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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1914.

Belgium's Violation of Neutrality.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in Berlin publishes the following:
 The English Government has made effort to explain our disclosures as revealed in the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War concerning the Anglo-Belgian military conventions of the year 1906, with the simple declaration, that Major-General Grierson who had active charge of the matter was dead and that Colonel Barnardiston was commanding the English troops in the Kiautschou campaign; also that it was possible that an academic discussion took place between the two English officers and the Belgian military authorities regarding such assistance as the English army would be able to render Belgium in the event of its neutrality being infringed upon by one of her neighbours.
 The Belgian Government has declared that it was quite natural that the English military attaché in Brussels, particularly during the Algeiras crisis, should have asked the Chief of the Belgian General Staff about the measures by which any violation of Belgium's neutrality as guaranteed by England should be met. The Chief of the General Staff, General Ducarme answered, according to the Belgian Government that Belgium was able to defend an attack from whatever side it might come. The Belgian Government then adds: "Did the negotiations go beyond these limits and did Colonel Barnardiston submit a military plan which the British General Staff wished to adopt in the event of a neutrality violation? We doubt it." In calling for the unbridged publication of the material found in the Belgian secret records, the Belgian Government gives the solemn assurance that it had never been requested directly or indirectly to join the Triple-Entente in the event of a Franco-German war.
 As shown conclusively from a recital of the above facts, the English Government waives any denial of the statements of the German authorities, but contents itself with an attempt to make light of the matter. Perhaps, in view of super-abundance of available evidence, a denial would be as useless as inadvisable. In the meantime, our discovery of an Anglo-Belgian military secret service, as well as the finding of war maps, drawn at the same period by English officers, tend to prove again, how much importance was attached to the Anglo-Belgian plan for making a united war against Germany. We append

in facsimile), General Ducarme's report as found in manuscript, and addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, and dated April 10th 1906.
 If for any reason the Belgian Government fail to recall the circumstances, all doubts will be removed upon referring to the appended report of the conference of General Ducarme with Lt-Col. Barnardiston, the English military attaché, which record was found in the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War, and in a file bearing the title "Conventions anglo-belges."
 The report of General Ducarme translated from the French is as follows:
 Caption: Letter to the Minister, reporting confidential conversations.
 To the Minister of War.
 Brussels, April 10th, 1906.
 Confidential:
 Sir: I have the honor to render you a concise report of my conversations with Lt-Col. Barnardiston. The first one took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston stated that the British War office was deeply concerned on account of the European political situation, and the possibility of an early war. He stated that an army of 100,000 men was provided for, in the event of an attack upon Belgium and desired to know how such a measure would be interpreted by us. I replied that from a military stand-point, it could be regarded with favor, but that any question of intervention was of equal importance to our highest civil authorities; in the meanwhile, I would lay the facts before the Minister of War. Mr. Barnardiston stated that the English Ambassador in Brussels would discuss the matter with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he set forth the plan as follows: The landing of the English troops would be effected on the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais and with greatest possible rapidity. To land in Antwerp, would not only consume more time, but would require larger transports and would be less safe. After this point was settled, there were several other features to be agreed upon, such as railway transportation, the requisitions of the English army for commissaries of various kinds, and the selection of a commander-in-chief for the allied forces. He asked whether we were able to successfully defend our country during

the ten days time estimated as necessary to transport the English troops. I answered that Namur and Liege could not be taken by surprise, and that our regular army of 100,000 men would be ready to strike within four days.
 Mr. Barnardiston after expressing his entire satisfaction with my statements, emphasized:
 1. that our arrangement should be absolutely confidential, 2. that it should not be binding for his Government, 3. that only his Ambassador, the English General Staff, he and I had knowledge of this matter, 4. that he did not know whether the opinion of his Sovereign had been obtained.
 In a subsequent conversation Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received confidential communications from other military attachés regarding our army. He then gave the numerical details of the English forces; we could rely that within 12 to 13 days, 2 army corps, 4 cavalry brigades and 2 brigades of mounted infantry could be disembarked.
 He requested me to study the question of the transportation of these forces to such points where they would be most useful, and with that object in view he promised to give me details of the composition of the army to be landed.
 He reverted to the question of the actual strength of our regular army and insisted that no detachments of it be diverted to Namur or Liege, saying that those places were sufficiently garrisoned. He requested that the English army participate in all the privileges contained in the regulations of our war service. Lastly he insisted on England's designating the Commander-in-chief.
 I replied to him that I could say nothing regarding the final point and promised him to study the other questions attentively.
 On a later date, the English military attaché confirmed his previous estimate: 12 days at least would be necessary to accomplish the landing on the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (1-2 1/2 months) to land 100,000 men at Antwerp.
 Upon my urging that there was no need to wait until the landings were completed before commencing with the railway transportation and that it would be better to regulate the latter in conformity with the daily arrivals on the coast, Mr. Barnardiston promised me

full particulars of the proposed daily landings.
 As regards the division of military activities I told Mr. Barnardiston, that this could be easily agreed upon.
 The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the more all the details were simplified. The colonel assured me that half of the English army could be landed in 8 days, the remainder by the 12th or 13th day, except the mounted infantry, which could not be counted on until later on.
 Upon this I again insisted upon knowing the exact figures for the daily landings, in order to control the railway transportation for each day.
 The English military attaché discussed with me several other questions, viz.:
 1. The necessity of keeping secret all movements and holding the press to strict secrecy.

2. The advantages which could result, if each English Field Staff was allotted a Belgian officer, each company of troops an interpreter and also gendarme, so as to co-operate with the English police-force.
 In another conversation, Lt. Col. Barnardiston and I, took up the question of our combined operations in the event of a German attack upon Antwerp, also on the possibility of an attempted march of German troops, through Belgium with a view of reaching the French Ardennes.
 In this matter, the Lt. Col. endorsed the plan which I had submitted to him, and assured me of its approval by General Grierson, the Chief of the English General Staff.
 Other questions of secondary importance were also settled, particularly in regard that of specially assigned

Cover.
Conventions anglo-belges

*) The printing is arranged in such a way that the facsimile can be cut out and folded up.

Page 4.

La base d'appui anglaise
 La base d'appui anglaise à Brussels, de qui la mise en œuvre serait assurée par les services de guerre allemands.

Confidentialité

Après avoir eu l'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lt. Col. Barnardiston et qui ont fait l'objet de mes communications verbales, la première visite faite de la part de son Excellence, j'ai fait part de ses préoccupations de l'état d'esprit de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux éventualités de guerre du moment. Ses craintes de transport, d'une totale de 100.000 hommes environ, était portée pour le cas où la Belgique serait atteinte.

Le Lt. Col. a répondu d'instinct comment cette affaire serait réglée par nous, je lui ai répondu que, au point de vue militaire, elle ne présentait qu'un intérêt secondaire; mais que cette question d'interférence était également de l'ordre de l'intérêt public et que, en tout cas, j'étais tenu de lui en rendre compte à son Excellence.

Le Lt. Col. a répondu que son ministre à Bruxelles ne paraissait pas s'en occuper.

Le Lt. Col. a dit que le débat de son Excellence sur la base de France, vers Arras, Valenciennes et Calais, de façon à éviter le plus possible le mouvement de débarras par routes demandant beaucoup plus de temps, parce qu'il faudrait transporter les transports par chemins de fer, la question des requisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise paraissait avoir recours, la question de commandement des forces alliées.

Le Lt. Col. a répondu à ces questions autres points, savoir: les transports par chemins de fer, la question des requisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise paraissait avoir recours, la question de commandement des forces alliées.

Je lui ai répondu que les plans de transport de l'armée anglaise, par chemins de fer, de 100.000 hommes, seraient en état d'être exécutés.

Le Lt. Col. a répondu que son Excellence n'avait rien à dire.

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Note

Lorsque je rencontrai le Général Grierson à Compiègne pendant les négociations de 1906, il m'assura que la base d'appui de l'armée anglaise serait assurée par le chemin de fer, mais de façon à assurer le débarras de 100.000 hommes, mais de façon à assurer leur action dans un délai plus court que celui dont il est question précédemment.

J'ai sept. 1906

Page 1.

Confidentialité

Lettre à M. le Ministre
 Sujet des entretiens confidentiels

Bruxelles, le 10 avril 1906

M. le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lt. Col. Barnardiston et qui ont fait l'objet de mes communications verbales.

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M. le Ministre de la guerre

Belgian officers, the interpreters, the gendarmes, war maps, illustrations of the uniforms, copies of some Belgian regulations translated into English, the fixing of custom charges on English consignments of provisions, also hospital accommodation for the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was decided about the control of the press through civil or military orders.

During my last conferences with the English attaché, he informed me just how the daily disembarkments in Bou-Calais and Cherbourg would work out. The distance from the last named point which for technical reasons had to be included, would involve a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the 10th day, the 2nd corps on the 15th day. Our railway schedules would then be arranged so as to transport the troops either in the direction Brussels-Louvain, or Namur-Dinant, in one day, after the landing of the respective corps, i. e. on the 11th day for the 1st corps, on the 16th for the 2nd corps.

Once more, I pointed out for the last time as emphatically as I could, the necessity of hastening the naval transports, so that the English troops could cooperate with us as early as between the 11th and 12th days. The most favorable results could be attained only by simultaneous and concerted action of the allied forces. On the other hand, serious consequences could ensue if there was a lack of cooperation. Lt. Col. Barnardiston assured me that everything would be done to attain this object.

In the course of our conversation, I convinced the English military attaché, that we would to the best of our ability, oppose the movements of the

enemy, and not from the every beginning proceed to seek protection in the forts of Antwerp.

Lt. Col. Barnardiston stated that at the time being he placed little hope either for the support or on an intervention by Holland. He informed me at the same time that his government intended to transfer the English base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp, just as soon as the North Sea would be cleared of all German ships.

In all of our conversations, Lt. Col. Barnardiston took pains to inform me of the secret data that he was regularly receiving about the military status of our Eastern neighbour, and emphasized that it was also vitally necessary for Belgium to keep herself posted as to what was going on in the adjoining Rhineland. I had to admit to him that in time of peace, the secret service in foreign countries was not conducted by our general staff, and that we had no military attachés with our foreign ministers. I avoided however carefully, mentioning to him that I did not know whether or not, our espionage service, as prescribed by our regulations, was in operation. But I deem it my duty to mention now of our situation in this regard which is evidently less complete than, and inferior to, that of our neighbours, and possible enemies.

Signed: Major General, Chief of the General Staff. (Signature.)

Special memorandum.

When I met General Grierson during the manoeuvres of 1906, he assured me

that the re-organization of the English army permitted not only the landing of 150,000 men, but that this force would be able to get into action, in much less time, than was estimated in the first place as above.

End of September 1906.

(Signature.)

The document also shows the following marginal note:

"L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne."

The significance of this, is demonstrated by records found in the Belgian ministry for foreign affairs which refers to a conversation between Lt. Col. Bridges who succeeded Mr. Barnardiston as English military attaché, and General Jungbluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff. This document which is dated April 23rd, and presumably 1912, is marked "confidentielle" in the handwriting of Count Van der Straeten, director in the Belgian ministry for foreign affairs. Translated, it reads as follows: "Confidential: The English military attaché expressed the wish to confer with General Jungbluth, and met him on the 23rd of April.

The Lt. Col. told General Jungbluth that England was in position to send to the Continent an army consisting of six divisions of infantry, eight brigades of cavalry—together 160,000 men. England he said, had besides this everything else necessary to defend the British Isles, and everything was in readiness.

During the recent events, the English government would have promptly effected

a landing of troops in Belgium, even if we had not asked for assistance.

The general took exception to this on the grounds that our consent would have been necessary for such an act.

The military attaché replied that he was aware of this, but since we could not prevent the Germans from marching through our country, England would have landed her troops in Belgium any way.

As regards the point of debarkation, the military attaché did not definitely express himself; he did state that the coast was rather long, but the general knows that during the Easter holidays, Mr. Bridges made daily visits from Ostend to Zeebrugge.

The general added that we were unquestionably in position to prevent the Germans from marching through Belgium."

Thus we have positive evidence that the English government in the event of a war between France and Germany, had the firm intention to promptly enter Belgium with an army, thereby violating Belgium's neutrality. When Germany in justified self-defence was forced to take a similar step, England saw fit to use this very same act, as a pretext to declare war against Germany.

With unexampled cynicism, the English government has moreover used the German violation of Belgian neutrality to prejudice the whole world against Germany, incidentally assuming the roll of an unselfish protector of the small and weak nations. As regards the Belgian government, it would have been its duty not only to promptly reject all these English insinuations, but to instantly inform the other signatory powers to the London Protocol of 1839, especially the

German government, of the repeated attempts of England to lead Belgium into a violation of her duties as a neutral power. The Belgian government did not assume this position, but thought itself justified to make, in conjunction with the English war office, preventive military plans against an imaginary German invasion of which it pretended to know. But Belgium has never made the slightest attempt to take steps in conjunction with the German government or the German military authorities, against the possibility of a Franco-English march into Belgium, although, as has been proven through the archives in our hands, Belgium was well posted on the fixed plans or intentions of the Entente-powers, in that direction. Thus the Belgian government decided from the outset to join the enemies of Germany and make common cause with them. As our opponents have not hesitated to deny systematically the truth when it places them in an awkward position, the Imperial German Government has published in facsimile, the documents mentioned above, and has brought them to the notice of all the neutral governments.

Of the report of General Greindl, for many years Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, made to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, of 23rd December 1911, extracts of which were published at the time, only part of the first page has been reproduced in facsimile on account of the large size of the document. This document, also found in Brussels is only a copy of the original report. Its official character will however be seen from the printing on the sheet used from the copying.

SECTION
N°
ANNEXE
Réponse au N°
Dion-Gle. B...

Copie.

Berlin, le 23 Décembre 1911

Legation de Belgique.
N° 3022/1911

Très Confidentielle.

Que fera la Belgique en cas de guerre?

Monsieur le Ministre.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la dépêche du 27 octobre de France, P., sans numéro de dossier, n° d'ordre 1108,

Vous avez répondu à la lettre de félicitation... (Handwritten text in French)

Après un entretien... (Handwritten text in French)

Il me rappelle... (Handwritten text in French)

Je lui réponds... (Handwritten text in French)

Il en tant... (Handwritten text in French)

Sur mon objection... (Handwritten text in French)

Quant aux protestations... (Handwritten text in French)

Il me rappelle... (Handwritten text in French)

Il me rappelle... (Handwritten text in French)

Le 27 octobre... (Handwritten text in French)

Après un entretien... (Handwritten text in French)

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