager inheritance. However, the miners’ testimony in this case supports the police report entirely.¹⁰²

Although this report was by far the most detailed investigation of a mining accident to enter the court record, the paperwork nevertheless leaves several questions unanswered. First and foremost, why was this accident, one out of at least 6 that year, a criminal investigation where no others were? Why were none of Mamani’s direct coworkers interviewed for the report? Did no one else report or witness the two men fall or the sound of the equipment crashing against the walls of the shaft? What is the significance of the fact that both men were found “practically

¹⁰¹ Investigation into the death of Ponciano Mamani, November 1967, ALP PJJ Caja 399.

¹⁰² ALP PJJ Caja 409 Expediente 130615 17 Nov 1967 “Manuela Ticona de Mamani vs Juana Pacheco Pari”.

nude,” torn from their clothes? Why was this report filed with the courts two weeks after the accident itself, and why, most importantly, was it later misfiled in a stack of municipal documents from 1965?¹⁰³

The extra concern taken with this case stems from the political concerns of the Barrientos government to resolve its own culpability in two ways. First, the state needed to avoid any implication in politically motivated violence, especially at the end of the bloody year of 1967. And second, the very notion of workplace accidents threatened Barrientos’s narrative of rationalized development in fundamental ways. For the miners, the death of Ponciano Mamani had the potential to shake up an already tenuous political connection with the town and nation.¹⁰⁴ After the “rationalization” measures of 1965, the miners at Siglo XX and many other camps had declared their mines to be Free Zones, bringing the military into these settlements to forcefully refute this claim. Corocoro did not have such a direct clash, but relations between the STMC and the municipality and national government deteriorated after 1965. Violence continued to escalate in some mining areas as Barrientos consolidated military control of many mines, but came to a head in June of 1967, in what has come to be called the Massacre of San Juan. That month, the FSTMB had called together a general assembly in Siglo XX to formalize worker opposition to Barrientos’s continued attack on the miners and COMIBOL and to consider offering financial and logistical support for the guerrilla foco led by Argentine Che Guevara recently established in the Bolivian lowlands. The night before the assembly the workers and their families celebrated the festival of San Juan, drinking and dancing through the night in honor of the winter solstice.

¹⁰³ I have no direct evidence that anything contained in the report is false except for these lingering questions. The death certificate, signed by Dr Beltran of the Company Hospital, lists his cause of death as multiple fractures of the cranium, ribs, limbs, and loss of blood. These injuries are consistent with the described accident.

¹⁰⁴ Municipal documents from 1967 list Mamani as Interim Secretary General, which suggests that the union itself was in a state of political upheaval. ALP PJAC Caja 229.

The army descended on the town in the early morning of the 24th, taking control of the worker's radio station, the mines, and union offices and killing dozens of miners and their families.¹⁰⁵ Coincidentally, Ponciano Mamani shared his name with one of the publically named victims of this massacre.¹⁰⁶

In October, Barrientos turned his attention from the miners to the guerrilla foco camped out in the forests of Ñancahuazú, sending the army to kill Che Guevara as well as three former Corocoro miners that had left to become ELN militants.¹⁰⁷ While both of these events had the effect of cowing leftist opposition into quiescence in Bolivia, Barrientos understood that this social peace was a tense one, and worker unrest could easily flare at the death of a labor leader. Barrientos was also fighting the impression among Bolivians that the Che Guevara capture had in fact been carried out primarily by the US army, which many considered an embarrassing infringement on Bolivian sovereignty.

This disaster is also emblematic of COMIBOL's shift away from improving the conditions of workers' lives and livelihoods to maintaining its own institutional integrity. As early as the late 1950s, Bolivian miners were concerned with the lack of capitalization of COMIBOL's mines, not only to fund new exploration, but to update machinery and equipment for the shafts and treatment plants.¹⁰⁸ While the Barrientos government negotiated funding

¹⁰⁵ Official army accounts list 16 dead and 71 wounded, while Valentin Abecía provides an estimate of around 100 dead. Che Guevara, from his camp in Ñancahuazú heard of 87, which is also the number provided by James Dunkerley. Regis Debray remembered around 70 dying. Cited in Soria Galvarro et al, 1967: *San Juan a Sangre y Fuego*, 144-5.

¹⁰⁶ La Patria de Oruro, June 26, 1967. Cited in Carlos Soria Galvarro, José Pimentel Castillo, Eduardo García Cárdenas eds, 1967: *San Juan a Sangre y Fuego*. (La Paz: Punto de Encuentro, 2008), 145.

¹⁰⁷ Soria Galvarro T et al., 1967: *San Juan a sangre y fuego* (La Paz: Punto de Encuentro, 2008). 1967 letter in William Ratliff papers suggests that the POR's growing strength is concentrated in the La Paz region. Box 14, image 1670. 1671 has a Manuel Alanoca listed in the millers section in La Paz.

¹⁰⁸ See for example, economic and technical reports from the 1963 Congreso Nacional de Mineros in Colquiri, detailing the failure of COMIBOL to keep up with minería mediana, Archivo Legislativa, Fondo Sinforoso Cabrera.

through the US for Block-Caving and Sink and Float technology at the largest mines at Siglo XX and Catavi, mines like Corocoro were considered less profitable, and therefore less prioritized for investment. Underground miners, using old and heavy drills, and masks with filters that filled quickly with debris, soon learned that skipping some safety regulations was required in order to do their jobs with any kind of efficiency.¹⁰⁹ As for Corocoro's Mamani, it is entirely possible that his death was caused by his own negligence. Without further eyewitness testimony, the police report can only be taken as the most likely explanation of the truth. Nevertheless, this document reflects several things about the condition of life in the mines. First of all, the accident reinforced the sense that the miners were never safe, neither from the army nor from the conditions of their own labor. Felix Muruchi, who like Ponciano Mamani was a young union militant in 1967, recalled that he entered into politics because of the danger: "I thought it would be better to die fighting for a cause than as a victim in a mining accident.... Working inside the mines is frightening. It's like signing a suicide pact with an indefinite term."¹¹⁰ For the miners themselves, the state and company's failure to invest in new equipment (for example, of a closed elevator car rather than open cart) existed on a continuum from negligence to maliciousness, from personal to political violence. On this same continuum existed massacres like the Noche de San Juan.

What kind of disaster was the death of Ponciano Mamani and Juan Fuentes, who left even less of a record of his life than Mamani? In the most immediate sense, Mamani's death brought financial disaster to at least two families, as evidenced by the tenaciousness of the battle over Mamani's will. Shortly after his death, Mamani's mother, Manuela Ticona, and his girlfriend

¹⁰⁹ Nash, *We Eat the Mines*, 194.

¹¹⁰ Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*, 78.

Juana Pacheco each filed claims with the courts claiming to be the sole lawful heir of the miner. Ticona argued that as Mamani was not married, she was his legal next of kin. However, Mamani's girlfriend Juana Pacheco had a son Victor, and neighbors to testify that they lived together in the barrio Toledo as man and wife. Mamani had been helping to support both his mother and his own family, but after his death the social benefits due to a fallen miner could only be passed on to one heir. The dispute carried on for a year, ending with Mamani's son Victor finally named as heir, and Victor's mother as entrusted with his estate. Manuela Ticona fought every one of these decisions, including accusing the Judge of bias when he told her that "your son's sweetheart has all of the reason here," even though legally speaking, the Judge was simply following the law.¹¹¹ She also attempted to get all of her grandson's benefits transferred to a bank in La Paz, out of the reach of Juana but accessible by a tutor named Alarcón. As Chapter 4 makes clear, the degree to which Mamani's relatives battled over his benefits, much like the lack of mining investment, was a measure of the failure of the state to improve conditions of life in the mines, or to share state resources to maintain families. This was the real failing of the revolutionary dream, and increasingly younger miners saw no reason to believe in a state that claimed to honor it.

Beginnings of the Modern Cooperative Movement

Another form of disorder that the state sought to regulate in this period was kajcheo, the illegal recuperation of ore from company mines, through semi-official recognition

¹¹¹ "la querida de tu hijo tiene toda la razón." ALP PJJ Año 1967 Caja 409 Expediente 130615 17 Nov 1967 "Declaratoria de Herederos: Manuala Ticona de Mamani vs Juana Pacheco Pari." The Judge is said to have made this remark to Martha Guzman, one of the parties accused, at the beginning of the chapter, of threatening to bring Paz Estenssoro's Control Político down on the querellant.

of cooperative mining.¹¹² Cooperative mining in its modern form dates back to the 1930s, when workers laid off due to the depression formed small organizations to work the closed mines illicitly and sell the ore they recovered in local markets. These cooperatives brought a trade-union sensibility to what had been a persistent mining practice since the colonial period of ore-theft and tolerated but unauthorized excavation of unused veins. The first federation of cooperative miners, still referring to themselves as *kajchas*, or “free workers,” formed in Potosí in 1944 and participated in the FSTMB from its beginnings. Mining cooperatives often enabled small groups to explore for and exploit veins of other minerals such as gold, silver, wolfram, and antimony in places where they existed in small but consistent quantities, saving private companies and later COMIBOL from wasting expenditures on untested veins.¹¹³

Absi also reports that 1952 dealt the most devastating blow to *kajcheo*, at least at first, because nationalized mining companies had exclusive rights to the veins. The first legal recognition of mining cooperatives came in 1958.¹¹⁴ During this period, the MNR governments of Hernan Siles and Paz Estenssoro saw cooperatives as an economic safety valve. As MNR encouraged the first state-approved cooperatives to form, this practice essentially allowed for regulating and incorporating ore theft into an entity that could be authorized but not empowered, unlike COMIBOL miners. As marginal COMIBOL mines such as Bolsa Negra and Kami, as well as larger mines such as Pulacayo became less productive, they ceded more and more of their holdings to private collectives. During the Stabilization and Triangular Plans, the government

¹¹² Absi finds etymological origins of the term in the root “*qaq*” has a relationship to being touched by the ray of the sun, shaman, but also shares similarities with the word for prostitute. Absi notes that the same word is also related to birth. Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*, 18.

¹¹³ Ibid., 17–24.

¹¹⁴ COMIBOL, *Organización Y Funcionamiento de Cooperativas Mineras*; Jocelyn Michard, *Cooperativistas Mineras En Bolivia: Formas de Organización, Producción, Y Comercialización* (Cochabamba, Bolivia: Centro de Documentación e Información, 2008).

saw cooperatives as both a check on the power of COMIBOL miners and useful answer to unemployment, and thus encouraged their growth.¹¹⁵ In addition to cooperatives, there were several kinds of labor external to the mines in which both men and women could engage by the 1960s. These miners worked on contract or through intermediaries rather than as salaried employees. For example, locatorios received contracts to work abandoned mines and ore piles and sold any ore they found directly to the company at discounted prices.³¹ Other workers, such as arrendistas, palliris, and lameros (placer miners) also made contracts directly with private companies, cooperatives, or COMIBOL for their rights to recuperate ore. The members of these cooperatives were miners engaged in labor just as demanding and dangerous as COMIBOL employees, but without benefits such as social security, accident protection, and subsidized access to the company store. The MNR revolution in 1952 thus initiated a fundamental split in the interests of cooperative miners and those who worked as salaried employees of COMIBOL.

In many ways, cooperative mining was a response to the failings of a labor politics predicated on hierarchy within a centralized state industry. Whereas union hierarchies reinforced a certain distance between more established workers and newcomers, in principle, cooperatives recognized all socios as equal decision-makers. From their beginnings, cooperative miners organized themselves around principles of “Mutual Aid, Solidarity, and Democratic Control” with each socio receiving an equal vote in all decisions of the cooperative, including those of which worker had access to which veins. Cooperatives also made use of indigenous practices of social organization more explicitly than did the miners’ union, taking as one of its guiding

¹¹⁵ Centro de Promoción Minera (Bolivia), *El cooperativismo minero: paliativa, engaño o solución?* (La Paz: CEPROMIN Centro de Promoción Minera, 1987). By the late 1960s, the Barrientos-controlled directorate of COMIBOL saw cooperative mining as a useful palliative in the face of miner layoffs and general unemployment: COMIBOL, *Organización Y Funcionamiento de Cooperativas Mineras*.

³¹ Filemón Escóbar, *La mina vista desde el guardatojo: testimonio de Filemón Escóbar*. (La Paz, Bolivia: CIPCA, 1986), 53.

principles as well the Andean concept of *ama sua*, *ama llulla*, *ama qhella* (Do not lie, do not steal, do not be lazy). On an economic level, cooperatives placed the entire burden of risk on the workers themselves rather than the company or the state, which enabled cooperative workers to argue that they out-produced salaried company workers, who took home a paycheck no matter what.¹¹⁶ In practice, however, cooperatives could easily become vehicles for exploitation of less experienced miners.¹¹⁷ Many cooperatives operated on a *de facto* hierarchy as a limited number of socios with equal votes and privileges contracted out production to a series of family members and subalterns who received neither, but were entirely dependent on their supervisor for both pay and opportunity.¹¹⁸

As a result, in 1968 several cooperatives split from the FSTMB, forming the Federation of Cooperative Miners (FEDCOMIN) to better represent their own interests. It was in this context that some FSTMB miners began to see cooperative formation as a betrayal of the revolution.¹¹⁹ The miners in these unions saw cooperatives not as exerting increased worker control over the means of production, but as evidence of the state turning away from its role

¹¹⁶ Interview with anonymous cooperativistas at Potosí, January 2013.

¹¹⁷ In this, cooperatives were not unlike customary labor sharing arrangements that rural—and occasionally urban—families used to pluralize economic ventures across multiple economic and geographic ecosystems. The Alacama dispute, from Chapter 4, in which a man accused his brother of violating the Agrarian Reform by not paying him a wage for raising livestock, shows how these customary and in theory reciprocal forms could become exploitative in the face of scarcity. In another example, a Corocoro carpenter informally leased his workshop and client-base to his nephew while he worked for a time in a nearby private mine, the Empresa Nito. He and his nephew went to court upon his return over whether the agreement had included the nephew supporting his wife and family and turning over tools and materials in exchange for the opportunity. See Expediente 031367 12 Mayo de 1964, ALP PJJ Caja 398: Eleodoro Villa Florez vs Eleutario Paco. The line in each of these cases between mutual profit and exploitation was very thin.

¹¹⁸ Nash, Dandler, and Hopkins, *Popular Participation in Social Change*; Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*; Michard, *Cooperativistas Mineras En Bolivia: Formas de Organización, Producción, Y Comercialización*. In recent years, socios of cooperatives have reacted violently to the idea that their employees might want to unionize. See Christopher André, “¿Qué Piden Los Mineros Enfrentados Al Gobierno?,” *El Deber*, August 25, 2016, <http://www.eldeber.com.bo/economia/piden-mineros-enfrentados-al-gobierno.html>.

¹¹⁹ Cooperative miners often did resent the degree of control COMIBOL and the FSTMB exerted over the prices they could earn for labor, and Pascale Absi notes they often were suspicious of the communist influence in the FSTMB. Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*, 26.

subsidizing and guaranteeing a living for productive use of Bolivia's natural resources. In the eyes of union miners, encouraging cooperatives could only undermine the idea that Bolivia's government owed its miners a safe, healthy, and well-regulated workplace in exchange for the national wealth produced.¹²⁰ This mutual resentment, whereby COMIBOL miners lamented the lack of ideological orientation among cooperativistas, and cooperativistas saw state workers as entitled and lazy, would be a major cause of labor's disintegration of solidarity in the face of structural adjustment in the 1980s.¹²¹

Conclusions: Embracing Death

During the 1960s, the miners sustained an assault on their vision of revolutionary participation from governments and local elites who saw both their political and social demands as excessive. This assault was not a simple return to pre-1930s racist ideas of workers as "la indiada," and unfit for citizenship, but a Cold War-era assault on worker privileges and the idea that the state should protect its citizens generally. Like most Cold War struggles in Latin America, elite attempts to discredit workers built on centuries of racist anxieties around cultural comportment, but Barrientos did not seek to disenfranchise workers as Indians. Instead, the dictatorships of Barrientos, and as we shall see increasingly in the next chapter, Banzer

¹²⁰ Filemón Escóbar, *La Mina Vista Desde El Guardatojo: Testimonio de Filemón Escóbar*. (La Paz Bolivia: CIPCA, 1986).

¹²¹ Both Absi and my own experiences with cooperative miners who grew up in Potosí in the 1970s and 1980s agree that the cooperativistas said the Comibolistas didn't know how to work, whereas state miners saw cooperative miners as illiterate campesinos who are irresponsible in their exploitation of the mines. Interview with Marcelino Martinez Lopez, conducted February 8, 2013, Potosí, Bolivia. Absi argues forcefully for divergent mining identities: "In this way, the criteria that contribute to the social construction of the category of 'cooperative miner' involve at the same time social and the economic, ethnic and cultural factors, as well as behaviors and moral values. It is in the intersection of these different categories where, more than through their labor position, cooperative miners define themselves as a social class fully differentiated from the COMIBOL miners." "De esta manera, los criterios que intervienen en la construcción social de la categoría de mineros cooperativistas involucran al mismo tiempo lo social y lo económico, lo étnico y lo cultural, así como comportamientos y valores morales. Es en la intersección de estas diferentes categorías donde, más allá de su ocupación laboral, los cooperativistas se definen como una clase social plena y diferenciada incluso de la los mineros de Comibol." Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*, 12.

attempted to change the privileges that came along with worker citizenship. These governments attacked the very structures that had enabled the creation of the MNR's welfare state in order to shift greater personal responsibility and personal risk onto Bolivian workers. Workers responded by building their own structures of accountability within communities, which resulted in an increase of worker practices that read from the outside as indigenous culture and tradition.

Faced with political closure and economic insecurity, miners sometimes took out their frustrations on their own bodies and the bodies of their family members, as well. This caused a feedback loop of increased policing of the domestic as well as increased disorder within the domestic sphere. The combined effect of a higher police presence and more economic insecurity was, for the men of these mining communities, a loss of control over conditions of life. Increasingly, mining communities responded in two ways: while an older generation of leaders retreated into defending the limited social benefits continued access to COMIBOL granted them, younger men responded by evading the control of the state entirely.

Even with these changes, mineworkers have always understood personal risk as a component of their working and social lives. Even during the heyday of the revolution, when demanding changes at the level of the state seemed a plausible way to ensure prosperity and some degree of safety, workers continued to cultivate ties of reciprocity with rural extended families and coworkers to stave off economic disaster, and ties of reciprocity with the earth and spirits that governed the mines to stave off death.¹²² Workers never completely abandoned these

¹²² For Oruro, Nash describes two such practices of economic reliance on extended kin: the *aini* and the *pasanaku*, in which women pool resources for eventual distribution. The *aini* exists in the form of a loan of goods or capital that must be returned twice over, and the *pasanaku* took the form of a lottery of consumer goods. These systems, along with marketing excess food and resources to less fortunate neighbors, allowed mining families access to cash and consumer goods during times of scarcity as well as reinforced ties of solidarity between *comadres*. These practices usually did not merit the attentions of the municipal courts, except that when they did not function as planned, they occasionally resulted in fist fights or libel suits, or in a few cases, allegations of theft or *estafa*. Nash, *We Eat the Mines*, 110–111. For spiritual practices, of course, the miners relied *ch'alla* and other rituals asking for the dual protections of the *tío* and *Pachamama*, Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, 134–137.

practices, even if the revolution threatened their *raison d'être* and high ranking union leaders and leftist intellectuals downplayed the prevalence and significance of these practices during the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, in the 1980s, government interest in fomenting cooperative development led to the creation of consumer cooperatives among the same groups. After the fall of the union in the 1980s and the rise of Katarista and Indianista politics as a more successful challenge to neoliberal globalization, many miners embraced these practices as symbolic of worker continuity with histories of indigenous resistance, as I will discuss in the next chapter.¹²³

Even during the most worker-friendly moments of the revolution, working in the mines meant accepting the inevitability of eventual death by accident or by silicosis.¹²⁴ As María Tapias suggests for twenty-first century Cochabamba, Andean ideas about health and wellbeing locate the origins of bodily disease in social disorder and social failings.¹²⁵ Revolutions predicated on an interventionist welfare state similarly posit poverty and disease as emblematic of social disorder—and the responsibility of the state to fix. Silicosis represented, in a very material way, the limits of an interventionist state to change the conditions of life in the mines. As the governments of the 1960s increasingly told the miners their demands were too costly for the nation to bear, and as the DIC moved towards criminalizing symptoms of disorder rather than trying to treat its causes, miners internalized their inability to feed their children as a disaster as

¹²³ This is the impetus behind works such as that by union leader and former communist: Escóbar, *De La Revolución Al Pachakuti*.

¹²⁴ Tapias, investigating health practices among cooperative miners in Potosí in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, found that workers respond to the threat of silicosis by ignoring it when they are young and only taking mitigating safety precautions after several years in the mines, often after it is too late. Ingrid Tapias Montecinos, Olivier Barras, and Juan Carlos Oporto, *La herencia de la mina: representaciones sobre la contaminación minera en Potosí* (Potosí: Programa de Investigación Estratégica en Bolivia : Embajada Real de Dinamarca, 2010), 46.

¹²⁵ While anthropologists have noted the analogous relationship between individual bodies and the social body in Andean understandings of health and well-being, particularly in Kallawaya traditions, to my knowledge, the only scholar to explore the political ramifications of disease in the context of precarity and poverty is María Tapias, *Embodied Protests: Emotions and Women's Health in Bolivia* (University of Illinois Press, 2015), 5; Bastien, *Healers of the Andes*.

inevitable as silicosis and mining accidents. The burden of this social disaster was born increasingly by women whose unacknowledged labor had always helped mitigate insufficient resources in the mines, as the next chapter will explore.

In 1952, the MNR came to power at least in part by suggesting that Bolivia's national problems—poverty, underdevelopment, and dependence on foreign markets—could be solved by nationalizing resources, investing in social welfare, and involving popular groups in the running and management of the state. For the miners specifically, this meant union leaders in government, workers in the management of the company, and fair remuneration for work performed. Compromises could be made, and were, over what form these payments could take. The early struggles of the 1950s and 1960s were the negotiation of the terms: frozen prices instead of pay raises, free education, healthcare, and housing in exchange for accepting fewer political privileges. But even the MNR at its most revolutionary could not fix the precariousness of life in the Bolivian mines. On a global economic scale, copper prices still determined the fortunes of the mines, and by extension, miners. On a daily scale, miners faced risks of ore drying up, or of collapse of a shaft, or equipment malfunction even in the most capitalized of mines. And the Bolivian mines, after 1952, were never well capitalized.

The MNR itself gambled on COMIBOL, using profits to invest in the national oil company, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianas (YPFB), and other enterprises at the expense of investing in equipment, exploration, or upkeep of the mines themselves. The miners, for generations accustomed to placating the Tío and Pachamama in order to safeguard their lives, saw in co-gobierno with the MNR a risk that might pay off in terms of economic prosperity or at least assuring stability against the forces of poverty and danger. The assumption of power by General Barrientos did not fundamentally change how miners and their families understood this

risk, but the late 1960s, and especially after the golpe of Hugo Banzer in 1971, participation in the government ceased to hold the promise of future prosperity. The balance of power in state-building projects shifted from being a source of economic and social mobility to being a force of repression and control.¹²⁶

Working inside the mines never ceased to be dangerous and damaging, despite the social welfare benefits and political control promised by the revolution. Young men such as Ponciano Mamani, who left behind a teenaged girlfriend and a young son just shy of two years old in addition to his mother, expected the possibility of violent death every working day of their lives. Although Mamani's mother argued in court that his young age prevented him from putting down a will, in all likelihood it was his belief that he did not have anything worth dividing.¹²⁷ His mother and girlfriend well understood his social benefits to be his lasting economic legacy, and fought each other in court to keep them. The state, true to its pro-maternalist policies, favored the unwed mother of Mamani's child to his own mother. Ponciano Mamani was not a big deal in the same way Mario Durán had been, and is not remembered in the town as such. Mamani was poor and less well-connected and did not get any honors from the city at his death, just an investigation and a court battle over his pension between his girlfriend and his mother.¹²⁸

Unlike their fathers, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, young men built a culture for themselves that valued risk taking, immediate enjoyment of earnings and winnings, and came to

¹²⁶ COMIBOL began to offer classes for workers in "industrial safety" starting in 1978, see ALP FSC XVII CNM La Paz, 1978, ALB 096.

¹²⁷ In general, when families of a deceased person asked for a declaration of inheritance, they had to prove why the deceased did not leave a will.

¹²⁸ Part of this was due to age and life stage, but much of it had to do with the foreclosure of possibilities for advancement of miners through union life, as well as a return of racist exclusions of the most indigenous miners in this period, a last name like Mamani signaled indigenous peasant status whereas a Durán was likely mestizo. DIC REPORT: "Investigation into the Deaths of Ponciano Mamani and Juan Villca" ALP PJAC Caja 399.

supplant the future-oriented vision supported by revolutionary projects such as free education for the children of workers. The benefits promised by the state, by 1967, were not coming, and were not enough to live on anyway. The revolutionary state had been replaced by a technocratic military state intent on dividing the miners from the peasants. The military state in fact only continued the state expansion initiated by the MNR, reaching ever more effectively into the lives of its citizens but also ever more punitively. In 1965 and again in June of 1967 the Barrientos government had sent the military into Catavi, killing miners and their families as they celebrated the Día San Juan. Whether Ponciano Mamani was killed by agents of the state or by faulty equipment, the result for his community was the same: slow, precarious erosion of quality of life punctuated by tragedy. What happens to utopias when day to day survival is uncertain and the revolutionary state exists only to punish?

Chapter 6: Hatun Tantas: Children of the Revolution, 1971-1992

Have they forgotten that for such a long time the workers have tolerated hunger because we understand that you cannot expect miracles to happen overnight? Perhaps they have forgotten how the workers donated work days and free labor to strengthen democracy?¹

Hunger is a violent experience that make us understand the courage and anger of the people. When you are hungry you understand the urgency of working for justice in the world. The poor are hungry year round; but their hunger is not on display (the way we are), and their hunger is so constant that it has ceased to be news.²

In early 2013, I sat with two miners in their 30s in Potosí. Both had grown up in rural mining communities, the children of miners themselves. Jesus's father had worked for COMIBOL. Efraín's father, on the other hand, had worked for a mining cooperative. They grew up in the same kinds of neighborhoods, with small, concrete-walled houses and limited access to plumbing and electricity. Both fathers worked in dangerous conditions and retired with health problems due to mining. But Efraín remembered there was a difference. As a child, his family had to pay for his school books and uniforms. Children of COMIBOL miners got these free, and while both children got free school breakfasts, Efraín clearly remembered the "hatun tantas," the children whose fathers worked for COMIBOL received more generous portions of bread.³ He remembered Christmas presents distributed to children of COMIBOL miners, and none to

¹ "¿Es que olvidan que por mucho tiempo los trabajadores nos aguantamos el hambre porque comprendíamos que no podíamos esperar milagros de la noche a la mañana? ¿Acaso olvidan que los trabajadores aportamos con mitas y jornales para el fortalecimiento de la democracia?" from Central Obrera Boliviana., *VII Congreso de La COB : Documentos Y Resoluciones.*, 1. ed. (La Paz Bolivia: Centro de Documentación e Información, 1988), 22.

² "El hambre es una experiencia violenta, que nos hace comprender la valentía y la ira del pueblo. Cuando se tiene hambre se comprende mejor la urgencia de trabajar para que haya justicia en el mundo. Los pobres hambreadan todo el año; pero ellos no están en vitrina (como estábamos nosotros) y su hambre es tan crónica que ya ha dejado de ser noticia." Padre Luis Espinal "Comentarios Sobre la Huelga de Hambre" 1979, cited from Luis Espinal, *Lucho Espinal, testigo de nuestra América* (IEPALA Editorial, 1982), 161.

³ Hatun/Jatun tanta, Quechua for "big bread." Interview conducted with Efraín Mamani and Jesus Ayarza, Potosí, January and February 2013. Marcelino Martinez Lopez Interview, February 8, 2013.

families like his. In Corocoro, a domestic employee named Albertina who had grown up orphaned in the community recalled that she had to get special tickets from families of state miners, so that she could also get provisions from the company store in the 1980s.⁴

This chapter suggests that we cannot understand the downfall of the miners as a political entity in the 1980s, and the end of the MNR vision of revolution more generally, without understanding the everyday experiences of mediated exclusion like Efraín's and Albertina's. In this chapter, I will explore several crucial turning points in the mines during the 1970s and 1980s, interrogating historiographical narratives that assume the revolution ended in 1985 with Decree 21060, which shut down the mines. I will show how the end of worker citizenship and the revolutionary vision of 1952 was visible as early as 1976, when Corocoro hosted, for the first time in its history, a National Miners' Congress for the Federation Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB). Although to local observers, the congress seemed to signal a defiant continuity of labor activism despite the harsh military dictatorship of Banzer, in fact the congress was emblematic of the reduced horizons of political struggle for the inward-facing unions. I will explore the lead up to this congress as well as its aftermath, exploring how the increased marginalization of workers during the 1970s also resulted in the provincialization of politics in Corocoro. By examining the struggles over social and family life in this period, I will suggest that family poverty became the only acceptable register for engaging with, and contesting, the state. I will show how on this terrain the miners in fact defeated Banzer, but lost the war against their own MNR government in the 1980s. Complicating existing histories of political struggle in this period, I show how crucial struggles over gender and family control of production and reproduction were to political struggle in this period.

⁴ Interview conducted with Doña Albertina, Corocoro, October 2013.

Return to Military Populism

Barrientos' quest for public order was cut short when he died in a helicopter crash in 1969. His death left a vacuum in Bolivian politics, as a series of military officers and their civilian allies tried to reproduce his combination of populism and containment built during the Restorative Revolution. General Ovando, who had helped Barrientos take power in 1964 and was also involved in the military campaign against Che Guevara in Ñancahuazú in 1967, took a page out of the MNR's book by attempting to move the military government in a more worker friendly, though not necessarily democratic direction.⁵ Through his "Revolutionary Nationalist Model of Development," "Modelo Nacional Revolucionario de Desarrollo," Ovando believed that by capitulating to certain popular demands, particularly wage increases and nationalizing the US-held Gulf Oil production zones in the east, he could stabilize popular discontent in the wake of Barrientos' death. Ovando remained in power between September 1969 and October, 1970, but his regime did not stabilize the country. Instead, Ovando's political opening allowed a great florescence of protest and political activity among workers, students, and discontented professional sectors.⁶

⁵ Malloy characterizes Ovando as an institutional product of the revolutionary Bolivian military: he saw the military as the true instrument of the national revolution, but was not himself interested in politics or policy. He hoped the military could cultivate a stable populist base without the corrupting influence of political parties, but unlike Barrientos, had no direct ties to social movements with which to accomplish such a task. Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*, 45.

⁶ Strengers argued that institutionalism was the major feature of military politics in this period, in both its relatively leftist and relatively rightist positions. Writing from the perspective of post-Banzer, post-García Meza, Strengers overemphasizes the "rightist" tendencies of Barrientos. From the perspective of the workers, Barrientos was a huge swing to the right, but from the perspective of Cochabamba valley peasants, he was a populist. In his Marxist discussion of types of military politics in Bolivia, he also never mentions earlier histories of military populism in the Chaco war aftermath, which is a huge oversight. Zavaleta, on the other hand, saw these military populists as trying to strike a balance of social peace via "parallel concessions to the working class and imperialism." Zavaleta calls both Ovando and Torres, "nationalizers, institutionalists, negotiators," for example, since Ovando believed that by nationalizing Gulf Oil he had the popular leeway to then repress the workers the guerrillas in Teoponte. Torres more clearly understood that he needed to establish equilibrium with worker power but did not know how to do it, and was too weak to maintain the state this way. Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*; Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo Nacional-Popular En Bolivia*.

While the sexual politics of masculinity had always been central to the revolutionary project, it was this period that saw the emergence of a gendered politics of power exercised through, and increasingly by, women. One of the local manifestations of the Ovando period was the brief assumption—unprecedented and unrepeatable—of a female mayor and female treasurer in Corocoro in 1970.⁷ The two women who took power in this period were relatively wealthy residents of the town with commercial connections: Nely Luna, who in 1951 was seduced or assaulted by a very young Mario Durán, was the daughter of a mechanic and a merchant and property owner in her own right. Evangelina de Michel was likely related to Hugo Michel, who had accused his neighbor of being a Falangist in 1965, and Carlos Michel, who was the Juez Instructor presiding over Ponciano Mamani's inheritance proceedings.⁸ The rise of Eva de Michel and Nely Luna suggests that the generation of elite workers who took power after 1952 was beginning to give rise to new forms of power in the town. The families of those radicals of the 1950s and 1960s were now the decent citizens of Corocoro, the safe political bets during times of transition.

It also suggests a new strategy in Bolivia that was beginning to take hold during moments of extreme political instability such as this one: using the temporary assumption of power by a well-connected woman to create the image of apolitical neutrality and compromise.⁹ In Bolivia as in the rest of Latin America, essentialist visions of apolitical, but moral motherhood have

⁷ See, for example, in Caja 242, payroll for the year 1970 lists both as Alcaldesas. The same year also saw a telegram from Gen Ovando Candia congratulating the "alcaldesa" Eva de Michel.

⁸ Carlos Michel is the Juez Instructor in 1964, caja 397, and Martha Guzman is named in the Ponciano Mamani inheritance dispute.

⁹ Another measure of this crisis was the fact that an intelligence report on Trotskyist subversion in Bolivia during this period highlighted the La Paz region as a particular site of growth for the party, see Wm Ratliff Papers, Hoover Institute. Lydia Gueiler Tejada, *La mujer y la revolución* (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1983); Alfonso Crespo, *Lydia* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 1999).

sometimes allowed a woman connected to the regime to take leadership during periods of political crisis. In these cases, certain women have leveraged their imagined neutrality, morality, and even assumed lack of political acumen, to suggest that they can be the antidote to the corruption or instability of the recent past and bring a community through crisis. In this case, Andean traditions of gender complementarity, with women taking charge of the finances of a household, supported someone like Nely Luna assuming control of Corocoro's finances. The tenure of Eva and Nely presaged the brief regime of Lydia Gueiler Tejada, the first female president in Bolivia, who served for several months in 1980 before being ousted in a coup by her relative García Mesa. Gueiler was similarly a wealthy woman who had long served in the MNR as a leader of the women's auxiliary, the Barzolas, and later emerged as an independent politician in her own right.

Another mark of the relative opening of the Ovando years was the return of civilian control over COMIBOL. The workers in the COB and the miners' union were cautiously supportive of Ovando's regime, believing him to be a military man in the style of the 1930s military populist. Ovando, in turn, allowed the FSTMB to hold its 14th Congreso Nacional de Mineros in Siglo XX (the first since Lechín had been banished in 1965), and a month later, allowed the COB to hold its 4th Worker Congress (the first since 1962) on May Day in La Paz, in the currently unused Legislative Palace.¹⁰ This would set the stage for an even more radical experiment in popular democracy in 1971 under General JJ Torres. Nonetheless, more popular protest generated greater political instability and Ovando, like his predecessors, resorted to jail and assassination of political opponents, including the director of the popular magazine *Hoy*,

¹⁰ It was in this period of relative toleration of political agitation that June Nash first entered her fieldwork zone in Oruro, a fact which took her several years and a return to military dictatorship to appreciate. Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*.

Alfredo Alexander.¹¹ Ovando's use of the army to destroy the ELN guerillas that had taken over a gold mine at Teoponte, most of whom were middle-class students, brought criticism from the workers.¹² Ultimately, however, it was Ovando's decision to pay reparations for the Gulf Oil seizures that destabilized his government. When the COB announced a general strike, members of Ovando's military junta began to get anxious about the public disorder, and in October, Ovando's subaltern JJ Torres took power in a counter coup.

A wary worker's movement saw reason to hope that it could return to governing under Torres. Immediately, the COB called together its own Political Command that offered to support the Torres regime, if it could guarantee worker co-participation in at least 50% of the cabinet. Torres accepted, and in order to prove his nationalist credentials, Torres nationalized the US-owned Zinc Mines at Matilde, placing former Corocoro Gerente Elí Sotelo in charge.¹³ With the assumption of Torres in 1971, union leader Hugo Parrado became mayor of Corocoro, restoring worker power to the men, as had happened in 1952 and 1965. During the Torres period, Bolivia also expelled USAID and the Peace Corps, citing concerns about sterilization without consent of indigenous women.¹⁴ The workers used this period, not to rally around a renewed state revolutionary project, but to reject the corruption and self-interested tendencies of the leadership to that point. The worker leadership hoped to return to their previous engagement with Bolivian politics, ideally even extending to worker control, Control Obrero. This time, however, Control

¹¹ Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*, 23.

¹² For more on Teoponte, see: Hugo Assmann, *Teoponte; una experiencia guerrillera*. (Oruro, Bolivia, 1971); Néstor Paz Zamora and Cecilia Avila de Paz, *Cartas a Cecilia: diario de campaña, Teoponte, 1970* (Santa Cruz [Bolivia]: [publisher not identified], 1995).

¹³ Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*, 156.

¹⁴ The 1968 film *Yawar Mallku (Blood of the Condor)* by the Ukamau Collective, publicized this accusation, causing national and regional outrage among Latin American leftists. See Molly Geidel, "Sowing Death in Our Women's Wombs"; Molly Geidel, *Peace Corps Fantasies* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

Obrero would be replaced with the more communal worker co-participation (co-gestión), which the COB argued would be both more defined and more collective than Control Obrero. In this, the leadership responded to critiques of engineers, management and the rank and file who all believed that Control Obrero had led to personal corruption of the representative, who thought too much of his own power.¹⁵ The Torres experiment lasted from October 1970 to August of 1971, and produced not only one of the most politically creative and radical periods of recent Bolivian history, but also one of the most effective and repressive counter-revolutions in Bolivian history.

Torres was not politically very adept or very ideologically driven, but he believed that he had to govern alongside the workers, or at least let them believe they were participating in government. In the face of a frustrated army uprising in January, he capitulated to worker demands to organize a Popular Assembly, which would be the instrument of the working class to create a socialist Bolivia. The Popular Assembly was called on May 1, 1971 and began to meet in the Legislative Palace (unused since the latter years of Barrientos' presidency) on the anniversary of the Noche de San Juan, June 24th. The composition of the Asamblea was heavily weighted towards the miners, whose representative Juan Lechín led the assembly, and who explicitly identified themselves as the vanguard of this socialist revolution. Workers generally made up 60% of the delegates, while the middle classes had 24%, campesinos 10%, and traditional political parties were granted 6%.¹⁶ The exclusion of the campesinos, who made up the vast majority of the Bolivian laboring class, was a point of particular contention and debate

¹⁵ Nash, Dandler, and Hopkins, *Popular Participation in Social Change*.

¹⁶ Malloy argues that campesinos made up at least 40% of the economically active population of Bolivia in the 1970s. Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*, 73. Also contentious in terms of inclusion was the fact that the largest campesino organization, the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, headed by Genaro Flores, had been excluded from the conference entirely, in favor of the much smaller Bloque Independiente, affiliated with the Maoist PCML. Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*, 173.

during the congress itself, as the miners wanted to punish the establishment campesino organizations for allying with the Barrientos government during the era of the Military Peasant Pact.¹⁷

During the Assembly itself, delegates spent much of their time debating policy decisions they had no means of enforcing, and they met for only a few weeks before adjourning to prepare for a never-to-happen second meeting. The most important function of the Asamblea, however, was to articulate a vision of shared worker-state power that included, for the first time, a thorough debate about the meaning and purpose of workplace co-participation, an explicit negotiation of power between the military and the militias, and finally, a mechanism for holding government actors accountable for past actions.¹⁸ In other words, this Asamblea tried to work through in specifics what the 1952 revolution had only vaguely promised, confusingly implemented, and then immediately sought to curtail. The debates over inclusion, meanwhile, rendered visible the limits of the popular as constructed in the original political coalition of the MNR: while workers could demand to be heard, Indians and peasants had to be spoken for.

The Asamblea was not only the most radical attempt to articulate a national populist coalition on the terms set by the MNR, but the clearest example of the inability of that coalition to account for the fact that campesinos and indigenous Bolivians wanted to set the terms of their own political inclusion. It is not surprising, therefore, that the immediate post-Torres period resulted in both a fundamental break between the government and the campesino communities that had most benefitted from the military peasant pact, and the development of radical

¹⁷ Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, 177.

¹⁸ Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*, 62.

alternatives to mestizo Marxist revolution on the part of indigenous communities in the highlands.¹⁹

While the worker delegates felt betrayed and ill-used by both military and civilian politicians, including their own leadership, they had not fundamentally given up on the idea of a multi-class coalition government leading to social change.²⁰ The events of 1971 would foreclose that possibility, both in the eyes of the left and the right. The Torres and Ovando regimes were marked by popular upheaval, land and factory takeovers, and threats to private property. The military immediately sensed the threat that calls for militia power and state accountability posed to their institution. The Asamblea delegates, for their part, understood that coup attempts were likely and had no illusions that political leadership would comply with worker demands unless forced to do so by powerful worker organizations. In the event of a coup, the delegates declared that the Assembly itself would assume military and political leadership of the masses, and they asked Torres repeatedly to supply arms to popular groups. Torres never complied. When the coup began in August of 1971, the workers fought without the weapons they had been given in 1952 and lost against a much more unified and committed foe than they had faced in 1952 or

¹⁹ See also the discussion of this period in Portugal Mollinedo and Macusaya Cruz, *El Indianismo Katarista, Una Mirada Crítica*, 155–162.

²⁰ The continuity of Juan Lechín retaining leadership of the FSTMB, the COB, and the Popular Assembly obscures the radical rejection of the leadership that in fact occurred in both the Siglo XX mining congress of May 1970 and the Asamblea the assembly halls. The miners were divided in their support between Victor Lopez Arias and Lechín, with at least half voting for Lopez. The miners faced disagreement among themselves about the nature of their participation in the government of COMIBOL and fought consistently against party activists in the PCB (Moscow), PCML (Beijing), the POR (Trotsky) and the Grupo Espartaco on this matter. Other issues that came up for negotiation were a proposed restructuration of CNSS, addressing strikes by bank workers and other middle class groups, and creating a Worker University at Siglo XX. Nacionalización – the workers were very concerned with the trend towards minería mediana and also cooperativismo. While the delegates eventually elected Juan Lechín to preside over the Asamblea, at least half of the miners voted against him. Both in the CNM of 1970 and in the Asamblea, delegates forced Lechín to publically account for his record of participating in the rightward moves of the MNR and the Barrientos regimes. For example, "¡Que Entre! Lechín Será Juzgado por los Obreros" *Tribuna*, 30 Abril, 1970. Cited in Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*, 39.

1964. With Banzer, the potential for radical military populism, in the style of Bolivia in the 1930s and Peru under Velasco, was firmly and finally foreclosed.

Mirages of Stability and Growth: The Banzer Years

The Bolivian Army, increasingly restive under the unstable leadership of JJ Torres, made unsuccessful moves towards a coup throughout 1971, ultimately cohering in August behind a School of the Americas-trained conspirator from Santa Cruz named General Hugo Banzer. On August 21, 1971 Banzer led a revolt from the east that quickly overpowered worker resistance in Cochabamba, Oruro, and finally, La Paz. Although initially Banzer framed his coup as a National Revolutionary restoration, and counted on the support of both the right wing of the MNR (including Victor Paz) and the FSB, Banzer was not generally interested in civilian democracy. Nor was Banzer adept, as had been Barrientos, at playing factions of workers and peasants off each other for political support.²¹ Banzer's eight-year dictatorship ultimately destroyed Bolivia's tradition of military populism, replacing this with increasingly power regional interests, local corruption, and the beginnings of Bolivia's narco-state. Outwardly, Banzer projected a model of business growth, order and stability, but his regime was built on successfully breaking the visible strength of the political left, both among the working and middle classes. In order to achieve social peace on his terms, Banzer closed Bolivian universities for two years and outlawed the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) and anything so messy as union activism. By 1974 Banzer felt sufficiently in control of the country to break the Military Peasant Pact that had helped Barrientos maintain control since 1964, and break with his electoral

²¹ Most historians have concluded that Banzer was uninterested in continuing the corporatist populism of his military predecessors, but my own and Bridgette Werner's research on this period suggest that the Bolivian government did actually attempt to cultivate corporatist ties with portions of both the working class and the peasantry, with mixed results. (Personal communication, April 2016). The Banzer government did not, however, intend to offer any autonomy to these groups, resulting in officialist unions with very little legitimacy among the rank and file.

coalition in the FPN, decreeing full military control of the country in 1974 that was supposed to last until 1980.²²

The Banzer regime also brought repression home to Corocoro. The Tarapacá Battalion, stationed just outside the city for most of the twentieth century, assumed new prominence in this period. Tarapacá had been integral to the fighting that brought Torres' Popular Assembly experiment down, as the battalion was the first to breach the Plaza Murillo when workers were still attempting to hold the Laikakota hill in Miraflores and Torres was deciding whether to abandon the Palacio Quemado. The other army units stationed between Corocoro and La Paz on the other hand, the Viacha and Los Andes Battalions, had been some of the last to turn against Torres.²³ In 1971, Gral Brig Carlos Hurtado Gomez took over COMIBOL, and periodically throughout the latter years of Banzer's government, local military officials took over municipal affairs. Banzer's requirement that all unions be approved by local government was, in fact, observed in Corocoro, as the workers reported to a local judge the official results of their elections in 1974.²⁴

Like Barrientos, Banzer couched his seizure of power as a restoration, a Nationalist Revolution to return the country to the noble but lost goals of 1952. More explicitly than Barrientos, however, his restoration linked the economic and social life of Bolivia in ways that directly harkened back to the MNR of the 1950s—although to different ends. For example, Banzer framed his closure of the Universities, which had declared themselves to be “free territories” within the Bolivian state, as an Education Reform that would bring Bolivia's higher

²² For more on Banzer's relationship with the campesino community during 1974, during which time he sent the army into the valleys of Cochabamba, committing what has become known as the Masacre del Valle in Tolata, January 1974, see Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, 49.

²³ Strengers, *La Asamblea Popular*, 207–211.

²⁴ “Sindicato de Mineros sobre su Directiva Sindical” ALP PJAC Caja 243.

education into greater service of the nation and free it from reactionary politicking. Without a trace of irony, Banzer's education minister Augusto Mendizábal argued that, under a "dictatorship of the student," the Universities of the country had become guerrilla training grounds where extremists' willful misinterpretation of ideas like "autonomy" and "co-government" had led an entire generation of nationally-minded youth astray, much as the unions had misled humble workers.²⁵ Thus, Banzer hoped to return to the goals of education in the service of the nation.

Many of Banzer's reforms were also framed as modernizing interventions. In 1973, he streamlined the Family Code, updating the legal framework under which social security claims could be pursued, to encourage more stringent paternity requirements and updating the divorce code to include heretofore unlegislated concerns, such as homosexuality.²⁶ The Banzer

²⁵ Augusto Mendizábal Moya, *Reforma Integral de La Educación*, vol. 4 (La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Información y Deportes, 1972), 19. Even this rejection of student radicalism made use of the categories and language of the MNR of the 1950s, making reference to co-gobierno between classes in a shared nationalist project. For example, the anti-guerrilla diatribe began first with a defense of the 1952 revolution: "From the time of the conquest until 1952, this country has been populated by four culturally distinct groups. The rich, the sons of the mining magnates and landlords; a small and diverse middle class; factory and mine workers; and finally the indigenous masses that in their overwhelming majority were oppressed and lacked all rights. The Revolution of April 9 1952 radically changed this situation by putting into practice an absolute legislative equality among all Bolivians; but this advantage that allowed—for example—the sons of the workers and slowly the sons of the peasants enter the University without obstacle, gave rise to extremist parties taking advantage of the situation to take power over time in the houses of higher education, not exactly controlling the indifferent masses through their sectarian struggles, but introducing into their ranks effective agitators and impassioned militants. In this way, after 1960, the university was converted into a general barracks for communist extremism, to be in 1967 a General Staff of the guerrillas and later their incubator with expenses paid by the State." "Desde la época de la conquista hasta 1952, convivían en el país cuatro grupos culturalmente distintos. Los ricos, hijos de los servidores de la minería y de los latifundistas; una clase media heterogénea y reducida; los trabajadores de las minas y de las fabricas, y finalmente las masas nativas que siendo aplastante mayoría carecían de todos los derechos. La revolución del 9 de Abril modificó esta situación radicalmente al legislar y poner en práctica una igualdad absoluta entre todos los bolivianos; pero esa ventaja que permitió—por ejemplo—que los hijos de los obreros y paulatinamente los hijos de los campesinos ingresaran sin obstáculos a la Universidad, dio lugar a que los partidos extremistas aprovecharan la coyuntura para apoderarse poco a poco de las casas de estudios superiores, no precisamente controlando sus mayorías indiferentes a la lucha sectaria, sino introduciendo en ella hábiles agitadores y apasionados militantes. De esta manera, a partir de 1960, la universidad fue convirtiéndose en cuartel general de extremismo rojo, para ser en 1967 Estado Mayor de las guerrillas y posteriormente incubadora de éstas con gastos pagados por el Estado."

²⁶ Prior to 1973, the allowable causes of divorce included madness, abandonment and infidelity, but Banzer's code modernized these to specify homosexuality and corruption of children, as well as attempted murder of spouse as causes. Hugo Banzer, *Código de Familia*, 1973.

government also instituted seminars for municipal officials in order to standardize local government.²⁷ While Cédulas or Carnets de Identitdad first came into use in the 1950s in Corocoro courts, in the 1970s increasingly petitioners at the local courts were required to show identification numbers and, if male, proofs of military service.²⁸ The municipality made use of new technologies like affordable copy machines and typewriters to streamline local services, resulting in a proliferation of documentation around cultural events, regulations, and taxes. These technologies and investments merely made possible the kind of centralization that both Victor Paz Estenssoro and René Barrientos had attempted during the 1960s, but increased petroleum and indeed cocaine profits assisted in this process.²⁹ At the same time, these technological forms of centralization and control over the security apparatus as seen in the last chapter combined with a tendency towards privatization and abdication of state control over local concerns to create something that looked a lot like neoliberalism.

Despite a rhetoric of efficiency, Banzer's regime never really attempted to reform the bureaucratic structures and high administrative costs of COMIBOL.³⁰ First of all, Banzer's governing coalition was not stable enough to seriously risk dismantling COMIBOL and the political fallout that would entail. Additionally, Banzer and his allies found COMIBOL's coffers

²⁷ Resolución Sin Numero, Primer Curo de Seminarios de Alcaldes Municipales de La Paz, SENDU, ALP PJAC Caja 243.

²⁸ Before this period, miners had employee numbers through COMIBOL, but now nearly all male petitioners in the urban courts had state issued ID numbers. This period also witnessed an increase in Bolivians who had been born in years prior to official documentation petitioning the courts to certify their birth certificates for official documentation purposes. See, for example, Marcelino Candia Plata, minero, verifying his date of birth and parentage 3 Enero 1975, ALP PJJ Caja 430.

²⁹ Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*; Madeline Barbara Léons and Harry Sanabria, *Coca, Cocaine, and the Bolivian Reality* (New York: SUNY Press, 1997), 119.

³⁰ One thing Banzer did not by any means do was get COMIBOL bureaucratic and administrative costs down to efficient levels. Indeed, cronyism and nepotistic appointments were a feature of the Banzer years of COMIBOL. Morales, *Minería boliviana*, 164–5. See, for example, a letter from Banzer's political party, FPN, to the gerente of COMIBOL in 1974 recommending hiring of Teddy Villa as a worker, ALP PJAC Caja 243. See also Gregorio Iriarte, *Los Mineros: Sus luchas, frustraciones, y esperanzas*. (La Paz: Ediciones Puerta del Sol, 1983).

useful as a source of funding for their own private funds and projects. Rather than target institutions like CNSS and COMIBOL head on, this government instead fostered the parcelization of government functions and the encouragement of private competition with the mines. In the 1960s, the first new private mine, Nitto, opened in Corocoro since the Corocoro United Copper Mines had consolidated small Chilean and British enterprises in 1909. By the 1970s, a joint state-private enterprise called Shaft Sinkers Enterprises as well as the Empresa Nitto were competing with COMIBOL for the region's mineral deposits.³¹ Banzer also encouraged cooperative formation as never before.

Banzer also began dividing the social security infrastructure of the government into smaller pieces. As an entity, CNSS was unwieldy, and from 1956 to 1975 had not operated at a profit. During the 1970s, first under Torres and later increasing under Banzer, moreover, the government had created smaller *cajas* that competed with the mandate of the CNSS, decentralizing provision of social services to smaller segments of the population.³² By 1976, for example, railway workers, bankers, students, truckers, petroleum workers, and municipal employees each had their own social welfare organization, which fragmented the basis of

³¹ Funding new mining projects through joint private-public agreements has been a feature of the MAS government in the 2000s as well. Shaft Sinkers entered into an agreement with the EMC in 1973, Redacción del Sistema de Archivo de la COMIBOL, "Corocoro Acuña Su Historia En Cobre: El Yacimiento Minero Que Convirtió Al Cóndor En Montaña," *Bocaminas* 1, no. 6 (August 15, 2011): 4–5. The introduction of these companies produced a flurry of court documentation as workers or families in trouble with the law sought to negotiate between the city and the company itself. Shaft Sinkers as an enterprise seems to have been short-lived in the town, shows up in 1975: Alicia Quintana de Mamani, about verifying her husband's wage 2 Abril 1975 Juana Quispe, wants Shaft Sinkers to verify her spouses' wage 29 Nov 1976 from ALP PJJ Caja 430 1976. In another case, two miners got into a drunken fight, and the accused aggressor asked the police to allow him to return to work at Shaft Sinkers the next day. Expediente 234886 27 Dic 1975, Ramon Maldonado Molliendo vs Calixto Limachi in the matter of a violent attack. Teofilo Alacama Vargas, asks for an extension because his job at Shaft Sinkers is very important 14 Agosto 1976. Simeon Condori Colque, trabajador regular de shaft sinkers, protests his arrest for abuso deshonesto Julio 7 1976. Germn Llapaco Limachi, obrero de Shaft Sinkers defending himself against accusations of robbing the mine, 9 Sept 1976.

³² In 1976, CNSS covered about 18% of the population of Bolivia, or about a million people. See 1976 CNSS Report, ALB FSC.

solidarity among such groups.³³ In this period, too, social scientific investigations of poverty and disease combined with an expansion of civil society charity groups to remove public health from the mandate of public institutions.³⁴ Neighborhood action committees increasingly took initiative for development and social initiatives in place of the state.³⁵

During the era of military dictatorships, COMIBOL provided something of a refuge for those who still believed in a mandate of state supported development and protections for the working class. Even during moments of extreme repression, COMIBOL and its attendant institutions were sources of collaboration between the government and the miners. In 1967, just weeks before a clash between Siglo XX miners and the military killed dozens of men and their families, the government announced that, in accordance with the demands of workers themselves, it would ensure that the 1% all workers paid towards school construction would be earmarked for the schools that served miners exclusively.³⁶ Corocoro, Catavi, and Huanuni were singled out for new school construction. In the years following and continuing through the 1970s, COMIBOL itself would construct some 50 new schools, more than doubling the number of students served to just over 66,000 at the end of the 1970s.³⁷ At the same time that the state

³³ This period also witnessed the growth in NGOs and other corporate entities carrying out the functions of CNSS, see for example, "Letter from Junta Nacional de Acción Social" regarding a child whose father cannot support her on his wage at the Mina Chacarilla 14 Sept 1976, ALP PJJ Caja 430.

³⁴ Letter from Junta Nacional de Accion Social regarding a child whose father cannot support her on his wage at the mina chacarilla 14 Sept 1976 ALP PJJ Caja 430

³⁵ In Columbia, Acción Comunal committees were created by the Peace Corps, though in Bolivia this may not have been the case. *La Accion Comunal: Conclusiones de una Evaluacion Economica* (Bib. Orton IICA / CATIE, 1967). Notes for the formation of such groups can be found: La Paz (Bolivia) H. Alcaldía Municipal, *Plan bienal, 1967-1968*, 1967.

³⁶ "Decisión Consultada - COMIBOL Administrará Aporte Laboral Destinado a Edificaciones Escolares," *El Diario*, June 1, 1967. Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, 61. Miners considered scholarships particularly to be one of the best social benefits they could pass on to their children. She also suggests, however, that there were struggles over the distribution of education resources, and that the state was less and less inclined to grant scholarships to the children of interior workers, preferring to grant them to the children of administrative staff who, being technically miners themselves, also benefitted from the social benefits of COMIBOL.

³⁷ *Panorámica Educativa, 1971-1985*, Archivo Historico de COMIBOL.

was privatizing functions and putting more burden on communities to provide for their own education and healthcare, COMIBOL remained a highly visible outpost of state subsidies for children and families of miners.

COMIBOL schools were formed under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Culture, and at least in theory shared the same curriculum as those in the rest of the country. In practice, these schools were autonomous from the system of state schools, maintained their own teaching pools and had substantial leeway to direct their own curriculum, which was often ideologically Marxist in orientation. During the 1960s, students received free uniforms, free textbooks and scholarly materials, and free breakfasts every day.³⁸ Many schools also offered free transportation to the major mining barrios. Thanks to the 1967 reforms, these schools were more consistently funded than most rural schools. In theory, the expansion of schools through COMIBOL in the countryside served all rural children, not just children of miners. In practice, an average of 10% of the students of COMIBOL schools were “particulares,” that is, unaffiliated with the mines.³⁹ For this reason, COMIBOL schools were very much an extension of COMIBOL itself, and increasingly one of the arenas in which the cultural politics of revolution were fought out over the course of the 1970s and 19780s.

In Corocoro, professors were often sources of class conflict because they were charged so fundamentally with maintaining and reproducing the social order and forming the next generation of worker citizens. So, for example, when Elisa Vidaurre de Angulo was called a

³⁸ *Política Educativa de COMIBOL*, (La Paz: COMIBOL, 1977).

³⁹ For numbers, see Appendix 3, from *Panoramas Educativas, 1971-1977*, Archivo Historico de COMIBOL. Technically, COMIBOL schools themselves were part of Bolivia's system of *escuelas particulares*, that is, not directly run by the government itself, a designation which included autonomous schools run by indigenous communities as well. COMIBOL students were about 6% of the total population of school children in Bolivia in the 1960s, and made up 24% of the student body of *escuelas particulares* nationally.

polyandrist and a “birlocha playing at sainthood,”⁴⁰ it was imperative that she defend her reputation:

For the last four years I have been working in this city as a teacher for the Empresa Minera de Corocoro’s school ‘Ismael Montes,’ and as a result in my position as educator I observe an irreproachable moral conduct in order to reflect a good example with my students, which is to say I do not have any motives of enmity with anyone in the community. As Your Honor can appreciate, any kind of imputation of bigamy makes me look to the vindictive public as a vulgar delinquent and endangers the stability of my house, not to mention makes me hated and contemptible in the eyes of society.⁴¹

Male professors sometimes ran into trouble for different reasons. More secure in their racial and class status, these men nonetheless spent a great deal of time socializing with the children of workers, and sometimes found themselves targets of drunken aggression. For example, in 1968, Professor Jorge Saavedra, out drinking with employees of the Cine Corocoro, was attacked by a dozen drunken workers as both groups attempted to buy alcohol from the same store.⁴²

The XVI National Miners’ Congress of 1976

The Banzer dictatorship also witnessed Corocoro hosting, for the first time in its history, a national congress of the FSTMB, the 16th National Convention of Miners from May 1-7, 1976. Since Banzer had made autonomous unionization illegal and exiled much of the leadership, the

⁴⁰ A birlocha is a term referring to a rural indigenous woman masquerading as an urban resident. It carries the same connotations of illegitimacy, disorder, and improper upward mobility as chola, but is not usually used as a self-identifier. See, for example, discussion in Rivera Cusicanqui, *Violencias (re) Encubiertas En Bolivia*, 80.

⁴¹ “Desde hace unos cuatros años vengo trabajando en esta ciudad como profesora en la Empresa Minera de Corocoro, escuela “Ismael Montes”, consecuentemente en me calidad de educadora observo una moralidad intachable a fin de reflejar un buen ejemplo con mis educados, por manera que, no tengo motivos de enemistad con persona alguna en la población. Como podrá apreciar, su autoridad, semejante imputación de vigamia [sic] me hace aparecer ante la vindicta publica como a una vulgar delincuente y hasta hace peligrar la estabilidad de mi hogar, fuera de hacerme odiosa y despreciable ante la sociedad.” ALP PJJ Caja 406 Elisa Vidaurre vs Sara de Roca, Expediente 026595 5 Julio 1966. Similarly: Expediente 009361, Angelica Chacon vs Maz Delgado. Chacon brought suit against the wife of the schoolteacher Max Delgado for accusing her of being a whore. Max Delgado filed against Angelica Chacon for the same thing. Angelica Chacon v de Castillo was the administrator of the Club Carrasco at the time. 24 Enero 1964, ALP PJJ Caja 396.

⁴² ALP PJJ Caja 415 Expediente 165750 18 Mayo 1968 Fidel Chavez Avila vs Teodosio Arcaya. Expediente 165749 24 Mayo 1968 Saturnino Valeriano vs Teodosio Arcaya and Others. The fight resulted in several injured parties, but Saavedra seems to have refrained from bringing a lawsuit. Ruperto Fuentes Cortez, a teacher, wrote into the courts about an explosive attempt on the life of his adopted son 15 sept 1975, ALP PJJ 430.

Corocoro Congress was the first substantial attempt to assert a union presence with the full knowledge of government officials.⁴³ This Congress was also the first to evince a notable shift in the style of political confrontation between the miners and the government: the appeal to a human rights framing and the involvement of civil society organizations such as the Catholic Church as mediators.⁴⁴ More than a military or economic battle, the miners waged a publicity war against the Banzer regime over who produced progress, order, and dignity. As such, it was an important, though understudied, precursor to both the campaign that effected Banzer's downfall in 1978 and also the failure of worker citizenship to galvanize popular support for the miners in the 1980s.

The congress itself was notable for conflict between official labor leaders and a radical rank and file infiltrated by a strong Maoist presence. Although the union elected many of these rank and file candidates unwilling to make deals with the government, they also reaffirmed institutionalist candidates such as Juan Lechín Oquendo, who remained in power throughout this period. The more radical delegates called a strike to be held in June unless the Banzer government raised wages for mine workers, and at first, both COMIBOL and Banzer's minister of labor appeared to consider the demand. However, in June, Banzer reversed course and instead sent the military in to occupy all major COMIBOL mines, declaring the unions illegal once again. The resulting strike lasted nearly a month before the miners returned to work. Historian and POR activist Guillermo Lora criticized the 'adventurist' spirit of this congress as

⁴³ It seems likely that the relative quiescence of Corocoro as a mining center in this period, as opposed to, say Siglo XX, which had recently battled the Banzer government over the right to control their own radio stations, in fact enabled this congress to take place. The government actually did formally authorize the Corocoro Congress shortly before the meeting took place, only to occupy the mines shortly after. *Testimonios de Cristianos, Bolivia: 1971-1976* (Lima, Peru: Centros de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1976), 166.

⁴⁴ Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders : Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

irresponsible, since the strike brought the military into direct occupation of all of COMIBOL's mines, hampering labor organization nationally.⁴⁵ However, as Malloy notes, while the workers lost on the wage issue and the military occupation, Banzer was forced to recognize independently elected labor representatives, acknowledging the limits of his government to impose order on the mines.⁴⁶ The Congress was the first testing ground of a new kind of struggle in Bolivian labor history.

Both the content of the discussions in the Congress and the context in which they were carried out showed a labor movement in transition from integrating with local powerholders and state agents to leveraging international activists through intermediaries like the UN, the Human Rights Committee, and the Catholic Church. For example, in contrast to earlier decades, the Municipality of Corocoro made no formal welcoming arrangements to the union, except to enact a ban on selling alcohol anywhere in the town from the end of April through the end of the Congress.⁴⁷ The Bishop of Corocoro, Jesús Lopez de Lama, kept an eye on the Congress proceedings, however, in the name of keeping the peace and witnessing events in case of violence.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ "The parties and factions of the left took pains to arrive at Corocoro, a mining center locked in the highlands that lives more from the memory of its glorious past than in its miserable present." "Los partidos y grupículos de izquierda se esmeraron en llegar hasta Corocoro, un centro minero enclavado en el altiplano, que vive más del recuerdo de su glorioso pasado que de su miserable presente." Guillermo Lora, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano: tomo V 1952-1964* (Los Amigos del Libro, 1980), 55. Aldo Cuevas, "El Congreso Minero de Corocoro", La Paz, Mayo de 1977. Felix Muruchi remembers this as a time when the radical miners forced the collaborators out of the union leadership, Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*, 109.

⁴⁶ Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*, 94.

⁴⁷ ALP PJAC Caja 244, Decreto Municipal 5/76. Stores that violated this act would be fined upwards of 1500 bolivianos.

⁴⁸ The Bolivian Catholic Church, which through the Barrientos government had welcomed right wing dictatorships and the rightwing Catholic parties that sustained them, began to change its political orientation, first with the emergence of socially radical priests influenced by liberation theology in mining centers (such as Gregorio Iriarte in Siglo XX) in the late 1960s. The institution of the Church became wary of the Banzer dictatorship in 1972, when the extent of human rights violations and disinterest in civilian political organization became. Finally, when in 1975 Banzer sent the army into Siglo XX and Catavi to shut down miners' radio stations, which were operated by the Church), Archbishop Manrique formally spoke out against the Banzer government. See *Documentos de la*

The most important order of business at the 16th CNM was, first, vindicating the autonomously elected leadership and, second, proving that Banzer could not silence the labor movement. The Congress therefore honored exiled and imprisoned activists and issued forceful proclamations on matters of domestic and foreign policy such as US investment and Bolivia's right to access the Pacific Ocean.⁴⁹ Essentially, the FSTMB fought against Banzer's marginalization by continuing to act as though it had an MNR-era mandate to participate in governance, positioning itself as a responsible interlocutor in matters of government policy and national development. Beyond this, three key issues emerged as union concerns in the Congress: outreach and solidarity with potential allies, restructuring the Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social (CNSS), and finally, maintaining ideological control over education in the mines.

In many ways, the schools available to the miners were the very last bastion of worker control in the 1970s.⁵⁰ In the 1976 Congress, workers in Corocoro asserted their right to control the pedagogy and training of teachers, and insisted that their children be educated in small classrooms with access to cultural materials such as radios, cinema, and chess clubs. The

Conferencia Episcopal de Bolivia, 1979 as well as *Testimonios de Cristianos, Bolivia: 1971-1976*; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Organization of American States, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Bolivia* (Washington, D.C: General Secretariat, Organization of American States, 1981).

⁴⁹ This demand, a relatively new concern for the miners, was in fact one of the major issues that brought Banzer into conflict with an otherwise sympathetic Pinochet regime, and suggests that one of the long-term effects of military nationalist governments was a generalized acceptance of anti-chilean patriotism. Another cause of this shift may have been that earlier worker congresses were generally sympathetic to the Chilean government of Salvador Allende, and Pinochet allowed a resurgence of neighborly resentment over the tract of coast lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific.

⁵⁰ Felix Muruchi and Carmen Morelos, who were each children of miners or miners with children themselves in this period, recall experiencing prejudice against miners as violent, abusive, and uneducated, particularly in 1980s. *Libres!: testimonio de mujeres victimas de las dictaduras* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2010), 184; Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*, 77. Nash notes that although many of the teachers in the late 1960s were children of the working class and radical themselves, some were not. Prejudice against the children of underground workers was visible even in the schools, where she heard a teacher telling the children that their parents did not care about them sufficiently to make it easy for them to learn, 335. At the same time, new curricula stressed that education must be in service of the moral uplift of the working class, which had the effect of telling policing expressions of worker culture as producing poverty. *Política Educativa*, 1977.

Education Commission contained a report back from a Mining Pedagogy Conference held in the radical miners' stronghold of Siglo XX the same year, as well as updates on a plan to create a Worker University in the same camp.⁵¹ Miners were also concerned about the availability of high quality pre-basic instruction for the youngest children in the mines. Finally, they were concerned over whether COMIBOL was setting aside enough money to fund continued school expansions and upkeep.⁵² The last defenses the miners had, in many ways, were in control of their education.

In terms of allies, the FSTMB leadership made sure to call attention to the brutal repression of the miners' "hermanos campesinos" during the massacre of Tolata that broke, for good, any pretense at a military-peasant pact. The miners also hoped to address concerns of the locatorios, or contract miners who recuperated waste ore on the outskirts of COMIBOL mines. The union noted that these miners had been given prejudicial pay rates by the government, and hoped to help organize calls for better pay. However, in the same moments, the miners re-emphasized their status as the worker vanguard, leading the way towards proletarian revolution.⁵³ The emergent Katarista leadership attended the Corocoro conference and assisted in solidarity with the miners throughout 1976, but received scant attention from the miners themselves.⁵⁴ As in the Popular Assembly of 1971, therefore, the miners wanted to organize the rest of the country into a workers' revolution, but refused to share the mantle of leadership of this

⁵¹ This university was finally constructed in 1982, shortly before the closure of the mines. "Planeamientos Educativos y Culturales del XVI Congreso Nacional Minero de Bolivia" Fondo Sinforoso Cabrera, Archivo de la Legislatura, May 1976.

⁵² Ibid. Nash noted in 1969 that expenses for education were the only discount from a miners' paycheck that she never heard the workers complain about. Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, 226.

⁵³ Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, *XVI Congreso Nacional de Mineros, 4 Mayo 1976 Corocoro* (La Paz, Bolivia: Central Obrera Boliviana, 1976). Victor Lopez Arias, "Informe de Labores del Comité Ejecutivo de la FSTMB" Fondo Sinforoso Cabrera, Archivo Legislativo.

⁵⁴ Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, 190.

revolution with those they deemed to be ideologically underdeveloped, or who did not always share their priorities.

The Congress was also deeply concerned with the government proposal to restructure the Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social (CNSS). As a result, the director of labor relations for the CNSS, Mario Ortiz Choque, presented a report to the Corocoro Congress, commenting on the history and purpose of the organization. He argued that the CNSS in its modern form was a product of a “philosophy of solidarity” emerging out of the revolution, but that the simultaneous passage of the Ley de Seguridad Social with the Stabilization Plan meant that the CNSS was infected from its conception with a “virus,” and could not sustain its mandate in the current economic climate. The reforms he proposed divided the CNSS into distinct corporate entities for different categories of workers, expanding the funds for a miner-specific pension plan and separating these subsidies from the medical centers operated by CNSS. Ortiz Choque assured the miners that this Miner’s Fund would be a better financial deal for most workers than under current law, but acknowledged that workers might have to push the government to carry through on its promises.⁵⁵ In other words, Ortiz Choque urged the miners to support the dismantling of the *national* welfare state and accept, in exchange, an unspecified and far from guaranteed plan for themselves alone.

A second series of reforms targeted the organization and provision of healthcare itself in mining communities. In the name of greater national health, Ortiz proposed the orientation of clinics around a series of family doctors engaged in preventative medicine. Rather than wait until a worker or his family got sick, these doctors would maintain more regular contact with mining

⁵⁵ This FCM had been created by decree in 1974. Mario Ortiz Choque, “Report on the Situation of CNSS” XVI CNM May 1976, Fondo Sinforo Cabrera, Archivo Legislativo Boliviana.

families, attending to the “biological, psychological, and social” health of mining communities.⁵⁶

In conjunction with the earlier reforms, this meant that the CNSS was joining the Banzer government in combining increased regulatory presence with decentralization of the welfare state, with an increased focus on teaching the workers and their families about hygiene and preventative care. In this period too, the Banzer government expanded the funds for courses in Industrial Security for the workers, rather than actual infrastructural safety measures in the mines. Taken together, Ortiz was correct: these reforms represented an expansion of needed services, but also an ideological reorientation away from centralizing all functions within COMIBOL.

Church observers noted with some surprise the success and peacefulness with which the Congress was carried out, given recent conflicts between miners and Banzer.⁵⁷ Although it appeared at first that COMIBOL would negotiate a wage increase in the time frame allotted by the FSTMB Congress, in June, former president JJ Torres was assassinated in Buenos Aires by agents of Operation Condor, rumored to be in the employ of Banzer. To forestall (or provoke?) a conflict, Banzer ordered troops to the mines. The miners declared a general strike, followed by students, cooperative miners and many factory and peasant workers. At first glance, then, the old solidarity between workers that had allowed the 1971 Assembly to govern the country briefly under Torres seemed to be holding strong under Banzer. But the denouement of the 1976 Conference in fact marked the emergence of a different kind of battle: this was a fight framed around human rights rather than economic solidarity. The strike won for the miners their right to exist, but left their wages low and their political profile uncertain.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 20.

⁵⁷ Testimonios de Cristianos, *Bolivia: 1971-1976*, 166.

Although Banzer attempted to block reporters from the mines, observers in the Catholic Church kept tabs on what was happening throughout this conflict in major mining centers such as Corocoro and Siglo XX.⁵⁸ Corocoro, Oruro and Potosi became military zones, subject to military law. The occupation of the mines produced mass firings and the closing of pulperías and radio stations, as well as raids on houses, and, as in 1965 the prohibition of miners celebrating their religious festivals. The Bishop of Corocoro and the Archbishop of La Paz declared themselves in sympathy with the strikers and offered to mediate the strike with the government. The government refused mediation and organized a demonstration of loyalty from the government appointed “yellow” unions. One of Banzer’s preferred tactics during this period was to refuse entry to journalists into the mines, but demand that their papers run attacks on the miners in the press, calling them extremists and violators of the public order.⁵⁹

Workers responded in kind to this publicity war, using their connections with students, church officials, and international activists to put pressure on the government. In this campaign, workers’ wives and families took center stage, using a tactic that workers in Siglo XX had used since the 1960s but that would spread to the rest of the country and gain increasing visibility in this era. Miners and their families sent out communiques asserting that they were neither extremists nor agitators, just poor workers asking for a fair wage. While the union sent out communiques to the OIT and the Bolivian Catholic Church, the Housewives Committee wrote letters to the UN, the Red Cross, the Bolivian Human Rights Association, and even an open letter

⁵⁸ One church official believed that the government was trying to avoid another Noche de San Juan by waging psychological warfare Ibid., 176; Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, *XVI Congreso Nacional de Mineros*, 4 Mayo 1976 Corocoro.

⁵⁹ “The celebration of religious rites was prohibited in mining areas.” “Se prohibió la celebración de los cultos religiosos en la zona minera.” Testimonios de Cristianos, *Bolivia: 1971-1976*, 168.

addressed to “public opinion.”⁶⁰ In this last letter, the Housewives of Catavi asked a series of questions designed to shame the government:

If the government speaks of progress for the country, will it accept a worker who earns 17 pesos a day and has 9 children? Who makes progress, the agents and soldiers or he that works? ...If the highest calling of the state is education, why is it molded to the needs of the government in power? Perhaps telling the truth makes one a communist or extremist in this country? Who are the civilizers, the high bureaucrats or the poor classes?⁶¹

Middle class groups concerned with Banzer’s delayed elections and human rights violations responded favorably to these communiques. Human rights groups and civil society increasingly worked together in this period, laying the groundwork for the general strike that would bring down the government in 1978.

This form of messaging was effective but came at a cost: it harkened back to a discourse not seen since the 1920s, when the workers were poor sheep to be protected, rather than heroes and soldiers of the revolution. Although the wives of the workers emphasized that their struggle was towards progress and civilization, their middle class interlocutors began to pay attention to their cause as human rights victims, not laborers. Even the expansion of the Amas de Casa Comité, first organized in Siglo XX, had the potential to obscure the labor politics of their cause. While the committee signed its 1976 communiqué as coming from the “wives of workers,” they soon began to call themselves housewives and organize nationally as hungry mothers and starving children, gaining the most political traction when their actions in La Paz

⁶⁰ In this, the miners made use of triangulated connections to put pressure on a government that would not listen directly to workers. A full discussion of this tactic in Latin American and global human rights movements can be found in Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*.

⁶¹ “Si el gobierno habla del progreso de la patria, y estará bien esto cuando un trabajador minero gana 17 pesos diarios cuando tiene 9 hijos? Quiénes hacen progreso, los agentes y militares o el que trabaja? ...Si la función más alta del estado es la educación, por qué es amoldada a la manera del gobierno que ingresa al poder? Acaso hablar de la verdad es ser comunista o extremista de nuestra patria? Quiénes son civilizadores, los altos funcionarios o la clase pobre?” Testimonios de Cristianos, *Bolivia: 1971-1976*, 172–178.

left their worker husbands back in the mining communities they came from.⁶² On these terms they gained allies but lost the valorization of worker citizenship.

The 1976 Corocoro Congress witnessed a labor movement that was therefore both increasingly radicalized and increasingly marginalized from shared governance and the priorities of potential labor allies. This same phenomenon was visible in Corocoro itself. From 1952 through 1971, miners and their union had participated actively in municipal affairs, organizing festivals and contributing to the organization of political life in the town. In response to the June strike, and the assassination of JJ Torres by Operation Condor operatives in Argentina, the military took control of the mines in Corocoro. As a result, in the August 6 festivities celebrating Bolivian independence, a parade including, “authorities, civilians, soldiers, civic organizations, sports teams, schools, and all the townspeople in the Calle Carrasco,” had no formal place for the union, although it did have a parade of drillers competing against each other for cash prizes on the final day.⁶³ As with the alcohol ban, the miners had returned to being merely marginal members of the public, those most unruly, disruptive to the public order. Despite the claims of their political organizations and public solidarity from the Housewives Committee, the Congress showed that miners were no longer heroes of progress and development.⁶⁴

⁶² While many women in Corocoro identified themselves in the courts as being engaged in “labores de casa,” “labradoras,” or “comerciantas” throughout this period, the first instance of a woman identifying as an ama de casa to the courts only occurred in 1976. Mercedes Mamani Chambilla, ama de casa, about a case from 1968-70. 3 Feb 1976, ALP PJJ Caja 430.

⁶³ “Homenaje a la Fundación de la República de Bolivia en su CLI Aniversario, 6 de Agosto 1976” ALP PJJ Caja 430.

⁶⁴ One of the most striking features of municipal documentation in this period is the fact that despite a proliferation of paperwork over all kinds of mundane matters of city life, there are almost no documents from this period relating to the miners’ union and the congress itself. These documents either never existed or were destroyed, but provide a measure of exclusion of workers as participants in the official life of the town.

The Politics of Hunger

The period between 1978 and 1984 was characterized by extreme swings between democratic openings and reshufflings and violent military regimes, with moments of ineffectual interim civilian governments and total chaos interspersed between. Nonetheless, these years saw the emergence and rapid development of a new political environment in Bolivia, in which the military, the COB, and the political parties each took part. Increasingly, democracy became the only viable alternative for stability, but the ambiguous relationship between formal electoral democracy and widespread political representativeness largely remained unexamined in this period, in part because neither option was more than an ideal at any given moment. Also, in this period, a lack of evidence that any political force could maintain a stable government on its own made the reliance on outside assistance, particularly from the USA or the IMF, seem particularly appealing. Ultimately, two episodes of these pendulum swings are crucial, I think, to understanding the ways the COB perceived itself and was perceived in the 1980s: first, the 1978 hunger strike; and second, the bloody attempts to consolidate military control during 1981-2 that targeted mining communities extensively, including Corocoro. In this period the COB argued that it established a reputation as a defender of democracy and a threat to military stability, but also as a potential competitor for popular authority with the parties on the electoral left.

Although Banzer began his regime with the support of several moderate politicians, including the MNR's own Victor Paz Estenssoro, by the late 1970s the dictator had alienated most of his erstwhile allies in the political classes. Formally banned in 1974, several political parties nonetheless had begun to reconstitute themselves by 1978 around Banzer's vague promises for elections in 1980. These groups operated semi-clandestinely alongside human rights activists in the Catholic Church and, of course, the COB and FSTMB. The agitation of these

groups encouraged Banzer to move the election date up to 1978, although most of the leadership of the formal parties and the labor movement continued to live in exile abroad or in prison at home.

It was around this time that Comité de Amas de Casa leader Domitila Barrios de Chungara, whose testimony had just been published in Mexico City, began working in 1977 with the newly formed Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (Permanent Assembly on Human Rights, APDH). This allowed her to serve as a link between the Siglo XX community, the clandestine labor leadership, and members of the Union Democrática de la Patria party who remained in Bolivia and were petitioning to hold elections. Thus, in December of 1977, when four housewives from the Comité in the Siglo XX mining community decided to enter into a hunger strike in the Archbishopric of La Paz, calling for amnesty for all prisoners and exiles (including their husbands), recognition of rights to unionize, the rehiring of those fired for union activity, removal of the army from the mines, both the democratic left and the unions responded enthusiastically.⁶⁵ What had begun as a struggle over workers rights quickly became a referendum on the continuing dictatorship of Hugo Banzer. While the labor unions and leftist political activists organized sympathy strikes nationwide, the APDH offered solidarity assistance in finding safe spaces for strikers. A week in, members of the APDH such as priest Luis Espinal also took part in the strike, occupying the offices of the *La Presencia* newspaper. By January of 1978, general strikes and sympathetic hunger strikes had spread nationwide as well as to exile communities in Lima, Mexico City, and Paris.⁶⁶ In a turn of events unprecedented in Bolivian

⁶⁵ Barrios discusses this period in the beginning of her second published testimonio, Domitila Barrios de Chungara, *Aquí También, Domitila!*; The APDH offers its own timeline of the hunger strike, with photos and newspaper clippings, in Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia., *Huelga de Hambre*.

⁶⁶ Jorge Mansilla T, *Huelga de Hambre : Bolivia, Mujeres Mineras, Victoria Popular* (Lima, Peru: s.n., 1978); Lavaud, *La dictadura minada la huelga de hambre de las mujeres mineras, Bolivia, 1977-1978*.

history, Banzer acquiesced to all of the demands of the strikers except the removal of troops from the mines in late January. This strike did not cause Banzer to immediately resign, but it did signal the end of his political power over the country.

Governments thrown out by popular protest are certainly not rare in Bolivian history, but the movement that brought Banzer down was notably civil and bloodless compared to the angry crowd that hung President Villarroel from a lamppost in 1946 or the pitched battles that failed to keep Torres in power. Banzer would go on to reenter politics as a civilian with some success through his Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) party, winning a plurality of the votes and serving his constitutionally allotted presidential term in 1997.⁶⁷ The workers brought Banzer down, but did so in the name of civil democracy and in order to protect powerless women. As one observer wrote movingly, the initiators of this protest were impoverished women:

Daughter, sister, girlfriend, mother, or widow of the miner, the woman of the mines is the greatest symbol of Bolivian stoicism. Born to lose, the woman of the mines learns to forge metal out of her difficult life: never giving up and keeping her dignity in the face of death, which is a form of dying in triumph.⁶⁸

Symbolically powerful, these women were not thereby encouraged to define the future order of politics in Bolivia, but to allow civilian politicians to save them from corrupt politicians. In this victory over dictatorship, the relationship between state and citizen was left undefined by all parties, allowing a popular mandate to form around democracy that meant one thing to workers and quite another to middle class and indeed indigenous activists who saw no value in the 1950s model of revolution.

⁶⁷ Dunkerley explores this phenomenon in James Dunkerley, *Bolivia: Revolution and the Power of History in the Present: Essays* (Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

⁶⁸ Hija, hermana, novia, madre o viuda de minero, la mujer de las minas es el mayor símbolo del estoicismo boliviano. Nacida para perder, la mujer minera aprende a forjar durante su apretada vida los metales de la no resignación y se cubre la dignidad hasta la muerte que es una forma de morir en triunfo. Mansilla T, *Huelga de Hambre*, 9. Mansilla later noted that this was a spontaneous protest over which no civil society group had taken “paternity.”

The presidential elections of 1978 have the dubious distinction of being the most blatantly fraudulent in Bolivian history. Banzer's chosen successor General Pereda won, but the leftist coalition Union Democrática de la Patria claimed to have legitimately won the elections. The UDP's complaints received a sympathetic ear in Washington, and popular unrest was such that Pereda decided to stage a coup to ensure he would actually make it into office.⁶⁹ This coup so failed to consolidate Pereda's hold on power that he decided his regime should be a transition to elections after all, which he called for July 1979. In these elections, the UDP narrowly won the presidency and the MNR barely a majority in the legislature. Neither majority was strong enough to appoint a president, so new elections were called for June 1980.

Before the new elections could be held, however, Colonel Natusch Busch attempted a bloody coup that, while initially successful, only lasted a few weeks before a new junta took over and called for the resumption of the electoral process. Characterizing Natusch Busch's regime is difficult not least because of its brevity, but also because the Colonel himself seemed to be attempting both repression and revolution at once. At least in terms of rhetoric Natusch Busch attempted to style himself as a military socialist in the vein of his uncle, beloved president Germán Busch. Malloy suggests that he seriously hoped to create an alliance with the COB and offered them a position in the government. However, despite fond remembrances of the 1930s and a desire to return to JJ Torres' promise of co-gobierno and obrera democrática, the labor unions through the COB ultimately refused this offer.⁷⁰ Natusch Busch's regime is mostly

⁶⁹ James Dunkerley, *Bolivia, 1980-1981: The Political System in Crisis* (London: University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 1982), 3.

⁷⁰ Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, *Evaluación de La Lucha Política de Los Trabajadores Mineros* (La Paz Bolivia: Ediciones Gráficas "E.G.," 1992), 111; Malloy, *Revolution and Reaction*, 146.

remembered for exacerbating the trend in Bolivian military dictatorships (present, but still nascent at the end of Banzer's government) of encouraging paramilitary violence and military ties to narco-trafficking, thus setting the template for the similarly unstable dictatorship of García Meza. Miners held to this moment of distrust of Natusch Busch as evidence of their suitability for democratic participation.

The UDP also won the elections held in June of 1980, but just barely. In a general climate of uncertainty and open rumors of impending military insurrection, congress appointed MNR activist and women's committee leader Lydia Gueiler Tejada as interim president. At this point, the COB was one of several groups to attempt to negotiate with the military to prevent a coup. In the agreement known as CONADE, the COB, the MNR, the UDP, and the military all agreed to uphold democratic transition at all costs. The COB appeared to take this commitment most seriously, going so far as to quell the strikes of its own constituent unions in order to maintain stability.⁷¹ These groups may have hoped that an interim government led by a female politician would be an "apolitical" enough choice to ensure temporary stability, or perhaps they expected that general Luis García Meza Tejada would not carry out a coup against his cousin. Nevertheless, in July, García Meza did exactly this, preventing the UDP's Hernan Siles Zuazo from taking office in another bloody coup.

Meza's eighteen month dictatorship and the series of even shorter military regimes that followed it were violent and repressive, but nonetheless consistently incapable of stabilizing the country or consolidating a backing among the elite political classes or business groups. Rather, these governments used the army's control over the newly emergent cocaine trade in the eastern lowlands to stave off economic collapse while at the same time doing very little to address the

⁷¹ Dunkerley, *Bolivia, 1980-1981*, 10.

economy itself. García Meza did try unsuccessfully to impose government-friendly unions on the mines as Banzer had done, without any measurable success. Meanwhile, the COB responded with near continuous general strikes in this period. A human rights report from Potosí suggested that the majority of casualties immediately resulting from Meza's coup were miners, who formed the last wave of resistance, and were therefore massacred when the army arrived with aerial reinforcements at mining camps such as Caracoles and Viloco.⁷² Miners in Corocoro also participated in this struggle, resulting in the local radio station being destroyed and many activists being killed and imprisoned by the army, as well as brought to detention camps in La Paz.⁷³

COMIBOL miners recalled this moment with fondness as one in which they defended democracy from the frontlines. By publically casting themselves in this manner, miners hoped to rekindle the nationalist narrative of sacrifice that had unified the 1952 Revolution. For example, in a pamphlet produced by the Centro de Promoción Minera, miners recounted their struggle against the García Meza dictatorship as one of ultimate victory against a corrupt regime. Miners produced a great deal of propaganda, pamphlets and memorials in this period, in which they highlighted their struggle against state-appointed unions and for worker self determination as a distillation of the national fight for return to democratic government. The language used in these pamphlets is lofty and centered on national rejuvenation rather than revolution: "The spirit that moves us is wide and patriotic and we are conscious of our obligations and rights."⁷⁴ Against a

⁷² Ibid., 20; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Organization of American States, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Bolivia*.

⁷³ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Organization of American States, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Bolivia*. Interview with Isaac Hurtado, Corocoro, August 2013.

⁷⁴ "El espíritu que nos anima es amplio y patriótico y somos conscientes de nuestras obligaciones y derechos." Centro de Promoción Minera (Bolivia), *Tres Años de Lucha Sindical 1981-84* (La Paz Bolivia: Ediciones CEPROMIN, 1984), 29.

government that increasingly accused the miners of defending their own interests at the expense of everyone else, miners insisted that their vision was national and collective. Ultimately, the miners did not understand how their interests could be selfish, as the economic vision inherited from 1952 failed to distinguish between the economic viability of COMIBOL (and their own stability and survival as employees) and the national well-being.⁷⁵ In their summary of this period of struggle, the miners believed that democracy required COMIBOL, “porque la consolidación de la democracia no puede justificarse si no representa un medio para conseguir mejores condiciones de vida.”⁷⁶

By the 1980s, however, the miners’ argument that COMIBOL was the basis of economic prosperity in Bolivia was no longer based on reality. Of the major tin producing countries of the world, Bolivia was the highest cost producer and thus the most vulnerable to price fluctuations and, as would happen in the 1980s, the flooding of global markets with tin stockpiles.⁷⁷ Corocoro’s production of copper was never substantial enough for Bolivia to compete as a primary copper producer on the global market, and in this period copper’s price was a low \$.99 libro fino.⁷⁸ Finally, since the nationalization of YPFB under Ovando in 1969, the Bolivian state had been directing more and more of its energy towards petroleum production, resulting in a diversification of the industrial sources of production in Bolivia’s economy, as the table below suggests:

⁷⁵ Central Obrera Boliviana, *Frente a La Crisis : Propuesta de Política Económica de La Central Obrera Boliviana* (Cochabamba: Universidad Mayor de San Simón Instituto de Estudios Sociales y Económicos, 1979), 7.

⁷⁶ Centro de Promoción Minera (Bolivia), *Tres Años de Lucha Sindical 1981-84*, 43.

⁷⁷ Fox, David "Bolivian Tin: Crisis in the Making" in Thomas Greaves and Culver, William, eds., *Miners and Mining in the Americas* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986); John Crabtree, Gavan Duffy, and Jenny Pearce, *The Great Tin Crash : Bolivia and the World Tin Market* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1987).

⁷⁸ Ministerio de Minería y Metalurgia and Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), *Dossier: Estadísticas Del Sector Minero Metalúrgico 1980-2013* (La Paz, Bolivia: Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2014), 274.

YEAR	TIN AS PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS	TIN AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	PETROLEUM AS PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS
1955	66.5	29.6	2.0
1960	81.3	11.4	6.4
1965	84.9	15.4	0.6
1970	56.8	10.6	6.9
1975	41.2	8.5	19.3
1980	40.1	6.2	25.8

Table 6.1 Source: William Lee Baldwin, *The World Tin Market: Political Pricing and Economic Competition* (Duke University Press, 1983), 42.

Thus, while COMIBOL miners in conferences such as the CNM of Corocoro in 1976 continued to propose plans to revitalize tin and other mineral production, and considered it their duty to defend both democracy and social welfare as a precondition for democracy, Bolivia generally was less beholden to the mineral industry specifically. While the miners saw their political agitation as evidence of their commitment to democracy, political elites saw the miners as potential forces of destabilization and chaos, and many poor Bolivians saw the miners as simply fighting to retain privileges their neighbors had. After the return to democracy in 1982, the government was increasingly successful in casting worker agitation as violence akin to the violence that had characterized the military regimes, rather than as a form of national political participation.⁷⁹

Gender Trouble and Neoliberalism in the Mines

At the same time that the miners were fighting for democracy on the terms of human rights and civil liberties, the Banzer and Meza governments were consolidating an attack on the institutional bases and benefits that had come to define worker citizenship. In this way, the struggle over worker participation in democracy obscured a more fundamental assault on the

⁷⁹ For example, Dunkerley, who was an observer in this period, observed that the struggles of the Jornadas de Marzo, where miners occupied the city of La Paz for a week, were a frightening moment for the citizenry as well as the political parties, and colored later reactions to miner protests. Dunkerley, *Bolivia*.

idea of a state commitment to the social welfare of its citizens. As the last chapter suggested, cooperative formation had been one way in which the Barrientos and Paz regimes had sought to limit worker political power and undermine the institution of COMIBOL. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, official encouragement of cooperative formation as a solution to poverty became more explicit and widespread through institutions like the regional Corporaciones de Fomento (CORDEFO) and the Instituto Nacional de Cooperativismo (INALCO). These institutions helped encourage productive cooperatives of miners, transport workers, and small agriculturalists, but it also (and increasingly in this period) encouraged the formation of consumer cooperatives as a poverty reduction tool. Using cooperatives, the military governments of Banzer, Natusch Busch, and García Meza laid the groundwork for the dismantling state social institutions and social commitments that would occur in 1985, in the name of local development and poverty relief.⁸⁰

For example, in 1977, the Banzer government signed an accord with the United Nations and the FAO to foster Clubes de Madres as an anti-poverty and local development measure.⁸¹ These were to be created initially as clubs and later turned into “proto-cooperatives” in the cities of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba as well as the rural provinces of the La Paz Department neighboring Corocoro, such as Ingavi and Los Andes.⁸² The mothers’ clubs that operated through INALCO were modeled explicitly on mothers’ clubs that had existed in certain communities since the 1960s, but also implicitly on consumer cooperatives and lotteries that women in mining communities had adapted from rural traditions of resource pooling, such as the

⁸⁰ ALP CRDLP, Box: 128 Photo: 8832 Doc: “Decreto Supremo No 17682” Gral Div Luis García Meza Tejada

⁸¹ ALP CRDLP Box: 127 Photo: 8796 Doc: Instituto Nacional de Cooperativas “Bolivia y el Programa Mundial de Alimentos Naciones Unidas/FAO Sobre Asistencia del “PMA” para un Proyecto de Clubes de Madres y Desarrollo Sanitario Rural No 2313”

⁸² ALP CRDLP Box: 127 Photo: 8794 Doc: “Ayuda Memoria del Proyecto PMA/BOL 2313 Clubes de Madres.”

aini and the pasanaku.⁸³ Most critically, these cooperatives reproduced many of the functions that COMIBOL had taken over or expanded in the 1950s, offering funds for communities to build healthcare centers, acquire educational materials, and particularly distribute milk and other crucial food items to needy families. Unlike COMIBOL, however, these proto-cooperative clubs created no ongoing responsibility between the state and the communities they served, and explicitly encouraged members to reserve a portion of the funds to encourage mothers to become producers of crafts or other exportable products in their own right. In the Banzer era, these state-approved mothers' clubs had access to foodstuffs and consumer products imported from the United States under the terms of non-emergency aid.⁸⁴ During this period, the government was not the only entity fostering this kind of initiative: missionaries and NGOs moving into mining communities helped spread a gospel of self help and reform that targeted the failings of miners and their spouses as parents, rather than the structural causes of poverty in the communities.⁸⁵

Social policies designed to target women and families with aid were explicitly and institutionally linked to those policies tied to a political as well as economic restructuring of the mining industry. In both cases, the price for participation in these cooperatives was the

⁸³ Nash described several of these adaptations to poverty as they were practiced in Oruro in 1969. These strategies centered around the pulpería, and were mostly organized by women. The ayni (aini in Nash) was an institution also found in rural ayllus (indigenous communities or kin groups) that was based around reciprocal lending exchanges. The ayni often enabled miners and their families to pool resources for weddings, or holiday celebrations, and was linked to notions of comadrazgo. The practice of pasanaku allowed for the creation of a savings pool for bulk buying of resources that were more expensive for individual families such as furniture. In contrast to the ayni, pasanaku relationships did not necessarily imply kinship, and the organizer of the pasanaku lottery sometimes made a profit. In times of political turmoil when the pulperías shut down, the Comité de Amas de Casa organized a food distribution cooperative using similar practices to the pasanaku. Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*, 106–111.

⁸⁴ This aid derives from PL 480, signed into law by Eisenhower. ALP CRDLP Caja 127 Photo: 8796 Doc: Instituto Nacional de Cooperativas “Bolivia y el Programa Mundial de Alimentos Naciones Unidas/FAO Sobre Asistencia del “PMA” para un Proyecto de Clubes de Madres y Desarrollo Sanitario Rural No 2313”

⁸⁵ This had begun in the 1960s, see for example, “Seminario de CONIF: Interesantes Sugerencias Sobre La Mujer Campesina, Minera, Y Obrera,” *El Diario*, June 3, 1967. The wives of mine administrators also sometimes formed groups along these lines, though these were not welcomed by mining families. Böhrst de Sotelo, *Mi Experiencia En Las Minas*. These kinds of projects gained greater force with the explosion of NGOs in the 1980s.

abdication of leftist politics. Although in September, García Meza had singled out the mining cooperatives of FENCOMIN along with lowland rice producers as examples of the kind of economic growth that could be effected through apolitical cooperatives, it seems as though the miners, like their union counterparts, did not always cooperate with García Meza's plans.⁸⁶ On October 31, 1980, blaming "political deviations" on the part of the FENCOMIN, García Meza disregarded the democratic organization of the Federation and reconstituted its leadership under an engineer named Victor Hugo Echeverría.⁸⁷ The same engineer was placed in charge of recreating the Mothers Clubs originally fostered under Banzer's 1977 treaty.

The struggles of the miners to demand human rights and a return to democracy should therefore be understood in the context of a general move towards fighting political wars against state-centered development in the social realm, on the part of both miners and the military governments. In this period, just as the miners were struggling to make demands on the state, mining families increasingly took the stage as political agents in their own right.⁸⁸ Building on the successes of the 1978 hunger strike, the Amas de Casa expanded from their base in Siglo XX and Huanuni to all of the major mining centers in Bolivia, including Corocoro.⁸⁹ While the

⁸⁶ ALP CRDLP, Caja 128 Photo: 8832 Doc: "Decreto Supremo No 17682" Gral Div Luis García Meza Tejada. This decree, "recognizes the importance of the national cooperative system as being one of the best kinds of solution to the great socio-economic problems of the country that by their inclusive nature drags down vast sectors of the urban, rural, and marginal population." "reconoce la vigencia del sistema cooperativo nacional por constituir una de las mejores alternativas de solución a los grandes problemas socio-económicos del país que por su naturaleza participativa arrastra a grandes sectores de la población urbana, marginal, y rural."

⁸⁷ ALP CRDLP Box 128 Photo: 8851 Doc: "Informe Intervención de FENCOMIN" October 31, 1980. October 31st was also the date on which nationalization of the mines had been decreed in 1952.

⁸⁸ Throughout Latin America, Cold War assaults on leftist politics, traditionally the domain of masculine struggle, allowed for women to organize in new, "apolitical" ways, reformulating political demands within the vocabulary of human rights and their family roles as wives and mothers. See, for example, Heidi Tinsman, "A Paradigm of Our Own: Joan Scott in Latin American History," *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 5 (December 1, 2008): 1357–74.

⁸⁹ Centro de Promoción Minera (Bolivia), *I Ampliado de Mujeres Mineras : Testimonio Colectivo* (La Paz : Bolivia: Centro de Promoción Minera, 1991). Only the first edition of *Mujer Minera* mentions Corocoro, and no delegates took on educational roles in this *Ampliado*. By the second meeting, Corocoro was no longer a major mining center. This likely has to do with the links between Corocoreños and merchant communities in El Alto and other regions.

FSTMB struggled to organize among cooperative miners that by 1980 had a population about as large as that of nationalized miners themselves, the *Comités de Amas de Casa* were more successful at creating affiliated groups among the wives of cooperative miners in places like Potosí and Oruro. *Amas de Casa* committees also explicitly targeted mothers' clubs and consumer cooperatives, understanding that these communities represented potential threats to their basis of organization.

One of the strengths of this movement was its ability to organize within both public and private mines, which the FSTMB struggled to do.⁹⁰ At the same time, both the FSTMB and the *Amas de Casa* were limited by their own understandings of family politics and the role of women in the social order. The *Amas de Casa* derived their political legitimacy from rendering hypervisible the role of women as mothers and spouses of wage-earning men. If these women were working (which was nearly universal in this period), this was an indictment of the state's failure to provide substantive wages to their husbands. Because of this, the *Amas de Casa* Comité struggled to organize around the *palliris*, women who worked for wages or contracts recuperating ore from the waste heaps outside the mines.⁹¹ While the Comité argued that it spoke for the interests of these women, they were reluctant to allow *palliris* to set the agenda of struggle, just as the FSTMB struggled to represent *locatorios* and *cooperativistas*. Furthermore, single women were not welcome in the Comité except in cases of clear abandonment. Even in the 1990s, women lost their place in the Housewives' Committee if their marriage disintegrated or their husband left the mines.⁹²

⁹⁰ Interview conducted with Irene Mamani de Checa of Comité de Amas de Casa in Mina Bolívar, July 2011.

⁹¹ *Palliris* had never entirely been eradicated from the mines, despite the rationalization of production after 1952. Katarista organizer Luciano Tapia's mother had been a *palliri* in the Corocoro mines. Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Así es nuestra vida)*.

⁹² Centro de Promoción Minera (Bolivia), *III Ampliado de Mujeres Mineras : Testimonio Colectivo, La Paz, Septiembre, 1991*. (La Paz: Centro de Promoción Minera, 1993). One indication of the normalcy of such work can

In rural communities, women's work was understood to be crucial to the household unit. Andean systems of gender organization within peasant communities often explicitly included women as producers in the household, as part of a complementary system of social organization based around the marriage bond, and this norm had historically extended to mining communities as well.⁹³ In COMIBOL communities, men dominated the formal paid labor whereas women supplemented household income with other forms of temporary and informal employment. Within such a system, the women of the Amas de Casa saw their role as assisting with the mine labor of their husbands, as well as ensuring the accountability of both government and company.⁹⁴ Some members of the Amas de Casa also formulated a critique of gender inequalities within their own families, explicitly distinguishing their position from feminism. These women argued for equal rights based on a Marxist understanding of women's labor as crucial to the reproduction of the labor force. Combining Andean conceptions of complementarity within the conjugal bond and Marxist feminist ideas of the double day, these activists suggested that mining women derive their right to political voice through their position as wives and mothers in the family. This was not, in other words, a politics of gender autonomy, even though in practice it often demanded a great deal more space for women to set the terms of their own participation in family and civil life.

be found in the testimonies of palliris, who recall domestic disputes with their husbands over whether they could leave the house to go to political meetings, but not over whether they could work outside the house.—Historias de Vida de las Mujeres Mineras del Cerro de Potosil (PRODIS YANAPAKUNA, Cooperazione Internazionale, n.d.), 18, Centro de Informacion y Desarrollo de la Mujer.

⁹³ Denise Y Arnold and Conferencia Internacional sobre Parentesco y Género en los Andes, *Más allá del silencio: las fronteras de género en los Andes* ([La Paz]; St. Andrews: ILCA, Instituto de Lengua y Cultura Aymara ; CIASE, Centre for Indigenous American Studies and Exchange, 1997); Harris, *To Make the Earth Bear Fruit*; Billie Isbell, *De Inmaduro a Duro: Lo Simbolico Femenino Y Los Esquemas Andinos de Genero* (Biblioteca Andina, 1997), 520.

⁹⁴ Ampliado Nacional de Amas de Casa Mineras, *Participación de La Mujer Minera* (La Paz: Centro de Promoción Minera, 1989). See also the criticism of elite feminisim in Chungara, *Si Me Permiten Hablar*; Domitila Barrios de Chungara, *La Mujer Y La Organizacion* (La Paz: Centro las casas, 1980). See attempts to claim Barrios de Chungara as a feminist, Chinchilla, "Working-Class Feminism."

One of the hallmarks of the mid-century vision of worker citizenship, I suggest, was delegitimizing the work of women and particularly children as linked to poverty, underdevelopment, and implicitly, indigenous cultural backwardness. Worker citizenship as enacted by COMIBOL and the MNR created vision of family progress predicated on a nuclear family dependent on a single male wage and a mother at home to take care of children and household. This vision had not ever reflected the reality of life in the mines during the twentieth century, as even at its most prosperous COMIBOL was unable to provide sufficiently for the needs of mining families. As earlier chapters have suggested, families used adaptations of extended kinship networks based on indigenous rural agrarian practices to pool resources and survive the precarious economic conditions in the mines. To the extent that COMIBOL and state regulations encouraged abandoning such practices, state led anti-poverty measures also functioned as tools of assimilation and eradication of indigenous culture.⁹⁵

In the 1980s, neoliberal alternatives to centralized state industry and welfare offered new space for communities to recuperate these cultural practices that were considered undesirable in the eyes of COMIBOL and the 1952 state. This posed a dilemma for COMIBOL miners seeking to fight neoliberal reforms: many of their critiques of the effects of these policies also reproduced racist discourses that devalued rural and indigenous practices as anti-modern and barbaric. One such policy was the encouragement of cooperative mines.

Although their numbers have been rising steadily in the past few decades, mining cooperatives have, since colonial times, always existed alongside the larger private and state mines. Although the state did not keep track of these numbers in the early years of cooperative

⁹⁵ Beyond actual mine work, women also fulfilled roles within the mining community that were either illegal, unanticipated, or unregulated by the company, such as unauthorized food and alcohol production, unauthorized ore recuperation, and prostitution. Nash, *We Eat the Mines*, 94.

mining, the accelerated growth of cooperatives actually began long before the passage of Decree 21060 in 1985.⁹⁶ Already 30% of the workforce in 1980, cooperative miners were set to numerically surpass state miners by 1986 regardless of the closure of COMIBOL. After Decree 21060, however, cooperatives took over production of the vast majority of mineral production in Bolivia, accounting for 90% of the mining population by 2000.⁹⁷ Today, there are between 60,000 and 100,000 cooperative miners in Bolivia, although accurate numbers are notoriously hard to come by, since most socios employ more than one subordinate, officially or not, making the population potentially much greater.⁹⁸

The increase in cooperative mining had opened up increased space for women to work inside the mines.⁹⁹ This opportunity was both economically necessary for many families and profoundly threatening to the gendered order of union mine work. Writing from the early twenty-first century, Pascuale Absi argued that Potosí miners created a gendered social space in their communities based around a model of the heterosexual conjugal bond. In this schema, the mines themselves were feminine spaces that men rendered fertile through (sexualized) work. For women, the interior of the mine was a dangerous space in two ways: first, because women made the mine jealous, and second, because the interior of the mine was also the realm of *tío*, a devil spirit who was said to be sexually dangerous to women. The exterior of the mine, on the other hand, was a public space gendered male, within which the home was the domesticated domain of the housewife. Variations of the belief that a female presence within the mines made valuable

⁹⁶ See table in Appendix 7.

⁹⁷ Ministerio de Minería y Metalurgia and Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), *Dossier: Estadísticas Del Sector Minero Metalúrgico 1980-2013*.

⁹⁸ “Concobel: 3 de 10 Bolivianos Son Cooperativistas (Erbol, 26.3.13),” *CEDIB*, accessed March 31, 2016, http://www.cedib.org/post_type_titulares/concobel-3-de-10-bolivianos-son-cooperativistas-erbol-26-3-13/.

⁹⁹ Centro Diocesano de Patoral Social Oruro., *Las Palliris En Oruro*. (Oruro: CEDIPAS, 1989).

veins disappear seem to date back to the colonial period and have persisted among both state and cooperative miners. Both Nash and Absi have observed some version of this taboo, in each case attributing to it the desire to secure more (or more prestigious) jobs for men during times of job scarcity. Nash in particular argued that since the most dangerous, exhausting, and thus prestigious and masculine position was to be a driller in the mines, a woman who drilled called into question the social order. During much of the twentieth century, the idealization of a single wage earner nuclear family model as a matter of both state and union policy helped reinforce this taboo against female miners, and COMIBOL did not hire women to work inside the mines, though it often responded to the reality of family poverty by hiring women outside the mines.¹⁰⁰ Despite such taboos, women have worked in and outside the mines since colonial times.¹⁰¹

Cooperative miners also blurred the distinction between interior and exterior miner as well as the gendered distinctions between hierarchies of labor. With much fewer employees and resources, cooperative enterprises tended to mine smaller shafts and share labor, or concentrate entirely on the exterior of the mine. Compared to COMIBOL, women were often engaged in multiple levels of production within cooperatives, at times even working with small hydraulic

¹⁰⁰ Nash, *We Eat the Mines*, 119; Ana María Aranibar J., *La Minería Con Rostro De Mujer* (La Paz: Programa de Cooperación Danesa al Sector de Medio Ambiente, 2003), 17; Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*.

¹⁰¹ Laurie Mercier and Jaclyn Gier, eds., *Mining Women: Gender in the Development of a Global Industry, 1670 to the Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). My own perspective is that the prohibition on women entering is somewhat misleading. Although Nash does not specify how she was allowed to visit the interior of the mines, Absi notes that gringas like herself as well as tourists are allowed in the mines without problem. She attributes this to the relative weight of her assumed prosperity and outsider status. As an independent scholar with assumed power, she was functionally not a woman for the purposes of this taboo. My experience visiting cooperative and former state mines was similar to Absi's, in that miners would tell me about the taboo while escorting me through the mines, and even offering me the chance to work a day inside. While they attributed this superstition to the past, I suspect that even in the heyday of this taboo, only the presence of certain kinds of women (wives) constituted a threat to the miners. Andean gender systems are profoundly inflected by age, fertility, and marital status, calling into question an essential male-female binary system of categorization. Interviews with cooperative miners conducted in Potosí with 18 de Julio Cooperative, February 2, 2013; Interviews conducted in Oruro with Corazón de Jesús Cooperative, February 19th, 2013 Isbell, *De Inmaduro a Duro*. An elderly woman, a lesbian, or an outsider is fundamentally not a competitor for the fertility of the mines.

drills or selling ore. Male and female workers in cooperatives were also more likely to come from Aymara-speaking regions, unlike the bulk of Quechua and Spanish-speaking salaried workers. These miners often worked on a temporary, migratory basis, and often their children worked alongside them in the mines. Increasingly, these children also shared space in COMIBOL schools and socialized with the children of salaried workers.

Childhood in Corocoro at the End of the Revolution.

Life in the mines was never easy for children growing up. Memoirs and testimonies of children who grew up in mining communities in the early part of the twentieth century emphasized cramped housing, overcrowded and harsh schools, and the weight of work in the mines, born by mothers just as much or more so than fathers. Young boys recalled the relative freedom experienced by children whose parents were too busy working and feeding the family to keep them out of trouble.¹⁰² Girls, by contrast, recalled having to take on responsibilities from an early age, caring for themselves and their minor siblings.¹⁰³ Childhood was short for these children, and was full of danger in the form of the natural environment or the hazards of work.

For a brief time after the Revolution of 1952, the state made a concerted effort to improve the lives of the children of mineworkers. The revolutionary MNR hoped to create a new generation of citizens out of the raw materials of Bolivia's worker and peasant classes, and believed that protecting children and mothers were two key components of this Bolivian modernity. Giving both boys and girls access to a "modern" childhood, that is, ensuring they

¹⁰² This freedom also caused anxiety for the parents and family members, sometimes taking the form of the *larilari*, a spirit said to haunt the Morococala mines and rooftops and steal children, which Juan Rojas believed was the reason his father wanted to leave the mines after he was born. June Nash, *I Spent My Life in the Mines: The Story of Juan Rojas, Bolivian Tin Miner* (Columbia University Press, 1992); Luis Oporto, *Cuatro Testimonios Sobre Historia Social de Siglo XX (Bolivia)* (La Paz: MUSEF, 1992); Luciano Tapia, *Ukhamawa Jakawisaxa (asi es nuestra vida): Autobiografía de un Aymara* (La Paz: Hisbol, 1995).

¹⁰³ Domitila Barrios de Chungara, *"Si Me Permiten Hablar: Testimonio de Domitila, Una Mujer de Las Minas de Bolivia"* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1977).

lived in sanctioned family arrangements, had access to play and education, and were kept away from labor and perversion, was understood to be crucial to this process. As a result, the situation of children was of primary concern to the state in the 1950s. The state granted workers better wages, workplace protections, and benefits than ever before, which helped keep children from working in the mines themselves.

COMIBOL, the state mining company, financed and built schools and hospitals, movie theaters and markets, and even a vacation home for the children of mineworkers at Tacata, near Cochabamba. This “hogar de niños” was originally an orphanage attached to one of the Patiño mines in the 1940s, but was taken over by the MNR state and remained into the 1970s, when a publication of COMIBOL’s Department of Education described Tacata as “a vacation home for the children of workers,” equipped with a pool, gardens, sports facilities, and parks.¹⁰⁴



Image 6.1 Source: González Moscoso, René. *Informativo económico de Bolivia*. (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1974), 22.

COMIBOL also maintained funds for select children of workers to receive scholarships to study in normal schools, technical colleges, or universities once they completed high school. In other

¹⁰⁴ Gerencia de Relaciones Industriales, “Política Educativa” (COMIBOL: Departamento de Educación, 1977). Archivo Historico de la Minería Nacional. Initial references to the Hogar de Niños can be found in the budgets for COMIBOL expenditures as early as 1953, Balances Generales 1953.

words, COMIBOL aimed to give the children of mineworkers a more luxurious lifestyle than they would ordinarily receive as members of the working class.

In 1955, the MNR government passed a Children's Bill of Rights that guaranteed all children rights to alimentation, protection, and the freedom to pursue their own happiness and full development as human beings.¹⁰⁵ Building on reformist impulses that saw child labor and servitude as signs of a backward society, this bill complemented the recent abolition of forced labor services in indigenous communities by declaring that neither the state, nor parents, nor anyone else could force a child to work and prioritized childhood as a site of protection, development, and the enjoyment of life. Up until that point, the most common means of caring for orphaned or impoverished children, especially girls, had been to place them as domestic servants in the homes of wealthy citizens, who would feed and, in theory, educate them in exchange for household labor. Traces of this practice up remained through the 1960s in Bolivian cities, though after the revolution, this practice was more commonly a means for poor young women to migrate to cities, rather than a means of keeping orphaned children off the streets.¹⁰⁶

These benefits, as my dissertation has suggested, disproportionately favored the families of workers after the revolution. By the 1970s, many of these protections and benefits had withered away or been abolished completely, but the schools remained. The mining schools were considered to be better funded, better equipped, and better maintained than most other state-run schools in the countryside. Mirroring the division between COMIBOL workers and cooperative miners, COMIBOL schools also attracted better quality teachers because the schools paid better.

¹⁰⁵ For the full text of the law, see Appendix 4.

¹⁰⁶ For an example of such a case, see Elena McGrath, "Seduction and Power in Revolutionary Bolivia" *Notches: re(marks) on the History of Sexuality*, (October 15, 2015) <http://notchesblog.com/2015/10/15/seduction-and-power-in-revolutionary-bolivia/>.

Teachers in these schools also tended to be ideologically committed to the cause of a well educated and radical working class.¹⁰⁷ This created divisions between rural mining camps and other rural communities in terms of education and access.

But even within these schools, there were distinctions between working class families. Two such distinctions stand out: first, even underground mineworkers discriminated against those female children and women who dressed in polleras rather than “de vestido.”¹⁰⁸ Second, these schools maintained hierarchies between workers and non-workers. Although the education laws of the 1950s had guaranteed protections to all students, by the 1970s, regulations governing school attendance affirmed that rural students without a closer educational institution could attend COMIBOL schools, but only children of regular and retired workers continued to receive free scholarly materials, uniforms, scholarships, and school transportation.¹⁰⁹ Everyone, in

¹⁰⁷ “It is important to note that the education was very good, we had very modern educational materials and the professors were required to use them, and our school supplies were also free. The teachers were of a very high quality since COMIBOL paid better than other state schools.” “Es importante también destacar que la educación era muy buena, teníamos material didáctico muy moderno y los profesores estaban obligados a usarlo, además se contaba con material escolar gratuito. Los profesores eran de muy buen nivel pues la COMIBOL pagaba más que en otras escuelas del Estado.” *Libres!*, 186.

¹⁰⁸ Lagos, *Nos Hemos Forjado Así*, 42; Nash, *We Eat the Mines*, 314. Militant and Guerillera Carmen Rosa Murillo del Castillo was from Huanuni, born in 1954, remembered that in her childhood, Huanuni was really important and prosperous. Even in school, she could see the social differences, for example between a girl of pollera and without much food and a girl who had better clothes and better food. *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ “Enrollment: Admission to the primary and high schools of COMIBOL are the children, younger siblings, and stepchildren of active duty workers of the Company. [As well as] The children of parents killed in a workplace accident or sick from a professional illness acquired in service to the Company. Children of former workers of the Company who are are benefitting from social security pensions. Alongside these legal obligations, enrollment of students in the following cases will be permitted: children of workers that have an indirect relationship with the Company such as contract miners, cooperative miners, transport workers, placer miners, renters [of company concessions], etc. Children of independent people, not linked to the company, in mining districts where there are no other public schools.” “Matricula. Son admitidos en las escuelas y colegios de COMIBOL: los hijos, hermanos menores, e hijastros de los trabajadores en servicio activo de la Empresa. Los hijos de padres fallecidos en accidente de trabajo o con enfermedad profesional, al servicio de la Empresa. Los hijos de ex-trabajadores de la Empresa, acogidos a la Renta de Seguro Social. Al margen de las obligaciones legales, se admite la matricula de alumnos en los siguientes casos: hijos de trabajadores que tienen relación indirecta con la Empresa: contratistas, cooperativistas, transportistas, locatarios, arrendatarios, etc. Hijos de personas particulares, ajenas a la Empresa, en distritos mineros donde no existen servicios fiscales.” Política Educativa, 1977.

theory, received free breakfasts, but as Efraín recalled, not everyone received equal provision in those breakfasts.

As Appendix 4 shows, by the 1980s, around 20% of the mining schools were inhabited by students whose parents did not work for COMIBOL. These students could be children of cooperative workers, like Efraín, or children who lived in rural villages without schools. Increasingly, these students began to question whether the education they were receiving was intended for them, whether COMIBOL's schools were in fact racist, exclusive, and assimilationist.¹¹⁰ Education was always in Spanish in these classes, even though most mining families continued to speak Quechua, and many Corocoro families spoke Aymara. Miners' children, more invested in the narrative of progress and advancement through education that allowed space for workers to play a role in history, did not necessarily avoid discrimination, but they felt more included in the assimilationist project undertaken by the state. Nevertheless, one of the major ideological shifts of the 1980s was critique of assimilationist education coming out of the Indianista and Katarista movements. These communities insisted on bilingual education and community control over education, not just to ensure a Marxist curriculum (as in the case of the mines) but to ensure that education did not also mean de-culturation.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Education in Bolivia has a long and fraught history of implication in racist and assimilationist development projects. While many communities welcomed schools, issues of language and autonomy, that is who controls the content of education, have always haunted state education projects. See for example, *Educación indígena: ciudadanía o colonización?* (Ediciones Aruwiyiri, Taller de Historia Oral Andina, 1992). Brooke Larson, "Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds: the Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s-1940s" In Andrew Canessa, ed., *Natives Making Nation: Gender, Indigeneity, and the State in the Andes* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005), pp. 32-59; and "Redeemed Indians, Barbarianized Cholos: Crafting Neocolonial Modernity in Early twentieth Century Bolivia" In N. Jacobsen and C. Aljovín, eds., *Political Cultures of the Andes, 1750-1950* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 230-252.

¹¹¹ Aurolyn Luykx, *The Citizen Factory: Schooling and Cultural Production in Bolivia* (SUNY Press, 1999); Gustafson, *New Languages of the State*.

In this struggle, the increased local autonomy offered by decentralization and neoliberal reforms helped indigenous community demands more than centralization. The miners were not allies to these critiques of assimilation, and in fact continued to reproduce racist hierarchies in their attempts to reach out to campesinos, indianistas, Katarista activists.¹¹² The generation of children who grew up in mining communities in the 1970s and 1980s grew up with the dashed expectations of COMIBOL, even before the newly democratic government of 1985 shut down the mines (and their hospitals and schools) under Decreto 21060. When miners from an earlier generation attempted to fight for an earlier vision that valorized workers through a revolutionary welfare state, they encountered workers and peasants alike who had never received those benefits, and considered the miners to be lazy, entitled, and unwilling to cede control over the social movements to other groups.¹¹³

The military governments from 1964 to 1971 responded to real need within these mining communities for opportunity in the face of economic uncertainty and regulation of local excesses of power. The new forms of regulation enacted by the military governments were both economic and political: certain forms of contraband trade that had existed in the shadow of state institutions and markets such as cooperative mining enterprises became semi-officialized in this period, while state structures lost funding, investment, and clout. These informal kinds of economic activity had always been crucial to the reproduction of the social order of the town

¹¹² In an interview with Oscar Sanjines, Secretary-General of the Confederation of Bolivian Workers (COB), the leader insisted that, “miners conscientize the peasants.” Author(s): Oscar Sanjines Source: *Labour, Capital and Society / Travail, capital et société*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1981 / avril 1981), pp. 138-142. Despite the fact that the campesino movement under Jenaro Flores was offering active solidarity to the miners throughout this period, the leadership continued to insist on rural activists taking a back seat to the “worker vanguard in the mines.” Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, 56.

¹¹³ Many of those excluded were miners as well. By the early 1980s, that is well before Decree 21060 closed COMIBOL mines, there were as many cooperative miners as state miners who worked but received no protection from the state. Ministerio de Minería y Metalurgia and Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), *Dossier: Estadísticas Del Sector Minero Metalúrgico 1980-2013* (La Paz, Bolivia: Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2014).

(and were often taken on by women). Now the state offered a formal structure for recognizing and incorporating their activities. The state saw encouraging the formal recognition of informal economic and political structures as a means to check the formidable power of the COMIBOL miners and their union in national political life, as well as to outsource financial risk on new business ventures. In doing so, the military governments laid the foundations for the structural adjustment policies enacted by civilian politicians, finally taking down the institutions of the MNR revolution only in 1985.

Epilogue to the Revolution: Workers Defending Democracy

In the tumultuous six years between the fall of Hugo Banzer's military government and the assumption of power by the democratically elected MNR government in 1984, Bolivia entered a new phase of political possibility. It was in this period that the workers negotiated with the army and politicians of the left and center in an attempt to reform the Bolivian government. Both the national miners' federation and the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) saw themselves as protecting and strengthening democracy at this point, and by so doing, earning their place within the government that would eventually come to power, as had happened in the 1950s and 1970s. To a limited extent, the Union Democrática de la Patria (UDP) party that took office in 1982 also saw the labor movement, particularly the COB, as a legitimate participant in the government. UDP president Siles Zuazo was unable to stabilize Bolivia's economy or political system, however. Rather than succumb to another round of military coups, Siles resigned early and called new elections for 1984. These elections marked both the advent of a relatively stable (if not entirely representative) democratic system in Bolivia and the end of the possibility for a powerful labor movement within the government.¹¹⁴ The MNR that took power in 1984 had the same leaders as in 1952, but not the same priorities for radical change.

During the period of military dictatorship, labor leadership working through the COB agitated for a return to democracy as they understood it—a return to co-government as it had been practiced in the aftermath of the Revolution. Workers could count on elite politicians from the left and center along with national and regional human rights networks as their allies in this struggle by the late 1970s. This coalition of workers and activists proved capable of wearing down several attempts to re-assert military control of the government and Bolivia returned to

¹¹⁴ "The 1997 Election in Historical Perspective," in Dunkerley, *Bolivia*.

formal democratic government under the former leaders of the MNR in 1982. The political parties of this period, however, did not share the same models of democratic government with the COB. While the labor movement argued that its democratic political credentials ensured the COB a place in the new democratic coalition, the political calculus of the MNR and UDP parties cast mass labor movements as a destabilizing rather than strengthening influence.¹¹⁵ Rampant economic instability only added to this tension, causing real fears among popular groups and the middle classes over what would happen under either a radical leftist or reactionary military government. By 1984, a rupture in the pro-democracy coalition was inevitable.

In 1985, Victor Paz Estenssoro became the first president since 1964 to both win an election and serve out his entire term. Paz Estenssoro's 1985 government inherited an economy in tatters, with the price of tin falling internationally, inflation peaking at 23,000%, and the political system nearing a state of civil war. Estenssoro decided in August, with the help of economists Jeffrey Sachs and Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, to agree to the terms of a US-backed IMF loan. Thus, he decreed an economic shock program for Bolivia: he devalued the peso, reduced salaries, removed price controls, and began the first in a series of huge layoffs in nationalized industries that particularly targeted the nationalized mining and petroleum companies.¹¹⁶ These measures sent the economy into a deep recession and caused a significant drop in quality of life for many sectors of the population, but they did reduce inflation and

¹¹⁵ See, for example, the document put forward by the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, *El Destino de La Coyuntura Democrática Será También El Destino de La Clase Obrera Y La Nación : Proyecto de Tesis Para El XX Congreso de La F.S.T.M.B. Y El VI Congreso de La COB*. (La Paz, Bolivia: CEPROMIN, 1984). This document put forward a vision of worker democracy built on past conjunctures such as the government of Villarroel, the 1952 MNR, and the popular assembly of 1971.

¹¹⁶ Decreto Supremo N° 21060, 29 de agosto de 1985. Comisión Andina de Juristas, *Bolivia: Neoliberalismo Y Derechos Humanos*, Serie Informes Sobre Derechos Humanos 1 (Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1988), 25.

stabilize the peso.¹¹⁷ In the case of the miners, the triple shock of salary reduction, mass firing, and the closing of company stores represented a policy of starvation, both literal and figurative, of mining power, and a near-destruction of the tin mining industry.¹¹⁸ In the years between 1985 and 1992, nearly all of COMIBOL's mines, including Corocoro, were closed, sending 25,000 workers to find new lives and livelihoods in the coca growing valleys of the Yungas and El Alto, the semi-urban periphery of La Paz which in 1987 became a city in its own right. In 1985, the Empresa Minera Corocoro had 989 employees, but by 1989 that number had been reduced to 26. The state mine produced no copper between 1986 and 2009.¹¹⁹

This event, memorialized as "Decree 21060" of 1985, sparked a series of massive protests by workers and peasants, over the next year which finally culminated in a march by 10,000 miners to La Paz, known as the "Marcha Por La Vida y Por La Paz."¹²⁰ Despite some support from the intellectual left and civil groups, for example from the Bishop of Corocoro, the miners were unable to convince the general public that restoring COMIBOL was a critical piece of, rather than a threat to, Bolivia's newly restored democracy. The government met the protest with a state of siege and an army blockade, which ultimately convinced the miners to return to their homes and end the protest. These events exposed the failure of the labor movement to defend against the assaults of neoliberal democracy. Miners, much of the left, and members of Bolivia's human rights movement remember *this* moment, 1985, as the end of the revolutionary vision of 1952, rather than the dictatorships of 1964-1981. For example, a human rights report in 1999 lamented:

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 22; Dunkerley, *Bolivia*, 106.

¹¹⁸ Centro Boliviano de Investigación y Acción Educativas.; CEDLA, *Por La Vida Y Por La Paz : Testimonio de La Marcha Minera*. (La Paz: CEBAIE; CEDLA, 1986), 7.

¹¹⁹ Morales, *Minería boliviana*, 172. See also Appendix A to this dissertation.

¹²⁰ Centro Boliviano de Investigación y Acción Educativas.; CEDLA, *Por La Vida Y Por La Paz*, 46.

We entered into a new social era with 21060, a new form of conceiving the state, the dominant class more possessive of the political apparatus, a political and historical negation of the tradition of struggle and representation of civil society, a “democratic” form of exercising power with legalized repression. The miners’ march could carry on no further... [it is] the historic and heroic conclusion of the miners’ centrality and leadership over social struggles, the sunset of their hegemonic role as a vanguard class.¹²¹

Members of the left saw this moment, rather than 20 years of dictatorship, as the most radical betrayal by MNR of those who fought its battles and defended its vision from 1952 to 1982.

Historians and observers at the time echoed this end of the revolution, citing the neat irony of Victor Paz Estenssoro presiding over both the creation and the dismantling of COMIBOL.¹²² And yet the MNR from the 1940s always had tendencies toward both populist radicalism and centrist economic stabilization within its revolution. What happened, in essence, was that one of these models—stabilization—became associated both globally and regionally with peaceful democratic transition, while the other became synonymous with military coups and terror. The MNR government of the 1980s was skeptical of returning to co-gobierno with the COB, but the experience of instability during the earlier period of the 1950s had foreclosed any possibility of this during the precarious democracy of the 1980s. When faced with the continued agitation of the COB, the MNR and other parties that survived the early 1980s ultimately decided that the organization, while an asset in defending against military regimes, was also a threat to their own claims to authority. Meanwhile, the COB and the FSTMB still operated under the

¹²¹ Ingresamos a un nuevo período social con el 21060, una nueva forma de concebir el estado, la clase dominante más posesiva del aparato estatal, una negación política e histórica de la tradición de lucha y representatividad de la sociedad civil, una forma “democrática” de ejercer el poder con represión so pretexto de ‘legal.’ La marcha minera no podía avanzar más... [es] la culminación histórica y heroica de la centralidad y liderazgo minero de las luchas sociales y el ocaso de su propia hegemonía como clase de vanguardia. César Navarro Miranda, *Bolivia : Estados de Sitio En Democracia* (Potosí: Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Potosí, 1999), 82.

¹²² James Dunkerley, *The Crisis in Bolivia* (Notre Dame, IN: The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1985); Gill, “Relocating Class”; Arbona, “Sangre de Minero, Semilla de Guerrillero.”

assumption that defending the democratic process would gain them entry into the political government.

Many miners left their homes after 1985, and Corocoro itself was nearly entirely depopulated, just as in 1930. As in 1930, some moved back to the countryside while others migrated to larger cities. Those who stayed in the mines were often those with the fewest resources required for moving: widows and single mothers. Rather than turn to the state, these women relied on NGO, church, and aid projects for their subsistence.¹²³ Many found work as palliris and guardas, although some worked in cooperatives in the interior mine. Those with education derived through COMIBOL worked part time as teachers or NGO employees, domestic employees, laundry women, or petty merchants.¹²⁴ Those without such options became part-time ore thieves or palliris.¹²⁵ Many of the women who stayed had already been palliris before the mine closures, and stayed in the mines afterwards due to poverty or attachment to the region. These women had been the first to suffer the abandonment of state commitment to social uplift, and had lived precarious lives long before 1985. Even during the heyday of the mining economy in the 1920s, and the MNR state's most ambitious moments of social welfare in the 1950s, survival strategies such as opportunistic migration, women and children entering the

¹²³ For example, Aranibar J., *La Minería Con Rostro De Mujer*; Centro Diocesano de Patoral Social Oruro., *Las Palliris En Oruro.*; Jiménez Chávez, *Mujeres de Las Minas de Bolivia*; Lagos, *Nos Hemos Forjado Así*; Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt and Martha Macintyre, *Women Miners in Developing Countries: Pit Women and Others* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006); UNIFEM, *El Trabajo Invisible de La Mujer Minera Boliviana*, 1. ed. (La Paz: CEPROMIN, 1996); "Historias de Vida de Las Mujeres Mineras Del Cerro de Potosí" (PRODIS YANAPAKUNA, Cooperazione Internazionale, n.d.), Centro de Informacion y Desarrollo de la Mujer; Bolivia, *Warmi Mineral Y Copajira: Imágenes Y Testimonios De Mujeres Mineras*, 1. ed (La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible, Viceministerio de la Mujer, 2005).

¹²⁴ CEPROMIN, *Por Que Y Para Que Tanta Lucha?* (La Paz, Bolivia, 2002).

¹²⁵ McFarren suggested that this phenomenon is still a viable financial strategy for some former miners or recent migrants to the communities. In Lourdes Benería and Shelley Feldman, eds., *Unequal Burden: Economic Crises, Persistent Poverty, and Women's Work* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 156; Centro Diocesano de Patoral Social Oruro., *Las Palliris En Oruro.*

workforce or becoming temporary traders, renting rooms, and employment on the periphery of the mines had been features of the mining landscape.

As in the 1930s, Decree 21060 did not result in the end of mineral exploration in Bolivia, but in the ceding of vast, unproductive mining complexes to small groups of cooperatives willing to take all the risk and the reward for exploitation upon themselves.¹²⁶ These groups still had to sell their ore through the state mineral purchasing market, so the state still made a profit from these cooperatives, but shifted all the risk and the social costs onto the backs of these cooperatives. In Corocoro, however, cooperative-level production was difficult without a treatment facility for the ore. Until 2009, it appeared that the mining industry in the town itself might disappear completely.¹²⁷ The complete destruction of the mining economy and relative lack of cooperative production may explain why Corocoro was never a center of Amas de Casa activity, as most of the organization's expansion outside of the Oruro-Siglo XX area happened post-1986.

Those miners who had resources or connections to commerce tended to leave Corocoro for El Alto or the Yungas, bringing a cultural memory of labor struggle and pride in mining

¹²⁶ Victor Paz Estenssoro, *Ley 858 (20.5.1986)*, accessed March 31, 2016, http://www.cedib.org/post_type_leyes/ley-858-20-5-1986/. Corocoro was home to at least one such cooperative, which produced copper on a small scale until the mine was reopened as a joint private-public enterprise in 2009. Morales, *Minería boliviana*, 236.

¹²⁷ Amas de Casa Comités from Corocoro only show up in Centro de Promoción Minera (Bolivia), *I Ampliado de Mujeres Mineras*. In 2007, the MAS government signed a contract with the Korean Resources corporation (KORES) to build a hydrometalurgic plant to begin processing copper ores again. Mining recommenced in 2009, and since that time, the Corocoro mines, still operated through COMIBOL have been expanding as a surface-mining enterprise. Reuters, "BOLIVIA: COREA DEL SUR DESARROLLARÁ COROCORO," *Mining Press*, October 24, 2007, <http://www.miningpress.com/nota/138722/bolivia-corea-del-sur-desarrollara-corocoro->. This renewed production has not yet resulted in a population boom for the town. In a September 2013 interview with office workers in the mine, young engineers and administrative staff mostly see Corocoro as an outpost, and they try to spend as many weekends in La Paz as possible. The majority of the current population subsists on agriculture or commerce. Interviews conducted in Municipal and COMIBOL offices, September 21 and October 4, 2013.

heritage with them.¹²⁸ Families from Corocoro helped populate the El Alto neighborhood of Villa Adela where the dance known as the Ch'uta Corocoreño now forms part of La Paz' Carnaval parades.¹²⁹ It is from Villa Adela that the Trans Pacajes Collective now runs the only transit service to Corocoro, as the Arica-La Paz railroad ceased to run in 2005.¹³⁰ Families from Corocoro also contributed to the formation of the Mercado Huyustus and the Gran Poder neighborhoods in La Paz.¹³¹ Finally, many migrants ended up in the growing population of Bolivian workers in Buenos Aires.¹³²

On a national scale, a 1989 census of retired miners found that the average “relocalizado” was male, born between 1945 and 1949, who had worked for the mine between five and nine years. Thanks to the free education available in the COMIBOL mines, the majority of former miners had a primary school education and a substantial minority had secondary school, and most wanted to continue to work in the mines. Some stayed in mining communities or moved to Oruro or Potosí and attempted to work as cooperativistas. Many moved to El Alto, where CNSS and COMIBOL had been offering housing plots to miners for decades. Most would end up in urban La Paz or Oruro, however, with a smaller minority in Cochabamba and the Chapare,

¹²⁸ See, for example, Arbona, “Sangre de Minero, Semilla de Guerrillero”; Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*. One of Gill's informants was a relocalizada from Corocoro, Lesley Gill, *Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State* (Columbia University Press, 2013), 78.

¹²⁹ See Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the ch'uta dance. Cusicanqui, “Orígenes de La Danza Del Ch'uta.”

¹³⁰ The tracks remain, and there are rumors that service will resume in 2016. <http://www.fcalp.cl/> Grupo Copesa, “La Resurrección de Los Ferrocarriles Internacionales de Arica,” accessed May 3, 2016, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2015/06/680-635436-9-la-resurreccion-de-los-ferrocarriles-internacionales-de-arica.shtml>.

¹³¹ Interviews with Don Daniel y esposa; Eusebio Sarmiento, September 2013. Also, personal communications with Mario Durán Chuquimia, Nicole Pacino. In January of 2016, a portion of the Huyustus Market was burned to the ground because of an accident with a stray firework. Pamela Pomacahua, “Dos Incendios Devoran Parte de la Uyustus y un Galpón en la Illampu” *Pagina Siete*, January 2, 2016. <http://www.paginasiete.bo/2016/1/2/incendios-devoran-parte-uyustus-galpon-illampu-82136.html>.

¹³² These migrants maintain a vibrant online presence in the Facebook group, Corocoreños en Argentina.

offered the possibility of access to agricultural land. The luckiest relocalizados, those who had chosen to retire on company terms before being fired, received between 50-150 bolivianos monthly as a pension, which did not suffice to support them or their families in the economy of the late 1980s.¹³³

The movement of so many former miners to cities such as Cochabamba and La Paz caused a crisis of cultures. When populations of “relocalized” or fired miners moved to the city, they left behind communities such as Corocoro in which they had been key players in the local political and social environment. Relocalizados expected to be treated as urban citizens and members of a political community, but they encountered instead hostility, prejudice, and exclusion.¹³⁴ Elite urban residents of La Paz and Cochabamba did not see former miners as important citizens but as rural Indians, dirty and violent and inclined towards drunkenness and domestic violence. Other poor Bolivians sometimes experienced the miners’ sense of political entitlement this way as well.¹³⁵ Worker citizenship as imagined by the 1952 consensus held little weight in these communities, except for among a few members of the intellectual left.

Former COMIBOL workers themselves did not lose their commitment to the 1952 vision of revolutionary citizenship that valued education, vocal worker participation, and leadership in politics and social struggles. Women who remained in mining camps often tried to keep their

¹³³ Instituto Nacional de Estadística Bolivia; Fondo Social de Emergencia, Ministerio de Trabajo y Desarrollo Laboral, and Fondo Social de Emergencia, *Registro Nacional de Mineros Relocalizados 1989* (La Paz, Bolivia: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 1989).

¹³⁴ Felix Muruchi recalled during this period his children experiencing prejudice against miners as violent, abusive, and uneducated, whereas Carmen Morelos herself experienced this hostility in Cochabamba, “the looked me up and down with contempt and asked, ‘you are from the mines?’” “me miraban de pies a cabeza despectivamente diciendo, eres de la mina?”. Kohl, Farthing, and Muruchi, *From the Mines to the Streets*, 77; *Libres!*, 184. Gill described many miners as insecure, for the first time, in their social and political identities in Gill, “Relocating Class.”

¹³⁵ Sociologist Maria Cielo found that communities of relocalizados had a reputation for violently occupying neighborhoods where they wanted to create new settlements, regardless of the occupancy of earlier groups. Maria Cristina Malong Cielo, “The City Effect: Urban Institutions, Peripheries and Political Participations in Bolivia” (Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2010), 181.

children in the local schools and out of the workforce, and supported NGO efforts to counter illiteracy in these communities. In fact, a substantial minority of the palliris and other women living in the mining communities were literate, and several had graduated from high school.¹³⁶ Gill found a tendency for former miners in La Paz to become teachers and traced continuity between mine union activism and teachers' unions.¹³⁷ Many former miners also became the union leaders of the Sindicato de Cocaleros, headed by Evo Morales, whereas former Amas de Casa became leaders in mothers' clubs and neighborhood organizations in El Alto and Cochabamba.¹³⁸ McFarren also noted that housing cooperatives among former miners in La Paz were organized like unions, with titles held over from miner federation positions.¹³⁹

It is worth reiterating that the democratic government of the MNR was capable of doing what no military had—demobilizing the miners. This was done not with actual physical assault, as had been attempted a number of times by the military, but by destruction, through economic means, of the essential basis of their organizing power. Military violence in the 1970s and early 1980s was crucial in convincing actors throughout the Bolivian political scene that the risk of a return to military rule was too high to engage in destabilizing social welfare projects.¹⁴⁰ What the MNR government of Paz Estenssoro did, then, was attempt to use the legitimacy of the democratic system to undermine the miners' ability to prevent the MNR's redefinition of democracy. For example, when the Minister of Labor's responded to the *Marcha Por Vida*

¹³⁶ CEPROMIN, *Por Que Y Para Que Tanta Lucha?*; "Historias de Vida de Las Mujeres Mineras Del Cerro de Potosí."

¹³⁷ Gill, "Relocating Class."

¹³⁸ Lagos, *Nos Hemos Forjado Así*.

¹³⁹ Wendy McFarren, "The Politics of Bolivia's Economic Crisis: Survival Strategies of Displaced Tin-Mining Households," in Benería and Feldman, *Unequal Burden*, 131–158.

¹⁴⁰ For the Guatemalan case, Greg Grandin characterized state violence as a necessary and constitutive part of creating a neoliberal political and economic order. Grandin, "The Instruction of Great Catastrophe," 48.

protests, he scolded, “union leaders should work more for social improvement and not compete for power with the government.”¹⁴¹ In this way the MNR marginalized the miners for being agents of instability because they resisted the terms of democracy the MNR had set forth.

But in many ways, the miners defeated themselves by failing to push for broader definition of worker citizenship that could incorporate those who did not work in the mines and their children. The Bolivian revolution was revolutionary precisely because it defined citizenship in new ways: some indigenous children became, for the first time, emblematic of the Bolivian future. Modernist revolutionary utopias, in other words, for all their limitations, had a value for indigenous and poor communities in Bolivia. When the MNR government of 1985 shut down COMIBOL, it admitted to the world that the social welfare vision of 1952 predicated on state capitalist development was impossible to fund and to carry out in Bolivia. Rather than replace this vision with a plan of development that could be both socially expansive and efficient, the new government simply contracted the functions of the state itself, foregoing centralization in favor of autonomy and efficiency. Thus, miners lost more than their jobs when Decree 21060 closed mines throughout the country. They lost a vision of progress in which collective action and sacrifice in the present might bring a better future on a national level.

¹⁴¹ Navarro Miranda, *Bolivia*, 56.



Images 6.2 and 6.3 Houses abandoned since the 1980s, Corocoro August and October, 2013. Photo: Elena McGrath



Image 6.4 Corocoro Movie Theater, built early 1960s, sits abandoned October, 2013
Photo: Elena McGrath



Image 6.5 Corocoro confronts the army, Photo Credit: Centro Boliviano de Investigación y Acción Educativas.; CEDLA. *Por La Vida Y Por La Paz : Testimonio de La Marcha Minera*. La Paz: CEBAIE; CEDLA, 1986.

Conclusions: The Revolution as a Devil's Bargain

“In the time of revolution the miner must go on working or the revolution must stop, for revolution as much as reaction needs coal.”¹

In mines as old as those at Potosí, it is possible to trace the history of nationalization in the size and condition of the mineshaft. The stonework built during the colonial period to support the tunnels is extensive and aesthetically pleasing, even, with arches and capstones marking entrances. The tunnels are not large, but big enough for mules in parts, and clearly designed for permanence. The initial entry to the mine, if colonial, is easy to walk into, rather than crawl. The slow pace of expansion shows in the craftsmanship. In the 19th century, wooden beams imported from North America and Chile made expansion relatively more efficient, tunnels easier to carve out and brace with some degree of safety, as long as the wood held up. The workmanship was less impressive, but still represented an investment of material and skill. In the late 19th century, the more prosperous mines, such as Corocoro, acquired ore-hauling machinery (like the Skip that killed Ponciano Mamani) that required the shafts be consistently wide and relatively uniformly engineered, in the main lines.

During the COMIBOL period, the tunnels were built taller and wider than ever before. In this period for the first and possibly the only time, the accessibility of the worker was a concern. Regular shifts of large numbers of men had to move through the mines, and mechanized cars became larger, the infrastructure wider, the transport faster. These are the galleries in which it is still possible, if you are a decently tall gringa, to walk upright. The tracks are still present, though mostly not the hauling machinery, so the carts are now pushed by hand. But the national mining

¹ George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* (London, VGollancz Ltd, 1937), 33.

company eventually became a profit-making enterprise for particular politicians, who siphoned off income to fund their own private enterprises rather than invest in maintenance and infrastructure. These tunnels were built well, but are crumbling now in their lack of upkeep.

The cooperative mines have expanded upon these shafts, post Decree 21060. Men and women with pickaxes and dynamite and no investors do not carve larger tunnels than they absolutely need to crawl to the seam or vein. They do not smooth jagged edges or attempt a consistent width or import wood from overseas. They do not buy Skips or elevators, but lash together ladders of eucalyptus beams. They do not build for permanence or engineering norms when they cannot guarantee a return; they build fast and they judge the risks on experience and luck. Where the tracks of past mining enterprises exist they use carts; otherwise, they carry ore themselves, in canvas sacks. They do not, in sum, plan for the future.

In the visible history of mining infrastructure can be read more than just engineering and geology. The social infrastructure of the mines changed over this period to include company-run hospitals, schools, and provisions. The nationalized mines under COMIBOL represented an experiment in making backbreaking and dangerous work not just profitable and survivable, but livable. In many ways, the massive social mandate of early 1960s COMIBOL looks in the early twenty-first century as cheekily ambitious, as hubristic, as a fifteen-meter mine tunnel with rolling stock and a brand-new 1950s engine in an exhausted vein.² The dream of extractivist economies has always been, to some degree, to make “living well” a reality for the majority of citizens.³ Before Evo Morales claimed “vivir bien” as a guiding philosophy of his government,

² While arguments continue into the present about the extent to which mines such as Potosí are irreparably depleted, these discussions of mineral viability began from the beginning of the revolution. Burke and Corporación Minera de Bolivia, *The Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Comibol) and the Triangular Plan*.

³ See the current Bolivian politics of “Vivir Bien,” <http://www.bolivianinfoforum.org.uk/news-detail.asp?id=99>

COMIBOL radically expanded the scope of people to whom mine work might offer a good living, an education, and access to the luxuries of modern life. That it could not sustain this dream should give us some concern about how we calculate value (human, environmental, financial) in our global economy.

The encouragement of informal labor continues to be a hallmark of Bolivia's twenty-first century social movement state under MAS. In 2014, Bolivia made international headlines by legally recognizing labor for children as young as 10 years.⁴ This legal recognition was, as Bolivians were quick to note, merely giving the state control over a practice that had long been necessary for poor communities in the face of an unstable economy and few good options. Child workers themselves had banded together in syndicates to demand recognition, in the hopes that such recognition could lead to better working conditions. Many international observers and news outlets questioned why, in the face of economic growth and increasing prosperity, Bolivia would not instead try to limit the poverty that would cause families to rely on child labor.⁵

What these reports miss, however, is that Bolivia once did try to change the conditions of poverty itself so that children of miners would leave the mines and never have to assume the risks of their parents. The state was unable to resolve the central problem that from sugar production to copper mining to the iPhone, the work of producing modernity is back-breaking and depends on inhuman demands on under-paid humans somewhere down the line. Workers and the state alike collaborated on a vision of worker citizenship, which then fell prey to the

⁴ John Otis, "Newest Legal Laborers in Bolivia: Children," *Wall Street Journal*, October 30, 2014, sec. World, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/newest-legal-laborers-in-bolivia-kids-1414627368>. Morales also introduced a subsidy, early in his first term, the Bono Juancito Pinto for the families of school age children. Morales sees this childhood subsidy as a hallmark of his Buen Vivir program, once again funded through nationalized resource extraction, in this case the petroleum reserves of YPFB: Decreto Supremo N° 28899, 26 de octubre de 2006.

⁵ Katy Watson and Alpacoma, "Child Labour Laws: A Step Back for Advancing Bolivia?," *BBC News*, BBC South America Business edition, accessed April 11, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30117126>.

corruption and repression of military governments and the racist vision of state assimilation that refused to expand its definition of modernity to include women, nontraditional workers, and indigenous groups.

By the 1980s, when Evo Morales began his career as a union activist in the coca fields of the Chapare, this vision of state-led development was under assault from all sides, by economists who claimed it was too inefficient to indigenous communities tired of an assimilationist state. In the twenty-first century, the Bolivian state has yet to solve the paradox of protecting its most vulnerable citizens without treading into authoritarianism or exclusion.⁶ In the case of the MNR, the vision of miners' children healthy, educated, and free from poverty in the future certainly enabled the MNR state and mining communities to work jointly on a political project that demanded sacrifices from the miners in the present for future rewards ever postponed, and in fact enabled the creation of the repressive state apparatus that shut down the MNR itself.⁷

My dissertation suggests that political struggle is, partially, a history of communities and states trying to manage risk and impose order on a precarious landscape. For a great deal of Bolivia's history, the eradication of indigenous practice in favor of more "modern" cultural traits

⁶ This failure was recently emphasized when, during a conflict between cooperative miners and the government, a high ranking MAS official was taken hostage and then later killed in retaliation for the deaths of four cooperativistas at the hands of police. Reuters, "Bolivian Deputy Interior Minister Beaten to Death by Miners," *The Guardian*, August 25, 2016, World edition, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/26/bolivian-deputy-interior-minister-beaten-to-death-by-miners-say-reports>. Morales's response has been to accuse the cooperativistas of attempting a coup against his government. "Evo Denunció Un Intento de 'Golpe de Estado,'" *La Nación*, August 28, 2016, El Mundo edition, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1932312-evo-denuncio-un-intento-de-golpe-de-estado>.

⁷ In early 2016, Evo Morales' bid to stay in power indefinitely was derailed by a popular vote that rejected amending the constitution. One of the scandals to rocked his presidency during this period was the revelation that the unmarried politician fathered a child out of wedlock. Initial reports fretted over the possibility of his former lover's improper business contracts, but more recent reports noted that Morales has failed in his paternal obligations to the child. "Evo Asumirá Paternidad Solo Cuando Haya Certeza de Su Hijo," *Diario Pagina Siete*, April 19, 2016, <http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2016/4/19/asumira-paternidad-solo-cuando-haya-certeza-hijo-93817.html>. This episode reflects the centrality of family and the politics of legitimate fatherhood to statecraft even (or perhaps increasingly) in twenty-first century Bolivian politics. One of the central tenets of the bill of rights of the child passed under the MNR in 1955 was the right of the child to know his or her paternity. Obscured in this episode is the commitment to democracy that continues to hold sway among Bolivians who are still critically supportive, by and large, of Morales, though they do not want him to stay in power indefinitely.

had been a way of imposing order. In the twentieth century, creating a centralized state with a direct mechanism for interacting with citizens was another attempt. The state is only one such regulatory mechanism, however. To this day, Bolivian miners entering the mines place their fates and fortunes in the hands of the *tío*, the devil-like spirit that protects or imperils men and offers a select few access to fleeting prosperity and wealth.⁸ Like the dancing figure in the *ch'uta* of Corocoro, the modern *tío* often appears to miners in the form of a gringo in a business suit, a white man offering prosperity. Like the devil in the crossroads or coming to Faust, the *tío* offers riches to those who accept his bargain, but the price is high: in this morality tale, the rich miner never stays wealthy, never lives long, never passes that wealth down to his family. The men said to have benefited from such pacts inevitably squander their wealth on drugs, sex, and risky business ventures, or they have their wealth stolen by jealous friends and neighbors.⁹

June Nash argued that stories about the *tío* shifted with political and economic changes in the mines such that although he originally functioned as a means of cautioning against the abuses of foreign mining engineers, after the revolution he became a cautionary tale for men who would sell out community solidarity for personal gain.¹⁰ Both Absi and Nash take this individual pact

⁸ This *tío* is variously referred to as a devil or Andean spirit known as a *supay*, although Luciano Tapia argues that *tío* is a profoundly post-Columbian concept and has no Andean analog. Tapia, *Ukhamawa jakawisaxa (Asi es nuestra vida)*. Miners in Oruro province told me it shares more in origins with the Germanic mythical figure Kobold (interviews conducted October, 2012). The figure also shares some similarities with the Cornish and Welsh “knocker” that warns miners of potential cave-ins. This creature migrated to North America as the Tommyknocker, see: Ronald M James, “Knockers, Knackers, and Ghosts: Immigrant Folklore in the Western Mines,” *Western Folklore* 51, no. 2 (April 1992): 154. For accounts of the *tío* in Bolivia, see particularly Nash, *We Eat the Mines*; Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*.

⁹ Absi, *Los Ministros Del Diablo*, 5.

¹⁰ Nash, *We Eat the Mines*, 226. Michael Taussig used Nash’s ethnographic research to argue that devil worship was a means of peasant communities coming to terms with capitalist conditions of labor. “These peasants represent as vividly unnatural, even as evil, practices that most of us in commodity-based societies have come to accept as natural in the everyday workings of our economy, and therefore of the world in general. This representation occurs only when they are proletarianized and refers only to the way of life that is organized by capitalist relations of production. It neither occurs in nor refers to peasant ways of life.” Taussig, *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America*, 3. I am including Taussig, here, as I believe that his rather sweeping and unrooted discussion of Bolivia nevertheless attempts something valuable in understanding production and consciousness as linked, and the *tío* as a modern phenomenon. Taussig, comparing with his own Colombian fieldwork, saw late-twentieth century

with the devil to be emblematic of the miners' ambivalent relationship to their own prospects in the mines. But alongside this extreme and personal pact with the devil lies the everyday reality of the miners' collective pact with the *tío*. All miners and visitors propitiate the *tío* in order to survive the conditions in the mine and keep the vein prosperous, not just those who hope to become rich supernaturally.

While some observers understand the devil as the miners' means of mediating changing contours of class solidarity and keeping profits within the community, the devil also functions as a symbol of the inherently dangerous conditions of labor in the mines, whether under a socialist revolutionary government or a military junta. No revolution and no political party has successfully eradicated the devil from the mines, nor have they removed the threat of silicosis, cave in, and everyday destitution. On this collective level, all the miners have already made the pact with the devil for short term benefit at the price of local environment and collective health in the long term. The miners have already signed their suicide pact, and are intentionally sacrificing themselves in order to make something else possible. What made this sacrifice worth it? For a time, the MNR revolution offered a vision of national progress and generational uplift. This sacrifice and risk of the body was a national sacrifice, a way of producing Bolivia as a better place for all. Furthermore, although miners could transfer very little of their own material

manifestations of the Bolivian *Tío* as a cultural adaptation of peasants experiencing the first ruptures of integration into capitalist markets. Taussig's theory is elegant but undermined somewhat by the fact that Bolivian peasants have been integrated into global markets of exchange, and indeed the mines themselves, for centuries. His hypothesis that *Tío* worship would die out as proletarian culture came more fully to replace peasant cosmologies has not been born out in recent decades. As both Nash and others, such as Jorge Sanjines have noted, Taussig presupposes a group of Bolivian peasants unaccustomed to capitalist labor in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries, ignoring four centuries of links between Andean indigenous communities and the mines of Potosí, Oruro, and certainly Corocoro. "Contrary to Taussig's explanation, which reduces peasant and miner to a duality governed by irreconcilable modes of production that succeed one another with the passage of time, the peasants were never necessarily horrified by the commercialization of their economy. To the contrary, as Pascale Absi asserts (Absi 2005: 125), there was a voluntary dimension to their participation in the market. As it happened, *kajcheo* itself — a practice that allowed workers in colonial times to work abandoned mines illegally during weekends— was an indigenous market innovation that contributed to the reproduction of Andean communities." Sanjines C., *Embers of the Past*, 117.

wealth to their families, by investing in schools, hospitals, better food, and job opportunities for their children, miners could pass on the intangible rewards through the generations.¹¹

I argue that during the revolution, miners understood their conditional alliances with the MNR and other political figures in similar terms. The miners were not dupes of the MNR, but rather working their own advantage from profoundly disadvantaged circumstances. In exchange for labor and sacrifice, the miners expected to be able to represent themselves in the governing of Bolivia, but most profoundly, a better kind of life for their families and children. During the era of military dictatorship, this bargain ceased to function as it had before, and the miners understood that their sacrifices were no longer resulting in payment. We can see the physical manifestations of this social breakdown in personal and private as well as political disorder. The last defenses of this pact were schools and pulperías, but because political autonomy was lost first, the mining men experienced a crisis of autonomy themselves.

Many revolutionaries of 1952 hoped to eradicate visibly indigenous rituals such as devil worship from the mining landscape, replacing them with western rituals of proletarian labor and political participation. Yet cultures of militancy and of ritual both evolved to combat the violence and precariousness of life in the mines. Protection rituals were threatening to the state because they were visible evidence of the danger, poverty, and instability of life—and of the inadequacy of the state to respond to the needs of its citizens. Elite reformers and revolutionaries did not simply hope for assimilation, they hoped that modernization and development could change the conditions of life and labor in Bolivia such that practices like appeals to the devil for protection would be unnecessary for Bolivia's workers.

¹¹ Taussig, *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America*; Sanjinés C., *Embers of the Past*.

In 1982, the miners and their allies won a return to democratic government, headed by the same politicians who had led the revolution of 1952. It was a democratic government, however, that finally shut down the state mines, ending the revolution for good and turning places like Corocoro once again into ghost towns. Or did it? Three decades later, Corocoro is thriving again, the copper mines expanding under a joint foreign-national agreement coordinated by the neo-socialist, pro-indigenous, and revolutionary nationalist government of Evo Morales. Morales' particular articulation of Andean cultural expressions, Marxist and anti-globalization rhetoric, and state directed capitalism in the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party has been hailed (or bemoaned) by international observers as a new kind of politics for Latin America. From the perspective of mining communities such as Corocoro, however, the MAS revolution looks less like a rupture and more like a return to a particularly Bolivian attempt to resolve contradictions between indigeneity and modernity.

Bolivians themselves either celebrate or bemoan a certain *cultura caotica* (chaotic culture) endemic to the country.¹² But the association of unruliness, otherness, and instability with obstacles to modernity has haunted the utopian projects of the twentieth century throughout the globe. In this way, I believe that the history of Bolivian miners and the state trying to think and act beyond such contradictions has much to offer the world. Bolivia can tell us more about the contradictions and failures of utopian politics in the twentieth century. Moreover, in an era of globalized insecurity, informal economies, and the possibility of imminent disaster in the form of climate change, I believe that Bolivia is the canary in the coal mine. Places such as Bolivia can help us think about the increasingly unstable present in new ways. "It is as if the south, again

¹² This was, in fact, the title of a film festival that has taken place in La Paz since 2009.

reversing the taken-for-granted telos of modernity, is the direction to which point the signposts of history unfolding.”¹³

In the early twenty-first century, many scholars want to find new forms of revolution to replace the perceived failures of the twentieth century utopian projects. Many embrace nonwestern worldviews and epistemologies as the next form of politics more revolutionary than the revolution. This is a product of the insistence for decades on the part of leftists and nationalists in linking their hopes for change to European and centralized models. But the politicians and parties that exist today and make use of Andean and indigenous imagery are not exactly rupturing with the past. Pachakuti, an Andean concept meaning a return to a different time and place, is a compelling concept as an indigenous mode of understanding revolution, harkening back to the cyclical origins of the latinate word revolution itself.¹⁴ But it also contributes something more: a rupture that shifts the terms of both time and space, but does not destroy all that exists in that time and space. Much like Marxism and permanent revolution offered twentieth century Bolivians a way out of the past, ideas of Pachakuti and alternative indigenous paradigms seem to offer politicians a way out of the contradictions of the present.

By looking at dialectics of order and disorder over the twentieth century, my dissertation hints at an alternative genealogy of neoliberalism that foregrounds the way popular demands for local autonomy, state decentralization, and cultural pluralism found resonance in economic ideologies coming out of Jeffrey Sachs and the Chicago School. Smuggling, ore theft, and black market vending of subsidized goods were methods of survival long before twenty-first century preoccupations with informal economies and the precariat. When the centralized state

¹³ Comaroff and Comaroff, *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony*, 40.

¹⁴ Escóbar, *De La Revolución Al Pachakuti*.

increasingly provided only repression without economic stability, gambling with instability became increasingly attractive, as did loosening the regulatory apparatus of the state via neoliberal structural adjustment.

How sustainable is Corocoro's current boom? In order to make his social revolution viable, Evo Morales had to re-present an idea of social prosperity that could withstand the threats of resource scarcity, austerity, and increasingly, global discourses of sustainability. His vision of "vivir bien," which takes its cues from Andean conceptions of living well within the social as well as environmental order, attempts to celebrate both industry and environmental sustainability. This philosophy is already showing signs of strain as divergent groups each seek to impose their own vision of living well on a landscape and government unaccustomed to saying no to social movements.¹⁵

By 1985, only a very few salaried miners still held on to the promise of state-directed revolution, and these found few allies by mobilizing the hopes and promises of the last 50 years. Poor Bolivians did not welcome structural adjustment, some aspects of neoliberal reforms, such as decentralization and embracing diversity did play into their interests, as can be shown by the political coalition of Kataristas and MNR in the presidential elections of the 1990s.³⁷ Rather than


¹⁵ Particularly in questions of Amazonian indigenous sovereignty and lucrative development. Marco Curi, "Dejarán 'Vivir Bien' En El Tipnis Al Firmar Reglamento," *El Día*, December 5, 2011; Xavier Albo, "Interculturalidad Para Vivir Bien En El TIPNIS," *CIPCA: Centro de Investigación Y Promoción Campesinado*, August 7, 2012, http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2630:interculturalidad-para-vivir-bien-en-el-tipnis&catid=144:cipca-notas-2012&Itemid=152. "Vivir bien is often presented as a philosophy that emerges organically from Aymara and Quechua understandings of the social and natural order, as for example: <http://www.boliviainfoforum.org.uk/news-detail.asp?id=99>. See also, Diego Pacheco, *Vivir bien en armonía y equilibrio con la Madre Tierra: una propuesta para el cambio de las relaciones globales entre los seres humanos y la naturaleza* (Universidad de la Cordillera, 2013). Scholars such as Pedro Portugal and Carlos Macusaya trace its origins back to conversations between social movements and leftist intellectuals in the 1980s, noting that it reflects less a historical reality of indigenous communities and more a useful, if ambiguous, political philosophy for a disillusioned left.

³⁷ See Xavier Albó, "From MNRistas to Kataristas to Katari," in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World - 18th to twentieth Centuries*, ed. Steve J. Stern (University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); James Dunkerley, *Bolivia: Revolution and the Power of History in the Present: Essays* (Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Bret Gustafson, *New Languages of the State: Indigenous Resurgence and the Politics of Knowledge in*


compromising forever the authenticity of these struggles, this neoliberal conjuncture actually helped create the distinctly new pink politics of the twenty-first century, not as an unbroken chain of historical resistance to globalization but as a continuation of complicity as well as critical engagement with power.

Bolivia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Waskar Ari, *Earth Politics: Religion, Decolonization, and Bolivia's Indigenous Intellectuals* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2014); Pedro Portugal Mollinedo and Carlos Macusaya Cruz, *El Indianismo Katarista, Una Mirada Crítica* (La Paz: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016).

APPENDIX 1 Maps of Corocoro and Bolivia



APPENDIX 2 COMIBOL MINES 1974




Source: González Moscoso, René. *Informativo económico de Bolivia*. La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1974.

APPENDIX 3 MNR Social Legislation

Decreto Supremo no 4017 de 11 de Abril de 1955

1. El Gobierno de la Revolución Nacional reconoce e instituye los siguientes principios, como los DERECHOS DEL NIÑO BOLIVIANO.
 - a. El derecho a nacer en condiciones adecuadas rodeado de las máximas atenciones higiénico-médicas.
 - b. El derecho a conocer sus padres, llevar un nombre que no sea lesivo a su condición humana ni constituya un estigma social de reconocimiento negativo.
 - c. El derecho a todas las oportunidades de la vida desde su nacimiento hasta el desarrollo complete de su personalidad.
 - d. El derecho a ser alimentado, asistido, instruido, y educado suficientemente para gozar de las prerrogativas de todo ser humano.
 - e. El derecho a no ser maltratado moral o materialmente por los suyos o por cualquier miembro de la colectividad.
 - f. El derecho a la igualdad, a la relación social y al contacto con todos los niños.
 - g. El derecho de ser respetado en sus creencias religiosas.
 - h. El derecho a escoger las actividades y juegos de su preferencia y la orientación libre para su profesión.
 - i. El derecho preferencial de protección y ayuda con relación a los otros miembros de la sociedad.
 - j. El derecho a todas las medidas de previsión y seguridad sociales.
 - k. El derecho de reclamar contra la explotación de su trabajo por parte del Estado, sus padres, tutores, y apoderados.
 - l. El derecho al respeto de parte de los demás en cuanto a su dignidad y al goce de todo lo bello.
2. Apruébase la “Sección Tutelar y Policía de Menores” de la Dirección Nacional de Menores y Protección a la Infancia dependiente del Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social y organizada con anterioridad al presente Decreto.
3. Con exclusión de toda otra autoridad policial, la Sección Tutelar y Policial de Menores desarrollará las siguientes funciones:
 - a. Ejecutar los actos que sean necesarios para la asistencia de los niños y la super-vigilancia de los derechos establecidos en el Art. 1º de este Decreto, denunciado ante las autoridades de Menores, Previsión Social y la Justicia Ordinaria a las personas transgresores de estas disposiciones y las leyes de protección de menores.
 - b. Intervenir en las actuaciones de menores de 18 años que estén sometidos al ámbito del derecho penal.
 - c. Solucionar todos los casos de abandono material o peligro moral.
 - d. Inspeccionar y vigilar todos los sitios públicos donde puedan existir menores en estado de abandono material o moral y corran peligro físico o moral.
4. Queda prohibida la detención de menores por miembros de la policía uniformada, cuya intervención se limitará a casos infraganti, dando aviso inmediato a la Dirección Nacional de Menores y Protección de la Infancia, asimismo la publicidad en todo cuanto concierne a menores de conducta irregular.

Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, "ASÍ LA REVOLUCIÓN CUMPLE CON EL PUEBLO" *La Rebelión* May 1, 1956



APPENDIX 4: Ore Production and Disorder, 1951-1965

Year	Days Lost to Strikes	Man-hours lost to strikes	Production of mineral, metric tons	COMIBOL profits and (losses) USD	Price of tin, Libros Finos/\$
1951	NA	NA	27,347	(341,050)	NA
1958	40	205,260	15,805	(6,589,348)	\$0.91
1959	37	467,172	17,384	(10,314,168)	\$1.10
1960	29	152,075	15,230	(12,557,319)	\$0.99
1961	210	489,798	14,830	(9,556,109)	\$1.10
1962	37.5	172,895	15,261	(16,155,697)	\$1.12
1963	194.5	499,205	15,393	(14,860,982)	\$1.12
1964	33	161,384	17,713	(5,347,897)	\$1.50
1965	47.5	311,384	16,550	(38,086)	\$1.74

Source: Cuadros 54 y 59 Morales, Jorge Espinoza. *Minería boliviana: su realidad*. La Paz: Plural Editores, 2010.



APPENDIX 5: DIC Investigative Forms

LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

PAPETERIA DE INFORMACIONES Y DENUNCIAS


RUPINA CHAMBI DE MANANI. Calle Caquiaviri s/n. 40.
Informante - Denunciante - Querrelante Domicilio Caso N
No. de Teléfono O.I. Zona Perdscilla.-
Fecha del Hecho 22/4/67.- Lugar Perdscilla.-
Ocurrido a las. Fecha 21- y hora: 94746
Esc. Den. Quer. recibido: Personal - Escrito a las y fecha:
El día sábado 22 de los corrientes, aproximadamente a las 10:30 hrs. ex-cuncubino (hailo con respeto) que responde al nombre de **Roy Candia Plata** en estado de ebriedad cual si fuera una fiera con hidrofobia se ha atacado violentamente al domicilio ubicado en la Calle Caquiaviri de esta localidad, hasta el extremo de amenazarnos de muerte con una arma de fuego (Revólver), no cesando su objeto ha arrojado varias piedras tanto contra la puerta de la habitación así como también al patio, habiendo salvado milagrosamente mi vida. Por lo expuesto, pide se levanten diligencias de Policía Judicial de conformidad a lo que dispone los Arts. 50. y 100. del Procedimiento Criminal y se eleve obrados a la autoridad llamada por ley.
Escrito a **RUPINA CHAMBI PLATA**. Sexo: M.
Edad: 33 Sexo: M.
Edad: 26 Sexo: F.
Edad: Sexo:
Firma *[Firma]*
Comisario DIO. Par. Jefe Detecivo *[Firma]*
Funcionario de turno: *[Firma]*
ASIGNADO A LA Investigación.
DIVCS. ASIGNADOS:
INV. ESP. (S)
Se expidió: Comparendo - Apremio - Allonamiento
Pdo. Jefe de Sub Seco. *[Firma]*

APPENDIX 6 COMIBOL Schools




APPENDIX 7 Public and Private Employment, 1980-2000

Source: Ministerio de Minería y Metalurgia, and Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL). *Dossier: Estadísticas Del Sector Minero Metalúrgico 1980-2013*. La Paz, Bolivia: Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2014, pg 31.




YEAR	COMIBOL WORKERS	COOPERATIVE WORKERS	PRIVATE SECTOR	TOTAL MINERS
1980	27823	21500	20446	69769
1981	27807	21000	20515	69322
1982	28244	24700	20721	73665
1983	30032	26200	24238	80470
1984	29803	27000	20665	77468
1985	27092	28649	14258	69999
1986	7500	28900	10600	47000
1987	7500	32700	16059	56259
1988	6862	36900	17949	61711
1989	7488	44500	18397	70385
1990	8056	48543	16915	73514
1991	4300	51829	18817	74946
1992	3540	52028	15412	70980
1993	2937	52720	7257	62914
1994	2819	50828	6347	59994
1995	3187	49873	5105	58165
1996	3345	49480	4204	57029
1997	4036	48320	5000	57356
1998	3353	49768	4800	57921
1999	3045	49860	4100	57005
2000	3027	49120	2462	54609

APPENDIX 8 Relocalization in Corocoro and Bolivia by Numbers



Total Relocalizado Population Surveyed, 1989



COROCORO in 1989

Number of EMC Workers Receiving Retirement Payments from COMIBOL		
Monthly Amount	Number of Workers	Percent of Total
None	470	66%
<50	22	3%
50-99	145	20%
100-149	65	9%
150-199	12	2%
200+	3	0%
Total Receiving Payments	247	34%
Total Surveyed	716	100%

Relocalizados in Corocoro		104
Women		4
Men		100
Ages 20-24		1
25-29		4
30-34		10
35-39		18
40-44		28
45-49		16
50-54		6
55-59		10
60+		11
Dependents Under 10 (M+F)		208
Dependents over 10 (male)		123
Dependents over 10 (female)		222
Total Population		657

Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Bolivia; Fondo Social de Emergencia, Ministerio de Trabajo y Desarrollo Laboral, and Fondo Social de Emergencia, *Registro Nacional de Mineros Relocalizados 1989*; Morales, Jorge Espinoza. *Minería boliviana: su realidad*. La Paz: Plural Editores, 2010. *Whereabouts Unknown* numbers derived from number of employees of EMC in 1985 compared to total number of surveyed relocalizados in 1989 (716). This survey was extensive but only carried out in urban areas and former mining centers. Based on my contacts with former Corocoreños, some of these unaccounted for former workers were likely in the Yungas, Chapare, Argentina or Chile.

APPENDIX 9: Glossary and Abbreviations:

Ayllu	An indigenous extended kinship group; a rural community of origin for many miners.
Ch'alla	An offering to the tío or Pachamama or other spirit, usually a mixture of coca, tobacco, alcohol, sometimes including llama entrails or other decorative items
Ch'uta	Someone who has recently become a cholo, that is, an indigenous person attempting to live an urban, more culturally mestizo life. Also, a dance that mimics such an individual, originating in the mining community of Corocoro and later becoming a national Carnival tradition.
COB	Central Obrera Boliviana, the Bolivian Labor Federation created after 1952.
CSTB	Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores Bolivianos, the first state-affiliated national labor federation, formed during the military governments of the 1930s.
Cooperativista	Member of a small group of miners with concessions to individually exploit ore and sell it. Not a salaried worker.
CUCM	Corocoro United Copper Mines, A French/British Mining Company formed in 1909.
EMC	Empresa Minera Corocoro, the COMIBOL-run mines in Corocoro
FSB	Falange Socialista Boliviana, a rightwing catholic political party formed in the 1950s
FSTMB	Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, the national mineworker union formed in 1944
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, a nationalist reformist party formed in 1942.
Pachamama	Earth, the female spirit animating the earth in Andean belief systems.
Palliri	Palliris were woman who worked on the outskirts of the mines, breaking up waste ores for secondary processing and ore recuperation. The name comes from the Quechua word for grind.
PIR	Partido Izquierdista Revolucionario, a communist political party during the 1930s-1940s.
POR	Partido Obrero Revolucionario, a Trotskyist/Fourth International political party formed in the 1920s.
Tío	A spirit that haunts the mines and can protect from accidents, a devil-figure that can offer wealth to mine workers or financial ruin.

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 Biblioteca y Archivo Histórico de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional (BAH ALP), La Paz
 Centro de Información de la Mujer (CIDEM), La Paz
 Museo Etnográfico (MUSEF), La Paz
 Oficios del Municipio y Juzgado Corocoro
 Sistema de Información y Archivos Históricos de la Corporación Minera de Bolivia (SIAH COMIBOL), El Alto
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Denver Public Library Western History Collections, Denver, CO
 Hoover Institute, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA
 University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, Madison, WI
 Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI

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Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (BDIC), Université Paris Oest, Nanterre, France
 Political Pamphlets Archives Collection, Senate House Libraries, University of London, UK

Private Papers

Efraín Mamani
 Eusebio Sarmiento
 Fundación Inca
 Oficina Empresa Minera Corocoro

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American Mining and Metallurgical Manual
Bocaminas (1960s-1970s)
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La Calle
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The Guardian
Life Magazine
Masas
El Mercurio (Chile)
The Mexican Mining Journal

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The Nation
New York Times
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Presencia (Bolivia)
La Razón
Rebelión
Socavón
Última Hora
The West Coast Leader
World Mines Register

Interviews (conducted between 2011 and 2013)

Doña Albertina (Corocoro)
 Rogelio Altamirano (Corocoro)
 Jesus Renaldo Ayarza Elias (Potosí)
 Marcelino Ayarza (Potosí)
 Mario Chambi (Corocoro)
 German Chamorro (Oruro)
 Jose Cordova (Oruro)
 Daniel Gonzales (Potosí)
 Isaac Hurtado (Corocoro)
 Constantino Lima (La Paz)
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 Felix Reyes (Corocoro)
 Raul Robles Reynaga (Oruro)
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