

Supplement: Belgium's violation of neutrality. November 25, 1914

Berlin, Germany: Continental Times, G.m.b.H., November 25, 1914

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Belgium's Violation of Neutrality.

Zeitung in Berlin publishes the following: The English Government has made

effort to explain our disclosures as revealed in the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War concerning the Anglo-Belgian military conventions of the year 1906, with the simple declaration, that Major-General Grierson who had active charge of the matter was dead and that Colonel Barnardiston was commanding the English troops in the Kiautschou campaign; also that it was possible that an academic discussion took place between the, two English officers and the Belgian military authorities regarding such assistance as the English army would be able to render Belgium in the event of its neutrality being infringed upon by one of her neighbours.

The Belgian Government has declared that it was quite natural that the English military attaché in Brussels, particularly during the Algeciras crisis, should have asked the Chief of the Belgian General Staff about the measures by which any violation of Belgium's neutrality as guaranteed by England should be met. The Chief of the General Staff, General Ducarme answered, according to the Belgian Government thas Belgium was able to defend an attack from whatever side it might come. The Belgian Govern-ment then adds: "Did the negotiations go beyond these limits and did Colonel Barnardiston submit a military plan which the British General Staff wished to adopt in the event of a neutrality violation? We doubt it." In calling for the un-abridged publication of the material found in the Belgian secret records, the Belgian Government gives the solemn assurance that it had never been requested directly or indirectly to join the Triple-Entente in the event of a Franco-German war.

As shown conclusively from a recital of the above facts, the English Government waives any denial of the statements of the German authorities, but contents itself with an attempt to make light of the matter. Perhaps, in view of super-abundance of available evidence, a denial would be as useless as as found in manuscript, and addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, and dated April 10th 1906.

If for any reason the Belgian Government fail to recall the circumstances, all doubts will be removed upon referring to the appended report of the conference of General Ducarme with Lt-Col. Barnardiston, the English military attaché, which record was found in the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War, and in a file bearing the title "Conventions anglo-belges.

The report of General Ducarme translated from the French is as follows:

Caption: Letter to the Minister, reporting confidential conversations.

To the Minister of War.

Brussels, April 10th, 1906.

Confidential:

Sir: I have the honor to render you a concise report of my conversations with Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. The first one took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston stated that the British War office was deeply concerned on account of the European political situation, and the possibility of an early War. He stated that an army of 100000 men was provided for, in the event of an attack upon Belgium and desired to know how such a measure would be interpreted by us. I replied that from a military stand-point, it could be regarded with favor, but that any question of intervention was of equal importance to our highest civil authorities; in the meanwhile, I would lay the facts before the Minister of War. Mr. Barnardiston stated that the English Ambassador in Brussels would discuss the matter with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he set forth the plan as follows: The landing of the English troops would be effected on the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais and with greatest possible rapidity. To land in Antwerp, would not only consume more time, but would require larger transports and would be less safe. After this point

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine | in facsimile*), General Ducarme's report | the ten days time estimated as necessary | full particulars of the proposed daily to transport the English troops. I answered that Namur and Liege could not be taken by surprise, and that our regular army of 100 000 men would be ready to strike within four days Mr. Barnardiston after expressing his entire satisfaction with my statements, emphasized :

> 1. that our arrangement should be absolutely confidential, 2. that it should not be binding for his Government, 3. that only his Embassador, the English General Staff, he and I had knowledge of this matter, 4. that he did not know whether the opinion of his Sovereign had been obtained.

In a subsequent conversation Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received confidential communications from other military attachés regarding our army. He then gave the numerical details of the English forces; we could rely that within 12 to 13 days, 2 army corps, 4 cavalry brigades and 2 brigades of mounted infantry could be disembarked.

He requested me to study the question of the transportation of these forces to such points where they would be most useful, and with that object in view be promised to give me details of the com-position of the army to be landed.

He reverted to the question of the actual strength of our regular army and insisted that no detachments of it be diverted to Namur or Liege, saying that those places were sufficiently garrisoned. He requested that the English army participate in all the privileges contained in the regulations of our war service. Lastly he insisted on England's designating the Commander-in-chief.

I replied to him that I could say nothing regarding the final point and promised him to study the other

questions attentively. On a later date, the English military attaché confirmed his previous estimate: 12 days at least would be necessary to accomplish the landing on the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time $(1-2^{1/2} \text{ months})$ to land

landings.

As regards the division of military activities I told Mr. Barnardiston, that this could be easily agreed upon.

The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the more all the details were simplified. The colonel assured me that half of the English army could be landed in 8 days, the remainder by the 12th or 13th day, except the mounted infantry, which could not be counted on until later on.

Upon this I again insisted upon knowing the exact figures for the daily landings, in order to control the railway transportation for each day.

The English military attaché discussed with me several other questions, viz.: 1. The necessity of keeping secret all movements and holding the press to strict secrecy.

2. The advantages which could result, if each English Field Staff was allotted a Belgian officer, each company of troops an interpreter and also gendarme, so as to co-operate with the English police-force.

In another conversation, Lt. Col. Barnardiston and I, took up the question of our combined operations in the event of a German attack upon Antwerp, also on the possibility of an attempted march of Germann troops, through Belgium with a view of reaching the French Ardennes.

In this matter, the Lt. Col. endorsed the plan which I had submitted to him, and assured me of its approval by General Grierson, the Chief of the English General Staff.

Other questions of secondary importance were also settled, particularly in regard that of specially assigned

Cover.

Convention, anglo-belyes

inadvisable. In the meantime, our discovery of an Anglo-Belgian military secret service, as well as the finding of war maps, drawn at the same period by English officers, tend to prove again, how much importance was attached to the Anglo-Belgian plan for making a He asked whether we were able to

was settled, there were several other features to be agreed upon, such as railway transportation, the requisitions of the English army for commissaries of various kinds, and the selection of a commander-in-chief for the allied forces. united war against Germany. We append | successfully defend our country during | coast, Mr. Barnardiston promised me

100.000 men at Antwerp. Upon my urging that there was no need to wait until the landings were completed before commencing with the railway transportation and that it would be better to regulate the latter in conformity with the daily arrivals on the

*) The printing is arranged in such a way that the facsimile can be cut out and folded up.

Page 4.

& base d'approv ? anylance The to like from a clearers, dis que la mere du nord tenning allettagio de hours les murires de guvere allement.

Daves bour seres entractions, le la la la fait part toor ce confidentile you'il ponideris sur listat the gaunaan eterroane don to Selenching & biancount you the cle. Lis mine heneys, it insister sur la reicessite " insperieuce pour la Orely. de se tessie au convans de ce qui se pannis dues las page thissens que unes avoisinant. Je due les conferen que, chez nans, le fleccrie de torneillanse are dels de la franchere, en tunges de pais, su celere pas discedunas de aubre ebat major ; HA get wear a avour pur jenere theory to for ander State d'athachis mil es aupoir de coro ligations. Je me yandar bien, equartans de las avacer que prignances si le service Fragionnage, que cyuntury at prescuis por our cigl?", stais on non prepare. Ison il at de man devoire de duqueler isi cette détactione que que were met un état d'infériories flagrande vis. a vis de son vaisins, sons emouris excudesels. dely " nearfort, chief du logo d'th.

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Page 1.

Lettre à M'lettemistre suger des subschiens compidentiels

Arunelles, le 10 anil 1906

Mo letteinistre,

J'ai l'houman de vous rendre encepte sommariement des entretuis que pai eus arre le Ol. Ramundritan et que aut fait depos l'abjet de nes commissiontions vertales. La première visite date de la mi facoreir. Me samuent itan me fit part des préaccupations de l'atat acuper de son page relationing à la tehendine politique generale et any incidenties de queron du monuch. Un curai de transper, Tan total de 100.000 housines eurisaie, chait projeté pour le cas ai la Belignin serais attaquée

le Mal. as 'agant dunnende' comment cette action terait niterpailes par unes, fe lui réparder que , au point de rue militaire, alle me puerrais qu'étre favorable ; man que esthe question Musterenstione allowing igalement de transcer patrique et que, des lass, f'etais Tenne Peu entreferior le Minister de la guerre.

M' hannendritan me cépantis que son muisire à Brunelles an partirais à wohn mis. des aff. A.

Il continue laur a teur : le débany : des ans fourges the forces. sur la cole de France, vers Anokenque et Calais, de facan à Later le plus possible le mournoust. de débang - par aurens demandere beaucoup plus de temps parse qu'il faudricis diprove des hamport plus considerables et gen la L'ausité unait mans complète

Ceci adruis, il udurais à rigles divers autres pourte, savoir : les heavywats par ch. de fet, la questions des riquisitions auxquelles l'arme suglaire pournais essie ressour , la quedrone de consensadance Lup " dus formes alliers.

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Je ripoutri que la plans de human et de luye chaines à l'abri Frus aug de manie et que, en 4 forem, notre armée de compagne, forte de 100.000 hommen, concit en itat Traiterraine - se goi l'a torrais complit persongue

A to tetemistre de la guerre

is a spect Strates 30. Responsible Editor, C. Walley Beach

fin septlere 1906

Belgian officers, the interpreters, the gendarmes, war maps, illustrations of the uniforms, copies of some Belgian regulations translated into English, the fixing of custom charges on English consignments of provisions, also hospital accomodation for the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was de-cided about the control of the press through civil or military orders.

During my last conferences with the English attaché, he informed me just how the daily disembarkments in Bou-Calais and Cherburg would work out. The distance from the last named point which for technical reasons had to be included, would involve a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the 10th day, the 2nd corps on the 15th day. Our railway schedules would then be arranged so as to transport the troops either in the direction Brussels-Louvain, or Namur-Dinant, in one day, after the landing of the respective corps, i. e. on the 11th day for the 1st corps, on the 16th for the 2nd corps.

Once more, I pointed out for the last time as emphatically as I could, the necessity of hastening the naval transports, so that the English troops could cooperate with us as early as between the 11th and 12th days. The most favorable results could be attained only by simultaneous and concerted action of the allied forces. On the other hand, serious consequences could ensue if there was a lack of cooperation. Lt. Col. Barnardiston assured me that everything would be done to attain this object.

In the course of our conversation, I convinced the English military attaché, that we would to the best of our ability, oppose the movements of the

proceed to seek protection in the forts of Antwerp

Lt. Col. Barnadiston stated that at the time being he placed little hope either for the support or on an intervention by Holland. He informed me at the same time that his government intended to transfer the English base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp, just as soon as the North Sea would be cleared of all German ships.

In all of our conversations, Lt. Col. Barnardiston took pains to inform me of the secret data that he was regularly receiving about the military status of our Eastern neighbour, and emphasized that it was also vitally necessary for Belgium to keep herself posted as to what was going on in the adjoining Rhineland. I had to admit to him that in time of peace, the secret service in foreign contries was not conducted by our general staff, and that we had no military attachés with our foreign ministers. I avoided however carefully, mentioning to him that I did not know whether or not, our espionage service, as prescribed by our regulations, was in operation. But I deem it my duty to mention now of our situation in this regard which is evidently less complete than, and inferior to, that of our neighbours, and possible enemies.

Signed: Major General, Chief of the General Staff.

(Signature.)

Special memorandum.

When I met General Grierson during

SECTION

ANNEXD

Réponse au N' Dion Gie Bolu

enemy, and not from the every beginning | that the re-organization of the English army permitted not only the landing of 150,000 men, but that this force would be able to get into action, in much less time, than was estimated in the first place as above.

End of September 1906.

(Signature.)

The document also shows the following marginal note:

"L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne."

The significance of this, is demonstrated by records found in the Belgian ministry for foreign affairs which refers to a conversation between Lt. Col. Bridges who succeeded Mr. Barnardiston as English military attaché, and General Jungbluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff. This document which is dated April 23rd, and presumably 1912, is marked "confidentielle" in the handwriting of Count Van der Straaten, director in the Belgian ministry for foreign affairs. Translated, it reads as follows:

"Confidential: The English military attaché expressed the wish to confer with General Jungbluth, and met him on the 23rd of April.

The Lt. Col. told General Jungbluth that England was in position to send to the Continent an army consisting of six divisions of infantry, eight brigades of cavalry-together 160 000 men. England he said, had besides this everything else necessary to defend the British Isles, and everything was in readiness. During the recent events, the English the manoeuvres of 1906, he assured me government would have promptly effected |

Copie.

du de Belgique. Legations de Belgique. 1.º 3022/1626 Cres Ponfiduntielle. Ene fera la Belgique en cas de guerre:

a landing of troops in Belgium, even if we had not asked for assistance.

The general took exception to this on the grounds that our consent would have been necessary for such-an act.

The military attaché replied that he was aware of this, but since we could not prevent the Germans from marching through our country, England would have landed her troops in Belgium any way.

As regards the point of debarkation, the military attaché did not definitely express himself; he did state that the coast was rather long, but the general knows that during the Easter holidays, Mr. Bridges made daily visits from Ostend to Zeebrügge.

The general added that we were unquestionably in position to prevent the Germans from marching through Belgium."

Thus we have positive evidence that the English government in the event of a war between France and Germany, had the firm intention to promptly enter Belgium with an army, thereby violating Belgium's neutrality. When Germany in justified self-defence was forced to take a similar step, England saw fit to use this very same act, as a pretext to declare war against Germany.

With unexampled cynism, the English government has morover used the German violation of Belgian neutrality to prejudice the whole world against Germany, incidentally assuming the roll of an unselfish protector of the small and weak nations. As regards the Belgian government, it would have been its duty not only to promptly reject all these English insinuations, but to instantly inform the other signatory powers to the London Protocol of 1839, especially the

German government, of the repeated at tempts of England to lead Belgium into a violation of her duties as a neutral power. The Belgian government did not assume this position, but thought itself justified to make, in conjunction with the English war office, preventive military plans against an imaginary German invasion of which it pretended to know. But Belgium has never made the slightest attempt to take steps in conjunction with the German government or the German military authorities, against the possibility of a Franco-English march into Belgium, although, as has been proven through the archives in our hands, Belgium was well posted on the fixed plans or intentions of the Entente-powers, in that direction. Thus theBelgian government decided from the outset to join the enemies of Germany and make common cause with them. As our opponents have not hesitated to deny systematically the truth when it places them in an awkward position, the Imperial German Government has published in facsimile, the documents mentioned above, and has brought them to the notice of all the neutral governments.

Of the report of General Greindl, for many years Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, made to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, of 23rd December 1911, extracts of which were published at the time, only part of the first page has been reproduced in facsimile on account of the large size of the document. This document, also found in Brussels is only a copy of the original report. Its official character will however be seen from the printing on the sheet used from the copying.

NOVEMBER 25, 1914.

Jai en l'houncer de recevoir la défiche du Grioven. he Fance, P, Sand numéro de Possie, nº 2'our 1108,

Mousiai le Ministre.

Berlin le 25 Tecembre 1911

Page 2.

apris anoir reprise toute to tatifaction are type to use tillorostim stail absolument empire ; 20/ flate ne pourait lier ton your i ; 50/ fly ton minus he I'lt ?" any lai alme at mai chious souls , su a morners, dous la compidence ; 47/ 22sejuvrais & son Pourmain somis it's pressuchi.

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carie et 2 brig d'un avertie . Il au demante d'acconnices la question du tomosport de un forces veur la partie su pays où elles termines abiles et, dans ce but, it me promit la Composition déhaillie de l'amise de bibang !.

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"hiermonins, fe crus durine aisister à muereau son la recerche de consaitre le consenses jour painfine, di farme à rigles les beaugust for four ch . de for de chaque facer.

Page 3.

lettache auglais ou sucheding availe le birres quetres quertieres, tarper : 1º/ siconde de tenir le secret des ages " ch Fablissie de la prese qu'elle fisher and saigness courses ;

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frai insiste unes benuesie fais et aussi uneng que ple pausies tranger surglarin fallest pris de nom entre le 11° able 12 pour , las ticallate la plus hereny, la plus favorables person other otheres per une action courregule of simultanie des forces allices bu lassfrans, a dera su échie quare si at assand me de provonies par Le lol. Barnandriken m'a assure' que tout ennis fait dans un bat.

Ou wars de aus entretiens, peus l'ascarine Dacument l'attaché mil " anytan Affilte la volonté que nous avisies l'esteaver, Jam la limite du pourble, les ouver The l'assessie et de see par une refuguer, dis te debus, Jan annes.

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