Post-authoritarianism and Cultural Dimensions:

Cross-national variations in relationships among media use, political talk, and political participation.

By

Heysung Lee

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

The requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Mass Communication)

At the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2024

Date of final oral examination: 13/12/2024

The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:

Hernando Rojas, Professor, Journalism and Mass Communication

Dhavan V. Shah, Professor, Journalism and Mass Communication

Michael Wagner, Professor, Journalism and Mass Communication

Katherine J. Cramer, Professor, Political Science

Jee-Seon Kim, Professor, Educational Psychology

Abstract

Political participation and communication are closely connected and central to the tenets of democracy. Contemporary scholarship posits that communication, including media and discussions, play important roles in political activism. However, a large proportion of this literature is from Western contexts, especially the U.S. This potentially disregards applying theories that may show variations across cultural contexts. The present study aims to explore cross-national variance in communication's impact on political behaviors. The dissertation includes two chapters. First, the study explores the role of "collective memory" in shaping political communication, focusing on the ineradicable country's authoritarian past. Second, the dissertation explores Hofstede's cultural dimensions, specifically focusing on individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance. The dissertation employs data from 14 countries as part of the Comparative National Elections Projects (CNEP) and performs a series of random intercept models. The results show that political participation is associated with collective memories. Specifically, three-way interactions indicate that pro-attitudinal media mobilize citizens in post-authoritarian countries with high democratic satisfaction, while pro-attitudinal media influence citizens in full-fledged democracies with low democratic satisfaction. Furthermore, based on Dinas & Northmore-Ball (2020), this study identifies an anti-dictatorship bias: in countries ruled by left-wing authoritarian regimes, conservatives are more mobilized by pro-attitudinal media sources than liberals, but this trend reverses in countries that experienced right-wing regimes. Related to Hofstede's cultural dimensions, the findings suggest that individualism and uncertainty avoidance, interact with pro-attitudinal media use and talking with close ties, such as family members and friends, on political behaviors. Three-way interactions indicate a more nuanced relationship between cultural dimensions, media use, and satisfaction with democracy when explaining political participation.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Hernando Rojas. His support throughout my Ph.D. journey has been invaluable. His guidance and mentorship helped me grow as a researcher and scholar, providing a role model. Under his supervision, I have learned comparative studies, global communication, and political communication.

I am also deeply thankful to my committee members: Dr. Dhavan Shah, Dr. Michael Wagner, Dr. Katherine Cramer, and Dr. Jee-Seon Kim. Their insights, encouragement, and expertise have greatly enriched my academic journey. It has been a privilege to learn from such distinguished scholars in the fields of communication, political science, and educational psychology.

I extend wholehearted thanks to my family for their support throughout this journey. My parents, Ha Hyung Lee and In Young Kim, have been supportive throughout the years, sharing their wisdom and encouragement along the way. Special thanks to my brother, Jaesung Lee, my companion throughout the Ph.D. process. I hope he achieves great success in his own academic journey.

Lastly, I want to acknowledge Max Weber's *Science as a Vocation*. This work, which I revisited multiple times during my doctoral studies, offered insights from 100 years ago that truly resonated with me. Weber's words—"Thousands of years must pass before you enter into life, and thousands more wait in silence, depending on whether or not you succeed in making this conjecture; without this, you have no calling for science and should do something else" (Weber, 1991, p.135) —have served as both a challenge and an inspiration, reminding me of the persistence and dedication for a life in academia.

I am deeply grateful for the opportunities and academic journey I experienced at Madison. I will cherish every moment, the companionship of my colleagues and friends, and the mentorship of the incredible faculty.

References

Weber, M. (1991). *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology* (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, Eds. & Trans.). Routledge. (Original work published 1919)

List of Tables

List of Figures

Introduction

Political participation is at the heart of democratic societies as a form of influencing government decision-making processes directly or indirectly (Krosnick et al., 2010; Verba et al., 1995). The extent to which communication factors affect mass political behaviors is a central question in political communication research. Citizens often do not have sufficient information to gauge politicians' opinions, to connect their political opinions, and further decide their political actions (Converse, 1964). Such information diets can be conveyed by media exposure, campaign messages, and interpersonal interactions (Johann et al., 2018; McLeod et al., 1999; Shah et al., 2007). A strain of literature has found that media use, from traditional media such as newspapers, television, or radio and more recent media, like social media, promote political participation (Boomgaarden, & Schmitt-Beck, 2019; Gil De Zúñiga et al., 2009). We also know that political discussion with in-group or out-group members, could either mobilize or demobilize people (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Klofstad, 2015; Mutz, 2006).

Despite the scholarly attention given to participatory behaviors, most empirical tests have limited foci in terms of cultural contexts. They mostly deal with Western countries (Pfetsch & Esser, 2012) and specifically concentrate on the U.S. (Boomgaarden & Schmitt-Beck, 2019). For example, between 1980 and 2009, the leading journals in mass political behavior published 1,100 articles and most of the research relied on ANES (American National Election Studies) data (Robison et al., 2018).

Theories and concepts might not be consistently confirmed in a cross-national context, so testing only one country may ignore differences across cultures. For example, compared to other countries, Americans tend to vote less but participate more in other activities (Verba et al., 1995). Also, the knowledge gap theory, that is more available information exacerbates

knowledge inequalities, receives less support in other countries when compared to the U.S. (Haugsgjerd et al., 2021). Thus, a research agenda should reach beyond Western countries in order not to neglect opportunities to test theories and their limits which might be context-dependent (Boomgaarden & Schmitt-Beck, 2019; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Recent studies have considered country-level differences in terms of the link between communication variables and political participation, including media ownership, infrastructure, press freedom, or cultural factors, and show that the impact of media use and political talk on political participation varies by context (see Gill de Zúñiga et al., 2019; Barnidge et al., 2020; Borah et al., 2021; Skoric et al., 2016).

In sum, in the current research, I will focus on two frameworks explaining cultural and historical differences across countries for examining how cross-national differences or similarities in communication affects political behavior.

First, an authoritarian past as a collective memory will be a theoretical framework used to explain historical differences across countries. The theory of collective memory originated in sociology and is now widely used for expounding on country-specific historical events in a variety of disciplines, including history, philosophy, sociology, political science, and communication. Many countries around the world experienced authoritarianism or are currently under autocratic or oligarchic regimes, though their degree and duration vary. Citizens in post-authoritarian countries have different opinions on democracy, and political participation may also be more nuanced compared to countries without these experiences (Auerbach & Petrova, 2022; de Leeuw et al., 2020). As new democracies have consolidated, they learn ways of reconstructing political ideologies by alienating or reevaluating their authoritarian past (de Leeuw et al., 2021; Dina & Northmore-Ball, 2020). Collective memory will be outlined as a

theoretical framework for explaining varied communication effects on political participation in post-authoritarian countries, as communication scholars have paid attention to the role of media as a mnemonic agent, recalling collective memory by journalists, media messages, or interactions in new media (see Cohen et al., 2018; Lee & Chen, 2018; Robinson et al., 2013).

The second framework is Hofstede's cultural dimensions. Hofstede's dimensions have been applied in intercultural communication research for decades, due to their availability of accounting for cultural differences as a spectrum. The six dimensions are (1) individualism and collectivism, (2) Uncertainty avoidance, (3) Power distance, (4) Masculinity, (5) Short-term and long-term orientation, and (6) Indulgence (Hofstede, 2004; Hofstede et al., 2010). The proposal will focus on three dimensions that seem especially relevant, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance, and explain how each dimension possibly works as a contextual variable that shapes political participation in cross-national settings.

The current paper consists of the following sections. The first chapter delves into the concept of the authoritarian past as a collective memory, linking it to political communication literature. The second chapter shifts to Hofstede's cultural dimensions, exploring how cross-cultural differences influence the relationship between media use, political discussion, and political participation. Chapter 3 brings together the historical and cultural aspects from the previous chapters, posing a novel question that bridges these two dimensions. Following this, the dissertation introduces the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) dataset, detailing its characteristics and measurements before summarizing the analysis. Then, the results outline findings from multilevel models and logistic regression models. Finally, the discussion and conclusion summarize the key findings and their broader implications in cross-cultural contexts.

Chapter 1: Shadows of the Past –

Post-Authoritarianism in Political Communication and Participation

Authoritarian Past as Collective Memory

Collective memory in communication studies. Collective memory is the shared memory of a social group or society that is closely connected to the group's identity (Olick, 1999). Collective memory differs from facts or history since the concept refers to past events attached to a social group's values, emotions, and interpretations (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). Also, collective memory is not an individual's recollection but a selection of past events by a social group in which history is important and worth remembering (Conway, 2010). Thus, collective memory links to present life, social norms, and future directions in society (Lewis & Weigert, 1981).

Scholarly interests in collective memory studies have burgeoned in the last decades, trying to explain the social meanings of traumatic events like the Holocaust and the World Wars, ideological tensions during the Cold War, and democratization after the 1990s (Conway, 2010; Lee & Chen, 2018; Misztal, 2005). Similar to an individual's cognitive ability, society has limited capacities for collective memories, indicating that they can be recalled and forgotten (Schwartz, 2009). Further, humans have developed various mnemonic devices to remind people of their pasts and connect them with present society and worldviews, including iconic or textual features (Conway, 2010). For example, religious rituals, commemoration, or other institutionalizing tools like museums, monuments, or murals are great devices for refreshing collective memories (Durkheim, 1995).

Nowadays, academic attention has shifted to mediated communication as a mnemonic device for collective memory. Many recent studies in communication highlight how media could evoke collective memories and further imbue cultural values and identities. Mass media like

newspapers or television contribute to politicizing and contextualizing collective memory for social cohesion and shared sentiments toward an event, through journalists' strategic reframing (Cohen et al., 2018; Robinson, 2009). In the new media environment, the audience actively engages in writing collective memories utilizing interactive functions on Twitter (now X) (Sumikawa & Jatowt, 2021) or Wikipedia (Ferron & Massa, 2014). Therefore, collective memory is efficiently also articulated, rewritten, and preserved via media platforms.

Such recollections of old memories in society could affect civic activities in contemporary society. The media could mobilize people to participate in current events by invoking politicized historical events. For example, in Hong Kong, asking in a survey to recall the memory of the 1989 Tiananmen protests in Beijing was associated with support for democracy in social media discourses (Lee & Chan, 2018), and participating in the June 4th commemoration rallies (Lee & Chan, 2013). Or, in Japan, books and government policy publications elicited memories of pollution in the 1970s and mobilized citizens to get involved in environmental activism against nuclear power in the context of the 2011 meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power plant (Avenell, 2012). Based on the characteristics of collective memories and their relationship with media, the following section discusses the mechanisms of collective memories -- especially of an authoritarian past-- that create a distinctive political environment, shape political behaviors, and further explain cultural variance in a comparative context.

Authoritarian past as collective memory. The current study argues that an authoritarian past is a collective memory, preserved with shared meanings within cultures, and further suggests its ability to explain political participation in a comparative context. To begin with a definition, the most widely used is that authoritarianism is the indoctrination and dictatorship of a powerful figure or one party (Dinas & Northmore-Ball, 2020). Authoritarianism involves the repression of

political pluralism, often through exerting strong power by a ruling party or the military to quash anti-government opinions and social movements (Linz, 2000). Svolik (2012) further elucidates two conflicts that characterize authoritarian regimes. First is the tension between the leader and the masses or "balancing against the majority excluded from power the problem of authoritarian control" (p.1). The second conflict is between the dictator and their allies who share power, as historical evidence shows that most previous authoritarian leaders were removed through coup d'états (Svolik, 2012). In the current manuscript, authoritarianism is broadly defined as a regime that exercises rigid control over a single country, such as a dictatorship, the most accepted concept in the field of comparative politics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as Fukuyama (1992) proposed in his "end of history" thesis, it appeared like global society was progressing towards democracy. Several countries, including post-soviet countries, that had experienced authoritarian regimes entered democratic governments after rapid political transitions. Svolik's (2012) analysis showed that 316 authoritarian dictators, who were in power for at least one day between 1946 and 2008, were consequently ousted. Among these dictators, popular uprisings overthrew 10%, and another 10% stepped down through democratic transitions (Svolik, 2012). However, despite Fukuyama's (1992) promising outlook, even in a new era of democracy after the Cold War, scholarly debates on a decline in democracy have continued. The discourse on democratic backsliding is partly supported by the dismantling of freedom, human rights, and democratic systems in many nations. In 2022, democratic status worsened in 60 countries while it improved in only 25 countries, and more than 30 countries are currently under authoritarian regimes, or moving towards authoritarianism (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2022; V-Dem, 2022). Many studies focus on countries currently under

authoritarian regimes and find they wrestle with oppression such as censorship in online media (Tai & Fu, 2020).

Nonetheless, the current study focuses on countries with an authoritarian past, considering that the past helps explains the present. First, as discussed previously, recollections of collective memories could shed light on political attitudes and behaviors about current events. An authoritarian past is also a collective memory, that constitutes important national history, affects identity and norms in societies, and shapes the rhetoric of contemporary politics (Assmann & Czaplicka, 1995; Manucci, 2022). This collective memory is significantly associated with democracy and politics, as seen in examples like the "politics of regret" in Germany (Olick, 1999) or political debates over decommunization policies in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and Africa (Misztal, 2005).

Second, the collective memories of authoritarian regimes may illustrate a discrepancy in political discourse and participation across countries. Countries with an "authoritarian past", that successfully shifted to democracy, are often distinguished from "established democracies" (de Albuquerque, 2022). This is partly due to contemporary politics not being detached from the authoritarian past as the government leverages to legitimize its power and garner supporters. Jović (2004) illustrated that such collective memories in post-authoritarian regimes are different from the absence of such memories in full-fledged democracies:

> .... this is also the case in the immediate aftermath of the liberal 'revolutions' and during the period of transition. Any political change—and especially one that includes a complete collapse of a regime—is followed by a period of transition and consolidation, in which the bond between 'real power' and power to dominate over symbols, memories and

> forgetting remains strong. The link between political, economic and military power and memory is not confined to authoritarian regimes or occupations—it also characterizes the period of transition to, and consolidation of liberal democracy. On the contrary, a fully consolidated liberal democracy does not know of a concept of 'official memories', as it allows pluralism in the sphere of symbolic power just as it allows pluralism in all other spheres of power (political, economic, military, cultural, etc.) (p.98)

Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between post-authoritarian countries and fully established democratic countries. The next section will describe how an authoritarian past can explain political engagement and civic activities in a mediated society.

Communication and Political Participation in Post-authoritarian Countries

Political participation is defined as voluntary activities, varying in their extent and effects, to influence public policy or select public officials in charge of those policies (Verba et al., 1995). Political participation encompasses a wide range of activities, such as attending political protests, serving on local government, writing a letter to public officials or politicians, signing a petition, or voting in an election (Lupia et al., 1998; Verba et al., 1995). Especially, voting is a unique participatory behavior, that affects the government directly by selecting who will represent citizens' interests and needs (Lupia et al., 1998; Verba et al., 1995).

Due to the importance of the topic, voting has gained centrality over many decades in the research on mass political behavior in American politics (Robison et al., 2018), and in other countries (Barnidge et al., 2020; Kim & Han, 2005; Skoric et al., 2016). Scholars have examined potential factors affecting voting behaviors and political participation such as demographic factors, socioeconomic status (SES), information environments, and campaign messages (Johann et al.,

2018; Shah et al., 2007; Verba et al., 1995). The basic models of civic participation presume rational voters, who utilize available information to make correct voting decisions (Lupia et al., 1998). For example, the civic voluntarism model proposes that political activism as non-obligatory behavior depends on three factors; resources (e.g., education and language), psychological engagement with politics (e.g., political interest, political efficacy, partisan strength, etc.), and access to social network which can provide information and resources or mobilize people (Verba et al., 1995). Therefore, citizens of higher socioeconomic status (SES), who have more resources like time or money and civic skills from higher education, are likely to be more active in politics than people in lower SES (Verba et al., 1995). Aligning with the assumption, several studies found that demographics and socioeconomic status affect turnout rates. Wealthy, white, and educated people showed higher turnout rates in the United States (Krosnick et al., 2010; Verba et al., 1995). However, such disparities in participation were less stratified by SES in online political participation among young adults (Lane et al., 2021). Other than SES, psychological factors also affect voting behavior; people with higher group solidarity and stronger attachment to their party vote more often than others (Krosnick et al., 2010). Voters with greater political knowledge, political efficacy, and political interests tend to participate more (Verba et al., 1995). One's previous voting experience could also influence future actions, considering rewards from previous voting (Downs, 1957) or sticking as habitual behavior (Krosnick et al., 2010).

Protesting and participating in rallies are considered different types of political behavior that attract different citizens. Individuals protesting on the street tend to be younger, college students, and politically disaffected (Medel et al., 2023; Schussman, & Soule, 2005). Mediated communication including newspapers, television, and social media has been consistently related to different forms of participation (Schussman, & Soule, 2005; Shah et al., 2007). Protesting can

be facilitated by a lack of trust and confidence in institutions, while voting is usually positively related with institutional trust (Katsandiou & Eder, 2018). Citizens on street demonstrations are less likely to vote in elections, suggesting that these two types of political participation are different (Medel et al., 2023).

There are also variations in participating in politics based on collective memories of authoritarianism. It is widely recognized that citizens from post-authoritarian countries are less participatory, compared to people living in established democracies (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Hadjar & Beck, 2010; Kostelka, 2014). The variations in political engagement are partly due to regional, socio-demographic, and attitudinal differences, and the unique transition processes from the authoritarian regime (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007). One explanation is that in new democracies, political participation often declines after an initial transition period (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). This "post-honeymoon" effect was observed as citizens became disenchanted with the democratic process, although long-term trends may show an incremental increase in participation (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). Another explanation relates to distrust in political agencies and a lack of democratic norms in new democracies that restrain political participation. Years of authoritarianism often mar public trust in political institutions, making citizens question the efficacy and integrity of democratic processes, even after a shift to democracy (Fernandes et al., 2015; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). In addition, citizens who have lived under political pressure in an authoritarian regime may fear being penalized for participating in politics (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007). Finally, there could be institutional barriers. Political parties in post-authoritarian countries may be fragile and fragmented, thwarting citizens from finding parties reflecting their identities and voices (Kostelka, 2014). Electoral systems and political institutions may still echo remnants of authoritarianism, hindering political participation (Wright & Escribà-Folch, 2011).

It is important to promote political participation in post-authoritarian countries to build fertile grounds for a stable democracy that adheres to democratic norms and moves towards civil society. Kadivar (2018) found in an analysis of young democracies in 80 different countries, that the longer the nonviolent mobilization pressing a government for change, the more likely the democracy is to endure. Communication, including interpersonal and mediated communication, is useful for delivering political information and elite cues, further building trust in democracy, and eventually enabling citizen participation.

Political discussion. Politics has become more visible centering public attention, due to the press and traditional word of mouth, consequently, distinctive policies and positions by opposing parties or candidates could reduce public confusion (Kinder, 1988). V.O. Key's (1961) idea of "latent opinions" also proposes that some opinions may not be visible in surveys or polls, but they could rise as major opinions at some later moment. As emphasized in previous literature, an individual's opinion does not exist in a vacuum but is developed or shifted through social interactions (Blumer, 1938; Sunstein, 2002).

Mutz's (2006) book, *Hearing the Other Side*, provides a rationale and mechanisms for how discussing politics with others may affect the formation of political attitudes and activism. People tend to interact with ideologically homogeneous social networks, and like-minded people mobilize each other to take part in collective action by sharing similar viewpoints (Mutz, 2006; Sunstein, 2018). Mutz (2006) highlights the importance of "hearing the other side" in everyday life. She found that exposure to disagreeable opinions was related to increased political awareness of the rationales behind others' perspectives and opinions, while exposure to congenial opinions increases political awareness of the rationales behind one's attitudes, but decreases awareness of others' opinions (Mutz, 2006). Further, cross-cutting exposure was related to increased political tolerance

(Mutz, 2006), but no significant relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political participation was found (Matthes et al., 2019).

In post-authoritarian countries, citizens are likely to discuss politics with strong ties and may be reluctant to engage in open discussions, because of fear of government censorship, even if they do not exist anymore (Howard, 2003). They are also wary of partisan conflict or political disagreement and have little experience resolving disagreements (Lup, 2015). In empirical studies, people who have experienced an authoritarian past were less likely to discuss politics with weak ties, while they tend to interact with strong ties, like family members or close friends (Lup, 2015). Zhang (2012) compared Singapore and Taiwan, one a more established democracy and the other a post-authoritarian country and found that the Taiwanese were more mobilized by political discussion while such a relationship was not found in Singapore.

Though "hearing the other side" is encouraged to mitigate polarization and extreme attitudes (Mutz, 2006; Sude & Knobloch-Westerwick, 2023), discussing politics with strong ties or homogeneous people could promote political participation in post-authoritarian countries more than in other countries, considering that people in those countries might prefer to remain in closed social circles. Based on this I pose the following hypotheses:

H1: The effects of talking politics with strong ties on political participation will be greater in post-authoritarian countries.

H2: The effects of talking politics with weak ties on political participation will be smaller in post-authoritarian countries.

Pro-attitudinal media. Citizens learn about politicians and parties through campaign messages, media rhetoric, and conversations with people within their social networks (Shah et al., 2009; Zaller, 1992). Lazarsfeld et al. (1948)'s seminal study found in the 1940 presidential election in the U.S. that individuals' political decisions could be influenced by campaign messages, mediated by mass media in a two-step flow that involved opinion leaders as an intermediary step between media and citizens. This study shifted the paradigm of research agendas and brought extensive attention to the relationship between mass media and political participation. In political communication, media effects generally refer to "cognitive, attitudinal, or behavioral responses to some mediated stimuli on the part of media audiences" (Boomgaarden & Schmitt-Beck, 2019, p. 5), thus, media exposure could facilitate learning about candidates, developing policy preferences, and deciding whether and how to vote (Boomgaarden & Schmitt-Beck, 2019; Krosnick et al., 2010).

Many studies examine media effects on political participation and most of the studies posit a positive causal relationship between mere exposure to media messages and participation (Kim & Han, 2005). Also, new media is known to affect political participation. Expressive and informational use of social media facilitates political participation (Skoric et al., 2016). High-speed internet increases political information-seeking behavior, news consumption, and political knowledge, though it does not mobilize people directly (Lelkes, 2020).

The surge of partisan media, often represented by CNN and FOX News, attracts niche audiences as media options to select content flourish (Stroud, 2011). Stroud (2011), building on Festinger's (1962) theory of Cognitive Dissonance, that postulates that people undergo a cognitive conflict when they come across counter-attitudinal information or messages, so they are willing to seek pro-attitudinal sources or avoid counter-attitudinal sources to resolve the dissonance. In this

news choice scenario, partisan selective exposure refers to selecting news media that corresponds with one's political predispositions, to resolve cognitive dissonance (Stroud, 2011). Studies on this concept demonstrated that Democrats favor liberal-leaning media and Republicans like to consume conservative-leaning media (Stroud, 2011). Partisan selective exposure was also related to polarization and political actions, as conservative media use was related to increased affective polarization and increased misperceptions mediated by affective polarization (Garrett et al., 2019). Further, partisan media use was also positively related to voting for in-party candidates, and increased political participation (Stroud, 2011; Wojcieszak et al., 2016).

In post-authoritarian countries, where democracy is less solidified than in established democracies, the role of media can be more effective in promoting political participation. Journalists who live in countries that transitioned from dictatorships to democracies tend to be in tension with the government and try to "rethink" their roles in nurturing democratic norms (Obijiofor et al., 2017). For example, Arendt (2024) conducted a longitudinal analysis from 1816 to 1932 in Austria which experienced the shift from monarchy to democracy. The author found that the salience of democracy in the press had increased over time, and such a rise was accompanied by the levels of democratization in Austria.

In countries with weak democratic institutions, individuals with political connections are more likely to engage in political activities. This suggests that media highlighting such connections can encourage participation among citizens (Tsai & Xu, 2018). Aligning with this logic, Breuer and Groshek (2014) further argue that the success of transitioning democracies depends on including previously marginalized groups in politics. In such cases, individuals empowered by media exposure might mobilize protests instead of seeking change through new democratic institutions. Melki et al. (2022) provides evidence that pro-attitudinal media use further mobilizes

citizens' political participation in transitional democracies such as Chile, Hong Kong, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, suggesting that during periods of political unrest, individuals in post-authoritarian countries were more likely to seek out and trust pro-attitudinal media. Thus, we also propose that:

H3: The effects of pro-attitudinal media on political participation will be greater in post-authoritarian countries.

Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Participation

Satisfaction with Democracy. In a democratic society, citizens have perceptions or evaluations of how the political system operates and functions. The extent of democratic satisfaction in a country varies based on individuals and the type of democracy in place (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). Satisfaction with Democracy (SWD) is defined as "evaluations of the overall performance of the regime, exemplified by satisfaction with democratic governance and also general assessments about the workings of democratic processes and practices" (Norris, 2011, p. 24). SWD has been widely recognized and investigated in comparative politics to unpack the dynamics behind political engagement (Canache et al., 2001; Norris, 2001). For example, in the 1990s, SWD was the most widely used question in 13 cross-national surveys (Claassen & Magalhães, 2005) and is still a universally studied concept in comparative research over recent years (Singh & Mayne, 2023). The global trends of SWD are quite consistent and there is a small discrepancy between studies when examining major surveys such as the Latinobarometro, Afrobarometer, Asian Barometer Survey, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), World Value Survey (WVS), and others (Valgarðsson & Devine, 2022). Most publications using SWD

are cross-national studies, however, they remained Western-centric as seen in 56% of publications between 2016 and 2021 are based on European data (Singh & Mayne, 2023).

One big theme of SWD research is to explore links between SWD and political participation (Singh & Mayne, 2023). There are two possible scenarios, and empirical findings are also mixed. The first scenario is that a high SWD, which ensures one's certainty in the electoral process and democratic functions within the country, will increase voter turnout (Birch, 2010). Analyzing the European Social Survey collected in 22 countries between 2002 and 2003 showed that high levels of SWD led to higher voter turnout (Grönlund & Setälä, M, 2007). In addition, a specific element of SWD such as the perception of election integrity was positively related to turnout rates using a CSES survey with 33 countries from 1996 to 2002 (Birch, 2010). Similarly, when looking closely into national elections in 24 European countries, dissatisfaction with politicians was positively associated with the likelihood of non-voting (Hadjar & Beck, 2010).

On the other hand, another stream of research found that lower SWD increases the probability of voting. This approach explains that when citizens are satisfied with democracy, they are less likely to participate in social changes because they want to maintain the status quo of a satisfactory society. An analysis of this relationship in 12 democracies over the period 1976–2011 displayed a pattern that over-time increases in citizens' satisfaction with democracy were associated with significant decreases in voter turnout these countries national elections (Ezrow, & Xezonakis, 2016).

Regarding protesting, the literature consistently finds that dissatisfaction makes citizens participate more. For example, using the survey and interviews in the context of 15-M protest in Spain, citizens with lower SWD tended to participate multiple times (Portos & Masullo, 2017).

In addition, an analysis of the European Social Survey of 25 democratic countries in 2008 survey showed that political dissatisfaction was related to a higher likelihood of protesting (Christensen, 2016).

Mass media, Satisfaction with Democracy, and participation. Mass media affects political evaluations by priming certain issues, making them more salient to voters and affecting their perceptions of government competence (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2019; Zaller, 1996). Exposure to television and newspapers enhances citizens' understanding of democracy and its performance in the country, as these media serve as educators who instruct on democratic norms, procedures, political actors, and systems in general (Newton, 1999). Democratic systems require citizens to make informed decisions, often involving complex cognitive processing. High satisfaction with democracy can encourage citizens to trust democratic processes and institutions, leading to more thoughtful and engaged decision-making (Warren & Gastil, 2015). Aligning with this argument, people with high SWD are more attentive to election campaigns and political news, which creates a virtuous cycle from increased attention to news that further enhances their SWD, making them more likely to engage in political activities (Nisbett et al., 2021). A previous study found that more sophisticated citizens were more affected by media content in the context of EU democratic performance (Demset et al., 2015). Moreover, especially in transitional democracies, citizens advertently consume the media to get political information (Loveless, 2008).

Therefore, it is possible people with high levels of SWD will increase their interest in election campaigns and news coverage, so mass media effects can be amplified by the level of SWD. However, considering the mixed findings regarding the relationship between voting and SWD it is also plausible that higher SWD and frequent media use may cancel out each other so it

is difficult to predict the direction of impact on voting behavior. On the other hand, lower SWD and frequent pro-attitudinal media use will lead to more participation in protesting.

When considering the traumatic past of authoritarianism, people in countries with an authoritarian past may likely be affected more by pro-attitudinal media, as we proposed in the previous hypothesis, while SWD further strengthens such effects. Pro-attitudinal media, serving as an educator for democracy in post-authoritarian countries where the past leaves uncertainty and distrust of the political system (Loveless, 2008), can "allow" protest among satisfied citizens who are willing to be part of the democratic process. In fact, in transitional democracies, protests are often seen as a legitimate form of political expression. Media coverage of protests and political issues can highlight the perceived importance of these actions, encouraging more citizens to join in (Melki et al., 2023). Based on these alternatives I pose the following research question:

RQ1: What will be the relationship between pro-attitudinal media, satisfaction with democracy, and an Authoritarian past on political participation?

Antidictator Bias and Partisan Selective Exposure

After the demise of authoritarian regimes, dictatorships have become old memories, and society needs to deal with how to "remember" or "forget" the authoritarian past. In post-authoritarian countries, changing official holidays and demolishing monuments often show a rejection and marginalization of the symbols of old regime (Jović, 2004). Jović (2004) further explains this "erasing" or "overwriting" process:

> To promote an alternative narrative of the past is to attack and undermine the very essence of the authoritarian regime; whether through remembering an event deeply hidden within the context of the official memory, or through 'forgetting' something that the official memory wants us to remember. It is because the power-struggle in authoritarian regimes is often led through a 'battlefield of memories/forgetting' that the collapse of these regimes almost unavoidably involves a 'revolution' in the sphere of official memories. The old official memories are overthrown simultaneously with the collapse of the old political, economic and military elites. For example, the former communist systems were by definition hostile to the Past. Based on a Marxist concept of history, the Past was treated as a period of class exploitation and injustice, which ought to be replaced by a revolutionary different Future. Future is represented in complete opposition to the Past. Revolutionaries wanted not only to reinterpret the Past (and Present) but to change it, as Marx's famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach argued. In the construction of the Future, the Past was used as a Hostile Other. The representation of the 'dark' Past was thus of constitutive importance for the new, radically different, image of the Future. With the end of the communist regime, the Past came back, in defiance of the old narrative which marginalized it and portrayed it only in dark colours. The Past was rehabilitated, and its revival became a constitutive process for the new post-communist regimes. (p.99)

As evident in the quotation, people try to rewrite the old memories after such regimes collapse. Moreover, transitional democracies are also not free from the ideologies of past regimes. This is because old regimes are not independent of left-right ideologies as some countries experienced authoritarian regimes related to the left, and others were under regimes related to

right-wing ideologies. Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) proposed the idea of "antidictator bias", a phenomenon of people in post-authoritarian countries leaning towards ideologies that are opposite to the ideology of the previous dictatorship. The anti-dictator bias is rooted in negative memories of suppressive regimes. For example, politicians in post-communist countries publicize their ideological detachments from the past or position themselves as anti-communists (Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Spirova, 2008). In countries with previous right-wing dictatorships, citizens' ideologies are likely to lean toward the left (Dina & Northmore-Ball, 2020). Relevant studies have also found similar results; support for far-right parties is lower in countries that experienced right-wing autocracies, compared to others (Frantzeskakis & Sato, 2020).

Anti-dictatorship bias has been used to investigate ideologies and political participation in post-authoritarian countries within a comparative context. For example, despite the conventional understanding that protests are frequently organized by the liberal camp, in post-Soviet countries, it is the left-leaning people who are less engaged in protesting, suggesting that protests were commonly seen within the ideological group that opposed the previous undemocratic regime (Kostelka, & Rovny, 2019).

While shifting to the impact of mass media on political participation, exposure to ideologically consistent news outlets is known to affect engagement in politics (Dalen, 2021; Stroud, 2011; Stevens & Allen, 2017; Valenzuela & Brandão, 2015). By reducing cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) or reaffirming pre-existing attitudes, seeking attitude-consistent outlets through motivated reasoning contributes to engagement (Kunda, 1990; Lee, 2021). Thus, integrating the concept of partisan selective exposure and antidictator bias, we expect that the effect of partisan media on political participation will interact with the ideological leanings of the prior regime. For example, the effects of liberal media outlets might not be as strong in post-

communist countries, compared to other countries. In this logic, pro-attitudinal media might consist of two levels: an individual-level alignment with my own ideology and a country-level alignment with a previous authoritarian regime. In order to explore this, I pose the following research question.

RQ2: Will the effects of pro-attitudinal media on political participation vary by the congruence of partisan media with authoritarian regimes of the past?

The mobilizing role of mass media and political discussion could also vary across citizens in the same country because individuals have different perceptions of a traumatic past. Witnessing the past during their youth might make people believe in the importance of the event and shape their political behaviors throughout their lifetime (Schuman & Scott, 1989). In this sense, empirical studies in collective memory often perform cohort analyses, assuming a generation as a social unit and that their collective memories would yield different patterns across generations (Conway, 2010; Mannheim, 1972; Zaromb et al., 2014). For example, Americans who were young adults during the World War believe that the World War was the most important event in the U.S., while those who witnessed the Vietnam War in their youth reported the Vietnam War as the most important historical event (Schuman & Scott, 1989). A subsequent study found that young adults and older adults have different recollections of the Iraq War (Zaromb et al., 2014). Similarly, an "antidictator bias" might be more prominent in older cohorts than younger cohorts who were indoctrinated by the authoritarian regimes in early ages (Dinas & Northmore-Ball, 2020).

If citizens do not have a consensus on the importance of past events, their understanding of democratic values and civic life could be different. In fact, younger generations are less likely

to engage in political activities compared to older generations who were under undemocratic regimes (Lup, 2015). Thus, it is possible that the impact of mass media and political talk on political participation would be different by generations within one country.

Comparing across generations may provide ample explanations for mapping generational differences depending on their memories of an authoritarian past. Relevant literature found that media use and political talk have a positive relationship with the political participation of young and old adults. Older adults' political participation is promoted by traditional news use (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2021) and strong social networks (Nygård et al., 2015). Also, a meta-analysis showed that young adults' news use increases their political participation (Boulianne & Theocharis, 2020). However, when comparing the two age groups, a significant difference appears: the impact of media use on political participation is stronger among young adults than old adults (Bachmann et al., 2010). Despite the meaningful findings, most of those studies did not perform cohort analyses but instead cut off years to divide into the younger and older groups. Thus, performing cohort analysis may show more nuanced differences across generations. Thus, I pose the following research question:

RQ3: Will the effects of (a) political discussion and (b) media use on political participation vary by generation in post-authoritarian countries?

Chapter 2. Cultures, Communication, and Political Participation.

Hofstede (2001) introduced cultural dimensions to explain modern countries' different world views and social behaviors. He described that "people carry 'mental programs' that are developed in the family and early childhood, reinforced in schools and organizations, and that these mental programs contain a component of national culture" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 19). In his book, Hofstede (2001) empirically validated six statistically independent cultural dimensions. Hofstede's cultural dimensions have been one of the most widely used concepts in comparative studies (Park et al., 2012), enabling robust statistical analyses through updated scores for each dimension (https://geerthofstede.com/).

The second chapter of the dissertation focuses on three dimensions, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance which may be critical for political participation. These dimensions explain how variations in cultures regarding social interactions and the persuasiveness of political agreement in these relationships might affect political participation (Basabe & Ros, 2005; Croucher et al., 2013). In general terms, Asian and Middle Eastern societies tend to have higher scores in collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance than Western societies, though there are subtle variations across countries and over time (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010; Park et al., 2012; Shen & Liang, 2015).

Individualism-Collectivism.

Individualism and collectivism deal with cultural differences in interacting with individuals and groups. Collectivistic cultures share value systems, intimately linked with social norms, and individuals mostly follow the social values and norms. On the other hand, individualistic cultures value self-construal and independence (Hofstede, 2001). It has been known that around 70% of the world's population lives in collectivist cultures (Eveland et al., 2015).

Individualism-Collectivism (IDV from now) is closely associated with the *Face Negotiation theory* proposed by Ting-Tommey and Kurogi (1998), which explains different communication styles across cultures. People from collectivistic cultures need a "face", or a self-image when interacting with others, and they shun disagreements and confrontations not to be isolated from a social group and maintain their "face" (Ting-Tommey & Kurogi, 1998). Many studies confirm that face negotiation exists, especially in collectivistic cultures; for example, clarifying one's opinions is regarded as a crucial communication skill in individualistic societies like the U.S., while indirect and nonconfrontational languages are preferred in collectivistic cultures such as Asian countries (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996; Miyahara, 2004; Park et al., 2012). Moreover, collectivistic cultures embrace reserved and withdrawn manners in social settings (Heinrichs et al., 2006).

This tendency explains why people in collectivistic cultures are assimilated into group norms or shared opinions, similar to the principle of homophily, "birds of a feather flock together" in social networks (McPherson et al., 2001). People tend to socialize with people who share their social identities or close social ties and adjust their opinions in the direction of the group's views over time (Lazer et al., 2010; Sunstein, 2002). In addition, political agreement in discussion networks promotes political participation (Choi, 2022; Mutz, 2006; Nir, 2011; Smith, 2015). Thus, discussing politics with others, especially with close networks or ideologically homogenous people, is likely to exert greater effects on political participation in collectivistic countries compared to individualistic ones.

A handful of studies have already examined this relationship, and their results are somewhat mixed regarding the direct effects of IDV on political participation. Some studies found no direct effects of IDV on political engagement (Bimber & Gil de Zuniga, 2022; Shen & Liang,

2015). However, a closer examination of political discourse in those cultures reveals some variation. Eveland et al. (2015) found that people in individualistic cultures discuss politics more frequently than people in collectivistic cultures. This aligns with Minkov's (2018) analysis of 56 countries, which uncovered that individualistic cultures encourage self-expression.

Political agreement can facilitate political participation in collectivistic cultures. Talking politics with a homogeneous network has a positive relationship with political participation in collectivistic cultures, compared to individualistic ones (Eveland et al., 2015). In addition, strong ties have greater mobilizing effects in collectivistic countries (Ai & Zhang, 2021). Thus, it is plausible that exposure to strong social ties would amplify the effects of political discussion on participation in collectivistic cultures beyond their impact on individualistic ones. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis:

H4: The effects on political participation of discussing politics with strong ties will be greater in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic ones.

In addition, the surge of partisan media, often represented by CNN and FOX News in the U.S., is partly for attracting niche audiences living in a selective media environment (Stroud, 2011), and this is not only the case in the U.S. Many countries have media outlets attached to left-right ideologies, and their tone of coverages are highly polarized, favoring in-party politicians and denouncing out-party politicians (de Leeuw et al., 2021). Partisan media exposure shapes the audience’s behavior. Pro-attitudinal media use mobilizes citizens to participate more in voting and other forms of political participation, while counter-attitudinal media use may either demobilize

people or exert no significant influence on political participation (Dalen, 2021; Dilliplane, 2010; Stroud, 2011; Stevens & Allen, 2017; Valenzuela & Brandão, 2015; Wojcieszak et al., 2016).

Cultural dimensions could broaden our understanding of partisan selective exposure effects in a comparative context. Exposure to attitude-consistent media should work similar to discussing politics with homogenous people, considering that partisan media outlets are regarded as either in-group or out-group in ideological terms (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2017). Highlighting social identity via messages may have a greater effect on solidifying in-group affection in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic ones (Park & Warner, 2024). Aligning with this idea, Kim and Kwak (2022) found that pro-attitudinal incidental exposure increases political participation among people in a collectivistic culture, while counter-attitudinal incidental exposure dampens political participation among people in an individualistic country.

Thus, the mobilizing impact of pro-attitudinal media is likely amplified in collectivistic cultures, which leads me to pose the following hypothesis:

H5: The effects on political participation of exposure to pro-attitudinal media sources will be greater in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic cultures.

Uncertainty avoidance.

Uncertainty avoidance (UAI from now) refers to cultural attitudes of avoiding conflict and disliking ambiguous situations (Hofstede, 2001). To cope with uncertainty, people utilize technology, law, religion, rituals, etc., that enable some predictability in society; thus, in a high UAI culture, people build social systems to follow social rules and obey bureaucratic systems to deal with social anxiety, neuroticism (Hofstede, 2011) and uncertainty (Hofstede, 2001).

UAI guides information-seeking behaviors since avoiding ambiguity naturally leads to the need for more information. Studies found that high UAI cultures tend to communicate more ritualistically and be less harmonious than weak UAI ones (Merkin, 2005). This allows people living in higher UAI cultures to be more susceptible to the amount of information via media and other platforms. For example, people from high UAI cultures like Japan hesitate to make decisions and take actions with limited information, while people from weak UAI cultures, like the U.S. and Germany, tend to behave similarly regardless of the amount of information they have (Vishwanath, 2003). The levels of UAI also affect the persuasiveness of messages. A previous study found that citizens in high UAI culture are more influenced by health messages from credible sources (De Meulenaer et al., 2018) and are more susceptible to fake news (Arrese, 2022). Furthermore, stronger discussion frequency and political agreement effects on political participation were found in high UAI cultures (Eveland et al., 2015).

Therefore, if a person in a high UAI culture has more information through discussing politics, they are more likely to participate than those in a low UAI culture. Thus, I propose:

H6: The effects on political participation of discussing politics with strong ties will be greater in high uncertainty-avoidance cultures.

Partisan media outlets are important information sources. Ideologically leaning media provides partisan cues helping the audience to understand political issues and politicians easily (Skovsgaard et al., 2016; Stroud, 2011). For example, active media use alleviates the susceptibility to conspiracy theories in countries with high UAI cultures (Mari et al., 2022). As elaborated before, the amount of information is essential to act in countries with UAI cultures. Therefore, it is likely

that attitude-consistent media use exerts a greater mobilizing impact on citizens in high UAI cultures who need clear information.

H7: The effects on political participation of exposure to pro-attitudinal media will be greater in high uncertainty avoidance cultures.

Power distance.

Power distance (PDI from now) is related to a hierarchy and power dynamics in interpersonal relationships (Hofstede, 2001). PDI is positively correlated with UAI, but they are conceptually different; UAI is connected to adherence to the authority of rules and systems, while PDI in contrast is about accepting the authority of a person or people (Hofstede, 2001). PDI explains why some cultures are more deferential and obedient to authority figures. High PDI cultures value obeying power holders and acknowledging their privileges, while low PDI cultures believe in equal rights and allow conformity to authority for social convenience (Dai et al., 2022; Hosfede, 2001; Spencer-Oatey, 1997). Inequality depicted in George Orwell's "Animal Farm" or India's caste system is an exemplar of strong PDI (Hofstede, 2001). Nowadays, PDI often manifests in hierarchical relationships between bosses and subordinates, parents and children, teachers and students, and rulers and citizens (Daniels & Greguras, 2014).

The relationship between PDI and political participation is quite nuanced. Since people in PDI cultures are known to be more submissive and passive, increased PDI is significantly associated with decreased voting and non-violent political participation (Travaglino & Moon, 2020). Ironically, despite compliance with authority figures in PDI cultures, these societies sometimes experience radical political movements to overturn powerful governments (Hofstede et

al., 2010; Travaglino & Moon, 2020). Previous studies also found a positive relationship between PDI and domestic political violence in 53 countries (Van de Vliert et al., 1999).

The impact of talking politics within social networks on political participation is significant, mobilizing people in high PDI cultures (Shen et al., 2009). Thus, it is plausible that discussing politics would increase political participation, but the moderating role of PDI is not clear considering the mixed findings in the relevant literature. Therefore, I pose the following research question:

RQ4: Will the effects on political participation of discussing politics with strong ties vary by country-level power distance?

PDI is also associated with susceptibility to media sources. In the persuasion literature, people in high PDI cultures tend not to question expertise and are more vulnerable to messages from authority figures or experts (De Meulenaer et al., 2018; Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007). Since journalists are generally regarded as professional in providing evidence-based information in many countries, though trust in media organizations and journalistic norms vary across countries (Hanitzsh et al., 2011), we could assume that mass media sources are also ones with authority, expertise, and credibility (Arrese, 2022; Bergan & Lee, 2019). Thus, PDI may amplify the mobilizing effects of pro-attitudinal messages. Thus , I expect that:

H8: The effects on political participation of exposure to pro-attitudinal media sources will be greater in cultures with high power distance.

Satisfaction with Democracy, Cultural Dimensions, and Political Participation.

As discussed in the previous chapter, satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is a strong indicator of political participation. However, findings in the literature are inconsistent, showing that SWD can be either positively or negatively related to political participation. Cultural dimensions may explain these discrepancies, as they account for variations in political participation across different countries.

The demand-supply model of SWD indicates that SWD consists of a gap between the expectation and reality of democracy within a country (Heyne, 2019). Given that SWD is perceptual and stems from personal evaluation, cultural dimensions such as individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance can further shape the direction of the relationship between SWD and political participation.

First, individualistic cultures that value free expression and innovation can lead to faster democratization, whereas collectivistic cultures, that esteem social harmony and conformity tend to undermine political actions for democratization (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2021). Participating in politics in an individualistic culture is encouraged as a good civil activity and a democratic norm, on the contrary, demonstrators and protesters in collectivistic cultures are socially avoided since they are seen as disrupting social harmony (Kobayashi et al., 2021). We hypothesized that the effects of pro-attitudinal media will be greater in collectivistic cultures as pro-attitudinal media sources provide rationales and social acceptance of the activists. Such mobilization effects of pro-attitudinal media sources would also vary by the levels of SWD in collectivistic countries. Specifically, high levels of SWD would mobilize citizens to participate by creating a safe environment characterized by civility and tolerance, ensuring that political participation would not

be socially penalized or avoided. However, SWD might not play such a large role in individualistic countries where participating in politics is already widely acknowledged as socially "good".

Second, high UAI cultures that reject social changes accompanied by risks and ambiguity, tend to be more politically conservative and less likely to accept social transformation and equality (Jost et al., 2007). In the case of deciding attitudes on issues, people in high UAI cultures consider the "controllability" of the situation and information, whereas a similar tendency was not observed in other cultural dimensions such as IDV and PDI (Barr & Glynn, 2004). Countries with high UAI are also more likely to support autocratic leaders and radical parties who offer "certainty" (Gründl & Aichholzer, 2020; Schoel et al., 2011). Considering this, SWD would be a significant indicator for citizens living in high UAI cultures to believe that the political system and democratic process are functioning accordingly to gauge the "controllability" or "certainty" of outcomes and procedures of political participation. Therefore, the mobilization effects of SWD should manifest more strongly in high UAI cultures, especially when exposed to attitude-consistent sources.

Finally, PDI hampers interaction with authority figures and people in higher social hierarchy (Dai et al., 2022), increasing feelings of social distance (Lammers et al., 2012). Moreover, PDI was negatively related to democratic tendencies but positively associated with autocratic ones (Terzi, 2011). Those that are suppressed in strong power dynamics and disaffected about the environment, tend to exhibit more extreme attitudes and participate in voting (Stanojevic et al., 2020). Therefore, dissatisfied citizens in high PDI countries, where voices are devalued and orientation toward political elites is required, are more likely to participate in politics through pro-attitudinal media, because they perceive these media sources support and share their views.

On the other hand, countries with low PDI are exemplified by egalitarianism, providing a more comfortable environment to challenge authority and participate in electoral processes

(Daniels, & Greguras, 2014). In addition, low PDI cultures highlight fairness and justice in decision-making processes (Begely et al., 2002). Therefore, people living in low PDI cultures with high SWD, who believe their country's democracy is fair and effective, pro-attitudinal media provides resources to legitimize their political participation. In contrast, those with low SWD in the same country may not experience the similar mobilization effects from pro-attitudinal sources, as their low SWD prevents from feeling confident that democracy is functioning properly to safeguard their political participation. In order to explore these possibilities, I pose the following research question:

RQ4: What will the relationship between pro-attitudinal media, satisfaction with democracy, and cultural dimensions be on political participation?

Chapter 3. Integrating and Exploring the two approaches:

Culture and History

Civic culture, including both citizens and political elites, has been milestone in establishing democracies and shaping mass political behavior in a comparative context (Almond & Verba, 2015; Bisin & Verdier, 2024). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have also emphasized that shifts in cultural values, particularly towards liberty and self-expression, strengthen democracy. It is widely believed and empirically demonstrated that culture drives changes in political institutions and civic behaviors, although institutional change can also affect political culture (Ruck et al., 2019). Welzel (2021) further developed the model of "regime-culture coevolution," arguing that the awakening of human cognition through education and modernization makes people less susceptible to authoritarian powers. found that a country's cultural values explain more than 50% of the cross-national differences between autocratic and democratic regimes. This research explained that the spread of cultural values is associated with the rise of democracy, while a lack of these values is linked to a relapse from democracy to authoritarianism.

Therefore, considering the close connection between authoritarianism and culture, it is worthwhile to explore the interaction between an authoritarian past and cultural dimensions of civic participation. For example, collectivistic cultures tend to have experienced authoritarianism more, but they also tend to break through from autocracy to democracy (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2021). Also, post-authoritarian countries can have higher power distance, a imprint of old regimes that powerful figures and institutions exert a strong hierarchy and oppress free expressions. Therefore, in this work, we want to postulate a research question about a unique and explorative analysis integrating Chapter 1 and Chapter 2: Will the cultural dimensions and the authoritarian past interact on political participation? If so, what would be the relationships?

RQ5: What are the relationships between cultural dimensions including (a) individualism-collectivism, (b) uncertainty avoidance, and (c) power distance with the experiences of an authoritarian past on political participation.

Methods

Data

CNEP (Comparative National Elections Project) is a public dataset, collected and managed by Ohio State University (https://u.osu.edu/cnep/). It includes 60 election surveys from 30 different countries from 1990 to 2024, and 16 countries have multiple waves. As designed for a comparative study, the questionnaire includes a "Common Core Questionnaire", dealing with similar items across countries. The interview mode is mostly face-to-face, but some recent surveys integrate Internet and telephone surveys.

CNEP assumes that individuals are nested within countries (Lup, 2021). The sample of CNEP is designed to represent the adult population in each country, and most surveys use multi-stage stratified sampling methods. However, sampling methods are not consistent across the countries. For example, Germany in 1990 used stratified multi-stage random sampling, from individuals within households, households in random routes, and then areas. But in France 2017 researchers used stratified sampling from the European Social Survey with propensity score matching, which differs slightly from what Germany has done.

CNEP also has multiple waves in certain countries. To illustrate, CNEP II was conducted from 1993 to 2000, CNEP III was collected from 2004 to 2009, and the most recent CNEP IV has been collected from 2009 to the present. Also, some countries include pre- and post-surveys

relative to elections (e.g., Chile and Spain), but the majority of countries only have post-election items.

For the present research, we have selected 14 countries that included the media-related items that are of interest. The countries and survey years are: 2014 Turkey, 2015 Spain, 2017 France, 2017 Germany, 2017 Great Britain, 2018 Colombia, 2018 Mexico, 2019 Hong Kong, 2019 Ukraine, 2020 Serbia, 2020 Taiwan, 2020 US, 2021 Chile, and 2022 Brazil. Total number of individuals sampled is 23,767. Detailed information related to the data, such as survey agencies, funding organizations, survey dates, target demographics, sampling methods, sample sizes, interview methods, and response percentages, can be found in Table A3 within the Supplemental Materials document.

Table 1-1 summarizes the country names, year, sample size, the presence of an authoritarian past, the ideology of the previous authoritarian regime, and scores for each cultural dimension. We characterize countries with continuous democratic governance since World War II as established democracies, following previous literature (See Dinas et al., 2020). For example, Mexico is not classified as a post-authoritarian country even though it experienced dictatorship twice (1833–1855; 1876–1911), while countries like Ukraine and Serbia transitioned to democracy when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 are categorized as prior authoritarian countries. The details of authoritarian history are included in the Supplemental Materials, specifically in A2.

Table 1-1. Country Data and Characteristics.

Country	Year	Sample size	Authoritarian Past	Ideologies of Authoritarian Regime	PDI	IDV	UAI
Turkey	2014	1173	No	-	66	37	85
Spain	2015	2411	Yes	Right	57	51	86
France	2017	2000	No	-	68	71	86

Germany	2017	3236	Yes	Right	35	67	65
Great Britain	2017	2000	No	-	35	89	35
Colombia	2018	1118	Yes	Right	67	13	80
Mexico	2018	1428	No	-	81	30	82
Ukraine	2019	2001	Yes	Left	92	55	95
USA	2020	2000	No	-	40	91	46
Taiwan	2020	1200	Yes	Right	58	17	69
Hong Kong	2019	1200	No	-	68	25	29
Serbia	2020	1800	Yes	Left	86	25	92
Chile	2021	1000	Yes	Right	63	23	86
Brazil	2022	1200	Yes	Right	69	38	76

*Note: Cultural Dimension scores are from *H*ofstede's website (https://geerthofstede.com/) and Hofstede Insight (https://www.hofstede-insights.com/).

Due to the omission of certain question items, specifically control variables such as internal and external political efficacy, in some of these surveys, we employed a multiple imputation technique, specifically predictive mean matching (PMM), to impute missing data. The key advantage of PMM in multiple imputation is that it preserves the distributional characteristics of the observed data when the distribution of the variable with missing data is not normal or when there are outliers in the data (Moretti & Shlomo, 2023). To account for variability, the process is repeated multiple times (50 times), creating a set of imputed datasets. Then, the average of these imputed datasets was calculated and used for subsequent analyses, improving the accuracy and robustness of statistical inferences. Within the entire dataset, this imputation method was only applied to the control variables, such as internal and external political efficacy. This procedure is a replication of the method employed by Barnidge et al. (2020), which also used a multiple imputation technique with CNEP data.

Measures: Dependent Variables

Voting. There is a binary question asking respondents "Did you vote in the recent election?" (0=No or I don't know; 1= Yes).

Protest. There is a dichotomous question asking respondents if they participated in protest demonstration in last 12 months (0= No or I don't know; 1= Yes).

Measures: Individual-level Independent variables and Moderators

Pro-attitudinal media use. The item asked, "Across all of the media sources (including television, newspapers, radio, internet, social media) you may have used to obtain information about the campaign, how many favored the same (political party or candidate) as you did?" (0= None; 1= Some; 2= Most; 3= Almost all of them).

Political talk. A battery of questions asks for the frequency of political discussion: How often do you talk about the recent election with your [family/spouse/friend/neighbor/co-workers] (0- Never; 3- Often). The set of questions allows us to measure political talk with weak ties (neighbor/co-workers), and strong ties (family/friend) (see Ai & Zhang, 2021; Lup, 2015). The correlation between talking with family and friends are high ($r = .60$, $p < .001$) and the correlation between talking with co-workers and neighbors that is also high ($r = .44$, $p < .001$).

Satisfaction with democracy. The single item asked a respondent if they were satisfied with how democracy was working in the country (0= Not at all satisfied; 3= Very satisfied).

Political ideology. A respondent's political ideology, in terms of left and right, was measured from 1 (farthest left) and 10 (farthest right).

Measures: Country-level independent variables

*Cultural dimensions. H*ofstede's website (https://geerthofstede.com/) and Hofstede Insight (https://www.hofstede-insights.com/) provide scores of each dimension for countries around the globe. The scores range from 0 to 100, and the latest version is the 2015-dimension data matrix.

Authoritarian past. As mentioned above, countries freed from authoritarian regimes after World War II are classified as post-authoritarian regimes. The item was coded as a binary dummy (0= Established democracy; 1= post-authoritarian countries). The details of the regime's history are in Supplemental Materials A2.

Ideology of past regimes. The ideologies of the past authoritarian regimes could be assessed from previous studies in comparative politics (see de Leeuw et al., 2021; Dina & Northmore-Ball, 2020; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Frantzeskakis & Sato, 2020; Spirova, 2008). The classification of regime ideologies is presented in Supplemental Materials A2.

Measures: Individual-level control variables

Control variables include demographics, such as age, gender, and education. We also controlled for political interest and internal and external political efficacy. Campaign news exposure was measured by asking "During the electoral campaign how frequently did you follow information, such as news or opinion, about the election through…" (1) Online news media, websites, or blogs, (2) Newspapers, including online editions, (3) Radio, including online broadcasts, and (4) Television, including online broadcasts from 0 (Never) to 7 (Everyday). We averaged these for items into an index of campaign news exposure (Cronbach's alpha= .69).

Measures: Country-level control variables

Compulsory voting is measured for each election by International IDEA (2021). It is recommended to control compulsory voting when predicting turnout because countries with compulsory voting laws are expected to have higher turnout rates (Eveland et al., 2015). Therefore, compulsory voting dummy (0= no compulsory voting, 1= compulsory voting) was controlled based on the reports of International IDEA (2021). In addition, years after democratic transition is

a dummy variable created to control for each country's duration of democracy. It ranges across a span of 10 years (1 = 0–10 years; 5 = 41–50 years; 8 = more than 70 years/established democracy).

Analytic strategy

Multi-level modeling. To test hypotheses and research questions regarding cultural dimensions and an authoritarian past, we conducted a random intercept model, since it could explain more than a simple OLS regression, including one or more error terms in each level (Park et al., 2012; Peak et al., 2005; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Snijders and Bosker (2012) also suggest that multi-level modeling is appropriate if a researcher wants to test the effects of group-level variables and draw conclusions related to the population. All covariates and controls were grand-mean centered.

Cohort analysis for testing generational differences in post-authoritarian countries. Regarding RQ6, cohort analysis is adequate for empirical testing. Most research on generational differences in collective memory or regime shift uses cohort analysis. The method breaks the dataset into cohorts sharing common experiences within their lifespan (Mason & Fienberg, 2012). The concept of generations is important, since "the generational character created by the events a cohort experiences during its youth is assumed to exert an important, even decisive, influence on the later attitudes and actions of its members" (Schuman & Scott, 1989, pp.359-360). For this analysis, the following steps are required. (1) Select a country (countries) with an authoritarian past. Selection of cases is important, because the timing of the transition to democracy varies by society and the duration of authoritarian regimes is not the same, and some countries have been under several dictators. We selected Chile and Ukraine; one having emerged from a previously right-wing regime and the other from a former left-wing regime. Additionally, both countries democratized from those regimes around the same time, with Chile in 1989 and Ukraine in 1992,

although Ukraine's process had taken longer. (2) Define cohorts who experienced the authoritarian regime in early adulthood (Mannheim, 1952). (3) Perform cohort analysis. The details of the procedure are documented in A2 in the supplemental materials.

Results

Before addressing the main hypotheses and research questions, OLS regressions for each country were performed. Table 1-2 illustrates OLS regressions results of the 14 countries. The findings provide an overview of variations within country. In addition, these suggest several consistent and inconsistent patterns across countries. For example, talking with close ties mobilized turnout while talking with weak ties mobilized protests in Western countries without dictatorships like France, Great Britain and USA. On the other hand, post-authoritarian countries like Colombia, Germany, and Serbia show the positive association between talking with close ties, weak ties and protesting.

Table 1-2. OLS regressions of Each Country

	Colombia		Mexico	
	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.04*** [0.03, 0.06]	4.32*** [3.57, 5.28]	0.03*** [0.02, 0.04]	8.32*** [6.59, 10.73]
Age	0.82 [0.60, 1.10]	1.45*** [1.19, 1.78]	1.06 [0.68, 1.63]	1.93*** [1.49, 2.53]
Education	1.57* [1.12, 2.24]	1.58*** [1.29, 1.95]	0.96 [0.64, 1.47]	1.13 [0.87, 1.47]
Gender	1.08 [0.83, 1.41]	1.08 [0.89, 1.29]	1.14 [0.80, 1.63]	1.29* [1.05, 1.60]
Ideology	0.67** [0.51, 0.89]	0.86 [0.71, 1.05]	1.16 [0.82, 1.65]	0.95 [0.77, 1.18]
Political interest	1.49* [1.07, 2.10]	1.62*** [1.29, 2.05]	1.40+ [0.96, 2.08]	1.29* [1.02, 1.65]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.15 [0.85, 1.55]	0.84 [0.69, 1.04]	1.18 [0.83, 1.67]	0.95 [0.75, 1.20]
External Political Efficacy	1.49** [1.14, 1.95]	0.81* [0.66, 0.99]	0.78 [0.53, 1.10]	1.04 [0.85, 1.28]
News consumption	1.20	1.24+	1.11	1.34*

	[0.89, 1.63]	[0.99, 1.55]	[0.76, 1.60]	[1.05, 1.73]
Talking with close ties	**1.59***	1.23	0.89	1.33+
	[1.04, 2.49]	[0.96, 1.59]	[0.49, 1.61]	[0.97, 1.84]
Talking with weak ties	**1.43***	1.11	**2.04****	0.92
	[1.03, 2.01]	[0.87, 1.43]	[1.26, 3.45]	[0.67, 1.25]
Pro-attitudinal media	0.81	**1.23***	0.87	1.08
	[0.60, 1.09]	[1.01, 1.51]	[0.60, 1.24]	[0.88, 1.34]
SWD	1.17	0.99	1.11	1.03
	[0.90, 1.54]	[0.82, 1.20]	[0.80, 1.53]	[0.84, 1.28]
N	820	821	839	890
Loglikelihood	-199.391	-364.108	-131.598	-311.284
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.21	.12	.10	.08

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All coefficients are standardized.

Table 1-2. (continued)

	France		Great Britain	
	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.13***	13.00***	0.03***	12.73***
	[0.10, 0.15]	[10.31, 16.66]	[0.02, 0.04]	[10.30, 15.98]
Age	0.67***	1.67***	0.71***	1.93***
	[0.59, 0.76]	[1.40, 2.01]	[0.58, 0.86]	[1.60, 2.33]
Education	1.19*	1.21*	1.13	1.11
	[1.04, 1.37]	[1.02, 1.43]	[0.90, 1.43]	[0.94, 1.32]
Gender	0.88+	1.20*	1.17+	0.93
	[0.78, 1.01]	[1.02, 1.43]	[0.97, 1.41]	[0.78, 1.09]
Ideology	0.63***	1.26**	0.76**	0.79*
	[0.55, 0.72]	[1.06, 1.50]	[0.62, 0.93]	[0.66, 0.95]
Political interest	1.35***	1.46***	2.18***	1.09
	[1.13, 1.60]	[1.20, 1.77]	[1.57, 3.05]	[0.87, 1.36]
Internal Political Efficacy	0.91	1.05	1.06	1.11
	[0.80, 1.05]	[0.87, 1.26]	[0.86, 1.30]	[0.91, 1.34]
External Political Efficacy	1.03	1.00	0.95	1.04
	[0.89, 1.20]	[0.82, 1.24]	[0.77, 1.17]	[0.85, 1.28]
News consumption	1.29**	1.32**	1.48**	1.34**
	[1.10, 1.52]	[1.09, 1.60]	[1.14, 1.95]	[1.09, 1.66]
Talking with close ties	0.98	**1.38****	1.17	**1.63*****
	[0.82, 1.16]	[1.12, 1.70]	[0.91, 1.53]	[1.30, 2.05]
Talking with weak ties	**1.41*****	0.95	**1.44*****	0.87
	[1.22, 1.63]	[0.76, 1.19]	[1.21, 1.72]	[0.71, 1.08]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.04	1.08	0.95	1.00
	[0.91, 1.18]	[0.90, 1.29]	[0.78, 1.16]	[0.85, 1.18]
SWD	0.88+	1.18+	**0.79***	1.06
	[0.77, 1.01]	[0.99, 1.42]	[0.65, 0.97]	[0.89, 1.27]

N	1989	1991	1931	1932
Loglikelihood	-783.599	-507.028	-429.396	-546.888
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.12	.14	.21	.12

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All coefficients are standardized.

Table 1-2. (continued)

	Germany		Ukraine	
	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.08***	13.08***	0.01***	3.74***
	[0.07, 0.10]	[11.14, 15.51]	[0.00, 0.02]	[3.16, 4.45]
Age	0.64***	1.47***	0.81	1.28**
	[0.56, 0.73]	[1.30, 1.67]	[0.48, 1.31]	[1.09, 1.51]
Education	0.98	1.14*	2.18**	0.89
	[0.86, 1.12]	[1.01, 1.29]	[1.32, 3.82]	[0.76, 1.05]
Gender	0.98	0.94	0.83	1.14+
	[0.86, 1.11]	[0.82, 1.07]	[0.53, 1.30]	[0.98, 1.32]
Ideology	0.84**	0.97	1.25	0.93
	[0.74, 0.95]	[0.85, 1.11]	[0.79, 1.96]	[0.79, 1.08]
Political interest	1.26**	1.88***	0.80	1.24*
	[1.06, 1.51]	[1.56, 2.27]	[0.45, 1.43]	[1.02, 1.50]
Internal Political Efficacy	0.77***	1.08	0.69	1.16+
	[0.67, 0.88]	[0.94, 1.25]	[0.41, 1.15]	[0.98, 1.38]
External Political Efficacy	1.48***	0.99	1.59+	0.94
	[1.28, 1.72]	[0.84, 1.16]	[0.93, 2.65]	[0.78, 1.13]
News consumption	1.10	1.31***	2.13**	1.05
	[0.95, 1.28]	[1.12, 1.53]	[1.34, 3.41]	[0.89, 1.23]
Talking with close ties	**0.79****	**1.40*****	0.74	**1.45*****
	[0.66, 0.94]	[1.18, 1.67]	[0.42, 1.31]	[1.20, 1.77]
Talking with weak ties	**2.11*****	1.01	1.23	0.96
	[1.84, 2.42]	[0.85, 1.20]	[0.74, 2.08]	[0.79, 1.16]
Pro-attitudinal media	**1.16***	1.02	1.21	1.06
	[1.03, 1.31]	[0.90, 1.16]	[0.77, 1.87]	[0.91, 1.23]
SWD	**0.71*****	**1.48*****	1.02	**0.85***
	[0.62, 0.82]	[1.29, 1.70]	[0.64, 1.65]	[0.72, 1.00]
N	3049	3055	1147	1156
Loglikelihood	-885.435	-836.263	-94.334	-554.888
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.15	.19	.13	.07

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All coefficients are standardized.

Table 1-2. (continued)

	Hong Kong		Taiwan	
	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)

Constant	0.71*	8.98***	0.06***	13.31***
	[0.51, 0.98]	[5.64, 15.36]	[0.03, 0.10]	[8.64, 22.02]
Age	0.70*	1.66*	0.73+	1.09
	[0.53, 0.93]	[1.09, 2.59]	[0.51, 1.04]	[0.74, 1.63]
Education	0.96	1.30	1.09	1.01
	[0.74, 1.25]	[0.87, 1.94]	[0.77, 1.58]	[0.69, 1.45]
Gender	0.90	0.79	1.21	1.29
	[0.69, 1.16]	[0.53, 1.16]	[0.87, 1.70]	[0.88, 1.92]
Ideology	1.13	0.55**	0.89	0.67*
	[0.89, 1.43]	[0.36, 0.81]	[0.67, 1.17]	[0.47, 0.93]
Political interest	1.26	1.26	2.66***	0.91
	[0.81, 1.97]	[0.67, 2.38]	[1.58, 4.62]	[0.51, 1.62]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.38*	1.13	0.98	1.06
	[1.03, 1.87]	[0.70, 1.82]	[0.70, 1.38]	[0.71, 1.59]
External Political Efficacy	1.15	1.35	1.00	1.36
	[0.83, 1.59]	[0.81, 2.31]	[0.67, 1.47]	[0.84, 2.26]
News consumption	0.68*	1.46+	1.29	1.21
	[0.50, 0.93]	[0.99, 2.13]	[0.85, 1.99]	[0.79, 1.88]
Talking with close ties	**1.66****	**1.94***	**2.00****	**2.27****
	[1.14, 2.45]	[1.13, 3.40]	[1.22, 3.34]	[1.37, 3.89]
Talking with weak ties	0.98	0.88	1.05	1.10
	[0.74, 1.30]	[0.56, 1.39]	[0.72, 1.53]	[0.68, 1.80]
Pro-attitudinal media	**1.41***	1.21	1.15	1.20
	[1.07, 1.87]	[0.80, 1.86]	[0.83, 1.59]	[0.80, 1.83]
SWD	**0.42*****	**0.43*****	0.89	0.70+
	[0.31, 0.57]	[0.27, 0.67]	[0.64, 1.24]	[0.46, 1.05]
N	346	346	400	400
Loglikelihood	-181.175	-98.948	-121.978	-105.959
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.24	.20	.21	.12

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All coefficients are standardized.

Table 1-2. (continued)

	Serbia		USA	
	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.05***	1.76***	0.10***	7.01***
	[0.03, 0.06]	[1.52, 2.04]	[0.08, 0.13]	[5.73, 8.65]
Age	0.62***	1.53***	0.42***	1.53***
	[0.48, 0.80]	[1.30, 1.80]	[0.35, 0.49]	[1.29, 1.81]
Education	1.04	0.92	1.12	1.37***
	[0.84, 1.30]	[0.79, 1.07]	[0.97, 1.31]	[1.16, 1.62]
Gender	1.04	0.88+	0.94	0.95
	[0.85, 1.28]	[0.76, 1.02]	[0.81, 1.09]	[0.81, 1.12]
Ideology	0.83	1.19*	0.86+	1.13
	[0.66, 1.04]	[1.03, 1.38]	[0.73, 1.01]	[0.95, 1.34]

Political interest	1.04	1.13	1.13	1.63***
	[0.81, 1.36]	[0.96, 1.35]	[0.92, 1.39]	[1.35, 1.96]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.13	0.99	0.86+	1.05
	[0.90, 1.42]	[0.85, 1.15]	[0.73, 1.01]	[0.88, 1.24]
External Political Efficacy	0.79*	1.18*	1.26**	0.97
	[0.63, 0.97]	[1.03, 1.37]	[1.06, 1.49]	[0.81, 1.18]
News consumption	1.07	0.97	1.53***	1.07
	[0.84, 1.36]	[0.83, 1.15]	[1.27, 1.85]	[0.89, 1.29]
Talking with close ties	**1.68****	**1.37****	1.01	**1.30****
	[1.21, 2.35]	[1.10, 1.71]	[0.83, 1.22]	[1.08, 1.58]
Talking with weak ties	**1.33***	0.96	**1.72*****	1.02
	[1.03, 1.72]	[0.79, 1.16]	[1.48, 2.00]	[0.84, 1.25]
Pro-attitudinal media	**0.79***	**1.51*****	**1.25****	**1.27****
	[0.62, 0.99]	[1.29, 1.78]	[1.08, 1.46]	[1.07, 1.51]
SWD	**0.38*****	**2.30*****	0.87+	1.03
	[0.28, 0.50]	[1.95, 2.72]	[0.75, 1.01]	[0.88, 1.21]
N	1251	1256	1722	1722
Loglikelihood	-329.928	-641.560	-603.107	-543.887
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.24	.24	.19	.15

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All coefficients are standardized.

Table 1-2. (continued)

	Turkey		Chile	
	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.01*** [0.00, 0.02]	8.48*** [6.56, 11.21]	0.10*** [0.07, 0.14]	2.51*** [1.95, 3.29]
Age	0.83 [0.50, 1.33]	1.63*** [1.23, 2.20]	0.47*** [0.33, 0.66]	1.02 [0.83, 1.27]
Education	1.01 [0.64, 1.58]	0.93 [0.70, 1.23]	0.88 [0.63, 1.24]	0.80+ [0.64, 1.00]
Gender	1.26 [0.84, 1.87]	1.41** [1.10, 1.83]	1.34* [1.02, 1.78]	1.04 [0.86, 1.26]
Ideology	0.62* [0.39, 0.96]	1.02 [0.78, 1.33]	0.61*** [0.46, 0.81]	0.89 [0.71, 1.11]
Political interest	2.51** [1.41, 4.67]	1.31+ [0.97, 1.78]	1.86*** [1.36, 2.56]	2.12*** [1.66, 2.75]
Internal Political Efficacy	0.90 [0.62, 1.29]	1.08 [0.83, 1.40]	0.99 [0.73, 1.35]	1.07 [0.85, 1.34]
External Political Efficacy	1.29 [0.85, 1.94]	1.20 [0.90, 1.62]	0.57** [0.38, 0.83]	0.99 [0.77, 1.28]
News consumption	1.84** [1.20, 2.85]	1.07 [0.82, 1.40]	1.05 [0.77, 1.41]	1.21 [0.96, 1.53]
Talking with close ties	1.24	**1.39***	0.95	1.25

	[0.73, 2.13]	[1.01, 1.93]	[0.67, 1.34]	[0.96, 1.63]
Talking with weak ties	1.10	1.04	1.15	1.10
	[0.73, 1.65]	[0.77, 1.42]	[0.89, 1.48]	[0.88, 1.38]
Pro-attitudinal media	0.83	1.23	1.17	0.89
	[0.54, 1.26]	[0.94, 1.62]	[0.88, 1.55]	[0.72, 1.09]
SWD	**0.49****	1.12	1.04	**1.24***
	[0.29, 0.79]	[0.84, 1.49]	[0.79, 1.36]	[1.01, 1.52]
N	711	711	574	570
Loglikelihood	-101.995	-242.326	-184.866	-312.360
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.28	.08	.18	.18

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All coefficients are standardized.

Table 1-2. (continued)

	Brazil		Spain	
	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)	Protest OR (95% CI)	Turnout OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.17***	5.24***	0.27***	9.95***
	[0.14, 0.21]	[4.33, 6.40]	[0.20, 0.37]	[7.13, 14.38]
Age	0.85+	1.28**	0.78*	1.06
	[0.71, 1.01]	[1.07, 1.52]	[0.61, 0.98]	[0.80, 1.42]
Education	1.15	1.27*	1.03	1.16
	[0.97, 1.35]	[1.05, 1.54]	[0.83, 1.29]	[0.88, 1.54]
Gender	1.12	1.23*	1.02	1.17
	[0.94, 1.33]	[1.03, 1.48]	[0.82, 1.27]	[0.89, 1.56]
Ideology	0.98	0.83*	0.49***	0.74*
	[0.83, 1.16]	[0.69, 0.99]	[0.38, 0.62]	[0.55, 1.00]
Political interest	1.62***	1.10	1.53*	1.33
	[1.32, 2.00]	[0.90, 1.34]	[1.09, 2.17]	[0.87, 2.05]
Internal Political Efficacy	0.99	1.14	0.83+	0.66**
	[0.82, 1.18]	[0.94, 1.39]	[0.66, 1.03]	[0.51, 0.85]
External Political Efficacy	1.19+	1.12	0.79*	1.02
	[0.99, 1.44]	[0.91, 1.37]	[0.63, 0.98]	[0.78, 1.34]
News consumption	1.09	0.99	1.22	2.03***
	[0.89, 1.35]	[0.81, 1.22]	[0.92, 1.61]	[1.41, 2.98]
Talking with close ties	1.02	**1.49*****	1.24	**1.66****
	[0.82, 1.28]	[1.21, 1.84]	[0.91, 1.70]	[1.16, 2.39]
Talking with weak ties	1.09	1.11	1.21	0.78
	[0.91, 1.31]	[0.90, 1.38]	[0.94, 1.55]	[0.56, 1.09]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.19+	1.02	0.84	1.20
	[1.00, 1.42]	[0.85, 1.22]	[0.67, 1.06]	[0.91, 1.61]
SWD	1.16+	0.96	0.80+	**1.42***
	[0.99, 1.37]	[0.80, 1.14]	[0.63, 1.00]	[1.05, 1.95]
N	998	999	520	704
Loglikelihood	-445.591	-424.602	-266.463	-192.078

Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.06	.08	.18	.17

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All coefficients are standardized.; For Spain, internal and external political efficacy values are multiple imputed using predictive mean matching to address missing values.

Next, to address the hypotheses and research questions, multilevel logistic regressions with random intercept were performed for each outcome, followed by cross-level models with interaction terms between individual-level and country-level variables. The random intercept model with covariates and controls is compared with the baseline model without covariates and controls. The summary of the hypothesis, research questions, and findings are presented in Table 6. The model comparison supported that the random intercept and cross-level models fit better than the baseline models (see Table 2-1 to Table 3-2 in the APPENDIX).

Authoritarian Past and Political Participation

The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was used to infer the proportion of total variance in the likelihood of participating in politics. The ICC of the baseline model of protest (see Table 2-1) was 0.19, suggesting that 19% of the variance in protesting can be explained by variations between countries. In addition, the ICC of the baseline model in turnout (see Table 2-2) was 0.05, indicating that 0.5% of the variance in voting can be explained by differences between countries. This suggests that country-level factors contribute to protest, but a large portion of the variance in turnout models is due to individual-level factors within countries.

H1 posited that talking with close ties would have a greater effect on political participation in post-authoritarian countries. The results of the protesting models are illustrated in Table 2-1 and the turnout models are presented in Table 2-2. The authoritarian past has no main effects on protest (OR = 1.19, 95% CI [0.17, 8.36], p = .860) or turnout (OR = 0.88, 95% CI [0.36, 2.18], p = .788). Interactions with authoritarian past shows that talking with close ties has

no significant relationship with protest (OR = 0.91, 95% CI [0.78, 1.07], p = .255) or turnout (OR = 1.01, 95% CI [0.90, 1.15], p = .821). Therefore, H1 is rejected.

Regarding H2, we tested the interaction between talking with weak ties and authoritarian past. The interaction term was significant in the protest model (OR = 0.82, 95% CI [0.71, 0.94], p = .004), while it reached a marginal significance in the turnout model (OR = 1.13, 95% CI [1.00, 1.28], p = .051). Figure 1-1 visualizes the interaction between the authoritarian past and talking with weak ties. As hypothesized, people in post-authoritarian countries were less affected by political discussion with weak ties, compared to people in established democracies. Thus, H2 is partially supported.

H3 proposed that the effects of pro-attitudinal media will be greater in post-authoritarian countries. However, the interactions of pro-attitudinal media and the authoritarian past were not significant in protest (OR = 1.01, 95% CI [0.87, 1.16], p = .949) or voting models (OR = 1.03, 95% CI [0.91, 1.17], p = .623). Thus, H3 is rejected.

RQ1 was examined through a three-way interaction, using pro-attitudinal media use, authoritarian past, and satisfaction with democracy. The results indicated significant interactions in protesting (OR = 1.22, 95% CI [1.07, 1.39], p = .003) and the voting model (OR = 1.13, 95% CI [1.01, 1.27], p = .042). Figure 1-2 and Figure 2 provides a visualization of the three-way interactions, showing that the effects of pro-attitudinal media exposure vary based on one's level of SWD, while the pattern differs between established democracies and post-authoritarian countries.

Authoritarian Ideology and Political Participation

The ICC of the protest model (see Table 3-1) was 0.09, and the ICC of the turnout model (see Table 3-2) was 0.04, indicating a decrease in ICC due to the reduced sample size when focusing on post-authoritarian countries.

RQ2 asked whether talking politics and exposure to pro-attitudinal media have different effects based on self-reported ideology on political participation. The results of the protest models are presented in Tables 3-1. The model with interactions showed that the three-way interaction (Ideology X Regime Ideology X Talking with close ties) had no significant relationship with protest (OR =1.08, 95% CI [0.86, 1.35], p = .521) or turnout (OR = 1.00, 95% CI [0.88, 1.15], p = .949). Similarly, the three-way interaction between an individual's ideology, prior regime's ideology, and talking with weak ties were not significant in the protest model (OR =1.11, 95% CI [0.92, 1.34], p = .295) or the turnout model (OR =1.00, 95% CI [0.88, 1.13], p = .966).

On the other hand, a three-way interaction (Ideology X Regime Ideology X Pro-attitudinal media) had no meaningful relationship with protest (OR = 1.01, 95% CI [0.81, 1.25], p = .946), while it is significantly associated with turnout (OR = 0.85, 95% CI [0.74, 0.98], p = .025). Figure 3 illustrates the nuances of the relationship. As expected, the selective exposure hypothesis showed different patterns based on the previous regime's ideology in post-authoritarian countries. The effects are more pronounced in left-wing regimes than right-wing regimes. Conservatives in previously left-authoritarian regimes tend to be more mobilized by pro-attitudinal media sources, as shown by the steep increase compared to liberals. However, conservatives in previously right-wing regimes are less affected by pro-attitudinal media compared to liberals.

Cohort Analysis: A Case Study of Chile and Ukraine

Chile. RQ3 posited that the effects of political talk and media use on political participation will vary by generation in post-authoritarian countries. To address this, we performed cohort analysis using Chile 2017, 2021, and Ukraine 2019, one experienced a right-wing regime and another a left-wing regime. First, cohorts were classified as a group who experienced the authoritarian regime in early adulthood (see Mannheim, 1952) and subsequent cohorts were defined with the similar range of years (see A2 in Supplemental Materials for details). The cohorts were included as a dummy variable and then we tested two-way interactions (Cohorts X Political discussion and Cohorts X Pro-attitudinal media use) in binomial logistic regressions to investigate any differences across cohorts.

The analysis using Chile 2017 and 2021, cohort membership was modeled with four levels: 1942-1952, 1953–1970, 1971–1988, and 1989–2003, with the earliest cohort as the reference group. The results showed that people from the 1989–2003 cohort were significantly more likely to participate in protests compared to the reference group (OR = 7.06, CI [2.46, 29.98], p = .002). No significant effect was found for the 1971–1988 cohort (OR = 3.18, CI [1.07, 13.72], p = .066) and 1953–1970 cohort (OR = 1.96, CI [0.64, 8.60], p = .295). These findings suggest that youngest cohorts those born between 1989 and 2003 are more likely to engage in protest activities compared to the reference group.

The interaction effects were tested between cohort membership and like-minded media use on protesting. The findings indicate that all two-way interactions were not meaningful. First, the interactions between pro-attitudinal media use and cohort membership were not significant across all cohort groups, including 1953–1970 (OR = 0.48, CI [0.14, 1.65], p = .225), 1971–1988 (OR = 0.62, CI [0.19, 2.05], p = .416), and 1989–2003 (OR = 0.64, CI [0.20, 2.06], p = .425). Second, in terms of the moderating role of talking with close ties with cohort groups, all

interactions did not achieve statistical significance: 1953–1970 (OR = 1.12, CI [0.27, 4.26], p = .871) 1971–1988 (OR = 0.88, CI [0.22, 3.22], p = .842), and 1989–2003 (OR = 1.16, CI [0.29, 4.22], p = .815). Finally, similar insignificant results were found for interactions with talking with weak ties: 1953–1970 (OR = 0.76, 95% CI [0.30, 2.02], p = .545), 1971–1988 (OR = 0.56, 95% CI [0.22, 1.48], p = .203), and 1989–2003 (OR = 0.50, 95% CI [0.20, 1.29], p = .117). The three-way interaction terms between cohort membership, pro-attitudinal media, and satisfaction with democracy were also tested. None of these interactions were statistically significant: 1953–1970 (OR = 1.44, 95% CI [0.46, 4.36], p = .517), 1971–1988 (OR = 1.60, 95% CI [0.54, 4.62], p = .385), and 1989–2003 (OR = 1.35, 95% CI [0.46, 3.84], p = .576).

When moving to voter turnout, the interaction terms between the cohort groups in predicting voter turnout were not significant: 1953–1970 (OR = 0.81, 95% CI [0.46, 1.39], p = .450), 1971–1988 (OR = 0.77, 95% CI [0.44, 1.31], p = .339), and 1989–2003 (OR = 0.63, 95% CI [0.36, 1.07], p = .093). Two-way interactions show similar nonsignificant patterns. The interaction between cohort and pro-attitudinal media exposure was not significant in the 1953–1970 cohort (OR = 0.90, 95% CI [0.52, 1.53], p = .712), the 1971–1988 cohort (OR = 1.08, 95% CI [0.63, 1.80], p = .768), and the 1989–2003 cohort (OR = 0.79, 95% CI [0.46, 1.31], p = .366).

In terms of relationship between talking with close ties and voter turnout, interaction effects were not found. The interactions between talking with close ties and all groups of cohorts, including 1953–1970 (OR = 0.94, 95% CI [0.50, 1.69], p = .843), 1971–1988 cohort (OR = 0.93, 95% CI [0.50, 1.64], p = .800), and 1989–2003 cohort (OR = 1.09, 95% CI [0.59, 1.92], p = .784) were not significant. Similarly, political discussions with weak ties did not show significant interactions with cohort groups, across the 1953–1970 cohort (OR = 0.78, 95% CI

[0.35, 1.46], p = .479), the 1971–1988 cohort (OR = 0.93, 95% CI [0.42, 1.75], p = .845), and the 1989–2003 cohort (OR = 0.84, 95% CI [0.38, 1.57], p = .633).

In summary, these results suggest that cohort membership did not significantly moderate the relationship between (1) like-minded media use and political participation, and (2) political discussion and protesting in Chile.

On the other hand, the three-way interactions between pro-attitudinal media use, satisfaction with democracy, and cohorts on voter turnout unveil more nuanced relationships. The three-way interaction showed that the 1971–1988 cohort was significant (OR = 1.72, 95% CI [1.03, 2.95], p = .041) and 1953–1970 cohort was marginally significant (OR = 1.57, 95% CI [0.93, 2.73], p = .098), while the interaction for the 1989–2003 cohort was not statistically significant (OR = 1.50, 95% CI [0.90, 2.56], p = .125).

Figure 4-1 illustrates the details of the relationship. The 1971-1988 cohort is the first post-Pinochet generation who spent their early adulthood right after transition to the democracy. In the three-way interaction plot, voter turnout tends to increase with more frequent pro-attitudinal media exposure, but only for those satisfied with democracy. This visualizes an amplifying effect of pro-attitudinal media and satisfaction with democracy on voter turnout in this first post-Pinochet generation, compared to the reference group who born between 1924 and 1952.

Ukraine. We replicated the analysis using the Ukraine dataset. We are unable to combine different years of the survey, as CNEP only has data from one year (e.g., Ukraine 2019) for post-authoritarian countries with left-wing regimes. When analyzing cohorts by categorizing into four different groups: 1928–1948, 1949–1971, 1972–1992, and 1993–1999, cohort effects were not statistically significant. In other words, protest participation did not meaningful vary between

people from the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 0.37, 95% CI [0.07, 2.83], p = .267), the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 0.87, 95% CI [0.21, 6.02], p = .861), or the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 0.65, 95% CI [0.07, 6.05], p = .690).

The interaction between cohort membership and consuming pro-attitudinal media was not statistically significant for the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 2.71, 95% CI [0.47, 25.24], p = .312), the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 4.17, 95% CI [0.94, 33.19], p = .106), or the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 5.92, 95% CI [0.92, 65.15], p = .093). Similarly, the interaction between cohort groups and political discussions with close networks was not statistically significant for the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 1.72, 95% CI [0.24, 12.26], p = .584), the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 2.78, 95% CI [0.43, 17.41], p = .268), or the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 3.77, 95% CI [0.34, 52.83], p = .289).

On the other hand, the interaction between cohorts and talking with weak ties showed that the effects varied by cohort groups. The interaction between cohort membership and weak political discussions was statistically significant for the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 8.85, 95% CI [1.25, 143.65], p = .046) and the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 7.63, 95% CI [1.23, 115.98], p = .048), but not for the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 4.77, 95% CI [0.45, 88.26], p = .197). Figure 4-2 visualizes the interactions. The reference group (1928-1948) shows a slight negative relationship between talking with weak ties and protesting. The cohort of 1949-1971 and the cohort of 1972-1992 exhibit almost flat lines, which are different from the reference group with almost flat lines.

The three-way interaction between cohorts, like-minded media use, and satisfaction with democracy was also not statistically significant for the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 2.41, 95% CI [0.30, 18.04], p = .419), the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 1.56, 95% CI [0.21, 10.61], p = .672), and the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 1.06, 95% CI [0.12, 9.23], p = .959).

Gearing toward the outcome of voter turnout in Ukraine, we found similar insignificant results. Cohort effects were not statistically significant, indicating that voter turnout did not differ between cohorts from 1949–1971 (OR = 1.38, 95% CI [0.71, 2.56], p = .316), 1972–1992 (OR = 0.85, 95% CI [0.44, 1.56], p = .616), and 1993–1999 (OR = 1.23, 95% CI [0.57, 2.59], p = .587).

The interaction between cohort membership and pro-attitudinal media use was not significant for the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 1.29, 95% CI [0.72, 2.34], p = .390), the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 1.43, 95% CI [0.80, 2.55], p = .227), or the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 1.57, 95% CI [0.81, 3.07], p = .180). In addition, the interaction between cohort membership and political discussions with close ties was not statistically significant for the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 1.13, 95% CI [0.57, 2.20], p = .711), the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 0.83, 95% CI [0.43, 1.58], p = .572), or the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 1.25, 95% CI [0.56, 2.83], p = .587).

Similarly, the interaction between cohort membership and weak political discussions was not statistically significant for the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 1.79, 95% CI [0.94, 3.49], p = .080), the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 1.59, 95% CI [0.85, 3.06], p = .151), or the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 1.90, 95% CI [0.87, 4.31], p = .114).

The three-way interaction between cohort, pro-attitudinal media use, and satisfaction with democracy was significant for the 1972–1992 cohort (OR = 2.30, 95% CI [1.09, 5.82], p = .045), but not for the 1949–1971 cohort (OR = 2.04, 95% CI [0.96, 5.20], p = .088) and the 1993–1999 cohort (OR = 1.89, 95% CI [0.84, 4.97], p = .149). Figure 4-3 illustrates the relationships. In the reference group (1928-1948), people who are less satisfied with democracy have tend to vote more when they are exposed to pro-attitudinal media. People who born between 1972 to 1992 are

likely to participate in voting more when they have higher satisfaction with democracy and consume pro-attitudinal media more.

Table 2-1. Multilevel Logistic Regression Model Authoritarian Past Predicting Protest

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)	Model 5 OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.08*** [0.02, 0.27]	0.08*** [0.02, 0.26]	0.08*** [0.02, 0.26]	0.08*** [0.02, 0.27]	0.078*** [0.02, 0.23]
Age	0.60*** [0.56, 0.65]	0.60*** [0.56, 0.65]	0.60*** [0.57, 0.65]	0.60*** [0.56, 0.65]	0.60*** [0.55, 0.65]
Education	1.11* [1.02, 1.20]	1.10* [1.02, 1.20]	1.10* [1.02, 1.19]	1.11* [1.02, 1.20]	1.11* [1.02, 1.20]
Gender	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.10]
Ideology	0.83*** [0.78, 0.88]	0.83*** [0.78, 0.88]	0.83*** [0.78, 0.88]	0.83*** [0.78, 0.88]	0.83*** [0.78, 0.88]
Political interest	1.38*** [1.27, 1.51]	1.39*** [1.27, 1.52]	1.39*** [1.27, 1.52]	1.38*** [1.27, 1.51]	1.38*** [1.27, 1.51]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.00 [0.92, 1.08]	1.00 [0.92, 1.08]	1.00 [0.93, 1.09]	1.00 [0.92, 1.08]	1.00 [0.92, 1.08]
External Political Efficacy	1.13** [1.05, 1.22]	1.13** [1.05, 1.22]	1.13** [1.05, 1.22]	1.129** [1.048, 1.216]	1.13** [1.05, 1.22]
Talking with close ties	1.16** [1.05, 1.28]	1.21** [1.07, 1.38]	1.16** [1.05, 1.28]	1.16** [1.05, 1.28]	1.15** [1.05, 1.27]
Talking with weak ties	1.34*** [1.24, 1.45]	1.34*** [1.24, 1.45]	1.49*** [1.34, 1.66]	1.34*** [1.24, 1.45]	1.34*** [1.24, 1.45]
News consumption	1.27*** [1.16, 1.38]	1.27*** [1.16, 1.39]	1.27*** [1.16, 1.39]	1.27*** [1.16, 1.38]	1.27*** [1.16, 1.387]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.03 [0.96, 1.11]	1.03 [0.96, 1.11]	1.03 [0.96, 1.11]	1.03 [0.93, 1.14]	1.00 [0.89, 1.12]
SWD	0.79*** [0.73, 0.85]	0.79*** [0.73, 0.85]	0.79*** [0.73, 0.85]	0.79*** [0.73, 0.85]	0.71*** [0.64, 0.78]
Compulsory voting	0.71 [0.46, 1.09]	0.71 [0.46, 1.09]	0.10 [0.45, 1.08]	0.71 [0.46, 1.09]	0.71 [0.46, 1.10]
Years after democratic transition	1.22 [0.48, 3.14]	1.22 [0.48, 3.14]	1.22 [0.48, 3.13]	1.22 [0.48, 3.14]	1.25 [0.49, 3.21]
Authoritarian past	1.19 [0.17, 8.36]	1.24 [0.18, 8.71]	1.28 [0.18, 8.93]	1.19 [0.17, 8.36]	1.26 [0.18, 8.81]
Talking with close ties × Authoritarian past		0.91 [0.78, 1.07]			
Talking with weak ties × Authoritarian past			**0.82** **[0.71, 0.94]**		

Pro-attitudinal media × Authoritarian past				1.01 [0.87, 1.16]	1.04 [0.90, 1.20]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD					0.93 [0.84, 1.03]
SWD × Authoritarian past					1.19* [1.03, 1.37]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × Authoritarian past					**1.22** [1.07, 1.39]**
N	16447	16447	16447	16447	16447
Marginal R^2	.20	.20	.20	.20	.21
Conditional R^2	.35	.36	.36	.35	.36

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 2-2. Multilevel Logistic Regression Model Authoritarian Past Predicting Turnout

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)	Model 5 OR (95% CI)
Constant	6.30*** [3.62, 10.97]	6.28*** [3.61, 10.94]	6.19*** [3.54, 10.84]	6.27*** [3.60, 10.90]	6.08*** [3.53, 10.48]
Age	1.49*** [1.40, 1.58]	1.49*** [1.40, 1.58]	1.48*** [1.39, 1.58]	1.49*** [1.40, 1.58]	1.49*** [1.40, 1.58]
Education	1.07* [1.01, 1.15]	1.07* [1.01, 1.15]	1.08* [1.01, 1.15]	1.08* [1.01, 1.15]	1.08* [1.01, 1.15]
Gender	1.08** [1.02, 1.14]	1.08** [1.02, 1.14]	1.08** [1.02, 1.15]	1.08** [1.02, 1.14]	1.08** [1.02, 1.15]
Ideology	1.00 [0.95, 1.06]	1.00 [0.95, 1.06]	1.00 [0.95, 1.06]	1.00 [0.95, 1.06]	1.01 [0.96, 1.07]
Political interest	1.34*** [1.25, 1.44]	1.34*** [1.25, 1.44]	1.34*** [1.25, 1.44]	1.34*** [1.25, 1.44]	1.35*** [1.26, 1.44]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]
External Political Efficacy	1.04 [0.97, 1.11]	1.04 [0.97, 1.11]	1.04 [0.97, 1.10]	1.04 [0.97, 1.11]	1.03 [0.97, 1.10]
Talking with close ties	1.41*** [1.30, 1.52]	1.40*** [1.25, 1.56]	1.41*** [1.31, 1.53]	1.41*** [1.31, 1.52]	1.41*** [1.31, 1.53]
Talking with weak ties	0.98 [0.91, 1.05]	0.98 [0.91, 1.05]	0.90+ [0.81, 1.01]	0.98 [0.91, 1.05]	0.98 [0.91, 1.05]
News consumption	1.13*** [1.05, 1.22]	1.13*** [1.05, 1.22]	1.13*** [1.05, 1.22]	1.13*** [1.05, 1.22]	1.13*** [1.05, 1.22]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.13*** [1.07, 1.21]	1.13*** [1.07, 1.21]	1.13*** [1.07, 1.21]	1.11* [1.01, 1.23]	1.10+ [1.00, 1.22]
SWD	1.20*** [1.13, 1.27]	1.20*** [1.13, 1.27]	1.20*** [1.13, 1.27]	1.20*** [1.13, 1.27]	1.00 [0.91, 1.11]
Compulsory voting	1.06 [0.87, 1.30]	1.06 [0.87, 1.30]	1.07 [0.87, 1.31]	1.06 [0.87, 1.30]	1.07 [0.88, 1.30]
Years after democratic transition	1.33 [0.86, 2.07]	1.33 [0.86, 2.07]	1.34 [0.86, 2.08]	1.34 [0.86, 2.07]	1.34 [0.87, 2.07]
Authoritarian past	0.88 [0.36, 2.18]	0.89 [0.36, 2.19]	0.90 [0.36, 2.24]	0.89 [0.36, 2.19]	0.92 [0.38, 2.24]
Talking with close ties × Authoritarian past		1.01 [0.90, 1.15]			
Talking with weak ties × Authoritarian past			1.13+ [1.00, 1.28]		

Pro-attitudinal media × Authoritarian past				1.03 [0.91, 1.17]	1.04 [0.91, 1.18]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD					0.92+ [0.84, 1.00]
SWD × Authoritarian past					1.31*** [1.16, 1.48]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × Authoritarian past					**1.13* [1.00, 1.27]**
N	16706	16706	16706	16706	16706
Marginal R^2	.18	.18	.18	.18	.18
Conditional R^2	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 3-1. Multilevel Logistic Regression Model Authoritarian Ideology predicting Protest

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.02*** [0.00, 0.08]	0.02*** [0.00, 0.08]	0.02*** [0.00, 0.09]	0.02*** [0.01, 0.09]
Age	0.68*** [0.60, 0.76]	0.68*** [0.60, 0.76]	0.68*** [0.61, 0.77]	0.68*** [0.61, 0.77]
Education	1.21** [1.06, 1.38]	1.21** [1.06, 1.38]	1.22** [1.06, 1.39]	1.20** [1.05, 1.37]
Gender	1.02 [0.92, 1.12]	1.02 [0.92, 1.12]	1.01 [0.92, 1.12]	1.02 [0.92, 1.12]
Ideology	0.81*** [0.74, 0.88]	0.77* [0.62, 0.96]	0.75* [0.60, 0.94]	0.80* [0.65, 0.97]
Political interest	1.52*** [1.35, 1.71]	1.52*** [1.35, 1.72]	1.51*** [1.34, 1.71]	1.52*** [1.34, 1.71]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.00 [0.90, 1.12]	1.00 [0.90, 1.12]	1.00 [0.89, 1.11]	1.00 [0.90, 1.12]
External Political Efficacy	1.04 [0.94, 1.16]	1.04 [0.94, 1.16]	1.04 [0.94, 1.16]	1.04 [0.94, 1.16]
Talking with close ties	1.16* [1.01, 1.33]	1.21 [0.92, 1.58]	1.16* [1.01, 1.34]	1.18* [1.03, 1.36]
Talking with weak ties	1.20*** [1.08, 1.34]	1.20** [1.07, 1.33]	1.11 [0.88, 1.40]	1.20** [1.08, 1.34]
News consumption	1.18** [1.04, 1.33]	1.18** [1.04, 1.33]	1.18** [1.04, 1.33]	1.17* [1.03, 1.32]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.04 [0.94, 1.15]	1.04 [0.95, 1.15]	1.05 [0.95, 1.16]	0.69** [0.54, 0.90]
Compulsory voting	1.00 [0.62, 1.63]	1.00 [0.62, 1.63]	0.99 [0.61, 1.61]	0.99 [0.61, 1.62]
Years after democratic transition	0.76 [0.35, 1.62]	0.76 [0.35, 1.63]	0.76 [0.35, 1.64]	0.76 [0.35, 1.65]
SWD	0.89* [0.81, 0.98]	0.89* [0.81, 0.99]	0.89* [0.81, 0.99]	0.91+ [0.83, 1.01]
Ideology of the regime	5.21** [1.56, 17.44]	5.51** [1.63, 18.68]	5.05** [1.49, 17.11]	4.70* [1.38, 16.04]
Talking with close ties × Ideology of the regime		0.94 [0.71, 1.25]		
Ideology × Ideology of the regime		1.04 [0.82, 1.33]	1.02 [0.79, 1.30]	1.01 [0.81, 1.27]
Ideology × Talking with close ties		0.97 [0.79, 1.18]		

Ideology × Talking with close ties × Ideology of the regime		1.08 [0.86, 1.35]		
Talking with weak ties × Ideology of the regime			1.08 [0.85, 1.38]	
Ideology × Talking with weak ties			1.02 [0.86, 1.21]	
Ideology × Talking with weak ties × Ideology of the regime			1.11 [0.92, 1.34]	
Pro-attitudinal media × Ideology of the regime				1.64*** [1.24, 2.16]
Ideology × Pro-attitudinal media				1.01 [0.83, 1.24]
Ideology × Pro-attitudinal media × Ideology of the regime				1.01 [0.81, 1.25]
N	8750	8750	8750	8750
Marginal R^2	.22	.22	.22	.22
Conditional R^2	.29	.29	.29	.30

*Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3-2. Multilevel Logistic Regression Model Authoritarian Ideology predicting Turnout

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)
(Intercept)	1.80 [0.70, 4.63]	1.93 [0.74, 5.06]	1.98 [0.76, 5.18]	1.83 [0.70, 4.82]
Age	1.36*** [1.26, 1.47]	1.35*** [1.25, 1.46]	1.35*** [1.25, 1.46]	1.33*** [1.23, 1.44]
Education	1.02 [0.93, 1.12]	1.03 [0.94, 1.13]	1.03 [0.94, 1.13]	1.04 [0.94, 1.14]
Gender	1.07+ [0.99, 1.15]	1.06+ [0.99, 1.14]	1.07+ [0.99, 1.15]	1.07+ [0.99, 1.15]
Ideology	0.97 [0.91, 1.04]	1.22*** [1.09, 1.35]	1.20*** [1.08, 1.34]	1.19** [1.07, 1.33]
Political interest	1.40*** [1.28, 1.53]	1.39*** [1.27, 1.52]	1.39*** [1.27, 1.52]	1.40*** [1.28, 1.53]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.05 [0.96, 1.13]	1.05 [0.97, 1.14]	1.05 [0.97, 1.14]	1.05 [0.97, 1.14]
External Political Efficacy	1.03 [0.95, 1.12]	1.02 [0.94, 1.11]	1.03 [0.95, 1.12]	1.03 [0.95, 1.11]
Talking with close ties	1.38*** [1.25, 1.53]	1.20* [1.04, 1.38]	1.39*** [1.26, 1.53]	1.35*** [1.22, 1.49]
Talking with weak ties	1.05 [0.96, 1.14]	1.07 [0.98, 1.17]	0.94 [0.83, 1.08]	1.06 [0.96, 1.16]
News consumption	1.06 [0.97, 1.16]	1.07 [0.97, 1.17]	1.07 [0.98, 1.17]	1.08 [0.98, 1.18]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.15*** [1.06, 1.24]	1.16*** [1.07, 1.25]	1.15*** [1.06, 1.24]	1.47*** [1.27, 1.69]
Compulsory voting	0.93 [0.67, 1.29]	0.96 [0.69, 1.34]	0.96 [0.69, 1.34]	0.98 [0.70, 1.37]
Years after democratic transition	0.89 [0.53, 1.50]	0.90 [0.53, 1.53]	0.90 [0.53, 1.52]	0.89 [0.53, 1.52]
SWD	1.32*** [1.23, 1.43]	1.31*** [1.22, 1.42]	1.32*** [1.22, 1.43]	1.29*** [1.20, 1.40]
Ideology of the regime	2.82* [1.27, 6.29]	2.74* [1.21, 6.21]	2.65* [1.17, 6.00]	2.84* [1.25, 6.45]
Talking with close ties × Ideology of the regime		1.24** [1.05, 1.45]		
Ideology × Ideology of the regime		0.68*** [0.59, 0.78]	0.68*** [0.59, 0.79]	0.71*** [0.62, 0.82]
Ideology × Talking with close ties		1.04 [0.94, 1.15]		

Ideology × Talking with close ties × Ideology of the regime		1.00 [0.88, 1.15]		
Talking with weak ties × Ideology of the regime			1.20* [1.02, 1.40]	
Ideology × Talking with weak ties			1.04 [0.95, 1.15]	
Ideology × Talking with weak ties × Ideology of the regime			1.00 [0.88, 1.13]	
Pro-attitudinal media × Ideology of the regime				0.72*** [0.61, 0.86]
Ideology × Pro-attitudinal media				1.12+ [0.99, 1.26]
Ideology × Pro-attitudinal media × Ideology of the regime				0.85* [0.74, 0.98]
N	8955	8955	8955	8955
Marginal R^2	.18	.19	.19	.19
Conditional R^2	.21	.23	.23	.22

*Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4-1. Logistic Regression Predicting Protest Using Chile Data

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)	Model 5 OR (95% CI)
(Intercept)	0.01*** [0.00, 0.04]	0.01*** [0.00, 0.04]	0.02*** [0.00, 0.05]	0.01*** [0.00, 0.04]	0.01*** [0.00, 0.04]
Education	0.94 [0.76, 1.18]	0.94 [0.76, 1.18]	0.94 [0.76, 1.18]	0.94 [0.76, 1.19]	0.94 [0.76, 1.18]
Gender	1.11 [0.92, 1.33]	1.11 [0.92, 1.34]	1.10 [0.92, 1.33]	1.11 [0.93, 1.34]	1.11 [0.92, 1.33]
Ideology	0.58*** [0.47, 0.71]	0.58*** [0.47, 0.70]	0.58*** [0.47, 0.70]	0.57*** [0.47, 0.70]	0.57*** [0.47, 0.70]
Political interest	1.41** [1.12, 1.76]	1.40** [1.11, 1.75]	1.41** [1.12, 1.76]	1.41** [1.13, 1.77]	1.39** [1.11, 1.74]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.01 [0.82, 1.24]	1.01 [0.82, 1.25]	1.01 [0.82, 1.24]	1.02 [0.83, 1.25]	1.02 [0.83, 1.25]
External Political Efficacy	0.91 [0.73, 1.13]	0.92 [0.73, 1.14]	0.92 [0.73, 1.14]	0.90 [0.72, 1.12]	0.91 [0.73, 1.13]
Talking with close ties	1.19 [0.94, 1.52]	1.20 [0.94, 1.52]	1.13 [0.32, 4.41]	1.17 [0.92, 1.49]	1.19 [0.94, 1.52]
Talking with weak ties	1.11 [0.93, 1.31]	1.11 [0.93, 1.31]	1.11 [0.94, 1.32]	1.96 [0.76, 4.73]	1.10 [0.92, 1.31]
News consumption	1.32** [1.07, 1.62]	1.33** [1.08, 1.63]	1.33** [1.08, 1.64]	1.34** [1.09, 1.64]	1.34** [1.09, 1.64]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.24* [1.02, 1.51]	2.03 [0.64, 6.31]	1.24* [1.02, 1.50]	1.24* [1.02, 1.50]	2.06 [0.65, 6.53]
SWD	0.85+ [0.70, 1.03]	0.85+ [0.70, 1.02]	0.86 [0.71, 1.04]	0.85+ [0.70, 1.03]	1.04 [0.29, 3.94]
Survey year (2021)	2.36*** [1.60, 3.51]	2.36*** [1.60, 3.52]	2.39*** [1.61, 3.57]	2.40*** [1.62, 3.57]	2.38*** [1.61, 3.54]
cohort (1953-1970)	1.96	2.55	1.85	2.05	2.64

	[0.64, 8.60]	[0.72, 16.69]	[0.54, 10.46]	[0.55, 13.23]	[0.74, 18.21]
cohort (1971-1988)	3.18+ [1.07, 13.72]	3.97+ [1.16, 25.70]	3.44+ [1.07, 18.96]	4.18+ [1.21, 26.12]	4.09+ [1.18, 27.92]
cohort (1989-2003)	7.06** [2.46, 29.98]	8.81** [2.66, 56.26]	6.47** [2.06, 35.30]	9.65** [2.91, 59.41]	9.11** [2.71, 61.38]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1953-1970)		0.48 [0.14, 1.65]			0.47 [0.14, 1.63]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1971-1988)		0.62 [0.19, 2.05]			0.62 [0.19, 2.03]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1989-2003)		0.64 [0.20, 2.06]			0.63 [0.19, 2.05]
Talking with close ties × cohort (1953-1970)			1.12 [0.27, 4.26]		
Talking with close ties × cohort (1971-1988)			0.88 [0.22, 3.22]		
Talking with close ties × cohort (1989-2003)			1.16 [0.29, 4.22]		
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1953-1970)				0.76 [0.30, 2.02]	
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1971-1988)				0.56 [0.22, 1.48]	
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1989-2003)				0.50 [0.20, 1.29]	
SWD × cohort (1953-1970)					0.84 [0.21, 3.14]
SWD × cohort (1971-1988)					0.88 [0.22, 3.24]
SWD × cohort (1989-2003)					0.77 [0.20, 2.78]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD					0.72

					[0.26, 2.05]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1953-1970)					1.44 [0.46, 4.36]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1971-1988)					1.60 [0.54, 4.62]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1989-2003)					1.35 [0.46, 3.84]
N	1380	1380	1380	1380	1380
Log Likelihood	-404.370	-403.438	-403.482	-401.405	-402.505
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.16	.16	.16	.17	.17

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4-2. Logistic Regression Predicting Turnout Using Chile Data

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)	Model 5 OR (95% CI)
Constant	2.68*** [1.64, 4.50]	2.69*** [1.64, 4.54]	2.68*** [1.64, 4.55]	2.79*** [1.67, 4.94]	2.91*** [1.75, 5.03]
Education	1.05 [0.92, 1.19]	1.04 [0.91, 1.19]	1.05 [0.92, 1.19]	1.04 [0.91, 1.19]	1.04 [0.91, 1.19]
Gender	0.99 [0.88, 1.12]	1.00 [0.88, 1.13]	0.99 [0.88, 1.12]	1.00 [0.88, 1.13]	1.00 [0.88, 1.13]
Ideology	0.96 [0.85, 1.10]	0.96 [0.84, 1.09]	0.97 [0.85, 1.10]	0.96 [0.85, 1.10]	0.95 [0.84, 1.09]
Political interest	1.77*** [1.52, 2.07]	1.77*** [1.52, 2.07]	1.76*** [1.51, 2.06]	1.77*** [1.52, 2.07]	1.78*** [1.52, 2.08]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.11 [0.96, 1.29]	1.13 [0.97, 1.30]	1.11 [0.96, 1.28]	1.12 [0.97, 1.29]	1.12 [0.97, 1.30]
External Political Efficacy	0.91 [0.78, 1.05]	0.90 [0.78, 1.05]	0.91 [0.78, 1.06]	0.91 [0.78, 1.05]	0.90 [0.78, 1.05]
Talking with close ties	1.37*** [1.16, 1.61]	1.36*** [1.16, 1.61]	1.38 [0.81, 2.48]	1.36*** [1.16, 1.61]	1.37*** [1.16, 1.62]
Talking with weak ties	0.88+ [0.77, 1.02]	0.89+ [0.77, 1.02]	0.89+ [0.77, 1.02]	1.03 [0.57, 2.24]	0.88+ [0.76, 1.01]
News consumption	1.30*** [1.12, 1.50]	1.30*** [1.12, 1.51]	1.30*** [1.12, 1.51]	1.30*** [1.12, 1.50]	1.30*** [1.12, 1.50]

Pro-attitudinal media	0.88+	0.96	0.88+	0.88+	1.07
	[0.78, 1.01]	[0.60, 1.58]	[0.77, 1.00]	[0.77, 1.01]	[0.66, 1.85]
SWD	1.12+	1.12+	1.12+	1.11	0.93
	[0.98, 1.27]	[0.99, 1.28]	[0.98, 1.27]	[0.98, 1.27]	[0.57, 1.52]
Survey year (2021)	1.15	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.14
	[0.88, 1.49]	[0.88, 1.48]	[0.88, 1.48]	[0.88, 1.48]	[0.87, 1.48]
cohort (1953-1970)	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.79	0.77
	[0.46, 1.39]	[0.46, 1.39]	[0.46, 1.39]	[0.43, 1.39]	[0.43, 1.34]
cohort (1971-1988)	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.73	0.72
	[0.44, 1.31]	[0.44, 1.31]	[0.44, 1.31]	[0.40, 1.28]	[0.40, 1.25]
cohort (1989-2003)	0.63+	0.63+	0.62+	0.61+	0.59+
	[0.36, 1.07]	[0.36, 1.07]	[0.35, 1.06]	[0.33, 1.05]	[0.33, 1.01]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1953-1970)		0.90			0.82
		[0.52, 1.53]			[0.45, 1.41]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1971-1988)		1.08			0.98
		[0.63, 1.80]			[0.55, 1.67]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1989-2003)		0.79			0.71
		[0.46, 1.31]			[0.40, 1.21]
Talking with close ties × cohort (1953-1970)			0.94		
			[0.50, 1.69]		
Talking with close ties × cohort (1971-1988)			0.93		
			[0.50, 1.64]		
Talking with close ties × cohort (1989-2003)			1.09		
			[0.59, 1.92]		
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1953-1970)				0.78	
				[0.35, 1.46]	
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1971-1988)				0.93	
				[0.42, 1.75]	
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1989-2003)				0.84	
				[0.38, 1.57]	
SWD × cohort (1953-1970)					1.46
					[0.85, 2.53]
SWD × cohort (1971-1988)					1.20
					[0.70, 2.06]

SWD × cohort (1989-2003)					1.07 [0.63, 1.82]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD					0.65+ [0.40, 1.03]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1953-1970)					1.57+ [0.93, 2.73]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1971-1988)					1.72* [1.03, 2.95]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1989-2003)					1.50 [0.90, 2.56]
N	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373
Log Likelihood	-765.216	-763.020	-764.613	-764.442	-758.634
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14

*Note: +p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 5-1. Logistic Regression Predicting Protest Using Ukraine Data

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)	Model 5 OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.02***
	[0.00, 0.07]	[0.00, 0.08]	[0.00, 0.06]	[0.00, 0.06]	[0.00, 0.09]
Education	2.04**	2.17**	2.10**	2.18**	2.19**
	[1.24, 3.57]	[1.31, 3.82]	[1.27, 3.69]	[1.32, 3.84]	[1.31, 3.93]
Gender	0.87	0.86	0.83	0.89	0.86
	[0.55, 1.36]	[0.54, 1.34]	[0.52, 1.31]	[0.56, 1.39]	[0.54, 1.35]
Ideology	1.23	1.16	1.25	1.20	1.16
	[0.78, 1.92]	[0.73, 1.83]	[0.79, 1.99]	[0.76, 1.91]	[0.73, 1.84]
Political interest	0.83	0.78	0.82	0.78	0.79
	[0.47, 1.48]	[0.43, 1.42]	[0.46, 1.47]	[0.43, 1.39]	[0.43, 1.45]
Internal Political Efficacy	0.70	0.72	0.69	0.70	0.72
	[0.41, 1.16]	[0.42, 1.20]	[0.40, 1.15]	[0.41, 1.17]	[0.42, 1.21]
External Political Efficacy	1.53	1.65+	1.53	1.63+	1.64+
	[0.90, 2.54]	[0.97, 2.75]	[0.89, 2.57]	[0.95, 2.73]	[0.95, 2.75]
Talking with close ties	0.68	0.71	0.29	0.65	0.73
	[0.38, 1.21]	[0.40, 1.26]	[0.05, 1.75]	[0.36, 1.17]	[0.41, 1.30]
Talking with weak ties	1.28	1.25	1.29	0.20	1.24
	[0.73, 2.28]	[0.73, 2.20]	[0.74, 2.31]	[0.01, 1.15]	[0.72, 2.20]
News consumption	2.08**	2.17**	2.07**	2.10**	2.17**
	[1.32, 3.33]	[1.37, 3.49]	[1.31, 3.32]	[1.33, 3.39]	[1.36, 3.54]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.19	0.35	1.23	1.31	0.42
	[0.76, 1.85]	[0.05, 1.35]	[0.78, 1.93]	[0.82, 2.06]	[0.03, 2.65]
SWD	1.01	1.08	1.02	1.07	0.78
	[0.63, 1.66]	[0.67, 1.79]	[0.63, 1.68]	[0.66, 1.76]	[0.08, 4.05]
cohort (1949-1971)	0.37	0.34	0.41	0.41	0.23
	[0.07, 2.83]	[0.06, 4.16]	[0.08, 3.76]	[0.05, 10.23]	[0.03, 4.40]
cohort (1972-1992)	0.87	0.71	0.91	1.03	0.69
	[0.21, 6.02]	[0.16, 8.32]	[0.21, 7.69]	[0.20, 23.98]	[0.13, 12.11]
cohort (1993-1999)	0.65	0.44	0.76	0.77	0.33
	[0.07, 6.05]	[0.03, 7.09]	[0.08, 8.20]	[0.07, 21.04]	[0.00, 9.03]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1949-1971)		2.71			1.47
		[0.47, 25.24]			[0.15, 24.80]

Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1972-1992)	4.17 [0.94, 33.19]			3.12 [0.43, 44.78]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1993-1999)	5.92+ [0.92, 65.15]			5.46 [0.41, 133.87]
Talking with close ties × cohort (1949-1971)		1.72 [0.24, 12.26]		
Talking with close ties × cohort (1972-1992)		2.78 [0.43, 17.41]		
Talking with close ties × cohort (1993-1999)		3.77 [0.34, 52.83]		
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1949-1971)			8.85* [1.25, 143.65]	
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1972-1992)			7.63* [1.23, 115.97]	
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1993-1999)			4.77 [0.45, 88.26]	
SWD × cohort (1949-1971)				2.07 [0.31, 25.21]
SWD × cohort (1972-1992)				1.14 [0.20, 12.35]
SWD × cohort (1993-1999)				1.87 [0.17, 39.35]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD				0.83 [0.14, 5.52]

Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1949-1971)					2.41 [0.30, 18.04]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1972-1992)					1.56 [0.21, 10.61]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1993-1999)					1.06 [0.12, 9.23]
N	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150
Log Likelihood	-93.469	-91.251	-92.446	-90.774	-89.542
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.14	.16	.15	.17	.18

*Note: +p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 5-2. Logistic Regression Predicting Turnout Using Ukraine Data

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)	Model 5 OR (95% CI)
Constant	3.53*** [2.01, 6.59]	3.67*** [2.07, 6.98]	3.53*** [2.01, 6.61]	4.19*** [2.26, 8.57]	6.43*** [2.93, 17.38]
Education	0.86+ [0.73, 1.01]	0.87+ [0.74, 1.02]	0.86+ [0.73, 1.01]	0.86+ [0.73, 1.01]	0.89 [0.75, 1.05]
Gender	1.13 [0.97, 1.31]	1.12 [0.96, 1.30]	1.13 [0.97, 1.31]	1.13 [0.97, 1.31]	1.12 [0.97, 1.31]
Ideology	1.00 [0.86, 1.17]	1.00 [0.85, 1.16]	1.00 [0.85, 1.16]	1.00 [0.85, 1.17]	0.99 [0.84, 1.15]
Political interest	1.22* [1.00, 1.49]	1.21+ [0.99, 1.47]	1.24* [1.01, 1.51]	1.22* [1.00, 1.49]	1.20+ [0.98, 1.47]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.15 [0.97, 1.36]	1.15+ [0.98, 1.37]	1.15 [0.97, 1.36]	1.15+ [0.97, 1.36]	1.14 [0.96, 1.35]
External Political Efficacy	0.95 [0.79, 1.15]	0.96 [0.80, 1.16]	0.96 [0.80, 1.16]	0.96 [0.80, 1.15]	0.97 [0.80, 1.17]
Talking with close ties	1.47*** [1.21, 1.79]	1.47*** [1.21, 1.79]	1.51 [0.82, 2.87]	1.47*** [1.21, 1.79]	1.45*** [1.19, 1.77]
Talking with weak ties	0.97 [0.80, 1.18]	0.97 [0.80, 1.18]	0.97 [0.80, 1.18]	0.60+ [0.32, 1.08]	0.98 [0.81, 1.20]
News consumption	1.08 [0.92, 1.28]	1.08 [0.92, 1.28]	1.08 [0.92, 1.28]	1.07 [0.91, 1.27]	1.09 [0.93, 1.30]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.06 [0.91, 1.24]	0.78 [0.46, 1.33]	1.06 [0.91, 1.23]	1.06 [0.91, 1.24]	2.33 [0.83, 8.85]
SWD	0.84* [0.71, 0.99]	0.84* [0.72, 0.99]	0.84* [0.71, 0.98]	0.84* [0.71, 0.98]	0.40* [0.17, 0.83]
cohort (1949-1971)	1.38 [0.71, 2.56]	1.33 [0.68, 2.49]	1.39 [0.71, 2.57]	1.16 [0.55, 2.26]	0.77 [0.28, 1.75]
cohort (1972-1992)	0.85 [0.44, 1.56]	0.82 [0.42, 1.52]	0.84 [0.43, 1.53]	0.72 [0.34, 1.39]	0.46+ [0.17, 1.04]
cohort (1993-1999)	1.23 [0.57, 2.59]	1.20 [0.55, 2.56]	1.39 [0.62, 3.14]	1.12 [0.47, 2.59]	0.68 [0.22, 1.77]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1949-1971)		1.29 [0.72, 2.34]			0.44 [0.11, 1.27]

Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1972-1992)	1.43 [0.80, 2.55]			0.48 [0.12, 1.37]
Pro-attitudinal media × cohort (1993-1999)	1.57 [0.81, 3.07]			0.55 [0.14, 1.70]
Talking with close ties × cohort (1949-1971)		1.13 [0.57, 2.20]		
Talking with close ties × cohort (1972-1992)		0.83 [0.43, 1.58]		
Talking with close ties × cohort (1993-1999)		1.25 [0.56, 2.83]		
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1949-1971)			1.79+ [0.94, 3.48]	
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1972-1992)			1.59 [0.85, 3.06]	
Talking with weak ties × cohort (1993-1999)			1.90 [0.87, 4.31]	
SWD × cohort (1949-1971)				1.99+ [0.92, 4.75]
SWD × cohort (1972-1992)				2.29* [1.08, 5.42]
SWD × cohort (1993-1999)				2.23+ [0.92, 5.80]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD				0.46+ [0.19, 0.93]

Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1949-1971)					2.04+ [0.96, 5.20]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1972-1992)					2.30* [1.09, 5.82]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × cohort (1993-1999)					1.89 [0.84, 4.97]
N	1159	1159	1159	1159	1159
Log Likelihood	-548.916	-547.854	-546.778	-547.169	-542.597
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	.07	.07	.07	.07	.08

*Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 1-1. Interaction plot of Authoritarian past and Talking with weak ties predicting Protest



Figure 1-2. Three-way Interaction plot of Authoritarian past, Pro-attitudinal media, and Democratic satisfaction predicting Protest



Figure 2. Three-way Interaction plot of Authoritarian past, Pro-attitudinal media, and Democratic satisfaction predicting Turnout.



Figure 3. Three-way Interaction Plot of Authoritarian Ideology, Pro-attitudinal media, and Ideology predicting Turnout



Figure 4-1. Three-way Interaction plot of Cohort, Pro-attitudinal media, and Satisfaction with Democracy predicting Turnout in Chile



Note. The interaction plot provides a visualization of interactions between pro-attitudinal media use and four cohorts in Chile. Cohorts are classified by birth years: 1924-1952, 1953-1970, 1971-1988, and 1989-2003.

Figure 4-2. Interaction plot of Cohort and Talking with Weak Ties predicting Protest in Ukraine



Note. The interaction plot provides a visualization of interactions between political talk with weak ties and four cohorts in Ukraine. Cohorts are classified by birth years: 1928–1948, 1949–1971, 1972–1992, and 1993–1999.

Figure 4-3. Three-way Interaction plot of Cohort, Pro-attitudinal media, and Satisfaction with Democracy predicting Turnout in Ukraine



Note. The interaction plot provides a visualization of interactions between pro-attitudinal media use and four cohorts in Ukraine. Cohorts are classified by birth years: 1928–1948, 1949–1971, 1972–1992, and 1993–1999

Cultural Dimensions and Political Participation

The ICC of the baseline protesting model (Model 1 in Table 6-1) was 0.15 and the ICC of baseline turnout model (Model 1 in Table 6-2) was 0.05. This indicates that a large proportion of the variance is due to variance within countries, though cross-country variance contribute to political participation.

Individualism-Collectivism. H4 posited that talking with close ties would have a greater effect on political participation in collectivistic cultures. It was supported in the protest model (OR = 0.88, 95% CI [0.79, 0.97], p = .009) but not in turnout model (OR = 0.99, 95% CI [0.91, 1.07], p = .735). Figure 5-1 displays the clear distinction between individualistic and collectivistic cultures; more talking politics with families and friends leads to greater mobilization in protesting in collectivistic cultures compared to individualistic cultures.

H5 postulated that the selective exposure hypothesis would prevail in the IDV dimension. This was not supported in the protest model (OR = 0.96, 95% CI [0.87, 1.05], p = .342) or the turnout model (OR = 1.01, 95% CI [0.93, 1.09], p = .808).

Uncertainty Avoidance. H6 posited that talking with close ties would have a greater effect on political participation in countries with high UAI cultures. The interaction was significant in the protest model (OR = 0.88, 95% CI [0.79, .99], p = .033) but not in turnout (OR = 1.04, 95% CI [0.92, 1.17], p = .543). However, Figure 5-1 shows that the relationships between UAI and political talk are reversed from the hypothesis. Citizens in high UAI cultures were not influenced by political discourses with family and friends, whereas people living in low UAI cultures were mobilized for protesting by talking with close ties.

H7 postulated that high UAI cultures would be more susceptible to the mobilization effects of pro-attitudinal media. The interaction between UAI and pro-attitudinal media was

significant in the protest model (OR = 0.82, 95% CI [0.74, 0.91], p < .001) but not in turnout (OR = 1.00, 95% CI [0.89, 1.13], p = .962). Similar to its relationship with talking with close ties, as shown in Figure 5-2, people in high UAI countries were less prone to participate in protesting when they were exposed to pro-attitudinal media sources. Therefore, H7 is rejected because of the opposite findings.

Power Distance. RQ4 asked whether talking with close ties has any meaningful effects on political participation. The results show that the interaction (talking with close ties X PDI) was not significant in the protest model (OR = 0.98, 95% CI [0.83, 1.15], p = .795) or turnout model (OR = 0.92, 95% CI [0.82, 1.03], p = .138).

H8 proposed that citizens who use pro-attitudinal media in PDI cultures are likely to participate in politics more. The interaction between PDI and pro-attitudinal media was not significant in the protest model (OR = 1.04, 95% CI [0.89, 1.22], p= .585) or in the turnout one (OR = 1.09, 95% CI [0.97, 1.23], p = .134). Therefore, H8 is rejected.

Three-way interactions. RQ5 examined three-way interactions (pro-attitudinal media use X cultural dimensions X SWD). To start from the protest model, the three-way interactions were significant with IDV (OR = 0.90, 95% CI [0.83, 0.98], p = .018) and PDI (OR = 0.86, 95% CI [0.75, 1.00], p = .049). However, three-way interactions (pro-attitudinal media X UAI X SWD) were not significant (OR = 1.04, 95% CI [0.94, 1.15], p = .465). Figure 5-4 illustrates the three-way interactions among pro-attitudinal media use, IDV, and SWD. The plot shows that exposure to pro-attitudinal media did not have varying effects on protesting depending on SWD in individualistic cultures. On the other hand, highly satisfied citizens were mobilized by pro-attitudinal media, while less satisfied citizens were demobilized for protesting in collectivistic cultures.

Another significant three-way interaction involving pro-attitudinal media, PDI, and SWD is displayed in the right panel in Figure 5-4. People who were less satisfied with democracy in countries with high PDI had a higher likelihood of participating in protests when exposed to media that align with their viewpoints. However, in countries with low PDI, more satisfied citizens tended to protest more when they consume pro-attitudinal media frequently. On the other hand, none of the three-way interactions reach significance in the voting model, including IDV (OR = 0.93, 95% CI [0.86, 1.01], p =.078), UAI (OR = 1.10, 95% CI [0.98, 1.23], p =.099), and PDI (OR =0 .93, 95% CI [0.83, 1.04], p =.232).

Cultural Dimensions, Authoritarian Past, and Political Participation

R6 explored the potential link between Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. To investigate this, we conducted multi-level models with random intercepts. However, the model failed to converge, likely due to the increased number of parameters making the model too complex for the data. Despite this, the models are included in the Supplemental Materials. The interpretation should be cautious, and future studies should take into account for alternative modeling

Table 6-1. Multilevel Logistic Regression Model Cultural Dimensions predicting Protest

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)	Model 5 OR (95% CI)
Constant	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	[0.06, 0.13]	[0.06, 0.13]	[0.06, 0.13]	[0.06, 0.12]	[0.05, 0.12]
Age	0.60***	0.60***	0.61***	0.60***	0.61***
	[0.55, 0.65]	[0.56, 0.65]	[0.56, 0.66]	[0.56, 0.65]	[0.56, 0.66]
Education	1.10*	1.11*	1.10*	1.10*	1.09*
	[1.02, 1.19]	[1.02, 1.20]	[1.01, 1.19]	[1.02, 1.20]	[1.01, 1.19]
Gender	1.02	1.02	1.01	1.02	1.02
	[0.95, 1.09]	[0.95, 1.09]	[0.95, 1.09]	[0.95, 1.09]	[0.95, 1.09]
Ideology	0.83***	0.83***	0.82***	0.83***	0.81***
	[0.78, 0.88]	[0.77, 0.88]	[0.77, 0.87]	[0.78, 0.89]	[0.76, 0.87]
Political interest	1.39***	1.38***	1.40***	1.38***	1.36***
	[1.27, 1.52]	[1.26, 1.51]	[1.28, 1.53]	[1.26, 1.50]	[1.25, 1.49]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99
	[0.92, 1.08]	[0.92, 1.08]	[0.93, 1.09]	[0.92, 1.08]	[0.92, 1.08]
External Political Efficacy	1.13**	1.13**	1.13**	1.13**	1.11**
	[1.05, 1.22]	[1.05, 1.21]	[1.05, 1.22]	[1.04, 1.21]	[1.03, 1.20]
Talking with close ties	1.16**	1.14*	1.17**	1.16**	1.15**
	[1.05, 1.28]	[1.03, 1.26]	[1.06, 1.29]	[1.05, 1.28]	[1.04, 1.26]
Talking with weak ties	1.34***	1.34***	1.41***	1.34***	1.36***
	[1.24, 1.45]	[1.23, 1.45]	[1.29, 1.53]	[1.23, 1.45]	[1.26, 1.48]
News consumption	1.27***	1.27***	1.25***	1.27***	1.26***
	[1.16, 1.38]	[1.16, 1.38]	[1.15, 1.37]	[1.17, 1.39]	[1.16, 1.38]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.03	1.03	1.04	1.01	1.01
	[0.96, 1.11]	[0.96, 1.10]	[0.96, 1.11]	[0.94, 1.09]	[0.93, 1.09]
SWD	0.79***	0.79***	0.79***	0.79***	0.84***
	[0.73, 0.85]	[0.73, 0.85]	[0.74, 0.85]	[0.74, 0.85]	[0.78, 0.91]
Compulsory voting	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.78
	[0.53, 1.13]	[0.53, 1.13]	[0.54, 1.12]	[0.55, 1.12]	[0.54, 1.13]
PDI	0.68	0.70	0.74	0.67	0.65
	[0.35, 1.33]	[0.35, 1.38]	[0.39, 1.43]	[0.35, 1.26]	[0.34, 1.26]
IDV	0.68	0.72	0.68	0.70	0.72
	[0.42, 1.12]	[0.44, 1.18]	[0.42, 1.10]	[0.44, 1.12]	[0.45, 1.17]
UAI	0.74	0.76	0.72	0.79	0.82
	[0.44, 1.24]	[0.45, 1.28]	[0.44, 1.19]	[0.48, 1.28]	[0.50, 1.36]
Talking with close ties × PDI		0.98 [0.83, 1.15]			
Talking with close ties × IDV		0.88**			

		[0.79, 0.97]			
Talking with close ties × UAI		0.88* [0.79, 0.99]			
Talking with weak ties × PDI			0.83** [0.72, 0.95]		
Talking with weak ties × IDV			1.06 [0.97, 1.16]		
Talking with weak ties × UAI			1.06 [0.97, 1.16]		
Pro-attitudinal media × PDI				1.04 [0.89, 1.22]	1.09 [0.92, 1.28]
Pro-attitudinal media × IDV				0.96 [0.87, 1.05]	0.98 [0.89, 1.08]
Pro-attitudinal media × UAI				0.82*** [0.74, 0.91]	0.82*** [0.74, 0.92]
SWD × PDI					0.74*** [0.63, 0.87]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD					1.11** [1.03, 1.19]
SWD × IDV					1.04 [0.95, 1.14]
SWD × UAI					1.34*** [1.21, 1.50]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × PDI					0.86* [0.75, 1.00]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × IDV					0.90* [0.83, 0.98]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × UAI					1.04 [0.94, 1.15]
N	16447	16447	16447	16447	16447
Marginal R^2	.23	.23	.25	.24	.24
Conditional R^2	.35	.34	.35	.34	.35

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 6-2. Multilevel Logistic Regression Model Cultural Dimensions Predicting Turnout

	Model 1 OR (95% CI)	Model 2 OR (95% CI)	Model 3 OR (95% CI)	Model 4 OR (95% CI)	Model 5 OR (95% CI)
Constant	6.07*** [4.78, 7.70]	6.13*** [4.84, 7.77]	6.10*** [4.80, 7.75]	5.97*** [4.68, 7.61]	6.08*** [4.78, 7.73]
Age	1.49*** [1.40, 1.58]	1.49*** [1.40, 1.59]	1.49*** [1.40, 1.59]	1.49*** [1.39, 1.58]	1.50*** [1.40, 1.59]
Education	1.08* [1.01, 1.15]	1.07* [1.01, 1.15]	1.08* [1.01, 1.15]	1.08* [1.01, 1.15]	1.09* [1.02, 1.16]
Gender	1.08** [1.02, 1.15]	1.08** [1.02, 1.15]	1.08** [1.02, 1.15]	1.08** [1.02, 1.15]	1.08** [1.02, 1.15]
Ideology	1.00 [0.95, 1.06]	1.00 [0.95, 1.06]	1.00 [0.95, 1.06]	1.00 [0.95, 1.06]	0.99 [0.94, 1.05]
Political interest	1.34*** [1.25, 1.44]	1.34*** [1.25, 1.43]	1.34*** [1.25, 1.43]	1.35*** [1.26, 1.45]	1.35*** [1.26, 1.44]
Internal Political Efficacy	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]	1.02 [0.96, 1.09]	1.02 [0.95, 1.09]
External Political Efficacy	1.04 [0.97, 1.11]	1.04 [0.97, 1.11]	1.04 [0.97, 1.10]	1.04 [0.97, 1.11]	1.04 [0.97, 1.11]
Talking with close ties	1.41*** [1.30, 1.52]	1.43*** [1.32, 1.55]	1.41*** [1.30, 1.52]	1.41*** [1.31, 1.52]	1.41*** [1.31, 1.53]
Talking with weak ties	0.98 [0.91, 1.06]	0.99 [0.92, 1.07]	0.99 [0.91, 1.07]	0.98 [0.91, 1.05]	0.98 [0.91, 1.05]
News consumption	1.13*** [1.05, 1.22]	1.13** [1.05, 1.21]	1.13*** [1.05, 1.22]	1.14*** [1.06, 1.22]	1.15*** [1.06, 1.23]
Pro-attitudinal media	1.14*** [1.07, 1.21]	1.13*** [1.07, 1.21]	1.13*** [1.07, 1.21]	1.10** [1.02, 1.18]	1.10** [1.03, 1.18]
SWD	1.20*** [1.13, 1.27]	1.20*** [1.13, 1.27]	1.20*** [1.13, 1.27]	1.19*** [1.12, 1.27]	1.13*** [1.05, 1.21]
Compulsory voting	1.23+ [1.00, 1.52]	1.23+ [1.00, 1.52]	1.23+ [0.99, 1.51]	1.23+ [1.00, 1.53]	1.24+ [1.00, 1.53]
PDI	0.78 [0.54, 1.14]	0.77 [0.53, 1.12]	0.78 [0.53, 1.14]	0.79 [0.54, 1.15]	0.77 [0.52, 1.12]
IDV	1.12 [0.85, 1.47]	1.12 [0.85, 1.47]	1.11 [0.84, 1.47]	1.11 [0.83, 1.46]	1.12 [0.85, 1.47]
UAI	0.94 [0.70, 1.27]	0.95 [0.70, 1.28]	0.96 [0.71, 1.29]	0.94 [0.70, 1.28]	0.97 [0.72, 1.32]
Talking with close ties × PDI		0.92 [0.82, 1.03]			

Talking with close ties × IDV		0.99 [0.91, 1.07]			
Talking with close ties × UAI		1.04 [0.92, 1.17]			
Talking with weak ties × PDI			0.86** [0.77, 0.96]		
Talking with weak ties × IDV			0.93+ [0.86, 1.01]		
Talking with weak ties × UAI			1.12+ [1.00, 1.27]		
Pro-attitudinal media × PDI				1.09 [0.97, 1.23]	1.07 [0.95, 1.20]
Pro-attitudinal media × IDV				1.01 [0.93, 1.09]	1.01 [0.93, 1.10]
Pro-attitudinal media × UAI				1.00 [0.89, 1.13]	1.02 [0.90, 1.15]
SWD × PDI					0.93 [0.83, 1.04]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD					0.98 [0.91, 1.04]
SWD × IDV					0.95 [0.87, 1.02]
SWD × UAI					1.24*** [1.12, 1.38]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × PDI					0.93 [0.83, 1.04]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × IDV					0.93+ [0.86, 1.01]
Pro-attitudinal media × SWD × UAI					1.10+ [0.98, 1.23]
N	16706	16706	16706	16706	16706
Marginal R^2	.19	.19	.19	.18	.19
Conditional R^2	.23	.23	.23	.22	.23

*Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Figure 5-1. Interaction plot of Cultural dimensions and Talking with Close ties predicting protest



Figure 5-2. Interaction Plot of Cultural dimensions and Pro-attitudinal media use predicting protest



Figure 5-3. Interaction Plot of Cultural dimensions and Talking with Weak ties predicting protest



Figure 5-4. Three-way interaction plot of Cultural dimensions, Pro-attitudinal media, and Satisfaction with Democracy predicting Protest



Figure 6-1. Interaction Plot of Cultural dimensions and Talking with weak ties predicting Turnout



Table 7. Summary of Hypothesis, Research Questions, and Findings

Hypothesis & Research Questions	Summary
CH 1. Authoritarian Past	
H1: The effects of discussing politics with strong ties on political participation will be greater in post-authoritarian countries.	Not supported
H2: The effects of discussing politics with weak ties on political participation will be smaller in post-authoritarian countries.	**Supported for protesting model**
H3: The effects of pro-attitudinal media on political participation will be greater in post-authoritarian countries.	Not supported
RQ1: What will be the relationship between pro-attitudinal media, satisfaction with democracy, and the Authoritarian past on political participation?	**Supported for protesting and voting models**
RQ2: Will the effects of partisan media on political participation vary by the congruence of partisan media with authoritarian regimes of the past?	**Significant**
RQ3: Will the effects of (a) political discussion and (b) media use on political participation vary by generation in post-authoritarian countries?	Not significant
CH 2. Cultural dimensions	

H4: The effects of discussing politics with strong ties people on political participation will be greater in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic cultures.	**Supported for protesting models**
H5: The effects of exposure to pro-attitudinal media sources on political participation will be greater in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic cultures	Not supported
H6: The effects on political participation of discussing politics with strong ties will be greater in high uncertainty-avoidance cultures.	Not supported
H7: The effects on political participation of exposure to pro-attitudinal media will be greater in high uncertainty avoidance cultures.	Not supported
RQ4: Will the effects of discussing politics with strong ties on political participation vary by country-level power distance?	Not significant
H8: The effects on political participation of exposure to pro-attitudinal media sources will be greater in cultures with high power distance.	Not supported
RQ5: What will be the relationship between pro-attitudinal media, satisfaction with democracy, and cultural dimensions on political participation?	**Significant**

Authoritarian Past and Cultural Dimensions

RQ6: Will there be the relationship between cultural dimensions including (a) individualism-collectivism, (b) uncertainty avoidance, and (c) power distance, with an authoritarian past, on political participation.	**Inconclusive**

Discussion

The current paper examined two big themes using one dataset. In the discussion, the findings and their implications will be elaborated by chapter.

Discussion on Chapter 1 findings

Chapter 1 deals with the impact of political discussion and pro-attitudinal media on political participation, considering the collective memories of the authoritarian past. The findings suggest that discussing politics with intimate individuals and exposure to media aligned with one's viewpoint do not interact with an authoritarian past. However, discussing politics with weak ties does interact with such a past. Countries with an authoritarian past show a minimal effect of weak ties compared to countries with established democracies. These findings correspond to previous literature, which suggests that citizens in post-authoritarian countries tend to avoid interacting with people who do not share their opinions and are less influenced by them due to a fear of censorship and a lack of experience in resolving such cognitive dissonance (see Howard, 2003; Lup, 2015).

This relationship was significant only in the protest model, not in the voting model. This is partly due to the different nature of the two types of participation. Since protesting is a way to express discomfort and distrust toward the government (Katsandiou & Eder, 2018), discussing politics with people who do not share one’s opinions and less intimate might underscore conflict and a lack of consensus in politics, which, in turn, leads to greater mobilization effects among fully-fledged democratic citizens.

The three-way interaction using pro-attitudinal media, SWD, and an authoritarian past were significant for both protest and turnout. In the protest model, pro-attitudinal media effects are more pronounced for more satisfied citizens in post-authoritarian countries and less satisfied

citizens in established democracies. For highly satisfied citizens in post-authoritarian countries, exposure to pro-attitudinal media increases the likelihood of participating in protests. However, the relationship is reversed in established democracies in which people with low SWD tend to participate in protesting more when exposed to media sources sharing their beliefs. The three-way interaction in the turnout model exhibits different patterns. For post-authoritarian countries, exposure to like-minded media promoted voter turnout, though it did not vary depending on levels of SWD. On the contrary, in full-fledged democracies, citizens with low SWD are mobilized by pro-attitudinal media.

These findings align with the explanations from relevant literature. In post-authoritarian countries, where memories of past repression may remain, citizens who are more satisfied with democracy seem to find permission or validation in pro-attitudinal media, which in turn encourages them to engage in politics, particularly protesting. As noted in Chapter 1, in post-authoritarian countries, citizens often deem protesting as healthy and civic behavior as media coverage encourages protests (Melki et al., 2023). On the other hand, established democracies follow a general pattern – people who lack democratic satisfaction are exposed to pro-attitudinal media participate in politics more frequently -- found in European countries with longer democratic history excluding post-authoritarian countries like Russia and Ukraine (Christensen, 2016).

The current research also explored the variations within post-authoritarian countries. As Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) presented the idea of antidictatorship bias, the three-way interactions between one's ideology, ideology of prior regime, and exposure to like-minded media sources support this concept. For example, conservatives in previously left-wing regimes tend to be more mobilized by pro-attitudinal media content than liberals who experienced similar

regimes. On the other hand, in previous right-wing regimes, the mobilization effects of like-minded media are greater among liberals than conservatives. The inheritance of a prior regime ideology continues to shape how people are affected by like-minded media outlets. Therefore, the selective exposure hypothesis for mobilization was supported with the perspective of the anti-dictatorship bias.

Finally, the additional cohort analysis showed a lack of generational variation, despite expectations that generations growing up during dictatorships might have been indoctrinated by the regime and that later generations might exhibit participatory patterns similar to citizens in established democracies. This counter-intuitive finding implies that collective memories of previous regimes are not dominated by generations who spent their early years during those periods but are instead a bequest shared by the entire country.

One consistent pattern we found in the three-way interaction among pro-attitudinal media, SWD, and cohort groups is that the generations in Chile (1971-1988) and Ukraine (1972-1992) that spent their early adulthood right after the collapse of their regimes and the transition to democracy, are more likely to participate in voting when they are satisfied with the state of democracy in their country and are exposed to pro-attitudinal media outlets. This juxtaposes to the earlier generations who spent many years of their lives under dictatorship — Chile (1924-1952) and Ukraine (1928-1948) — where less satisfied individuals are more likely to be mobilized by pro-attitudinal media sources. Rather than a sense of fulfillment, disillusionment with democracy may be a motivating factor for voting to choose the government officials in this earlier cohort since they witnessed the end of authoritarian rule and the rise of democracy (see Svolik, 2013).

In sum, Chapter 1 sheds light on a new approach to comparative political communication—adding a layer of collective memories shared by a group of citizens living in a country, which often cast a long shadow over our current participatory behaviors. Future studies should further explore the different factors that could explain these phenomena. For example, democratic backsliding, a lack of media freedom, widespread hate speech, and incivility around the world might be interact with collective memories. Future research should continue to pursue this new insight within the discipline.

Discussion on Chapter 2 findings

Chapter 2 explores how cultural dimensions add a layer to the relationship between political discussion, media use, and political participation. First of all, discussing politics with close ties exhibits greater mobilization effects in collectivistic cultures compared to individualistic cultures. This echoes with the idea that people in collectivist societies are likely to value kinship, social groups, and communities, and thus seek to conform to group norms to avoid social isolation (see Ai & Zhang, 2021; Eveland et al., 2015). On the other hand, pro-attitudinal media use does not follow a similar pattern. The three-way interaction involving pro-attitudinal media use, IDV, and SWD shows that the effects of pro-attitudinal media use and SWD vary by degree of IDV. In collectivist societies, those satisfied with democracy who are exposed to like-minded media sources protest more. It is plausible when individuals in these collectivistic cultures are satisfied with their government and exposed to media supporting their views, they are more likely to participate in protests, often to defend or support the current system. The collective inclination may help build a sense of shared responsibility and promote protest as a way to express group solidarity with the democratic structure (Fominaya, 2010).

Regarding uncertainty avoidance, the findings show a pattern opposite to what was hypothesized. People in cultures with high UAI were not affected by political discussion and like-minded media sources, whereas those in cultures with lower UAI were more likely to be mobilized by close ties and pro-attitudinal media sources. This contrasts with the hypothesis, which postulated that individuals in high UAI cultures would be more influenced by information sources—both interpersonal and mediated—due to their need for cognitive affirmation before taking action. This could be potentially because discussions with friends and family may not provide enough information to make individuals in high UAI cultures feel certain. The amount of information they require to prompt an action may have a higher threshold (see Granovetter, 1978). The decision-making process for people with high UAI may be more complex and require more authentication and affirmation (Jung & Kellaris, 2004).

Finally, regarding power distance, the interactions including discussions with close ties and pro-attitudinal media were not significant. However, the three-way interaction showed a significant relationship. In countries with a high PDI, individuals dissatisfied with democracy were more likely to participate in protests when they consumed media that reinforced their views. On the contrary, in countries with low PDI, satisfied citizens were more likely to protest when exposed to media that supported their opinions. This implies that in societies with greater power inequality, dissatisfied individuals may feel empowered to challenge the system when they are exposed to media that warrant their opinions. On the other hand, in low PDI societies, where a stronger emphasis on equality and democratic participation exists, those satisfied with the system may be motivated to engage in protests to uphold or express their views when they find support from the media.

Discussion on exploratory analysis of Chapter 3

The exploratory analysis of integrating culture and authoritarian history elucidate the potential interactions. The model did not converge due to potential overparameterization. Despite of statistical issues, this part briefly discusses the output. The findings unpack interesting dynamics between cultural dimensions and post-authoritarianism on political participation, particularly protest and voter turnout. First, the analysis showed that individualism (IDV) did not significantly interact with an authoritarian past in either protest or turnout models.

On the other hand, uncertainty avoidance (UAI) showed a significant interaction with an authoritarian past in the turnout model, but not in the protest model. Voter turnout has a positive association with UAI in established democracies. In other words, citizens from countries with higher degree of UAI may seek stability and security through democratic processes, leading to higher voter turnout rates. However, citizens from post-authoritarian countries with high UAI were less likely to vote, possibly because prior authoritarian legacies may leave distrust or discomfort with political institutions, making citizens more hesitant to engage in the electoral process.

Finally, power distance (PDI) showed significant interactions with collective memories of an authoritarian past in both protest and turnout models. But they exhibit different patterns. Citizens from established democracies with high PDI were more likely to engage in protests. In full-fledged democracies with power dynamics, protesting could be one way for citizens to challenge authority. The interaction term in the turnout model shows that individuals in post-authoritarian countries with high PDI were less likely to vote. This pattern indicates that rigid power structure in post-authoritarian countries might clamp down on voting, as citizens may feel deprived or believe that their vote are not important.

To summarize, these findings suggest that the legacy of authoritarianism can shape political behaviors in a nuanced way, when considering cultural dimensions. Specifically, while IDV may not play a significant role, the interactions between UAI, PDI, and the authoritarian past call attention to research in how citizens engage in political participation based on their cultural and political environments.

Limitations

Despite significant findings in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the study is not without limitations. First, the selection of countries may omit those with post-authoritarian regimes and cultural backgrounds. Although the CNEP includes a wide arrange of countries from Europe, Latin America, and Asia, we do not have enough data from Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, the current analysis only includes two previously left-wing regimes, Serbia and Ukraine, so future studies should utilize a more diverse set of countries to confirm whether this is a global phenomenon.

Second, we cannot guarantee a causal relationship because the data is not from a panel dataset. Having datasets that allow us to investigate the longitudinal effects of collective memories and cultural perspectives from the 1990s would be highly valuable.

Third, the binary dependent variables should be interpreted cautiously in multi-level models, as multi-level logistic regression is non-linear compared to multi-level regression with continuous outcomes. In addition, the number of 14 countries can be considered as a limitation, since it may result in oversimplification of global trends. Future studies should address this issue by increasing the number of countries. Another way to address this question is to delve into within-country variation. Especially, the three-way interactions can be tested within each country

to validate whether the observed pattern prevailed in certain countries or represents general patterns shared among countries with similar historical or cultural backgrounds.

Fourth, regarding the cohort effects, it is challenging to conclude whether they reflect generational effects or life-cycle effects. This is partly due to the lack of survey years in dataset, especially in the case of Ukraine, where only one survey year is available. Since CNEP provides a limited number of waves in most countries, future research should use data for several decades to ensure whether these effects represent generational differences.

Finally, the current study did not measure the effects of social media because it was not included in the survey. As interaction with either homogeneous or heterogeneous networks on social media is known to drive political participation and foster polarization in many countries (Gill & Rojas, 2021; Kim & Rojas, 2024; Lee et al., 2022), it would be worthwhile to test social media as an independent variable in a comparative context if the data becomes available. Future studies should account for this.

Conclusion

The research is divided into two chapters to explain country-level variances in the relationship between political discussion, media use, and political participation. From a macro-level perspective, the study straightens out comparative political communication, which has been relatively understudied but holds significant potential for addressing issues such as global democratic backsliding, social cleavages, the rise of populism, and the spread of political violence, among others.

Political communication research has consistently shown that media exposure and political conversation tend to drive political participation (see Mutz, 2006; Verba et al., 1995). The current study found that adding a contextual layer can help in understanding the virtuous

cycle of communication and participatory behaviors. First of all, traumatic pasts can linger in people's mindsets and shape this relationship, as discussed in Chapter 1. These findings elucidate the need to consider collective memories when exploring differences across countries to understand their political behaviors. Moreover, several countries are currently experiencing transitions toward democracy or shifts toward autocracy, indicating that democratic backsliding and development fluctuate globally. For example, as of 2023, 34 countries, including Lesotho, Colombia, and Kenya, showed improvements in democracy, whereas countries such as Ukraine and Tunisia experienced noticeable declines (Gorokhovskaia et al., 2023). It is important to examine what factors shape citizens' political activism, given that democracy can be consolidated by competitive, transparent, and peaceful elections (Gorokhovskaia et al., 2023) and that citizens express their viewpoints through protesting (Heyne, 2019). Therefore, Chapter 1 highlights the importance of global democracy statuses, which are usually not status quo, to understand their past, current state, and future.

Chapter 2 offers different insights that culture can shape communication. More specifically, cultural dimensions can affect one's susceptibility to or acceptance of messages or information from mediated and interpersonal communication, resulting in diverse degrees of participation. Future studies should explore how cultural contexts might influence cognitive processing and coping behaviors (see Cheng et al., 2024), as seen in the contrasting findings regarding uncertainty avoidance. In the social media era, challenges and threats exist, often characterized as the prevalence of hate speech, fake news, and incivility. Future research should address these issues, and how cultural contexts shape social media users' participatory behaviors.

There are two possible future directions for this study. First, the dataset should be extended. Regarding the CNEP data, we lack a legitimate sample for the African continent. Since

most research on post-authoritarianism focuses on post-Soviet countries, it would be worthwhile to investigate other regions with different cultural contexts. Second, other societal indicators, such as media freedom (from Freedom House) and democracy indices (from V-Dem or Polity scores), could serve as additional country-level moderators, as found in previous studies (Barnidge et al., 2020; Borah et al., 2021). Beyond the selective exposure hypothesis, we need to reconsider what is meant by “hostile” media in the context of post-authoritarian countries. Does it refer to media hostile to one's ideology, or to the previous regime? Similarly, does the concept of "hostile" media hold the same meaning in individualistic and collectivistic cultures? Future studies should explore these questions to advance research in this area.

References

Ai, M., & Zhang, N. (2021). Strong-tie discussion, political trust and political participation: A comparative study of mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. *International Communication Gazette*, *83*(5), 497-516.

Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (2015). The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Princeton University Press.

Anderson, C. J., & Guillory, C. A. (1997). Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy: A cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems. *American Political Science Review*, *91*(1), 66-81.

Arendt, F. (2024). The Media and Democratization: A Long-Term Macro-Level Perspective on the Role of the Press During a Democratic Transition. *Political Communication*, *41*(1), 26–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2023.2238652

Arrese, Á. (2022). Cultural Dimensions of Fake News Exposure: A Cross-National Analysis among European Union Countries. *Mass Communication and Society*, *0*(0), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2022.2123278

Assmann, J., & Czaplicka, J. (1995). Collective memory and cultural identity. *New german critique*, (65), 125-133.

Auerbach, K., & Petrova, B. (2022). Authoritarian or Simply Disillusioned? Explaining Democratic Skepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. *Political Behavior*, *44*(4), 1959-1983.

Avenell, S. (2012). From fearsome pollution to Fukushima: Environme2ntal activism and the nuclear blind spot in contemporary Japan. *Environmental History*, *17*(2), 244-276.

Bachmann, I., Kaufholf, K., Lewis, S. C., & Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2010). News platform preference: Advancing the effects of age and media consumption on political participation. *International Journal of Internet Science,* 5(1), 34–47.

Barnidge, M., Rojas, H., Beck, P. A., & Schmitt-Beck, R. (2020). Comparative corrective action: Perceived media bias and political action in 17 countries. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 32*(4), 732-749.

Barr, P. S., & Glynn, M. A. (2004). Cultural variations in strategic issue interpretation: Relating cultural uncertainty avoidance to controllability in discriminating threat and opportunity. *Strategic Management Journal*, *25*(1), 59-67.

Basabe, N., & Ros, M. (2005). Cultural dimensions and social behavior correlates: Individualism-Collectivism and Power Distance. *International Review of Social Psychology.* 18(1), 189-225.Bergan, D., & Lee, H. (2019). Media credibility and the base rate fallacy. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, *63*(2), 195-210.

Bernhagen, P., & Marsh, M. (2007). Voting and Protesting: Explaining Citizen Participation in Old and New European Democracies. *Democratization*, 14, 44 - 72. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340601024298.

Bimber, B., & Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2022). Social influence and political participation around the world. *European Political Science Review*, *14*(2), 135–154. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577392200008X

Bisin, A., & Verdier, T. (2024). On the joint evolution of culture and political institutions: Elites and civil society. *Journal of Political Economy*, *132*(5), 1485-1564.

Blumer, H. (1948). Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling. *American Sociological Review* 13(5): 542-549.

Boomgaarden, H. G., & Schmitt-Beck, R. (2019). The Media and Political Behavior. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Borah, P., Barnidge, M., & Rojas, H. (2021). The Contexts of Political Participation: The Communication Mediation Model Under Varying Structural Conditions of the Public Sphere. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 19401612211029466.

Boulianne, S., & Theocharis, Y. (2020). Young people, digital media, and engagement: A meta-analysis of research. *Social Science Computer Review*, *38*(2), 111-127.

Breuer, A., & Groshek, J. (2014). Online media and offline empowerment in post-rebellion Tunisia: An analysis of Internet use during democratic transition. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *11*(1), 25-44.

Canache, D., Mondak, J. J., & Seligson, M. A. (2001). Meaning and measurement in cross-national research on satisfaction with democracy. *Public opinion quarterly*, *65*(4), 506-528.

Cheng, C., Ying, W., Ebrahimi, O. V., & Wong, K. F. E. (2024). Coping style and mental health amid the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic: a culture-moderated meta-analysis of 44 nations. *Health Psychology Review*, *18*(1), 141-164.

Choi, H. (2022). How Partisan Cable News Mobilizes Viewers: Partisan Media, Discussion Networks and Political Participation. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 1-24.

Christensen, H. S. (2016). Political dissatisfactions and citizen involvement: political participation in Europe during the early stages of the economic crisis. *Partecipazione e conflitto*, *9*(1), 19-45.

Claassen, C., & Magalhães, P. C. (2022). Effective government and evaluations of democracy. *Comparative Political Studies*, *55*(5), 869-894.

Cohen, A. A., Boudana, S., & Frosh, P. (2018). You Must Remember This: Iconic News Photographs and Collective Memory. *Journal of Communication*, *68*(3), 453–479. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqy017

Converse, P. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 206-61.

Conway, B. (2010). New Directions in the Sociology of Collective Memory and Commemoration. *Sociology Compass*, *4*(7), 442–453. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2010.00300.x

Croucher, S. M., Otten, R., Ball, M., Grimes, T., Ainsworth, B., Begley, K., & Corzo, L. (2013). Argumentativeness and Political Participation: A Cross-Cultural Analysis in the United States and Turkey. *Communication Studies*, *64*(1), 18–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2012.727942

Dai, Y., Li, H., Xie, W., & Deng, T. (2022). Power Distance Belief and Workplace Communication: The Mediating Role of Fear of Authority. *International journal of environmental research and public health*, *19*(5), 2932.

Dalen, A. V. (2021). Red economy, blue economy: How media-party parallelism affects the partisan economic perception gap. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *26*(2), 385-409.

Daniels, M. A., & Greguras, G. J. (2014). Exploring the nature of power distance: Implications for micro-and macro-level theories, processes, and outcomes. *Journal of management*, *40*(5), 1202-1229.

de Albuquerque, A. (2022). Transitions to nowhere: Western teleology and regime-type classification. *International Communication Gazette*, 17480485221130220.

de Leeuw, S. E., Azrout, R., Rekker, R. S., & Van Spanje, J. H. (2020). After All This Time? The Impact of Media and Authoritarian History on Political News Coverage in Twelve Western Countries. *Journal of Communication*, *70*(5), 744-767.

de Leeuw, S. E., Rekker, R., Azrout, R., & van Spanje, J. H. (2021). Are would-be authoritarians right? Democratic support and citizens' left-right self-placement in former left-and right-authoritarian countries. *Democratization*, *28*(2), 414-433.

De Meulenaer, S., De Pelsmacker, P., & Dens, N. (2018). Power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and the effects of source credibility on health risk message compliance. *Health communication*, *33*(3), 291-298.

Dilliplane, S. (2011). All the News You Want to Hear: The Impact of Partisan News Exposure on Political Participation. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *75*(2), 287–316. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfr006

Dinas, E., & Northmore-Ball, K. (2020). The ideological shadow of authoritarianism. *Comparative Political Studies*, *53*(12), 1957-1991.

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. *Journal of political economy*, *65*(2), 135-150.

Durkheim, E´. (1995). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: The Free Press.

Dvir-Gvirsman, S. (2017). Media audience homophily: Partisan websites, audience identity and polarization processes. *New media & society*, *19*(7), 1072-1091.

Eveland et al. (2015). Cultural Variations in the Relationships Among Network Political Agreement, Political Discussion Frequency, and Voting Turnout. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *27*(4),

Eveland Jr, W. P., & Hively, M. H. (2009). Political discussion frequency, network size, and "heterogeneity" of discussion as predictors of political knowledge and participation. *Journal of Communication*, *59*(2), 205-224.\

Ezrow, L., & Xezonakis, G. (2016). Satisfaction with democracy and voter turnout: A temporal perspective. *Party Politics*, *22*(1), 3-14.

Fernandes, T., Cancela, J., Coppedge, M., Lindberg, S., & Hicken, A. (2015). Measuring Political Participation in Southern Europe: The Varieties of Democracy Approach. *International Institutions: Transnational Networks eJournal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2692553.

Ferron, M., & Massa, P. (2014). Beyond the encyclopedia: Collective memories in Wikipedia. *Memory Studies*, *7*(1), 22-45.

Festinger, L. (1962). *A theory of cognitive dissonance* (Vol. 2). Stanford university press.

Fominaya, C. F. (2010). Creating cohesion from diversity: The challenge of collective identity formation in the global justice movement. *Sociological Inquiry*, *80*(3), 377-404.

Frantzeskakis, N., & Sato, Y. (2020). Echoes of a fading past: Authoritarian legacies and far-right voting. *Electoral Studies*, *66*, 102163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102163

Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press.

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Ardèvol-Abreu, A., & Casero-Ripollés, A. (2021). WhatsApp political discussion, conventional participation and activism: Exploring direct, indirect and generational effects. *Information, Communication & Society*, *24*(2), 201–218. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1642933

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Puig-I-Abril, E., & Rojas, H. (2009). Weblogs, traditional sources online and political participation: An assessment of how the Internet is changing the political environment. *New media & society*, *11*(4), 553-574.

Gill, H., & Rojas, H. (2021). Communication Mediation Model Predicting Political Participation among Instant Messaging App Users: An OSROR Approach. *Communication Studies*, 1-23.

Gorodnichenko, Y., & Roland, G. (2021). Culture, institutions and democratization. *Public choice*, *187*, 165-195.

Gorokhovskaia, Y., Shahbaz, A., & Slipowitz, A. (2023). *Freedom in the World 2023: Marking 50 years in the Struggle for Democracy*. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2023/marking-50-years

Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. *American journal of sociology*, *83*(6), 1420-1443.

Gründl, J., & Aichholzer, J. (2020). Support for the populist radical right: Between uncertainty avoidance and risky choice. *Political Psychology*, *41*(4), 641-659.

Grzymala-Busse, A. M. (2002). Redeeming the communist past: The regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Hadjar, A., & Beck, M. (2010). Who does not participate in elections in Europe and why is this? A multilevel analysis of social mechanisms behind non-voting. *European Societies*, *12*(4), 521-542.

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Haugsgjerd, A., Hesstvedt, S., & Karlsen, R. (2021). Increased Media Choice and Political Knowledge Gaps: A Comparative Longitudinal Study of 18 Established Democracies 1995-2015. *Political Communication*, *38*(6), 731–750. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1868633

Heinrichs, N., Rapee, R. M., Alden, L. A., Bögels, S., Hofmann, S. G., Oh, K. J., & Sakano, Y. (2006). Cultural differences in perceived social norms and social anxiety. *Behaviour research and therapy*, *44*(8), 1187-1197.

Heyne, L. (2019). Democratic demand and supply: a spatial model approach to satisfaction with democracy. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, *29*(3), 381-401.

Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.).Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hofstede, G. (2011). Dimensionalizing cultures: The Hofstede model in context. *Online readings in psychology and culture*, *2*(1), 8.

Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Hornikx, J., & Hoeken, H. (2007). Cultural differences in the persuasiveness of evidence types and evidence quality. *Communication Monographs*, 74, 443–463. doi:10.1080/03637750701716578

Howard, M. M. (2003). *The weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, R., & Catterberg, G. (2002). Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 43, 300 - 316. https://doi.org/10.1177/002071520204300305.

International IDEA. (2021). Voter turnout database. [Database]. Retrieved from https://www.idea.int/

Johann, D., Königslöw, K. K. V., Kritzinger, S., & Thomas, K. (2018). Intra-campaign changes in voting preferences: The impact of media and party communication. *Political communication*, *35*(2), 261-286.

Jost, J., Napier, J., Thórisdóttir, H., Gosling, S., Palfai, T., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated With Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity?. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33, 1007 - 989. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207301028.

Jović, D. (2004). 'Official memories' in post-authoritarianism: An analytical framework. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, *6*(2), 97–108. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319042000242001

Jung, J. M., & Kellaris, J. J. (2004). Cross-national differences in proneness to scarcity effects: The moderating roles of familiarity, uncertainty avoidance, and need for cognitive closure. *Psychology & Marketing*, *21*(9), 739-753.

Kadivar, M. A. (2018). Mass mobilization and the durability of new democracies. *American Sociological Review*, *83*(2), 390-417.

Key, V.O. (1961). Public opinion and American Democracy. Cambridge university press.

Kim, J., & Rojas, H. (2024). How Does Political Communication Relate to Perceived Extremity of Partisans and Their Divides? From Communication to Polarization Perceptions to Political Engagement. *Communication Studies*, 1-24.

Kim, D. H., & Kwak, N. (2022). When Does Incidental Exposure Prompt Political Participation? Cross-National Research on the Importance of Individualism and "Collectivism. *International Journal of Communication*, *16*, 22.

Kim, S. H., & Han, M. (2005). Media use and participatory democracy in South Korea. *Mass Communication & Society*, *8*(2), 133-153.

Kinder, D. (1998). Opinion and action in the realm of politics. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 778–867). McGraw-Hill.

Kleinnijenhuis, J., Van Hoof, A. M., & Van Atteveldt, W. (2019). The combined effects of mass media and social media on political perceptions and preferences. *Journal of Communication*, *69*(6), 650-673.

Klofstad, C. A. (2015). Exposure to political discussion in college is associated with higher rates of political participation over time. *Political Communication*, *32*(2), 292-309.

Kobayashi, T., Miura, A., Madrid-Morales, D., & Shimizu, H. (2021). Why are Politically Active People Avoided in Countries with Collectivistic Culture? A Cross-Cultural Experiment. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 52, 388 - 405. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220221211008653.

Kostelka, F. (2014). The State of Political Participation in Post-Communist Democracies: Low but Surprisingly Little Biased Citizen Engagement. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 66, 945 - 968. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2014.905386.

Kostelka, F., & Rovny, J. (2019). It's not the left: Ideology and protest participation in old and new democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, *52*(11), 1677-1712.

Krosnick, J. A., Visser, P. S., & Harder, J. (2010). The psychological underpinnings of political behavior. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 1288–1342). John Wiley & Sons, Inc..

Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological bulletin*, *108*(3), 480.

Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2012). Power increases social distance. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *3*(3), 282-290.

Lane, D. S., Thorson, K., & Xu, Y. (2023). Uninterested and unequal?: examining SES-based gaps in youth political behavior on social media. *Information, Communication & Society*, *26*(4), 663-681.

Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H. (1948) The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. Columbia University Press, New York.

Lazer, D., Rubineau, B., Chetkovich, C., Katz, N., & Neblo, M. (2010). The coevolution of networks and political attitudes. *Political Communication*, *27*(3), 248-274.

Lee, H. (2021). "Easy" and "hard" issues: Attitude extremity and a role of the need to evaluate. *Social Science Quarterly*, *102*(6), 2930-2941.

Lee, F. L., & Chan, J. M. (2013). Generational transmission of collective memory about Tiananmen in Hong Kong: how young rally participants learn about and understand 4 June. *Journal of Contemporary China*, *22*(84), 966-983.

Lee, F. L., & Chan, J. M. (2018). Memory mobilization, generational differences, and communication effects on collective memory about Tiananmen in Hong Kong. *Asian Journal of Communication*, *28*(4), 397-415.

Lee, S., Rojas, H., & Yamamoto, M. (2022). Social media, messaging apps, and affective polarization in the United States and Japan. *Mass Communication and Society, 25*(5), 673-697.

Lelkes, Y. (2020). A bigger pie: The effects of high-speed Internet on political behavior. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 25*(3), 199-216.

Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. J. (1981). The structures and meanings of social time. *Social forces, 60*(2), 432-462.

Linz, J. J. (2000). *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Loveless, M. (2008). Media dependency: Mass media as sources of information in the democratizing countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Democratisation, 15*(1), 162-183.

Lup, O. (2015). Informal Political Conversation in Old and New Democracies in a Comparative Perspective. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *27*(4), 497–508. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edv039

Lup, O. L. (2021). Personal social networks and individual voting turnout in a comparative perspective. *Romanian Journal of Political Sciences, 21*(2), 7-21.

Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D., & Arthur, L. (1998). The democratic dilemma: Can citizens learn what they need to know?. Cambridge University Press.

Mannheim, K. (1952). The problem of Generations. In Essays on the Sociology of Knoweldge (pp. 276-322). London: Routledge.

Manucci, L. (2022). Populism and Collective Memory. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Populism* (pp. 451-468). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Mari, S., Gil de Zúñiga, H., Suerdem, A., Hanke, K., Brown, G., Vilar, R., ... & Bilewicz, M. (2022). Conspiracy theories and institutional trust: examining the role of uncertainty avoidance and active social media use. *Political Psychology*, *43*(2), 277-296.

Mason, W. M., & Fienberg, S. (Eds.). (2012). *Cohort analysis in social research: Beyond the identification problem*. Springer Science & Business Media.

Matthes, J., Knoll, J., Valenzuela, S., Hopmann, D. N., & Von Sikorski, C. (2019). A meta-analysis of the effects of cross-cutting exposure on political participation. *Political Communication*, *36*(4), 523-542.

McLeod, J. M., Scheufele, D. A., & Moy, P. (1999). Community, communication, and participation: The role of mass media and interpersonal discussion in local political participation. *Political communication*, *16*(3), 315-336.

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. *Annual review of sociology*, *27*(1), 415-444.

Medel, R., Somma, N., & Donoso, S. (2023). The Nexus between Protest and Electoral Participation: Explaining Chile's Exceptionalism. *Journal of Latin American Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x23000706.

Melki, J., Kozman, C., Mellado, C., Elórtegui, C., So, C. Y., Movahedian, M., ... & Farhat, S. (2023). Selective exposure during uprisings: A comparative study of news uses in Chile, Hong Kong, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. *International Communication Gazette*, *85*(7), 537-559.

Merkin, R. S. (2006). Uncertainty avoidance and facework: A test of the Hofstede model. *International Journal of intercultural relations*, *30*(2), 213-228.

Minkov, M. (2018). A revision of Hofstede's model of national culture: Old evidence and new data from 56 countries. *Cross Cultural & Strategic Management*, *25*(2), 231-256.

Misztal, B. A. (2005). Memory and democracy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *48*(10), 1320-1338.

Moretti, A., & Shlomo, N. (2023). Improving statistical matching when auxiliary information is available. *Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology*, *11*(3), 619-642.

Mutz, D. (2006). *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democrat.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 57-87.

Newton, K. (1999). Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise? *British Journal of Political Science*, *29*(4), 577–599. doi:10.1017/S0007123499000289

Nir, L. (2011). Disagreement and Opposition in Social Networks: Does Disagreement Discourage Turnout? *Political Studies*, *59*(3), 674–692. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00873.x

Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic phoenix: Reinventing political activism*. Cambridge University Press.

Nygård, M., Nyqvist, F., Steenbeek, W., & Jakobsson, G. (2015). Does social capital enhance political participation of older adults? A multi-level analysis of older Finns and Swedes. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, *31*(3), 234-254. doi:10.1080/21699763.2015.1069207

Obijiofor, L., Murray, R., & Singh, S. B. (2017). Changes in journalism in two post-authoritarian non-Western countries. *International Communication Gazette*, *79*(4), 379-399.

Olick, J. K. (1999). Collective Memory: The Two Cultures. *Sociological Theory*, *17*(3), 333–348. https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00083Paek, H. J., Yoon, S. H., & Shah, D. V.

(2005). Local news, social integration, and community participation: Hierarchical linear modeling of contextual and cross-level effects. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *82*(3), 587-606.

Park, H. S., Levine, T. R., Weber, R., Lee, H. E., Terra, L. I., Botero, I. C., ... & Wilson, M. S. (2012). Individual and cultural variations in direct communication style. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *36*(2), 179-187.

Park, J., & Warner, B. R. (2024). Does Collectivism Make a Difference? A Comparative Test of Common Ingroup Strategies to Reduce Affective Polarization. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *36*(3).

Pfetsch, B., & Esser, F. (2013). Comparing political communication. In *The handbook of comparative communication research* (pp. 47-69). Routledge.

Repucci, S. & Slipowitz, A. (2022). The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule. Freedom House. Retrieved November 7, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rul

Robison, J., Stevenson, R. T., Druckman, J. N., Jackman, S., Katz, J. N., & Vavreck, L. (2018). An Audit of Political Behavior Research. *SAGE Open*, *8*(3), 2158244018794769.

Robinson, S. (2009). “If you had been with us”: Mainstream press and citizen journalists jockey for authority over the collective memory of Hurricane Katrina. *New Media & Society*, *11*(5), 795–814. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444809105353

Ruck, D., Matthews, L., Kyritsis, T., Atkinson, Q., Atkinson, Q., & Bentley, R. (2019). The cultural foundations of modern democracies. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 4, 265 - 269. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0769-1.

Schoel, C., Bluemke, M., Mueller, P., & Stahlberg, D. (2011). When autocratic leaders become an option--uncertainty and self-esteem predict implicit leadership preferences.. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 101 3, 521-40 . https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023393.

Schuman, H., & Scott, J. (1989). Generations and Collective Memories. *American Sociological Review*, *54*(3), 359–381. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095611

Schussman, A., & Soule, S. A. (2005). Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation. *Social forces*, *84*(2), 1083-1108.

Schwartz, B. (2009). Collective forgetting and the symbolic power of oneness: The strange apotheosis of Rosa Parks. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *72*(2), 123-142.

Shah, D. V., Cho, J., Nah, S., Gotlieb, M. R., Hwang, H., Lee, N. J., Scholl, R.M., & McLeod, D. M. (2007). Campaign ads, online messaging, and participation: Extending the communication mediation model. *Journal of communication*, *57*(4), 676-703. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.00363.x

Shah, D. V., McLeod, J. M., & Lee, N. J. (2009). Communication competence as a foundation for civic competence: Processes of socialization into citizenship. *Political Communication*, *26*(1), 102-117.

Shen, F., & Liang, H. (2015). Cultural Difference, Social Values, or Political Systems? Predicting Willingness to Engage in Online Political Discussion in 75 Societies. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *27*(1), 111–124. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edu012

Shen, F., Wang, N., Guo, Z., & Guo, L. (2009). Online network size, efficacy, and opinion expression: Assessing the impacts of Internet use in China. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *21*(4), 451-476.

Singh, S. P., & Mayne, Q. (2023). Satisfaction with democracy: a review of a major public opinion indicator. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *87*(1), 187-218.

Skoric, M. M., Zhu, Q., & Pang, N. (2016). Social media, political expression, and participation in Confucian Asia. *Chinese Journal of Communication*, *9*(4), 331-347.

Skovsgaard, M., Shehata, A., & Strömbäck, J. (2016). Opportunity structures for selective exposure: Investigating selective exposure and learning in Swedish election campaigns using panel survey data. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *21*(4), 527-546.

Smith, A. E. (2015). The Diverse Impacts of Politically Diverse Networks: Party Systems, Political Disagreement, and the Timing of Vote Decisions. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *27*(4), 481–496. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edv018

Snijders, T.A.B., & Bosker, R.J. (2012). Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and advanced multilevel modeling. (2nd ed.) Sage.

Spencer-Oatey, H. (1997). Unequal relationships in high and low power distance societies: A comparative study of ibtor-student role relations in Britain and China. *Journal of cross-cultural psychology*, *28*(3), 284-302.

Spirova, M. (2008). The Bulgarian socialist party: The long road to Europe. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 41, 481-495.

Stanojevic, A., Akkerman, A., & Manevska, K. (2020). Good workers and crooked bosses: The effect of voice suppression by supervisors on employees' populist attitudes and voting. *Political Psychology*, *41*(2), 363-381.

Stevens, D., & Allen, B. (2017). When Going to War Is Costly: A Comparative Study of Audiences and the Partisan Press. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *22*(3), 380-401.

Stroud, N. J. (2011). *Niche news: The politics of news choice*. Oxford University Press on Demand.

Sude, D. J., & Knobloch-Westerwick, S. (2023). The Role of Media in Political Polarization| When We Have to Get Along: Depolarizing Impacts of Cross-Cutting Social Media. *International Journal of Communication*, *17*, 23.

Sumikawa, Y., & Jatowt, A. (2021). Analyzing history-related posts in twitter. *International Journal on Digital Libraries*, *22*(1), 105-134.

Sunstein, C. (2002). The Law of Group Polarization. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 10(2):175-195.

Sunstein, C. (2018). *# Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media*. Princeton university press.

Svolik, M. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.* Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139176040.

Svolik, M. (2013). Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57, 685-702. https://doi.org/10.1111/AJPS.12005.

Tai, Y., & Fu, K. W. (2020). Specificity, conflict, and focal point: A systematic investigation into social media censorship in China. *Journal of Communication*, *70*(6), 842-867.

Terzi, A. (2011). Relationship between Power Distance and Autocratic-Democratic Tendencies.. *Educational Research Review*, 6, 528-535. https://doi.org/10.5897/ERR.9000275.

Ting-Toomey, S., & Kurogi, A. (1998). Facework competence in intercultural conflict: An updated face-negotiation theory. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 22, 187–225. doi: 10.1016/S0147-1767(98)00004-2

Travaglino, G. A., & Moon, C. (2020). Power distance orientation as an antecedent of individuals' intentions to engage in radical political action. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 23*(8), 1283–1308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220921940

Tsai, L. L., & Xu, Y. (2018). Outspoken insiders: Political connections and citizen participation in authoritarian China. *Political Behavior, 40,* 629

Valenzuela, S., & Brandão, A. S. (2015). Historical dramas, current political choices: Analyzing partisan selective exposure with a docudrama. *Mass Communication and Society, 18*(4), 449-470.

Van de Vliert, E., Schwartz, S. H., Huismans, S. E., Hofstede, G., & Daan, S. (1999). Temperature, cultural masculinity, and domestic political violence: A cross-national study. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 30, 291–314. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022199030003002

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press.

V-Dem Institute. (2022). Democracy report 2022: Autocratization changing Nature? V-Dem Institute. Retrieved November 8, 2022, from https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf

Vishwanath, A. (2003). Comparing online information effects: A cross-cultural comparison of online information and uncertainty avoidance. *Communication Research, 30*(6), 579-598.

Warren, M. E., & Gastil, J. (2015). Can deliberative minipublics address the cognitive challenges of democratic citizenship?. *The Journal of Politics*, *77*(2), 562-574.

Welzel, C. (2021). Democratic Horizons: What value change reveals about the future of democracy. *Democratization*, *28*(5), 992–1016. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1883001

Wertsch, J. V., & Roediger, H. L. (2008). Collective memory: Conceptual foundations and theoretical approaches. *Memory*, *16*(3), 318–326. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210701801434

Wojcieszak, M., Bimber, B., Feldman, L., & Stroud, N. J. (2016). Partisan news and political participation: Exploring mediated relationships. *Political Communication*, *33*(2), 241-260.

Wright, J., & Escribà-Folch, A. (2011). Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42, 283 - 309. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000317.

Zaromb, F., Butler, A. C., Agarwal, P. K., & Roediger, H. L. (2014). Collective memories of three wars in United States history in younger and older adults. *Memory & Cognition*, *42*(3), 383–399. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-013-0369-7

Zhang, W. (2012). The effects of political news use, political discussion and authoritarian orientation on political participation: Evidences from Singapore and Taiwan. *Asian Journal of Communication*, *22*(5), 474-492.

Appendix A.

Table 1. Zero-order correlations among key variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Ideology (1)	1											
Close talk (2)	-.03***	1										
Weak talk (3)	.04***	.56***	1									
Pro-attitudinal media (4)	.06***	.20***	.17***	1								
SWD (5)	.06***	-.01	.01	.03***	1							
Authoritarian past (6)	-.05***	.02**	.09***	.06***	.06***	1						
Authoritarian Ideology (7)	.04***	.01	-.06***	-.10***	.06***	.31***	1					
IDV (8)	-.07***	.09***	-.10***	-.18***.	-.00	-.40***	-.09***	1				
UAI (9)	-.03***	.00	.15***	.08***	-.07***	.50***	-.13***	-.44***	1			
PDI (10)	.02**	-.03***	.15***	.20***	-.11***	.15***	-.57***	.62***	.68***	1		
Protest (11)	-.07***	.16***	.15***	.04***	-.11***	-.03***	.08***	.00	-.09***	-.05***	1	
Turnout (12)	.01	.23***	.11***	.06***	.08***	-.09***	.10***	.16***	-.08***	.16***	.05***	1

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. ** $p < .001$

Table 2-1. Model Comparison with Empty Model (Protest, Authoritarian Past)

Models	AIC	BIC	Log Likelihood	Chi-square	p-value
Empty Model	6235.8	6251.2	-3115.9		
Baseline	5589.9	5720.9	-2777.9	675.88	.000
Interaction (close talk)	5590.6	5729.4	-2777.3	677.18	.000
Interaction (Weak talk)	5583.5	5722.2	-2773.7	684.31	.000
Interaction (Pro-attitudinal media)	5591.9	5730.6	-2777.9	675.89	.000
Three-way interactions	5577.7	5739.6	-2767.9	696.06	.000

Table 2-2. Model Comparison with Empty Model (Turnout, Authoritarian Past)

Models	AIC	BIC	Log Likelihood	Chi-square	p-value
Empty Model	8348.9	8364.3	-4172.4		
Baseline	7695.8	7827.1	-3830.9	683.06	.000
Interaction (close talk)	7697.7	7836.8	-3830.9	683.11	.000
Interaction (Weak talk)	7694.0	7833.0	-3829.0	686.83	.000
Interaction Pro-attitudinal media	7697.6	7836.6	-3830.8	683.3	.000
Three way interactions	7681.2	7843.4	-3819.6	705.69	.000

Table 2-3. Model Comparison with Empty Model (Protest, Authoritarian Past Ideology)

Models	AIC	BIC	Log Likelihood	Chi-square	p-value
Empty Model	3215.2	3229.4	-1605.6		
Base	2943.6	3063.9	-1454.8	301.63	.000
Interaction (close talk)	2950.1	3098.7	-1454.0	303.15	.000
Interaction (Weak talk)	2942.1	3090.7	-1450.0	311.13	.000
Interaction (Pro-attitudinal media)	2936.3	3084.9	-1447.2	316.92	.000

Table 2-4. Model Comparison with Empty Model (Turnout, Authoritarian Past Ideology)

Models	AIC	BIC	Log Likelihood	Chi-square	p-value
Empty Model	5133.1	5147.3	-2564.6		
Baseline	4718.0	4838.7	-2342.0	445.17	.000
Interaction (close talk)	4685.2	4834.3	-2321.6	485.95	.000
Interaction (Weak talk)	4686.5	4835.6	-2322.2	484.69	.000
Interaction (Pro-attitudinal media)	4675.8	4824.9	-2316.9	495.3	.000

Table 3-1. Model Comparison with Empty Model (Protest, Cultural dimensions)

Models	AIC	BIC	Log Likelihood	Chi-square	p-value
Empty Model	6235.8	6251.2	-3115.9		

Baseline	5587.3	5726.1	-2775.7	680.48	.000
Interaction (close talk)	5581.5	5743.3	-2769.7	692.33	.000
Interaction (Weak talk)	5569.2	5731.0	-2763.6	704.63	.000
Interaction (Pro-attitudinal media)	5574.4	5736.3	-2766.2	699.34	.000
Interaction (Three-way Interactions)	5533.5	5749.3	-2738.7	754.32	.000

Table 3-2. Model Comparison with Empty Model (Turnout, Cultural dimensions)

Models	AIC	BIC	Log Likelihood	Chi-square	p-value
Empty Model	8348.9	8364.3	-4172.4		
Baseline	7698.3	7837.3	-3831.1	682.58	.000
Interaction (close talk)	7701.5	7863.7	-3829.7	685.38	.000
Interaction (Weak talk)	7695.3	7857.5	-3826.7	691.54	.000
Interaction (Pro-attitudinal media)	7698.5	7860.6	-3828.2	688.41	.000
Interaction (Three-way)	7669.7	7885.9	-3806.8	731.2	.000

Supplementary Materials

Supplementary Material A

Country Selection and Characteristics.

A1. Country Selection for the whole sample

The selection of countries in the current study followed the process: (1) The country was classified as a "democracy" during the data collection period, based on assessments by the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) and Freedom House. For example, Turkey (now Türkiye) was undeniably an electoral democracy in 2006. However, in 2017, Turkish President Erdoğan sought to legitimize his autogolpe through a referendum in April, shifting the country toward an electoral autocracy (V-dem, 2017); (2) The countries with culture dimension scores; (3) it is the most recent survey in a given country and at least from 2010 since because the most recent cultural dimension score is from 2015, year starts from 2014. This resulted in excluding countries like Argentina (2007) or Uruguay (2004); (4) the independent variables and dependent variables are eligible. The 14 surveys are: 2014 Turkey, 2015 Spain, 2017 France, 2017 Germany, 2017 Great Britain, 2018 Colombia, 2018 Mexico, 2019 Hong Kong, 2019 Ukraine, 2020 Serbia, 2020 Taiwan, 2020 US, 2021 Chile, 2022 Brazil.

References

V-dem (2017). Democracy Reports. https://www.v-dem.net/publications/democracy-reports/

A2. Country Selection for cohort analysis

For cohort analysis, we selected the two countries, one is from previously left-wing regime and one from prior right-wing regime. Chile and Ukraine were selected, since the two countries emancipated in similar years, Chile in 1989 and Ukraine in 1992. For Chile, we used survey from 2017 and 2021 to ensure a larger sample numbers and controlling for the survey year. For Ukraine, CNEP has only one survey year from 2019, inhibiting to perform the similar analysis. We defined cohorts by the regime experience during early adulthood. The below table illustrates the details of each cohort in the two countries.

Table A2-1. Cohorts in Chile

Birth year	Early adulthood	N
1924-1952	Already adults before and during Pinochet regime	250
1953-1970	Spent early adulthood during Pinochet regime	678
1971-1988	First generation reaching adulthood during the democratic transition (First Post-Pinochet Generation)	790
1989-2003	Second post-Pinochet generation spending early adulthood in the democracy.	892

Note: The regime started 1979 and ended 1989.

Table A2-2. Cohorts in Ukraine

Birth year	Early adulthood	N
1928-1948	Already adults before and during Soviet Union	155
1949-1971	Spent early adulthood during Soviet Union	783
1972-1992	First generation reaching adulthood during the democratic transition (First Post-Soviet Generation)	807
1993-1999	Second post-Soviet generation spending early adulthood in the democracy.	200

Note: The regime started 1945 and ended 1992.

Table A3. ***Technical information for individual surveys.***

Country & Year	N	Timing of Interviews	Survey Organization	Funder for Survey	Mode of Interview	Sampling Method	Population Covered	Response Rate
Chile 2017	1600	Nov 20 - Dec 15	School of Communication, Diego Portales University-Feedback	Diego Portales University and Feedback (polling firm)	face-to-face	multi-stage stratified random sample	Adults living in the three main urban areas of Chile: Great Santiafo, Great Valparaiso and Great Concepción	25%
Colombia 2018	1118	Jun-Jul 2018	Deproyectos SAS	Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation/ Universidad Externado de Colombia	face-to-face	multi-stage stratified random sample	nationally representative sample of adults	30%
France 2017	2000	May 2017	YouGov	The Ohio State University	internet	stratified sampling with propensity score matching	nationally representative sample of adults	40%
Germany 2017	3236	Sep-Oct 2017	Ipsos	Fritz Thyssen Foundation and National Science Foundation	Computer-Assisted Web Interviews (CAWI)	four-stage sampling w/ quotas for age, gender, education and region	nationally representative sample of voting-age citizens	51%
Great Britain 2017	1600 + 400 Scottish over-sample	Jun 2017	YouGov	National Science Foundation	internet	stratified sampling with propensity score matching	nationally representative sample of adults	27%

Hong Kong 2018	1057	Nov-Dec 2015	YouGov	City University of Hong Kong	internet	quota sampling for gender, age, education	representative sample of ethnically Chinese adults	19%
Mexico 2018	1428	Jul 2018	Moreno & Sotnikova Social Research and Consulting	Moreno & Sotnikova SRC, El Financiero, and University of Nebraska	face-to-face	multi-stage stratified area cluster sampling	national representative sample of adults	48%
Spain 2015	2411	Dec 2015	UPF RECSM (questionnaire design);Netquest (fieldwork)	Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO); Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona); UPF Research and Expertise Center for Survey Methodology	internet	quota sampling for age, gender and region	nationally representative sample of adults	82%
Taiwan 2016	1000	Jan-Feb 2016	AIP	City University of Hong Kong	internet	quota sampling for gender, age, education	representative sample of ethnically Chinese adults	20%

Turkey 2014	1178	Dec 2014 - Feb 2015	Koç University Center for Survey Research and Frekans	Koç University; Sabancı University; The Ohio State University School of Communication; Wayne State University Department of Communication; Annenberg School for Communication's Center for Global Communication Studies; Internet Policy Observatory at the University of Pennsylvania	face-to-face	multi-stage stratified area sampling	nationally representative sample of voting-age citizens	50%
United States 2020	1600 + 350 over-sample of non-college-grad rural	Dec 2016 - Jan 2017	YouGov	The Ohio State University	internet	stratified sampling with propensity score matching	nationally representative sample of adults	36%

	whites in battle-ground states							
Ukraine 2019	2001	Oct 4-16 2019	Research and Branding LLC	Ohio State University	face-to-face at respodent's place of residence	Respondents selected by quota sampling representing the adult population of Ukraiine by region of residence (region), type of settlemend (regional center, city, vallage), gender and age.	All of Ukraine - 24 regions of Ukraine and Kiev (with the exception of Crimea, Sevastopol, uncontrolled territories of Donetsk and Lugansk regions).	68%
Serbia 2020	1800	August-September 2020	University of Belgrade	US Department of State grant to Ohio State University	face-to-face	Three-stage random stratified sample, Sampling unit: Polling station territory (number of units 140/150) Stratification criterion: Small, medium and large polling stations Stratifica	general	2562, which gave him a response rate of 0.4 (2562 + 1800) / 1800 = 40%

	tion method: Polling station; Household; First next birthday

**Note.* The details are provided by CNEP (https://u.osu.edu/cnep/).

Table A4. ***Summary Statistics for the whole sample***

Protest	Vote	Close Talk	Weak Talk	Pro-attitudinal news	Age	Female	SWD
%	%	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	%	M (SD)
12.1%	81.3%	2.68 (.91)	1.98 (1.21)	1.13 (.83)	46.30 (16.04)	52.3%	1.27 (.87)

Table A5. ***Country-level descriptive statistics.***

Country Year	Protest	Vote	Close talk	Weak Talk	Pro-attitudinal news	Age	Female	SWD
	%	%	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	%	M (SD)
Turkey ‘14	4%	87%	2.40 (0.90)	2.04 (0.91)	1.03 (0.66)	39.45 (14.82)	49%	1.52 (0.94)
Spain ‘15	26%	87%	2.85 (0.81)	1.89 (0.78)	0.96 (0.71)	47.52 (15.24)	49%	0.86 (0.75)
France ‘17	16%	91%	2.88 (0.88)	1.93 (0.83)	0.89 (0.87)	48.78 (15.94)	54%	1.13 (0.79)
Great Britain ‘17	8%	90%	2.63 (0.92)	1.60 (0.65)	0.83 (0.66)	47.73 (17.20)	53%	1.34 (0.81)
Germany ‘17	11%	89%	2.76 (0.94)	1.89 (0.91)	0.88 (0.75)	50.58 (14.53)	50%	1.62 (0.81)
Colombia ‘18	8%	75%	2.86 (0.82)	2.26 (0.88)	1.39 (0.77)	42.71 (16.19)	53%	1.29 (0.75)
Mexico ‘18	3%	83%	2.49 (0.97)	1.96 (0.99)	1.43 (1.02)	46.21 (17.59)	51%	0.98 (0.86)
Ukraine ‘19	2%	76%	2.79 (0.88)	2.18 (0.93)	1.39 (0.73)	46.43 (16.69)	55%	1.26 (0.87)
US ‘20	14%	85%	2.80 (0.90)	1.70 (0.78)	1.23 (0.80)	49.55 (17.32)	53%	1.18 (0.83)
Taiwan ‘20	8%	83%	2.48 (0.70)	1.70 (0.67)	1.44 (0.65)	41.93 (11.73)	50%	1.90 (0.72)
Hong Kong ‘19	33%	72%	2.55 (0.75)	1.84 (0.72)	1.60 (0.65)	42.31 (12.56)	56%	1.16 (0.91)
Serbia ‘20	9%	57%	2.57 (0.99)	2.06 (0.97)	1.37 (0.84)	45.70 (16.48)	54%	1.19 (0.95)
Chile ‘21	11%	60%	2.22 (1.00)	1.56 (0.73)	0.95 (0.83)	46.72(16.72)	58%	1.21 (0.83)
Brazil ‘22	17%	81%	2.84 (0.88)	2.12 (0.99)	1.53 (0.94)	39.37 (13.89)	51%	1.12 (0.87)

Supplementary Material B

Details of Authoritarian Countries.

B. Regime Starts and End year

The regime start year is the year when the dictatorship began, and the regime end year is when the first democratic election was held right after the dictatorship. The classification of left-wing and right-wing regime follow the previous literature (see de Leeuw et al., 2021; Dina & Northmore-Ball, 2020; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Frantzeskakis & Sato, 2020; Spirova, 2008). The details are illustrated in the tables.

Table B1. Left-Wing Regimes

Country	Regime Start- End	Description
Serbia	1919-1990	From the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the first democratic parliamentary elections.
Ukraine	1945-1992	From the formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until the nationwide elections.

Table B2. Right-Wing Regimes

Country	Regime Start- End	Description
Spain	1936-1978	From the year Francisco Franco started the presidency to the occurrence of the initial democratic general elections.
Germany	1933-1949	From the time Adolf Hitler assumed office as Chancellor and dictator until the occurrence of the first democratic federal elections in West Germany.
Colombia	1953-1958	From peaceful coup led by General Rojas against the democratically elected President Gomez to the elections for the first National Front president, which marked a compromise system between the main political parties
Taiwan	1945-1996	From the year Chiang Kai-shek seized leadership of Kuomintang (KMT) until the first democratic presidential election.
Chile	1979-1989	From the year of President Allende's against by Pinochet's coup to the first democratic presidential elections.

Brazil	1964-1985	From Starting with the coup against President Goulart and continuing until the time when presidential elections were finally permitted.

Supplementary Material C

Chapter 3 Results

Table C. Multilevel Logistic Regression Model Predicting Protest and Turnout Using Authoritarian past and Cultural dimensions

	DV: Protest						DV: Turnout					
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	OR	*SE*	*p*	*OR*	*SE*	*p*	*OR*	*SE*	*p*	*OR*	*SE*	*p*
Constant	-2.48	0.21	<.001	-2.57	0.63	<.001	1.80	0.11	<.001	2.54	0.28	<.001
Age	-0.51	0.04	<.001	-0.51	0.04	<.001	0.40	0.03	<.001	0.40	0.03	<.001
Education	0.10	0.04	.019	0.09	0.04	.022	0.08	0.03	.022	0.08	0.03	.014
Gender	0.02	0.04	.653	0.02	0.04	.601	0.08	0.03	.008	0.08	0.03	.008
Ideology	-0.19	0.03	<.001	-0.19	0.03	<.001	0.00	0.03	.889	0.00	0.03	.912
Political Interest	0.33	0.05	<.001	0.33	0.05	<.001	0.29	0.04	<.001	0.29	0.04	<.001
Internal Political Efficacy	-0.00	0.04	.988	0.00	0.04	.984	0.02	0.03	.538	0.02	0.03	.554
External Political Efficacy	0.12	0.04	.001	0.12	0.04	.002	0.04	0.03	.258	0.04	0.03	.228
Talking with close ties	0.15	0.05	.003	0.15	0.05	.004	0.34	0.04	<.001	0.35	0.04	<.001
Talking with weak ties	0.29	0.04	<.001	0.29	0.04	<.001	-0.02	0.04	.627	-0.02	0.04	.647
News consumption	0.24	0.04	<.001	0.24	0.04	<.001	0.13	0.04	.001	0.12	0.04	.001
Pro-attitudinal media	0.03	0.04	.453	0.03	0.04	.454	0.13	0.03	<.001	0.13	0.03	<.001
SWD	-0.24	0.04	<.001	-0.24	0.04	<.001	0.18	0.03	<.001	0.18	0.03	<.001
Compulsory voting	-0.24	0.21	.255	0.02	0.22	.917	0.13	0.11	.229	-0.05	0.10	.614

Years after democratic transition	-0.05	0.28	.850	-0.73	0.42	.080	0.25	0.14	.074	-0.26	0.19	.178
PDI	-0.38	0.34	.266	1.87	0.91	.040	-0.22	0.17	.188	-0.03	0.39	.942
IDV	-0.36	0.27	.171	0.97	0.64	.128	0.04	0.13	.737	0.01	0.27	.965
UAI	-0.33	0.29	.257	-1.17	0.41	.004	0.06	0.15	.691	0.19	0.18	.280
Authoritarian past				-0.72	0.86	.404				-0.72	0.38	.062
PDI × Authoritarian past				**-3.50**	**1.14**	**.002**				-0.08	0.50	.867
IDV × Authoritarian past				-1.31	0.74	.076				0.19	0.31	.551
UAI × Authoritarian past				**2.22**	**1.05**	**.036**				**-1.11**	**0.50**	**.026**
ICC		.14			.08			.04			.01	
N		16447			16447			16706			16706	
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2		.24 / .35			.27 / 0.33			.19 / .22			.22 / .23	

**Note.* Confidence intervals were not able to be computed since the models did not converge. All parameters should be cautiously interpreted.

Figure C-1. Interaction Plot (Authoritarian past X Cultural Dimensions) on Protest



Figure C-2. Interaction Plot (Authoritarian past X Cultural Dimensions) on Protest