Creating and Contesting Empire: The Colonial Legacy of Policing in Tanzania

By

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Abstract

This dissertation reframes contemporary policing in Tanzania as a colonial legacy. I examine the colonial roots and postcolonial persistence of policing to theorize the relationship between the police, state, and society. Using previously classified archival data and contemporary news and human rights reports, I trace the development of the police and state in former Tanganyika to present-day Tanzania. The dissertation is structured around three within-case studies of policing in three time periods: 1) the period of formal British colonization in Tanganyika (1919-1961); 2) the decade leading up to Tanganyika's transition to independence (1950-1961); and 3) the contemporary period under the late President John Magufuli (2015-2021). The colonial and postcolonial police not only sought to establish a hierarchical order to maintain state control and extraction, but the police created the state itself. Policing institutions persisted over time because of this inseparable relationship with the state, which extended colonial technologies and practices into the afterlife of empire. Without understanding the police as a colonial legacy, we remain ill-informed about the purpose and growth of policing over time. This dissertation offers context for understanding how police shape racialized, classed, sexualized, and gendered state control today.

Chapter I. Introduction: Reframing Policing as a Colonial Legacy

A global uprising against police violence emerged out of the year 2020 after police killed Ahmaud Arbery in February, Breonna Taylor in March, and Nina Pop, Tony McDade, and George Floyd in May. These were just five of the names raised up in protests around the world in a year when 249 Black people would be killed by the police in the United States, according to the Mapping Police Violence Database.[1] National and international headlines were flooded by the defacing and toppling of confederate statues in the United States and colonial statues in the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Greenland, to name a few. These demonstrations sought to expose how histories of state violence, encompassing enslavement, colonization, and genocide, continue to be celebrated. The range of these demonstrations included calls to strike down symbols of colonialism around the world.

Some examples from the first week of June 2020 are pictured below. Figure 1 depicts a protest in Accra, Ghana with a sign reads, "POLICE BRUTALITY = COLONIAL VIOLENCE" and a sticker of a Black Power fist in the corner (*BBC News* 2020). Figure 2 is a photo of a statue in Greenland of a Danish-Norwegian missionary, Hans Egede, who began colonization in Greenland in the eighteenth century. The statue was covered in red paint and tagged with the words, "GEROGE DECOLONIZE" (Skydsgaard and Gronholt-Pedersen 2020). Figure 3 is a photo of a statue in Brussels of Belgium's King Leopold II splattered with red paint and graffitied in yellow and purple, "BLM," "THIS MAN KILLED 15 MILLION PEOPLE," "FUCK RACISM," and "KNOW YOUR ENEMY" (O'Leary 2020). Other statues of Leopold II

[1] A "police killing" is defined by the Mapping Police Violence Database as "a case where a person dies as a result of being shot, beaten, restrained, intentionally hit by a police vehicle, pepper sprayed, tasered, or otherwise harmed by police officers, whether on-duty or off-duty" (Sinyangwe, McKesson, and Elzie 2021). Halfway through 2021 in the United States, as of May 25, there have only been six days where police did not kill someone.

were toppled and tagged throughout the country (Wynne 2020). Figure 4 is a photo of signs from a protest in Green Bay, Wisconsin. One sign says, "I CAN'T BREATHE" and "Justice for Floyd" and includes a drawing of a white man who looks like an American Revolutionary soldier (presumably George Washington) holding an American flag and standing on the neck of someone (presumably George Floyd) (Mathew 2020). Another sign depicts a Martin Luther King, Jr. quote, "An INJUSTICE anywhere is a threat to JUSTICE everywhere," and says "BLACK LIVES MATTER IN GREEN BAY" with a photo of George Floyd in the middle.

Figure 1. Protest in Accra, Ghana (*BBC News* 2020)

Figure 2. Statue in Greenland of Hans Egede, a Danish-Norwegian missionary (Skydsgaard and Gronholt-Pedersen 2020)

Figure 3. Statue in Brussels of Belgium's King Leopold II (O'Leary 2020)

Figure 4. Protest in Green Bay, Wisconsin (Mathew 2020)

Many protestors from these examples said that they were not just trying to expose injustices of the past but to raise awareness of how this past continues to shape the present. This raises the question, what do these colonial histories have to do with the police and George Floyd today? This dissertation argues that without understanding the police as a colonial legacy, we remain ill-informed about the purpose and growth of policing over time. This dissertation reframes policing as a colonial legacy.

I examine the colonial roots and postcolonial persistence of policing using the case of Tanzania, illustrative of a seemingly global trend of policing with excessive force. The reason Tanzania is well-suited for exploring the historical and contemporary dynamics of the police is captured in the title of a recent editorial: "How the police force became the single biggest threat to public safety in Tanzania" (Said 2020). Khalifa Said leaves us with the insight that "police brutality and the securitization of political and civic space" are not new phenomena in Tanzania,

but “as old as Tanzania itself.” My focus on what was formerly known as Tanganyika under British colonial rule (currently mainland Tanzania) is motivated by my interest in understanding the politics of policing in contemporary Tanzania. Tanzania is just one example of a global wave of increasingly autocratic regimes that have come to the fore over the past six years that have used violent policing strategies, although this dissertation shows that this phenomenon has a much longer history due to the persistent colonial legacy of the state.

Building on a critical criminological framework, I develop a new theory that explains the relationship between the police and state. I build this theory and draw these conclusions from the case of Tanzania and former Tanganyika under the British Empire, but this analysis holds implications for other places with experiences of coloniality as well. The colonial and postcolonial police not only sought to establish a hierarchical order to maintain state control and extraction, but the police were central to statebuilding and ultimately responsible for creating the state. Policing institutions persisted over time because of this inseparable relationship with the state, which extended colonial technologies and practices into the afterlife of empire.

Using previously classified archival data and an original collection of political violence reports, I trace the development of the police and state in former Tanganyika to present-day Tanzania to answer three questions: 1) how was policing used as a colonial tool, 2) how was it resisted, and 3) how might this history shape policing today? The dissertation is structured around an analysis of policing in three pivotal time periods: 1) the period of formal British colonization in Tanganyika (1919-1961); 2) the decade leading up to Tanganyika’s transition to independence (1950-1961); and 3) recent years in contemporary Tanzania (2015-2021).

I argue that the colonial police played a central role in asserting imperial rule, establishing hierarchical order, and extracting labor/resources. But just as the police played a

central repressive role, they were also an entry-point for societies to resist colonization, leading to an interconnected dynamic between resistance to policing and resistance to colonialism. Colonial policing might still impact the present, since policing did not end with British rule but remained as a leftover in the aftermath of empire, despite and because of this resistance. This dissertation offers context for understanding how police shape racialized, classed, sexualized, and gendered state control today. Furthermore, these lineages of repression and resistance might suggest new ways forward for the remaining work of decolonization.

Argument

This dissertation offers a new explanation of the relationship between the police, state, and society. It explores how the creation and contestation of the colonial police shaped the modern capitalist state under and after the British Empire and explains how understanding the police as a colonial legacy is fundamental to understanding the contemporary politics of policing. There are four main parts to my argument.

First, *the police were central to establishing state control and order*. The police were developed throughout the British Empire to serve as the primary "tool," "machine," and "weapon" for establishing centralized control and hierarchical order in and through modern capitalist states.

Second, the *police produced the state*. Through attempting to create control and order, the colonial police produced the modern Tanganyikan state, its extractive capitalist economy, and the power of the British Empire.

Third, *resisting the police was central to resisting colonization.* Contesting the police was bound up with resisting the British colonial state and forms of imperialism following

independence in Tanganyika. Anti-colonial resistance to the police helped end formal British rule, but, paradoxically, also accelerated policing in and after the transition to independence.

Finally, *the police remain today as continuing and contested colonial legacy.* The co-constitutive relationship between the police and state helped both assemblages persist, even (or especially) throughout critical junctures, such as major transitions of state power (e.g., independence), international conflicts (e.g., WWII and Cold War), and neoimperial interventions (e.g., development and foreign aid). Despite reforms and resistance to British control over the police after independence, colonial policing institutions continued to shape state practices and ideologies of racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed control.

Contribution to the Literature

This dissertation contributes to three gaps in the literature that have inhibited our understanding of the relationship between the police, state, and society in contexts that have experienced coloniality. The police are often absent from scholarship on colonization and decolonization, Global South security studies, and comparative analyses of statebuilding. I bridge insights on the police from various disciplines, including history, anthropology, and sociology, with the political science and African politics literature on the state to understand how colonial legacies may be reproduced and resisted.

First, there is a lack of research on the development of colonial police and on what happened to the police at the turn of independence in colonized territories. This is an important critical juncture for understanding changes and continuities to policing institutions following formal imperial rule around the world because the police were originally introduced as a tool for establishing colonial order and facilitating economic extraction (Killingray 1986). Scholars of

colonialism have lamented the scarcity of research on the colonial police in general but especially during this pivotal period (Andersen and Killingray 1992, 3). Institutional changes leading up to the fall of the British Empire have implications for how the police operated after this point, such as the expansion of policing in response to growing anti-colonial and nationalist politics, militarization of police forces, deployment of the police for counterinsurgency operations, use of the police for intelligence gathering on opposition, and shifting ideologies and designs on policing (D. Anderson and Killingray 1992). Changes and continuities in policing during and right after the watershed of African independence movements are crucial for understanding postcolonial policing because "the process of decolonisation marked a distinct, novel and important phase in the evolution of policing" (Andersen and Killingray 1992, 3). In other words, a better understanding of policing during this pivotal period can illuminate the successes, challenges, and remaining work of decolonization.

Second, the policing literature on the Global South is sparse, and the security and intelligence literature within this geopolitical scope fixates on the military. Existing literature largely overlooks the often connected but unique role of the police in broader security, intelligence, control, and surveillance systems. Thirty years after Andersen and Killingray's critique, security scholars point out the broader dearth of studies on non-Western, non-Anglophone national institutions and international relations, with the exception of militaries (Maguire and Franklin 2020, 1). Historians point out the dominance of international policing studies on the United States, Canada, western European countries, and Australia (Johansen 2017, 114). And, international relations scholars point out that the Eurocentric nature of security studies impedes our understanding of the mutually constitutive nature of Global South and Global North security relations (Barkawi and Laffey 2006). These critiques raise the question of

whether we can fully understand policing in the Global North before we understand policing in the Global South (Johansen 2017, 115).

Third, there is a lack of comparative research on the police in relation to the state. Some have shown how establishing law and order is central to building and maintaining states, particularly under empire and for the purpose of capitalist extraction (D. Bayley 1975). In the case of the United States, there is emerging multidisciplinary scholarship on policing, statebuilding, and empire, both domestically (Soss and Weaver 2017; Vitale 2017; Seigel 2018; Razack 2020) and abroad (Camp and Heatherton 2016; Bowling, Reiner, and Sheptycki 2019; Schrader 2019). However, the police are often absent from global comparative analyses of colonial and postcolonial statebuilding and related contemporary outcomes regarding authoritarianism and identity-based violence.

Theory of Policing as Statebuilding

I theorize the relationship between the police and the state by first building on a critical criminological framework. Fundamental to critical criminology is the insight that the institution of the modern police is relatively new and unique to state societies, and it was developed to serve the interests of those in power. Therefore, the British colonial police system, and its successors, were not neutral tools to maintain social order throughout occupied territories and later postcolonial states. Rather, the police system was used to produce and reproduce the economic and political power of empire and its legacy states.

Given the inextricable relationship between the police, state, and power, I propose a new theory that the police were central to statebuilding and ultimately responsible for creating the state. Policing is not just a method of state control, and the police are not merely agents of the

state, but they bring the state into being. This constitutive relationship is most clear when examining how the main imperatives of the state are achieved: hegemony, legitimacy, autonomy, security, revenue, and accumulation (C. Young 1997). If the police carry out these defining characteristics of the state, which is likely in contexts that do not have states as units of political organization, it can be said that the police are bringing the state into being. This has implications for whose interests the police and state serve following periods of intensive statebuilding, such as under and after the British Empire. This theory can help explain how contestation of the contemporary police may be understood as contestation of the contemporary state and the legacies of violent colonial occupation it represents and reproduces.

Research Design

Methods and data

The purpose and development of the police and state are especially observable during the period of colonial statebuilding in the early twentieth century. Processes behind the development of the police and state are most evident when and where colonial legitimacy was contested. Using colonial archival data and a variety of other primary and secondary sources, I examine the historical development of the police in relation to the state during British colonization in Tanganyika, changes and continuities in policing during the critical juncture of independence, and how these legacies manifest and why they matter in the contemporary moment. This methodological approach is modeled on studies that use process tracing to examine the connection between historical legacies of slavery and contemporary mass incarceration in the United States (see for example Davis 2003; M. Alexander 2010).

I collected data primarily at the U.K. National Archives, the British Library, the London University Institute of Commonwealth Studies, the Senate House Library and Archives, and the Herskovits Library of African Studies. The most informative files were part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office migrated archives, a previously classified collection of documents from Britain's former colonial administrations that were sent to the Colonial Office before countries' independence due to their sensitive and incriminating nature.[2] I also drew from curated materials at the City of London Police Museum, the Imperial War Museum, and the British Museum.

I take "creation" and "contestation" not as two punctuated moments in a process but as incremental, iterative, and contingent processes that unfolded over time together. The creation of the colonial police includes the legislative introduction of the British police and prison system in all of its imperial holdings around the world, but also the many developments, both bureaucratic and otherwise, that built and fortified police institutions over time. Policing institutions did not create themselves but were intentional tools of control and order that had to be continually brought into being to carry out colonization. Along every step of the way, these institutions were challenged by the people colonizers sought to make into orderly, civilized, and law-abiding subjects. The contestation of the police system encompasses the many moments when individuals questioned, challenged, and resisted the creation of the police system.

Achieving Tanzanian independence did not happen as a single event but was continually negotiated and bureaucratically constituted. The colonial police, surveillance system, and

[2] The administrative background listed in the catalogue for the collection reads: "This material was created by former British colonial administrations as part of their daily administration activities. As British dependent territories came to independence decisions had to be taken about which papers to destroy, which to leave for successor administrations, and which to ship back to the UK. The general rule, as set out in a Colonial Office guidance telegram of 3 May 1961 on the 'disposal of classified records and accountable documents', was that successor Governments should not be given papers which: might embarrass HMG or other governments; might embarrass members of the police, military forces, public servants or others eg police informers; might compromise sources of intelligence information; or might be used unethically by Ministers in the successor government" (The National Archives 2021).

constructions of criminality were key battlegrounds in this process. Colonial bureaucratic and administrative minutiae (including informal minutes, confidential telegrams, conference papers, intelligence briefings, meeting readouts, newspaper clippings, annual reports, parliamentary debates, ordinances, ordinances to revise other ordinances, etc.) paint the picture of how colonization and decolonization took place. By reading against the archival grain (Stoler 2009), details emerge about colonial officials' and settlers' priorities, anxieties, and contradictions. These shaped the development of the police and state institutional responses to resistance, which the British continuously faced throughout their attempts to establish externally imposed law and order. By analyzing these dynamics, the challenges, compromises, and successes of anti-colonial and decolonial strategies come to light. It is from this vantage point that we can see the otherwise obscured institutional and ideological creation and contestation of the police, empire, and state.

This dissertation design is informed by research and Swahili training in Tanzania, as well as consultation with experts and practitioners from other parts of the continent. My understanding of the police, identity, and politics benefits tremendously from Tanzanian scholars, lawyers, and experts of the legal system and human rights organizations. To obtain contemporary data, I drew from news reports and human rights reports, and I piloted the collection of data on political violence against gender and sexual minorities across ten African countries for the Armed Location and Event Data Project. While completing this fieldwork in the United Kingdom, I also learned invaluable insights from assisting a human rights organization with casework for LGBTQ+ individuals claiming asylum from around the world.

Analytical approach

This project began as an investigation of the politics of marginalization based on gender and sexuality in Tanzania. However, I began to pivot to examine policing more broadly and historically after problematizing my positionality as a white settler doing research on repression in contemporary Africa, and reckoning with the ethical and logistical challenges of working on politically charged issues. At the same time, I was continuously educated on how queer and trans folks in my own community differentially experience violence, and why our resistance—led by queer and trans women of color—has manifested as a broader contestation of the carceral state.

This project was inspired by the visions of Black, feminist, queer, trans, abolitionist leaders confronting police violence in the United States and across the world. Some of the most formative thinkers and ideas that transformed this dissertation's approach and guided the analysis that follows include but are not limited to: Cathy Cohen's cautioning against focusing on homogenized identities instead of how power gets distributed across categories (C. J. Cohen 1997); M. Jacqui Alexander's critique of imperialism and nationalism with queer theory and Black feminism (M. J. Alexander 2005); Ruth Wilson Gilmore's, Angela Davis's, and other abolitionist thinkers' decades of work conceptualizing the multi-sited violence of the prison industrial complex (Gilmore 2007; Davis 2003; Oparah 2005; M. Alexander 2010; Stanley 2011; Kaba 2020); Sylvia Federici's insight that capitalism is "necessarily committed to racism and sexism" (Federici 2004, 17); and Sylvia Tamale's, María Lugones's, T.J. Tallie's, and Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí's complicating of the colonial and neocolonial impact on gender and sexuality (Tamale 2013; Lugones 2007; Tallie 2019; Oyěwùmí 1997).

This research design is also indebted to scholarship on the persistence of colonial institutional legacies and the challenging of these legacies. Ann Laura Stoler has curated

genealogies of "imperial debris," or the processes through which imperial power manifests in the present (2013), as well as a critical approach to uncover how colonial leftovers of "duress, durability, and duration" inform political practices today (2016, 7). Following Stoler's method, I take colonial lineages to be "messy, troubles spaces" that are "key points of access to imperial logics that depend on the differential allocation of resources and rights—and the racialized distinctions in which they are cast" (2016, 21). Through interrogating seemingly obvious and fixed concepts in the colonial archives, like security and sexuality, we can gain insight into how imperial governance and colonial states worked (21-22).

Jyoti Puri traces enduring colonial laws, practices, policies, and discourses that were introduced to establish colonial order through controlling sexuality in India (2016). Puri finds that these institutions were built into the state which enabled them to persist after the end of formal colonial rule, and these institutions are targets of civil society organizing today. Following Puri's conceptual framework, which resonates with Stoler's, this dissertation approaches the state as a "fragmented, messy, contingent, and inconsistent" assemblage and a "discursive illusion" (10). Puri "demystifies" the state by unearthing the banal nitty-gritty details of governance to show how the state has been produced and challenged (10-13). Stoler and Puri's methodological, empirical, and theoretical contributions provide an invaluable guide for understanding the complex dynamics, practices, and institutions that persist as contested colonial legacies. This approach can extend and deepen comparative African politics to show the extent to which "the colonial state lives" (C. Young 1997, 2) through the institution of the colonial police. To fill in this hole in the comparative politics literature and explain the relationship between the police, empire, and state, this dissertation offers a new analysis of the development of the British colonial police in an African state at the turn of independence.

Case selection and rationale

The dissertation is structured around an analysis of policing in three pivotal time periods: 1) the period of formal British colonization in Tanganyika (1919-1961); 2) the decade leading up to Tanganyika's transition to independence (1950-1961); and 3) recent years in contemporary Tanzania (2015-2021). I use the case of former Tanganyika to answer the question, how did the creation and contestation of the colonial police shape the modern capitalist state at the end of the British Empire? The universe of cases to explore this question must have experienced British imperial rule; inherited British policing and state institutions; and have accessible quality data on the period of colonization and the transition to independence. Critical criminological frameworks are most useful for examining early periods of capitalist and state development, so this period of formal British colonial rule when the capitalist state was originally imposed throughout the empire is crucial for understanding consequent institutions.

Cases on the African continent are well suited to answering this question because the "Scramble for Africa," launched by the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, was one of the most formalized and wide-reaching processes of mass land dispossession and occupation by European powers in the world. Tanganyika would become a UN Trust Territory under the British a bit later following World War I, but the territories that were carved out of existing polities during this time, like German East Africa, are important sites for understanding the origins, development, and contestation of imperial institutions. Data availability and quality also played a role in selecting this case, as the U.K. recently released a repository of confidential colonial records that they had concealed since they formally left East Africa which I was able to access in

the U.K. My familiarity with the case and language proficiency in Swahili gives me leverage to interpret data accurately and apply my theoretical framework in a nuanced way.

While a number of African cases fit these selection criteria, Tanganyika is the best case because of its historical commercial significance on the Swahili Coast and geopolitical significance to the British Empire, due to its interconnectedness to neighboring former Rhodesia, former Nyasaland, Kenya, and Uganda. The development and contestation of the police and state in Tanganyika was bound up with colonization and anti-colonial resistance in these other territories. Because Tanganyika was occupied as a colony later than these other areas (after being occupied by Germany for a short period), Tanganyika can be seen as a culmination and further testing ground of British colonial policies that had been used for the past hundred years leading up to that point, and there is an accessible documentary record for the whole period of British occupation in this area. Tanganyika's location on the Swahili Coast of the Indian Ocean also made it a major commercial hub that was vital for transportation and trade, and this historical importance dates back to the powerful wealthy city-state of Kilwa Kisiwani seven hundred years before the Germans or British arrived on the mainland. Tanganyika is crucial not only for fleshing out the relationship between police, empire, and state in the East African region, but it may shed light on how the police and state were developed and contested elsewhere leading up to the fall of the British Empire.

The former colonial capital of Tanganyika, Dar es Salaam, was also an international intellectual hub throughout the twentieth century. The world's leading Black radical, critical Marxist, and pan-African thinkers of the 1960s and 1970s passed through the University of Dar es Salaam at one point (Bedasse 2013; Markle 2017). Many of the thinkers and activists that would make pilgrimages to Tanzania were at the forefront of challenging imperialism and

furthering movements that would lead to Black liberation across the continent and diaspora (most notably, for example, Walter Rodney, Claude Ake, Dani Wadada Nabudere, Stokely Carmichael, Robert F. Williams, Malcolm X, and of course Julius Nyerere). The work left by these preeminent individuals and continued by their students help guide this analysis of the Tanzanian state today and its colonial and postcolonial influences.

Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized both chronologically and thematically. I first advance a new theory that the police were central to statebuilding during colonization (Chapter Two). Next, I move to the empirical section (Chapters Three, Four, and Five), which is structured around three within-case studies of policing in three time periods. In these chapters, I trace the development of the colonial police and the state and how Africans navigated and resisted these institutions. I conclude by examining implications beyond Tanzania for understanding policing as a colonial legacy in other contexts with historical and ongoing experiences of coloniality.

Chapter Three shows how policing gender and sexuality in Tanganyika was instrumental to colonization. The police were a key tool of establishing colonial control, and British values, such as heteronormativity, were institutionalized and instrumental to creating social, political, and economic order. Through this process of attempting to consolidate power and regulate social order, the colonial police produced the modern Tanganyikan state, its extractive capitalist economy, and the power of the British Empire.

Chapter Four finds that resisting the police was central to resisting colonization. Anti-colonial resistance to the state vis-à-vis the police helped end formal British rule, but, paradoxically, also accelerated policing in the transition to independence. Anti-colonial and anti-

police resistance led the British to further strengthen and militarize the police forces on their way out, and the British ensured that they would maintain some control over the police after they left through legislation and the constitution. The co-constitutive relationship between the police and state helped both assemblages persist after the fall of empire.

Chapter Five argues that legacies of coloniality, policing, and resistance continue to inform state practices and ideologies today. Despite resistance to the police throughout colonization and reforms after independence, colonial policing institutions continue to shape racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed control because these institutions constitute the state. The police system is not only a site where people—especially marginalized and criminalized people—experience state violence around the world. It is also a site of political contestation, resistance, and decolonization. Beyond Tanzania, these findings matter for understanding policing and the state in many contemporary contexts that experienced or continue to experience forms of coloniality.

Chapter Six concludes with the implications of reframing the police as a colonial legacy and the stakes if we neglect to identify the police as a colonial legacy. I end with a discussion of emerging social movements that are making transformative demands focused on abolishing the police to continue the processes of decolonization and liberation on a global scale.

Chapter II. Theory of the Police and State

I propose a new theory of the relationship between police and state: the police were central to statebuilding and ultimately responsible for creating the state. This theory builds on and makes a new contribution to the field of critical criminology, which provides a framework for challenging assumptions about institutions that are commonly perceived as given or preexisting, like crime, the police, and state. I first define the key concepts at work in this theory: the colonial police and the state. Next, I provide the critical criminological framework that underpins it, as well as an assessment of previous theories of the police and state. I then explain my theory that the police were central to statebuilding during colonization and show what it would look like if the police were responsible for carrying out the defining imperatives of the state. I conclude by considering the contribution and broader implications of this theory of policing as statebuilding.

Key Concepts

Invention of the colonial police

Throughout this dissertation, I refer to the police as a set of institutions and practices, a system, and a force of personnel that was introduced at the start of formal colonial rule across the British Empire. Colonial police forces were born out of the first professionalized police forces in Ireland[3] and were deployed throughout the Empire. "Modern police" organizations became

[3] The modern police is typically dated back to 1812-1818, when Robert Peele developed the Irish Constabulary as Chief Secretary for Ireland, which then spurred the professionalization of the British police force in London with the well-known story of the Metropolitan Police (Sinclair 2007, 11). The official "Colonial Police Service" would

distinguished by the following developments in the early nineteenth century: public support and bureaucratic form, full-time employed police officers, permanent fixed rules and procedures in departments that continuously employed police officers, and departmental accountability to a central governmental authority (Lundman 1980). The "colonial police" consisted of a group of institutions created for the dual purpose of establishing control and order to uphold the administration of colonies, and extracting revenue to finance these territories (Killingray 1986, 411).

Professionalized police forces did not exist before the British arrived in what became known as the Tanganyika Territory in 1919, although the German East Africa administration had previously employed some local leaders as *akidas* to assist European officials with day-to-day law enforcement and tax collection (Willis 1993, 55). These origins are why Tanzanian legal scholars refer to the modern police force as "a colonial state invention…necessary to insure the enforcement of colonial rule and the efficient functioning of the colonial economy" (Shivji and Yahya-Othman 2014, V). In theory, the police were distinct from other security apparatuses, like the military which predates the police and was used for enslavement and conquest. In reality, there was significant overlap.[4] Micol Seigel has referred to the alleged separation of the police and military as a myth that aimed to depict the police as a civilian force in order to increase its legitimacy (Seigel 2018, 13–14). It follows that part of the role of the colonial police was to legitimize the authority of external imperial governance by delegitimizing indigenous institutions and customs (Brogden 1987, 9–10, 14). In this sense, the police were meant to appear

emerge in 1936 to standardize all imperial forces and attempt to bring them more in line with the British model (Sinclair 2007, 6).

[4] Some examples of this overlap that I found in Tanganyika Police Annual Reports included the following: incidences when the military backed up the police to suppress disturbances (like cattle raids, strikes, and riots); instances when the police were used to replace the military when detachments were pulled out; and regular trainings of the police by the military (through annual "refresher courses" and when they received new kinds of guns).

fundamentally different from the military so that they would be perceived as legitimate professionalized forces, instead of occupying troops, that maintained internal rather than external security by surveilling everyday threats and controlling crime from within.

British colonial police forces were made up of roughly three groups of people that were structured hierarchically: at the bottom were indigenous Africans in constabulary roles who constituted the majority of force, in the middle and top were international recruits who had been trained in the metropole and other colonies (especially India, which was one of Britain's oldest colonies), and at the top were white officers in the primary leadership roles. Figure 1 shows the leadership of the territory next to the leadership of the police and symbolizes the closeness of the colonial state and colonial police, as well as the racialized nature of the colonial and therefore policing project. Many white officers enrolled in the colonial police forces because they could not find work elsewhere after serving in wars, and they were motivated by a "childhood fascination" with stories of African explorers (e.g., David Livingstone) that told of "savagery," "horror," and "gruesome atrocities" (e.g., see Callander 2014, 31). Officers could express a preference for which territory they were assigned but usually did not know anything and were not required to know anything about that place. These stories, bound up with feelings of "racial superiority," may have shaped the dynamic not only between police officers and colonized populations, but also among racialized groups of police officers (Callander 2014, 22 and 80).[5]

The broader composition of the Tanganyika Police Force in the 1950s is pictured in Figure 2. Indigenous populations were recruited to serve in the lower rungs (but not any higher)

[5] R.N. Callander recounts in his memoir a time early on in his career when another white police officer described to him how Africans view them in Tanganyika and what the dynamic among police officers is like: "everyone rates us somewhere below a rabid centipede with the pox. Ah, I hear you say; except the police ourselves; at least we are united in brotherhood under the badge of *Salus Populi.* But no, not true. I discover to my dismay, that even in the ranks of our beloved Force there is Us and Them. Us Whites, and the Rest. And the rest don't really like the whites. Plus, there are more of Them. A sodding great lot more. And everything you want done, has to be done by one of Them" (Callander 2014, 80).

of colonial police forces across the British Empire as part of indirect rule. This system was resorted to because it would have been unaffordable and implausible to have a wide-reaching European military presence to establish effective occupation and collect taxes throughout vast unfamiliar territories. Indirect rule, however, was reluctantly and inconsistently implemented by European officials across districts because Europeans saw indigenous authorities as inefficient, inadequate, and incompetent (Willis 1993, 55 and 59–61). This system was gradually phased out in Tanganyika with growing "disillusionment" in the 1940s and 1950s and replaced with representative councils (Willis 1993, 63; citing Austen 1967, 605).

Figure 1. Photos of the Tanganyika Territory governor and police commissioners (left) and two provincial commissioners with an Australian officer (right), circa 1949-1958 (Callander 2014, 192–93)



Great White Chief – Governor Sir Edward Twining, with Police Commissioner Robert Foulger and Senior Assistant Commissioner George Johnson. Beside them is 'Mister Reliable', Inspector Ernest. *Photo* Police P.R.

Motco P.C.s Odilo and Mbaruku with author. *Photo* Author

Figure 2. Photo of Tanganyika police group, hat badge, and pins, 1956 (WorthPoint n.d.)



The state

This dissertation is specifically interested in the relationship of the police with the building of the state, and both of which were born out of modernity and global capitalism. Modernity has its origins in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European Age of Enlightenment. Social contract theories emerged during this period about the idealized relationship between law-abiding citizens and a liberty-respecting sovereign. This relationship was believed to result in a thriving capitalist market, improved science and reason, religious tolerance, and democratic republics. This kind of social-contract-based state and society could then lead to the ultimate Enlightenment goal of political, social, and economic modernization and progress for human civilization.

Many of these same thinkers who championed individual liberty, universal rights, equality, and contractual relationships with a sovereign political power, also justified externally imposed imperial domination with their perceived obligation of bringing modernity and

civilization to the rest of the world (Kohn and Reddy 2017). "Enlightenment" had a double meaning that was perpetuated to justify colonization: light symbolized Europe leaving religious darkness for secular knowledge, and then bringing their light, which become synonymous for European whiteness, to a world of darkness (Kendi 2017, 80). The invention of the modern police came out of Enlightenment ideas that the police were meant to aid in delivering modern civilization and democracy to the world (Rawlings 2001, 1). Enlightenment ideas behind imperialism and its requisite institutions, like the modern criminal punishment system, cannot be understood apart from ideas that Black Africans were inferior, uncivilized, and disorderly and in need of modernization.

Global capitalism is the second feature integral to development of the state because it was a decisive driver of the Enlightenment's institutional developments. The capitalist state's purpose was to legally and economically structure the joint extractive and civilizing venture of Empire. Western Europe was only able to find its way out of the seventeenth century economic crisis and feudalism by and through capturing what Marx called the "world market" through empire, which enabled extremely rapid expansion and accumulation of profit, especially in England (Hobsbawm 1960, 109–10). To be sure, Western Europe's Industrial Revolution was only achieved by and through global capitalism (Hobsbawm 1960, 100). Africa was responsible for the development of Europe, just as Europe is responsible for the underdevelopment of Africa (Rodney 1972).

I also draw from Weber's classical definition of a state as a "community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber 1958, 78 italics in original) and Tilly's concept of a "nation-state," which controls a defined, continuous, centralized, differentiated territory and reinforces its claims

through gaining a monopoly over physical coercion within that territory (Tilly 1975, 27). England cohered into the first modern capitalist nation-state after it moved away from feudalism and found its way out of economic crisis by expanding its global empire and trade (Lachmann 1989, 47). This analysis attends to the modern capitalist nation-state in particular because it is tied to the historical context and nexus of forces from which the colonial police emerged. In the following section I lay out a theoretical framework to analyze *how* the colonial police came to be a core feature of this state.

Critical Criminological Framework

I theorize the relationship between the police and state by building on a critical criminological framework, and specifically Marxist and counter-colonial criminology theories. The birth of the field of critical criminology is usually dated to the 1960s and 1970s, a period of burgeoning social movements that challenged forms of state violence, including war, neoliberalism, mass incarceration, and policing. However, throughout the early 1900s, intellectuals in Africa and the Diaspora were questioning biological and sociological explanations of crime that were rooted in anti-blackness and that sought to maintain white supremacy. Black radical thinkers like Ida B. Wells, W.E.B. Du Bois, Franz Fanon, Walter Rodney, and Stuart Hall are not conventionally viewed as critical criminologists and their contributions transcend criminology (see for example DuBois 1996; Gabbidon 1996). However, these thinkers laid the groundwork for the field to pivot away from questions like, "what causes crime and how can it be prevented?" Their work destabilized the notion that crime was a given, fixed, scientific, and neutral category and informed questions like, "how does crime come to be

defined a certain way by the state?" and "what kind of order does this create and who does it serve?"

Given this constructed nature of crime and its interwovenness with systems of domination, early theories of the emergence of the police appropriately emphasize the interconnected emergence of the state and class hierarchies. However, these theories problematically conceptualize the evolution of the police as a function of increasingly complex societies and overlook the role of colonialism in diffusing policing institutions and the modern state itself throughout the world. I put forth a new theory to explain how policing institutions have not only become a core and contested feature of the modern state. I theorize that the police produced the racialized, gendered, sexualized, and classed state and continuing forms of imperialism. Policing is not just a method of modern state control but is constitutive of the modern state itself. The institutions that constituted the state were not pre-existing and given, but they had to be brought into being through repeated legible actions, or performances. I see policing as a key performance of power that brings the state, and its composite apparatuses, into existence. In this sense, the state did not just make the police to carry out its policies; instead, *the police made the state*. European colonial powers sought to establish racial order and rule through the legal and economic framework of a state. This state was not just a government building but a set of policies, discourses, practices, and buildings that had to be created by people on the ground.

I theorize the police were central to bringing these components into being. The police were the main institution at the British Empire's disposal to (attempt to) monopolize violence. The police produced and then sought to safeguard the state and capitalist political economy. British colonial administrators used policies of indirect rule to create this hierarchical racial

order, and they did so through the institutions and practices of policing. Creating this order was an iterative process because the Africans who the British sought to make into law-abiding colonial subjects did not just submit. The police did not just maintain and sustain a pre-existing order or an order that was eventually accepted, but they had to constantly bring about an order, and they did so through a system of criminalization, discipline, and punishment. Contestation of the police may therefore be understood as contestation of the authority and legitimacy of the state and the legacies of violent colonial occupation it represents and reproduces.

Police unique to states

An essential insight from critical criminology is the assertion that the modern police system is a relatively new apparatus that was created with the modern state and to serve the interests of those in power (Michalowski 1985, 170). In conjunction with the wave of critical criminologies that came out of the mid-twentieth century were attempts to determine the relationship between the police and state. Early theories appropriately emphasized the interconnected emergence of the police, state, and class hierarchies. However, these theories conceptualized the evolution of the police as a function of increasingly complex societies and overlooked the role of colonialism in diffusing policing institutions and the modern state itself throughout the world. My theory builds on the groundwork provided by these initial theories and serves as a corrective.

Before the British diffusion of modern police forces around the world, the functions associated with the police "were carried out primarily as a by-product of other social relationships" and by volunteers or temporary employees (Bowling, Reiner, and Sheptycki 2019, 6). Institutions of order and justice looked entirely different in precolonial societies, many of

which “existed without any formalized system of social control or policing” (Bowling, Reiner, and Sheptycki 2019, 6). This led early anthropologists and historians to try to understand what led to an emergence of police on a global scale using their pseudoscientific theories of social evolution.

One of the first studies was a comparative legal institutional examination of 51 pre-industrial societies (Schwartz and Miller 1964). It found that police (defined as a “specialized armed force used partially or wholly for norm enforcement”) only appeared where there was “a substantial degree of division of labour” (Schwartz and Miller 1964, 161 and 166). Another study measured the degree of specialization and institutionalization of police functions in 169 societies and found that more “specialized police functions are strongly associated with more complex social stratification and with the presence of the state” (Robinson and Scaglion 1987, 140). They concluded that the formalized police systems “follow and parallel” the formation of class society (Robinson and Scaglion 1987, 129). Societies that had specialized police functions had these functions associated with a state organization and with class structure.

In addition to the above studies, which focused primarily on the Global South (i.e., scope conditions were invariably described “pre-industrial,” “pre-literature,” and “pre-colonial” societies), there were also studies on the emergence of the police in the Global North. The relationship between the police, state, and capital was found in Western Europe, where establishing law and order was central to building and maintaining states, particularly for the purpose of capitalist extraction (D. Bayley 1975). In studying the formation of the police in the United States, scholars similarly highlighted the connection between the growth of the state and class divisions. One sociologist found that modern police departments were spurred by increasing economic specialization, class creation and stratification, and population size (Bacon

1939). Well before this point though, in almost every Southern colony and state, patrols emerged to police enslaved Black people to prevent them from deserting and uprising on plantations (slave patrols first appeared in legislation in 1704 in the Carolina colony) (Reichel 1988, 59). Chattel slavery and plantations provided the bedrock of the American political economy, and these patrols would grow into the modern and professionalized police forces known today (Reichel 1988). In the American North, police forces concurrently and subsequently emerged in urban areas to break up labor organizing (Harring 1983), with the first municipal police force introduced in Boston in 1838 (Savage 1865; Lane 1967) and other major cities thereafter (Richardson 1970; Flinn and Wilkie 1973; Schneider 1980).

Leading contemporary criminologists maintain that the police emerged with and for social hierarchies to protect emergent powerful groups (Lynch, Michalowski, and Groves 2000, 145). This shift from social systems that serve the community to social systems that serve the state (Robinson and Scaglion 1987) are particularly necessary in capitalist societies, where there is a clear connection between the development of the police and the development of the state.[6] The development of the police is not just associated with the development of the state, but the police has been considered "an institutional mainstay of the modern state system" (Bowling, Reiner, and Sheptycki 2019, 41), which has led to the perceptive observation that "the history of police is the history of state power" (Neocleous 2021, 46).

Policing therefore arose not to protect *all* interests, but to protect the interests of those gaining power, who subsequently gain an interest in protecting that power and controlling other

[6] The police have been instrumental in communist and fascist orders as well for establishing control, economic exploitation, and repression. However, from my research and others', it appears there is something about the privatization of property, private ownership over the means of production, and increasing division of labor (Bowling, Reiner, and Sheptycki 2019, 6) that is inseparable from the development of the modern professionalized police force. This is an area where further comparative studies could examine the shared and disparate factors that led to the emergence of modern police under different types of regimes and economic systems.

groups. This is most clear in historical studies of the colonial police, which tend to sidestep the state in their analyses. Nonetheless, in a cross-national history of the colonial police, Georgina Sinclair unambiguously mentions, "any police force has been and always is intrinsically linked to the state within which it operates: a police force is in reality an agent of the state" (Sinclair 2007, 11).

These theories highlight the importance of considering the state and police together because there seems to be something intrinsic to stateness that has brought on the development of the police. But, this begs the question, how can the police be an "agent" of the state, "made possible" by the state system, and inseparable from historical "state power" when there is not already a state in existence? This is where early theories of the police and its relationship to the state and society fall short.

First, early theories are fundamentally mistaken in their linear evolutionary view of political, social, and economic institutions. These scholars are biased by the racist paradigm that was popularized by the social sciences that all societies begin in a primordial state of being then gradually develop into more complex societies over time—depending on their fitness and aptitude—which leads them to adopt more complex institutions, like the state and police. Second, these scholars are confined by conflict theory's limitations in their view of the state and class, and they consequently conclude that the state, in needing to control supposedly naturally-forming classes, created the institution of the police. This presupposes the existence of a global capitalist state system, which was not in existence prior to the imposition of modern police forces around the world. Third, even in describing the historical and theoretical relationship between conflict, domination, and the state, these theories leave out colonialism. Without an examination of colonialism, any theory that seeks to conceptualize the relationship between the police and

state and to understand the factors that caused and shaped the emergence of the modern police will be fundamentally flawed. This was a huge oversight in the emergence of the field of critical criminology (as it is conventionally conceived), as well, which sought to understand how the construction of crime is always implicated in systems of power.

Counter-colonial criminology

Biko Agozino introduced "counter-colonial criminology" to problematize criminology itself "as a tool for imperialist domination" that continues to operate as a repressive technology alongside the police, prison, and army (2003, 228). Agozino comes from a lineage of thinkers who he considers African colonial criminologists: Franz Fanon advocated for reparative justice over punitive justice; Walter Rodney viewed colonial law and order as a means to optimize conditions for exploitation; and Kwame Nkrumah saw how neo-colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism were able to operate and extract capital without physical occupation (Agozino 2018, 3–5). Agozino emphasizes the difficult imperative of decolonizing criminology and its associated institutions, especially amidst setter colonialism and recolonization projects and in a field that is dominated by patriarchal white supremacist imperialist thought (2018). Agozino calls for the "withering away of the law," invoking Marx's "withering away of the state."[7] This is based on the logic that if class oppression went away, there would not be a need for a repressive state or repressive law (Agozino 2018, 14).

Critical criminologies like Agozino's, and anti-criminologies (S. Cohen 1988), are invaluable for understanding the relationship between police and state, and also the interconnected dynamics of crime, power, race, control, hierarchy, empire, and capital. New

[7] Marx borrowed this concept from studying Black anti-slavery abolitionist organizing in the United States (Agozino 2014).

fields are emerging in critical criminology, such as indigenous criminology (Cunneen and Tauri 2016) and southern criminology (Carrington, Hogg, and Sozzo 2016), to imagine what decolonized criminal justice theories and institutions might look like, to decenter Western/Northern/Metropolitan/Euro-American criminological knowledge production, and to name and end the crime of imperial violence. They suggest ways forward for imagining how colonial-rooted institutions like the police, which was established to guard the repressive state and repressive law, might be "withered away."

These approaches inform my analysis of the colonial police in one African context at the end of the British Empire. Using a counter-colonial criminological framework, it becomes clear that the colonial police system, and its successors, were not neutral tools to maintain social order. Rather, I argue that the police system was used to produce and reproduce the economic and political power of empire by bringing the state into being.

Policing as Statebuilding

Given the inextricable relationship between the police, state, and power, I propose a new theory that the police were central to statebuilding and ultimately were responsible for creating the state. I begin by explaining how I conceptualize statebuilding, drawing from Crawford Young, and then show how the police were central to carrying out the defining imperatives of the state. In the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I test this theory by examining the development of the colonial police and its relationship to the development of the state.

Statebuilding

According to Young's framework, there are two stages of European domination: conquest and statecraft. Conquest was associated with the partition of territories (e.g., the 1885 "Scramble for Africa") and is described as a single act, while creating states out of these territories was an extended series of acts that sought to establish "permanent domination" of European powers (C. Young 1997, 95). This dissertation is most interested in the second stage, during which the police arose. The second stage, which Young refers to as "constructing Bula Matari,"[8] aimed to assert European sovereignty through diplomacy and/or force so as to convey superior power that would "congeal into enduring forms of dominance" (95). This long-lasting dominance was attempted through the establishment of states.

The imperial sovereignty doctrine of European international law allowed for the creation of states, not based on consent but on whoever came out as victor in conquest and domination, as established by the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). Sovereignty would only hold if "effective occupation" was achieved, which required "prescriptive force by the creation of a visible infrastructure on the ground of garrisons [armed forces] that affirmed imperial presence and served as an embryonic framework for assertion of rule" (C. Young 1997, 96). In other words, European domination relied on the framework of states with borders to lay claim to territories and to establish rule, order, and revenue (100). Historians refer to this period following the Berlin Conference and into the early twentieth century as "New Imperialism," distinguished by the division of Africa among European powers and Britain's attempts to revive its imperial purpose and global financial supremacy (Cain and Hopkins 1987, 15; Gallagher 1982). A shift in colonial bureaucratic strategy followed World War I. Colonial administrators became increasingly professionalized, instead of just being enlisted from military forces, and

[8] Bula Matari, literally "breaker of rocks," was a nickname given to Henry Morton Stanley.

increasingly autonomous from central administrators and the metropole, due to limited communications technology (C. Young 1997, 101).

The colonial administration required a local security force to establish hegemonic rule over more permanent colonies, but as previously mentioned, there were not enough European military troops to cover such wide swathes of land, and this would be costly. The British rotated military officers between colonies and recruited within colonies, and "augmented" these troops with "sizable armed police forces" (C. Young 1997, 105). European powers that failed to establish coercive administrative apparatuses during this state-construction phase also risked rival colonial powers' encroachment (e.g., the Portuguese in Angola) (106). Establishing hegemonic rule was fundamental to colonizing territories, but so was financing these governing structures. This imperative led to the creation of more formalized agencies and extractive devices to get indigenous populations to pay for the governing apparatus that colonizers were imposing on them (78). While promises of great riches were made to metropoles, achieving this was quite difficult, so "the control of African labor, channeling it into basic infrastructure and taxable activity, became the very core of colonial state construction, the hinge on which its logic turned" (79). Establishing hegemony and generating revenue through controlling labor and taxing local populations were the main imperatives that the state sought to achieve.

The police and imperatives of the state

While not extensively discussed, Young left traces of how he thought the police and security forces featured in the project of statebuilding. For instance, the cover of *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* is a painting of the Congo Free State, which Belgian King Leopold II brutally seized and operated as his personal possession, ultimately killing ten to

fifteen million people by various estimates. This painting depicts presumably African security officers being directed by a white Belgian authority overseeing their execution of violence. This image symbolizes how colonial state construction took place. Nevertheless, in the six imperatives of the state that Young spells out, the police only explicitly feature in two, hegemony and security: "hegemony is sustained through the policing apparatus whose professionalization is one of the hallmarks of the modern state" (C. Young 1997, 35–36; citing D. Bayley 1975), and hegemony required a local security force to "underwrite" it and serve as its "coercive arm" (C. Young 1997, 105).

I build on and depart from this theory in several ways. I theorize that the police were central to achieving, or attempting to achieve, all six state imperatives. My theory also differs from other theories of the police. The police did not just expand the state's reach and capacity of control (C. Young 1997, 73–74), but they were the state's reach and manifestation of state control. The police were more important than the military for day-to-day routine policing and surveillance and ensuring that Africans would become law-abiding colonial "subjects." There would not be a colonial state without the colonial police. They were not *part of* the state's "harsher realities of daily hegemony" (C. Young 1997, 166) because there was no pre-existing state that they served; they created the state by enacting this daily hegemony.

Instead of an established state, what existed was indigenous people's land that imperial powers were trying to "effectively occupy" so as to maintain "legitimate" domination (according to European international law) long enough to create a stream of revenue generation to finance said state. This also speaks to Jeffrey Herbst's primary issue with accounts of colonialism, a critique that leads him to believe that the police were not a significant force during colonization. In *States and Power in Africa*, Herbst's single discussion of the police (with the exception of a

few quotations from other references) is to back up his main argument that when it came to consolidating power and asserting authority over populations, Europeans were limited by the same factors as precolonial leaders (i.e., vast inhospitable territory and sparse populations). Herbst invokes Killingray (1986, 114–15) to describe how the colonial police were thinly spread throughout territories and how this resembled early English policing in small towns before the professionalization of the force. He agrees with Killingray that the police to civilian ratio and the reach of the British throughout their vast territories was extremely limited and essentially a failure (Herbst 2000, 79). Killingray's archival evidence from multiple contexts does paint a picture of the colonial police and the Native Authority[9] as small, inadequate, incompetent, weak, underfunded, ill-equipped, inefficient, illegitimate, and sometimes nonexistent (Killingray 1986).

Herbst sees the colonial police as evidence of colonial state failure: "Nothing so epitomizes the limited ambitions of many colonial states, and the failure to establish empirical statehood, as the small size of the security forces that existed in the colonies through the terminal colonial period" (Herbst 2000, 79). For an institution that purportedly exemplifies Herbst's argument, the police unfortunately do not merit further mention in his theoretical and empirical analysis of how the colonial state operated. My theory of the police and state would help explain Herbst's and others', like Pierre Englebert's, characterization of the colonial state as a failure. Where the state was weak and nonexistent, so was police presence.

I start with Young's imperatives of the state, but where he deems the state central to achieving these imperatives, I argue that the police were. If my theory is right, we should expect

[9] I return to several of these cases in my analysis of British colonial archival data on Tanganyika, including Uganda, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. For more information on the Native Authority, which was established as part of the system of British indirect rule, see Burton, Andrew. 2002. "Adjutants, Agents, Intermediaries: The Native Administration in Dar Es Salaam Township, 1919–1961." In *The Urban Experience in Eastern Africa, c. 1750-2000*, edited by Andrew Burton, 98–118. Nairobi, Kenya: British Institute in Eastern Africa.

for the police to carry out the defining objectives of the state. I will next describe each of the six imperatives and explain what it would look like if the police were central to that imperative.

I. Hegemony. Establishing hegemony involves establishing domination through discipline and punishment according to a created rule of law (C. Young 1997, 36; borrowing from Foucault 1995a). If the police were carrying out the hegemonic objective of the state, they would be involved in a continuous "struggle to ensure the supremacy of their authority" and meet refusals to that authority with force (C. Young 1997, 35). As stated earlier, hegemony is one of the two imperatives that Young explicitly identifies with policing.

II. Legitimacy. Legitimacy is the core of the Weberian state and hegemonic rule rests on its own credibility. If the police were responsible for generating legitimacy for British colonization, they would visibly possess superior force to demonstrate their monopoly on violence and thus credibility (C. Young 1997, 37). However, coercion is like a gold reserve that underpins this power: if coercion is used too much, it loses value (C. Young 1997, 37; citing Parsons 1964). Therefore, we would expect the police to attempt to render colonial rule legitimate not just through using violence, but through maintaining the threat and possibility of using violence at any time (Seigel 2018).

III. Autonomy. Autonomy, in the context of a colonized territory, is a degree of independence and sovereignty in relation to the metropole. Colonial authorities were increasingly only constrained by settler communities and corporate interests (C. Young

1997, 159). If the police were responsible for increasing the autonomy of the colonial administration, they would aim to consolidate power and professionalize and institutionalize the "apparatus of rule" (36). The police would allow for high-level colonial officials to be increasingly independent in interpreting their own territory's interests and managing the territory accordingly (122).

IV. Security. While the contractual school of thought holds that the state must provide safety for its citizens as part of the social contract, this does not apply to colonial states because colonized populations did not necessarily consent to enter the state. Young explains this relationship with the symbol of Bula Mathai. So while ensuring order and public safety is theoretically at the heart of a state's reason for being, in colonial contexts, security is instead associated with "the hegemonic apparatus" of coercion (C. Young 1997, 117). In this sense, security is perhaps the most obvious imperative associated with the state that the police carry out, and Young does it acknowledge it as such (37). The police can be said to be responsible for this imperative by serving as "the institutional core of the state," in conjunction with the military (37).

V. Revenue. Revenue generation was central to colonization because resources were at a minimum required to finance the administration of colonies, and resources were expected to stimulate the European economy. If the police were central to ensuring revenue generation, they would "engage in a ceaseless struggle with civil society to extract the resources necessary" (38). The police would do this while attempting to balance acting as a predator with maintaining legitimacy (C. Young 1997, 39).

VI. Accumulation. Accumulation is the amassing of wealth through an expanding economic base that generates revenue. African labor was the primary factor of production during colonization as "virtually all operations" were labor intensive (C. Young 1997, 137). Across all colonial powers, public infrastructure was financed by "what amounted to a labor tax" (174). Colonization, and especially the period of development after World War II, required steady labor "under the direction of a property owner and the supervision of the state, and that laborers be made to learn and internalize new value and attitudes" (C. Young 1997, 138; quoting Frederic Cooper 1997, 2–3). Young says labor was overseen by colonial administrators and African chiefs, but he does not mention the police (138). If the police were responsible for carrying out the imperative of accumulation, they would be at the forefront of the task of creating an expanding economic base through controlling labor and ensuring revenue generation over time.

If the police carry out these defining characteristics of the state, which is likely in contexts that do not have states as units of political organization, it can be said that the police are bringing the state into being. If my theory is correct that the police were central to statebuilding, we should especially see the police carrying out the core twin imperatives of the state: creating hegemony and ensuring revenue generation. We see these imperatives come together most clearly in attempts to control labor. In Chapter Four, I evaluate my theory with examples of colonial attempts to control African labor in Dar es Salaam, the former colonial capital of Tanganyika.

Conclusion: Contribution and Implications

In contrast to viewing crime and the police as inventions bound up with systems of power, such as the state, orthodox criminologists contend that the police are a natural result of social phenomena, like increasing urbanization and industrialization, which generate social disorder and crime. With this line of reasoning, policing is deemed an appropriate response to social disorder. Many colonial police commissioners and governors of British territories articulated this logic in the annual reports and correspondence that I found in the U.K. National Archives, which I detail in Chapter Three.

My theory undercuts justifications to strengthen police forces as a response to alleged disorder and crime. It contributes to the work of critical criminologists who challenge the view of crime as fixed and instead see crime as a product and sustainer of unequal socioeconomic relations. By understanding the police as constitutive of the state, we can better address questions raised by critical criminologists, such as, "*What* order does policing maintain?" and "*Whose* idea of order does policing protect?" (Lynch, Michalowski, and Groves 2000, 147). By reframing the police as inseparable from colonial statebuilding, it becomes clear that policing is not a method to resolve social disorder, but that policing has instead always served as a strategy to maintain an unequal social order and hegemonic rule based on race, class, gender, and sexual hierarchies (Lynch, Michalowski, and Groves 2000, 164).

I build on and depart from the Marxist view of the state as a tool of economic exploitation and expansion to theorize the relationship between the police, empire, and state. Imposing the legal and economic framework of a "state" onto imperial holdings was one way to consolidate power and establish racialized order in colonies to streamline extraction from

colonies. However, I depart from these theories in asserting that the police were not merely "agents" of the state who made the state felt on the ground (e.g., Bula Matari), but the police brought the state into being. If the state is a protector of powerful interests, powerful interests are a reflection and bedrock of the state. If the police were developed to produce and safeguard the state, this may have led the state and police to outlive their colonial origins and purposes. The deeply rooted co-constitutive relationship between the state, capitalist extraction, and police could enable these assemblages to persist over time. This may be largely driven by the continued investments of the most powerful in this established system, which postcolonial leaders had to wrest from colonial control. This theory can help explain how contestation of the contemporary police may be understood as contestation of the contemporary state and the legacies of violent colonial occupation it represents and reproduces.

Chapter III. The Colonial Origins of the Police and Policing Sex in Tanzania

Introduction

Tanzania has been touted as a paragon of national social cohesion and peace in sub-Saharan Africa since independence. Tanzania has not had politicized ethnolinguistic cleavages or leaders overstaying term limits, in contrast to its East African neighbors, and it has served as a global frontrunner in women's rights, representation, and other democratic outcomes (see Yoon 2013). This narrative of unity and equality is often traced back to Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere, and his *Ujamaa* policies and cultural ideology that sought to unite the country under a shared Swahili identity (Bjerk 2015).

Since 2015, President John Magufuli's administration has passed seemingly atypical restrictive policies targeting journalists, civil society organizations, opposition politicians, pop stars, statisticians, young mothers, people living with HIV/AIDS, and gender and sexual minorities (McLellan 2018; Ratcliffe 2018; Human Rights Watch 2019a; Rosen 2019). President Magufuli has expanded the meaning of his reputation, *Tingatinga* ("The Bulldozer"), in his authoritarian approach to quashing democratic dissent and peaceful opposition (Subramanian 2019). The police are the main agents of this state-sponsored violence and they have been reported surveilling, targeting, and abusing suspected gender and sexual minorities through arbitrary arrests, unlawful extended detainment, deportation, raids of households and organizations, and forced anal examinations (Honan 2017; Mgallah 2018; Pleasance 2018; Human Rights Watch 2019b; Nyeko 2019). One investigative journalist recently deemed the Tanzanian police "the single biggest threat" to public safety, justice, and democracy, and called for its abolition (Said 2020). This raises the question of what extent these methods of state

surveillance and suppression are new to Tanzania, and whether these policies and their violent enaction by the police are unique to President Magufuli's administration.

This chapter lays the groundwork for explaining the puzzle of contemporary Tanzanian politics by answering the following interconnected questions: *How did Tanzania's police system come to be such a powerful and violent agent of the state? What purpose was it originally designed to serve? And what does sex have to do with it?* Drawing on decolonial and feminist scholars like Sylvia Tamale (2020), I maintain that understanding the history of policing is fundamental to understanding contemporary policing. Analyses that begin to examine how historical institutions impact experiences of violence today often exclusively focus on holdover colonial laws, such as those criminalizing forms of public assembly and same-sex acts. Even though the police are the main enactors of violent state policies, they are often missing. I argue that the politics of policing in Tanzania today is not new but a colonial leftover. To understand today's autocratic civil society crackdowns, scholars must historicize the police as a continuing colonial legacy that is deeply bound up with the repression of marginalized groups, including but not limited to gender and sexual minorities. I do this by connecting often disparate research agendas on state-building, colonization, and gender- and sexuality-based repression.

A closer look at Tanzania suggests that the recent policing of gender and sexuality and broader suppression of civil society is not necessarily new or unique to the increasingly autocratic regime of President Magufuli. By examining the development of the colonial police in former Tanganyika using the British archives, I find that the police system was a primary tool of colonization. The police were not simply the most visible arm of the state or a means of violence for those in power. Rather, the police system was a key means to constitute, legitimatize, and expand political power and the capitalist state itself, and this power was

maintained through creating a racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed order. While British rule formally ended in Tanganyika in 1961, colonial legacies of criminalization, surveillance, policing, and imprisonment did not.

This chapter has implications for understanding the relationship between the modern capitalist state and civil society in other contexts. Colonial values and priorities, like heterosexuality and racial capitalism, were embedded in the broader criminal punishment system, which was transferred throughout the British Empire over several centuries. We might therefore expect to find similar legacies in other contexts that experienced, or continue to experience, forms of coloniality under the British Empire. My analysis will not only advance the study of gender and sexuality in these contexts, but it will also shed light on others who the British deemed threats and codified as "criminals," including people who sought abortions, lived with mental illnesses, or experienced houselessness, poverty, or other forms of precarity.

Methods and Data

Tanzania is an important case for understanding dynamics of repression that seem to arise even in relatively progressive environments, and it can shed light on other African and postcolonial contexts. In this chapter, I focus on the period of formal British colonial rule in then-Tanganyika (present day mainland Tanzania) to understand the historical roots of the police and of policing gender and sexuality. I use an approach reminiscent of genealogy because historical colonial institutions have implications for the relationship between state and society following the end of formal colonial rule. I use archival research, critical discourse analysis, and process tracing to determine how policing emerged, for what/whose purposes, and how it implicated gender and sexuality in colonial Tanganyika (1919-61). This chapter lays the

groundwork for understanding the relationship between state and society generally, and policing and identity specifically, following the end of formal colonial rule.

I use primary and secondary sources collected in 2018-2019 at the Herskovits Library and Archives of African Studies and the U.K. National Archives, British Library, and London University Institute of Commonwealth Studies.[10] The data in this chapter come from police training guides, ethics manuals, police and prison department annual reports, police governing documents, and colonial officials' memos and correspondences. I build upon and depart from historians of the penal system and Tanganyika (e.g., Iliffe 1979; Williams 1980; Burton 2005). My analysis is guided by the work of Tanzanian lawyers and legal scholars (e.g., Kapinga 1990; REDET Project 2008; Shivji and Yahya-Othman 2014) and human rights experts (e.g., OutRight International 2009; Ghoshal 2013). I use the model provided by Tanzanian scholars Issa Shivji and Saida Yahya-Othman to trace the modern police force back to its origins as a "colonial state invention" foundational to rule and extraction (2014, v). Building on their work, I show how the police system, crimes, and criminals were socially constructed, and I extend this approach to illuminate the policing of gender and sexuality.

I use a feminist methodology to be attentive to difference, androcentric bias, and hegemonic knowledge production in order to locate experiences and voices erased by the British officials who established and maintain the archives (Hesse-Biber 2011). I read along and against the grain to understand how colonial administrators attempted to develop and document neat social categories (Stoler 2009, 15), which did not just disappear at the fall of empire.[11] During

[10] My approach is informed by fieldwork in Tanzania in 2017, when I met with NGOs, scholars, and activists in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. Since then, most of this research took place outside of Tanzania due to ethical and safety considerations given the politically sensitive environment concerning identities central to this project.
[11] These archives and social categories may have further implications for how postcolonial leaders have "reactivated" social categories to suit their own "new governing strategies" (Stoler 2009, 15).

colonization, the seemingly theoretically fixed and stable categories of gender and sexuality found in the archives were always in flux and being reformulated (16).

A Theory of Colonization through Policing

However brief in the face of a much longer history of institutional change and development in pre-colonial African contexts, the period of colonial rule is fundamental to understanding the contemporary politics of policing. This is because the rupture in indigenous systems of justice by the imposition of European systems of capitalist extraction and state control would shape state and society relations for years to come. This period marked the beginning of institutions and practices that sought to bring about hegemonic control to facilitate "ruthless extractive action" (C. Young 1997, 279). The institutions most relevant to my theorizing of the relationship between colonization and policing include the police and prison system, the capitalist nation-state, and the undergirding system of heteronormative Christian values.

The institutions that preceded colonization differed markedly from those imposed by European colonizers. Generally, the many various sub-Saharan African polities "did not have professional full-time law enforcement organizations" dedicated to enforcing written laws until late-nineteenth century European colonialism (Stapleton 2015). Instead, small designated groups (in some cases of centralized rule), community pressures, and councils of elders may have enforced norms that were communicated orally. While there is a dearth of scholarship on what indigenous systems of justice and order looked like, we are certain of one crucial difference: indigenous polities were not constrained by the permanent yet artificial lines and monopolizing structures of capitalist nation-states. Before this point, there were a variety of "political experiments" that "ranged from villages to empires; from micro-polities to macro-polities; from

households to empire" (Schatzberg 2014, 26). This Westphalian way of centralizing power and hierarchically ordering society eliminated previous recourses that people could turn to amid struggles over space and autonomy, like simply moving to a different place. This is not to say pre-colonial modes of governance and arbitration were completely eliminated, but the imposition of the state "narrowed their scope considerably" (Schatzberg 2014, 26).

The growth of modern nation-states and capitalist relations in colonized territories was carried out through creating police and prison systems. This system fundamentally altered social relationships and ideological beliefs (Williams 1980, 36). Global cross-national studies have shown that many pre-colonial and pre-literate societies had practices of dealing with damages through mediation, but these practices did not include police, that is, a specialized armed force to systematically enforce norms (Schwartz and Miller 1964, 166). While the focus of this dissertation is policing, systems of imprisonment were designed in tandem with systems of policing. British colonial police and prisons were used to coerce people to work and pay taxes, to provide a labor pool for public works, and to contain and punish people (Williams 1980, 29–30). For these reasons, the modern criminal punishment system is inseparable from the capitalist nation-state (Bowling, Reiner, and Sheptycki 2019, 41). I theorize that the police and prison system is central to the processes of colonization that sought to establish a capitalist nation-state.

The Origins of the Police and Policing Sex in Tanganyika

This chapter seeks to answer three interconnected questions: *How did Tanzania's police system come to be such a powerful and violent agent of the state? What purpose was it originally designed to serve? And what does sex have to do with it?* I examine what the original purpose of the British colonial police was, how the police became central to developing the

colonial state and economy of the Tanganyika Territory, and why the police system grew dramatically following World War II at the end of formal colonial rule. I then turn to the most widely studied colonial legacy relating to establishing a heteronormative social order, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, but go further to analyze the institutionalization and enactment of colonial heteronormative values through the police and prison system.

This chapter intervenes in studies of colonial criminal punishment to show how European values undergirded these systems of state control. I argue that challenges to heteronormative Christian values threatened colonialism and the development of a capitalist nation-state. European missionaries were not the only norms enforcers of monogamous and heterosexual Christian values. Rather, colonial police and prison officials were employed to establish control and facilitate extraction by creating and maintaining a particular social order. Fundamental to this social order were heteronormative ideals about gender and sexuality. By tracing the development of policing in relation to gender and sexuality during colonization, we can deduce how colonial anxieties about non-heteronormative practices shaped the construction of "crimes" and "criminals." Furthermore, we can uncover how constructions of criminality were deeply embedded in and constitutive of the capitalist nation-state.

"Government's machinery": Origins of the police system

The police are often left out of analyses of the colonial state even though they were the main means of establishing control. Across colonized territories, the police force was "the most visible public symbol of colonial rule" and the arm of the government most directly and regularly in contact with people (D. M. Anderson and Killingray 1991, 1–2). One of Britain's first decisions in administering the Tanganyika Territory Mandate was to issue the Police and Prisons Proclamation (Williams 1980, 31). The civilian police would be separate from the

military, which was a change from the few preceding years under German occupation when there was a joint military and police force (Kamau 2006, 11).[12] There is no written record of anything that resembled European police and prison systems before this point in the area that would be known as Tanganyika, and there is scant reliable literature of precolonial systems of norms enforcement. The British colonial policing system was loosely modeled off their own in the metropole and those implanted throughout the Empire, and colonial policing methods would inform policing in the metropole as well (D. M. Anderson and Killingray 1991, 12–13).

In Dar es Salaam, the Tanganyikan colonial capital, the police were the most essential of the three main government branches in imposing and maintaining colonial order, followed by the urban administration and judiciary (Burton 2002; 2003, 65). Reports from colonial police commissioners of Tanganyika illuminate the police system's entrenchment, power, and centrality to British colonization in the Territory. For example, after overseeing the first decade of the police and prisons system in colonial Tanganyika (1919-1928), Commissioner P.F. Browne thanked those who had helped "weld the police organisation into an active and integral part of the Government's machinery for the development of the Territory to the common good" (Tanganyika Police 1928, 29). This suggests that the police were not merely a lever of the colonial state, but the engine of state-building. I argue that the colonial police should be treated not simply as agents of state control, but as "active and integral" creators of the colonial state.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the British colonial government expanded state power through continuously broadening the application of criminal legislation. Ideas about who constituted a criminal and what constituted a crime, in combination with the processes of policing and imprisonment, helped construct the colonial subject. Florence Bernault

[12] This is where the German loanword for "soldier" came from (*askari*) (Kapinga 1990, 42), that Tanzanians now use for "police" in Swahili.

has described the influence of colonial prisons as fundamentally different from those in the Western metropoles because they sought to make Africans into "*objects* of power," as opposed to "equal citizens and legal *subjects*" (emphasis in original, Bernault 2018, 55) The growing list of punishable crimes and characteristics of disciplinable prisoners both exemplifies and was interconnected to the growth of the colonial state in Tanganyika. Four decades of police and prison department annual reports illustrate a trend of an increasing number of punishable crimes, as well as an increasing number of criminals (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Graph of Total Number of Crimes Reported (1923-1961)



Source: *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report on the Administration of the Police*

These annual reports underestimate the number of crimes reported because they do not include figures from the Native Authorities, who were tasked with policing the more rural and less developed areas, which corresponded with areas where there were not significant populations of white settlers (Kamau 2006, 3). These Native Authorities, or the African administrators implemented as part of the British policy of indirect rule, were primarily tasked with policing and tax collection, which undermined their local support and hamstrung their ability to execute other responsibilities as colonial intermediaries (Burton 2002). In addition to these figures being only a partial count of crimes detected, the influence, active presence, and reach of the police throughout the territory was constrained by limited resources, presumably leaving many areas "more or less unpoliced" and many offences undetected (Burton 2003, 65). Despite these limitations, the police were the main tool the British had to establish order and control, and these numbers of crimes reported may therefore serve as a proxy for state capacity and growth following this initial period of high colonialism in the early twentieth century.

"Development of the territory": Growing the police and economy

The demand for labor and economic extraction necessitated the expansion of the police and prison system in British colonies, especially following the legal abolition of slavery. Growth in colonial police and prisons was driven by Britain's rapid urbanization and industrialization, internal uprisings,[13] and consequent professionalization of the police force. The Industrial Revolution relied on the growth of hard labor, global networks of capital production and exploitation, and imperial conquest and occupation. Strategies to repress and control colonized

[13] Incidents like the 1819 Peterloo Massacre led to increased government crackdowns and surveillance. The British calvary charged a crowd of about 80,000 unarmed civilians who were demanding parliamentary representation reforms, killing 18 people and injuring as many as 700.

Ireland combined with urbanization in London led Robert Peele to create the first professionalized police force in 1839 (Sinclair 2008). Policing in British-colonized Ireland would inform the Indian Police Act of 1861, which would be used across British Africa (Hawkins 1991, 21). The colonial police system in Tanganyika served the purpose of "internal suppression" rather than "external security" (Kapinga 1990, 41–42), and it was designed to maintain economic and political order within the territory, as depicted by the alignment of police stations with major roads and railways ("Map of Tanganyika Territory" 1920).

A change of hands in territories after World War I required new sources of labor for resource extraction, which was euphemistically called "contract" or "forced" labor but was a form of temporary enslavement (Sherwood 2007, 135). At this point, Britain had legally abolished slavery one hundred years prior in 1807 and in colonies beginning in 1833, although unevenly (e.g., in Tanganyika in 1919). Colonial prisons were expanded to provide free labor (see Figure 2), and convict labor became fundamental to the colonial economy (Williams 1980, 29). Prisons is Kenya filled up by 1925 and so the British response was to create detention camps, followed by prison camps in 1933 (Branch 2005, 247). By 1934 in Tanganyika, there were twelve "labour camps"[14] with 123,375 native workers, whom the camps were reportedly "popular" among (Great Britain Colonial Office 1935, 80). Coerced convict labor generated significant profits across British colonies, such as in Nigeria (Archibong and Obikili 2019) and South Africa (Worger 2004), and allowed for public works and industrial projects within colonies (Bernault 2018). Ultimately, these new forms of enslavement would lead Britain to make "more money out of slavery and the slave trade after 1807 than before" (Sherwood 2007, 175).

[14] Officials used different words to describe how people served sentences, including "jail, penitentiary, prison, correctional facility, corrective labor camp, etc." (Williams 1980, 27).

Figure 2. Women imprisoned and shackled doing roadwork in Dar es Salaam (ca. 1919-1927)

Source: Library of Congress

The police not only played a central role in filling the prisons, but in maintaining a white hierarchical social order so as to facilitate ruthless extraction across colonized territories (D. M. Anderson and Killingray 1991, 6). Bound up with the colonial administration's desire to maximize economic extraction was an imperative to "protect" white settlers from indigenous Africans, who primarily filled the ledgers of criminal offenders. Patrols were carried out in "areas of more isolated non-native settlement," and European officers, as opposed to African constables, were posted to "all the more important stations" (Great Britain Colonial Office 1935, 70). This racist mentality led to the policing of primarily urban areas, where there was more commerce and greater populations of white settlers, and establishing rural police posts only near settlers' farms (Kamau 2006, 3).

The development of the territory and townships, which were predominantly settler-occupied urban areas, drove the growth of the police. Colonial police administrators justified calls for increasing the strength of the police force with claims of increasing crimes, which were conceptualized as naturally occurring phenomena especially prevalent among Black colonial subjects. The reason the police and prison departments were separated in Tanganyika was because of a demand for more police with a "growing European settlement" ("Police and Prisons Department" 1927). From this point on, the police force only grew with claims that they were "very fully occupied" and needed "extended police services" and personnel (Tanganyika Police 1930, 21). The 1938 Tanganyika Police Commissioner described a natural cycle of increasing crimes, which required increased policing to protect "the people comprising the general public…from the criminal and crime" and to maintain "an adequate strength to hold these fluctuations [of crime] in check" (Tanganyika Police 1938, 30). The Commissioner stresses the link between policing, the economy, and "educational progress" that might impact the quantity of crimes and resulting need for protection (30).

This orthodox view of crime underlying these justifications assumes that crimes are ontological, value-free problems with observable causes rooted in individual, group, or societal flaws (Lynch, Michalowski, and Groves 2000, 2). One historian has the beginnings of critical criminology in his characterization of crime in Dar es Salaam as a form of urban survival and colonial resistance (Burton 2004, 91). However, Burton and other prominent historians of Tanganyika fall back on racist behavioral theories of why crimes occur (e.g., "culture of poverty," Iliffe 1979, 388–89), much like the colonial police commissioners.[15] A view of crimes as "colonial state inventions" (Shivji and Yahya-Othman 2014, v), and as inventions rooted in

[15] Khalil Gibran Muhammad shows that in the context of the United States, deeply rooted ideas about Black people as criminals informed the development of modern policing and social policies, especially in urban areas (2010).

systems of domination meant to serve those in power (as theorized by radical criminologists), challenges the pseudoscientific explanation of crime as a justification for more police. The field of criminology itself has been fundamentally connected to the project of colonialism and imperialism from the beginning, as argued by counter-colonial criminologists (Agozino 2003).[16]

"War emergency duties": WWII changes to policing

World War II caused a major financial, institutional, and bureaucratic expansion of the police system. On the eve of WWII, "volunteers" were enrolled as "special constables" to assist the police in case of imminent attack and to arrest "enemy subjects throughout the Territory" (Tanganyika Police 1939, 16). The police department added one hundred regular constables and one hundred reserve officers for "war emergency duties" (16). Needless to say, these additions were not eliminated after the end of the war. Ultimately, Britain's involvement in the war (1939-1945) irrefutably shaped the second half of formal colonial rule in Tanganyika and created the cracks that Africans would take advantage of to achieve independence across the empire.

These changes were continuously modeled on the growing police presence in the British metropole. England's ordinance to appoint special constables in the metropolitan police force[17] informed the ordinance drawn up in Tanganyika to allow for an analogous expansion of the police force.[18] This provision was shortly followed by an ordinance to create a reserve force modeled on England's at the time ("Formation of a Police Reserve in Tanganyika" 1939) and a Security and Intelligence Bureau, directly connected to the War Bureau in London (M. A. Young 1939). The Governor of Tanganyika wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies about the

[16] We can see how criminology continues to perpetuate forms of colonialism today (Kitossa 2012).
[17] "Statutory Rules and Orders, 1923, No. 905: The Special Constables Order," 1923
[18] "Proposal to Amend the Police Ordinance to Make Additional Provisions for the Appointment of Special Constables," 1939

need for a “separate and secret” surveillance organization that would collect intelligence information under the “cloak” of the already existing Criminal Investigation Department at the police department, but would secretly operate as the Security and Intelligence Bureau (M. A. Young 1939, 3). The Director of the Bureau would be the Commissioner of Police, and if the bureau needed to close, the personnel would be absorbed into the police. The creation of a Security and Intelligence Bureau was only one of the many visible (or rather, invisible) legacies of British surveillance, policing, and imprisonment that emerged or was bolstered at this time.

WWII had a decisive impact on the administration of British colonies, especially on the strengthening and expansion of the police, prison, and military systems in colonized territories. New policies were implemented in colonies to materially and militarily support the war effort, to cut back on other services and projects in colonies (such as forestry and research), and to strengthen internal and external security in colonies. An income tax was implemented, exports were increased, and trade was ramped up among British colonies (“Estimated Revenue and Expenditure Figures for 1939-1940” 1940; “Offices: Admiralty, Crown Agents, Foreign” 1940). The police and prison financial estimates are included in these reports along with a justification of increasing the funding of police so as to increase security during this time (“Offices: Admiralty, Crown Agents, Foreign” 1940).

Along with steadily increasing the bureaucratic capacity of the police system, together with the colonial state, the British expanded the definition of criminals and crimes. This was a chief means of expanding state power because it would give the state increasing control over the lives of its subjects. The criminalization of people who transgressed gender and sexuality norms was increasingly applied in the period following WWII (see Figure 3 and Table 1). The British also broadened this criminalization and imprisoned colonial subjects for poverty, abortion,

houselessness, mental illness, and a whole host of crimes deemed threats to public morality (see Figure 4).[19] In the next section, I show how the growth of the policing apparatus that was justified by wartime would only intensify in the post-war period.

Figure 3. Graph of Total Number of "Unnatural Offence" Cases (1929-1961)



[19] Due to changes in penal and criminal codes and the classification of crimes throughout British colonial rule, some categories of crimes against public morality do not translate across years. I have provided three separate tables (see Appendix) to demonstrate how this class of crimes was differently legislated, characterized, and delineated from 1930 (when this category of "offences against public morality" first appears) to 1961.

Table 1. Total Number of "Unnatural Offence" Cases (1929-1961)

Year	Total Cases		Year	Total Cases		Year	Total Cases
1929	37*		1940	*(Missing report)*		1951	65
1930	11		1941	*(Missing report)*		1952	50
1931	17		1942	*(Missing report)*		1953	41
1932	9		1943	*(Missing report)*		1954	48
1933	6		1944	*(Missing report)*		1955	47
1934	10		1945	6		1956	64
1935	6		1946	11		1957	82
1936	7		1947	9		1958	84
1937	6		1948	25		1959	102
1938	12		1949	46		1960	126
1939	9		1950	34		1961	155

**Unnatural offence cases aggregated with rape cases in 1929*

Figure 4. Graph of Total Number of Public Morality Cases (1930-1961)



Source: *Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report on the Administration of the Police*

"Second colonial occupation": Post-WWII expansion of the police

In the period after WWII, which would rapidly lead to Tanganyikan independence, a new stage of colonization ensued under the discourse of "Development." Post-WWII reconstruction efforts across Europe were accompanied by analogous and interconnected development plans introduced in the colonies. For instance, wartime taxes and compulsory labor were held over in Tanganyika to fund "development," and these policies went hand in hand with funds and initiatives to strengthen the police force and other security measures.

WWII and the Cold War influenced colonial ideologies and fears that made their way into the criminal punishment system in this period. Historians refer to the post-war period as "the Second Colonial Occupation," to delineate this major shift in imperial governing strategies that would ultimately aid in the fall of British colonial holdings (Low and Londsdale 1991). This pivot in strategy was reflected in policing in post-war Tanganyika: the British bolstered their police, intelligence, and security forces to preempt potential communist infiltration ("Review of Police and Security Forces in Relation to Communist Infiltration: Tanganyika (Part A)" 1949). The Tanganyikan colonial administration proposed to introduce Emergency Wireless Communications and strengthen colonial police forces by creating an auxiliary unit of Special Constables, similar to the permanent one in the UK, to supplement the regular police force during emergencies.

Outside experts who evaluated the Tanganyika police force during this time called for "expansion and improvement of police force" so as to fend off communist infiltration ("Review of Police and Security Forces in Relation to Communist Infiltration: Tanganyika (Part B)" 1949). They recommended that there be "more policemen on the beat" and called attention to the importance of training officers, making better use of domestic facilities, and improving the

Criminal Investigation Department (Johnson 1950). These signs indicate that the strength, size, capacity, and reach of the police only continued to grow throughout the final decade of formal British colonial rule in Tanganyika.

Furthermore, in a section on "the Police in Native Authority and Tribal Areas," which was part of the British system of indirect rule, this report describes a positive feedback loop of the number and concentration of police officers and the number of crimes that "come to light":

> As it becomes apparent that the time has come for the more intensive policing of a particular district, a commissioned officer is posted and…with the consequent higher standard of police work, a great deal of crime which previously would have gone unreported, comes to light. As crime comes to light, the need for additional police posts becomes evident and services are consequently extended. (Johnson 1950, 3)

In other words, the presence of more police in an area led to the discovery of more crimes; the discovery of more crimes led to a demand for more police. Another driver for more officers to be stationed in a district was the construction of new railways for mineral extraction. This again suggests strong links between the development of the extractive economy and the development of the police force (Johnson 1950, 3). Johnson then plainly describes the seemingly inevitable trend of the police "(covering) an increasingly larger area," particularly in urban areas and as the "economy develops," which would require even more police: "there should be no hesitation in requesting additional police service when the need for them becomes apparent" (Johnson 1950, 4). The relationship between crime, economic development, and policing is also demonstrated by the1950 Commissioner's report that crimes—particularly property crimes—have increased "in all areas which are being opened up or developed" and where there is a superior Police Officer posted (Tanganyika Police 1950, 11).

This illustrates how the British police were gradually expanding into "tribal areas," which were not as heavily colonized. As communications and transportation technology improved,

these areas became more easily accessible for colonial authorities and police. When these areas were reportedly still "primitive," or not as occupied by the British colonists and settlers, there was no need for the "*modern* police service," (my emphasis) in discursive contrast to the native authority policing system (Johnson 1950). However, as these less-urban areas saw more economic development or became more incorporated into the colonial system of economic extraction, there would need to be more "Regular Police." Again, developing the colonial economy and state is articulated as a primary justification and driver of a strong police presence.

This logic and evidence are fundamental to my findings that the British criminal punishment system was set up to expand the colonial state and economy, completely supplanting the German model of corporal punishment and systems of discipline and punishment preceding colonization. This analysis can potentially help explain the deeply embedded nature of policing institutions in Tanzania and their persistence following formal colonial rule, such as the disproportionate policing of urban areas. The final part of this analysis will engage the questions of what kind of social order the growing police and prison system was tasked with upholding and how a certain type of criminality came about.

"Unnatural offences": Criminalization of sexuality

Who was most affected by this significant growth in policing over the period of British colonization in Tanganyika? What values were enacted and institutionalized in the police and prison system? Laws are the most frequently cited artifacts in analyses of colonial legacies of criminal punishment systems. For instance, it is widely recognized that half of the seventy countries that criminalize nonnormative sexuality are located on the African continent (Carroll and Mendos 2017). However, I argue that heteronormative Christian values were

institutionalized in more obscure ways than through the law. These values are nested in the broader police and prison that has so far been described in this dissertation. Nonetheless, the law is bound up with why the colonial policing of gender and sexuality persisted in the afterlife of empire, so I will provide a brief overview of how the main law criminalizing "unnatural offences" came to be in Tanzania and almost all British colonies (Han and O'Mahoney 2014).

In the British Empire beginning in 1862, so-called "unnatural offences" were criminalized under the now infamous Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.[20] Section 377 was purposely vague so it could be widely applied and cover other acts subsumed under "carnal intercourse," including rape and pedophilia (Gupta 2008, 19). Originally modelled on England's Buggery Act of 1533, this modern innovation of looser applicability was immediately brought back to England, where an "unnatural offence" was punishable by death until 1861 and criminalized in various ways until 2003 (Gupta 2008, 20; Dryden 2017). The Tanganyika colonial office first adopted the Indian Penal Code and Indian Criminal Procedure Code in 1920, following Zanzibar, which applied it in 1867 as the first in the region, followed by the East Africa Protectorate in 1897 and Uganda in 1902 (Morris 1974, 13). Arrests for "unnatural offences" in Tanganyika first appear in the police logs in 1929 (Tanganyika Police 1929, 12) and continue throughout the period of British colonial rule, with a rapid increase following WWII (see Figure 3 and Table 1 which are based on a dataset I constructed from annual reports).

Part of the rationale behind selecting the Indian Penal Code over English Common Law for British colonies was that the former required less training. However, the white settlers in East Africa were "bitterly opposed to, and deeply suspicious of" this criminal code because it

[20] Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code: "Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall be liable to fine."

carried with it harsher laws and penalties and gave greater unchecked power to the colonial authorities than English law would have (Morris 1974, 6). The British colonial administration then replaced this code in Tanganyika with the Queensland Code after the Northern Nigeria colonial office modified it in 1930, along with Kenya, Uganda, and Nyasaland (now Malawi) (Friedland 1992, 1177). In 1945, the Tanganyika colonial administration replaced the Indian Penal Code with its own Code of Criminal Law (Government of Tanganyika 1945), all the while preserving the criminalization of "unnatural offences." These changes throughout colonialism were "largely unplotted and accidental" (Friedland 1992, 1178) and the result of the "whims, preferences, and power struggles of bureaucrats" (Gupta 2008, 23). However, behind these laws was always a heteronormative Christian moral basis to the development of the criminal punishment system and the white colonial civilizing mission in general.

"Must be rooted out": Institutionalizing and enacting colonial values

Colonial laws and penal codes had various origins and motivations: Christian missionaries' teachings of homosexuality as a sin, a capitalist extractive demand for a gendered division of labor and reproduction, and colonial anxieties about subjects who deviated from societal norms and challenged authority. These ideas stemmed from the racist mentality that indigenous peoples, and especially those in Africa, were "sexually corrupt," as evidenced by their supposed "bent toward homosexuality" (Gupta 2008, 10). Anti-homosexuality or sodomy laws were then seen as a "cure," as well as a way to defend white colonialists "against moral contagion" (11). While the British took more of a non-assimilationist approach and ruled indirectly through African personnel in contrast to the French and other European colonizers, the British still instituted their own system of values. Their policy was that they could only maintain

native values that were consistent with "Christian ethics" or "progress"; all other values had to be "rooted out" (Harlech 1941, 16). Non-heteronormative acts were viewed as inconsistent with the British system of colonial values. I find that the British attempted to "root out" these acts in the Tanganyika Territory and other African colonies through the police and prison system.

Christian ethics relating to gender and sexuality were deeply entrenched in the colonial state, not only socially and legally, but economically. Systems of taxation and labor exploitation altered people's relationship to their work and introduced binary-gendered power dynamics in the household and society (Etienne and Leacock 1980). In other words, labor under colonialism became increasingly specialized and divided along gendered lines. British officials were also concerned about economically and politically marginalized men during World War II and its aftermath of labor strikes, especially in Tanganyika, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, and the Gold Coast in 1947-1948 (Frederick Cooper 1996a, 241). This led them to implement "stabilization, discipline, and socialization" policies throughout Africa in attempt to secure the labor force by separating workers from their families and communities (Frederick Cooper 1996a, 241). These policies of taxation, labor exploitation, and stabilization are some of the most studied ways that the British used gendered social policies to manipulate the structure of families and communities to maximize the extraction of labor and resources from the colonies. However, the police and prison system are left out of these analyses. I argue these systems were central to executing the above policies through surveillance and punitive measures that aimed to bring about the desired configurations of gender, sexuality, family, and society.

Some of these norms were inscribed in colonial police training guides and ethics manuals, such as one for the British Apartheid-era police force in South Africa[21] that included

[21] While this text was used for training the British police force in Apartheid South Africa, I expect that similar language existed in police manuals used in Tanganyika and throughout the British Empire.

entire chapters dedicated to regulating monogamous, heteronormative, and procreative sex. One chapter entitled, "Homosexuality and Lesbianism," reads, "The creed of creation of God means that sexual intercourse within marriage should be focused on the opposite sex. Everything beside that, will disturb God's will, with devastating results" (Botma 1991, 39). A diagram illustrates "the decree of creation" that dictates what belongs in a proper marriage (i.e., one marriage partner, opposite sex, sexual intercourse, and family) (see Figure 5). Another section in this police manual is devoted to "Labour and Women" and somewhat cryptically reads, "Women can only practise those occupations that do not affect her being a woman…The Primary task of a mother remains her home and her children. If she accepts an occupation, it may not affect or make her primary task impossible" (Botma 1991, 54). Here, the division of labor along heteronormative binary cisgender lines becomes evident: there are certain "occupations" that would prevent a woman from being a woman, a role exclusively defined by "The Primary task" of being a mother, at home, and with children.

Figure 5. "The decree of creation" (Botma 1991, 37)



These policies were not only institutionalized in training manuals, but they were enacted by police and prison officers. One report recounts how a prison officer tried to prevent men from having sex with other men because he "did not want the homosexuality in his prison to receive any more publicity than was necessary for maintaining a reasonable control over the prison" (Tanner 1970, 352). In other words, "homosexuality" practiced under the supervision of colonial officials was suspected to draw public attention, which would then have threatened colonial control over the prison, and perhaps by extension, over society. Simply put, "homosexuality" threatened officers' ability to "maintain a reasonable control." The fact that these interlinked anxieties are confronted and documented in the site of a prison is no coincidence, given the well-established conceptualization of punishment as a "political tactic," or a technique of exercising power through control over the body and soul (Foucault 1995b, 23–24). This prison officer's two-pronged fear of 1) gay sex under his watch and 2) of others finding out suggests that there was something about not being able to enforce heteronormativity that challenged his control over the prison and, importantly, perception of that control. Homosexuality seems to be perceived as a threat to colonial control and public perception of colonial authority, which was exercised through discipline and punishment in prisons.

Conclusions

Colonial policing in Tanganyika and other parts of the former British Empire is fundamental to understanding the seeds of the state institutions that regulate gender and sexuality. Scholars should look beyond the most widely studied colonial legacy, the penal code that criminalized "unnatural offences," to better understand the institutionalization and persistence of colonial values, including but not limited to heteronormativity. I find that the

police originated as the heart of colonial government machinery, the police were central to developing the colonial state and economy, and the police steadily grew with and through the state, expanding exponentially after World War II and until independence. By examining how the criminal punishment system structured the colonial state and economy, and how the police system was developed to regulate gender and sexuality within the state, new insights emerge. Colonial policing was constitutive of the state itself and was therefore sticky, and policing institutions and norms became fundamental to the functioning of the Tanganyika social, political, and economic order. This theory and evidence presented here may explain why colonial criminal punishment legacies have persisted across the former British Empire.

These institutions were used strategically by postcolonial political actors to fit similar but divergent interests and purposes, as I will explain in Chapter Five, so these institutions may not look and function identical to their original colonial manifestations. Nonetheless, the history of interconnected similarities between colonial and contemporary policing of gender and sexuality has virtually been erased, perhaps to allow for the continuation of criminalization, surveillance, profiling, targeting, repression, and imprisonment of those deemed a threat to the state. This project joins others' calls (e.g., Soss and Weaver 2017) for more analyses of the police system as central to the production and reproduction of the colonial, postcolonial, and contemporary state and economy and its practices. Policing institutions are not only the main sites where citizens experience violence at the hands of the state, but policing institutions may serve as key sites of political contestation, resistance, and decolonization.

Chapter IV. Contesting Police and State at the End of Empire

Introduction

This chapter examines the question, how did the creation and contestation of the colonial police shape the modern capitalist state at the end of the British Empire? I identity three gaps in the literature that prevent us from understanding the relationship between the police, empire, and state. I bridge insights on the police from history, sociology, international relations, and American politics with the comparative politics literature on the state to understand how colonial legacies may be reproduced and resisted. This chapter informs the overarching theory of this dissertation that the police were responsible for carrying out the main imperatives the state and can therefore be seen as creating the state itself.

The purpose and development of police and state assemblages are especially observable during times when they were created, which I focus on in Chapter Three, and contested, which I focus on this chapter. Using colonial archival data and a variety of other primary and secondary sources on former Tanganyika, I examine changes and continuities in policing at the end of one of the biggest imperial projects in history, the British Empire. This analysis finds that resisting the police was central to resisting colonization and forms of imperialism following independence. Anti-colonial resistance to the police helped end formal British rule, but, paradoxically, also accelerated policing in and after the transition to independence. Consequently, the police persisted in the afterlife of empire.

I conclude that the co-constitutive relationship between the police and state helped both assemblages persist, even (or especially) throughout critical junctures, such as major transitions of state power (e.g., independence), international conflicts (e.g., WWII and Cold War), and

neoimperial interventions (e.g., development and foreign aid). Despite reforms and resistance to British control over the police after independence, colonial policing institutions continued to shape state practices and ideologies of racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed control.

Methods and Data

I use archival data from the U.K. National Archives and British Library to examine the contestation of the police in relation to the state in the final years of formal British rule in Tanganyika. I identify the decade leading up to Tanganyika's independence (roughly 1950-1961) as a critical juncture for the police, empire, and state. Many battles were waged around the future of policing that would fundamentally shape and inform the postcolonial state and society for the long term. I use archival and discourse analysis to explain two major episodes that exemplify the creation and contestation of policing and the state in Tanganyika at the end of the British Empire. The goal of this chapter is not to paint the police system as an all-encompassing enactment of colonial rule, but to complicate how policing worked through examining interactions in the Dar es Salaam harbor and Legislative Council (following Browne 2015, 24).

This chapter therefore focuses on the "creation" and "contestation" of empire not as two punctuated moments in a process, but as incremental, iterative, and contingent processes that unfolded over time together. The creation of the colonial police includes the legislative introduction of the British police and prison system in all of its imperial holdings around the world, but also the many developments, both bureaucratic and otherwise, that built and fortified police institutions over time. Policing institutions did not create themselves but were intentional tools of control and order that had to be continually brought into being to carry out colonization.

Along every step of the way, these institutions were challenged by the people colonizers sought to make into orderly, civilized, and law-abiding subjects. The contestation of the police system encompasses the many moments when individuals questioned, challenged, and resisted the creation of the police system.

Analysis

This analysis is framed around two main questions: (1) What is the relationship between contesting the police system and contesting the empire? (2) How did anti-colonial resistance to the police and neoimperial influence over the police shape the independent postcolonial state? I find that resisting the police was central to resisting colonization because contesting the police was bound up with resisting the British colonial state and forms of imperialism following independence in Tanganyika. Anti-colonial resistance to the police helped end formal British rule, but, paradoxically, also accelerated policing in and after the transition to independence.

The centrality of the police to contesting and creating and reasserting empire is demonstrated by the actions of Tanganyika anti-colonial leaders and everyday resistors, and by the actions of British colonial officials and administrators. Contestation of the police in Tanganyika included attempts to physically interrupt policing and overthrow police institutions, collective organizing to test and weaken a police force's strength, legislative and diplomatic moves to bureaucratically weaken the police system, questioning and delegitimizing of the police in newspapers and government, challenging of cases of police brutality in court, escapes from police and prison custody, and coordinated and spontaneous acts of resistance alike against being policed and surveilled. Figure 1 summarizes the main dimensions and illustrative evidence of resistance and production of policing.

These dimensions and episodes demonstrate the police system's importance to anti-colonial efforts, reassertion of colonization, postcolonial state-building, and subsequent neo-imperialism. In the following section, I analyze one episode that illustrates dynamics of resistance and reassertion of the colonial police and state: a dockworkers strike that was violently broken up by the police at the Dar es Salaam harbor. This incident and its aftermath has ramifications for how the Tanganyika police and state were resisted and reasserted leading up to independence, and crucially, for the period right after the end of formal British colonial rule over the Tanganyika Territory.

Figure 1. Dimensions and Examples of Contestation and Creation of the Police

PART I. ***What is the relationship between contesting the police system and contesting the empire?*** Challenging the colonial police system was central to liberatory self-governance strategies.			
Dimensions	**Anti-colonial resistance to police**	**Colonial production of police**	**Illustrative evidence**
Material Physical	-Attempts to physically interrupt and overthrow police and prisons -Use of courts and newspapers to contest police brutality -Labor strikes, union organizing, and creatively challenging yet obeying ordinances to test the police's reaction	Attempts to ramp up policing: -Materially (vehicles, arms, funds, personnel, training) -Transnationally (used to quash neighboring antic-colonial movements) -Legislatively and constitutionally (leadership, commission, ordinances)	-Incidents of attempts to overthrow police posts and prisons in annual reports and memoirs -Police brutality court cases (e.g., "Kipawa Affair") -Massai resistance and police standoffs
Political Bureaucratic Fiscal	-Negotiations to bureaucratically weaken police force	-Negotiations to bureaucratically strengthen police force	-Constitutional Conference -Diplomacy of Nyerere with British administrators -Politicians' debates in LegCo -Governor's speeches about law and order

Ideological Legitimacy Legal	-Question and delegitimize police (e.g., LegCo debate challenging the legality of cross-national policing and then questioning increased funding of police, expansion of police, and need for the police)	-Campaign to legitimize police (e.g., consulting UN trusteeship guidelines on power/reach of police, Governor's speeches warning consequences if weak police and lack of law and order)	-Police used to quash anti-colonial resistance in Nyasaland and consequent debates in LegCo questioning the mandate, purpose, and necessity of the police

PART II. ***How did anti-colonial resistance to the police and neoimperial influence over the police shape the independent postcolonial state?*** Efforts to disrupt colonial policing and to Africanize the inherited nation-state accelerated the growth of policing leading up to independence and led to continued neoimperial influence over the Tanzanian nation-state following the end of formal colonial rule.			
Material Political Fiscal Ideological	-Contest pathways for continued influence, including breaking UK ties, declining aid, resisting local and bureaucratic police governance	-Create pathways for continued influence, including through creating a consulate, leadership of police, aid, UK trainings, bureaucracy, Commonwealth ties, intelligence and security network	-Colonial discourse (e.g., governor's speeches, correspondences) about the joint need for a strong police force to maintain law and order and continued British influence over that police force, due to reluctance to hand over power because of racist ideas about competency and capability for self-governance
Legal	-Contest criminalization (e.g., strikes, protests, etc.)	-Crack down on criminalization (e.g., increase in crimes against morality/public good)	-Parliamentary records and debates -Proliferation of ordinances and laws

Part I. "A challenge to law and order": Policing a Dockworkers Strike

The location of Tanganyika on the Swahili Coast had long been geopolitically significant as an international trading hub, and it experienced rapid commercial growth in the nineteenth century in coastal towns running south from the modern Kenya/Tanzania border to Dar es Salaam (Brennan and Burton 2007, 14–15). The town of Dar es Salaam was formally founded by Sultan Majid bin Sayyid of the Omani-Zanzibar Empire when he took over an unoccupied harbor site and an adjacent small fishing village 1866. When the German East Africa Company captured the town, one of the first things they did was build arterial roads from the harbor, based on a grid of three concentric zones laid out by the Sultan, to enable communication between the military headquarters and police posts on the outskirts of town (Brennan and Burton 2007, 21, 23–24; Edward and Hård 2020, 33). Dar es Salaam would become the commercial, military, and administrative capital of German East Africa, and roughly thirty years later, the British would designate it their capital of the Tanganyika Territory.[22]

When the British took over the Tanganyika Territory under a League of Nations Mandate after World War I, they continued to develop Dar es Salaam and its large natural harbor, from which the town derived its Arabic name, until it became a major commercial port. World War II would bring an economic boom driven by industrial development, a major increase in the goods that passed through the port, and a dramatic expansion in the formal labor force (Brennan and Burton 2007, 46–47).[23] Dockwork was the most coveted job due to its flexibility and relatively

[22] Today the Dar es Salaam Port is responsible for 90% of Tanzania's trade (World Bank 2012), serves as the gateway to six landlocked countries (Malawi, Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo), and is one of the most important urban centers in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the largest cities in Africa (Brennan and Burton 2007).

[23] In the post-war decade, the Dar es Salaam Port saw a threefold increase to almost one million in the tonnage of goods passing through in 1956, and the formal labor force in the city expanded from 14,000 in 1931, to 36,000 by 1952, mostly in domestic servants (Brennan and Burton 2007, 47).

high wages, although generally wages remained low for unskilled workers and working conditions were horrible. The harbor and other major public works and infrastructure projects provided the "firm material foundation" of "local empire" that the British Empire depended on (Edward and Hård 2020, 43).

In contexts of increasing capitalist industrialization and accumulation, one major factor that has historically led to the growth of the police is the growth of labor organizing (Spitzer and Scull 1977; Harring 2017). This appears to have been the case in Dar es Salaam, where a rise of labor strikes sparked an increase in surveillance, suppression, and violence at the hands of the police. Special police units had been set up at the harbors and railways, an arrangement dating back to German design of the city, as these were key points of commerce and transit. Cases of strikes at sites vital to the colonial political economy help illustrate the dynamics between workers and the police leading up to independence and the interlocking growth of uprisings and policing. One notable strike that demonstrates this connection between labor organizing and the police was led by the Dockworkers Union on February 1, 1950 in Dar es Salaam to protest a new system of registration that would convert causal workers to permanent status.

Figure 2. Dar es Salaam Port Dockside Industrial Scenes, 1949



Top row, left to right: Crane offloading cement, offloading tins of ghee on the harbor quayside; bottom row: crane loading tractors for the ground nut scheme

Source: Screenshots from British Pathé film (*Tanganyika AKA Tanganyika Dar Es Salaam (1949)* 2014)

Labor organizing as refusal

For the past three years, through collective bargaining and strikes, the Stevedores and Dockworkers Union won pay raises and policies that helped ensure compensation. Sometimes the harbor employers agreed to these demands against the wishes of the Territory's Labor Department, and sometimes negotiations with harbor employers came with compromises for the workers. One such negotiation led to the establishment of "the scheme for the control and

regularization of employment in the industry," which was based on a similar scheme in the UK (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 2). The scheme's aim was exactly that, to "control" and "regularize" employment. It proposed to increase systematic surveillance by Port Authorities through adding a new gate to control workers' entry into the harbor, to register all workers, and to turn daily-paid "casual" workers into monthly-paid permanent workers. The Union had previously waged and won a battle against a policy that would have forced everyone to become non-casual workers, who tended to receive less in wages than casual workers. The Union opposed this plan again and called for a strike the next day the policy was reintroduced.

In his report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Deputy Governor decried this process as "irresponsible" and claimed that the Union had called for violence against their own members who attempted to proceed to work, which "constituted a challenge to law and order" (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 2). The elements of refusal—refusing to be controlled, refusing to be "regularized," refusing to accept a new surveillance scheme, refusing to be paid less, refusing to work until demands were met, refusing to allow each other to comply with a policy that would economically harm them all, refusing to back down after the Labor Department intervened—are what challenged the Colonial Government's idea of "law and order." This collective refusal was not seen as "a challenge to law and order" only because violence may or may not have been called for; it was a challenge because it was a rejection of the legitimacy of the imposed law and order and a threat to the economic extraction that law and order was imposed to maintain.

Policing law and order

Since law and order were at stake on the morning of February 1, the police were called in, which was convenient enough since their barracks were intentionally built across from the

harbor and there was a designated special force already in operation on the docks. Some stopped working that morning, but no formal strike ensued. The Union Executive had called off the strike the night before, although representatives had allegedly still planned to proceed and had allegedly openly advocated for violence. Again at the end of that day, the Union Executive advised workers to return home until negotiations ended.

The next day, February 2, when 800 mostly non-union casual laborers showed up for work in the port, Union officials asked the Senior Superintendent of Police to help prevent them from working. According to the Deputy Governor's report, the Superintendent "carefully explained the functions and duties of the Police in connection with labour disputes" (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 3), which were presumably not to aid challenges to law and order. The Union held another meeting that day calling on workers to return to work because the strike voided the terms of their negotiation with their employers. At that point, the Secretary of the Union began sending "threatening" letters with the Union's demands to the Port Manager, Labour Commissioner, the Chief Secretariat to the Government, and the Private Secretary to the Government (3). In one of these letters, the Union explained that the police refused to help them because he said there was no rule "that some people can be stopped from going on duty"; however, the Union cleverly pointed out that the police regularly "get a hold of people through the dock area" (The Stevedores and Dockworkers Union 1950). Here, the labor organizers called out the hypocrisy in the police's claim: the police are known to "get a hold of people" while they are working, which might mean the police use the dock area as an opportune site of surveillance, seizure, and arrest. So, stopping some workers from going on duty did not seem contrary to the police's "functions and duties" in the workers' eyes.

On the third day of February, there were pickets near the docks with enough strength that officially merited police intervention. The police arrested picketers who opposed them or who were reportedly "found with concealed weapons" (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 3). According to the Deputy Governor, "it was found that in every case the arrested persons were carrying concealed weapons such as knives, axes, iron bars, bottles and clubs" (emphasis in original). In the report, the sequencing of which came first, the arrests or discovery of the concealed weapons, is ambiguous. However, the Deputy Governor does make it clear in the next passage that at 7 a.m. a group of men attacked the Assistant Superintendent of Police "with a blow from behind," leading to a "melee" and a number of injuries, to both policemen and workers.

Then, the police believed that people were leaving to get reinforcements and weapons "to fight the police, attack their barracks and release arrested persons" (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 3). Two hours later, a "disorderly crowd" of supposedly 2,000 stoned the police's motorized patrol. The police then drove to another station for reinforcements, which were given reluctantly since the Senior Officer at the barracks wanted to protect his own men. Three officers were armed with service revolvers and ammunition and 30 other ranks joined them to break up the "large hostile mob," which had formed with "the worst elements armed with clubs, knives, pangas (matchets) and rocks" (4).

Two constables guarding the vehicles "misunderstood instructions" and sent them away for reinforcements, leaving "the small party without adequate transport" (4). The party got into position, was stoned, and several constables were injured, leading Assistant Superintendent Stewart to "warn the crowd that if it did not desist he would have to shoot" (4). I retain the original description that followed to most accurately reflect the discourse and rationale used to describe the alleged perpetrators and victims of what happened next:

> They continued to attack and the two Assistant Superintendents and the Sub-Inspector fired without effect, and the mob proceeded to further violence. The police were compelled to retreat towards the small vehicle and the crowd attacked. Assistant Superintendent McLoughlin and Sub-Inspector Bannerjee appeared to have covered the rear of the party but were cut off and brutally hacked, receiving ghastly wounds from head to foot. At this point the crowd, apparently satisfied with the damage done, dispersed and the Assistant Superintendent Stewart recovered the wounded officers and brought them back to the barracks. (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 4)

The reinforcements arrived too late and "collected one dead rioter," and six rioters were admitted to the hospital with bullet wounds and one of them died there. The three officers were admitted to the hospital (one was treated by a doctor that flew in from abroad for the occasion), while of the 19 constables injured, five were admitted to the hospital (4). The report also mentions that there was some confusion over how many revolvers and rounds were fired by the officers. The Deputy Governor admits that it was incorrectly stated in a telegram that only one revolver was fired, but he had later learned that all three officers had fired. Two officers were still in critical condition and one revolver was still missing, so at the time of the report, the colonial administrators did not know how any rounds were truly fired.

It is not difficult to tell from this archival file, other official police reports of the incident, and newspaper clippings that the Deputy Governor and police always already saw the workers as violent, regardless of whether they were picketing, carrying weapons, or using those weapons. It seems that the Deputy Governor does not mince words in describing the threat that the workers posed, as evidenced by his multiple (different) lists of the weapons workers and arrested individuals had, in "<u>every case</u>." Even before describing the "melee" that ensued on the dock on February 3, in every section of the report, the Deputy Governor claims that the Union was calling for violence. While the Union is perfectly justified to whatever means of resistance they have at their disposal, most of the Deputy Governor's claims are contradictory (e.g., the union called off the strike; the union encouraged violence during the strike). I point this out not to call into

question the validity or obvious bias of the Deputy Governor's claims, but instead to show what kinds of ideas British administrators had about their colonial subjects and how these ideas informed practices and decisions of the police, which frequently led to violence and death. Consider the official write-up of the episode in the Police Annual Report for that year, in which I have italicized mentions of violence, as well as yet another list of suspected weapons:

> On the 1st February the Dockworkers' and Stevedores' Union called a strike which caused considerable dislocation of the normal port working. By 3rd February, the strikers openly resorted to *intimidation* and *violence* and from an early hour in the morning the Police were busy arresting strike pickets *armed* with *knobkerries, iron bars, knuckle-dusters* and the like. Later in the morning a *riotous mob* moved on the business and shopping centre of the town and were engaged by a Police patrol on the open space known as Mnazi Mmoja. Reference has been made in paragraph nine to the resolution and courage displayed by the Police party on this occasion, who, although heavily outnumbered and *violently attacked*, undoubtedly prevented a serious spread of *rioting*. It was necessary to resort to the use of firearms in self protection and three *rioters* were killed. There were no further acts of *violence* and the life of the town quickly resumed its normal course. (Tanganyika Police 1950, 8)

The Police Commissioner describes the dockworkers as being "armed" with a variety of weapons and openly resorting to "intimidation and violence," but neglects to mention that an unknown number of police officers with an unknown number of guns fired an unknown number of rounds and killed two people. Similarly, the commissioner described the "rioters" as violent in the second encounter, yet the police were again the only bearer of firearms and killed three more people. The commissioner applauds the police party's "resolution and courage" that prevented the "serious spread of rioting" and enabled the town to "quickly resume its normal course." The purpose of the police party was to suppress anything deemed a threat to the economic and social order, and this collective refusal of the dockworkers was deemed a threat; therefore, all accountability for violence rested on their actions, not those of the police.

Aftermath of the strike

The Deputy Governor determined that the Union leaders were to blame for the violence and arrested them and searched the headquarters for evidence. At the time of the report, 15 people had so far been sentenced to 15 months for unlawful assembly (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 5). Simultaneously, the report downplays the impact this "fracas" had on the township and reassures the colonial administrators that everything is under control: "The normal life of Dar es Salaam was, in fact, little affected by the incidents which passed off almost entirely unnoticed outside the African town. There were rumours that the Railway casual labourers might strike in sympathy with the dock labourers but the rumours proved untrue" (5). Then when the Provincial Commissioner held a meeting, 3,000 towns people attended, who "seemed genuinely anxious to dissociate themselves from the conduct of the hooligan element."

The Deputy Governor also sought to impress upon his higher-ups in London that the threat was gone. The instigators were believed to "have left town" and "at no time was the situation out of hand but the unfortunate incident involving serious injuries to two police officers naturally raised some public alarm" (5). Newspapers reported that the police opened fire on the rioters and denounced them as "hooligans" and a "small irresponsible element," language that was perhaps intended to underplay one thousand dock strikers attacking the police ("Tanganyika: Strikes and Riots" 1950).[24] There was also a series of reported "murders," "disorder," and "riots" in the several days' aftermath of the strike (Reuter 1950).

Importantly, the Deputy Governor sought to reassure the Colonial Secretary of State that business was able to continue as usual: "It is an important feature that throughout the period of

[24] Elizabeth Hinton provides the historical context for the racist language of "riots," a term used to describe incidences of violent police suppression of Black uprisings, and calls for a recasting of these forms of protest as "Black Rebellions" (Hinton 2021).

the strike the port was kept working; between 700 and 800 men were employed on the 2nd and 3rd of February and by the 5th February the numbers had increased to over 1,000, and the number of persons applying for work exceeded the number required by several hundreds" (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 5). The Deputy Governor seems to cast this as a successful story of police intervention and control. Despite some injuries and deaths, the threat was neutralized and business could resume, the main priorities of the police and colonial government. This is an important case for understanding the role of the police and military, decisions to use force, and strategies to suppress collective uprisings. This is also an important case for understanding acts of resistance against the colonial police and colonialism at large and how this impacted the material power and ideological training of the police at the turn of independence.

A series of ministers' correspondence about weapons was cited in the file for this incident alongside the Deputy Governor's report ("Tanganyika: Strikes and Riots" 1950). For instance, one circular dispatch from June 1948 informed all colonies "of the desirability of using tear smoke," and in November 1949, a London police officer encouraged the Commissioner of Police to obtain the requisite supplies for using this kind of riot control weapon. The next month, 1,000 non-explosive grenades (No. 91) were requested, but upon being unavailable, the Crown Agents informed the Tanganyika police of "the various American weapons on the market and to enquire which types should be ordered" ("Confidential Minute on Police Response to Dock Workers Union Strike" 1950). Another response to the dockworkers union strike from a colonial official in London was that they were "disturbed" that Tanganyika still did not have tear gas bombs. The strike and following police violence was not disturbing, and he deemed any "formal enquiry into the disturbance" unnecessary.

In addition to the articulated priority of equipping the Tanganyika police with more anti-riot weapons, there was discussion among the Tanganyika Department of Labor and London Colonial Office about how to solve the "port labour problem" going forward. They gave up on their "experiments" with collective bargaining and decided to pass legislation to set up a Wage Board (following the example in Nairobi) so as to fix the wages in the port industry, to issue registration cards with photo identification to ensure "the efficient working of this port both now and in the future," and to introduce attendance tickets as part of a "labour control scheme" similar to that of the National Dock Labour Board in the UK (Molohan 1950).

The police are enmeshed with the capitalist production system that was created by and for the colonial state. Protecting the functioning of industrial hubs of labor and capital extraction (e.g., harbor and railways) was fundamental to the functioning of the colonial political economy. Stopping the functioning of these hubs and their protectors was a powerful strategy to challenging the legitimacy and authority of the colonial state. This episode suggests that the police (and harbor employers) were not merely *agents* of the state, as the colonial administrators were only responsible for reputational and political cleanup. Instead of being agents of the state, the police were bringing the state into being by constructing and fortifying its political economic backbone, protecting the means of production, and ensuring production continued in a key hub of labor and capital extraction. The dockworkers were targeting the legitimacy, hegemony, and financial security of the colonial state by resisting the police and rejecting being exploited through their labor. Throughout the year 1950, there would be 50 strikes involving at least 7,444 workers and resulting in 11,006 working days lost, according to the Tanganyika *Annual Report of the Labour Department* (Jackson 1979, 220). This dockworker strike is just one of a long history of labor organizing in Tanganyika through British colonial rule (see Figure 3). Even

before trade unions were formed in the 1930s in Tanganyika, historian John Iliffe dates labor protest back even earlier to desertion from caravans and early plantations, as well as strikes and demonstrations (Iliffe 1979, 395).

Figure 3. Examples of Police Resistance and Labor Organizing in Tanganyika

Year	Example of Resistance through Labor Organizing
1929	Cases of rioting, unlawful assembly, "escapes from lawful custody," and "obstructing the police in execution of their duty" classified under "Class I. Offences against the State, Public Tranquility, Safety and Justice" (Tanganyika Police 1929, 10)
1933	Rioting on a sisal estate (Tanganyika Police 1933, 19)
1936	Arson because native worker wasn't paid by European employer (Tanganyika Police 1936, 27); arson to a Moravian mission (28); 3 cases of arson because laborers weren't paid (24)
1936	Arson to 25 acres of sisal (Tanganyika Police 1936, 14)
1937	Opposition to the Native Authority Coffee Rules culminated in a riot and police responded to several other protests, but these riots were later in the report downplayed and the police's success in quelling them was overplayed (Tanganyika Police 1937, 10, 35)
1939	A strike in Tanga resulted in 50 striker casualties and 8 police casualties, 52 rioting convictions, and sentences ranging from 5 to 18 months' imprisonment with hard labor (Tanganyika Police 1939, 6)
1949	Miner strike for unpaid labor (Tanganyika Police 1949, 9)
1950	Dockworkers strike (described above)
1961	Major uptick in resistance (riots and escapes from custody): "Reports of offences relating to riot, escapes and rescue from lawful custody and offences against the administration of justice, numbered 1,636 in 1961 as against 976 in 1960" (Tanganyika Police 1961, 10)

Part II. "The Territory could do without that force": Policing the Nyasaland Emergency

Individual colonies have been commonly viewed in isolation by some scholars, an approach which has led them to miss important cross-territorial strategies in the transition to independence. For instance, they miss the fact that "the colonial office was simultaneously struggling with insurgencies in numerous territories, and that administrators, soldiers, and policemen alike were being constantly transferred from one colony to the other…" (Grob-Fitzgibbon 2016, 3). However, British policies around the transition to independence and counterinsurgency campaigns and "dirty wars of empire" to stifle resistance movements in various territories (notably, such as the Mau Mau north of Tanganyika) were part of "a concerted imperial strategy" (Grob-Fitzgibbon 2016, 3–4). This strategy was deemed to have successfully "(secured) the colonies for the Commonwealth in an orderly transfer of power while maintaining British influence in the region and strengthening overall Western dominance in the Cold War world" (Grob-Fitzgibbon 2016, 3). This has been described as "Britain's imperial endgame" that according to some accounts, they won (Grob-Fitzgibbon 2016, 4).

In correspondence with British colonial officials in 1959, Nyerere questioned whether it was a breach of the United National Tanganyika Trusteeship Agreement to use part of the Tanganyika police force to quell the chaos declared a state emergency in Nyasaland and to prevent spillover effects in Tanganyika. This debate demonstrates how the British used the police as a transnational tool of maintaining law and order across colonial borders, which dates back to a regional agreement made in 1953, even in potential violation of the UN Trusteeship Agreement. Nyerere argued in the Legislative Council that this reciprocal agreement had never benefited Tanganyika before, and that many Tanganyikan police officers employed during the emergency in Nyasaland had lost their lives doing so. These were mostly Africans on the

frontlines who filled the 72 rank and file Field Force officers enlisted for this task. Their assignment was to "ensure the security of the Karonga Township and prison, including responsibility for the custody of political prisoners to be arrested under the Emergency" (Macoun 1959, 1). The Tanganyika police helped Nyasaland authorities with arrests, custody, and dispersing crowds, which led to the following scene on March 3, 1959:

> Unsuccessful attempts were made to disperse this crowd and at 8.53 a.m. it became necessary to use rifle fire. Twenty rounds of .303 ammunition were fired by ten members of the unit in addition to which Mr. Thomas had previously fired five rounds with automatic carbine in an endeavour to prevent the crowd breaking over the airstrip into Karonga Township. Two persons were killed by rifle fire and it was later ascertained that about twenty received gunshot wounds. A further ten sustained injuries from burns caused by tear smoke shells and from batons. This action effected the crowd's dispersal. (Macoun 1959, 2)

This scene from the police report illustrates one example of how colonial police forces were used to suppress resistance and maintain control across borders of British imperial holdings. The level of violence of opening fire on a crowd and number of injuries and casualties demonstrates the compounded power that police officers and colonial authorities had when they combined forces across territorial boundaries.

However, the resistance also continued: people illegally gathered and crowded roads leading to Karonga, dug up culverts to destroy roads, removed planks to dismantle bridges, sabotaged telephone landlines, and cut off food supplies to the government (Macoun 1959, 2–4). Congress supporters in Nyasaland empowered people to rise up against the colonists, allegedly resulting in "terrorised" members of the African civil service and local chiefs and a "complete breakdown in the administration of the District" (Macoun 1959, 3). Without help of the Tanganyika police force, the Nyasaland colonial government and some "loyal Africans" would not have been enough to stop the "determined resistance" and prevent the rioting that posed a

"serious danger to the few European officials and their families left in Karonga" (Macoun 1959, 3). Therefore, this incident led to calls to set up "properly organised security teams and the presence of additional police" to arrest remaining dissenters and reestablish order in the area (Macoun 1959, 4). Would Nyasaland have achieved independence any sooner than 1964 if the Tanganyika police forces had not intervened and if this incident had not led to a ramping up of police in the area? Perhaps this strategy of transnational policing played a role in slowing the pace of achieving independence and dismantling the British Empire in East Africa.

Another characteristic of this tactic of transnational imperial policing was the shuffling of personnel between colonies. The Deputy and Acting Police Commissioner who filed the aforementioned report on the incident in northern Nyasaland, Michael Macoun, was promoted to serve as Commissioner of Police in Uganda, in March 1959 presumably tied to his handling of this incident, and he was replaced by someone on transfer from Northern Rhodesia (Tanganyika Police 1959). Cross-national bureaucratic exchanges may have aided collaboration and communication across colonial lines to suppress resistance through shared surveillance, intelligence, and strategies. The crosspollination of British policing staff and practices suggests this analysis may have implications beyond Tanganyika. Furthermore, the global transfusion and fortification of these methods by the U.K. would not end with formal colonial rule.[25]

In a Legislative Council session following this incident, Nyerere questioned the rationale behind this cross-national policing decision, whether it violated the Trusteeship Agreement, and which government covered the expenses (Tanganyika Legislative Council 1959a). One week

[25] Macoun would leave Uganda in 1965 (Uganda gained independence in 1962), go on a lecture tour of the United States, teach at the National Police Staff College in the United Kingdom, and then serve as Inspector-General of Police in the Colonial Office, followed by a departmental merger and title change to "Overseas Police Adviser/Inspector General of Police of the Dependent Territories," during which he traveled to 78 countries (Macoun 1996). Throughout his tenure as Overseas Police Adviser, Macoun would advise on Police Training to the Overseas Development Administration, serve as the U.K. delegate at twelve Interpol Conferences, and visit sites of "incipient disorder."

before the session, the colonial administration retrieved a list of the questions Nyerere was planning to ask, and so they were able to consult with the Colonial Office prior to having to justify this decision, since they were themselves concerned about its legality (Turnbull 1959). According to legal counsels' correspondence with colonial officials, the Tanganyika Governor could use a police ordinance (section 86, cap. 322) to cover his decision to move sixty police officers into the Northern Province of Nyasaland ("Use of the Tanganyika Police Force in Nyasaland" 1959). Other correspondence between colonial governors had established informal agreements about aiding each other in emergencies.[26]

It is worth noting that it was not until after the fact that the British colonial government felt compelled to check whether its actions were permissible under the international agreement that legitimated their state and police power, and that representatives were able to draw upon the principle of national sovereignty and international accountability even under colonial domination. International law did not seem to have much bearing on colonial governors' and police commissioners' decisions, and they had acquired relative autonomy in their day-to-day administration of colonies. It also demonstrates how challenges to British rule and the elastic nature of the police's mandate warranted an exception to the international legal principle of national sovereignty.

When the Chief Secretary tried to justify this legal backing to the Legislative Council, however, several representatives pushed further on this point, asking whether domestic police forces would only be deployed in neighboring territories if they were not needed in Tanganyika

[26] For instance, an agreement existed between Tanganyika and Uganda: "in an immediate emergency the Uganda Police would certainly go to the aid of the police in a neighbouring territory if that action seemed immediately necessary and desirable" (Crawford 1959).

at the time. Representative Jamal went so far as to challenge the necessity of the police altogether:

> Mr. Jamal: Is the Government aware that as a result of the temporary absence of the contingent of Tanganyika Police in Nyasaland it was demonstrated that the Territory could do without that force, and that therefore there is no question of using additional money for Police Force extensions?
>
> The Chief Secretary: That is not relevant to the original question. (Tanganyika Legislative Council 1959b)

Representative Jamal's observation strikes at the heart of the colonial police's raison d'être: "it was demonstrated that the Territory could do without that force." While colonial administrators tried to cover their verging-on-illegal decision to expand their territorial monopoly of violence to another territory vis-à-vis the police, African political leaders saw at least a discursive opportunity to question the very existence of the police. Representative Jamal expresses unequivocally that this is evidence that Tanganyika does not really need a police force, which forecloses any question of increasing the budget of expanding the police force. Upon challenging the necessity and legitimacy of having a police force, the Chief Secretary immediately dismisses the line of inquiry as "not relevant" and prohibits further discussion on the topic altogether. The following year there would be a count of 976 combined riots, escapes from police custody, and "offences against the administration of justice" (Tanganyika Police 1961, 10). The British colonial administrators needed a police force to maintain law and order, and they especially needed to expand it given the growing perceived threat and power of African intellectuals and communism, and the constant specter of a combination of the two.

Policing as State-building?

I next apply my theory of policing as state-building to these two episodes to evaluate whether the police can be said to be responsible for the main imperatives of the state.[27] These imperatives cannot be measured separately because they are always interacting and usually competing (C. Young 1997, 40), but I include how they are connected, overlapping, or in tension with each other below. I find that there is evidence of the police attempting to achieve the main imperatives of the state, but also of the people (in these cases, workers and representatives) mounting challenges to these imperatives. This leads me to conclude that the police were a main tool of colonization, but also an entry-point for resisting colonization. This dynamic would shape the relationship between the police, state, and society after the end of formal colonial rule in Tanganyika.

I. Hegemony

When the Dockworkers Union threatened to have a strike, this was seen as a challenge to colonial supremacy and authority, so the police preemptively intervened and tried to eliminate the threat. They used force (opened fire) on a crowd of civilians who were only armed with sticks, stones, and farm tools because this strike was seen to present so much of a threat to colonial domination that it was not enough to simply arrest and imprison the workers later. This strike was not only a refusal to work, but "a refusal to acknowledge the domination of the state," which called for force (C. Young 1997, 35). In his report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Deputy Governor decried the strike as "irresponsible" and claimed that the Union's actions "constituted a challenge to law and order" (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 2). This collective refusal was perceived as such a challenge because it was a rejection of the legitimacy of the

[27] See Chapter Two for an overview of the characteristics of each of the six imperatives: hegemony, autonomy, security, legitimacy, revenue, and accumulation.

imposed law and order and a threat to the economic extraction that law and order was supposed to maintain.

The police were the main agents responsible for the "continuous struggle to ensure the supremacy of their [colonial] authority" (35). Because this strike challenged colonial hegemony, London concluded that the only way to reinforce their rule was through increasing the police's capacity for violence to subdue future "disturbances" like the strike and following demonstrations. The legitimacy of the police use of force was never questioned in London as evidenced by their judgement that a "formal enquiry" into the "disturbance" was unnecessary.

II. Autonomy

The police advanced the autonomy of the Tanganyika colonial administration. The police were becoming an increasingly professionalized force, especially in the period following WWII, and increasingly independent from command in London. The police, mostly only constrained by their equipment, also achieved a degree of autonomy and acted on their own accord without much supervision from the Tanganyika Governor or London in the incidences described in this chapter. The strike demonstrates this because the police were interpreting what the colonial administration's interests were in this situation and acting relatively independently to neutralize threats to those interests. Reports filed by the Dep. Governor and messages between London officials suggest that they wanted to preserve this independence of the police. They prevented an official inquiry into the demonstrations from being carried out and they were primarily concerned with better equipping the police to prevent future such "disturbances." The workers were challenging this autonomy by challenging the police, those who were entrusted with carrying out British colonial policies. They even questioned the allegiance of the police to

see just how autonomous they were when they asked an officer if he would help them prevent workers from working during the strike.

III. Security

The strikers and the protestors they inspired constituted a direct threat to the internal security of the territory, in the eyes of the police. The British colonial administrators viewed the African workers as violent before they acted and found their concealed weapons as further evidence of this threat they posed to security (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 3). According to the Deputy Governor, "it was found that in every case the arrested persons were carrying concealed weapons such as knives, axes, iron bars, bottles and clubs" (emphasis in original). The strike and actions of the protestors was also characterized by the news as "attempted murder" of a British police officer (see Figure 4).

When workers collectively organized to challenge the policies introduced by the harbor and colonial administrators that would reduce their wages, job security, and potentially safety (through increased surveillance), this made the British feel like their security was being threatened. The colony's financial security relied on workers showing up and operating the docks, and the colonizers' physical security relied on workers falling in line and not gathering together since they outnumbered the British. Even though military troops were called in to stand by, it was the police who were stationed directly across from the harbor and who were called in to intervene, and the police who were in charge of suppressing the following protests. More so than the military and navy, the police seemed to be the main "national security council" of the state (C. Young 1997, 37).

As the institutional core of the state, the aftermath of the strike led the police to further arm and equip themselves to suppress future "disturbances" to their security. The police's struggle to put down the strike and following demonstrations were directly attributed to the police force not being strong enough in terms of tear gas and communications equipment: "It seems to me that if a little of this had been used on the mob at the right moment it would have had the desired effect but I doubt whether any tear gas bombs were available!" and "The disturbance in question clearly shows the weakness of Police equipment," in the words of the Assistant Police Adviser in London, who had previously worked in the London Metropolitan Police (Abbiss 1950).

Figure 4. Telegram of news report following dockworkers strike (Reuter 1950)



42540/SD. MR. E. SCOTT

ATTEMPTED MURDER

DAR ES SALAAM MARCH 23 REUTER - ELEVEN AFRICANS CHARGED WITH THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF A BRITISH POLICE ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT AND AN ASIAN SUB-INSPECTOR IN A RIOT HERE ON FEBRUARY 3 WERE TODAY COMMITTED TO TANGANYIKA HIGH COURT FOR TRIAL.

THEY WERE COMMITTED FROM THE RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT HERE, WHERE THEY WERE CHARGED EARLIER THIS MONTH.

THE TWO POLICE OFFICERS, ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT J.M.MCLOUGHLIN AND SUB-INSPECTOR A.K.BANNERJEE, WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED WHEN STRIKING AFRICAN DOCKERS ATTACKED A POLICE PATROL. THE POLICE OPENED FIRE, KILLING ONE AFRICAN AND WOUNDING SEVEN. THEY ARRESTED 86 AFRICANS.
REUTER 1510

Mr Wallace.

IV. Legitimacy

Contrary to a contract view of statebuilding, colonial statebuilding did not involve consent but was achieved primarily through coercion, so legitimacy was not granted from inside but outside (i.e., London). As Young describes, the colonial administration's "battle for legitimation on the European front was won, but colonial agents were well aware that its command over its subjects relied ultimately on force" and "no social contract other than conquest bound its subjects to its rule" (C. Young 1997, 139). This left establishing hegemony precarious (139), so the police sought to create the appearance of legitimacy to suppress challenges to colonial rule, which was potentially one reason they were used instead of the military to ensure daily hegemony from within the territory. The police sought to preserve colonial authority and maintain the right to enforce these policies by demonstrating that they possessed "superior force" to the workers (C. Young 1997, 37). This is the core of the Weberian state because the state has a monopoly over violence, so the police sought to visibly demonstrate their capacity for violence as a way to uphold their claim to legitimate use of this violence and therefore legitimate domination over the territory.

The strike challenged the legitimacy imperative of the colonial administration because the workers were saying through their refusal to work that they did not find the harbor's new policies legitimate so they would not accept them. The union sent letters to the colonial administration with their demands, but they were refused. So the workers used the next tool at their disposal: their own labor. They refused to work because they disagreed with the policies being introduced since they would not fairly compensate them and therefore further exploit their labor. This was not only a questioning of these policies of increased monitoring, regulation, and control, but a questioning of the authority behind the these policies. Through withholding their

labor, the workers were challenging the harbor and colonial administration's power to make them work under disagreeable conditions.

V. Revenue and VI. Accumulation

Financing and profiting off of colonial territories and especially following WWII, was the main priority of the British Empire. The police were central to extracting resources for the colonial project, most straightforwardly through their main interactions with colonized peoples through tax collection. In labor disputes between African workers and colonial industries, the police took the side of capital interests. The Dockworkers' Union tested this: they asked the police if they would help prevent dockworkers from working and the police refused, even though they would otherwise use the dock area to "get a hold of people" and prevent people from working on a regular basis (Fletcher-Cooke 1950, 3). Here the workers can be interpreted as pointing out the contradictory nature of the police force's imperatives of ensuring revenue and accumulation while attempting to secure legitimate hegemonic rule.

Contesting Police, Empire, and State

These two episodes demonstrate how the colonial police came to be a core and contested feature of the state: resistance to colonial rule was deeply connected to resistance to the colonial police, and resistance to the colonial police shaped postcolonial and neoimperial practices, ideas, and material methods of policing. It is hard to imagine what the colonial state would look like without the police.

First, throughout formal colonial rule and during the transition to independence, anti-colonial efforts to dismantle the British Empire were bound up with resistance to the police

system. Challenging the colonial police system was central to liberatory self-governance strategies. Anti-colonial resistance to the police helped bring about the end of the British Empire. This resistance involved attempts to physically interrupt and overthrow, bureaucratically weaken, and fundamentally delegitimize the police as a daily manifestation of the colonial state. These forms of resistance demonstrated that "the Territory could do without that force" (Tanganyika Legislative Council 1959b). I find that there was a rise in collective organizing to challenge colonial authority especially following World War II, as reflected by a wave of strikes across West and East Africa (Frederick Cooper 1996b). These tactics often targeted or came head-to-head with the police. One potential explanation for this is that the police were the main way people came into contact with the state, so the police became an important avenue of resistance to colonialism. Collective organizing, like the dockworkers strike, was not only resistance to economic exploitation but to forms of state surveillance, policing, and violence that were being ramped up during this pivotal time.

Second, the challenging of policing institutions in the transition to self-governance shaped the postcolonial police system and its relationship to the newly independent state, partly by disrupting its operations and partly by accelerating its neoimperial growth. We can see how efforts to disrupt colonial policing and to Africanize the inherited nation-state accelerated the growth of policing leading up to independence through innovating strategies and stockpiling weapons for controlling riots, strikes, and forms of protest that continued through the end of formal British colonial rule. The broader security and intelligence system remained in place, and British officials sought to protect their power "by transforming formal empire into informal influence," such as by fortifying this system with security assistance for decades to come (Maguire and Franklin 2020, 2). We can also see this through a push to pass legal and

bureaucratic measures aimed at legitimizing and empowering the police, such as in cross-national arrangements between governors aimed at expanding police power beyond state lines, and in inscribing and protecting police power in Tanganyika's first Constitution (A. Smith 1961). Overall, the falling British Empire held on tightly to the police and institutionalized ways to continue influencing the postcolonial state through the police into independence.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates how the colonial police system was contested and reasserted on the eve of independence and the fall of the British Empire. The co-constitutive relationship between the police and state, including its capitalist economic bedrock, helped both assemblages persist, and the police helped create and reassert the power of the state. This was the case especially throughout critical junctures, such as major transitions of state power (e.g., independence), international conflicts (e.g., WWII and Cold War), and neoimperial interventions (e.g., development and foreign aid).

Studies on colonial security institutions focus solely on the period of colonization, although these institutions did not end there; rather, they shaped the development of security institutions in new postcolonial regimes (Maguire and Franklin 2020) and across western Europe and the Americas (Andersen and Killingray 1992; Barkawi and Laffey 2006). However, this literature misses the connections between policing institutions in colonial and postcolonial state apparatuses, and the ways in which other security institutions, like the military, private security firms (Singer 2007), and other public agencies,[28] are related to policing (Johansen 2017, 116).

[28] For example, see the work of Dorothy Roberts on family regulation agencies' role in policing Black people in the United States (Roberts, Dorothy. 2002. *Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare*. Reprint edition. New York: Civitas Books), and the work of Maya Schenwar and Victoria Law on alternative forms of state control, punishment, and surveillance beyond the physical prison (Schenwar, Maya, and Victoria Law. 2020. *Prison by Any Other Name:*

This dissertation highlights the police as a missing link in in the emerging comparative global security scholarship, but also in the comparative politics canon on state-building.

A definitive insight that Young left us with is that "the colonial state lives, absorbed into the structures of the independent polity" due to the state's "formidable capacity for its own reproduction across time and in the face of systematic efforts by new regimes to uproot prior forms and build new blueprints" (C. Young 1997, 2). This chapter argues that the police were essential to this production and reproduction of the state, so much so that the police should be central in Young's conceptualization of Bula Matari, the symbol of "white domination that was the energizing force in the superstructure of imperial hegemony" (2). If we conceptualize the police as a distinctive feature of the nineteenth-century European state superimposed on African polities, this might help explain the persistent superstructures of the colonial state, and the police's place in them. Despite reforms and resistance to the police after independence, colonial policing institutions continued to shape state practices and ideologies of racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed control in the territory that would become Tanzania in 1964 (Kamau 2006; Kapinga 2014; Shivji and Yahya-Othman 2014). Because of these connections, many contemporary challenges are derived from the colonial legacies of the police and state.

This analysis raises other questions, such as, how do these legacies of coloniality, policing, and resistance inform state practices and ideologies today? Why does this matter for contemporary politics in Tanzania and other postcolonial contexts? What role might police and prison abolition play in dismantling today's systems of state violence? By putting these findings

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The Harmful Consequences of Popular Reforms. New York: The New Press). See also the work of Jean-Paul Brodeur, who expands the definition of "policing" beyond visible law enforcement to include multiple "webs" of agencies, individuals, and practices (Brodeur, Jean-Paul. 2010. *The Policing Web*. 1 edition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press).

in conversation with theories of policing and state violence in other postcolonial contexts and contemporary settler colonial contexts, new insights may emerge about the relationship between empire-building and -dismantling, the police system, and the continued work of decolonization.

Chapter V. Policing Tanzania Today

Introduction

In this dissertation so far, I have argued that the police were central to creating colonial hegemony and extraction. Along every step of the way, this system was met with resistance, but despite—or perhaps because of—resistance and corresponding reforms to this system, it still exists in the afterlife of empire. In the previous chapter, I suggested some ways that colonial ideas, practices, and institutions of policing may have persisted past the end of formal colonial rule in Tanganyika. In this chapter, I illustrate how these legacies manifest in policing in Tanzania today. The colonial purpose and design of policing exacerbates the relationship between state and society.

The regime of the past six years is well suited for examining the role of the police because Tanzania has experienced extreme civil society crackdowns, which have led some to call this a turning point for the country. Some argue that Tanzania's democratic space has been diminishing more rapidly than any other African country ("Subverting Democracy in Tanzania and Zambia" 2019; Siegle and Cook 2020), most notably freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders 2020), especially considering its comparatively democratic reputation (Becker 2021, 189; Freedom House 2021) (see Figures 1 and 2). Others have contextualized this phenomenon in a broader global trend of mass protests and mobilization challenging authoritarian and hybrid regimes, consequently inciting reversals in democratization and human rights (Goldsmith 2021).

This chapter homes in on the role of the police in these contentious dynamics between state and society in contemporary Tanzania. I begin with an overview of how I navigated data limitations, given the highly sensitive political climate. I next assess the nature and function of

policing through the eyes of the Tanzania Police Force and the average Tanzanian. I then explore how policing and marginalized people's experiences in Tanzania today compares to the rest of its history and the continent. I argue that the police's centrality in establishing authoritarian rule is a legacy of colonialism that has been evolved by the ruling party to consolidate and maintain a hold on power over time.

Figure 1. Freedom in the World: Overall Score (out of 100, 2016-2021)



Figure 2. Freedom in the World: Disaggregated Scores on Political Rights (left panel, out of 40) and Civil Liberties (right panel, out of 60) (2017-2021)[29]



Navigating Data Limitations

It has been a challenge to collect data on policing and violence in Tanzania since I began this dissertation in 2016 due to crackdowns, largely carried out by the police, on opposition and dissent to the government.[30] To overcome these limitations, I triangulated data from national, regional, and international news sources; public opinion surveys; NGO and human rights reports; scholarship and commentary from Tanzanian experts; and interviews and broadcasted panels with activists and lawyers from neighboring countries. From this data collection, I have compiled two cross-national datasets and one national dataset that will be made publicly available after publication (see Appendix A for a complete overview).

The first dataset summarizes the experiences of gender and sexual minorities documented in human rights reports, as well as other intersecting marginalized groups, such as people who trade sex and people living with HIV/AIDS in sixteen African countries. The second dataset

[29] Comparable scores prior to 2017 do not exist (Freedom House changed the scales from a 7-point score for both Political Rights and Civil Liberties, to a 40- and 60-point score, respectively).
[30] In early conversations I had doing fieldwork in 2016, longtime activists, academics, and health and human rights practitioners I spoke with raised concerns about saying anything to me that could be perceived as going against then-President Magufuli.

includes all reported incidents of political violence targeting gender and sexual minorities in ten African countries. I employed methods from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to systematically collect this data and contributed this dataset as a pilot for a new type of political violence to ACLED. The third dataset includes all state actions that have been taken against gender and sexual minorities in Tanzania over time, ranging from bills, policies, speeches, high-level arrests and detainments, violence, media and civil society crackdowns, and statements.

The State of Tanzania Today

Since achieving independence in 1961, Tanzania has been ruled by the same party, now known as CCM (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*, or "the Party of Revolution"). For the first time in elections between 2005 and 2015, CCM's lead started shrinking as more opposition parties and leaders gained strength (Paget 2021, 61). From 2015 to 2021, late President John Magufuli earned an international reputation as *Tingatinga* ("the bulldozer") (Rosen 2019; Subramanian 2019) and "the public face of tyranny" (Paget 2021, 62). Magufuli passed harsh policies and launched severe crackdowns targeting an array of individuals: opposition politicians, journalists, civil society organizations, pop stars, statisticians, young mothers, people living with HIV/AIDS, and gender and sexual minorities (McLellan 2018; Ratcliffe 2018; Rosen 2019).

The police have been the main arm of the state responsible for surveilling, arresting, and violently repressing civil society organizations, opposition supporters, government dissidents, and historically marginalized groups. The police are therefore part and parcel of the "return of the one-party state" (Collord 2021). In the latest annual review of Tanzania by the U.S. State Department, the police are the main topic of the 50-page report and are cited for numerous

abuses (2020).[31] In scrutinizing the individual actions of Magufuli, most journalists, activists, policymakers, practitioners, and scholars mention the police in their analyses, but they have largely taken its repressive role for granted. That is, there has been little questioning of the nature and function of policing in relation to Tanzanian politics. For example, Human Rights Watch submitted a report to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review in which the police feature prominently, although none of their recommendations name the police (Human Rights Watch 2021).[32] I argue that this is a grave oversight that further reinscribes the power and naturalization of the police, and a missed opportunity to identify how the police are entrenched in the governing apparatus of the state and ruling party.

The regime of the past six years provides an entry point into understanding the function of the police in contemporary Tanzania because this period has led the country to a major turning point. CCM's tactics to maintain power culminated in the 2020 election, when the party earned

[31] A full summary of these abuses follows: "Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government or on behalf of the government; forced disappearance by the government or on behalf of the government; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government or on behalf of the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including violence, threats of violence, or unjustified arrests or prosecutions against journalists, censorship, site blocking, the existence of criminal libel laws even if not enforced; overly restrictive nongovernmental organization laws; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; refoulement of refugees to a country where they would face a threat to their life or freedom or other mistreatment of refugees that would constitute a human rights abuse; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; restrictions on political participation where elections have not been found to be genuine, free, or fair; serious acts of corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for violence against women; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting persons with disabilities, members of national/racial/ethnic minorities, or indigenous people; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex persons; existence or use of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults; and use of forced or compulsory child labor" (United States Department of State 2020, 1–2).

[32] The report covers the following areas of human rights violations: "Attacks on the Political Opposition"; "Attacks on Press Freedom and Freedom of Expression"; "Attacks on Freedom of Association"; "Discrimination, Arbitrary Arrest and Torture and Ill-Treatment on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity"; "Abuses and Discrimination Against Girls and Women"; "Abuses Against Refugees and Asylum Seekers"; "Corporal Punishment and Humiliating Treatment in Schools"; and "Shackling of People with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities" (Human Rights Watch 2021).

its highest vote share since multipartyism began in 1992. Magufuli won a second term with 84 percent of the official vote, CCM won 93 percent of the elected seats in the National Assembly and a similar proportion in local councils, and, in 2019, CCM won 99 percent of local government positions (Paget 2021, 61). The brutality of tactics to suppress opposition and dissent has led some to consider this past election an "authoritarian landslide" that signaled Tanzania's turn from a multiparty regime that used authoritarian tactics, into a fully authoritarian regime that uses unparalleled levels of electoral manipulation and violence (Paget 2021, 61–62; *Al Jazeera* 2020b). This chapter focuses on the role of the police in this pivot under the Magufuli administration, but it also questions the extent to which this repression is distinct from postcolonial policing in Tanzania and contemporary policing in other contexts.

Policing in Tanzania

The significance of understanding the operation of policing in Tanzania today is exemplified in the title of the op-ed, "How the police force became the single biggest threat to public safety in Tanzania" (Said 2020). Before explaining what is behind this characterization, I begin with an overview of first, what the police say their mandate is, and second, what citizens say the police do and do not do.

What the police say about the police

The Tanzania Police Force is currently under the Ministry of Home Affairs and derives its power from the Criminal Procedure Act (Government of Tanzania 1985). The Tanzania Police Force articulates its vision and responsibilities, respectively, in the following way: "To be a professional Army (or "force") in maintaining the safety of the people and their property in the

United Republic of Tanzania" and "provide quality services that will enable them to identify, prevent and control crime in the United Republic of Tanzania" (Tanzania Police 2021a).[33] Central to the Force's perceived mission is ensuring the safety of people and property, and identifying and preventing crime.

In addition to being the primary national agency responsible for law and order, the Tanzania Police Force is significant to this analysis because of its special division known as "The Field Force Unit," which was the part of the police system that was most directly held over after British colonialism formally ended (Shivji 1990, 19). The Field Force Unit grew rapidly out of Dar es Salaam after WWII with the surge of labor organizing and strikes and produced a "Motorized Unit," which could quickly intervene in case of protests and so-called "riots," as had happened in the dockworkers strike that I described in Chapter Four. Today, this unit is primarily tasked with controlling demonstrations and riots (United States Department of State 2020, 1).

While the primary agency, the Tanzania Police Force is only one of several entities responsible for security, or "coercion," as leading legal expert Issa Shivji terms it. Following colonial rule, auxiliary police and paramilitary forces also emerged to supplement the formal police force (Kapinga 1990, 43), such as the people's militia, which was established in 1971 and trained by the Tanzania People's Defense Force (which today includes the army, navy, air force, and National Services). There are also groups that are trained by and/or are in regular communicate with state law enforcement agencies (Ghoshal 2013, 57). *"Polisi jamii"*

[33] Translation by author. The police use the word "jeshi" to describe themselves. "Jeshi" literally translates as "army" or "military," although in this case it means "force." The original Swahili version on the police website reads as follows: "Dira: Kuwa Jeshi lenye weledi katika kudumisha usalama wa watu na mali zao katika Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. Dhima: Kutoa hudumu bora zitakawazowezesha kubaini, kuzuia na kudhibiti uhalifu katika Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania."

(community police), for example, patrols neighborhoods and provides reports to the Tanzania Police and have been found responsible for many human rights violations (Ghoshal 2013, 57).

Another group known as "*sungusungu*," encompasses vigilante organizations that arose in the 1970s and 1980s to protect cattle form theft, were pardoned in the 1980s after being found guilty for criminal activities by courts, and then deputized by the government in 1989 (Shivji 1990, 23–24, footnote 27). *Sungusungu* is now generally used to describe semi-official neighborhood militias, which are quite widespread (four out of ten citizens have a local militia in their neighborhood (Twaweza 2017, 8)) and have garnered criticism from human rights organizations because of their violent policing of marginalized groups (Ghoshal 2013, 3, 35, and 56–61). *Sungusungu* technically operate under local government and the official police, but they have a degree of autonomy since they were given the power to make arrests due to The People's Militia Act of 1973 (Ghoshal 2013, 57), a policy which came out of CCM's 1971 Party Guidelines ("Crime and Policing Issues in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania Focusing on: Community Neighbourhood Watch Groups - 'Sungusungu'" 2000, iii). While these other security/coercion bodies are relevant to the state of policing in Tanzania today and will be discussed again later, this chapter focuses primarily on the Tanzania Police Force because there is more publicly available information about it and it is the main government agency for policing on a national level.

What the people say about the police

Tanzania does not have reliable or recent data on crime rates, so public opinion data is useful for understanding the broader state of security in the country and for evaluating the legitimacy of institutions of law and order (Twaweza 2017, 1). The pan-African research

institution, Afrobarometer, and the Tanzanian community-based organization, Twaweza, have enumerated public opinion surveys with questions on policing in Tanzania. Responses provide a window into how the average Tanzanian views the police and what kinds of experiences they have had with the police, but questions about highly sensitive topics like the police are prone to social desirability bias. Consequently, responses may be skewed as more positive and less critical of the police, although they may still raise interesting trends in reported perceptions over time. Overall, many Tanzanians do not trust the police, are concerned about corruption among the police (more so than other government workers), have paid bribes to the police, have had bad experiences with reporting crimes to the police, and do not go to the police for assistance, let alone have a police station nearby or know the number for the police.

Tanzanians' reported trust in the police has mostly remained consistent throughout Afrobarometer's seven surveys of Tanzanians since 1999 (see Figure 3). There was a slight drop in trust 2002/2003 (potentially due a change in the wording of the question and response options[34]) and then a jump in trust in 2005/2006, but then in the subsequent round, a return to the average rates of around 60% trust and 40% distrust. The jump in 2005/2006 is surprising given that this was a period marked by violent police crackdowns around the national election (*NBC News / AP* 2005). However, most of this violence took place in Zanzibar, and there were only a few respondents from Zanzibar included across all survey rounds. Even so, it is curious to note that this jump was driven by more respondents reporting that they had "a very great deal" of trust

[34] Afrobarometer Round 1 (1999/2001) wording: "What about the following institutions? How much of the time can you trust them to do what is right: Police service?" The response options included the following: I do not trust them at all/Never; I distrust them somewhat/Sometimes; I trust them somewhat/Most times; I trust them a lot/Always; and don't know. Afrobarometer Rounds 2-7 (2002-2018) wording: "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (The police)." The response options for Round 2 included the following: Not at all; a little bit; a lot; a very great deal; and don't know/haven't heard enough. The response options for Round 3 through Round 7 included the following: Not at all; just a little; somewhat; a lot; don't know/haven't heard enough (and Round 7 included a "refused" option).

in the police at unprecedented levels compared to the other survey rounds (see Figure 4). However, this could just be a sign of the pressure in this period of time to respond positively about the police since the number of respondents who reported that they did "not at all" trust the police in the two rounds prior also decreased.[35]

Figure 3. Trust in the Police (responses aggregated) (Afrobarometer R1-R7 1999-2018)



Figure 4. Trust in the Police (Afrobarometer R1-R7 1999-2018)

[35] This phenomenon seems to have happened with survey respondents in Nigeria, who reported a decrease in perceived corruption among police over the past ten years, yet Nigeria was ranked the highest among 18 other African countries surveyed for having the most people say they had paid a bribe for police assistance (77% of respondents) (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Logan 2020, 6 and 9).



A major factor that seems to impact trust in the police is people's views on and experiences with corruption. Afrobarometer asked about people's perception of corruption among civil servants and how corruption was being handled in the country. Respondents with more trust in the police seem to have more positive views about how the country is handling corruption, while respondents with less trust in the police seem to have more negative views about how the country is handling corruption (see Figure 5). For example, of respondents who reported that the country was handling corruption "very well," 74% said they trusted the police "a lot" or "a very great deal." In contrast, of respondents who reported the country was handling corruption "very badly," 48% said they trusted the police "a lot" or "a very great deal," while the rest reported that they did not trust the police "at all" or only "a little bit."

Figure 5. Trust in police by view of handling corruption (Afrobarometer R7 2016/2018)



Another interesting factor associated with whether people trust the police was whether they had reported crimes to the police (Aiko 2015). People seemed to distrust the police more when they had reported crimes, compared to people who did not report crimes they experienced. Encounters with the police likely shaped people's trust in the police and may be interpreted as a sign of "performance problems in the police machinery," a finding that is also supported by the higher proportion of victims who have reported crimes and say it is "difficult" or "very difficult" to get police help when needed (Aiko 2015, 11). This was borne out by Twaweza surveys as well, which found that a majority of citizens (66%) would seek assistance first from their village/street chair if an incident occurred (especially people who were poorest and lived in rural

areas), while far fewer (26%) would go to the police (i.e., people who were wealthiest and lived in urban areas) (Twaweza 2017, 5).

In addition to views about a lack of police integrity, a majority of people do not report incidents to the police because of the distance and inaccessibility of police stations and low police responsiveness (Aiko 2015, 15). Two out of three citizens have no police post within half an hour of their home and only 4% know the number to call the police (Twaweza 2017, 6–7). However, whether a police post was present in a ward or neighborhood did not make a difference in satisfaction with the police, which "does not seem to provide a glowing rating of police services" (Twaweza 2017, 11). Afrobarometer responses also reflected skepticism of equal and impartial treatment before the law, and many believed that people who commit crimes go unpunished (Aiko 2015). Similarly, Twaweza found that a majority of citizens saw police officers as the third most likely group to not receive punishment when they commit a crime (Twaweza 2017, 9).[36] This serves as a testament to the kind of service most citizens expect and experience from the police and how they view accountability for people in positions of power (Twaweza 2017, 11–12).

"The single biggest threat" to safety in Tanzania?

A majority of Tanzanians' distrust in the police, doubts of effectiveness and accountability of the police, and lack of access to the police raises the question: what are the police doing if not "maintaining the safety of the people and their property" and "providing quality services that will enable them to identify, prevent and control crime"? (Tanzania Police

[36] In ascending order, respondents saw the following groups as rarely or never receiving punishment when they commit a crime: public servants (68% of respondents), religious leaders (68%), police officers (69%), senior government officials (72%), and rich people (74%) (Twaweza 2017, 9).

2021a). While presumably an underestimate due to the potential risk of disclosing this kind of information, 14% of people reported that they had heard about incidents of the police threatening, beating, or stoning people, and 4% reported that they had heard about incidents of the police killing people (Twaweza 2014, 6). Twice as many people reported that they had heard about the community police (*Sungusungu*) threatening, beating, or stoning people (31%) and about the same proportion had heard about the community police killing people (6%). The national army was less likely than both of these groups to have been reported as a perpetrator of violence (3% and 1% for the two respective questions). A majority of Tanzanians were concerned for their safety, especially around an election: more than half expressed fear of being a victim of political violence, while slightly less than half felt unsafe walking in their neighborhoods (Twaweza 2014, 7).

There is unfortunately a lack of public opinion polling over the past several years in Tanzania, partly due to the pandemic, which has delayed Round 8 of the in-person Afrobarometer survey (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Logan 2020, 1). Nonetheless, other sources of information from journalists, human rights organizations, and social media supplement the available data on average citizens' experiences and tell us more about the role of the police on a more national level. These reports and testimonies tell of the police carrying out arbitrary arrests, unlawfully detaining people for extended periods, and raiding households and organizations. The police have been central to the Magufuli administration's crackdowns on civil society and closing democratic space because the police have been responsible for enforcing bans on various organizations, protests, media, and convenings. The police have taken a heavy-handed approach to suppressing opposition supporters, government dissenters, and historically marginalized groups, especially gender and sexual minorities. A far cry from an

providing public services and controlling crime, commentators characterize the Tanzania Police Force as "a major obstacle in people's efforts to fight for justice and democratic reforms" (Said 2020).

These strategies of suppressing opposition on one hand and consolidating power for CCM on the other, seem to have intensified over the past six years and then came to a head in the October 2020 election (for a comprehensive overview of this process, see Collord 2021, 13–24). One presidential candidate said polling stations were all surrounded by armed forces and what happened should not be called an "election" at all, but a "military exercise" (*Al Jazeera* 2020b). The police used tear gas and live bullets to disperse opposition supporters and expelled (unfavorable) election observers (*Al Jazeera* 2020a). Many people were injured and at least 22 people were killed (Tanzania Election Watch 2021). The main opposition leader who had already survived multiple attempts on his life, Tundu Lissu, fled the country after the police banned protests contesting the election, which was declared flawed (*The New York Times / AP* 2020; Gavin 2020; Paget 2021, 65–66).

While Tanzania stands out in the region for generally smooth peaceful transitions of power and presidents who have not overstayed their term limits, this is not the first time violence has followed an election. The police fired tear gas, water cannons, and live ammunition against opposition supporters during the 2001 and 2005 elections as well (*Human Rights Watch* 2001; *NBC News / AP* 2005). What some argue is new, however, is the level of constant overt and covert harassment against opposition supporters (Paget 2021, 66). While Magufuli used many existing CCM tools at his disposal, "the lavish use" of old and new laws that closed civil society space and "naked violence" to eliminate opposition marked a break with the past (Paget 2021, 66; Amnesty International 2019; Nyeko 2019). This is why one commentator named the police

as “the single biggest threat” to safety in Tanzania today, while also acknowledging that “police brutality and securitization of political and civic space” are “as old as Tanzania itself” (Said 2020).

Despite the extent of this violence, suppression of opposition was accompanied by another target: groups that have been historically marginalized in Tanzania since colonization. Beginning in the year after Magufuli’s election, Tanzania became an international flashpoint of anti-LGBTQ politics when the government issued a series of attacks on LGBTQ health, organizations, and rights (for a timeline see Ghoshal 2020, 13–22). As early as 2011, however, there have been other attacks reported on LGBTQ people (Ghoshal 2013), so this is not an entirely new phenomenon.[37] However, as previously described, the extreme scope and scale of this repression does seem to be unique to the Magufuli administration with a more elevated level of deploying heterosexist rhetoric at rallies and in national announcements, introducing policy bans that drive these groups even farther away from health services, and encouraging the police to use more force. Over the past six years, the police raided events and trainings (*Devex* 2017; Isaack 2017; Nyeko 2019); arbitrarily arrested and detained people suspected of being gay (*Deutsche Welle* 2017; *Reuters* 2017); oversaw or conducted forced anal exams (Burke 2018; Ghoshal 2020); tortured and sexually assaulted people accused of being gay (Ghoshal 2020); illegally held foreigners for “promoting homosexuality” (*News24* 2017; Quintal 2018); and were threatened to be used as a “hit squad” to publicly out and track down individuals (*BBC* 2017;

[37] Since 2011, the Tanzanian government has leveraged hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric, taken away health services (lube ban, closing HIV/AIDS clinics), condoned or encouraged increased police force against suspected gender and sexual minorities, targeted discriminatory policies and profiling, and incited violence among civil society. Over the period of May 2012 to April 2013, Human Rights Watch and Wake Up and Step Forward Coalition (WASO) interviewed 121 members of high-risk groups, along with Tanzanian government officials, service providers, and academics (Ghoshal 2013). Participants reported torture, rape, assault, arbitrary arrest, and extortion against these persecuted groups, and fear of this kind of abuse was driving them away from HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment services.

Pleasance 2018; Ratcliffe 2018). The function of the police in suppressing human rights organizing and marginalized groups should also be considered alongside the deployment of the police to suppress opposition supporters. This raises questions about how Magufuli and his appointed officials[38] view threats to the party, and consequently the nation, and what the political salience of ideas around gender and sexuality might stem from.

Is contemporary policing distinct?

Changes in policing practices and ethics since colonialism?

Not only were the colonial police and their relationship to the state inherited after independence, but the U.K. government and international policing associations have continued to train, fund, and equip Tanzanian police forces to the present (e.g., U.K. Home Office 2016; INTERPOL 2018; College of Policing 2021). This is not to suggest that the colonial policing and implementation of British social value systems were not contested or changed when adopted by Tanzanian leadership after independence, or that they have remained exactly the same since. For instance, a more recent policing guide includes an introduction by a Dar es Salaam police inspector general who acknowledges that the police force has a long history in Tanzania, dating back to its initiation by the British is 1919. This inspector general then emphasizes the importance of the police protecting groups such as women and children whose rights are violated in society: "*Wanawake na watoto ni moja ya makundu ambayo haki zake hukiukwa wakati mwingine*" ("women and children are one of these groups whose rights are sometimes violated") (Mahita 2003, iii). The Tanzania Police Force also has a page on its website that details the

[38] Namely Hamisi Kigwangalla, Deputy Minister of Health (see Kigwangalla 2016), and Paul Makonda, former Regional Commissioner of Dar es Salaam (see Pleasance 2018).

colonial history of the institution and concludes with the challenge of changing the police system away from its colonial orientation (Tanzania Police 2021b).[39]

While contemporary police may voice ideals of protecting vulnerable groups' rights, Tanzania's legislation, inherited from colonialism, that governs the power of the police poses an issue. Police officers can legally "stop and search" at their own discretion (Section 42 of the 1985 Criminal Procedure Act) and use force against anyone who resists arrest (Section 19 of the Penal Code, Cap 16), and although there are restrictions on use of force in interrogation and detention in police custody without trial, in most cases these are not followed in practice (Mwanajiti et al. 2001, 169). There are many examples of the police abusing their power and torturing citizens, in some cases leading to death (170-172). Some attribute these frequent abuses and this mentality of police officers to mistreat the accused and convicted to "the legacy of the colonial legal framework relating to the Administration of Police Powers and Observation of Human Rights in Tanzania" (175).

In addition to the police, the legacies of the British penal code, courts, judicial principles, and judges have had a persistent impact on criminal punishment following the end of formal colonial rule (Feingold 2018). The colonial criminalization of marginalized groups has persisted, such as Section 154 of the Penal Code which holds that anyone who "has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature … or permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature" commits a crime punishable on conviction by thirty years

[39] "Mara tu baada ya Tanganyika kupata uhuru wake tarehe 9 Desemba 1961, Jeshi la Polisi lilianza kubadili mwelekeo wake toka katika kutumikia Wakoloni na kuanza kuwatumikia wananchi kwa mujibu wa sera za Serikali ya Wananchi wa Tanganyika japo bado lilikuwa na mfumo wa kikoloni. Ilichukua muda kulibadilisha na kulifanya Jeshi la Polisi liwe la kumlinda Mtanganyika na mali zake" (Tanzania Police 2021b). Translation by author: "As soon as Tanganyika gained its independence on December 9, 1961, the Police Force began to change its focus from serving Colonizers to serving the people in accordance with the policies of the Tanganyika People's Government even though it still had a colonial system. It took time to change it and make the Police Force protect the Tanzanian and their property."

to life imprisonment (Government of Tanganyika 1945). An attempt to commit sodomy was also criminalized and punishable on conviction by a minimum of twenty years of imprisonment. The law also carried a five-year prison term for "indecent practices between males," that is, any man who commits any act of gross indecency with another man, procures another man to commit such act, or attempts to procure the commission of such act.

In 1998, the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act replaced Section 154 of the colonial British penal code with the following provision on "Unnatural of offences":

> (1)Any person who- (a)has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; or (b)has carnal knowledge of an animal; or (c)permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature- commits an offence, and is liable to imprisonment for life and in any case to imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years. (2)where the offence under subsection (1) of this section is committed to a child under the age of ten years the offender shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. (*Tanzania Act No. 4 of 1998: Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act* 1998)

The only other attempted changes to this legislation occurred one decade after the 1998 act when the Tanzanian Parliament voted down a bill proposed to increase the penalty for unnatural offences, following Ugandan MP Bahati's attempt to worsen the penalty in Uganda (Muga 2014; Welch 2014). This suggests that the recent crackdowns of gender and sexual minorities and violent political repression under President Magufuli are not associated with changes in this particular law.

Comparison to postcolonial policing in Tanzania

Contemporary journalists, human rights practitioners, and scholars argue that Tanzania's use of authoritarian tactics is not entirely new. But to what extent does this apply to the main instrument of this turn, the police? Drawing from the work of eminent Tanzanian legal scholars, I argue that contemporary policing is a continuation of postcolonial policing in many ways, most

importantly because of the police's centrality to the governing apparatus. Since the early years of independence, the police have been used as a coercive tool by the ruling party, which has been from the beginning CCM, to suppress dissent, crack down on mass mobilization, and execute extractive state projects, such as villagization. In line with the premise of this dissertation, the contemporary state of authoritarianism and policing in Tanzania cannot be understood apart from this postcolonial period of transformation and continuity.

Some have pointed out the irony that the most direct inheritance of the colonial police was the Field Force Unit (FFU), given that Tanzania's postcolonial leaders who brought the country to independence were its main targets (Kapinga 1990, 42; citing Tenga 1986, 43). But later, to be admitted to the police force one had to be a member of CCM (Kapinga 1990, 43). The FFU was so notorious for its ruthlessness that it became known by the Swahili translation of its acronym, "*Fanya Fujo Uone*," or "If you cause trouble you will face the music." (Shivji 1990, 19; citing Tenga 1986). Throughout the 1960s to 1970s, the FFU beat up students in demonstrations, broke up strikes, killed protesting workers, and played a key role in villagization (Shivji 1990, 19). Shivji also documents detailed case studies and counts of death, beating, harassment, and injury in the 1980s, and the police are responsible for the greatest number and proportion of abuses, followed by the Militia, National Service, *Sungusungu*, and Party (see 70a, "Violation of Life Through the Illegal Use of Force by Individual Agents in the State Organs of Force: 1981-87"). Shivji highlights the role of the party, CCM, in participating in these violations and provides an example case study of this in 1982 (1990, 71–72). Shivji categorizes many of these incidences as "extra-legal coercion" because they are not legal or illegal, but "ostensibly authorised at the highest levels of the Party and the State" (1990, 81–82). Because of

this high-level authorization, Shivji believes that those executing this violence would not question it as "unlawful" or "illegitimate" (82).

One incident where high-ranking CCM leaders' and security officers' participation in violent coercion did make it to court took place in 1976 (Shivji 1990, 90–99). A meeting was called to respond to killings in Mwanza and Shinyanga that were targeted at suspected witchdoctors. The meeting of the Regional Security and Defense Committees was chaired by then-Vice President and Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa and was attended by regional security officers, government leaders, and high-level party leaders, including the Minister of Home Affairs (Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who would go onto become president, 1985-1995), Minister in the President's (Nyerere) Office (Peter Siyowelva), and the Mwanza Regional Commissioner (Peter Kisumo, who resigned after the incident). This meeting resulted in the decision to try suspected murderers in court if there was enough evidence, and arrest and interrogate the rest.

What followed was a month of torturous detainment and interrogations that involved physical abuse, sexual violence, and the murder of multiple people at the hands of security officers (some police officers were called in from Dar es Salaam because the local officers were seen as too lax) (Shivji 1990, 90). In the trial, medical personnel who were recruited to administer injections during the interrogations and conduct false post-mortem reports of those who had been killed refused to talk given their "oath to keep government secrets" (97). Some police, prison, and security officers testified during the trail that "they knew what was being done was unlawful but were still prepared to do it because orders came from the top" (97-98). One Assistant Commissioner of Prisons added that his career was on the line, and even though it was "legally wrong" to comply, he "thought it was right" because "it was a decision of the government" (98; for similar testimony, see 50). These individual-level motivations behind

participation are consistent with the literature on what leads people to comply with acts of violence (e.g., see Milgram 1973; Waller 2002).

Inherited colonial-era laws are also important in considering the actions and parameters in which law enforcers are acting over time. The right to life has been provided for since the Constitution was amended in 1984 to include Article 14.[40] However, as legal scholar Issa Shivji has pointed out, this provision includes a "claw-back" caveat that is unusual for such a basic right (i.e., the right to life can be limited by the law), and a similar limitation is included in Article 13(6)(e) under which "cruel, inhuman, and undignified punishment is prohibited" (Shivji 1990, 9–10). The right to private property and to state protection of property was more strongly protected by the law than any other right, perhaps due to the British Colonial Office's desire to protect its own acquisitions (Kapinga 1990, 38–39). Similarly, others have systematically analyzed national laws and court cases that determine the reasonableness and legality of police use of force (Haule 2015, 18–21). The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, which was founded in 1980 to review all laws, called for the reform of forty repressive laws that they found to be unconstitutional or outdated ("Final Report on Designated Legislation in the Nyalali Commission Report" 1994). More studies of this kind are necessary to identify aspects of the adapted colonial legal and criminal punishment system that have an "oppressive nature," as the Commission did (1994, iii).

Comparison to other contexts in Africa

What we know from the eighteen countries that have been included in the most recent Afrobarometer survey is that a majority of respondents view the police as corrupt and

[40] Article 14 reads, "Every individual has a right to exist and receive protection from society for one's life, in accordance with the law."

untrustworthy. Almost half of respondents say "most" or "all" of the police in their country are corrupt, even more so than members of parliament (38%), tax officials (35%), judges and magistrates (35%), and presidents and their staff (35%), while those perceived as being least corrupt and most trusted are traditional leaders and religious leaders (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Logan 2020, 2).

To compare the experience of marginalized groups with the police in Tanzania to other places, I systematically analyzed the richest source of available evidence of this violent political repression of people of nonnormative gender and sexuality in African contexts: 21 Human Rights Watch reports published between 2003 and 2021 that were based on 1,337 interviews and fieldwork in 16 African countries, covering at least 83 cities (see Appendix A). This analysis demonstrates the pervasiveness of the violence that takes place against gender and sexual minorities and the many forms it takes, including verbal, physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, which sometimes result in death.

These reports suggest a link between political statements and violence: homophobic or transphobic political rhetoric incites violence and makes gender and sexual minorities less likely to report crimes committed against them to the police because they run the risk of facing repercussions themselves. These reports also provide evidence of a link between legal criminalization and violence: the criminalization of homosexuality exacerbates violence because it gives law enforcement officers impunity to treat anyone suspected of being queer or trans however they deem fit. In all reports over the past nearly twenty years, the introduction of new criminalization laws or the escalated enforcement of existing laws incited greater levels of state repression against gender and sexual minorities, especially individuals who trade sex, use injection drugs, and live with HIV/AIDS. These reports also included accounts of violence at the

hands of the state in countries without legislation criminalizing queerness when interviews were conducted. This suggests that while criminalization may be a key factor in the incitement of violence, it is not the only thing driving it. Even in cases where arrests of gender and sexual minorities were relatively low, people were still accused of being queer for extortion. Because of these experiences with criminalization, discrimination, repression, and violence, gender and sexual minorities were less likely to seek health services and treatment.

Across all contexts, gender and sexual minorities reported negative experiences with the police, leading many vulnerable people to avoid them altogether, even when they were the victim of a crime and needed legal recourse. There were many forms of violence carried out by the police, military, intelligence agents, or prison guards, including bribery, extortion, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests, anal examinations (a form of sexual assault and torture), and ill-treatment and torture while detained (e.g., beating, burning, belting, clubbing, water boarding, rape, and death threats). The broader criminal punishment system systematically fails gender and sexual minorities. Gender and sexual minorities underreport crimes committed against them due to lack of trust in police; they are denied legal representation, no one will represent them, or lawyers who do receive threats; they experience process violations in cases against them; they are framed for breaking the law; they experience extended custody before being charged; they experience systematic discrimination due to biased law enforcement and judicial officials; and they experience or risk secondary victimization when reporting crimes to the police rather than protection. State surveillance was used in some cases to target gender and sexual minorities by wiretapping cell phones and raiding apartments to collect and arrest contacts.

Understanding the extent of non-violent repression is also important to understanding violent repression because they are connected, as is violence carried out by state and non-state

actors. Non-state actors play a role in inciting or perpetrating violence, including the media, neighbors, family, friends, landlords, and religious leaders and organizations. Legal criminalization and discriminatory political statements incite violence in communities, sometimes in the form of vigilante or semi-official security groups carrying out community profiling and policing. There is some variation in which gender and sexual minorities are targeted across contexts, but people who are transgender bear the brunt of violence because they may outwardly express their gender nonconformity and be read or misread as queer. Gender and sexual minorities with other marginalized identities are especially vulnerable to this violence, and other marginalized groups are similarly targeted and abused by the police, including people from lower socioeconomic classes, sex workers, people who use drugs, people living in peri-urban or rural and informal settlements, and people living with HIV/AIDS.

An analysis of incidents of political violence against gender and sexual minorities in ten African countries also suggest that the police play a central role in perpetrating this violence. There also seems to be a connection between criminalization laws' existence and experiences of identity-targeted violence and mob justice. News and human rights reports also reveal that this violence is compounded by other types of precarity, including poverty, if someone is a refugee, young people, etc., and this has only been exacerbated by the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Conclusion

An analysis of the contemporary state of policing in Tanzania indicates that the police continue to be a crucial component of the governing apparatus. The origins of the police and policing practices are inseparable from the colonial project of the first half of the twentieth century, and therefore inseparable from the modern state itself. Despite grassroots and elite-level

contestation over the future of the police and state at the critical juncture of independence, the postcolonial political leadership of the state, with CCM at the helm, used the police to consolidate power in attempt to fully take over a governing apparatus that was set up for their subjugation.

The usefulness of the police in establishing control, politically, socially, and economically, is why the institutions under the police system persisted and why there are continuities in the fundamental purpose and nature of policing from colonialism to postcolonialism to the present. "The history of police is the history of state power" (2021, 46), as critical theorist Mark Neocleous incisively announces. Considering this history, Magufuli's strategy for consolidating power vis-à-vis the police is not without precedent in Tanzania and not merely due to an individual penchant for heavy-handed leadership. Rather, one-party authoritarian rule is a postcolonial legacy, as others have argued over the past three decades (Shivji 1990, 50; Makulilo 2008; Kabwe 2020; Becker 2021),[41] because early leaders were attempting to lay claim to the British colonial state that was necessarily despotic.

As can be said of virtually all aspects of the broader legal system, some elements were directly inherited from colonialism, while other elements were evolved to suit different but remarkably similar purposes, namely suppressing dissent and mobilization against those in power. Colonial, postcolonial, and neocolonial aspects coexist and therefore must be considered together to explain the state of authoritarian politics (Shivji 1990, 50–51). An examination of the police as the lifeblood of the state is the most direct and effective way to reveal these interwoven dynamics.

[41] This has led others to the unequivocal conclusion that "the current authoritarian turn, then, is more of a return to the early postcolonial period than a new departure" and "it did not start with Magufuli" (Becker 2021, 190).

Chapter VI. Conclusion: "The Importance of a Global Context"

This dissertation has demonstrated how the British colonial police system created an enduring system of social, economic, and political hierarchies and enabled brutal modes of resource extraction whose legacies continue to shape the contemporary Tanzanian polity. The task of establishing this order was often bound up with controlling the body, and in particular through the policing of gender, sexuality, and labor. This British system of policing differed markedly from precolonial systems of justice and reconciliation and sought to eradicate indigenous self-government and ways of being. In exploring cases of noncompliance with British morality, labor organizing, and questioning of the police since the beginning of British colonization in Tanganyika, I find that for as long as the police have existed, they have been resisted. Yet this analysis has also demonstrated that the police have a tenacious hold on the societal order of things and are strongly enmeshed in the state. Even after formal colonial rule ended in Tanganyika in 1961 and the state and society went through a major critical juncture into independence, the police system continued to express key features of colonial rule, from anxieties and criminalization of threats, to policies, practices, and goals to suppress them.

This chapter begins with the #EndSARS movement as a test case of the significance of reframing of the police as a colonial legacy. In Nigeria and the diaspora, activists and scholars have contested the legitimacy of the police as a violent instrument of the state for years. Around the world, emerging movements are making transformative demands focused on abolishing the police to continue the processes of decolonization and liberation on a global scale. I end by addressing the questions, *if we reframe the police as a colonial legacy, what implications does*

this have for policing today? What is at stake if we neglect to identify policing as a colonial legacy?

Organizing toward Decolonization

How are activists challenging the police because of its colonial origins?

As I described in Chapter One, activists confronting carceral states around the world are increasingly invoking the colonial origins of the police and the necessarily racialized, classed, gendered, and sexualized nature of policing. Furthermore, they are calling for more education about the colonial origins of policing and police violence. I will conclude by describing how activists are currently organizing around these connections on the ground to continue the work of decolonization. This dynamic is most clearly visible in the mass protests against the police and police violence in Nigeria. The most recent wave of these protests made international headlines across major news outlets, sparked conversations among scholars and activists in Nigeria and the diaspora, and inspired collective transnational organizing over the past year.

In October 2020, tens of thousands of people took to the streets across Nigeria and the diaspora, and within two days, thirty million Tweeted with the hashtag #EndSARS to protest police brutality and demand an end to the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) (Ofoma 2020; Adegbite 2020; Gal-Dem 2020). This was not the first time this unit had been publicly contested, nor was it the first time protests would lead to the government "disbanding" the unit. Rather, it was the *fourth* time SARS would be "disbanded," meaning re-branded, this time to the Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT), and re-formed, with officers being shuffled between units (Malumfashi 2020; Jones 2020; Dayo 2020). According to a human rights report

on the Nigeria Police Force, which was found responsible for hundreds of unlawful killings and disappearances each year, SARS in particular had carried out torture, extortion, unlawful arrests, extrajudicial executions, and sexual violence since its inception thirty years ago (Amnesty International 2016).

The most recent wave of nationwide protests against SARS was led by youth, feminist organizations, and queer and trans activists (Figure 1), because these communities tend to be targeted the most by the police (Adetona 2020; Desmond 2020; Ofoma 2020). Violence against people who experience disproportionate levels of marginalization, criminalization, and precarity has only increased in the midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic, especially with the police's militarized enforcement of pandemic measures (Aborisade 2021). This is a phenomenon that has been documented throughout the world (Reid 2021) and witnessed by feminist and LGBTQ+ rights activists and lawyers who I have been in conversation with in eastern and southern Africa.

Figure 1. Nigerian activist at #EndSARS protest with sign that reads, “It’s a very good day to end police brutality and protect queer people!!! #ENDSARS #IGPRESIGN #QueerNigerianLivesMatter (photo by Tochukwu Ukeje) (Ofoma 2020)

In 1992, SARS was born out of a merger of special units that had proliferated after the Nigerian civil war ended in 1970 and it originally only operated in the capital, Lagos, for its first ten years before spreading to all 36 states (Malumfashi 2020). While SARS was created about thirty years after colonialism formally ended in Nigeria, the institution of the police was introduced by the British colonial administration and policing practices and legal institutions were disseminated throughout the rest of the empire, including in Tanganyika, from this early occupied territory in 1861 (Killingray 1986; Alemika 1993). This has led sociologist Etannibi

Alemika to conclude that police forces since colonialism in Nigeria have been "consistently repressive corrupt, and inefficient" due to their colonial origins as an "apparatus of violence" (Alemika 1993, 187).[42] Alemika clearly illustrates the importance of the colonial context for interpreting the persistence of violence of postcolonial and contemporary policing in Nigeria.

To compound these long-term issues, the U.K. Government has been funding, training, and equipping SARS, such as by approving export licenses for military goods worth 136 million GBP since 2008 (approximately 190 million USD) (Akinwotu 2020; Forrest 2020; Gbadamosi 2020; "UK Export Licence Data" 2021). Political scientist Mojubaolu Olunfuke Okome has gone farther to stress that Nigeria has "a new colonial state" and that "independence is yet to come" (Akinwale et al. 2020). Okome argues that the British should not be trusted with Nigeria's national development because they continue to protect their own interests (Okome 2020a; 2020b), as was voiced in a U.K. parliamentary debate that I will describe next. Okome's vision for Nigeria is that it should take back its power and become a democracy by not accepting assistance from the U.K. (Okome 2020b).

Even with reforms, such as re-branding and re-forming the unit over the years, the police maintain their original colonial purpose of protecting those in power and using force to enforce the law, according to Isa Sanusi of Amnesty International Nigeria (Akinwotu 2020). Even more consequentially, re-forming the police only re-forms the problem of the police, which at its core is coloniality and the legitimation of violence for control (Adebisi 2018). It is for this reason scholars like Panthera Odum have reflected on the #EndSARS protests by saying, "Police

[42] Alemika argues that "the inherited and sustained colonial legacy of repressive policing" has been used to sustain a widely opposed and illegitimate government. He attributes "the repressive characters of both the state and police," the paramilitary nature of the police, the police's legitimacy crisis and alienation from the people, and the poor performance of the police to its colonial origins (187). Alemika lists the expansive functions initially prescribed to the police and how these have been used to enact violence since the end of formal colonial rule (197-198).

abolition is a process of decolonisation, literally and figuratively. By getting rid of the police, we are rejecting the colonial notion that Africans are savage people who require harsh punishment and abuse to get 'in line'" (Dayo 2020). Similarly, Damola Aluko, a Nigerian feminist, has said that Nigeria's liberation requires police abolition, and "ending SARS brings Nigeria closer to braking the chains of colonialism" (Dayo 2020). Adebisi reminds us that while decolonization cannot take place without eliminating remaining features of colonialism, the police are only one example of this (2018). When I asked Okome whether movements against police brutality should expand their focus beyond the inherited colonial police to the inherited colonial state, she agreed and said, "we need a truly democratic state" (Akinwale et al. 2020). To rid societies of colonial legacies, knowledge of the workings of these legacies is required.

Implications for Today

If we reframe the police as a colonial legacy, what implications does this have for today?

Reframing the police as a colonial legacy helps identify the interests, investments, and ideas that lie at the heart of policing today and that were seeded by colonial powers. In this dissertation, I have described several of these inheritances that fundamentally shaped policing, spanning capitalist extraction, heteronormativity, and hegemonic control. Without centering these historic origins and purposes of the police, we may misunderstand policing today. Alternatively, if we view the original purpose and function of policing to be control through coercion, we may come to view violence as a defining aspect of policing instead of an aberration.

This reframing announces that the work of decolonization is not over. By naming the police as a colonial legacy, new targets for the remaining work of decolonization come into

view. Activists may realize new possibilities for decolonization by identifying the continued operations of policing technologies in African contexts that were designed to cast certain types of bodies as criminal from the start of imperialism. Precolonial indigenous strategies for pursuing justice and reconciliation that were deliberately suppressed by colonial policing may also come to light.

Reframing the police as a colonial legacy dispels dominant narratives, or "myths," about the nature and purpose of policing. One of the most pervasive myths is that the police are a civilian force and not a military force (Seigel 2018, 13–14), and another is that the purpose and function of the police is to solve crimes (D. H. Bayley 1996, 25–28; Baughman Forthcoming). The twentieth-century predecessor of these myths was inscribed as the Colonial Police motto: *salus populi* (Figure 2), which former East African officers translated as, "serving the public" (Callander 2014, 12) and "Servants of the People" (Franklin 1996, 143).[43]

[43] This maxim comes from Cicero's championing of the health (welfare, good, salvation, felicity, safety) of the people as the supreme law of the land (bk. III, part III, sub. VIII).

Figure 2. “Kenya police / reserve kings crown chrome cap badge 1938 – 1953” (WorthPoint n.d.), with an arrow pointing to the Colonial Police motto, *salus populi.*

This dissertation challenges these myths by showing that while the colonial police had a distinct purpose, they were in reality more of a paramilitary than civilian force, composed of former military officers, and trained directly by the military to use whatever force necessary to quash public uprisings and maintain British control over the territory (Callander 2014, 23–27, 74). Identifying the police as a colonial legacy not only calls into question which “public” and “People” the police claim to be serving, as others have effectively done in settler colonies (e.g., see Schenwar, Macaré, and Price 2016). But it casts doubt that the colonial police were tasked with or aiming to protect the health, welfare, good, or safety of any people at all, except perhaps of white settlers (which there were relatively few of in Tanganyika, and Nigeria compared to settler colonies).

Instead of bringing peace and justice, the police subjected colonized populations to daily surveillance and routine violence, especially Africans who did manual labor at key commercial

sites, who lived in urban areas, who challenged white heteronormative moral codes, and who threatened the hierarchal order. It is through policing, for the purposes of creating hegemony and revenue, that colonial powers brought the state into being, as I theorize. Instead of serving people, the police served the interests of the British Empire, namely through the extraction of goods and control of labor to finance the administration of the colonies and the development (and especially postwar reconstruction) of Europe. An examination of the origin story of the Tanzania police renders the myth of policing as "serving the public" untenable. It is for these reasons that police mottos that evolved out of British colonial forces have become a mockery in protests against police violence, most notably the current Nigerian police motto, "Police is your Friend" (Malumfashi 2020).

Examining modern police forces with an eye to their colonial origins also has the effect of uprooting misconceptions that the police are a preexisting, natural, and neutral institution in every society, which this dissertation and other scholars of policing have shown is not the case (e.g., see Bowling, Reiner, and Sheptycki 2019, chaps. 3 and 4). The assumption that the police and prison are given institutions in society may be due to their extensive reach (Davis 2003) and "comprehensive social-institutional totality" (Gossett 2011, 324). Because networks of policing, surveillance, and imprisonment touch so much of society and have immense power over people's life chances, it is difficult, for many, to imagine a society without them.

Presupposing the existence of the police makes it all the more challenging and crucial to grapple with the colonial birth and diffusion of the modern police. This dissertation advances the literature that aims to identify "the historical and political ideologies that continually naturalize the abusive force of the police with such power as to make them appear ordinary" (Stanley and Smith 2011, 2). Reframing the police as a colonial legacy aids in this process of de-naturalizing

the police because it locates the period of European colonization as the founding moment of many modernized police forces throughout the world, as Nigerian activists and scholars are doing in the #EndSARS movement. This reframing, therefore, implicates the present.

What is at Stake

What is at stake if we neglect to identify policing as a colonial legacy?

If we fail to identify the police as a colonial legacy, we potentially miss the relationship between the use of policing to control land and to dehumanize certain bodies. As I show in Chapter Three, establishing control over the body was key to establishing order. My examination of arrest counts shows the range of Africans who were criminalized in colonial penal codes and who were closely policed because the British deemed them "immoral," "deviant," "unnatural," or a "threat to public order." If colonialism is missed in analyses of policing, modes of bodily control that were co-constituted through policing could be missed, too. An oversight like this could warp our understanding of policing as a tool designed for serving the public instead of structuring systems of hegemonic power.

When intersecting axes of identity and power are written out of accounts of policing, the ways that hegemonic regimes, like heteropatriarchy and white supremacy, operate may be further obscured and secured (Stanley 2011, 4). This dissertation complements the work of scholars who have argued that Christian European ideals of binary cisgender and heterosexual norms were part and parcel of the colonial project (Oyěwùmí 1997; Lugones 2007), and this dissertation shows how the police were central to bringing about, enforcing, and reinscribing these norms. By emphasizing the constitutive relationship between the police and state, this

dissertation shows how processes of heteropatriarchy are deployed for building state and empire, and how these processes continue to be carried out as state-sponsored violence today (M. J. Alexander 2005, 23).

Also at stake, if we neglect to identity policing as a colonial legacy, is the perpetuation of inaccurate and incomplete narratives about Africans that are rooted in anti-Blackness. Violence that many queer and trans Africans experience at the hands of the police, for example, is often attributed to racist stereotypes of Africans as inherently violent, morally corrupt, and socially backward, as Sylvia Tamale has pointed out (2013, 37, 42). The "single story"[44] of a violent and suffering Africa dominates accounts of the continent (Wainaina 2005) and is perpetuated by headlines like, "Why Africa is the Most Homophobic Continent" (D. Smith 2014) and "The 10 Places LGBTQ Travelers Should Never Visit" (half are African countries) (Wilson 2015). These single stories about Africans are always juxtaposed to stories about white Europeans, despite the European origins of the police and laws that criminalize queerness across the world. But to be legible, the single story of a violently homophobic Africa relies on the equally incomplete and inaccurate single story of a progressive and inclusive white west. Together, these stories reproduce colonial power dynamics that paint the West as more advanced and superior to Africa, which can then be used to justify, advance, and hide forms of policing and gender- and sexuality-based violence within both contexts (Puar 2007). The historical context of colonial institutions, norms, and practices is necessary for interrupting racist ideas about the nature and roots of this

[44] I borrow the metaphor of a "single story" from Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's now world famous TED Talk (2009) because I find this to be a very compelling framework for showing how the danger of a stereotype lies not only in its inaccuracy but its incompleteness. At the time of writing this in 2021, Adichie is embroiled in an ongoing conflict over her reluctance to claim full responsibility for harmful comments she made about trans women in 2017. I only retain this citation, with this caveat, in hopes that Adichie will take accountability for the danger of the single story she is perpetuating. In my other work, I delve more into the tensions and confluences between feminist and LGBTQ+ organizing in several contexts in Africa.

violence in African contexts, and its presumed contrast to and separation from violence in the Global North.

To be clear, marginalized groups in Tanzania and Nigeria do commonly experience violent policing, which is what led to this dissertation. However, in order to understand this phenomenon, one must confront narratives about Africa as a universally violent place because these obscure what has led to and enabled this violence in the first place. Furthermore, with historical context and specify, these narratives risk fueling the "white savior industrial complex" (Cole 2012). Europeans have from time immemorial justified imperialism by positioning themselves as purveyors of order, civilization, development, and democracy (Tamale 2013, 42). The latest iteration of western interventions has been in the name of gay rights (Puar 2013). Jasbir Puar locates the history of foreign interventions in the broader history of settler colonialism, which "[articulates] its violence through the protection of serviceable figures such as women and children, and now the homosexual" (2013, 338). According to Puar's analysis of pinkwashing, countries like the United States and Israel may point to "victim" populations around the world to continue to justify their own "imperial/racial/national violence" (2013, 338). This is why the police and the violence they disproportionately execute against marginalized populations must be understood within the framework of colonial and neocolonial power dynamics.

Just as it is necessary to attend to the colonial dimensions of the Global North's single stories of a homophobic Africa to prevent the reproduction of (neo)colonial dynamics, we should also foreground colonialism in discussions about Africa as a place of rampant police violence, especially when (neo)colonial interests are still at stake. These single stories and discussions are

not merely hypothetical or untouchable media Cthulhus. The material effect of this discourse is actively playing out today and can be seen on the floor of the U.K. House of Commons.

In November 2020, hon. Theresa Villiers called for sanctions against Nigeria for police violence, and in her introduction of the debate, became the first and last MP that day to briefly acknowledge and swiftly dismiss the "real sensitivities" of anything that could be perceived as foreign interference given Britain's "previous colonial involvement" (House of Commons 2020). Another MP called for sanctions by invoking Chinua Achebe's novel about British colonialism, *Things Fall Apart*, only to claim that Nigeria was falling apart today except without the colonial aspect (due to "corruption, violence, and attempts at control"). Hon. Tom Tugendhat's denial of the U.K.'s culpability for the state and state of policing in Nigeria today was followed by a justification for sanctions based on the economic potential of Nigeria ("despite the fact that it is ill governed, brutalized, and robbed" and "a scene of conflict and anti-SARS movements"). His optimism was inspired by an image of Nigeria as "the global center of learning," which is what he says Nigeria was—until the British left. He concludes with an argument that imposing sanctions provides "an opportunity for the U.K. to do something real, not just in the interests of Nigerians, although it would be, and not just in the interests of Africans, although it would be that, too, but fundamentally in the interests of the British people."

These arguments rest on and perpetuate the assumption that colonialism is over and that the U.K. is not culpable for any aspect of the violent policing executed by SARS. These sentiments reproduce the western media's single stories of Africa as the "heart of darkness," and also of "Africa rising" to its true potential (Bunce, Franks, and Paterson 2016). The effect of painting Nigeria as a violent, corrupt, and poorly governed country with only itself to blame, is that it presents an opening for white saviorism by portraying Nigeria as a place in need of help

from the U.K. ("this is an opportunity for the UK to do something real"). Furthermore, it simultaneously paints Nigeria as an economic powerhouse and a potential boon to the U.K., especially if it were to return to its state of greatness under British colonial rule.

Meanwhile, Nigerians at the forefront of the #EndSARS movement and in the diaspora urged people not to sign petitions for sanctions because this could escalate the situation, harm the most vulnerable, and duplicate past instances when Western intervention exacerbated tensions instead of bringing peace (Gal-Dem 2020). Nigerians called for international engagement through other means, such as holding the Nigerian President, government officials, and police heads accountable for crimes against humanity; ending U.K. Government funding of Nigerian Security Services; and spreading education about the history and lingering effects of British colonialism in Nigeria and its history of resistance to imperialism (Gal-Dem 2020).

What is most at stake if policing is not viewed within its colonial framework, is finding real solutions to address repressive political institutions as colonial legacies. If the violent pursuit of hegemonic control is mistakenly regarded as an aberration to policing instead of its reason for being, reform may seem like a viable response. On the contrary, this dissertation provides the historical context behind why scholars and activists have come to the conclusion that simply changing the operations of policing will not work because the system is not "broken" but working "according to its own logic" (Stanley 2011, 8). This logic is driven by the interconnected goals of establishing hegemonic control and ruthlessly extracting labor and resources. My analysis of the colonial development of the police conforms with Michel Foucault's timeless characterization of the prison: reform constitutes this institution's main "program" and does not even necessarily come from a recognition of failure or an attempt to correct (1975/1995a, 234). Instead, reform has been bound up with the police's history from the

beginning. In this sense, the history of the police is a history of reform. To properly address policing as a colonial legacy, we must understand what the police's original purpose was, and therefore what reforms have historically aimed to do: strengthen the police's capacity to establish control, consolidate power, violently suppress resistance to authority, and extract resources.

Conclusion: "The Importance of a Global Context"

Activists and scholars demonstrate the importance of transcending national borders in collectively working toward police abolition, decolonization, and liberation. The Movement for Black Lives, for instance, issued a statement of solidarity with the #EndSARS protests in Nigeria (Figure 3) after the Nigerian army opened fire on protestors at the Lekki Tollgate on October 20, 2020 (Busari et al. 2020). In this statement, they named "colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, anti-Blackness, and other forms of white supremacy" as uniting people from Africa and the diaspora in an interconnected struggle around the world (Black Lives Matter 2020). Okome importantly added the state as a common part of the struggle that connects the aims of protestors and the police's treatment of protestors in #EndSARS and Black Lives Matter movements around the world (Akinwale et al. 2020).

Figure 3. Image from Black Lives Matter statement of solidarity with the #EndSARS movement (Black Lives Matter 2020)



Cell phones and social media have certainly facilitated a new scale and speed of mobilization (Essien 2020), and have made it harder for governments to cover up violence against protestors, like in the Lekki Tollgate massacre and in uprisings throughout the United States following the murder of George Floyd (Dewan and Baker 2020; Gabbatt 2020). However, cross-national forms of organizing against anti-Black state violence did not begin today. Rather, as this statement points out, "the global movement for Black lives" continues a century of movements within the Black radical tradition, including Black Internationalism, pan-Africanisms, Garveyism, socialism, and Black Power (Black Lives Matter 2020). These calls for liberation and solidarity center anti-Black violence as a legacy of colonialism and imperialism. Decolonization requires the dismantling of the necessarily violent state institutions that were

built to suppress resistance, eradicate indigenous ways of being, and extract resources, all in the service the empire. Ultimately, by identifying the police and policing as a colonial legacy, we may see why connections are being made between police abolition, decolonization, and liberation around the world.

Historian Robin D.G. Kelley and others have framed domestic protests against police violence in the United States as instances of a broader global struggle against racism, settler colonialism, and war. Leading scholars of the carceral state therefore call for a global approach to understanding and confronting its violence. Angela Davis has critiqued Michelle Alexander's groundbreaking and now canonical text, *The New Jim Crow* (2010), for lacking a broader global context, and Michelle Alexander has agreed that this context is necessary to fully understand the workings of mass incarceration in the United States (Davis 2016, 13–14). Ruth Wilson Gilmore recently put the importance of global connections in no uncertain terms in saying that abolition "has to be international. It has to stretch across borders so that we can consolidate our strength, our experience, and our vision for a better world" (Kumanyika, Gilmore, and Scahill 2020).

At the same time, the term "global" does not imply that there is "a universal and undifferentiated global carceral regime," but rather highlights transnational connections between local and global institutions of "repressive confinement" under globalized systems of capitalism, neoliberalism, and mass incarceration (Oparah 2005, xii–xiii). This dissertation similarly finds that a globalized approach is essential because the colonial project of policing was also globalized due to the nature of the British Empire. Colonial administrators were thinking transnationally when laying the legal precedent for police forces to extend beyond state borders and diffusing repressive practices through shuffling police personnel between colonized

territories, as demonstrated in Chapter Four. This dissertation joins others in emphasizing the importance of globalizing our thinking and organizing around the police.

This approach may help us better grapple with the history and politics of policing in our own communities as well, as suggested by Alexander and Oparah, and as illustrated by volumes like, *Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter* (Camp and Heatherton 2016). A global approach may reveal ways that the development of policing doctrine and strategies at home may be directly interconnected to policing abroad and vice versa (e.g., see Schrader 2019; Paulson-Smith Forthcoming). By exploring the colonial origins and development of the police, this dissertation deepens knowledge about a fundamental, shared, interconnected aspect of systems of law and order seeded by the British Empire around the world throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Furthermore, it brings to light a long lineage of collective transnational organizing in resistance to the police and the state.

Appendix

Appendix A. True Cases: "Offences Against Public Morality"

Year	Rogues and Vagabonds	Other Offences	Rape	Indecent Assaults	Gambling	Unnatural Offences	Against Religion	Against Marriage	Defamation	***Total***
1930	37	16	33	7	3	11	1	0	0	***108***
1931	55	17	24	13	0	17	1	2	0	***129***
1932	74	25	27	11	0	9	1	1	0	***148***
1933	55	18	32	29	5	6	3	5	0	***153***
1934	53	48	18	11	7	10	0	1	1	***149***
1935	43	33	21	17	57	6	2	0	1	***180***
1936	74	23	29	22	6	7		3	0	***164***
1937	32	17	21	30	43	6	4	0	0	***153***
1938	21	24	25	23	26	12	1	0	0	***132***
1939	66	23	19	17	9	9	1	1	1	***146***
1940-1943: Missing reports										
1944	13	40	21	28	10	3	0	0	1	***116***
1945	24	45	26	16	3	6	1	0	0	***121***
1946	62	95	32	9	6	11	0	1	0	***216***
1947	50	82	71	11	4	9	1	1	0	***229***
1948	77	85	62	37	13	25	2	1	1	***303***
Total	***736***	***591***	***461***	***281***	***192***	***147***	***18***	***16***	***5***	***2447***

Appendix B. True Cases: "Offences Injurious to the General Public"

Year	Rape	Indecent assaults on females, defilement, etc.	Other Offences under XIV to XVIII	Unnatural Offences	Abduction	Incest	Child Stealing	Attempts to procure abortion	Fraudulent Pretence of Marriage, Bigamy, etc.	***Total***
1949	108	90		32	11	5	0	3	1	***250***
1950	135	132		24	9	3	0	5	0	***308***
1951*	214	186		65	38	7	7	6	1	***524***
1952	164	185		41	18	6	3	1	0	***418***
1953	153	173	182	27	20	5	1			***561***
1954	159	147	272	34	29	4	1			***646***
1955	180	178	263	38	15	0	4			***678***
1956	244	190	239	50	13	5	5			***746***
1957	251	216	259	63	17	3	7			***816***
Total	***1608***	***1497***	***1215***	***374***	***170***	***38***	***28***	***15***	***2***	***4947***

**Only total reported cases available in 1951, as opposed to "true cases"*

Appendix C. Total Cases Accepted/True: "Against Public Morality"

Year	Other	Rape and Indecent assault	Unnatural offences	***Total***
1958	433	515	73	***1021***
1959	665	551	76	***1292***
1960	897	654	96	***1647***
1961	1253	690	119	***2062***
Total	***3248***	***2410***	***364***	***6022***

Appendix D. Contemporary Datasets Overview

1. This dataset summarizes publicly available interview data from human rights reports on the general experiences of gender and sexual minorities, as well as other intersecting marginalized groups, such as people who trade sex and people living with HIV/AIDS in sixteen African countries.

Country	Year	Criminalized?	Data	Cities/counties #	Interviews #
Tanzania	2020	Yes	Interviews conducted with 35 self-identified lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Tanzanians (many remotely conducted due to government preventing independent investigations of HR) - in-person interviews in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar and by phone with individuals from Tanga, Arusha, and Morogoro	5	35
Tanzania	2019	Yes	Interviews with 80 people in mainland TZA and Zanzibar - included reporters, newspaper editors and staff of NGOs in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Arusha, Ilindi and Mwanza	5	80
South Africa	2019	No	Interviewed 46 women currently working as sex workers (3 were trans women) - Musina town, four in Makhado and five in Tzaneen and four in Hoedspruit. Six sex workers were interviewed in Bush Buck Ridge, seven in De Deur and Eikenhof towns and fourteen in downtown Johannesburg	8	46
Malawi	2018	Yes and no (no arrests permitted but still illegal)	Interviews with 45 LGBT people in the nation's two major cities Lilongwe and Blantyre in 2018 and with Malawian activists	2	45
Ghana	2018	Yes	Interviewed 122 individuals in Accra, Tamale, Kumasi and Cape Coast who self-identify as LGBT—52 lesbians, 45 gay men, 8 bisexual women, 4 transgender men, 4 bisexual men and 1 transgender woman	4	122

Nigeria	2016	Yes	Interviewed 73 Nigerians who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) as well as representatives of 15 Nigeria-based non-governmental organizations. Field research in Abuja, Lagos, and Ibadan, and interviewed activists working with LGBT people and on a range of other human rights issues, in particular access to HIV services and treatment, from Kano, Kaduna, Delta, Cross River, Zamfara, and Niger States	9	88
Kenya	2015	Yes	Interviewed 65 gay and bisexual men, lesbians, and transgender women, and more than 20 clergy, county government officials, police officers, lawyers, health workers, and community activists. Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale, and Nairobi counties	4	86
Liberia	2013	Yes	30 interviews with self-identifying lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons in Liberia, conducted in the capital Monrovia in September, October, and December 2012. The report does not seek to systematically document human rights abuses against LGBT people in Liberia. Rather, it aims to illustrate the negative impact that existing legislation has already had on the LGBT population, and emphasizes that the proposed legislation seems likely to make a bad situation much worse.	1	30
Tanzania	2013	Yes	Between May 2012 and April 2013, Human Rights Watch and WASO conducted field research in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Tanga, Arusha, and Mwanza. Human Rights Watch conducted additional research in Mbeya and Chunya with the assistance of Population Services International (PSI), an international NGO focusing on reproductive and sexual health. / Two Human Rights Watch researchers and two WASO researchers interviewed 254 people for this report, including 121 members of key populations	7	254

Cameroon	2013	Yes	Primary research took place in October 2012 and from January to February 2013. Researchers visited Yaoundé, Douala, Buea, Kumba, and Limbe and interviewed 14 of the 26 people we knew to have been prosecuted for homosexuality between 2010 and 2012, including five who had been convicted. One person was interviewed in a country outside Cameroon where he had sought asylum. Researchers also spoke to police and Ministry of Justice officials, lawyers, academics, Cameroonian and international nongovernmental organizations, UN officials, and foreign diplomats.	5	15
Uganda	2012	yes	Research carried out by Human Rights Watch staff throughout 2011, as well as in-country research missions between May and July 2012. Human Rights Watch interviewed 41 people, including 25 representatives of NGOs working on a broad range of thematic work and from around the country, as well as donors, police, and government actors. Mostly in Kampala	1	41

South Africa	2011	No	121 people we interviewed for this report - primarily Black lesbians and transgender men living in townships, peri-urban and rural areas, and informal settlements are among the most marginalized and vulnerable members of South Africa's LGBT population: This report documents the experiences of self-identified lesbians, bisexual women, and transgender men who live in townships close to large cities (Durban, Cape Town, Johannesburg) as well as those living in and around smaller towns and rural and peri-urban areas (the participants in Lusikisiki, the Eastern Cape; Thohoyandou and Tzaneen, Limpopo; and Ermelo, Mpumalanga). A small number lived in cities—Johannesburg, East London, Durban, Nelspruit (renamed Mbombela), and Cape Town—at the time they experienced violence, although even in these cases, the incidents of violence often took place in townships they were visiting. / Field research was conducted in townships, small towns, and cities in six of South Africa's nine provinces: Gauteng, the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo.	9	121
Senegal	2010	No	Research conducted in the Senegalese capital Dakar, and in the cities Mbour and Kaolack, from July 22-August 7, 2009, supplemented by periodic follow-up telephone interviews, NGO reports, press reports, and other secondary sources through September 2010. Human Rights Watch conducted in-depth interviews with 45 Senegalese men who had faced violence, arrest, or abuse, as well as with Senegalese human rights activists, journalists, medical doctors, and the leader of a religious organization.	3	45

Cameroon	2010	Yes	Research conducted in the Cameroonian cities of Buea, Douala, Ebolowa, and Yaoundé from September 1 to October 4, 2009 and interviewed 45 self-identified gay and bisexual men, lesbians, and bisexual women, and men who have sex with men and women who have sex with women including some gender nonconforming	4	45
Burundi	2009	Yes (in the middle of the research for this report)	From November 2008, when the National Assembly first passed the discriminatory law, through May 2009, shortly after the criminal code was promulgated, Human Rights Watch carried out in-depth interviews with 16 members of Burundi's LGBT community, all of them young people between 17 and 37. / Human Rights Watch teamed up with photographer Martina Bacigalupo to create portraits of ten of these young people, many of whom feel that their very identities have been rendered criminal by Burundi's new law. In these pages, we allow them to speak for themselves. We hope that others will draw lessons from these narratives and will work to restore the rights of people like Mike, Anneyoncé, Cynthia, Pascal, and Yves.	1	16
Egypt	2004	Yes	Research conducted in Egypt over three months in the early 2003, as well as on documentation and legal research and analysis carried out by human rights activists in Egypt. Human Rights Watch interviewed sixty-three men who had been arrested on suspicion of homosexual conduct, in Cairo and in other cities in lower Egypt.	2	63

Zimbabwe	2003	Yes	In this report, Human Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) document and analyze the impact of state-sponsored homophobia in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana. The report shows how these attacks attempt to create an atmosphere of intolerance in which governments can erode the basic principles of human rights, and individuals can abuse others with impunity. It contrasts these to the different situation in South Africa, where the constitution has promised an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation-but where a lack of will as well as foresight has kept these promises short of fulfillment.	4	39
Namibia	2003	Yes	In this report, Human Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) document and analyze the impact of state-sponsored homophobia in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana. The report shows how these attacks attempt to create an atmosphere of intolerance in which governments can erode the basic principles of human rights, and individuals can abuse others with impunity. It contrasts these to the different situation in South Africa, where the constitution has promised an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation-but where a lack of will as well as foresight has kept these promises short of fulfillment.	1	32

Zambia	2003	Yes	In this report, Human Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) document and analyze the impact of state-sponsored homophobia in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana. The report shows how these attacks attempt to create an atmosphere of intolerance in which governments can erode the basic principles of human rights, and individuals can abuse others with impunity. It contrasts these to the different situation in South Africa, where the constitution has promised an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation-but where a lack of will as well as foresight has kept these promises short of fulfillment.	3	
Botswana	2003	Yes	In this report, Human Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) document and analyze the impact of state-sponsored homophobia in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana. The report shows how these attacks attempt to create an atmosphere of intolerance in which governments can erode the basic principles of human rights, and individuals can abuse others with impunity. It contrasts these to the different situation in South Africa, where the constitution has promised an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation-but where a lack of will as well as foresight has kept these promises short of fulfillment.	1	

South Africa	2003	No	In this report, Human Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) document and analyze the impact of state-sponsored homophobia in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana. The report shows how these attacks attempt to create an atmosphere of intolerance in which governments can erode the basic principles of human rights, and individuals can abuse others with impunity. It contrasts these to the different situation in South Africa, where the constitution has promised an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation-but where a lack of will as well as foresight has kept these promises short of fulfillment.	4	95
			Southern Africa report interviews		39
21	***17***			***83***	***1,337***

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2. This dataset includes data from all reports of political violence targeting gender and sexual minorities in ten African countries. I used ACLED's definitions of "political violence" and the sub-category of "violence against civilians" to code for violence targeted and gender and sexual minorities:

> **Political violence:** "Political violence is defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation. ACLED records political violence through its constituent events, the intent of which is to produce a comprehensive overview of all forms of political disorder, expressed through violence and demonstrations, within and across states. A politically violent event is a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups toward a political end, although some non-violent instances – including protests and strategic developments – are included in the dataset to capture the potential pre-cursors or critical junctures of a violent conflict" (ACLED 2019, 6).
>
> **Violence against civilians:** "ACLED defines 'Violence against civilians' as violent events where an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. By definition, civilians are unarmed and cannot engage in political violence. The perpetrators of such acts include state forces and their affiliates, rebels, militias, and external/other forces. In cases where the identity and actions of the victims are in question (e.g. the target may be employed as a police officer), ACLED determines that if a person is harmed or killed while unarmed and unable to either act defensively or

> counter-attack, this is an act of 'Violence against civilians'. There is no minimum number of civilian fatalities needed to qualify as an ACLED event. 'Violence against civilians' includes attempts at inflicting harm (e.g. beating, shooting, torture, rape, mutilation, etc.) or forcibly disappearing (e.g. kidnapping and disappearances) civilian actors. The following sub-event types are associated with the 'Violence against civilians' event type: 'Sexual violence', 'Attack', and 'Abduction/forced disappearance'" (ACLED 2019, 11).

I draw from established best practices in conflict data collection for ensuring quality data (Salehyan 2015). I systematically searched for keywords based on my initial pilot data collection of reports on political violence against gender and sexual minorities in Tanzania:

[Country name]
Gay
Lesbian
LGBT
Queer
Homosexual
Transgender
Arrest

Murder
Beat
Rape
Assault
Police
Violence
Anal (exam)
Stoned/stoning

I consulted the following sources: Nexis Uni (formerly LexisNexis Academic), allAfrica.com (distributes news produced primarily on the African continent), regional and local newspapers, ProQuest International Newsstream (provides information from more than 660 of the world's top newspapers), Human Rights Studies and Reports, and other international news sources.

I completed the data collection on the following ten countries:

ORDER	COUNTRY	SEQUENCING RATIONALE	REGION
1	Kenya	Many LGBTQ+ refugees experiencing violence	East
2	Uganda	Many LGBTQ+ refugees experiencing violence	East
3	Botswana	Most recent African country to decriminalize	South
4	Tunisia	Expand MENA regional coverage and in news recently	North
5	South Africa	Known high levels of anti-LGBTQ+ violence	South
6	Liberia	Expand west AF regional coverage and in news recently	West
7	Somalia	Known high levels of anti-LGBTQ+ violence	East
8	Ghana	More salience and coverage of LGBTQ+ issues in general	West
9	Nigeria	More salience and coverage of LGBTQ+ issues in general	West
10	Zimbabwe	More salience and coverage of LGBTQ+ issues in general	South

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