



# LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

## **Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Near East: Jordan-Yemen. Volume XIII 1955/1957**

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955/1957

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84>

As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.

FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES

---

1955-1957

VOLUME XIII

---


NEAR EAST:  
JORDAN-  
YEMEN



---

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

Washington









# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

---

Volume XIII

## Near East: Jordan– Yemen

*Editor in Chief* John P. Glennon

*Editors* Will Klingaman

Aaron D. Miller

Nina J. Noring

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9665

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

# Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.



## IV Preface

---

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.

The Center, in coordination with geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

John P. Glennon supervised the planning of this volume. Compilation was directed by M. Paul Claussen. Harriet D. Schwar assisted in final preparation of the volume. Will Klingaman compiled the section on Lebanon and Nina J. Noring that on Syria. Aaron D. Miller compiled the remainder of the volume. Lynn Fliakas Chase prepared the lists of sources, abbreviations, and names. Althea W. Robinson performed the technical editing under the supervision of Rita M. Baker. The Twin Oaks Indexing Collective prepared the index.

**William Z. Slany**  
*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

# Contents

<b>Preface</b> .....	III
<b>List of Sources</b> .....	VII
<b>List of Abbreviations</b> .....	XIII
<b>List of Persons</b> .....	XIX
<b>Jordan</b>	
The question of Jordanian adherence to the Baghdad Pact; United States concern over the stability of Jordan; the aftermath of Sir Gerald Templer's mission to Jordan; the dismissal of General Glubb; termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty; the crisis of April 1957; the extension of U.S. military and economic assistance to Jordan .....	1
<b>Kuwait</b>	
United States interest in Kuwait .....	169
<b>Lebanon</b>	
The question of military and economic support to Lebanon; United States interest in the pro-Western orientation of Lebanon; Lebanese support for the Eisenhower Doctrine .....	170
<b>Muscat and Oman</b>	
United States interest in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.....	222
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	
United States interest in the question of military and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia; renewal of United States tenancy at the Dhahran Airfield; interest of the United States in negotiations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia regarding the Buraimi Oasis dispute; visit of King Saud to the United States in February 1957 .....	249

## VI Contents

---

### Syria

Deterioration in relations between the United States and Syria; Syria's response to the Baghdad Pact and the formation of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian pact; questions of economic and military assistance; the Syrian crisis of 1957 .....	513
--	-----

### Yemen

United States interest in Yemen .....	748
---------------------------------------	-----

Index .....	775
-------------	-----

# List of Unpublished Sources

## Department of State

1. *Indexed Central Files.* Papers in the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1955–1957 are indicated by a decimal file number in the first footnote. The following are among the most useful of these files. Regional and general files: 110.11–DU, 120.1580, 682.87, 780.00, 780.022, 780.5, 880.2553. Files on Jordan: 611.85, 641.85, 684A.85, 684A.86, 685.00, 685.87, 741.551, 785.00, 785.5, 885.10. Lebanon files: 611.83A, 711.56383A, 783A.00, 783A.5, 783A.56, 883A.2553. Muscat and Oman files: 611.86E, 641.86E, 786E.00, 786E.2553. Saudi Arabia files: 611.86A, 641.86A, 711.56386A, 786A.00, 786A.11, 786A.5 MSP, 786A.56, 886A.2553. Syria files: 110.13–HE, 110.15–HE, 611.83, 682.83, 683.00, 783.00, 783.5–MSP, 783.56, 883.2553, 883.3932. Yemen files: 611.86H, 786H.56, 886H.00–TA, 886H.2553.

2. *Lot Files.* Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

### Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on official visits by ranking foreign officials, and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State, for the years 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials, and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1953–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials, and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1956–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials, and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### Daily Summaries: Lot 60 D 530

Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication *Daily Secret Summary* and *Daily Top Secret Summary* for the years 1953–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

## VIII List of Sources

---

### INR Files: Lot 58 D 776

Subject and country files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and its predecessors, 1945–1957.

### INR Files: Lot 59 D 27

Miscellaneous files for the years 1948–1954 as retired by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, including master file of minutes of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

### INR Files: Lot 62 D 42

Selected documents from country and subject files for the years 1957–1960, including Intelligence Advisory Committee and National Security Council papers, as maintained by the Office of the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

### INR–NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

### NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616

Files of the Richards Mission to the Middle East, including general country and subject files, briefing books, and reports to the President and Congress, for the period November 1956 to August 1957, as maintained by the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

### NEA Files: Lot 58 D 545

Contains country files for Egypt, Nepal, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Cyprus, Turkey, and Yemen, and subject files for United Nations, Personnel, and the Baghdad Pact for the year 1956, as maintained by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

### NEA Files: Lot 58 D 722

Files maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs for the years 1954–1956, relating to the Middle East Watch.

### NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518

Top secret records pertaining to the Middle East for the years 1954–1957, as maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

### NEA Files: Lot 59 D 582

Files on Lebanon and Israel for the years 1953–1958 including reports, memoranda, and correspondence, as maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

### NEA Files: Lot 61 D 48

General subject files for the countries of Aden, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Muscat for 1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

### NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547

Miscellaneous subject and chronological files relating to Arabian Peninsula matters, primarily Saudi Arabia, for the years 1956, 1961–1962, 1964–1966, and 1968,

as maintained by the Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/ARP Files: Lot 70 D 148

Subject files concerning Saudi Arabia for the years 1956–1961 and 1967–1968, including correspondence with the Embassy and material on the Dhahran Airfield, as maintained by the Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/NE Files: Lot 58 D 398

Files on Israel and Lebanon for the years 1954–1956, as maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/NE Files: Lot 59 D 38

Files maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs for the years 1956–1957, including documentation on Syria, Egypt, and Sudan.

NEA/NE Files: Lot 61 D 59

Miscellaneous files maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs for the years 1953–1960, including documentation on Syria, Egypt, and the United Arab Republic.

OCB Files, Lot 61 D 385

Master set of administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Operations Staff.

OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

PPS Files, Lot 66 D 70

Policy Planning Staff subject, country, and chronological files for the year 1955.

PPS Files, Lot 67 D 548

Policy Planning Staff subject, country, and chronological files for the years 1957–1961.

Presidential Correspondence, Lot 64 D 174

Correspondence between President Eisenhower and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## **X List of Sources**

---

### **Secretary's Staff Meetings, Lot 63 D 75**

Chronological collection of the minutes of the Secretary's staff meetings during the years 1952–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **S/P–NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1**

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

### **S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417**

See State–JCS Meetings.

### **S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351**

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence, and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95**

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1947–1963.

### **S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123**

Records pertaining to the Middle East for the period August 1957 to February 1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417**

Top secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## **Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas**

### **Dulles Papers**

Records of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959.

### **Kevin McCann Records**

Records, 1946–1960. Documents cited in this volume are from the Collection of Press and Radio Conferences and Press Releases, 1952–1961.

### **President's Daily Appointments Record**

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Daily Appointments, 1953–1961.

### **White House Central Files**

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, White House Central Files, 1953–1961. Documents cited in this volume are from the Confidential file within this collection.

### Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower (DDE) Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

### Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

#### ICA Message Files: FRC 58 A 403

Incoming and outgoing cables and airgrams of the International Cooperation Administration for the period July 1, 1956–June 30, 1957, as maintained by ICA headquarters in Washington.

#### USIA/IAN Files: FRC 63 A 190

Lot 61 D 233: Files of the Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency, for the years 1953–1959.

### National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

#### JCS Records

National Archives Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

#### Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book

Daily log of the meetings and appointments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for the years 1953–1959.





# List of Abbreviations

*Editor's Note:* This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

- A**, airgram  
**AA**, Anti-Aircraft  
**Achdut Haavoda**, Israeli Socialist Labor Party  
**ACSP**, Arab Collective Security Pact  
**AFSC**, American Friends Service Committee  
**AKA**, Attack Cargo Vessel  
**AL**, Arab League; Arab Legion (Transjordan)  
**ALCSP**, Arab League Collective Security Pact  
**ALO**, series indicator for military telegrams  
**AmEmb**, American Embassy  
**AMS**, Agricultural Marketing Services, Department of Agriculture  
**AP**, Associated Press; Atlantic Pact  
**ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARAMCO**, Arabian-American Oil Company  
**ARMATT**, Army Attaché  
**ASRP**, Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party (Syrian)  
**B/D**, barrels of petroleum per day  
**BG**, David Ben Gurion  
**BIS**, Bank of International Settlements  
**BJSM**, British Joint Services Mission or British Joint Staff Mission  
**BMEO**, British Middle East Office  
**BNA**, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State  
**BSFMC**, Bilateral San Francisco Memorandum of Conversation  
**CA**, circular airgram  
**CARE**, Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere  
**CASU**, Cooperative Association of Suez Canal Users  
**CCS**, Combined Chiefs of Staff  
**CE**, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army; Central Europe; Council of Europe; Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State  
**CF**, Conference File  
**CHMAAG**, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CIA/LC**, Central Intelligence Agency, Legislative Counsel  
**CINCAL**, Commander in Chief, Alaska  
**CINCARIB**, Commander in Chief, Caribbean  
**CINCFE**, Commander in Chief, Far East  
**CINCLANT**, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic

## XIV List of Abbreviations

---

- CINCNELM**, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
- CINCONAD**, Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
- CINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific
- CINCSAC**, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
- CINCUSAFE**, Commander in Chief, United States Air Force, Europe
- CINCUSAREUR**, Commander in Chief, United States Army in Europe
- circ**, circular telegram
- cirtel**, circular telegram
- comite**, committee
- CONAD**, Continental Air Defense Command
- CONADR**, Continental Air Defense Command Regulation
- ConGen**, Consulate General
- Contel**, Consulate telegram
- CRO**, Commonwealth Relations Office
- CS**, Chief of Staff
- CSA**, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
- CSAFM**, Chief of Staff, Air Force Memorandum
- CSS**, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture
- CVA**, Attack Aircraft Carrier
- CVS**, Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft Carrier
- CX**, Naval Reserve Captain, Captain, or Commander
- CZ**, Canal Zone
- DA**, Development Assistance
- DCL**, Director of Central Intelligence
- DD**, Destroyer
- DEFREPAMA**, Defense Representative Army Attaché
- Del**, Delegation
- Delga**, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly; also used to refer to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
- Dento**, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Denver White House
- Depcirgram**, Department of State circular airgram
- Decirtel**, Department of State circular telegram
- Deptel**, Department of State telegram
- desp**, despatch
- DEW**, Distant Early Warning
- DIB**, Defense Intelligence Briefing
- DirGen**, Director General
- DL**, Demarcation Line
- DRN**, Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Department of State
- DRS**, Division of Research for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Department of State
- DRW**, Division of Research for Western Europe, Department of State
- Dulte**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
- DZ**, Demilitarized Zone
- E**, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
- EARIS**, Egyptian-American Rural Improvement Service
- ECA**, Economic Cooperation Administration
- E-I**, Egyptian-Israeli
- EIMAC**, Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission
- E.J.**, Eric Johnston
- Embdesp**, Embassy despatch
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- ES**, Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly
- ES-I**, First Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly
- ESS**, Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Pact
- ETW**, Eden Talks, Washington
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/RA**, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EURATOM**, group of European nations formed for the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses
- EXIM Bank/EX-IM**, Export-Import Bank
- FAF**, French Air Force
- FAO**, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
- FAS**, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
- FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
- FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

- FinAtt**, Financial Attaché  
**FLO**, Foreign Liaison Office  
**FN**, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State  
**F.O.**, Foreign Office  
**FOA**, Foreign Operations Administration  
**FonMin**, Foreign Minister, Ministry  
**FonOff**, Foreign Office  
**FPSC**, Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee  
**FRC**, Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate  
**FSD**, Division of Fuels, Department of State  
**FTC**, Federal Trade Commission  
**FY**, fiscal year  
**FYI**, for your information  
**G**, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State  
**G-2**, Army (or Marine) general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional level or higher  
**GA**, United Nations General Assembly  
**GAA**, General Armistice Agreement  
**Gadel**, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly  
**GHQ**, General Headquarters  
**GMT**, Greenwich mean time  
**GOE**, Government of Egypt  
**GOI**, Government of Israel; Government of India  
**GOL**, Government of Lebanon  
**GOS**, Government of Syria  
**GSA**, General Services Administration  
**H**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Department of State  
**Herut (Tenuat HaHerut)**, Israeli political party  
**HICOM**, High Commission (er)  
**Histadrut**, General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel  
**HJK**, Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom  
**HJK-IMAC**, Jordanian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission  
**HKJ**, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
**HM**, His/Her Majesty  
**HMG**, His/Her Majesty's Government  
**HQ**, Headquarters  
**IAC**, Intelligence Advisory Committee  
**IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
**IC**, Division of International Conferences, Department of State  
**ICA**, International Cooperation Administration  
**ICAO**, International Civil Aviation Organization  
**ICA/W**, International Cooperation Administration, Washington  
**ICJ**, International Court of Justice  
**IDAB**, International Development Advisory Board  
**IDF**, Israeli Defense Forces  
**IDF-FLO**, Israel Defense Force-Foreign Liaison Office  
**I-E**, Israeli-Egyptian  
**IEG**, Imperial Ethiopian Government  
**IFC**, International Finance Corporation  
**IG**, Israeli Government  
**IIS**, Israeli Intelligence Service  
**IMF**, International Monetary Fund  
**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**INS**, International News Service  
**IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State  
**IO/OES**, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State  
**IO/OIA**, Office of International Administration, Department of State  
**IPC**, Iraq Petroleum Company  
**IRD**, International Resources Division, Department of State  
**ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; also Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense  
**ISMAC**, Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission  
**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**Jlem**, Jerusalem  
**JSPC**, Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**JSSC**, Joint Strategic Survey Committee  
**Jugs**, Yugoslavs  
**JVP**, Jordan Valley Plan; Jordan Valley Proposal  
**K**, kilometer  
**kw**, Kilowatt  
**L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

## XVI List of Abbreviations

---

- L/E**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State
- L/NEA**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
- LE**, Egyptian pounds
- Leb**, Lebanon
- Lon**, London
- MA**, Military Attaché
- MAAC**, Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee
- MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group
- MAC**, Mixed Armistice Commission
- MAG**, Military Advisory Group
- Mapai**, Israeli Labor Party
- Mapam**, Israeli United Workers' Party
- MATS**, Military Air Transport Service
- MC**, Memorandum of Conversation; Office of Munitions Control, Department of State
- MCM**, Milliard Cubic Meters
- MDA**, Mutual Defense Assistance
- MDAP**, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
- ME**, Middle East
- MEEC**, Middle East Emergency Committee
- MEPPG**, Middle East Policy Planning Group
- MinDef**, Minister, Ministry of Defense
- MinFonAff**, Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- MP**, Member of Parliament (United Kingdom)
- MSA**, Mutual Security Agency/Act/Assistance
- MSP**, Mutual Security Program
- MSTS**, Military Sea Transport Service
- mytel**, my telegram
- NAC**, North Atlantic Council; National Advisory Council
- NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NE**, Near East; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- NEA**, Near East and Africa; Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
- NEACC**, Near East Arms Coordinating Committee
- NH**, Note to Holders
- Niact**, night action, a telegram designator requiring immediate action
- NIC**, National Indications Center
- NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate
- Noform**, not releasable to foreign nationals
- NSC**, National Security Council
- NUP**, National Unionist Party of Sudan
- NZ**, New Zealand
- O**, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
- OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
- ODM**, Office of Defense Mobilization
- OEEC**, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
- OFD**, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
- ONE**, Office of National Estimates
- ORM**, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State
- OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- OSP**, Offshore Procurement
- PAO**, Public Affairs Officer
- PCC**, Palestine Conciliation Commission
- PIO**, Public Information Officer
- PL**, Public Law
- PLG**, Paris Liaison Group
- PM**, Prime Minister
- PMCG (NY)**, preparations for the Meeting of the Chiefs of Government (New York)
- POL**, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
- Polto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State
- POM (NY) MC**, preparations for the October Meetings (of the Foreign Ministers) (New York) Memorandum of Conversation
- PPS**, Parti Populaire Syrien, Syrian National Party
- PriMin**, Prime Minister
- PTS**, proposed talks with the Soviets
- R**, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
- RA**, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
- RAF**, Royal Air Force
- RCC**, Revolutionary Command Council of Egypt
- RCT**, Regimental Combat Team

- R&D**, research and development  
**reftel**, reference telegram  
**Res**, Resolution  
**RGT**, Army Regimental Combat Team  
**RLG**, Rome Liaison Group  
**RMA**, Reimbursable Military Assistance  
**S**, Office of the Secretary of State  
**S/P**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State  
**S/PV**, Security Council/Procès-Verbeaux  
**S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
**S/S-RO**, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
**SA**, Saudi Arabia  
**SAC**, Strategic Air Command  
**SAG**, Saudi Arabian Government  
**SC**, United Nations Security Council  
**SCUA**, Suez Canal Users Association  
**SEA**, Southeast Asia  
**SEATO**, South East Asia Treaty Organization  
**Sec**, Secretary  
**Secto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences  
**Secy**, Secretary  
**SFIO**, Section Française d'Internationale Ouvrière  
**SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe  
**SNIE**, Special National Intelligence Estimate  
**SOCONY**, Standard Oil Company of New York  
**SOSUS**, Sound Surveillance Underwater System  
**SPC**, Special Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly  
**SPD**, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)  
**SS**, submarine  
**SY**, Division of Security, Department of State  
**SYG**, Secretary-General  
**T/O & E**, Table of Organization and Equipment  
**TAPLINE**, Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company  
**TC**, Truce Commission (in Palestine); United Nations Trusteeship Council  
**Tedul**, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington  
**Toden**, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Denver White House  
**Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences  
**TS**, Top Secret  
**TSO**, Truce Supervisory Organization (United Nations)  
**TVA**, Tennessee Valley Authority  
**TWA**, Trans World Airlines  
**U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State  
**U/MSA**, Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State  
**U/PR**, Office of the Chief of Protocol, Department of State  
**UJA**, United Jewish Appeal  
**UK**, United Kingdom  
**UKG**, United Kingdom Government  
**Umma**, Umma (Independence) Party of Sudan  
**UN**, United Nations  
**UNA**, Office of United Nations Affairs, Department of State  
**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly  
**UNMIS**, United Nations Mission  
**UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State  
**UNRRA**, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration  
**UNRWA**, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine and the Near East  
**UNSC**, United Nations Security Council  
**UNSCOP**, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine  
**UNTS**, United Nations Truce Supervisor; United Nations Treaty Series  
**UNTSO**, United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization  
**UNSYG**, Secretary-General of the United Nations  
**UP**, United Press  
**urtel**, your telegram  
**USA**, United States Army  
**USAF**, United States Air Force  
**USAREUR**, United States Army, Europe

## XVIII List of Abbreviations

---

<b>USARMA</b> , United States Army Attaché	<b>USRO</b> , United States Mission to the
<b>USCINCEUR</b> , United States Commander in Chief, Europe	North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
<b>USDel</b> , United States delegation	<b>USSR</b> , Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>USG</b> , United States Government	<b>USUN</b> , United States Mission at the United Nations
<b>USGADel</b> , United States Delegation at the United Nations	<b>Wafd</b> , Egypt's principal political party
<b>USIA</b> , United States Information Agency	<b>WE</b> , Western Europe; Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
<b>USIS</b> , United States Information Service	<b>WFTU (WFTCU)</b> , World Federation of Trade Unions
<b>USLO</b> , United States Liaison Officer	<b>WH</b> , White House
<b>USMC</b> , United States Marine Corps	<b>ZI</b> , Zone of Interior
<b>USNMR</b> , United States National Military Representative to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe	
<b>USOM</b> , United States Operations Mission	

# List of Persons

*Editor's Note:* The identification of persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. Historical personages alluded to in the volume and certain minor officials are not identified. All titles and positions are American unless indicated to the contrary.

In this and in other editorial material throughout the volume (document headings, footnotes, and editorial notes), every effort has been made to provide recognizable and consistent transliterations of names of individuals from countries using non-Roman alphabets. The transliterations adopted for proper names were those commonly used by the Department of State at the time, or in documents or official publications of the countries concerned. (In the case of Arabic names, differences arise in the transliteration of vowels. The editors have generally rendered the definite article as al- rather than el- , and have omitted diacritical marks.)

- Abd al-Hadi, Awni**, Jordanian Foreign Minister, July 1–October 29, 1956  
**Abu al-Huda, Tawfiq**, Prime Minister of Jordan until May 30, 1955  
**Adams, Sherman**, Assistant to the President  
**Aldrich Winthrop W.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom until February 1, 1957  
**Allen, Francis O.**, Officer in Charge of Syria-Lebanon Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until September 11, 1955  
**Allen, George V.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, January 24, 1955–July 26, 1956  
**Alphand, Hervé**, Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations until August 24, 1956; Ambassador to the United States from September 10, 1956  
**Amer, Gen. Abdel Hakim**, Egyptian Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Minister of War and Marine; Chief Commander of the Egyptian-Syrian Joint Command from October 23, 1956  
**Anderson, Robert B.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until August 4, 1955; Special Emissary for the President to the Middle East, January–March 1956, and in August 1956; Secretary of the Treasury from July 29, 1957  
**Armstrong, William P.**, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until June 16, 1957  
**al-Asali, Sabri**, Prime Minister of Syria, February 13–September 13, 1955, and from June 14, 1956; Minister of the Interior, February 13–September 13, 1955, and from January 2, 1957  
**al-Atasi, Fayid**, Syrian Foreign Minister until February 13, 1955



## XX List of Persons

---

- al-Azm, Khalid**, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, February 13–September 13, 1955; again Minister of Defense from January 2, 1957; Minister of Finance from November 17, 1957
- al-Badr ben Ahmad, Muhammed**, Crown Prince and Foreign Minister of Yemen from August 31, 1955
- Barbour, Walworth**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 20, 1955; Deputy Chief of Mission in the United Kingdom, November 20, 1955–February 23, 1956; thereafter Minister–Counselor
- Barnes, Robert G.**, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, June 12–August 1, 1955; Director, August 1, 1955–March 11, 1956; thereafter Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs
- Baxter, William O.**, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until August 26, 1956; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Israel
- Becker, Loftus E.**, Legal Adviser of the Department of State from June 13, 1957
- Ben Gurion, David**, Israeli Minister of Defense from February 17, 1955; also Prime Minister from November 3, 1955
- Berding, Andrew H.**, Assistant Director for Policies and Programs, United States Information Agency, until March 22, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 28, 1957
- Bergin, Rear Adm. Charles K.**, USN, Regional Director for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, from 1957
- Bergus, Donald C.**, Officer in Charge of Israel–Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- Bernau, Phyllis D.**, Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State
- Berry, James L.**, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, October 21, 1955–August 30, 1956; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
- Bitar, Salah al-Din**, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 14, 1956
- al-Bizri, Gen. Afif**, Syrian Chief of Staff from August 17, 1957
- Black, Eugene R.**, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- Blackiston, Slator C., Jr.**, Vice Consul at Jerusalem until February 9, 1956; Consul, February 9–April 8, 1956; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, April 8, 1956–March 10, 1957; thereafter Attaché of the Embassy in Lebanon
- Boardman, Francis**, Deputy Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until July 3, 1955; Officer in Charge of Syria–Lebanon Affairs, July 3, 1955–August 26, 1956
- Bowie, Robert R.**, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 10, 1955; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, August 10, 1955–August 31, 1957; Department of State member of the National Security Council Planning Board, August 28, 1955–August 31, 1957
- Bulganin, Marshal Nikolai Alexandrovich**, Soviet Minister of Defense until February 1955; thereafter Chairman, Council of Ministers, Member of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party, and Head of Government
- Burdett, William C.**, Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo–Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until October 9, 1955; Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, October 9, 1955–October 7, 1956; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 7, 1956–August 11, 1957; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, August 11–November 3, 1957

- Cabell, Lt. Gen. C.P., USAF**, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
- Caccia, Sir Harold**, Deputy Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office until November 1956; Ambassador to the United States from November 9, 1956
- Carrigan, John W.**, Consul at Dhahran until July 20, 1955; Consul General, July 20, 1955–August 11, 1957
- Chamoun, Camille**, President of Lebanon
- Chehab, Fuad**, Lebanese Minister of Defense, November 27, 1956–January 3, 1957; thereafter Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Army
- Coulson, Sir John Eltringham**, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until October 1955; Minister of the British Embassy in the United States from October 27, 1955
- Cumming, Hugh S., Jr.**, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, May 5–October 10, 1957; thereafter Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
- Cutler, Robert**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman of the National Security Council Planning Board, member of the Operations Coordinating Board and the Council on Foreign Economic Policy until April 1955, and again from January 1957
- Dale, William N.**, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until July 29, 1956; thereafter Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
- Dean, Sir Patrick Henry**, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until August 29, 1956; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State
- Dearborn, Frederick M., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination and Member of the Operations Coordinating Board from 1957
- Dillon, C. Douglas**, Ambassador to France until January 28, 1957; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from March 15, 1957
- al-Din, Abd al-Baqi Nizam**, Syrian Minister of Public Works, 1955; Chief of Staff from July 8, 1956
- Dodds-Parker, Arthur D.**, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations until December 1955; Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Relations, December 1955–January 1957
- Dorsey, Stephen P.**, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until June 2, 1955; Acting Director, June 2–September 11, 1955; detailed to the International Cooperation Administration as Deputy Regional Director for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, September 11, 1955–August 12, 1956; thereafter International Cooperation Administration Counselor and Director of the United States Operations Mission in Lebanon
- Duke, Sir Charles Beresford**, British Ambassador to Jordan
- Dulles, Allen W.**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State
- Eban, Abba**, Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative at the United Nations
- Eden, Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony**, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister until April 6, 1955; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, April 6, 1955–January 10, 1957
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States
- Eisenhower, Maj. John S.D.**, USA, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President

## XXII List of Persons

---

- Elbrick, C. Burke**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until February 14, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Emmerson, John K.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Pakistan until April 4, 1955; Counselor of the Embassy in Lebanon, April 4, 1955–April 21, 1957
- Fahad ibn Saud**, Prince, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense from January 3, 1957
- Faisal ibn al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al Saud**, brother of King Saud; Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister
- Faisal II**, King of Iraq
- al-Faqih, Sheikh Asad**, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States until August 3, 1955
- Fawzi, Mahmoud**, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the Egyptian Delegation at the United Nations, also Representative at the General Assembly
- Fritzlan, A. David**, Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula and Iraqi Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until August 14, 1955; Counselor of the Embassy in Iraq after July 1, 1956
- Furnas, Howard E.**, Intelligence Staff Officer, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until September 8, 1957; thereafter member of the Policy Planning Staff
- Gallman, Waldemar J.**, Ambassador to Iraq
- Gargoni, Khalid**, Saudi Arabian Royal Counselor
- George, Walter F.**, Democratic Senator from Georgia until January 3, 1957; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, until January 3, 1957; Special Ambassador to NATO from January 3 until his death on August 4, 1957
- Geren, Paul F.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Jordan until November 14, 1955; Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, November 15, 1955–summer 1956
- al-Ghazzi, Said**, Prime Minister of Syria, September 13, 1955–June 14, 1956
- Gleason, S. Everett**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
- Glubb, Lt. Gen. Sir John Bagot**, British Chief of the General Staff of the Arab Legion in Jordan until March 2, 1956
- Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J.**, USA, Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer to the President
- Gray, Gordon**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 14, 1955–February 27, 1957; Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, from March 14, 1957
- Green, Theodore F.**, Democratic Senator from Rhode Island; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from January 3, 1957
- Greene, Joseph N., Jr.**, Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, September 9, 1956–October 21, 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs until February 14, 1957; Ambassador to the United Kingdom until February 14, 1957; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs; Representative at the 12th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1957
- Hagerty, James C.**, Press Secretary to the President
- Hamid Ad-Jin, Ahmad bir Yahya Muhammed**, Imam of Yemen
- Hammarskjöld, Dag**, Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Hamui, Mamun**, Counselor of the Syrian Embassy in the United States; also Chargé d’Affairs ad interim from July 20, 1957

- Hancock, William**, Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Air Force; detailed to the Department of State as Department of Defense Liaison during negotiations for Daharan Airfield
- Hare, Raymond A.**, Ambassador to Egypt from September 25, 1956
- Hasan, Ibrahim**, Minister of the Yemeni Legations in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany; also Acting Chief Royal Counselor for Foreign Affairs
- Hashim Bey, Ibrahim**, President of the Jordanian Senate; Prime Minister, December 20, 1955–January 9, 1956; July 1–October 29, 1956; and again from April 25, 1957
- Hayter, Sir William Goodenough**, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union until January 1957; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office
- Heath, Donald B.**, Ambassador to Lebanon from March 9, 1955
- Henderson, Loy W.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration from January 26, 1955
- Herter, Christian A.**, Consultant to the Secretary of State, January 14–February 21, 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State
- Hollister, John B.**, Consultant to the Secretary of State, May 2–July 1, 1955; Director of the International Cooperation Administration, July 1, 1955–September 15, 1957
- Hood, Viscount Samuel**, Head of the Western Organization Department, British Foreign Office, until September 4, 1956; Assistant Under Secretary of State, September 4, 1956–September 1957; thereafter Minister of the British Embassy in the United States
- Hoover, Herbert, Jr.**, Under Secretary of State until February 21, 1957
- Howe, Fisher**, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until March 12, 1956; thereafter, Director of the Executive Secretariat
- Humphrey, George M.**, Secretary of the Treasury
- al-Husayni, Jamal**, Royal Counselor to the King of Saudi Arabia
- Hussein**, King of Jordan
- Ibn Saud, Abul Aziz**, King of Saudi Arabia until November 8, 1953
- al-Jabri, Majd al-Din**, Syrian Minister of Public Works until February 13, 1955, and June 14–December 31, 1956
- Jenkins, Alfred L.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, February 20, 1955–August 25, 1957; also Counselor of the Legation in Yemen, August 26, 1956–August 25, 1957
- Jernegan, John D.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until October 9, 1955
- Johnston, Eric**, Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board, Foreign Operations Administration, until 1956; Chairman, International Development Advisory Board, International Cooperation Administration, from 1956; Personal Representative of the President to the Middle East, with the rank of Ambassador
- Jones, John Wesley**, Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until February 14, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Karam, Georges**, Lebanese Foreign Minister, March 30–November 19, 1956
- al-Khalidi, Fakhri, Husayn**, Prime Minister of Jordan, April 15–25, 1957
- al-Khayyal, Sheikh Abdullah**, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States from August 3, 1955

## XXIV List of Persons

---

- Khouri, Victor A.**, Lebanese Ambassador to the United States from November 8, 1955
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.**, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party; member of the Politburo of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
- al-Khuri (Khouri), Faris**, Syrian Prime Minister until February 13, 1955; member of the International Law Commission of the United Nations
- Kirk, Roger**, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until May 5, 1957
- Kirkpatrick, Ivone A.**, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Lahud, Salim**, Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 19, 1955–November 27, 1956
- Lakeland, William C.**, Consul at Aden and Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the Legation in Yemen until April 7, 1957; thereafter Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- Larson, Arthur**, Director of the United States Information Agency, December 18, 1956–November 15, 1957
- Laskey, Denis Seward**, Head of the Economic Relations Department, British Foreign Office, from May 9, 1955; Counselor of the Foreign Office; Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1956
- Lathram, L. Wade**, Politico–Economic Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, July 31, 1955–October 6, 1957; thereafter Director, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian and Regional Affairs
- Lightner, E. Allan, Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from May 14, 1956; also Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (International Information and Cultural Affairs) from July 27, 1956
- Lloyd, Selwyn**, British Minister of Supply until April 1955; Minister of Defense, April–December 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from December 12, 1955
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.**, Permanent Representative at the United Nations
- MacArthur, Douglas II**, Counselor of the Department of State until November 24, 1956
- McCardle, Carl W.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 1, 1957
- McGuire, E. Perkins**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1956–1957; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics from 1957
- Macmillan, Harold M.**, British Minister of Defense until April 6, 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April 6–December 20, 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 20, 1955–January 10, 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
- Macomber, William B.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, January 10–November 16, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1955–August 15, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
- Makins, Sir Roger M.**, British Ambassador to the United States until November 15, 1956; thereafter Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury
- Malik, Dr. Charles**, Lebanese Ambassador to the United States until October 1955; Representative at the United Nations, 1956–1957; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Education from November 19, 1956

- Mallory, Lester D.**, Ambassador to Jordan
- Mansfield, Mike**, Democratic Senator from Montana; member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Menderes, Adnan**, Prime Minister of Turkey
- Merchant, Livingston T.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 7, 1956
- Mishaal, Prince**, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense until December 26, 1956
- Mollet, Guy**, Prime Minister of France, January 31, 1956–June 11, 1957
- Molloy, Col. Robert W.**, USA, Military Attaché of the Embassy in Syria from February 22, 1955
- Molotov, Vyacheslav M.**, Soviet Foreign Minister until June 1, 1956; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the United Nations and Representative at the General Assembly, 1955; First Vice Chairman, Council of Ministers, until July 5, 1957; Minister of State Control, November 21, 1956–July 4, 1957; Ambassador to Mongolia from August 1957
- Moose, James S., Jr.**, Ambassador to Syria until June 30, 1957
- Morgan, Thomas E.**, Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania; member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
- Morton, Thruston B.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until February 29, 1956; Republican Senator from Kentucky from January 3, 1957
- al-Mufti, Said**, Prime Minister of Jordan, May 30–December 15, 1955, and May 22–July 1, 1956; Minister of the Interior, April 15–25, 1957
- al-Mulki, Fawzi**, Jordanian Minister of Court and Minister of Defense, December 20, 1955–January 9, 1956
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Musaad, Prince**, Saudi Arabian Chief of Royal Diwan of Complaints
- al-Nabulsi, Sulayman**, Prime Minister of Jordan, October 29, 1956–April 25, 1957
- Nasser (Nasr, Nassir), Gamal Abd'al**, Egyptian Head of Government; President and Head of State from June 24, 1956
- Nelson, Harold S.**, Deputy Chief, Egypt–Jordan Division, International Cooperation Administration, January 16–April 10, 1955; thereafter Director of the International Cooperation Administration Mission in Jordan
- Newsom, David D.**, Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Iraq and Public Affairs Officer of the United States Information Agency Mission until June 27, 1955; thereafter Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula–Iraq Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- al-Nimr, Abd al-Halim**, Prime Minister of Jordan, April 13–15, 1957
- Nixon, Richard M.**, Vice President of the United States
- Norstad, Gen. Lauris**, USAF, Air Deputy, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, until November 20, 1956; thereafter Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- Nuwar (Nawar, Nuwwar), Maj. Gen. Ali Abu**, Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Arab Legion, May 1956–April 1957; thereafter in exile
- O'Keefe, Brig. Gen. Richard J.**, USAF, Commanding General of Dhahran Airfield, Saudi Arabia, from April 1956
- Parker, Richard B.**, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Jordan until January 27, 1957; also Consul, February 9, 1956–January 27, 1957; thereafter Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- Parkes, Roderick W.**, British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia after October 24, 1956
- Parsons, Marselis C.**, Officer in Charge of Northern European Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State,

## XXVI List of Persons

---

- until January 29, 1956; Deputy Director, January 29–May 6, 1956; thereafter Director
- Phillips, Horace**, First Secretary and Consul of the British Embassy in Saudi Arabia
- Phleger, Herman**, Legal Adviser of the Department of State until April 1, 1957
- Prochnow, Herbert V.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, November 7, 1955–November 11, 1956
- Quarles, Donald**, Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Development until August 14, 1955; Secretary of the Air Force, August 15, 1955–April 30, 1957; Deputy Secretary of Defense from May 1, 1957
- al-Quwatli (Quwaitli, Quwatly, Kuwatly), Shukri**, President of Syria from August 18, 1955
- Radford, Adm., Arthur W.**, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 14, 1957
- Raymond, John M.**, Acting Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, spring 1956–April 1, 1957; thereafter Deputy Legal Adviser; also Acting Legal Adviser, April 3–June 12, 1957
- Reams, Robert B.**, Deputy Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State, January 27–June 5, 1957; thereafter Special Assistant for Foreign Operations
- Reinhardt, G. Frederick**, Counselor of the Department of State from March 17, 1957
- Richards, James P.**, Democratic Representative from South Carolina until January 3, 1957; Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, until January 3, 1957; Special Assistant to the President from January 1957
- Rifa'i, Abdul Monem**, Jordanian Ambassador to the United States, February 1955–June 1957
- al-Rifai, Samir**, Prime Minister of Jordan, January 9–May 22, 1956
- al-Rimawi, Abdullah**, Jordanian Minister of State
- Roberts, Randolph**, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, after January 29, 1956
- Robertson, Reuben B., Jr.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 5, 1955–April 25, 1957
- Rockwell, Stuart W.**, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 1, 1956–August 11, 1957; thereafter Director
- Rountree, William M.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Iran with personal rank of Minister until October 9, 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 9, 1955–July 26, 1956; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State
- Russell, Francis H.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Israel until May 17, 1955; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, May 17–September 25, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1955–October 7, 1956
- Salah, Walid**, Jordanian Foreign Minister until May 30, 1955
- Sandys, Sir Duncan**, British Minister of Supply until January 1957; thereafter Minister of Defense
- Sanger, Richard H.**, Attaché of the Embassy in Jordan, October 4–December 19, 1955; First Secretary, December 19, 1955–April 22, 1956; thereafter Counselor
- Sarraaj, Col. Abd al-Hamid**, Chief of Syrian Military Intelligence
- Saud, ibn Abd al-Aziz**, King of Saudi Arabia
- Schwinn, Walter K.**, Consul General at Dhahran after March 23, 1957
- Seager, Cedric**, Deputy Regional Director for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Operations, Foreign Operations Administration, until May 1, 1955; Regional Director, International Cooperation Administration, May 1,

- 1955–October 8, 1956; Regional Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Operations, October 8, 1956–August 15, 1957; thereafter Director of the United States Operations Mission in Morocco
- Shaw, John F.**, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 3, 1955–September 23, 1956; thereafter Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in that office
- Shepley, Col. Phillip**, USA, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Sherwood, Robert K.**, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until October 6, 1957; thereafter Consul at Casablanca
- al-Shishakli, Adib**, former President of Syria
- Shuckburgh, Charles Arthur Evelyn**, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until June 25, 1956
- Shuqayr (Shuaqir), Gen. Shawkat**, Syrian Chief of Staff until July 8, 1956
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Consultant to the Secretary of State until January 1, 1956; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Matters, January 1, 1956–October 18, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- Solh, Sami Bey**, Lebanese Prime Minister until September 19, 1955; and again from November 27, 1956
- Staats, Elmer B.**, Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board
- Stassen, Harold E.**, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission to March 1955; thereafter Special Assistant to the President
- Stevens, Eli**, Politico–Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from August 8, 1955
- Stoltzfus, William A., Jr.**, Vice Consul at Kuwait until June 2, 1956; Second Vice Consul of the Embassy in Syria, June 2–November 17, 1956; thereafter Second Vice Consul of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia
- Strong, Robert C.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Syria
- Sullivan, Charles A.**, Director, Policy Division, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense, until 1956; Director, Office of Special International Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, from 1956
- Surur, Muhammed Sheikh**, Saudi Arabian Royal Counselor and Minister of Finance and National Economy
- Sweeney, Lt. Col. James L.**, USA, Army Attaché of the Embassy in Jordan from February 27, 1956
- Symmes, Harrison M.**, Consul at Kuwait until September 11, 1955; Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Department of State, September 11, 1955–November 11, 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
- Talbott, Harold E.**, Secretary of the Air Force until August 13, 1955
- Tarazi, Salah al-Din (Salah el-Dine)**, Counselor of the Syrian Delegation at the United Nations; Representative at the General Assembly, 1955–1956; Alternate Representative from 1956; Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from December 31, 1956
- Tassan, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim**, Saudi Arabian Acting Chief of Staff, and Director General of Civil Aviation
- Templer, Sir Gerald**, Chief of the British Imperial Staff
- Twining, Gen. Nathan F.**, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 30, 1957; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 15, 1957



## XXVIII List of Persons

---

- Tyler, William R.**, Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until February 14, 1957; thereafter, Director; also member of the Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly from September 9, 1957
- Wadsworth, George E.**, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
- Waggoner, Edward L.**, Consul at Izmir until July 8, 1955; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Syria, July 18, 1955–August 12, 1956; thereafter Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- Walid, Khalid Bey**, Saudi Arabian Royal Counselor
- Warren, Fletcher**, Ambassador to Turkey from June 13, 1956
- Whisenand, Brig. Gen. James**, USAF, Deputy Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Air Staff, Department of the Air Force, 1956–1957; Director from 1957
- Wiens, Henry W.**, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission in Iraq until September 30, 1955; Director of the International Cooperation Administration Mission in Iraq, September 30, 1955–December 16, 1956; thereafter Chief of the Near East Division, International Cooperation Administration
- Wilcox, Francis O.**, Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until September 6, 1955; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Wilkins, Fraser**, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 3, 1955–July 28, 1957; Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, July 28–September 16, 1957; thereafter Minister–Counselor
- Williams, Murat W.**, Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, May 14–July 29, 1956; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs
- Wilson, Charles E.**, Secretary of Defense until October 8, 1957
- Withers, Charles D.**, Office of South Asian Affairs, March 13, 1955–November 1956; Deputy Director, November 1956–August 25, 1957; thereafter Consul General at Nairobi
- Yasin, Yusuf Sheikh**, Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister, Minister of State, and Delegate at the League of Arab States
- Zabarah, Ahmad Ali**, First Secretary and Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Yemeni Legation in the United States
- Zeineddine, Farid**, Syrian Ambassador to the United States until August 1957

# JORDAN

THE QUESTION OF JORDANIAN ADHERENCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT; UNITED STATES CONCERN OVER THE STABILITY OF JORDAN; THE AFTERMATH OF SIR GERALD TEMPLER'S MISSION TO JORDAN; THE DISMISSAL OF GENERAL GLUBB; TERMINATION OF THE ANGLO-JORDANIAN TREATY; THE CRISIS OF APRIL 1957; THE EXTENSION OF U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN<sup>1</sup>

## 1. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>2</sup>

*Amman, February 7, 1955—2 p.m.*

239. With most developments Turk-Iraqi pact<sup>3</sup> and inter-Arab relations apparently temporarily over except for shouting, Jordan's position continues one of caution and balance dictated by her position of economic and military weakness although basically she is oriented to West and present government at least favors Iraq initiative.

Prime Minister in frank discussion with Turkish Minister stated his expectation withdrawal or disinterest (since technically for 7 years yet no state can withdraw) of Egypt from ALCSP. This will entail break up Arab League and realignment of individual Arab states. Most probable result will be adherence Turkey Iraqi arrangement and further development with Western powers. Lebanese expected act first and Prime Minister stated Jordan certainly not the last.

Believe Abulhuda while cautious has been consistent and firm. Am quite prepared believe Foreign Minister Walid Salah has been ineffective or troublesome at Cairo. . . . However in recent days Prime Minister has sent him precise and firm instructions on basis of full cabinet decisions.

---

<sup>1</sup> For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 875 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-755. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Ankara, London, and Tripoli.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the proposed military alliance between Turkey and Iraq. On February 24 Turkey and Iraq signed at Baghdad a Pact of Mutual Cooperation. For text, see 233 UNTS 199. The Pact was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3.

King Hussein yesterday said privately he likely journey Baghdad next weekend. I had made appointment for Eric Johnston with him tomorrow which in view Johnston's delay have arranged to keep personally and will endeavor guide his thinking.<sup>4</sup> The King at this juncture is likely torn between family ties with Iraq and past Saudi largesse.

Mallory

---

<sup>4</sup> Eric Johnston, the President's Personal Representative with the rank of Ambassador, had been working since his appointment in October 1953 to obtain agreement among the riparian states—Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel—for the development and utilization of the Jordan River basin. For documentation on the Johnston Missions to the Near East, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1345 ff.

---

## 2. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, February 18, 1955—10 a.m.*

264. King Hussein returned Amman noon yesterday. Member his party has given me confidential account Baghdad visit. King and all members party went Iraq sold on Egyptian viewpoint (some . . . have active anti-Iraq bias). While Baghdad discussions dispelled suspicions and eased feelings they were not so convincing as to counteract likely Egyptian sales effort when King proceeds Cairo February 21 (note date change avoid conflict with Eden).<sup>2</sup> Apparently visit and discussions were just that and there was no great Iraqi understanding or any offer of assistance to Jordan. I was told that all party got was "an exposition on how well off Iraq is". As an interesting personal sidelight Hussein is in quandary on providing adequate gift to Feisal which may have to be his favorite English sports car.

During King's absence Cabinet approved budget lopping off his 100,000 dinars increase in 250,000 dinar item for Arab Legion Air Force. He is sold on air power and is now angry both with ground forces officials here and British who unsympathetic in London talks last December. The British Air Ministry was apparently less than

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.8587/2-1855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, London, Ankara, and Jidda.

<sup>2</sup> On February 20, Eden met with Nasser in Cairo.

tactful in talking of the expense of jets when a few obsolete piston-engined Spitfires at pounds sterling 1,000 each would have sufficed for training and prestige. The matter has reached a point where King Hussein has said to an intimate that on this trip he is going to ask the Egyptians for assistance in building an air force. My informant said he, of course, didn't know what strings the Egyptians might attach but they could be counted on to make most of it.

Having come thus far my informant in oblique approach wondered whether the US could help since we must have quantities of Mustangs that could be distributed. I pointed out the broad strategic concepts which are known to my visitor and normal expectation any assistance from West would be in keeping therewith. Following completion Turco-Iraqi agreement other countries, for example Lebanon, could adhere, and might get arms. It was possible that Jordan could fall in same group but, of course, British interests in Arab Legion etc. controlling. Certainly I said Jordanian combination with Egypt against northern tier concept would not cause any enthusiasm on our part. I hinted that Egyptian skullduggery of present order may not help her in future. I asked that ideas be passed on to Hussein and I was assured they will be during trip to Cairo. British Embassy has not been informed of foregoing.

Am entertaining King quietly this evening and may have opportunity enlarge on facts. Increasingly apparent British handled London visit poorly and allowed impetus to nationalistic trends.

Re last paragraph Baghdad's 584 believe wish father to thought.<sup>3</sup>

## Mallory

---

<sup>3</sup> The last paragraph of telegram 584 from Baghdad, February 16, reads: "Interestingly enough, there is a widespread belief locally, expressed on occasion even in official circles, that fall of Abdul Huda's Government imminent, although admittedly the wish here may be father to the thought." (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-1655)

3. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, March 16, 1955—6 p.m.*

302. King Hussein summoned me today. After usual exchange he expressed hope I was pleased with manner in which Jordan was emerging from present contretemps. In reply said I had been concerned during Cairo meeting but now that important foreign matters in sure hands Prime Minister, was much reassured. As gambit I added hope and expectation Egyptians would quiet down in reasonably near future but with weak Government Syria still a matter of preoccupation. He picked this up agreeing generally. . . .

Hussein said Jordan fortunately had emerged from family fracas quite well and not compromised in any direction. He said with emphasis even Egypt does not now expect or is pressing Jordan to join its collective arrangement.

King then said Jordan prepared to listen to any request from US to join in agreements and the conditions involved. (I know he is personally interested in some air force which British discouraged in December.) I gave him another review our position stressing we not asking much less urging any state which we feel should exercise its free will in its own interests. However, we are interested in strengthening regional defense and again discussed arms aid to Iraq, et cetera. I was surprised at his ready acceptance and appreciation of our view which apparently I had poorly presented before or which had not penetrated his thinking. I am advised by trusted LC member that on visit to Pakistan from which he returned Monday night King and party much impressed by Pakistan's hard work, spirit, martial training and US assistance. It appears Pakistan visit excellent antidote to previous Egyptian visit and pressures. His Majesty has elsewhere noted that while Pakistan army of British tradition air force largely American.

King saw British Ambassador immediately after me. Conversation followed same line. We believe main purpose is concern for arms if not coordinated at least springs from same motivation as Prime Minister's inquiry Embassy telegram 288, March 9.<sup>2</sup> Prime

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3-1655. Confidential. Repeated to Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Karachi, London, Ankara, Jidda, Paris, and Tripoli.

<sup>2</sup> On March 5 in a conversation with Geren, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda asked about U.S. intentions concerning arms shipments to Jordan in the event that his country should join the Baghdad Pact. According to Geren, Abu al-Huda also indicated that Jordan was interested in modifying its treaty relationship with the United Kingdom. (Telegram 288 from Amman, March 9; *ibid.*, 682.87/3-955)

Minister also asked British Ambassador what advantage including arms would accrue in event Jordan joined Turco-Iraqi Pact. British Ambassador has sought instructions. It is hoped Department may concur.

I am as yet unable fully assess possibilities raised today or whether they may eventuate in further reorientation Government policy. Positive attitude by King always important component in formulation ultimate Government line.<sup>3</sup>

Mallory

---

<sup>3</sup> On March 19 Mallory informed the Department that both the King and Prime Minister had inquired about the U.S. reaction to Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact and the benefits Jordan might expect if it joined. According to the Ambassador, each query was motivated by a desire for arms "over and above" what the Jordanians were receiving from the British. Mallory added that it was not clear whether the King prompted the Prime Minister to make such inquiries or vice-versa. The Ambassador concluded, "I suspect there is coordination between them but such cannot be assumed as the King often free wheels." (Telegram 305 from Amman; *ibid.*, 682.87/3-1955)

---

#### 4. Editorial Note

On April 1, in a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George Allen presented his views on the matter of Jordan's or other Arab States' adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Allen informed the Secretary that he had discussed the question with the Counselor of the British Embassy and expressed concern that Jordanian adherence to the Pact might encourage Lebanese or even Syrian participation. Such events, Allen continued, might complicate U.S. efforts to effect an Egyptian-Israeli settlement by isolating Egypt, weakening Nasser, and intensifying "Israel's agitation." (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/4-155)

That same day, the Embassy in London reported that in conversations with Shuckburgh, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State expressed the view that the United Kingdom was not pressing Jordan or any other Arab State to join the Turco-Iraqi pact. The British made it clear, Shuckburgh continued, that should Jordan decide to enter the pact, the United Kingdom would consider revising the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. According to the Embassy, Shuckburgh thought it "extremely dangerous" for either the United States

or the United Kingdom to discourage Jordanian adherence. (Telegram 4350 from London; *ibid.*)

On April 4, Aldrich informed the Department that in the course of a conversation with Eden, the British Prime Minister stated that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom should advise Jordan against joining the Turko-Iraqi pact. (Telegram 4365 from London; *ibid.*, 780.5/4–455)

---

## 5. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, October 22, 1955—11 p.m.*

198. Paris for Russell.<sup>2</sup> Overall conclusions reached in penetrating telegram 367<sup>3</sup> to Department from Damascus are generally applicable here with respect to both US interests and possible courses of action. Jordanian reactions to recent events while in keeping with previous trends have also been strong and prompt a re-examination our position. There is universal popular Jordanian enthusiasm for flame of Arab political liberation ignited by Nasser's arms deal with Soviet bloc. Jordanians shared Arab feeling of gaining initiative. A Russian token offer of arms for local national guard would have tremendous propaganda effectiveness.

Government cannot or will not carry through "unpopular" policies. This weakness growing and mass pressure now so sways Amman authorities they fear mob action if government tries to move against current Arab thinking. British influence, long a stabilizing force in Jordan, is steadily declining and if tested might be found insufficient. The Throne, formerly source of real strength, has become virtually impotent. The center of mass power has moved from east bank Bedouin to Palestinian Arabs who are bitter over existence of Israel and implacably opposed any settlement with Israel.

Bitterness towards and distrust of US following Palestine war receded substantially in the face of Eisenhower and Dulles policy of impartiality. Due events of past year, much of this gain has been

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/10–2255. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Karachi, Moscow, Rome, Tehran, and Tripoli.

<sup>2</sup> Russell was accompanying Dulles on his trip to Europe to attend the Foreign Ministers meeting held in Geneva, October 27–November 16.

<sup>3</sup> Document 312.

lost. It appears unlikely unfavorable trend can be reversed during continuation of the policies recently followed by US in this area.

Several courses might be considered to stem anti-western tide.

a. Inducements such as arms, money or treaties. Because feeling towards Israel is so deep and emotional, money does not suffice. This shown by reluctance accept proposed \$200 million expenditure Jordan Valley plan. New guarantees against Israel have little or no appeal to Jordanians in their present mood. Arms to Jordan alone are unthinkable unless in larger pattern of northern tier, et cetera.

b. We might try pressures. This could mean stopping ICA activities, withdrawing UNRWA subsistence to refugees and getting British to reduce or end annual subsidies and loans. Such pressures at this time would be counter-productive. New Russian policy in Near East indicates Moscow would be delighted make gesture of filling vacuum created.

c. Propaganda is powerful weapon but must have some solid basis. Reiterated protestations of friendship have worn thin out here.

d. Realignment of interest through additional members in Turko-Iraqi Pact would be useful, for example, adherence by Jordan and US. Effect on Israel might be counter-balanced by some limited security guarantee, membership in NATO or new Mediterranean grouping to include her.

e. Jordan is economically non-viable and promises to remain. In long run logical way overcome Jordan's weakness is to join in some manner with a viable unit, for example, Iraq. Such union would be attractive to many Jordanians. British would probably not object strongly since they have the same interests and privileges in both countries. . . .

*Summary:* There is no easy course open and when all factors are considered, one is always returned to the hard and overriding fact that to have Jordanians (and presumably other Arabs) on our side requires restraint in our relations with Israel.

Political situation in Jordan is disintegrating and resulting instability is playing into hands of anti-western nationalists and Communists. Unless something is done to reverse unfavorable trend this former strong point in Near East will become source of weakness to west.

**Mallory**



6. **Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 9, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Jordanian Adherence to the Baghdad Pact

After Messrs. Coulson and Morris called on you Monday, December 5 we dispatched Dept Circular 373 to the field (Tab A <sup>2</sup>). In that we asked Ambassador Mallory to keep us informed and also to comment on the British view that U.S. support for the U.K. in its efforts to get Jordanian adherence would be of particular significance. The British have said that a U.S. promise of additional economic aid to Jordan would be very helpful.

Ambassador Mallory has replied to Embtel 264 (Tab B <sup>3</sup>) giving his view that a mere verbal assurance of U.S. support for Jordan's adherence or even an undertaking to provide additional economic aid would have little effect on the Jordanians. He feels that the strongest effect could be gained through commitments to furnish military aid.

Willie Morris called at NE yesterday and read us a long telegram from General Templer in Amman. <sup>4</sup> Templer feels that his first visits have been encouraging and the British promises of additional aid to the Arab Legion and a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty have been quite effective. When we told Morris that Mallory felt that only U.S. military aid would have substantial impact in the situation, he did not appear to press the matter further. We told him that we have been working on the assumption that military assistance to Jordan would remain a British responsibility. Mr. Morris appeared gratified at this. Our guess is that the British would much prefer to continue their present monopoly on military aid to Jordan.

A further telegram (Embtel 266) (Tab C <sup>5</sup>) has now come in from Ambassador Mallory in which he confirms the general optimism of the British and indicates that he has carried out the Department's instructions in a conversation with the King.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-955. Drafted by Bergus.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/12-555)

<sup>3</sup> Not attached. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/12-755)

<sup>4</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> Not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-855)

---

## 7. Editorial Note

On December 6, Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the British Imperial Staff, accompanied by Michael Rose, Head of the Levant Department of the Foreign Office, arrived in Amman for discussions with King Hussein and Jordanian officials. The visit, which lasted until December 14, was motivated primarily by Britain's desire to facilitate Jordan's early adherence to the Baghdad Pact. According to British Embassy representatives in Washington, Templer was authorized to offer the Jordanians a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and additional military aid as incentives for adherence. (Circular telegram 373 to Amman, December 5; Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-555)

Although, according to Rose, Hussein adopted a "constructive attitude" toward Jordan's joining the pact, West Bank members of the Cabinet insisted that Egypt be consulted before any decision was made. The government of Prime Minister Said Mufti, already weak and, in the words of the Embassy in Amman, "torn by dissension between east and west bank ministers", was forced to resign. (Telegram 2510 from London, December 16; *ibid.*, 780.5/12-1655, and telegram 274 from Amman, December 14; *ibid.*, 785.00/12-1455) On December 14 King Hussein charged Haza al-Majali, former Minister of the Interior and Vice-Premier, with the task of forming a new cabinet. On December 15, Mallory reported from Amman that Majali was having difficulty securing West Bank cooperation in the new government as a result of the local feeling that he had "sold out" to the British on the Baghdad Pact. "Cleavage between west and east bank elements continues", the Ambassador observed, "and civil disturbances may result." (Telegram 276 from Amman; *ibid.*, 785.00/12-1555)

On December 16, extensive rioting erupted in various parts of Jordan in both the West and East Banks.

8. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, December 18, 1955—1 p.m.*

283. Disturbances now widespread throughout Jordan,<sup>2</sup> road communications between East and West Bank halted by violent demonstrations in Jericho where cars being stoned and halted. Unconfirmed reports of casualties in various West Bank communities and of damage to property and cars.

Amman heavily patrolled by Legion. Groups students and demonstrators throwing stones at cars and pedestrians. Passage through center of town dangerous and traffic from Jebel to Jebel [*sic*] almost halted. Sporadic shooting can be heard but no information on casualties available. Legion instructed shoot below knees at demonstrators but patience may be exhausted as result stonings of Legionnaires themselves.

Students in local schools joining in melee and in state considerable excitement. Slogans being shouted against Glubb, King, Majali, Majali's wife, and "traders in hashish".

Americans and British warned keep off streets and no Americans known to be in danger. Car of military attaché stoned and three windows broken. No casualties.

Majali apparently determined make strenuous efforts remain in saddle and bring situation under control.<sup>3</sup>

**Mallory**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/12-1855. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, and Tel Aviv; passed to the Department of the Army.

<sup>2</sup> On December 19, Barbour reported from London that Glubb had assured the Foreign Office that the situation in Jordan was not out of control and was not likely to become so. According to Barbour, the Foreign Office believed that the current disturbances were not a result of "any basic antipathy" to the Baghdad Pact but were fomented and financed by a combination of "left-wing elements, Egyptians and Saudis." (Telegram 2525 from London; *ibid.*, 780.5/12-1955)

<sup>3</sup> On December 19, Hussein dissolved the Jordanian Parliament. The al-Majali government was asked to resign and was replaced on December 21 by a caretaker government headed by Ibrahim Hashim, President of the Senate and former Prime Minister. Elections for a new Parliament were to be held within 4 months.

---

9. **Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, December 27, 1955—5 p.m.*

306. Further to my immediately preceding telegram 305.<sup>2</sup>

King Hussein stated to Embassy officer that ESS offer displace UK financial assistance Jordan was not received but is expected. Prime Minister of Syria has requested permission to visit Hussein. Jordanians have stalled on this but must reply within few days and probably affirmatively.

King admits frankly that although he is against this offer as not being in interests of Jordan, his hand can be forced by public opinion to position where he would have to accept.

King stated he has received extremely confidential information indicating that the money would be made available possibly even from Moscow. I entertain some doubts on reliability this latter information but must admit that strange things are happening in this part of the world. There is also hint from other sources that USSR Ambassador Cairo has offered to help.

The consequences of valid-appearing offer forcing Jordan's hand would be far reaching and deleterious. No method preventing acceptance appears except UK and US prepared assure King promptly of large package arms and aid. I am not sanguine such would suffice to convert government and public opinion from its pro-Arab exultation. . . .

**Mallory**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 885.10/12-2755. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Damascus and London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 305 from Amman, December 27, the Embassy informed the Department that on December 26 the Amman press reported Jordan's official denial that the ESS powers had offered it financial aid. On December 27, however, an Arab News Agency report indicated that such an offer was made. In the Embassy's view the offer had not yet been made, but the Jordanian Government reportedly feared that it would be forthcoming. (*Ibid.*)

**10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 29, 1955—7:34 p.m.*

295. Reur 305, <sup>2</sup> 306. <sup>3</sup> At your discretion and after consultation with your British colleague you may wish see King and other HKJ officials as desirable and speak along following lines:

USG aware of and appreciates King's sincere efforts strengthen and develop his country. We feel historic ties between HKJ and UK have been of benefit both sides and have been of cardinal value to Jordan in its efforts to establish and maintain its sovereign independence and integrity. We deplore recent efforts exploit Jordan public opinion to derogation of interests and security of Jordan. We have grave doubts as to motives behind new offers of assistance to Jordan and Jordan's armed forces. Apart from motives, we would also question ability of those who make grandiose promises sustain Jordan economy to make good on their commitments on dependable basis. <sup>4</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 885.10/12-2755. Secret. Drafted by Bergus; cleared by George V. Allen; repeated to London, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 320 from Amman, December 30, Mallory informed the Department, among other things, that the British Ambassador was aware of the gravity of the ESS offer and was unable to propose alternatives. Mallory concluded that he did not intend to see Hussein concerning the substance of telegram 295. (Department of State, Central Files, 885.10/12-3055)

---

**11. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Amman, January 5, 1956—11 p.m.*

330. Violent events past few weeks suggest desirability re-examination position Jordan in Near East complex. This is an appraisal of current situation especially chances settling Palestine

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1-556. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv.

problem which we believe needs new or changed approach to make it possible.

Significant changes in sources of power and influence have occurred here. Authority and prestige of Throne have declined . . . and are relatively weak. Of late nationalist, extremist and subversive elements have increased in strength and freedom of action. Position of US improved during our policy impartiality but remains weak. Money we provide gives some return in good will through Point Four but refugee relief through UNRWA gains no understanding and fewer thanks. Extensive negotiations by Eric Johnston and handsome offers for Jordan Valley Plan have insufficient appeal overcome . . . government timidity. Missionaries, goodwill agencies, and relief food supplies have made no appreciable dent. Refugee bitterness over creation Israel remains fully potent and those who thought time had healed wounds and abated emotions (including most foreign observers in Amman) were misled.

The decline in British position is signally important and largely unperceived by them until now. Never so great as popularly supposed, their power atrophied from lack of exercise. Until Baghdad Pact proposal of December there never had been request for performance or return on heavy investment by UK and they lost their influence by default. Good will cannot be tunked [?] in the Palestinian mind any more than in Moscow.

The Israeli attack on Gaza on February 28<sup>2</sup> made deep impression in Jordan. Egypt's purchase of Czech arms resulted in prompt and dramatic change in public opinion, hardening it against settlement with Israel, and against the West. Local opinion, in part wishfully, and in part the result of superior Egyptian propaganda, felt liberated from Western dependence, sensed for the first time initiative over Israelis and comforted by turn to Arab leadership.

During internal crisis and riots of December 14–21, 1955, the strength of Egyptian influence was manifest. Very revealing also is public acceptance and even approbation of subversive character of Egyptian activity, . . . and interference in domestic affairs. Side result also to be borne in mind is growing disrespect for the Arab Legion and its leadership. Jordan not yet accustomed to orderly processes of Republican Government, has lost its respect for authority, and influence of mob pressures must now be constantly borne in mind.

Whatever may be importance of Jordan Valley Plan, of Baghdad Pact, or refugee problem, it is increasingly clear they must be subordinated to an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem.

---

<sup>2</sup> On February 28, 1955, units of the Israeli armed forces crossed the armistice lines at Gaza and attacked and destroyed the headquarters of the Egyptian Army.

For any settlement certain points now stand out.

(a) Nasser of Egypt must give his approval. He may not be able bring about settlement, but certainly as far as Jordan is concerned, it cannot be done over his opposition.

(b) He is likely the best vehicle and he has sent word to Ben Gurion (by Richard Crossman, UK Labor MP, if not others) that he is willing to undertake making of peace providing the discussions are secret.

(c) Some new twist or gimmick is necessary to give apparent advantage or to allow new avenue of approach. Arab leaders must pull off victory, even if only on paper. After Anthony Eden's Guild Hall speech of November 9<sup>3</sup> there was much separatist talk in west Jordan, and the dream of an independent Palestinian Arab state along approximate lines 1947 partition<sup>4</sup> was widely discussed. Recently this has been quiescent but suggests an opening which may provide necessary window-dressing. If Nasser supported creation of new independent Arab Palestine it would likely appeal to Arab world. (UK, US or UN proposal of same would draw immediate opposition.) A buffer state perhaps under aegis of UN and preferably unarmed should appeal to Israel both in terms of security and possibilities of trade extension. This without prejudice to the many negotiating points of borders, corridors, compensation et cetera.

(d) After recent violence here those who most wish to retain territory, viz. King Hussein, find themselves unhappy with Palestinians. Hussein could be reduced to ruling desert Kingdom of Transjordan with British support (perhaps improved by the JV plan and strengthened by Baghdad Pact) or he can have dual monarchy with Iraq or he can dream of future glory. The latter he has already done and recently spoke to me in cryptic terms. . . . He intimated that all he wished from the US or UK was non-intervention or hands-off policy.

(e) The consequences of delay may be substantially more serious than the increase in Egyptian and Communist influences. There appear to be possibilities of an Afro-Asian neutralist federation in which Nasser could play leading role. In the Near East it could go far to displace western position and in foreseeable future have major influence on availability of oil supplies.

In approaching possible settlement of Arab Israeli problem or in event matter to be discussed with British in near future, I suggest:

---

<sup>3</sup> For text of Eden's speech, see Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, pp. 382–385.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the U.N. General Assembly resolution concerning the future government of Palestine, adopted on November 29, 1947. For text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Resolutions, 16 September–29 November 1947*.

1. Initiate negotiations if possible by March due upcoming US elections, meanwhile withholding Israelis from Banat Yacoub water diversion.

2. That Abdul Nasser, even though his motives be suspect, be used as leader or negotiating avenue.

3. Nasser be given, or allowed to have as his very own, idea that he can liberate Arab Palestine state west of Jordan River or to use it as negotiating gambit. Perhaps the Secretary General of UN or some similar person could provide Nasser with idea.

4. Suggest British use no pressures on Jordan on such other questions as Baghdad Pact.

5. Subordinate Jordan Valley plan to overall settlement since prior acceptance would contribute little to success major problem.<sup>5</sup>

**Mallory**

---

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 331 to Amman, January 14, the Department informed the Embassy: "Analysis current situation contained Embtel 330 has been studied with close interest in Dept. Continued distrust Amman politicians by former Palestinians has been noted. Further details re your references to Eden speech and upsurge separatist notions on West Bank would be appreciated when convenient." (Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1-556)

---

**12. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen), Washington, January 8, 1956, 12:50 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

George Allen telephoned the Secretary that there were two telegrams in telling about the riots in Jordan.<sup>2</sup> The Arab L. had not proved very effective. Allen said a significant thing was that the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Drafted by Mildred Asbjornson.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to telegram 228 from Jerusalem, January 7, which reported an attack on the consulate general in Jerusalem by a mob of 300 rioters. (Department of State, Central Files, 122.4912/1-756) The second telegram was not identified. Reports arriving in the Department of State later that day included telegram 337 from Amman, January 8, which contained a detailed account of the rioting in Amman and the West Bank and noted in part: "Scale and violence of demonstrations prior to arrival of Legion have exceeded all previous and has new feature of arson. Primary targets Western institutions or symbols of West." In telegram 338 from Amman, January 8, Mallory noted in part: "Amman political situation reaching critical point both with respect what forces are to control country and possible British evacuation. A test is approaching as to whether moderate governments and Legion can control situation or political hotheads and extremists take over. My guess is no extremist take over in near future but continuing tension and possible troubles with flames fanned from abroad." (*Ibid.*, 785.00/1-856)



American Consulate was the only one singled out for attack. There was evidence that the Communists were mixed up in it. Mr. Allen said our people had behaved very creditably and they were drafting a telegram to the Consul General commending him for his action. The Secretary thought this all right. The Secretary asked if he shouldn't see the Jordanian Ambassador to make representation to the J. Government. Allen said he thought so but the Ambassador was out of town. He would, however, get the Chargé and see if he could set up an appointment with the Secretary at 4:00 at the Secretary's residence.

The Secretary asked how many Marines we had and Allen said three or four out there. They had used tear gas ejectors. Allen said while it was pretty sensitive to use this, if they hadn't he felt sure that all our files would have been destroyed and perhaps even the building set on fire.

The Secretary said that he would call McCardle once he found out about the appointment and get a press statement lined up to put out.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 315 to Amman, January 8, the Department informed the Embassy that it had issued a statement for publication which included the following: The Secretary had expressed his concern to the Jordanian Chargé about increasing "mob violence" in Amman and in Jerusalem and about the damage to American property and the threat to American lives. It was obvious, Dulles had informed the Chargé, that steps taken by the Jordanian Government were "inadequate to the situation." Dulles also requested that the Jordanian representative communicate to his government the importance of safeguarding American lives and property. Finally, the Department had instructed the American Ambassador in Amman and the Consul General in Jerusalem to make similar representations. (*Ibid.*, 785.00/1-856)

---

### 13. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, January 10, 1956—5 p.m.*

343. Believe situation in Jordan steadily deteriorating. For chronicle events, see immediately preceding telegram 342.<sup>2</sup> As of today law and order extends only within range of Legionnaire's rifle. Even

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1-1056. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Rome for RLG, and Tel Aviv; passed to the Department of the Army.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 342 from Amman, January 10, provided detailed information on the extent of rioting and disturbances in Jordan. (*Ibid.*, 785.00/1-1056)

under Legion control Amman increasingly restless at deprivations strict curfew. Conflicting orders and timidity of Prime Minister and ministers and above all temporizing have allowed mob activity and mob confidence rise. Circumstances have permitted revelation Communist effectiveness. Facts becoming known locally and even Palestinians who thoroughly enjoy sport of twisting British lion's tail are now openly discussing Communist infiltration.

New Cabinet contains no strength. Prime Minister Samir Rifai<sup>3</sup> widely regarded as British tool. He is of period of Abol Huda but without his toughness. Expect new government to be forced out and underlying issue of who controls Jordan will then be more than ever acute with issue between leftist politicians and Legion as only remaining source of order, unless unpredictable events develop as result courses of action mentioned London's telegram 2773.<sup>4</sup>

Appreciate opportune Deptel 319.<sup>5</sup> Sincerely hope even partial evacuation will not be necessary but confess future of Western influences in Jordan and security of American community now giving serious concern.

**Mallory**

---

<sup>3</sup> Samir al-Rifai, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister in the Hashim cabinet, agreed on January 8 to form a new government after the resignation of the Hashim government the previous day.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1-956)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 319 to Amman, January 9, commended the Embassy staff for its courage in handling the recent situation in Jordan and forwarded certain technical details regarding the departure of American dependents in the event evacuation became necessary. (*Ibid.*, 785.00/1-856)

---

**14. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, January 10, 1956—6 p.m.*

2795. Kirkpatrick called me to Foreign Office this afternoon and, after informing me of instructions sent Makins last night to advise Department that King of Transjordan yesterday requested UK to pass on to Iraq inquiry concerning availability of Iraq division for service in current situation Jordan, which request Cabinet felt it had

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1-1056. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, and Cairo.

no alternative but to comply with, told me on instructions that at subsequent Cabinet meeting this morning British have decided to reinforce their Middle East forces and will issue announcement that connection this afternoon. Kirkpatrick said announcement would be to effect that because of situation in Middle East reinforcements are being sent to the area. There will be no reference to Jordan but obviously press will deduce purpose. In response to my question Kirkpatrick said further that reinforcements now contemplated will consist of approximately one brigade which will be sent to Cyprus.

Re King's position and attitude Kirkpatrick said Hussein is apparently angry and at moment determined to take such forceful action as is required. However he does not now contemplate suspending constitution and ruling by martial law but is relying on his Prime Minister to re-establish control. King appreciates gravity of calling in assistance from foreign troops but would envisage such step as the lesser of evils. He is aware that Egypt would react vociferously but assumes she will be stopped from physical intervention by absence of common frontier.

Kirkpatrick emphasized seriousness of situation in Jordan but at same time thought it by no means certain that situation cannot be held with Arab Legion as at present deployed. He noted that UK regards activities of Egyptian radio as particularly provocative and is instructing Trevelyan to endeavor to persuade Nasser to call off its present highly inflammatory broadcasting. He suggested that it might be helpful if US Embassy in Cairo would support Trevelyan's representations with Nasser in this connection.

With regard to possible evacuation of British civilians UK appreciates seriousness such step and does not contemplate action to that end now. If worst comes to worst Kirkpatrick noted that British have an armored regiment already in Jordan and 600 British Air Force ground troops in Habbaniya which could presumably hold an airfield as safe civilian evacuation area.

Course of conversation Kirkpatrick remarked incidentally that he had noted that US Consulate Jerusalem had bad time and that US Marines were involved in its protection. He inquired on what basis Marines were attached to Consulate whether by convention or otherwise. I was unable to say whether such Marines might be regular part of Consulate complement or had been sent from Embassy Guard detachment at Tel Aviv nor in either case whether they are there on basis of specific international agreement or merely as normal official Guard complement.

---

## 15. Editorial Note

On January 12, at the 272d meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Allen Dulles in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, raised the question of British policy in Jordan. The memorandum of discussion includes the following exchange:

"Mr. Dulles expressed the view that the British have suffered their most humiliating diplomatic defeat in modern history as a result of developments in Jordan. To protect what remains of British interests in the Middle East, London had lately airlifted troops to Cyprus. Mr. Dulles believed that General Glubb would probably be able to maintain the situation against the extremists. While, said Mr. Dulles, the Communist element in Jordan was not yet in a decisive position, the Communists were exploiting to the hilt all the advantages which presented themselves.

"Secretary Dulles inquired of Mr. Allen Dulles whether there was not evidence of Communist direction of the riots directed against U.S. installations throughout Jordan last Saturday. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that this was a hard question to answer. There was not sufficient hard evidence to reply categorically one way or the other. There was always a tendency to blame the Communists for everything that happened.

"Mr. Dulles thought that the repercussions on Iraq of events in Jordan might prove quite serious, though as long as Nuri remained in control Iraq would remain attached to the Baghdad Pact.

"All these developments, said Mr. Dulles, were evidently causing the British to re-think their policy in the Middle East and perhaps to put greater weight on the necessity for securing a peace between Israel and Egypt. This would show up when Prime Minister Eden came to Washington." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

16. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

ETW MC-1

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The Secretary  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Ambassador Aldrich  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Allen  
Mr. Rountree  
Mr. Hogerty  
Mr. Cottman

*UK*

Prime Minister Eden  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Ambassador Makins  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Sir Leslie Rowan  
Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Ian Samuel  
Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of press arrangements during Eden's visit; the draft of a declaration to be issued at the conclusion of the talks; European integration; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the Baghdad Pact, Iran, and Iraq; and Syria (see Document 321).]

*Jordan*

The Secretary asked for the British views on the situation in Jordan.

Mr. Lloyd said it might be well to view the situation in retrospect; to consider whether it had been an error to send Templar to Jordan. He thought that, in balance, it had been just as well that Templar had gone and we had found out what the situation in Jordan really was. The strength of the opposition had been revealed, as had Egyptian intrigue and propaganda and the uses to which Saudi money was being put. It had been difficult to restore order and to keep the country under control. The event had proved the Government to be extremely weak and unable to employ effectively the Jordan Army. There were, however, still elements sympathetic and hopeful that Jordan eventually could adhere to the Baghdad Pact. The King certainly had no reason the [to] like the Saudis, and was still very friendly to the British and to the idea of joining the Pact. There was a great deal of repair work to be done; one of the greatest problems resulted from the Palestinian Arabs having been

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7; no other drafting information is on the source text. The conversation concluded at 4 p.m. and took place during Eden's visit to Washington, January 30–February 3.

stirred up by the communists. The important things were to restore and maintain stability, to build up the prestige of the King, to point out the importance of the alliance with the British, to cope with Saudi bribery and intrigue, and generally to help in every way possible. The fact was, however, that high Government officials were being bribed by the Saudis and the British could not be certain what would happen. He observed Nuri had not done all he could to strengthen the ties between Iraq and Jordan, and thought it important that he do more.

Mr. Eden remarked that, with regard to the Palestinian refugees in Jordan, anything which took their eyes off of going back to Israel would be opposed by them. Here, he said, the Saudis had a fertile field for agitation.

The Secretary stated it was hard to find Arab leaders willing to come out on our side, for many Arabs often interpreted this as working with Israel; and no Arab leaders could afford to be regarded as pro-Israel. This made it extremely difficult to get their help in dealing with the communist problem.

Mr. Shuckburgh thought the Iraqi might do a great deal in Syria, as well as the Turks. Many Syrians sympathized more with the Iraqi than they did with the Turks.

Mr. Lloyd commented Iraqi activity in Syria raised the Hashemite problem, which was particularly alarming to Saudi Arabia and caused strong Saudi resentment having nothing to do with other issues such as the communists.

Mr. Eden expressed the view we must decide later, not during this trip, where we should go in relation to Egypt, and what our attitude toward Nasser should be.

The group then recessed for a few minutes pending the arrival of the President.

---

**17. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Amman, January 26, 1956—2 p.m.*

385. HKJ Ambassador Rifai should arrive Washington today. Have discussed his impressions and soundings while here and find

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1-2656. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Ankara, Tehran, and Tel Aviv.

we in general agreement on changes which have occurred in basic forces. He hopes see Secretary and Assistant Secretary Allen shortly after return. As brother of Prime Minister his government sources excellent, with outside contacts more restricted.

Prime Minister and Ambassador, with both of whom I have talked twice in recent days, are convinced of deep change in temper and opinion of body politic. Prime Minister stated this so significant as to require change in British thinking and approach and he calling in UK Ambassador Duke in next day or two for frank discussion. Prime Minister claims British appear unable adjust traditionalist thinking to new circumstances, fail realize changes and believe through some propaganda efforts waiting and patience all will turn out well. It has been clear to this Embassy for over a month that British are dissimulating concern with stiff upper lip.

At same time clear that scapegoats are being sought and while this in part may explain Prime Minister's attitude certainly does not cover all his conviction. The natural and easy scapegoat here is British especially General Glubb. Unfortunately it has also been hinted that some quarters in London explain British setbacks by blaming Glubb which could entrain dangerous developments. For my part British here especially Embassy appear unable perceive changes and real dangers and if they report what they apparently estimate situation to be then Shuckburgh and Foreign Office may be misled. We see situation as follows: (1) The man of the street and the refugees have for the first time flexed their political muscles and found them strong; (2) unless already popular, courses of action involving foreign countries can no longer be undertaken by mere negotiation with King and Prime Minister. Prior preparation of public mind and broad appeal are required. (It is on this point that British will find major difficulty in comprehension and adoption); (3) barring prompt Palestine settlement present Cabinet if not the last is next to last chance for moderate government. It is to be doubted that Abol Huda could or would come back; (4) Cabinet changes in foreseeable future due internal disturbances or death of Samir Rifai (who has serious heart condition) could only result in governments successively pushed to left. Only alternative is martial law under King which could not last long without complete paralysis; (5) redressment of public thinking towards confidence in Jordan Government and in concepts of law and order would be lengthy; (6) British influence is low and there are no foreseeable means except settlement Palestine problem which can re-establish it in part. Efforts of British adopt firm measures or to strengthen their position by bringing in more troops are likely to be counter-productive; (7) any consideration adherence Baghdad Pact must be postponed indefinitely; (8) any proposal settlement Palestine problem must be com-

plete and without aspects of being a palliative. Attempts push Jordan Valley Plan again before proposing Palestine settlement is inviting difficulties and further setbacks.

Mallory

---

18. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) and the Jordanian Ambassador (Rifa'i), Department of State, Washington, January 28, 1956**<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Political Problems of Jordan

Ambassador Rifa'i, who had just returned to the U.S. after a period of consultation in Jordan, suggested that it might be useful to consider the reasons behind the recent disturbances in Jordan. Mr. Rifa'i had seen the second wave of demonstrations, and held the same views on them as his brother, the Jordan Prime Minister. Mr. Allen said his preliminary impression was that while the rioters had been excited by Cairo radio and exploited by the Communists, the reasons for the demonstration could basically be ascribed to Arab nationalism and "unity". He would appreciate the Ambassador's comment on this thesis.

Mr. Rifa'i opened by expressing the regret of his Government over the damages inflicted on American property and installations in Jordan. The Jordan Government hoped that the U.S. Government would realize that the situation was unusual and beyond Jordan's control. At the moment of the riots no Jordan Government had been formed. Therefore, he hoped that the Secretary and the Department would not think that no adequate precautions had been taken. Jordan had hesitated to use force to quell the demonstrators, preferring to avoid the resulting heavy loss of life. They had tried to keep the demonstrations peaceful. While this effort had failed and there had been damage, it was still felt that the choice of methods had been the better one. The riots had not been directed solely at U.S. institutions, Jordan Government property was also damaged. This

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1-2856. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus.



meant that Communist elements had played a major role. The Government had uncovered a plot to burn the central part of Amman. Furthermore, the British Bank in Amman had been attacked and a British officer of the Arab Legion killed. There might be justification, however, in saying that the mob violence was directed primarily at U.S. interests. Mr. Rifa'i acknowledged that Communism had grown in Jordan and said that if blame had to be placed on the Jordan Government it might be based on the fact that the Government had shown lack of vigor in combatting Communism.

Another element had been the bitterness of the Palestine refugees who held the U.S. responsible for their destiny. Mr. Rifa'i wished to assure the U.S. that the present Jordan Government valued highly U.S. friendship, counted on the U.S. and wanted to work with the U.S.

Mr. Rifa'i stated that British claims that elements in Jordan had been "bribed" by outside parties was untrue. Not a single revolver had been distributed by Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Not a single Saudi dollar or Egyptian dinar had been distributed to mob elements in Jordan. What had been given was the usual gifts which King Saud is accustomed to distribute to top level people in Jordan. King Saud could not buy mob violence in Jordan. If he could, then why didn't Iraq or Britain try to buy domestic tranquillity? Britain has experience in distributing money in Jordan.

The conclusion of all this was serious. It would be strange if Britain felt that she could continue in Jordan using her traditional methods. Mr. Allen felt that Britain may have learned some things from the recent violence in Jordan. Mr. Rifa'i said the British were living in the past. Mr. Allen said that perhaps the British felt they had made a mistake in Jordan. Mr. Rifa'i said there was no proof they had dropped the idea of bringing Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. This would mean inviting excitement in Amman. Had the present Jordan Government not been formed, no other constitutional Government could have been formed. The British had suggested to the King that he put Jordan under military rule and suspend the constitution. This would have created the possibility for the take-over by an extremist government with the future and attitude of Jordan in doubt. The present government had taken responsibility out of a sense of duty to the country and the throne and to prevent military rule. This government had wide support. Mr. Rifa'i did not know whether Britain was satisfied. If the present Government resigned, things would be dangerous in Jordan. This would be the last moderate government.

Mr. Allen asked if there were any danger of the Government's resigning. Mr. Rifa'i replied that it was having difficulties in carrying out its duties. Every day the Government was being told that certain

people in Jordan should be arrested for conspiracy. The British were doing this only to create doubts in the King. There were false reports as to the mission of the Saudi troops stationed south of Aqaba. "They" brought Yunis Bahri to wage radio propaganda against the ESS powers. Jordan did not wish to harm her relations with these countries. Mr. Allen asked who had brought Yunis Bahri to Jordan. Mr. Rifa'i replied that it had been the British, working through the King. How could a government hope to work smoothly and softly if their radio station was sending out aggressive speeches? The Prime Minister had threatened to resign over this. These British efforts prevented the stabilization of the situation.

Mr. Allen asked on a purely unofficial basis whether, if disturbances recurred, Jordan would prefer assistance from Iraqi or British troops in maintaining order. Mr. Rifa'i said that his government accepted neither. The Prime Minister had rejected British forces. During the troubles, elements in the northern part of Jordan had declared their accession to Syria. There had been talk on the West Bank of setting up an independent Arab republic. The Iraqis, Saudis, and Israelis had all been prepared to dismember Jordan. The situation had been saved now and this was very important. We knew that the U.S. had had no finger in the pie. Prime Minister Eden should be told that the British should not add new problems to the situation to stir things up. The time was not healthy. There should be no activity regarding the Baghdad Pact, an Arab-Israel settlement, or the Johnston Plan at this time. Such efforts would undoubtedly fail and order would again have to be restored. The Johnston Plan should be permitted to rest for the time being.

Mr. Allen asked whether the U.S. should not publicly announce that we were dropping the Johnston Plan. Mr. Rifa'i recalled that the Arab League Committee had left the matter open. The U.S. dropping the Plan would give Israel a pretext to start work on the Jordan River. Mr. Allen asked whether it would be useful if the British announced that they would bring no pressure on Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact and the U.S. announced it would not use pressure for the Johnston Plan. Mr. Rifa'i thought this might be helpful. Mr. Allen replied that Israel would probably start digging at Jisr Banat Ya'qub. Mr. Rifa'i thought this would mean war; Egypt would be bound to come in and he did not know what would happen to Jordan.

Mr. Rifa'i said that he hoped British thought would change. The British should realize that it was no longer easy to carry out their plans. Jordan wanted friendly relations with the U.S. as well as the British. Britain must "take it easy" with Jordan. Mr. Allen harked back to the possibility of Jordan's dismemberment by other Arab states and said that the irony was that if the various Arab armies

had entered Jordan, they all would have done it in the name of Arab unity. . . . Mr. Rifa'i said that the Saudis had assured his government that their forces were near Aqaba in answer to Ben Gurion's threat to force the Straits of Tiran.

Mr. Allen said he could assure Mr. Rifa'i that our Government felt that every effort should be made to avoid bringing up difficult problems to the Jordan Government and people. Mr. Allen had taken this line with Mr. Shuckburgh and had made the point in his briefing of the President, preparatory to his talks with Eden. Mr. Rifa'i was gratified to hear this.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> On January 28, in a telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles, Allen referred to his meeting with the Jordanian Ambassador. According to the memorandum of the conversation, Allen noted that the Ambassador requested that nothing be done "to rock the boat". (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

---

## 19. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, March 2, 1956—1 p.m.*

458. At noon yesterday<sup>2</sup> King Hussein called on Prime Minister Rifai at his office and gave him personally hand-written orders, stating he would await word of their execution and leaving Raisdiwan Talhouni at the Prime Ministry. The orders were the dismissal of three British officers Lt. General Glubb, Commander Arab Legion, Brigadier Hutton, Chief of Staff and Sir Patrick Coghill, Chief Counterintelligence. Upon departure King Cabinet meeting called during course of which Prime Minister summoned British Ambassador Duke to inform him. Cabinet decided to carry out orders. Prime Minister could give Duke no reasons, stating government not consulted and orders were ultimatum. Prime Minister summoned Glubb, gave him King's orders which accepted in soldierly fashion. Prime Minister asked if Glubb could depart Jordan that afternoon to which Glubb replied impossible as everything he possessed in world was

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3-256. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Jerusalem, Jidda, Karachi, Tehran, and Tripoli; passed to the Department of the Army.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 453 from Amman, March 1, the Embassy informed the Department that Hussein had ordered the dismissal of Glubb, Hutton, and Coghill, and replaced a number of British officers with Arabs. "Motives unknown," the Embassy concluded, "but hope clarify tomorrow morning." (*Ibid.*, 741.551/3-156)

here. Was accordingly arranged he depart early following morning by Legion plane.

Duke saw King 6:45 p.m. requesting reasons for action. Reasons not clear but those given include King's alleged discovery insufficient stores and supplies ammunition, deficiencies in proper assignment of officers in Legion and further that Glubb had not helped him against Egypt. Duke's telegraphic report of Glubb's acceptance dismissal crossed in transmission with message from Prime Minister Eden to Hussein requesting King not take precipitate action and pointed out matter should have been consulted with HMG. This post facto message delivered to King at midnight.<sup>3</sup>

Glubb departed Amman approximately 7 a.m. today from Arab Legion Air Force hangar which was under extremely heavy guard. British officers Arab Legion Air Force confined to quarters as of 7:30 p.m. last night. In addition dismissal 3 British officers there were at least 3 Jordanian officers supposedly loyal to Glubb who were retired. Additionally 8 British officers relieved from their commands primarily from elite Beduin troops. They are replaced by Arab officers and pattern suggests desire tight control of Legion either by King or Arab officer clique.<sup>4</sup> Official radio this morning carried short address by King Hussein asking obedience army and people and maintenance of order for steps he was taking in national interest. Announcement then made termination services Glubb and others. Stated Brigadier Radi Anab appointed temporary Commander of Legion, Cabinet Ministers were requested to remain Amman and that King following developments closely.

Ambassador Duke who has not yet finally made up his mind says there could be 4 possible reasons for King's action: The alleged shortage of ammunition which is likely not valid; alleged discontent among some Legion officers; publicity in England about Glubb which has piqued the King and feeling that Glubb may have been

<sup>3</sup> On March 2 the Embassy in London informed the Department that Hussein's dismissal of Glubb was a "great shock" to the British Government. The Embassy further noted that the Cabinet was meeting later that day to consider the situation and decide what line should be taken with the press. (Telegram 3671; *ibid.*, 741.551/3-256)

<sup>4</sup> On March 4 the Army Attaché at Amman, Lieutenant Colonel James L. Sweeney, reported his observations on the Glubb dismissal to the Department of State. Among other things, Sweeney noted: "future events Jordan dependent on the following currently cloudy factors:

- "1) Strength King vis-à-vis Free Officers Movement (FOM),
- "2) Egypt support or control FOM,
- "3) London reaction and
- "4) Number British officers remaining.

"Only time will tell if Hussein will be the Farouk of Jordan and Innab the Naguib. And if so who is the Nasser?" (Telegram CX 33 from Amman; *ibid.*, 741.551/3-455)

center of attraction for criticism for example as from Egypt. Duke said this morning he did not know what course of action might develop but he believes that matter should not pass without a positive reaction from the UK.

I do not expect civil disturbances but there is large demonstration under way in Amman shouting thanks to King and to Nasser. Embassy advised Americans stay off streets. No restrictions on tourists.<sup>5</sup>

**Mallory**

---

<sup>5</sup> On March 6 the Embassy in Amman forwarded a detailed account of the events surrounding the dismissal of Glubb. (Despatch 297; *ibid.*, 741.551/2–656)

---

**20. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, March 5, 1956—4 p.m.*

3718. Re Embtel 3714.<sup>2</sup> Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick asked me to come and see him this morning to tell me about manner in which Prime Minister is planning to handle situation regarding Jordan in House this afternoon.<sup>3</sup> He plans first to chide Jordanians for having treated Glubb in manner they did after so many years of faithful service. Second, it will be stated that all British officers who have executive jobs are going to be withdrawn because they must not have responsibility without authority. All other British personnel will be permitted to remain. As to continuance of subsidy and further steps govt will state matter is under study. General thinking of HMG is that subsidy will undoubtedly ultimately be withdrawn and Arab Legion will disintegrate since most of its crack regiments are Bedouins who are not in sympathy with assumption of command by officers close to King. Kirkpatrick stated that Jordanian who has now been put in

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3–556. Top Secret; Niact.

<sup>2</sup> On March 5 the Embassy in London informed the Department that the British Government was still in the process of evaluating the significance of Glubb's dismissal and had come to no decision on the future of British policy with regard to Jordan or on the continuance of the subsidy of the Arab Legion. The Prime Minister's expected statement in the House of Commons later that afternoon, the Embassy noted, would be little more than a "stop-gap". (Telegram 3714; *ibid.*, 741.551/3–556)

<sup>3</sup> For text of Eden's remarks, see *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, March 5, 1956, cols. 1719–1725.

command is no more capable of exercising such duties than he Kirkpatrick would be.

Kirkpatrick also said Selwyn Lloyd would take up with Secretary at Karachi<sup>4</sup> question of re-study of position of HMG and us regarding entire Middle East. What British are thinking about is that Baghdad Pact must be strengthened immediately and I gathered they hope US would now consider becoming a party. I told him I thought matter equally important as strengthening Baghdad Pact was immediate settlement of Buraimi problem because it seemed to me essential to draw Saudi Arabians away from Egyptian influence. Kirkpatrick said he agreed entirely with this and that British were prepared make every effort to reach an agreement on a boundary line between Saudi Arabia and Muskat and Abu Dhabi immediately. If US Govt would express willingness to take action in UN and diplomatically to prevent violation of agreed line by Saudis it would be extremely helpful to British Govt.

He alleged that Brit had twice previously asked action this nature by US and been refused. I pointed out that earlier request (Embtel 2474 Dec 15, 1955<sup>5</sup>) was of quite different import and that while I could not speak definitively for US Govt I would be prepared recommend proposal that US take action diplomatically and through UN re violation of frontier once established which would in any case seem consistent obligations UN Charter.

As indication depth Brit reaction Jordanian developments, believe noteworthy Kirkpatrick remarked his thought is to effect Jordan will eventually be partitioned between Israelis, Saudi Arabs and Egyptians.<sup>6</sup>

Department repeat as desired.

**Aldrich**

<sup>4</sup> Between March 6 and 8, Dulles attended the second meeting of the SEATO Council in Karachi. Telegram 3718 was repeated to Karachi as Tosec 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3-556)

<sup>5</sup> Document 146.

<sup>6</sup> On March 9, the Embassy in London reported that Foreign Office officials were unable to find evidence that either the Saudis or Egyptians were involved in instigating the dismissal of Glubb. According to Foreign Office sources it was more likely that the dismissal resulted from internal factors, particularly Hussein's desire to effect a "personal coup". According to the Embassy, the British did admit that external influences such as Egyptian radio broadcasts did have some effect. Foreign Office officials also noted that the Jordanians apparently believed that they could remove Glubb and other British officers without affecting Jordan's treaty relations with the United Kingdom. According to the Embassy, the Foreign Office was also concerned about the repercussions of anti-British developments in Jordan on the British position in the Persian Gulf. (Telegram 3834; Department of State, Central Files, 641.85/3-956)

21. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Acting Secretary of State and the Jordanian Ambassador (Rifa'i), Department of State, Washington, March 6, 1956<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Dismissal of General Glubb

Ambassador Rifa'i called on instructions from his Government to provide the following explanation regarding the recent dismissal of General Glubb.<sup>2</sup> The action was determined by King Hussein solely for internal administrative reasons and was taken only against General Glubb as a person. Recent statements and press reports have exaggerated and distorted the matter. Jordan desires to continue the friendliest relations with the United Kingdom and the United States, and intends to live up completely to its obligations under its treaty with the UK. The Jordan Government hopes that the United States will use its good offices with the United Kingdom to impress upon the British the facts given above and particularly the desire of Jordan that the good relations between the two countries not be disturbed.

Mr. Hoover expressed appreciation for the Ambassador's comments and stressed the value the United States attaches to friendly relations with Jordan. He said the United States thinks the long-standing relations between Jordan and the United Kingdom have been of mutual benefit and have contributed to the internal stability and sovereign independence of Jordan. He added that the circumstances of General Glubb's dismissal could not but cause a sharp reaction among the British public, as is evidenced by the concern expressed in the House of Commons. Consequently, the British Government is bound to consider carefully the effect of General Glubb's dismissal on Anglo-Jordan relations. The Acting Secretary

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3-656. Confidential. Drafted by Burdett.

<sup>2</sup> On March 6, in a memorandum to Hoover that briefed the Acting Secretary on his scheduled meeting with Rifai later that afternoon, Rountree noted:

"We surmise that Mr. Rifai will seek to minimize the dismissal of General Glubb and take the line that Jordan was acting within its sovereign rights. He might well state that the King's action should not be interpreted as reflecting a desire to disrupt Jordan's relations with and financial support from Britain. He will refer to the pressure to substitute Egyptian-Saudi Arabian-Syrian assistance for the British subsidy being brought on Jordan by Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia whose Chiefs of State will be meeting shortly in Cairo.

"He may request that the U.S. intervene with Great Britain and urge the British to continue financial support to Jordan and to acquiesce in arrangements whereby British military advice is given to an Arab Legion completely under Jordan command. If Jordan is unable to continue to count on British help, she will not be in a position to withstand internal and external pressures to accept the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian-Syrian offer or even to seek assistance from the Soviet bloc." (*Ibid.*, 611.85/3-656)

emphasized the hope of the United States that the changes in the Arab Legion do not presage any change in Jordan's clearly demonstrated intentions to carry out faithfully the general armistice agreement.

The Ambassador assured Mr. Hoover that there would be no change in Jordan's strict observance of the general armistice agreement.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> On March 8 the Department conveyed to the Embassy in Amman the substance of Hoover's meeting with Rifai. (Telegram 478; *ibid.*, 641.85/3-856)

---

## 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 10, 1956—6:35 p.m.*

490. 1. Dept notes press reports that King Hussein has rejected ESS aid offer because of condition that he renounce British assistance. Mallory should approach King at earliest opportunity and discuss informing him of US gratification at this step. USG continues feel long-standing ties between UK and Jordan have contributed much to sovereign independence of HKJ. We hope that satisfactory arrangements can be worked out between UK and Jordan and are speaking to British along this line. If appropriate you should point out that relaxation of controls along Jordan-Israel armistice line can lead to cycle of bloody incidents with dangerous consequences. Advise British colleague in confidence.

2. Embassy London should inform FonOff in confidence of foregoing and state Dept hopes Glubb letter to *Times* (London's 3859<sup>2</sup>) indicates intention on part HMG seek work out arrangements with Jordan which will maintain British interests and relations there. We understand difficulties which dismissal Glubb presents to HMG and complex problems HMG faces in attempts create effective

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.85/3-956. Secret. Drafted by Bergus; approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Sent also to London; repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Paris, and Tel Aviv; and pouched to Karachi and Jerusalem.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3859 from London, March 9, the Embassy forwarded a brief summary of a letter which Glubb had written to the *London Times*. In his letter, Glubb urged that Britain use restraint and advised against a policy of "getting tough" or stopping the subsidy. According to Glubb, his dismissal was first a result of personal differences with the King and second a result of Egyptian and Saudi pressure. (*Ibid.*)



relationship between HMG and Arab Legion. At same time we feel attempt should be made and hasty action which could be interpreted as punitive avoided.<sup>3</sup>

Hoover

---

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3906, March 12, the Embassy in London informed the Department that it had carried out its instructions. The Embassy also reported that it had informed the Foreign Office that the Department was aware of the difficulties facing the British Government in Jordan and that it hoped the British would be able to maintain its interests there. The Foreign Office, the Embassy continued, had indicated that future policy toward Jordan was still under consideration. In the Embassy's view the prospect that Britain would terminate its subsidy was "now rather remote." (*Ibid.*, 641.85/3–1256) On March 13, Aldrich informed the Department that in a conversation with Eden he learned that Kirkbride was returning to Amman to talk with the King and to advise the British Government on their future course of action. According to Aldrich, Eden indicated that no mention was to be made regarding the continuation or cessation of the subsidy. Eden added that no final determination had been made regarding British policy toward Jordan, but it might be possible to maintain the Arab Legion as an "effective force." (Telegram 3921 from London; *ibid.*, 641.85/3–1356)

---

### 23. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, March 16, 1956—4 p.m.*

502. Storm over Glubb's dismissal is rapidly subsiding. Jordanians have taken mild and reassuring line which has been helpful with British and in apparent interest maintaining as much influence and strength as possible and salvage best from situation UK now appears to be meeting HKJ halfway. British Embassy has accepted King Hussein protestation of his desire for continuation close ties with UK and West which apparently echoed in Foreign Office. An accommodation re British officers in Legion will likely be worked out to mutual satisfaction UK and Jordan within next few weeks.

Precise analysis underlying causes and reasons for Hussein's action not yet possible. My best estimate is that number of influences combined toward King's decision. Contributory were:

- (a) Dislike of Glubb by certain family elements . . . ;
- (b) The general anti-British line promoted by Egypt especially as regards lack of Arab control of Legion;

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/3–1656. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Ankara, Jerusalem, Jidda, Paris, Tel Aviv, Tehran, and Tripoli; passed to the Department of the Army.

- (c) Dissatisfaction among Arab Legion officers particularly junior group who formed sort of free officers movement;
- (d) King's realization that such popular move would rebuild his waning influence and popularity;
- (e) Possibly the King believed, as he has announced over the radio, that Glubb did not plan sufficiently aggressive tactics in case of war with Israel and that there is not enough ammunition.

Above list indicative and not exclusive but probably contains the major items. The Egyptians did not have as far as we can determine any recent direct hand in Glubb's ousting but their activities over the past year in the propaganda field and working with officers were contributory. Cannot accept, however, alleged claim of Egyptian Ambassador here that he responsible for victory nor claims of London newspapers that it is all an Egyptian plot. Most of it is Hussein's own doing but with considerable assistance, prompting and nudging. There are several side effects. Most apparent is the exaltation of Arab nationalism. This has been accomplished by an increase in anti-foreign sentiment. Unless there is some rather dramatic development enhancing prestige of UK and US, it may be expected that this anti-foreign and particularly anti-Western sentiment in the populace will remain at new high level. Another effect is frank fear on the part of Arab Christians as rising Moslem xenophobia becomes more apparent. In some vague way they feel they lost protection through Glubb's dismissal. General security is being questioned and some flight of capital is already reported. A number of Christian Arab businessmen are seriously considering migration. The effectiveness of the Legion will tend to be less.

Glubb's dismissal is not an unmitigated evil. The action has gone far toward removing Jordan's defensive position and inferiority complex vis-à-vis other Arab states. King is now hero and no longer puppet. Prime Minister Rifai says HKJ is now in position to have even improved relations with Britain with the new and more "normal" situation. Syrians and Egyptians no longer able either look down noses at British dominated Legion or use it as propaganda weapon. As result HKJ may be able take more positive and constructive attitude toward Arab politics and eventually perhaps Arab-Israeli dispute. Dangers lie in natural Arab tendency become over-confident and rash.

A major question is strength and source of leadership. Previous governments have been weak and ineffective. King has been well aware and deplored this. Coincident with new popularity he has also taken more positive direction of the executive and to large extent is running the show. He is young and inexperienced but providing he

does nothing foolish may remain in saddle for some time which is desirable with populace of so many uncertain and divided loyalties.

Mallory

---

**24. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 28, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Developments in Jordan and Iraq

Ronald Bailey stopped in to see me this afternoon at the request of the British Ambassador. He said that he had been instructed to maintain liaison with me for the purpose of providing the Watch Committee with significant British information with respect to developments in the Near East. You may wish to mention the following two points, or pass this memorandum, to S and U: <sup>2</sup>

1. On March 24 the Jordan Prime Minister had just confirmed to the British Ambassador in Amman report that Ali Hiyari, who had been Jordanian Chief of Staff since Glubb's departure, had now been appointed to command an Arab Legion division. Nuwar had been made new Chief of Staff. <sup>3</sup> The report was that King Hussein had no knowledge of this change. A "Free Officers" pamphlet was being circulated calling for complete freeing of Arab Legion from British Officers. The British Foreign Office had thereafter telegraphed the British Ambassador in Amman that these developments appear very dangerous not only for the U.K. position in Jordan, but also for the King. The Ambassador was instructed to approach the King along the following lines:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/3–2856. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins. Also addressed to Rountree.

<sup>2</sup> No indication was found that the memorandum was forwarded to Dulles or Hoover.

<sup>3</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abu Nuwar, formerly commander of the Princess Aliya Brigade of the Arab Legion.

a. Current negotiations to associate British Officers with the Arab Legion in Jordan seem to be progressing satisfactorily; therefore agreement might now be reached.

b. The U.K. was anxious with respect to the situation in Jordan and in the Legion might be getting out of control, with grave risks to the throne, particularly from a coup d'état.

c. A replacement of some of the young officers responsible for the last coup might be desirable.

d. If the King was disposed to take action the U.K. believed there were senior Arab officers who could handle the Legion: Sharia, Kiyari, Fawaz Muhairi.

e. The U.K. would help; it would postpone for a limited time release of remaining British Officers in executive command.

If the King agrees as above, the U.K. did not believe it could be done with Rifai in office.

2. The Iraqi Crown Prince and Nuri Pasha have recently discussed possible changes in the Iraq Prime Ministership with former Iraqi Prime Ministers. Surprisingly, Salih Jabr had supported continuance of Nuri in office. The Crown Prince had strongly supported the continuance of Nuri in office. The British Foreign Office telegraphed the British Ambassador in Baghdad and said it was pleased with the Crown Prince's robust attitude and had gone on to describe the situation in Jordan and had asked the British Ambassador to discuss with the Iraqis. The British thought there was a real danger in Jordan of civil war or a pro-Egyptian Government through a coup d'état. The British wished to know what action Iraq would take in such circumstances and thought Iraq and the U.K. should each know what the other was doing and adopt a common plan. Iraq was aware of British dispositions in Jordan. There was also a parachute brigade in Cyprus. Operational plans to secure Mafraq and Amman Airfields and to provide protection for the King was being considered. There were supply difficulties which the U.K. and Iraq should discuss. How could land connections with Iraq be kept open?

**25. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Amman, March 30, 1956—2 p.m.*

534. The movement of Jordan from its Western alignment towards neutralism continues. The easy and common characterization of this change as a drift ignores fact it is not a passive movement but rather is stimulated. Foreign governments and domestic groups are working on Jordan and are prying her loose from West. Internal political situation has deteriorated to point where lack of any real national loyalties, differences between King and Prime Minister, cupidity and ambition among Legion officers now without British restraint, destructive opposition by political outs, and continuing activity by Communists and allied groups makes easier conquest by Egyptian propaganda machine and subversive elements. . . . One is prone to attribute all difficulties and tensions to Palestine problem. Certainly it is primary irritant. There will be no halt to undesirable political developments unless it is settled. However, such an imperative and highly desired step to prevent war and ease tension is no longer whole story. Palestine and the motion wrapped therein has also provided a medium by which drive to eliminate British influence from the Near East has been further pushed and a screen behind which rising tide of Arab nationalism has been encouraged. Such forces may be slowed by Palestine settlement but it is unlikely they would be stopped.

Not only is Jordan being increasingly lost to our side but her persuasion into ESS camp, which may well occur, can have wider effects on the future of fence-sitting Lebanese and in extracting Iraq, as only Arab member, from Baghdad Pact. Thus, for the present what happens to the insignificant national entity of Jordan is likely to affect critically the Western position in entire Middle East.

**Mallory**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/3-3056. Secret. Repeated to London, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, Ankara, Jidda, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Paris, Karachi, and Jerusalem.

---

26. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs<sup>1</sup>

O/PS/7

Washington, April 19, 1956.

*Problem*

Future United States Policy Toward Jordan.

*Discussion*

The failure to solve the Palestine problem has caused a progressive deterioration in the western position in Jordan since the termination of the Arab-Israel war. The 500,000 refugees in Jordan who have little hope of being integrated into the economy of the country are the primary source of instability. Having been uprooted for 8 years, the refugees are more and more inclined to listen to communist or extreme nationalist propaganda.

Jordanian unrest was first conclusively demonstrated during October of 1954 in the riots which took place as a result of the government-rigged parliamentary elections. Following British efforts to induce Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, nation-wide violence occurred in December 1955 and January 1956 which was directed at American institutions though western consulates, UNRWA, and Jordan Government offices were likewise attacked. Popular opposition to the Pact was fanned by communists, Egyptian and Saudi agents who found a common meeting ground over this issue. Thereafter, Nationalist sentiment brought about the abrupt dismissal of General Glubb and other officers by King Hussein. The Arab Legion has thus been weakened. The British no longer control its movements. . . .

The December-January riots and subsequent events have demonstrated that:

1. Direct British influence in Jordan has been weakened.
2. Neutralist and pre-communist sentiment has increased.
3. The success of the rioters has developed a psychology of rebellion in the Jordanian population and made difficult effective Government control.
4. Though thus far King Hussein has refused to accept ESS offers of financial support in lieu of the British subsidy, popular pressure to do so may force him to abandon his position. If he accepts, the EES powers are in a position to cancel the aid and gradually dismember Jordan. If he continues his refusal, he is likely

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Meetings of MEPPG (agenda, memos of conv., etc.) 4/9/56 to 6/30/56. Secret. According to a covering memorandum by Kirk in S/S, April 19, this paper was drafted by Bergus and Blackiston and approved by Wilkins.

to be forced off the throne with probably the same end result—the partition of Jordan between Syria and Saudi Arabia.

5. Christian-Moslem differences have increased.

6. American missionary establishments continue in danger.

7. The refugees have adopted a nihilist philosophy which during January caused them to continue rioting after calm had been restored in other parts of the country. However, the experience of mob rule and wholesale property destruction has caused business men and officials to realize that a further breakdown of law and order could affect them.

8. Removal of British control of the Arab Legion may lead to the infiltration into Israel from Jordan and the likelihood of border clashes.

9. There is now no appreciable difference in interests and aims between the urban inhabitants of East Jordan and those of the West Bank as a result of the sizeable influx of Palestinians as refugees, merchants and government officials into the settled areas of Transjordan.

It may not be said that United States policies in Jordan have been successful. U.S. economic assistance whether given directly or through UNRWA is taken as a form of atonement for the U.S. support for the partition of Palestine. Jordan has a "relief mentality." Since its establishment Jordan has been supported by the British. It has received aid for the refugees from the United Nations since 1948. The absorptive capacity of the country restricts the provision of technical assistance. The presence of many Americans in Amman living in better personal circumstances than the local population creates local antagonisms. The deep-seated hostility toward foreign countries has presented a formidable obstacle to ICA and USIS. U.S. information programs have met with serious practical difficulties.

The partition of Jordan among its neighbors should be constantly kept in mind. British influence is bound to decline. Iraqi attempts to strengthen Iraqi influence made at the present time in a context of British prodding can not succeed. At the same time, while the ESS powers could create chaos in Jordan, they are not yet able to make an effective satellite of the country. Thus the conflicting interests and unhappy state of mind which plague the West present obstacles to Colonel Nasser as well. A Soviet attempt to take over the country by internal subversion might be met by vigorous military action and physical conquest of parts of the country by Israel, Iraq and perhaps Saudi Arabia.

#### *Recommendations*

1. *General Policy.* Our general policy line should be that we wish to maintain friendly, cooperative relations if Jordan wishes them. We would support the association of Jordan, in its present or in a new

form, with one or more Arab states if the government and people so wish.

Meanwhile, we should support the British position in the country. Nevertheless, we should persuade the British to forego actions which seem colonial and seek to channel British influence in a direction which will demonstrate to the Jordanians the value of an attachment to the West.

2. *Economic Aid.* We should continue technical assistance projects but should phase out those of marginal value and those in which the Jordan Government has expressed no particular interest. We should continue development assistance but should concentrate on one or two good projects and those whose value to the country is easily demonstrated. Such projects should be given publicity when commenced and finished according to schedules announced at the inception of the projects.

U.S. contributions to the UNRWA relief program should [be] given in the form of agricultural commodities rather than cash and should be administered by Jordan.

Development and technical assistance projects of ICA, British Development Board, and UNRWA should be carefully coordinated.

3. *Information Policy.* We should emphasize Arab development with western assistance rather than oblique and repetitious attempts to derogate the Soviets. U.S. information activities should give a good coverage of world news and should be devoid of all but the most subtle propaganda.

We should stress the strong and mutually profitable relationships existing between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (given a favorable outcome of the Dhahran Air Base negotiation), the U.S. and Iraq and the U.S. and Lebanon.

. . . . .



27. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 27, 1956—1:36 p.m.*

633. For Ambassador: At your discretion you should seek early private audience with King and convey to him substance following in manner you feel most effective:

1. USG has on more than one occasion recent months expressed view long-standing ties between HKJ and UK have been of mutual benefit and of importance in maintaining sovereign independence and territorial integrity Jordan. In all frankness it appears if these ties were to be further weakened in turbulent circumstances existing NE today, chances for peaceful and prosperous future Jordan would be considerably lessened.

2. We understand difficulties faced by King and pressures being put on him. We unaware withdrawal Iraq proposal give aid Jordan. We are inquiring re this report and prepared urge Iraqis carry through proposal.

3. We are unaware any reports UK prepared furnish "Gnat" jets to Israel and doubt validity.

4. Over past few months US has failed respond Israel's request purchase arms in this country. We have insisted to Israel security Israel and area can not be assured by arms alone but should be sought by other means such as protection afforded by UN Charter and determination free world take steps counter aggression and aid victim aggression NE. These same considerations apply Jordan. US does not intend embark upon arms race with Soviet bloc in NE.

5. US did not question Jordan's right determine command Jordan forces which we felt was matter for decision by sovereign state Jordan. . . . It is only too possible HKJ arrangements with Soviet bloc or with ESS powers procure Soviet arms would result consequences which no one could foretell.

6. As popularly acclaimed leader Jordan people, King in position take brave steps necessary assure future his nation. We feel right path lies in strengthening ties with Jordan's trusted friends rather

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.56/4-2756. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad and pouched to London.

than being tempted into snares laid by those who scarcely bother veil intention extinguish Jordan sovereignty.<sup>2</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>2</sup> On May 4, the Embassy in London requested that it be permitted to convey the substance of telegram 633 to the Foreign Office. The Embassy noted that it would be very helpful in the context of United States–United Kingdom–Saudi Arabia relations if the British could be informed of the U.S. view of the Anglo-Jordanian relationship. (Telegram 5081; *ibid.*, 785.56/5–456) On May 7, the Department authorized the Embassy to convey the substance of telegram 633 to the Foreign Office with the qualification that it wait until Mallory had presented it to King Hussein. (Telegram 6696 to London, transmitted to Amman as telegram 655; *ibid.*)

---

## 28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 12, 1956—3:47 p.m.*

667. For Mallory. Dept continues gravely concerned re deteriorating situation Jordan. From evidence available here apparent events since December and departure Glubb have seriously jeopardized prospects continuing political viability Jordan. King obviously seeking strengthen personal power on basis popularity with mob and relationship with Nuwar faction in Legion. Nuwar faction presently in control Legion but its uneasy leadership seriously questioned by rival factions. PriMin and Cabinet seem almost have disappeared as far as their influence on political developments concerned. ESS powers continue efforts penetrate Jordan for number reasons not necessarily consistent with each other but including: 1) desire eliminate bridgehead British influence; 2) opposition to enlargement Baghdad Pact; 3) removal Jordan as potential threat Saudi Arabia; 4) latent territorial aspirations in Jordan; 5) desire solidify Arab anti-Israel front; 6) traditional Arab pleasure in political machination.

King may perceive risks but hope bring about situation where ESS powers (with Soviet arms available) would be competing with West and Iraq as to which side would shower most political and material favors on Jordan. Popularity Nasser and ESS sentiments among Jordan mob prevent him from opposing their efforts directly.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5–1256. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad and London.

At same time he keenly hurt by what he considers Iraq's failure appreciate his stature as Arab leader or willingness quickly respond his appeals for support.

We believe that in critical weeks ahead you should bring to King's attention considerations outlined Deptel 633.<sup>2</sup>

Following further points which expand para 5 of Deptel 633 should also be included:

1. Even if assurances given Jordan that Soviet bloc arms can be obtained under cover transaction between Jordan and another Arab state and without necessity introduction Soviet technicians into Jordan, King incurring grave risks by reliance on assurances. Experience indicates difficulties encountered limiting or restricting Soviet personnel and influence once dependence on Soviet bloc as ultimate source of arms and spare parts developed.

2. Backbone Jordan internal and external security will continue to be Arab Legion which publicly sworn loyalty King. National Guard acted as militia enforce order along HKJ frontiers and resist violations armistice lines until superior force Legion brought to bear. Were Guard now strengthened with Soviet bloc arms and perhaps foreign instructors in use, serious logistic problem would be created. Furthermore opportunities could be created for those who would wish foster competing loyalties in Guard and Legion rather than integrate into effective force for defense sovereignty of Jordan.

3. Once Soviet bloc had established beachhead in Jordan inevitable it would seek eliminate elements known for desire maintain independent state and preserve longstanding relationship with West.

As King and other Jordan officials may hear of US discussions with Nuri you should include in your approach statement that US is continuing to use such influence with Iraq as it has and would appreciate King's suggestions.

You should keep British colleague informed substance approaches.

London inform FonOff substance this message.

Embtel 622<sup>3</sup> received since drafting foregoing. Information therein further emphasizes importance of early discussion between you and King Hussein . . . to retard movement by Jordan into ESS grouping.

Dulles

---

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 622 from Amman, May 11, Mallory informed the Department that the possibility that Jordan might receive Soviet bloc arms and become associated in a joint command with Egypt has "sharply increased". According to Mallory, reports indicated that Hussein had informed a British officer that Jordan might receive two jet squadrons, heavy artillery, and tanks from Egypt. The Ambassador commented, however, that in his view the information had a 50 percent chance of being accurate. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.56/5-1156)

---

**29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 12, 1956—3:48 p.m.*

944. For Gallman. Re Deptel 667<sup>2</sup> to Mallory. At earliest opportunity you should seek private talk with Nuri and acquaint him with Dept's appreciation situation Jordan. You should point out view present trends in Jordan could well lead further ESS and communist penetration, increasing civil strife, and increasing threat Iraq from Arab world.

Iraq in position exercise maximum constructive influence during this critical period. We hope Iraq Govt would consider early and effective approaches Jordanians. Expression sympathetic attitude toward Jordan economic development projects would be helpful if coupled with firm commitments contribute appreciable amounts to potash works and superphosphate plant. Time may not permit further waiting to determine how crises develop. Perhaps Iraq could further economic aid in form assistance in financing road and Aqaba Port development. Projects in cultural and information fields including grant number scholarships for Jordanians to study in Iraqi institutions might be useful.

Also of prime importance would be development close ties between Iraq Army and Arab Legion.

Exercise constructive Iraqi influence in Jordan of vital importance to Iraq's future role among Arab nations. Strong Jordan would represent important link between Iraq and other Arab nations—role Nuri himself foresaw in his suggestions re Saud-Faisal meeting (Embtel 1150<sup>3</sup>), matters now receiving urgent consideration in Washington.

Vital factor in strengthening Jordan-Iraq relationships and countering ESS influence is psychological. US under no illusions as to difficulties involved. At this time Jordanians might respond to gestures which showed friendship, respect for their legitimate aspirations, and sympathy for their problems.

You should stress need for secrecy these discussions and US interest in Nuri's views as to how Jordan situation can be handled.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5-1256. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London and Amman.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

You should keep your British colleague informed substance your approach.<sup>4</sup>

London convey FonOff substance this message.<sup>5</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> On May 13, Gallman informed the Department that he had met with Nuri that morning and covered the substance of the Department's instructions. According to the Ambassador, Nuri shared U.S. concern, but expressed little hope that "anything constructive" could be accomplished with the Jordanian Government. Stabilizing the situation, Nuri continued, depended on checking "ESS maneuverings." Gallman reported, however, that in spite of Nuri's pessimism, the Prime Minister was working along two lines—economic and military. In the remainder of the telegram Gallman conveyed the details of Nuri's proposed approach. (Telegram 1184 from Baghdad; Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5-1356)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 5256 from London, May 14, the Embassy informed the Department that it had conveyed the substance of telegrams 667 to Amman and 944 to Baghdad, to the Foreign Office. (*Ibid.*, 785.56/5-1456)

---

### 30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 16, 1956—6:33 p.m.*

954. For Ambassador. Dept appreciates promptness approach Nuri and opportunity available discuss Jordan problems with Malloy. In further talk with Nuri (Embtel 1184<sup>2</sup>) you may wish mention following:

1. Dept does not believe Iraq aid Jordan should proceed in context Jordan's adherence economic committee Baghdad Pact. In highly volatile situation prevailing Jordan raising issue Jordan association with Pact in any form could precipitate severe internal disturbances.

2. Iraqi procedures normally require accountability for government revenue and parliamentary approval. US aid for Jordan totaled \$33 million during past 5 years was authorized by Congress in similar manner. PriMin might find it useful so inform parliamentary leaders. USG would be happy discuss feasibility coordinating its aid plans with any program in which Iraq planned assist.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5-1356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bergus and Wilkins and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Amman and London.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, *supra*.

3. We believe PriMin's thinking re military assistance Jordan eminently sound but question whether plans meet urgency situation. We suggest Iraq discussions with Jordan Chief Staff should be helpful. If in present critical circumstances Jordan, visit of Innab to Iraq is prevented or delayed, it might be useful for Iraq to take initiative in arranging staff talks with Jordan.

4. Dept underlines psychological gestures by Iraq which are highly useful in bringing home to Jordanians closer relations with Iraq, buttress Jordan sovereignty and independence. Cultural relations program might be of special value. Some indication Iraq values Jordan friendship and understanding Jordan has borne brunt of Palestine problem especially refugees might find quick response in Amman today.<sup>3</sup>

### Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup>In telegram 1206 from Baghdad, May 17, Gallman reported that he had conveyed to Nuri the four points outlined in telegram 954. According to the Ambassador, Nuri noted that no "fundamental amelioration" could be expected until Saudi Arabian and Egyptian "maneuvering" in Jordan was curbed. Gallman also reported that Nuri was particularly interested in the prospects of U.S.-Iraqi coordination of assistance for Jordan. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5-1756)

---

### 31. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, May 18, 1956—2 p.m.*

633. Called on King afternoon May 17 in response Department telegram 667.<sup>2</sup> British Ambassador, who had similar instructions, came out as I went in.

Began conversation with story of Uncle Joe, desert rat gold prospector, who upon appeal of St. Peter had rid heaven of undesirable characters by spreading rumor of gold strike in hell and then joined the group, victim of his own fabrication. I then turned to current exaggerated stories of West arming Israel and to fear I entertained that certain people would follow Uncle Joe's example

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5-1856. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, Ankara, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

<sup>2</sup>Document 28.

and believe their own propaganda. (For example, Cairo's 2260.<sup>3</sup>) It was human, I said, to try to get others to follow one's example and it would be surprising if there were no arms offers made to HKJ by or through Egypt. I expanded on this, pointing out dangers either direct Egyptian offer or of Egypt being unwitting stalking horse for Soviet bloc and presenting all the usual arguments, including those in Department telegrams 633<sup>4</sup> and 667. During conversation was able ask King point-blank if he had been offered arms or requested any. . . .

I dwelt at some length on fact US refuses enter arms race and on facts of offshore procurement in France. King said he understood the explanation but nevertheless unfortunate that arms were supplied to Israel by France and that France apparently engaged in such activity because of her involvement in North Africa. After all, Arabs had to stick together and if in addition to Algerian situation Israel's armed forces were strengthened, it could only be to detriment of West as far as Arabs concerned. I gave him rather full enunciation our stand on arms to Israel, protection from aggression through UN, et cetera, pointing out as Department instructed that we would feel same way towards Jordan. This apparently had little effect.

King thanked me for statement about US intentions with respect Iraq. He hoped they would be fruitful.

King repeated desire to stay in middle of Arab extremes and try draw factions together. He went on to say this was purpose his recent trip Lebanon since he thought Lebanon and HKJ had much in common this respect and solid front of two would be mutually beneficial. In this connection Beirut's 1463<sup>5</sup> strikes us as good and sound summary King's general philosophy as he might express it to Arabs. He has developed considerable liking and respect for President Chamoun.

. . . . .

Were it necessary characterize King's present state on basis yesterday's conversation I would say that his heart is still in right

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2260 from Cairo, May 16, reported indications that Nasser was "working himself into state of believing reports reaching him that decision taken Paris that piecemeal supply armament to Israel by various nations would continue until arms strength of Israel exceeded that of Arabs." (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5-1656).

<sup>4</sup> Document 27.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 1463 from Beirut, May 16, Heath forwarded brief highlights of a conversation between Chamoun and Hussein as conveyed to him by the Lebanese President. Among other things, Chamoun noted that King Hussein expressed his determination to keep Jordan out of the ESS pact. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.11/5-1656)

place but am not sure what he will do. . . . He is up to his neck in swift currents. While some of these are his own making, strongest forces beyond his control and he cannot move against stream. The real determinants are major trend within Arab world and pressures from strong neighbors (Embassy despatch 391<sup>6</sup>). Hussein and Jordan cannot resist them indefinitely. Answer lies less in helping King resist being pushed into morass which he does not wish to enter than in blocking forces which are pushing him.

**Mallory**

---

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 785.00/5-356)

---

## 32. Editorial Note

On May 20, Prime Minister al-Rifai submitted his resignation to the King. On May 22, former Prime Minister al-Mufti formed a new government.

On May 24, Hussein accepted the resignation of Major General Radi Innab who succeeded Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion in March. Innab was formally replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abu Nuwar. According to the Embassy in Amman, the appointment of Nuwar was an "open legalization status quo" since he had gained influence with the King at the time of the Glubb dismissal. (Telegram 650 from Amman, May 25; Department of State, Central Files, 785.551/5-2556) The Embassy had predicted in a telegram of May 6 that Nuwar would probably replace Radhi in the near future. According to the Embassy, "Abu Nuwar since helping engineer Glubb dismissal has climbed rapidly." (Telegram 603 from Amman, May 6; *ibid.*, 785.00/5-656)



**33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 4, 1956—6:54 p.m.*

1030. Baghdad's 1254<sup>2</sup> and 1260.<sup>3</sup> Dept shares Nuri's views seriousness situation Jordan and threats which recent developments there pose to Iraq and others interested security integrity NE. In manner most likely be effective you should point out to Nuri it was precisely these considerations which impelled your discussions with him based on Deptels 943<sup>4</sup> and 944.<sup>5</sup> We are continuing follow situation Jordan closely. For confidential information Iraq Govt. only, subject Congressional approval, we plan offer Jordan nearly \$8 million in economic and technical assistance in forthcoming fiscal year. US remains prepared discuss feasibility coordinating its aid plans with any program in which Iraq planned assist. We discussing developments with British.

In delicate situation Jordan, appears to us there is clear need for Iraq effort over and above what US and UK might do. As prospering and orderly Arab state with traditional ties Jordan, Iraq has means strengthen constructive influence which not available to US and UK. For example, prompt Iraqi initiative in offering loans to Jordan authorized by Iraq Parliament would serve as clear evidence to Jordanians Iraq Arab state willing provide material help rather than mere promises Jordan. This wholesome effect might be lost if Iraq seeks link economic assistance matters with other questions such as military relationships. Dept again underlines value of psychological gestures which demonstrate to Jordan people value maintaining friendly relations with Iraq. Would hope worthwhile military relationships could develop once feelings of mutual confidence established.

In developing situation Jordan, it important against background of actual or potential clashes of rival elements struggling for power, there should emerge among Jordanians widespread appreciation com-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/5-2956. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, and London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1254 from Baghdad, May 28, the Embassy reported a conversation between an official of the Iraqi Foreign Office and a representative of the Embassy. The conversation focused on recent Jordanian-Iraqi relations and the exchange of three notes with the Iraqis. (*Ibid.*, 685.87/5-2856)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1260 from Baghdad, May 29, the Embassy reported that Nuri regarded the replacement of Innab by Nuwar as a serious matter. According to the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuwar was "very susceptible to Egyptian-Soviet influence." (*Ibid.*, 685.87/5-2956)

<sup>4</sup> Printed as Document 28.

<sup>5</sup> Document 29.

mon interests with Iraq. We can not over-emphasize to Nuri feeling prompt and generous Iraqi initiative at this time absolutely essential to fostering such appreciation on part Jordanians.<sup>6</sup>

London advise FonOff.

**Hoover**

---

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 1325 from Baghdad, June 9, Gallman informed the Department that he had conveyed to Nuri the points highlighted in telegram 1030. Among other things, Nuri noted that Iraq did not envision any economic or financial assistance to Jordan beyond the potash and superphosphate projects approved by the Iraqi parliament. (Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/6-956)

---

**34. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to Jordan (Mallory), Department of State, Washington, September 10, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

The Situation in the Near East and in Jordan

In response to Ambassador Mallory's request for guidance prior to returning to his post, the Secretary said that the United States now finds itself in a difficult position in the Near East. We have strong bonds of friendship with the United Kingdom and France, but we cannot agree with their current approach to Near Eastern problems. This smacks of the power politics of the past; London and Paris like to speak to the Arab capitals with the authority of the "supernation."

The Secretary said that we consider Nasser an extremely dangerous individual. We believe that other Arab leaders agree with us, but don't dare speak out against the Egyptian President.

This week, said the Secretary, a decision may be reached on whether the United Kingdom and France are going to use force in an attempt to solve the Suez problem. He had been working with the President over the weekend in an effort to inject moderation into an explosive and very dangerous situation. If force were used, an additional complication might be a decision by Israel to take advantage by participating in the conflict. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, it would be very difficult for Americans in the Near East,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/9-1056. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell, September 11-17.

since they would inevitably be associated in local minds with the British and French.

The Secretary went on to say that if recourse to military methods is not used, we believe that processes exist for the deflation of Nasser. There are economic measures, such as alternate routes to the Suez Canal, adjustment of United States cotton export policy, and curtailment of United States aid programs. Also, Arab jealousies might work against Nasser if the West did not make him a martyr.

. . . . .

Ambassador Mallory said that the United Kingdom's position in the Near East and in Jordan was deteriorating. The United Kingdom pays an annual subsidy to Jordan of about £10 million, which was considered a good investment when it provided for a dependable military entity such as the Arab Legion, as well as two airfields in Jordan. The question now is whether, under the present circumstances, the United Kingdom will consider it worthwhile to keep on paying the subsidy. The Ambassador asked what our attitude would be if the United Kingdom decided to pull out. Would we pull out too, or try to supplant the British? The Ambassador went on to say that Point IV was being attacked by the Jordanians for political and other reasons and that in his opinion we have gone through the best projects.

The Secretary said that he did not like to provide a direct answer to a question like this without having more background. However, his off-the-cuff reaction was that in circumstances such as the Ambassador had described, we would cut back our assistance to Jordan. The Secretary emphasized the increasing difficulty the Department was having in getting funds from Congress for aid programs.

The Secretary then mentioned to the Ambassador the new circular instruction, sent out during the Ambassador's absence on leave, concerning the increased responsibilities of Chiefs of Mission for programs in their countries. The Department did not wish the Chiefs of Mission merely to acquiesce in plans for aid programs. If they thought for instance that there are too many Americans in a country or that a particular aspect of a program would not be beneficial, they should make their views forcefully known to the Department.

The Secretary concluded by wishing Ambassador Mallory good luck as he returned to Amman and by stating that the Department had full trust and confidence in him. The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for the time he had given him and the valuable guidance he had provided.

35. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 20, 1956—7:26 p.m.*

422. We feel Nuri's suggestion (Embtel 446<sup>2</sup>) Iraq-UK-HKJ approach to Jordan's defense problems highly practical and worthy further development. We would hope that Iraq military mission to Jordan is in position be sufficiently forthcoming maintain Jordan interest in proposal. Iraqis might wish consider token grant military equipment at this juncture as means further cementing HKJ-Iraq collaboration. While we recognize Iraq has no large surpluses military equipment available perhaps certain items could be transferred to Jordan at this time with Iraq making up deficiencies from traditional suppliers at later date.

Re Nuri's suggestion (Embtel 461<sup>3</sup>) US make small arms available Jordan there are number of factors which appear militate against such a move. One is provision UK-HKJ treaty that Jordan will ensure that armament and essential equipment HKJ forces will not differ from those forces of HMG. US has no desire disturb long-standing UK-HKJ arrangements. Another is fact military assistance whether grant or cash reimbursable requires conclusion military assistance agreement in accordance with US legislative requirements. Experience shows conclusion such agreements requires time.

**Hoover**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/9-1556. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Amman and London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 446 from Baghdad, September 15, Gallman reported, among other things, that Nuri, in the course of a discussion on Jordanian defense matters, had suggested that on the basis of Jordan's treaty with the United Kingdom and with Iraq, "a plan of joint action could and should be worked out for use in case of large-scale Israeli aggression." (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> On September 18 Gallman informed the Department that Nuri had expressed the hope that the United States could supply Jordan with some small defensive arms. (Telegram 461 from Baghdad; *ibid.*, 685.87/9-1856)

36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 27, 1956—7:34 p.m.*

462. Embtel 513.<sup>2</sup> Substance of following should be conveyed to Nuri:<sup>3</sup>

Department appreciates extent Jordanian pressure upon Iraq for military assistance. We have followed with interest recent efforts Iraq maintain and consolidate its influence in Jordan Governmental circles. However we feel strongly that Iraqi acquiescence Jordan request for Iraqi support in form of military force within Jordan, even if token, would be ill advised at this juncture. Iraqi military presence in Jordan now could hardly fail increase apprehension in some Israeli circles and might be used in others as pretext for serious Israeli counter action against Jordan. There is also possibility it would encourage irresponsible action of Jordan Government against Israel. Finally such Iraqi entry into Jordan might provoke reactions on part of Egypt Saudi Arabia and Syria which would be unhelpful at this time.

As regards Nuri's request for assurance concerning continuity US arms supply, Department has never considered objectives US military assistance program to Iraq inconsistent with Iraqi obligations under bilateral or multilateral agreements to assist other Arab states in the event they become victims of aggression. However we are not prepared in advance of actual situation which may develop to give commitment regarding continuity of our arms supply program.

FYI: With regard to Nuri's question about supplying some arms to Jordan through Iraq we have requested views Embassy Amman on political merits of this. Matter of blankets being investigated. Will

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/9–2756. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, Karachi, Ankara, Cairo, London, Damascus, and Beirut.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 513 from Baghdad, September 27, Gallman conveyed the substance of a conversation with Nuri al-Said. Among other things, Nuri expressed concern over recent Jordanian-Israeli border clashes; indicated that for the present he had no intention of dispatching an Iraqi division into Jordan, but would increase supplies at Mafraq and deploy a battalion to protect them. According to Nuri, Iraq's objective was to strengthen Jordan against communism and support the Baghdad Pact. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85/9–2756)

<sup>3</sup> On September 28, Gallman informed the Department that Nuri was unable to receive him and would meet with him the following day. The Ambassador added that he had delivered a letter to Nuri covering texts of the first two paragraphs of telegram 462. (Telegram 520 from Baghdad; *ibid.*, 685.87/9–2856)

send further word re arms and blankets within next few days. End FYI.

Dulles

---

37. **Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Baghdad, September 29, 1956—1 p.m.*

530. I saw Nuri at his home this morning (Embtel 520,<sup>2</sup> September 28). I found him most earnest and quite disturbed. He had, he said given most careful consideration to my letter. Pressure on him from Jordan was so strong that he would have to give Jordan immediate concrete evidence of support. He could not abandon plan for storing supplies within Jordan. He would proceed to store supplies at Hotel-4 and Hotel-5 and then at Mafraq. He wanted to make it clear that only a very small force would accompany the supplies as guards. Perhaps the force could be kept down to a few hundred troops. Iraq's aim he said he wished to emphasize again was solely to keep Jordan out of the Communist camp. If Iraq did not proceed now to do at least that much Jordan already receiving some Soviet aid from Egypt would most assuredly "pass over to Communist camp". Mafraq is quite some distance from the present scene of clashes. Even so he would guarantee that the small guard that would accompany supplies into Jordan would not get involved in any skirmishes.

I told Nuri we fully respected his guarantee but we greatly feared that the appearance of even a small force would be interpreted by Israel as an act of aggression and would precipitate powerful countermove.

Nuri replied that he was fully aware of that danger and that was why he had earlier asked that we make it clear in Tel Aviv that what he contemplated doing was no act of aggression but intended solely to give heart to Jordan in resisting Communist influence. Along with this explanation he was adding his guarantee that these few Iraqi soldiers would not take part in any fighting.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/9-2956. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Amman and Tel Aviv, and to Karachi, Ankara, Cairo, London, Damascus, and Beirut.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, *supra*.

Here I interjected that it would be tragic if Jordan confused Israeli retaliatory raids with an Israeli build-up for war. I had seen no evidence whatever I told Nuri of such Israeli intentions. I then returned to the great potential danger of sending even a token Iraqi force into Jordan. Nuri persisted, however, in his line that he must give Jordan immediate evidence of support.

At this point I asked Nuri whether he could not turn over the supplies he had in mind to the Jordanians at the frontier. That Nuri said, was out of the question. He did not have that much confidence in the Jordanians. "The supplies I am afraid" he said "would simply disappear".

Nuri then returned to the need of giving Foreign Minister Hadi some definite word of help before he returns to Amman. He said he would be seeing Hadi again this evening. Hadi was planning on returning to Amman tomorrow the thirtieth. Almost in desperation he asked whether we could not in the course of the day give him a definite answer on his request for some small arms and blankets which Iraq in turn could pass on to Jordan. I told him I would immediately urge Department again to give me a definite answer.

Could I, I finally asked Nuri, assure the Department that he would take no steps in moving supplies and guards into Jordan until I had had Department's reply on his small arms and blankets request and we had had further talk. He said I could guarantee the Department that. He also said he wanted to give us the guarantee now that in case of Israeli aggression in force he would not move any Iraqi troops in force across frontier until he had consulted with US and British.<sup>3</sup>

### Gallman

---

<sup>3</sup> On September 30 Gallman reported that Nuri had called on him at the Embassy inquiring about his request for small arms and blankets. According to the Ambassador, Nuri added, among other things, that the British Ambassador to Iraq had assured the Jordanian Foreign Minister Awni Abd al-Hadi, among others, that in case of Israeli aggression against Jordan, the United Kingdom would "immediately" assist Jordan under the provisions of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. (Telegram 533 from Baghdad; *ibid.*, 685.87/9–3056) That same day, the Department informed Gallman that the question of small arms and blankets was still under consideration. The Department added that it was doubtful that arms could be furnished, but it was hopeful that a way could be found to supply blankets. (Telegram 489 to Baghdad; *ibid.*)

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Amman, September 29, 1956—6 p.m.*

294. Reference Iraqi troops for Jordan. Appears this subject being fogged by welter divergent facts and interests. Stripped side issues naked point remains that Jordan no longer British strong point, is open game cut-throat struggle for influence. So far with lingering ties, annual British financial subsidy and some royal affinity to Iraq she is still shakily on side West. This at expense Arab unity Nasser style. He is bending efforts win Jordan and if he succeeds, through default or otherwise, I respectfully suggest that Iraq will come next.

The policy choices are therefore between trying keep part of Arabs Western oriented and in Baghdad Pact, or letting Nasser take over whole area.

Most arguments so far seen advanced against sending Iraqi troops here appear self-seeking or specious. Iraqi efforts have United States small arms sent Jordan strike one as diversionary red herring to cover unwillingness, hesitation or procrastination.

Israeli arguments about lack of armistice with Iraq are negated in same telegram (Tel Aviv's 295 <sup>2</sup>) by statement Israelis could occupy part Jordan if other Arab troops come. Moreover Israel by her own actions has rendered armistice agreement and UNTSO virtually useless. Little doubt Israel would be faced with far more serious situation if Iraq fails orient Jordan her way and armistice line becomes dominated by Nasser coalition. From this end of telescope it appears Israel may disregard the Anglo-Jordanian alliance since her arguments suggest build-up to justify warlike action. War by Israel this fall would be well justified from her point view. Next year likely too late and European intrusion in Near East, which she constitutes, will, remarkably like the crusaders, be then on defensive.

There is much justification for sending Iraqi troops here but only if Iraqis prepared for and assisted in real struggle for influence.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/9-2956. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Baghdad and Tel Aviv, and to Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, London, Jidda, and Tripoli.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 295 from Tel Aviv, September 27, reported, among other things, that there were indications that Israel was "apprehensive" about the possible movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan. According to Lawson, Ben Gurion indicated to him as early as July 1955 that he was concerned about Iraqi troops in Jordan and the implications of border clashes with an enemy state with no armistice agreement with Israel. (*Ibid.*, 685.87/9-2756)



Trying at moment to keep her troops out merely replaces today's problem by larger less desirable one tomorrow.

Mallory

---

39. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 1, 1956—7:58 p.m.*

497. You should inform Nuri (Deptel 489<sup>2</sup>) we unable in absence MDAP agreement with Jordan provide that country directly or through intermediary of Iraq rifles, machine guns and blankets which he asked for. However, we can understand Iraq's desire assist Jordan by making available from Iraqi supplies certain desired military items. For our part we wish to assure Nuri of our desire to help and we would be prepared support later inclusion within currently budgeted military aid program for Iraq of items considered by both countries as necessary to enhance effectiveness of Iraqi forces.

(FYI: We wish avoid having aid we may provide Iraq in forego-ing categories labelled as replacement for equipment Iraqis may give Jordan. We unable indicate precisely when such aid might be forthcoming but we would exert every effort insure Iraqi requirements met as promptly as possible. Important that Nuri understand any such aid will have to come from funds earmarked for Iraqi portion MDAP funds. End FYI)<sup>3</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.87/10-156. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Fritzman and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 489 to Baghdad, September 30, the Department informed Gallman that the question of small arms and blankets for Jordan was still under consideration. (*Ibid.*, 685.87/9-3056)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 546 from Baghdad, October 2, Gallman reported that he had conveyed the substance of the first paragraph of telegram 497 to Nuri. According to the Ambassador, the Prime Minister expressed surprise that the United States "could not help even with some blankets." (*Ibid.*, 685.87/10-256)

40. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of  
Israel-Jordan Affairs (Bergus) to the Director of the  
Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins)<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 25, 1956.*

SUBJECT

The Jordan Parliamentary Elections and Preliminaries Thereto<sup>2</sup>

The 1954 Jordanian Parliamentary (actually Chamber of Deputies) elections were rigged in favor of pro-government candidates. Civil disorders resulted and many of those responsible for the rioting were jailed. The population was extremely dissatisfied with the results and the British were held responsible for the government interference. Thereafter there was more or less continuous agitation by Jordanians, especially the Palestinian element, for dissolution of Parliament and new free elections. This agitation reached its zenith during the riots which were touched off last winter by General Templar's visit to Amman seeking Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact. Immediately prior to the resignation of Prime Minister Hazza Majali (who favored Jordan's joining the Baghdad Pact) in December 1955, which was forced by the rioting, the King dissolved Parliament. Subsequently, the King had misgivings about the wisdom of this move and in early January 1956 the High Court of Jordan was asked to decide whether the dissolution had been constitutional. The court held that the dissolution was invalid (the dissolution decree not having been signed by the appropriate Minister) and the former Parliament was reinstated. This brought on the January series of riots in which law and order throughout Jordan completely broke down. Order was eventually restored but then, on March 1, the King fired Glubb and a wave of nonviolent pro-Egyptian and anti-Western sentiment once more swept the country.

On May 21, a government was formed by Said Mufti who was morally committed to seek dissolution of Parliament. A decree of dissolution was issued by the King on June 26 and, in accordance with the Constitution, elections were scheduled for October 21.

These elections have now been held and as a result three communists, running on a National Front ticket, have been elected.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/10-2556. Secret. Drafted by Blackiston. A note attached to the source text, October 26, from Wilkins to Rountree and Berry, reads: "For your information when you have a spare moment. A useful summary of the Jordan situation". An additional notation from Rountree reads: "Many thanks. Very interesting plus useful."

<sup>2</sup> Elections were held on October 21. On October 29 a new government, led by Prime Minister Sulayman al-Nabulsi, leader of the National Socialist Party, was formed.

In addition four other extremists have been elected and 19 of the total 40 members of the new Parliament are anti-Western. Nine of those elected are considered neutrals some of whom would be willing to jump aboard a pro-Egyptian anti-Western band wagon. The twelve pro-Westerners elected are considered weak. Thus for the second time in history communists have been elected to an Arab Parliament. The previous example is the 1954 election of Khalid Bakdash to the Syria Parliament.

It is difficult to predict the trend of the Jordan Government until the new cabinet has been formed. This should take place within the next few days. Cabinet members need not be members of Parliament and rarely are. The Parliament does not have great influence over the acts of the government or the King but it does have more than nuisance value. However, there are only a handful of potential Prime Ministerial candidates most of whom are a shop-worn lot having served as Prime Minister many times in the past. A sufficiently vigorous Prime Minister who had both the confidence and support of the King could probably effectively negate the effect of the extremists and their followers in Parliament. Unfortunately none such exists. However since no dependable ESS offer to supplant the British subsidy seems likely to be forthcoming in the immediate future, it would appear that despite the pressure of the street no Government will be able to do more than call for revisions of the British treaty. It is likely that Jordan will rock along for some time to come much as it has in the past but with increasing Egyptian influence being felt in the country. The point of diminishing returns must fast be approaching for the British and whether they will desire to continue the subsidy must be dependent upon the effect an abrogation of the treaty and withdrawal of the subsidy, followed by a probable partition of Jordan, would have on the British position in other areas of the Near East.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> On October 27, the Embassy in Amman conveyed its impressions of the recent Jordanian elections. According to the Embassy, the new Parliament was anti-Western in character, and any future dealings with the Jordanian Government would be difficult if not impossible. (Telegram 390; Department of State, Central Files, 786.5/10-2756)

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Amman, November 9, 1956—4 p.m.*

477. Immediately following good-bye call on me by Ambassador Duke our ARMA gave me following details long conversation he had just finished with Major General Ali Abu Nuwwar, Commanding General Jordan Arab Army.

1. Iraqi would not accept him as Commanding General combined armies. Furthermore they insisted Jordan terminate Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian tripartite military pact which he refused. As result Joint Staff arrangements abandoned and Nuwwar expects Iraqi troops will gradually phase-out.

2. Nuwwar said Communist influence gaining very rapidly here. If US wants salvage anything in Jordan it must act immediately.

His recommendation is that US furnish military and economic aid Jordan in sufficient volume compensate for similar British aid which will soon be ended. If US will put up money and arms Nuwwar guarantees that communism will be prevented from dominating Jordan, that he will dissolve Parliament and take over the government, and "I and the people of Jordan will follow US policies". Nuwwar said he willing fly Washington and confer with President Eisenhower and other officials and sign agreement along lines as drafted by US. Nuwwar said he is anti-Communist but he must have aid and if he does not get it from US he will get it from USSR.

. . . . .

In conclusion Nuwwar expressed desire see me personally and begged most strongly that this message be treated in highest confidence with no indication any such matter under consideration being communicated anyone outside American Embassy Amman, himself, and few US officials in Washington. . . .

In conclusion Nuwwar reiterated his strong anti-Communist stand but stated that if he has to turn to Communists for assistance he will be in the first rank of those waving the red flag.

I will probably have to see Nuwwar before long. Should Department have any comments would appreciate them promptly.

**Mallory**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-956. Top Secret; Priority; Noform.

42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 10, 1956—3:18 p.m.*

553. Embtel 477. <sup>2</sup> FYI Difficult comment definitively because such factors as immaturity . . . Nuwar and uncertain strength of his position in Arab Army, extent and details USSR discussions with Jordan, power and influence remaining in hands King and Government, British intentions toward Jordan. End FYI.

You may your discretion comment along following lines if you feel it desirable to talk to Nuwar:

Our policies supporting political independence and territorial integrity NE states well known. Our leadership in UN actions aimed at bringing about cease fire, withdrawal of troops, and establishment UN emergency international police force Egypt are most recent proof of this. We strongly urging all NE states take no action which would jeopardize UN efforts (which supported by overwhelming majority nations of world), risk renewal or spread of active hostilities, and further threaten peace and stability of area and of world.

Recent brutal Soviet attempts extinguish national dignity and independent existence Hungarian people, which also condemned by vast majority UN members, demonstrate clearly motives behind current Soviet efforts increase communist influence over Arab states.

We appreciate Jordan's need for outside assistance in maintaining its security forces and assuring its economic development. We feel Jordan should continue look to friendly countries with whom Jordan has had long-standing treaty arrangements for dependable assistance which has strengthened Jordan sovereignty. We aware difficulties presented to Jordan in maintaining traditional relationships in light present crisis, but hope UN efforts will reduce tension and avert hostilities. We recall provisions UNGA resolution Novem-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-956. Top Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

ber 2 calling on all members UN refrain from introducing military matériel into NE.<sup>3</sup>

## Hoover

<sup>3</sup> On November 2, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 997(ES-1) that included the following recommendation: "Recommends that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present Resolution." For full text of the resolution, see U.N. doc. A/3256. On November 14, Mallory informed the Department that Ali Abu Nuwar had again raised the question of the United States replacing Great Britain as the source of outside aid to Jordan. According to Nuwar, the Soviet Union had offered assistance, but he did not wish to accept it. Mallory noted that he had conveyed the Department's instructions as outlined in telegram 553 omitting the Department's view that Jordan should look to countries with whom it has had "long-standing treaty arrangements." In the Ambassador's view, to have spoken along such lines "could only have earned disgust and the conviction that Jordan must accept other help." It was difficult, Mallory conceded, to grasp the degree to which public opinion had turned against the United Kingdom. (Telegram 487 from Amman; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-1456)

### 43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 18, 1956—2:20 p.m.*

590. Embtel 503.<sup>2</sup> Matter raised with you by King is obviously of such serious consequences that immediate substantive reply not possible. Pending results consideration by USG you should continue your efforts persuade King take no precipitate action, pointing out dangers to Jordan of jumping from frying pan into fire. Emphasize that US working hard through UN to restore peace to Near East and to bring about withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egypt. Once this accomplished situation should be more stable and pressure for

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-1756. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 503 from Amman, November 17, reported a conversation in which Mallory was told that the severing of Jordan's relations with the United Kingdom was under consideration and that if that should happen, Jordan would need financial assistance, possibly from the Soviet Union or other Arab states but preferably from the United States. Mallory had replied that the United States had not envisaged supplanting the United Kingdom, that U.S. military assistance granted to other countries had been provided under mutual defense assistance agreements and only for purposes of defense, and that budgetary assistance to the general income of a country was not customary and might not be possible. He also reported a Jordanian perception that a move by President Eisenhower for an overall settlement of Middle East problems would have an electrifying effect. (*Ibid.*)

Jordanian break with UK should lessen somewhat. Add that as soon as present crisis dealt with US envisages major effort through UN to resolve basic underlying issues of Palestine and Suez. Chances of success this effort will be much greater if Arab states and Israel, recognizing increased danger to their security and independence resulting from present crisis, will adopt more flexible attitude than in past toward solution these long-standing issues.<sup>3</sup>

**Hoover**

---

<sup>3</sup> On November 18, the Department conveyed to the Embassy in London a summary of telegram 503 from Amman and directed the Embassy in London to ascertain from the Foreign Office what were British plans in the event Jordan broke with the United Kingdom and provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to "step in". The telegram noted: "Occurs to Department that Iraq might play useful role, especially if outside assistance provided for this purpose." (Telegram 3583; *ibid.*, 684A.86/11-1856) On November 19, the Embassy in London informed the Department that the Foreign Office was anxious over the situation in Jordan but had no idea as to what it might do in the event of a break. According to the British, Hussein was in favor of a break, while Nuwwar and most politicians in Jordan were opposed. The Foreign Office considered the possibility of Iraqi aid "uncertain" as a result of Nuri's domestic problems and the prospect of an Israeli response to Iraq's intervention. According to the Embassy, the Foreign Office representative inquired about the possibility of U.S. aid. The Embassy responded that while it had no information on this matter, it doubted whether the United States could furnish assistance comparable to the British subsidy. (Telegram 2811; *ibid.*, 684A.86/11-1956)

---

#### 44. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Baghdad, November 19, 1956—1 p.m.*

882. Deptel 845.<sup>2</sup> We understand from local Central Bank authority Iraqi reserves approximated dinars 152 million as of September. We estimate this provides adequate reserve to support current projects undertaken by development program. However uncertainty as to when pipelines and pumping stations can be repaired

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-1956. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Amman.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 845 to Baghdad, November 18, the Department solicited the Embassy's estimate of the role which the Iraqis might play in the event that Jordan broke relations with the United Kingdom. The Department added that the political and economic implications of possible "indirect assistance" to the Iraqis should be taken into consideration. The Embassy was instructed not to approach the Iraqi Government. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11-1856)

and lack of confidence in ability Syrian Government insure smooth operation when facilities restored will undoubtedly make Iraqis reluctant draw against this reserve for non-development purposes except for compelling reasons.

In assessing desirability providing Jordan with assistance of [garble] current UK subsidy Nuri will probably be motivated by:

1. His desire that such help be coordinated with US assistance programs (see Embtel 346 September 1<sup>3</sup> and preceding messages) and his conviction that apart from USSR only country able supply heavy arms is US (see Embtel 446 October 15<sup>4</sup>). In this connection he would probably expect US assurance that we would be prepared help supply Jordan's military requirements.

2. The degree to which he believes Iraqi influence will be paramount in Jordan after assistance has been granted. I do not believe he would be prepared to offer a large grant without clear assurances on this point.

3. The extent to which Iraq in the event her financial position should deteriorate to point where current development program were threatened could expect to receive substantial assistance. Nuri would probably expect to have assurances from us on this point. Specifically he would expect in contingency mentioned above US economic assistance policy. I doubt if he would find it politically desirable request UK assistance.

In event Jordan should take action terminating UK connection Nuri will likely lose no time in approaching US to request that we fill gap. In order forestall this development and anticipate possible Soviet maneuver I believe we should be prepared take initiative at appropriate time and make forceful case for Iraq's assumption this burden. If Department's assessment of problem indicates political desirability Iraq's assuming responsibility Jordan assistance request I be authorized make this approach equipped with compelling arguments and in position deal with questions raised in (1) and (3) above.

**Gallman**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 346 from Baghdad, September 1, informed the Department that Nuri al-Said had expressed the hope that difficulties in U.S. assistance to Jordan could be worked out at the earliest possible date. (*Ibid.*, 785.5-MSP/9-156)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 35.



45. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, November 22, 1956—1 p.m.*

528. Discussion with King Hussein (Embtel 520<sup>2</sup>) apparently bore some fruit. General Nuwwar CGS came to see me last evening ostensible reason that in spite unanimous vote in Parliament King had decided HKJ would not recognize Russia and Red China and they wanted me to know this. He said after November 20 audience King had spoken to him of aid from United States and Nuwwar had then told King of his discussions with ARMA and me (Embtel 487<sup>3</sup>). While they felt a break with United Kingdom was inevitable they judged present crisis was not time to act and as mentioned in Deptel 590<sup>4</sup> go from frying pan to fire. Hence they will wait awhile and Nuwwar said in fact he will tell British Chargé they do not plan abrogate treaty at present. He twice mentioned fear of possibility United Kingdom giving more favorable attitude to Israel. Nuwwar went on to say they did not wish accept Russian aid either indirectly through Syria or directly and likewise not wishing an interregnum financial limbo thought best to wait United States attitude and work something out. They much prefer United States assistance. During course of a long conversation I extracted from him their idea, for moment at least, was not break with United Kingdom for period up to 6 months. The two young men are changeable and impressionable. They apparently have been plowed down as result developments but delay of 6 months may prove wishful thinking unless Suez and Sinai are cleared up or unless King suspends constitution and rules with military junta or both. It will not be long before public opinion could again be in mood where clarion call from Cairo could send anti-British mobs in streets as forceful as those in anti-Baghdad Pact demonstration in December 1955.

Re Deptel 599<sup>5</sup> the question of the source and timing of aid for Jordan will be determined by two factors: Speed of withdrawal of British French and Israeli forces from Egypt and Gaza and the rate of

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-2256. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad and London.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11-2056)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 42.

<sup>4</sup> Document 43.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 599 to Amman, November 20, the Department solicited additional comments and recommendations from the Embassy on Hussein's recent approach to the United States for aid and on the political effects of a possible U.S. decision to furnish budgetary aid to Jordan in the event the United Kingdom ended its subsidy. The Department also sought the Embassy's views on how direct assistance might be implemented. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-1756)

progress toward settlement Palestine problem. If there is speedy withdrawal and real progress toward settlement problem will be less acute and British may enjoy period of grace.

Failing these developments United States aid must be immediately available else popular demand will probably force issue to point where it will be too late for aid from any Western source.

Re short term impact on Jordan attitude should British subsidy and treaty arrangements be terminated and United States assume burden we can expect little more than to retain our present improved position. The passing of the English ogre removes the buffer of comparison and the Communists, extremists and others who now belabor them would turn on US. It would be no victory for the Soviets to have British replaced by Americans. One could expect them to build up an attack. Such attack could be avoided or tempered by the public approbation of Gamel Nasser. Could this be arranged, and it is almost necessary, the Communist and extremists teeth would be drawn for some time to come. Favorable impact would also be possible if Hussein could claim change in source of subsidy as victory over the English comparable to ousting of Glubb.

Re longer term effects on HKJ the relationships with United States and west generally should improve but with respect other countries would be only reflection of favorable attitude to United States. In the foreseeable future any mending of the attitude towards Britain and France can only occur if these countries follow United States lead in moves favorable to Arabs.

The question of attitude towards United States and West both short and long term is based on national acts, the subsidy being secondary. For the moment we are well regarded for 3 reasons:

First we supported the Arab cause, not as effectively in local eyes as did Russians but we did come through.

Second, we look good in comparison to others because they despise the French, hate English, somewhat fear unknown Russians, dislike Iraqis and hero worship Nasser.

Third, Nasser gave his approval of our actions. It is what we do in a positive way that counts if we are to keep the Russians out. The day of the status quo is over.

Re question of channel for aid Embassy believes should be direct United States to Jordan. Efforts to channel it otherwise, for example through Iraq, would either meet refusal or such grudging acceptance as to destroy its usefulness. The Iraqis are now in great disrepute in Jordan. Iraq aid would be looked upon as English or English maneuver. Were it to become known as American aid through Iraq it would still be branded as English and fail its purpose. Moreover quite apart from more purely Jordanian reactions it would be subject to attack of Egypt, Syria and left fringe generally. Thus

Embassy can state unequivocally that it would be better to do nothing than to try to do it through Iraq at this time.

Manner of direct assistance is likely best provided by increasing United States aid to meet current combined United States and British levels—about \$40 million. Funds for support Arab army should be so earmarked but offered as direct budgetary support without strings except for time factor and appropriate controls governing type and source of material purchased. Presence of a MAAG training group would be as distasteful to HKJ as to Israel. Suggest combined United States and United Kingdom economic and technical assistance programs be administered accordance normal ICA procedures but decisions respect continuation British financed economic aid programs such as Aqaba port and desert road be based on review for suitability and soundness as individual projects. The whole matter can probably be handled with ICA staff here at its full authorized level plus 1 or 2 financial controllers.

I wish to emphasize that financial assistance to Jordan by the United States as well as the money we have been putting into refugee upkeep or through UNRWA is a losing game unless we are determined not only to terminate present crisis in a matter of days but also to promptly seek settlement of Palestine problem for which mood has now improved.

Mallory

---

46. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 23, 1956—7:54 p.m.*

619. Urtel 528.<sup>2</sup> At earliest appropriate opportunity you should convey to King and Abu Nuwar Department's view that their decision not recognize USSR and Communist China and to defer consideration abrogation UK–Jordan treaty eminently sound and sensible in light present critical circumstances Near East. Jordan recognition of Communists would only increase opportunities for

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2256. Top Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Baghdad and London.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

Communists to step up their efforts achieve their objective of subverting and dominating entire Near East.

USG appreciates frankness with which King and Abu Nuwar have discussed these vital problems with Ambassador. Their views receiving closest study here and we hope they will continue feel free consult us. Of particular interest would be King's and Abu Nuwar's thoughts as to contributions Jordan could make to stabilizing area and to achievement of permanent solutions to Palestine and Suez problems.<sup>3</sup>

Hoover

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 569 from Amman, November 30, reported that Mallory had conveyed the Department's views to the King. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-3056)

---

**47. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 26, 1956.*

SUBJECT

A United States Program for Jordan<sup>2</sup>

*The Problem:*

Jordan, which has never been a viable state, economically or politically, was created and maintained by the British. In return for an expenditure in Jordan in the magnitude of \$30 to \$40 million annually, Britain obtained the following benefits: military transit and base rights; the services of the British-trained and officered Arab

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 58 D 398, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S June-Dec. Secret. Drafted by Bergus. The source text bears no indication that it was sent to the Acting Secretary or approved.

<sup>2</sup> On December 3, at a meeting in the Secretary's office, attended by Dulles, Hoover, Murphy, Henderson, and others, the subject of Jordan was raised in the course of a review of the current situation in the Middle East. According to an "informal record" of the meeting prepared by Greene, Rountree noted that Jordan was the "one pressing question" which required a U.S. decision. Rountree remarked that the Department had asked the British for their views, but added that "we may have to move in the next few days to provide budgetary assistance to Jordan, some of which helps support the Arab Legion, in order to forestall a Soviet move." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 780.00/12-356)

Legion (which proved its worth to Britain in Iraq in 1941, and in Palestine 1947-1948); a sphere of abiding British political influence in the Middle East as postwar British withdrawals took place from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt.

UK-Jordan relations have been in difficulties since the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951. The decline of British influence was sharply accelerated by the public unrest created by an abortive British attempt to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact in December 1955. This touched off events culminating in the dismissal of Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, in February 1956. The UK-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in October 1956 has brought a crisis for the future of significant British influence in Jordan. The Jordan Parliament has unanimously recommended the abrogation of the UK-Jordan treaty and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR and Communist China.

Our Ambassador at Amman has had a series of discussions with the King and Abu Nuwar, Commander of the Arab Army. The Jordan Government's position seems to be this: Jordan will not recognize the USSR or Communist China. Jordan will defer for the time being abrogation of the UK-Jordan treaty, but a break with Britain is probably inevitable. Jordan realizes that it needs non-Arab assistance to survive, and would prefer such assistance from the United States. If United States help were not available, however, Jordan would accept assistance from the USSR. We have told the Jordanians that their views are receiving closest study in Washington. We have also urged them to take no precipitate action.

Our Embassy in Moscow feels that the USSR would respond favorably to a Jordan request for aid. Embassy London reports an awareness on the part of the British as to their loss of position in Jordan, but British intentions towards Jordan appear obscure.

*Basic Considerations:*

1. The increase of USSR, Syrian, or Egyptian influence in Jordan challenges United States interests in the Near East and should be prevented. It is to United States interest to have the United Kingdom position in Jordan maintained as long as possible.

2. A United States program aimed solely at maintaining the status quo in Jordan would be unrealistic, in view of the lack of political and economic viability of the state. United States activities in Jordan should be aimed at the ultimate peaceful integration of the country into one or more of the territories of neighboring states friendly to the West. A first step in this process could be the fostering of augmented Iraqi influence in Jordan.

3. Jordan is the only Arab state in which the unresolved issues arising out of the Palestine conflict are the primary political and economic facts. Any resolution of the Palestine problem along lines acceptable to the United States will require substantial United States influence in Jordan.

4. A United States program to augment or supplant British influence in Jordan would raise a number of problems. In the first place, the UK-Jordan treaty is not, according to its terms, subject to denunciation until 1968 or to revision until 1963. Its unilateral obligation by Jordan over British protest could create juridical as well as political problems. At the same time, the British have, in the past, indicated a certain willingness to revise the treaty well in advance of 1963. They offered drastic revision to Jordan in the context of Jordan's adhering to the Baghdad Pact. Accordingly, revision or termination of the treaty by mutual consent should not be ruled out.

British assistance to Jordan has been predominately in the field of defense and internal security—a defensive alliance and total support of Jordan's defense budget. It would not be desirable for the United States to enter into such a relationship, which in any event has become irritating to the Jordanians. The most feasible means of assistance to Jordan would probably be a United States or United States-Iraqi program of budgetary support, with joint Jordan-Iraqi cash military procurement and training activities in accordance with Article 7 of the Jordan-Iraq treaty of 1947. These should be from traditional Western sources.

5. Israel would, in keeping with its policy of seeking to prevent close Arab ties with the United States and the West, oppose an augmentation of United States influence in Jordan unless the United States were prepared to establish a clear relationship with Israel at the same time, perhaps by a security arrangement.

6. Jordan's natural ties—historic, geographic, linguistic—are with Syria, a country presently unfriendly to the United States.

The dynastic and treaty relationship between Jordan and Iraq is overshadowed by mutual distrust between ruling elements in the two countries as well as Iraqi unpopularity among the mass of Jordanians. At the same time, Iraq is probably the only Arab country which would be in a position to enter into long-standing economic and military aid relationships with Jordan.

Saudi Arabia has in the past asserted territorial claims to roughly the southern third of Jordan. However, it is doubtful that King Saud would view with equanimity a collapse of Jordan which brought organized Communist activity to his northern frontiers. We have urged King Saud to support King Hussein in his decision not to

recognize Communist states and to avoid precipitate action with respect to the Jordan–UK treaty.

Egypt has sought to increase its influence in Jordan with the primary objective of removing British influence and secondarily as a means of maintaining pressure on Israel and Iraq.

These Arab states have shown more interest in keeping each other out of Jordan than in taking it over.

*Recommended Elements of a Program for Jordan:*

1. A decision in principle within the United States Government to offer budgetary support to Jordan at the rate of approximately \$30 million annually, directly and in conjunction with Iraq assistance efforts in Jordan.

2. An approach to the British based on United States concern at the developing situation in Jordan and United States interest in preventing a Communist take-over in Jordan with a view to ascertaining their willingness to continue some assistance to Jordan on the basis of a revised UK–Jordan relationship such as the payment of rental for base facilities. If the British feel that they are no longer in a position to assure Jordan's remaining friendly to the West, the United States would be willing to augment its present efforts in that country. These could be phased into such United Kingdom assistance to Jordan as the United Kingdom and Jordan may agree shall remain. We could assure the British that such efforts on our part would not be aimed at supplanting long-standing British commercial and cultural interests in Jordan.

3. Assuming British recognition of the need for increased United States efforts in Jordan, an approach to the Jordanians to the effect that the United States is disposed to assist Jordan on the basis that the Jordanian people wish to remain in the free world and are willing to cooperate with it. One of the forms of such cooperation would be full cooperation with the UNTSO and the ceasing of fedayeen activity against Israel based on [in?] Jordan. We feel that Jordan with its many pressing problems and meagre resources needs to strengthen its relations in the area as well as with the United States in view of forces in the area seeking, with Soviet assistance, to take over Jordan. Accordingly United States aid to Jordan would be forthcoming in the context of Iraqi–Jordanian political and economic cooperation. The United States seeks no military facilities in Jordan.

4. An approach to Iraq repeating the above points, pointing out that while the United States is willing to assume a large part of the burden of assisting Jordan, it is greatly in Iraq's interest to participate in these efforts to the utmost of its abilities. In addition to

offering financial assistance, Iraq should make the strengthening of Iraqi influence in Jordan a matter of first priority in its foreign policy and be prepared to devote the necessary effort and skill to this enterprise. Iraqi assistance to Jordan should be in the context of the Iraq-Jordan treaty of 1947 and general friendly interest. There should be no attempt at this time to formulate new treaty relationships or bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact.

5. An approach to Saudi Arabia pointing out the urgent necessity of United States-Iraqi efforts in Jordan to prevent, inter alia, Communist takeover of territory on Saudi Arabia's northern border through which TAPLINE runs. Conversely, we can assure the Saudis that United States-Iraqi activities in Jordan will in no way jeopardize Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity. We are aware of Saudi Arabian interests in Jordan and are prepared to discuss with the Saudis how best these interests can be furthered.

6. Lebanese support of United States-Iraqi efforts in Jordan should be obtained to broaden the basis of Arab support.

7. An approach to Israel should be made to the effect that Israel can not help but benefit from measures aimed at increasing United States influence and general stability in Jordan. Israel's acceptance of this fact will enhance United States-Israel relations. The United States will continue to use its influence in Jordan and in the United Nations to strengthen border security. It is of the utmost importance that Israel pursue a course of action which will lessen rather than increase border tensions. The growth of United States influence in Jordan increases the possibilities for an Arab-Israel settlement.

*Recommendation:*

That NEA further discuss the foregoing suggestions with other departments and agencies of the Government and submit specific recommendations for approval.



**48. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, December 2, 1956—1 p.m.*

581. Saw Prime Minister Nabulsi yesterday and inquired re end Anglo-Jordan treaty and subsidy. He said HKJ wishes terminate on friendly basis making distinction between abrogation and termination (Embassy telegram 571<sup>2</sup> repeated London 130). Stated treaty not essential to friendship, that tripartite declaration would protect Jordan as well as British treaty which has not prevented large Jewish attacks, and that United Nations would come to assistance as it did for Egypt. He was reluctant give indication timing but finally said Ministerial Committee to discuss aid with other Arab countries would not be leaving soon, that there was no hurry press matters and that United Kingdom not likely break off subsidy so long as she had treaty and air bases here. However if United Kingdom did break unilaterally then Jordan could only submit and tighten her belt. I gathered impression he hopes United Kingdom will break and relieve him from both duty of break called for in government policy statement and probable financial chaos which would follow.

After considerable exchange he said King Hussein had informed him of his conversation with me on financial assistance. He said such aid would be good if were given without special conditions, so government could use as it saw fit and not like Point 4 to various projects. I mentioned that army was an important point and questioned need for present enlarged force. He countered by asking about arms and I reviewed MDAP treaty provisions.

I pointed out we would not wish be in position of pushing United Kingdom out of Jordan and asked his observations. Conversation finally arrived nowhere in particular. It showed either unwillingness face situation or fact he has more devious plans. At present Prime Minister appears gripped by forces bigger than he can cope

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12-256. Top Secret. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 571 from Amman, November 30, Mallory informed the Department, among other things, that Nabulsi had indicated to the British Ambassador that there was a distinction between abrogation and termination. According to Nabulsi, abrogation of a treaty was a unilateral act; termination would follow bilateral negotiations. (*Ibid.*, 641.85/11-3056)

At the Secretary's staff meeting on December 4, during the course of the intelligence briefing, Armstrong raised the matter of Jordan's plan to terminate its treaty with Great Britain. Dulles asked whether there was a clause in the treaty which provided for the termination desired by the Jordanians. Armstrong agreed to check. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

with and is uncertain. He is learning a lot about government and responsibility. . . .

A problem at hand is what to tell King Hussein. We must before long reply his plea for financial aid. British attitude hardening although Ambassador Johnston has recommended to London to pay 800,000 sterling cover December army needs. By now Syria, Egypt and Russia undoubtedly know of King Saud's offer assist obtaining United States aid to Jordan and may be preparing block or counter-move.

Mallory

---

49. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, December 10, 1956, 9:45 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

USDel/MC/1/2

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary  
Mr. Macomber

*United Kingdom*

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd  
Mr. Dennis Lackey

SUBJECT

Jordan

During his conversation with the Secretary on other subjects, Mr. Lloyd turned to the subject of Jordan. He said that the UK felt that the Jordan treaty was of no further use and that "our money spent there is wasted, except that it may keep out worse money". He said that Jordan had asked the UK to negotiate the termination of their defense treaty. He said the UK had under the subsidy given Jordan 800,000 pounds for December and added that the UK felt the treaty should not be terminated without one month's notice in payments.

The Secretary asked Mr. Lloyd "What is the future of Jordan?" Mr. Lloyd replied "I don't think it's got one". He then added "unless it becomes a little Satellite". He said he thought that the King will

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 814. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. Dulles was in Paris for the 18th Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held December 11-14.

go mad. He thought that Trans Jordan alone could have been kept going (although it would have needed a subsidy), but that it was ruined when it took over the West Bank and the refugees. He said that he didn't see how Jordan could last for very long but that "it does not suit us or you that it becomes a Russian Satellite."

It was agreed that the King of Jordan was not going to do well in passing the hat among his Arab neighbors in an effort to get a replacement for the British subsidy. The Secretary said we had considered giving Jordan some money but he did not know whether we would do so. He said that he was not too much alarmed by Satellites springing up which are not contiguous to the territory of the USSR. If the territory is not contiguous, the Russians are not able to act as they had in the Hungarian situation. He said that non-contiguous Satellites can be "pinched off" by the US and UK working together. He said he thought the Russians knew this, that they would make trouble with non-contiguous Satellites but they were not prepared to make a big investment in areas which they could not hold. He added that he thought this was the reason the Russians had not moved in on the Aswan Dam.

Before leaving this subject, Mr. Lloyd mentioned that the British subsidy to Jordan was about 13 million pounds per year.

---

## 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 12, 1956—11:38 a.m.*

698. Your 581. <sup>2</sup> Department feels might be useful this juncture for you to have further conversation with Nabulsi in course of which you could make following points:

US policy towards Jordan has been made clear on many occasions in past. US has taken at face value Jordan statements to effect HKJ was determined preserve its sovereign independence and territorial integrity as member free world and to resist Communist efforts subvert and take over Jordan. This understanding has been one of factors underlying US decision to provide economic and technical

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12-256. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell and Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, London, Jidda, and Cairo.

<sup>2</sup> Document 48.

---

assistance to Jordan with view assist Jordan to strengthen internal stability and increase well-being Jordanian people.

Unstable conditions in NE resulting from crisis over Egypt have provided excellent opportunity for Communist elements to attempt undermine security of NE states. Any steps which would increase instability in area would play into Communist hands and have harmful effect upon ability of govt concerned to resist Communist subversion. US believes that in these critical days Jordan should hold fast to those factors which provide dependable source of strength for future. One of these is relationship with UK. US took leadership in UN to find measures to deal with Egyptian crisis and UK and France have now announced their decision to withdraw from Egypt. This course of events should serve to promote restoration of more normal atmosphere.

Jordan faces many practical problems in assuring adequate external assistance for maintenance its security, refugee relief requirements, and economic development. USG sympathetic and wishes continue assist Jordan in coping with these problems but hopes obstacles will not be placed in way of its ability do so by developments which would tend isolate Jordan from its friends and cause deterioration in Jordan's capability maintain and strengthen its own security and stability.<sup>3</sup>

**Hoover**

---

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 618 from Amman, December 14, Mallory reported that Nabulsi was "unavailable" and might be away for several days. The Ambassador informed the Department that he would see Nabulsi as soon as possible and offered his personal observations on the Department's telegram. Mallory noted that the Department's consideration of the maintenance of Jordan's sovereign independence and territorial integrity was "most timely"; a more normal atmosphere was coming about after the Anglo-French decision to withdraw from Egypt; strengthening of the Western position in Jordan would have to come from good will toward the United States alone; there was considerable doubt in the British Embassy in Amman concerning the budget to be presented to Parliament in March 1957; and even since Suez, Jordan "both in press and private" had expressed a hope for "'positive American action'". (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12-1456)

---

## 51. Editorial Note

On December 14, Secretary Dulles, in Paris to attend the 18th Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, met with British Foreign Secretary Lloyd at the Palais de Chaillot for a discussion that

covered Middle Eastern matters. In regard to Jordan, the memorandum of conversation includes the following exchange:

"Lloyd enquired what might be done about the situation in Jordan. He went on to say that he doubted that the British would be willing to continue their subsidy, although they would not cut it off without thirty days' notice. He said the UK was disturbed about the Jordan situation and did not wish to leave a vacuum. He hoped that the Jordanians would not automatically go to the Russians for help if the British subsidy were terminated. He said the Jordanians feel that the British are committed to payment of the full annual subsidy, which would carry through the British fiscal year ending March 31. He reiterated his doubt that the UK would be willing, in the face of the position Jordan had taken, to continue the subsidy.

"The Secretary said the US would have to have Congressional approval for any help we might want to offer to Jordan, and that before such help is offered we would need to know where we are going militarily and economically. We would not have to wait for an omnibus aid bill to pass Congress in order to offer such aid, but could give priority to a Middle East program, under which we might help Jordan, if we had a full understanding with the Jordanians as to the object and purposes of this aid and general policies. He agreed we should do something more in the area to make ourselves felt.

"Lloyd said the British Parliament would not want to sanction continued subsidy to Jordan under present circumstances, and he was apprehensive about what would happen during the gap between the end of the British fiscal year and the end of the US fiscal year. The Secretary said that Soviet assets are not unlimited and we should not assume they would pick up the check in Jordan." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 828)

---

## 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 24, 1956—5:09 p.m.*

451. Embtel 335. <sup>2</sup> You should convey to King Saud appreciation for his timely message to King Hussein and belief that exercise of King Saud's influence should be continued in Amman and that we should both make effective use of resources at our command in suitable ways to assist Jordan. US for example has been aiding

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/12-2456. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, and London.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 252.

Jordan for some years through provision of some \$8 million annually in technical assistance and economic development and some \$17.5 million annually in contributions for Arab refugees over half of whom are in Jordan. King Saud's comments as to effective use of Saudi Arabia resources for suitable assistance to Jordan would be helpful. In discussing this matter with King Saud and other SAG officials and in obtaining their comments you may as you think desirable inform them of substance of accompanying Deptel to Amman<sup>3</sup> on this subject.

. . . . .

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

---

**53: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 24, 1956—5:36 p.m.*

748. Embtel 618,<sup>2</sup> Embtel 647,<sup>3</sup> Jidda's 335.<sup>4</sup> At early opportunity you should approach King Hussein along lines indicated below stating we appreciate frankness with which he has discussed his problems with us and that we understand his concern regarding problems which confront Jordan. We appreciate reasons behind King's request that discussion of American assistance be confined to himself. At same time Prime Minister has indicated to us his awareness of King's request. You may therefore in your discretion make following views known Prime Minister also as seems desirable:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/12-2456. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins, Rockwell, and Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and London.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 647 from Amman, December 20, reported a conversation concerning Jordan's desire for U.S. assistance. Mallory commented that it was unlikely that British hopes for a continuation of the status quo would be realized, that Jordan was under heavy pressure, and that the anti-Western forces would probably win unless U.S. assistance was provided. He recommended that unless a prompt settlement of the Palestinian problem could be envisaged, assistance should be provided to Jordan on an interim basis. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12-2056)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 252.

1. *Possible sources of assistance for Jordan.* There are heavy demands in other Arab states as well as Jordan for social and economic development projects; consequently, even if Jordan were assisted by some Arab states today there would be no certainty that these same states could continue assistance indefinitely in future. Soviet assistance carries with it danger of Communist penetration and loss of independence. Jordan should therefore not lightly terminate its present financial relations with UK, especially in the absence of clear and acceptable alternatives.

2. *Anglo-Jordanian Relations.* UK capacity to develop new relationships is great. After World War II UK made new arrangements with India, Burma, Ceylon. Over years UK and Jordan have adjusted their relations in light of changing circumstances. There is now no reason to believe they could not continue to be improved.

3. *US Assistance.* US presently making available some \$8 million annually in technical assistance and economic aid and some \$17.5 million annually in contributions for Arab refugees over half of whom are in Jordan. US has also sought to assist in maintenance of peace. Following recent outbreak of hostilities in Egypt US honored its pledge and moved for action in UN. Hostilities were stopped and foreign troops are now being withdrawn. If Jordan should now move to cut itself off from Western countries and to associate itself with Soviet Bloc, these steps might be expected to affect Jordan's relations with its Western friends and might be expected limit their ability to help.

You might conclude by emphasizing that we would appreciate King Hussein's further views, that for our part we are continuing to examine all aspects of matter and that we feel confident that answer lies in assistance from existing sources including US with adjustments if necessary in light new situation. We will have further comments to present at later stage.<sup>5</sup>

FYI in originally drafting Deptel 698,<sup>6</sup> we considered possibility that Jordan Govt, despite assurances of King and Abu Nuwar, was committed to course which could lead only to increasing Syrian-USSR influence in Jordan. We feel that Nabulsi must be as aware as are we of fact that Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia not in position replace British as reliable source subsidy and that money would have to

---

<sup>5</sup> Mallory reported in telegram 679 from Amman, December 27, that he had carried out his instructions. He stated that the Middle East war had made continued British financial assistance politically unacceptable to the Jordanian Government and people, that Israel's augmented military strength had increased Jordan's concern about its security, and that Jordan intended to seek aid from Arab sources but hoped to be able to rely on U.S. assistance if Arab aid was not forthcoming. (Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/2-2756)

<sup>6</sup> Document 50.

come from other quarters. We are particularly disturbed over possibility that Nabulsi may feel he can play off USSR against West in bargaining for aid to Jordan.

Question of Jordan's federation with one or more other Arab States is one for Jordan alone to resolve. US position has been that we would not oppose such developments provided they in accordance with freely expressed wish of peoples concerned. However, think it can be seriously questioned as to whether increase of Syrian influence in Jordan at this time and under these circumstances really in best interests of Jordan people.

Also appreciate strains which UK-Jordan relations have undergone in past few months. We believe, however, that constructive approach to present problems by both British and Jordanians might lead to beneficial results for both parties. What we seek to avoid, *inter alia*, is termination of UK-HKJ relationship in circumstances which would be taken as symbolic of split by Jordan with its Western friends. We feel it essential that Nabulsi and King be aware of importance we give to HKJ attitude on these questions as well as need for Jordan maintain strong ties with West if Jordan's economic needs are to be met and if Jordan people are to maintain any vestige of independence and self-determination.

Separate telegram is being sent to Jidda in which Amb Wadsworth is authorized further to discuss with King Saud question of economic assistance for Jordan.<sup>7</sup> It seems to us that Saudi Arabia (and perhaps Iraq at later stage) should also have interest in preservation of independent Jordan and in extension assistance for that purpose. End FYI.

Re Embtel 652,<sup>8</sup> you may in your discretion inform British Ambassador of your conversations with King Hussein.

Dulles

---

<sup>7</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 652 from Amman, December 21, Mallory informed the Department that the British Embassy had made indirect and "not so indirect" inquiries about Jordan's request to the United States for assistance and that Mallory had sought to cover the matter. British Ambassador Johnston, however, informed him that Under Secretary Hoover had reportedly inquired of Caccia how Britain might react to American aid to Jordan or even to a possible American takeover of the British position in Jordan. Lloyd reportedly remarked to Caccia that it was an "interesting" idea and would be discussed with Dulles at Paris. For this reason, Mallory felt obliged to tell Johnson that Hussein had indeed mentioned the question of aid, but had not made an official request. Mallory concluded: "Can Department furnish any navigational help? We have thus far escaped obstacles but this flying blind is becoming risky." (Department of State, Central Files, 641.85/12-2156)



54. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 3, 1957.

SUBJECT

Proposed Discussions with British re Jordan

*Discussion:*

In our memorandum to you of December 21 (Tab A<sup>2</sup>), we recommended that the British Ambassador be invited to call to discuss the situation in Jordan. Our Ambassador in Amman has been approached by the British Ambassador there regarding the possibility of increased United States aid for Jordan. We have authorized Mr. Mallory to inform the British of his conversation with King Hussein on this subject. It is believed that it would be useful for us to make a formal effort at this time to endeavor to ascertain British intentions towards Jordan and to urge the British to seek to maintain a close relationship with that country.

*Recommendation:*

That you ask the British Ambassador to call and that you make the following points:

1. Egyptian, Syrian and Communist efforts to bring about a severance of Jordan's ties with the West continue unabated. We believe these efforts should be opposed, as they threaten general free world interests in the Near East.

2. The present Jordan Government states that it intends to terminate the U.K.-Jordan treaty as soon as financial assistance from Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia can be arranged. While it is doubtful that dependable financial assistance could be obtained from these sources, the possibility can not be ruled out that the USSR would channel funds to Jordan through an Arab state.

3. United States aid to Jordan has been given at the rate of about \$8 million annually in addition to our UNRWA contribution. The United States would be willing to consider a modest increase in such aid, but there are some of Jordan's needs, i.e. arms and logistic support for the Jordan Army, which the United States would have great difficulty in meeting in view of applicable laws and policies.

4. The United States feels that once tempers have cooled in the Near East and some stability has been restored, it will be possible

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12-2056. Secret. Drafted by Bergus.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

for Jordan's needs to be met by those countries which have demonstrated an interest in maintaining Jordan's political independence and territorial integrity. These would include the United Kingdom, United States, perhaps Saudi Arabia, and at a later stage Iraq. We would hope that the U.K. would continue its efforts to maintain close relations with Jordan. We feel that it is to our common interest to make every effort to prevent a sequence of events in Jordan which could lead to a rupture of all of Jordan's ties with the West.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> On January 18, Mallory informed the Department that British Ambassador Johnston had notified him that the United Kingdom was stopping its financial aid to Jordan at the end of the fiscal year on March 31. According to Mallory, Johnson added that the Foreign Office had no objection to the Americans "assuming burden." (Telegram 813 from Amman; *ibid.*, 885.0041/1-1857) The Embassy in Amman transmitted a detailed account of the conversation to the Department in despatch 181, January 18. (*Ibid.*, 641.85/1-1857)

---

**55. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, January 17, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Jordan

The Ambassador referred to a copy of a communication from the UK Government to the Jordan Government which had been passed to the State Department and said that he had been instructed to make an oral statement on the British position with respect to Jordan.<sup>2</sup> He had reduced this statement to writing and he handed the Secretary an aide-mémoire (copy attached).

The Ambassador said that he wished to make one additional point, namely, that this is not a question of pulling a British

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5/1-1757. Secret. Drafted by Elbrick.

<sup>2</sup> The communication, January 16, noted, in part, that according to the Ministerial statement of policy issued by the Jordanian Government on November 27, 1956, it was Jordan's intention to end the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and to effect the removal of British troops and bases from its territory. It further took note of the Jordanian Prime Minister's statement to the British Ambassador on November 29, 1956, that Jordan would be approaching Britain with a request for negotiations to terminate the treaty. The communication indicated the willingness of the British Government to enter into immediate discussions regarding the future of the treaty and solicited the views of the Jordanian Government concerning the place and date of the discussions. (The text of the British communication is attached to a copy of a memorandum dated January 17, from Rountree to Dulles; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 582, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S 1957.)

chestnut out of the fire because no British chestnut is involved. Rather, it is a matter which concerns all of the West, and the United Kingdom is concerned—as other Western countries must also be concerned—over the possibility that the Soviet Union might move into Jordan. In reply to the Secretary's question, the Ambassador said that part of the support which the United Kingdom had been giving to Jordan was in the form of equipment to the Army, and part in other forms of aid.

The Secretary said that we, too, are concerned lest a hostile base be established in Jordan but he said that the United States, due to its policy with respect to Israel and the Arab countries, is inhibited from giving military aid as the British have been doing. We might, however, consider the possibility of supplying economic assistance for other purposes, leaving military aid to the British to supply as in the past. The Secretary said that we would be willing to talk to the British about this matter whenever they wished.

### [Attachment]

#### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Her Majesty's Embassy has passed to the State Department a copy of a communication which was to be delivered to the Jordan Government by Her Majesty's Ambassador in Amman on January 16. This communication informs the Jordan Government that Her Majesty's Government are ready to meet the wish expressed in various public statements by the Jordan Government for a revision of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of 1948.

2. Her Majesty's Government's decision to make this communication at this time was dictated by the possibility that the Jordanian Mission which is now touring other Arab capitals might succeed in mobilising Arab aid for Jordan, and by the need to put themselves in a position to meet the renewed expressions of Jordanian hostility which are likely to follow such a development. The wording is deliberately vague. Her Majesty's Government cannot afford to continue the present arrangements indefinitely and do not intend to do so. But they do not want to be too specific at present about the method of ending them because they wish to discuss the situation with the United States Government and also because the Prime Minister of Iraq has advised them to proceed with caution.

3. Her Majesty's Government's present commitment to Jordan costs them about £13 million a year. At a time when, as part of the measures to strengthen sterling, they must review overseas expenditure, it is only businesslike to cut down drastically on Jordan in

which there is no longer any specifically British interest to be sustained. On the other hand, it is not in the common interest of the Western Alliance that Jordan should be left to her own devices or at the sole mercy of Syria, Egypt or even Saudi Arabia. They therefore hope that the United States will be prepared to take over this commitment.

---

**56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 6, 1957—7:22 p.m.*

904. Please immediately inform King that we highly gratified at his recent public action in pointing out Communist menace.<sup>2</sup> We strongly share his view that Communist imperialism poses primary threat to sound development of Arab nationalism and to independence and integrity Arab states. Forthrightness which King has brought to bear on problem should have constructive effect in Jordan and elsewhere. King's remarks reflect determination preserve independence of Jordan, strengthening of which has been purpose of aid rendered by US. US looks forward to discussions between Jordan Government and Richards mission within framework President's proposals, assuming favorable Congressional action.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.86/2-657. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bergus and Rockwell and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a public directive which King Hussein sent to Prime Minister Nabulsi on February 2 pointing out the danger to Arab nationalism posed by communism and urging the Jordanian Government to guard against Communist activity. Telegram 875 from Amman, February 4, commented that the King's action was the most important Jordanian political event in the last few months, that it "publically established his opposition to Communism and to alignment with the Eastern Camp", and that in view of "rapidly expanded Egyptian-Syrian-Communist influence here King's action involves him in critical battle with leftist elements which could result in loss of throne." (*Ibid.*, 785.00/2-457) Telegram 894 from Amman, February 6, reported a conversation along the lines of Mallory's instructions in this telegram. (*Ibid.*, 685.00/2-657)

57. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>*Amman, February 13, 1957—3 p.m.*

928. Tehran for Harold Nelson.<sup>2</sup> A new political situation is fast emerging in Jordan with possibility proper action by US may put this central and now virtually buffer state on side of west.

Only year ago we saw anti-Baghdad pact anti-western riots here. March 1, 1956 Glubb Pasha was dismissed and British lost any influence over events in Jordan. Arab nationalism rose rapidly under Gamal Nasser's leadership and reached an apogee during Suez Canal attack. Since then there is evidence of changes and shifts which may be turned to our use. In Jordan changes appear caused principally by concern over rapid rise leftist influence both within and without government; stand of UN and US over Suez; substitution of Arab for British aid army; British willingness terminate treaty on friendly basis; and suspicion on part Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud of both Egypt and Syria. In many respects present is moment of pause and appears as the morning after the emotional display.

Hussein has come out with strong anti-Communist stand employing Arab traditions and Islam as vehicle. By comment favorable to Eisenhower doctrine he has publicly shown himself on our side. He is now legitimate target for regime in Syria and Communists and Bathiyiin in Jordan. He cannot expect genuine support from Nabulsi Government. . . . So far as generally known he has not opposed King yet but has not supported his policies. Prime Minister shows no disposition to dispense with Communist and Bathiyiin supporters in government, who, if put in opposition could help out extremist elements. Balance of power at moment is army which generally assumed loyal to King. . . .

Time of decision whether Jordan to continue relatively unfettered independent entity, or go way of Syria is near. First phase in that decision will be Cairo meeting chiefs of state with Saud on return from US probably February 23.<sup>3</sup> Subsequent position of Hussein will depend in great measure upon strength of purpose maintained by Saud and Nasser. If Saud wins then Hussein may be expected to be bolstered to point where US assistance to Jordan could assure favorable posture. If Nasser wins then Hussein will be

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/2-1357. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Tehran, Ankara, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

<sup>2</sup> Harold Nelson, ICA Director in Amman.

<sup>3</sup> On February 24 King Saud met in Cairo for discussions with Nasser, Quwatli, and Hussein.

in weak position and while US assistance might still be worth the gamble the chances of success would be greatly diminished.

Respecting such assistance, development of Eisenhower doctrine and trip Ambassador Richards certain facts and recommendations are given below.

1. US assistance to Jordanian military is presumably not needed since former UK subsidy has been assumed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. The possibility that form and manner payment of this Arab subsidy would be such as place HKJ in untenable financial position investigated by the Embassy and found not to be valid. Appears Jordan can make out militarily and otherwise up to year or two even though there are delays and even though manner of payment may prove awkward.

2. A request for assistance in procurement of arms could well arise in future but appears unlikely for a time in view military agreements with Egypt Syria which provide joint military arrangements.

3. Non-military aid both for technical cooperation and economic development have in past been provided by both UK and US. What UK may do respecting future development loans not known. Possible they might continue at reduced level if present treaty negotiations finished amicably. If non-military aid from UK-US were cut off, Jordan would almost certainly seek it elsewhere.

4. Granting too much aid would be serious mistake, tending engender inflation, raising local living costs, giving very poor return per dollar and tending make Americans held in low esteem.

5. Absorptive capacity of Jordan for investments and aid to sound development projects is limited. However there is also room for impact projects, realizing that returns are to be in political coin.

6. The project which combines great impact value with substantial development potential use Yarmuk River irrigate eastern Ghor Jordan Valley. This uppermost in planning all Jordanian officials. Could be worked out as part of unified plan for valley. Much investigation and planning done on this but grant of funds is essentially political decision with broad area implications. Recommend Department review.

7. There must be adequate understandings re Jordan's obligations, which in past she has overlooked and point made clear that such understandings are to be respected. If we are to get anywhere we cannot accede to repetitious local chant aid can be accepted if no strings attached.

8. Technical cooperation should be continued at about present or slightly reduced level. However fine working relationship between many technicians and Jordanian counterparts would be strengthened if technical cooperation could be more separately identified as continuing US policy, with fewer American technicians unburdened with duty administering economic aid.

9. Any increase in economic aid should be identified as result acceptance Eisenhower plan and announced request by HKJ. Were aid given merely as additional ICA funds, then new total would become accepted as norm expected year by year from "Point IV".

10. To determine aid level will require additional review and perhaps negotiations. Depending on what UK is disposed do in future I would recommend in addition to technical cooperation of about \$2 million per year, that total economic assistance should be about \$15 million.

11. Basic agreements with Jordan Government should be revised to promote assumption greater operating responsibilities by HKJ.

12. Some flexibility in granting and withdrawing aid is badly needed. If King Hussein can keep Jordan in western camp he should in our own interest be supported. If Prime Minister seeks to defy King, inhibit his powers, or depose him, we need possibility withdrawing aid. As matters stand local Arabs can rely on our administrative inertia to present us with fait accompli. Aid should be a useable diplomatic tool and weapon.

13. Washington must provide suitable increase qualified personnel to bolster ICA staff administer increased aid.

Up to present I have been opposed to any more aid to Jordan on grounds that they could not make good use of it nor would it gain us any particular credit. The battle is now joined. At least one champion is in the lists in person King Hussein. If he able to sustain anti-Communist stand by HKJ (not necessarily pro-American) and if aid requested following pro-Eisenhower doctrine stand, I recommend it be granted.

Mallory

---

58. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 18, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. R. W. Bailey, British Embassy

NEA—Mr. Lampton Berry

NE—Richard B. Parker

Mr. Bailey called at his own request to discuss Jordan. He opened the discussion by recalling that in January there had been an initial approach by the British Ambassador regarding the future of Jordan and that there was an informal commitment on both sides to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/2-1857. Confidential. Drafted by Parker on February 20, and revised by Berry on February 23.

further discussions (see Secret Memorandum of Conversation, January 17<sup>2</sup>). It would be one of the questions on the agenda at Bermuda<sup>3</sup> and perhaps it would be well to do a little preliminary spadework so that each side knew something about the other's thoughts and intentions.

Jordan had decided to terminate the Anglo-Jordan treaty and the British were not sorry about it.<sup>4</sup> There had been some discussion about the United States taking over some of Britain's obligations under the treaty but the conclusion of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi aid offer pretty well obviated this. However, the British understood that we were seriously considering increasing our economic aid to Jordan by a small amount and that this would be done in connection with the Richards Mission.

He presented papers showing that in the eight years from 1948 to 1956 the British had contributed nearly £ 60 million for the support of the Arab Army and that termination of the treaty under which this had been paid would save about £ 10 million per year. Development assistance since 1950 had totaled £ 7½ million in interest-free loans. In addition, the British were committed to construction of the Aqaba Deep Water Port and the Desert Road from Aqaba to Amman. Total cost of these two projects was estimated at £ 4½ million, of which £ 630,000 had been spent already.

The British did not envisage any further military assistance to Jordan following the termination of the treaty. Consideration would probably be given to Jordanian requests to purchase British spare parts, ammunition and supply items since their equipment was all British. The development loans could probably be terminated without serious dislocation. However, the Aqaba Port and Desert Road projects are of major importance and withdrawal of British assistance in their construction would be a serious matter to Jordan.

The British are now considering whether or not to continue available economic assistance to the Jordan Government after the termination of the treaty. The course of the negotiations for the termination of the treaty, and the extent to which British stocks and installations in Jordan can be satisfactorily removed or disposed of, will clearly be important factors governing this decision.

Mr. Bailey stated that the British were using the question of possible continuance of British economic assistance as a lever in the

---

<sup>2</sup> Document 55.

<sup>3</sup> Between March 21 and 24, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan met at Bermuda to exchange views on various matters of concern to both countries.

<sup>4</sup> On March 13, representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and Jordan signed an agreement to terminate the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948. Among its provisions, the agreement provided for the withdrawal of British forces and disposal of their stores within 6 months.



current treaty negotiations and asked that we not make any public or private promises or statements of intent to increase United States economic assistance to Jordan until after the treaty negotiations have been completed. Mr. Berry gave Mr. Bailey assurances that we did not intend to make any such promises or commitments before completion of the treaty talks. He said he felt able to give these assurances since we were unlikely to reach any firm decision with respect to what we could or should do for Jordan until after the Richards Mission had visited the country and submitted its report. Since Mr. Bailey had said that the British-Jordanian talks would be completed by March 31 at the latest and since it was not contemplated that the Richards Mission would visit Jordan until after that date, Mr. Berry said there seemed little likelihood that any U.S. commitments to Jordan would conflict with the British-Jordanian talks.

Mr. Bailey also asked that we collect our thoughts on the whole question of the future of Jordan and British and American roles there prior to the Bermuda meeting. He read an excerpt from a Foreign Office memorandum which suggested that if the Department of State has as many doubts as the Foreign Office does about Jordan, perhaps it would be a good idea for the British and American Ambassadors in Amman to get together and write a joint report for everybody's enlightenment. Mr. Berry replied that we would be glad to get together our thoughts on Jordan but that he doubted that much purpose would be served by a joint ambassadorial report.

---

**59. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Amman, March 29, 1957—2 p.m.*

1147. Inform Richards. Jordan political situation still fluid and now uneasy. Prime Minister Nabulsi continues build demagogic straw men and then claims he must march with them. Even to Abdul Monem Rifai, Jordan's Ambassador to US, he yesterday argued fiction his speeches are given as political leader and unrelated his position Prime Minister. To recent visitors has minimized importance extremists and their activity and in next breath claimed

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-2957. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, and London.

government must accede their demands. There can remain no doubt he is intent on destroying Jordan as presently constituted and throwing out King in favor of still undefined federation with Syria and Egypt.

King continues manifest sincere anxiety arrange matters so Ambassador Richards will be favorably received. During talk with King March 27 Turkish Ambassador urged him not forego opportunity assistance from US. King agreed and said extraordinary developments could be expected soon. Nature not specified. Abdul Monem Rifai saw King yesterday and left with conclusion King seriously determined change government soon but uncertain in what manner. Last night I saw King's uncle Sharif Nasser who agreed recent times had been busy and anxious but now happily "it is over".

. . . information otherwise available to Department suggests Syrian plotting against King. This will reach him and should enhance his desire to install an anti-extremist pro-Jordan Government.

Probabilities of sort of "coup de palais" in near future growing.

Mallory

## 60. Editorial Note

On April 11, at the 319th meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Allen Dulles, in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, raised the matter of the situation in Jordan. The memorandum of discussion includes the following exchange:

"Mr. Dulles said that the situation in Jordan had reached the ultimate anticipated crisis. Prime Minister Nabulsi had been removed by the King. Prior to Nabulsi's departure, however, certain changes in the governmental set-up had occurred which were not very favorable to the King. Hussein has selected an old-fashioned conservative to try to form a new Cabinet, but this will prove a difficult task. The real power of decision rests largely with the Army, whose loyalty to the King is uncertain. The action of the mob was also likely to be significant. For the time being it was thought that Nasser would temporize in the face of these developments, though in time he will give his support to the leftist elements. In short, this situation was extremely critical." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

On April 11 at 7:17 p.m., the Department of State sent the following message to the Embassy in Amman:

"During further discussions which you will probably have with King Hussein during next few days you should say you have heard from Department and that it is following developments in Jordan with great interest and care. You should stress we admire courage King has shown in moving to safeguard best interests Jordan and believe his firmness of purpose will continue to stand him in good stead." (Telegram 1271; Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4-1157)

---

**61. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Amman, April 13, 1957—6 p.m.*

1268. Inform Richards. No cabinet formed as of 1100 GMT.<sup>2</sup> Amman flooded with rumors and speculation but few facts.

King yesterday requested National Socialist Abdul Halim Nimr, member Nabulsi government, attempt form Cabinet. Consultations by Nimr broke down late afternoon apparently after he insisted inclusion Ba Thi Rimawi and National Socialist extremist Irshaidat in new Cabinet. This in line with pre-arranged stand anti-King bloc. Reports this morning are that King has requested Said Mufti form new government.

Strongest in maze rumors is that General Nuwwar completely on side Nabulsi crowd though still endeavoring maintain strong relations with King. . . . King being subjected pressures from all sides form government having support National Socialists (his request to Nimr may have been temporary yielding these pressures). Public views success Mufti efforts with considerable pessimism. Belief gaining currency that widespread disorders requiring use armed forces would invite Iraqi and Israeli intervention. (Nuwwar told ARMA 2 days ago if Iraqi tried move into Jordan he would resist them with all his strength although this not said in context lack of support for King. Moreover said he would do this in spite of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-1357. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa, and to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Aden.

<sup>2</sup> On April 15, Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi formed a new government serving as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Nabulsi became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

probability Israel would then move in occupy West Bank.) News that another Syrian brigade may have moved Mafraq area heightens speculation that any move by Iraq likely be met with armed Syrian opposition.

Ba Thi-Communist student demonstrators estimated 600 assembled central Mosque square this morning listened to strong anti-west speeches from Communists Shuqayr, Warrad and others. They heaped abuse and blame on US for causing fall Nabulsi Government. (This TASS story of US complicity in government crisis, earlier propounded by Rimawi to British newsmen, appears gaining intensity. Pointed accusations being made against me and other Embassy officials for "roles" in ousting Nabulsi from power.) Demonstrators carried banners denouncing Eisenhower Doctrine Baghdad Pact and one calling for "cooperation of nation army and police". Also shouting anti-monarchy epithets.

Reports from West Bank indicate no troubles so far today. In Jerusalem merchants determined settle all demonstrations lest Easter season tourists be frightened away. In country as whole extremist leaders appear to be holding street mobsters in reserve and calm still order of day. King reportedly has taken precautionary measures designed stop troubles before they begin. Yesterday to British Ambassador he expressed reserved confidence situation would soon be satisfactory but hoped Richards mission arrival "would be delayed" until this realized.

There is little ground for optimism and Embassy maintaining precautions respecting safety of dependents.

**Mallory**

62. Memorandum of a Conversation, Acting Secretary  
Herter's Residence, Washington, April 14,  
1957, 2:45 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan and the Possibility of British Intervention

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary  
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador  
Mr. Willie Morris, British Embassy  
Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell, NE

The Acting Secretary received the British Ambassador at the latter's urgent request. The Ambassador was under instructions from Selwyn Lloyd. Sir Harold read several messages just received from the British Embassy in Amman. The struggle for power being waged by King Hussein was reaching a climax. On Saturday <sup>2</sup> General Nuwwar had attempted to stage a coup against the King, with the assistance of some of the Syrian military now in Jordan, but the King, forewarned, had frustrated this. General Nuwwar had been arrested and was now in prison, and General Hiyari had been named in his place. The Royal Palace was being fortified against attack, and from the nature of the measures being taken it appeared that the attack was expected from military elements, not from street mobs. The Ambassador said that the British Government assumed we agreed that it was in our interest for the King to win this fight. The Acting Secretary replied that we definitely did agree.

Ambassador Caccia went on to state that Selwyn Lloyd had instructed him by telephone from Scotland to ask the Department what its attitude would be in the circumstance that King Hussein should appeal to the British for military intervention on his behalf. Would the United States support the United Kingdom if the latter took an affirmative decision? There was still an air squadron at Mafraq and some British troops at Aqaba, of the number of which the Ambassador was not informed. Because of the situation of the United Kingdom in the Middle East at the moment, an appeal to the British for help would obviously be a step taken by Hussein in desperation before going under, but the British Government wished to consult with the United States about this in advance, in order to avoid another serious split between the two countries with regard to possible developments in the Middle East. Intervention would be a

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/4-1457. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell on April 15.

<sup>2</sup> April 13.

drastic step with such light forces as the British now had in Jordan, and the safety of the some 1500 British subjects in the Amman-Mafraq area was an important consideration. Their lives might be gravely endangered should the operation fail. Failure would also be a grievous blow to British prestige.

The Acting Secretary said this was a most serious question which he would like a little time to answer. The situation in Jordan was very fluid at the moment, and it was difficult to form an accurate picture of what was going on. The Ambassador's question had very important implications, not only for the present but for the future. The Anglo-Jordan treaty was no longer in effect. There was the possibility that the Syrians would intervene. If British military action should save Hussein for the moment, what would be the next step? The Ambassador said that there might be the good possibility that the intervention would give forces loyal to the King time to rally around him. In any event, this would be the purpose of the intervention.

The Ambassador then asked whether the Eisenhower Doctrine would not apply in this case. The Acting Secretary doubted this very much, pointing out that the Doctrine was applicable in cases of overt aggression by international Communism or by states in the area dominated by international Communism. The trouble here was that the Jordan situation, despite its international overtones, was essentially an internal problem. The Ambassador thought that the Egyptian and Syrian subversion involved might be basis for the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine. He suggested that what was happening in Jordan had many similarities to what happened in Czechoslovakia, where an internal situation resulted in a Communist takeover. We could not afford to lose Jordan in this way, in the Ambassador's opinion. He did not wish to imply, however, that the British Government was all set to move in Jordan. London realized the difficulties inherent in intervention, and at the moment did not know what it would do if King Hussein should ask for British aid. It would be very helpful to have an agreed United States-United Kingdom position, and in any event the British wished the Americans to be fully informed now of possible future steps, so that later there would be a minimum of trouble in the United Nations and elsewhere.

The possibility of Iraqi and Saudi intervention was discussed. The American side expressed the view that it would be much better if the action, should there be any, were confined to regional forces. Iraq was understood to be hesitant to move alone, however, and King Saud probably would not want to involve his own forces in actual fighting against other Arabs in Jordan. The possibility that the Israelis might move was also discussed, and the British were in-

formed that Sunday morning another message had been sent to our Embassy in Tel Aviv stressing the need to urge restraint upon the Israelis in the current delicate situation in Jordan.

Ambassador Caccia then wondered whether it might not be helpful to have King Saud issue a public statement in support of Hussein. (Subsequent to the adjournment of the meeting, Mr. Morris telephoned Mr. Rockwell to say that the Ambassador had had another telephone conversation with Selwyn Lloyd, and the British Embassy now hoped that it would be possible for us to urge King Saud to take this step.)

. . . . Meanwhile we would give the Ambassador's question the very serious consideration it obviously required and would be in touch with Sir Harold at the earliest opportunity. The British Ambassador thanked the Acting Secretary for receiving him on Sunday, and he and Mr. Morris took their leave.

---

**63. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff (Collins), to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations (Erskine)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 15, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

Current Situation in Jordan

1. In spite of a backdrop of conflicting and censored information, it is apparent that King Hussein, at the moment at least, has the upper hand in his struggle to retain the throne and to wrest control of the country from the pro-Egyptian/Syrian and leftist factions.

2. The preponderance of the regular Army (25,300), key element in the current Jordanian crisis, has remained loyal to King Hussein. The vacillating, but generally pro-Egyptian Army Chief of Staff, Major General Ali Abu Nuwar, has been deported to Syria and reportedly a Hussein favorite, Major General Ali Hiyari, is now Acting Chief of Staff of the Army. In addition, large numbers of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CJCS—Palestine (17 June 57). Secret. The source text is a copy forwarded by Collins to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 15 under cover of a memorandum, attached to the source text, indicating that the ribbon copy of the memorandum had been sent to Erskine in response to a verbal request earlier that day.

---

bedouin tribal elements (reported to be anywhere from 1,000 to 10,000) have entered the city of Amman to demonstrate loyalty to their King (and to fight for him if necessary).

3. We have press information to the effect that a new cabinet has been formed today by independent, pro-West Khalidi. The press also reports that recently-ousted Prime Minister Nabulsi is a member of the new cabinet. With the exception of Nabulsi, the new cabinet, it is believed, will be generally amenable to Hussein's pro-West policy.

4. The enthusiasm of the pro-Egyptian/Syrian Palestinian Arabs for demonstrations against the King may be dampened by the attitude of the Army and by Hussein's apparent intention to use the Army to maintain order and support his throne.

5. It is too early to tell whether or not Hussein has weathered the storm. The Syrians might still be induced to intervene in support of their partisans. Iraq stands ready to move in to support Hussein if asked. Saud probably wishes Hussein success. And Israel must be expected to be prepared to take advantage of a break-up of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. On balance, however, it appears that each of the neighboring states will work to preserve the Kingdom lest each might lose out in the division of the spoils.

**Richard Collins**<sup>2</sup>  
*Brigadier General, USA*

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 15, 1957—4:56 p.m.*

1315. FYI we desire give most effective support possible to King Hussein in his efforts maintain sovereign independence and territorial integrity Jordan. We believe US supporting action at this stage must be taken in ways avoid giving substance to false charges Hussein is acting at instigation USG. We are consulting closely with

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4-1557. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bergus; cleared with Herter; and approved by Rountree who signed for Herter. Also sent priority to Baghdad, Jidda, and Tel Aviv; repeated priority to Addis Ababa (for Richards), Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and USUN.



British on Jordan but feel same considerations apply to them as to US as regards open identification with Hussein. Iraq and Saudi Arabia would seem best sources assistance. End FYI.

Individual missions requested take following action on urgent basis:

a. Embassy Amman in its discretion should get word orally to King that we applaud courage and determination he is showing in efforts resist machinations those who would destroy Jordan. While we are sure King would agree that in present delicate situation US should avoid action which could be misinterpreted or exploited by King's enemies, it is our hope that Richards Mission can visit Amman for fruitful discussions as soon as King feels that appropriate moment has arrived. As for King's request for assistance in light of reported Israel troop movements, all information available to USG indicates there no evidence of unusual Israel military activity. We have cautioned Israelis against precipitate action. We feel it essential in these critical days that King work closely with Saudis and Iraqis.

b. Embassy Jidda should orally inform King Saud (if possible privately) of steps US taking. We hope Saud will render every assistance to Hussein and work closely and effectively with Iraqis. Presence of Damaluji in Riyadh should facilitate Saudi-Iraqi cooperation. We note Iraqis have determined render all possible assistance to Hussein. We feel that Saudi-Iraqi support of Hussein can well be crucial element in determining future of Jordan. Meanwhile . . . we have no indication of unusual Israeli military activity. We hope that time will quickly arrive when it would be appropriate for Richards to proceed to Amman for fruitful discussions. We express our sincere appreciation for efforts Saud has made and is making assist King Hussein in struggle against elements who pose threat not only to Jordan but to entire area. We would hope visit of Prince Fahad to Jordan could be expedited so that constructive influence of Saudi Arabia in Jordan could be strengthened.

c. Embassy Baghdad should advise Iraqis generally of steps we taking with Hussein Saudis. We hope Iraqis will take advantage visit of Damaluji to Riyadh to strengthen cooperation with Saudis and with Hussein. Believe Saudi-Iraqi cooperation on this problem augurs well for advancement interests both countries in handling other area problems. We speaking to Israelis along lines suggested by Bashayan in Baghdad's 1710.<sup>2</sup> . . . and our information so far indicates no unusual Israel military activity.

---

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1710 from Baghdad, April 15, Gallman informed the Department that Iraqi Foreign Minister Bashayan had suggested that the United States inform Israel that any Iraqi troop movements near the Jordanian-Iraqi border were prompted by an interest in stabilizing the situation in Jordan and not changing the status quo. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/4-1557)

d. Embassy Tel Aviv should seek early opportunity to make following points to Israel PriMin: 1) US closely following developments in Jordan and believes success of Hussein's present efforts of vital importance to NE generally including Israel. 2) Hussein has already expressed concern at reports of unusual Israel troop movements near border; we have advised him that we had no information of such activity; we reinforce, however, our hope expressed earlier that Israel will take no action which could exacerbate situation or hinder Hussein's efforts to strengthen his position. 3) Iraq Government has advised us that they are strengthening military contingents at H-3 in Iraqi territory. Iraqis have asked that we inform Israel Government that this action being taken solely in interest stabilizing situation in Jordan and not with view to changing status quo of Jordan. This assurance applies equally to any further action Government of Iraq might find it necessary take. Specifically GOI in any plan of action will respect independence of Jordan. 4) USG looks with favor upon this precautionary move on part Iraq. Numbers of Iraqi troops involved and Iraqi assurances make it abundantly clear they pose no threat to Israel. While USG hopes that Hussein will be able to maintain order with his own security forces and that Syrian troops will withdraw or remain quiescent, feel Hussein should be in position invoke assistance from Iraq, if necessary, under Iraq-Jordan Treaty of 1947. We fully aware Israel's views on general question entry of Iraq troops into Jordan as expressed in US-Israel conversations of October 1956 but feel now as we did then that it to interest all concerned that status quo be maintained in Jordan and that if situation develops to point where Iraqi assistance to Hussein is required, Israel should not oppose it. We accordingly urge Israel continue maintain calm and take no precipitate action.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> On April 18, Lawson informed the Department that he had conveyed the points outlined in telegram 971 to Ben Gurion. According to the Ambassador, the only remark the Prime Minister made "of possible significance" was his reaction to the prospect that Iraq would increase its military strength at H-3. The Prime Minister queried, "How close to Jordan River will they propose to come?" (Telegram 1226 from Tel Aviv, April 18; *ibid.*, 685.00/4-1857) On April 20, Lawson took up the points contained in telegram 971 with Foreign Minister Meir. According to the Ambassador, Meir noted that Israel had no intention of intervening as long as the status of Jordan remained unchanged. (Telegram 1230 from Tel Aviv, April 19; *ibid.*, 685.00/4-1957)

**65. Editorial Note**

On April 17 at 12:11 p.m. Secretary Dulles telephoned Allen Dulles. Phyllis Bernau's record of the conversation reads in part:

"The Sec asked re developments. A said Jordan is slightly helpful and we are working hard to hold it. There are plans and State has been very cooperative." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

Later that day at the 320th meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Allen Dulles began his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, with comments on recent developments in Jordan. That portion of the memorandum of discussion reads:

"The Director of Central Intelligence informed the National Security Council that the situation in Jordan had changed somewhat for the better. King Hussein had seized and had thus far held that initiative. Although the former pro-Soviet Prime Minister, Nabulsi, remained in the new Cabinet as Foreign Minister, the portfolios of Defense and Interior had been given to strong anti-Communists. Hussein probably views the present Cabinet as interim. Army loyalty remains the key to his ultimate success and, as of the moment, he seems to have the majority of the Army behind him. In fact, the left-wing 'free officers' group seems to be disintegrating. The question of Army pay may well turn out to be the key to whether Hussein can maintain himself in control. To complete his victory the King will have to gain the support of the turbulent populace in Jordan.

"While the Cairo press is interpreting events in Jordan as a victory for the pro Egyptian factions, we have learned from other sources that Nasser is extremely unhappy over what has happened and is seeking every means of reversing the situation in Jordan. Recent events there have likewise greatly increased Nasser's irritation with King Saud." (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

**66. Editorial Note**

On April 17, during the course of a conversation with Rountree and Bergus that included discussion of Aqaba and the Suez Canal, Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the United States, raised the matter of recent developments in Jordan. The memorandum of the conversation includes the following exchange:

"Mr. Eban said that Israel was following developments in Jordan with concern and vigilance. He would like the U.S. Government's appreciation of the situation. Mr. Rountree said that it was too early to tell how solid the King's position was. We were encouraged to believe that it was fairly substantial and that in the absence of unexpected developments the King could maintain that position. One of the aspects of recent developments appeared to have been the extent to which pro-Egyptian and pro-Syrian elements had lost ground. Another had been King Saud's support of King Hussein. We were somewhat concerned at the tension in the area and Ambassador Lawson had been asked to make our concern known to the Israelis. We were anxious that no precipitate action be taken. We were relieved that the Syrians had not forcefully intervened. Hussein was relying on support from the Saudis and the Iraqis. The Iraqis had moved a number of troops to H-3 on Iraqi territory. The Iraqis had given assurances that these troops were there purely for purposes of supporting King Hussein. We had passed on these assurances, at Iraq's request, to the Israel Government. Mr. Eban believed that the best chance for stability in the area was in maintaining the status quo in Jordan. Otherwise a new situation would develop. Israel was remaining passive. Mr. Rountree felt that this was a highly commendable attitude. Mr. Eban said that if Jordan was fragmented, there would be an effect on Israel. His Government had raised the prospect of affirmative action which could be taken if King Hussein succeeded in his efforts. One of these might be renewed efforts to bring about the plan for Jordan River development. It might be too early to make such efforts but we should be thinking about this". (Memorandum of conversation by Bergus, April 17; Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4-1757)

67. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, April 21, 1957—5 p.m.*

1343. Inform Richards. Comment on Embtel 1342.<sup>2</sup> Sequence events last 36 hours indicate steady development new dangers likely affect King's tenuous control present crucial period.

During evening as [garble] newly appointed CGS Major General Ali Hiyari left for Damascus presumably either on pretext or without knowledge King or government. During morning hours April 20 Hiyari telephoned Prime Minister Khalidi and tendered resignation. Early Saturday unconfirmed rumors began circulating of Hiyari's resignation and considerable political activity begun. King Hussein presided over cabinet meeting which began 0830 hours at house ex-Prime Minister Mufti and lasted until 1315 hours. King then departed and meeting transferred to Foreign Ministry office of Nabulsi. This meeting ended 1515 hours. The public result this 7-hour meeting was Prime Minister communiqué, reported reference telegram 1342.

Later in afternoon prior to issuance communiqué, public information office confirmed earlier reports of Hiyari's resignation and one reliable report from Damascus indicated Hiyari had requested "political asylum".

During afternoon Hiyari gave press conference in Damascus subsequently broadcast BBC, Voice of Arabs, radio Israel but not reported locally. General Nuwwar reportedly present during this conference, reporting of which suggests master-minding by Egyptian-Syrian stooges of Moscow. Highlights conference as broadcast:

Accusation by Hiyari that Hussein conspiring with "certain foreign military and civilian attachés (one broadcast said "diplomatic missions") against the independence of Jordan, its sovereignty and its present ties with sister Arab countries". Hiyari alleged this plot aimed at striking Jordanian people and was led by King and his agents in country. He said he had tried while in Jordan to prevent King and these agents from going ahead with plots but when unable continue his efforts he preferred leave country for Syria. He had

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/4-2157. Secret; Niact. Sent also to Asmara; Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1342 from Amman, April 21, conveyed the text of an official Jordanian communiqué issued by Prime Minister Khalidi. The communiqué noted, among other things, that as a result of the "ministerial crisis" which had led to the formation of a new government, "some regrettable incidents occurred inside some army units resulting in resignation CGS General Nuwwar." As a result General Ali Hiyari had been appointed Chief of Staff. Soon after, the communiqué noted, Hiyari had tendered his resignation. (*Ibid.*)

pretended he was going to Damascus on official business he said and for talks with Syrian military colleagues. Later he phoned Minister Defense (Prime Minister Khalidi) and tendered resignation. He denied that there was ever any plot by Nuwwar and other officers against King and throne. "Purpose of King and his agent in creating and fabricating that plot was simply to oust Nuwwar and then to attempt remove Jordan from Arab or Bitand purge army of pro-Arab officers". Hiyari went on to say that at beginning of ministerial crisis King had contracted him and other top officers asking them if they were willing cooperate with him "in event he switched to cooperating with west". However, officers reacted negatively, result was that King concocted plot involving Nuwwar and other officers subsequently surrounded Palace with pro-King officers and armored cars and then arrested Nuwwar.

Imprisonment to date three brigade commanders (out of six) and seven other key officers and exile (both forced and voluntary) of two commanding generals of army within five days has left army shaken and morale lowered. Further activities of board investigation attempt at military coup last week will only serve create further nervousness. Apart from significance departure capable but not too bright soldier Hiyari, appointment acting CGS Majali is widely mark beginning intensification internal split between east and west bank.

Picture complicated further by reliable information given ARMA that Syrians, working through pro-Nuwwar officers in Jordan army, Palestinian Bathiyiin and Communist, are actively planning counter-coup "after Easter tourist season ends". This may tie in with Damascus meeting Nuwwar, Rimawi, CGS Syrian Nixam Ed-Din and C/S Egyptian army Muhammad Ibrahim reported Damascus telegram 2473<sup>3</sup> to Department. This move clearly attempts to capitalize on accentuated east-west bank differences.

Large amounts outside money being passed through Syrian and Egyptian hands to finance opposition King.

Concomitantly dissension within cabinet is increasing. Implication Hiyari and Nuwwar almost certain publicize involvements Nabulsi and others. Executive committee National Socialist party held long meeting yesterday afternoon at which time it is presumed question of Nabulsi's continuation in government was raised. Elements within his party grouping are understood to be increasing pressure as him to resign. Such resignation likely create necessity new action by King. In event fall of present cabinet alternatives rapidly narrowing down to choice by King of military rule or

---

<sup>3</sup> On April 20, the Embassy in Damascus reported that according to an Arab diplomat, these officials had met secretly at a Damascus hotel to plan the formation of a "national" government in Jordan. (Telegram 2473; *ibid.*, 785.00/4-2057)

abdication, unless he assassinated first. King not likely abdicate and may well resort to military government.<sup>4</sup>

**Mallory**

---

<sup>4</sup> The transcript of a telephone conversation from Secretary Dulles to Allen Dulles on Sunday, April 21 at 10 a.m. reads in part:

"Sec asked if there was any word from Syria. Sec said if there was any way we could get any offer of assistance to strengthen the hand of the King we should try to do so. Sec asked if there was anything we could do through the Saudis. Sec said he did not think we needed Richards there for that. Sec said if we could find a dependable way of getting the Saudis to help out that would be better than if we did it; the only trouble was . . . that it would leak to Egypt and others." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

---

## 68. Editorial Note

On April 23, at the meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the situation in Jordan was discussed. According to notes on the meeting prepared by William McAfee, the following exchange occurred:

"Mr. Dulles referred to the timing of Ambassador Richards' visit to Jordan, indicating that he had been consulted yesterday on this question and had expressed the view that a visit at this time might have unfortunate repercussions, tying the U.S. in with recent moves and feeding anti-western propaganda. At a subsequent point in the meeting, General Schow concurred in the opinion that a visit at this time might ignite a sizeable fire, and in response to a question from the Chairman on whether this was the view of the IAC, no member expressed dissent.

"Mr. Armstrong pointed out that at 9:30 a.m. the radio had carried a report from a *New York Times* correspondent who had just left Jordan, that disturbances were beginning in cities on the West Bank, that there was no confirmation of this from our own sources, but that such a development was not unlikely. He referred to Nuwwar's press interview in which the latter claimed that our ambassador and service attaché had conspired to upset the Nabulsi Government, charging the U.S. Government in effect with actions which he had promised he would take if given U.S. support. General Schow reviewed the size of foreign forces now in or near Jordan, indicating that they were approximately as follows: *Syrian*—3,000 located in north Jordan, with an additional brigade just across the frontier in Syria; these troops are approximately 45 miles from Amman; *Iraqi*—at H3, 4,500 troops about 250 miles from Amman; *Saudi Arabian*—at Aqaba and other points, 6,000 to 7,000 approxi-

mately 200 miles from Amman. (A battalion at Jericho is about 40 miles away.)

"The Chairman asked Mr. Armstrong whether the 500,000 refugees in Jordan were under fairly strict control. Mr. Armstrong stated that they were under loose supervision being given quarters and subsistence at certain points, but not restricted generally in their movement.

"Mr. Dulles asked if any member felt the need for a special paper on the likelihood of Israeli action in case of further internal instability in Jordan. Mr. Armstrong questioned whether the IAC was in a position to add anything to what was already thoroughly known to the policy makers. He noted that developments continued to depend on the personal courage and determination of the King, that if he panicked or lost his nerve, his government would be lost, but if he continued firm he had a chance to pull out a satisfactory solution. Mr. Armstrong stated that support from Iraq and Saudi Arabia may have played a significant role in strengthening the King's will." (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 59 D 27)

---

## 69. Editorial Note

On April 24, at 2:40 p.m., President Eisenhower, then vacationing in Augusta, Georgia, telephoned Secretary Dulles in Washington. The transcript of the telephone conversation reads as follows:

"The Pres returned the call.

"The Sec said we just had a message . . . from Hussein of Jordan. He has a program which is a good tough program and if it works it will be wonderful for us. The Sec read it and said he is planning to send a message back at once and get in contact with Israel and warn them . . . if any overt Soviet intervention we would consider it fell under the ME Res. . . . The Pres agreed with the above action—and said 'I think this is right.' The Sec said Radford suggested sending vessels to Beirut. The Pres suggested getting the Pres of Lebanon to ask for this. The Sec said he may decide to let it leak that they talked. If so, he will call Hagerty. The Pres said he would just put on the bulletin board: 'The President and the Secretary of State conferred at some length today about the Jordan situation. They are watching the situation with the greatest care.' The Pres said for the Sec to do whatever he wants." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)



70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, April 24, 1957, 3:32 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Developments in Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel  
The Secretary  
NEA—William M. Rountree  
NE—Donald C. Bergus

The Secretary said that he had asked Mr. Eban to come in because he wished to say a word, probably unnecessary, about developments in Jordan.

Developments in Jordan were moving rapidly toward a climax. It appeared that King Hussein would persist in a strong line to defend himself against what had been openly exposed as Egyptian and Syrian intrigue. . . . Israel action could be one thing which would unite the Arabs. At present Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Lebanon were supporting Hussein. The Secretary thought that if Hussein won it would have great significance and mark the beginning of a trend away from the extreme nationalistic views expounded by Nasser and others and which were, to some extent at least, Communist inspired. The U.S. wanted to give Hussein a fair chance. We wanted to tell the Israelis our thoughts with respect to his efforts, . . . . There might be deliberate provocation of Israel by anti-Hussein forces.

Mr. Eban said he would convey this urgently to his Government. There appeared to be no great divergence from what he had said in his previous meeting with the Secretary, i.e., that Nasser viewed developments in Jordan as a setback and would attempt a counterstroke. Israel had thought for a while that Nasser would be content with pro-Egyptian elements sharing control in Jordan; now it appeared that he wanted the whole thing. Although the major assault had been against Khalidi, it was clear that it was aimed at the King. Israel's policy had been to avoid anything that played into Nasser's hands.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on April 25. The meeting concluded at 3:53 p.m. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) In telegram 999 to Tel Aviv, April 24, the Department forwarded the substance of Dulles' meeting with Eban. The Department instructed the Ambassador to see the Israeli Prime Minister as soon as possible to review the conversation and to emphasize the points made by the Secretary. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4-2457)

The Secretary said that if the King stood firm and should be physically threatened by Syria (he did not think Egypt was in a position to intervene physically) or if steps were taken that represented a challenge to the Middle East Doctrine, the U.S. would respond very strongly.

Mr. Eban said that the Israelis felt that the advent of the Richards Mission was having an effect in Jordan similar to that created by the Templer Mission. It would be wise to eliminate this factor from discussion in Jordan. He wished to advise us that this was not the time for a Richards visit to Jordan. The Secretary said he hoped Mr. Eban would not hesitate to make suggestions. We had not made a final decision regarding a Richards visit to Jordan and were weighing the factors involved.

Mr. Eban inquired whether the U.S. was near a position of defining a Soviet-controlled Government, in the terms of the Middle East Doctrine. The Secretary said we were approaching such a position. This question was more conspicuous with regard to Syria.

Mr. Eban pointed out that Cairo Radio was broadcasting in Hebrew reports that many Iraqi troops were entering Jordan. Egypt wished to embroil Israel.

The Secretary said that our guess was that the loyal troops in Jordan might have to be moved to the West Bank where there was the greatest danger. If this were done and the Syrians took advantage of the exposure of the East Bank, then the Iraqis might come in. Mr. Eban observed that if the Syrians entered with Jordan consent, that was one thing. If they entered without Jordan consent, that would be a violation of the United Nations Charter. Mr. Rountree felt that the likelihood of Syrian troops remaining in Jordan was small.

Mr. Eban said that he appreciated this information and counsel. He hoped the public would not be given the impression that Israel had been warned by the U.S. The Secretary agreed. He felt that this was part of the general policy of consulting with respect to this area which we had indicated during the February talks we would try to embark upon. He welcomed Israel's counsel. This was a mutual operation. We were not warning Israel. Our own forward thinking might involve action on our part if the Middle East Doctrine were challenged. He hoped that no policy on Israel's part would lead to conflict with the U.S.

Mr. Shiloah said his Government was aware of the need for caution. The Secretary had referred to the Middle East Doctrine. If the U.S. decided to act under it, it would be useful if Israel were prepared. The Secretary did not think that such action on our part would be necessary. Developments were moving in such a way, however, that we were thinking of it as a possibility. There was

increasing evidence of Communist inspiration behind the anti-Hussein campaign.

It was agreed that the press be told that Mr. Eban's visit had been a follow-up of his previous call on the Secretary and that there had been a routine discussion of matters of common interest.

---

**71. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 24, 1957, 5:35 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Recent Developments Regarding Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

*U.K.*

Sir Harold Caccia, British  
Ambassador  
Mr. J.E. Coulson, Minister

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE

The Secretary said that he had asked the British Ambassador to call because he wanted to tell him about certain recent developments regarding Jordan. He said that we had received a purported message from King Hussein through intelligence channels in which he said he proposed to take a strong line in Jordan, including martial law on the West Bank, suspension of constitutional rights and a strong statement regarding the activities of Egypt and Syria in Jordan. In his message King Hussein asked if he could count on United States support if Israel or the Soviet Union intervened in the situation.

The Secretary said that after consultation with the President we had sent a message to King Hussein that, assuming he had proceeded along the lines which he had already indicated, we would make clear to Israel that any intervention by it would involve a strong adverse reaction on the part of the United States.<sup>2</sup> He also said that we would regard any overt intervention by the Soviet Union as a challenge under the Middle East Doctrine and that if requested by Jordan we would intervene militarily. The Secretary said we had not

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4-2457. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins on April 25. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1462 to Amman, April 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4-2457)

yet heard whether King Hussein had taken any of the actions which he had proposed in his message.

The Secretary continued that he had spoken with the Israeli Ambassador this afternoon and had informed him of what King Hussein planned to do and of the attitude of the United States. . . .

The Secretary said that we believed if King Hussein did act and was able to achieve his objectives it would represent a significant development. We continued anxious to give King Hussein effective support. According to the latest information from intelligence sources the King had made a public statement, but we had no further details.

The British Ambassador appreciated the information and said that Nuri had spoken with the British Ambassador in Baghdad, making two points: 1) King Hussein should ask the Syrians to withdraw from Jordan and 2) King Hussein should request Iraqi troops, in writing, if he actually wanted them to enter Jordan.

Sir Harold noted that King Hussein might turn to Britain for help but they had very few troops remaining in Jordan, some at Aqaba and possibly 800 at Mafraq.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> On April 25 the Department forwarded the substance of Dulles' conversation with Caccia to the Embassy in London. (Telegram 7536; Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4-2557)

---

## 72. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Unified and Specified Commanders<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 24, 1957—7:10 p.m.*

JCS 921766. Limit distribution of this message to your major commanders and senior staff officers.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) SSC.57. Secret; Noform; Operational Immediate. Sent to Commander in Chief, Alaska, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska; Commander in Chief, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; Commander in Chief, Caribbean, Quarry Heights, Canal Zone; Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, Paris, France; Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan; Commander in Chief, Pacific, Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii; Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, London, England; and Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska.

With the reopening of the Suez Canal and the anticipated early registration with the United Nations of the Egyptian memorandum covering the operations of the Canal, the focus of tension in the Middle East has shifted to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. King Hussein, supported in large part by the tribal sheiks and the old Bedouin element in the Jordan Arab Army, is being subjected to a sharply increasing propaganda and subversive assault from leftist-nationalist elements among the Palestinian Arabs both inside and outside of the Army, strongly supported and guided by similarly oriented elements of the Syrian Government and by the Egyptian Government. The maintenance of a government in Jordan favorably disposed to the West now depends upon the life and continuing resolution of the King and upon the loyalty and effectiveness of an army subjected to divisive strains. The loss of Jordan to the leftist Egyptian-Syrian camp would be a setback to U.S. interests in the area. Whether the King continues to attempt to rule with a constitutional government or resorts to a military dictatorship, the struggle for power is unlikely to be expeditiously resolved.

Saudi troops in Jordan and Iraqi troops in Western Iraq are prepared to support Hussein upon his request. Syrian troops in Jordan are confined to barracks and their withdrawal may be under consideration. Inconclusive evidence of possible Israeli mobilization has been reported. Strong representations are being made to Israel to keep hands off. The death of Hussein or the calling in of Iraqi troops could result in clashes among opposing forces and within the Jordan Army.

Instructions have been issued to sail Sixth Fleet to Eastern Mediterranean and the Sixth Fleet Amphibious Task Group to Beirut. Two DDs are remaining in Massawa-Aden area. In addition JCS are considering possible movements of certain ground and air units from Europe to staging bases in Turkey or Lebanon.

---

### 73. Editorial Note

On April 24 at 5:30 p.m., Press Secretary James Hagerty, traveling with President Eisenhower, held a press conference in Augusta, Georgia. Hagerty noted, among other things, that both the President and the Secretary of State regard "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital." Discussion followed as to whether Eisenhower's pronouncement constituted the administration's first use of the Ei-

senhower Doctrine. For text of the press conference, see Eisenhower Library, Kevin McCann Collection of Press and Radio Conferences and Press Releases, 1952–61.

---

#### 74. Editorial Note

On April 25, the Khalidi cabinet resigned and a new cabinet was formed with Ibrahim Hashim as Prime Minister. On the same day, King Hussein placed Jordan under martial law and declared a curfew in several urban areas.

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles discussed the situation in a telephone conversation at 8:59 a.m. on April 25. A memorandum of the conversation prepared by Phyllis D. Bernau reads in part:

“The Sec said the situation seems to be still in hand in Jordan and moving approximately as forecast, etc. Any more support from us would be embarrassing. The Pres said in that case reconsider moving the fleet? The Sec said that is done. The Sec said Snyder called at 7:30 and said it was moving and the news was out. The Pres mentioned going to Libya and Greece without going further. The Sec does not think it will do any harm and the Pres agreed. The Pres said anything he needs in the way of encouragement—temporary pact—we can give him—a little training mission and weapons. The Sec said we can do this but do not want to do anything he does not ask for. The Pres referred to wording in the res. The Sec said he thinks he knows he has our support. They praised him and the Pres sort of mentioned inviting him over.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

An account of the conversation prepared in the Office of the President in Augusta, Georgia, reads in part: “The President said that the young King was certainly showing spunk and he admired him for it. He said ‘let’s invite him over one of these days’ when situation is less tense.” (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

**75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 25, 1957—11:04 a.m.*

1962. You are requested at earliest possible moment to again review Jordanian situation with Nuri. You may inform him we have informed Israeli Government US purpose to support status quo in Jordan, emphasizing we know this to be also objective of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. . . . Israeli attitude reassuring.

You may further inform him . . . our fear Syrians might be tempted inject themselves overtly into situation particularly if substantial elements Jordanian army should become disaffected from King. . . .

You may assure Nuri of continued US determination to support Hussein in every practicable way. You should emphasize importance we attach to open support of Hussein by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, including public expression of willingness by these nations to provide forces to assist Hussein should he request them.

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/4–2557. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and approved and signed by Dulles.

Meanwhile we continue to examine possibilities of financial and other assistance to Jordan. (Baghdad's 1772<sup>2</sup>)

Dulles

---

<sup>2</sup> On April 24, the Embassy in Baghdad reported a conversation with Nuri on April 23. Among other things, Nuri noted that Iraq did not have the "reserves" to assist King Hussein at the present time. Nuri "wished" that he might furnish Hussein with at least 200,000 pounds to be used to counteract Egyptian and Syrian "subversive activities." (Telegram 1772; *ibid.*, 120.1580/4-2457)

On April 26, Gallman informed the Department that he had called on Nuri and conveyed to him the substance of telegram 1962. Nuri noted, in part, that he would immediately pass the information to King Faisal. The Prime Minister then added: "Please tell Mr. Dulles that what you have been doing and propose to do is all to the good, but up to now you have been working only on the tail and leaving the head intact. The head is Nasser and in the last analysis, it is Nasser who is the source of all the disturbances in the Middle East.'" (Telegram 1788 from Baghdad; *ibid.*, 785.00/4-2657)

---

## 76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 25, 1957—11:04 a.m.*

944. Department desires you seek audience as soon as possible with King to review current situation in Jordan. Emphasize our deep concern over events and our firm determination, which we believe King shares with us, to preserve independence of Jordan. You may inform King:

1. We have irrefutable evidence Syrians and Egyptians are carrying out widespread covert operations against Hussein and Jordanian regime in obvious collaboration with Communists. We have knowledge Egyptian sponsored plot to assassinate Hussein. We would urge Saud exercise great care with respect his own personal security at this time.

2. We attach importance at this juncture to open support of Hussein by friendly nations such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq and to public expression of willingness by such nations to provide forces for assistance of Hussein if he should request them. We would hope King might see way clear to make such expression. We know Hussein keenly appreciates King's current support.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/4-2557. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and approved and signed by Dulles.



3. We wish lend our support in every practicable way and have problem under constant consideration. (FYI: In this connection Department requests you also determine, if possible, extent of King's current financial assistance to Jordan. End FYI.)

4. We believe this to be most critical time and believe it is in interests freedom and independence of all Arab peoples to support Hussein.<sup>2</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>2</sup> On April 29, Wadsworth informed the Department that he presented the substance of telegram 944 to King Saud in an audience on April 27. According to the Ambassador, Saud noted, among other things, that he would continue to support Hussein and had already placed Saudi forces in Jordan under Hussein's command. The King also noted that Hussein was short of funds and if the United States could furnish money, it would be best to do so through Iraq. (Telegram 659 from Jidda; *ibid.*, 785.00/4–2957)

---

77. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 25, 1957—8:16 p.m.*

1508. Re Deptel 1462.<sup>2</sup> For Ambassador. You should soonest convey to King in manner you deem most appropriate and effective US views along following lines:

We wish reaffirm that US is following with greatest concern events in Jordan. We have been giving thought to what additional steps we might take support King and loyal elements in this critical time. We have already moved on a wide front, examples of what we are doing being:

1. President has stated publicly independence and integrity Jordan vital to US.
2. Units Sixth Fleet, with Marines aboard, proceeding Eastern Mediterranean. Fleet visit Beirut planned beginning April 30.
3. Representations to Nasser.
4. Suggestions to Turks.
5. Messages to Saud, Nuri and Chamoun.
6. Urging restraint on Israelis.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/4–2257. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Bergus and approved and signed by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 71.

---

7. Responding favorably to Hussein's request for deferment visit Richards Mission.

Various other thoughts have occurred to us as to additional measures which might be taken in support of King. However, we fully conscious of fact that some of these might have effect in Jordan different than that which we might desire and intend. For example we are wondering if military equipment would be useful to Jordan at this stage either directly or in conjunction with friendly countries in area. We are also wondering if there are short-term needs which could be met through economic assistance. We would appreciate receiving urgently from King his further views as to how we might most effectively give substance our earnest desire help him.

Ambassador should suggest to Hussein that he might find it desirable to communicate with Saud, King Feisal and Chamoun along following lines:

Egyptian and Syrian interference in form incitement street elements, inflammatory broadcasts, fedayeen raids, and widespread attempts at bribery continues. If, despite clearly expressed wishes by Hussein, Egyptians and Syrians fail desist from such activities, Hussein giving serious consideration to reference this overt and covert violation Jordan sovereignty to Security Council. Decision not yet taken but pace events such that Jordan initiative in Security Council may be called for momentarily. Their preliminary reactions would be appreciated.

Dulles

---

78. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 25, 1957—9:03 p.m.*

4137. Please deliver following message from President to President Chamoun. Confirm date and time delivery:

"April 25, 1957.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. According to a notation on the source text, President Eisenhower suggested changes in the message that were approved by Dulles. Eisenhower's handwritten changes appear on the draft message to Chamoun sent to the White House for approval. (*Ibid.*)

Dear Mr. President:

I have studied with care your impressive message of April 24, 1957<sup>2</sup> and share your belief that present developments in Jordan are of great importance to free peoples everywhere. The independence and integrity of Jordan are of deep concern to the United States and I entirely agree that this is a situation where those who love freedom must join together to strengthen that cause.

We are following developments in Jordan closely and have conveyed to King Hussein our encouragement and support. In our close consultation with King Saud, we have expressed to him our appreciation for the very effective measures he has taken to support King Hussein. We have also been in touch with the Government of Iraq, and share the belief of the Iraqi Government that the deployment of Iraqi forces on Iraqi territory in a manner in which they can be quickly available to King Hussein is a wise precautionary measure.

The Government of Israel has been told of our firm view that Israel should exercise the greatest restraint in the present crisis in Jordan. Israel seems to display<sup>3</sup> a constructive attitude.

Units of the United States Sixth Fleet, with United States Marines aboard, are moving into the Eastern Mediterranean. Ambassador Heath is being instructed to ask the Government of Lebanon for permission for a call by ships of the Fleet at Beirut for approximately three or four days beginning April 30. This could of course<sup>4</sup> be extended if considered desirable by our two Governments in the light of circumstances.

We are keeping in close touch with other friendly Governments. I am gratified at your expression of Lebanon's deep concern in this matter of our common interest, and at reports indicating measures which Lebanon is taking to assist King Hussein. Perhaps you might wish to consider further steps such as a public expression of support for King Hussein and private consultation with friendly Governments in the area with regard to steps they might take to assist the King.

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower changed the initial draft from "has displayed" to "seems to display".

<sup>4</sup> Eisenhower changed the initial draft from "Perhaps this could be" to "This could of course be".

You may be certain that you and I share the same purpose, and I would greatly appreciate any further views or suggestions which you might have.<sup>5</sup>

Sincerely,  
Dwight D. Eisenhower''

Dulles

---

<sup>5</sup> On April 26, the Embassy in Beirut informed the Department that it had delivered the President's letter to Chamoun. According to the Embassy, Chamoun expressed appreciation for Eisenhower's reply and for his dispatch of units of the Sixth Fleet to Beirut. Chamoun also expressed the hope that the arms that Ambassador Richards had promised to provide Lebanon would begin to arrive shortly. (Telegram 2567; Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/4-2657)

---

**79. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Tel Aviv, April 26, 1957—1 a.m.*

1257. Reference: Deptel 999;<sup>2</sup> Embtel 1251.<sup>3</sup> I saw Golda Meir in her Jerusalem residence for hour's consultation this evening on basis Secretary's conversation with Eban. She told me she had only brief "flash" from latter who reported Secretary as saying Hussein was doing well but more trouble could be expected. Secretary hoped King could keep free of problems other than his troubles with Arabs . . . .

She listened intently to my reiteration points Secretary made, interrupting only twice—to ask me to repeat my paraphrase of his remarks regarding possible implementation American Doctrine against Syrian intervention, and possibility of Syrians attacking exposed East Bank if Hussein were obliged to move loyal troops west of river (respectively paragraphs 2 and 3 Deptel 999). On the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4-2657. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Amman.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 70.

<sup>3</sup> On April 25, Lawson informed the Department that he had arranged an appointment with Foreign Minister Meir as the Prime Minister was in the Negev. The Ambassador added that he would seek to arrange a meeting with Ben Gurion if the Department thought it necessary. Lawson noted, however, that two visits to the Prime Minister's desert retreat within a week might raise "public and press speculations". (Telegram 1251 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4-2557) Later that day the Department notified the Embassy that the appointment with Meir would be satisfactory. (Telegram 1001 to Tel Aviv; *ibid.*)

former point, she asked me if this meant USG would act if Syria moved against Jordan. I replied this would depend on interpretation of Doctrine under conditions existing at time. It seemed apparent to me she is convinced we would take action. Later in conversation, she said Hussein's "remarkable" survival thus far traces largely to USG's support for him against Syrian threat.

She went further, I thought, than GOI has before, either in our conversations this month (Embtel 1230<sup>4</sup>) or in October 1956, to indicate understanding of USG interest in unfettered Iraqi hand if required by Syrian developments, but said she thought our *démarche* to GOI should be matched by similar representations, not only to Iraqis but also to Saudis. She felt that US should be obtaining and transmitting assurances (a) from Iraqis that any penetration by their forces of Jordanian territory was not intended as and would not constitute threat to Israel, (b) from Saudis that their troops were not and would not be in Jordan to threaten Israel and (c) also from Saudis, that regardless of their public statements they did not intend to interfere with movement of vessels through Tiran Straits or Aqaba Gulf. Furthermore, USG should assume certain responsibilities in connection with these assurances and not serve merely as post office.

She recalled that last time we discussed it (Embtel 1230), "I told you that both Jordan and Iraq can be assured we have no intention of taking steps if our security is not involved. I can repeat that assurance. However, we are wondering when Secretary consults with us as to Jordan and Iraqi requirements whether he is at same time talking with them on Israel's very real interests. We certainly hope Iraqis will win any encounter with Syrians but what happens to us if Syrians move in from north and Saudis take a hand? We think you should make clear to Hussein and his friends that USG has another interest in ME—that is, integrity and survival of Israel."

**Lawson**

---

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 64.

---

80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy  
in Turkey<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 26, 1957—7:20 p.m.*

2526. For Ambassador.

A. We have informed King Hussein of Jordan:

1. We wish reaffirm our great concern events his country and have been giving thought to steps we could take to support him. We have already moved on wide front. President has stated publicly independence and integrity Jordan vital to US. Units Sixth Fleet with Marines aboard proceeding Eastern Mediterranean and Fleet visit to Beirut planned begin April 30. We making representations to Nasser and . . . Israelis. Have made suggestions to Turks. Have sent messages Saud, Nuri and Chamoun requesting their cooperation. Have responded favorably to Hussein's request for deferment visit Richards Mission.

2. Various other thoughts have occurred as to additional measures which might be taken. However we aware some of these might be counterproductive. For example we wondering if military equipment would be useful to Jordan at this stage, given either directly or in conjunction friendly countries of area.

3. We also wondering about short term needs Jordan which could be met through economic assistance.

4. We would appreciate receiving urgently from King his further views as to how we might most effectively give substance to our earnest desire to help him.

B. . . .

Ankara may at its discretion pass to Turks in strict confidence information contained A 1 and A 4 above. Cairo Damascus should consider info this telegram strictly for Ambassador's background info.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4-2657. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Parker and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated priority to Cairo and Damascus.

**81. Editorial Note**

On April 29, American and Jordanian representatives exchanged a series of notes regarding economic assistance. In response to a Jordanian request for economic and technical aid, the United States agreed to assure the “freedom” of Jordan and to maintain its “economic and political stability” and agreed to extend \$10 million in economic assistance. The proposed aid was to be provided in Mutual Security aid funds and not under funds approved for use by the Richards mission. Telegram 1542 to Amman, April 27, a joint State–ICA message, authorized the exchange of notes, transmitted the text of an approved announcement, and provided additional instructions as to the use of funds. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.5–MSP/4–2757) The text of the notes were transmitted in telegram 1466 from Amman, April 29. (*Ibid.*, 785.5–MSP/4–2957) See also 8 UST 1064.

---

**82. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 2, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Jordan Crisis; Israel–United States Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy  
The Acting Secretary  
NEA—William M. Rountree  
NE—Richard B. Parker

Ambassador Eban called at our request.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Herter said that we wished to make several comments regarding Mrs. Meir’s remarks

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5–257. Secret. Drafted on May 3 by Parker.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles on April 27, Rountree informed the Secretary of the contents of telegram 1257 (Document 79), noted that Ambassador Lawson had speculated that Ben Gurion tended to use Meir, given Meir’s use of strong language, as a “trial balloon”, and recommended that the U.S. response to Meir’s remarks be made by either Dulles or Herter to Eban with a report of the conversation telegraphed to Tel Aviv for presentation to Meir by Lawson. Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 582, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S 1957)

to Ambassador Lawson on April 26, and that we planned to send a summary of our comments to Ambassador Lawson for discussion with Mrs. Meir (see Department's telegram No. 1025 of May 2 to Tel Aviv<sup>3</sup>).

Mr. Herter noted that we felt that we had made abundantly clear to the states of the Near East the fact that United States foreign policy embraced the preservation of the State of Israel. We were prepared to reaffirm this to those states should we feel that the situation required it. We hoped to continue our consultations with Israel on problems affecting the Near East. We felt that the present crisis in Jordan was a most serious matter and believed that the successful assertion of the King's authority could mark a turning point for the better in the entire picture of relations between the Arab states and the West. This would be very much in Israel's interest. Therefore, we thought Israel should make every effort to contribute to a situation which would be helpful. . . .

Mr. Herter continued that . . . we had no evidence that Iraq was desirous of posing a threat to Israel. Similarly, we did not think the Saudi troops now in Jordan posed a threat to Israel and considered them primarily as a stabilizing influence in the internal security situation.

Mr. Herter reiterated our belief, previously expressed by the Secretary on April 19, in the need to move forward quietly in the Straits of Tiran if Israel's objective was, as we believed it was, the strengthening of Israel's economy rather than domestic political victories. Highly publicized transit of an Israel ship through the Straits at this time, when the situation in Jordan was still critical, could have an adverse effect on King Hussein's efforts as well as on the area situation generally.

Mr. Herter continued that we appreciated Israel's deep concern over developments of such importance to her and we hoped that we could work together toward solutions of the many problems of the Near East.

Mr. Eban replied that Israel considered recent American statements regarding the independence and integrity of Jordan as extremely prudent and would like to feel that the Arab states would see this policy as applying not merely to Jordan but to all the states of the area, including Israel. Mr. Shiloah added that while Israel herself had no doubts as to United States policy in this regard, it was important that the Arabs also have no illusions. Mr. Herter noted that the statements made were quotations from language used in the Joint Resolution on the President's Middle East proposals. Mr.

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1025 forwarded the substance of the May 2 conversation and instructed Lawson to convey Herter's comments to Meir. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.84A/5-257)



Eban noted that, as far as Israel was concerned, the occasion for reiterating United States policy regarding the preservation of Israel arose every day.

Mr. Eban continued that, as a historical note, he wished to point out that the current crisis in Jordan was due to the machinations of what might be called the Nabulsi-Rimawi-Nasser coalition. It was precisely the appearance of this coalition following the elections of last October which had been one of the important factors causing Israel's concern for her future safety. He also had two reflections to pass on as to why Hussein had been able to assert his independence. One was that the legend of Nasser's military invincibility had been largely destroyed by the Israelis. The other was that Egypt had no territorial contiguity with Jordan. . . .

Mr. Eban continued that the question now facing the world was what Nasser's riposte would be following Hussein's assertion of independence. It could be either within Jordan or elsewhere. There appeared to be little Nasser could do outside Jordan. The Suez Canal was already nationalized and it would be dangerous to attempt anything on his frontier with Israel. He would probably seek to work something within Jordan, perhaps a counter coup or an assassination. We should keep our fingers crossed.

Mr. Herter noted that they were crossed already.

Mr. Shiloah said that he and Mr. Eban had been much reassured by Mr. Herter's statements but wished to point out that unless Israel was sure that the Saudis and Iraqis were fully aware of United States attitudes toward Israel, Israel would continue to be uneasy whenever there were any movements of such troops within Jordan. We would have to expect the Israelis to appear at such times to ask that the Saudis and Iraqis be reminded that there was a limit. Mr. Eban noted that there was considerable difference between the East Bank and West Bank. Mr. Shiloah said that Israel was not expecting or asking for any United States action or statement at this time, but merely wished to emphasize that Israel was most sensitive about troop movements within Jordan.

Mr. Eban said that Israel appreciated the importance of events in Jordan and would continue to cooperate in this regard. He said that one weapon Nasser might use against Hussein was a recrudescence of Jordan-based fedayeen activity. He had done this in the past and could do it again. While Israel was pleased at the prospect of a turning point in Arab-Western relations as mentioned by Mr. Herter, as a short term goal it would settle for a peaceful border. Mr. Herter and Mr. Rountree both replied that we were quite sure King Hussein felt the same way.

Mr. Eban said that his Government had decided to keep the next ship arrival at Eilath completely quiet if possible. If, in spite of

precautions, the news of the ship's arrival leaked out, the arrival would be treated as a purely routine matter not deserving comment. There were two reasons for this. One was "the American reason". The other was that the Iranians had requested the Israelis to keep such arrivals quiet for fear of jeopardizing the oil supply. Also, Israel hoped to establish a variegated flag pattern, sending through Norwegian, Dutch, Liberian and other flag vessels rather than concentrating on United States flag vessels.

Mr. Herter expressed appreciation of the information conveyed by Mr. Eban and, recalling a past conversation, said that at some future date he would like to discuss in detail the Palestine refugee problem. It was agreed that this would be done following the Secretary's return from Bonn.<sup>4</sup>

With regard to Suez, Mr. Eban remarked that he had not expected much out of the Security Council deliberations on the subject, but that his Government was concerned at the crystallization of the boycott, which took two forms: discrimination against Israel flag vessels and discrimination against foreign flag vessels carrying cargo for Israel. He would like to discuss with us soon methods by which Israel could assert its rights peacefully yet fruitfully. He understood the United States position to be that the best method would be concentration on cargoes rather than on vessels and he would have some detailed questions to discuss at a later date.

Mr. Eban noted that Israel's economic position was a cause of great concern. Because of events in Egypt and Europe, the flow of immigration was expected to rise to a level of 100,000 persons per year for the next two years or so and this had already created serious problems. All sources of assistance, official and otherwise, were influenced by the attitudes of the American Government and he would also wish to discuss this in detail later. Mr. Herter said that, in all candor, he must say that any action the Department could now take was most limited by doubts as to how Congress would act on the budget.

Mr. Shiloah raised the question of certain items of a civilian nature, such as trucks, which appeared on the Munitions List for bureaucratic reasons and which were therefore being denied to Israel by the United States. Mr. Rountree noted that the November 2 resolution of the General Assembly was still in effect. Mr. Shiloah said that he was surprised that all the restrictions imposed under the resolution had not been lifted automatically following the Israel withdrawal. Some relief could perhaps be obtained through reclassification to allow purely civilian items to pass, even though they

---

<sup>4</sup>Dulles arrived in Bonn on May 1 to attend the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

appeared on the Munitions List. These were items which certainly could not be considered as contravening the resolution and which were in fact obtainable from Europe. Mr. Rountree noted that the restrictions were still very much in force as far as shipments to Egypt were concerned and that lifting them for Israel would mean lifting them for Egypt.

Mr. Eban noted that the Secretary, while in Bonn, had spoken to von Brentano about German-Israel relations. His Government thought it would be most helpful if the Secretary could also speak in the same manner and with the same words to Chancellor Adenauer. Mr. Herter replied that, as he recalled the Secretary's schedule and the plan of the NATO meetings, he did not think this would be possible.

---

**83. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Amman, May 3, 1957—8 p.m.*

1501. Bonn for USDel. Inform Richards. Until few days ago I had not been sanguine about future prospects of Jordan or of this area. The enunciation of the American doctrine by the President, the splendid record of Ambassador Richards visits to country after country, and success of King Hussein in beating back leftist attempts on his country and throne give rise to hopes. When the White House plainly announced support of Jordan, the Sixth Fleet was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean and the US gave \$10 million in aid the tide appeared stemmed here. The question was whether we were to stand and await more blows or move forward to realignment of forces in Near East. Then yesterday Samir Rifai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and backbone of the government called me for long conference at his home. What he said appeared to provide us with significant opportunity for constructive moves, and I therefore submit a fairly full summary of his remarks.

Samir Pasha stated information available shows no doubt Jordan crisis engineered from abroad and involved Egypt, Syria, and Russia. Cabinet crisis only one manifestation of larger design to overthrow

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/5-357. Secret; Priority; No-form. Repeated priority to Rabat and Tripoli, and to Baghdad, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda; passed to the Departments of the Army and the Air Force.

King, disrupt loyal elements and make country Communist puppet. Chief reasons for failure of plan due miscalculations that King could not form viable Cabinet and army so divided as be rendered ineffective. King was supported by troops and Cabinet formed.

He said initial success of King's stand and new government very encouraging and believes they can carry on. Samir estimates 50 percent containment disruptive elements due choice of measures adopted and very prompt announcements. Other 50 percent is action thereunder.

Hussein believes and present government follows him in conviction Communist activities Jordan must be crushed. This in Samir's opinion a battle for survival. He added that unmasking forces at work during crisis here already causing reassessments in Arab world. He hoped and believed that active opposition to Communist authority would next occur in Syria and matter one of timing. In this respect Jordan occupies key position and if Jordan can carry on with the necessary outside assistance and with the developing understanding in sister states whole position in Middle East could be changed. . . .

Samir made point that one of first steps to break up Syrian intrigue in Jordan is removal Syrian army. It could simply be asked to leave but this would raise question over present Saudi troops which HKJ wished remain here. Syrians could be handled indirectly and his plan is do this by requesting presence Iraqi troops under treaty 1947 and station them in Mafraq. Wishes do this before British evacuation Mafraq air base May 31 when Jordan troops will occupy. He mentioned May 15 as possible date to request Iraqis. In doing this he hoped accomplish following: (a) bring Iraq into Jordan picture, (b) overcome Egyptian Syrian claims defense Jordan their problem, (c) threaten Syrian designs and warn her with forces near frontier, (d) cause withdrawal Syrian troops. Samir also said he plans put Iraqi representative on joint command in Jordan.

Samir stated that in respect Communist activities Jordan now following same lines as US. It has he said virtually adhered to American doctrine. He pointed out with conviction that Jordan had become fulcrum for upshooting [*uprooting?*] influence Egypt and Syria and in fact bring about a change in internal orientation of latter. He mentioned importance new alignments in Arab world which begin with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan. He was frank to point out Jordan could not play a desirable role without considerable assistance; in fact she would not be able to maintain present position without help. He said he felt necessary be straightforward and frank in their position and details of kind of help needed and of most use.

First and immediate was he obliged tell UK that HKJ unable pay Jordan dinars 700,000 due May 1. British had granted one month

delay but Jordan was up against it. He inquired if US could give funds this purpose or somehow have British payment covered for example in UK debt to US. I replied saw no possibility of this but would report matter and perhaps friendly representations to UK not to press for payment could be made. He hoped for early news as HKJ in very awkward position. (Believe he not unmindful of what would happen to exchange value of dinar if payment repudiated.)

Second problem, he said, is bad financial situation of government. Budget of Nabulsi government being studied now but first indications are it not a true budget. He fears shortfall of income which will be aggravated by both manner payment Egyptian-Syrian Army subsidies and likelihood little will be forthcoming. So far Saud has made available Jordan dinars 2,500,000 and other nothing. The \$10 million aid would, he said, be most helpful to government. I pointed out it could not be used for armed forces and examination of use of money necessary. He will instruct Ministers Finance and Economy discuss question with Nelson USOM/Jordan tomorrow. Also wishes review Point IV aid to give greatest immediate impact and employment. I agree this necessary.

Third problem, Samir stated, is army. Need there has become more apparent and more important. Loyalty of army was all-important and needs be rewarded somehow and position restored to that prior pay and allowance cuts by Nuwwar for which they do not have the money. This army, previously crack force in area largely because of superior training and esprit, now suffering because its arms and equipment second grade or obsolete. This especially marked in view recent Egyptian-Syrian acquisitions from Soviet bloc and Iraq from United States and United Kingdom. Even Saudis better equipped. Considerable importance attached this point by King and government and Samir hoped means could be found envisage substantial equipping army. I told Samir there were some statutory conditions such as agreements, training missions, etc., which had stopped others in area in past. To my surprise he promptly replied this no cause preoccupation since Jordan, having decided on anti-Communist line and cast the die, was prepared take necessary steps.

Re equipment for army he said military had prepared request which he said was patently large and read some items. I remarked it very large but when occasion permitted some discussions on technical military level would undoubtedly result in adequate revision. He gave me original handwritten list asking if I had someone of confidence to translate and return.

*Comment and recommendations:* A unique opportunity is given the United States to encourage realignment of forces in Near East. It is possible to foresee the countering of Communist activity in Arab

world, the shifting of alignments in Syria, close cooperation of Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the negation of Nasser's influence and protection of Persian Gulf militarily. With a little rosy tinted optimism one can speculate on so quieting things that eventual settlement of the Palestine problem may be possible.

If we are to take the opportunity of using Jordan as a lever for these desirable purposes the fulcrum will have to be further and prompt American assistance. It may come fairly high but compared to the issues at stake would be cheap. No recommendation of individual types of assistance or amounts of aid are made herein. The important thing, it seems to me, is the course of action. If we desire to assure Western orientation of area we need to move in unhesitatingly here. We must not delude ourselves that this can be accomplished by economic assistance alone. Direct or indirect military aid will also be necessary. Such military aid could even pave the way for eventual Jordanian adherence to the Baghdad Pact, although at this time breathing the thought aloud would be counter-productive.

I strongly recommend a bold American approach, since we alone have any chance of success. This can be accomplished through diplomatic channels. It can be made somewhat more dramatic by the despatch of a few qualified and authorized persons to Amman. It can be made even more dramatic if we decide on aid by inviting King Hussein or Foreign Minister Rifai to the United States and handing them a package. I urge the latter.<sup>2</sup>

### Mallory

---

<sup>2</sup> Mallory forwarded a more detailed account of his meeting with Rifa'i in despatch 279 from Amman, May 3. (*Ibid.*, 785.00/5-357) On May 6, the Embassy in Beirut, commenting on telegram 1501 from Amman, noted: "We can add all information from reliable sources here clearly give every indication that if King Hussein and his present line fail, repercussions on pro-Western policy of Lebanon would be dangerous and could be disastrous." (Telegram 2653 from Beirut; *ibid.*, 685.00/5-657)

**84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 6, 1957—7:14 p.m.*

7803. Embtel 5956. <sup>2</sup> You should inform FonOff that in expressing hope (Deptel 7678 <sup>3</sup>) UK would extend every possible economic assistance to Jordan view critical situation there we had in mind: 1) possible deferral of payments due UK from Jordan in accordance terms agreement terminating UK-HKJ Treaty; 2) continuation some development assistance funds especially for those projects initiated by UK.

As FonOff aware, US has made \$10 million available to Jordan for use in maintaining economic and political stability and has undertaken to maintain continuing review Jordan's problems in cooperation with HKJ Govt to determine what future steps may be required. We feel it most important that USG not emerge as sole source aid to Jordan and accordingly are continuing urge Saudis and Iraqis assist Jordan. We feel that UK for its part can make significant contribution to efforts Hussein and other constructive elements in Jordan and in area who have come to realize close identity their interests with those of Free World. <sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 885.10/5-257. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Berry who signed for Herter. Repeated to Amman.

<sup>2</sup> On May 2, the Embassy in London informed the Department that it had expressed to the Foreign Office its hope that the United Kingdom would extend "every possible assistance" to Jordan. The Foreign Office added, among other things, that it had granted Jordan a month's deferral on monies already owed to the United Kingdom. (Telegram 5956 from London, May 2, *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 7678 to London, May 1. (*Ibid.*, 885.10/4-3057)

<sup>4</sup> On May 7, the Embassy in London informed the Department that it had conveyed the substance of telegram 7803 to the Foreign Office, emphasizing the view that the United States should not be the only source of funds for Jordan. According to the Embassy, the Foreign Office official indicated that he would obtain a reply as soon as possible. (Telegram 6057; *ibid.*, 885.10/5-757)

---

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Baghdad, May 6, 1957—8 p.m.*

1846. Prime Minister asked me to call at his home this evening. He had there with him the former Jordanian Prime Minister Hazzen Majali and Foreign Minister Bashayan. Majali, it was explained to me, had come to Baghdad on personal mission but with knowledge of King Hussein to press upon Iraqis Jordan's serious financial plight. After that introduction Majali did the talking.

Iraq, he said, had courageously come out in favor of the West but had thereby isolated herself from rest of Arab world. He suggested that some of any additional aid we might extend to Jordan be extended through Iraq in order to help Iraq rehabilitate herself among Arab states. Any further economic aid for Jordan might very well continue to be extended directly by US. Any military aid, however he strongly advised should come through Iraq and Saudi Arabia. With arrival here of King Saud on 11th a good opportunity would be given for discussion to coordinate aid for Jordan by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and US. King Hussein would probably not be able to come himself at that time. He would though, he was sure, send a representative. Perhaps he himself might return in that capacity. In any event on his return to Amman he would see Ambassador Mallory and explore these suggestions further.

My response was that while I felt these suggestions had merit I was not at all sure they could be carried through. I would, nevertheless, report them and in turn request Department's views.

I would like particularly Department's reaction to suggestion that we sit-in on some of the talks while King Saud is here. If we are to do that we should, I think, be prepared to make some concrete suggestions to further coordinated aid.

Nuri in an aside to me maintained again that Iraq did not have the financial means at present to help Jordan. Cost of maintaining troops at H-3, he added, was proving to be quite a burden.

**Gallman**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/5-657. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Amman.



86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 6, 1957—7:42 p.m.*

2112. Baghdad's 1846.<sup>2</sup> Re Majali comments on military aid to Jordan. Request received from Jordan Government and possibilities and procedures now under study. Aid through third country is possibility but complicated and has disadvantages. Encouragement this idea should not be given at present.

We continue believe as stated Deptel 2082<sup>3</sup> most effective aid to Jordan would be that provided by friendly Arab countries. Iraq-Saudi meeting provides excellent opportunity coordinate such aid. We do not believe we should participate these discussions. In private conversations outside formal sessions you may emphasize to both Saudis and Iraqis our strong interest preservation independence Jordan, in fact we have given extraordinary aid, are continuing our regular aid program and have possibility some military aid under study. We believe Saudi Arabia and Iraq should continue provide economic assistance to Jordan and military aid as well.

(FYI—We should strongly encourage greater Iraqi contributions to this effort. In present circumstances ME, and view our knowledge Iraqi surpluses and fact Iraqi oil flow being restored, Nuri's continued refusal consider appreciable aid leaves unfavorable impression. We would appreciate your assessment this problem. End FYI.)<sup>4</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/5-657. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2082 to Baghdad, May 6, the Department instructed the Embassy to continue to emphasize to the Iraqis the advantages of stabilizing the situation in Jordan through aid from other Arab countries. (Department of State, Central Files, 885.0087/5-657)

<sup>4</sup> On May 9, Gallman informed the Department that he had conveyed the first two paragraphs of telegram 2112 to Nuri. According to the Ambassador, Nuri was pleased that the United States was considering Jordan's request for military assistance and seemed ready to accept the fact that the United States was not participating in the coming Saudi-Iraqi talks. Gallman added, among other things, that in response to his view of the desirability of Iraqi aid to Jordan, Nuri responded that Iraq was presently "short of cash". (Telegram 1860; *ibid.*, 785.5-MSP/5-957)

---

87. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 7, 1957—12:09 p.m.*

1646. Amman's 1501.<sup>2</sup>

1. Department shares your view future stability Jordan matter of deep concern to US. We prepared be as helpful as possible but we consider it most important that USG not emerge as sole source of aid for Jordan. Accordingly we will continue urge Saudis<sup>3</sup> and Iraqis assist Jordan. Up to now Iraqis have felt unable give substantial financial assistance. We intend keep on pressing this point with Nuri and are suggesting to Saud that he discuss matter in Baghdad during his visit there.

2. We have already expressed to British our hope that UK will extend every possible economic assistance to Jordan. We plan discuss this further with view to achieving UK acquiescence in deferral payments called for by agreement terminating UK-HKJ Treaty, and continued UK project assistance.

3. Broad authority given you in Deptel 1542<sup>4</sup> (see para 4) should put you in position respond to Jordan's most urgent needs in planning expenditure of \$10 million and can be used budget support including military salaries.

4. Nature and amount of further US economic aid, if any, to Jordan must of necessity depend on firm recommendations Embassy. We are more interested Embassy's views and projections re what HKJ Govt will require in months ahead to maintain solvency with respect its internal obligations and assure modest program economic development than in lists recommended projects. This connection best possible info re Jordan budget situation would be useful.

5. We prepared consider sympathetically military assistance to Jordan Army view assuring morale and efficiency of necessary force

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/5-757. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Herter. Pouched to Beirut, Cairo, and London and repeated to Baghdad, Damascus, and Jidda.

<sup>2</sup> Document 83.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1001 to Jidda, May 6, the Department instructed the Embassy, among other things, to express to the King U.S. concern over Jordan's financial situation and to convey its appreciation of Saud's support for Hussein. The Department added that while the United States was continuing its assistance to Jordan, it believed that there was great advantage in stabilizing the situation in Jordan through assistance from other Arab countries. Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Department noted, might wish to consider additional measures. (Department of State, Central Files, 123-Wadsworth, George)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 81.

maintain effective internal security. Dept now discussing matter with Defense and will advise.<sup>5</sup>

Herter

---

<sup>5</sup> On May 9 in telegram 1541, the Embassy in Amman informed the Department that it had conveyed the substance of paragraphs 1 and 2 of telegram 1646 to Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister Rifai, Minister of Finance Hananiya, Minister of the Economy Khairy, and the Director of the U.S. Operations Mission in Jordan. Regarding paragraph 3, the Embassy noted, that since the subject of military salaries did not arise, it had offered no comment. There was no discussion of paragraphs 4 and 5. The Embassy added, among other things, that both Rifai and Hananiya urged that the entire \$10 million in aid be furnished immediately for the Jordanian budget. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/5-957)

---

## 88. Letter From King Hussein to President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, May 12, 1957.*

HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: It is with great pleasure and esteem that I have received your Excellency's sincere greetings and warmhearted congratulations on the occasion of the events that have transpired in our beloved land.

Destructive elements and propagandists of sedition and international Communism have attempted to put an end both to the citadel of the state that we have built and to the pillars of government in order that the country might become the prey of the Communists and the opportunists. When their evil designs became known to us for certain and their bad intentions became clear, we hastened to set matters aright. We decided to strike against the hands of the propagandists of evil a blow that would preserve our beloved land for us and permit us to march forward with it against those among

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. The source text, which was initialed by Eisenhower, is a Department of State translation forwarded with the original letter to the White House under cover of a memorandum by Howe of June 6. According to Howe's memorandum, the letter, which was handed to Mallory in Amman on May 15 for transmission by diplomatic pouch, was an acknowledgement of an oral message sent by Eisenhower to Hussein "through other channels" at the time of the Jordanian crisis. Howe indicated that the Executive Secretariat did not believe a written reply was necessary and suggested that a telegram be sent to Mallory instructing him to tell the King that the President had received his letter and "warmly reciprocates the King's expressions of friendship." A notation by Goodpaster in the margin of Howe's memorandum reads as follows: "8 June 57 State advised President approves."

us who are opposed to our inherited traditions and our noble Islamic faith.

It is my hope that the elements of friendship and amity between us will increase and that there will be a flourishing of the good relations that bind together our two great countries and our noble people in the light of the sentiments you have expressed once according to the guidance that you have laid down. I take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my great respect, wishing health and happiness for yourself and progress and prosperity for the magnanimous American people.<sup>2</sup>

Your friend,

Husayn<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> On June 8, in telegram 1927 to Amman, the Department instructed Mallory to inform the King that Eisenhower was "very pleased" with his message and warmly reciprocated his expressions of friendship and good will. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.11/6-857)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

## 89. Editorial Note

On May 16, at the 323d meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Allen Dulles in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, discussed the situation in Jordan. The memorandum of discussion includes the following:

"Turning to the Middle East, Mr. Dulles stated that the situation in Jordan remained calm. There were reports, however, of the organization in Damascus of a resistance movement against King Hussein, with the full covert support of Egypt. Mr. Dulles expressed the opinion that the young King had probably been wise to refuse the invitation to meet with King Saud and King Feisal at Baghdad. Presumably the whole thing, including Hussein's polite refusal, had been arranged in advance, and the refusal did not represent in any sense a defection by King Hussein."

Later in the discussion, President Eisenhower made the following comments on Dulles' briefing on Jordan, according to the memorandum of discussion:

"The President, referring to Mr. Dulles' earlier comments on plots against King Hussein of Jordan being hatched at Damascus, said that it seemed to him that . . . these plotters are committing

illegalities and crimes behind the scenes, and this rendered it easier for us to counter these moves.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

**90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 17, 1957—6:11 p.m.*

1747. Embtels 1591,<sup>2</sup> 1592.<sup>3</sup>

1. Consideration being given next steps in our efforts strengthen stabilize Jordan. ICA cabling separately our preliminary comments on Embassy's proposals for expenditure \$10 million and our need for further information. We feel emphasis should be on ascertainment minimum immediate needs Jordan rather than longer term projects.

2. We also planning explore further with Iraqis possibilities their giving tangible assistance Jordan. Feel it imperative we persuade Saudis, Iraqis, Jordanians to move beyond stage of public statements and private assurances of support to establishment practical working relationships for implementation such assurances. We considering suggestions we could make to this end, such as consultation among Finance Ministers three countries. Embassy views requested.

3. Study possibilities US military aid Jordan Army view assuring morale and efficiency of necessary force maintain effective internal security going forward. Considerations include: 1) need to minimize impact US arms aid on Arab-Israel situation; 2) logistic and training problem which would be created by introduction other than British weapons into Jordan Army; 3) our desire avoid emergence as sole source military or economic aid Jordan, and wish obtain participation

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/5–1557. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Berry.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1591 from Amman, May 15, conveyed the substance of a conversation between Mallory and Samiral Rifai. Their discussion touched on the following subjects: rapprochement with Saud and Faisal, the removal of Syrian troops from Jordan, budgetary assistance, Jordan's request for military equipment and military training, radio broadcasting, the visit of King Hussein to the United States, and the proposed cultural agreement between Egypt and Jordan. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1592 from Amman, May 15, Mallory informed the Department that Rifai had formally requested military assistance from the United States, and had handed the Ambassador a "Top Secret" list of arms and material. Mallory noted, among other things, that American military aid would have a great impact and that the United States could "with modest cost achieve notable results." (*Ibid.*, 785.5–MSP/5–1557)

friendly Arab states in such program. Will report our conclusions soonest. Meanwhile you should endeavor forestall hopes that massive direct US military assistance Jordan on way.

4. Re Embtel 1584,<sup>4</sup> while we appreciate need for periodic encouragement Hussein and others to press forward along course they have so rightfully chosen, we will not be surprised if they seek minimize risks by . . . hesitating precipitate open enmity of Syria, etc. . . .

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1584 from Amman, May 14, Mallory informed the Department that King Hussein had decided not to proceed to Baghdad to meet with King Saud who was presumably in Iraq on a state visit. (*Ibid.*, 785.11/5-1457)

---

**91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 18, 1957—1:37 p.m.*

2235. Baghdad's 1868.<sup>2</sup> Should Nuri raise question of our reaction his suggestion US financial assistance through Iraq to Jordan you may indicate problem extremely complex from US legal standpoint, but suggestion and possible alternative being urgently considered USG. We continue believe all interested parties, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia, should seek ways working together to ensure independence Jordan.

FYI Meanwhile, we desire Embassy's comments our current thinking. We appreciate problem as posed Embtel 1868. Any loan to Jordan through Iraq or Saudi Arabia, however, cannot be arranged

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/5-1157. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, and London.

<sup>2</sup> On May 11, the Embassy in Baghdad informed the Department, in telegram 1868, that it agreed with its assessment that with the restoration of oil flow in Iraq and the Iraqi Petroleum Company's loan to the Government, the Iraqi financial situation was "good." According to the Embassy, part of Nuri al-Said's reluctance to extend aid to Jordan resulted from the fact that he would have to obtain authorization from the Parliament. Despite "widespread sympathy" for Jordan's financial problems, the Embassy concluded, any large diversion of funds from Iraq's own development program would present the Prime Minister with local political problems. The Embassy inquired if funds from the Richards mission could not be loaned to Iraq with the understanding that they would be used to reimburse the Iraqi Development Board for any funds it furnished Jordan. (*Ibid.*)

under current US legislation and practices. Loan as suggested would also seem raise Parliamentary problem in Iraq since presumably authority would be required pass Development Board funds to Jordan. We assume therefore parliamentary obstacle surmountable.

While we do not yet have full results Saud–Faisal talks re Jordan, presume some groundwork has been prepared for their further cooperation. It seems to us highly preferable from psychological points of view that aid for Jordan should come from Arab sources and that any US aid should be supplemental. We believe we should make still further approach to Nuri encouraging him to match contributions already made by Saudi Arabia and US. In event Embassy believes this not feasible, we are sufficiently convinced importance securing some Iraqi contribution to consider proposal in which US would agree make further funds available to Jordan to match Iraqi contribution. Embassy comments particularly desired on extent to which such additional US aid might make it easier for Nuri support substantial Iraqi aid.

While Iraqi contribution potash and phosphate project will undoubtedly be helpful, we believe Jordan's greatest need straight budgetary support. We would assume any funds from Iraq which we might match would go for latter purpose. End FYI.

Dulles

---

**92. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 7, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

Military Assistance to Jordan

*Discussion*

The Jordan Government has requested from the United States: 1) economic aid; 2) budgetary support; 3) military assistance in the form of grants of hardware; and 4) assistance in military training.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5–MSP/6–757. Secret. Drafted by Bergus between May 29 and June 1 and sent through Murphy and S/S. Herter initialed the memorandum.

The \$10 million grant to Jordan under Section 201<sup>2</sup> of the Mutual Security Act has been applied to budgetary support. We have suggested to the Embassy at Amman that funds allocated to Jordan in previous years for development assistance be reprogrammed to take into account current needs.

The Jordanians have stated that they were prepared to sign a military assistance agreement with the United States.

On the question of military hardware, the Department of Defense informs us that they are aware of Jordan's present stocks and future needs. Defense says that they have no direct military interest in Jordan as such but are willing to extend military assistance to Jordan on the basis of a political decision by the Department of State that such assistance is in the United States interest. Defense is also willing to make training facilities available to the Jordanians.

It is clearly in the United States interest that the Jordan Army remain an effective force for the maintenance of internal security in the country, that its loyalty to the King remain unquestioned, and that its morale remain high. It should continue to consider the Free World as the major source of supply for arms. At the same time, in view of the lack of Defense interest in Jordan, it would be difficult to justify a military assistance relationship of the type which we have, for example, with the countries of the Baghdad Pact.

#### *Alternative Courses of Action*

1. *Direct United States Assistance:* The Jordanians envisage a program of grant United States military aid in the form of a large quantity of modern United States weapons and state that they are prepared to sign the necessary agreements. We feel that the disadvantages of such a course outweigh the primary advantage which would accrue in terms of Jordan Army pleasure at having the latest type of United States weapons at its disposal. We also incline to the belief that the Jordanians are not presently fully aware of the terms and implications of our standard grant military aid agreement. The negotiation of such an agreement with Jordan, given the complex situation within Jordan and in Jordan's relations with neighboring states would almost inevitably be very difficult. It might also put us in a position of having to justify before Congress a program of continuing military assistance to Jordan on the basis of Jordan's forces playing an effective role in the defense of Free World interests in the area. Among other factors militating against this course of action are:

---

<sup>2</sup> Section 201 of the Mutual Security Act (approved on August 26, 1954, as Public Law 665) dealt with the authorization of funds. For text, see 68 Stat. 832.



a) It would almost inevitably lead to a cycle of inflated Jordanian expectations and what would have to be disappointing United States performance in terms of types and quantities actually delivered.

b) It would require a shift in our present policy of avoiding the position of major supplier of arms to Israel and its immediate neighbors. It could well generate pressures for similar assistance to Israel.

c) A major delivery of United States arms to Jordan, whose forces from the outset have been trained and equipped by the British, would create very real problems in the fields of maintenance and spare parts, technical training, and the disposition of standardized weapons among the Jordan forces.

While we would not preclude the making available to Jordan of certain items of United States equipment necessary to make up a balanced program, we believe that for political reasons, primary emphasis should be placed on the restoration of an effective relationship between Jordan and its traditional supplier. The United States should however be in a position to offer military training slots, primarily for relations and morale purposes, to personnel of the Jordan Army.

2. *Assistance Through a Friendly Arab State:* Nuri Said has strongly advised that any military assistance to Jordan should come through Iraq and Saudi Arabia. He feels that such a move would help strengthen Iraq's position in the Arab world.

We are, of course, anxious that the United States not emerge as the sole source of aid for Jordan and to persuade other friendly Arab states to assist Jordan. We are hoping that Nuri Said can be convinced to make some economic assistance available to Jordan. We are encouraging the growing belief on the part of Saud and the Iraqis that the maintenance of Jordan's independence is in their interest and that they should work together in the pursuit of this interest.

At the same time, attempting to channel substantial United States military aid to Jordan through Saudi Arabia and Iraq would create a number of very real practical problems. Neither of these countries maintains large stockpiles of weapons which the Jordanians consider desirable. This would mean that Iraq and Saudi Arabia would have to serve as transit points for United States shipments. Releases of United States-furnished arms to Jordan by Saudi Arabia and Iraq would raise the problem of United States consent to the transfers in accordance with the requirements of the Mutual Security law. We would probably have to contend with a tendency on the part of the Iraqis and the Saudis to use United States arms delivered to them for transmission to Jordan as bargaining points to assure that we deliver nothing to Jordan superior in type and quantity to,

or on more favorable terms than, what is being delivered to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. There might also be a tendency on the part of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to add the United States delivered arms to their own stocks and to try to substitute less desirable or older weapons for delivery to Jordan. The overall political risks involved in doing through nearby countries what in itself is risky would be compounded.

We therefore believe that our primary objective in dealing with this matter with Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be to persuade them to make funds available to Jordan to help Jordan acquire military goods from its traditional supplier. This would not exclude the possibility of suggesting that Iraq and Saudi Arabia make token grants of arms for political reasons.

3. *Assistance in Procuring Arms from the United Kingdom:* We believe that the best course of action would be one in which the primary emphasis would be on the maintenance of the traditional supply relationship between the United Kingdom and Jordan. This obviates the logistic and standardization problem. Although Britain no longer has a treaty with Jordan, we feel that the training problems created by deliveries of British goods could probably be handled on a satisfactory ad hoc basis. The restoration of Britain to the traditional supply position which it has held in Jordan would minimize the impact of arms deliveries to Jordan on the Palestine problem. We feel that the British would be pleased at the prospect of an enhanced position in Jordan and at United States assistance in assuring such a position. It would also be in line with the President's discussion with Macmillan in Bermuda that the United States favored a continuing role for Great Britain in the Middle East.

United States military aid to Jordan should be implemented very largely in terms of off-shore procurement for matériel in the United Kingdom for the purchase of arms and military equipment. Admittedly, this course of action would not have as much political appeal to the Jordanians as the prospect of F-100 jet fighters and the latest in United States armor. At the same time, the arguments in favor of standardization and simplified supply problems are very compelling. The size of the program we established would indicate to the Jordanians our very real interest in their maintaining an effective fighting force.

#### *Elements of a Military Assistance Program for Jordan*

1. There is needed a determination by the President, under Section 401a of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended,<sup>3</sup> that

---

<sup>3</sup> Section 401a dealt with special funds. See 70 Stat. 557.

a program of military assistance of up to \$10 million should be established for Jordan in FY 1957. We recommend the use of this Presidential authority in this case because it will permit a waiver of the legal requirement that Jordan enter into a standard bilateral military assistance agreement, which involves quite extensive assurances on the part of a grant aid recipient. For the reasons indicated earlier in this memorandum, we feel that from both the United States and Jordanian points of view the negotiation of such an agreement should not be attempted at this time, and further that the assurances which we believe we can obtain will be sufficient to protect United States interests.

2. A 401a determination by the President would enable us only to require from the Jordanians a simple exchange of notes containing assurances that the arms would not be used for aggressive purposes and that they would not be transferred without our consent, together with such other assurances as the United States might deem desirable. We would make clear that this was a one-shot operation and that it would not be an attempt to fill all the needs of Jordan's armed forces. While we would propose to assume this stance vis-à-vis the Jordanians, it should be recognized at the outset that the possibility is remote that a one-shot operation will prove to be sufficient to attain long-run objectives we seek in Jordan. Our experience in the initiation of previous military assistance programs demonstrates that it is extremely difficult to abruptly cut off assistance after a relatively short period without incurring serious political liabilities. Nevertheless, even if we are unsuccessful in our attempt to accomplish our objectives solely within the magnitude of the military assistance program herein recommended, we feel that both the short and prospective long-term benefits to be derived from developing a closer Jordanian association with the West are worth the expenditures involved; certainly so long as magnitudes in the future do not greatly exceed that proposed herein. Although we would not indicate to the Jordanians the term of years which we would expect such a program to last, since this might be construed as implying a commitment to come forward again at the end of such a period, we would, for internal planning purposes, expect the \$10 million program to extend over a period of two years.

3. Upon completion of the exchange of notes with the Jordanians, the United States, through defense agencies in Europe and in consultation with the British and the Jordanians, would develop a program which would adequately reflect legitimate Jordanian requirements for arms and training. The program would be primarily for off-shore procurement of arms in the United Kingdom for delivery to Jordan.

4. In the course of these developments, we could keep the Saudis and Iraqis informed and urge that they make cash contributions for the purchase of arms available to the Jordanians.

*Recommendations*

1. That you approve in principle the approach outlined in the four paragraphs immediately preceding.

2. That NEA be authorized to indicate to the British the course of action we envisage and enlist their cooperation and support.

3. That we proceed to seek a determination by the President under Section 401a of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, authorizing the establishment of a \$10 million military assistance program for Jordan. (A memorandum is in preparation.)

4. That at the appropriate time we proceed to the negotiations with the Jordanians and the discussions with the Saudis and Iraqis along the lines set forth above.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Dulles initialed his approval of each of the four recommendations. A notation on the source text indicates the concurrences of DOD, ICA, U/MSA, and EUR.

On June 12, in a memorandum to Rountree, Burdett noted that Dulles had approved the paper recommending a military assistance program for Jordan. He wrote: "There remains the question of NEA's approach to the British. There are obvious dangers in the Jordanians obtaining an impression that we are working out a program with the British prior to our consulting them. Furthermore, since we are not asking the British to draw up a program, there appears little need for informing them now. Accordingly, we propose that the British be informed at approximately the same time as we approach the Jordanians." Rountree noted on the memorandum: "I agree—Perhaps shortly before we talk with the Jordanians." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 61 D 20, Military assistance to Jordan)

That same day, at the Secretary's staff meeting, Dulles noted that he had approved the recommendation that the United States implement a small program of military aid to Jordan. The Secretary added that it might be wise to inform the Israelis of the American plan and try to persuade them against making a similar request. Rountree expressed some doubt about this course in view of recent Israeli requests for arms. Dulles, however, believed that Israel approved of U.S. policy in Jordan and could be persuaded to support this aspect of it. Accordingly, Dulles asked Rountree to inform the Israelis in an effort to persuade them not to make a similar request for arms. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 7, 1957—9:38 a.m.*

1908. Joint State–ICA message. For Seager.

We have carefully considered your 1707.<sup>2</sup> Appreciate difficulties in obtaining firmer figures on budget view strong possibility Jordanians themselves have no clear idea future revenues. At same time we continue be guided by considerations as previously stated including: a) desire avoid US becoming sole source aid Jordan; b) wish extend US assistance in manner most likely stimulate help from Iraq and Saudi Arabia;<sup>3</sup> c) need for Jordanians exert utmost effort adopt sound fiscal practices.

We incline believe assistance from Egypt and Syria will either not be forthcoming or else be granted in kind (e.g. unusable obsolete military equipment) in such manner as be of little help in Jordan's budgetary problem. At first glance this would appear argue on political as well as financial grounds for US stepping in now with balance required estimated at around \$20 million additional for budgetary support. You will understand however difficulties we would face in justifying this amount in light considerations set forth above. We would further have no assurance that even grant of this magnitude would carry Jordan throughout balance HKJ FY.

We disturbed that Jordanians out of present meager resources called upon pay British \$2 million. Dept intends discuss this with British urging British adopt sympathetic attitude re deferment future payments and continuing British aid at least complete road and port projects.

In absence firm recommendations to contrary, we propose following course of action:

1. That in concluding conversations with Jordanians you say you have had no word from Washington re further US economic aid this FY. You may in your discretion add that you understand urgent consideration is being given in Washington to question military aid.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5–MSP/6–357. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Herter. Repeated priority to Baghdad, Jidda, and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1707 from Amman contained Cedric Seager's report of discussions with various Jordanian officials, particularly Rifai. The conversations focused largely on the budgetary situation, economic aid, and Jordanian–Iraqi relations. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> In the course of a discussion at the Secretary of State's staff meeting on June 10, Rountree noted that it was likely that the United States might have to increase its aid to Jordan to \$15 million above the \$10 million already given, even after Saudi Arabia's contribution. Rountree added that assistance would hopefully be coming from Iraq. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

FYI If approved would be limited largely to continuing supply items formerly furnished by British hence applies against budget deficit. End FYI.

2. That when you proceed to Baghdad you review Jordan situation with Nuri. Method negotiation left your discretion but in order secure Iraq contribution equal or greater amount you authorized indicate US willingness make available to Jordan \$5 million additional FY 1957. We are in touch with Saudis on their plans for aid to Jordan and would hope US, Iraqi and Saudi plans be made public simultaneously.

3. Meanwhile we will be proceeding with necessary determinations make available \$5 million additional budgetary aid to Jordan under FY 1957 funds.

4. We would proceed notify Jordanians of this additional allocation in about ten days time hoping Iraq would announce its contribution simultaneously or earlier. If not, we would inform Jordanians that we pressing Iraqis give like amount and urge Jordanians make appropriate representations at Baghdad.

While above course of action will not respond immediately to all of Jordan's needs as presently projected for current HKJ FY, it should carry Jordanians through months ahead and give US opportunity for further action with Saudis, Iraqis and British as well as time for renewed efforts determine Jordan's actual needs. Embassy-USOM should of course attempt persuade HKJ avert expenditure increases proposed Embtel 1707 and keep us informed.

Herter

---

94. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Baghdad, June 10, 1957—11 p.m.*

2064. Joint Embassy-USOM. From Gallman and Seager.

Met for one hour this morning with Nuri. Ambassador explained purpose Seager's mission and emphasized urgent nature time factor with respect action on Jordan. Seager described difficult situation confronting Jordan assuming Egypt-Syria subsidy and near desperate outlook if Egypt-Syria subsidy unpaid. Nuri here interposed emphatically that subsidies would not be paid adding "in addition to which Syria is bankrupt".

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 885.0086/6-1057. Secret; Priority.

Made it clear to Nuri that Jordan's survival dependent upon early additional financial support. Explained that additional US support without contribution by Iraq both difficult to justify at home and politically unwise. Told Nuri we found it hard to believe Iraq unwilling and unable share cost Jordan's immediate survival. Thus some immediate Iraq contribution appeared imperative.

Nuri listened attentively throughout opening presentation. Did not affect hardness of hearing as frequently his habit when controversial topics under discussion. His initial reaction was somewhat petulant statement Jordan's dilemma of that country's own making, strongly abetted by King Saud. Nuri said he had repeatedly urged Jordan Government not to take action resulting in loss British subsidy but they cease to follow advice of Saud and Nasser with present deplorable consequence. "It is therefore duty of Saud to help them more. He should pay twice three times as much as he has promised. We are blameless in this matter. Let him pay".

We explained it was less a matter of ascribing blame as facing up to present reality. Time pressing. Immediate decision required. Unlikely Saud would agree, after time-consuming argument, increase his contribution to anywhere near proportions required.

Nuri then adopted line that he would help if he could but owing pipeline stoppage had borrowed money for budget needs from IPC and constitutionally impossible raid *ib [it?]* for purpose support Jordan. He added that he had in fact materially helped Jordan this week. He had undertaken make available immediately one and one-half million dinars Iraq contribution to phosphate development and had let Jordan Government know Iraq would keep eyes closed if money diverted to other Jordanian domestic purposes. Insistently pleading both good will and poverty, he urged US put pressure on Saud and UK, the former to increase his subsidy and latter continue some loans for development purposes. Any remaining gap to be closed by US diversion of funds from aid recipients in less urgent need than Jordan. We insisted this proposes solution both unpalatable and unjustifiable. Iraq had major interest in stability present Jordan Government and must itself find or divert funds to aid Jordan.

Nuri obdurate but declared his maximum concession would be to borrow (if USG willing) equivalent Syria subsidy (dinars 2.5 million) from US Government free of interest, repayable in 1960, and that he would immediately turn this sum over to Jordan. We explained this not possible in our view but would report to Washington. We added that some reflection needed both parties after this initial meeting and that we would solicit further meeting within 48 hours. Nuri said more time needed because of Cabinet crisis. Suggested meeting next Monday. Seager insisted this too long to wait.

We will therefore attempt further discussion Wednesday and will then tell him, if his attitude continues negative, that we wish explain situation to Crown Prince Abdul Illah view strong royal family ties between Iraq and Jordan. Seager concluded by saying he confident USG would provide 5 million dollars additional support Jordan if Iraq contributed immediately 6 million dollars out of its own resources. Nuri again pleaded poverty and closed with long dissertation on historic theme of Israel, need for US to insist on settlement Palestine issue, hopeless outlook for Jordan long as settlement not reached, and so forth.

Department may wish furnish comment on Nuri's loan proposal prior our next meeting.

Nuri's conversational trend throughout appeared indicate he expected continue as PM although he feigned ignorance.

Gallman

---

95. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs' Special Assistant (Burdett) to the Assistant Secretary (Rountree)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 12, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Additional Economic Aid to Jordan

The Kingdom of Jordan's latest budgetary estimates indicate that projected expenditure for the present fiscal year (April 1, 1957 through March 31, 1958) will amount to \$82.8 million. To meet this, Jordan has available domestic revenue amounting to \$18.8 million and a Saudi subsidy of \$14 million. Although Syria and Egypt have promised support amounting to \$16.8 million, we do not believe that Jordan can count on this assistance. Jordan is therefore confronted with a gap of \$50 million. (Tab A<sup>2</sup>)

The United States has to date made available to Jordan from FY 1957 funds \$10 million as an initial grant for budgetary support as well as economic development projects. Approval for the use of \$10

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/6-1257. Secret. Drafted by John Shaw.

<sup>2</sup> Tab A, a paper entitled "Jordanian FY 57 Budgetary Situation," was not found attached.



million primarily for off shore procurement of military items has also just been given by the Secretary. In addition we had hoped to be able to provide further budgetary support on the basis of matching contributions from the Government of Iraq and had authorized that \$5 million of additional FY 57 funds be made available on this basis. The US proposal has been discussed with Prime Minister Nuri of Iraq (Tab B<sup>3</sup>); and while we will continue to seek his support (Tab C<sup>4</sup>), it appears obvious that his Government is not prepared to make a matching contribution.

The most that Nuri has suggested is that the US loan him interest free for three years the equivalent of 2.5 million dinars (\$7 million). This proposal raises highly complex legal and administrative questions for the United States and offers questionable political advantages; it is not receiving serious consideration.

Given the present state of Jordanian finances and absence of other sources of aid there appears to be no alternative but for the US to increase its contemplated additional contribution from \$5 million to \$10 million. There will then be available to the Government of Jordan, in addition to the Saudi subsidy of \$14 million, \$20 million of US funds for budgetary support and general economic aid plus a \$10 million for military assistance. The gap between estimated expenditures and receipts will still amount to \$20 million.

This difference is largely accounted for by the extraordinary budget where the expenditures are primarily directed to long term development projects. We believe that to the extent this budget reflects future hopes rather than immediate needs some savings may be possible. To the extent reductions cannot be made it is hoped that some assistance can be given to selected projects in the extraordinary budget by reprogramming about \$4 million of prior year MSP funds. Instructions to this effect have already been issued to USOM/Jordan. In addition efforts will be continued to urge the United Kingdom to maintain its economic aid program in Jordan (about \$6 million). Should these efforts not fully succeed but through careful management expenditures are held to approximately \$6 million monthly, US aid at the proposed higher level, together with domestic revenues and the Saudi subsidy should permit maintenance of the Jordanian economy for about 10 months or through January 31, 1958.

---

<sup>3</sup> Tab B, not found attached, was telegram 2064, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Tab C, not found attached, was telegram 2421 to Baghdad, June 11. In it the Department instructed the Embassy to continue pressing Nuri for a change in his attitude regarding aid for Jordan. Among other things, the Department instructed the Embassy to remind the Iraqis that the United States had responded "promptly and effectively" to Hussein's request for aid, a request supported by Iraq and by other friendly Arab States. (Department of State, Central Files, 885.0086/6-1057)

U/MSA has been notified of this new urgent requirement for additional economic aid funds in Jordan. (Tab D<sup>5</sup>)

*Conclusions:*

1. The proposed loan of funds to Iraq to permit the Government to give assistance to Jordan does not appear to be feasible and a telegram to this effect has been sent to Baghdad. (Tab C)

2. The most practical means of meeting Jordan's financial needs in the present situation is to increase US budgetary aid from \$5 million to \$10 million.

*Recommendation:*

That you approve our pursuing with U/MSA and ICA increasing US budgetary aid by \$10 million rather than the \$5 million originally planned.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Tab D, not found attached, was a memorandum entitled "Jordan—FY 57 Economic (DA) Aid—\$10 million."

<sup>6</sup> Rountree initialed the source text and noted: "I agree."

---

## 96. Editorial Note

On June 13, at the 326th meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Allen Dulles in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, raised the question of Jordan and the potential threats to King Hussein and King Saud. The memorandum of discussion includes the following exchange:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said he would first deal with developments in the Middle East. Of recent days, Nasser had lost a great deal of ground and standing in the Arab world. King Saud was still in Amman. King Hussein had all but broken diplomatic relations with Egypt following his expulsion of two Egyptian diplomats from Jordan. . . . Nevertheless, continued Mr. Dulles, we cannot but worry about Nasser's possible reaction to these recent reverses. We believe that he is still plotting to do away with King Saud and King Hussein, and both are in genuine danger.

"Meanwhile, President Kuwatly of Syria has been visiting in Egypt. It is not clear what has transpired in the course of this visit. There are, however, indications of further Saudi rapprochement with Iraq. With regard to the recent resignation of the government of Nuri Said in Iraq, Mr. Dulles predicted that Nuri would probably be

persuaded to resume the office of Prime Minister. There seemed no particular reason for his resignation except the desire for a rest.

"Secretary Dulles broke in to comment that in recent days Nasser had grown increasingly bitter, and that he was blaming the United States in general and Secretary Dulles in particular for everything that had gone wrong. This was illustrated by Nasser's article in *Look* magazine. Nasser's attitude seemed to Secretary Dulles to be rather ironical, in view of the direction of U.S. policy when Egypt was invaded last November; although, admittedly, the prime motivation of our actions last autumn was not the desire to cultivate the friendship of Nasser and of Egypt." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

97. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 19, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Additional Economic Assistance to Jordan

*Discussion*

The Embassy at Amman has reported (Tab B<sup>2</sup>) that Jordan may face a critical and dangerous fiscal situation by August 1, 1957. The primary reason is the failure of Syria and Egypt to make good on their promises to contribute \$21 million annually to Jordan. Considering the highly strained relations between Jordan and Syria and Egypt, it is extremely doubtful that aid from this source will be forthcoming, nor is it to our interest that Syria and Egypt use this means to reassert their influence in Jordan.

Our efforts to persuade the British and the Iraqis to assist Jordan have so far been unavailing. We intend to pursue these efforts vigorously, but there is no assurance that funds from these sources can be obtained within the next two months. Saudi Arabia has contributed \$7 million to Jordan and has undertaken to contribute a further \$7 million on October 1, 1957. We doubt that we

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/6-1957. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on June 18 and transmitted through S/S.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1815 from Amman, June 17; not found attached. (*Ibid.*, 785.5-MSP/6-1757)

would be successful in an effort to persuade Saudi Arabia to expedite its second payment.

Our greatest concern is that Jordan will face a crisis in August at a time when our ability to assist Jordan may be highly limited, in view of the very strong possibility that Congressional action on Fiscal Year 1958 Mutual Security funds will not be completed in time. Accordingly, we feel that some of the remaining Fiscal Year 1957 funds should be committed to Jordan as quickly as possible. Since April 27 we have given the Jordanians \$10 million in special economic assistance and expect to be in a position to extend another \$10 million in the form of military assistance before July 31. On the basis of information available to us in late May, we had decided to extend another \$5 million in economic aid, hoping that we could convince the Iraqis to match this contribution. Mr. Hollister had agreed to this amount. However, the Iraqis would not make a matching contribution. It is our considered opinion, in view of all available evidence, that we should increase this proposed additional grant to \$10 million.

We understand that Mr. Hollister is reluctant to allocate more than \$5 million of Fiscal Year 1957 funds to Jordan for this purpose. We believe that our interests in the independence and integrity of Jordan are so great that it would be unwise to take the risk of inadequate provision for Jordan's needs. We believe that the sum of \$10 million will be required to overcome this risk.

#### *Recommendation*

That you sign the attached memorandum to Mr. Hollister (Tab A<sup>3</sup>) requesting that \$10 million of Fiscal Year 1957 Mutual Security funds be made available to Jordan for budgetary support.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached. A copy of the memorandum to Hollister as signed by the Secretary on June 20 is attached to a memorandum from Rountree to the Acting Secretary, June 28. (*Ibid.*, 785.5-MSP/6-2857)

<sup>4</sup> A note from Wilkins to Rountree, attached to a copy of this memorandum, *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 582, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S 1957, reads:

"The original of the attached memo is in Mr. Herter's office awaiting his consideration.

"We understand that Mr. Hollister is now agreeable to \$7.5 rather than \$10 million on grounds that his figures show the smaller amount will carry Jordan through Sept. We doubt this amount will suffice and even if it does it will cut things too fine and take too great risk.

"Time is so short we hope you can persuade the Secretary to sign the letter in Mr. Herter's office and to ask Mr. Hollister for the \$10 million today." A handwritten notation on the source text from Rountree to Wilkins reads: "Approved by Mr. Herter & now with Secy. I have asked SS to try to expedite."

98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 24, 1957—7:15 p.m.*

2058. President on June 24 signed determination under Section 401(a) of Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended providing for extension military assistance to Jordan in amount \$10,000,000. Following are steps Department envisages in executing assistance program under this determination. You are authorized begin with step #1 soonest.

1. Inform King Hussein and Rifai we have given serious study various Jordan requests for military assistance. We have decided extend military assistance to value of \$10 million as one-shot operation. Portion this assistance can be allocated for training in US but we understand most pressing Jordan military requirement be equipment. USG does not intend financing any increase present level Jordan armed forces, but rather providing most urgently needed replacements present equipment in order maintain effectiveness present forces. FYI We believe primary needs are in ground forces and Presidential determination made on that basis. This does not necessarily preclude limited amount equipment for other services. End FYI.

A. *Equipment.* We believe it unwise introduce American equipment into Jordan Army in view obvious problems standardization and increased cost involved. We therefore intend purchase equipment needed from UK under offshore procurement procedures.

We envisage Jordan-US consultations at working level initially perhaps in Amman but principally at EUCOM (Paris) to draw up list items desired, establishing priorities in light equipment on hand, estimated needs, costs, etc. We hope Jordan able send few selected officers Paris. We believe wide knowledge possessed by our people in EUCOM and USAREUR of supply situation and serviceability various types military items available in UK will be extremely useful to Jordanians.

As soon as agreed list completed, we will arrange to obtain through USAREUR estimated prices delivered HKJ, availability and delivery date and begin making arrangements for procurement through Dept/Army channels. We will endeavor have deliveries start as soon as possible. Must be understood clearly no additional US funds will be forthcoming from USG for transportation. Therefore transportation and training costs must be deducted from \$10 million to determine amount available for actual purchases of equipment.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/6-2457. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bergus and Parker and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Paris and passed to USCINCEUR and DEFREPNAMEA.

FYI USARMA will act as US Agent to receive items for transfer to HKJ. End FYI.

B. *Training.* We can make available limited number vacancies for training Jordanians at US defense installations, FYI primarily for moral and political purposes End FYI. ARMA should submit soonest to Dept Army preliminary estimate number students and type courses desired. FYI We assume Jordanians most interested in basic courses at Infantry, Artillery and Armored Schools. No vacancies now available Command and General Staff College. School courses are listed in DA Pamphlet 20-21. End FYI.

Should be made clear all training costs, including transportation, per diem and tuition for students will be deducted from \$10 million. Estimated comprehensive costs per Middle East student in recent past have averaged \$1,500 for Infantry School, \$4,000 for Artillery School, \$2,800 for Armored School.

2. If King and Rifa'i agreeable above, essential exchange of notes establishing agreement be made as soon as possible. Text of draft note is being transmitted by separate cable. Text should not be made public for time being. Suggest you emphasize desirability limiting distribution within HKJ for present.

3. We are informing British Emb here of our plans June 25. We assume British willing go along. We authorizing Jidda and Baghdad inform Saudis and Iraqis general plans on June 26. We are informing Israelis here June 26 also.<sup>2</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>2</sup>On June 25, the Embassy in Amman informed the Department, in telegram 1886, that it had conveyed the substance of its instructions to King Hussein and Samir Rifai. According to the Embassy, both were "most grateful and fulsome" in their appreciation for aid and were ready to "move soonest". (*Ibid.*, 785.5-MSP/6-2557)

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, June 25, 1957—5 p.m.*

1885. Reference Department telegram 2003, June 17.<sup>2</sup> Joint Anglo-American assessment Jordan situation follows:

The following is verbatim text.

Jordan—A joint Anglo-American assessment.

1. We have examined the present situation in Jordan from the viewpoint of Anglo-American policy and our joint assessment is set forth below:

2. The American and British arguments on which this assessment is based are set out in appendices A and B which are being forwarded separate despatch.

3. Joint assessment.

I. The preservation of Jordan as an independent and pro-Western state, or her incorporation in a larger pro-Western entity, is of the highest importance to Anglo-American policy.

II. The present anti-Communist regime in Jordan is about as satisfactory as can be hoped for at present from Western viewpoint. Although not broadly popular and depending almost entirely on the continued safety of King Hussein, the Hashem-Rifai government is reasonably stable. Calm prevails throughout country and populace accepts martial law arrangements under which the next session of the House of Representatives has been put off for 90 days, and probably for much longer. Some changes in the personnel of the present Cabinet are possible, but Jordan's basic policy and pro-Western alignment should remain unchanged.

III. However, Jordan is economically non-viable and must have outside support to the extent of approximately pound sterling 15 million to sustain minimum government operations, including payment of the Army and a modest development program, otherwise the present regime will collapse. If the present regime is to demonstrate the tangible results of its pro-Western policy and achieve political stability, a sum of approximately pound sterling 20 million, including USOM/Jordan expenditures, appears desirable.

IV. On its present resources it would not be safe to assume that the government will be able fully to pay the Army from October onwards, and the crisis may develop as early as August.

V. Aid to Jordan could take three forms:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 885.10/6–2557. Secret. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2003 to Amman, June 17, the Department instructed the Embassy to proceed with the joint assessment of the Jordanian situation. According to the Department, the British decision to continue aid to Jordan might depend in large measure on the assessment. The Department expressed the hope that British aid would continue. (*Ibid.*, 785.5441/6–1457)

#### A. Budgetary aid.

A minimum of pound sterling 6.5 million in addition to present Saudi Arabian and American commitments is required during the current HKJ financial year. For the achievement of broader political aims (see paragraph III above) pound sterling 11.5 million will therefore be needed.

#### B. Economic aid.

This is urgently needed to deal with unemployment, and stimulate the economy generally, apart from its long-term importance. (This is included in V A above).

#### C. Military aid.

In the form of equipment, and if the Jordanians so request, of training facilities and military advice. Only minor economies now possible in defense expenditures. Spending on national guard already much reduced, but cuts in the Jordan Arab Army would lay Hussein open to the charge by Nasser of failing to protect the Arab world against Israel. Jordanian Air Force should be continued at absolute minimum level as a morale factor only.

VI. If the government collapses, the most likely alternative would be a return to an extremist left-wing nationalist government of the Nabulsi type.

VII. This would rightly be regarded throughout the Arab world as a resounding victory for Nasser and the Kremlin.

VIII. A possible alternative, or a possible consequence, would be the complete disintegration of Jordan, almost certainly bringing with it armed clashes between Jordan's Arab and Israeli neighbors in circumstances which would greatly increase the risk of a major war.

IX. The only powers outside the Russian-Egyptian camp which can be expected to support Jordan are the USA, the UK, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and possibly the Gulf states, particularly Kuwait.

X. Fusion or federation with one or more of her Arab neighbors may be the long-term solution of Jordan's problems and is well worthy of study but this cannot take place in time to avert Jordan's imminent crisis.

### 4. Recommendations.

I. The American and British Governments should use every effort to persuade the Government of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states to contribute their maximum to the funds necessary for Jordan's maintenance.

II. The American and British Governments should consult urgently as to how the differences should be provided.

III. The importance of the refugee problem as an obstacle to permanent stability in Jordan cannot be overstated. The American and British Governments should do everything possible to expedite the solution of this problem.

IV. Closest coordination of Anglo-American policy in Jordan is essential. Jordan should be regarded as a proving ground for the



demonstration of active Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup>

Signed C.H. Johnston and Lester D. Mallory.

**Mallory**

---

<sup>3</sup> The texts of the American and British position papers prepared for use in the joint Anglo-American assessment were forwarded in despatch 327 from Amman, June 24. (*Ibid.*, 785.00/6–2457) These papers include, among other things, discussion of the current regime, the economic situation, and forecasts on the future of Jordan.

On June 26, the Embassy reported that there was “substantial agreement” with the British on the joint assessment, but there were differences on the following subjects: Palestinian refugee attitudes toward returning to Israel; the degree of seriousness of the economic situation in Jordan; and the level of financial assistance required to support Jordan during any fiscal year. (Telegram 1899 from Amman; *ibid.*, 885.10/6–2657)

---

## 100. Editorial Note

On June 25 and 27, the United States and Jordan exchanged notes regarding an agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. For text of the accord, see 8 UST 1073.

On June 29, in an exchange of notes between Ambassador Mallory and Foreign Minister Rifai in Amman, the United States agreed to meet Jordan’s request for military aid and to provide \$10 million under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. According to a joint State–Defense message to Amman, the primary purpose of the military aid was “political impact”. The secondary purpose was budgetary relief for the Jordanian Government. (Telegram 45 to Amman, July 8; Department of State, Central Files, 785.5–MSP/6–1657) The full text of the notes exchanged in Amman is in despatch 2 from Amman, July 2. (*Ibid.*, 785.5–MSP/7–257) See also 8 UST 1069.

---

## 101. Editorial Note

On July 12, during the course of a meeting between Prime Minister Suhrawardy of Pakistan and Secretary Dulles, Dulles raised

the subject of the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit to Jordan. The discussion then turned to the overall situation in the Hashemite Kingdom. The memorandum of conversation includes the following discussion:

"The Secretary observed that we attach much importance to the Prime Minister's prospective visit to King Hussein and the Prime Minister asked what he should tell Hussein. He stated that President Eisenhower had told him we had had difficulty in finding money for Jordan. According to Mr. Suhrawardy, Jordanian representatives had been telling him that Jordan would look to the US for money.

"The Secretary agreed that the situation of the Jordanians was serious. The US would not wish them to fall back into the clutches of Egypt. Neither could we give them money indefinitely. The British had withdrawn their subsidy partly because it represented a drain upon their resources. The US simply could not try to balance the budget of every country with financial difficulties.

"Jordan had never been a viable state, the Secretary continued. Ernest Bevin had told him with much satisfaction of the creation of Jordan; it was to be a British base to remain useful after Suez had gone. Clever plans such as this one sometimes failed to work out. People got independence-minded. Jordan's only source of income was the rental of its real estate for military bases.

"Mr. Suhrawardy observed that the Jordanians could rent their real estate to Russia or Egypt, to whom it would be most useful.

"The Secretary declared that the fact that the US had found \$30 million for the Jordanians showed that we were serious about Jordan but that we could not supply funds indefinitely.

"The Secretary suggested that Mr. Suhrawardy tell Hussein he had acted with courage and skill and with good judgment in his choice of people to rely on. We showed our sympathy at a time Hussein was afraid of foreign intervention by sending our fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean. But neither a fleet nor money constituted a permanent solution of Jordan's problems and the US would welcome suggestions from Mr. Suhrawardy and from King Hussein as to what the future of Jordan should be. The Prime Minister put forward the thesis that there should be a federation of Jordan with Iraq to form a 'greater Iraq'. Faisal and Hussein might rule jointly.

"The Secretary asked how King Hussein sees his own future and emphasized that he would like to have Mr. Suhrawardy's conclusions after his visit to Amman. Mr. Suhrawardy said he would ask King Hussein for his views concerning the future. The Secretary urged that the US and Pakistan work together in the matter.

"The Secretary said that Jordan is wretchedly poor. Perhaps development of water resources or settlement of refugee problems would help. Mr. Rountree concurred, noting that with less population Jordan could be made viable but that there did not seem to be the possibility of enabling Jordan to support its present population, including refugees. The Secretary observed that the refugees were a continuing menace to the stability of Jordan. Mr. Suhrawardy responded that the refugees lived on the hope of returning to Palestine. The US position had been set forth in an August 1955 address

made by Secretary Dulles, a copy of which was made available to the Prime Minister.”

In addition to the subject of Jordan, the conversation touched on the Baghdad Pact, the Arab-Israeli question, and the problem of Aqaba. (Memorandum of conversation, July 12, by John M. Howison and Charles D. Withers of the Office of South Asian Affairs; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 890)

---

## 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 31, 1957—7:07 p.m.*

942. Deptel 884 to London, 192 to Amman.<sup>2</sup> Following points will be made in conversation with UK Embassy August 1 and should be made same day to FonOff:<sup>3</sup>

1) US pleased receive information re UK decision on interest-free loan to Jordan.

2) US recalls that joint Anglo-American assessment Jordan situation towards end June agreed that preservation Jordan as independent pro-Western state of highest import Anglo-American policy and that Jordan non-viable and must have outside support to extent of minimum £15 million annually.

3) US has made heavy financial commitments to Jordan in recent months. US hopes that UK in spite of change in its position in Jordan will in light of its interest in strengthening pro-Western forces in Near East give earliest consideration to making available larger measure of assistance than now proposed. Continuation of economic assistance at levels of recent years prior to termination treaty would be most helpful. Postponement of annual Jordan debt repayment is among other assistance measures which might be considered. US realizes difficulties both political and economic involved for UK in connection such possible steps but believes US-UK

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 885.10/7–3157. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell and Shaw and approved by Berry who signed for Herter. Repeated to Amman and pouched to Baghdad, Jidda, Cairo, and Damascus.

<sup>2</sup> On July 29, the Department in telegram 192 to Amman, repeated to London, informed the Embassy, among other things, that the United Kingdom agreed to give Jordan an interest free loan amounting to £1,130,000. (*Ibid.*, 885.10/7–2957)

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of the conversation by Bergus is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 885.10/8–157)

objectives in Jordan so important as to warrant special efforts by both countries.

**Herter**

---

103. Letter From the President to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 7, 1957.*

DEAR FOSTER: I notice in the Department of State's summary of August sixth a statement to the effect that we have a reluctance to allow the Jordan government so-called "offensive weapons."<sup>2</sup>

I have little faith in distinctions of this kind. A weapon can probably not be classed as defensive or offensive except upon the basis of the identification of the original aggressor. I have a feeling that we can frequently destroy some of the value of our aid by being too restrictive as to quality and type.

Of course I do most heartily approve our restriction that weapons provided by us may be used only for defensive purposes; so if the receiving nation becomes identified as an aggressor, we will support the other side.

In any event, to be specific, I certainly do not blame King Hussein for wanting some modern tanks.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memos. Personal.

<sup>2</sup> On August 2 a joint State-Defense message informed the Embassy at Amman that the United States was unable to furnish the heavy offensive weaponry which the Jordanians were requesting. U.S. supply of M-47 tanks and 155mm. guns, the Department added, would produce "seriously unfavorable" Israeli reaction; generate demand for a continuous supply for spare parts and other new U.S. equipment; and would be extravagant in view of Jordan's present financial condition. (Telegram 230; Department of State, Central Files, 785.56/8-257) On August 5 Mallory, replying to telegram 230, informed the Department, among other things, "For army to be left begging while everyone around is getting new and better weapons creates severe problems of morale and professional pride within the forces especially the officer group. We must be most careful not to trigger a change in political line-up of the Arab states by restrictions on particular kind of hardware. If Jordan doesn't get the tanks we can surely expect a very severe reaction." (Telegram 203 from Amman; *ibid.*, 785.56/8-557)

I tried to call you on the phone but they reported you had gone out to Walter Reed. We can talk about the matter at your convenience.<sup>3</sup>

D.E.

---

<sup>3</sup> On August 7, during the course of a telephone conversation with the President, Dulles raised the question of military equipment for Jordan. The transcript of the telephone conversation includes the following:

"Sec. said he had received his note of today about arms for Jordan. The Sec. said that the cable summary was a little misleading. What we don't want to do is to give heavy tanks to Jordan. If we do that it will raise complete hell with Israel and we will have to send a lot of heavy equipment that in turn will make more trouble with the Arab States. The Pres. said that made sense. You don't want to do it for Jordan because of the Syrian trouble. Sec. said we had taken the position with Israel we would not give heavy equipment to her Arab neighbors. Sec. said we don't think they have anything as heavy as these tanks. Pres. said he didn't want to put this fellow in a hole who so far had shown courage and was on our side." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

---

**104. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Amman, August 12, 1957—6 p.m.*

251. Increasing pressures are being applied from several sources on King Hussein and Jordan Government. Highly effective are the attacks by Syrian-Egyptian press and radio on Jordan's tie with the west and position as supposed stooge of the US. Some pressures are more direct, such as attempt bomb US ConGen Jerusalem last Thursday night which was to have been followed by bombings of British Consulate and certain newspapers (. . . has reported details). The military governor of Jerusalem has filled me in on enough detail to prove authenticity. This was to be and perhaps will be followed by other terroristic and confusion creating activities directed from the Deuxieme Bureau Damascus. King Hussein has noted to me he is struck by fact that Haj Amin Hussein's men being those involved in this.

There has been recent rash defamatory pamphlets; the government saw fit last weekend to arrest about 10 Qawmiyiin members

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/8-1257. Secret; Noform. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

including Hamad Farhan (now released). Liberation Party (Tahriri) has issued strong pamphlets and Bathiyin are apparently also active. Indirect but very effective pressure has come from Israel through its activity in Government House neutral zone in so-called tree planting. I informed by Foreign Minister his theme has been picked up by Syrian-Egyptian press, and attacks are beginning on Jordan's impotence in face Israeli provocation.

While difficult to assess and define, there seems to be growing feeling of malaise or unrest best described as a decrease in confidence in present government. Part of this can be attributed to failure military trials to produce dramatic evidence for public consumption. Present uneasiness can also be attributed to differences and divergencies which naturally occur after cohesion that existed immediately following spring crisis period.

There have been number of . . . reports concerning plans for establishment of free Palestine Government under Ex-Grand Mufti. Matter has now reached point of open rumor with specific statement General Hiyari ex-CGS now in Gaza assisting in organization. King Hussein is concerned about this not altogether in fear that it might happen but rather in fear ultimate motives and persons who may be behind such a move. The scheme has been ascribed to President Nasser with suggestion it may be linked with broader British aims in turn involving Israelis.

Jordan's Army decreases in strength and prestige as Syria, Israel and Egypt acquire more new equipment.

Within six weeks HKJ government must reach decision with respect to Parliament; whether to appear before it, dismiss it and hold new elections, etc. Government decision will have profound effect. I detect also clear evidence substantial differences opinion among ministers on desirability of continuation and/or changes in Cabinet.

While part of above may be usual Arab political machinations, one must nevertheless take cognizance clearly displayed danger signals. If existing pressures continue or augment, Hussein and government will find increasing difficulty maintain pro-Western position in Jordan. If Soviet position in Syria permits outflanking of Turkey and Northern Tier of Baghdad Pact, pressures here will increase. If Israel continues provocative moves which place the Jordan Government in indefensible position, support for regime will decrease. The present case of Government House neutral zone is building up and could reach point where, if HKJ feels it must react.

. . . The most immediate dangers apart from the ever possible threat of assassination, are that King Hussein and his government may seek to retaliate against Israel and/or to counter subversive bombings and other plots by attempting some themselves. In my

judgment such acts are not likely, however, since reason can probably be made to prevail.

While pressures increase, help expected from sister Arab states is not forthcoming. King Saud appears more quiescent in his support of Hussein and more tolerant of Syrian extremism. Iraq also appears to be leaving Hussein to hold the bag. All this is undermining anti-Communist stand in Jordan.

In the larger picture external pressures on Jordan remain basically the same as in early April. There has been a resurgence of pressure from Egypt and Syria, while pressure has increased from Israel. In sum Jordan feeling post-crisis relapse, while all her enemies, Israel as well as Egypt and Syria, renew the attack and while her allies less effective. By and large the west and friends of the west are sitting still. The Communists are moving. The brave stand here may win through but no one should be deceived that the battle is by any means over.

**Mallory**

---

**105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 24, 1957—6:02 p.m.*

569. We have been holding conversations with King Hussein concerning the types of military items which we might assist Jordan to obtain through the \$10 million we have made available for this purpose. On August 19 in Amman King in conversation with Mallory asked that we consider furnishing regiment (which would be 36) of [with] M47 tanks.<sup>2</sup>

Ankara should inform King we agree furnish this number M47s.<sup>3</sup> We assume he will wish also obtain at least one year's spare parts for each tank as well as ammunition.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.56/8-2457. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell; cleared with OSD; and approved and signed by Dulles. Also sent to Amman and repeated to Istanbul and to Paris for USCINCEUR and DEFREP-NAMA.

<sup>2</sup> Mallory reported the conversation in telegram 336 from Amman, August 21. (*Ibid.*, 785.56/8-2157)

<sup>3</sup> King Hussein was in Turkey August 22-25.

Ankara may wish consider desirability Henderson's conveying this information to King.

Amman should inform Rifai.

Dulles

---

106. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*London, November 12, 1957—2 p.m.*

2985. When called on Selwyn Lloyd at his home this morning on another subject found him discussing Jordan with Sir William Hayter. Lloyd expressed serious concern possibility Egyptian-Syrian coup Jordan. Believed Nasser rapidly committing himself by means radio propaganda campaign to extent would be impossible for him to fail to follow such campaign with action and thought Syrian entrance into campaign particularly ominous on more or less same reasoning. Felt West might have very short time before being faced with fait accompli. Principal concern was with possibilities for US-UK intervention which he took to be alternative which we unlikely be able to avoid. He assumed that assassination of King very likely prelude Egyptian-Syrian move, and although discounted feasibility US-UK ground occupation Jordan, considered unlikely there would be pro-Western and pro-King forces on ground to which US-UK air support could be given.

Lloyd noted his understanding that intelligence circles appeared inclined take less pessimistic view re imminence major Egyptian-Syrian move but wished Secretary to know he himself highly disturbed.

Whitney

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/11-1257. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Amman.



107. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Amman, November 13, 1957—2 p.m.*

975. References: Deptels 1136<sup>2</sup> and 1143,<sup>3</sup> London 2985<sup>4</sup> to Department 13 to Amman.

Have had several talks with British Ambassador on topics above telegrams. We had at first agreed to jointly defer eliciting news King Hussein until return Ambassador Mallory tomorrow. However, UK Ambassador now has instructions from London to proceed, and is seeing King Hussein noon today. Although my relations with Hussein good, . . . I feel best have US contact with King on this subject wait his return.

Our estimate consequences various types US-UK military intervention in Jordan will go forward tomorrow. In this connection Ambassador Johnston now thinking in part along following lines:

(1) Crisis in Jordan probably exaggerated. Country outwardly calm and although dissatisfaction with composition Hashem-Rifai Government and some its policies growing, situation only little more fragile than has been case since Communist successes in Syria. Report of growing dissatisfaction in Jordan Arab Army apparently largely confined to individual officers on west bank previously associated with free officer movement. (USARMA has nothing to confirm such reports.)

(2) Main threat to stability in Jordan is now, as it has been since April, possibility King Hussein be assassinated. Likelihood this increased by provocative Egyptian-Syrian broadcasts but at same time unusual precautions being taken to safeguard King.

(3) Second threat comes from possibility of uprising in Army. This not likely however and Royal Guards regiment under command Sherif Nasser with best equipment and most loyal elements in Army now stationed in and around Amman designed to prevent coup of type attempted by Nuwwar Saturday, April 13.

(4) Ambassador Johnston feels that if King assassinated it should be possible form regency council around King's younger

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/11-1357. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1143 to Amman, November 12, the Department informed the Embassy that the British Embassy had inquired whether the approach contained in telegram 1136 should be postponed until Mallory returned to Amman or whether the British Ambassador should make it on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom. The Department added that it had suggested that in view of the urgency of the subject the British Ambassador should proceed. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/11-1257)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2985 from London, November 12, the Embassy informed the Department, among other things, that Lloyd had expressed serious concern about the possibility of an Egyptian-Syrian coup in Jordan. (*Ibid.*)

brother Mohammed with mother Zein in background, and strong hand such as that Samir Rifai at helm. He feels such government could take care of internal disorders.

(5) If group sometimes referred to as Jordanian Government in exile should move into Jordan with limited support from Syrian military, British Ambassador believes Iraqis and Saudis with Iraq playing leading role, should be able to handle situation.

(6) If Syrians throw in more substantial forces he feels Iraqis and Saudis would probably need logistical support from UK and US which he thinks would be sufficient to turn tide. British Ambassador however feels if this not enough pro-western air support might be needed, and that this should be provided jointly by UK-US.

Ambassador Johnston noted that in case of rapid outbreak civil war here it might be necessary to bring in some UK paratroopers to protect the British community. He felt worth exploring the possibility that such troops, along with any US Marines which might have been brought into Jordan to protect US citizens here, might be used in limited support of Jordanian forces in Amman area. Other than this he felt no western ground support should be deployed here.

In conclusion he felt that successful coup now in Jordan would be sure to result in Nabulsi type government run by Rimawi, Irshaida and Nuwwar, with Nabulsi as spokesman. It would be strongly anti-western, pro-Syrian and pro-Russian.

Sanger

---

**108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 15, 1957—4:17 p.m.*

1503. Deliver Nolting 9:00 a.m. November 16. Current violent Egyptian radio and press attacks on King Hussein and Jordan Government are matter of concern to us and presumably other NATO members who may possibly raise subject NAC or other NATO forum. In this event you authorized present following information after coordination with your UK colleague.

Cairo, Damascus and Moscow radios and press engaging in campaign violent abuse and incitement to revolt against King Hus-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.85/11-1557. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Compton and Parker and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman and London.

sein and Government of Jordan. Cairo openly calling for assassination King. Principal accusation is Hussein conspiring with Israelis to resettle Palestine refugees and has been given various amounts money by U.S. as inducement. This entirely untrue.

We believe coordination Cairo, Damascus and Moscow efforts significant and lends support to reports Egyptians and Syrians are planning coup, with Jordan émigrés as nucleus of new government. Campaign is another indication difficulties in path our having fruitful relations with Egypt under Nasser.

Situation within Jordan appears be under control at present. Anti-Hussein demonstrations reported by Cairo, Damascus and Moscow in fact pro-Hussein demonstrations arranged by Government. While evaluation loyalty of Army, which is crucial factor, very difficult, appears mainly loyal although some reports disaffection. Tight security measures and restrictions on civilian travel have so far been successful in preventing continuation nuisance bombings which occurred October.

However, situation extremely dangerous. Although anti-Hussein campaign could redound against Nasser, presence large number unemployed and general dissatisfaction population, particularly Palestine refugee element, with Hussein and Government offers fertile soil for propaganda effort this type. We would regard success this campaign and overthrow Hussein and Government and replacement by Government following Egyptian-Syrian line as most serious development affecting stability of entire area and Western position there.

. . . . .

We are making clear to Hussein our support for him in this crisis and have left Egyptians in no doubt of our strong disapproval this campaign, which constitutes new obstacle in way betterment relations between US and Egypt and creates new tensions in ME.

**Dulles**

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 16, 1957—2:57 p.m.*

704. 1. Department considers that successful coup d'état against present regime in Jordan, instigated or supported from Egypt and Syria, would be serious blow to Western interests in Middle East. It wishes to consider urgently what preventive or countermeasures might feasibly be undertaken.

2. You should personally seek audience with King soonest, informing him that in present threat to Jordan we desire urgently to have his views on following questions:

a) How imminent does he consider threat of leftist coup in Jordan to be?

b) Is there any additional advice or assistance he could give King Hussein at this stage to help him in warding off the danger of such a coup?

c) . . .

. . . . .

3. In addition foregoing, Department would appreciate your views without discussion with King, as to the probable consequences in Saudi Arabia of:

a) An appeal by Hussein for Saudi assistance in dealing with a coup d'état.

b) Western military intervention at King Hussein's request. <sup>2</sup>

**Dulles**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/11-1657. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dorman and approved and signed by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> On November 16, the Department of State sent similar telegrams to Baghdad and Beirut with particular instructions for each post. (Telegram 1251 to Baghdad and telegram 1980 to Beirut; both *ibid.*)

110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 20, 1957—9:06 p.m.*

1227. Dept has read your 1000 <sup>2</sup> with considerable interest. We believe that closer association between Jordan and Iraq; or Jordan and Saudi Arabia; or Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, would be a constructive development provided it took place at the initiative of the states concerned. To have best chances of succeeding it should be spontaneous indigenous move. We have no illusions however as to political and practical difficulties involved. We feel in present atmosphere in area that US intervention with states concerned on specific behalf of any such alignment might well have undesirable political repercussions and constitute obstacle to progress. We therefore believe that US should at this moment take no initiative with regard to Hussein's project but should not oppose it, allowing the states concerned to work things out in their own way.

We continuing encourage Iraq and Saudi Arabia to extend political and economic assistance to Jordan, and, in event of need, military support.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/11–1657. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and Bergus and approved by Berry who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

---

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Amman, November 25, 1957—5 p.m.*

1074. King Hussein summoned me to palace yesterday afternoon and during course lengthy audience, at which Foreign Minister Rifai present, reviewed current situation at level basic relations between US and Jordan. It is apparent recent developments have brought new thoughts and are causing reassessment of Jordan's assets. This reap-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.85/11–2257. Secret; Priority.

praisal I believe has been caused primarily by new realizations respecting Israel and a message to Hussein from King Saud.

His Majesty stated and subsequently reaffirmed that the line of action and policy which he has adopted would have been followed in any event perhaps with minor adjustments. He would have worked for Arab unity, he would have resisted Communism; he would have held off Egypt and Syria as he has done. . . .

. . . . .

He feels that within Jordan they have won through on the fight of attempted Communist subversion and are reaching point where they can carry the battle against Communism more into the area as a whole. To take stand he needed help which fortuitously forthcoming from the United States. To keep his position and to hold it and perhaps to move on into more anti-Communist influence in the Arab world Jordan needs to be made self-supporting and he requests assistance to that end. However in this respect he and his government are very concerned that they cannot count on any support for next year. It is not known whether the country can be kept afloat financially. He does hope that other countries including sister Arabs will be of assistance but he needs assurances on the United States share in the continuing struggle.

He said text operations with respect to US aid have been extremely difficult. He mentioned with unusual gravity that after all these months there was continual backing and filling and still was no decision on what kind of articles could be furnished. He said he was informed that US could let him have a T33 aircraft only at the price of \$125,000 with delivery a year hence, this at a time when he had heard many of the same aircraft were being furnished to Saudi Arabia. He spoke in some bitterness of the obsolete Vampire jets of his Air Force which they are having trouble keeping in the air and the exposed position of Jordan when Israel has hundreds of operational aircraft. He said he was aware that respecting the need for more employment in Jordan and the difficult position of the budget that these matters were under study. He was grateful for the US assistance in the past and assumed that it would continue. He said great stress however must be put on the question of assurance for the future. He hopes that US relations with Jordan, which finds itself in the very key and difficult position in the East-West struggle, will be considered in the light of that position and not always with one eye directed toward what Israel may think. He felt the present position was such that we had to consider Jordan and its position by itself. He said, "Does the US trust and believe in Jordan or not?"

In summation His Majesty said that while current problems of budget and economic aid are important Jordan is at a new point and needs a definition of policy. The question is one of principle and he requests to be informed of the attitude of the US.

In a separate discussion with Foreign Minister Rifai it was evident that the problem of Israel is uppermost. Samir Pasha reviewed the need for economic help particularly in the employment field, the need for further military assistance not certainly on the Russian scale to Syria but adequate to permit the Jordan Army to stand strong in face of subversion and to protect its frontier, and finally the political problem, especially of Israel's behavior. He felt that there had been strong reason to believe that Israel was fully responsive to US control, saying that the Israelis would not have left Gaza were this not true. They would not have withdrawn from Sinai were this not true. There have been many and adequate demonstrations in the past that when US wished for Israel to behave herself that the latter has done so. However of late the provocative acts against Jordan can only be construed in the realization that Israel wishes to exploit Jordan's embattled position in the cold war for her selfish ends or that Israel may wish to pass from a cold war to a hot fight. The Foreign Minister said that regardless of what the issue may be any showdown with Israel would cause all Arabs to unite regardless of their other difficulties or rivalries. He felt that at a time when the US was trying to promote tranquility and the settlement of problems in the Near East that the recent attitude of Israel was anything but helpful and he hoped that she might be made to see reason by the US.

*Comment:* On questions of amount economic and military assistance appears desirable comment in subsequent message where effort will be made analyze current status. On question of basic American position and possible assurances to Jordan believe the observations and messages of the two pro-American Kings deserve prompt and careful examination.

It is desirable in my opinion furnish a clear-cut expression of US position. This would provide a basis for continuing cooperation even though our position may not fully coincide with Jordanian concept of desirable assurances.

**Mallory**

**112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 28, 1957—12:36 p.m.*

1294. Embtel 1074.<sup>2</sup> You should seek audience with King soonest and make following points:

1) US attitude toward aggression by Israel or any other Near Eastern state has been made very clear. US action at time invasion Suez amply demonstrates our policy and determination this regard. Where Egypt, despite massive armaments, was powerless to act, action of US and other UN members was decisive factor. In Sinai, Israel learned painful lesson re attitude of US in case of Israeli aggression, and Israelis have been left in no doubt that this attitude remains unchanged. King can be certain we would take action designed bring about cessation of Israel aggression against Jordan should it occur.

2) UN and its subordinate organs have direct responsibility for implementation of General Armistice Agreements and maintenance of conditions of tranquillity along armistice lines. We strongly support UN in this endeavor. We regret that Jordan felt impelled to take public issue with UNTSO and doubt whether this gesture serves HKJ interest in maintenance armistice regime. UNSYG's willingness to leave UNHQ for NE at this critical time<sup>3</sup> demonstrates his desire to strengthen functioning of UN machinery in area. We are pleased with manner which Jordanians have responded to UNSYG desire to go to Amman, and we assume Jordanians will meet him in that spirit and work closely with him. We see no reason why current problem with respect to Scopus can not be worked out through UN and UNSYG. Meanwhile we have made clear to Israel it should not take precipitate action in this matter.

3) We have fully appreciated courageous stand taken by Jordan and aid we have extended is one measure of our appreciation. As further evidence of our support, we have recently offered to extend assistance up to \$10 million from FY 1958 funds to be devoted to Jordan development program. We have supplied significant quantity of military goods to Jordan and are presently seeking means of being helpful in connection with Jordan's request for heavy artillery.

4) HM should therefore have no doubt as to our continuing interest in stability, independence and integrity of Jordan. This has

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.85/11-2557. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> During the first week of December 1957, Hammarskjöld visited the Middle East to discuss the Mt. Scopus situation with Jordanian and Israeli officials.



been expressed publicly at highest levels of USG. At same time, with regard to his request for assurances of continuing financial support, we must ask HM to appreciate considerations arising from US constitutional system. Power to appropriate public funds rests solely with Congress, and Executive cannot commit Congress re future appropriations. Congressional appropriations are determined on annual basis. Of particular importance is belief in Congress (which organized on biennial basis) that one Congress should not commit the next. We have for a long while had fruitful and lasting relations with many friendly states which have had full awareness of this factor in the conduct of US foreign relations. Essential element in these relationships has been sense of mutual confidence based on genuine community of interest, which happily characterizes US-Jordanian relations. This being so, Hussein can be certain that Jordan's needs will continue receive sympathetic consideration by USG.

**Dulles**

---

### 113. Editorial Note

On December 18, during a meeting of the NATO Heads of Government in Paris, with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Menderes, and Foreign Minister Zorlu of Turkey among others present, the subject of Nasser and Egypt's relations with Jordan were raised. The memorandum of conversation includes the following exchange:

"The President asked Prime Minister Menderes whether he thought there were any signs that Nasser was becoming uncomfortable in his relationship with the USSR. The President had a feeling Nasser might be seeking to disentangle himself from the Russians.

"The Prime Minister commented that Nasser was always gambling. He thought he was merely seeking time to consolidate his position.

"The President said that Nasser must give convincing proof of a change of heart. Mr. Zorlu commented that the yardstick in question must be Jordan. Nasser should stop trying to overthrow the Jordan Government. The President agreed. He said that we would continue to support Jordan and that no doubt if Egypt or Syria should attack Jordan, we would invoke the American Doctrine on the grounds that the attack was carried out as a result of Communist domination of the attacking country." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

# KUWAIT

## UNITED STATES INTEREST IN KUWAIT

### 114. Editorial Note

On August 11, 1955, Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., discussed developments in Kuwait with British Ambassador Sir Roger M. Makins. The Under Secretary expressed United States concern over "communist-inspired propaganda and activity" in Kuwait, noted that the United States and the United Kingdom had an important stake in Kuwait oil, and stated that the United States had no desire to undermine British influence and prestige in Kuwait but wished to cooperate with the United Kingdom in improving situations which might imperil their common interests. A memorandum of the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/8-1155. Other documentation with respect to U.S. interest in and concern with Kuwait is *ibid.*, 786D.00. Documentation relating to an agreement signed on May 14, 1955, between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Kuwait Oil Company is *ibid.*, 886D.2553.

For previous documentation on Kuwait, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952-1954, volume IX, Part 2, pages 2405 ff.

# LEBANON

## THE QUESTION OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO LEBANON; UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION OF LEBANON; LEBANESE SUPPORT FOR THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE<sup>1</sup>

### 115. Memorandum of a Conversation, Lebanese Embassy, Washington, February 24, 1955<sup>2</sup>

#### SUBJECT

President Chamoun's Reaction to the Department's Answers to the Four  
Questions Posed by Ambassador Malik on Instructions<sup>3</sup>

#### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Charles Malik, Ambassador of Lebanon  
NE—Mr. Hart  
NE—Mr. Francis Allen

Ambassador Malik telephoned Mr. Hart, urgently asking that he and Mr. Francis Allen call at the Embassy to hear an urgent message he had just received from his Government. Upon arrival at the Embassy, Ambassador Malik explained that he had received from the Lebanese Foreign Office one of the strongest messages that had ever been sent him, which he, judging by its phraseology, believed had been drafted by President Chamoun himself. The message consisted of the Lebanese Government's reaction to the Department's

---

<sup>1</sup> For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 64 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-2455. Confidential. Drafted by Allen.

<sup>3</sup> Malik had originally put forward five questions in a meeting with Secretary Dulles on February 9. The first question, concerning the connection between United States military aid and an improvement in Arab-Israeli relations, was answered by Assistant Secretary George V. Allen in another conversation with Malik on February 9. Allen stated that while the United States could not spell out preconditions to its military aid, it hoped for a general reduction in Arab-Israeli tensions. Allen also emphasized the value of a regional defense organization to Lebanon's independence. (Memorandum of conversation by Allen, February 9; *ibid.*, 780.5/2-955) Allen answered the other four questions on February 22. He told Malik that American military aid could not be extended to Lebanon until Lebanon adhered to the "Northern Tier" defense organization, and until Arab-Israeli tensions were lowered. Allen also stated that the United States did not envisage a large-scale program of economic aid to Lebanon under existing conditions.

answers to the four questions posed by Ambassador Malik on instructions which had been given to the Ambassador by Assistant Secretary Allen on February 22. The gist of the message was as follows:

The Government of Lebanon deeply regrets the "frigidity and immovability" of United States policy as regards Lebanon's "needs" during this crucial period in the Near East. Lebanon has for years consistently acted in ways friendly to the United States and has supported United States policy to a notable extent. It has proved its desire to maintain peace in the Near East. It has gone as far as is possible in the direction of American policy in the matter of organizing the defense of the Middle East, and especially as regards the conclusion of the Turkey-Iraq pact.<sup>4</sup> Lebanon is continuing to do what it can to ensure that the Arab states "agree" to this pact, or at least that they do not oppose it. Similarly, Lebanon has been helpful as regards the Unified Plan for the Jordan River.<sup>5</sup> In sum, there has never been any doubt as regards Lebanon's position "at the side of the West", especially the United States; or about Lebanon's readiness to offer all assistance, in case of emergency, to the Western powers.

Despite all this, and other things such as Lebanon's constant support of the U.S. in the United Nations, the U.S. persists in granting only small quantities of aid to Lebanon. The Lebanese Government is seriously concerned that the United States insists that before it can extend military aid or significant economic aid to the Lebanon, three conditions must be met; namely, significant improvement in Arab-Israel relations; further development of the Northern Tier; and Lebanon's joining the Northern Tier. These conditions were not made when the United States offered military aid to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In the case of Egypt, the United States did not require improvement in Arab-Israel relations; and the U.S. offered military aid to Saudi Arabia without requiring that Saudi Arabia do anything about the Northern Tier.

Ambassador Malik is instructed to take up "frankly and definitively" with the U.S. Government this matter of U.S. assistance to Lebanon, with special emphasis on the following vital point: the giving of aid by the U.S. helps to lead the Arab states "to cooperate positively with the U.S." at this crucial stage when the refusal of the

---

<sup>4</sup> On February 24, Iraq and Turkey signed a 5-year Pact of Mutual Cooperation (the Baghdad Pact). For text, see United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 233, p. 199. The Pact was subsequently adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, Pakistan on September 23, and Iran on November 3.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to *The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region*, a plan prepared at the request of UNRWA, under the direction of the Tennessee Valley Authority, by Charles T. Main, Inc. (Boston, 1953).

Arab states to cooperate "may cause their permanent withdrawal from support of the U.S."

President Chamoun, the message continued, had been asked by Salah Salem to be the "spokesman of all the Arab states" in discussing the whole matter of Middle East defense with the Western powers. Ambassador Malik is instructed to invite Secretary Dulles to visit President Chamoun in Beirut on his return from Bangkok to discuss the question of cooperation between the U.S. and the Arab states. The message concluded with an instruction to Ambassador Malik to return to Beirut "immediately" on consultation.

In subsequent general discussion of the message, Dr. Malik expressed "personally" the following views as to the possible reasons for this unusually strong approach. The Government of Lebanon is probably under very strong pressure from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, local extreme nationalists, pro-Egyptian and pro-Saudi elements, leftists and communists to go along with the Egyptians, Saudis and the Syrians in opposing the Turkey-Iran agreement, the "Northern Tier" and Western ideas for the defense of the area. He had no recent information about what is going on in Lebanon, but he suspected that President Chamoun and his supporters fear that pressures may be building up similar to those in Syria which have had the effect of drastically changing Syrian policy in a way unfavorable to Western interests. The present regime in Lebanon may fear that it is "sticking its neck out" on matters of importance to Western and U.S. policy in the area against strong opposition from neighboring states and possibly from France. Elements in Lebanon hostile to the Chamoun regime, possibly supported by these outside influences, might take action against Chamoun. In this situation Chamoun, who has been notably cooperative in working with the United States may well feel irritated and isolated, having nothing whatsoever from the U.S. to indicate that we are willing in any way to give "special" help and support to Lebanon which has so consistently given support to the U.S. and U.S. policies.

Apart from Chamoun's own personal position, the Ambassador said, Christian Lebanon as a whole now feels isolated, with the possibility of an impending break-up of the Arab League which in its "protocol" and charter guaranteed Lebanon's independence. The Lebanese Christians are wondering whether they may not have moved from a real degree of autonomy under the Ottoman Turks, and later under the French, into a situation under the "Pax Americana" or "Pax Anglo-Saxonica" in which they will, without any effort on our part to help them, be swallowed up by the neighboring Moslem states.

Ambassador Malik said regarding his instructions to return to Beirut, that it would be very awkward for him to return with nothing new to report to President Chamoun other than our "negative" policy as already reported by him following his recent conversations with Mr. Jernegan and Assistant Secretary Allen.<sup>6</sup> He hoped that the Department could be persuaded to give a more favorable response to Lebanon's requests for aid prior to his impending departure.

Mr. Hart replied that he was sure the Department would give careful consideration to the Government of Lebanon's message and the Ambassador's request, but he did not believe it likely that there would be any significant change in the near future in our policy as regards the matter of aid for Lebanon as outlined to him in recent conversations in the Department. Mr. Hart said that we would seek immediately to reply to President Chamoun's kind invitation to Secretary Dulles to visit Beirut. (Ambassador Malik was informed on February 26 that the Secretary was unfortunately not able to accept the invitation.)

---

<sup>6</sup> Malik met with Jernegan on February 4; a memorandum of conversation of that date by Francis O. Allen is in Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-455.

---

## 116. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 1, 1955<sup>1</sup>

### SUBJECT

Lebanon's Request for Grant Military and Large-Scale Economic Aid;  
Lebanon's Role in the Middle East Defense

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Charles Malik, Ambassador of Lebanon  
NEA—Mr. George V. Allen  
NE—Mr. Parker T. Hart  
NE—Mr. Francis O. Allen

Having been ordered home on consultation, Ambassador Malik called on Assistant Secretary Allen to discuss the recent urgent message he had received from Beirut regarding Lebanon's desire for immediate US military and large-scale economic aid. Ambassador

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-2455. Confidential. Drafted by Allen.

Malik had informed the Department of the contents of the message from his government (which he believed had been drafted by President Chamoun himself) on February 24,<sup>2</sup> and he wished before his departure to be informed of the Department's reaction to this message. Prior to his call at the Department on March 1, Ambassador Malik had been informed that current US policies as explained to him (Departmental Memoranda of Conversation dated February 4 and February 22, 1955, and Departmental telegram to Beirut No. 1113, February 14, 1955<sup>3</sup>) had been determined after careful consideration of all the factors involved, and there was little chance of their being changed in any major way in the near future.

Mr. Allen opened the discussion of the message Ambassador Malik had received from Beirut by stressing that the ties between the US and Lebanon are strong and deep; and that the US has consistently acted in ways most friendly to Lebanon ever since the establishment of its independence in which we had played a not insignificant role. We were therefore puzzled at the reference in the message to the "frigidity and immovability" of US policy toward Lebanon; we could not regard such a description as either justified or accurate.

Mr. Allen also said he was surprised at the reference in the message to "American policy" regarding the organization of Middle East defense. We do not regard the developing defense organization as an expression of American policy. It is rather a result of the mutual interests of the countries of the area and of the United States and other powers concerned with the defense of the area. Such defense arrangements are only effective if the participating countries feel that their own national interests are served by them. The United States is not interested in urging any country which does not want to join collective security organizations to do so. Thus in the case of NATO neither Sweden nor Switzerland found it to their interest to join and we have remained on completely friendly terms with these countries, though we of course do not send them military aid or military missions. Similarly, we have no intention of attempting to induce Lebanon to join collective security arrangements for the defense of the Middle East. This is a matter which is strictly for Lebanon to determine in its own best interests, and the US will

---

<sup>2</sup> Compare Departmental Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Malik, Mr. Hart and Mr. Francis Allen dated February 24, 1955. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>3</sup> The memoranda of conversation are not printed. Telegram 1113 summarized a conversation between Malik and Allen of February 9 and instructed the Embassy to take the same line the Department had taken in this conversation if the Lebanese Government put forward similar questions. (Department of State, Central Files, 786.12/2-855)

remain on friendly terms with Lebanon whether or not it takes such a step. At the same time, we must make it clear in a spirit of deep friendship that if the countries of the Near East remain unaware of the dangers confronting them we can do little to help them. They are not doing us a favor by joining in collective security.

Mr. Allen finally emphasized that he took strong exception to the phrase in the Lebanese message which appeared to threaten "permanent withdrawal of support of the U.S." if US aid should not be extended to Lebanon. In our view there is involved here not a question of Lebanon or other Arab states supporting the US or vice versa, but rather a question of Lebanon, the US and others supporting their mutual interests, with each country in doing so acting out of conviction as to its own best interests.

Ambassador Malik replied that he believed the meaning of the phrase concerning the danger of a "withdrawal of Arab support of the United States" was that it is important to take steps at this time to reduce developing anti-Western and anti-American feelings, since these feelings may soon become more rigid and difficult or impossible to change. In other words, the US may lose the support of the Arabs, including Lebanon if it does not act most carefully in the present most delicate situation in the Near East.

Mr. Allen expressed surprise that the Lebanese Government should feel that US relations with the Arabs were as bad as this would imply; that after two years during which the US Government had done everything in its power to be fair to the Arabs and as helpful to them as possible under President Eisenhower's policy of impartiality, things should somehow have reached the stage of our being in danger of "permanently losing" our friendly relationships with the Arab world. This would indeed be surprising after the numerous steps that had been taken over the past two years to redress the imbalance in US policy said to have previously existed as between the Arab states and Israel.

Ambassador Malik replied that the Arabs believed that the US was trying to put pressure on them to make peace with Israel; and that many resented what they believed was a tendency on the part of the US to try to make them take sides in the "cold war".

Mr. Allen requested the Ambassador to convey to the authorities in Beirut the continued strong and friendly interest of the United States in Lebanon's welfare and independence, and at the same time to emphasize that we will be at a loss as to what to do if after two years of our impartial policy with every effort made to do all we possibly can for the Arabs, things are as bad now as was implied in the message from the Lebanese Government. Ambassador Malik replied that he was grateful to Mr. Allen for his frankness, and wished to emphasize that this frankness would not be misinter-



preted by him. He agreed that we should all work together for the common good. Mr. Allen concluded by saying that if Lebanon follows what it is convinced is its own national interest, the United States will be entirely satisfied.

Ambassador Malik raised the matter of a possible official visit by President Chamoun to the United States. Mr. Allen replied that when the question of official visits was considered at the highest levels about six weeks ago, the decision was taken not to arrange any additional visits for the time being because of President Eisenhower's crowded schedule. He stressed, however, that a visit by President Chamoun was high on "NEA's list" of proposed official visits.

---

117. **Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Beirut, July 15, 1955—7 p.m.*

54. In conversation with me today, President Chamoun brought up the question of arms aid to Lebanon, remarking that there should be no objection to any such arrangement since by no stretch of the imagination could Lebanon be conceived as having any aggressive designs on Israel. I replied that as far as I was aware there was no consideration being given by the USG to arms aid arrangements with any of the Arab States at this time, observing that until there was some lessening of the tension with regard to Israel, the moment would hardly seem opportune.

There followed some discussion of the tension in the Gaza district and President Chamoun suddenly expressed his opinion that no real assistance could be expected from the military regime in Egypt toward moving in the direction of a solution of the Israeli issue. He asserted that the Communists and Communist viewpoint were well represented in the Revolutionary Committee and in the Egyptian press. He cited the last edition of the magazine *Al Tahrir*, under direction of Anwar Sadat which he said contained three pages praising the Soviet-inspired Partisans of Peace.

**Heath**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683A.84A/7-1555. Confidential.

118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy  
in Lebanon <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 28, 1955—4:35 p.m.*

649. Embtel 442. <sup>2</sup> We share your concern over political developments in Lebanon and possible consolidation opposition to Chamoun. . . .

Accordingly you authorized at your discretion and at time you think best to assure Chamoun orally as follows: From association with him first in UN circles and during three years his Presidency, US has come to have great confidence in his judgment, and believes that his conception of best interests of Lebanon and Near East area coincide with ours. We fully support his desire for independent progressive Lebanon. We impressed by his personal attitude toward Jordan Valley development plan which indicates his awareness of importance of regional economic development; his efforts maintain quiet on Israel border which shows importance he attaches to stability; and his conversations with you (Embtel 409 <sup>3</sup>) which reveal he recognizes insidious nature Communist threat and far reaching implications deals with Soviet bloc such as Egyptian arms arrangement.

FYI: We are currently reviewing Embtel 414 <sup>4</sup> and canvassing other possibilities assisting states in area which cooperate with us but are not yet in position to make definite suggestions. Also we agree with you that timing of any approach to Lebanon should take

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10-1755. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Allen.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 442, October 17, Chargé John K. Emmerson noted, inter alia, that opposition in Lebanon to Chamoun had been increasing for the past 3 months. Emerson wanted to assure Chamoun that the United States had confidence in him. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 409, October 9, Emmerson summarized a conversation he had with Chamoun on October 8. According to Emmerson, the Lebanese President was concerned with what he saw as increasing Communist influence in Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. Emmerson noted that Chamoun was concerned enough to consider adhering to a Syria-Iraq rapprochement, if Lebanon's independence could be guaranteed. (*Ibid.*, 780.00/10-955)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 414, October 11, Emmerson reported, inter alia, his belief that negotiations to obtain for the United States general rights to Beirut International Airport, and subsequently improve facilities at the airport, would be an "excellent move" in the context of the current Middle East situation. He felt that once the United States made such an approach to Lebanon, the Lebanese Government would "likely press hard for military assistance" as an accompaniment to an air agreement. Such action, according to Emmerson, would forestall Egyptian dominance over Lebanese policy and encourage Lebanese resistance to Syrian neutralist pressures. (*Ibid.*, 711.56383A/10-1155)

into consideration possible emergence of Solh as Prime Minister . . . .

Hoover

---

119. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, October 28, 1955—10 p.m.*

Secto 56. British delegation has handed us following memorandum on subject which Macmillan would like discuss with Secretary:

“Lebanon is small state, friendly to West and moderating influence. Lebanese President under strong pressure join Syrian-Egypt pact. A little economic help would encourage him. We might try to find a few arms for him but some economic aid might be easier. Help of some kind might make wide difference in Middle East. If one country which had refused accept Egyptian policies received our backing, that would set trend in right direction.”

Please cable summary of any US economic and military aid to Lebanon during past few years and any scheduled for current year. Please also comment on British memorandum as well as on Beirut telegram 475.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–2855. Confidential. Repeated to Beirut and London. Dulles was in Geneva attending a conference of the Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The conference began on October 27 and adjourned on November 16.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 475, October 26, Emmerson summarized conversations with Chamoun and Foreign Minister Lahud of Lebanon, reporting that Lahud wanted to know what current U.S. policy in the Middle East was, and specifically what the United States wished from Lebanon. (*Ibid.*, 683.87/10–2655) In Tosec 116 to Geneva, November 1, Acting Secretary Hoover replied that while the United States “could as desirable” give prompt consideration to Lebanese requests for arms purchases under the 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Lebanon, he feared that “U.S. military aid might backfire unless it can be granted in context of policy towards other Arab states.” Hoover also stated that the Department of Defense had reaffirmed a request that the Department of State negotiate an agreement for U.S. rights for joint use of military facilities in Lebanon, specifically Beirut International Airport. The telegram included the following figures on U.S. aid to Lebanon from fiscal years 1951 through 1956: \$11.2 million technical assistance; \$11 million economic aid; no grant military aid or cash reimbursable military purchases. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/11–155)

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Beirut, October 29, 1955—3 p.m.*

490. Re Secto 56. <sup>2</sup> Embassy agrees with principle aiding Lebanon proposed British memorandum; however believe small amounts economic aid would not achieve psychological effect so imperative now. On other hand relative small amount arms aid would produce immediate strong effect and would prove to Lebanese value of policy close alignment and support US. Commitments effected by air agreement and arms aid (Deptel 533 <sup>3</sup> and Embtel 414 <sup>4</sup>) would serve as guarantee to an independent Lebanon which would give GOL necessary confidence and strength take more leadership in area. Consequently we reiterate recommendations made Embtels 414, 440<sup>5</sup> and 442.<sup>6</sup>

With respect . . . Karame Government (Deptel 649 <sup>7</sup>) although we still of same opinion believe situation has worsened since October 11 (Embtel 414) to extent we might wish speed action. Believe we could safely make preliminary confidential approach to President . . . informing him US has intention make offer and seeking his cooperation in method and timing.

Would like add suggestion that Lebanese might at same time be helpful in continuing steps toward solution Arab-Israeli problem on basis Secretary's August 29 [26] proposals. In lengthy interview between Foreign Minister and Congressman Multer this morning Foreign Minister made personal suggestion that President Eisenhower or Secretary invite representatives Arab States and Israel separately to discuss further steps. Foreign Minister expressed several times his willingness meet any time to discuss question.

Believe possible that if given encouragement and tangible support Lebanese might play constructive role in working toward relaxation of tensions. To achieve best effect in Arab States and Israel

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10-2955. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to Geneva for the Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 533 to Beirut, October 5, the Department noted, inter alia, that the purpose of the Department of Defense in seeking U.S. rights to Beirut International Airport was to develop installations and units there to support possible wartime operations in Lebanon. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56383A/10-555)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 118.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 440, Emmerson commented, among other things, that some encouragement to Lebanon in the form of limited defensive arms aid would help the U.S. cause with the Arabs and pose the least threat of unfavorable repercussions on the part of Israel. (Department of State, Central Files, 101.21-NIS/10-1755)

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 118.

<sup>7</sup> Document 118.

offer arms to Lebanon should be coupled with simultaneous proposal of meeting discuss Arab-Israeli question (paragraph 2, Embtel 440).

We believe situation demands concerted action on several fronts and that piecemeal offers would not serve our objectives. We need to show that we have confidence in our friends and that we are prepared take initiative in reaching fair *modus vivendi*.

Emmerson

---

### 121. Editorial Note

In December 1955 the Government of Lebanon opened negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) to establish a new pipeline transit rate agreement. IPC wished to determine the rate on the basis of pipeline mileage; Lebanon wished to receive the same share of profits as Syria, regardless of pipeline mileage. Negotiations reached an impasse by January 1956, but discussions continued.

On June 29, 1956, the Lebanese Parliament unanimously passed a tax measure imposing income taxes, retroactive to January 1952, on foreign companies previously exempt under special agreements. This law affected other concessionary companies, including the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) and the Mediterranean Refining Company (MEDRECO), as well as IPC. The Embassy presented a note to the Lebanese Government on July 25, expressing its regret at the measure, and predicting the impairment of confidence on the part of foreign investors in Lebanon's international reputation for fair treatment. (Telegram 240 from Beirut, August 1, 1956; Department of State, Central Files, 883A.112/8–156) Chamoun signed the measure on July 25, 1956, and it became law on August 1.

Tapline and IPC then refused to pay income taxes. On October 14, 1956, IPC and Chamoun reached a truce agreement, under which Chamoun agreed to instruct Finance Minister Georges Karam not to attempt to collect the income tax from IPC or Tapline. (Telegram 897 from Beirut, October 19; *ibid.*, 883A.2553/10–1956) This arrangement improved the atmosphere, and after an interruption due in part to the Suez crisis and the impairment of IPC's pipelines in Syria, negotiations resumed in January 1957. However, the strained relations among Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon delayed an agreement by those three nations on profit-sharing. (Despatch 493 from Damascus,

June 15, 1957; *ibid.*, 883.2553/6-1557) Information concerning the negotiations is *ibid.*, 883A.2553 and 883A.112.

---

122. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 21, 1956<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Lebanese Request for Arms

PARTICIPANTS

Victor Khouri, Ambassador of Lebanon  
NEA—Assistant Secretary Allen  
NE—Mr. Boardman

Ambassador Khouri made an official request for US arms and handed Mr. Allen a list<sup>2</sup> in French which he described as very modest. He said that Lebanon had no aggressive intentions, but wanted her army of five thousand to be well equipped and wanted to keep her expenditures low. In his personal opinion, the request was "an important test of friendship".

In reply to Mr. Allen's question, the Ambassador said that he did not use the word "test" in any threatening way and proceeded to translate from a telegram from his Ministry of Foreign Affairs which spoke of Lebanon's constant non-aggressive spirit, her tendency to line up with the West, and her hope for an American gesture which she could interpret as a mark of friendship. The telegram made two other points: (1) that Lebanon wanted substantially reduced, if not token prices, and (2) that Lebanon had always obtained arms from the West, despite offers from other countries.

Mr. Allen observed that the request undoubtedly represented an important decision by the Lebanese Government. He wondered if the Government had concluded that its past reliance on the good will of the West to support her independence was no longer enough. The Ambassador did not consider this a likely interpretation. "What can we do with an army that is no more than a police force?" he asked. "We simply want better equipment. There are no important political implications involved."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/1-2156. Confidential. Drafted by Boardman.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached but a copy is *ibid.*, NEA/NE Files: Lot 58 D 398, Lebanon, "Lebanese Requests to Purchase Military Equipment 1955-56."

Mr. Allen then noted that the US had not been a traditional source of military equipment for the Near East. It did not want to become one, and it did not wish to upset traditional supply patterns. Why then, he asked, should Lebanon turn to the US Government for arms? When the Ambassador replied that it was because of US friendship, Mr. Allen asked if the Lebanese had become less friendly with the British and French. The Ambassador said he had no instructions on these questions, nor on the technical matter of why his country should want to add new types of equipment requiring different maintenance and spare parts. He said that his request was so "miserably small" that these matters did not seem particularly relevant.

Mr. Allen said that we had a good many requests for arms before us. We had not sold arms to any Near Eastern country at reduced prices, though we had requests from Syria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia and several of these countries wanted reduced prices. We had given arms to only one Near Eastern country—Iraq. If there were adequate reasons for arms, there was considerable reason for us to prefer to give rather than sell them. Although he would have to refer the request to the Secretary, Mr. Allen said it might be best on the whole for Lebanon to continue to obtain its arms from the French and the British. He stated, however, that the Lebanese request would be given sympathetic and prompt consideration, though by "prompt" he did not mean to imply that there could be an early reply. He welcomed the request in that it was an expression of Lebanon's friendly attitude towards the US, and he assured the Ambassador of US concern for Lebanese independence.

(No direct mention was made during the conversation of the apparently much longer and larger list of arms in English transmitted with Embassy Beirut's Despatch No. 255<sup>3</sup> received in the Department December 30, 1955 with a request for a Defense Department price and availability study.)

The Ambassador said he had several other questions on other subjects including the Shuckburgh talks,<sup>4</sup> and it was agreed that he should come in again the following week.

---

<sup>3</sup> In despatch 255, December 19, the Embassy enclosed a list of equipment required by the Lebanese Army on which the Lebanese Government had requested price and availability data. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 783A.5-MSP/12-1955)

<sup>4</sup> The Shuckburgh talks were a series of meetings held in Washington, January 13–19, between officials of the British Foreign Office, led by Evelyn Shuckburgh, and representatives of the Department of State.

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the  
Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Beirut, January 21, 1956—3 p.m.*

813. President has informed Embassy military talks with Syria postponed at least two weeks following yesterday's meeting Prime Minister Ghazzi. <sup>2</sup>

President told Embassy informant Lebanon not fearful Israeli attack, more concerned Syrian situation, particularly growing Communist influence Army other circles. This connection President made further plea for US arms sales at low prices. Said negative answer would be serious blow Lebanon and his own position.

Embassy reiterates recommendations special efforts be made offer GOL arms on attractive conditions through combination economic aid or other arrangements as suggested previous telegrams.

We believe mistake if we too complacent over Lebanon's position this area. Communist offensive not without effect here in face already deteriorating position West due lack settlement Arab-Israeli problem with all that implies plus intensified Syrian-Saudi pressure.

Believe we still have opportunity here make example Lebanon as country aligned with and supported by West. However, such result is not at all foregone conclusion and will be difficult achieve. Military cooperation would produce good effect tend counteract prevalent unfortunate feeling US responds quickest most generously countries who flirt with Communists (Egypt).

In context actions other Near East countries which may be contemplated believe we should simultaneously make efforts strengthen our position here which would be relatively inexpensive and we believe completely justified. Test will be response Lebanon arms request which if negative will make efforts achieve Lebanon's cooperation with our policies in area most difficult and will alienate President and affect his prestige in country.

Embassy believes we must regard all our programs Lebanon as political in objective. Consequently forms of aid less important than kind of result to be accomplished. Believe ICA program should be given new look in this framework. Embassy prepared make suggestions later communications.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/1-2156. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> According to Emmerson, Chamoun told him on January 6 that Ghazzi was coming to Beirut to demand that Lebanon enter into a military agreement which would effectively subordinate the Lebanese Army to Egyptian command. (Despatch 293, January 16; *ibid.*, 780.00/1-1656)



Believe decision arms sales need not be hurried . . . but all avenues offering possibility favorable response should be explored.<sup>3</sup>

Emmerson

---

<sup>3</sup> On January 23, the Department noted that it was puzzled as to the motives inspiring the Lebanese request for American arms, since Lebanon had hitherto largely used other sources of arms supplies. The Department further stated that Ambassador Khouri had said that other unnamed countries had offered lower prices than the United States for arms. It requested the Embassy to ascertain the reasons behind the Lebanese request. (Telegram 1160 to Beirut; *ibid.*, 783A.56/1-2156)

---

**124. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Lebanon (Heath) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 23, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Lebanese Request to Purchase Arms

Ambassador Khouri, Lebanon, asked to see me before his appointment with Assistant Secretary of State Allen since his Government had suggested he "take advantage of" my presence in Washington.<sup>2</sup>

Khouri's request to purchase a relatively small amount of armament (less than the seven million dollars' worth listed by the Lebanese Government several weeks ago) is a legitimate one. Its small army of less than seven thousand could not take the lead in any offensive operations against Israel and, if war should unfortu-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83A/1-2356. Confidential. Heath was in the United States to serve as a Senior Adviser to the U.S. Delegation at the Tenth U.N. General Assembly, beginning September 11, 1955. After this service, the Department granted Heath home leave.

<sup>2</sup> Heath lunched with Khouri on January 24. According to Heath, Khouri remarked that Lebanon had requested only a small amount of defensive arms and sought to buy them from the United States because, in Khouri's opinion, Chamoun wanted closer ties of all sorts with the United States. In fact, Heath noted, Khouri claimed that Chamoun would eventually like a mutual security pact with the United States, but the present state of relations between Lebanon and other Arab nations precluded this. In response to Khouri's inquiry as to why his request of January 21 had been greeted with reserve and questioning, Heath replied that the United States was not anxious, "as a general rule, to sell arms or to contribute to an arms race." (Memorandum from Heath to Allen, Rountree, Wilkins, and Boardman, January 26; *ibid.*, 783A.561/1-2656)

nately recur, its role might well be only a repetition of the token operations it performed in 1948.

If we plan to sell Israel arms, it might be tactically desirable to approve the Lebanese request first. I am at present opposed, however, to Lebanon's request that these arms be furnished at a substantial reduction in cost. Lebanese official and public opinion would never believe that we had furnished armament at a financial loss to the US Government nor would it be particularly grateful if it did believe so. The Lebanese Government instructed Khouri to say that Lebanon had received offers of armament at bargain prices from other countries but did not specify what countries. If Czechoslovakia has offered arms, political opposition to their purchase would probably arise in Catholic or other circles in Lebanon, or such opposition could be created.

. . . . .

---

**125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 28, 1956—7:44 p.m.*

1440. Ambassador Khoury stated to Dept February 25 he deduced from Foreign Relations Committee hearings February 24<sup>2</sup> all new applications for shipments arms to Near East being held under consideration. He inquired regarding possibility GOL obtaining reduced prices if applications eventually approved. Dept replied little possibility existed reduced prices but added GOL probably had better case for obtaining limited US arms than other Israel's neighbors provided any shipments authorized.

Should you be approached by GOL regarding arms application you should indicate that developments since request submitted have altered public attitude re arms shipments to area to such an extent that it would be very difficult for USG to take favorable action at this time.<sup>3</sup> Sales at reduced prices would be particularly difficult

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.56/2-2856. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Boardman and approved by Allen.

<sup>2</sup> On February 24, Secretary Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the situation in the Middle East.

<sup>3</sup> Besides the increasing tension between Egypt and Israel, the American public's attitude toward arms shipments to the Middle East was affected by the publicity given earlier in the month to a shipment of 18 light tanks to Saudi Arabia. Pro-Israel

even under normal circumstances. You may indicate above applies equally to Israel and Arab states. Any changes in present situation presumably would affect both Israel and Arab states (Embtel 978<sup>4</sup>).

It does not appear necessary or desirable for you to take initiative in approaching GOL at this time. Above provided so that if GOL should inquire, you will be in position to discourage expectations of prompt favorable action and thereby avoid any grounds for belief US encouraging Lebanon to request American arms. Dept understands some GOL officials have expressed latter view informally.

**Dulles**

---

pressure groups condemned the tank agreement, and numerous Congressmen also voiced objections.

<sup>4</sup>In telegram 978, February 25, Emmerson reported a conversation of that morning with President Chamoun, in which he told Chamoun, among other things, that arms sales to Arab States "inevitably increased pressure for arms to Israel." Emmerson said that Chamoun then asked why, if Israel were given weapons, Lebanon could not receive the small amount of arms he had requested. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.5-MSP/2-2556)

---

**126. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Beirut, March 1, 1956.*

1014. I saw President Chamoun by appointment yesterday. He was disposed to discuss at length the Lebanese request to purchase arms, arguing Lebanon's correct behavior vis-à-vis Israel, his anxiety over Syria's attitude toward Lebanon and Syria's policy of attempting to squeeze Lebanon economically. He also argued that the sale of American arms would tend to convince Lebanese opinion that the policy of friendship toward the West, and specifically towards the United States, was a paying one. There was, he asserted, a growing current of opinion in Lebanon that countries such as Egypt which created difficulties got more favors from the United States in the form of loans and credits than countries which were sincerely friendly and cooperative.

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/3-156. Confidential. Pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Judda, Tel Aviv, London, Ankara, and Paris.

I suggested that he could well understand that, at the moment when we are resisting very considerable pressure to provide Israel with arms, it was not politically advisable to add to that pressure by selling arms to states directly bordering Israel. I suggested a little patience might be in the interest of both Lebanon and the U.S. I remarked that military equipment and weapons were undergoing steady and rapid improvement and observed that while the arms purchased by Egypt from Czechoslovakia were perhaps modern for this area, they were not the newest types, but obsolescent.

The President discussed with some foreboding the Soviet attempts at economic penetration of the area. As it was, Lebanon was exporting most of her citrus crop, now almost as large as that of Israel, to central Europe and was having increasing trouble in disposing of surpluses. If Lebanon became increasingly dependent on Communist markets, it would be very difficult for his or any other government to follow a resolute anti-Communist policy. He realized that the U.S. could obviously not itself import Lebanese fruit any more than it could take Egyptian cotton, but he urged intensive study be given to the possibility of American aid programs providing for triangular trade which would take care of some of these surpluses. He remarked that the Communist bloc's ability to take almost any amount of excess products was a most dangerous weapon against the free world.

President went on to say that, frankly as an undoubted friend of the U.S., he wondered at times, particularly in view of our support of Israel, whether we had a definite, coherent policy in this region. I said our policy was quite clear: it included friendship to Lebanon and, in the interest of all the states concerned, a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. Chamoun said that it was inconceivable there would ever be truly friendly relations between Israel and the Arab states since Israel would never act in a friendly or Christian manner. It was possible, however, that relations might become officially tolerable. Since U.S. policy was to support Lebanon as friend, he assumed Lebanon was of importance to U.S. and free world. Country was small and its importance obviously not that of Turkey but nevertheless geographical location gave it certain undoubted strategic value. In requesting arms President had in mind not only immediate defense needs against outside aggression but Lebanese role in defense of free world. Such association with West, particularly with U.S., might at some future time take form larger defense arrangement.

Chamoun said the repatriation or resettlement elsewhere of the 118,000 Palestine refugees in Lebanon was absolutely vital to Lebanon. . . . He avoided answering my question whether Lebanon

would not be willing to make a separate peace with Israel if the refugees were taken off her hands.

Heath

---

127. Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee<sup>1</sup>

J.C.S. 2099/621

Washington, May 8, 1956.

REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON FOR THE  
SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES

The Problem

1. In response to a request<sup>2</sup> by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), to review four lists<sup>3</sup> of equipment which the Government of Lebanon desires to purchase from the United States and to recommend:

a. Whether the items concerned should be approved for sale to Lebanon.

b. Suitable substitutes where appropriate.

c. Reasons, if approval or suitable substitutes are not recommended.

d. Any other considerations concerning the transactions, the country, or the area, as deemed appropriate.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. The Department of State has requested<sup>2</sup> the Department of Defense to furnish pricing and availability information on four lists of military equipment which the Government of Lebanon desires to purchase from the Government of the United States.

3. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) stated<sup>2</sup> that "the current policy of the United States is to sell only those arms to the countries of the Near East, involved in the present Arab-Israel dispute, for internal security and legitimate self-defense. In addition,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) Sec. 29. Secret. Transmitted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 8. The recommendation in paragraph nine was approved by the Joint Chiefs at their meeting of May 23, 1956.

<sup>2</sup> Dated 13 April 1956; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2099/611. [Footnote in the source text. J.C.S. 2099/611 is not printed.]

<sup>3</sup> Appendices "A", "B", "C" and "D", to J.C.S. 2099/611. [Footnote in the source text. None printed.]

the over-all policy with respect to this area is under urgent review by the National Security Council."

4. The National Intelligence Advisory Committee (NIAC) has stated<sup>4</sup> that:

*a.* Lebanon is heavily dependent on the West because of its trade patterns and the conviction of its Christian elements that friendly relations with the West are necessary to continued Lebanese independence and to their own survival in a Moslem world. Lebanon has accordingly temporized in the present controversy in the hope that a solution will be found which will preserve some degree of Arab unity while permitting beneficial relations between Arab States and the United States and United Kingdom.

*b.* Lebanon will probably try to stay out of the Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia (ESS) Pact so long as the pact is not open to Iraq. Lebanon would strongly be tempted to join the pact if this appeared the best way of assuring its continued independence.

5. For additional facts bearing on the problem, see Enclosure "B".

#### Discussion

6. Lebanon has a valid requirement for the weapons requested to provide for her self defense. If Lebanon cannot obtain arms from the West, she may seek to obtain arms from the Soviet Bloc or feel obliged to join the ESS Pact in order to purchase arms from Egypt. Either action would be detrimental to U.S. interests, including the maintenance of peace in the Near East.

7. For additional Discussion, see Enclosure "C".

#### Conclusion

8. From a military viewpoint, the arms and equipment requested should be made available for sale to Lebanon.

#### Recommendations

9. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A", which reflects the above conclusion, to the Secretary of Defense.

10. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands.

[Here follow Enclosure "A," a draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending that the arms equipment listed in the April 13 memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) be approved for sale to Leba-

---

<sup>4</sup> NIE 30-55, dated 21 June 1955; on file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text.]

non; and Enclosure "B," a statement of the facts bearing on the problem of the Lebanese arms purchase request.]

### Enclosure "C"

#### Discussion

1. Lebanon is not a member of the ESS Pact but could become involved in hostilities with Israel in event of general conflict between the Arab States and Israel. However, it is believed that Lebanon will stay out of the ESS Pact and avoid war with Israel if possible. If Lebanon were to join the ESS Pact, the solidarity, and to some extent the strength, of the ESS Pact would be increased with a resultant increase in the threat of an Arab offensive against Israel. It is therefore in the interest of the United States to encourage Lebanon to maintain her independence outside the ESS Pact.

2. Providing arms to Lebanon would increase the total military capabilities of the Arab States if Lebanon subsequently joined the ESS Pact. It appears, however, that if the United States provides arms to Lebanon it probably would increase rather than decrease Lebanon's determination to stay out of the ESS Pact. Furthermore, under the terms of the U.S.-Lebanon MDA Agreement,<sup>5</sup> Lebanon has given assurance she will not undertake any act of aggression, or sell or transfer weapons received under the terms of the Agreement without the consent of the United States.

3. Lebanese military forces have no offensive capabilities and a very limited defensive capability. The weakness of Lebanon could tempt either Syria or Israel to overrun Lebanon as an avenue of attack on the other, or might lead Lebanon to join the ESS Pact in an effort to preserve her independence.

4. If the United States were to sell Lebanon the arms requested,<sup>6</sup> it would increase the ability of Lebanon to maintain its independence outside the ESS Pact and reduce the possibility that Lebanon will seek arms from the Soviet bloc. It would improve U.S.-Lebanese relations and facilitate the acquisition by the United States of base rights<sup>7</sup> in Lebanon.

5. While providing arms to Lebanon would involve the risk that Israel would use this as a pretext for initiating hostilities, it would

---

<sup>5</sup> On file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. For text of this agreement, see TIAS 3147; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2908.]

<sup>6</sup> See Enclosure to J.C.S. 2099/611. [Footnote in the source text. J.C.S. 2099/611 is not printed.]

<sup>7</sup> See Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 570/377. [Footnote in the source text. J.C.S. 570/377 is not printed.]

have the beneficial effect of demonstrating our willingness to support moderate nations in the Near East and would serve to encourage Jordan, as well as Lebanon, to maintain a policy of moderation in the current crisis.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> On May 23, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Radford stated:

"It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Lebanon has a valid requirement for the weapons requested to provide for its self-defense. If Lebanon cannot obtain arms from the West, she may seek to obtain arms from the Soviet Bloc or feel obliged to join the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia (ESS) Pact in order to purchase arms from Egypt. Either action would be detrimental to U.S. interests including the maintenance of peace in the Near East.

"It is the further view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that making these weapons available under the provisions of Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, would have the beneficial effect of demonstrating the willingness of the United States to assist nations in the Near East which are oriented to the West and moderate in their actions. In addition this action should improve U.S.-Lebanese relations and facilitate the acquisition by the United States of base rights in Lebanon." (National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) Sec. 29)

---

## 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 25, 1956—8:39 p.m.*

2147. Embtel 1264<sup>2</sup> and Deptel 1999.<sup>3</sup> You authorized inform GOL Department will approve sale 24 recoilless rifles and ammunition in reftels and is requesting Defense make them available as soon as possible upon receipt formal request from GOL and comple-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.5-MSP/4-1356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Boardman; cleared in draft with Lakeland and in substance with Dulles; and approved by Rountree.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1264, April 13, Heath reported, inter alia, that General Chehab, Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Army, informed the U.S. Army Attaché of the Lebanese Army's urgent need for 24 recoilless 105mm or 106mm rifles for defensive purposes, and 50 to 100 pounds of ammunition per gun. Heath said Chehab indicated price would be no problem. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1999, May 7, the Department gave the Embassy price figures on the 105mm guns and shells, and said that a high-level Defense decision was expected soon. (*Ibid.*, 783A.5-MSP/5-356)



tion financial arrangements under March 1953 reimbursable aid agreement.<sup>4</sup>

FYI: In order minimize embarrassment from publicity Embassy might discreetly suggest to GOL that matter not be made public until after shipment. End FYI.

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> The Embassy received a letter of request for 25 106mm rifles, spare parts, and ammunition from General Chehab on June 2. (Telegram 1565 from Beirut, June 2; *ibid.*, 783A.5-MSP/6-256) The sale was completed with full payment in cash on October 19. (Memorandum from Waggoner to Finn, November 21; *ibid.*, 783A.561/11-2156)

---

## 129. Editorial Note

On June 23, the International Cooperation Administration announced that the United States was supplying an additional \$3.67 million in aid to Lebanon for transportation and road improvement. (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1956, page 67)

On November 18, President Chamoun formally requested Sami Solh to form a new government. Solh insisted on including Dr. Charles Malik, former Lebanese Ambassador to the United States, as Foreign Minister. General Fuad Chehab assumed the post of Minister of Defense. The Embassy in Beirut described all three of these men as “pro-West,” and evaluated the new Cabinet as the “strongest Lebanese Government in years.” (Telegrams 1277 and 1293 from Beirut, November 19 and 20; Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/11-1956 and 783A.00/11-2056, respectively)

### 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 23, 1956—5:06 p.m.*

1880. Embtel 1281.<sup>2</sup> Inform Chamoun USG deeply appreciative his consistent efforts exercise moderating influence, especially in connection with current NE crisis,<sup>3</sup> and hopes Lebanon will continue to support UN actions to restore and preserve peace in NE. Steps which it has taken in Egypt indicate manner in which UN can be effective. UN thus provides measure of protection to Lebanon as regards its own security.

With regard possible intervention Soviet volunteers in NE, US has stated its firm determination to oppose such action, which would contravene terms of GA resolution November 2<sup>4</sup> and subsequent resolutions.

With regard to arms mentioned by Chamoun, Department urgently reviewing matter. Meanwhile US understands UK has agreed furnish Lebanon considerable quantity arms of various types. Would be helpful to Department know to what extent Lebanese needs will have been met when these arms received. FYI UK Embassy has told Department UK prepared loan Lebanon 500 Sten guns or 500 machine guns and unspecified number of anti-tank guns, tanks, and aircraft. These items, together with recoilless rifles purchased in US, should strengthen Lebanese armed forces considerably. End FYI.

Does Embassy now recommend that GOL be advised of total cost of military items they have requested?<sup>5</sup>

**Hoover**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/11-1956. Secret. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1281, November 19, Heath recounted his conversation of November 19 with Chamoun. According to Heath, Chamoun expressed concern over the Soviet arms shipments to Syria and the presence of Syrian troops on the northern border of Lebanon. Chamoun stated that this situation required the United States to furnish immediately the weapons Lebanon had requested to purchase a year before. Heath said that Chamoun admitted he had made the same request of the British Government. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Suez Canal crisis. At this date, the United States was encouraging Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from occupied territory.

<sup>4</sup> U.N. General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-1).

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 1542, December 17, Heath informed the Department that the question of payment for U.S. arms had not yet arisen, and that such a question would probably provoke a request from the Lebanese Government for the entire arms list on a grant basis. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/12-1756)

131. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 12, 1957.

SUBJECT

Military and Economic Assistance for the Lebanon

*Discussion*

Last month President Chamoun of the Lebanon called on Sami Solh to form a new Lebanese cabinet, which included Charles Malik as Foreign Minister and other pro-Western political figures. The American Embassy in Beirut has characterized the formation of this cabinet as a pronounced defeat for Syria and for Nasser. One of the most important problems confronting this cabinet is possible subversive action by Syria and Egypt. President Chamoun has also been apprehensive lest Syria move in other ways against the Lebanon.

During the past year, Lebanon has indicated an interest in buying American military equipment under the Section 106 Agreement between it and the United States. <sup>2</sup> Lebanon has, however, not pressed these previous requests (with the exception of the purchase of 25 recoilless rifles) probably because it continues to hope to obtain arms at a cut rate or on a grant basis. Recently President Chamoun renewed Lebanon's request for arms. Our Ambassador in Beirut has urged that we respond to President Chamoun's request by offering a package deal which would include recoilless rifles and 105mm howitzers as grant aid, and the sale of signal equipment at standard prices. <sup>3</sup> He says that an offer merely to sell the arms requested at standard prices would be a severe disappointment and would fall short of the "positive policy" which is expected of the United States. Because of these developments, we are taking up again the question of arms for Lebanon and will submit a recommendation to you on this subject.

This recommendation will be of some importance because, if it should be decided that arms for Lebanon are desirable on a grant basis, we might subsequently find it necessary to consider similar arrangements for other countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Until now, only Iraq has signed an agreement

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.5-MSP/1-1257. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, approved as Public Law 665 on August 26, dealt with the sale of military equipment, materials, and services. For text of the Act, see 68 Stat. 832.

<sup>3</sup> Heath so recommended in telegram 1542, December 17, 1956; see footnote 5, *supra*.

under which it received a small amount of grant aid. We have reimbursable military agreements under Section 106 with Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, but only Saudi Arabia and Israel have made regular purchases. Lebanon and Syria have usually obtained their arms in Europe. Of all the Near Eastern countries, only Saudi Arabia relies on the United States. The rest have relied on the United Kingdom and Europe. The proposed Congressional joint resolution<sup>4</sup> which is now being considered will also have an important bearing upon this question.

Pending further consideration of the foregoing matters, we would like to take steps to demonstrate our friendship for Lebanon and our interest in its welfare. We believe we should immediately supply the Lebanon with some road construction and communications equipment on a grant basis. They have already indicated interest in receiving such equipment. These items would represent an earnest of American interest and it could be made clear to the Lebanese Government that we were urgently considering additional aid in the economic and military fields.

#### *Recommendations*

(1) That you approve in principle the immediate supply to Lebanon on a grant basis of \$532,580 worth of road construction equipment and \$1,111,845 worth of communications equipment<sup>5</sup> as earnest of United States interest.

(2) That you approve our discussing with Defense, ICA and E the following possible additional steps:

(a) Agreement to contribute further to enlargement and improvement of the Beirut International Airport;

(b) Discussion with the Lebanese of possible United States assistance in the proposed housing reconstruction program;

(c) Renewal of our offer to undertake a study of an atomic energy program for the Lebanon, including financing part of the cost of a reactor, training program, etc.;

(d) Agreement to assist further in the development of village electrification and water programs;

(e) Consideration of the possibility of making needed agricultural products available to the Lebanon under P.L. 480;

(f) Consideration of the possibility of arms assistance on a grant basis as well as under Section 106.

<sup>4</sup> On January 5, Eisenhower submitted a resolution for economic and military cooperation with the nations of the Middle East (House Joint Resolution 117, Senate Joint Resolution 19). Termed "the Eisenhower Doctrine," the measure was approved by Congress in slightly altered form on March 7.

<sup>5</sup> These were the amounts requested in the December 1955 Lebanese arms list. (Memorandum from Waggoner to Rockwell, November 21, 1956; Department of State, Central Files, 783A.561/11-2156)

(3) That you sign the attached telegram<sup>6</sup> designed to convey to President Chamoun the general line of our current attitude.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Not found attached. Drafted on January 11, but not sent until January 17. See Document 133.

<sup>7</sup> Macomber initialed Secretary Dulles' approval of the recommendations.

---

### 132. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Beirut, January 13, 1957—8 p.m.*

1691. Joint Embassy-USIS message. Circr 592 January 8.<sup>2</sup> Despite variety of interests and pressures in small Moslem-Christian Republic of Lebanon, official GOL reaction to President's January 5th Mid-East policy speech was forthright and favorable. President Chamoun told me he supported "Eisenhower Plan one hundred percent" and Embassy has heard virtually no reservations expressed by Prime Minister, Foreign Minister or other high officials of Foreign Office. Moreover official opinion is widely known rather than repressed as frequently happens in Lebanon for reasons involving the country's relations with Moslem Arab neighbors. Foreign Minister Malik told press here Cairo and Rome that Lebanon desires cooperate US in new approach providing no infringement Lebanese sovereignty.

Reaction of press, which uncensored on this matter, as well as of influential political leaders in Christian and moderate Moslem segments community generally favorable. Outright opposition limited to Communist and pro-Communist newspapers. Leftist Socialist and extreme Moslem nationalists for most part criticize speech for its omissions rather than its content, pointing particularly to failure condemn recent aggression against Egypt or specifically contribute new ideas concerning Arab refugee and Palestine problems. Moslem extremists have given Eisenhower statement noticeably less negative

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/1-1357. Official Use Only. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Ankara, Paris, London, and Tel Aviv.

<sup>2</sup> In circular telegram 592, the Department requested Embassies to assess local reaction to President Eisenhower's January 5 Mideast policy speech. (*Ibid.*, 611.80/1-857)

reception than they gave Jordan Valley Plan or Dulles proposals of August 1955.

While more sophisticated observers believe speech may be turning point in ME history, few commentators see true significance vis-à-vis international Communist menace. Many moderate and pro-Western commentators who welcome mainlines new approach nevertheless observe that Palestine and Suez problems are the immediate threats to area's security since they believed danger overt Soviet attack quite remote. In fact main burden of public and press criticism is that American guarantee would insure area against overt Communist aggression but fails provide against Zionist or colonialist aggression from non-Communist countries and does not go to heart of problems causing instability in area.

Embassy believes press generally reflects public reaction accurately. Newspaper comments perhaps more important as mirrors than as influence on opinion and should of course be read with careful attention to religious and political bias of individual papers and commentators. Press mirrors official opinion only somewhat murkily as Lebanese fears "anti-Arab" too pro-Western in this era of rampant Arab nationalism cause many leaders and politicians to temper their true beliefs in public statements. Egyptian and Syrian hostility to new plan may have some effect among Moslems here. This hostility is to date however strengthening favorable reaction of dominant Christian elements in country. Embassy notes that Foreign Minister Malik's recent statements to press have yet to be editorially criticized.

In sum new policy will be subject continuing critical but not necessarily hostile debate in most circles. However Embassy believes policy will strengthen hold present Government and moderate pro-Western elements in country facilitating policy of close cooperation with US without compromising continued cooperation with Arab neighbors. It will tend to reduce susceptibility to Communist and Moslem extremist blandishments and help preserve generally favorable climate of relations with US now prevailing.

For additional comment and quotations see Joint Weeka 2 Embtel 1680<sup>3</sup> and US information cables to USIA news room dated January 8, 9, 10 and 11.<sup>4</sup>

**Heath**

---

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1680, January 10, the Embassy cited specific Lebanese press responses to Eisenhower's January 5 message. (*Ibid.*, 611.80/1-1057)

<sup>4</sup> None printed.

**133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 17, 1957—8:46 p.m.*

2600. You are authorized inform Chamoun USG aware of the outside pressures being brought to bear against Lebanon and is sympathetic his desire bolster Lebanon's security with defensive arms and economic assistance. He may also be informed specifically that 1) Department now discussing with interested government agencies details possible future economic assistance for Lebanon based on previous understanding of country's needs, 2) Suggestions embodied Embtel 1656,<sup>2</sup> while requiring detailed discussion and study, are helpful in this connection and Department would welcome further indications his views as to how US might practically cooperate with Lebanon in economic field, 3) Matter of Lebanese arms request being given high-level consideration which will be influenced by developments affecting proposed Joint Congressional Resolution.<sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.5–MSP/1–757. Secret. Drafted by Rockwell and Eagleton and approved by Dulles. Repeated to Cairo and Damascus, and pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Paris, London, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1656, January 7, the Embassy reported, inter alia, Prime Minister Solh's urgent request for American aid in developing a low-cost housing program in Beirut. Solh also discussed the importance of completing the road to the Lebanon–Syria border. The Embassy informed the Department, however, that there was "little evidence to date" of the Lebanese Government's willingness to be "realistic" in its approach to the "politically complex and economically important subject" of low-cost housing. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> House Joint Resolution 117, Senate Joint Resolution 19.

### 134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 2, 1957—1:10 p.m.*

2773. Embtels 1737<sup>2</sup> and 1804.<sup>3</sup> FYI only. We are seeking Presidential determination under Section 401 (a) of Mutual Security Act<sup>4</sup> to make available approximately two million dollars with which to provide as grant engineering and communications equipment requested by GOL in December 1955. We are hopeful necessary determination will be made in near future and that Lebanese can be advised at earliest opportunity.

Meanwhile we are considering with Defense what further military assistance we might make available and under what kind of arrangements. Providing major military items, such as heavy artillery and aircraft, would raise serious problems in our relations with Saudi Arabia, where we have not provided grant arms despite repeated requests. It could also raise serious problems in US-Israeli relations because of Lebanon's proximity to Israel.

However, we fully aware need bolster security Lebanon and position present govt. It seems to us that Lebanon should place primary reliance upon its traditional suppliers in Western Europe for arms. US can however assist with some items on a reimbursable basis or possibly on a grant basis. We believe US can more effectively assist Lebanon and avoid upsetting pattern military aid for other Near Eastern states such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia by concentrating

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/1-1857. Secret. Drafted by Waggoner, Rockwell, and Wilkins and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1737, January 18, Heath stated that the political impact of American aid in the form of signal and engineering equipment would be minor. He noted that the political significance of American arms aid to Lebanon was more important than the military impact, since arms aid would in any event not have a "decisive effect" on the military security of Lebanon or the United States. Thus, Heath added, "I urge that arms, as distinguished from equipment, can be included in any United States offer to be made to Lebanon." (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1804, January 26, Heath recounted a conversation he had with Chamoun earlier that week, in which Chamoun told him that the United Kingdom would not be able to provide "Hunter" jet fighters as it had previously intimated. Heath said Chamoun asked whether the United States could supply such planes. Heath reported to the Department that he, the Army Attaché, and the Air Attaché all felt that the arms requested were "militarily necessary to Lebanon for internal and external security." They felt that prompt receipt of such arms would fortify the Lebanese Government's determination to resist "Syrian and Egyptian pressure and subversion." (*Ibid.*, 783A.56522/1-2657)

<sup>4</sup> Section 401(a) authorized the President to use at his discretion up to \$50 million of the funds made available under the Mutual Security Act, without regard to the requirements of the statute, to achieve the purposes of the act "when the President determines that such use is important to the security of the United States." For text of the Act, see 68 Stat. 833 and 69 Stat. 283.



upon economic assistance. Expanded economic assistance program, with some military aid, might in our view accomplish desired objectives in Lebanon and would not involve above drawbacks. With ICA we giving urgent consideration to recent Lebanese requests.

Dulles

---

**135. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Various Matters Relating to the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of Lebanon  
Mr. Azkoul, Member Lebanese Delegation to the UN

The Secretary  
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director, NE

Dr. Malik called on the Secretary to discuss various matters relating to the Middle East. Dr. Malik referred to the Agenda which he had submitted in advance (attached<sup>2</sup>) and said that as the Secretary's time was limited he would only cover parts of it.

Dr. Malik continued that as a representative of the Lebanon he would like first to refer to its basic policy and matters relating to its interests. He said Lebanon, through its own character and through the attitude of the present Government, was committed to a Western course. They were formally identified with the West and fully supported its policies of freedom, justice and peace.

Dr. Malik referred to the security of the Lebanon and said it needed strength which it thought could be achieved by special arrangements with the West and through internal measures within Lebanon. Lebanon needed technical and economic assistance which might be on a larger scale than was now the case. Dr. Malik thought it was possible Lebanon might become the headquarters of a UN

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 680.00/2-557. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Emergency Force if and when that force became permanent for the United Nations for the Middle East.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Malik next referred to the coming Parliamentary elections in Lebanon and said he had discussed them with the Secretary's assistants. In Dr. Malik's view these elections were crucial. At the present time there was collusion between . . . Egypt and Syria on the one hand and the Communists on the other to bring about a change of regime in Lebanon. Such a change of regime would be disastrous. As the new Parliament, which was shortly to be elected, would be required in 1958 to select a new President, it could be seen that an adverse development now would have serious effects later.

The Secretary asked Dr. Malik on what grounds he reached the conclusion that Saudi Arabia was involved in the Lebanon and, specifically, whether Saudi Arabian money was being spent there and whether King Saud knew of these activities. . . .

The Secretary suggested that if the opportunity arose Dr. Malik might mention this general subject to the President during his conversation with him on February 6.<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Malik next referred to Lebanon's arms requirements and said they needed assistance in modernizing Lebanon's forces. The Secretary observed that all of the Middle Eastern states seemed to consider arms an absolutely essential requirement and asked Dr. Malik why this was the case. Dr. Malik replied that, in his view there were three principal reasons: 1) fear of Israel and distrust of the West which was protecting it; 2) Arab-Muslim infatuation with strength, and 3) Soviet offers of arms.

Dr. Malik observed regarding Soviet offers that Lebanon had been offered arms by the Soviet Union but had refused them.

The Secretary said Egypt had obtained arms from the Soviet Union and what had been the result? It was not Soviet arms that had saved Egypt following the recent Israeli attack and the subsequent intervention by the British and the French but U.S. influence which led the way for UN action. The Secretary continued he was depressed that Middle Eastern states were relying upon arms which they were unable to use and which were obtained at great cost.

Dr. Malik observed that the Secretary's remarks reflected a deeper question. This question was the way in which the Communists were penetrating the Middle East and the extent of Middle Eastern distrust of the West. The question was deeper than the

---

<sup>3</sup> In December 1956, Chamoun and Malik had proposed stationing a permanent U.N. Emergency Force in Lebanon to keep peace in the Middle East. The Department of State entertained the idea for several months, but apparently dropped it from active consideration after January 1957. Documentation on this matter is in Department of State, Central File 320.5780.

<sup>4</sup> See *infra*.

Arab-Israeli problem. The Middle Eastern countries wished arms without aligning themselves with the United States. The Soviet shadow lay over the Middle East. In another phrase, it might be described as a bulwark behind which some of the Arab states sought salvation. The Eisenhower Doctrine, as recently announced, was another bulwark and was greatly welcomed.

Dr. Malik said Lebanon wanted two things: 1) Security from external aggression through arrangements with the West and 2) internal security through the development of a loyal army. Recently the loyal Lebanese Army had saved the situation within Lebanon. No other Arab state, even Iraq or Israel, had an army as loyal as the Lebanese Army. It was strictly pro-West and would continue as such for another twenty years, provided it was properly equipped and staffed. The Secretary said he had during recent testimony before Congressional Committees emphasized to the Congress the importance of well equipped internal security forces. It was accordingly reassuring to the Secretary to know that the Lebanese Army was pro-West. Dr. Malik said another factor in Lebanese security was its mountainous terrain in which small well equipped security forces could be especially useful.

Dr. Malik added that if the United States wished Lebanon to give assurances of non-aggression against Israel or any other state, Lebanon was prepared to do so.

Dr. Malik said he wished to speak on the subject of Egypt. On his way to the United States recently he had talked with Nasser for four hours and had given more than a hundred hours of thought to the situation of Nasser and his activities.

Dr. Malik had reached an absolute conclusion. Nasser was personally charming, pure in motives from his point of view, well meaning and disinterested, but his limitations and policies were such that they could not lead to peace and progress in the Middle East. Dr. Malik believed it necessary to search for an effective alternative to the type of nationalism which Nasser represented. This search should be the immediate object of high policy. The Secretary observed we were not opposed to nationalism but supported it. We did not, however, support the type of nationalism which would lead to a loss of independence, especially among the countries at one of the most important crossroads of the world as was the case in the Middle East. The Secretary thought that countries which, in pursuing this type of nationalism, became dependent upon Communism, would isolate themselves and die. Nasser's philosophy would have this result.

Dr. Malik said he considered this type of nationalism as a virulent and morbid type which was constantly being fanned and agitated by the Communists. Dr. Malik's experience indicated Arab

nationalism and Communism in the Middle East must be brought into conflict. Arab nationalism was being penetrated by Communism. Ways must be found to suffocate Communism as it appeared.

The Secretary observed that the British and French concept of nationalism as it had developed was somewhat different than the concept of nationalism in the United States. Because vital interests were involved, some European states felt unable to trust other countries and wished to retain some control of them. The Secretary had told Molotov that the post-war Russian program for Germany seemed a repetition of the Versailles Treaty. The United States on the other hand was dependent upon the rest of the world to a different degree because of distance, resources and other factors. We were thus more willing to have confidence in other countries.

Dr. Malik said an understanding could be reached between Middle Eastern countries and European countries provided Arab nationalism was purified of Communism. It was the latter factor which caused the difficulty. Communists and nationalists in the Middle East now spoke exactly alike. They both used the same phrases and the same substance. A wedge must be driven between Arab nationalists and Communists. The Communists must suffer a radical defeat, especially in Syria or Egypt.

In summary, Dr. Malik thought we should concentrate upon a radical defeat for Communists, not by word or by economic assistance, but by political change in Syria or Egypt. If there were a change in Syria or Egypt, there would be brighter prospects for all other Middle Eastern problems, including Israel. We were mistaken if we thought the Middle Eastern situation could be improved by assisting Saudi Arabia. Only a political change in Syria and Egypt would achieve the desired result.

The Secretary inquired if Dr. Malik had placed any of his views on paper. Dr. Malik said he had drawn up a set of 21 propositions of one sentence each, summing up his philosophy regarding the Middle East. He was prepared to be judged by these propositions one hundred years from now. He said he would make them available to the Secretary within the next few days.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> By the time Malik sent these propositions to Dulles, on February 12, they had grown to 34 propositions of one sentence each. (Letter from Malik to Dulles, February 12; Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/2-1257)

**136. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, February 6, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

The Lebanese Foreign Minister's Call on The President

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Foreign Minister  
Dr. Victor A. Khouri, Lebanese Ambassador

The President  
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director, NE

The President welcomed the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Dr. Malik and the Lebanese Ambassador, Dr. Khouri, at the White House this morning. He said he was glad to see them both again. He had just come from his weekly press conference and it was of interest that more than half of the questions put to him had related to the Middle East. This fact was evidence of the great interest in Middle Eastern affairs in this country.

The President said that we continued to give strong support to the United Nations. We felt that there should be compliance with its resolutions. It was our belief that Israel should heed the recent General Assembly Resolution on withdrawal which had been adopted by an overwhelming vote.<sup>2</sup> It seemed to us Israel would wish to have a decent respect for the opinion of other countries. It was also our view that Israeli shipping should be able to pass through the Suez Canal in accordance with the provisions of the Convention of 1888.

Dr. Malik said Lebanon greatly admired the leading role which the United States, under President Eisenhower, was playing in the United Nations and which it was taking with respect to many Middle Eastern problems. The President of the Lebanon had asked him to bring a letter to the President and, with his permission, he would hand it to him now.<sup>3</sup> The President thanked Dr. Malik and said he would like to scan it briefly.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83A/2-657. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins.

<sup>2</sup> On February 2, by a vote of 74 to 2, the General Assembly called upon Israel to withdraw immediately behind the armistice demarcation line. (Resolution 1124(XI); for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1957, p. 327)

<sup>3</sup> In this letter, January 1, Chamoun expressed his wishes for American and Lebanese happiness and prosperity, his certainty that the United States would discharge its "historic tasks" in the Middle East with humility, and his hope for peace, prosperity, and the defeat of the forces of evil. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.83A/2-657)

The President remarked that it was a very fine letter and that he was especially interested in the very eloquent next-to-last paragraph. The President agreed there was a great struggle going on in the world between those who supported independence, freedom and progress and those who were guilty of intolerance, distrust and greed. The President of Lebanon had well expressed views which he himself held. The President said that he would keep the letter and study it and reply shortly.

The President said that we in the United States were greatly concerned with present developments in the Near East for two principal reasons: We were concerned because of difficulties among the Near Eastern states themselves and because of the threat of international Communist aggression and subversion in the area.

The President said that last November when the United Nations General Assembly had been debating the resolution relating to cease fire and withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt, we had given serious consideration to the possibility of broadening the resolution to include basic problems existing between Israel and the Arab states. It was our belief that until these basic problems were solved no lasting solution for current problems could be found. It was decided, however, that the moment was not propitious for this action and it would be preferable to defer action on such a resolution for the time being. It, nevertheless, remained our long-term objective to seek a long-range solution for the Arab-Israeli problem. In moving from point to point, as was the case with ships, it was sometimes necessary to tack.

The second problem affecting the Middle East was the threat of international Communism. It was for this reason we had advanced a new policy relating to the Middle East and the statement which he had made before the Congress on January 5. It was sometimes called the Eisenhower Doctrine. The President preferred that it should not be described in this way because he wanted it known as American policy for the Middle East. Dr. Malik said that, as he had already stated publicly, Lebanon welcomed the initiative taken by the President. Dr. Malik thought the President's leadership had been urgently required and had been extremely timely.

Dr. Malik said many of his countrymen and others in the Near East held similar views. The President said he was interested in these comments because he had had the impression that there had been some opposition to his proposals. The President suggested that, since Dr. Malik had lived in the United States for many years as the representative of Lebanon, he might wish to bring this information regarding Near Eastern attitudes to the attention of his friends among members of Congress.

The President said he had spoken with King Saud about his proposals of January 5. He said there was no doubt the King was opposed to Communism and would have nothing to do with it, but that he did not seem to realize the extent to which the Communists were gaining greater and greater control in Syria and in Egypt. He did not seem to have full information as to the ways and means in which the Communists were working in the Middle East. For example, many of the Arabs seemed to think that they could accept Russian arms and Russian "volunteers" for the time being and could break off their dependence upon Russian sources of supply and could get rid of the Russian "volunteers" when they wanted to. It was the President's belief they were very much mistaken if they thought such relations with the Soviet Bloc could be so easily terminated. Czechoslovakia's sad experience was the proof of his conclusions.

Dr. Malik said he agreed with the President completely and that Lebanon and its officials were fully conscious of the threat of Communist subversion and were exerting every effort to combat it. Dr. Malik thought Syria and Egypt were gradually falling under Communist domination. It was essential political change take place in Syria and Egypt. The Communists were endeavoring to penetrate Arab nationalism and should be repulsed. Meanwhile, Syria and Egypt and even Saudi Arabia were intervening in Lebanese internal affairs. They were proving especially active at the present time because of the forthcoming Lebanese Parliamentary elections. If these elections went against those Lebanese representatives who favored the West, the future of Lebanon would be affected because the Parliament would later be called upon to select a new President. Dr. Malik hoped we could find some way of assisting Lebanon in preventing these developments.

The President said he had not realized before that Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia were intervening in this way in Lebanon's affairs. He said this type of activity raised a new spectre and asked if Dr. Malik had mentioned it to the Secretary of State. Dr. Malik said he had spoken of it in his conversation with the Secretary on February 5. Dr. Malik continued that he did not know whether King Saud himself was fully aware of these activities, but that he must be informed about some of them. Some of King Saud's counselors, on the other hand, were known to have no scruples.

The President said we had high hopes for King Saud and that he would prove to be a force for stability and peace in Saudi Arabia. Each of the countries should develop and strengthen itself. We generally thought first of Lebanon and of Iraq and fanned out from there. It seemed to us we should avoid a situation in which only one

man such as Nasser could be regarded as the leader of the Arab world.

The President said relations between the United States and Lebanon were of especial interest to us because of ties with that country and because our policies had similar objectives of opposition to Communism and of efforts to resolve Middle Eastern problems.

Dr. Malik referred to rumors that the United States planned to take the place of the British and the French and to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East. The President said this was absolutely incorrect and he wanted to make clear that the British and French continued to be close friends of the United States, that our policies were not designed to replace them, and that we thought they had a future role to play in Middle Eastern matters when tempers cooled. The President noted he had long been an advocate of cooperation with the British and the French and had many personal friends in both countries. He was confident good relations would eventually be restored between Britain, France and the Middle East. Dr. Malik said he was in entire agreement.

Dr. Malik said he had no [one] final point relating to Lebanese internal security forces. Lebanon had a small, efficient, loyal army and wished to keep it so. He hoped the United States would, as possible, be able to assist Lebanon in this task.

The President repeated his thanks for the letter which Dr. Malik had brought from the President of Lebanon to which he would reply soon.<sup>4</sup> He had been most interested in Dr. Malik's views and thanked him for them.

---

<sup>4</sup> At 11:55 a.m. on February 6, Eisenhower telephoned Dulles and informed him of the letter from Chamoun and the conversation with Malik. (Memorandum of conversation transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

Also on February 6, Eisenhower asked Dulles in a memorandum to have a staff officer "whip up a draft" reply "in a sympathetic vein" to Chamoun's letter. Eisenhower stated that, "While I should like to generalize a bit on our readiness and anxiety to help, I don't, of course, want to be specific or say anything that might tie our hands later." (Memorandum from Eisenhower to Dulles; Department of State, Central Files, 611.83A/2-657)

In his reply, February 11, Eisenhower returned Chamoun's wishes for a peaceful and prosperous New Year, thanked him for Lebanon's favorable reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine, and assured him that freedom and noble ideas would prevail. (Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files)



137. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Beirut, March 15, 1957—2 p.m.*

2209. From Richards. Preliminary general discussion with President Chamoun and Foreign Minister Malik last evening went off in cordial atmosphere and both Lebanese expressed full understanding and approval of new United States Middle East policy. Chamoun pointed out Lebanon had given its indorsement publicly even sooner than the American Congress. They expressed full concurrence in principles underlying policy.

Conclusion of nearly two hour exchange Chamoun made closing statement to effect that he did not believe in formal written alliances, but believed firmly in friendship, understanding and cooperation as bonds between peoples. Said Lebanon had strong friendship for people of United States Lebanon would not give United States military bases in time of peace, . . . .

We outlined essential elements of new Middle East policy emphasizing especially sincerity of President Eisenhower as man of peace and fact policy supported not only by Executive branch, but also by Congress and great majority of American people. I also emphasized President's complete respect for sovereignty Lebanon and all other free nations and fact we not seeking sphere of influence, bases, or special position for ourselves.

I introduced subject of possibility United States aid to Lebanon by saying we wanted to assist where we could but that our funds are limited and we probably could not do everything Lebanon would like us to do. Chamoun mentioned no figures, saying he would leave details to experts, spoke of list of "vital economic projects" Lebanon wished to undertake in order produce greater employment and higher living standards especially in certain relatively backward areas of country. Rather than ask for large lump sum in one year, he would prefer receive assurances of continued help over period of five or six years which would be needed to complete proposed projects. I pointed out limitations on our authority and fact Congress up to now had never appropriated money for more than one year at a time. Nevertheless, I did not think United States was going to abandon foreign aid programs and felt there was reasonable assur-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-1557. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tripoli.

After Congress approved the President's Mideast Resolution (Eisenhower Doctrine) on March 7, Eisenhower sent former Congressman James P. Richards to the Middle East to gather information and explain American policy to Middle Eastern governments. Richards' first stop was Beirut. See also *infra*.

ance if something were started it would be carried forward. Chamoun observed he was not asking firm guarantees but wanted to emphasize importance of continuity.

Re military aspect of policy, Chamoun voiced thanks to President Eisenhower for offer of United States armed protection against Communist aggression. He said, however, Lebanon did not fear Soviet attack but rather Communist penetration. Danger had increased since Syria and Egypt had begun to large extent to follow Russian policy. Communist activities had never been so great as now.

While Lebanon knew she could call on United States if attacked by major power Chamoun said she also felt she must have small army of her own equipped with modern weapons which could at least delay invasion until help came. She wanted develop one infantry division, one tank brigade and one artillery brigade along with two air squadrons. She greatly appreciated our recent offer of \$2 million worth equipment. He had been told, however, Lebanon would not be given shooting weapons. He was not convinced this was good decision. I observed we were anxious to avoid stimulating arms race in Middle East, to which he replied Lebanon would not and could not attack any country with armed forces of size he had mentioned. Since Russia, our common enemy, was helping Syria, which was unfriendly to Lebanon, Chamoun said it would be logical for United States to help Lebanon protect herself against Syrian attack.

I said I had understood that Lebanon was interested in building up forces for internal security. Chamoun agreed he feared Communist infiltration but reiterated need to guard against overt attack as well.

Malik's only contribution to general discussion was to say that it was important to nip Communist designs in the bud and that this was primarily a political problem rather than economic or military. He spoke of Egyptian-Syrian- . . . conspiracy against Lebanon and argued United States should take interest in all aspects Lebanese politics, devoting attention to countering Communist elements.

**Heath**

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>*Beirut, March 16, 1957—8 p.m.*

2223. From Richards. After intensive discussions with Lebanese officials including President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Commanding General, Minister of National Economy and President of Chamber of Deputies and taking into account views and recommendations of Ambassador Heath and his staff I concluded program of economic and military assistance to Lebanon necessary to further purposes of President's proposals. Accordingly I have informed GOL United States prepared in principle initiate necessary procedural and legal steps to provide on grant basis economic development assistance up to \$10 million. Military defense assistance up to something over \$2 million (exact MDAP figure not given Lebanon but we estimate will amount to about \$2.7 million).<sup>2</sup>

Following are among factors influencing my decision:

1. Lebanon prior to my visit endorsed President's proposals and has strongly reaffirmed this stand in public statements since my arrival. These acts required considerable political courage which we should recognize.
2. Public impact achieved in Lebanon as first country visited by mission important to success of mission's trip as a whole.
3. Real fear evident among Lebanese officials (confirmed by Embassy) over growing intensity subversive activities in country by Communists supported by Syria and Egypt.<sup>3</sup> This fear extends to apprehension that Syria might go so far as to launch armed attack.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-1657. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Tripoli, Ankara, Tehran, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Karachi, Kabul, Jidda, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Athens, Tunis, Rabat, Rome, and New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> Since Lebanon did not have a standard Mutual Defense Assistance Program agreement with the United States, this aid was furnished through Section 401(a) of the Mutual Security Act. Lebanon gave assurances that it would use this military aid only for self-defense, that it would not transfer the equipment without U.S. consent, and that it would protect the security of all assistance furnished. (Memorandum from Metzger to Raymond, April 10; *ibid.*, 783A.5-MSF/4-1057) The aid agreement was effected by an exchange of notes at Beirut, and entered into force on June 6, 1957. (TIAS 3855; 8 UST 943)

<sup>3</sup> In conversation with General Chehab, now Commanding General of the Lebanese Army, Richards was told that "in the past few months the Syrians have sent money and arms to Lebanese tribesmen along the Syrian border, have sought to persuade these tribesmen to address petitions to the Syrian government to incorporate their areas within the borders of Syria, have bribed Lebanese newspapers and politicians, and have incited and bribed persons to create civil disturbances in Lebanon. Syrian army officers who are on intimate terms with their counterparts in Lebanon have kept the latter well informed about Syrian aggressive intentions toward Lebanon." (Record of meeting at the Lebanese Ministry of Defense, March 15; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616, Lebanese Document)

Lebanese argued with logic that US should respond to call for help from pro-Western Lebanon against Soviet armed Syria.

4. During forthcoming elections pro-Western policies of present government will be very much on the block. Government must be in position to show tangible results from cooperation with West. Defeat of political grouping now in power would severely damage US interests and could swing Lebanon into Syrian-Egyptian fold.

5. Lebanon obviously has neither intention nor capability of launching attack on any other country. I heard remarkably few references to Israel. I did hear repeated expressions of admiration for President Eisenhower's stand after UK-French attack on Egypt and for his February 2 statement regarding Israel withdrawal.<sup>4</sup>

6. In view of present status of Lebanon's economy and absence of debt I would find it somewhat hard to justify grant economic or military aid on purely economic grounds. However I consider political reasons mentioned above overriding. Projects selected for economic aid<sup>5</sup> will involve considerable financial contributions by Lebanon Government. These projects appear sound capable of quick implementation and will have direct impact upon population. They should both create good will for the US and help rectify conditions which Communists and their supporters can exploit.

7. My decision regarding additional grant military aid was difficult. Items to be provided will be for defensive purposes.<sup>6</sup> They have been screened from a very much larger list of deficiencies presented to me on my arrival. Mission tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to get Lebanon to accept equipment on credit or loan basis. After weighing carefully all factors I concluded that this small amount of additional equipment as a grant was justified. It will in no sense affect arms balance in area but will impart to Lebanese important additional feeling of self-confidence and thus willingness to resist either direct attacks or subversion from Syria. Regarding reactions elsewhere in area I believe Iraqis likely to approve; Israel is unlikely to object; and in case of complaints from Saudi Arabia, we can point to small amount of arms compared to amount flowing to Saudis and to favorable consideration given to Saudi requests during Saud's visit to Washington.

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to Eisenhower's February 20 statement, urging U.N. pressure upon Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory. For text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 11, 1957, pp. 387-391.

<sup>5</sup> These projects included low-cost housing, highway construction, irrigation, flood control, rural electrification, village water supply, and airport expansion. (Telegram 2224 from Beirut, March 16; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-1657)

<sup>6</sup> These items consisted of anti-tank weapons, light artillery, motor transport, engineering equipment, demolition equipment, fortification material, and electronic equipment. (*Ibid.*) A detailed list is in Army message CX 16 from Beirut, March 16; *ibid.* According to Heath, the only shooting weapons included were 12,106 recoilless rifles and 18 105mm howitzers. (Telegram 2223, section 2)

[Here follows section two of the telegram, dealing in part with the procedures necessary to implement aid commitments made by the Richards mission.]

Heath

---

### 139. Editorial Note

On March 16, Richards and the Government of Lebanon issued a joint communiqué at Beirut, noting the similar purposes of Lebanon and the United States, and announcing the agreement in principle on certain forms of aid. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, pages 725-726.

On April 11, at the 319th meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, discussed the situation in Lebanon. The memorandum of discussion includes the following statement by Dulles:

"News from the Lebanon is very encouraging, with the Egyptians apparently giving up hope of exercising much influence over the forthcoming Lebanese elections." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

On April 24, Chamoun wrote to Eisenhower expressing concern over the crisis in Jordan. For text of Eisenhower's reply, dated April 25, see Document 78.

140. Operations Coordinating Board Report <sup>1</sup>*Washington, July 31, 1957.*OPERATIONS PLAN FOR THE LEBANON (NSC 5428) <sup>2</sup>

## I. Introduction

*A. References:*

1. "U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East", approved by the President, July 23, 1954.
2. "Basic National Security Policy", NSC 5707/8, approved by the President, June 3, 1957. <sup>3</sup>

*B. U.S. Objectives Regarding the Near East are:*

3. Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.
4. Stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.
5. Settlement of major issues between the Arab states and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.
6. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.
7. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.
8. Wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area to be recognized as, and have the status of, sovereign states; and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and toward the free world generally.

*C. Special Operating Guidance:*

U.S. programs in The Lebanon are carried out by State, ICA, USIA and Defense, the latter through Military Attachés. In pursuing the policy objectives set forth above, U.S. actions in The Lebanon should be guided by the following:

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Near East, January–July 1957. Secret. A covering note by Charles E. Johnson, Executive Assistant to the OCB, indicates that this operations plan, a revised version of the plan dated July 12, was concurred in by the OCB at its July 31 meeting, for implementation by the responsible agencies of the actions and programs contained therein. The previous (July 12) draft was authorized for destruction.

<sup>2</sup> For text of NSC 5428, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.

<sup>3</sup> Scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of *Foreign Relations*.

9. The U.S. should support The Lebanon in its efforts to preserve its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity whether against aggression from without or subversion from within. U.S. programs and actions should be designed to strengthen the Lebanese Government's capacities for resisting aggression and subversion by increasing the strength, efficiency and loyalty of the Lebanese armed forces and internal security forces; to encourage the will to resist aggression and subversion on the part of those elements already so inclined by evidencing full and continuous support for Lebanese independence; and to stimulate in the minds of Lebanese in general an awareness that the maintenance of a free and independent Lebanon is the best possible guarantee for the eventual satisfaction of their political, social and economic aspirations.

10. U.S. programs should likewise be designed to demonstrate concretely and conclusively that a free and independent Lebanon and its people stand to gain most in political, social and economic terms by maintaining and broadening the traditional ties and interdependencies which have characterized Lebanese relations in the past with the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Efforts along these lines at the moment should be directed particularly toward the Moslem population which has been more responsive to frequently irresponsible and emotional ideas emanating from within the Arab world than to those originating in the West. In pursuing such efforts, the U.S. should avoid any action which might contribute to a deepening or solidifying of existing religious differences and should demonstrate publicly scrupulous respect for Lebanese independence and sovereignty.

11. Of equal importance, the full weight of U.S. influence should be brought to bear on the Lebanese Government to induce it to undertake or continue programs which are responsive to the needs and hopes of the Lebanese people. Such programs, with U.S. assistance where appropriate, must eventually produce tangible economic and social benefits if the Lebanese Government is to receive the wholehearted and broadly-based public support which is essential to the continued existence of The Lebanon as a stable, prosperous and independent state.

12. While the influence of any Lebanese Government on important Middle Eastern issues is necessarily limited by The Lebanon's small size, limited military potential and non-Moslems of approximately 50 percent, the Lebanese Government should be encouraged to continue to exercise a moderating influence in meetings of the Arab powers and, through personal diplomacy on the part of its leaders, with other Arab world leaders.

13. While U.S. actions in The Lebanon will be important for the effect they will have in The Lebanon itself, they may in the long

run have an equally important effect area-wide. Effective implementation of U.S. programs could make of The Lebanon an example of U.S.-Arab cooperation, the tangible benefits of which could be expected in the long run to stimulate more favorable attitudes toward the U.S. and U.S. policies elsewhere in the Arab world. Specifically, it should be possible to demonstrate through our programs in The Lebanon that an Arab country without any infringement of its sovereignty or limitation on its freedom of action as an independent state can collaborate with the U.S. to achieve security and to advance the well-being of its people.

*D. Selected U.S. Arrangements With or Pertaining to The Lebanon:*

*14. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees:*

a. The United States, by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The resolution declared that the U.S. is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism, whenever a victim requests such aid.

*15. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services:*

a. Ambassador Richards informed the Lebanese Government on March 16, 1957 as follows:

(1) The U.S. would provide grant economic assistance, up to \$10 million, for imports of commodities such as reinforcing steel, copper wire, asphalt, pipes, pumps and transformers which are needed in the Lebanon's development program. The Government of The Lebanon in turn agreed to deposit the equivalent of \$10 million in Lebanese pounds in a special counterpart account to be used in construction of mutually agreed upon development programs such as low cost housing, highway construction, irrigation, flood control, rural electrification, village water supply and airport expansion.

(2) The U.S. would provide defensive military assistance consisting of anti-tank weapons, light artillery, motor transport, engineering equipment, demolition equipment, fortification material and electronic equipment amounting to approximately \$2.2 million.

b. The Lebanese Government was informed in February 1957 that the U.S. would provide on a grant basis signal corps and engineer equipment for use by the Lebanese armed forces amounting to approximately \$1.6 million.

c. For FY 1957 the U.S. is committed to a Technical Cooperation program in The Lebanon amounting to slightly more than two million dollars, and a \$10 million development assistance program as described in a (1) above.



16. *Other Arrangements:*

- a. Technical Cooperation Agreement—1952.<sup>4</sup>
- b. Military Assistance Agreement for cash sales—1953.<sup>5</sup>
- c. Developmental Assistance Agreement—1954.<sup>6</sup>
- d. Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy—1955.<sup>7</sup>

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

[Here follow individual action items in the political, economic, military, and information and cultural areas.]

---

<sup>4</sup> For text of this agreement, which entered into force on January 5, 1952, see TIAS No. 2639 printed in 3 UST (pt. 4) 4751.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see TIAS No. 3147 printed in 5 UST (pt. 3) 2908.

<sup>6</sup> For text, see TIAS No. 3009 printed in 5 UST (pt. 2) 1392.

<sup>7</sup> For text, see TIAS No. 3313 printed in 6 UST (pt. 2) 2653.

---

**141. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 12, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Emergency Grant Aid to Strengthen the Lebanese Gendarmérie

*Discussion*

The Lebanese Government has requested that the U.S. provide certain light arms, transport, and communications equipment to strengthen the Lebanese Gendarmérie. It is estimated that the equipment requested will cost something less than two million dollars. Our Country Team in Beirut strongly supports this request. The strength and morale of the Lebanese Gendarmérie have become vital as developments in Syria make it likely that Syrian, Soviet, and Egyptian agents will increase their subversive activities against the pro-Western Lebanese Government. Indeed, Lebanese leaders appear to consider the danger from internal subversion more immediate than the threat of overt Syrian aggression. I believe that our immediate agreement to supply this equipment and the expeditious ship-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.5–MSP/9–1257. Secret.

ment thereof would contribute substantially to the effectiveness, morale, and Western orientation of the Lebanese Gendarmérie.

In order that our support of the Lebanese Gendarmérie produce the maximum psychological effect in the Lebanon and the area, it would be useful if we could move ahead promptly on the basis of an assurance from the President that he will make available funds under Section 400(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.<sup>2</sup> After obtaining such assurance, we would inform the Lebanese Government of our intentions by sending the attached telegram. We would concurrently initiate the standard procedure with ICA for obtaining Presidential approval under Section 400(a).

#### *Recommendations*

That you obtain the President's assurance that funds up to two million dollars will be made available for strengthening the Lebanese Gendarmérie under authority of Section 400(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended; and that, having received the assurance of the President,<sup>3</sup> you sign the the attached telegram<sup>4</sup> to our Embassy in Beirut.

---

<sup>2</sup> Section 400(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, authorized the appropriation of \$250 million to the President in special assistance funds. In any fiscal year, \$50 million of these funds could be used in accordance with the provisions of Section 401(a). For text of the Act, see 71 Stat. 355.

<sup>3</sup> A marginal notation on the source text in the handwriting of the Secretary of State, referring to the clause "having received the assurance of the President," reads: "Goodpaster says this can be assumed. JFD".

<sup>4</sup> Not attached to the source text; for text as sent, see *infra*.

---

## 142. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 13, 1957—7:01 p.m.*

971. Joint State-ICA. Embtel 614.<sup>2</sup> FYI. We prepared supply on crash basis subject ICA procedures reasonable amount equipment up to \$2 million for Lebanese police agencies including Gendarmérie

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/9-357. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Waggoner and approved and signed by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 614, September 3, the Lebanon Country Team reported to the Department on the internal security situation in Lebanon. The Embassy also stated its approval of Chamoun's request for gendarmerie assistance. (*Ibid.*)

along lines request submitted ARMA's CX 88<sup>3</sup> and provided equipment can be justified for civil police purposes. ARMATT evaluations Gendarmérie needs are not sufficiently detailed. In order determine specific items needed on most urgent basis and in order tailor list to items currently available in stock here we can send police expert this week to Beirut for brief study which can be completed within few days. End FYI.

You should advise President Chamoun that in response his request we are prepared assist GOL strengthen internal security agencies by study of needs, technical advice, training and supply of most needed civil police equipment. In order obtain current evaluation most urgent needs, we can send expert immediately to Beirut for consultation GOL officials. In view urgency we would appreciate immediate reply<sup>4</sup> and, if reply favorable, Chamoun's assistance in facilitating consultations. We would expect be able commence shipments immediately upon receipt expert's recommendations.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>3</sup> ARMA CX 88, July 11, reported, among other things, the list of gendarmérie equipment requested by Chamoun on July 6. (*Ibid.*, 783A.56/7-1157)

<sup>4</sup> The Embassy agreed to the idea of sending a police expert to discuss the needs of the Lebanese gendarmérie. (Telegram 779, September 16; *ibid.*, 783A.56/9-1657) In telegram 981, October 3, the Embassy summarized the study and recommendations of the police expert, forwarded a specific list of equipment, and noted that the Lebanon Country Team concurred in the expert's report. (*Ibid.*, 783A.56/10-357)

143. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, October 17, 1957<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Lebanon

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Foreign Minister

Dr. Victor A. Khouri, Lebanese Ambassador

The Secretary

NEA—William M. Rountree

NE—Stuart W. Rockwell

Dr. Malik said the situation in Lebanon is not happy.<sup>2</sup> The opposition is the tool of Egypt and Syria and is facilitating the growth of neutralism. The Soviet earth satellite has had much to do with promoting neutralism, but the Secretary's statement on October 16 was very helpful in rekindling confidence in the United States.<sup>3</sup> President Chamoun must be encouraged to hold firm both by pointing out the affirmative aspects of so doing and the negative ones of not doing so.

Dr. Malik thought that U.S. economic assistance to Lebanon must be considerably increased. . . . In the military field, Dr. Malik appealed for quick delivery of the gendarmérie equipment and the 12 jet fighter planes desired by the Lebanese Government.<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Malik said that the opposition was pressing the Government to alter its adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine. He had need of clarification in writing of certain questions asked by the opposition.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10-1757. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell on October 18.

<sup>2</sup> On October 12, the Department informed the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations that, among other things, "our reports from Beirut, based on Ambassador Heath's conversations with GOL leaders, indicate that situation can be kept in hand. While we do not wish minimize seriousness of problem our impression is that situation might not be so grave as Malik appears to fear." (Telegram 349 to New York; *ibid.*, 783A.00/10-1257)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to Dulles' news conference of October 16, during which he noted that the Soviet Earth satellite success would benefit the United States by avoiding any possible complacency that might arise due to the "very marked superiority" of American military power. (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 4, 1957, p. 708)

<sup>4</sup> CX 106 from Beirut, August 22, dealt with the Lebanese Army's request for military equipment during fiscal year 1958. Among the items requested were 12 Sabre jets. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/8-2157)

. . . . .

The gendarmérie equipment was going forward. The Secretary questioned the need for the 12 jet planes, and Dr. Malik said he really did not know why they were needed; his Government kept pressing for them, however. The Secretary said of course we wanted to be helpful.

The Secretary then discussed the false myth being created that the Eisenhower Doctrine seeks to force people to choose sides. The truth is that the Doctrine was designed to put us in a position to help in preserving the independence of the Middle East states. We had no objection if states desired to be neutral as long as they were truly neutral.

The Secretary gave Dr. Malik a draft of a letter from the Secretary providing responses to the questions asked by the Lebanese opposition which the Secretary offered to send if Dr. Malik desired.<sup>5</sup> Dr. Malik expressed his appreciation and said he would study the draft and let Mr. Rountree know whether he wished to receive it.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> The draft letter, October 17, is *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 582, U.S.–Lebanon Relations.

<sup>6</sup> After several modifications, the letter was accepted by Malik. (Instruction A–89 to Beirut, November 14; *ibid.*, Central Files, 611.83A/11–1457) For text of the letter as modified, see *infra*.

---

**144. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Minister Malik<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 6, 1957.*

DEAR MR. MINISTER: It was a great pleasure to see you again in New York and in Washington and to have an exchange of views with you concerning matters of mutual interest. Our discussions were, as they have always been, helpful to me in clarifying aspects of the situation in the Middle East.

It is a particular pleasure to discuss such matters within the framework of the close and friendly relationship which exists be-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–657. Confidential. Drafted by Waggoner.

tween our two countries. That relationship does not, as you know, involve any arrangement which would require the Lebanon to come to the assistance of the United States in the event of hostilities between the United States and any country. Nor does it involve commitments by the Lebanon to collaborate with the United States on the solution of specific problems affecting the Middle East. Rather, the relationship is based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and our desire to see the Lebanon maintain its national independence and sovereignty and resist aggression, direct or indirect.

The United States Government has made clear on several occasions its willingness to assist the nations of the Middle East to defend their independence and territorial integrity. Under the Joint Congressional Resolution of March 9, 1957, we have left no doubt that we are prepared to assist those nations to develop their economic strength and to improve their defensive military capabilities.

We have repeatedly made clear our unalterable opposition to the use of force or the threat of force between any of the countries in the Middle East and stated that we would, consistent with our obligations as a member of the United Nations, immediately take action both within and outside the United Nations to oppose aggression. In a statement issued on behalf of the President and myself on April 9, 1956,<sup>2</sup> the White House declared that, in accordance with our responsibilities under the United Nations Charter, the United States would observe its commitments within constitutional means to oppose any aggression in the Middle East area. Again on October 29, 1956,<sup>3</sup> a White House statement recalled that the United States has pledged itself to assist any victim of aggression in the Middle East and added that we would honor our pledge. We did so.

Your Government, I know, subscribes to the principles of freedom, and respects the freedom of others. This is one of the reasons why the voice of the Lebanon is heard with respect in the councils of the community of nations.

Sincerely yours,

**John Foster Dulles**<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> For text of this statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 23, 1956, p. 668.

<sup>3</sup> For text of this statement, see *ibid.*, November 12, 1956, p. 749.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

# MUSCAT AND OMAN

## UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE SULTANATE OF MUSCAT AND OMAN<sup>1</sup>

### 145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>2</sup>

*Washington, December 13, 1955—8:01 p.m.*

3320. Embtel 2416.<sup>3</sup> You should inform Foreign Office USG is deeply concerned re information that Sultan of Muscat is moving into Oman with force. Without doubt this move will be regarded as having been taken with British concurrence, and as most serious development in view tension already created by Buraimi dispute. It comes at time when USG has been making every effort restrain Saudi Arabia from taking more vigorous action re Buraimi and in face our several messages to UK on this subject. It seems most likely this event, when known, may precipitate Saudi request for SC consideration both of Buraimi issue and action against Oman. We have been told informally Soviet delegate has promised SAG full support on Buraimi in Security Council.

US has always believed that US and UK should cooperate in area. This particularly necessary at this time because of recent developments. If we had been informed earlier of Muscati action we would have urged UK to make every effort to restrain Sultan. Because of interests which we both have in southeastern Arabia, we believe it is essential that UK take this action now. We are considering direct appeal to Sultan and will appreciate further word from UK in order to coordinate this approach.

We appreciate Foreign Office desire to keep information confidential but understand action already becoming known. In these circumstances UK will realize that US when matter is discussed will

---

<sup>1</sup> For related information, see Documents 164 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12-1255. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wilkins and Newsom; approved by Hoover. Repeated priority to Jidda and Paris and to Dhahran and Aden.

<sup>3</sup> Dated December 12; it reported that the British Foreign Office had informed the Embassy in confidence that the Sultan of Muscat had initiated an offensive against the Imam of Oman. (*Ibid.*)

be required to state it had no advance knowledge whatsoever of action and if it had would have urged that it not be taken.

You should also inform Foreign Office USG believes status Imam of Oman an open question on which US has not taken stand. Saudi Arabia has not in so far as we can presently determine claimed territory of Imam, but recognizes his independent status. US has doubts treaty of 1833 between US and Sultan is conclusive on point of independence of Oman. You might add the following details as desirable during your discussion: Treaty furnishes no indication of US position with regard to extent of Sultan's territories at the time. Arabic text uses term "Protector of Muscat and its Dependencies," thus not defining extent of Sultan's sovereignty. In addition, date line of English text referring to "Kingdom of Aman," is absent in Arabic text. Even in English text, ruler refers to himself solely as "Sultan of Muscat."<sup>4</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> On December 14, the Embassy informed the Department that it had conveyed telegram 3320 to the Foreign Office, emphasizing U.S. concern over the Sultan's campaign into Oman and urging Britain to attempt to restrain the Sultan. According to the Embassy, Foreign Office officials expressed their disappointment that on both the Buraimi and Muscat issues, British arguments did not seem persuasive to the United States. (Telegram 2463 from London; *ibid.*, 786E.00/12-1455)

---

**146. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, December 15, 1955—4 p.m.*

2474. Paris for SecDel.<sup>2</sup> Kirkpatrick called me to Foreign Office today and in half-hour conversation vigorously and somewhat emotionally professed British failure comprehend United States policy toward Saudi Arabia relation Buraimi and Muscat.

Expressing bewilderment at Department request British restrain Sultan Muscat (Deptel 3320<sup>3</sup> and Embtel 2463<sup>4</sup>) Kirkpatrick em-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12-1555. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Aden. Repeated to Paris, Jidda, and Dhahran.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles was in Paris attending the Fourth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, *supra.*



barked lengthy review developments and British attitude regarding Saudi Arabia over last 18 months and said felt basic misunderstanding exists United States-United Kingdom objectives area. On assumption United States and United Kingdom had agreed at Geneva that further encroachment Soviets into Arabian Peninsula contrary United States-United Kingdom interests and in further conviction that Saudis playing Soviet game British think United States efforts restrain local Sheikhs resisting Saudi pressures and subversion are playing into Soviet hand. He asked bluntly whether we desired Saudis achieve complete hegemony over Peninsula or if not where we would be prepared to draw line to stop their encroachments. Noting Saudi adherence Egyptian-Syrian Pact in direct opposition to United States-United Kingdom concept Baghdad Pact, Saudi willingness accept Soviet assistance and Department's statement that Soviets have offered Saudis full support Buraimi case Kirkpatrick attempted draw analogy Buraimi-Muscat situation to position if Chinese Communists seized Formosan territory and British should urge US restrain Chinese Nationalists from using force restore possession. Particular reference Muscat also attempted analogy supposing insurrection in Philippines and British request United States restrain Magsaysay from restoring internal order. When I protested these analogies on various grounds particularly non-Communist nature Saudi Arabs and conviction United States Government that settlement disputes by force is not in broad interests United States-United Kingdom posture with Soviets in which our major effort is to deter Soviets from starting brush fires, he essayed further analogy of conceivable border dispute between Guatemala and Honduras and opined we would be unlikely restrain Guatemalans from resisting Honduran invasion.

I took issue with his exposition along lines various previous Deptels but he maintained claim of mystification over United States attitude. I asked whether in circumstances British are finally rejecting resumption arbitration Buraimi (Deptel 3315<sup>5</sup>). He protested we have never informed Saudis their action in arbitration constituted breach arbitration agreement. Having entered on arbitration as peaceful method settlement dispute Britain obligated insure just solution and impossible to do so unless Saudis can be restrained from sabotage in which they previously engaged. However he said in event United States could give Britain assurance it would inform Saudis as above, would not countenance continuance Saudis' previous tactics and would draw line beyond which further Saudi encroachments would be met with force, i.e., a United States guarantee, he unsure what Foreign Secretary's final position would

---

<sup>5</sup> Document 197.

be. I opined that his efforts draw blueprint future action in this manner seemed highly unrealistic to me in light of evolving situation Middle East and importance of issues at stake there. In reply he launched into exposition moral principles at stake for British in relation to Sheikdoms with which British have closest ties and obligation.

In summarizing Kirkpatrick reiterated British in dark as to where United States policy is headed in Arabian Peninsula in light vast resources available Saudis for subversion etc and said would particularly like clarification whether we intend base our policy on assumption Saudis' staunch Western adherents and can be relied upon to resist Soviet encroachments. In his view while Saudis not now in Communist camp their attitude bears considerable resemblance to that of Nehru.

Kirkpatrick concluded he had given this lengthy exposition to me for Department since he felt such discussion Buraimi and Muscat as Secretaries of State would have time for today in Paris might necessarily be limited.

**Barbour**

---

#### 147. Editorial Note

On December 23, the Department of State informed the Consul in Dhahran, John W. Carrigan, that in view of the recent developments in Muscat, the Consul might visit Muscat and Salalah. The Department also instructed Carrigan to report on the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a consular office in either of the ports. (Telegram 82 to Dhahran; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12-2355)

On March 12, 1956, Carrigan reported the results of his January trip to Muscat and his February visit to Salalah. The Consul recommended that there be no change in the present situation until oil was developed in the Dhofar area or until there was a need for a closer relationship with Muscat, Oman, or Dhofar. Dhahran would continue to have overall responsibility for Muscat, with Aden taking charge of consular affairs in Dhofar. (Despatch 147 from Dhahran; *ibid.*, 123-Carrigan, John W.)

In September 1956, the Secretary of State authorized initiation of negotiations with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, Said ibn

Taimur Al bu Said, for the replacement of the treaty of 1833 with a modern version of a treaty of amity and economic relations. The idea of negotiations had emerged from the Sultan's offer to approve the reestablishment of a Consulate in Muscat, provided the United States replaced the 1833 treaty with a modern agreement of friendship, navigation and commerce. United States interest in reestablishment of a Consulate in Muscat had increased as a result of expanding petroleum development in the Dhofar area and the increasing strategic importance of the Persian Gulf. (Letter from Rountree to Schwinn, June 14, 1957; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 61 D 48, Muscat Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations & Consular Rights; documentation on petroleum developments in Muscat and Oman is *ibid.*, Central File 786E.2553)

Between July 21 and 24, 1957, Walter K. Schwinn, Consul General in Dhahran, carrying drafts of a proposed agreement, visited Muscat, but negotiations were not immediately successful. According to Schwinn, the Sultan was "obviously overwhelmed and perhaps frightened by the complexity of the initial drafts. (Telegram 603 from Dhahran, June 25; *ibid.*, 611.86E4/6–2557) The Department continued negotiations with the Sultan in late 1957 and throughout 1958. A Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights was concluded at Salalah on December 20, 1958. (For text of the treaty, see 11 UST (pt. 2) 1835. Documentation on the negotiations is in Department of State, Central Files 611.86E4 and 786E.00.)

---

#### 148. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 19, 1957.*

DEAR FRIEND: [Here follows a paragraph of discussion concerning the West Indian Federation.]

You will have heard through Harold Caccia and by now read also in the press<sup>2</sup> of the trouble which has blown up in Oman and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. According to a notation on a telegram forwarding the text of Macmillan's letter to the Embassy in London, the message was received by the President on July 22. (Telegram 696 to London, July 23; Department of State, Central Files, 641.86E/7–2357)

<sup>2</sup> On July 23, in a memorandum to the President forwarding a report of British press coverage on the Oman situation, Dulles noted:

"The fact that so many papers expressed themselves at about the same time in

will be familiar with events which lead up to the re-establishing of the Sultan's authority in Oman two years ago. In this part of the world it is always difficult to know how to act for the best but we believe that the Sultan is a true friend to the West and is doing his best for his people. But his own forces are weak, partly because he and his predecessors have relied on us to protect him against outside aggression. There is, I believe, no doubt that the present insurrection has been organized and armed from outside. The Sultan has appealed to us to help him and the obligations of friendship seem to us to demand that we should not desert him in times of trouble. Moreover, there must be a risk that if the troubles in Muscat are not contained and disposed of as soon as possible, they may spread. I hope that it will be possible to restore the Sultan's authority quickly, by dealing, with the help of limited air support from us, a speedy blow at the confidence and prestige of the rebel leaders. I will make sure that your people are kept in close touch with developments.

I am of course well aware that Nasser is encouraging this trouble and probably hopes to use this occasion to make difficulties for both of us. I am afraid there can also be no doubt that the Saudis are involved. As you know, we have recently put forward a plan for encouraging better relations between the Sultan and King Saud. This plan still seems to us to offer the best chance of improving the situation in that part of the world, but there is little chance of persuading the Sultan to adopt it while he feels that attempts are being made to detach part of his territory from him. We shall try to implicate the Saudis as little as possible in public discussion of these events, and to keep the door open for the realization of our plan for better relations.

I know that in all this I can count upon your sympathy.

All kind regards,

Yours ever,

Harold<sup>3</sup>

---

interpreting the Oman and Muscat trouble as being due to oil rivalries and US-UK competition, and particularly *The Times* statement, suggests that this point of view is not alien to some at least of those in the Foreign Office. I do not attribute it to Macmillan personally." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

In a memorandum of a telephone conversation dated July 24, Dulles indicated that it appeared to the President that "the British press was just looking for a whipping boy—what irritates him is that they do not say what they want the President to do." (*Ibid.*, Eisenhower Diaries, Phone Calls July-Dec. 1957)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

149. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*London, July 23, 1957—4 p.m.*

633. Selwyn Lloyd asked me to call at FonOff this noon. Lloyd presented HMG's views concerning the situation in Oman as follows:

He briefly reviewed history of present outbreak, mentioning rebellion against Sultan in 1913 followed by 1921 agreement in which Sultan gave Imam substantial amount autonomy in interior Oman.<sup>2</sup> Lloyd said that in 1950s Imam was corrupted by money from outside and it therefore became necessary for Sultan to establish his rule in interior, which he did in 1955. Recently, however, rebels have appeared in Oman with a few machine guns and land mines and created "a certain amount of alarm and despondency" among the Sultan's forces. Sultan had thereupon asked help from HMG which Lloyd said "we will give".

Lloyd continued that "military side is minor matter, on scale of sending 50 men or so and shooting up a fort or two". In old days, he said, HMG would have spent six months getting up a punitive expedition. However, Lloyd said, nowadays the press is so active and so interested in any appearance of trouble, and there are so many interests which would like to draw sides out of this affair between the Sultan and Saudi Arabia or even if possible between HMG and the US Govt.

Therefore, Lloyd said, he hoped that (1) the Secretary of State, if he were asked at press conferences or elsewhere, might take the line that this is a small, local affair, without great significance and (2) that US Govt might do anything it could to acquaint the Saudi Govt with fact that HMG "does not plan to magnify this affair whatever the provocation."

Lloyd referred to plans for conciliatory meeting between King Saud and Sultan (Deptel 625<sup>3</sup> and Embtel 442<sup>4</sup>) and made point that "if we can get this affair cleaned up then Sultan will have enough prestige to make a meeting with King Saud possible".

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/7-2357. Secret; Niact.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably reference is to the 1920 Treaty of al-Sib. The full text of the treaty was transmitted in despatch 757 from Cairo, January 13, 1956; *ibid.*, 786E.00/1-1356.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 625, July 20, informed the Embassy that on July 19 British officials in Washington had notified the Department that British military forces, in response to an appeal from the Sultan, had been authorized to assist him against the insurgents. The Department added that the British had also presented memoranda regarding a proposed meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat. (*Ibid.*, 786E.00/7-1657)

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

Lloyd then outlined HMG's program of military action in support of Sultan.

(1) A support company of troops would be moved from Kenya thereby bringing the total of UK ground forces available in Sharjah and Bahrain to a battalion. Lloyd noted that no UK troops were being moved into Sultan's domain "because of the temperature".

(2) The Trucial scouts may be used for "sealing off action".

(3) HMG would transfer some arms to the British officers in command of the Sultan's forces.

(4) The RAF would drop leaflets in the area affected by the uprising.

(5) The RAF would then attack with rockets "at one, two, or three points, then there would be a pause" to assess the effect.

(6) After that it might be necessary "to do a bit of bombing, perhaps a fort or two". However, Lloyd said, that the idea of laying the place waste was out of the question "because the Sultan's motive was purely to reestablish his rule".

I asked what, if any, evidence of Saudi involvement had come to light and Lloyd said mainly the fact of Talib's presence in Oman after being given refuge in Saudi Arabia and being treated as honored guest there.

I inquired if rumor of Suleyman Bin Himyar's death (Embtel 600<sup>5</sup>) had been confirmed, and Beeley of FonOff, who also present with Lloyd, said no. Both Lloyd and Beeley agreed that he was a member of the rebel group.

Lloyd then concluded by reiterating hope that Secretary of State might choose to take line that Oman affair is "small stuff" and not considered important by USG. Lloyd said HMG does not wish to ask for USG support "because that might involve the US with King Saud". However, he added, "If we don't beat this down we will have trouble with other areas around the coast of Arabia."

Lloyd said he plans make further statement on Oman in Commons this afternoon.

*Comment:* Lloyd seemed sincerely worried that divisive efforts in press and political groups would put great pressure on US either to support UK action or to declare for the right of the warring groups to have it out without HMG interference. While not agreeing that Lloyd's comment to effect this "small, unimportant show" would be appropriate, it true, of course, that if US policy or sympathy are not involved, a statement to that effect would help HMG.

I note that the Exchange Telegraph News Service has carried at 1:34 pm today an item stating:

---

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 600, July 22, the Embassy conveyed additional information on the nature and extent of the recent uprising in Oman. (*Ibid.*, 786E.00/7-2257)

"The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. John Hay Whitney, had a 20 minute meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary at the Foreign Office late this morning.

"The meeting had been arranged during the morning the Ambassador was asked to call.

"Mr. Lloyd is likely to make a further statement on the situation in Oman in the Commons this afternoon, writes the Exchange Telegraph Diplomatic Correspondent.

"Before the Ambassador's arrival a Foreign Office spokesman had stated it was known that the UK and US Govts were in touch on the Oman situation, as would be expected between two govts in friendly relations".

Department repeat as desired.

Whitney

---

**150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 24, 1957—12 p.m.*

728. Please pass following to Prime Minister from President:

"Dear Harold:

I share your satisfaction in knowing that the Trinidad discussions have been put into channels that should bring out all the important factors applying to the case.

We are, of course, sympathetic with your efforts to bring about a better understanding in the Mid East, particularly between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. I assume that this is just the latest incident of the old Buraimi trouble and I hope that however the matter is settled, you will achieve a better and firmer relationship with King Saud himself. I cannot help but believe that if we handle things correctly, he will be our best counterbalance to Nasser's influence in the region.

In this connection we have heard that disturbing rumors are current in London to the effect that the present troubles in the Sultan's area have been brought about by the efforts of our major oil companies to damage the British oil possessions in that region. Certainly I do not have to assure you that such rumors are completely false. If we were willing to tolerate this kind of thing we would never have been so ready to do our best to help solve the oil problems that were generated for you by the Suez crisis of last fall. The reason that such rumors are disturbing, however, is that too

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Drafted by the President and approved by Dulles.

great a readiness on our part to criticize each other for whatever troubles we may encounter in our dealings with other nations cannot possibly have anything but a harmful effect on our common problems in the world.

I do not suggest that there is anything you can do about this matter, but I call it to your attention merely as something that should be in my opinion of continued concern to us on both sides of the Atlantic.

I am quite certain that if you should address DePauw University next spring you and I can find a chance for an informal chat. I certainly would consider it a great privilege to have such an opportunity.

With warm regard,  
As ever, D.E."

Dulles

#### 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 25, 1957—8:13 p.m.*

800. London's 443,<sup>2</sup> 582,<sup>3</sup> 618.<sup>4</sup> Embassy requested discuss Muscat-Oman situation with FonOff along lines below. Department making similar approach to UK Embassy here:

1. Reports provided Department by UK regarding disturbances Inner Oman are cause for considerable concern that events may develop in such way as to adversely affect British position in Persian Gulf and lead to serious difficulties with Saudi Arabia. We hope situation can be headed off which would only provide opportunities for anti-Western elements in Middle East. It would be particularly unfortunate if matter should result in reestablishment of Saudi-Egyptian unity. Differences with Saudi Arabia over Aqaba are existing aggravating factor which needs to be taken into account.

2. As UK knows we fully support maintenance of "substantial British position in Persian Gulf". We aware British views re obligation to respond to request from Sultan for assistance and recognize

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/7-2257. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 786E.00/7-1957)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 582, July 20, conveyed the texts of press reports on the uprising in Oman. (*Ibid.*, 786E.00/7-2057)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 618, July 22, forwarded the text of Lloyd's July 22 statement on Oman in the House of Commons. (*Ibid.*, 786E.00/7-2257)



British apprehensions that failure to respond effectively could lead to undermining British stand throughout Sheikhdoms. We have no desire whatsoever to condone activities which aim at altering Sultan of Muscat's suzerainty over his territory.

3. We realize some participants in present disturbances came from Saudi Arabia, but we have no firm information re degree of Saudi Arabian or Egyptian participation. In any Saudi action failure to make any progress re Buraimi and related matters would undoubtedly be factor. We also know that Sultan has seldom exercised firm control over Inner Oman which is tribal area subject to periodic revolts.

4. We think current difficulty underscores necessity attempting to work out an accommodation with Saudi Arabia and Muscat and other border areas on broad range of border problems. Satisfactory understanding, perhaps underwritten by US as suggested by Henderson in London, offers only real prospect of relative stability over any period of time. Such an accommodation we believe would be best possible assurance for continued maintenance of stable British position in Persian Gulf. In its absence we must anticipate continued challenge to UK presence throughout area.

5. Therefore, our thinking is that renewed efforts should be made to start on admittedly long road toward such an accommodation. First step might be meeting between Sultan and King Saud as discussed in London. If British see merit in this general approach we are prepared to discuss with King Saud.

6. In any event we hope British will extend their support to the Sultan in such a way as to minimize repercussions in wider theatre.<sup>5</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>5</sup> On July 26, the Embassy in the United Kingdom reported that it had discussed the substance of telegram 800 with Beeley. According to the Embassy, Beeley found the Department's position "highly satisfactory" from the British point of view. (Telegram 729; *ibid.*, 786E.00/7-2657)

---

## 152. Editorial Note

While in London for the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, held between July 31 and August 2, Dulles, Macmillan, and Lloyd discussed the situation in Oman. On July 29, during a meeting attended by Dulles, Whitney, and Lloyd at

the residence of the American Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary raised the question of Oman. The memorandum of conversation includes the following:

"Mr. Lloyd began the conversation by discussing briefly the Muscat-Oman and Cyprus situations. With regard to Oman, Mr. Lloyd said that there was no question of using British troops there. He said that they could indeed barely survive under the tropical conditions. It is, he said '110 degrees in the shade, but there is no shade.'

"The Secretary stressed that his purpose in coming to London was to deal with the question of disarmament and the work of the UN Subcommittee. He did not have the most recent information on either the Oman or Cyprus situations and therefore preferred not to discuss them at this time."

The Secretary continued with a discussion of Cyprus. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 894)

On July 31 during a meeting at 10 Downing Street, attended by Dulles, Macmillan, Whitney, and Lloyd, the Secretary referred to the current situation in Oman and the question of Saudi arms supply to the insurgents. The memorandum of conversation includes the following:

"I read the substance of Jidda's 101. [Not printed; *ibid.*, Central Files, 786E.56/7-2957] Macmillan seemed greatly pleased. He felt that irrespective of the accuracy of the information, it indicated a desire on the part of King Saud not to play this up into a great affair and to get himself deeply involved in it. Macmillan said that he too wanted to play it down, that they were not going to conduct an exhaustive military operation to eliminate all rebel opposition. Probably such opposition had existed for a long time and would continue to exist in the hills. They intended to call it off as far as they were concerned within ten days.

"He indicated a desire to try to maintain friendly relations with King Saud." (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 896. In Dulte 10, from London, August 1, the Embassy forwarded an excerpt from the memorandum of the Secretary's conversation concerning Oman; *ibid.*, Central Files, 786E.56/8-157.)

153. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Acting Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 1, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Saudi Involvement in Omani Uprisings of 1955 and 1957

During the uprising in Inner Oman in 1955 which culminated in the ouster of the Imam of Oman by the forces of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman aided by the British, there were allegations from the British side that the uprising had been instigated by Saudi Arabia. Such allegations were made by the British Foreign Office to the US Embassy in London in December 1955 and in February 1956 the Foreign Minister of the Sultan, who is British, charged to an officer of the US Consulate General in Dhahran that "foreign intrigue and instigation" were behind the rising and that letters implicating the Saudis had been found in the Imam's capital of Nazwa. There can be little doubt that the Saudis were sympathetic to the uprising because of their conflict with the UK and the Sultan over the Buraimi oasis. However, while they gave diplomatic and political support to the Imam and while there was gun-running, there is no information available on large-scale Saudi arms deliveries to Omani forces at that time.

After the ouster of the Imam, Talib, the Imam's brother, fled to Saudi Arabia from where he paid visits to Egypt. From July 1956 to May 1957 up to 500 Omani refugees were trained near Dammam as a battalion . . . Saudi officers and . . . NCO's served as instructors. . . . Talib was reported present nearly every day and the group may have developed a personal loyalty to Talib. The Omanis were armed with carbines and Beretta pistols. They were trained in infantry weapons through rocket launchers and were instructed in guerrilla tactics. The last group of Omanis . . . left Saudi Arabia between May 13–15, 1957; they reportedly landed on the Omani coast unarmed from dhows and infiltrated into the interior.

In October 1956 the British Foreign Office informed US Embassy London that the British Consul in Muscat had reported the landing of several shipments of small arms by the Saudis at the Omani port of Sur during September. Sur is located southeast of Muscat on the Gulf of Oman. It lies on a narrow channel in which small craft can anchor. The British report apparently refers to the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8–157. Secret. Drafted by Liebesny.

same incidents mentioned in London's telegram No. 809 of July 30, 1957,<sup>2</sup> point 2, where it was stated that launches from the al-Khobar area in Saudi Arabia (al-Khobar is close to Dammam) had been carrying arms to Sur.

. . . two surplus seagoing launches of the type formerly used on the Bahrein-al-Khobar run had been sold in good faith to a Dammam merchant, who resold them to Talib ibn Ali in August 1956. The launches are no longer in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and are believed in use on the Muscat-Oman coast. It is possible that these launches could have been used to ship arms to Oman in the fall as alleged by the British sources. . . . in January 1957 Talib bought from the Dhahran Airfield NCO Club a two-engine fishing boat that was out of commission and half sunk. It did not have Air Force markings. The boat was raised, had new engines installed and has likewise disappeared from the Eastern Province coast. It is presumed to be used in the same area as the two launches.

Saudi Arabia has so far shown no great concern about the latest developments in Oman. However, King Saud has been absent in Ethiopia and the influential governor of the Eastern Province likewise was absent from his post, having gone on a pilgrimage. Strong pro-Imam propaganda picturing the uprising as a nationalist liberation movement has come from Egypt, Syria, and the USSR.

*Conclusions:*

Evidence . . . indicates that the Saudis supported the Imam's cause both before and after the 1955 uprising. There is no evidence of official support of the present uprising, and arms smuggling into Oman may have been done by Talib and his group rather than by the Saudis directly. However, there is circumstantial evidence that such smuggling took place from a Saudi port and probably with Saudi knowledge, although the King himself may not have been aware of individual instances. It is conceivable that the Saudi Government would want to stay aloof officially from the present rebellion in order to minimize disturbances in the Peninsula and avoid extension of Egyptian knowledge. However, King Saud has in the past frequently been emotional on such matters and it is not impossible that he may yet be goaded by Egypt, by his feelings over Buraimi, by tribal ties, or by court pressures into taking a strong line against the Sultan and the British in order to preserve his stature as an Arab leader.

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

**154. Editorial Note**

On August 1, at the 333d meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Allen Dulles, in his review of developments affecting United States security, referred to the current hostilities in Muscat and Oman. The memorandum of discussion reads in part as follows:

"Mr. Dulles pointed out that the hostilities in Muscat and Oman had more importance than any very, very small war had had for some time. . . . The importance of this conflict lay in the fact that it might spread throughout the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms. The British feel that their prestige is involved and are very much disturbed. If the conflict spreads, it would involve areas with vital oil resources. Mr. Dulles noted parenthetically that no oil had yet been discovered in Oman.

"Secretary Herter said that he was glad Mr. Dulles had explained the relation between Saudi Arabia and the conflict in Oman. The State Department had been informed that Saudi Arabian arms were not being used in this conflict. . . ." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

**155. Editorial Note**

During a meeting with the President on August 3, Secretary Dulles, having reviewed developments on disarmament at London, turned to the situation in Oman. That portion of Dulles' memorandum of the conversation reads as follows:

"I then spoke of the situation in Oman. I said I was greatly concerned that it could not be quickly wound up as a minor incident but that the Arab world would be drawn in in opposition to the UK, Nasser would have a new chance to assert Arab leadership, and we would be caught between our desire to maintain an influence in some of the Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, and our desire to maintain good ties with the UK. A small scale Suez might be in the making. I said it was some mystery about the decision to use ground troops. Selwyn Lloyd told me on Monday [July 29] that this was out of the question, and on Wednesday night Macmillan and Lloyd had said nothing to indicate that they expected to use ground troops, although Macmillan had indicated they were going to clean the matter up within ten days. The President said that what had happened confirmed the often demonstrated fact that conventional air power alone was not decisive. The President shared my concern at the prospects." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 14, 1957—7:25 p.m.*

121. Re Oman. You may convey following to UKDel (Urtel 190<sup>2</sup>):

1. Notwithstanding US usual attitude favoring discussion of questions in SC and in spite of very real difficulties for us, US has decided will not support inscription of Oman item on SC agenda. US had concluded no constructive purpose would be served by SC consideration Oman situation. On contrary, believe probable result would be acrimonious and fruitless debate to detriment Free World and benefit Soviets and Arab extremists. We feel discussion this matter would force friendly Arab states into public alignment with Egypt and Syria, damaging to US and UK relationships in area.

2. US plan is to abstain in vote on inscription. We realize this position open to some criticism since abstention, procedurally, will have same effect as negative vote and will be portrayed as such by our critics. However after carefully considering alternatives we believe such course would minimize danger to stability of area and our interests there and at same time enable us cooperate with UK in heading off inscription.

3. We feel that initiative in lining up votes on inscription should rest with British and we do not propose announce now our position. However should British and USUN feel it necessary have selected delegates informed US plans abstain in order obtain necessary support to keep matter off agenda you are authorized discreetly inform those delegates. In effort minimize adverse publicity in ME we are anxious have this handled with utmost discretion.

4. Re timing we do not wish influence decision on convening SC. We would feel Tuesday August 20 entirely acceptable, but would also be prepared agree to earlier date if generally desired.

FYI In reaching decision on inscription Dept has weighed unfavorable British reaction that would result from our affirmative vote, on one hand, against probable Arab reaction resulting from abstention which equivalent to negative vote, on other. We believe we would lose more from first course than from second. As matter of

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8-1257. Confidential. Drafted by Cargo, DePalma, and Gamon; and approved by Murphy. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> On August 12, the Mission at the United Nations informed the Department that Crosthwaite had inquired about U.S. reaction in the event the Arabs requested inscription of the Oman item on the agenda of the Security Council. According to the Mission, Crosthwaite indicated that the British would favor steps to prevent inscription. (Telegram 190; *ibid.*)

fact there seems to be lack of enthusiasm on part certain Arab governments in taking issue to Council. This probably stems from realization Council debate would primarily serve purposes of those bent on embarrassing West regardless of effect on fellow Arabs. We recognize complex legal issues involved. However we are convinced SC would not be able deal with legal issues in manner helpful to our overall interests in area. We fully understand UK would prefer US negative vote but believe UK will realize need for US take position more likely minimize harm to our relations with friendly Arab governments while accomplishing immediate objective of heading off inscription.

Herter

---

**157. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) and the British Ambassador (Caccia), Department of State, Washington, August 15, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

Ambassador Caccia called at his request. He said he had no instructions from his Government but that he had just noted the Arab request for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to consider "the armed aggression by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland against the independent sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Imamate of Oman."

Caccia said that he had heard just this morning from the U.S. Delegation in the U.N. that the United States might be taking the position that it would merely abstain in the vote in the Security Council.<sup>2</sup> He asserted that if we did that our action would be

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.86E/8-1557. Secret. Drafted by Murphy.

<sup>2</sup> On August 15, the Mission at the United Nations informed the Department that Crosthwaite was notified of the U.S. decision to abstain on the matter of the inscription of Oman. The Mission also reported Crosthwaite's strong reaction against the Department's decision, noting its own view that abstention was "unlikely to carry much weight" with the Arabs. (Telegram 218; *ibid.*, 786E.00/8-1557) On August 16, forwarding the draft of a letter to Macmillan which contained a paragraph on Oman, Eisenhower wrote to Herter: "I invite your particular attention to the paragraph on Oman. I saw in some staff notes that we were going to 'abstain' if this matter were brought up in the Security Council. I am not so sure that that is the attitude we should take, and if this is really our intention I should like to hear the reasons therefore [*sic*]." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series) The paragraphs on Oman of the President's draft letter to the Prime Minister read as follows:

misinterpreted by the public in Great Britain and that the result would be extremely harmful to Anglo-American relations. He said that inevitably there would be popular opinion expressed that after all the United States is governed by selfish oil interests and that the indignation against the United States which resulted from our attitude in Suez would be revived and perhaps intensified. He said with some emotion that he could not emphasize adequately how strongly he felt and that he was certain his Government would reflect the same feeling. I suggested that would depend in part on how the U.K. Government presented the problem to its public.

Caccia inquired when the Secretary would return and whether the Secretary was informed of this position. I told Caccia that the Secretary had not been informed but that he would be back in Washington according to the present schedule on Monday.<sup>3</sup> Caccia said that he would urgently request permission to discuss the matter with the Secretary and wondered whether this would be possible. I said that I was certain that the Secretary would be glad to see him at the earliest convenient moment and that I hoped that this would be possible on Monday.

I explained to Caccia that this question had received very thoughtful consideration in the Department during the Secretary's absence; that while we did not pretend to have all the facts, perhaps, regarding the developments in Oman and have not had access even to the text of the treaty or other arrangements which existed between the United Kingdom and the Sultan, we had thought that the British purpose would be well served by our abstention. Caccia agreed that the British purpose is to exclude the item from the Security Council agenda. He agreed also that our abstention would undoubtedly bring about that result. His argument was based solely on the interpretation which might be given to the U.S. position by the British public. He agreed that those who had knowledge of the procedures involved would understand our position. I said that I was a bit surprised that what amounted to practical cooperation by the United States in achieving the British objective in this instance should be developed as harmful to Anglo-U.S. relations.

---

"While this has been going on, I have tried to follow, as closely as possible, your operations in Oman. I know that it was a difficult decision for you to make to enter that affair, since your motives were bound to be deliberately misinterpreted in every corner of the earth where unfriendly people would have an interest in so doing.

"Needless to say, I hope that the situation so develops as to preserve your position and that Britain does not inherit additional ill will in the region as a result. I must say that under the circumstances I do not see that you could have acted in any way other than you did." (The full text of the President's draft letter is in Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8-1657.)

<sup>3</sup> August 19.



I referred to our general policy regarding liberality of discussion of problems of this nature in the Security Council, mentioning that, of course, there were exceptions. These would concern items such as, for example, the case of Guatemala. I suggested that Sir Harold might recall the position we had taken at that time—that that case was appropriate for regional action rather than discussion immediately in the Security Council. Yet we had had the greatest difficulty with his Government in agreeing to our point of view and in fact the British had been unwilling to vote with us on that issue but had reluctantly abstained. Sir Harold argued vehemently that the cases were quite different because Guatemala is an independent state, whereas the Imamate of Oman could claim only the vaguest tribal autonomy. I suggested that the Arabs were charging aggression and asserting that Oman has a legal right to independence. Obviously if we abstained on such an issue we would be subject to considerable Arab criticism. This risk we were willing to take in the interest of Anglo-American relations. British failure to credit us with what is practical cooperation would be the source of regret.

I told Caccia we would inform him promptly regarding an appointment with the Secretary.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> See Document 161.

---

### 158. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>

*London, August 17, 1957.*

DEAR FRIEND: I have just heard that Foster is unfortunately away during this troublesome situation which is developing about Oman and the forthcoming United Nations Security Council debate.

Although there is still time after Foster gets back on Monday for a decision to be taken by your Government to vote against inscribing this matter on the Agenda, I hope that you will not mind my asking you yourself in the meantime to have a look at the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. According to a notation on another copy of Macmillan's letter, it was received at the White House on Saturday, August 17. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower Correspondence, 1957–1958, vol. 11) The text of the Macmillan letter was sent to the Embassy in London for its information. (Telegram 1388 to London, August 18; *ibid.*, Central Files, 786E.00/8–1857)

message Selwyn has sent Foster. I would not worry you except for this one reason. We have done such a lot together during the past few months to get things right between us that it would really be tragic if they go wrong again.<sup>2</sup>

Yours ever,

Harold<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> In a further message to Eisenhower dated August 18, Macmillan noted: "You will of course realise that anything which may make the Sultan of Muscat feel that doubts are being cast on the essential unity of Muscat and Oman will make it almost impossible to get him to accept the idea of a meeting with King Saud." He added, "Both of us, I think, believe that direct negotiations between them is the thing to work for." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

### 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 17, 1957—7:05 p.m.*

1382. Deliver following message from President to Prime Minister Macmillan as soon as possible:

"August 17, 1957

Dear Harold: I have your message regarding Oman and it is receiving my urgent study. As you no doubt know through Harold Caccia and Crosthwaite the view of my staff here is that abstention on the vote to inscribe would best serve our common interest and achieve the practical result you wish.

After his return to Washington I will discuss this with Foster to whom Selwyn has sent a note on the same subject<sup>2</sup> and then communicate with you further.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768E.00/8-1757. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling.

<sup>2</sup> On August 16, Caccia handed Murphy a communication from Lloyd requesting that it be forwarded to Dulles. The letter, providing background on the situation in Oman, expressed British concern over the U.S. intention to abstain during the coming Security Council sessions on Oman. Lloyd urged Dulles to instruct the U.S. representative at the United Nations to vote against inscription and to use American influence in urging other "friendly members" of the Council to act accordingly. (*Ibid.*, 786E.00/8-1657) On August 19, the Department telegraphed the text of Dulles' reply to Lloyd to the Embassy in London. The Secretary noted, in part, that both he and the President "rely importantly on our confidence that you and the Prime Minister understand that our position in this matter is based solely on the objective of bringing about a solution which is in the common interest." (Telegram 1416; *ibid.*, 786E.00/8-1957)

I appreciate not only the time factor involved but of course the larger consideration you mentioned. Warm regards. D.E."

Observe Presidential Handling. Advise date and time of delivery.

**Herter**

---

**160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 19, 1957—8:20 p.m.*

1417. Please pass following to Prime Minister from President:

"August 19, 1957

Dear Harold: This supplements my message to you of the 17th.<sup>2</sup> Foster is now back and although both of us are deeply engaged today in relation to the Mutual Security legislation we did have lunch together and he had a talk with Harold Caccia. It looks as though if you want quick action which will result in the non-inscription of the matter the best we can do, consistently with our prior practice and lack of knowledge of the complicated local facts here, would be to abstain. This is as good as a negative vote from the standpoint of keeping the matter off the agenda and I do not think you need to worry about the outcome.

If you want to have the matter discussed and deal with the 'Treaty of Sib' and such matters sufficiently to make a clear public case against there being an inscribable issue, then we might feel that we could vote positively against inscription. This would of course depend somewhat upon the character of the presentation that was made. But we assume that you have a good case in this respect.

You may well decide that it is better not to have the argument and to get the matter quickly behind us so that we can work together on some constructive developments.

I know you would rather have us vote from the outset and immediately against inscription. However, I think that we can recognize that the common goals which we have cannot always be best achieved by our necessarily always taking a uniform public position.

As you know, both personally and officially, Foster and I want always to be on the same slot with you but we think that all things considered the above is the best solution we can figure out at the moment.

Sincerely, DDE"

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8-1957. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

Observe Presidential Handling.

Dulles

---

161. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 19, 1957**<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Oman

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador  
The Secretary  
Deputy Undersecretary Robert Murphy

Ambassador Caccia called on the Secretary at his request for a discussion of the position regarding the Arab request for Security Council consideration of the events in Oman. The conversation opened with a brief reference to the events in Syria, Caccia saying that these events are as disagreeable to the United States as they are to the United Kingdom. The Secretary replied that having just returned to Washington last evening he had not yet caught up with the developments either in Syria or Oman, as he had been absorbed in the Mutual Security program and had spent the morning testifying in the Senate. He said he was having a meeting later today to consider the situation in Syria. The Secretary thought that in the light of present trends the United Kingdom and the United States ought to work out a concerted program with reference to the countries in the Middle East area. Caccia referred to conversations which Malik has been having with the U.K. Ambassador in Beirut in which Malik has expressed great concern regarding the developments in Syria. The Secretary thought that in a general sense we ought to be thinking in terms of some cordon sanitaire around Syria. He said this represents a vague thought, as he had not yet been briefed on the position. Caccia referred to the series of contacts between Syria and the USSR and the question of what might be done under the general heading of covert operations. He admitted the United King-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8-1957. Secret. Drafted by Murphy.

dom is weak on assets. The Secretary mentioned that we had been hopeful at least as an off-chance that some favorable development might occur at the time of the recent Syrian elections. This had not quite come off. Caccia referred to the British impression that the Iraqis are not quite the same without Nuri. According to Nuri, Iraq erred in connection with the Arab proposal concerning Oman in not having put the question as to what the boundaries or what the alleged State of Oman might be. However, that seems now to have been overcome by events. Caccia referred to the message from Selwyn Lloyd to the Secretary,<sup>2</sup> which placed emphasis on Anglo-American relations and also stressed . . . our thought to get the Sultan and Saud together . . . . The Secretary said that he had not had much opportunity to study this question but that after consultation with the staff today, he felt that the conclusions seemed pretty well jelled. He said that he had accepted the conclusion that we should abstain in connection with the inscription of the item of Oman on the Agenda of the Security Council. He said that it would be very difficult for the United States to vote against inscription. He recalled that when the Soviet Union proposed the inscription of the item concerning United States "aggression" in Taiwan that the United States voted in favor of the inscription. Occasionally, of course, for exceptional reasons like Morocco, we might vote against the inscription of a given item.

Caccia referred to Mr. Macmillan's message to the President, which pointed out that it would be a tragedy to Anglo-American relations if we did not stand together on this item and in that connection he referred to the improvement in Anglo-American relations which was developed at the Bermuda meeting. He also emphasized that the procedural aspect of getting the "Potentates" together in Arabia would be slender indeed. He referred to and showed the Secretary the telegram from the British Political Adviser Burrows this morning which made the point that it would probably be impossible to persuade the Sultan to get together with Saud if the United States only abstained and did not vote on the side of the British. The Secretary said that of course this point of view does not take into account Saud's own position. He referred to the Saudis spear-heading the move to inscribe the Agenda and the Saudis point of view that Oman is an independent state. Caccia thought that our joint interests would not be served by an airing of the Saudi involvement in the Oman rebellion, saying that pushing debate would butter no parsnips and that they would not want to indict Saud in public, but no doubt would be obliged to do so. The Secretary referred to the Buraimi situation and negotiations as well

---

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 159.

as to the Saudis' protest to the United Kingdom regarding their use of Buraimi as a base for operations in Oman. He referred to the Saudis' point of view that the United Kingdom has no right to use Buraimi. Caccia referred to the British argument that Oman possesses no degree of sovereignty and there was a discussion of the provisions of the Treaty of Sib of 1920.

The Secretary said that in our opinion there would be strong reasons in favor of inscription of the item on the Security Council Agenda, but said that we are willing to depart from our regular policy in this case and abstain. This will give the United Kingdom the practical result it wishes. The matter, he said, has been debated in the Department for several days, and while the Secretary does not like the idea of abstention, as it seems to be a weak position, having heard the question debated by his staff during the past hour he was unable to find a better result. He believed the United Kingdom could put on a good front with this position.

Caccia brought up again the question of the distinction to be made between an internal matter and an international question and again discussed the provisions of the Treaty of Sib. The Secretary said that he did not know exactly what the Treaty says but that we did not want to commit ourselves now to saying it is or it is not an international matter. Some of our people take the point of view, he said, that it could be considered under Article 35,<sup>3</sup> whereas others do not. He again referred to the Taiwan Resolution. He said also that we cannot very well take a position on the merits of the question until we know a little more about it. The Secretary also said that he is deeply concerned about the evident hostility between the United Kingdom and King Saud. He said this situation, superimposed on the Israeli problem, makes for a most difficult situation. The United States has sincerely been seeking to compose these differences but the Saudis felt bitterly, and of course the United Kingdom feels it has to maintain its own prestige with the Sheikdoms. The general atmosphere in the area, he said, is certainly not good. We believed that during his visit here we opened Saud's eyes to the dangers of communist penetration, and the events in Jordan confirmed this opinion of dangers to Saud. . . . We also have the most difficult question of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba to deal with. . . . This makes for a most distressing situation. We do not feel happy about it and are sure that the United Kingdom also are not happy. The Secretary wished that we could have an opportunity to sit down and thrash these questions out, as it is an awkward

---

<sup>3</sup> Article 35 of the U.N. Charter referred to the terms under which Member and non-Member states might bring disputes or situations to the attention of the General Assembly or Security Council.

situation. The Secretary said that he thought Caccia should tell Selwyn Lloyd that we have, as we see it, no better alternative than to abstain. The issues are so framed, it seems to us, that as eager as we are to vote one way or another, it involves passing on the merits before we know what they are. The situation seems to include a series of relationships which do not have a counterpart in our society. Abstention seems the best we can do. Caccia asked the question whether in the time available the British possibly could demonstrate the nonstatehood of Oman. The Secretary said that our position would be more apt to change after some public discussion of the affair. He said if the British wished us to act on the merits, we should have some presentation, pro and con. Caccia replied that there would be no harm in the United Kingdom letting us see their case. The Secretary thanked the Ambassador and said that it would receive immediate consideration by our Legal Adviser and staff.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> On August 19, after his meeting with the Secretary, Caccia wrote to Dulles, forwarding a summary of Sir Pierson Dixon's arguments on Oman. In part, these arguments compared Britain's support of the Sultan of Muscat with British aid to Greece in 1944. On August 20, Dulles replied, thanking Caccia for the information, and pointing out that "when we went into Greece in 1947 at its invitation to help to put down armed insurrections supported from outside, we expressly recognized the jurisdiction of the United Nations." Dulles added, in part: "Therefore, I suggest that you do not press us on this analogy." (Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8-1957)

---

## 162. Editorial Note

On August 20, in a telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Lodge raised the question of Oman. The memorandum of the telephone conversation includes the following exchange:

"Amb. Lodge began the conversation by asking if [*sic*] the Secretary if he thinks we ought to abstain on this Oman business. Lodge said it seemed to him it was kind of a legalistic thing and we will end up with nobody liking it. The Secretary said that was probably so, but in the light of our past practices and precedents we are making a big concession to the British to ignore those precedents and abstain; that in accordance with those precedents we ought to vote to inscribe. The Secretary said he had discussed this matter with the President; that while neither of them liked the abstention idea, they concluded that anything else would be worse.

"The Secretary said he had received last night a letter from Caccia which he read in part to Amb. Lodge. He also read a part of

his reply to Caccia. Secretary discussed background and precedents in connection with the Guatemalan case, Greek case, and Formosan case.

"Amb. Lodge reiterated his feeling that its tone is legalistic and that the Arabs won't like it and the British won't like it. The Secretary said he appreciated this but that our Far East area is violent in its view that if we vote with the British against jurisdiction, countries like the Philippines, Thailand, etc., will be thrown back again into the Arab-Asian bloc. Amb. Lodge said he appreciated having the background as to the reasons for our decision to abstain." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers)

Later that day, the Security Council held two meetings to decide whether the Oman item ought to be placed on its formal agenda. The United Kingdom representative, supported by France, Australia, Cuba, and Colombia, voted against inscription. Iraq, the Philippines, Sweden, and the Soviet Union voted for inscription. The United States abstained and China did not vote. As a result of the 5 to 4 vote against inscription, the Oman question was not placed on the Council's agenda. (U.N. documents S/PV. 783 and 784, August 20)

**163. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers, New York, September 16, 1957, 1 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

TGA/MC/3

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary  
Mr. Rountree  
Mr. Greene

*United Kingdom*

Mr. Lloyd, Foreign Secretary  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Mr. H. Beeley

SUBJECT

Oman

Mr. Lloyd said he was concerned about Oman, since he supposed the Arabs might try to inscribe it on the agenda. He wondered what our attitude on this matter would be. The British would of

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/9-1857. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. Dulles and Lloyd were in New York for the opening of the Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which lasted from September 18 to December 14.



course strongly oppose the inscription, and he hoped the U.S. would try to dissuade the Arabs from pressing the matter. The Secretary responded that we of course hoped the question would not arise, and would do what we could to avoid an Arab proposal for inscription. However, if it should be put to a vote, that would present a difficult problem for us and he could not now state what our position would be. He recalled our traditional policy of not opposing the inscription of items which other delegations wished to have discussed before the U.S. <sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>The Oman question was not taken up in the Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

# SAUDI ARABIA

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE QUESTION OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA; RENEWAL OF UNITED STATES TENANCY AT THE DHAHRAN AIRFIELD; INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SAUDI ARABIA REGARDING THE BURAIMI OASIS DISPUTE; VISIT OF KING SAUD TO THE UNITED STATES IN FEBRUARY 1957<sup>1</sup>

## 164. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 9, 1955<sup>2</sup>

### SUBJECT

Aramco's Problems with Saudi Arabian Government

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Case, Vice President, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company  
Adm. Kelly, Washington Representative, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company  
NE—Mr. Hart, Mr. Dorsey, Mr. Gay, Mr. Allen, Mr. Fritzlan  
PED—Mr. Miller

Mr. Case had just returned from a trip to the Near East and Far East and wished to review with the Department some of the current problems facing the oil industry. He was particularly concerned about the situation in Saudi Arabia. He understood the sovereignty issue had been injected by the Saudis into the question to be arbitrated arising from the dispute over the Onassis agreement.<sup>3</sup> He had never favored the arbitration idea because of strong likelihood

---

<sup>1</sup> For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. ix, Part 2, pp. 2409 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/2-955. Secret. Drafted by Fritzlan.

<sup>3</sup> In January 1954 Aristotle Socrates Onassis, a Greek shipowner, concluded an agreement with the Government of Saudi Arabia which authorized Onassis to form a private company for the transport of Saudi oil. Aramco opposed the agreement on the grounds that it contravened the terms of the company's oil concession. On July 23, 1954, the National Security Council, in NSC 5428, "United States Objectives and Policies in the Near East," recommended that "the United States should take all appropriate measures to bring about the cancellation of the agreement between the Saudi Arabian Government and Onassis for the transport of Saudi Arabian-produced oil and, in any case, to make the agreement ineffective." The full text of NSC 5428 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. ix, Part 1, p. 525. For previous documentation on the Onassis agreement, see *ibid.*, pp. 795 ff.

of Aramco losing and he thought if the Saudi Government were successful in including the sovereignty question in the terms of reference the case would most certainly go against Aramco. In his own opinion the Saudi Government was prepared to take an increasingly harsh attitude toward Aramco and he did not rule out the possibility of the Saudis attempting to expropriate Aramco's properties and attempting to make other arrangements for the production of oil. . . . He foresaw no limit to the amount of trouble Aramco would experience in Saudi Arabia unless the U.S. Government took a firm line with the Saudi Government. Failure to take a strong position could result in repetition of the Iranian case which was to be avoided at all cost. He wondered to what extent the U.S. Government would be prepared to back Aramco.

There was some discussion of the likelihood of the Saudi Government being able to make an arrangement under which oil could be produced and marketed following a situation where there might be expropriation of Aramco's properties. It was generally agreed that this would be a most difficult task but the possibility of achieving it, through the use of experts from Russia and satellite countries, was not entirely ruled out.

In reply to Mr. Case's question, Mr. Hart said he personally believed the U.S. Government would continue to give Aramco strong support as in fact it had been giving throughout the Onassis matter. This did not necessarily mean in the final analysis we could prevent expropriation and nationalization if the Saudi Government were bent on carrying out such an extreme policy. . . .

Mr. Case seemed satisfied with Mr. Hart's reply which he understood to be a personal opinion and not necessarily a Departmental position. He reiterated that, as far as Socony among the parent companies of Aramco was concerned, every effort would be made to insure that the company stood firm against any encroachment of its rights in Saudi Arabia.

Reverting to the question of the Onassis agreement and the Saudi desire for a Saudi-registered tanker fleet, Mr. Case suggested that Aramco might profitably endeavor to make use of the services of a . . . ship-owner who would be prepared to place some tankers under Saudi registry. The question of incentive, he added, would have to be dealt with by Aramco making such an arrangement "attractive" to the ship-owner.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Later that day Case presented his views on the Onassis agreement to George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. (Memorandum of conversation by Stephen Dorsey, February 9, 1955; Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/2-955)

165. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 3, 1955.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Saudi Arabia with Special Reference to our Oil Interests

*Problem*

Aramco's dispute with the Saudi Arabian Government over the Onassis agreement has recently taken a turn for the worse and this fact, together with violent Saudi objections to the Turk-Iraqi pact,<sup>2</sup> bodes ill for US-SA relations. The whole complex of our relations with SAG is now under review.

While it had originally been understood that arbitration between Aramco and the SAG would be confined to the question whether the Onassis agreement is in conflict with rights granted by the SAG to Aramco under Aramco's concession agreement, the SAG has apparently succeeded in injecting the sovereignty issue as well, i.e., whether the concession agreement prevents the SAG from exercising the right to regulate transportation of oil exports and grant priority to Saudi flag vessels. The arbitration award may well go against Aramco, although off-takers may refuse to be bound by the results. (Aramco lifts no oil itself.)

This development suggests the possibility that the Saudis may become increasingly hostile toward Aramco and the USG and that they may have in their minds a threat or bluff of expropriation and nationalization of Aramco's properties, and of cancellation of our airbase agreement (which is valid until 1961 unless notice of termination or desire to modify it is given by December 18, 1955).<sup>3</sup> Thinking of the Iranian example, the Saudis may feel we would yield and even "bail them out" in case their action led to financial difficulties arising from inability to market their oil.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/3-455. Secret. Drafted by Fritzman and Hart.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, generally known as the Baghdad Pact. For text, see United Nations *Treaty Series*, Vol. 233, p. 199. The Pact was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3.

<sup>3</sup> In August 1945 the Government of Saudi Arabia granted the United States permission to construct an airfield at Dhahran. The agreement was first renewed in 1949 and again in 1951.

While relations between SAG and the USG and/or the oil company may not go from bad to worse, it appears desirable to have a well-defined attitude which could be made known in advance to Ambassador Wadsworth<sup>4</sup> to support him in the face of a possible campaign of pressures.

*Discussion*

. . . With an assured income of about \$250,000,000 per year from oil, the country is chronically short of cash. Attempts to budget for important national improvements have not been successful. . . . These circumstances have encouraged the SAG to make repeated demands on Aramco for more revenue and upon the USG for very sizeable amounts of aid. . . . US-SA relations have had their ups and downs, but generally speaking have deteriorated in recent months.

Following conclusion of the Buraimi arbitration<sup>5</sup> agreement last summer, and the apparently good progress made in the last six months in our military training activities, our relations with King Saud and his Government took a turn for the better. Ambassador Wadsworth encountered a more cordial reception when he visited the King and he was able, by a display of friendly firmness so to impress upon him the Department's opposition to the Onassis agreement that the King assented to removing its preferential and monopolistic provisions if Aramco and his advisers could find a satisfactory formula. . . . Inability to find such a formula led to the decision to arbitrate. Subsequent visits by Onassis to Saudi Arabia, during which he made attempts to stiffen the attitude of the King and his advisers, prepared the scene for the recent difficulties over the terms of reference of arbitration.

It is improbable that the King would at the present time take the decision to expropriate and nationalize Aramco's holdings. He is entirely dependent upon the oil revenues. . . . However, in the unlikely event that the King should threaten to take this drastic step, believing that Aramco and the US would be forced to yield for fear of losing our oil interests and our strategic position in the country, it would seem desirable to prepare our position in the face

---

<sup>4</sup>George E. Wadsworth, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, January 9, 1954–January 1, 1958.

<sup>5</sup>Longstanding border disputes between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman erupted in August 1952 with Saudi Arabian occupation of parts of the Buraimi Oasis area. The Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, supported by the United Kingdom, protested the Saudi action and blockaded the Saudi Arabian force. After considerable negotiation the parties agreed, in July 1954, to submit the boundary dispute to arbitration. Previous documentation on the U.S. interest in the Buraimi dispute is in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IX, Part 2, pp. 2458 ff.

of such a contingency and to keep Ambassador Wadsworth fully informed of our thinking.

Although King Saud has been irked by our neutral position in the Buraimi dispute and on occasion alludes to our support of Israel in bitter terms, the principal cause for his current anti-US feelings is to be found in our military aid program for Iraq and our support for Iraqi participation in the "northern tier" defense arrangement. A year ago the King predicted Iraq would never accept US military aid or join the "northern tier" arrangement. Recently, Prince Faisal has reportedly castigated the US in most acrimonious terms for encouraging Iraq in her plans to sign a treaty with Turkey. His talk several days ago with Wadsworth reflected deep bitterness against the U.S.<sup>6</sup>

In view of the fundamental differences between the USG and SAG on regional policies, it is perhaps too much to hope our relations can under present conditions become re-established on a basis of the mutual confidence and respect which existed from 1942 to 1947. Possibly there are certain steps we can take to improve our position, however, and in this connection it would appear important to avoid giving any indication that our interests in Saudi Arabia are of such a magnitude that we would be warranted in resorting to extreme measures to satisfy Saudi demands.

Recent soundings in the Pentagon suggest that Defense no longer places the same degree of importance on Dhahran Airfield as formerly. The Department has been exploring this question with the Pentagon and telegraphic instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth are being prepared in order that he may be able to reflect our views should the matter of Dhahran Airfield be raised with him.

It is believed that the SAG would shrink from cancellation of Aramco's concession or our airbase rights if it knew that by so doing it would lose most of its revenue and our military training missions. Should the SAG embark upon such an extreme course, however, we should be prepared for possible consequences. . . .

#### *Recommendations*

1. That we make clear to the SAG our position on the question of expropriation and nationalization should we have reason to con-

---

<sup>6</sup> On February 23, Wadsworth met with Prince Faisal, Saudi Arabian Prime Minister and brother of King Saud. In transmitting Faisal's reaction to the Turk-Iraqi pact, Wadsworth reported that Faisal spoke with "such unwonted vehemence and was so impervious to my counter plea (in essence that Iraq could join northern tier and continue loyal member Arab League) that I could not but sense bitterness in defeat which boded ill for future Saudi-American relations and an underlying jealousy rooted in Saudi Hashemite rivalry." (Telegram 416 from Jidda, February 27; Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-2755)

clude that it was being seriously threatened by SAG. We should leave no doubt as to our opposition to expropriation.<sup>7</sup>

2. That we give the King and his advisers no reason to suppose that there is the slightest chance of our changing our policy toward Iraq and the “northern tier” development or that we entertain any doubts as to the success of this policy. As a corollary, our representatives in Saudi Arabia should take advantage of opportunities to attempt to dispel the King’s suspicions of his Iraqi neighbors and to convince him that regional defense arrangements taking shape in the north are in his own security interests.

3. That we continue and, if appropriate and feasible, expand our present military training efforts in Saudi Arabia recognizing that this assistance (and any possible loan assistance we may be able to give in connection with the Riyadh–Jidda railway project) may help to temper Saudi feelings toward us but that such types of help in themselves will not reverse the present trend.

. . . . .

---

<sup>7</sup> As originally submitted to Murphy, Recommendation 1 reads as follows:

“That we make clear to the SAG our position on the question of expropriation and nationalization should we have reason to conclude that it was being seriously threatened by SAG. We should leave no doubt as to (a) our opposition to expropriation; (b) our insistence that if expropriation takes place the USG will expect full compensation paid Aramco; (c) our unwillingness in such event that any other American oil company or a company of a friendly state should accept the concession; (d) our unwillingness to rescue SAG from any resultant financial difficulties. . . .”

In an attached note to Allen dated March 4, Murphy suggested that points b, c, and d be omitted. (*Ibid.*, 886A.2553/3–455)

---

## 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 5, 1955—12:18 p.m.*

387. Department naturally concerned over recent but not unexpected renewal of unfavorable drift US-Saudi relations (Embtel 416<sup>2</sup>) which we attribute in large part to conclusion Turk-Iraqi pact and our well known support development “northern tier” defense

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2–2755. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Fritzlan; approved by Murphy; and cleared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Air Force. Repeated to Dhahran.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see footnote 6, *supra*.

arrangement. Department is facing possibility USG may be reaching a cross-roads in its relations with SAG. Obvious remedies for Saudi bitterness, i.e. radical change in our defense policy, one-sided support Saudi border claims and Arab attitudes re Israel and North Africa out of question. Furthermore record our recent relations with Saudi Arabia does not encourage belief that sizeable economic or military assistance would give our position in country solid strength for any appreciable period of time. On contrary we question whether willingness our part give such assistance (which cannot be justified either from financial or military-potential point of view) would not be interpreted as degree of weakness . . . and would pave way for future heavy demands. We therefore doubt real improvement in our relations possible without reorientation of King's policy.

Believe foregoing expression Department's feeling may be useful background in event King raises question Dhahran Airfield during March 10 meeting.<sup>3</sup>

While we believe King may refer to question in oblique terms or in general context his dissatisfaction with US policies it is possible he will go into specific details in effort elicit indication our willingness meet Saudi demands. In such case it may be useful review events related to Dhahran airfield, pointing out:

(1) Accomplishments military training mission. If you thought it desirable you could state approximate cost to US of mission to date.

(2) Opportunities afforded by US for purchase military equipment, until recently used to small advantage.

(3) Approximate cost to US of training being given Saudis in airfield operations to date.

(4) Importance of Dhahran as an international airport which has been achieved through US efforts and expenditures. These civil aviation facilities could become increasingly important with expansion and development of aviation. (In this regard you may wish point out fact we provide all aircraft facilities Dhahran for civil aircraft but Saudis collect fees.)

Grover<sup>4</sup> may be able indicate monetary cost to US above items and been alerted by Air Force.

Should question our economic assistance arise you would doubtless wish review our recent activity in re possible Export-Import Bank loan for Riyadh-Jidda railway.

Department inclines to belief King may prefer have subordinate such as Yusuf Yasin broach Dhahran airfield question in way which

<sup>3</sup> Wadsworth reported that during his March 10 audience with Saud the King's "attitude throughout was friendly and on Saudi-US relations showed marked lessening of tensions evident my meeting with Prime Minister Prince Faisal." (Telegram 436 from Jidda, March 14; Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3-1455)

<sup>4</sup> Brigadier General Orrin L. Grover, USAF, Commander of the Second Air Division, Saudi Arabia.



will leave no doubt Saudis expect large-scale "handout" in return for continuation USAF rights after June 18, 1956; failing which Saudis would cancel agreement. Such approach could be effort determine softness our position.

If you are approached in such manner we believe best tactics may be immediate reaction indicating we have no intention being "blackmailed," for such is indeed our attitude. Would suggest your response (in sorrow rather than anger) reflect regret Saudis considering cancellation mutually beneficial airfield arrangement which Prince Faisal had assured us would run for full ten year period (see page 31 Enclosure-1 Jidda despatch 401 of May 31, 1951<sup>5</sup>); and include foregoing arguments and expression hope we would continue together on road of progress. However if the Saudis insist on the impossible in exchange for continued base rights we would feel obliged leave Dhahran and withdraw our training missions without recrimination or hard feeling.

In our tentative opinion such a reaction on your part might do great deal to dispel Saudi idea Dhahran is so important to us we would gratify exorbitant demands in order retain it. Effect might enhance our chances of retaining airfield.

Foregoing has high-level State and Defense clearance.

Department invites your comment and will give most careful consideration to expression your views.

**Hoover**

---

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/5-3151)

**167. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, March 7, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

## SUBJECT

US-Saudi Relations

## PARTICIPANTS

Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, Saudi Arabian Ambassador

NEA—Mr. Allen

NE—Mr. Fritzlan

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador called on a courtesy visit to congratulate Mr. Allen upon the assumption of his new duties and Mr. Allen took advantage of the opportunity to have a frank discussion on US-Saudi relations. . . . He believed, however, a frank exchange of views on a matter which has been of considerable concern to us would be helpful in view of Sheikh Asad's plans to return to Saudi Arabia in June.

Mr. Allen said he and his associates were greatly concerned over the recent development of US-Saudi relations. He had been very surprised and disquieted over recent bitter anti-US remarks attributed to Prince Faisal. He wondered what was at the root of Faisal's feeling. He supposed our policies in connection with Israel explained a certain amount of his animosity. However, as the Ambassador well knew, the US Government for the past two years had done its best to follow an impartial course on the question of Arab-Israel matters and had done a great deal to redress the balance. This had been recognized in most Arab states but there appeared to be little evidence this was understood in Saudi Arabia.

The Ambassador confirmed Mr. Allen's feeling that the question of Israel was at the root of Faisal's attitude and recalled Faisal's unhappy experiences in New York in 1947 at the time the UNGA voted partition of Palestine. As for the King's attitude, he had been disappointed at the lack of support he had received from the U.S. Government when he came to the throne. . . . He appealed to us for help but was told that we might be able to assist in a matter of a loan for the construction of the Riyadh-Jidda railway. The King felt our response to be wholly inadequate considering the facilities Saudi Arabia had given us and the great friendship which we professed for each other. This and other matters, many of them petty questions, he felt accounted for the King's antagonism toward the U.S. He did not believe this attitude was basic or necessarily permanent and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/3-755. Confidential. Drafted by Fritzlan.

suggested that patience was necessary to allow the forces of reason to assert themselves in the highly emotional atmosphere of Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Allen agreed that patience was indicated in the circumstances and he hoped a measure of this would also be exercised in Saudi Arabia in regard to some of our own policies. On the question of economic aid to Saudi Arabia, we were entirely dependent upon Congressional appropriations which were often short of our expectations. Saudi Arabia is a country with enormous oil revenues, receiving approximately \$250 million a year. It was exceedingly difficult for us to justify economic assistance to Saudi Arabia in these circumstances at a time when other Arab countries such as Jordan and Egypt had economic problems of enormous magnitude to cope with and no income available to deal with them. It was disturbing to him that Saudi Arabia should place a dollar sign on its friendship for the U.S. We had accomplished much for the country and we could continue to help it on the road to progress. We desired Saudi Arabia's friendship and hoped that the Saudis would feel the same way toward us. Friendship, however, is a two-way street and cannot exist without reciprocity.

Sheikh Asad expressed general agreement. . . . However, the King was reorganizing the government and considerable progress had already been achieved. The fact was that Saudi Arabia was greatly behind other countries in economic development. There was not one good road in Saudi Arabia whereas the development of other states such as Egypt was immeasurably advanced. For this reason, Saudi Arabia needed such technical and economic assistance as we were able to give. Nevertheless, he understood the problems we had with Congress on this matter. He himself was amazed that the King should have terminated Point IV activity which he felt wholly beneficial for Saudi Arabia even though the amount involved was relatively small. . . .

The Ambassador said, while he was not sure what his new duties might be, there had been some talk about his assuming the post of Deputy Foreign Minister. He had expressed the hope the King would not decide on his new duties until he could discuss matters with him. He felt he was in a position to be of real service to Saudi Arabia and, especially, to help restore its relations with the U.S. to a plane of cordiality and confidence. If he felt the opportunity existed to do this he would gladly assume this post. . . .

There was some discussion of the Turk-Iraqi pact and Mr. Allen was at great pains to explain the indigenous character of this development, pointing out that we were really surprised when Nuri and Menderes expressed their intention in January to conclude the pact. As Sheikh Asad knew, we favored such a development as in

keeping with the "northern tier" concept but we did not expect it to happen as early as it did.

The Ambassador said the general feeling in the area was that we or at least the British were behind this development. Nuri was well-known for his pro-British proclivities and this might account for some of the strong feeling against it. Mr. Allen said he believed the British were as much surprised as we were over the development and he thought it would be a mistake to ascribe it to Nuri's pro-British attitude. Nuri had consulted with all previous Prime Ministers before adopting the policy and they had endorsed it. Sentiment in Iraq seems generally to be in favor of it. He did not see why our support for the "northern tier" development should be incompatible with our friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador agreed that the U.S. could be friendly both to Iraq and to Saudi Arabia at the same time.

Brief mention was made by Mr. Allen of the Onassis agreement and of our concern over this matter. Sheikh Asad expressed the hope that arbitration would proceed smoothly and yield a solution satisfactory to all concerned.

#### 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 6, 1955—8:01 p.m.*

478. Embtel 495. <sup>2</sup>

1. In view considerations discussed in reftel Department intends express to Defense concurrence in Secretary Talbott's agreement sell 3 additional B-26 aircraft to SAG. Assuming Defense agrees matter will then be discussed in NEACC where British opposition can be

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5622/4-2355. Secret. Drafted by Fritzman and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to London and to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force Europe (CINCUSAFE).

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 495 from Jidda, April 23, Wadsworth, in the course of a discussion of aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia, conveyed the Embassy's view that "much of ground thus laboriously gained will be lost if USG [does] not support implementation Secretary Talbott's approval sale of [to] SAG of 3 B-26's in question." The Ambassador added that the U.S. position in Saudi Arabia and the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield agreement would depend "in no small measure" on the success of the activities of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. (*Ibid.*)

expected (London's despatch 2949, April 7<sup>3</sup>). Department would probably take line this a reasonable request under reimbursable military assistance agreement which it feels obligated support pointing out delivery these aircraft would bring total to 9 whereas July 1953 Saudi request related to 18. However Department notes from reftel 6 B-26's and 3 C-47's now operative will be based temporarily Jidda where "minimal interim maintenance" available.

(FYI: Due unknown condition and status three aircraft Dhahran referred to joint message CD 97<sup>4</sup> it may be necessary obtain aircraft from other source. Air Force recommends no additional spare part purchase this connection at this time. These points should be clarified with SAG at later stage.)

2. Department and Defense Department concur your recommendation USAF should not incur responsibility maintenance Saudi aircraft at Dhahran. In replying to SAG you may state limited USAF facilities Dhahran and mission objectives preclude such maintenance and we urge SAG conclude at earliest date maintenance contract with qualified US aviation company adding our desire assist in contacting suitable companies, etc.

3. Department would appreciate receiving your views what may have been King's mind when he said there were "many things" in DAF agreement unfulfilled.<sup>5</sup> Do you believe his statement relates to contents Hare's letter June 18, 1951 to Faisal supplementing military assistance agreement same date?<sup>6</sup> Department feels would be helpful

<sup>3</sup> In despatch 2949, the Embassy in London reported that the British Foreign Office had expressed concern over U.S. licensing of a considerable quantity of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, including 6 B-26 aircraft, 60 armored cars, and a large quantity of military supplies. (*Ibid.*, 486A.118/4-755)

<sup>4</sup> In this joint message to the Departments of State and Defense, Talbott and Wadsworth reported from Dhahran that the Saudi Arabian Government had requested three additional B-26 aircraft on the same terms on which the 6 B-26's had been purchased. (COMDR CD 97 (Army Message) from Dhahran, April 18; *ibid.*, 786A.5-MSP/4-1855)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 495, Wadsworth also reported the King's remarks concerning the Dhahran Airfield. In telegram 533 from Jidda, May 21, the Ambassador informed the Department that according to Faisal, the King may have had "other considerations in mind" rather than the specific provisions of the Dhahran agreement. (*Ibid.*, 786A.5-MSP/5-2155)

<sup>6</sup> In this letter Raymond A. Hare, Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, had confirmed U.S. intentions to assist Saudi Arabia in the provision of a modest fighter force; provide for an ammunition reserve; provide base workshops; furnish tactical training as well as training in the use of equipment; and make every effort to furnish arms that were new and unused. In the course of the letter Hare noted: "The United States Government has directed serious effort and good will in deciding what it can and will do in meeting the desires of the Saudi Arabian Government and it has not the slightest intention of entering an agreement it does not plan to live up to." Hare's letter was transmitted as enclosure 3 to despatch 435 from Jidda, June 28, 1951. (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/6-2851)

if you in cooperation with MAAG undertook detailed study this question.

4. This message cleared with Defense.

Hoover

**169. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Jidda, July 25, 1955—5 p.m.*

39. (1) King Saud's Private Secretary Abdullah Bilkhair told me at state dinner last evening for President Sukarno he had highly confidential news for me to communicate my government only. It was this:

Prince Faisal had received (circa two weeks ago) invitation visit Communist China. Question whether he should accept had been discussed and argued at length in Royal Diwan and with King. Consensus royal counselors was he should accept; it was "good way to get to know other side." King, however, had personally decided to contrary as His Majesty wished no relations with Communists. Telegram expressing regrets had therefore been sent Peking two days ago.

Bilkhair asked what I thought. I answered I believed decision wise and wholly consistent King's position as given me at July 10 audience (mytel 17, July 15 <sup>2</sup>) and in written reply later sent me (text being forwarded by despatch 12 July 23 <sup>3</sup>).

Following are two key passages from King's written reply which I had in mind:

Our very special attitude towards communism is well-known to US Government and to world. It is to our interest that communism

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/7-2555. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; in telegram 11 to Jidda, July 9, the Department instructed Wadsworth, in part, to express to the King U.S. concern that current instability in Syria "provides opportunities for extension communist influence." (*Ibid.*, 611.86A/7-955) Having conveyed this message to the King on July 10, Wadsworth, transmitting the King's views on the situation in Syria, conveyed his impression that the King "welcomed this démarche, based as it was on Communist threat to Arab world and to Syria in particular." (Telegram 17 from Jidda, July 15; *ibid.*, 611.86A/7-1555)

<sup>3</sup> This despatch transmitted Saud's written reply to the U.S. démarche. (*Ibid.*, 611.86A/7-2355)

not infiltrate into any area of Middle East. In opposing communism, we do so on basic religious belief and Islamic principle, in which we believe with all our heart, and not to please America or Western states.

My position, in particular, of Moslem Arab King, servant to Holy Shrines, looked up to by 400 million Moslems in East and West, is extremely delicate and serious before God, my nation and history.

(2) During dinner Deputy Foreign Minister Yasin made appointment call on me later during evening. On arrival he said he wished speak of urgent matter; His Majesty wished me and US Government know of it since no other diplomatic representative would be informed. Yasin then said:

His Majesty received yesterday telegram from his Minister in Tehran reporting Soviet Ambassador had visited him and requested him convey to SAG desire of Soviet Government to establish diplomatic representation in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Minister asked if this was personal suggestion or request from Soviet Government. Soviet Ambassador replied "an official request from Soviet Government". I asked Yasin convey King my highest appreciation his confidence; I had been greatly encouraged by His Majesty's words and his opposition to communism at my July 10 audience; I would report this new development to my government in strict confidence.

Yasin replied he had King's reply to my démarche re Syria and were [he] read two passages quoted above. I said I believed King would be guided in this new matter by same strong "religious belief and Islamic principles;" and Yasin, perhaps by way of indicating concurrence my remark, told me of Prince Faisal having declined invitation visit Communist China.

(3) For after dinner coffee I was seated after President Sukarno to King's right, Bilkhair acting as interpreter. He had earlier spoken with me of King's conditional approval lifting ban against *Time* (see my immediately following telegram<sup>4</sup>). I asked name its correspondent who had covered July 19 visit of tanker *Saud the First*.

Sukarno picked up subject. En route to Egypt, he said, while visiting New Delhi he had asked Nehru what he thought of *Time* reporting (July 4 issue) of his visit to Russia. Nehru who had not read article replied "I haven't time for *Time*." Sukarno then asked if we had read its reporting to Bandung conference; this was not, he said, "way to make friends in Asia".

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 40 from Jidda, July 26, Wadsworth reported that according to Bilkhair, Henry Luce, *Time's* publisher, had instructed his representative to apologize to the King for any offense given in the magazine's reporting on Saudi Arabia. The King was reportedly prepared to lift the ban on the condition that the Department confirm Luce's intention to apologize, and that it obtain assurance that *Time* would not "attack Saudi Arabia as in the past." (*Ibid.*, 911.6286A/7-2655)

I have wondered if he will endeavor influence King Saud to establish relations with Russia and Communist China.

(4) As I have no specific guide as to Department's thinking in these questions, would appreciate its comment.

Wadsworth

---

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 25, 1955—6:01 p.m.*

56. Embtel 39. <sup>2</sup>

1. Department concurs your reply to Bilkhair concerning visit Faisal to China. No further action believed desirable in view possibility their action in informing you of invitation's rejection may be part of campaign to emphasize cooperation with us in preparation for additional aid requests (Embtel 17 <sup>3</sup>). Should King raise matter himself you may repeat your belief in wisdom decision, pointing out also, at your discretion, closer ties Saudi Arabia with Communist countries at this moment might cause confusion among Arabs faced with Communist propaganda in SA and elsewhere. You may also wish emphasize he should consider carefully before associating himself with regime where Moslems are under persecution and where Haj is utilized primarily as propaganda weapon to hide true facts.

2. With regard establishment diplomatic relations with Soviet Union we believe this is matter King must decide. However if you consider advisable and if King raises question you may wish remind him privately that we have substantial evidence indicating Soviet Embassies in other countries have assisted local Communist activity and that he may wish consider whether establishment relations with Soviet at this time might unduly aid disruptive forces threatening unrest in Arab world.

3. Should question arise concerning establishment relations with Communist China you may wish take more positive line, stressing that decision must also be King's but that we do not feel Communist China has recognized obligations in international relations. You

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/7-2555. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Moscow and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, *supra.*



may also wish state that, in view little trade, other matters of interest, King should examine carefully motives of Chinese in desiring establish diplomatic mission.

FYI: We feel establishment Communist missions in Saudi Arabia has particularly dangerous potential . . . and should be discouraged to extent we can discreetly do so. We must avoid however any direct recommendation against such action. End FYI.

Dulles

---

**171. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 31, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabia's Attempt to Apply the Boycott to Socony Mobil

*Discussion:*

Messrs. Nickerson and Case of Socony Mobil, one of the four parent companies of Aramco, called to discuss Socony's problem growing out of the Saudi demands that it either withdraw its interests from Israel or get out of Saudi Arabia. (Memorandum of Conversation attached. <sup>2</sup>) The company's interest in Israel is looked upon as of marginal significance, and I think it would like to withdraw from Israel rather than face up to the possible dangers of defying King Saud. On the other hand, it is believed that withdrawing from Israel poses for Socony serious dangers; it fears a Zionist campaign against it in this country in retaliation to withdrawal.

The King's demands are most unreasonable. To my knowledge there has been no case involving a secondary boycott against Israel quite like this one. It can be argued that Socony, as a minor stockholder of Aramco, does not itself actually do business in Saudi Arabia.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/8–3155. Confidential. Drafted by Gay; sent through S/S.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached. Reference is apparently to a memorandum of a conversation on August 23 between Allen and Austin T. Foster and John Case, General Counsel and Vice President, respectively, of Socony Mobil Company, Inc. (*Ibid.*, 886A.2553/8–2355)

Socony has not yet decided what it will do, but agrees to keep the Department informed. If it decides to challenge the demands of the Saudi Government by refusing to withdraw from Israel, thus shoving the problem into Aramco's lap, I think the Department should give strong support. I can hardly believe that King Saud will . . . follow through with extreme measures against Aramco.

While it is for the company to decide its course, I should not, unless you disagree, propose to discourage it from taking a position of resistance.

*Recommendation:*

That we make clear to the company that it must make its own decision but at the same time let it be known that if the decision is to resist the boycott action the Department will provide diplomatic support.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> According to a notation on the source text, Hoover approved the memorandum, "subject to caveat discussed personally with Mr. Allen." No record of Hoover's discussion with Allen has been found.

---

**172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 3, 1955—5:39 p.m.*

117. Deptel 77.<sup>2</sup> You may now inform SAG request to purchase eighteen M-41 tanks approved under provisions MDA Agreement<sup>3</sup> and in accordance with MAAG<sup>4</sup> recommendation that tanks re-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/8-755. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Hoover. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, London, and Tel Aviv, and pouched to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 77, August 11, the Department informed the Embassy in Jidda, inter alia, that the Saudi Arabian request for tanks was under "active consideration." (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> On June 16, 1951, Saudi Arabia and the United States concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDA) under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Act of 1949. For text of the accord see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 2 (pt. 2), p. 1460.

<sup>4</sup> Under the terms of a Military Assistance Advisory Group agreement (MAAG), concluded on June 27, 1953, the United States agreed to establish a training mission to assist and advise the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation. For text of the accord see 4 UST (pt. 2) 1482.

quired for training.<sup>5</sup> It may be fruitful seek audience and first inform King personally. In order prevent any speculation US decision tied to Soviet arms offer, you may wish to stress delayed decision has been due to many considerations involved in supplying heavy military equipment Middle East. You may state approval this shipment urged successfully in view long special US Saudi relations.

Information re availability, time and delivery to follow. NEACC has been informed.

Formal reply Saudi Embassy's note this subject being withheld until you have informed King.

**Hoover**

---

<sup>5</sup> On May 4 the Saudi Arabian Government had formally requested authorization to purchase two types of tanks. In a letter dated August 4 to the Secretary of Defense, Dulles supported the request. "We have recently reacquired a certain measure of influence with the Saudi Government", Dulles concluded, "and making the tanks available will help maintain or even enhance our position in the eyes of the Saudi Government." (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5-MSP/8-455)

---

### 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 7, 1955—6:44 p.m.*

121. Embtel 79, Deptels 82 and 87.<sup>2</sup> Department has had consultations with Socony and Aramco officials re Saudi demand. Socony anticipates possible difficulties in withdrawal from Israel and has not yet made definite decision. If Socony resists ultimatum Aramco will be faced with decision regarding next step.

Companies have not as yet requested Departmental assistance and we do not wish take formal action prior to such request. Meantime however for your information Department much concerned over far-reaching implications SAG demand. If SAG can

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/8-2655. Drafted and approved by Allen.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 79 from Jidda, August 26, is not printed. In telegram 82, August 16, the Department instructed Wadsworth to consult with Aramco representatives in Jidda to determine whether action could be taken to prevent Saudi Arabia's formal demand on Socony. (Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/8-1655) In telegram 87, August 19, Wadsworth was again instructed to discuss with Aramco Saudi Arabia's demand that Socony choose between "'cooperating with Israel and with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states.'" (*Ibid.*, 886A.2553/8-1955)

determine where Aramco members can do business, concession could be rendered inoperative. While present action is directed against Socony, next victim could be any present or future partners of Aramco and third country may not be Israel. Whole operation would rest on whim. . . .

If appropriate occasion arises Department would be glad for you bring out these implications in discussions with Aramco and SAG officials.

Hoover

---

**174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 14, 1955—7:17 p.m.*

141. Embtel 104.<sup>2</sup> General thinking regarding our attitude closer Saudi-Soviet relations remains as outlined Deptel 56.<sup>3</sup> Should King consult you specifically regarding Soviet arms offer you may in your discretion take following line verbally:

1. US is now making available arms and technicians. Saudi military needs are being met in accordance with agreed program keyed to ability Saudi Arabians to man and maintain new equipment. US wishes continue cooperate in building Saudi defense. Decision to provide tanks is solid evidence to this end.

2. There are undoubtedly other sources supply, but His Majesty may well wonder whether he wishes change in middle of program and obtain unaccustomed equipment which his forces could not as effectively utilize. It would not be in interests sound Saudi defense

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.86A/9-1955. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Wilkins and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Dhahran.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 104, September 8, Wadsworth reported that the King had expressed "keen satisfaction" concerning the proposed delivery of 18 M-41 tanks ordered by Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador noted that the King might soon raise the question of the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield agreement.

Wadsworth also noted, in reference to the matter of the Dhahran Airfield, that the "Embassy's Arab consultant tells me Prince Faisal has since referred in conversation with him to Prince Mishaal's remarks to General Schlatter, saying in effect: "It is substantially true, as Mishaal says, that, despite assurances held out to us when signing, we have gained relatively little from DAF agreement and that, had we rented it, we should have had some reasonable return." (*Ibid.*, 611.86A/9-855)

<sup>3</sup> Document 170.

to acquire equipment with which his officers and men have had no experience and which would complicate their training at this stage.

3. Introduction Soviet arms into Saudi Arabia would require of necessity introduction Soviet technicians. His Majesty may wish give serious thought to advisability introducing Soviet technicians to work closely his armed forces.

4. Although US is hopeful after Geneva conferences of possible settlement some East-West issues, we continue to be aware, as is His Majesty, of fundamental expansionist policies world communism and its efforts strengthen communist forces throughout world.

5. All evidence we have indicates renewed interest Soviet in Middle East influenced in part, at least, by desire frustrate collective security arrangements in area. Unprecedented statement Soviet Foreign Office regarding Middle East in April this year indicates Soviet attitude toward Near and Middle East. Bulganin before Supreme Soviet in August mentioned Soviet objective of neutral Near East (copies by pouch).<sup>4</sup>

Logical conclusion would seem to be that as Middle East states and especially Saudi Arabia are strengthening themselves USSR calculates that if it cannot achieve neutrality through persuasion it may be able accomplish this objective through proposal to establish diplomatic relations and supply military equipment.

In summary, old Arab proverb of camel and tent continues valid.

If Saudis raise issue Dhahran Base rights you should in your discretion frame your reply in context of belief SAG continues welcome Base Agreement and that US through MAAG and MDA continues carry out its obligations.

FYI Dhahran Base rights policy under study in anticipation Saudi request reopen negotiations. End FYI.<sup>5</sup>

**Hoover**

---

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> In anticipation of renewed negotiations on the use of the Dhahran Airfield, Murphy wrote to Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of Defense, on August 18, requesting Departments of Defense and the Air Force estimates on the importance of the base to the United States, "in the light of Saudi Arabia's strategic and military position and its importance as a supplier of oil." Murphy also requested estimates of the provisions of the Dhahran Agreement which the interested Departments might wish to modify in any future negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/8-1855)

175. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Jidda, September 15, 1955—5 p.m.*

119. Embtel 72 and despatch 22, August 20. <sup>2</sup>

1. Since sending reference despatch have had important conversations August 23 and September 13 with Royal Counselor Gargoni, at his request on instructions King Saud, re Russian proposals exchange diplomatic missions and supply arms Saudi Arabia. Facts were submitted reference despatch. Gargoni gave exposition their significance in field US-Saudi relations and made strong plea for military and economic aid, in brief summary essence as follows:

King's first desire is maintain US friendship. If US will advance palm's breadth, he will advance meter. Whatever his decision on proposals, it will not impair US-Saudi relations.

We, Saudi Arabia, will not sign pact with Russia nor rely on Russian guarantee. Our decision re exchange of mission is not yet taken, but as government we see ourselves in same position as US, Britain, Egypt, Turkey who maintain diplomatic relations with Soviets.

Affirmative decision would have important repercussions throughout Arab and Moslem worlds, because of high influence King enjoys. This would benefit Russians and not US.

Re arms offer, we must be realistic. To Arabs Israel is number one danger and enemy. We see US militarizes it to the teeth, offering all types assistance, financial and economic, to strengthen it. You can defend us against Russia, but we must defend selves against Israel. If it lives, we cannot live. We can never have peace with Israel.

If there is possibility US will wish "start new life with us," benefiting us as other states have benefited, by supplying us with arms so we may better contribute towards area defense, and help us rehabilitate our country and raise living standard, we can postpone answer to Russian offer.

US answers only "you are free do whatever seems to your own interest, US has nothing new to offer," then we will decide as befits

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.86A/9-1555. Secret; Limit Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 72, August 20, Wadsworth reported the highlights of the King's audience with Anatoliy Iosifovich Lavrentyev, Soviet Ambassador in Iran, as conveyed by Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, Yusuf Yasin. According to Yasin, Lavrentyev assured Saud that the Soviet Union would supply Saudi Arabia with any type of arms with or without payment. (*Ibid.*, 661.86A/8-2055) Despatch 22, August 20, transmitted the full text of Wadsworth's August 18 conversation with Yasin. (*Ibid.*)

our interests, and US and Saudi Arabia can remain friends. We do not bargain, blackmail, challenge or quibble.

His Majesty would appreciate earliest reply because he is being pressed for answer to Soviet offer. Telegram has just been received from Tehran requesting his decision.

2. During conversations, memoranda of which will be forwarded next airpouch,<sup>3</sup> we had extensive, generally unprofitable discussion US-Saudi relations. Following three points made by me and answered by Gargoni merit mention:

I recalled King had told Soviet Ambassador most important consideration was religion. I believed this would lead him refuse proposals. Gargoni answered it should not be exaggerated; Islam hates Communist principles; King will consult Ulema and act in accord Shariah precepts, but Ulema view with great satisfaction everything which makes Islam strong.

I suggested that, as King had refused grant military aid, terminated Point IV and been highly critical our northern tier policy, first move seemed rather up to him than to us. If he would advance palm's breadth, perhaps we could advance more than meter. Gargoni answered grant aid agreement would infringe Saudi sovereignty, said we could extend aid without it if we truly wished, revived alleged promises Ambassador Hare, repeated old charge re Truman letter and new line that Saudi Arabia had drawn no benefit from Dhahran airfield agreement.<sup>4</sup>

I argued Saudi Arabia did not need grant aid. New five-year army plan was within its budgetary capacity. Our ability aid allies and friends was limited; aid must go where most needed and most beneficial common cause. Gargoni answered Saudi Arabia is new country on new road of progress, its people are poor; it needs roads, hospitals, schools, as well as military equipment, in short everything.

*Comment:* I wonder if Department would like me request audience with King or Prince Faisal (who better understands western mentality) and have polite showdown beginning with expression astonishment Gargoni should have so presented matter to me when His Majesty himself had presented it in such very different form to Shah (see opening paragraphs Tehran Embtel 316 to Department<sup>5</sup>).

<sup>3</sup> In despatch 31, September 19, Wadsworth transmitted the full text of his conversations with al-Gargoni. (*Ibid.*, 661.86A/9-1955)

<sup>4</sup> This allusion is presumably to President Truman's October 31, 1950, letter to King Ibn Saud. For full text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1190.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 316, August 23, Chapin reported that according to the Shah, Saud was "perfectly willing" to join an anti-Communist defense pact on four conditions: (1) that Israel not become a member; (2) that Israel accept U.N. recommendations on boundaries and aid to refugees; (3) that neither the United States nor Britain interfere in Saudi affairs; and (4) that the United States and Britain give Saudi Arabia military aid. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8-2355)

I would also wish answer contention that Saudi Arabia has drawn no benefit from Dhahran airfield agreement and expose in simplest possible language just what our grant aid policy is today, as well as make such specific reply to King's query as Department may direct.

For exposition grant aid policy I should also welcome Department's counsel as to wording.

3. Since drafting foregoing I have received Deptel 141,<sup>6</sup> September 14. In my conversations with Gargoni I used most but not all its argument. It will be most helpful in further discussion.

I shall not however initiate any further action or discussion pending receipt Department comment on Gargoni's "exposition" Saudi position as summarized above. Such comment should I believe be for communication to King either directly or through Gargoni for Prince Faisal as may seem best at time.

However opening SAG-Aramco pricing negotiations and before crystalization our position on renewal Dhahran airfield agreement, it may be good policy defer raising clear issue with King if, as seems possible, to do so might precipitate new crisis, emotional or substantive, in Saudi-US relations.

Wadsworth

---

<sup>6</sup> *Supra.*

---

**176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 17, 1955—1:54 p.m.*

143. Jennings, Case and Foster of Socony Mobil will proceed Saudi Arabia September 21.<sup>2</sup> Appointment with King set for Sep-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/9-1755. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Wilkins. Repeated to Dhahran and Tel Aviv and pouched to London.

<sup>2</sup> On September 15, in a meeting at the Department, Brewster Jennings, President and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Socony-Mobil, informed Hoover and Wilkins that the company had no choice but to accede to Saud's request to close down operations in Israel. Jennings added that Standard Oil of Ohio might be interested in taking over Socony-Mobil's interest in Israel. Hoover replied that the Department "felt unable to raise objection to the decision which Socony had made." (Memorandum of conversation by Wilkins, September 15; *ibid.*, 886A.2553/9-1555)



tember 25. Primary purpose of visit is to discuss Saudi request that Socony choose between Aramco interest and Israeli operations. (Deptel 121<sup>3</sup>) Socony has decided it has no alternative but to accede King's request. It will retain its participation in Aramco and seek to dispose of its operations in Israel.

Socony will attempt: (1) have King cancel request in order prepare way for voluntary disposal; (2) to explain to King that disposal will require reasonable time, perhaps year or more.

Department feels unable to raise objection to Socony's decision. Department also recognizes practical difficulties of disposal and that it may take some time. FYI, there is possibility of sale to another American oil company. End FYI.

Socony representative will call on you and keep you fully informed. You may, in your discretion, give them all necessary and appropriate support in their relations with SAG.<sup>4</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>3</sup> Document 173.

<sup>4</sup> Jennings called on Hoover on October 20 to report that his meeting with King Saud on September 27 had been unavailing and that as there seemed to be no alternative, he had agreed to Socony's withdrawal from its operations in Israel. A memorandum of the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/10-2055.

---

**177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 24, 1955—1:33 p.m.*

149. Embtel 119.<sup>2</sup> Department believes it would be good policy to defer raising clear issue with King at this stage. Complete review US-Saudi relations would inject question Dhahran Air Base agreement into current discussion. Notice by either Saudi Arabians or ourselves of desire re-open negotiation of agreement not necessary before December 18. Meanwhile you have made clear to King and his advisers US views re Soviet-Saudi relations and Soviet arms for SA.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/9-1655. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Wilkins and approved by Allen.

<sup>2</sup> Document 175.

If Saudis initiate further discussions re latter two subjects you should continue rely on substance Deptels 56 and 141.<sup>3</sup> If you are further questioned on grant aid Department suggests you continue to comment as you did to Gargoni (Embtel 119). Saudis should receive no encouragement that we can, in year of substantially reduced aid budget, consider any provision economic or military grant aid, nor that we can, under any circumstances, consider aid to SAG without agreement required by USG legislation. You may also wish to frame your further conversations with comments first paragraph Deptel 387<sup>4</sup> in mind. Actual discussions with Saudis regarding aid at this stage however should avoid categorical statements in order not prejudice eventual avenues of approach when final decision is made regarding value Dhahran Air Base.

With regard benefits Dhahran Air Base agreement, we suggest addition of following to paragraph 3 of Deptel 387: "Air Force has given unofficial value Dhahran base installation, \$46,700,000; under 1951 agreements, all installation and construction property Saudi Arabian Government. Other services provided for Saudis estimated in excess \$1,000,000 per year." You may use the above paragraph at your discretion.

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> Documents 170 and 174, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Document 166.

---

**178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 30, 1955—7:06 p.m.*

157. We particularly concerned prevent Saudi Arabia from following Egyptian example in reaching agreement purchase Soviet arms and expect send you instructions make representations King week October 3. We considering . . . theme Nasser leading Egypt into arms of godless Communism which King because of his special position in Moslem world has responsibility to stop. In addition we are considering emphasizing to King in view his reported fear

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9-3055. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by William C. Burdett and approved by Russell. Pouched to London.

internal subversion and suspicion Egyptian advisers extreme danger in permitting Soviet influence penetrate any Arab country through arms deals.

We repeating oral representations which Allen will make to Nasser October 1 and separately letter from Secretary to Nasser which now will not be delivered but will form additional basis for verbal presentation. Your suggestions re best approach to King requested.

In meantime instructions Deptel 56 and 141<sup>2</sup> stand and you should not discuss locally possibility approach mentioned above.

Dulles

---

<sup>2</sup> Documents 170 and 174, respectively.

---

## 179. Editorial Note

According to the provisions of the July 30, 1954, Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of Shaikh Shakhbut ibn Sultan of Abu Dhabi and His Highness Sultan Said ibn Taimur of Muscat and Oman, and the Government of Saudi Arabia, an Arbitration Tribunal was established. The Tribunal was to determine a common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi within a line claimed by Saudi Arabia in 1949 and one claimed by Abu Dhabi in 1952; and to determine the sovereignty in an area within a circle, the center of which would be in the village of Buraimi and the circumference of which would pass through the point of junction of latitude 24°25' N. and longitude 55°36' E. (The text of the Agreement is in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1954*, volume 161, pages 187–198.)

The members of the Tribunal, Dr. Charles DeVisscher of Belgium, President; Dr. Ernesto Dihigo of Cuba; Dr. Mahmud Hasan of Pakistan; Sir Reader Bullard of Great Britain; and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin of Saudi Arabia, opened proceedings in Geneva on September 11, 1955. By September 15, the hearings had concluded and the Tribunal had withdrawn to consider its decision. On September 17, Bullard announced his resignation from the Tribunal. (Memorandum of conversation by Newsom, October 10; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/10–1055) According to a statement issued by the Foreign Office on October 4, Bullard's resignation was based on

evidence that Saudi Arabia had violated the Arbitration Agreement, attempted a coup d'état in Abu Dhabi, directed a campaign of bribery against the ruling family of Abu Dhabi, and that Yasin had conducted the proceedings of the Tribunal "on behalf of [the] Saudi Government." (Telegram 1364 from London, October 5; *ibid.*, 780.022/10-555)

---

**180. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 5, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Renewed Saudi Arabian Request for Military and Economic Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Ambassador Abdullah Al-Khayyal of Saudi Arabia  
Mr. Mohammad Mahdi, Third Secretary, Embassy of Saudi Arabia  
Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

The Ambassador began by stating that it was his purpose, while here, to establish closer and more friendly relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Secretary stated that he appreciated this. The Ambassador then stated that, in accordance with this, he would like to request military and economic aid from the United States.

The Secretary said he understood we were already extending aid to Saudi Arabia and asked Mr. Newsom for particulars. Mr. Newsom stated that we presently had a reimbursable military aid agreement with Saudi Arabia, under which we had sold them various items, including, most recently, nine B-26 aircraft. In addition, we had approved the sale of 18 M-41 tanks and Defense was currently processing the sale. In addition, facilities at the Dhahran Air Base, all of which become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government, and the activities of our military assistance group represent almost \$50,000,000 in aid over the past few years. Mr. Newsom also recalled that the United States, in 1954, offered Saudi Arabia a grant military aid agreement, but that the King did not feel he could sign

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5-MSP/10-555. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom. Approved by Dulles on October 12. In telegram 183, October 12, the Department conveyed the substance of this conversation to the Embassy in Jidda. (*Ibid.*)

the agreement required by our legislation. Finally, Saudi Arabia was receiving Point Four aid, but terminated the program.

The Ambassador then said they needed arms to strengthen their army and economic assistance for their ports and their railways. The Ambassador said the arms would be for their own defense and for the defense of the area.

The Secretary answered that, within the limit of our resources, we were sympathetic with Saudi Arabia's needs, desired to be helpful, and were giving assistance.

The Ambassador then asked if they could get such arms as they might request through the reimbursable aid agreement. The Secretary referred to the exchange of notes constituting a reimbursable aid agreement and stated that, in accordance with the provisions of this agreement and in principle, the United States Government was willing to sell such arms to Saudi Arabia as the Saudi Arabian Government might request.

The Ambassador asked whether the request to purchase 18 M-47 tanks, which was previously made and withdrawn, could be submitted again. The Secretary expressed his willingness, in accordance with the reimbursable aid agreement, to again consider this request.<sup>2</sup>

Ambassador Khayyal referred to the former request for grant military aid and asked if the United States were still willing to supply under an agreement. The Secretary said that if His Majesty's Government has changed its mind, we would again consider complying with the request. He explained that there were agreements required by legislation, however, which Saudi Arabia would have to sign.

Ambassador Khayyal asked if the U.S. could give Saudi Arabia "most favored nation" treatment with a minimum of conditions. The Secretary said we would not impose conditions which were not required by the legislation.

The Secretary indicated, however, that even though the United States and Saudi Arabia might reach agreement on grant aid, it would not mean funds would be available immediately for such aid. These were appropriated by the Congress and, when the present budget was considered, there appeared to be no possibility of an

---

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 150, October 5, which transmitted an account of the Ambassador's conversation with Prince Mishal, Wadsworth recommended that the Saudi request for 18 M-47 tanks be received favorably. The Ambassador also noted that Saudi Arabia had inquired about the possibility of receiving six C-119 aircraft. "I realize both questions may be awkward at this time but as Department already realizes", Wadsworth concluded, "early favorable answer might tip scales our favor in what today must be great debate in highest Saudi court circles: shall they in turn accept Soviet arms offer?" (*Ibid.*)

agreement with Saudi Arabia. A new budget would not be in effect until the middle of 1956.

The Ambassador raised the question of grant economic aid, as well. (Mr. Newsom asked, after the meeting with the Secretary, whether the Ambassador meant to include Point Four aid in this as well. The Ambassador said he did.) The Secretary said the Department would study this question with the Ambassador.

Turning from this discussion, the Ambassador said he had another point to make: The Arab and Muslim countries consider Saudi Arabia a special friend of the United States, yet they are surprised and disappointed that Saudi Arabia should have so little influence on United States policy in the area.

The Secretary answered that, although we did not speak of it very much, Saudi Arabia did have an influence. In the case of Israel, for example, we have, knowing Saudi Arabia's attitude, taken a cautious and reserved position and have not done things which Israel wanted. U.S. policy in recent years has been not to give more aid to Israel than we are giving to the Arab states. This policy has developed, in part, from the respect we have for Saudi Arabia.

Further, the Secretary said, we have used our good offices with the British to bring about some progress in the border problems and he understood some progress was being made in this question.

The Ambassador answered this by saying that he appreciated this friendship, but the United States had given nothing tangible; in three years Saudi Arabia had had nothing but promises. The Secretary responded by saying that the United States did not consider its friendship in terms of dollars, that some of our best friends, the Latin American countries, received nothing from us. Our aid had to be on the basis of the need and the danger to any given country as judged by the threat of the atheistic despotism which we were attempting to counteract.

### 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 10, 1955—7:34 p.m.*

177. Embtel 142;<sup>2</sup> Deptel 161.<sup>3</sup> You may in your discretion approach King regarding Egypt-Czech arms deal using substance Deptel 160 and in general approach outlined Embtel 142. Efforts encourage Arab leaders dissuade Nasser might have reverse effect however and for this reason do not consider it advisable ask Saudis dissuade Nasser at this time. We feel best approach is merely to inform King our position in view his importance in Arab and Islamic worlds and as you suggest by indirection argue in more palatable form against SAG following similar course.

You may further in manner you feel most effective wish state following:

1. US cannot agree with Nasser's statement that West unwilling supply arms. Recent Egyptian request purchase US arms was under active discussion at time Czech deal announced.

2. Department aware Saudis have received similar offer and is appreciative opportunity King has given us present our views.

3. US following policy non-intervention affairs of sovereign nations has given no ultimatum to Nasser nor have we asked anyone intervene with him. We have stated our position (Deptel 160) and fact we believe extension such deals other nations not in interests ultimate security Arab world and Islam.

4. In recalling Gargoni statement (Embdes 31<sup>4</sup>) we wish stress fact that Communism is particularly dangerous in nations of Near East where it can exploit tensions arising from impact new development with consequent serious threats internal subversion. Krushchev on September 17 told East German delegation "Geneva spirit" had not altered basic Communist aims. Soviets, although they have revised other parts Soviet Encyclopedia to conform to "new line" have not revised highly critical articles on Islam.

5. US has received SAG's note regarding Dhahran Air Base and will, following receipt of full text, be in communication with SAG concerning it. (Embtel 154<sup>5</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10-255. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Allen. Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv and pouched to Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, London, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 161, October 2, authorized Wadsworth to follow the guidelines conveyed in telegram 160 if he found them appropriate. (Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10-255) Telegram 160, October 2, sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda, instructed the Embassies in the presentation of U.S. views on the Soviet arms deal with Egypt. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 175.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 154, October 7, Wadsworth informed the Department that the Saudi Arabian Government, in a note dated October 4, had informed the Embassy of its intention to modify the Dhahran Airfield agreement and to terminate the agreement if

6. US will shortly advise SAG regarding exact cost M-41 tanks and hopes arrange delivery roughly within three months after completion financial arrangements. SAG request M-47 tanks will receive prompt consideration. Telegram follows regarding Ambassador's talk with Secretary October 5 in which Ambassador requests grant economic and military assistance.<sup>6</sup>

Soviet Foreign Office and Bulganin statements were pouched September 23.

## Murphy

no accord on the modifications were reached before June 18, 1956. The note indicated that the reasons for the action were the existence of the difficulties and misunderstandings in applying the agreement and the failure of the agreement to achieve its intended aim. The note concluded, however, that the Saudi Arabian Government was prepared to enter into immediate discussions to reach an agreement on the desired modifications. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/10-655) Wadsworth transmitted the full text of the Saudi note in despatch 44 from Jidda, October 11. (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/10-1155)

<sup>6</sup> See *supra*.

## 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 17, 1955—6:14 p.m.*

190. Saudi Ambassador today brought King's response to Secretary's conversation October 5 (Deptel 183<sup>2</sup>). Ambassador reiterated King's desire be friends with US but stated King needed arms. Saudi poorest armed of all countries in area despite wealth. King has considered Secretary's replies and accepts them as negative answer since they imply conditions. If this is final answer of US, King considers it refusal and wishes be excused if he tries to find arms where no conditions are attached.

Department replied His Majesty's decision is one for sovereign country to make. We pointed out however large amount US arms Saudis have purchased over four-year period and fact only outstand-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5-MSP/10-955. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Russell. Repeated to Cairo and London.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 180. A memorandum of the conversation between Allen and the Ambassador described in this telegram, erroneously dated October 14 but drafted on October 17, is in Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5-MSP/10-1455.



ing formal SAG request (for M-47 tanks) is currently under consideration.

FYI there seems little doubt SAG made approach in order be able state US has refused supply arms. Ambassador was categorically informed we have not refused and that provisions of grant agreement are similar to those already largely accepted in Reimbursable Aid Agreement.

Department will consider requests forwarded Embtels 150 and 160<sup>3</sup> in light of above. Your comments requested, end FYI.

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 180, and footnote 3, *supra*.

---

### 183. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*London, October 26, 1955—7 p.m.*

1699. Eden made statement in Commons today giving history of boundary problems with Saudi Arabia, announcing end of Buraimi arbitration,<sup>2</sup> and stating Trucial levies now moving to occupy area up to Riyadh line.<sup>3</sup> (Foreign Office explains this means 1935 line as amended recently.) Saudi police post ejected from Buraimi oasis earlier today, causing two casualties. Saudi Embassy informed this afternoon, following Eden statement, concurrently with notification to SAG in Jidda.

Foreign Office told Embassy decision to take above action made as result obvious failure arbitration, coupled with facts Saudis have continued violate arbitration agreement even after exposures at Geneva meeting of tribunal. Foreign Office official stated UK had given Saudis every opportunity settle Buraimi question on fair and legal basis but had no other recourse.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/10-2655. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, and Aden, and to Geneva as Tosec 66, October 28. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> For text of Eden's remarks, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 545, pp. 198-201.

<sup>3</sup> The Riyadh line or Ryan's line was the boundary line between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Trucial States, proposed by Sir Andrew Ryan, British Minister to Saudi Arabia, on November 25, 1935. In 1937 the line was again modified in favor of Saudi Arabia to include the Sufuk wells.

Foreign Office working level inclined believe after initial anger has been spent, Saudis will calm down and in any event there is little Saudis can do against latest British move except possibly take matter to UN. In this event UK prepared reveal full facts Saudi actions in arbitration proceedings and in Buraimi, which Foreign Office believes will undercut any Saudi case completely.

Embassy officer said Embassy would promptly inform Department and expressed view British action would cause considerable concern to USG.

**Aldrich**

---

**184. Message From the Director of Central Intelligence  
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Undated.*

1. In view of talks you are having about dangerous situation in Middle East, I wish to pass to you personally the substance of a report given to me by Terry Duce (representative of Aramco). . . . It concerns disturbing developments with regard to Buraimi.

2. Recent British forceable occupation of Buraimi negates five years U.S. Government effort to get Saudi Arabs and British to arbitrate their boundary controversies. It creates particularly bad impression, and undermines confidence in arbitration as a means of settlement, because of the manner in which the British appear to have sabotaged arbitration and resorted to force when arbitration appeared to be going somewhat against them. In September the British introduced before Geneva Arbitral Tribunal fantastic charges of Saudi bribery. (Duce fully familiar with Saudi . . . tactics and those stories do not ring true in any way.) Tribunal was able to determine that charges had not been substantiated and was ready to adopt the Saudi proposals for establishment of neutral supervision in Buraimi area when Bullard, British member of Tribunal, resigned on minutes notice, despite protest of Devisscher, its Belgian president. Since then Devisscher and another neutral have resigned apparently

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret. The source text bears no date nor place of origin. The reference to the "recent British forceable occupation of Buraimi" in the second paragraph, however, suggests that the message was written after October 26. A marginal notation on the source text reads: "Sec saw".

in belief that arbitration had become impossible, although Devisscher indicates willingness to reconsider if requested by both parties. Aramco's name mentioned in extensive publicity on bribery charges in British press and Duce gives categorical assurances Aramco played no role in Buraimi goings on and is convinced that bribery story submitted to the Tribunal and carried in the press is sheer invention.

3. Foresee following consequences:

A. Fight between British and tribes.

B. Introduction of another issue of colonialism in UN at most inopportune moment.

C. Complete nullification in Middle East of years of effort to establish arbitration as peaceful and workable method of determining boundaries with result of loss of faith by Middle East people in such orderly process. Incidental result would be to weaken UK basis for protesting possible Israeli alternative of frontier by force now that UK has just done same thing. Dignity and force of tripartite agreement bound to suffer as consequence.

D. Although force employed without prior consultation with U.S., Prince Feisal has stated he unable to believe British could have taken such a step without prior U.S. concurrence.

4. Timing particularly unfortunate since it bound to make Soviet offer of arms even more attractive.

5. Most desirable solution in eyes of Duce and his associates would be prompt reconstitution of arbitral tribunal and resumption of arbitration together with some form of supervision by neutrals over area in contention. If this possible joint presentation of problem to Security Council by British and Saudi Arabs could be urged with view to resuming arbitration under Council auspices.

6. No need to emphasize danger to U.S. interest, e.g. airbase, if situation continues to deteriorate. (End of Duce's report.)

7. For your information, in view Duce's business connections this report may be somewhat prejudiced, but on the whole we have found him an able reporter.

---

## 185. Editorial Note

On October 28, Alfred leSesne Jenkins, Counselor of the Embassy at Jidda, transmitted the substance of his conversation that day with Khalid Bey al-Walid, Royal Counselor to the King. According to Jenkins, Khalid expressed his concern over the recent British action in Buraimi; stated that the British move would destroy

Saudi efforts to resist Communism and aid from Russia; questioned the "friendship" between the United States and the United Kingdom; and referred to the "arrogant indifference, conceit and distortion of facts" in the British note of October 26 informing Saudi Arabia of the occupation of Buraimi. Jenkins responded that in the absence of formal instructions from Washington he would offer Khalid his personal observations. To the best of his knowledge, Jenkins noted, the United States had not been informed of the British action until it was a *fait accompli*. Referring to Khalid's remarks about friendship between the United States and the United Kingdom, Jenkins noted that while there might be disagreements among "free friends," it was important to maintain the "fundamental bases of friendship in constant and true perspective." Jenkins reiterated his surprise over the British action and noted that the United States was concerned over the incident and was studying its implications. (Telegram 189 from Jidda, October 28; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/10-2855)

Acting Secretary Hoover replied on October 29, indicating his approval of Jenkins' remarks to Khalid and instructing the Chargé to inform the Saudi Government that the United States "had no advance intimation whatever" of the British action and that when the British Embassy in Washington subsequently notified him of the British occupation of Buraimi, he immediately expressed "astonishment and concern at this precipitate move." (Telegram 212 to Jidda; *ibid.*)

---

**186. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Dhahran, October 30, 1955—7 p.m.*

79. Depressed and bitter, Saud bin Jilewi<sup>2</sup> said yesterday to me re Buraimi affair UK felt it had no further chance in the arbitration where SAG rights were prevailing and the only way UK thought it could protect its interest was by force, "so often the case between a powerful nation and a defenseless state such as Saudi Arabia." He said that SAG had kept to its word on forces in the oasis, a word it

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/10-3055. Confidential. Sent also to Jidda and repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> Amir Saud ibn Jilewi, Governor of Al Hasa province.

has given for the duration of the arbitration, and the UK had acted in violation of its own word. He ended up with an inexplicable, but possibly ominous "perhaps it all for the best—may come out better this way".

UK PR and PA on Bahrain Thursday<sup>3</sup> told me of action of Wednesday and showed me Eden statement. Their comment was that there was no alternative in view of SAG violation of agreement (i.e., bribery, intimidation, etc.) and that any other action might have imperilled their [*apparent omission*] interests.

Local public, within the informed limitations, feels bitterness and shock.

Aramco reports a working party at approximately 52 degrees 50 minutes east and 22 degrees 45 minutes north circled Friday and "buzzed" yesterday by four-engine plane. No knowledge of any messages being dropped as yet but felt that intent was clear—by endangering party, to drive them from area. Party is operating south of approved arbitration line.

Needless to say, Aramco top level is deeply concerned over affair:<sup>4</sup> their concern is not only directed toward the safety of their men in the field but also to another factor. SAG would appear to have as recourse either appeal to the UN or US against UK action. In either event we may find ourselves in middle. In this instance the "who is not for us is against us" approach of the SAG may well have a serious effect. If we find ourselves either supporting UK or abstaining from any support of SAG, the SAG, it is felt here, will not easily forgive us. In case of Consulate General and Aramco we cannot overlook relationship between local SAG and American citizens. Protection of Americans, granted willingly and as a friendly favor, is probably more on an "act of grace" basis, [garble] Saud bin Jilewi has told me he would always help unless we made it "impossible". I am afraid that "impossible" phase may lie before us if we concur with the British action.

Our basic policy vis-à-vis British power in Persian Gulf area I understand is position of supporting that power unless it is acting contrarily to our interests in the Persian Gulf. So far as I can see at present, Buraimi seizure as carried out is action which will have unfavorable repercussion on Consulate General's ability to support welfare American citizens in Dhahran complex, unless we condemn the UK action. So far as Bahrain is concerned, Bahrainis, as Department is aware, are gradually moving their campaign for certain civil liberties into an anti-UK movement: after all Bapco is a United

<sup>3</sup> October 25.

<sup>4</sup> Documentation on conversations between representatives of Aramco and the Department on the Buraimi affair is in Department of State, Central File 780.022.

States investment, and Bahraini feelings toward us may likewise become prejudiced.

Finally it has been noted that Egypt is making a considerable effort in Bahrain and, we understand, Kuwait. This British action may drive Saudis and Egyptians together in Persian Gulf area, something contrary to what we were beginning to hope might happen (i.e., Saudi reluctance to see Egypt penetrations their backyard).

On balance, therefore, from a local point of view, I feel that the UK action in Buraimi may have prejudiced US interests in Gulf area and our stand on this UK action may have significant effect our interests here.<sup>5</sup>

**Carrigan**

---

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 221, November 3, the Department authorized Carrigan to convey to ibn Jilewi the contents of Document 170. Both the Consul General and the Ambassador were also instructed to inform officials of Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government that the Department was expressing its concern to the British over their action and "as friend of both" was urging a return to arbitration. The entire situation, the Department concluded, was under active review. (*Ibid.*, 780.022/10-3055) In a memorandum to Sherman Adams, November 1, transmitting extracts of the day's Department of State summary considered of possible interest to the President, Goodpaster noted that according to the Consul General in Dhahran, "the UK seizure of Buraimi may have prejudiced U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

---

**187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 4, 1955—6:45 p.m.*

223. Following summarizes memorandum re Buraimi given to British Ambassador November 3:<sup>2</sup>

US concerned regarding possible repercussions recent British action. Coming at this time action may offer new opportunities to those seeking destroy Western influence in Near East and make it

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/11-455. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Wilkins. Sent also to London (by pouch); repeated to Dhahran; and pouched to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum was given to Makins by Hoover in the course of a conversation concerning a number of Middle East problems; filed with a memorandum of the conversation, *ibid.*, 874.2614/11-355.

increasingly difficult persuade Near Eastern nations adopt peaceful measures in settlement disputes.

We agree with UK it would be preferable not discuss Buraimi issue in SC if other arrangements possible. We do not believe in present context events we will be in position dissuade SAG from asking SC consideration without offering alternatives. Neither do we believe in the event matter went to SC that we could at this time assure UK our support. In desire examine other avenues of approach we suggest consideration following possible courses of action:

1) Direct talks between UK and SAG concerning current questions including Buraimi, recovery Aramco equipment on Aden Protectorate borders, continuation oil exploration in arbitration zone allotted to Saudi Arabia's concessionaires.

2) Return to arbitration by withdrawal British-led forces, substitution neutral supervisory commission within zone assisted by complements of police from both sides, and reconstitution arbitration tribunal with new members.

3) If neither of foregoing acceptable, peaceful solution in some other form.

If these approaches appear to be helpful to solution US willing discuss them with SAG.

**Hoover**

---

**188. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Jidda, November 6, 1955—2 p.m.*

208. Reference: Deptel 223,<sup>2</sup> London unnumbered, and last sentence my telegram 207<sup>3</sup> reading "King Saud is sorely troubled by

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/11-655. Secret; Niact. Re-ported to London and Cairo.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 207, November 6, Wadsworth informed the Department of his conversation with the King regarding the proposed visit to Saudi Arabia of a five-member House Armed Services Subcommittee. Wadsworth noted that the upcoming visit might be "signally beneficial" to relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-PR/11-655) The committee, consisting of Congressmen Melvin Price, W. Sterling Cole, George Miller, Walter Norblad, and William Bates, was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia between November 10 and 13. For documentation on the visit, see *ibid.*, 033.1100-PR/11-1555.

crisis in Saudi-British relations as result Buraimi occupation, and I have good reason believe he looks to USG for help".

On October 31 I delivered Acting Secretary's message (Deptel 212, repeated information London 2400<sup>4</sup>) to Royal Counselor Khalid Bey who undertook communicate it at once to King Saud. He said in substance:

This is important and welcome communication, important to Saudi-American relations and reassuring to us. His majesty is deeply concerned and troubled not only by British action in occupying Buraimi but also because of arrest of certain shaikhs of area whom British handcuffed and took to Dubai where they are held in prison.

His Majesty will not act precipitately, but he will exhaust every effort to maintain his rights, even to breaking relations with Britain should developments so dictate. He has already decided in principle to take dispute to Security Council.

Before taking definitive action however he will consult Prince Faisal who is returning from Cairo November 2 and Yusuf Yasin and Abdul Rahman Azzam whom he has called from Geneva. He is also consulting Richard Young in US.

On November 2 I attended lunch and on November 4 and 5 dinners given in King's honor. At lunch protocol official told me King was "extremely annoyed" British Chargé d'Affaires was present. Same day, by palace order, Chargé was not invited to either dinner; and there is reason believe King has said he will not receive British Ambassador-designate Parkes.

At dinner November 4 Prince Faisal told me dispute would be taken to Security Council after emergency meeting Arab League Political Committee to meet in Cairo this weekend and preparation of case by legal counsel. I asked if he had received Mister Hoover's message. He answered "Yes, but we don't yet know USG position". I replied my only later news was "matter is under active review" (Deptel 221<sup>5</sup>). He commented he could not "see how British could have done such a thing".

At dinner November 5 King showed me marked special favors, enquiring, inter alia, if meeting that morning between General Schlatter and Defense Minister Prince Mishal had been satisfactory and welcoming forthcoming visit Armed Services Subcommittee. He did not mention Buraimi but said he wished "discuss matters" with

---

<sup>4</sup> See Document 185.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 221 to Jidda, sent also to Dhahran, November 3, the Department authorized the consul general and the Ambassador, inter alia, to inform Aramco and the Saudi Government that the Department was expressing its concern to the British over their action and that it was urging a return to arbitration. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/10-3055)



me, if not before leaving for Riyadh November 7, then during my visit there November 12.

(*Note:* General Schlatter had, with my approval, enquired re "modifications" in Dhahran Airfield agreement desired by SAG. Gist of answer was SAG wanted help in strengthening its armed forces and that details of modification should present no problem. (I have had similar assurances from King through Khalid Bey and from Prince Faisal.) We will try to answer Deptel 218<sup>6</sup> shortly.

Same day Abdul Rahman Azzam lunched with me. He had received two telegrams from Young (Deptel 222<sup>7</sup>) and agreed "from strictly legal viewpoint" with Young's advice as to steps precedent to submission Buraimi dispute to Security Council. However, he could not "in conscience and as Arab" recommend following them, for "King's honor was at stake, and tribes were looking to him to act; even throne might be threatened".

He then argued that he at Geneva following British arbitrator's resignation, and SAG here had made abundantly clear to British Government and world Saudi desire resume and continue arbitration. British on other hand had sabotaged it for simple reason they saw they would lose. To again ask them to arbitrate would imply admission some truth in their charges of bribery, et cetera; there was none.

I have known Abdul Rahman many years; he was truly incensed. He added "I am man of peace and I have recommended pacific settlement of this dispute, but as Arab my heart is with those who want to fight. You know these people; their honor is at stake." (Department please compare with Khalid's opening remarks, above.)

*Comment:* There is much rumor that "white army" has been alerted. Semi-official "Bilad al Saudia" reports popular subscriptions, e.g., half month's salary by Saudi Air Force officers; and King himself told me November 2 of one of half million dollars.

If Department concurs my recommendation Armed Services Subcommittee should visit King November 12, I venture suggest appropriate instructions be sent Durbrow in Bombay or Addis Ababa; and I should appreciate further guidance supplementing Deptel 223 before November 11.

**Wadsworth**

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 218 to Jidda, sent also to Dhahran, November 3, the Department requested the Embassy to estimate what Saudi Arabia might demand during the forthcoming negotiations on the Dhahran Airfield. Wadsworth was also instructed to suggest counterproposals which might be employed in meeting the Saudi demands. In preparing his estimate, the Department instructed Wadsworth to "keep in mind that Department does not presently assume retention base so essential that we are willing attempt meet unreasonable or exorbitant Saudi demands." (*Ibid.*, 711.56383A/10-1155)

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 780.022/11-455)

189. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings, at Geneva**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 10, 1955—7:39 p.m.*

Tosec 226. During last few days we have suggested to British that they return to arbitration to settle Buraimi issue. We have also urged SAG to continue arbitration.<sup>2</sup> Yesterday British replied that arbitration had been made impossible by SAG on grounds of bribery and intimidation. In view of general tense situation in NE we recommend you urge Macmillan to return to arbitration in some form with addition of neutral observers in Buraimi oasis area. Addition of latter should cover British point re bribery or intimidation and provide new formula for British acceptance.<sup>3</sup>

**Hoover**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1055. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Allen. Repeated to London and Jidda.

<sup>2</sup> On November 7 in a meeting with the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, Allen informed al-Khayyal that the United States had expressed its concern to the British over the occupation of Buraimi. He also expressed the hope that the matter might still be resolved by arbitration. Allen then presented the Ambassador with a memorandum outlining the U.S. position on Buraimi. The memorandum reiterated U.S. concern over the collapse of arbitration and the British occupation of Buraimi. It also reaffirmed the earlier U.S. position that it had no advance knowledge of the British action, and expressed the hope that both parties might be able to resume arbitration. (Memorandum of conversation, November 7; *ibid.*, 684A.86/11-755) A copy of the U.S. memorandum is attached to a memorandum of November 7 from Wilkins to Allen. (*Ibid.*, 780.022/11-755) In telegram 230 to Jidda, November 9, the Department transmitted the substance of the memorandum presented to al-Khayyal on November 7. (*Ibid.*, 780.022/11-955)

<sup>3</sup> On November 13 Secretary Dulles informed the Department from Geneva that he had told Macmillan that he hoped the British would be able to return to arbitration. According to Dulles, Macmillan indicated that this was impossible in view of the extent of Saudi corruption. Dulles added that Macmillan had stated that he was "hurt" by the content of the U.S. memorandum on Buraimi delivered to the British Embassy on November 3. (Secto 284; *ibid.*, 396.1-GE/11-1355)

**190. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, November 22, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Luncheon Meeting with Secretary of the Air Force

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Donald Quarles, Secretary of the Air Force  
Mr. James H. Douglas, Under Secretary of the Air Force  
Major General Richard C. Lindsay, Director of Plans, Air Force  
Mr. John Johnson, Air Force General Counsel  
Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary, NEA  
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director, NE

Assistant Secretary Allen lunched with Mr. Quarles and others today. During the course of the luncheon various aspects of the political situation in the Near East were discussed. Against this background the question of the Dhahran Airbase was taken up. Mr. Quarles said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering the importance of the Dhahran Airbase and related matters. He added that the preliminary view of the Department of the Air Force was that the Dhahran Airbase was of importance but not of overriding interest to the United States. He said that the United States had invested about \$50 million in the Dhahran Airbase and that he did not believe it could be duplicated for less than \$100 million today. He said that if the United States and Saudi Arabia were not able to agree on an extension of the Airbase, it would be necessary to find other facilities in the area—in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Iran or possibly Qatar. In view of these factors, the Department of the Air Force and, he believed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hoped the U.S. could retain the Dhahran Airbase, but they were not willing to pay an exorbitant price therefor. Meanwhile, Mr. Quarles suggested the Department of State might attempt to assess the attitude of the Saudi Arabian Government in Jidda with respect to the price we might be expected to pay and that we might also attempt quietly to ascertain whether air facilities could be made available in Iraq or possibly elsewhere.

Mr. Allen said that he concluded from Mr. Quarles' remarks that the Department of the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs now held views generally similar to those which they had expressed in the past. Mr. Allen noted that the Department of State had already requested the American Embassy in Jidda for an assessment of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/11-2255. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins.

Saudi Arabian attitude and related factors.<sup>2</sup> The Department had also queried the American Embassy in Baghdad regarding possible air facilities there. Colonel Butler, the Air Attaché, was away for a few days and Ambassador Gallman was awaiting his return before expressing their views.

Secretary Quarles and Assistant Secretary Allen agreed further to discuss the matter when more information was available.

---

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 218, November 3, the Department instructed Wadsworth to prepare estimates of possible Saudi demands during future negotiations on the Dhahran Airfield, and to suggest possible U.S. counterproposals. See footnote 6, Document 188.

---

### 191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 23, 1955—8:27 p.m.*

2929. Embtel 2107,<sup>2</sup> 2133.<sup>3</sup> Department views with concern British reply to SAG note re Buraimi. We suggest you discuss with Foreign Office in following terms:

1. All evidence available to Department indicates Saudi Arabia takes most serious view of Buraimi action and that considerable pressure within Saudi Arabia is on King to use force. This pressure will not diminish but will increase and continuance of dispute may result in explosion.

2. Partly through efforts American advisers, King has maintained moderate policy, proceeding for second time to seek resumption arbitration, and curbing more extreme followers.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/11-2155. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins and Newsom and approved by Allen. Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2107, November 21, transmitted the substance of the British reply to the Saudi note of November 11 which proposed the resumption of arbitration. The British reply rejected Saudi Arabia's suggestions for a return to arbitration, a return to the status quo ante, and the appointment of a neutral committee to observe the Buraimi area until the dispute was settled. The British note offered to discuss suggestions with the Saudi Arabian Government for improving relations between the two countries. The full texts of the British and Saudi notes are enclosures to despatch 61 from Jidda, November 23. (*Ibid.*, 780.022/11-2355)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2133 dealt with another matter. Reference is presumably to telegram 2123 from London, November 22, in which Aldrich informed the Department, *inter alia*, that according to a Foreign Office official, there was no prospect of the British returning to arbitration with Saudi Arabia. (*Ibid.*, 780.022/11-2255)

3. In view British rejection latest Saudi request to resume arbitration, it now seems likely case will go to Security Council. We think this will tend to worsen situation. There will be charge and counter charge which will be detrimental to both sides. Effect will be further weakening of standing of Western countries.

4. We do not wish to comment on substance of Buraimi issue which until recently was under arbitration.

5. We realize arbitration may not have been perfect, but rather than throw away chance to achieve agreed settlement, we feel efforts should be made to perfect it.

6. Best current proposal for improving seems to be resumption of arbitration tribunal in Switzerland plus appointment of neutral commission in Saudi Arabia. We do not mean under UN auspices as in Indo China or Korea, but by selection of neutral commission by parties themselves. This procedure will take care bribery and intimidation aspect. We fear that reference to UN may bring about just type of neutral intervention by UN which UK fears.

7. We have reason to believe King is standing firm for present against efforts by some of his advisers to get him to accept Soviet arms offers and has refused to open diplomatic negotiations at this time. However, King plans visit India November 26. . . .

8. US shares with Britain desire to see retention UK influence in Persian Gulf area. We feel such influence can only be maintained over long run by achieving bilateral agreements on outstanding issues and preventing such disputes as this from awakening latent anti-Western feeling now manifested in troubles throughout Gulf sheikhdoms.

9. We are therefore impelled by what we consider seriousness of situation to bring these considerations to UK attention before attitudes have hardened and irrevocable steps are taken.<sup>4</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>4</sup> On November 26, the Embassy in London notified the Department that it had conveyed the substance of telegram 2929 to the Foreign Office on November 25. The Embassy also noted that it had expressed the hope that the United Kingdom would be willing to resume arbitration. (Telegram 2171; *ibid.*, 780.022/11-2655)

## 192. Editorial Note

On November 25, British Foreign Secretary Macmillan, in a message sent through Ambassador Aldrich in London to Dulles, conveyed his impressions of the recent Baghdad Pact meeting held in Baghdad during the week of November 21. After a discussion of the Arab-Israeli problem, the importance of the Baghdad Pact, and the increasing dangers of Communist activities throughout the Middle East, Macmillan turned to the problem of Saudi Arabia:

"The second problem is that of Saudi Arabia, and the misuse of these immense sums now available. . . . This raises of course very difficult problems and I would suggest that we might do two things. First we could make a joint study of the facts, based upon . . . information available to us. Secondly we could see what measures we can take either by direct governmental action or through the oil industry. You and I, of course, know all the old difficulties and suspicions. But I think the Middle Eastern position is so serious that we must use our influence to get the same kind of cooperation here as we have established in other parts of the world. It is too big an issue for us to act separately. You will of course reply, what about Buraimi? But I am quite prepared that this should be open for discussion between us just as frankly as the rest of the problem." (Telegram 2170 from London; Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-2555)

Dulles' December 5 reply to Macmillan reads in part as follows:

"I was pleased that you mentioned the Buraimi incident as a matter of our mutual concern. I am disturbed by the possibility of this becoming another issue to be seized upon by nations in the area to attack the West and I believe a solution is urgently needed, possibly through a resumption of arbitration with an effective neutral supervisory commission in the zone of dispute." (Telegram 3132 to London; *ibid.*)

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>*Jidda, November 30, 1955—8 a.m.*

243. Reference last paragraph my telegram 242<sup>2</sup> repeated information London 30.

1. Prince Faisal gave me November 24 copy last British note dated November 21 re Buraimi dispute (London Embtels 2107 and 2123 to Department<sup>3</sup>). He said he had searched it carefully for possible way out of dispute but every approach led only to end of blind alley.

He said no decision regarding it had been taken and, when taken, I would be informed. He added: "Our direction is towards United Nations Security Council; if nothing changes, we will follow course recommended by Young".

2. On November 20 King had told Aramco Board Chairman Davies he would not use force until after following Young's program. Davies reports him as adding he was man of peace but, if nothing should be accomplished by following that program, there seemed no alternative but to use force to eject British forces.

November 22 King proceeded by train from Riyadh to Dammam where some 20,000 greeted his arrival. Two addresses of welcome stressed British perfidy and called for jihad (holy war). Emotions ran high as King interrupted program to reply; highlights were:

I shall do utmost through diplomatic channels to avoid violence and bloodshed of my people . . . but if British persist in what they are doing (*Note:* elsewhere he called it aggression) I shall be first soldier to go . . . we shall defend our country with our lives . . . I pray God to lead his religion victorious . . . to thwart the conspirators.<sup>4</sup>

3. On November 25, when King received Eli Stevens with Embassy Arab consultant Muhammad, he must have been aware of contents British note of November 21.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/11-3055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 242, November 30, Wadsworth reported the substance of an audience between the King and Eli Stevens. According to a memorandum by Stevens, the King indicated that despite offers of arms from Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland he wanted the United States to be the only source of arms for Saudi Arabia. If the United States could not provide arms, Saud reportedly noted, he would be forced to reconsider. The King also noted, *inter alia*, that the United States might continue to use the Dhahran airfield in return for strengthening the Saudi armed forces under the proposed 5-year plan. (*Ibid.*, 611.86A/11-3055)

<sup>3</sup> See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 191.

<sup>4</sup> All ellipses are in the source text.

Stevens memo of audience reports him as having recounted history of dispute, then saying:

I will accept any advice USG will give me. If it says, go to Security Council, I will go; if to make positive action, I will; if to break relations and boycott Britain, I will; but whatever action USG advises, I would like guarantee of its support, and I will be guided by its advice.

Then mentioning Department's memo handed Saudi Ambassador November 7 offering exercise USG good offices with British Government (Deptel 230<sup>5</sup>) King said he had accepted offer and would like know soon as possible whether USG had approached British Government and results any such action. He added that if USG could not find early solution he would be forced to act (probably, as matters now stand, by taking dispute to Security Council).

Finally, Stevens reports that, in concluding audience, King reaffirmed he would take no decision until after receiving USG reply, provided it be received within "reasonable period".

4. Muhammad, who returned Jidda yesterday, confirms accuracy foregoing summary and, as in DAF-arms matter, stressed King's desire for early answer.

Wadsworth

---

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 189.

---

**194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 2, 1955—8:11 p.m.*

264. Embtel 243.<sup>2</sup> You may in your discretion indicate the following to Faisal and other SAG officials that USG:

1. has followed development Buraimi issue closely;
2. understands pressures on King and appreciates moderate attitude SAG has followed;
3. shares King's desire prevent violence in area and is making every effort support steps leading to satisfactory peaceful agreement;

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/11-3055. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Hoover. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*



4. appreciates King's reliance on advice individual Americans such as Young, and request for advice to USG. King's request receiving urgent and studied consideration.

5. has again pressed Buraimi matter with British in Washington and London, urging return to arbitration.

In connection with latter point you may make use of substance of Deptel 252<sup>3</sup> without reference to likelihood of SC consideration and comments on UK position in Gulf (paragraphs 3 and 8).

We will also mention US views to Azzam and Saudi Ambassador as we plan see them shortly.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 252 to Jidda was a repeat of Document 191.

<sup>4</sup> Hoover met with the Saudi Ambassador and Azzam Pasha on December 2; a memorandum of the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12-255.

---

#### 195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 8, 1955—3:57 p.m.*

268. Embtel 242.<sup>2</sup> In view King's current interest, Department now (Deptel 218<sup>3</sup>) believes it appropriate send formal acknowledgment Saudi note October 4 on Dhahran Air Base. In your discretion you may reply US willing discuss continuation of agreement and is studying possible modifications which it may also wish propose. Reply should state US appreciates desire SAG undertake conversations promptly and will notify SAG at once as soon as necessary preliminary studies completed by USG.

You may, in your discretion, at same time report verbally to Prince Faisal you have transmitted King's suggestion regarding possible US role in five-year armed forces development plan to Washington and pertinent Departments USG currently studying plan.

With respect M-41 tanks, payment made and Department has requested expeditious delivery.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/11-3055. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Allen. Pouched to London.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 193.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 188.

FYI: Department has noted assistance in implementing five-year plan likely be quid pro quo for DAB. Are we to assume from your message you believe Saudis might be willing consider a commitment on our part to provide portion of requirements for five-year program on reimbursable basis as starting point in negotiations. In reply Deptel 218 would appreciate elaboration without discussing matter with SAG of your views on extent to which you expect grant aid may be requested. In view rapid developments telegraph full summary reply Deptel 218.

Department plans send you further message for King prior his return December 12.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> King Saud was visiting India. On December 13 Wadsworth transmitted a résumé of Faisal's reaction to the U.S. note to Saudi Arabia on the Dhahran Airfield. According to the Ambassador, Faisal indicated, inter alia, that the renewal of the agreement would serve no useful purpose unless the United States would agree to assist Saudi Arabia in "building our strength." Wadsworth noted that Faisal expressed a hatred for Russia and communism. Faisal reportedly added that "what Russia and Bulganin are to America, Israel and Ben-Gurion are to us. We must be strong to meet that threat also." Faisal concluded by expressing a willingness to reach an agreement on the "new formula"—U.S. use of the airfield for American help in strengthening the Saudi Armed Forces. (Telegram 261 from Jidda; Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/12-1355)

---

**196. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Jidda, December 13, 1955—2 p.m.*

260. Re Deptel 268<sup>2</sup> repeated information London unnumbered.

1. Embassy Arab consultant delivered personally to Foreign Minister Prince Faisal December 12 first person note in sense first paragraph reference telegram together with verbal report in sense its second paragraph.

2. Re "FYI" reference telegram, Department is wholly correct in assuming that United States assistance in implementing "5-year plan" for strengthening Saudi armed forces is likely to be necessary quid pro quo for renewal Dhahran airfield agreement.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/12-1355. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

It would, however, in my opinion, be wholly incorrect to assume that Saudis might be willing consider commitment on our part to provide, on cash-reimbursable basis, portion of requirements for 5-year program as starting point in negotiations.

From my many conversations with King Saud and his counselors, I am convinced that starting point and basis for negotiations must be willingness on our part to lay firm foundation, as King sees it, for future American-Saudi relations based on realistic friendship and practical cooperation.

He has told us (my telegram 128 February 18, 1954 from Dhahran<sup>3</sup>) and confirmed one year later (my despatch 164<sup>4</sup>) that our enemies are his enemies and that, in same way his father permitted us to build and use DAF during last war, he would wish us use Saudi airfields in third world war. He added, however, that "America has not fulfilled all the promises it undertook when signing the DAF agreement"; and my despatch 181<sup>5</sup> reported my supposition that this remark had been prompted by our failure, following signature 1951 agreement, to provide grant military aid.

Today, question of grant military aid (in strict MDAP sense of term) does not arise, because King Saud, no more than Nasser, would consider signing conventional grant military aid agreement. To do so, King and counselors believe, would establish wholly unacceptable satellite relationship.

In lieu thereof, new formula has emerged in conversations following Saudi note of October 4 calling for renegotiation of DAF agreement. Expressed so far in general terms only, this formula is, in substance, as reported in paragraphs 2 and 5 my telegram 219.<sup>6</sup> It is mentioned in King's secret message November 20 (my telegram 234<sup>7</sup>) as well as in my telegram 242.<sup>8</sup>

Boldly put (if my crystal ball and 40 years oriental bargaining experience do not fail me) this formula, in Saudi thinking, has as its corollary today the very simple proposition that, if we will supply gratis and without grant aid agreement all equipment needed to implement King's 5-year plan, SAG will renew DAF agreement for another 5 years with but minor modifications in its present terms.

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/2-1854)

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 033.1100-TA/4-2955)

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 786A.13/5-2155)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 219, November 15, Wadsworth informed the Department of the visit to Saudi Arabia, November 10-13, of the House Armed Services Subcommittee. According to Wadsworth, during discussions with the congressional delegation, both Faisal and Saud raised the issue of the "formula" on which the Dhahran Airfield might be renegotiated. (*Ibid.*, 033.1100PR/11-1555)

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 611.86A/11-2255)

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 2, Document 193.

(*Note:* The word "all" has not been used thus far, but I can well imagine Yusuf Yasin starting with even larger demands.)

My telegram 242 reported estimated total cost of 5-year plan is \$400,000,000; of which \$65,000,000 was last of presently programmed equipment (not including spare parts and transport costs) if purchased from USG on cash-reimbursable basis. (*Note:* There are signs today that, in face of Israeli aggression, latter figure may be increased, e.g., by programming early delivery 7 additional jet fighter aircraft.)

Saudi thinking, to continue my analysis, can readily argue that, for use of DAF under present agreement, we undertook in 1951 to operate it as Saudi civilian airport without cost to SAG, to train Saudis as civilian airport technicians, and to supply military equipment (on cash-reimbursable basis) and military training mission (not MAAG in MDAP sense of term) for strengthening Saudi armed forces. What more natural, then, than that we should now, in far more critical political atmosphere than prevailed in 1951, accept this added undertaking for strengthening Saudi armed forces in return for use of what today is well-appointed Saudi airfield worth, because of improvements we have since made, some \$50,000,000 as against less than \$10,000,000 in 1951?

3. My own current thinking is that we would do well to go along with this new formula, because it offers both sound constructive basis for friendly negotiations designed to achieve common-interest objectives and high flexibility of position in what seems likely become difficult bargaining with SAG representatives.

For instance, if USG is prepared to go that high, we might suggest supply of equipment be on 50-50 basis or, alternately, offer to contribute major items of equipment such as tanks, aircraft and artillery, while continuing to facilitate Saudi acquisition of other needed items on cash-reimbursable basis. Moneywise, this alternative is attractive because, with obsolescence, value of major items would diminish as program progressed.

Another point which Department may wish consider at even this early stage is that, while SAG will no doubt appoint negotiating team, final deal in all likelihood must be with King personally—this having been Aramco's experience in all important negotiations—and, in last analysis, best deal with him could probably be made in Washington if President Eisenhower would invite him visit United States next spring after our preliminary negotiations here (Deptel 125<sup>9</sup>).

---

<sup>9</sup> In telegram 125, September 9, the Department informed the Embassy in Jidda that according to Harry Kern of *Newsweek*, the Saudi Ambassador and Sheikh Jabbar of

I would, too, feel more comfortable as to continuing value of King's assurances re wartime use of Saudi airfields (see fourth subparagraph of paragraph 2 above) if King reiterated them to President Eisenhower. He might even be led, if exercise our good offices in Buraimi dispute is successful, to permit some "militarization" of DAF (e.g. stockpiling) and, on basis Suez precedent, agree to its conversion into military base in event Russian attack on Turkey.

4. In foregoing paragraphs, drafted as answer to reference telegram, I have made substantial answer also to most of still pertinent questions put in Deptel 218.<sup>10</sup> Following refers specific points its paragraph 3:

- a. Not applicable, see above.
- b. Not applicable, but we may hear again of Riyadh-Jidda railway project.<sup>11</sup>
- c. I should hope they would continue within framework five-year plan.
- d. We are giving adequate current support in Buraimi issues; our testing will come if good offices fail and dispute is taken to Security Council. Palestine and North Africa will remain seriously troubling issues.
- e. General Schlatter has already replied.
- f. General Schlatter has answered first point. "Intended aim" seems clearly to have meant military equipment and perhaps economic aid. "Difficulties and misunderstanding", apart from our failure to have understood and met Saudi intended aim, are of minor

---

the Saudi Embassy in Washington had indicated Saud's desire to visit the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/9-955)

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 2, Document 190. In paragraph 3 of telegram 218, the Department instructed the Embassy to formulate estimates of prospective Saudi demands in terms of: (a) military grant aid; (b) economic grant aid, including specific project requests; (c) reimbursable aid requests; (d) U.S. support on international issues; (e) changes in MAAG arrangement; (f) specific changes in wording and provisions present Air Base Agreement. The Department queried: "In this connection what do you believe Saudis mean in note by 'difficulties and misunderstandings' and 'intended aim?'"

<sup>11</sup> Early in 1955, the Saudi Arabian Government had begun to explore the possibilities of possible U.S. loan assistance for the construction of a railroad from Riyadh to Jidda through Medina. By October Saudi Arabia sought to interest private American and European firms in the construction of the line. According to the Embassy in Jidda, the question of the financing of the railroad was still undetermined as of then. (Telegram 184 from Jidda, October 25; Department of State, Central Files, 102.798/10-2555) Documentation on the Riyadh-Jidda line is *ibid.*, 102.798, 886A.10, and 986A.712.

operational nature only and should present little problem to negotiators if in fact we are now prepared to meet intended aim.<sup>12</sup>

Wadsworth

---

<sup>12</sup> On December 15, Wilkins sent a memorandum to Allen regarding the "Five Year Plan" for the development of the Saudi armed forces—a plan, Wilkins noted, which might become the basis of discussions for the extension of the Dhahran Airfield. Although MAAG had assisted in the recommendations for material in the plan, Wilkins added, it had not been approved by either MAAG or the Department of Defense. In a chit attached to the Wilkins memorandum, Allen noted: "I would be enthusiastic about a five-year economic development plan and believe we must take a strong line with King Saud, on the grounds that if he does not devote more of his revenue to economic improvement of the country, Saudi Arabia is headed straight for Communism." (*Ibid.*, 786A.5-MSP/12-1555)

---

#### 197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 13, 1955—6:57 p.m.*

3315. For Ambassador from Secretary. Embtel 2339.<sup>2</sup> Please convey to Macmillan following message from me:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4111/12-755. Confidential. Repeated to Jidda. Drafted by Rountree and Newsom and approved and signed by Dulles. In telegram 2461, December 14, Walworth Barbour informed the Department that telegram 3315 arrived after Macmillan's departure for the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris, December 15-17. Barbour noted that he was forwarding the message to Sir Ivone A. Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and a copy to Evelyn Shuckburgh, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State. (*Ibid.*, 780.022/12-1455)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2339, December 7, Aldrich reported the substance of his December 7 conversation with Macmillan. According to Aldrich, the Foreign Secretary discussed his views on the proposed Anglo-American talks to be held in Washington in January and February 1956. In response to a question from Aldrich, Macmillan confirmed his readiness to discuss the Buraimi question in Washington. The Foreign Secretary implied, however, that it was unlikely that he would take any action before that time. (*Ibid.*, 033.4111/12-755) On December 17, in a luncheon meeting with Dulles in Paris, Macmillan, in the course of a review of the situation in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf, noted that if the United Kingdom had not acted in the Buraimi matter, it would have lost its influence in the entire Gulf area. Dulles replied that the "assets" of the West in the Middle East included the U.S. position in Saudi Arabia. These assets, the Secretary concluded, must be "balanced" against those of the United Kingdom. (Secto 9 from London, December 17; *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 643)

"Winthrop has sent me your message of December 7<sup>3</sup> indicating you are prepared discuss Buraimi as one of problems at January Washington meeting, but do not plan any action before that time. I welcome your suggestion but am concerned lest the pace of developments on the issue may make earlier action desirable.

"Since our talks in London and my message of December 5, Under Secretary Hoover has had further discussions with Saudi Arabian representatives. They are continuing to prepare their case for early submission to the Security Council but do not plan this step until efforts to resume arbitration with neutral observers have been exhausted. They confirm information we have received from other sources of heavy pressures on King Saud for more vigorous action. The King returns to Saudi Arabia December 12.

"The Saudi Arabians are willing to replace Sheikh Yusuf Yassin on the tribunal if this would help.

"Saudi Counsel advises us that if the case goes to SC, they will ask Council to call for resumption arbitration under UN auspices. Whether this request is ultimately endorsed or not, I can see advantages to be gained in anticipating and avoiding UN action by bilateral resumption. We recognize difficulties of conducting arbitration in area, but believe, though imperfect, this is best solution.

"I hope you will agree that Saudi attitude holds promise and that you will see your way clear to resume arbitration. I will appreciate your earnest consideration of this and earlier approaches."

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2345, December 7, the Embassy in London repeated Macmillan's views on Buraimi contained in telegram 2339. The Embassy also reported the substance of a discussion on Buraimi with working level Foreign Office officials. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 033.4111/12-755)

---

## 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 13, 1955—6:57 p.m.*

279. From Secretary. Please convey on my behalf in appropriate oral form following message to King:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12-1355. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom and approved and signed by Dulles. Repeated to London. According to Wadsworth, in an audience with Faisal on December 24, the Prince asked the Ambassador about new developments in the Buraimi matter. Wadsworth replied by reading the Secretary's message to the King. (Telegram 280, December 24; *ibid.*, 786A.11/12-2455)

"I have followed with concern problem of Buraimi oasis. As Under Secretary informed Azzam Pasha and Ambassador Khayyal,<sup>2</sup> we have agreed to assist informally as friends of both parties in effort find acceptable solution. With this in view, I have sent personal message to Mr. Macmillan. I have stressed to him moderate attitude which Your Majesty has pursued on matter. I hope it may be possible for me to discuss matter with him at early date.

"I am also instructing Ambassador Wadsworth to keep in close touch with you on this issue and on other matters of common interest between us."

This and following telegram constitute message referred to in last sentence Deptel 268.<sup>3</sup>

Dulles

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 194.

<sup>3</sup> Document 195. "Following telegram" presumably refers to telegram 281 to Jidda, December 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12-1355) This telegram transmitted to the Embassy additional points which it might wish to convey to the King. The Department, inter alia, suggested that the Embassy repeat to Faisal the U.S. desire to discuss the Dhahran Airfield and to assist Saudi Arabia in strengthening its defenses. The Department also instructed the Embassy to express the hope that the King would not use his resources to support opponents of the Baghdad Pact. On December 29 Wadsworth transmitted the King's written reply to the Secretary's message. In his message, Saud thanked the United States for its efforts to help solve the Buraimi problem. According to Saud, the "soundest means" to resolve the problem was a return to arbitration, based on restoration of the status quo ante and the establishment of a neutral international commission in the disputed areas. According to Wadsworth, Faisal, who had transmitted the King's message, added that the King, in view of domestic pressures, could not wait forever. (Telegram 282 from Jidda, December 28; *ibid.*, 780.022/12-2855)

## 199. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 20, 1955.*

### CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR MAKINS ON SAUDI ARABIAN SITUATION

Ambassador Makins called on me this morning to review some of the Middle East problems in anticipation of Shuckburgh's proposed trip to Washington and the visit of Sir Anthony Eden with

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.00/12-2055. Secret.



the President.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Allen and Mr. Elbrick were present, together with several members of the British Embassy staff.

After touching on a number of other points, Sir Roger stated that the UK had grave concern over Saudi Arabian bribery . . . in surrounding Arab countries. He gave me copies of some of the documents which had been captured in Buraimi when the British occupied the area. He also referred to Kirkpatrick's outline of HMG views to Barbour (London's No. 2474, December 15, copy attached).<sup>3</sup>

I stated to Sir Roger that we shared British apprehensions . . . . We had for many years enjoyed close relationships with the Saudis, . . . . But . . . . since the inception of the Buraimi disagreement, our relations had drifted further apart. I pointed out that the Saudis lived a feudal existence that was in many ways almost medieval in nature.

The only chance of increasing our influence and of modifying some of their policies was to re-establish closer and more friendly relations. The Saudis were never able to understand that the US and the UK did not work in close harmony and concert. Therefore, if the UK discontinued arbitration and moved into Buraimi with force, and at the same time conducted a campaign in the Trucial States, Muscat and Oman, the Saudis naturally became highly suspicious of our own motives.

The Soviets, of course, were just as aware as we were of what was going on, and were making every effort to exploit the situation. Unless this matter could be peacefully resolved, our information indicated a considerable risk of the Saudis turning to the Soviets for support, instead of to us. As the British knew, if an agreement to resume arbitration could not be reached soon, the Saudis would take the matter to the Security Council. The Soviets would give them active support, whereas the best we could probably do would be to abstain. It was not a very inviting prospect.

Sir Roger promised to convey our views to London.

H.

---

<sup>2</sup> Dulles and Macmillan agreed in Paris that Evelyn Shuckburgh would come to Washington in January for discussions on the Middle East in preparation for Eden's visit to Washington in February. (Sectos 6 and 9 from Paris, December 16 and 17. The former is *ibid.*, 740.5/12–1655; the latter is cited in footnote 2, Document 197.)

<sup>3</sup> Document 146.

200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 23, 1955—7:17 p.m.*

3518. From Secretary. You are instructed deliver following message to Kirkpatrick:

Secretary of State valued opportunity discuss Persian Gulf issues with Macmillan in Paris. Secretary has also noted your remarks to Barbour<sup>2</sup> and suggests that this question as well as related matters might be taken up when we jointly go into them in January. Department of State looks forward to discussions with Shuckburgh in Washington January 11. Secretary has however concern that events may overtake us.

Azzam Pasha, Saudi Arabian agent in Buraimi matter, announced to press in New York December 19 SAG will take case to SC in January, if present efforts reach other settlement fail. Department understands SAG still considering requesting SC sponsor resumption arbitration or negotiation in some form.

Meanwhile King Saud has returned from India, but has not yet seen Ambassador Wadsworth. Prior his departure he indicated he wished review Buraimi matter further upon return. Department anticipates he will continue emphasize pressures upon him for more vigorous action.

The Saudi Arabian Government has in the past invoked and probably will again invoke in connection with the Buraimi matter the following declaration made by President Truman to King Ibn Saud October 31, 1950:

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12-2355. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Wilkins and approved and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Jidda. On December 21, forwarding the draft telegram to Hoover and Dulles for approval, Allen noted that it was intended to "press the British gently" into taking some action on Buraimi. Although the British did not seem to be willing to resume arbitration, Allen noted, they might consider the prospect of direct talks with the Saudis a better alternative than "acrimonious Security Council consideration." (*Ibid.*, 780.022/12-2155)

On December 22, in a note to the Secretary attached to Allen's December 21 memorandum to Dulles, Gilman of the Executive Secretariat transmitted Hoover's suggested modifications and additions to the proposed telegram to London. According to Gilman, Hoover recommended that the Department emphasize to the British that the United States was not committed to support the United Kingdom in the Security Council. Hoover further recommended that the United States make the British aware of President Truman's letter to Ibn Saud of October 31, 1950. On December 23, in a note to Dulles, also attached to Allen's December 21 memorandum, Allen noted that the British would no doubt point out that at the time the Truman letter was written, Saudi Arabia was not in control of Buraimi. Saudi troops had entered the area only in August 1952 and were ejected by the British in October 1955. Allen questioned whether the Truman letter would be useful in this regard. For text of the Truman letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1190.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 146.

"I wish to renew to Your Majesty the assurances which have been made to you several times in the past, that the United States is interested in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. No threat to your Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States."

We do not cite this to imply that we have prejudged the Buraimi matter but only to show the pressure we are under.

Dulles

---

201. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 23, 1955—7:18 p.m.*

303. Embtels 260,<sup>2</sup> 261,<sup>3</sup> 262.<sup>4</sup> Agree (Embtel 260) starting point and basis for DAF negotiations should be establishment firm foundation for future Saudi-US relations. Believe, nevertheless, no formula should be proposed by either US or SAG at this time. Negotiations during early stages will thus be freer. Note December 12 should suffice indicate US interest for moment. At same time, we continue willing include in present studies any suggestions King may put forward. Ultimate US role in any formula should of course be in accord with current US legislation regarding military assistance and in general harmony with US military aid in other areas of NE.

FYI, USG not prepared retain DAF at any price. Discussions any formula requiring commitment on order of \$200 million in grant aid or otherwise even for favorable long-term extension would be entirely out of question. Furthermore, we would seek avoid any formula which would publicly couple commitments military or economic aid with military rights agreement.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/12-1355. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Allen. Sent to Dhahran and repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> Document 196.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 195.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 262, December 13, Wadsworth informed Allen that in accordance with the Department's instructions, he had avoided creating the impression that the United States had taken a formal position on the Dhahran Airfield. The Ambassador also noted that he had avoided asking the King for a "clear-cut" statement or written draft of the "formula" on which he might base future negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/12-1355)

During past four and one-half years US has already spent in Saudi Arabia in excess \$54 million on airport facilities and training. AF is providing [provided] for out of the \$44 million cash subsidy to Libya where Wheelus Field is located. Grant is labelled economic aid and will be made over twenty-year period. This special arrangement accepted with great reluctance by Defense and Congressional committees in order acquire far broader military operating rights in Libya than we enjoy at DAF. End FYI.

Dulles

---

202. **Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 29, 1955—7 p.m.*

2645. In Kirkpatrick's absence, I called on Caccia today and conveyed Secretary's message on Buraimi (Department telegram 3518<sup>2</sup>). I stressed Secretary's concern that events may overtake us, adding we understand Saudis may decide take case to SC in near future if efforts reach settlement by other means should fail.<sup>3</sup> I referred to pressures being brought to bear on King and added it probable SAG will invoke 1950 declaration made by President Truman to King Ibn Saud.

Caccia asked for text of this declaration, which I gave him. He said HMG could not of course regard Buraimi as part of Saudi territory. He added he would inform Foreign Secretary of my approach but was bound to point out to me that HMG had not been so far inclined agree to resumption of arbitration, which in its view was impossible owing to Saudi behavior. I replied that as I understood it we were not insisting UK agree resume arbitration if there was any other method of peaceful settlement which UK might suggest. Our concern, however, was that if matter got into Security Council, we and British might not find ourselves on same side of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12-2955. Secret. Repeated to Jidda.

<sup>2</sup> Document 200.

<sup>3</sup> On December 24, Wadsworth informed the Department that according to Faisal, unless "encouraging news" was received from the United States, Saudi Arabia would probably bring the Buraimi matter before the Security Council. (Telegram 280 from Jidda; Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/12-2455)

question, and this would have harmful effect on entire Western position.

Caccia said that if Saudis should decide bring matter to Security Council, they would have a very unhappy experience because HMG would make public certain documents in its possession which would place Saudi actions in Buraimi area in a most unflattering light. He therefore thought Saudis should think twice before bringing case to SC.

I asked Caccia whether it would not be possible for some completely disinterested group to be set up to settle the dispute. He commented any such group would presumably have [to] conduct a survey on the ground to determine wishes of inhabitants but Saudi corruption and bribery had been so widespread in area that justice would not result from any such survey.

In sum, while Caccia recognized that matter would be discussed with us by Shuckburgh and at Eden meetings with the President, he gave me no reason believe British are at this time disposed to take any initiative looking toward negotiated or arbitrated peaceful settlement. This attitude, which he clearly indicated has the approval of the Cabinet, is based, if I assess his reasoning and Kirkpatrick's earlier reasoning correctly, on a gamble that Saudis will not take direct action and will be dissuaded from raising case in Security Council by existence damaging documents to which he referred. He was unimpressed by my question as to whether in light prevailing customs and practices in Arabia, Saudi reaction to possibility of use documents might not be one of less apprehension than British anticipate and their value as moral deterrent therefore lessened.

**Barbour**

203. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

Current Problems of the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf

*Discussion:*

1. This memorandum sketches briefly the current problems in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. The attachments give details and, where pertinent, the U.S. position on these problems.

2. The Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf area contains our largest foreign investment and large overseas communities of U.S. citizens. The continued operation of our petroleum interests and the safety of our citizens are of vital concern to us. Our rights to the use of the Dhahran Air Field in Saudi Arabia are subject to renegotiation this spring.

3. The economic vitality and defense of Western Europe, where we have such major responsibilities, depend in large measure on the continued availability of the resources of this area.

4. The stability of this region and the continuance of the paramount position of the West are threatened by a series of current problems. These are:

5. The determination of land boundaries in previously undemarcated areas has created serious disputes between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors on the Persian Gulf, represented by the United Kingdom (Tab A).<sup>2</sup> Yemen is in disagreement with the UK over the border of the Aden Protectorates (Tab B). As a friend of the parties concerned, we are lending such assistance as we can in the search for solutions to these disputes.

6. Saudi Arabia is using its extensive resources to oppose the inclusion of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in Western-sponsored collective security arrangements. In so doing, Saudi Arabia is cooperating with anti-Western and, in some cases, leftist elements (Tab C).

7. Communist and extreme nationalist movements have appeared in the states and principalities of the region. Coordination with the UK of activities designed to observe and control these movements is vital to the maintenance of our position (Tab D).

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/1-456. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on December 22, 1955; sent through Hoover and S/S.

<sup>2</sup> The tabs are not printed.

8. Labor in the oil-producing areas is becoming a force of importance. Their demands have created tensions, particularly in Bahrein and Qatar (Tab E).

9. The retention of their position in the Persian Gulf is considered essential by the United Kingdom for political, economic, and strategic reasons. Background is provided on the British political (Tab F), economic (Tab G), and military (Tab H) position in the area.

10. Alternative courses of action are suggested in Tab I.

11. The Central Intelligence Agency is submitting separately to you its analysis of the situation. (Tab J)<sup>3</sup>

*Recommendation:*

That at your convenience we discuss the attached studies.

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

---

## 204. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Jidda, January 7, 1956—9 a.m.*

294. Deptels 298,<sup>2</sup> 300<sup>3</sup> and 316.<sup>4</sup> Hejaz Railway Survey Contract.<sup>5</sup> I have given this matter closest attention since sending

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 986A.712/1-756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 298, December 22, sent to Jidda for information, was repeated as 469 to Damascus and 277 to Amman of the same date. These telegrams requested the posts to comment on the prospect that the Polish bid for the survey of the Hijaz Railroad would be accepted. The Department also requested information on the possibility that Syria was seeking to offset its debts to Saudi Arabia by financing the project through the Syrian-Polish trade agreement. The Department also solicited suggestions on the prospects of blocking the Polish bid. (*Ibid.*, 986A.712/12-2055)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 300, December 23, the Department requested the Embassy in Jidda to provide information on when the Saudis were expected to make their decision on the submitted bids. The Department also inquired what measures the Embassy could take to point out "hidden motives" in the Polish offer. (*Ibid.*, 986A.712/12-2355)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 316, January 4, 1956, the Department requested Jidda's views on telegram 304 from Amman, December 27, not printed. In it, the Embassy in Amman reported that according to the senior Jordanian member of the executive committee, the Polish bid would not be accepted. (*Ibid.*, 986A.712/12-2755)

<sup>5</sup> During the 1950's the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan initiated plans for the reconstruction and repair of the Hijaz Railway, linking Damascus and Medina. In December 1955, the Executive Committee for the Recommissioning of the Hijaz Railroad, a trinational group of representatives from each country, opened bids

Embtel 273, December 21<sup>6</sup> but only last night received secret word from King Saud: "Tell the Ambassador he can be sure this contract will not be given to the Poles".

On December 27 after receiving from Prince Faisal King's message re Buraimi (Embtel 282<sup>7</sup>) I said reports that King had approved commission's recommendation troubled me greatly; it seemed obvious Polish bid was Communist political move, and only last month King had told Ambassador Cooper "we will not permit one Communist in Saudi Arabia" (Delhi Embtel 1079 to Department<sup>8</sup>).

At first Faisal was evasive, arguing that commission, set up by three governments, had but abided by terms of reference and it was not for one government to question decisions. Why, he asked, do you not bid lower? I said we do not subsidize private enterprise and again asked if King had approved. He asked why was I troubled? I said because I feared reaction in Washington would be most unfavorable, and I was trying my best with His Majesty and with him to lay sound foundation for future Saudi-American relations.

After further [*sic*] to my unsatisfactory discussion, he admitted Commission's recommendation had been "told to King who had raised no objection." I urged reconsideration, stressing incongruity that Communists, recognized enemies of Islam, should be selected by Moslems even to survey reconstruction of their famous pilgrim railway leading to their sacred shrines. His reply was noncommittal but he seemed agree that Yusuf Yasin, who was present throughout and would shortly return Riyadh, should inform King of my views.

I had to be content with this but, . . . decided appeal to King. Fortunately Faisal left Jidda on hunting trip so I could not be accused of going behind his back.

Abdullah Balkhair, King's private secretary, was arriving Jidda early following week. . . . He agreed write King . . . letter giving my views and sent it by trusted messenger.

Letter stressed unfavorable Washington reaction and suggested this [garble] even militant against Saudi interest in Buraimi dispute. . . .

---

for a proposed engineering survey of the railroad. Documentation on the Hijaz Railroad is *ibid.*, Central File 786A.712.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 273 the Embassy reported that the lowest bid for the survey contract was submitted by a Polish firm, CEKOP, of Warsaw. The Embassy added that the Executive Committee on Reconstruction was reportedly recommending that the Polish bid be accepted despite its awareness that the bid was far below the estimated survey costs and that it was "obviously based on Soviet desire penetrate area." (*Ibid.*, 986A.712/12-2055)

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 198.

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 1079, December 1, 1955, Ambassador John S. Cooper transmitted the highlights of his November 29 audience with Saud. The King talked at length about relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and about the Arab-Israeli issue. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.56/12-155)



King said he wished not only assure me Polish contract would not be approved but also send personal message to USG re Buraimi and other important matters. I will report these as soon as [name deleted] finishes writing up his notes.<sup>9</sup>

Re Polish contract King said that after phoning Abdullah he had sent personal letter to "our friend Shukri Quwatli" repeating arguments in Abdullah's letter. . . . He said he had in fact not taken exception to Poles "working in desert under surveillance" but on reading those arguments he decided at once Poles must not have contract.

. . . . .

King closed subject by saying in substance, "this action is right but I want it to be taken also as new proof of my desire to continue to cooperate with the United States." This was also major theme of message for USG. . . .

**Wadsworth**

---

<sup>9</sup>On January 10, 1956, Wadsworth conveyed Saud's secret message as reconstructed from the Embassy interpreter's notes. Among other topics, Saud informed the Ambassador that he had decided to postpone taking action on Buraimi until after the Eden-Eisenhower talks. The King later added that he would take no action on the offer of Russian arms or on Buraimi until he had received a "final reply" from the United States. The King's message also touched on the Dhahran Airfield, jet aircraft for Saudi Arabia, and the Baghdad Pact. (Telegram 299 from Jidda; *ibid.*, 986A.712/1-1056)

**205. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower**<sup>1</sup>

*London, January 16, 1956.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think that I must approach you about the situation which is rapidly developing in the Middle East, particularly in regard to the activities of Saudi Arabia and the bribery in which she is indulging. This is going on so fast that I felt I must telegraph before we meet. No doubt much of our information will be available to the State Department from the same sources as we receive it. Saudi money has been subsidising newspapers in Syria, Jordan and in the Lebanon, some of them extremely left and Communist or near-Communist papers, which they keep going. Many Ministers and Deputies are also being bought up.

Now has come a move, of which you will be aware, to supplant us in Jordan by making payments similar to those which we have been making all these years. Our payments to Jordan last year have cost us twelve million pounds. Nominally, the new offer comes from Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. However, the first two have no money.

There now appears to be a new development, as we learn from Jordan. The Russians are behind this whole plan to subvert the country. The Soviet Ambassador has approached the Jordan Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, with presumably the full knowledge and support of the Egyptians and Saudis, and offered him "everything" that he wants, including arms, provided Jordan denounces her treaty with us. The Jordan Government also has information that the Russians have offered to pay five years subsidy in advance.

In the light of all this it becomes increasingly clear that the Saudis, the Russians, the Egyptians and the Syrians are working together. If we don't want to see the whole of the Middle East fall into Communist hands we must first back the friends of the West in

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. On January 16 Ambassador Makins conveyed Eden's message to the White House under cover of a note indicating that it was based on the "latest secret information." (*Ibid.*) On January 19, in a memorandum to Dulles, Allen transmitted a proposed memorandum to the President and a possible reply to Eden's message, which, according to Allen, would indicate "our awareness of the problem, our willingness to discuss it further with the British Prime Minister, and our belief that it may well be essential that Western influence in Saudi Arabia be strengthened if we are to have any success in persuading the Saudis to use their money for better purposes." A handwritten notation on the Allen memorandum by William Macomber reads as follows: "Sec. has decided that no reply is necessary. WM" The proposed memorandum to the President was not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.001/1-1956) A copy of the proposed reply to Eden is attached as Tab F to a memorandum of January 26 from Barnes to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 611.41/1-2656)

Jordan and Iraq. This we are trying to do. It is equally important to find some way of regulating the Saudi use of their money and of stopping them playing the Russian game.

I understand full well all the difficulties this means for you, but if the Saudis go on spending and behaving as at present there will be nothing left for anybody but the Bear, who is already working in their wake.

Yours ever,

Anthony Eden <sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**206. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 17, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Buraimi

Most of our discussion yesterday with Evelyn Shuckburgh and his colleagues <sup>2</sup> concerned British action on the Persian Gulf, with particular reference to Buraimi. <sup>3</sup> The British were unable to understand that their position on the Gulf has elements of imperialism, they constantly repeated that their advice and support were earnestly desired by the Sheikhdoms and the Sultan of Muscat, that there was no agitation against them throughout these territories, and that King Saud and his clique were "corrupt, medieval, playing the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/1-1756. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> British Foreign Office representatives led by Evelyn Shuckburgh met with Department of State officials between January 13 and 19 for discussions on Anglo-American interests and objectives in the Middle East in preparation for the Eden visit to Washington. Records of the discussions and related materials are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 647, and *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28-Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers).

<sup>3</sup> On January 16, in a memorandum to Allen, Hoover noted that, at the suggestion of Allen's office, he had informed Azzam Pasha that the United States would attempt to convince the British to return to arbitration. Hoover wondered, however, whether the Department should not try to impress the British with the seriousness of the situation, and concluded: "I am fearful that if positive action is not taken we will have a serious problem on our hands. What plans do you have on how we should proceed?" (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 780.022/1-1756)

Communist game, and completely anti-Western". Shuckburgh referred at some length to the preferable position of British and American oil personnel in Kuwait and the Sheikdoms as compared with the "thoroughly unsatisfactory and miserable conditions" under which Aramco and its people must work in Saudi Arabia. His solution is a tough policy against Saudi Arabia in which the British hope very much we will join.

I and my associates (notably, Doug MacArthur, Bill Rountree and Francis Russell) questioned both the British premise and their suggested policy. I pointed out that Arab nationalists *do* regard the British position in the Gulf (and in Jordan) as imperialistic and we must all face this fact realistically if we are to devise a solution. I said that in many of the princely states of India, the rulers had preferred for Britain to remain in control since British departure would mean that the rulers would have to come under the domination of Indian politicians in New Delhi. Conditions of life were undoubtedly more pleasant for both American and British residents of India under the British regime. Nevertheless, we had to face the facts of life and realize that the 19th Century was no more. I did not wish to imply that we wanted the British to leave the Persian Gulf either today or tomorrow, but there was no use pretending that the Arab Sheikhs who welcomed British support were angels and that all those who opposed it were devils.

The crux of the problem is whether a tough line with Saudi Arabia is the solution. I pointed out that the American oil people in Saudi Arabia have not requested the United States Government to take a tough line, despite their many difficulties with the local authorities. I did not imply that we are ready to accept the Saudi position without question, but in the Buraimi dispute we were not persuaded that the British had ample justification for breaking off the arbitration.

We explored every possibility of resuming peaceful negotiations, including direct talks between the British and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Shuckburgh did not rule out this last suggestion but said quite definitely, under instructions, that the British Cabinet had made a firm decision that it would not resume arbitration.

We pointed out to the British that the Saudi Arabs had agreed with considerable reluctance to delay in bringing the matter to the Security Council pending knowledge of the outcome of the Washington talks; that the King claimed to be under heavy pressure from the tribes to take immediate action and, if some agreement regarding talks could not be reached, this might take the form of making a big case in the Security Council or of military action in the disputed area. It seemed to us improbable that the British expressed desire to avoid either of these courses could be avoided unless agreement to

resume arbitration was reached or unless some other device was employed, such as to undertake direct talks between the British and the Saudi Arabs. We told them that if the Saudi case should be brought to the Security Council the Soviets would be able to outbid us in supporting the Arabs just as they have outbid us in the current Arab-Israeli dispute. Undoubtedly, the minimum demand which would be made in the Security Council would be for the resumption of arbitration, and we said that we frankly felt it would be extraordinarily difficult for the US, at least, to take a position against this since to do so might cause irreparable damage to the Western position in the area. We did not see how the US could, for example, oppose arbitration on the basis that we had made a juridical determination on the merits of the case and had found that [*sic*] the British (or the Sheikhs') position to be unarguable. There is a difference of opinion as to who was right and who was wrong, and disputes of that nature are normally settled in some manner other than by a unilateral determination enforced by arms. We expressed misgivings regarding the British contention that, while they considered their position in the matter as completely sound, any arbitration would nevertheless go against them; we said that it seemed to us that it should be possible to devise procedures and mechanics for arbitration which would assure that responsible neutrals would render an equitable judgment without being influenced by what the British term "Saudi corruption and bribery".

I believe we made some impression yesterday on Mr. Shuckburgh and his colleagues, but their hands are tied by their instructions. We believe that every possible effort should be made to persuade Mr. Eden to take action which will avoid the necessity of bringing the case before the Council. The matter is still under discussion with Shuckburgh and his colleagues and as soon as our

respective positions have become more clarified,<sup>4</sup> a position paper for the Eden talks will be prepared for Departmental clearance.

<sup>4</sup> During the afternoon discussions, after confirming Shuckburgh's view of the importance of Middle East oil to Western Europe and the United States, Allen presented the Department's view of the difference between the American and British approach to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf as follows:

"The difference in the British and American position, to the extent that there is any difference, turns on the best means to assure our objective. The British desire to show firmness is probably shared by many people. Our view is that we should be careful not to exert more pressure than the traffic will bear. We differ somewhat about the Saudis. The picture as painted by the British is more black and white than in our conception. The British have described Saudi Arabian activities in terms of . . . evil, whereas we attribute many of the Saudi actions to Arab nationalism. The British have pointed out that the Saudis have voted with the Communist satellites. Our best judgment is that this is so not because the Saudis have an affinity for Communism, but because of their extreme nationalism. Instead of being motivated by Marxist idealism, we believe the Saudis are chiefly moved by: (1) their irritation against the U.S. for the preservation of Israel; (2) their fear of British domination of the Persian Gulf." (Memorandum of Conversation by Geren; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28-Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers))

---

## 207. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 19, 1956<sup>1</sup>

### SUBJECT

Visit of Mr. Shuckburgh regarding Recent Talks

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Great Britain*

Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh

Sir Roger Makins

Mr. Ian Samuel

#### *United States*

Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr.

Mr. William M. Rountree

Mr. Fraser Wilkins

Following the conclusion of the talks between Mr. Shuckburgh and his colleagues with Mr. Allen and other officials of the Department, Mr. Shuckburgh called on Mr. Hoover this afternoon.<sup>2</sup> Gener-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/1-1956. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.

<sup>2</sup> On January 19 British Foreign Office and Department of State officials held a final meeting in which they reviewed the progress of their earlier talks. Discussion ranged from the prospects of Saudi Arabia submitting the Buraimi issue to the Security Council, to the British refusal to resume arbitration, to the use of Saudi oil revenue. The conversation also touched on Muscat, the Persian Gulf, the Soviet offer

(Continued)

al aspects of the recent talks were discussed. It was noted that there had been a wide area of agreement on various issues and the United Kingdom and the United States had disagreed only with respect to the issues centering upon the Buraimi case. In this instance, as Mr. Hoover noted, the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed to disagree.

Mr. Hoover said that a memorandum had been prepared incorporating our current views on the latter point which he proposed to hand to Mr. Shuckburgh. Mr. Hoover read this memorandum (copy attached). Mr. Shuckburgh expressed thanks for this information which had previously been conveyed to him orally and, in response, suggested that Sir Roger might wish to give Mr. Hoover a copy of Mr. Shuckburgh's memorandum to Sir Roger. Sir Roger did so noting that it was an internal document and had not been prepared for submission to the United States Government.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Hoover said he did not wish to go into the substance of the case since it had already been discussed but he would like to make one or two comments. He hoped that an early solution of the Buraimi issue would make it possible for the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to settle their differences. Under such circumstances both the United States and the United Kingdom would be in a better position to persuade Saudi Arabia to devote its great income to worthwhile social and economic projects within Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Hoover noted further that the Saudi Arabian officials were deeply concerned regarding the threat which they believed the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan posed for them. The Saudi Arabian officials also continued to harbor strong feelings with respect to the establishment of Israel. It therefore seemed desirable, to the extent possible, to make clear to the Saudi Arabian Government that the Hashemites were not being encouraged to move against the Saudis and to make progress toward a settlement between the Arab states and Israel.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that he had been giving thought to ways in which the British might reassure the Saudis with respect to the

---

(Continued)

of aid to Libya, the Sudan, and Syria. (The memoranda of these conversations are *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers))

<sup>3</sup>The British memorandum, January 19, attached to the source text but not printed, emphasized the weakness of the Saudi claim to Buraimi, evidence of Saudi bribery, the importance of secure access to Persian Gulf oil, and the danger of Communist encroachment. The memorandum urged the United States to tell the Saudis that the British would fight the Buraimi issue in the Security Council and that the United States would not support Saudi Arabia in this regard. The United States would further advise the Saudis not to proceed with the appeal and state that the British were willing to open discussions with Saudi Arabia on all matters. On the question of frontiers, only minor modifications would be possible.

Hashemite House in Iraq and Jordan. Mr. Rountree thought that in order to have the greatest effect with respect to the Buraimi dispute, any reassurances regarding the Hashemites should be related to the Buraimi issue itself. In general conversation on this subject, it was noted that it would be more important for the Hashemites themselves to reassure the Saudis than for the British to do so on their behalf.

Mr. Shuckburgh also said that he wondered whether the Saudis might not find an economic and financial adviser from overseas useful to them in making plans for the expenditure of their increasing revenues from oil production. In general discussion on this subject, Mr. Hoover observed that Saudi acceptance of advice in this field would probably come slowly. The situation was evolutionary and suggestions would prove more acceptable if put forward over a period of time.

Mr. Hoover believed that the present moment was one of decision for the Saudi Arabs. He believed that the Saudi Arabs were reaching a crossroads in their relations with the United Kingdom and, in general, in their relations with the United States and other Western countries. It would soon be necessary for them to decide whether to raise the Buraimi issue in the Security Council. Once the issue was raised in the Security Council, a Pandora's Box would be opened. The Saudi Arabs, through bitterness, would dwell at length on their difficulties. The British themselves would be forced to reply. The Russians might be expected to take full advantage of this public forum and of the charge and counter-charge to their own advantage. It was for these and other reasons that Mr. Hoover hoped that the United Kingdom might be able to find some solution to the Buraimi question which would be acceptable to them and to the Saudi Arabs.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that he was returning to London the following afternoon but would be coming back to the United States by sea. He would be discussing this question with the Prime Minister and had no doubt the latter would wish to go into it with President Eisenhower toward the end of this month.

[Attachment]<sup>4</sup>

#### MEMORANDUM

Mr. Allen has informed me of your presentation of the British position on the problem of the Buraimi oasis. I know that the

---

<sup>4</sup> Secret.



Department has found your exposition and the discussions which followed most helpful in adding to our information and understanding.

Our concern in this dispute is essentially the preservation of the Western position in the area, including the assurance of continued Western access to the oil of the region. Our mutual position and our joint access to the resources of the area can most effectively be preserved by recognizing the challenges to the West and to traditional control in the area and reducing to a minimum through agreed settlements the conflict between Western nations and the states of the region.

As a friend to both parties we believe the continuation of tension between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia threatens the stability of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and creates difficulties for the settlement of other disputes.

Consideration of the Buraimi case in the Security Council will provide an unfortunate opportunity to the Soviet Union and other elements unfriendly to the West to exploit the situation for their own ends. Unless the Saudi Arabs see some alternative, such as direct talks with the United Kingdom, we do not believe Saudi Arabia will any longer refrain from asking the Security Council to consider the Buraimi problem. If the question should arise in the Security Council, the United States position would necessarily be determined largely by the developments in the Council and the facts then presented. It is, however, difficult to see how the United States could oppose a resolution incorporating the principles of peaceful settlement through some form of arbitration or negotiation and it would be in a very difficult position if it were to appear to support a U.K. position which offered no alternative course for settling the dispute.

We have noted reports of Saudi Arabian activity indicated in the documents presented to us by your representatives. We certainly do not condone activities of this character. In view of the political implications of the problem, however, and in view of traditional practices in the area, we doubt that these documents would represent an effective argument for world opinion against a return to arbitration or negotiation with the addition of appropriate safeguards.

We acknowledge the threat to our mutual position by Saudi Arabian activities in other parts of the Arab world. We do not believe Saudi Arabia is irrevocably committed to an anti-Western position. We believe that, following a solution of the Buraimi issue and some solution to the Arab-Israeli question, Saudi Arabia might be persuaded to reorient its current anti-Western policies and activities. Saudi Arabian reaction to any efforts to curtail payments to

them by commercial companies, even if this should be possible, would, in our opinion, further aggravate the situation.

We understand the problems confronting the United Kingdom in this matter and your reasons for opposing a return to arbitration. We hope, however, that, on the basis of the discussions here in Washington, you may be able to recommend to your Government that every effort be made to find a practicable alternative method of settlement to Security Council consideration.

Alternative methods might include one or more of the following and perhaps others: resumption of arbitration under neutral supervision with a terminal date on evidence, direct talks, mediation, referral to the International Court of Justice and direct negotiations between King Saud and the local rulers.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> On January 20, the Department conveyed the substance of the memorandum to the Embassies in London and Jidda and to the Delegation at the United Nations. (Telegram 4019 to London, January 20; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/1-2056) In telegram 347 to Jidda, January 21, the Ambassador was instructed to inform the King that preliminary talks had been held in Washington before the Eden-Eisenhower meetings, but that no decisions had been reached. The Department also expressed the hope that the King would continue to act with restraint in the Buraimi matter and avoid any action which might make "our current exercise of good offices more difficult." (*Ibid.*)

---

## 208. Editorial Note

On January 19, in the course of a conversation between American and British officials, Ian Samuel of the British Foreign Office raised the problem of Saudi money. Samuel noted that Saudi money was an "extremely dangerous weapon" and added that a way should be found to ask Aramco to stop its advances. (Memorandum of conversation by Newsom, January 19; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28-Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers)) That same day, in a conversation with Eugene Holman of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Dulles took note of the British concern. The Secretary indicated that the coming visit of Prime Minister Eden "would no doubt bear quite sharply upon the Saudi Arabian situation and emphasize the British feeling that American oil company royalties were helping the Saudis to finance what in effect was a war against British interests in the Near East." Dulles added that "we might be put in a difficult position by the British in relation to this general matter, and particularly in

relation to the territorial disputes.” (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, January 19; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)

On January 24, in response to reports that Nuri Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, was concerned over Saudi Arabia’s purported campaign to finance Communist elements within Iraq, the Department instructed Waldemar Gallman, Ambassador to Iraq, to inform Nuri that it had “studied with increasing concern reports of anti-Western activity and anti-Pact activity with accompanying evidence alleged Egyptian-Saudi participation.” Gallman was further instructed to inform Nuri that these studies were continuing and that the United States also was planning to make King Saud aware of its concern. (Telegram 544 to Baghdad; Department of State, Central Files, 686A.87/1–2356) That same day, the Department instructed Wadsworth in Jidda to inform the King of United States reports of Saudi activity in Jordan and Iraq. (Telegram 352; *ibid.*, 780.022/1–2456)

---

**209. Message From British Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

*London, January 23, 1956.*

Mr. Shuckburgh has informed me of his discussions with the State Department. I am glad to hear that on so many aspects of the Middle East problem there is general agreement between us and that it is really only in regard to Saudi Arabia and Buraimi that real differences exist.

I have seen the memorandum handed to Mr. Shuckburgh by Mr. Hoover on January 19. I quite understand the difficulty which this question presents for you in view of the important American stake in Saudi Arabia. They certainly are not easy people to handle. At the same time I must tell you that the stakes for us are even more vital and that we cannot afford to lose. Our position in the Persian Gulf States depends upon the confidence of the Rulers and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK officials corres. with Secy. Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol. I incoming. Top Secret. Ambassador Makins conveyed the message to the Department on January 23. A notation on Makins’ covering letter indicated that it was shown to the Secretary that day. An additional chit, dated February 1, from H.G. Appling of the Executive Secretariat, indicated that Allen and MacArthur agreed that no action was required beyond discussion with Eden. (*Ibid.*)

people in our ability to protect their interests. Any sign that we were going to let the Saudis back into Buraimi would be fatal to that position. We have to remember that thirty per cent of the Middle East oil, upon which our economy so entirely depends, lies under the Persian Gulf States with which we have special relations. The proportion will be much higher if substantial deposits are found in Muscat. We must at all costs retain control of this oil. It might make the whole difference to our national survival particularly if for any reason the larger oil-bearing states were to go wrong.

We are satisfied that return to arbitration in any form is unacceptable. Not only would it be regarded throughout the area as surrender to Saudi Arabia, but Saudi bribery has so perverted the loyalty of the tribes that the wisest and most impartial arbitrator would find it impossible to ascertain the true position. The Buraimi Oasis as you know is not contiguous to Saudi occupied territory; it is 400 miles away, beyond impassable deserts, and lies within the most sensitive point of junction between Abu Dhabi and Muscat. It has no oil. Its only value to Saudi Arabia is as a base from which to suborn and penetrate those states. Already they had begun this process under cover of the previous arbitration agreement, as can be seen from their activities in Oman. The present position therefore, though it may be wounding to King Saud's pride in that it marks the failure of his expansionist policy, represents no threat to Saudi Arabian security or to her interests.

If the Saudis take the matter to the Security Council we shall fight any resolution proposing arbitration. I hope we shall have your support and am confident that we can defeat any unacceptable resolution. At the same time I am very conscious of the difficulty this will cause you and I have been considering whether there is anything I can say now which would help to dissuade the Saudis from going to the Security Council. We are ready for direct talks with the Saudis without prior conditions at any time. In the course of such talks we would be willing to give King Saud the fullest assurances about our friendly intentions towards Saudi Arabia (i.e. we would deny the various suspicions he is alleged to entertain about our intention to build up a federation of peripheral states against Saudi Arabia or to encourage claimants to his territories). We could also discuss possible minor rectifications of the frontiers we have declared, and we are open to suggestions about the future of the tribesmen who left Buraimi after its occupation by us. Do you think that it would help if you were to inform the Saudi Arabian Government of the above? If so, I gladly agree to your doing so. Needless to say the main obstacle to direct discussions with the Saudis at present is their refusal to receive Her Majesty's Ambassa-

dor. I would be willing to send him straight back to Jedda if I could receive assurances that he will be received by the King.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> The source text is not signed.

---

## 210. Editorial Note

On January 27, in a conversation on the *Queen Elizabeth*, en route from London to Washington, Aldrich (who was accompanying Eden to the United States) and the British Prime Minister discussed Buraimi. The memorandum of conversation reads as follows:

“In discussing the Middle East, I again raised the Buraimi dispute and the need to find a satisfactory solution. I reiterated all of the points made in Under Secretary Hoover’s memorandum which had been previously given to the British.

“The Prime Minister lost his temper and flared up bitterly about the United States wanting always to have Britain abandon its interests and give away its rights.

“I said I could confidently assure him and his government that the United States did not want to replace Britain in the area and did not want American oil interests to oust the British; that we had no intention of seeking to expand the Saudi Arabian kingdom at British expense; that we feared failure to reach a solution and having the matter come up in the UN would be embarrassing to both Governments.

“Sir Anthony seemed very much reassured as a result of my categorical statement that we were not trying to take over oil interests from the British and indicated that a way would be found to enter direct negotiations with Ibn Saud over the disputed boundaries.” (A copy of the memorandum of conversation is an attachment to a memorandum from Barnes to Hoover, January 30; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648B.)

211. Letter From the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia  
(Wadsworth) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near  
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)<sup>1</sup>

*Dhahran, January 26, 1956.*

DEAR GEORGE: I write this enroute to Dhahran by train after a very full two-day visit to Riyadh. I will telegraph you its highlights so soon as Muhammed Effendi and I can put into orderly shape our voluminous notes and the several papers given us by the King's command.

This letter is to supplement that telegram—yet to be written—by sending you the enclosed memorandum of my private audience with the King on January 25.<sup>2</sup> I wrote it up the same (yesterday) evening from notes taken by me at the time. It will, with this letter, go forward to you by the Consulate General's air pouch tomorrow.

The major themes of all my discussions (except for two hours with Prince Mishaal on MAAG affairs) were very briefly: His Majesty's desire to build sound foundations for continuing cooperation with the United States; the perfidy of British propaganda and actions against Saudi Arabia and Saudi-American relations; Buraimi, "the test" of future Saudi relations with the West; and His Majesty's determination to resist Soviet offers and pressures "to the end" and then to yield only if "forced" so to do by our rebuff of his advances.

The skeptic could read all of this, as well as His Majesty's "secret" messages to us a fortnight ago, as little more than a well conceived and dramatized final plea for our support, at the Eden-Eisenhower meeting, of his claim to Buraimi and the adjacent disputed areas. But to me it is far more than that. I seriously believe it is the truth, as he sees it, if not, as you and I would see it, the whole truth.

In my view, he needs and wants us as a friend now and in the future. He respects us highly despite our support of Israel; our Northern Tier policy despite our support of the Baghdad Pact; and our stand against Communism and our role in world affairs despite his fears that we may be led by "Perfidious Albion" to support its

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/1-2656. Secret; Personal and Official.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; Wadsworth's audience with the King touched on a number of subjects, including Communist and Russian pressure, Buraimi and British pressure, and Yemen-Saudi relations. An annex included the following statement by the King: "Be sure we will fight Communism and Russia like the plague, but don't force me, by your acts of omissions, to take the plague. All the Arab countries, except Saudi Arabia, have caught it and are already, in varying degree, cooperating with Russia and its allies."

policy of encroachment against his frontier areas. I “buy”, as an understatement, the sentence in Hoover’s outstanding memo of January 19 to Shuckburg: SAG is not irrevocably committed to an anti-Western position.

In a friendly tour d’horizon with Yusuf Yasin—we have again buried the hatchet—I mentioned inter alia press reports that the Secretary would attend the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi March 14–16 and hoped thereafter to visit India and other neighboring countries. If he could visit King Saud, I said, I felt that together they could go far towards finding a solid basis for future Saudi-American relations.

Yusuf’s reply was interesting: “His Majesty would always welcome his visit. The fact is His Majesty would welcome any approach which might help strengthen Saudi-American relations, be it by Mr. Dulles visiting Saudi Arabia *or by His Majesty going to America.* (Note: Underlining mine. This is the first time this latter possibility, of which you have heard from other sources, has been mentioned here to me.)<sup>3</sup>

I have rambled intentionally in the foregoing paragraphs while impressions of my Riyadh visit, with its formal and private audiences and other discussions, are fresh in mind.

I will try to send you a memo of the formal audience by first pouch following my return to Jidda January 29. In some ways, as you will see from my telegram, it is more interesting than that of the later private audience sent herewith. His Majesty’s remarks were recorded in Arabic which Muhammad is now translating.

There was no scribe but myself at my second audience; and you will understand why this was so when you read its annex, which His Majesty asked specially be considered Top Secret. It is not unduly long, so I shall not attempt to brief it in this covering letter.

Finally, let me thank you for your recent letter.<sup>4</sup> I do not have it with me on this trip but recall well it told me just what I wanted to know of your thinking on my possible return “on consultation”, assured me Buraimi and Dhahran Airfield were very much in your thoughts and warned me that supply of M-47 tanks and F-86 aircraft to Saudi Arabia or any country in this area would require high-level decision.

That warning, though not unexpected, was particularly helpful in my Riyadh discussion of MAAG matters with Prince Mishaal. I gave him no encouragement of early decision, and stressed the need

---

<sup>3</sup> According to Harry Kern of *Newsweek*, the Saudi Ambassador and Sheikh Jabbar of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, had indicated that Saud was interested in visiting the United States. See footnote 9, Document 196. The underlining is printed here as italics.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

for prompt completion of arrangements for the expected early delivery of M-41 tanks and C-119 aircraft as mentioned in Deptel 348 to Jidda.<sup>5</sup>

In this general connection, however, I should much appreciate early word as to your agreement, if it can be given, at least in principle, to meet the last large (\$30-odd million) SAG request for "non-sensitive" military equipment items made within the framework of its "Five-Year Plan."

Faithfully yours,

**George**

---

<sup>5</sup> On January 22 the Department notified the Embassy in Jidda that, among other things, the first shipment of M-41 tanks and further action on the C-119 aircraft might be expected "soon". (Telegram 348; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/1-2256)

---

**212. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15-4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

ETW MC-1

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The Secretary  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Ambassador Aldrich  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Allen  
Mr. Rountree  
Mr. Hagerty  
Mr. Cottman

*UK*

Prime Minister Eden  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Ambassador Makins  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Sir Leslie Rowan  
Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Ian Samuel  
Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of press arrangements during Eden's visit; the draft of a declaration to be issued at the conclusion of the talks; European integration; and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text. Prime Minister Eden visited Washington January 30-February 3.



*Saudi Arabia and Buraimi Dispute*

Turning to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Lloyd said the expenditure of Saudi money for bribery throughout the Middle East made things extremely difficult for the West. Egypt provided to the area "school masters" and other intellectuals who undermined the Western position, with the Saudis providing the money. He thought extraordinary the Saudi action of working against the Western position and in giving comfort to the communists since, if communism should take over in the area, the Saudi regime would be the first to go.

The Secretary said the United States had a very large stake in Saudi Arabia—the Western stake in the Middle East as a whole was enormous, but the United States was particularly interested in Saudi Arabia. There were massive oil resources which were extremely important, and we also had an air base under an agreement scheduled to expire this year. The United States did not want to be put in a position where those interests might be lost. He had hoped the British Government would agree to renewal of arbitration of the Buraimi dispute to avoid having this issue seriously endanger the Western position generally in the Middle East and in Saudi Arabia in particular.

Mr. Eden said this was a big matter for the United Kingdom. The whole position of the British in the Persian Gulf was at stake. Excluding Saudi Arabia, the Americans held almost an equal interest with the British in Persian Gulf oil operations. That interest understandably was important to the United States, but it was vital to the very existence of the United Kingdom. In the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms, the basis for the British position was a series of treaties with the local rulers. If the British should weaken in the present dispute with Saudi Arabia and yield the position of the Sheikdoms, the resulting situation would be untenable. Thus, the British could not give way. They had suggested a settlement be based on the so-called Riad line (identified on the map) and had proposed to discuss that suggestion with the Saudi Arabs. The British would be prepared to make minor adjustments of that line, but that that was as far as they were prepared to go.

The Secretary suggested, and it was agreed, that discussion of the Buraimi dispute be deferred until the President joined the meeting.

[Here follows discussion of the Baghdad Pact, Iran, Iraq, Syria (see Document 321), and Jordan (see Document 16).]

213. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

ETW MC-2

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

President Eisenhower  
Secretary Dulles  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Ambassador Aldrich  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Allen  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Hagerty  
Mr. Rountree  
Mr. Cottman

*UK*

Prime Minister Eden  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Ambassador Makins  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Sir Leslie Rowan  
Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Ian Samuel  
Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

*Saudi-Arabia and Buraimi*

Turning to Saudi Arabia, the President inquired how we should proceed. He hoped the respective positions had been properly prepared to narrow the discussion as much as possible.

The Secretary said the Saudi Arab question and the Buraimi dispute were matters which brought forth the greatest difference between the British and Americans. Another issue upon which there was a divergence was trade with Communist China, but he observed that the Arabian matter was far more difficult. The US had good relations with Saudi Arabia and relied heavily upon oil reserves and an American air base in that country. We considered it most important to maintain those good relations. The UK, the Secretary continued, thought its prestige in the whole Middle East and its status in the Arab Sheikhdoms, including Kuwait, depended on its ability to support the Sheikhdoms. Any indication of weakness on its part would place the British position in jeopardy.

In reply to the President's question, the Secretary identified as the Buraimi dispute the main problem, but also mentioned other disputes including one involving Yemen.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text.

The President remarked that surely the British would not maintain that every mile in every border line in the vast area would be a matter of British prestige.

Mr. Eden referred to the treaty arrangements which Great Britain had with the Arab Sheikdoms. The British had had to give up many things in the world. Whether this had been wise or not might be questioned; however, the impression had been created that if the British were pushed hard enough they would "be off". If the British should yield here they would soon be completely out of the Middle East. He observed that when Mr. Churchill and he took office in 1951 the Sultan of Muscat had been prepared to attack Buraimi, but the British had stopped this action and asked him to go to arbitration. The Sultan had done this, but Saudi bribery and corruption had rendered arbitration impossible, and the British could not reasonably suggest to him that he undertake another such effort. Mr. Eden observed the US had vast oil interests on both sides of the lines and that from the point of view of oil it thus was not a British versus an American interest. He had stated in Parliament that the British were prepared to arrive at a settlement, but the basis upon which they were prepared to talk was the so-called Riyadh line (identified on the map).

The President inquired as to the Saudi reaction, to which Mr. Eden replied the Saudis had insisted the matter go back to arbitration.

The President commented the British were in a difficult position from a public relations viewpoint in maintaining that the principle of arbitration should be denied. If this position should be retained, he thought it might encourage many people throughout the world to be recalcitrant. He inquired whether it might be possible for the British to agree to the resumption of arbitration under entirely different auspices so that there would be a fresh start.

Mr. Lloyd responded that any arbitration would involve an effort to determine local loyalties, and since Saudi money had bought so many people in the area they would be prejudiced. No arbitration tribunal could adequately weigh bribery and corruption factors to determine the true situation.

Mr. Eden said he had originally proposed arbitration himself, but that this obviously was not a workable solution.

The President inquired concerning the value of the Buraimi territory itself, aside from the fact that it was important to British prestige and as a crossroads.

Mr. Lloyd responded its main value to the Saudis would be as a vantage point from which the tribes in the whole region could be corrupted.

The President stated that Arab and world opinion should be taken into account. The general public was unaware of the history of British interest in the area. The matter should be considered not only in terms of what is legally the position but also what the world thinks. He mentioned in this connection world opinion reaction to the Goan problem.

Mr. Eden said the military action in the area had been almost entirely a local one; the British in fact had only one company of troops in the vicinity. The Sultan would not willingly go back to arbitration. He had not in the first place wanted to agree to this course but had to be pressed by the British to do so; he would now be more adamant. The Foreign Secretary said the Riyadh line was a very good one and, if accepted by Saudi Arabia, would provide King Saud with more territory than he now possessed.

Mr. Lloyd commented that he had met Mr. Follis, President of the Standard Oil Company of California, aboard the *Queen Mary* on the trip to New York. In conversations concerning this matter, Mr. Follis had expressed the view it was more of a question of "face" than of substance.

The President observed that if it were a matter of "face" it should be possible to find some satisfactory solution. Perhaps if the King would be willing to receive a British representative to discuss the matter the UK should be prepared to send someone of very high rank. It would be important, also, that he be prepared to be flexible in his discussions.

The President expressed his understanding that the British were acting not only for themselves but for various Sheikhs and Sultans. He inquired whether the King had ever met with them.

Mr. Eden thought he had never met the Sultan of Muscat but that he had met the others involved. He thought they were, in fact, present during the previous arbitration.

Mr. Shuckburgh commented that Muscat was an independent country of which the Sultan was absolute sovereign. There were, however, a number of British advisers employed by the Sultan.

The President inquired what had been done about the British offer to engage in direct talks with the Saudi Arabs.

The Secretary and Mr. Allen said the offer had not been passed on to the Saudi Arabs since the latter had acceded to our suggestion the dispute not be taken to the Security Council, at least until after the current talks.

The President asked how firmly the British positions would be fixed before entering talks with the Saudi Arabs. He observed that one normally did not enter such talks with positions so rigid there would be no degree of flexibility. Could the British be sure, he asked, that the Sultan would go along with a give and take attitude in defining the line?

Mr. Eden responded the British position was that the Riyadh line should be the basis for settlement with only minor rectifications.

The President expressed interest in a British statement that previous negotiations had broken down because the British could not agree to let the Saudi Arabs into certain areas near Qatar which

had been demanded. If these areas were not important could not the British, by yielding them, let the Saudi Arabs save face?

Mr. Shuckburgh replied the Saudi Arabs had wanted the area in question primarily because they desired to establish a port there. He thought it not impossible to do something along the lines suggested by the President.

Mr. Eden commented, however, that the area in question might have oil deposits which would render such a decision more difficult.

The President commented that if the British should say they had reviewed their previous position and thought it might have been too rigid, and agree to give the area to the Saudis, it might be very beneficial. Essentially, he said, we were trying to save this area for the West. The American companies had maintained they were not interested in going down into the disputed areas but did so only when the King pressed them.

Mr. Hoover expressed the feeling that if the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia should talk with the King the latter would have to start from a certain negotiating position, . . . . The King's first step, he felt, would be to negotiate for either a settlement or for arbitration. Azzam Pasha, representative here of Saudi Arabia in the Buraimi matter, was in close contact with the King and had the latter's confidence. Perhaps, it would be very helpful at this juncture, until the groundwork was cleared away, for British talks with the Saudi Arabs to take place through Azzam Pasha.

Mr. Eden while not responding directly to Mr. Hoover's suggestion, commented a main element of the problem in Saudi Arabia was that the King was surrounded by bad elements.

The President said it was important to find some way of "breaking the log jam". He considered the removal of this problem to be very important in creating a better situation for the Western Powers. He observed that the Saudi King and his family, the Sultan and the Sheikhs could not stand communism; there must be a line over which they would not step if they knew they would be out of their jobs.

The Secretary remarked these people were highly emotional . . . . No doubt the present state of UK-Saudi Arab relations was bad and oil revenues were being used harmfully and in a manner which enhanced communist interests. If this particular problem could be removed, the main reason for King Saud's opposing the British would be eliminated. In this way the situation in the area generally might be greatly improved.

Mr. Eden commented he wished he could believe the Saudi Arabs would behave all right if there were a settlement of the Buraimi dispute. The British did not share this belief.

The Secretary responded he did not suggest the Saudi Arabs would completely renounce their intentions to dominate other areas on the Arabian Peninsula, but repeated his estimate that active Saudi efforts against the British in the Middle East would subside to some extent.

Mr. Eden observed the harmful Saudi actions in the area were not only directed at the British in the Buraimi matter but also were involved in such questions as the Hashemite-Saudi quarrel and Israel.

. . . . .

The Secretary said . . . . When the Secretary was in Saudi Arabia in 1953,<sup>2</sup> Ibn Saud read to him a letter written by President Truman in 1950 setting forth US interest in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and stating that no threat to the Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the US. The King had said the British were then threatening the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and should be thrown out by the US in accordance with President Truman's assurance.

Mr. Eden reverted to another aspect of the Saudi Arab situation, the use of Saudi money for bribery and corruption throughout the area. If the money should continue to be spent in this way we would continue to be in great trouble.

Mr. Hoover expressed the view that if the Buraimi problem could be solved it might be possible to develop our influence in Saudi Arabia. It would be unrealistic to suppose that Saudi recklessness could be eliminated overnight, but the situation might be mitigated over a period of time.

The President again asked that a good plan be developed for moving ahead. The plan should appeal to us as being logical but it also should be based on the necessity of taking into account world opinion. He emphasized we were dealing with a matter in which the effect of world opinion would be great.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it might be possible for the US to encourage King Saud to get better people around him as his advisers.

Mr. Hoover replied we hoped to do so over a period of time but that this was an extraordinarily difficult problem. He recalled a recent comment by Mr. Davies of ARAMCO to the effect that one of his most difficult times in Saudi Arabia was when he was called

---

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the Secretary's visit to Saudi Arabia, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. ix, Part 1, pp. 96 ff.

to task by King Saud as a result of an ARAMCO official commenting upon how Saudi Arabian revenues should be spent.

Discussion of the Buraimi dispute was concluded with the Secretary's suggestion that both sides consider the question overnight and talk about it at a subsequent meeting.

---

**214. Memorandum of a Conversation, Cabinet Room, White House, Washington, January 31, 1956, 2:40 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

ETW MC-5

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

President Eisenhower  
(where indicated)  
Secretary Dulles  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Ambassador Aldrich  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Prochnow  
Governor Stassen  
Mr. Reuben Robertson  
Admiral Radford  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Wilcox  
Mr. Allen  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Hagerty (in part)  
Mr. Goodkind  
Mr. Timmons  
Mr. Lister  
Mr. Gottman

*UK*

Prime Minister Eden  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Ambassador Makins  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Sir Leslie Rowan  
Sir Hubert Graves  
Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Ian Samuel

[Here follows discussion of disarmament, support costs for Allied troops in Germany, Berlin, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Drafted on February 7 but no other drafting information is given on the source text. The record of the President's Daily Appointments, 1956, indicates that the President did not join the meeting until 3:52 p.m. The Daily Appointment Record also indicates that Gordon Gray and Carl W. McCardle were also present at this time. (*Ibid.*) According to a note on the source text, the memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary of State level only, was being given restricted circulation to appropriate U.S. officials on a need-to-know basis.

long-range proving ground in the South Atlantic, the International Labor Office proposed convention on forced labor, China trade controls, and the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

*Saudi Arabia and the Buraimi Problem*

Mr. Lloyd noted that one of the first questions to be answered was whether the King would receive the British Ambassador. To do so at this stage might possibly mean loss of face to the Saudis, and he raised the possibility of inviting Prince Faisal to London. It might be possible in this case for him to meet the British Ambassador there.

The Under Secretary suggested that it might be useful to explore with Azzam Pasha his idea of how far the Saudis might be prepared to go. He said it would be desirable to look into all possible aspects of the problem before actual negotiations were undertaken and before a face-to-face meeting with Saudis. The Under Secretary said he felt quite certain that there was considerable room for maneuvering in this situation.

Mr. Lloyd said . . . that he agreed there was considerable room for maneuver with respect to the over-all problem.

The President said it appeared to be a question of contact—how to get together with the Saudis. It appears that there was not much hope of resuming arbitration, however, in view of the resignations from the arbitration tribunal. Mr. Lloyd said that perhaps as a first step the United States might suggest to the Saudis that they receive the British Ambassador.

The President said that perhaps Ambassador Wadsworth could go to the King and say, "We have talked this matter over with the British, now will you receive their Ambassador?"

The Under Secretary referred to the difficulty of sitting down and thrashing things out in the Court, in view of its medieval character.

Mr. Lloyd stated that the British had sent a friendly message to the Saudis through the Saudi representative in Bahrein. He noted, however, that this representative had not returned from Saudi Arabia to Bahrein.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that another look at the problem of access to the King should be taken.

Mr. Lloyd noted that the oil people seem to have come to believe that there was not as much oil in the area as they had at first thought.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that the British would be glad to discuss the question of providing the Saudis with means of access to ship their oil out through the Sheikhdoms.



The President indicated that the US Ambassador should have some ammunition to use in approaching the King on the subject.

The Prime Minister stated that what the United States representative might say to the King, with particular reference to what the United Kingdom is prepared to do, would have to be worked out.

The Under Secretary said it was important to avoid a situation where the US was placed in the position of becoming an intermediary between the British and the Saudis. This view received general agreement.

The President asked whether the key to the problem was access to the King.

The Under Secretary replied that this was definitely the case.

Mr. Lloyd expressed the view that contact should be established somehow, and repeated his earlier proposal that the British consider the possibility of having Prince Faisal come to London.

The Under Secretary said the US believed that Azzam Pasha was the only man who could get to the King for a frank discussion of the situation.

The Prime Minister said the Cabinet would have to know of the proposed courses of action discussed here, and said he would cable further word from London on his return. This would probably include the views that might be expressed in any approach to the King.

Mr. Lloyd said the British wished to prevent this problem being brought before the Security Council.

Mr. Allen pointed out that no one could tell how long it would be possible to restrain the Saudis from such action. They had agreed to hold off only until after the talks between the President and the Prime Minister.

The President said every effort should be made to restrain them. "We can point out to the Saudis that we have been discussing this problem with the British and should now be given time to work out necessary action."

The Prime Minister said the British definitely did not want rumors with respect to this situation coming out. . . . They would rather risk the matter being brought before the Security Council.

Mr. Lloyd expressed the hope that if the Saudis did submit the question to the Security Council, the US and UK would work and vote together for postponement of consideration. With the USSR in the chair, delaying tactics should be worked out.

The Under Secretary expressed the thought that the only place for maneuver at the moment was probably with respect to establishment of a neutral zone. The Saudis must have some formula to permit them to save face and this might be found in establishment

of such a zone. He did not believe it was so much a question of oil as of maintaining tribal support.

. . . . .

The Under Secretary referred to the two principal sources of income enjoyed by the Saudis, royalties and advances. There was some misconception, he said, that the oil company was responsible for cash advances. However, the Saudis obtain bank loans on the basis of royalties due them in subsequent months. . . .

. . . . .

The Under Secretary expressed the view that the only way to achieve satisfactory progress on this problem was to "get close to the Saudis". He thought improved relationship between the US and UK on the one hand and the Saudis on the other would lead to settlement of other questions.

The Prime Minister asked whether Israel would not raise strong objections to the sale of arms to the Saudis.

The Secretary replied that he thought the Israelis would not register strong objections. He pointed out that in connection with the provision of the sale of arms to any country, the US obtained a guarantee that they will not be transferred to another country without our consent, and the Saudis themselves could not utilize great quantities of arms.

The President said that the Saudis would probably act quickly to spend considerable sums on arms if made available. He pointed out that the use of arms was limited to the supply of ammunition and spare parts. Perhaps the Saudis should be allowed to obtain limited arms and then be urged to start a program of public works.

Ambassador Aldrich noted that Mr. Follis, the President of the Standard Oil Company of California, had told him that the Saudis were fearful of Egyptian activities and intentions in the area.

The Under Secretary suggested that trouble might be aroused between the Saudis and Egyptians apart.

The Prime Minister said he thought this aspect was worth looking into.

215. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 2, 1956<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

The Buraimi Dispute

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Abdullah al-Khayyal of Saudi Arabia  
Mr. George V. Allen, NEA  
Mr. Donald C. Bergus, NE  
Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

The Ambassador said he had come to learn the results of the consideration of the Buraimi dispute in the talks between the President and Mr. Eden.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Allen said the talks had included serious discussions of the Buraimi matter. The President, himself, participated and spoke strongly in expressing the hope and belief that the matter could be settled by peaceful means. He was firmly supported by the Secretary of State and Mr. Hoover.

The British were told, said Mr. Allen, that they had a heavy responsibility to find a peaceful means of settlement. He stressed that the United States emphasized its strong ties and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia.

As a consequence of the talks, said Mr. Allen, the British have agreed to re-examine the situation to try again to find some means of settlement, either by direct or third party discussions. The United States, he said, did not wish to remain in the center in this matter, but would continue to do what it could, for the present, to facilitate the finding of a solution to the problem.

For the moment, then, he continued, the United States is awaiting a further urgent examination of the problem by Prime

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/2-256. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> On February 3, the Department notified Wadsworth that it was informing the Saudi Ambassador of the results of the Eden-Eisenhower talks and instructed Wadsworth to notify the King that the Department believed it had impressed the British with the "gravity and urgency" of the Buraimi problem. The Department added that the United Kingdom was now considering its position in light of the talks. The Department concluded that while the United States appreciated the pressures on Saudi Arabia, the parties involved should be given time to work out the necessary course of action. (Telegram 370 to Jidda; *ibid.*, 611.41/2-356) The text of the joint declaration by Eden and Eisenhower, issued in a White House press release of February 1, contained the following sentence on Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf: "We reviewed the situation in Arabia and the Persian Gulf, with particular reference to current disputes and differences in that area. We believe that these differences can be resolved through friendly discussions." For text of the joint statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1956, pp. 232-233.

Minister Eden and his Cabinet. The Prime Minister, he said, returns to London on Monday.

Mr. Allen said he had no fixed opinion of what might be the result of the further British consideration. If the British arrive at a proposal which the United States feels it can appropriately pass on to Saudi Arabia, it will do so. The British were told that when Saudi Arabia asked U.S. advice on the matter the U.S. expressed to Saudi Arabia the hope that neither Security Council action nor force would be undertaken, at least, until the problem could be thoroughly examined. The United States further told the British that Saudi Arabia cannot be asked to continue to delay other action on the basis of vague hopes.

The Ambassador asked whether the United States had made any concrete proposals. Mr. Allen said various methods of settlement had been discussed. He thought it likely that the British might be willing to enter into direct discussions in order to show that some of the impressions the Saudi Arabians have of British policy are not correct. He explained that the British did not believe arbitration could be resumed because they felt the people of the area had been won away from their previous loyalties by Saudi Arabian favors.

The Ambassador asked about the evacuation of the British from the area. Mr. Allen said he believed some sort of control in the area would have to be arranged first. He posed informally the possibility of a neutral zone.

The Ambassador emphasized that Saudi Arabia had had sovereignty over the area for two hundred years. He said the British had brought the quarrel and if the British would leave the area, Saudi Arabia could make a satisfactory settlement with the Sultan of Muscat and other rulers as they had made one with Kuwait.

As he departed, the Ambassador referred back to the above discussion and said he presumed there was nothing to do but to await the answer of the British following the Cabinet consideration.<sup>3</sup>

[Here follows a brief discussion of the Arab-Israeli question and the Baghdad Pact.]

---

<sup>3</sup> According to Newsom, following Khayyal's conversation with Allen, the Department learned that the Ambassador had recommended to the King that he delay submission of the Buraimi issue to the Security Council for the present. (Memorandum of conversation by Newsom, February 6; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/2-656)

216. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 3, 1956<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Possible Future Developments with Respect to the Near East

PARTICIPANTS

*UK*

Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh

Mr. J. E. Coulson

*US*

NEA—Mr. Allen

NE—Mr. Wilkins

Prior to his departure for London Mr. Shuckburgh accompanied by Mr. Coulson called to discuss possible developments with respect to the Near East in the light of the recent talks between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden. During the course of the conversation the following principal points emerged:

1. Mr. Shuckburgh said that the British Foreign Office had received word from the British Chargé d'Affaires in Jidda that the Saudi Arabian Government had approached him regarding direct talks with respect to Buraimi. Mr. Shuckburgh said that Mr. Phillips was being instructed to give an encouraging reply and to keep the channel open. He hoped that the US would be able to support this development and would specifically instruct Mr. Wadsworth to consult with Phillips and to approach the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office. Shuckburgh said the British-Saudi Arab talks would be general and with no conditions attached to them. He hoped that we would say to the Saudi Arabs also that if the case subsequently went to the Security Council the US would not be able to support the Saudi Arab case there. Mr. Allen replied that he welcomed the commencement of direct talks between the British and the Saudi Arabs but that the US could not go so far as to indicate to the Saudi Arabs that we would support the British case in the Security Council. We could say to the Saudi Arabs that we welcomed direct talks. In addition, we might note that the Saudi Arabian Government might subsequently find it awkward to defend itself in the SC if the British were able to show they had been willing and anxious to negotiate directly and the Saudi Arabs had turned them down. Mr. Shuckburgh thought this would be helpful and it was agreed that the Department would telegraph the American Embassy in Jidda in this sense. Mr. Shuckburgh further added that, in the interim, Prime Minister Eden would consult the British Cabinet regarding

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/2-356. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.

various possibilities for the solution of British differences with Saudi Arabia.<sup>2</sup>

[Here follow points 2 and 3 dealing with various aspects of the Arab-Israeli question.]

---

<sup>2</sup> On February 3, the Department informed Wadsworth in Jidda of Saudi Arabia's approach to Phillips, adding that while the United States did not want to offer itself as a mediator, it did want the Saudi Government to know that it favored the idea of direct talks. The Ambassador was instructed to convey this to the King. The Department also added that Saudi Arabia might find it difficult to justify its position in the Security Council if the British could claim that they were prepared to open direct negotiations. (Telegram 369 to Jidda; *ibid.*)

---

## 217. Memorandum for the Record, by the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 21, 1956.*

RE

Suspension of Export Licenses for Military Materials to Middle East

Mr. Hagerty called me Thursday evening about 10:30 p.m., February 16, from Thomasville, Georgia, where he was accompanying the President on a vacation with Secretary Humphrey.

Mr. Hagerty was greatly concerned regarding press and Congressional reactions to a shipment of 18 light tanks then being loaded in New York for shipment to Saudi Arabia. I told him I would look into it and call him back. He felt we should take immediate action to halt the shipment if an "impossible" public relations problem was to be avoided.

During the next two hours I talked again several times with Mr. Hagerty, as well as with George Allen, Gordon Gray and Robert

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951-1957. Secret; Personal and Private. In a covering letter dated February 21, Hoover wrote to Dulles:

"In the attached Memorandum for the Record you will find the story of our troubles with the Saudi Arabian tanks.

"It probably was inevitable that the subject would break into the open eventually, but I think we have come out of it reasonably well. It is becoming more obvious all the time that we will have to sell the Israelis some defensive arms in the near future, but it can be held off at least until Bob Anderson completes his mission.

"I hope you are good and strong, after your vacation, for the Under Secretary feels a little beaten up!"

A marginal notation by Macomber indicates that the Secretary saw Hoover's letter.

Anderson. The tanks were apparently on lighters, ready for loading on the steamer, and scheduled for sailing the next morning at 10:00 a.m., February 17.

Apparently a responsible person in the Department had given the impression to the press that no such shipment had been authorized. As a result, there had been press, radio and Congressional allegations during the afternoon that the shipment was being handled in an improper manner and that the government agencies concerned were not aware of the transaction, or of the policy implications or repercussions.

If the shipment were permanently cancelled, it would unquestionably provoke the Saudi Arabians to the point where our future relations would be seriously jeopardized; they would probably proceed to buy arms from the Soviets; the negotiations for renewal of the Dhahran airbase would be difficult, if not impossible; and vital U.S. resources could be lost.

In the meantime Mr. Hagerty advised me he had wakened the President,<sup>2</sup> and that the President felt the shipment should be stopped. I did not have an opportunity to talk to the President.

Allen, Gray and I decided to temporarily suspend all valid export licenses of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan for purposes of a review. I so advised Mr. Hagerty, and he issued a statement in Thomasville giving the President's approval.

Allen and Gray undertook to put the enforcement order into effect with the U.S. Customs.

At a meeting in my office on the morning of February 17, the matter was reviewed by the following members of the Department: Murphy, Henderson, Phleger, Allen, Morton, Hill, and their staffs. A preliminary review of the export licenses indicated that they were not large in amount, and that for the most part they represented transactions initiated during the summer of 1955. A more detailed examination was started, to be completed in the afternoon.

It was agreed that the information officer would merely state "that the entire matter was under review."

At a meeting late in the afternoon, details of the outstanding export licenses were available. A summary is attached hereto of those which had been issued since August 17, 1955.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> According to Dulles, in a memorandum of conversation with the President on March 2, "the President referred, somewhat apologetically, to the Saudi tank matter, saying he had been disturbed all of a sudden in the evening when he was relaxed and going to bed, but that he remembered a good rule in war, which was probably also a good rule in peace, that is, not to disturb carefully thought out plans in a spirit of sudden emergency without calm review of the whole situation." (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

After the examination, it was the strong feeling of all present that the licenses should be reinstated. The Defense Department fully concurred, and a working group was designated to draft a statement overnight.

On Saturday, February 18, I had breakfast with Senator Knowland. I pointed out that the temporary suspension was already having severe repercussions in Saudi Arabia<sup>4</sup> and we would probably have to release the tanks soon if a major break in our relations was to be avoided. I outlined to him the result of our review. He agreed that we would probably have to take action, and that while there would undoubtedly be criticism from the Zionists, our policy of making a deliberate review would avoid charges of irresponsibility and create the opportunity for a complete statement.

I went over the matter with Senator George in his office during the afternoon. He also agreed that we would probably have to release the tanks and suggested that the President should make a strong statement authorizing the action. When I asked him if he would support the President, he said, "I think so", but would not definitely commit himself. He proceeded to tell me of his troubles with the Zionists in Georgia.

Senator George believed that the Secretary and I should go before the Foreign Relations Committee in executive session to review the entire Middle East situation soon after the Secretary's return from vacation. He felt it would be undesirable for me to go alone, before the Secretary got back, as the Committee would want to hear from him in any event. He tentatively fixed the date for Friday afternoon, February 24.<sup>5</sup> The Senator gave every appearance of cordiality throughout the conversation.

During the afternoon of February 18, a copy of the proposed statement was transmitted to Thomasville. I reached the President by telephone at 6:50 p.m., upon his return from the country. He approved the statement for immediate release and it was handed to the press by the Department at 7:30 p.m.

A copy of the release is attached.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 392 to Jidda, February 17, instructed Wadsworth to inform King Saud of the temporary suspension and to assure him that the U.S. Government remained "highly sympathetic" to Saudi requirements and that the suspension was temporary. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.561/2-1756) Telegram 374 from Jidda, February 18, transmitted the text of a message to this effect which Wadsworth had sent to the King. (*Ibid.*, 786A.561/2-1856)

<sup>5</sup> On February 24, Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on various aspects of the Arab-Israeli question. For text of the Secretary's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 5, 1956, pp. 368-370.

<sup>6</sup> Not found attached. For text of the press release, see *ibid.*, February 27, 1956, pp. 325-326.



**218. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 3, 1956.*

DEAR MR. MURPHY: Your letter of August 18, 1955 <sup>2</sup> requested the views of this Department on the continued use of Dhahran Airfield in Saudi Arabia. This request was referred for comment to the Air Force, which in turn submitted the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views.

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were furnished to Mr. Hoover by this office on an informal basis in January pending receipt of final Air Force views. (For your convenience an additional copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum is inclosed. <sup>3</sup>) The subject has also been discussed recently with representatives of the Department of State in connection with the temporary suspension of arms shipments to Saudi Arabia.

Both the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it important that the Dhahran Airfield be retained, pointing out that if we were forced to relinquish Dhahran comparable facilities would be required in the same general area to meet U.S. military requirements. They would not be prepared, however, to meet exorbitant Saudi demands in return for Dhahran's retention. While some improvement in the present Dhahran agreement is desirable, as noted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force recognize that we may have to be content with maintaining the current arrangements at the Airfield. This Department concurs in these views.

The major problem presented is the quid pro quo to assure the improvement or retention of U.S. rights at Dhahran. This Department has considered the matter in terms of the possibility of continuing current military assistance to the Saudi Arabian Government, with the object of offering the minimum necessary to secure the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. It is considered that the initial offer should be a continuation of military aid on a reimbursable basis, suggesting, however, the curtailment of activities of the training mission as indicated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crucial question presented is the extent to which we can make

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/3-356. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 174.

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached. A memorandum of January 27 from Gray to Hoover enclosed a copy of an appendix entitled "Military Guidance to be Used in Formulating a U.S. Position for the Forthcoming Negotiations with Saudi Arabia Concerning Dhahran Airfield." (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/1-2756)

matériel and equipment available on a reimbursable basis to meet such Saudi desires as may emerge during the forthcoming negotiations.

Preliminary analysis of the current Saudi Arabian so-called "five year" or "five phase" plan for the expansion of its armed forces indicates that during the first phase of this buildup the majority of the items requested can be made available, provided the Saudi Arabian Government does not insist on special concessions as to price and delivery times. This Department is prepared to recommend that the Saudi Arabian Government be so informed.

It is recognized on the other hand that acceptance of a commitment to provide the matériel and equipment included in the first phase of the Saudi Arabian plan must be integrated from the political standpoint with the overall U.S. policy regarding arms shipments to the Middle East. This will of course require extensive examination by the Department of State and where appropriate by the other government agencies concerned.

If it should develop during the course of negotiations that the Saudi Arabian Government will require more than U.S. matériel and equipment on a reimbursable basis (for example, a Saudi demand for grant military assistance), this Department would be prepared to examine such request, but can make no commitments without detailed study of specific Saudi proposals. The following observations, however, are offered for your interim consideration:

1. One possible measure of the upper limit of grant assistance might be the extent of the present U.S. investment in Dhahran itself. The Air Force has spent approximately \$50 million on fixed installations there, and these would become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government in the event of the withdrawal of U.S. forces. In addition, the Air Force has imported into Saudi Arabia approximately \$10.5 million worth of movable property, some of which could not be removed economically. The Army and Air Force together have provided Saudi Arabia each year with approximately \$1 million in goods and services, most of which is incidental to the U.S. military training program for the Saudi Arabian armed forces. This investment would have to be written off if the U.S. forces were required to give up Dhahran.

2. In the event we should be forced to seek an alternate location for the military facilities now located in Dhahran it is probable that some form of U.S. military or economic assistance would be demanded by the country concerned in return for the grant of necessary new facilities and operating rights. This, coupled with the loss of valuable time in establishing new facilities, must also enter into any calculation of the price we might be willing to pay for the retention of Dhahran. In this connection, the views of the Department of State on the political feasibility of possible movement to other countries in the Middle East would be appreciated.

3. There are other related measures, short of grant assistance which might be offered as a further quid pro quo to reimbursable aid and which are within present U.S. military capabilities.

a. The Air Force is responsible for discharging the U.S. commitment under the 1951 Air Base Agreement to train Saudi nationals in airport administration and to organize the Dhahran Airport technical administration. We are prepared to review this program and expand it in accordance with the capacity of the Saudi Airport administration to provide and use qualified personnel and to adopt improved methods.

b. Inasmuch as the Air Force construction program at Dhahran is now complete, the Department of Defense might be prepared to participate in a modest program for the construction of airfield facilities which would be useful to both the Saudis and the United States. This might take the form of a joint U.S.-Saudi Arabian program for the construction of such facilities as a terminal building and improved accommodations for Saudi military personnel living at the Airfield.

c. Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement the United States has sent an Army-Air Force training mission to Saudi Arabia to provide military training and advice for the Saudi armed forces. If necessary, this Department is prepared to review the objectives and compositions of this program, and, subject to the availability of funds, to expand it to an extent consistent with the U.S. objectives in the Middle East. The measure of such expansion would of course require further study by the military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Saudi Arabian plans for the expansion of its air force might call for military air operations at Dhahran. While the Department of Defense would wish to review most carefully any proposals for increased Saudi use of any of the air base facilities, we are prepared, if additional facilities are required, to accommodate Saudi operations within the limits imposed by Air Force operational requirements and subject to the availability of funds. In considering Saudi proposals for the joint use of the Airfield, it should be borne in mind that in addition to current operations, which include rotational training, the Air Force has a requirement to station an air defense unit at Dhahran, together with supporting facilities in adjacent areas.

4. It has been suggested from time to time that Saudi Arabia might request an annual cash payment, perhaps camouflaged under the heading of "economic aid", in return for continued U.S. use of Dhahran Airfield. The Department of Defense is not prepared to seek funds for such payment. In this connection it will be recalled that it was only because of unusual circumstances that the Department of the Air Force undertook to seek funds for an annual cash payment to Libya for the duration of the Wheelus Field Agreement. The Libyan payment arrangement was approved with reluctance by the interested Congressional Committees and only on the understanding that it would not be a precedent for cash subsidies to other countries in which we receive military rights.

It should be noted finally that in the event Saudi Arabia refuses to extend the Dhahran Airfield Agreement on acceptable terms, the Air Force will require approximately nine months from the time a decision to leave Dhahran was made in order to remove personnel and removable property from the base.

In view of the shortage of time available in which to accomplish the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, it is suggested negotiating instructions be dispatched as soon as it is possible. While representatives of our respective Departments are already engaged in working level discussions aimed at producing appropriate instructions, the views of the Department of State would nevertheless be appreciated as a matter of priority on the considerations raised above.<sup>4</sup>

Sincerely yours,

**Gordon Gray**

---

<sup>4</sup> On May 1, responding to Gray's letter, Murphy noted that the Department had reviewed the considerations in the March 3 letter and substantially incorporated them into the instructions for the renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield. Murphy indicated that while it was expected that negotiations would be difficult, the Department felt it should make a strong effort to retain the U.S. rights and position. As to alternative base rights, Murphy added, preliminary study had not indicated that such rights could be easily obtained in any suitable neighboring country. (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/3-356)

---

## 219. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts<sup>1</sup>

CA-6860

*Washington, March 7, 1956.*

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy in Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

The Department has received numerous reports from posts in the area concerning alleged Saudi Arabian efforts to support elements in opposition to the Baghdad Pact and to the British. There have been further reports that many in the area, including some British officials, believe that the Arabian American Oil Company is not only advancing large sums of money to the Saudi Arabian

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/3-756. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Burdett. Sent to Aden, Amman, Baghdad, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Jidda, Kuwait, and London.

Government, but is also assisting Saudi Arabia in the movement of troops in sensitive areas.

. . . . .

For your background information and appropriate oral use, you may be guided by the following:

(1) The United States supports and desires to see the maintenance of a substantial British position in the area; the United States and UK aims in the area are alike in many important respects.

(2) The United States has interests of its own as exemplified by petroleum concessions, rights at the Dhahran Air Field, and traditional friendships with the nations of the area.

(3) Neither the United States Government nor private United States interests are seeking to expand their position at the expense of the British. Private United States companies are frequently under pressure to be responsive to the demands of the country which granted their privileges. Both the United States Government and the companies, however, desire to reduce to a minimum their involvement in international disputes.

(4) The Western position can best be maintained by reducing to a minimum the points of conflict between Western nations and the nations of the area. Every effort must be made to settle outstanding differences by peaceful means.

(5) The Arabian American Oil Company makes advance payments to Saudi Arabia only for specific purposes, such as the Dhahran-Riyadh Railroad, local public works, housing developments and other similar projects.

In addition, Saudi Arabia, from time to time, borrows money from certain New York banks equal to accumulated, but unpaid, Aramco tax payments. These advance loans are possible because there is frequently a lapse of several months between the actual production of the oil on which the tax is levied and the payment by Aramco of the tax. In these cases, Aramco pays the tax, which forms the collateral for the loans, directly to the bank which made the loan. During 1955, loans of this type totaled \$93,000,000, of which \$57,000,000 were paid off during that year.

The only unusual payments made by Aramco to Saudi Arabia in 1955 covered retroactive taxes under a pricing settlement. This totaled \$73,000,000.

(6) The Arabian American Oil Company has assured the Department of State that, except where Saudi Arabian guards accompany Aramco field parties, Aramco does not move Saudi Arabian armed forces in its transport. Some confusion arises because trucks of Saudi Arabian Army and of Aramco are painted similar colors.

A record of the talks between representatives of the Department and representatives of the British Foreign Office which took place

between January 16 and January 20, 1956, will follow shortly. These transcripts will provide further useful background information.

Hoover

---

220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 9, 1956—6:12 p.m.*

434. Nuri Said has on several occasions raised with Ambassador Gallman question of Saudi support of opposition elements in Iraq and anti-Western elements other Arab countries. Ambassador Gallman replied these approaches on March 2 indicating Department believes Saudi influence can best be lessened through effort reduce King Saud's suspicions toward Iraq and Iraq's friends.<sup>2</sup>

Department also requested Ambassador explore with Nuri possibilities achieving better understanding between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Department acting on assumption Saud not entirely happy with growing Egyptian influence in Saudi Arabia and might be amenable to overtures from Iraq. U.S. indicated willingness support alignment if rapprochement possible.

In reply Nuri stated three main questions troubled Iraq-Saudi relations: the Hejaz, Iraq's special relations with Syria and position Iraq and Saudi Arabia in Persian Gulf area. Nuri felt Saudi royal family should stop agitating Hejaz problem since Iraq was remaining quiet about it. With regard to Syria Nuri believed Saudi Arabia should recognize Iraq's special relationships and importance of Syrian outlet for Iraqi oil but emphasized he wanted an independent Syria. Nuri stressed his belief Baghdad Pact which is designed block Soviet penetration serves as much for protection of Saudi Arabia as it does for protection of Iraq. He suggested Saudi Arabia stop its agitation against the Pact.

Nuri believes key man in Saudi Arabia today is Prince Faisal and any approach must be first to Faisal. Nuri believes Saudi Arabia

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/3-956. Top Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Baghdad and London.

<sup>2</sup> The substance of Gallman's conversation with Nuri was transmitted in telegram 881 from Baghdad, March 1. (*Ibid.*, 786.00/3-156) The Department's views on an Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement were transmitted in telegram 636 to Baghdad, February 27. (*Ibid.*, 786.00/2-2756)

should take initiative in view its recent activities despite fact Iraq failed return satisfactorily Saud's visit to Faisal coronation.

Other possibilities Department proposed in connection with rapprochement were:

1. Expression by King Faisal in letter or through special emissary to Saud of his concern over current Arab problems. Such approach might be based on deference to King Saud as elder and guardian holy places.
2. Pilgrimage by Faisal, possibly in company of Hussain of Jordan in June of this year when Haj takes place.
3. Governmental talks on common problems.
4. Royal meeting on Iraqi and Saudi yachts in Persian Gulf as Faisal met ibn Saud on HMS *Lupin* in 1930.
5. Meeting on border in desert, possibly in neutral zone.

We are keeping British generally informed steps being taken in this matter but have not discussed approach to Saudis. Nuri was cautioned to use utmost discretion in discussing matter since it is of course important that U.S. not be identified in any way with any proposal accepted. Purely indigenous development could not with justification be criticized by Egypt or Syria.

For present, forego is sent on purely FYI basis. Department would appreciate your comments and suggestions regarding possibilities of approach to Faisal or King on this subject.<sup>3</sup> Department considers Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement is one key to efforts improve Western position in area.

**Hoover**

---

<sup>3</sup> In response, Wadsworth reported on March 29 that King Saud, not Prince Faisal, was the "key man" in Saudi Arabia; that the initiative for the approach should be taken by King Faisal; and that King Hussein would be the best possible intermediary. Wadsworth added that of all the possible approaches mentioned in the reference telegram, the most suitable to Saud's present temper would be a state visit by Faisal during the Pilgrimage in mid-July. (Telegram 434 from Jidda; *ibid.*, 786.00/3-2956) On May 1, the Department informed the Embassy in Baghdad that King Saud had suggested in a top secret message to Wadsworth that he would be happy to have Faisal of Iraq visit Saudi Arabia. According to the Department, Saud approved of the idea of Hussein of Jordan acting as an intermediary. (Telegram 897 to Baghdad; *ibid.*, 786.00/5-156)

## 221. Editorial Note

On March 31, Rountree informed Dulles and Hoover that in a discussion of Near East policy with MacArthur, he had raised the problem of Saudi Arabia with the following recommendation:

“e. Regarding Saudi Arabia, we have asked Ambassador Wadsworth to return in early April for consultation. By then we must have definitive ideas as to what arms can now be offered to Saudi Arabia and what assurances can be given regarding other Saudi arms requests. We must develop instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth relating to his conversations with the King following his return to Saudi Arabia. These instructions would be consistent with our efforts:

“(1) to reassure King Saud of US willingness to work with him; (2) to make him feel that we look upon him as leader of the Arab world and therefore count heavily upon him to influence policies in the Arab world which would prevent Soviet infiltration and ultimate domination of the Arab states; (3) to endeavor discreetly to cause him to recognize the dangers of too close association with Egypt and Nasser; (4) to reassure him (assuming that we will have some success with the British in this connection) of our confidence that a satisfactory solution can be reached upon the Buraimi issue; (5) to elicit his help in preventing Yemen infiltration by the Soviets as a result of Yemeni purchases of Soviet arms.” (Memorandum from Rountree to Dulles and Hoover, March 31; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—memos, etc. from March 24, 1956 to April 23, 1956)

On April 1, Dulles, Hoover, and MacArthur met with Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador, and Ronald W. Bailey of the British Embassy at the Secretary's home. After discussion of Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East and the upcoming visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to London, Dulles turned to the problem of Saudi Arabia:

“The third point the Secretary said he wished to stress was our belief that the key to any constructive program in the area involved the winning away of the Saudi Arabians from their present alignment with Egypt. We believed that it might be possible to win King Saud away from Nasser, and Saud could give important anti-Communist leadership in the Arab world, which was important. However, we believed the winning away of the Saudis from Egypt depended on the UK reaching an accommodation with the Saudis on Buraimi. A settlement of the Buraimi issue was of vital importance, and if an immediate settlement could not be achieved, it might be possible for the UK and the Saudis to agree to some form of indefinite postponement of final decision on the Buraimi matter. The Secretary said he had stressed the importance of a UK-Saudi settlement on Buraimi. . . . The Secretary said we had reason to believe



that King Saud had some concern over the general philosophy of Nasser and his revolutionary group. Also, King Saud was in a position to exercise religious influence in the area. All these elements might be marshalled and used. . . . We believed it would be extremely difficult to counter the combined Nasser-Saud alignment, and therefore in our view Saudi Arabia represented the key." (Memorandum of conversation by MacArthur, April 1; *ibid.*, Omega Roundtree (for NATO meeting May '56))

---

## 222. Memorandum of a Conversation, Jidda, April 2, 1956<sup>1</sup>

### SUBJECT

- 1) Saudi-American Cooperation
- 2) Buraimi
- 3) Arms
- 4) Yemen
- 5) Syria
- 6) St. John Philby

### PARTICIPANTS

His Majesty King Saud with Royal Counsellor, Yusuf Yasin  
Ambassador Wadsworth with Embassy Arab Consultant, Muhammad  
Massoud, who also acted as interpreter

1) After compliments, I opened the conversation by expressing my appreciation for His Majesty's message saying he would receive me prior to my departure for Washington on consultation. I believed that my visit could further the common interests of our two countries which His Majesty and I had discussed during recent months. This was the sense of the reply (see copy annexed<sup>2</sup>) which I had sent him.

His Majesty, I said, had many times assured me and given proof of his friendship for my country. I remembered particularly his remarks to General Tunner and me two years ago in Buraida when he had said that he conceived his duty as a friend was two-fold: first, to continue, as his distinguished father had done, to cooperate with us in the common use of Dhahran Airfield and, second, to have no dealings with our enemies. But, he had added, your country, too, has reciprocal duties of friendship.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/4-256. Secret. Drafted by Wadsworth.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

It was in this spirit, I concluded, that I wished to present our common problems to my Government. If there were any special messages I could take from His Majesty I should be happy to do so. I had mentioned Dhahran Airfield specifically, because my telegram from Mr. Hoover asking me to return had indicated that he wished me to learn the viewpoint of our Defense Department on that question; but my telegram had, as well, indicated that the State Department would wish to consider with me Near Eastern area problems and all questions of common interest to Saudi Arabia and the United States.

His Majesty answered that what I had said as to cooperative friendship between our two countries was exactly what he had wanted to say. He continued substantially as follows:

I have always been proud of my friendship with America; and I want it to continue if the United States so desires.

I have certain principles. One is that I always keep my word. What I say is from my heart, based on religious faith and on our Arab tradition. This is well known.

No man lives who has not enemies; enemies who will talk against him. But it is by experience that others can know him. I repeat again that I want my friendship with America to continue.

I shall live up fully to my duties as a friend. Whatever be asked of me I shall do, on three conditions: that the independence of my country be maintained; that my Sovereignty be respected; and that there be no interference in our internal affairs.

I believe I have proven this to your Government. I should not have to mention examples. But, even after approving the Polish contract (for survey of the Hejaz Railway) I cancelled it (i.e. the approval) when I found it was contrary to American interest. And I am the only Arab leader who has not taken arms from the Russians or their satellites, because I want to be the friend of America.

If United States Government has understood these things, I will be ever with it. And from it I want, in turn, three things: that it back me as I am backing it; that that part of my country (Buraimi) which has been taken by force be restored; and that United States Government supply my army with the arms it needs, because I don't want to take them from others—except for those (British) arms which, as I told you, I am taking from Egypt.

When the 18 American tanks arrived last week I asked that one be brought to Riyadh to show the people, so they could see what I could get from America; and I had Americans drive it. It was a symbol of Saudi-American cooperation; and I gave the drivers watches and a month's pay.

To me the obtaining of arms is vitally important. If it is a question of paying, I can pay. Among the Arabs I am the richest, but my army is the weakest. I can get arms elsewhere, with training mission as well, but I want only American arms. And you may be sure I shall never use them to attack; I want them for defense.

As for Dhahran Airfield, anything which will help reinforce Saudi-American relations I will never hesitate to give. I repeat; if

America comes closer by a span, I will come by an arm's-length and cooperate to the fullest.

I am greatly hopeful your visit will help strengthen relations and realize our hopes, to our common interest. I will wait, with interest, to hear from you the decision of your Government.<sup>3</sup>

I said, in reply, that I would discuss all these things in Washington. His Majesty's exposition would be my best help in making them clear to my Government. His Majesty answered, by way of summation, that, in speaking as he had done, he had wished to reassure me as to "the bases of his policy with America."

2) *Buraimi*. I asked if His Majesty would wish to elaborate with respect to the two particular questions he had mentioned, Buraimi and arms. With respect to Buraimi, I had already sent him word my Government would be glad to continue to extend its good offices. We hoped that the proposed preliminary talks on ministerial level<sup>4</sup> would find bases for negotiations which would lead to settlement.

His Majesty asked if I know what attitude the British would take in reply to his proposal that the preliminary talks be held in New York.<sup>5</sup> I answered that I had heard from our Embassy in London, that, at working level, the Foreign Office was not happy on learning of this suggestion.<sup>6</sup> My Government's position was that it had no objection to these talks being held in New York. As one offering good offices to both parties it would hardly say more.

The King answered, "Your position is reasonable"; then added: "We do not want to be disappointed again. We will talk. We will

---

<sup>3</sup> According to a memorandum from Wilkins to Allen of April 9, the King's message was approved on April 3 by the Royal Saudi Diwan. That evening Saud informed Wadsworth that he planned to write a personal letter to the President, conveying this message to Eisenhower. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/4-956) In a letter dated April 3, the King expressed his gratitude for U.S. efforts to facilitate the reopening of discussions between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom and noted that he had asked Wadsworth to convey to the President Saudi desire to solidify the friendship existing between Saudi Arabia and the United States, on the basis of cordial cooperation which would maintain Saudi independence and sovereignty and assist the reinforcement of the Saudi army as an effective element for peace. The text of the Saud letter is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.

<sup>4</sup> The British and Saudi Governments had agreed in a series of aides-mémoire and notes to undertake direct discussions to improve relations. (Despatch 124 from Jidda, February 23, telegram 394 from Jidda, March 1, and despatch 148 from Jidda, March 27; Department of State, Central Files, 641.86A/2-2356, 780.022/3-156, and 641.86A/3-2756, respectively)

<sup>5</sup> The proposal was made in a Saudi aide-mémoire of March 24. The text was transmitted in despatch 148 from Jidda, cited in footnote 4 above.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 4122 from London, March 21, repeated to Jidda, the Embassy informed the Department that working-level Foreign Office officials believed that New York City would not be an appropriate place for discussions as this might imply pressure to bring the Buraimi matter to the Security Council. According to the Foreign Office, the British preferred Riyadh over London or Jidda because they wanted more direct access to the King. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/3-2156)

seek a basis for settlement. If the British show good will, we will show it."

Shaikh Yusuf commented that he had already explained to me that His Majesty's acceptance of the British proposal had been based on his desire to effect peaceful settlement of the dispute, but that it was the United States Government offer of good offices which had in large measure encouraged him to do so. Now, he feared, the British might say: We have agreed with the Saudis, so you Americans should withdraw. His Majesty would not wish that to happen. He wants United States Government to continue "in the picture."

I answered that, personally, I believed we would wish to do so and to be of all possible help in finding a basis for settlement. Personally, too, I had been thinking much as to what such basis might be. I had asked Yusuf to explain to me just what was meant by the formula "One-half undivided interest," as applied to the Saudi-Iraqi Neutral Zone, because in that formula, I had gathered, might lie a possible basis for settlement of the question of sovereignty in Buraimi and the Disputed Territory.

Yusuf, I added, had read me some two months ago a telegram from Ambassador Al-Khayal reporting that he had discussed this possibility with Mr. Allen; but I had heard nothing further of it except one report that Mr. Duce, too, thought it might open one way to settlement. I had, therefore, been happy to hear from Yusuf that he also saw in this suggestion a possible formula for the recognition of His Majesty's sovereignty, i.e. in the sense of tribal allegiance to His Majesty as liege-lord. Could I say His Majesty would have no objection to this idea as a possible basis for settlement?

The King commented in substance: It is a thorny problem. In the old days this area was not known as the Disputed Area. What shall we do with those now homeless, living here as refugees in tents, who want to go back to their homes? We have trouble now with Iraq and Quwait in the northern Neutral Zones where there are only nomads and no villages. In the Disputed Area, all the tribes give allegiance to Saudi Arabia, but there there are villages as well.

Why, His Majesty then asked, cannot the British be satisfied with the old boundaries of the last 100's of years? I answered: "Because, perhaps, there were no lines."

The King replied, in substance: Yes, there were. We have never interfered in the coastal areas or with the affairs of the coastal Shaikhs of Sharja, Dubai and Ras al-Khaima. Now it is they (the British) who are pushing into the hinterland. For our part, even if there be tribes in Ras al-Khaima who want to come to us, we will not interfere.

His Majesty concluded: The fact is that, if the British have good will and wish to reach an understanding with us, they will find us

ready. We are depending on God, our legitimate rights and the assistance of USG. And, if we do not reach an agreement, we must go to the Security Council where, we are confident, we will have the support of USG.

(Or: we will, as USG promised, have its support.)

I limited my reply to recalling that I had already assured His Majesty my Government will be happy to continue to exercise its good offices.

3) *Arms.* I opened discussion on this point by saying, in substance, that, as I saw it, Washington had two policies. One, which was of immediate concern because of the threatening Palestine situation, was to prevent, in the interests of peace, an arms race between Arabs and Jews. The other was based on our long-time, often repeated desire to contribute towards strengthening the Saudi army to the end that it be able effectively to maintain internal security and, in the event of war, defend itself and contribute to the defense of the area.

It was, I said, in the second connection that I hoped my visit to Washington would be helpful. Saudi Arabia had already bought between \$20 million and \$30 million worth of arms from USG. Today it had asked to buy another \$30 million to \$40 million worth of arms and equipment needed to supply its army under the Five-Year Plan which had been elaborated by our Military Mission in collaboration with His Majesty's officers. Another like amount would be needed to complete the Plan. I would, in Washington, hope to obtain assurance that these arms would be delivered in accordance with the annual scheduling of that Plan.

I asked if I might say in Washington that this would be agreeable to His Majesty.

In reply, the King at first expressed displeasure with my exposition. Was there, he asked, a change in our policy? Were we not ready to send the arms needed for his army? Whenever he had referred to the promises made by Ambassador Hare and others, I had said "Let us forget the past and build for the future." He wished to do that, with our help. But, was Saudi Arabia alone to be subjected to such conditions? Why were they not applied in the cases of Greece, Turkey, Iraq and Iran? I answered Saudi Arabia was not alone. We neither gave nor sold any arms to any country which was not ready for them.

The King continued: We want to be treated like these countries. But with one difference: I don't want these arms free of charge. If USG is ready to sell them to me without conditions, I will buy them.

I asked: "Is it a condition to ask that purchases be made as provided by the Five-Year Plan?" I could say there was no change in our policy. I had told him, on instructions from Washington, that USG wished to continue to assist in strengthening his army.

His Majesty answered that he feared we might now be "giving him a runaround." That was what he feared for the future. Besides, I spoke only of the Five-Year Plan. Prince Mishaal spoke of five phases. The question—of getting all the arms needed—was urgent. He wanted the phases realized more quickly.

In reply, I endeavored to explain: His Majesty had sent word to me in Washington over two years ago by Shaikh Asad that he wanted me to work on a Five-Year Plan. I had been doing so. It was a plan designed to build the best possible army in five years, within what we conceived to be the country's capabilities.

Prince Mishaal, on the other hand, I continued, saw things on a larger plane. I had said his five "phases"—of which our Five-Year Plan was but the first phase—could be realized but it would take more time. I would say, too, that, if the Five-Year Plan could be realized more quickly we would be as happy as would be His Majesty. I must add, however, that I believed, on the basis of my own experience in Turkey, that the officers of our Military Mission were more competent to judge these things than is Prince Mishaal.

The King answered that he understood my position, but he wanted to make three important points. He said:

a) I don't see that my army is progressing as fast as the armies in the other Arab states.

b) Must I say I will hold to the Five-Year Plan if I can go faster?

c) If we are going to renew the Dhahran Airfield Agreement and if I ask in return for renewal the giving of arms, would you give them?

I said in reply that I had already answered His Majesty's second question; the answer was, "No, and we would be the first to take satisfaction in faster realization of the Five-Year Plan." As to his second question (point C), I would take pleasure in asking for an answer during my discussions in Washington.

At this point His Majesty consulted with Shaikh Yusuf, following which I was asked and replied to three questions Yusuf had drafted, as follows:

a) Are you ready to offer all arms and equipment called for by the Five-Year Plan? I answered that that, in principle, had always been our policy and that I hoped the Plan could be realized in less than five years.

b) Are you ready to offer all arms and equipment called for by the five phases? I replied that I believed the answer would be "Yes, as soon as Saudi Arabia is ready for them."

c) If Saudi Arabia needs more arms than are included in the Five-Year Plan, are you ready to sell them to Saudi Arabia?

I had begun to reply to Yusuf's third question something to the effect that "if Saudi Arabia needed such arms for its own use. . . ." <sup>7</sup> when His Majesty interrupted to say, "I want to say two things: 1) I want the arms called for by the Five-Year Plan; and 2) I guarantee I will not give or sell them to anyone else." He added, "How can you even think I would give away arms when I am getting them from you and from Egypt".

His Majesty then left for sunset prayers, asking me to await his return. Upon his return, I asked if Muhammad Effendi might recapitulate what I had said on the question of arms. His Majesty concurring Muhammad did so. We then passed to other subjects.

[Here follows a brief discussion of Yemen, Syria, and St. John Philby.]

**George Wadsworth**

---

<sup>7</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

223. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, April 10, 1956<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

*Defense*

Gen. Alonzo P. Fox, Military Adviser to Secretary Gray  
 Mr. Charles A. Sullivan, Director, Office of Special International Affairs, OSD  
 Mr. James Wilson, Chief, Foreign Military Rights Affairs, OSD  
 Mr. William Lang, Office, General Counsel, OSD  
 Col. Philip Shepley, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, OSD  
 Maj. Edwin B. Owen, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, OSD  
 Mr. Leighton Cain, Office of Program and Control, OSD  
 Col. Fred Field, Director, Foreign Military Rights, G-3, Army  
 Comdr. Richard Markham, Office of Political-Military Affairs, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

*Air Force*

Gen. Richard King, Chief, Policy Division, and Directorate of Plans  
 Maj. James Martin, Foreign Military Rights  
 Gen. O'Keefe, newly appointed Commanding General of Dhahran Airfield  
 Dr. Delavan Evans, International Branch, Policy Division  
 Mr. William Hancock, Office of the Air Force General Counsel

*State*

Ambassador George Wadsworth  
 Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

Ambassador Wadsworth said that, in approaching the renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield, it was necessary to appreciate how King Saud, himself, and the other Saudi Arabs regarded the field.<sup>2</sup> It is their airfield and, unless a satisfactory new arrangement can be worked out before June 18, they will take it over. He said they had the men to operate the civil airport and that the acquisition of the very fine facilities which the Air Force has constructed will make it unnecessary for them to build their own facilities.

In their eyes, he said, the airfield is now worth \$50 million. We gave so much, he said, for an airfield in 1951 worth \$10 million, they believe we should pay much more for one worth \$50 million. The fact, he said, that we built the additional \$40 million worth of installation is immaterial to them.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 70 D 148, DAF Negotiations 1956. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on April 12.

<sup>2</sup> Wadsworth arrived in Washington on April 6 for consultation on the Dhahran Airfield and other matters.



But for one thing, the Ambassador said, it would probably be most difficult to obtain an extension of the rights at Dhahran; King Saud, however, needs the help of a strong power because of his dispute with the British over Buraimi and his other frontier areas. He, therefore, feels a necessity of continuing his close cooperation with the United States. He appreciates what the United States has done to date in the Buraimi matter.

If the United States is to retain the rights at Dhahran, therefore, the Ambassador said, it must first do the same four things which it agreed to do in 1951. These are:

1. To operate the civil airport
2. To train Saudis in airport operations
3. To provide a military mission, and
4. To sell arms.<sup>3</sup>

The Ambassador said that he believed we should offer to Saudi Arabia our firm commitment to sell the arms required by the Five Year Plan, which had been worked out with United States and Saudi Arabian military personnel in Saudi Arabia and which he, personally, had reduced to its present form. He said this would entail the sale of approximately \$70 million on phased basis over the next five years.

In addition, the United States must do something more and he suggested, first, that the United States build a terminal for the airport at Dhahran which would surpass those of Beirut and other cities of the area. The Ambassador pointed out that, if Dhahran is to become an international airport of importance in the jet age, it must have a decent terminal. The Ambassador then suggested that, in addition, we might give to Saudi Arabia T-33 jet training air craft, six C-119 aircraft and 18 M-47 tanks.

The Ambassador said he appreciated that his suggestions would raise problems which he hoped to be able to discuss during his period of consultation. It was arranged that officials of the Depart-

---

<sup>3</sup> On April 23, in a memorandum to Hoover regarding the proposed reply of the President to Saud's letter of April 3 and the Dhahran negotiations, Assistant Secretary Allen indicated that any reply to Saud "should indicate a willingness to supply arms if we are to achieve our objectives in Saudi Arabia. We believe some specific assurances at the time of the renegotiation of the Dhahran Air Field agreement are necessary if we are to enter into the negotiations with a reasonable prospect of success." (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5-MSP/4-2356) Later that day, during a phone conversation with the President on the question of arms sales to Israel, Hoover noted, in part, that the United States would soon be involved in negotiations for the Dhahran Airfield, and that "then we will have to sell to the Saudis." According to the transcript of the conversation, Hoover wondered how "we can do that without getting into trouble with our Israeli friends." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries, Telephone Conversations)

ment of Defense would review his version of the Saudi Arabian Five Year Plan and would confer subsequently with him on this matter.

---

**224. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, April 23, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabian Policies Toward Jews

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Al-Khayyal of Saudi Arabia  
Mr. Mahdi, Saudi Arabian Embassy  
Mr. George V. Allen, NEA  
Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

Mr. Allen said there has been one matter of concern to the Department for some time which he wished to discuss with the Ambassador prior to his departure for Africa. He said this was the matter of Saudi Arabian policies toward American citizens of the Jewish faith. He spoke to the Ambassador along the lines of the attached memorandum<sup>2</sup> and, upon the completion of the discussion, handed the Ambassador a copy.

Ambassador Al-Khayyal replied that, since this was the first time the matter had been raised by the United States Government, he would transmit the memorandum to Saudi Arabia and would undoubtedly have further comments later. Mr. Newsom said he wished to point out that, while this matter had not been raised in recent months, there were at least two or three cases, and perhaps more, in the past years in which the United States Government has indicated its inability to condone Saudi Arabian practices in this matter. The Ambassador asked whether these cases concerned primarily individuals and Mr. Newsom confirmed that this was the case.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/4-2356. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This undated U.S. memorandum raised two aspects of Saudi regulations and practices which "directly affect our citizens and cause particular concern": "1. The refusal to permit the transit of any U.S. citizen through Saudi Arabia regardless of color, race, or creed"; and "2. The requirement that U.S. firms certify that they are not Jewish owned or directed before being permitted to trade with Saudi Arabia."

The Ambassador stated that the problem in Saudi Arabia could not be compared to that in any other Arab state, since Jews have not resided in that country since the time of the Caliph Omar in the seventh century. He stated that the Jewish community was banned from the holy places of Islam because they had planned to assassinate the Prophet and this policy had prevailed ever since that time.

In response to a question, Mr. Allen said the Department's approach was not caused by any particular case nor by any particular pressure on the Department. He said it was a principle of the United States that all human beings should be treated as individuals and not as members of a group and that for this reason the United States had been unable to condone some of the practices of Saudi Arabia, although it recognized the right of Saudi Arabia to regulate the entrance of foreigners.

Ambassador Al-Khayyal asked whether the concern of the United States was directed primarily at the transit of Jewish persons at Dhahran. Mr. Allen said that the extension of the Saudi policies to persons in transit seemed particularly extreme. He said the United States cannot concur either in the policy of prohibiting the assignment of American soldiers of the Jewish faith. But, since the United States is a guest in Saudi Arabia, it accepts this, although it does not agree with it.

Prior to his departure, the Ambassador asked about the Buraimi matter. Mr. Allen said the problem had been discussed in Paris by the Secretary with the British. The United States was now primarily interested in determining what the U.K. intended to do as the next step. It understood that instructions were being prepared to the British Ambassador in Jidda regarding the agenda. Mr. Allen stressed that the Secretary had this problem very much in his mind and that the interest of the United States in an appropriate solution would continue.

225. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 25, 1956—4:46 p.m.*

553. Jidda's 480. <sup>2</sup> Embassy requested bring following attention SAG in manner you deem most effective perhaps through Azzam:

US welcomes decision UK and SAG begin discussion current differences. Decision represents act high statesmanship both on part King and present UK Government. UKG however fears recently reported actions on part SAG which appear directed against British on eve of talks may give unfortunate impression in UK and create atmosphere not conducive fruitful results. UKG has special reference to anti-British interpretations placed by Radio Cairo on Yemeni-Saudi-Egyptian treaty and on SAG loan to Yemen. Earlier UK had expressed concern re reported expulsion locust mission, arms distribution on Aden border. USG discussed two latter actions with Azzam April 16.

US has also received indirectly reports Saudi troop movements southward toward Buraimi (Embtel 479 <sup>3</sup>). In event these reports substantiated and become known in UK, USG anticipates further British hesitation to begin or continue talks. While US appreciates such movement may be normal defensive maneuver and may have begun before recent agreement on talks, any SAG assurances regarding these movements which can be passed on to UK might be helpful.

US continuing stress to UK (see following telegram to London <sup>4</sup>) only real solution these various problems lies in immediate opening talks.

**Dulles**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.86A/4-2356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree. Repeated niact to London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 480, April 23, confirmed Saudi acceptance of the Dodds-Parker mission. The Embassy also reported that the King would accept Ambassador Parkes' credentials before the start of the discussions. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 479, April 23, conveyed an unconfirmed report of a Saudi airlift of soldiers from Riyadh and Dhahran to "Shira, 'near Buraimi'." (*Ibid.*, 780.022/4-2356)

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

226. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 3, 1956—8:45 p.m.*

Tosec 22. <sup>2</sup> For Rountree. Saudi Arabian Ambassador talked with me today, reporting SAG impression talks with UK. You may wish suggest to Secretary he review matter with Lloyd.

Jidda's 506 repeated Paris 19; Jidda's 507 repeated Paris 20, <sup>3</sup> and Aramco message sent you today summarize respectively Saudi, UK and Aramco versions recent talks.

Saudi Ambassador believes British complaints represent pre-conditions for talks. He stated SAG expected discuss Buraimi, was surprised by introduction Baghdad Pact, Locust Mission, gun distribution Aden, other items.

We have stressed to him this merely first phase talks and believe progress is possible and successful conclusion will be reached. Saudi Ambassador said SAG cannot accept prior discussion various anti-British actions as prerequisite for wider talk. We have impression however SAG might be willing discuss Buraimi and British points simultaneously. We suggested Saudis might wish make gesture such as requesting removal particular individuals on Locust mission who may be objectionable, but retaining mission itself. Similarly, British might make some gesture.

Believe opportunity might be taken stress to UK: 1) Saudis continue talk about taking matter to SC if UK not willing discuss main issues within short time. <sup>4</sup> As we stated to UKG in memorandum handed Shuckburgh January 19, difficult see how US could oppose resolution in SC incorporating principles peaceful settlement or support UK position which offered no alternative settlement; 2) US on verge important negotiations with SAG over extension rights at Dhahran Airfield and related problem, SAG request for arms. Prompt resumption negotiations will assist US in approaching these

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.86A/5-256. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Hoover. Repeated to London and Jidda.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles was in Paris attending the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Council.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 506, May 2 reported the highlights of the April 29 conversations as conveyed to the Embassy by Ambassador Parkes. According to the Embassy, nothing "tangible" was accomplished toward bringing the two sides closer together. (Department of State, Central Files, 641.86A/5-256) Telegram 507, May 2, conveyed the Saudi version of the minutes of the talks. (*Ibid.*) The complete record of the talks was transmitted in despatch 202 from Jidda, June 2. (*Ibid.*, 641.86A/6-256)

<sup>4</sup> On May 5, the Embassy in Jidda informed the Department that it was not as convinced as the British appeared to be that Saudi Arabia would be hesitant to carry the Buraimi issue to the Security Council if all other measures failed. (Telegram 513; *ibid.*, 641.86A/5-556)

issues, and 3) prompt continuation these talks in both US and UK interest; delay not likely help and might harm.

Hoover

---

## 227. Editorial Note

On May 3, in a luncheon meeting in Paris during the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Dulles and Lloyd, accompanied by British Foreign Office and Department of State officials, discussed the Middle Eastern situation. After a discussion of Soviet objectives in the area, the Arab-Israeli conflict, joint Anglo-American policies, and the Aswan Dam, the British Foreign Secretary raised the question of Saudi Arabia. The report of the discussion includes the following:

"Turning to Saudi-Arabia, Lloyd reviewed progress Dodds-Parker mission and expressed gratification that first objective of bringing British Ambassador back and commencing talks on relatively friendly basis had been achieved. He thought next phase would be continuation of talks by Ambassador in Jidda and Riyadh. He was also considering inviting Azzam Pasha to visit him in London to discuss matter. He thought such conversations with Azzam would be particularly desirable in view Azzam's influence upon King and Lloyd's belief Azzam perhaps more intelligent and objective than other Saudi-Arabian reps who might be dealing with matter. He felt he should himself avoid meeting Feisal until later stages of negotiations.

"Lloyd was not optimistic regarding actual settlement of Buraimi issue and placed main hope in possibility protracted negotiations which would keep matter 'on ice' for some time during which other elements U.K.-Saudi relations might be improved.

"Lloyd inquired whether we felt Saudis were disposed turn away from Egypt. Secretary replied real progress this connection would depend upon success in other directions. Saudis' main concern was their disputes with British, with Hashemites and with Israeli. It will require continuous efforts by all of us to bring about situation in which Saudi-Egyptian ties will be less appealing to them. If progress can be made in British-Saudi rapprochement, in an improvement in Iraq-Saudi relations, and in the direction of a solution to Israeli problem, Secretary felt situation in Saudi-Arabia could be much improved. Meanwhile, we were greatly encouraged by fact that Saudis continued refuse Soviet arms and technicians and professed, we believe sincerely, that they desired full cooperation with us. Secretary referred to forthcoming negotiations on Dhahran Airfield and said he thought it would be necessary for us to agree to

sell some arms to Saudis. Lloyd's only reaction to latter comment was jokingly to ask whether the purpose of arms would be to attack Buraimi.

"Lloyd inquired whether U.S. had made representations to SAG re recent anti-British activities. He was told we had issued instructions U.S. Chargé to express our concern re reports provision of arms to tribes in Aden, expulsion British members FAO anti-Locust mission, and harsh anti-British propaganda on Saudi radio and in Saudi papers. Lloyd expressed appreciation." (Secto 11 from Paris, May 4; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-456)

Later that day, Dulles informed the President by telegram that, while Lloyd felt that the British and Americans were coming closer together on the Middle East, the British were still sensitive about Saudi Arabia and "fear that our policy of trying to wean the Saudis away from Egypt may be at the expense of selling out the British in Buraimi etc." (Dulte 3 from Paris, May 3; *ibid.*, 110.11-DU/5-356)

---

**228. Memorandum of a Conversation, Paris, May 4, 1956,  
Noon<sup>1</sup>**

NATO/MC/5

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Shuckburgh  
Mr. Rountree  
Mr. Burdett

SUBJECT

Near East

Mr. Rountree invited Mr. Shuckburgh to lunch to continue the discussion held by the Secretary with Mr. Lloyd on May 3. Mr. Rountree informed Mr. Shuckburgh in general terms of the Secretary's talk on May 3 with the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Theotokis, which dealt almost entirely with the Cyprus issue. Mr. Shuckburgh said he would report the matter.

Mr. Shuckburgh stated that except for Saudi Arabia there appeared to be no basic differences between the U.S. and U.K. views regarding the Near East. The British thought last fall and subse-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/5-1556. Top Secret. Drafted on May 15. No other drafting information is given on the source text. The conversation took place during the NAC Foreign Ministers meeting.

quently during conversations in London that agreement had been reached on policy towards Saudi Arabia. It now appeared that there was a serious misunderstanding. The U.S. was asking the U.K. and Iraq to make a series of concessions to Saudi Arabia, while nothing was required from the Saudis who were the real cause of Western difficulties in the area. The U.K. had thought that the U.S. was developing means to force a change in Saudi tactics. This apparently was not the case. Mr. Shuckburgh declared with some heat that the only alternative he saw to strong measures against the Saudis was for the West to relinquish its position in the Middle East. He inquired whether the U.S. in fact wished the British to give up their interests in the Arabian Peninsula.

Mr. Rountree replied to the following effect:

It is true that the U.S. and the U.K. assess the Saudi Arabian situation differently. We believe that it is possible to split Saudi Arabia from Egypt. This process will require progress on 3 matters—Buraimi, relations with the Hashemites, and Israel. All of these issues do not have to be solved but if progress is made the unnatural alliance between the Egyptians and the Saudis will tend to disintegrate. The U.S. wishes the U.K. to retain as strong a position as possible in the Middle East. We regard our effort in these difficult times as a common one. The problem is to discover the best way of achieving our objective. We see no practical alternative to trying to get along with the Saudis. With respect to Buraimi the British might wish to consider broadening the discussions and seeking general agreement on the boundaries between Saudi-Arabia, Aden and the various sheikdoms. Mr. Shuckburgh made no comment on this suggestion.

Mr. Shuckburgh took particular exception to an aide-mémoire recently left with the Foreign Office by the American Embassy in London requesting the British to urge upon Nuri and King Feisal a visit by the latter to Saudi Arabia. He said that the British were particularly sensitive regarding American suggestions which had the effect of "pushing" them to yield to the Saudis. Mr. Shuckburgh thought that King Feisal should not be asked to assure King Saud that Iraq had no aggressive intentions towards Saudi Arabia when in fact King Saud was actively attacking Iraq throughout the Near East. Mr. Rountree inquired whether Mr. Shuckburgh meant that it would be inadvisable for Feisal to visit Saudi Arabia. Mr. Shuckburgh replied in the negative saying that if the Iraqis were willing, the visit could prove a useful act. Mr. Rountree responded that the Department shared this view and had expressed itself along these lines to the Foreign Office. He, therefore, failed to see any fundamental disagreement on the subject of the visit and was unable to understand Mr. Shuckburgh's earlier comment implying resentment to the Embassy's approach which was in line with the policy which we



were both following in engaging in regular and frank exchanges on the problem of the Middle East and how our joint interests, as well as those of the free world generally, might best be pursued there. Mr. Shuckburgh's only comment was that of course we should both continue to work closely together.<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows a brief discussion of Jordan and Bahrain.]

---

<sup>2</sup> On May 2, Foster informed the Department that Shuckburgh was disturbed by the implication in the U.S. position that Iraq should assure Saudi Arabia it had no intention of threatening Saudi territory. According to Shuckburgh, it was the Saudis who were threatening neighboring states and facilitating Communist entry into the Middle East. Foster reported that Shuckburgh, who was leaving for Paris, planned to speak "frankly" to Rountree about this matter. (Telegram 5035 from London, May 2; *ibid.*, 786.00/5–256; also telegram 6558 to London, May 1; *ibid.*, 786.00/5–156)

---

**229. Draft of Memorandum From the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Allen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 9, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President, 8:30 a.m. Today

Attached is a copy of a memorandum, with annexes,<sup>2</sup> which I left with the President's secretary, written by me immediately following the meeting.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547, DHAHRAN AIRFIELD, Memos—Miscellaneous (Inter-Office, to Sec. etc.). Secret. Drafted by Wadsworth; a notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was not sent. According to the Record of the President's Daily Appointments, Wadsworth met with Eisenhower at the White House from 8:37 to 8:55 a.m. on May 9. (Record of the President's Daily Appointments, 1957, Eisenhower Library)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In the memorandum, May 9, Wadsworth indicated that he handed the President three documents which Eisenhower read: a copy of Saud's oral message of April 2; a copy of the King's written letter of April 3 in the Arabic original, with an English translation; and a summary of the "Five-Year Plan" for strengthening the Saudi Armed Forces, together with Wadsworth's recommendations for meeting the Saudi requests and insuring priorities for delivery. The memorandum concluded: "I suggested as a 'fall-back' position, that, if I fail to renegotiate the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, the President invite King Saud to visit him; they would succeed."

I was, I think, able to present the highlights of the Dhahran Airfield renegotiation problem, except for one point. That was that, while I did make the basic point that it was only natural the Arab mind should want something more from us for the use during the next five years of what today is a \$50,000,000 airfield than was offered five years ago for what was then a \$10,000,000 airfield, I was unable, because of lack of time, to suggest what that "something more" should be.

Had I been able to discuss this point, I would have suggested: a new airfield building program which, during the next five years, would construct a first-class air terminal building with all related modern communications systems and any other needed improvements for the joint use of our Air Force and international civil airlines, to the over-all end that the airfield be fully equipped to meet the needs of the new "jet age" on the threshold of which we now stand.

Similarly, while I was able to speak of King Saud's strong stand against Communism, against buying arms from Soviet sources and against exchange of diplomatic representatives with the USSR, I was unable to discuss the question of the Hejaz Railway from either the aspect of our current proposal to defray the cost of a broad-gauge survey or from that of the possibility that we might wish to participate in its reconstruction, on a fifty-fifty basis, with the concerned three countries, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria.

I venture to suggest that these missing facets of my presentation, together with the Department's comments, be brought to the President's attention when the matter (i.e. what I am to say to the King when proposing renewal of the DAF Agreement) is brought to his attention.<sup>3</sup>

---

On June 8, Gray informed Hoover that in accordance with a Department of State request for priorities for delivery of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, the Departments of the Army and the Air Force concurred in authorizing Wadsworth to inform the King that the United States would deliver military equipment within 6 months of a firm order form and a deposit of Saudi funds. (Letter from Gray to Hoover, June 8; Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5/6-856. Additional information is in a letter from Hoover to Gray, May 24; *ibid.*, 786A.56/5-2456)

<sup>3</sup> Later that day, in a conversation with the President, Dulles noted that Eisenhower referred to his earlier meeting with Wadsworth. According to the Secretary, the President indicated that "we should be prepared to give some substantial amount of armaments to the Saudis." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

**230. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 11, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement

*Discussion:*

You will recall that consideration of certain actions required in connection with the renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement was postponed until after your return from Paris.

At the bilateral talks with the British in Paris you informed Foreign Minister Lloyd of our intention to sell arms to Saudi Arabia. Although he did not receive the news with enthusiasm, he interposed no objection. <sup>2</sup>

These matters are of some urgency, as Ambassador Wadsworth is tentatively planning to leave May 15. We believe he should, on returning to Saudi Arabia, have the President's reply to King Saud's letter and a clear idea of our policy on arms sales to Saudi Arabia. You may wish to call a meeting as soon as convenient with Mr. Hoover, Mr. Murphy, Mr. MacArthur, Ambassador Wadsworth, and representatives of NEA to discuss the above matters.

Three additional steps are now required:

1. Transmittal to the President of the draft reply to the letter from King Saud (Tab A). <sup>3</sup> Ambassador Wadsworth, in his call on the President on May 9, left copies of King Saud's messages with the President.

2. The authorization of the sale to Saudi Arabia of approximately \$33 million in requests for military equipment currently pending, including 6 Jet Trainer aircraft (T-33), 6 cargo aircraft (C-119) and 463 miscellaneous items of ordnance, transport, quartermaster supplies, and other basic infantry equipment, but not including F-86 aircraft and M-47 tanks. Ambassador Wadsworth wishes to be authorized to inform the King of this decision at an appropriate

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/2-856. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 227.

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached. On May 12, in a memorandum to the President, Dulles forwarded a suggested draft reply to the King's oral message of April 2 and his written message of April 3. According to Dulles, "an appropriate answer from you to King Saud, acknowledging these messages and expressing our continued willingness to cooperate with Saudi Arabia would assist substantially in establishing the appropriate atmosphere for a successful renegotiation." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/5-1256)

stage of the negotiations. Upon receiving word from him that he had informed the King, we would forward letters of offer to the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The Ambassador believes Saudi Arabia will wish to have these items made available within six months. (Tab C) <sup>4</sup>

3. Approval of the instructions for the renegotiation (Tab B). <sup>5</sup> Your attention is invited particularly to Paragraph 11, Page 4. This refers to additional requests which will be received from Saudi Arabia during the next few years representing the remaining phases of their five year armed forces development plan. We will be committed with respect to these requests, but the time and rate of delivery will be subject to US-SAG agreement. We anticipate that this would involve an additional approximate \$50,000,000 in equipment, plus ammunition and spare parts.

*Recommendation:*

1. That you approve the memorandum to the White House with attachments (Tab A).

2. That you approve the negotiating instructions for the Dhahran Airfield Agreement (Tab B) which provides, in Paragraph 11, that we will sell the King the items which he needs for his Five-Year Plan on a phased basis. <sup>6</sup>

3. That you authorize the Ambassador to inform King Saud at an appropriate moment that, as a part of the Five-Year Plan, we are willing to sell him the items he has thus far requested, with the exception of M-47 tanks and F-86 aircraft. <sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>5</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>6</sup> Draft instructions for the renegotiation of the agreement had been sent to Jidda in CA-8034, April 13. CA-9304 to Jidda, May 23, authorized some changes in those instructions. (*Ibid.*, 751.56386A/4-1356 and 711.56386A/5-2356, respectively)

<sup>7</sup> Dulles initialed his approval of the three recommendations.

231. Letter From President Eisenhower to King Saud <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 14, 1956.*

YOUR MAJESTY: I am taking the opportunity to send to you by Ambassador Wadsworth my acknowledgment of your recent messages. Both the one which you gave the Ambassador orally during his farewell audience and your subsequent letter of April third are new milestones in the long history of the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. I am most appreciative of the sincere expressions of friendship which these convey.

We greatly value the close relationship which has existed between our two countries and especially the basis of mutual trust and cooperation which has characterized that friendship. In recent months I have been impressed by the understanding and statesman-like patience with which you have faced the numerous problems and pressures upon you and by your resolute determination to shun the temptations of precipitate action.

We are encouraged by the word which Ambassador Wadsworth brings on the Dhahran Airfield. We are gratified that it is your intention to continue our cooperation in this matter. I welcome the opportunity to reiterate my desire to continue to cooperate in the strengthening of your Kingdom. Ambassador Wadsworth is now in a position to discuss fully with you how, in our view, this objective may best be implemented and how the United States may be of assistance to you in the strengthening of your defense force.

I thank you for that portion of your message concerning Buraimi. We are hopeful that it may soon be possible for your Government and that of the United Kingdom to bring your discussions of the issues between you to a satisfactory conclusion. We will continue to exercise our good offices to the end that your discussions may be fruitful.

The United States continues to be deeply interested in the territorial integrity, prosperous development and independence of Saudi Arabia. I look forward to a continued period of close and mutually beneficial friendship between us and our peoples.

Sincerely,

**Dwight D. Eisenhower** <sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Wadsworth delivered the President's letter to Saud during an audience with the King on May 28. (Telegram 254 from Jidda, June 4; Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/6-456)

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

## 232. Editorial Note

On May 26, accompanied by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, Wadsworth returned to Saudi Arabia to begin preliminary negotiations for the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. On May 28, the Ambassador had an audience with King Saud during which Wadsworth delivered the President's letter of May 14, discussed the United States position on Buraimi and arms, presented the draft exchange of notes proposing a 5-year extension of the Dhahran agreement on its present terms, and conveyed to the King the United States offer to defray the cost of the survey of the Hijaz Railway. The King's response to the Eisenhower letter and to the American position on arms and Buraimi was positive, yet, according to Wadsworth, his initial remarks on the Dhahran Airfield "gave me first warning proposed extension might not be agreed on, if agreed, only for costly quid pro quo." The King, Wadsworth informed the Department, noted that great pressure had been brought upon him, both inside and outside of his country, against the renewal of the accord. "We would not agree to extend the agreement," the King continued, "without having certain things (something) to justify our attitude." (Telegram 254 from Jidda, June 4; Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/6-456)

That evening, after dinner at the Royal Palace, Wadsworth resumed discussion with the King. After a review of the situation in Yemen, recent Soviet approaches to Saudi Arabia, and the prospects of a meeting between Faisal of Iraq and Saud, the King concluded the audience by noting: "Our relations are very good. It is my hope they will remain so. Dhahran Airfield is [the] symbol of this. But you must help us. We need some justification, something concrete which our people and others can see and point to, something which will persuade them of the rightness of my judgment and action." (Despatch 213 from Jidda, June 13; *ibid.*, 711.56386A/6-1356)

On May 29, 30, 31, and June 2, Wadsworth talked with Faisal, Yasin, and al-Walid. Although discussion covered the subjects of Buraimi and economic and military aid, the main emphasis was on Dhahran. According to Wadsworth, during all of these meetings, Saudi officials continued to insist on "justification" for the renewal of the accord. Despite the Ambassador's attempts to explain that the airfield was in the mutual interests of both countries, and that the United States could neither rent the airfield nor provide grant aid without a special agreement, the Saudis continued to insist on a form of quid pro quo. In the Ambassador's final meeting with Yasin and al-Walid, the Royal Counselors proposed that, in return for a renewal of the agreement, the United States provide sufficient mili-

tary equipment to arm a 13-regiment Saudi army or pay \$50 million per year for the renewal. During his subsequent conversations with Faisal, Wadsworth was again informed of the importance to Saudi Arabia of justifying any decision to extend the agreement. According to Wadsworth, Faisal referred to the possibility of obtaining \$250 million in arms for the renewal of the accord. Wadsworth concluded his meeting with Faisal with the impression that while Saudi strategy revealed little change from the conduct of the 1951 negotiations, a “stronger surge of Arab nationalism is now increasingly influencing high policy decisions.” (Telegram 254) On June 4 Wadsworth left Jidda for Dhahran. (The complete record of Wadsworth’s conversations was transmitted in despatch 213. A summary of the first phase of the talks was drafted by Newsom in a memorandum of June 20; *ibid.*, 711.56386A/2–856.)

---

**233. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 21, 1956.*

**SUBJECT**

Possible Visit of King Saud to the United States

*Discussion:*

NEA has previously indicated that, at an appropriate time, during or following the renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement we might wish to invite King Saud to visit the United States. Ambassador Wadsworth confirms other reports we have received of the King’s keen interest in receiving such an invitation.

We envision that such an invitation would come in the context of a successful conclusion of the negotiations which are about to commence. The dates of the actual visit could be arranged to fit the convenience of the President and the King, probably in 1957.

Ambassador Wadsworth mentioned the possibility of such a visit to the President when he saw him on May 9 and urged that favorable decision at this time might well assist him in his negotia-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/5–2156. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on May 18.

tions, particularly if full accord could not be reached before June 18 when the present agreement expires. The President's reply, while in no sense a commitment, was to the effect that the suggestion had "good points".

We have, therefore, prepared the attached memorandum<sup>2</sup> to the President, suggesting that, if the President concurs, Ambassador Wadsworth be authorized at an appropriate stage in the negotiations of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, to tell the King that the United States Government would be pleased if, upon the conclusion of the new agreement, Saudi and American ties could be further strengthened by a state visit by His Majesty to the United States.

*Recommendation:*

That you approve the attached memorandum to the President.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>The memorandum to the President recommended, among other things, that upon successful conclusion of the Dhahran Airfield agreement, the United States could further strengthen its relations with Saudi Arabia by inviting King Saud to this country in 1957. The memorandum also pointed out that although Saud had visited the United States in 1946 while Crown Prince, he would, if invited, be the first reigning Saudi leader to pay a state visit.

<sup>3</sup>A notation on the source text by Macomber indicates that Dulles disapproved the memorandum. An additional marginal notation, presumably by Macomber, reads as follows: "Will play too early. Domestic implication Jewish [friends?]"

---

**234. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 11, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Importance of Saudi Arabian Oil (NIE 36.6-56)<sup>2</sup>

Reference is made to your query regarding the following statement in my memorandum of May 17:

"Loss of Saudi oil would not be economically or militarily critical to the West in view of the possibilities for quick expansion of production elsewhere in the Middle East."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/6-1156. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, INR-NIE Files)



We have reviewed Saudi Arabia's oil position in the light of free world requirements in the absence of an armed conflict involving the great powers and are of the view that the conclusions reached in NIE 36.6-56 (page 2, and pages 13-14<sup>3</sup>) are valid. The significance of Saudi oil under global wartime conditions has been analyzed in the context of total Middle East production by the Departments of Interior and Defense (OGD-12 (TS)). Although Saudi Arabian crude oil reserves constitute about 20 percent of the free world's proved reserves, the country's production (1,000,000 barrels per day (b/d) during the first quarter of 1956) is only 7 percent of total free world output. Refining capacity of 216,000 b/d is less than 2 percent of total free world capacity.

In the event of cessation of Saudi Arabian oil operations, it is estimated on a conservative basis that output elsewhere in the Middle East could be increased immediately by nearly 700,000 b/d and within six to twelve months by more than 1,000,000 b/d. Moreover, output from the US Gulf of Mexico area could be expanded at once by about 800,000 b/d and within a year by an additional 400,000 b/d. Expansion of output in the Middle East would probably involve no permanent price increases whereas those in the US Gulf area, if required, would result in some rise.

The production increases that are possible from other areas in the Middle East, compared with recent levels of output, are as follows:

Country	March 1956 Production	Increased Output Readily Available (In thousands of barrels per day)	Increased Output Available After 6-12 months
Iran	539	361	461
Iraq	716	11	191
Kuwait	1,175	275	325
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone	30	20	20
Qatar	<u>125</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>
Total	2,585	668	1,010

The termination of Saudi oil shipments would create some immediate dislocations in consuming areas. Within a relatively short period of time, however, supply sources could be rearranged and

<sup>3</sup> Page 2 of NIE 36.6-56 contained numbered paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Estimate's conclusions. Pages 13 and 14 included section V, not printed, entitled, "Outlook For Oil Operations" which contained the numbered paragraphs to which the conclusions on p. 2 referred.

tankers rerouted without any permanent harmful effects on world oil markets.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Interior are in substantial agreement with the above conclusions. A similar memorandum has been sent to the Under Secretary.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> A handwritten notation on the source text, presumably by Murphy, reads: "This assumes, of course, that the other areas would not be affected by changes with respect to Saudi Arabia. Is that a valid assumption?"

---

### 235. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles<sup>1</sup>

*London, June 23, 1956.*

MY DEAR FOSTER: I have been considering the record of last month's talks in Washington between our intelligence people on Middle Eastern problems. Whilst I am naturally heartened by the close cooperation that exists between the two Services and the wide measure of agreement that we have reached, it is sad to see that we are still so far apart on Saudi Arabia.

I wonder whether this is not due primarily to a divergence between us in assessing the available intelligence. For example, we are disposed to believe that Saudi Arabia is basically hostile to this country, that it regards Buraimi as a springboard for further expansion into the Persian Gulf, and that consequently a Buraimi settlement, far from detaching King Saud from Nasser, would be likely only to bring him into armed conflict with us in the Persian Gulf, thus aggravating the present situation. We base this view on secret reports, which are also available to you, . . . and on other intelligence.

I understand, however, that many of your people believe that if we could make some face-saving concession to King Saud over Buraimi, the consequence would be to place Anglo-Saudi relations

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Makins transmitted the letter to Dulles under cover of a note dated June 28. On June 29 Howe forwarded the message to Allen with instructions that a reply be prepared by the close of business July 5. Howe noted that the reply should be cleared with Armstrong, MacArthur, Murphy, and finally with Hoover. He added that the Department was handling the Lloyd letter on an Eyes Only basis. Copies, Howe continued, had been sent to Dulles, Hoover, and Armstrong, and the message had been shown to Murphy and MacArthur. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417)

on a good footing and to facilitate the detachment of Saud from Egypt. I do not know on what evidence this opinion is based. Nor do I know whether you have any evidence to show what would be the minimum concession required to bring Saudi Arabia into our fold.

But it seems to me that it might be of great advantage to both of us if we could have a joint examination of all the available evidence and an effort to reach an agreed assessment. If we could achieve this, it ought not to be too difficult in a second stage to reach agreement on a common policy.

I put this suggestion to you because of my deep anxiety to cooperate with you in the Middle East and to bring our policies in Saudi Arabia into full and amicable concord.

Yours ever,

Selwyn

---

236. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 27, 1956—11:22 a.m.*

3082. Cairo's 2557.<sup>2</sup> Dept convinced basis available reports Egyptians are involved in US difficulties in Saudi Arabia. . . . Nasser also author of suggested Saudi-Soviet arms deal through Egyptian intermediation. . . . Pattern of abortive free-Yemeni movement indicates lengths to which Egyptians would go and may be going in Saudi Arabia. While they may deny intention cause any difficulty to US, this is not first instance respecting West in which Egyptians have said one thing and done another. Individual Eyp-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/6-2356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and Geren and approved by Wilkins. Repeated to Jidda and London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2557 from Cairo, June 23, Byroade suggested that the Department attempt to verify the extent of the Egyptian involvement in Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador informed the Department that he doubted whether the Egyptians had a policy to drive the United States from Dhahran at this time. He added that it might complicate Wadsworth's relationship with Saud if Nasser were confronted with the charge. Instead, Byroade proposed to bring the matter to the attention of Hussein and emphasize that any Egyptian activities designed to damage the Dhahran negotiations would only hurt the prospects of "constructive" relations between the United States and Egypt. (*Ibid.*)

tians in Saudi Arabia, <sup>3</sup> if not Government, certainly regard reduction US influence as desirable objective Arab nationalism and we cannot be confident Egyptian Government desires otherwise. We cannot concur therefore in any proposal to approach Hussein or other Egyptian leaders this subject. US does not desire encourage Egyptians to believe their good offices are required for realization American objectives in Saudi Arabia.

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> On June 21 the Department informed the Embassy in Jidda that unconfirmed reports estimated that there were about 60,000 Egyptians in Saudi Arabia as of May 1956—5,000 army officers, advisors, and instructors, and the remainder workers. (Telegram 704; *ibid.*, 674.86A/6-2156)

---

**237. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 2, 1956 <sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Dhahran Air Base Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Reuben Robertson, Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 Gordon Gray, Assistant Secy of Defense, International Security Affairs  
 Mr. McGuire, Deputy Assistant Secy of Defense, Internat. Security Affairs  
 Admiral Truman Hedding, Special Asst to Admiral Radford  
 Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State  
 Allen Lightner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, P  
 David Newsom, NE  
 George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA  
 Mr. Bennett, G

Mr. McGuire opened the discussion on US-Saudi Arabia negotiations for extension of the Dhahran air base agreement by stating that the Pentagon now has two matters under study in that connection: (1) The State Department draft of a proposed letter to King Saud from the President. <sup>2</sup> (2) The "package" that Defense would be

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/7-256. Secret. Drafted by Bennett. Initialed by Murphy.

<sup>2</sup> On June 19, in a draft memorandum to Burdett, Newsom forwarded a second draft of a proposed letter from the President to Saud. According to Newsom, the idea of sending a Presidential letter posed a number of problems, from giving the Saudis

(Continued)

willing to offer the Saudis in event a suitable agreement on the Dhahran base is reached. He recognized that Ambassador Wadsworth is awaiting instructions from Washington. He said that Admiral Radford did not very much like the idea of the letter, while OSD is rather favorable to sending one.

He pointed out that the letter, as drafted, rather puts it up to the Saudis that unless we can reach reasonable agreement with them on extension of base rights, we are prepared to get out of the base. What if the King says, "All right, get out"? We have not considered what our next move would be. What if the King says, "All right, we'll negotiate"? We have not determined the size of our "package". He argued that the problem is really a political one and one calling for a government decision rather than Defense Department or air force determination. He does not object so much to sending a letter as to the fact that we have not yet decided on our next move after sending it. Admiral Hedding indicated that this was also substantially the view of Admiral Radford.

Mr. McGuire indicated that US has an investment of approximately 50 million dollars in the air field and fixed installations there, plus another 25 million dollars worth of movable facilities. The Air Force Department is now studying the problem on an urgent basis to determine the upper limit of size of the "package" it would be prepared to offer the Saudis. He indicated Secretary Quarles as having an interest in putting the operation of Dhahran on more of a civilian basis, in other words, something somewhat more subtle than the existing arrangement which involves the presence of some eleven hundred men in Air Force uniform. Mr. McGuire expressed the hope that the US negotiating position would be made firm in the near future, as he thought it would be bad tactics for the US to request a second temporary extension of the agreement. It would be much better, in his opinion, to have the other side ask for an extension while considering US terms.

Mr. Allen expressed the opinion that on Dhahran, as in other places around the world, we should face up to the problem there and insist that the Saudis also face up to it. If they do not wish us to be there, then we should know it and should be prepared to get out. Unless there is a reasonable attitude of cooperation on the part

---

(Continued)

the impression that the United States attached too great an importance to the airfield, to involving the President directly in the negotiations. Instead, Newsom proposed that Wadsworth make an appeal to the King regarding "pressures" (which Newsom did not further explain), and that the United States make a counteroffer of pilot training, an air terminal, or economic aid. If this failed, Newsom concluded, the United States might propose a formula for civilian control of the airfield. (*Ibid.*, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547, Dhahran Airfield, Memos—Miscellaneous (Inter-Office, to Sec. etc.))

of the Saudis, or any other government on whose territory we have defense facilities, then our arrangements are not on sound ground anyway, no matter how specific our agreements may be. We would be in a much better position to say to any government with which we are negotiating that we have other alternatives, that if they do not wish to have us there we do not wish to be there. This would improve our world-wide position. Deputy Secretary Robertson, Mr. Murphy and others expressed general opinion with Mr. Allen's views, and all agreed on the desirability of sufficient flexibility on the part of the US to enable it to withstand gouging and unreasonable demands and conditions by other countries presumably cooperating with us for mutual benefit rather than solely for financial considerations. Admiral Hedding pointed out that the adoption of such an attitude on our part would mean a new pattern of relationships everywhere we have bases and that this could have both good and bad aspects.

At this point Deputy Secretary Robertson called the attention of the meeting to the letter just received in Defense from Secretary Dulles suggesting an urgent study by State and Defense of the general problem of overseas bases and of the need for increased flexibility in our policy on bases in the light of rising nationalism abroad.<sup>3</sup> He expressed satisfaction over the letter, and Mr. McGuire commented that it was most timely. The latter said that the JCS had just been asked to study the same problem and the letter from the Secretary of State would complement and support that study. Mr. McGuire indicated that the JCS was undertaking to determine the priority of various of our overseas bases—Iceland, Morocco, the Azores, Spain, Dhahran, etc. In just what order of importance for US vital interests do these various bases stand?

Mr. Murphy took occasion to call attention to the Department's recent experience in asking JCS views on the importance to the US of bases in such areas as Morocco and Dhahran. He remarked that up to now we have always been told that the base in question is considered absolutely essential and that the US *must* continue to have use of it. He pointed out that such a position obviously affects our negotiating position vis-à-vis the foreign government, and reduces our area of maneuver in negotiations.

Mr. McGuire suggested that we need to establish a rental basis for the use of overseas territory. He asserted that the negotiations with Libya set a reasonable pattern and pointed out that the Libyan facilities are at least twice as large as Dhahran in territory and that

---

<sup>3</sup>On June 28, in a letter to Wilson, Dulles forwarded a memorandum entitled "Preservation of U.S. Overseas Military Bases, Operating Rights, and Facilities". (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 711.56300/6-2856)

we possess much broader rights in Libya. He indicated Secretary Quarles' view that the Air Force budget will simply not allow the payment of 50 million dollars a year to Saudi Arabia for rights at Dhahran.

There was discussion of various alternatives in handling the Dhahran situation such as, for instance, having the Dhahran base operated by a civilian airline with rights retained to put it on a war footing if necessary. Mr. Allen mentioned that the Saudis had actually made an approach to TWA indicating an interest in having TWA operate the field. It was agreed that this should be looked into.

In a further consideration of the proposed letter to the King, Mr. Murphy said that he was very loath to bring the President into the situation directly with the King at this stage of the negotiations. He felt that this would be using our heaviest ammunition too soon and suggested that it would be preferable for Ambassador Wadsworth to make another approach to the King. The Defense officials indicated concurrence with this viewpoint and, at Mr. McGuire's request, Mr. Newsom was designated by Mr. Murphy to sit down immediately with a Defense committee to work out a draft telegram to Jidda, instructing the Ambassador to approach the King and talk along the lines of our readiness to quit Dhahran in the event no reasonable arrangement for its continued use could be worked out. There was general agreement with Mr. Murphy's view that the Saudis would not have desire to have the Soviets move into Dhahran even if the US should leave, although Mr. Allen pointed out that it might be the Egyptians who would take over.

Mr. Murphy indicated that Mr. MacArthur would be working on the worldwide bases problem in follow-up to the Secretary's letter to Defense.

238. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 6, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 29 June 1956, subject as above.<sup>2</sup>

2. The detailed views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the negotiating suggestion made by the Department of State are contained in the Appendix hereto.<sup>3</sup>

3. In their memorandum to you dated 13 December 1955, subject: "Renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement with the Government of Saudi Arabia,"<sup>4</sup> the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you that they considered that the military importance of Dhahran Airfield is sufficient to warrant granting moderate economic, military and/or diplomatic concessions to Saudi Arabia in exchange for the continued use of Dhahran Airfield. Further, they recognized that over-all U.S. national objectives may warrant the making of still further, and perhaps major, concessions to Saudi Arabia in order to protect U.S. national interests in the Middle East and strengthen the special U.S. position in Saudi Arabia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm this evaluation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 381 Saudi Arabia (2-7-41) Sec. 11. Top Secret. A copy of the memorandum is in Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/7-656.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> The Appendix, not printed, is entitled "Comments with Respect to Suggestions by the Department of State for Possible Utilization in the Current Renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement," and consists of 10 paragraphs of discussion under the following headings:

1. The Possibility of the Saudi Arabian Air Force Utilizing Dhahran Airfield; 2. The Provision of Civilian Personnel for the Maintenance of Equipment Purchased from the United States; 3. Limited Grant Military Aid to Saudi Arabia Under an MDAP Agreement; 4. The Establishment of a Saudi Arabian Air Force Training Program at No Cost to Saudi Arabia; 5. An Augmentation of the Current Army Training Program in Saudi Arabia; 6. An Offer to Assist in the Maintenance of Saudi Arabian Air Force Planes and Equipment at No Cost to Saudi Arabia; 7. Additional Construction at Dhahran Airfield; 8. Simple Credit Arrangements to Saudi Arabia for the Purchase of Arms, Ammunition and Military Equipment; 9. Reduced Prices for Military Equipment; 10. Reduction of the Rights and Facilities Available to the United States at Dhahran under an Arrangement Which Would Continue to Permit the Transit of USAF Planes, Possible Use in Time of Hostilities, and the Exclusive Right to Provide Civilian Technicians for the Airfield.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 381 Saudi Arabia (2-7-41) Sec. 11)



4. With respect to the maximum extent to which concessions should be offered to retain Dhahran Airfield, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that in addition to any concessions in the political and economic aid spheres which may be decided upon by other Departments of the Government, concessions in the military sphere should not be substantially in excess of those outlined in the Appendix hereto. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that concessions offered during the renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement not be such as to prejudice U.S. military rights or military rights negotiations elsewhere.

5. The wartime use of Dhahran is not based upon the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, but rather upon the word of King Ibn Saud and his successor, King Saud, that, in the event of war, all facilities of Saudi Arabia will be made available to the United States. . . . The use of Dhahran Airfield fulfills current U.S. wartime requirements for an in-being, operating, and manned base in the area. Such a base must be developed during peacetime. Without the peacetime facility at Dhahran, capable of providing an immediate wartime use, wartime use of Dhahran will be limited to emergency landing rights.

6. There is no alternate base in the general area of Dhahran which is currently capable of satisfying all of the U.S. military requirements presently being accommodated at Dhahran. Any alternate base which would satisfy U.S. military requirements would necessitate base rights, funds, and construction to provide the needed facilities. Assuming that base rights for a fully satisfactory alternate could be obtained without delay and that funds were made available for the construction of additional facilities, the earliest date of beneficial occupancy is estimated to be late 1959.

7. The only U.S. military requirements currently being fulfilled at Dhahran that could be moved to an alternate, and undertaken at an acceptable cost, are the inter-theater air transport and the intra-theater air logistics operations. Bahrein, Shaibah (Iraq), and Baghdad West (Iraq) are considered to be the most satisfactory alternates to Dhahran for these air transport operations. Construction of additional facilities (minimum communications, housing, storage, and medical) will be necessary at any site selected as an alternate for Dhahran. In the event that the current negotiations for renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement are unsuccessful, it will be necessary to obtain additional base rights elsewhere in the general area in

the near future to meet at least some of the requirements currently met at Dhahran.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Arthur Radford**<sup>5</sup>

*Chairman*

---

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**239. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Jidda, July 7, 1956—3 p.m.*

7. My telegram 575,<sup>2</sup> repeated information Cairo 73, London 99. Department's June 2 summary of "views on Dhahran negotiations" (based on reference telegram) suggests that following subordinate considerations may be of interest if we either wish to continue negotiations or decide to "clear out". In either event, I submit, we shall need more time than now remains before July 19 to reach even preliminary understanding as to future relationships at DAF.

(1) King Saud and Royal court have now left Riyadh and will spend few days in Taif before proceeding Mecca for annual pilgrimage. Latter will culminate July 19 with Feast of Sacrifice. During fortnight before and after that date King will be, if not inaccessible, at best overwhelmingly occupied with pilgrimage affairs; following which his tentative schedule calls for visits to Jidda, Medina and Riyadh before leaving early August for state visits to Afghanistan and Indonesia.

My thought is that, if Department have special message for King, it could best be delivered in Mecca by Mohamed Effendi who at same time would arrange audience for me during King's Jidda visit.

(2) On the substance, if we wish to continue negotiations, Department may wish consider possibility authorizing me suggest that:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/7-756. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 575, June 20, contained Wadsworth's comments on prospects for renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/6-2056)

(a) In addition to "extending credit to Saudi Arabia repayable over 5 years for purchasing arms," we would undertake ship during next 6 months the \$35 million worth of arms now "on order" with USG, leaving for later negotiation question of how and when payment therefor would be made (see last page, last enclosure my despatch 213<sup>3</sup>); and

(b) On supposition two governments will eventually agree on basic issue, we propose interim study at technical level, by representatives of Saudi Defense Ministry and USAF, with view to determining mutually agreeable formula for continuing exercise by USAF of its minimum peace time requirements at DAF.

*Comment:* Time-gaining approach along these two lines might be useful per se, in that it might lead King Saud to realistic reconsideration of basic issue, i.e. whether he just continue insist, as major quid pro quo, or gift of arms, or money to buy them, for extension DAF agreement.

Perhaps more important, it might carry us over period American elections and thus render possible, should USG later so desire, extension of invitation to King Saud to visit Washington early next year.

(3) If, on other hand, we decide it be best to plan as of now to "clear out", Department may wish consider possibility authorizing me suggest to King Saud that it would be to mutual advantage were we to phase out our activities over next two years.

I would wish, then, to say that most obvious advantage to both governments would be one of convenience: to USG because it will take us some 2 years to construct elsewhere facilities similar to those we now use at Dhahran; and to SAG because thoughtfully conceived phasing-out program (which USAF would be glad elaborate with Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation) would enable SAG efficiently to phase take-over of operations and maintenance DAF with its own rather than foreign personnel.

(4) Before Hancock left for Washington he discussed briefly another possible approach which I have since definitively discarded. It was that we say frankly to King Saud that, in our considered opinion, Egyptian-sponsored 2-year 2-divisional plan is contrary to his and our interests because it would "put his beard in the hand of the Egyptian".

To take any such line at this time, I am convinced, would be offensive, ineffective and counter-productive because for better or for worse Saudi Arabia is tied to Egypt only by their common cause against Iraq. Mohamed Effendi puts it, "Saudi Arabia needs a strong Arab friend".

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/6-1356)

Interesting support is lent this view in Najib Rawi's comment (Cairo Embtel 2567<sup>4</sup>) that attempts to woo Egypt's present allies away from her are unlikely to succeed; and by Charles Malik (in July *Foreign Affairs*) where he says, "unless Saudi Arabia feels itself firmly secure, it must ally itself with Egypt".

(5) That Saudis do not desire to break off negotiations may perhaps be deduced from facts that Abdul Rahman Azzam called on me early last week to discuss Buraimi, that Finance Minister Surur requests our assistance in buying gold (my telegram 3, July 4<sup>5</sup>), that Prince Faisal who seldom attends official receptions came to mine on July 4 and Prince Mishaal sent special regrets with "congratulations and best wishes for independence our two friendly countries", and that Faisal has since sent me memorandum re SAG protest against British intervention in Franco-Saudi arms deal (my telegram 6, July 7<sup>6</sup>).

Mohamed Effendi comments as he did after last month's negotiations, "overall impression is they are as anxious as we to reach agreement, but they want arms in return".<sup>7</sup>

## Wadsworth

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 25, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.87/6-2556)

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 886A.131/7-456)

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 786A.56/7-756)

<sup>7</sup> In an official-informal letter to Wadsworth, July 9, Allen informed the Ambassador, inter alia, that while the Department of Defense believed Dhahran to be of "real value," it was not prepared to consider the Saudi proposal of \$250 million in rent. There was little support, Allen added, in either State or Defense for rent, grant aid, cash payment or credit, though the Department of Defense was urgently examining possible concessions. In a notation on the source text, Allen added: "I discussed your No. 7, July 7, with Bob Murphy this morning. The point of view here is that we do not want to 'clear out' if we can stay in on any reasonable basis, but we must let the Saudis know quite clearly that we are prepared to clear out—and mean what we say—if the Saudis feel that our presence there is contrary to their own interests. The petition by 600 people against the DAF agreement makes the field of less interest to us because we do not like to operate in a hostile atmosphere. Our experience is that the supplying of guns does not cure a situation of this kind—not for long anyway." (*Ibid.*, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547, Dhahran Airfield, Memos—Miscellaneous (Inter-Office, to Sec. etc.))

**240. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 10, 1956.*

DEAR SELWYN: I thank you for your letter of June 23, 1956 on Saudi Arabia. It is my hope also that we may find a way to work closely together in that country as elsewhere in the Middle East. You know the importance we attach to an improvement in the Western position there.

I fully agree with the desirability of a common intelligence assessment upon which to base our actions. Our staffs have frequently discussed the available information in the past. If you think it would be useful we are prepared to have another exchange. For our part we have little new data to add that will cast further light on Saudi intentions other than accumulating evidence of the extent of Egyptian activities.

However, we think that the pressure of events does not permit us the leisure to complete any formal exchange of intelligence prior to proceeding toward a solution of the Buraimi matter, which in our view remains the Gordian knot. I do not wish to imply either that we can give you assurances that a settlement at Buraimi would solve all our troubles or that I believe the Buraimi matter should be treated in isolation. The need is to start with Buraimi and work through the related problems. It occurs to me that you might wish to suggest to King Saud a new formula with Buraimi the first item in a package which would include delineation of all the frontiers which are in question. The package would then stand as a unit. This approach I believe would break away from further fruitless discussions of the agenda. The need for an overall boundary agreement is apparent to prevent the recurrence of future Buraimis. In my view it will be easier to reach such an agreement now than a few years hence. Furthermore, once an accord of this type is worked out there will be a solid position which could be defended in the UN and before world public opinion.

I am encouraged at the indications in your letter of your willingness to take a fresh look at Saudi Arabia and I am confident that we can find a way to resolve this problem. It exposes Saudi Arabia to the temptation of accepting Trojan Horse offers of support

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett. On July 11, Burdett delivered the signed original of the Dulles letter and one copy to Ronald Bailey, Counselor of the British Embassy, for transmittal to the Foreign Secretary. (Memorandum of conversation by Burdett, July 11; *ibid.*, Central Files, 786A.00/7-1156) On July 11, the Department transmitted the text of both Lloyd's letter and Dulles' reply, eyes only, to Aldrich in London. (Telegram 187; *ibid.*)

from Cairo and Moscow, and jeopardizes other programs of much wider import to our common interests in the Middle East.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

**241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 11, 1956—10:06 a.m.*

25. Jidda's 575.<sup>2</sup> Department desires you convey following orally to King:

Record of initial talks with King, Prince Faisal, Royal Counselors, re Dhahran has been thoroughly considered at highest levels Departments State and Defense. In spirit close friendship which has characterized relationship our two countries, we desire convey frankly to King USG reactions these preliminary talks.

President's letter and proposal which represented concerted effort on part USG to assist in strengthening His Majesty and His Majesty's Kingdom seemed rather quickly laid aside. In place Five Year Plan which had been basis our proposal, new two-division plan appears which on basis preliminary review in Washington appears ambitious and perhaps beyond current Saudi capability.

As regards His Majesty's reference to recently developed pressures against renewal of DAF agreement, we, too, are disturbed by this development. Although it is first indication of local opposition to DAF to come to our notice in 11 years our presence, we have no desire to continue the operation of DAF in unfriendly atmosphere. We are at loss understand this local opposition in view substantial

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/6-2056. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Allen, Newsom, and Wilkins and approved and signed by Dulles. Cleared in substance by Gray and in draft by Bennett and Barnes. Repeated to Dhahran and CINCUSAFE, Wiesbaden. On July 5, in a memorandum sent through Hoover to Dulles, Allen noted that after a meeting with Department of Defense officials on July 2, it was agreed to drop the idea of a Presidential approach at that time in favor of having Wadsworth make a similar approach to the King. The Department of Defense, Allen continued, was considering "on an urgent basis" the necessity of retaining rights at Dhahran and the possibility of concessions. Allen forwarded the proposed telegram for the Secretary's approval. A notation on the memorandum indicated that the telegram was signed on July 10, "subject to certain clarifications prior to transmission." (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/7-556)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 239.

benefits which Saudi Arabia and especially people Eastern Province have received from DAF in increased trade, international air traffic, and training Saudi Arabians in both civil and military aviation techniques. Nevertheless, in view seriousness with which King regards opposition, we must accept evaluation.

We are concerned, also, over His Majesty's statement re pressures from Soviet Union and from Egypt and the difficulties which His Majesty faces in resisting them. While motivations behind some of such pressures may undoubtedly be honest, other influences operating in insidious ways, utilize good will for purposes detrimental to Kingdom and its future. Once such forces are able move unchallenged, they can carry all before them. Pressures which would move His Majesty from positions he himself considers right can only threaten orderly development Saudi Arabia.

Immediate matter USG concern is Dhahran Airfield Agreement. While we appreciate privileges enjoyed to our mutual benefit, our principal thought is effect action we take regarding Dhahran may have on our broader relationship with Saudi Arabia. Our presence at Dhahran has been, for eleven years, symbol of spirit of cooperation and common interest. Those who would benefit by removal this symbol represent, in our mind, forces inimical to Saudi Arabia.

US-Saudi cooperation at Dhahran has been on basis mutual benefit. When, in minds Saudi Arabia, our presence no longer desired, US would not wish remain. Further, if our presence can only be justified by substantial financial assistance, question arises whether we should be there at all.

Real justification our presence would appear best found in terms continued value our common effort in development and strengthening Saudi Arabia and defense of principles which we share in common.

During DAF negotiations in recent years various suggestions have been discussed. At one time question of longer term arrangements (on which there was tacit agreement) was explored. On another, we examined questions of grant aid, increased rights for US at DAF, and rent. Currently there has been study of formula which provides \$250,000,000 in grant aid for purchase of arms. On review we find this suggestion out of question in view US overall policies and actual rights enjoyed at Dhahran.

Our planners remain convinced five-year plan represents program armed forces development within realm possibility in terms current Saudi Arabian ability provide trained manpower and absorb new equipment. Speeded up program which was given preliminary review in Washington might well result in excessive expenditures for support and maintenance unutilizable equipment and wastage which King does not wish. (In this connection you may wish present to

King actual indications over-ambitious planning such as combat readiness B-26s, difficulty finding pilot material, diversion pilot trainees to other fields, etc.)

We have King's assurance he wishes us remain Dhahran. Our presence will continue to be mutually advantageous, however, only by adoption realistic attitude on both our parts. We would hope King would suggest continuance discussions and that such discussions could be resumed with Royal Counselors by re-examination US proposals. (FYI. You might in this connection again stress benefits given Saudi Arabia over past five years as enumerated Section II, CA-8034. <sup>3</sup> End FYI)

Discussion already initiated with Minister of Defense might be continued to consider all various current plans for development Saudi armed forces, including five-regiment plan, thirteen-regiment plan, and two-division plan. We believe it vital in order avoid future misunderstandings and place our relationship in this field on sound basis that there be actual agreement on list of arms for which US willing receive orders during next few years. Monetary and force goal estimates subject varying interpretations. (FYI In this connection we assume figure of \$180,000,000 you mentioned to King represented cost \$82,500,000 in equipment listed Annex B, CA-8034, plus shipping costs, spare parts, and ammunition over five year period. King and Counselors should, at proper stage, clearly understand exactly what this figure includes. End FYI)

In order reach proper understanding on what US can provide, US willing assign military experts work on urgent basis with Saudis to draft procurement plan for consideration both governments, based on US ability provide and attainable Saudi force goals. Meanwhile letters of offer ready to be submitted on large Saudi ground force order and priorities established. Early agreement in Saudi interest since neither letters of offer nor priorities will remain valid indefinitely.

(FYI Meanwhile, USG has under active consideration suggestions we are willing discuss with Royal Counselors in event resumption discussions on foregoing basis. Once we have King's reaction foregoing and, perhaps, his proposal for additional extension, we are prepared forward detailed proposals. End FYI) <sup>4</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.56386A/4-1356)

<sup>4</sup> On July 14, Wadsworth notified the Department that he was having Mohammed Massoud convey a short message to King Saud through Yusuf Yasin. The message stated that Wadsworth had received new instructions regarding the Dhahran Agreement, but that there was no need to trouble the King until after the Haj. The

(Continued)



242. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles<sup>1</sup>*London, undated.*

I have delayed my reply to your letter of July 10 about Buraimi until my unofficial talks with Azzam were over and my colleagues and I had considered the results. I am afraid that these were meagre. Azzam made it clear that the Saudis are not interested in anything but Buraimi—we have heard from an unimpeachable source that King Saud is not concerned about his southern frontiers and will not trade Buraimi for concessions elsewhere. Moreover all their ideas for a deal over Buraimi involve either a recognition of Saudi suzerainty or some “neutral” administration that would permit the return of Saudi agents to the oasis. Either course would mean total surrender on the part of our allies. The former would involve a recognition that neither the Sultan of Muscat and Oman nor the Ruler of Abu Dhabi could possibly accept. The second would simply allow the Saudis to resume their subversion and gun-running which, as their own documents prove, were aimed at the disruption of the Sultan’s dominions. We could not accept such an arrangement even if we could impose it on the Rulers, which is certainly impossible in the case of the Sultan.

2. In these circumstances any sort of package deal seems to be ruled out. We can therefore do little more than make a concession on the place of Buraimi on the Agenda and put forward the offer that the President proposed during our talks in Washington at the beginning of the year. You will recall that he suggested that as the 1935 talks had broken down over the question of Saudi access to the sea east of Qatar we might offer some concession there. We can also offer to do our best to persuade the Sultan to allow back some of

---

(Continued)

message also informed the King that the instructions reiterated the U.S. desire to contribute toward strengthening his kingdom, that they rejected the Riyadh formula, and that they proposed the desirability of holding further technical discussions. (Telegram 22 from Jidda; *ibid.*, 711.56386A/7-1456) On July 17, the Department informed Wadsworth of its concern that his brief message to the King did not express the “full tone and implications” of telegram 25. The Department instructed the Ambassador to prepare a memorandum of the U.S. message to be transmitted to the King prior to the Ambassador’s next audience. The Department also added that telegram 25 represented a “firm realistic appraisal” of the U.S. approach to the Dhahran Airfield, noting that there was no reason to expect that it would change in the months ahead. (Telegram 40 to Jidda; *ibid.*)

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/7-2856. Secret. Conveyed under cover of a note from Makins to Dulles dated July 28. (*Ibid.*) According to a memorandum from Kirk to Oulashin, Makins handed the note to Hoover on July 28. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 776, N & ME 55-56)

the exiles from Buraimi. Both these possible offers were hinted at by Dodds Parker when he went to Riyadh in April, but not taken up.

I am now instructing our Ambassador to make them formally to Prince Faisal.

---

**243. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 6, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

U.S. Representations to Saudi Arabian Government Concerning  
Discrimination Against Jews

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Al-Khayyal of Saudi Arabia  
Mohamed Mahdi, Saudi Arabian Embassy

George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary, NEA  
A. David Fritzlan, NE

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador called to deliver his Government's reply to the memorandum expressing U.S. concern over Saudi discrimination against Jews, which was handed him by Mr. Allen on May 9. In delivering his Government's reply, Sheikh Khayyal expressed appreciation for the friendly tone of the U.S. memorandum and for the recognition contained in it of the right of Saudi Arabia to adopt regulations concerning these matters which appeared to it to be in its own interests.

Mr. Allen read the Saudi Arabian memorandum, a copy of which is attached,<sup>2</sup> and inquired whether Saudi Arabian policy in regard to the entry of Jewish persons into the country was of fairly recent date and specifically if it antedated the establishment of Israel. The Ambassador stated that the restrictions had been in effect since the Balfour declaration, which paved the way for the establishment of a Jewish state. Mr. Allen asked what the Saudi attitude towards Jews entering the country was before the Balfour declaration, and the Ambassador replied that, as far as he was aware, the question had not arisen.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886A.181/8-656. Confidential. Drafted by Fritzlan.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Mr. Allen took exception to the penultimate paragraph of the Saudi memorandum<sup>3</sup> implying that U.S. policy is responsive to Zionist pressures and stated that such was not the case; on the contrary, U.S. policies were determined in the light of the interest of this country as a whole.

Mr. Allen asked the Ambassador if Saudi regulations would prohibit the entry into the country of non-Zionist Jews. He explained that there was a considerable number of Jews in the country who looked upon Zionism with disfavor, and who strongly opposed Ben Gurion's contention that all Jews throughout the world must eventually look upon Israel as their home and as the country of their allegiance. The Ambassador said he was aware that certain Jews held non-Zionist attitudes, and he mentioned specifically Alfred Lilienthal as an example. He went on to say that Mr. Lilienthal had recently had no trouble visiting the Arab countries and had in fact been admitted to Saudi Arabia. This demonstrated that Saudi Arabia was concerned, not with matters of race and religion, but with the matter of support given the Zionist cause.

Mr. Allen enlarged upon the U.S. attitude in this matter, stating that we look upon Jews in this country as loyal American citizens and we could not condone the Saudi Arabian attitude of discrimination against them. He felt that cases of Jews wishing to visit Saudi Arabia should be considered individually rather than in general terms. He referred to Ben Gurion's attitude towards Jews and said he believed the Saudi Arabian Government was in effect playing the same game. By lumping all Jews together as Zionists and, for practical purposes, prohibiting their entry into and transit through Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabians were reinforcing the attitude of Ben Gurion and making it difficult for non-Zionist Jews to proclaim, and act in accordance with, their beliefs. Mr. Allen said U.S. policy was as opposed to an Israeli policy which claimed the allegiance of all Jews as it was to the Saudi policy of discriminating against all Jews. He pointed out that the great majority of American Jews, including those who were active Zionists, were also opposed to the concept of dual allegiance. His chief objection to Saudi policy was that the Saudis were lined up squarely behind the dual allegiance concept. The Ambassador said his government had to accept this concept as a fact until the contrary was more clearly demonstrated.

---

<sup>3</sup> The penultimate paragraph of the Saudi memorandum indicated that the U.S. contention that some Jews were active in their resistance to Zionism was not demonstrated in any clear manner. When the number of Jews opposed to Zionism increased to such an extent as to show an effect on U.S. policies, the memorandum continued, then the Saudis would reconsider the subject.

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 8, 1956.

83. Embtel 46. <sup>2</sup> Department's comments as follows:

1. We are surprised at Yusuf's remark about Jewish influence. You may in your discretion when next you talk with Yusuf state that Department fully approves your earlier remarks. (Have you any idea of what Yusuf had in mind?) <sup>3</sup>

2. We are not willing agree at this stage release letters of offer covering \$35 million reimbursable arms aid requested by SAG. We consider our action on this request an essential element of our bargaining capability in regard extension of DAF Agreement. Meanwhile we look upon 1951 agreement as having been extended without terminal date for period of negotiation.

3. We are working with other Government agencies on package offer which we believe may include construction new airport terminal Dhahran (at cost not exceeding \$5 million) and a modest air training program. Inclusion of first item should not be construed as willingness to extend grant economic aid. If Department able make firm offer on airport terminal, this would be extent of our ability to give economic aid as element DAF offer.

4. We suggest no further reference be made to possibility our construction air terminal and providing air training program. While we may be in position make firm offer on both points we feel premature discussion will diminish appreciably Saudi receptivity later.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/7-3156. Secret. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text. Drafted by Fritzlan and Newsom and approved by Allen.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 46 from Jidda, July 31, conveyed the highlights of a 2½-hour conversation between Wadsworth and Yasin. The Ambassador informed the Department that Yasin had remarked that there was "Jewish influence" behind certain parts of the recent message the United States had given to the King. Yasin also noted that "legally" the Dhahran agreement had expired, yet the King had not asked the Americans to leave. As a result, Yasin continued, the United States should reciprocate by agreeing to ship the present order of \$35 million in arms without demanding immediate payment. According to Wadsworth, discussion also touched on the possibilities of U.S. economic assistance, including the possible construction of an air terminal at Dhahran and a port at Damman. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum entitled "Comments on Deptel 83, August 8, re DAF Negotiations," dated August 11 and drafted by Wadsworth, the Ambassador noted, *inter alia*, that Yasin's remarks concerning Jewish influence are "typical of the man and should not cause surprise." (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/8-1156) The memorandum was delivered to the Department by William Hancock who had recently returned from Saudi Arabia.

5. Department believes consultation with Hancock would be useful.<sup>4</sup>

6. If it is necessary to discuss any of the foregoing points with SAG and it appears an answer is expected you may respond as indicated above.

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup>According to Wadsworth, both he and Yasin agreed that Hancock might be more useful if he returned to Washington to participate in talks concerning the U.S. preparation of a counterproposal—which Saud believed necessary. (Telegram 46)

---

**245. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 13, 1956.*

MY DEAR SELWYN: I am appreciative of the message from you which Sir Roger delivered to me on July 28.<sup>2</sup> I regret that your talks with Azzam Pasha did not produce results of greater moment, but I believe they were valuable as a step toward an ultimate understanding with Saudi Arabia. We are, of course, pleased to receive word of your intentions to continue the discussions with Prince Faisal on the official level.

I was interested to learn of your plan to raise formally the possibility of Saudi Arabian access to the sea near Qatar. This was, of course, not a formal proposal on the part of the President, but a passing suggestion arising from the history of the 1935 negotiations. We are certain that there are other possible territorial adjustments, too, which could be explored. Azzam's insistence upon the importance of Buraimi comes as no surprise to us, but we believe it still possible, through discussions not too limited by prior conditions and conducted in an atmosphere of good will, to produce a formula acceptable to both sides. We continue to believe, particularly in the

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/7-2856. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Allen. On July 28, Kirk informed Oulashin that action on the Lloyd note was being assigned to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Copies of the note had been forwarded to the Office of the Secretary, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary, the Counselor, the Policy Planning Staff, and the Bureau of European Affairs. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 61 D 260, Buraimi Dispute 1956—July–Dec.)

<sup>2</sup>Document 242.

light of recent events in Egypt, that the preservation of our joint position in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf can be more satisfactorily insured by reaching accord with Saudi Arabia.

If a definite treaty boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Arab principalities could be found which the United States and the United Kingdom could support publicly and firmly for the future, we would have gone far toward removing a problem which otherwise seems destined to plague us for a long time.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> On August 15, in a note to Makins, Elbrick transmitted the Secretary's reply. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 776, N & ME 55-56) On September 5, in a reply to Dulles, Lloyd thanked the Secretary for the "sympathetic tone" of his August 13 letter and noted, "Although we cannot give away Buraimi, I do not think that this makes an improvement of our relations with the Saudis impossible." (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

## 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 31, 1956—12:32 p.m.*

158. You may now resume discussions with King regarding Dhahran Airfield.<sup>2</sup> Following should be used as oral U.S. response to King's comments in earlier conversation:

USG pleased receive King's assurance his desire continue cooperation with US on basis mutual benefit. USG now prepared advance proposals which would supplement sale of arms as originally suggested and continuation present services at Dhahran. We believe King will recognize in new proposals sound basis for adding to strength of Kingdom and for continuing cooperation with US through next five years.

To widen cooperation in connection with extension agreement, it seemed natural to turn to vital aviation field. Dhahran itself with

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/8-3156. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Hoover. Cleared by OSD, ICA, U/MSA, and NEA. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> Wadsworth met with the King on July 25. He reported the meeting in despatch 26 from Jidda, July 25, and telegram 44, July 27. (*Ibid.*, 611.86A/7-2756 and 711.56386A/7-2556)

3000 landings monthly is symbol importance of air age to Kingdom. (FYI: Actual landing figures should be checked with Com 2 Air Div. End FYI) Airplane ties together varied parts of land not yet linked by road or rail. King undoubtedly looks forward to day when his own subjects will carry complete responsibility for air services and air defense. Most appropriate role US can play would be through preparing Saudi Arabia to assume this responsibility by establishing provisions in Saudi Arabia for training in this vital field.

USG now prepared establish air training program by providing instructors and facilities including use of training aircraft for basic flight training. Ultimately to extent qualified candidates become available, USG also prepared assist with advanced training.

USG further prepared construct new air terminal Dhahran to house facilities airport operation and provide modern services to growing number passengers. (FYI: At cost not to exceed \$5,000,000. End FYI)

While as King understands we do not intend measure our cooperation in terms of rent, it may assist King in measuring USG contribution through foregoing suggestion to know these proposals, combined with services currently being rendered at airport and through MAAG mission would represent a total of approximately \$25,000,000 in USG outlay in next five years. We can assure His Majesty this figure compares favorably with services being extended to other nations in area where US enjoys air field rights. (FYI: This \$25,000,000 intended as ceiling on total USG expenditures for Dhahran for five year period. End FYI)

Should foregoing meet King's desires, we suggest following might be sequence of events:

1. King would agree exchange of notes extending agreement for five years from date such exchange.
2. USG would release immediately following exchange of notes letters of offer on \$35,000,000 reimbursable aid order and make every effort provide delivery within six months.
3. US-Saudi technical groups would convene immediately to: (a) Draw up list of further arms which Saudi Arabia seeks from US for consideration by USG within framework basic equipment procurement figure of \$85,000,000 (including \$35,000,000 on order, but not including spare parts, ammunition and shipping cost); (b) Draw up plans for immediate establishment basic flight training facilities in Saudi Arabia to meet needs Saudi Arabian Air Force; (c) Prepare agreed plans for air terminal; (d) Discuss technical problems involved in operation of agreement and propose changes which might be accomplished by further exchange of notes.

Department must reiterate (see Deptel 83 August 8) that no economic aid in addition to air terminal can be included in our offer to SAG for continued facilities at DAF.<sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>3</sup> On September 6 Wadsworth acknowledged receipt of the instructions in telegram 158 and inquired whether he might also mention to the King the possibility of U.S. aid in establishing a countrywide modern weather service and a mapping project. The Ambassador also reported that Saud would welcome his visit. According to the Embassy's Arab consultant, Muhammed Massoud, the King also noted that if the United States would ship the \$35 million in arms, he would grant an additional 6-month extension of the Dhahran agreement. Wadsworth noted that while the Department had not replied specifically to this proposal, he assumed it was not acceptable. (Telegram 125 from Jidda; *ibid.*, 711.56386A/9-656) In telegram 177 to Jidda, September 8, the Department informed Wadsworth that it approved his idea of mentioning the projects to the King, provided the King understood the ceiling of U.S. expenditures. The Department added that it continued to believe that letters of offer on the \$35 million in arms requests would be released only after Saudi agreement to extend the Dhahran agreement for an additional 5 years. (*Ibid.*)

---

**247. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Dhahran, September 13, 1956—2 p.m.*

106. From Ambassador Wadsworth. Department telegrams 158<sup>2</sup> and 177<sup>3</sup> to Jidda.

(1) King Saud received me September 11 for 90 minute formal audience with Royal Counselors Yasin and Hussaini in attendance. Followed by half-hour private audience.

Major subject formal audience was extension DAF agreement with brief mention Suez crisis, Saudi-Iraq relations, and Communist threat in Syria (which I shall report in separate telegrams). Private audience was follow-up on DAF discussion.

(2) Opening formal audience, I said was happy present my government's reply, especially because it met King's formula "use my airfield and strengthen my kingdom". When discussing DAF, however, we believed we should limit ourselves primarily to aviation matters.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/9-1356. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, *supra.*



I then had Mohamad read in Arabic carefully edited paraphrase USG position and offer set forth Department telegram 158. King interrupted once to clarify that our willingness supply arms was on cash-reimbursable basis; and I to emphasize that our offer of \$25 million compares favorably with cost of services extended by US to other nations in area where it enjoys airfield rights and privileges.

At end reading, to which King listened closely, he said: "I wish to speak frankly. I do not see anything really new in this proposal . . . it gives me nothing to show my people, no justification for accepting."<sup>4</sup>

In reply, I argued strongly that our two new proposals were vital contribution towards strengthening kingdom. King replied: "I accept this, but it is not sufficient. I will make . . . a last offer. It is for you to accept it or not".

He continued: "If you are desirous of cooperating with us and if you really wish to support your friend, who has been on your side and has supported you, for which there is much evidence, and if you would like to support him with his people and with the world, I will accept extension of DAF agreement for 5 years on this basis—that, besides the \$25 million, you furnish me with the \$85 million worth of arms as a grant."

He added, "You have offered Pakistan \$300 million and Spain as much. I do not ask equivalent assistance".

I answered, "As I understand it, any such figure is impossible without a grant military aid agreement".

King asked, "Why not pay me the money, and I will buy the arms from you?"

I said, "We have grant military aid agreements with Pakistan and Spain, and it is under those agreements that, under our law, we can extend them that much assistance".

King asked, "Are we not agreed on DAF for 5 years; is that not enough for you to extend us this assistance?"

Perhaps, he added, it could be in field of economic aid. In reply, I insisted on need for aid agreement and urged again substantial character our offer.

King answered, "This is not first meeting at which I have told you I must justify my position . . . <sup>5</sup> if you accept my offer, I shall be glad to carry on our cooperation; if you reject it, we shall part friends".

I argued further but to little avail and undertook report fully his words, which I shall do by despatch.

---

<sup>4</sup> Ellipses in this and the next paragraph are in the source text.

<sup>5</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

King then said there was one important point he wished to clarify. If his offer was rejected, would US-Saudi agreement on supply of arms on cash-reimbursable basis continue in force?

To my reply that I believed it would, King asked, "Does this mean that for our order for \$35 million worth of arms you will submit letters of offer?"

I said I would be glad to submit question to Washington; we might wish reconsider timing and I asked whether, if answer was in affirmative, King would wish retain MAAG.

King replied, "That is why I inquired". If answer was "yes", he would wish MAAG remain.

Final point made by King at formal audience was that his desire continue our cooperation had again been proven by fact that "while DAF agreement has expired, I have not asked you to leave."

(3) Opening private audience, King said: "That you should leave Dhahran is neither to your interest nor mine. And that your government should not help me in delicate situation in which I am placed today is also against our common interest. These statements are twins."

. . . . .

He said Egyptians believed that, had USG not acted in Suez crisis, there would have been war, and added: "I, too, believe this and shall always be willing to help where I can. It is in light of all this that agreement between us on DAF is the more important."

I argued that our air force could not offer more for Dhahran's relatively limited facilities because this would set wholly unhealthy precedent.

King answered, "I do not ask you to leave; in fact quite the contrary; but I do ask something to justify my position."

At this point King left for sunset prayers. On his return I said it would be particularly helpful in reporting his views if I could say he accepted statement that our \$25 million offer compares favorably with cost of services extended other nations in area where we enjoy airfield privileges. If this was clearly recognized, I could more effectively present his plea for "justification" as being on higher political plane than quid pro quo for extension DAF agreement.

King replied he had no hesitation concurring our offer was eminently fair; question of justification, however, was quite another matter, although of necessity two were interdependent.

I persisted: "Then we are in full accord on the \$25 million figure as such? We agree that fair price for the carpet is 25 guineas?" King replied, "exactly".

I said, "it will remain, therefore, only for my government to consider whether it can meet your Majesty's need for justification." Again he concurred and again stressed high common interest in our meeting his offer.

. . . . .

(5) Am airmailing from Dhahran today despatch enclosing memorandum of private audience;<sup>6</sup> complete record after return Jidda tomorrow.<sup>7</sup>

**Carrigan**

---

<sup>6</sup> Despatch 29 from Dhahran, September 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/9-1356)

<sup>7</sup> Despatch 66 from Jidda, September 18, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/9-1856)

---

**248. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Jidda, October 3, 1956—5 p.m.*

171. (1) My telegram 106 from Dhahran,<sup>2</sup> reporting audience with King Saud September 11 on Dhahran airfield agreement, highlighted inter alia his keen interest in receiving letters of offer for \$35 million arms requested almost year ago. His closing words were: "I am asking nothing for further six months extension (of DAF agreement) but I should meanwhile like to receive your Government's letter of offer for the arms we ordered so long ago".

(2) During conversation with Royal Counselor Yasin in Riyadh September 27 he made particular point of asking me ascertain Department's reaction to this démarche. He said Defense Minister had been pressing Prime Minister for guidance and Prince Faisal "would like to know where we stand".

(3) Am aware Department's view expressed prior my September 11 audience was that letters of offer "should be released only upon SAG agreement of five year extension" (Deptel 177<sup>3</sup>) but venture suggest reconsideration is warranted by new emphasis placed on this

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/10-356. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 246.

particular subject by King and his Ministers. Favorable reply at early date would, I believe, greatly strengthen King's hand in dealing with what he has so often referred to as "internal and external pressures" and might well encourage him lend more positive support our Suez policies, e.g. by endeavoring persuade Nasser negotiate more realistically.

Wadsworth

---

#### 249. Editorial Note

With the Israeli attack in Sinai on October 29 and the subsequent British-French assault on the Suez Canal, the focus of United States-Saudi Arabian relations shifted temporarily from the issues of Buraimi and the Dhahran Airfield to the new situation created by the Suez crisis. Although Saudi Arabia remained friendly and appreciative of United States policy on Suez, its relations with Britain and France rapidly deteriorated. On November 6, Saudi Arabia severed its diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and France, and simultaneously forbade the loading and shipping of petroleum products to British and French ships and to any vessels destined for British or French ports. The Saudi Arabian Government also ordered Aramco to cut the flow of oil to Bahrain. With the closure of the Suez Canal, the United States grew increasingly concerned about the supply of Middle East oil to world markets, particularly to Europe. On November 8, at the 303d meeting of the National Security Council, President Eisenhower began the meeting by informing the Council that Robert Anderson, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, would deliver a report on the European oil situation in light of recent developments in the Middle East. After a lengthy review and discussion of the present oil situation, the dollar problem and a range of other matters pertaining to the supply of Middle East crude, the President raised the question of a total boycott of Arab oil. The memorandum of discussion includes the following exchange:

"The President pointed out that if we really get the Arabs sore at all of us, they could embargo all oil, which would ruin our present Middle East Emergency Committee plan which still counts on some 800,000 barrels of oil daily from Middle East sources. Mr. Anderson agreed, and said that furthermore, if the Arabs got sore enough, we could also lose what we are now getting from the Aramco tapline. Mr. Anderson thought it would not be amiss if the

State Department talked to Ibn Saud and asked him to what countries he was willing that his oil be sent. After all, Saud is, in a certain sense, cutting off his nose to spite his face when he threatens to cut off oil presently going to Bahrein. The British and French get very little of their oil from Bahrein Island. Secretary Hoover commented that he had received another useful suggestion from Mr. Anderson, namely, that if our European friends come here to Washington in the next ten days, we should invite King Ibn Saud to visit us after their departure. The President expressed approval of this proposal, and pointed out philosophically that the way of the peacemaker is proverbially hard. For this reason he believed that the first thing to do is to try to avoid aggravating either side in the controversy any further. If all of this was an hour-by-hour proposition, the President believed we would be best advised to let our Middle East Emergency Committee study further action. With a smile, the President added that despite his stiff-necked Attorney General, he could give the industry members a certification that what they were planning and doing was in the interests of the national security. This might assist them with respect to any involvement with the anti-trust laws." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Additional documentation on Middle East oil is in Department of State, Central Files 886A.2553 and 880.2553.

On November 8, in a meeting attended by Hoover, Murphy, MacArthur, Rountree, and Phleger, the possibility of inviting Saud to the United States "within the next few weeks" was raised. (Memorandum of conversation by Earl Sohm, November 8; *ibid.*, 033.84a11/11-856)

On November 9, in a conversation between Dulles and Adams, Adams noted that if Eden and Mollet came to the United States, it might be beneficial to invite Saud "as an offset." Dulles noted that this suggestion had "merit." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)

---

## 250. Editorial Note

During a discussion of Middle East problems on November 21 between President Eisenhower and Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, Acting Secretary of State Hoover, Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Allen Dulles, and other officials, the President noted the importance of Saudi Arabia. A memorandum of the conversation by Goodpaster reads in part as follows:

"The President reiterated his feeling that we should work toward building up King Saud as a major figure in the Middle Eastern area. He thought we should probably search for some way to induce the British to get out of Buraimi. He thought that we must make sure that Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq at least are aware of what we are doing, and give their assent. We must explain a number of points to them very carefully. We must prevent the dissolution of Western Europe, and once withdrawal from the Suez has begun, we must let them know that we are going to aid Western Europe financially. We must stress the importance of restoring Saud's oil markets in Western Europe. If we raise output from the U.S., it will be very hard to cut back. If at all possible, we should use Buraimi as an ace in the hole. We must face the question, what *must* we do in Europe and then the question, how do we square this with the Arabs?" (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

---

**251. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Dhahran, November 26, 1956—5 p.m.*

242. From Ambassador Wadsworth. Deptel 179<sup>2</sup> and Contel 241.<sup>3</sup> 1. At informal dinner audience November 22, King Saud read President's letter of November 16. It was, he said, "a good message and most welcome"; he was gratified by its substance and grateful for continuing opportunity exchange views with President; he would be glad discuss substantive matters with me next day; he was particularly pleased with President's "invitation that we may meet for general review of problems of common interest" which he was "delighted to accept."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.11/11-2656. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Repeated to Jidda. A notation on a White House copy of the telegram reads as follows: "President has seen 29 Nov 56" (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 179, November 16, transmitted the text of a letter from the President to King Saud. Responding to Saud's messages to the President of November 4 and 11 which dealt with the Suez crisis, Eisenhower expressed his hope that the King would continue to support U.N. resolutions on Suez. Expressing his appreciation for the opportunity to exchange views, Eisenhower concluded: "I hope that in the months ahead these exchanges may continue, and that perhaps we will have an opportunity to meet for a general review of problems of common interest." (Department of State, Central Files, 684.86/11-1656)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 241, November 26, conveyed a brief summary of Wadsworth's 4-day visit to Riyadh. The Ambassador informed the Department that the "King's attitude and general atmosphere throughout were markedly friendly and cooperative and appreciative USG policy in Suez crisis." (*Ibid.*, 611.86A/11-2656)

Later but with apparent association ideas, King cited, as outstanding characteristic chiefs of state should possess, avoidance of extremism; it had guided him at recent Beirut conference.<sup>4</sup> His grandfather Faisal had added, "the ruler should be religious and avoid evil; it is all too easy for any human being to commit evil but difficult to stand away from it". The implication seemed clear; President Eisenhower fully met these standards.

2. At formal audience November 23 after discussion substantive matters (reported in immediately following telegrams) King asked, "do you think I should answer President's letter now?" I answered that, as he had already given me most helpful comment and as important developments in situation might well occur within next few days, I ventured suggest brief delay.

King concurred but added, "I would especially wish him to know that, with regard to my meeting with him, I would indeed like to discuss the overall common interests of our two governments and world problems in general."

3. On November 24 when receiving Davies and Ohliger of Aramco, King said was very glad share with them good news of President's invitation and his acceptance.

**Carrigan**

---

<sup>4</sup> Beginning on November 13, King Saud, King Faisal, King Hussein, President Chamoun, and President Quwatli met in Beirut for a conference of the Arab Chiefs of State.

---

**252. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Jidda, December 15, 1956—10 p.m.*

336. My telegrams 329<sup>2</sup> and 330.<sup>3</sup> On reading King Saud's

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12-1556. Secret; Priority. A notation of December 19 by Goodpaster on a White House copy of the telegram indicates that the President was informed of its contents. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 329, December 15, conveyed the highlights of a meeting between General Tunner, Wadsworth, and Saud at the King's desert hunting camp. During the meeting the King handed the Ambassador a signed reply to the President's November 16 letter, emphasized his "urgent desire" to receive arms under the 5-year plan, and asked Wadsworth to convey the King's "earnest hope" that arrangements could be made for visiting the President. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12-1556)

message to President Eisenhower December 13, I paused at end passage entitled "the Palestine problem" to ask King if he had any special technique in mind when requesting postponement UNGA discussion pending consultation with USG.

King did not answer but later said: "I am awaiting answer from USG which you have said will come soon. What I meant by 'consultation' was that I want to discuss with President Eisenhower the problems mentioned in my message, the several situations troubling the Mid-East, review our problems, exchange views on US-Arab interests and matters of US-Saudi concern."

I asked if that included question of arms (my telegram 335<sup>4</sup>). King answered, "question of arms could be answered now and other matters be settled when time comes". He added, "Many things cannot be put in messages. I am ready to meet President Eisenhower and do everything I can within the interests of the Arabs. I would want one month notice to make necessary arrangements".

I sensed urgency in his words. He had already thought of flying to Italy and sailing thence by American Export Line *Constitution* or *Independence*. I answered, "I have not myself spoken of this visit because I have expected answer to come to Your Majesty from highest level. I welcome opportunity to telegraph sense of this conversation to my government".

## Wadsworth

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 330, December 15, transmitted the text of Saud's December 13 letter to the President. The King's message focused on four major areas: the Suez crisis, the Palestine problem, the situation in Syria, and the Baghdad Pact. (*Ibid.*, 786A.11/12-1556) The Arabic original and an English translation of the letter were transmitted in despatch 114, December 17. (*Ibid.*, 611.86A/12-1756)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 335, December 15, conveyed additional highlights of Wadsworth's December 13 audience with the King. According to the Ambassador, Saud remarked that the "most important subject now is arms. I am ashamed of how my army compares with those of other Arab and Moslem countries. All are equipped by United States, Britain or Russia. Saudi Arabia is only country to adhere only to United States. Are your delaying tactics proper way to repay our friendship?" A notation on a White House copy of the telegram indicates that the President had seen it. (*Ibid.*, 786A.56/12-1556)



253. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Dhahran, January 6, 1957—6 p.m.*

319. From Ambassador Wadsworth. My telegrams 315<sup>2</sup> and 318<sup>3</sup> from Dhahran. Following highlights my audience January 3 with King Saud:

(1) After discussing with King arrangements and schedule his visit to United States<sup>4</sup> I outlined for him substance Department circular telegram 426.<sup>5</sup> On economic interdependence His Majesty queried whether Britain and France included in concept and said: "Remember as far as ME relations with west concerned, economic confidence cannot be built up without political confidence". On Palestine King said: "I wish assure you we carefully studying Palestine question and will not oppose constructive action solve problem soon as it clear proper time has come".

Re UN force for security King said: "Of course we know if had not been for US, force never would have been established, and Britain and France would never have left canal. This not compliment, this fact".

(2) Arab relations with Britain and France.

King asserted he not authorized by other Arab states broach question but wished ask "personally, frankly, and privately, how can

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/1-657. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 315 from Dhahran, January 3, Wadsworth informed the Department that in an audience with Saud on January 3, the King had expressed the hope that the Eisenhower Doctrine would "meet vital area needs" as the Truman Doctrine had done. The Ambassador also conveyed details on the proposed visit of Saud to the United States. (*Ibid.*, 786A.11/1-357) A full memorandum of Wadsworth's January 3 audience was transmitted in despatch 56 from Dhahran, January 5. (*Ibid.*, 786A.11/1-557)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 318 from Dhahran, January 6, Wadsworth noted, inter alia, that he had forwarded the President's letter of January 3 to Saud. According to the Embassy's Arab consultant, the letter was read aloud to the King and President Quwaitly of Syria, then visiting Saud. (*Ibid.*, 786A.11/1-657) The letter to Saud highlighted the President's program for providing economic and military assistance to Middle East nations seeking to resist communism. (The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 250 to Dhahran, January 4; *ibid.*, 684A.86/1-457) According to Wadsworth, the Saudi reaction to Eisenhower's January 5 speech to Congress followed the general lines of Saud's initial reaction to the President's January 3 letter. Although Saud wanted time to study the letter, he expressed "general satisfaction" with the President's policy, particularly the aspects involving economic and military aid. (Telegram 382 from Jidda, January 15; *ibid.*, 611.80/1-1557)

<sup>4</sup> On January 7 a White House press release indicated that King Saud would visit Washington on January 30, 31, and February 1. (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 28, 1957, p. 135) Documentation concerning details of the Saud visit, including travel arrangements and ceremonies, is in Department of State, Central File 786A.11.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed here.

we restore relations with Britain and France? . . . <sup>6</sup> World War II was honorable and open, but look at dastardly way Britain and France chose attack Egypt . . . what do you think of Britain's using Israel to launch its attack on us? In spite of most treacherous act of great powers—so mean as to use Israel as "cat's paw"—I have counseled Egypt, Syria, and Jordan not continue cry out against Britain and France . . . when fighting, one should fight hard, but when peace comes, one should not exaggerate what has happened . . . I intend discuss this point with Quwatly and, on my way to US . . . with Nasser".

### (3) Baghdad Pact.

His Majesty said: "I am convinced . . . aim of US is to oppose Communism . . . you have my support and can be sure I will always work against Communism . . . but regarding Nuri and Britain, am sure they want Arab disunity. After its treacherous act, Britain still chief member of BP . . . Britain would give Israel anything it wanted . . . how can we not assume it working for Arab disunity through its membership in BP? . . . We can never have confidence in BP as long as Britain is member of it . . . .

"Chief aim my policy is to see that peace, security, and stability applied to whole world and especially to ME . . . I try keep balance among interests of Arabs. They ask my views because they know I am sincere in keeping my word and not interfering in their affairs . . . of course some Arab states following policies which I do not consider in their best interests, because now forced to . . . .

"Any pact or bloc in this area, unless supported by SA, will not succeed, and I will never join anything I think will cause harm to Arabs or bring destruction their homes".

### (4) Defense of SA.

King concluded: I am spending 400 million riyals a year on army which cannot go into action . . . you cannot have good morale in army unless it has arms . . . we are under pressure, directly and indirectly, take arms that have been offered (but) I have taken nothing because I gave my word to US . . . we will train and you must send arms". <sup>7</sup>

**Carrigan**

<sup>6</sup> All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

<sup>7</sup> In telegrams 251 and 285 from Dhahran, November 26 and December 7 respectively, Wadsworth reported the King's concern over his country's immediate need for arms. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5-MSP/11-2656 and /12-756) On January 5 the Department informed the Embassy in Jidda that the question of emergency arms for Saudi Arabia was under active review and that a message on this topic and on the Dhahran Airfield would be dispatched within the week. (Telegram 470; *ibid.*, 786A.56/1-557)

254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 9, 1957—8:08 p.m.*

487. Dhahran's 106, <sup>2</sup> Jidda's 171. <sup>3</sup> You are authorized talk with King Saud along following lines re DAF and emergency requests (Dhahran's 285 <sup>4</sup>).

Serious events beyond control either government have intervened since September 11 audience between King and Ambassador. We realize King's desire DAF matter not be put aside, however, and careful and serious study of previous discussions and of basic problems has continued despite USG preoccupation with crisis in Near East.

We appreciate King's firm stand both within Saudi Arabia and in Arab circles against Communist penetration and in favor cooperation with US in seeking peace in Middle East. We for our part are continuing our world-wide commitments in front line against Communist aggression and have considered DAF proposals in this context. Relatively limited rights enjoyed at Dhahran do not provide normal basis for grant military aid in amount and under conditions requested by King. It is necessary therefore to seek some new basis.

We believe proposals for training may provide this basis. Entire proposal represents unique idea involving substantial contributions by US and tailored to meet long-range needs of Saudi Arabia and King's desire for conspicuous demonstration value cooperation between Saudi Arabia and US.

To present full scope this proposal to SAG and to provide opportunity exchange views on details, we suggest technical discussions be instituted at an early date covering: (1) air training program; (2) terminal construction or alternative economic projects within \$5,000,000 ceiling; (3) expanded Army training program, including SAG request for training Royal Body Guard and Army Officer Service Schools. Information developed such discussions will assist in presenting concrete proposals. Following earlier review Saudi Arabian Armed Forces Development Plan, technical discussions this aspect as originally proposed paragraph 3 Deptel 158 <sup>5</sup> would not appear to be necessary.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5–MSP/12–756. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Dhahran, CINCUSAFE, and London.

<sup>2</sup> Document 247.

<sup>3</sup> Document 248.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> Document 246.

Department suggests technical discussions with members or deputies high military defense council by representatives USAF and MAAG concerning air training program and expanded Army training program. Anticipate that USAF general officer will be available to conduct these discussions. (FYI: He will be thoroughly briefed and in position to undertake discussions with background of recent USAF studies of air training program and decision regarding added Army training. End FYI.) Anticipate discussions could begin latter part of January 1957 and at appropriate point in discussions, senior representative would make reports on progress of technical discussions to King.

Under new regulations USG not in position make firm commitment regarding projects until such projects are defined and appropriations are available. Discussions with qualified US military representatives who know value of training and can show importance to Saudi Arabia of such activity will demonstrate true benefits these proposals to Saudi Arabia.

When technical discussions have been completed and participants have reported to their governments, King might then wish authorize further meeting to consider integration various proposals within an agreed ceiling on expenditures. Agreement could later be extended by exchange of notes, supplemented by project agreements.

(FYI: We are not prepared at this time make any commitment beyond \$25,000,000 ceiling USG expenditures for five years mentioned Deptel 158. Moderate increase this ceiling may be possible later. End FYI.)

Meanwhile, we are releasing letters of offer on most readily available items outstanding orders, including anti-aircraft guns and signal, engineer, quartermaster, chemical, medical and transportation items. As soon as emergency list mentioned Contel 285 is received, we will also give prompt attention these items. SAG may wish postpone action on T-33 aircraft until proposed technical discussions which may suggest arrangement by which use such aircraft can be made available as part training program.

We hope foregoing interim suggestions will be taken as first step toward agreement with SAG on basis mutual benefit and complete understanding in accordance practices both countries.<sup>6</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>6</sup> On January 9, in a letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson, Dulles requested that the Department of Defense reach a determination on how the proposed training program and other "continuing services" were to be funded and that it determine to what extent it might be willing to fund additional programs. (Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 70 D 148, DAF Renewal 1957 Negotiations) That same day, in a memorandum to Hollister, Dulles requested that ICA designate \$5 million in nonmilitary funds for the air terminal or for other economic projects which might fall within the designated ceiling. (*Ibid.*)

255. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 25, 1957<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

British Relations with Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador British Embassy  
Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary  
Marselis C. Parsons, Jr., Director, BNA  
Edwin G. Moline, RA

After concluding his discussion of the problem of oil supplies for Britain (see separate memorandum<sup>2</sup>) Ambassador Caccia who called at his request upon the Under Secretary today, said he wished to discuss current relations between Saudi Arabia and Britain.

The Ambassador said that his Government continued ready to discuss boundary problems with Saudi Arabia including Buraimi and six or seven other issues but was unwilling to confine itself to discussions on Buraimi or even to agree to place Buraimi specifically at the head of the list of problems for discussion. He believed that the Saudi position was to keep on insisting that the Buraimi question be settled before proceeding to take up other problems.

Mr. Hoover presented the U.S. view that a settlement of British disputes with Saudi Arabia would have a beneficial effect in advancing Western influence in the Middle East. He suggested that once British-Saudi relations had been normalized it might be profitable to consider . . . Saudi Arabia as a counter weight to Egypt. . . . The Ambassador indicated his Government's views leaned more toward the ultimate adherence of Saudi Arabia to the Baghdad Pact than . . . Saudi Arabia as a counter focal point to Egypt.

The Ambassador said that if talks could be initiated with Saudi Arabia, designed to cover all boundary questions, his Government would be disposed to propose a treaty delineating the borders now under dispute. He pointed out that one of the difficulties was that the British Government had certain protective responsibilities over peoples and territories claimed by Saudi Arabia. Both he and the Under Secretary agreed that any declaration of intent or other instrument short of an agreed treaty would be unsatisfactory in solving these territorial issues.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Discussion: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Parsons.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 840.04/1-2557)

The Under Secretary referred to a previous request of the Ambassador that the US Government consider a guarantee of any solution involving UK-Saudi agreement on boundaries. The Under Secretary pointed out that such a guarantee would have to be in the form of a treaty which might be unsuccessful in passing the Senate primarily because of the lack of a similar treaty with Israel. The Ambassador said that Her Majesty's Government did not feel that an executive statement expressing "grave concern" would suffice in lieu of the guarantee.

---

## 256. Editorial Note

On January 7, the White House officially announced that King Saud would come to the United States for a state visit, January 29, 30, and February 1. The King, who was to be accompanied by Ambassador Wadsworth and a large royal party, was scheduled to arrive in New York City on January 29 and then proceed to Washington for discussions with the President and Department of State officials. The King arrived in Washington on January 30 and left the United States on February 8. Planning for the visit, however, was complicated by two incidents which threatened to disrupt carefully arranged protocol procedures.

On January 9, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, having learned that Vice President Nixon would receive the King at the Military Air Transport Service Terminal near Washington, informed Department officials that unless President Eisenhower greeted the King personally, Saud might be forced to cancel his visit. Although the Department sought to impress upon the Ambassador and the King the importance of established protocol procedure and the demands on the President's health, the King insisted on a personal reception at the airport, maintaining that his personal prestige was at stake. The White House agreed to Saud's request but Secretary Dulles noted in a memorandum of conversation of January 11 that the President had expressed his annoyance. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President) For documentation regarding the airport meeting, see Department of State, Central File 786A.11.

The second problem concerning the Saud visit involved the planned reception for the King upon his arrival in New York City. Although the Department sought to fete the King upon his arrival, New York City officials, led by Mayor Robert Wagner, were unre-

ceptive to the idea of arranging local ceremonies on the King's behalf. On January 24, at the 310th meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Hoover raised the problem of the Saud visit. The memorandum of discussion includes the following:

"Bearing on this situation was King Saud's visit to the United States next week. Saud would arrive in this country in New York, and it was all too likely that there would be certain complications in receiving him. The municipal authorities of New York City are not inclined to provide the usual reception to a foreign sovereign and, instead, the State Department would provide a program of full military honors, which Secretary Hoover summarized. Secretary Hoover expressed himself as on the whole very hopeful of good results from King Saud's visit, on the basis of what we believe his attitude will be. So far as we can tell, he seems to wish to maintain an independent status in the Middle East. He apparently does not wish to join the Baghdad Pact, and perhaps we can end up by making Saud the senior partner of the Arab team rather than Colonel Nasser." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

On January 29, the day of the King's arrival, the *New York Times* reported, in a front page article, that Mayor Wagner had barred any official welcome for the King, accusing Saud of defending slavery, of being anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish. According to Eisenhower, the Mayor, "sensitive to the heavy Jewish population in his area," announced that the welcome customarily given to visiting dignitaries would be eliminated. (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace 1956-1961*, Garden City, New York (Doubleday & Company, 1965), page 115)

Despite the local difficulties, the reception for the King was held. After an Air Force salute at sea, the liner *Constitution*, carrying the royal party, was escorted into New York harbor by a Navy squadron and greeted pier-side by a Marine Corps band. The King was received by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Representative at the United Nations, who was designated as the President's personal representative during Saud's visit to New York. For documentation regarding the New York City reception and the problems accompanying the King's visit, see Department of State, Central File 786A.11.

---

## 257. Editorial Note

On January 29, Dulles, Hoover, Rountree, and Goodpaster met with the President at the White House for a briefing on the visit of

King Saud. The meeting lasted from 2:25 to 3:52 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, Record of President's Daily Appointments) In a memorandum of January 29, entitled "Notes on Meeting With the President January 29 Concerning the Visit of King Saud," Rountree noted that Eisenhower had endorsed the idea of mentioning to Saud during their initial meeting the problem of the Dhahran agreement and the arms question, and that the President had suggested that their advisers engage in detailed discussions separately. Rountree added that during the meeting he had informed the President that the \$50 million proposal suggested by the JCS had been reduced by the Department of Defense to \$35 million. According to Rountree, the President noted that negotiations might begin with the \$35 million plan, and, if it proved necessary, consideration could be given to raising the amount. A notation on Rountree's memorandum indicated that his notes were "informal and uncleared." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833) According to a memorandum of conversation of the January 29 meeting prepared by Goodpaster, the President also asked the Secretary of State "how stiff a line" he thought should be taken with King Saud regarding Egypt. Dulles replied, inter alia, that the Egyptians were violating the United Nations Resolution of 1949 and the armistice agreements, adding that the Saudis were adopting a "very tough line" regarding the "continued existence" of Israel and Israel's use of the Gulf of Aqaba. Concerning aid to Jordan through Saudi Arabia, Eisenhower indicated a preference for the "bi-lateral" method. The President also inquired if certain statements in the briefing book suggested that the United States should not be "over-friendly" with the Saudis. Dulles responded that "we are ready to protect the Saudi Arabians against the USSR, but are not anxious to get into their quarrels with Britain." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries, Memoranda of Conversations with the President) In a meeting of January 30, Hoover informed the OCB that as a result of discussion between Secretary Dulles and the President, it was agreed that the determination of the maximum expenditure would be left to the President. Hoover added that a cost of \$50 million was likely and might even be exceeded. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430) In the course of a telephone conversation with Gordon Gray, on January 30, Dulles remarked that in the Department of State's opinion there was no possibility of getting the air base \$7.5 million per year. The Secretary added that the Department was disappointed over the decision to cut back the amount to \$35 million. Dulles also expressed concern that, if no agreement was reached, Saud might return home and line up with the Egyptians. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)



258. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 29, 1957.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In your letter of January 9, 1957,<sup>2</sup> you requested two decisions from this department with regard to quid pro quo to be offered to Saudi Arabia for the five-year extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement.

After further discussion of this matter here, I believe that we should not, in view of the status of our other base arrangements in that area, offer the Saudi Government substantially more than \$35 million from all sources over a five-year period, including the ICA funds mentioned in your letter. This is based on our view that such a figure would not be substantially greater than that currently being given to Libya on an annual basis for retention of our rights in that country, which are considerably more favorable than any the Saudi Government has thus far offered.

In view of the fact that the bulk of the quid pro quo offered will take the form of an augmented training program for the Saudi Arabian forces, the \$30 million estimated cost should be provided from appropriate sources.

The details of the training program, which have been under discussion between representatives of our two departments, are being worked out on a priority basis and will be forwarded to you under separate cover.

Sincerely,

C.E. Wilson

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/1-2957. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 254.

**259. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, January 30, 1957, 3 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECTS**

1. Saudi Arabian Friendship for the United States
2. Possible Future Arab Cooperation with the West
3. Eisenhower Doctrine and the Threat of Communism
4. Dhahran Airfield
5. Suez Canal
6. Soviet Influence in Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen
7. Saudi Memoranda on, (a) Subjects to be discussed during the visit; (b) Meeting of Arab heads of state in Cairo

**PARTICIPANTS**

<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>United States</i>
His Majesty King Saud	President Eisenhower
Prince Musaad	Secretary Dulles
Prince Fahad	Mr. Hoover
Shaikh Yusuf Yassin	Mr. Rountree
Jamal Bey Al-Hussaini	Ambassador Richards
Shaikh Muhammad Surur	Ambassador Wadsworth
Others	Others

The President said that he was honored that His Majesty had come this long distance to meet with him and to discuss problems of mutual concern to Saudi Arabia and the United States. The basis of friendship between the two countries had already been established and this visit afforded the opportunity to exchange views on how we as friends could work together to strengthen the peace. The President asked whether His Majesty had any preliminary statements to make before beginning the discussion. He said he wished to assure His Majesty the conversations they were to have were strictly confidential and nothing would be made public except an agreed joint statement or statements.

His Majesty thanked the President for "his kind words" and said he wished to assure the President he had looked forward with anticipation for a long time to meeting him and members of the American Government. This keenness had been enhanced by recent events.

His Majesty said, first, he wished to assure the President they were true friends, and he wished to preserve that friendship and to make it grow. He was ready to do his utmost to work in this direction.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Confidential. Prepared in the Department of State. No other drafting information is given on the source text.

His Majesty said international developments of the past year were of great moment, and he wished to suggest that problems arising therefrom be reviewed with the aim of finding solutions. The President expressed his agreement.

His Majesty said that a topic of special importance was the consideration of possible areas of cooperation between the Middle East and the West. He reiterated that he was prepared to cooperate with the President to the utmost to help solve this and other problems, the solutions to be based on the principles that are to be brought out in the meetings.

His Majesty had prepared a summary of the goals he and his country were seeking, but he also hoped the President would agree to allow discussion of any subject which either side wished to raise.

His Majesty said he prayed for God's speed in these talks. Peace-loving peoples everywhere were looking to us in the hope that these meetings would truly contribute to the cause of peace.

The President agreed that each side should feel free to raise any subject it wished. He then asked whether His Majesty would like the Secretary to review certain major problems as seen by the United States, in order to ascertain whether both sides saw the facts in the same light. His Majesty agreed with pleasure.

The Secretary began by saying that the primary concern of the foreign policy of the United States was to assure conditions which would allow the peoples of the world to maintain their full independence, live in peace, and enjoy economic freedom and prosperity. The United States were once a colony, and Americans have not forgotten their efforts to gain freedom and independence. Unfortunately, there were cases of countries who have tried to take away freedom from their own and other peoples. Britain and France were once colonial powers, but their former rule over other peoples has diminished and has now been largely eliminated. However, the greatest danger at present was from international Communism, which started with a conspiracy of a small number of people who were able to take over all Russia and since then have seized control over approximately one third of the peoples of the world.

The doctrine of Communism contradicted every religion in the world and aimed at the destruction of every form of free society. The Communists, once they gained control, were entirely ruthless. The United States believed the Russians were anxious to extend their sphere of control into the Middle East. That was their traditional ambition, and if they succeeded in the Middle East, with its great resources of oil and its position as a strategic cross-roads, Russia would have gained a position of great power.

The present purpose of the United States, as announced in the new program, was to assist countries endangered by the ambitions of

the Communists. (The Secretary stated parenthetically that the House had just voted 355-61 in favor of the President's program.) It was important to have this opportunity to explain to His Majesty and his Counselors the purpose of the new program because it had been largely misrepresented in the Middle East by Communist propaganda.

The Secretary was confident His Majesty could provide very useful information about the program by giving his views, and those of other countries in the Middle Eastern area. At this time he wished only to emphasize that it was not the purpose of the program to extend the power of the United States into the Middle East; rather it was to help insure the independence and economic well-being of those states who expressed their desire for aid from the United States. The Secretary added that another item the advisors and officials of both countries would probably wish to discuss was the continued use of the Dhahran Airfield. This field was useful, but by no means indispensable. It facilitated travel and communications between the West and South and West Asia and it was important as a symbol of our friendly cooperation.

The Secretary said it would also be useful to have an exchange of views on the Suez Canal.<sup>2</sup> The Canal, as well as the oil pipeline, was very important in the transporting of oil to the markets of Western Europe. The United States believed the Suez Canal should be operated on the principle of full respect for the authority of Egypt; but, as specified in the Canal Convention of 1888,<sup>3</sup> the Canal must always remain an international waterway. The United States, furthermore, did not believe Egypt or any other nation should be in a position to stop or otherwise control unilaterally the movement of ships through the Canal, because that would put the nations using the waterway under the control of and at the mercy of those who could close it anytime they wished. If nations could not be assured their ships would move freely through the Canal and their oil supplies were steady and safe, there would be redoubled efforts to develop atomic energy as a substitute for oil. If this were done, it certainly would not be in interests of countries like Saudi Arabia, which depended upon exports of petroleum for economic prosperity. The Secretary stated that there were other matters on the American agenda for discussion in forthcoming meetings, but first he wished to inquire whether His Majesty would like to ask any questions at this point.

---

<sup>2</sup> Documentation on Saudi interest in the Suez Canal Crisis is primarily *ibid.*, Central File 684A.86.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Convention of Constantinople, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1887-1888*, vol. 79, pp. 18-22.

His Majesty said he only wanted clarification on the point about control and freedom of the Canal. Did the Secretary mean that it would be sufficient, in the American view, for Egypt to give assurances that the freedom of the Canal would be maintained? The Secretary replied such assurances would be sufficient if they were implemented in such a way that they could be relied upon. The nations using the Canal had to have the confidence that the Canal would always be open to them. The Secretary added he did not mean to imply control of the Canal needed to be taken away from Egypt, but in fact there would have to be conditions giving rise to confidence that shipping through the waterway would not be interfered with.

His Majesty then asked what assurances by Egypt would be acceptable to the nations using the Canal. The Secretary recalled for His Majesty that at the United Nations Security Council meetings in October there was unanimous agreement on six principles governing the operations of the Canal. There was also a private conversation between the Egyptian Foreign Minister and Britain and France, which went a good way toward determining how these principles were to be implemented. The results of this conversation were embodied in a letter dated October 24 written by the UN Secretary-General.<sup>4</sup> The letter also indicated the two sides were close to agreement on the important aspects of the problem. The Secretary said agreement could be reached within a few days, if the negotiations had not been interrupted by the armed attack on Egypt by Israel and then by Britain and France. The Secretary concluded by saying the Secretary-General's letter pointed the way toward an acceptable solution to the Canal problem.

His Majesty said it was his understanding that the six principles referred to had been agreed to by Egypt. The Secretary said this was true. Another area of serious concern to the United States was the extent of Soviet Communist influence in certain countries of the area. The increase in Communist influence had been based largely on the supply of arms made available by the USSR to these countries, of which were Egypt, Syria, and lately the Yemen. The Secretary hoped His Majesty would express his views on how Saudi Arabia and the United States could work together to combat this influence.

The President inquired whether His Majesty wished to mention any subjects in addition to the topics the Secretary had brought up. It would be useful to know what these subjects were prior to the actual discussion of them in the formal meetings.

---

<sup>4</sup> For text of Hammarskjöld's letter to Fawzi, see U.N. doc. S/3728.

His Majesty said the Secretary had touched on the points Saudi Arabia also considered the most important and which were included on its agenda for the meetings. This similarity in the agendas of the two countries demonstrated the degree of identity of their interests. He expressed the hope and belief it would not be difficult to resolve the points of difference in the views of each side. His Majesty said he had prepared a memorandum<sup>5</sup> on the main topics which Saudi Arabia wished to table for discussion. In summary, these were: (a) Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and how to strengthen and consolidate them. (b) Aims for the defense of the country. (c) The Dhahran Airfield Agreement. Saudi Arabia wished the United States to retain the airfield, which formed a continuing link between the two countries. The proof of his desire to have the United States Air Force remain at Dhahran was that he had not raised the question of renewal of the Agreement, although it expired some months ago. (d) His Majesty's views on the present situation in the Middle East. As the President was well aware, His Majesty was one of the Communists most bitter enemies; he had worked hard and would continue to work hard to bring home to his neighbors the dangers of Communism in their respective countries. (e) His Majesty also wished to give the President a memorandum on the meetings in Cairo (January 18–19) of the Arab heads of states, who had asked him to convey to the President their viewpoints on many of the current problems in the Middle East today and to be their spokesman at these meetings.<sup>6</sup> (f) There were certain other points, not mentioned in the memorandum on subjects to be discussed, that His Majesty wished to discuss later with the President and the Secretary.

His Majesty said he had sensed from his recent talks with other Arab leaders that they wanted to improve their relations with the United States and with the West as well, but only provided they could be assured the West would treat them fairly. There were undoubtedly hardships to overcome and knots to be unraveled

---

<sup>5</sup> The memorandum was entitled "Memorandum From King Saud To H.E. President Eisenhower On His Views Concerning Saudi Arabian Relations With The U.S.A. And Affairs Of The Middle East." It consisted of three primary sections: Saudi-American Relations, Matters Of Interest To The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia, and General Questions Concerning The Middle East. A copy is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833.

<sup>6</sup> On January 18, Nassar opened meetings in Cairo with King Saud, King Hussein, and Syrian Prime Minister Sabri al-Asali. The Memorandum of the Exchange of Views between the four Arab heads of State dealt with the following subjects: the Cold War; U.S. Objectives in the Area; Schemes In the Arab States; the Economic War; Israel; the Palestine Problem; the Suez Question; Settlement Of Relations With Britain and France; Differentiation between Nationalist and Communist Trends; Legitimate Western Economic Interests; and the Algerian Problem. (Text of the memorandum is *ibid.*)

before this could be done, but, according to an Arab proverb, where there was good will it was possible to move mountains.

His Majesty also said he would not wish to leave this meeting without mentioning the Eisenhower Doctrine. He was convinced the Doctrine would greatly benefit the countries of the Middle East but he believed there were many uninformed and illiterate people who did not understand its full implications. His Majesty said he knew it was no secret to the President that the Communists were doing everything they could to throw up barriers between the Middle East and the West, and that ignorant people could easily be deceived by Communists and other extremists. However, once the ideas and motives behind the Doctrine were explained and made clear to the Middle Eastern peoples, all opposition would melt away and everyone would be ready to cooperate with the United States.

The President said he would like to say a word about this program, called the Eisenhower Doctrine, which, he assured His Majesty, he had not named himself. The friendly interest of the United States in the Middle East was one of long standing. It included respect for the great religions that have come from the area and an acute sense of the importance of the area from the point of view of its strategic position and its great resources. The United States had always been sincere in its desire to assist in the advancement of the peoples of the Middle East and in its desire to see the peoples themselves benefit from their own resources and advantages. When the recent difficulties of the British brought to the attention of the United States that Western interests in the Middle East no longer seemed to be receiving adequate attention, this country decided that a new facet of its traditional friendship with the Middle East needed to be developed to meet new conditions. The President assured His Majesty, however, the United States contemplated no action other than what was being discussed today or had already been openly announced.

The President said the new Doctrine recognized two forms of threat. The first was the threat of military force by aggressors, and the second was the threat that resulted from the inability of people to make a living under modern conditions. If people were left in peace they could make their own living with nothing more than friendly technical help from outside. The first tenet of the Doctrine was that the United States wanted to help only those who wished for assistance. For those who asked, the United States was ready to sit down and discuss the problems involved and to work out what to do and how the United States could help. The United States sought no monopoly of economic or military power in the area. We sought only to help people who lived in peace and under their own rulers. The President said he particularly wished to assure His

Majesty on this point, and anyone who tried to put a sinister or wicked meaning into the Doctrine was doing a serious disservice to the interests of both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The President said he understood His Majesty to say that he had a memorandum on the meeting of the heads of the Arab states in Cairo. Would the best procedure be for the American side to study the memoranda prepared by His Majesty and his Counsellors and for the Saudi delegation to study the verbal presentation made at the meeting by the Secretary? His Majesty said there were three memoranda and an English translation of an outline of the memoranda. He wished to point out that the memoranda were not to be considered as final statements of policy but were to serve as points of departure for the coming discussions. The President said he understood perfectly. There was no use having a meeting if the respective positions were already firm. The Good Lord had given us brains to use and not to simply set aside.

---

**260. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1957, 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

The following, dictated largely from memory, is the gist of a private conversation between myself and the King of Saudi Arabia on the afternoon of Wednesday, January 30, 1957, lasting from 4:00 until 5:45 p.m. There was present one other only, an interpreter friend of the King's.<sup>2</sup>

The King started off by saying that he wanted to talk to me mainly about very secret, confidential things, some of them really personal. At the same time he said there were others that I could discuss with my advisers. However, I failed to get any clear understanding of which ones he considered absolutely secret (except for the last subject which I shall mention later), and which ones were of a lesser sensitivity. Consequently, I write this paper only for my own use and for the personal use of the Secretary of State. I have no objection if the Secretary of State permits a maximum of three other individuals in his Department to read it, should he believe that by so doing they would be helped in any way.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Royal Counselor Jamal al-Husayni.



*I. Relations with the British*

The King's first subject was his relationships with the British. He spoke at length and rather bitterly.

The King said that dating back into his father's reign, the Arab policy had been to trust the British and to work with them in the advancement of their own country. He said this policy was practically forced upon them because the only alternative was to seek help from the Soviet Government; and they have always been anti-Communistic. Long before his father died, the relationships between Arabia and Britain had become strained and very unsatisfactory to the Arabs. Because of this the British had a deliberate policy of keeping the Arabs weak; that is, denying them any arms—at least in amounts that would be satisfactory to any self-respecting nation. Because of their weakness he said the Arabs had suffered many indignities, to say nothing of encroaching upon their borders and the flouting of their government in critical areas. Because of this weakness, the Arabs have also suffered indignities from the Israeli and they have been helpless to reply. This situation has grown steadily worse over the years. His people have become more and more restless, more demanding that he do something, and there has arisen a strong element in his country demanding that he even deal with the Soviets in order to get the necessary arms.

The King said that in spite of all these provocations, the basic tenet of his policy continued to be refusal to have anything whatsoever to do with the Kremlin.

About seven years ago the Arabs started an intensified campaign to obtain some arms. He encountered nothing but failure. Finally, about a year and a half ago, the Soviets approached him with what he said were wide open and very enticing offers.

The Soviets told him that they would provide any amount of arms he desired, together with adequate training teams to bring his forces to a good state of readiness. They offered to do this at a cost that would be "lower than that of anyone else." He still refused.

Now, he says, the question has gotten to be a most sensitive one in his country. He simply must do something about the matter. He referred repeatedly to the demands of his people and the strength of public opinion. He talked about such matters far more than one would expect. . . .

In reply I said that this matter of armaments was not as simple as it appeared and that he should proceed very cautiously in making up his mind as to how much he wanted. I told him that we had helped to arm certain nations which had demanded far too much in the way of armaments, and as a result their economies were showing strains, and in some cases proved unequal to the task of maintaining

their forces. I told him that I thought the best military policy for any nation which had a great problem of economic development facing it was to seek such arms as would assure the maintenance of internal order and freedom from subversive activities, together with a small reserve that would give it reasonable protection against small raiding attacks against its borders. Beyond this point I argued that any country in this position should depend largely upon its friendship with the other free nations of the world. I maintained that the United Nations was set up to preserve weak nations from unjustified and unprovoked aggression and that he could always count upon help in such a case. However, I did admit that the self-respect of a nation did demand arms to the level I had roughly described, and asked him how much he thought would be necessary in his case.

The King replied . . . about as follows: "My country has 900,000 square miles and *at least* 12 million people. The British are nibbling at a number of my borders and have been particularly aggressive in the case of Buraimi and the Empty Quarter. The Israeli have raided us a number of times and now Iran has committed an aggression against us. (Later he spoke about this incident at some length.) He finally said that he had a program for armament which had been approved by American training teams in his country." (It is possible I misunderstood this particular statement, but this is what I thought he said.)

He did repeat, "I know that Britain would attempt to oppose our acquisition of armaments from you." He feels that we would long ago have agreed to let him have arms except for British opposition.

He then remarked that his military program would take up half of his national budget and so he would need economic help. To this I made little reply except to say that it had been our experience that the first thing that undeveloped nations needed was technical help because otherwise they spent money uselessly.

## *II. Economics*

The King said he had been working very hard at building new schools, hospitals, roads and communications. He said their five-year progress had been remarkable but it was, of course, still far too meagre. All his public expenditures had gone into these activities and he remarked, "All the money I have received has been wisely spent and for these good purposes."

The King remarked that the Bedouins were in a particularly deplorable state economically and had so little in the way of resources that they were practically living on a dole. This dole he

furnishes from his private purse. . . . But he said beyond the things just mentioned, Arabia could do no more by itself and they need desperately to have economic assistance.

In reply to this, I repeated my assertion that technical help should probably come first. I pointed out that schools were no good without teachers; that irrigation systems were of little use except where there were people who knew how to make economic use of water on land. I pointed out that this same observation applied almost in everything that was economic in character.

I emphasized that money alone could not make a country prosperous or raise its level of industrialization. It took investment, brains, experience in organization and professional matters, and a provision for balance among the various segments of the economy. I pointed out that purchasing power had to go along with the production of goods. Most of this was lost on him, but at least he did not express to me any thoughts of rushing into "big business" and he seemed to be responsive to the idea when I told him that small village and household industries were far more important to a country with very low living standards than were heavy goods industries.

Finally, I told him that our staffs would study both the military and the economic matters very sympathetically in cooperation with his staffs, but I did want to point out that it was progress all across the board that was sought, not an imbalance that would do no good at all for his country.

I thought that possibly the King felt that I was being too pessimistic in my attitude toward his desires and ambitions, for he remarked to me, "When we get this strength it will always be *with yours*." He wanted to make clear that whatever strength we built up for him would always be available to us. He said over and over again, "We are your friends and we want to be even better friends."

### *III. Islands*

The next matter that the King wanted to talk about were two islands in the Persian Gulf—Farasan [*Farsi*] and one named, I think, Arabi, or Aribi.<sup>3</sup> The modern political history of these islands as given to me by the King is as follows: For some years the ownership of the islands has been claimed by both Kuwait and Arabia. No other nation has asserted any claim to the islands, although of course Britain has supported the Kuwait claim.

---

<sup>3</sup>The President was apparently referring to the islands of Farsi and Arabi. Documentation on U.S. interest in the disputed islands is in Department of State, Central File 686A.88.

A short time ago an Iranian force suddenly moved into the islands, seized them and is now occupying one. The Arabs regard this as rank aggression. The King's Government has protested to Iran, but to no avail. Iran has not attempted to establish any historical claim—rather it has depended completely upon the power of possession. In this situation the Arabian Government has proposed two possible solutions to the Iranians:

(1) The Iranians to go home and leave both islands unoccupied, and the Arabs and Iranians thereafter to meet in negotiations to work out an agreed ownership.

(2) The Iranians to occupy one island and to recognize Arab ownership of the other.

The Iranians have refused to accept either suggestion. In fact, the suggestions have simply been ignored.

Again, the King said, a tense situation has developed in his country. This has reached a point where he believes he will have to cancel the planned visit of the Shah to Arabia, which was to take place in early March.

The King is at a complete loss to understand the developments since he says the Shah and he are great personal friends and "I have liked and admired him very much." He indicated that the Shah could be embarrassed very badly if he should come to Arabia at present. This subject was left with the intimation that he would appreciate our support wherever it was possible to give it in reaching a satisfactory solution to this question.

In reply I merely told him I would have the matter studied. I said that it was one thing that had escaped my attention.

#### *IV. Cairo Meeting*

The next subject was his meeting with some of the other Arab chieftains at Cairo. The King said that reports of the leanings of Nasser and the President of Syria toward the Soviets have been greatly exaggerated. Each of these men told the King that if the Soviets made any move that implied an attempt to interfere in their internal governmental activities, they would instantly cease all dealings with the Soviets. My impression is that he believes that these rulers can take from the Soviets anything they please, but still retain their own power of decision and control over all internal affairs. (I refrained from commenting . . . ) In any event, the King twice repeated a statement about as follows:

"I told my associates very plainly and flatly—I am with you in Arab cooperation and in opposition to Israel, but I will not go one step with you in working with the Soviet Union—I shall have nothing to do with the Soviets."

The King did not discuss plans for opening the Canal beyond saying that this subject had already been mentioned at the preceding conference. He did, however, take up the Israeli question and said that, as he explained in his letter of some time ago, he believed that we must take the status quo for the present and wait for feelings to calm down before we could do much in the way of constructive work. Of course the status quo for him involves a withdrawal of all Israeli forces inside the armistice line.

He repeated at some length the familiar complaints that the Arabs have against Israel, although he did tacitly agree that Israel, as a nation, is now an historical fact and must be accepted as such. He tried to put all the blame for border troubles on the Israelis, even though occurring a long time before the attacks of last fall. The Arab activities along the border he said were mostly those of civilians who had been dispossessed from their homes and who were hungry and starving—and just across the border they see their old properties being exploited by the Jewish communities. In desperation they try to go back at times and get some of the food and things of which they have been deprived. The Israeli use these small incidents as excuses to put on big raids, killing lots of Arabs. The King remarked that any fair settlement of the Jewish-Arab problem would give these border villages back to their former owners.

The King therefore felt that the Israeli should retire immediately from the Port of Aqaba and from the Gaza Strip and cease all of their border raids. He repeated that in the relatively quiet state that would result from such Israeli movements, we could then begin to hope to find the solution of the bigger and broader problem. This, of course, was a very one-sided presentation and so I told him that I would bring up some of the complaints brought to me by Jewish sympathizers.

I said, first, that because of the Egyptian embargo on Israeli shipping in the Canal, the Israelis had a good excuse to keep the Port of Aqaba and make it a useful and workable one.

Also, they have had so much trouble with raids originating in the Gaza Strip that they would under no circumstances permit Egypt to reoccupy it, arguing that in any case the Strip had never been a part of Egypt. I referred also to the Israeli complaints against the Fedayeen and their purpose of retaining partial mobilization to conduct retaliatory raids at any time they suffered a Fedayeen attack.

The King took each of these up in turn.

First, he said that the Egyptians in his opinion would not permit the Israeli shipping to transit the Canal, but after discussing it a little while longer, he said he did believe this was a negotiable item and that in return for other concessions, they would probably do so.

I immediately told him that unless the Egyptians would permit such transitting, then they would defeat in advance any attempt to settle the Canal issue on the six principles of the United Nations because they would stand in violation of the 1888 Treaty even before they started to confer.

The King repeated that he thought they might yield on this point.

He next stated that the Egyptians would never consent to the internationalization of the Gaza Strip. He said it was Arab, and internationalization of the Strip would mean inevitably that it was partly occupied by Arab enemies. I gained the distinct impression that the King thoroughly approved of the Egyptian stand on this point.

I replied that if the Israelis refused to turn over the Gaza Strip and the Egyptians refused to allow even an international force to occupy it, then we were at an impasse and any hope of reducing Arab-Israel tensions was gone.

Consequently, I asked him what would he think of establishing the Gaza Strip as an independent principality, somewhat like Yemen. He replied that this might provide an answer, although I told him that I was merely asking a question—that I did not know whether such an idea would be acceptable to either the Arabs or the Israeli or anyone else—but I was simply trying to find out whether there was some point of negotiation and flexibility rather than rigidity in the situation.

The King then went to the question of the Fedayeen. He declared that there had been only one raid by the Fedayeen in many weeks (I forget its exact date), and all other border disorders were not of their making. I felt sure, . . . that the King was completely misinformed, but that he implicitly believed what Nasser told him. So I did not pursue the subject further.

Finally, the King took up a subject which he said was completely personal and had not been mentioned to him by anyone, nor by him to anyone other than me.

It was the suggestion that I should ask Nasser and the King [*President*] of Syria to visit me. He said that he believed great good could come of such visits. He did not say that either knew of his suggestion—he intimated the contrary.

I had not expected this one and so I stalled a little bit, saying that of course I would think the matter over. He hastened to interject that he was certain these people did not lean nearly so much toward the Soviets as we had thought and they would like to re-establish their ties with the West.

I then remarked that, of course, I could not ask the two people he suggested immediately after the King himself had made a visit here without causing difficulty with our relationships with Israel. I asked him what he would think of my asking the head of the Jewish State. This he said would be quite all right and satisfactory.

In discussing this subject at some length, the King was rather vague and I am not quite certain what he thought would come out of it, but he did urge that it be treated on a top secret basis.

The King concluded with a little talk that showed he knew something about our political situation, at least that we had a lot of Jewish voters in this country. He maintained a very pleasant attitude throughout the conversation and seemed quite happy that I had given him an hour and three-quarters to get all of these matters off his chest.

He ended up by saying that in the Cairo meeting he had urged his associates to look upon American efforts in the region as motivated by genuine friendship and a desire to help—and not a desire to conquer. He repeated that he thought a face-to-face talk with both Nasser and the President of Syria would be very valuable.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> At 6:43 p.m. on January 30, in a telephone call to Secretary Dulles, Eisenhower conveyed the highlights of his private meeting with the King. The President focused almost entirely on those aspects of the meeting dealing with the Arab-Israeli issue and Iran. The President informed Dulles, *inter alia*, that he had kept notes of the meeting and would give them to the Secretary at their meeting. Eisenhower also noted that “the fact is, the fellow was more than anxious to be decent and honest.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

261. Memorandum of a Conversation, Blair House,  
Washington, January 31, 1957, 10:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECTS

1. U.S. Policy Aims in the Middle East
2. Arms for Saudi Arabia
3. Dhahran Airfield
4. Economic Projects for Saudi Arabia
5. Territorial Disputes—Buraimi
6. Territorial Disputes—Farsi and Arabi Islands
7. Israeli Occupation of Tiran and Sanafir Islands
8. Dangers of Communism and the "Imperialist" Powers
9. Baghdad Pact and Saudi Relations with Iraq
10. U.S. Relations with Egypt and Syria
11. Meeting of Arab Chiefs of State in Cairo
12. UN Resolutions on Israeli Troop Withdrawal and the Gaza Strip

PARTICIPANTS

*Saudi Arabia*

His Majesty King Saud  
Prince Musaad  
Prince Fahad (Minister of Defense)  
Yusuf Yassin (Acting Foreign  
Minister)  
Jamal Bey Al-Hussaini  
Khalid Bey Al-Walid  
Mohammad Surur

*United States*

Secretary Dulles  
Mr. Hoover  
Mr. Rountree  
Ambassador Wadsworth  
Ambassador Richards  
Mr. Stoltzfus

INTERPRETERS

Abdul Aziz Majid (S.S.)  
Mohammad Massoud (U.S.)

1. *U.S. Policy Aims in the Middle East*

The Secretary asked His Majesty if he would like to discuss the memorandum that he left with the President at yesterday's meeting. His Majesty said "Yes with pleasure".

The Secretary said that there had not been sufficient time to study this paper in full but in general it confirmed His Majesty's views as expressed to the President yesterday. The Secretary gave the opinion that it formed a good foundation and structure upon which to build stronger relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. It was difficult to evaluate the dangers and perils that were ahead, but, given mutual confidence, there was every hope that the two

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Confidential. Drafted by Stoltzfus who was assigned to serve as an interpreter during the King's visit.



sides would be substantially in agreement after an exchange of views.

The Secretary said that most important was the fact that the U.S. recognized the pre-eminent position of His Majesty in the Arab world and that the U.S. was prepared to base its policy on extending and protecting that position. The Secretary said it was also a fact that the U.S. has demonstrably stood for the independence of nations. The U.S. had many opportunities, especially during World Wars I and II to extend its domain in the world, but it had consistently rejected such temptations and instead had supported the independence of countries formerly under our jurisdiction, such as the Philippines and Puerto Rico. The U.S. also demonstrated recently its willingness to oppose two countries with which it had always had long and good relations because we could not support the action which they had taken. This was convincing evidence of our wish to maintain the independence of the Arab states. The Secretary said that he had been interested in an article he read in a London newspaper which said that Britain now conceded that one of the most important factors bringing about a cease fire in Egypt was the attitude of the U.S.

His Majesty said that he also recognized that fact.

The Secretary said that on the foundations of these two great cornerstones—(1) U.S. support of His Majesty as King of Saudi Arabia and as the custodian of the Holy places of Islam and (2) U.S. dedication to the freedom of nations—there lay the basis for a long enduring friendship between the two countries.

The Secretary continued by saying that the Saudi memorandum mentioned oil as the main resource of Saudi Arabia. The Secretary said that the U.S. gladly recognized the mutually advantageous arrangement that had developed between Saudi Arabia and the American oil companies for the development of oil resources. The U.S. hoped that this relationship would continue and increase to mutual advantage. The Secretary added that there was always the problem of maintaining adequate markets for this oil, and he believed that the American companies could be most helpful in this regard.

His Majesty said that on this occasion he wished to emphasize that the cooperation between his government and the American oil companies had always been good.

The Secretary commented that oil in the ground was not very valuable and that it must come out of the ground in order to be of benefit.

---

## 2. *Arms for Saudi Arabia*

The Secretary said that the memorandum next took up the subject of the Saudi Arabian army. He said that there had perhaps been undue delay in assisting His Majesty in this regard and that some deficiencies were evident. The Secretary said he recalled that when he had visited Saudi Arabia four years ago he had encountered the legitimate complaint that the Saudi army had received certain American vehicles the tires on which were unusable and the vehicles therefore could not be moved from the port. On his return to Washington he had reported the complaint to American Army authorities who had then arranged to fly out some tires, at considerable expense, to meet the needs of the Saudi Arabian army. The Secretary said he hoped that this action had covered the deficiency.

The Secretary said that the U.S. was now prepared to pursue actively the military talks that have been under way for some time, and suggested that discussions begin soon on this subject as raised in His Majesty's memorandum. The Secretary asked His Majesty if he agreed to this.

His Majesty said he accepted the suggestion but wished to raise one question which was: Did the U.S. really intend to arm Saudi Arabia?

The Secretary replied in the affirmative but stated it was a matter of how much arms could be supplied.

His Majesty said that his Minister of Defense and his military mission were ready to discuss arms whenever the U.S. was prepared to do so and that he had included a list of the Saudi arms requirements in his memorandum of yesterday. Discussions could take place on the basis of those requirements.

His Majesty said he wished to emphasize that the subject of arms was a delicate and sensitive matter with him. Saudi Arabia had already started to construct an army and it now had the MAAG mission. However, Saudi Arabia would not have an effective army without arms. This point, His Majesty said, was embodied in his memorandum and therefore would not need repeating here, but the fact was that he was unable to wait any longer for arms. He had been waiting twelve years for arms because he had not wished to extend his hand to anyone but his friends. His Majesty said that frankness on both sides was essential if an effective policy was to be built and results obtained. His people were inquiring where the arms were to defend the country. His Majesty said that while he had emphasized this many times to the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, it was something he wished to reiterate because he had such a feeling of sorrow on this score. When he was in Syria, for example, the Syrians had demonstrated their modern armaments to

him. While he was far wealthier and thus should be able to do much more and have better arms, still it was the Syrians, not he, who had obtained all the arms, and this was painful to him. He said that all he had at present were four anti-aircraft guns. His Excellency the Secretary surely could imagine his feelings when he found out that Iran, Greece, Turkey and Iraq had been furnished arms from the U.S. His Majesty asked whether the Secretary did not agree that he deserved something more than he has received to date for his strong friendship for the U.S. His Majesty said that he was only explaining the pain he felt. His people have no confidence in the army, and, in the recent attack by Israel on Saudi Arabia, the army was unable to reply. His Majesty said the Secretary would understand the great pressure that he was under to get arms from elsewhere. It was surely well known that he had no intention of attacking anyone and only desired to defend his country and maintain the vital interests that were common to both his country and the U.S.

The Secretary replied by saying that the U.S. was sympathetic to the desire of His Majesty to have a better equipped and better trained military establishment but he asked His Majesty to appreciate the fact that every friendly nation, which wanted to maintain a defense force, was asking for armed aid from the U.S. The U.S. had to take somewhat into account the degree of danger in each place. The northern tier countries mentioned by His Majesty were very close to the greatest military force outside the U.S. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia fortunately was not in the front line of this danger. This did not mean that there should not be a good and well-organized force in Saudi Arabia but only that Saudi Arabia was fortunate in not being in the front lines. The Secretary said he wished to say also that the receipt of Russian arms was not necessarily a guarantee of freedom and independence. He said he thought it certain that in the long run nations with friendly assurances from the U.S. would be happier and more prosperous than those who had taken arms from the USSR.

His Majesty said this was undoubtedly true but that Saudi Arabia wanted something with which to defend itself against its own dangers. Israel was on one boundary and Britain was threatening other boundaries, and Saudi Arabia was in constant danger.

The Secretary said that the U.S. understood that Saudi Arabia felt that these dangers existed, and that it was prepared to discuss an increased military program for Saudi Arabia. He wished to point out, however, that there are some forces more powerful than military forces that afford protection to a country's boundaries. Egypt had received large military supplies but this had not protected it. Egypt's real protection came from the fact that the U.S. took the leadership in opposing the aggression. Thus the force of the U.S. was more

effective in aiding Egypt than the Russian arms that Egypt had. The Secretary reiterated that his argument was not intended to dispute in any way His Majesty's contention that Saudi Arabia needed appropriate quantities of arms.

His Majesty said that Saudi Arabia's only aim was that it be armed by the U.S.

The Secretary suggested that the respective experts and counselors work on this as fast as possible and he also suggested that His Majesty provide a list of those of the Saudi delegation who were to work on military matters. The U.S. for its part would provide a list of its experts in this field.

His Majesty agreed to provide a list as soon as possible.

The Secretary said that the military section of the memorandum would be examined with the Saudi Minister of Defense and his team in order to see to what extent His Majesty's request could be met by the U.S.

### *3. Dhahran Airfield*

The Secretary then turned to the Dhahran Airfield Agreement and noted that the Saudi Arabian Government had stated its willingness to extend the agreement if some of the other outstanding matters could be dealt with satisfactorily. He said it was perhaps not appropriate to discuss it fully now but one point he had in mind was that, quite apart from other matters, he believed that it was useful to Saudi Arabia to continue to have an airfield that had communications with, and methods of transit to, all parts of the world. He hoped that His Majesty agreed that the airfield was in itself a good thing. The Secretary said that the airfield was an example of the U.S. working in cooperation with Saudi Arabia. The airfield thus had important symbolic value and demonstrated to the world that it would be a mistake to attack Saudi Arabia, friend of the U.S.

His Majesty said he welcomed a renewal of the Dhahran Agreement if the other points he had mentioned in his memorandum could be met.

The Secretary said that he had noted this point in His Majesty's memorandum.

### *4. Economic Projects for Saudi Arabia*

The Secretary then turned to the economic projects that had been suggested in His Majesty's memorandum and said that they seemed to be interesting, revenue-producing projects which should probably be discussed with the International Bank. The U.S. believed that some of these projects should be undertaken, and this task

would be rendered easier if the technical assistance program could be renewed in Saudi Arabia.

His Majesty replied that in his memorandum he had explained the operation of Point 4 in Saudi Arabia and had pointed out how expensive this program had been to the Saudi Arabian Government.

The Secretary said the matter would be studied further since there had not been time up to now to consider it fully.

His Majesty said he welcomed further study of this subject and suggested that his Minister of Finance meet with the American financial experts. He added, however, that since dealing with the International Bank meant acquiring new loans, he did not feel this would be in the interest of Saudi Arabia, which already had heavy debts on it.

The Secretary said that it was the U.S. view that where a project is revenue-producing, the International Bank was a good source of assistance. Revenue-producing projects could not be considered a burden on the budget because the revenue from these projects could be used to repay the loan. The Secretary added in any event the experts from both sides should get together on this matter.

#### *5. Territorial Dispute—Buraimi*

The Secretary then turned to the second part of the memorandum entitled "Territorial Disputes", the first item of which was the British action in Buraimi. He said he recalled that this subject was being actively discussed when he visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia four years ago, and he recalled discussing it fully with His Majesty when he was Crown Prince. The Secretary said that he had just re-read his notes of that conversation and saw that he had promised U.S. assistance to solve the problem. The results since had not been as good as he had hoped, but some positive accomplishments had been attained. The Secretary added that there were two possible ways the controversy might have gone: First, it might be confined to border incidents, the boundaries not being clearly marked.

His Majesty interjected to say that if there were no boundaries, there were certainly documents in existence to prove Saudi Arabia's case.

The Secretary replied that this was perhaps true but that a second and more serious possibility would have been an attack on Saudi Arabia itself. Fortunately, the controversy had not developed along the latter lines and had been kept within the confines of limited boundary disputes. While the U.S. regretted that there had not been a full solution of the problem, it believed it had had an influence in minimizing the nature of the problem.

His Majesty said he did not understand how the controversy could be considered anything but aggression in view of the fact that Britain had taken over Buraimi, killed a number of his people, violated its agreement with Saudi Arabia and had withdrawn from the arbitration tribunal. His Majesty said if Britain would withdraw from proven Saudi Arabian territory, he was prepared to negotiate either a bilateral agreement demarcating the boundaries or re-submit the question to arbitration. His Majesty added that even within the boundary of the concession area given to Aramco, aggression had taken place by Britain from the East and by Iran in the Arab Gulf. He said he attached great importance to friendly U.S. support for the just position of Saudi Arabia.

The Secretary said he was not attempting to defend the British position or to say that aggression had not taken place but only that he believed the situation would have been much worse had the U.S. not entered the scene. The U.S. had not ceased to urge its British friends to settle this matter. The Secretary said that when Prime Minister Eden was here two years ago, Buraimi had been one of the main topics of conversation and the U.S. had been prepared then, as it was now, to continue to seek a fair solution, and he hoped some progress could be made on the basis of the conversations now taking place during this visit.

His Majesty said that this is what he wanted also.

#### *6. Territorial Disputes—Farsi and Arabi Islands*

The Secretary said he noted also the point about Farsi and Arabi which had been taken over by Iran. This, to the U.S., was a new topic.

His Majesty replied that he had informed the American Ambassador two months ago about the Iranian aggression.

The Secretary said that he had asked the geographic and historical division of the Department to prepare a study of the Islands and the various claims to them. This report was not yet in hand but he wished again to assure His Majesty that the U.S. would continue to use its good offices to obtain an amicable solution. The U.S. had not to date come to an independent decision on the merits of the various claims to these Islands and he asked His Majesty whether his counselors had any documents or evidence that would be useful in the present American study of these Islands.

His Majesty said that such evidence was available and in the hands of his counselors and he would be happy to deliver them to the Secretary.

The Secretary said he wished to observe that the value of these Islands may be significant due to the possibility that they were in an

area of oil deposits. He said he believed it possible that these Islands, which were merely little areas of sand appearing above the level of the water, would not be too valuable in themselves and that perhaps an agreement between the countries concerning the respective rights of interested countries to subsurface resources throughout the Gulf would reduce the problem. The Secretary said the U.S. was in the throes of a similar dispute between the Federal Government and the individual states as to who owned the oil under the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. He said the U.S. had not yet solved its own problem and therefore it was perhaps presumptuous of it to try to solve someone else's similar problem so far away.

His Majesty said that the map of the "Arab Gulf" was well known and that for hundreds of years Iran had never laid claim to these Islands. Then suddenly and without warning Iran used its armed forces for an attack on the Saudi Arabian police guards who had been stationed on these Islands. Furthermore these forces were equipped with American arms which they had received after having promised not to use them for aggressive purposes.

The Secretary said he wished to restate his main point which was that the value of the Islands did not derive from the land area itself but rather from their location in a possible oil field. If the bigger problem of oil in the Gulf could be solved between the interested countries, the solution of the problem of the Islands would be easier.

#### *7. Israeli Occupation of Tiran and Sanafir Islands*

The Secretary then turned to the subject of Tiran and Sanafir Islands and stated it was the U.S. position that the Israeli forces ought to be withdrawn from the area and that the UN should see to it that no further aggression takes place between Israel and Egypt. The matter was now being actively discussed in the UN and it was to be hoped that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia could take similar positions.

#### *8. Dangers of Communism and the "Imperialist" Powers*

The Secretary said that the Saudi memorandum then dealt with Communism and the dangers of Communism and also the danger from the so-called imperialist powers. He said the U.S. was strongly convinced that the danger from Communism was much greater than that from the others. The U.S. deplored the recent action of its friends, but, as events have proved, as long as the U.S. was opposed to this action it would not be pursued. On the other hand the U.S. had found no way to help countries like Hungary which had fallen under Communism. The Secretary added that he hoped there would

be further opportunity to discuss the dangers to the Middle East area from international Communism or from any source.

His Majesty said he shared the Secretary's view but he wished to add that dangers to the area would not be overcome until the Arab peoples as well as the governments came to understand and have confidence in the U.S. and its policies in the area.

The Secretary said he agreed and he would be glad to discuss this point further. The U.S. knew that His Majesty was against Communism and that he could help the U.S. in this regard.

His Majesty said he was always ready to help.

The Secretary said that there was no desire on the part of the U.S. to substitute its judgment for the judgment of Arab leaders on how to combat Communism in their countries. When the U.S. found a strong leader like His Majesty it wanted to enlist his aid.

His Majesty said that, as he had already indicated to President Eisenhower, he was ready to cooperate but he needed something concrete in order to be of real strength and help to the U.S.

The Secretary remarked that with His Majesty's permission he wished to use the presence of His Majesty and his Counselors in the U.S. to obtain all the help and guidance possible now, and later to use the Richards' Mission to round out a study of the methods to effectively combat the dangers in the area.

His Majesty expressed his agreement with the Secretary.

#### *9. Baghdad Pact and Saudi Relations with Iraq*

The Secretary said that the memorandum went on to mention the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. was aware that His Majesty did not think highly of the Pact. The Secretary added that he could say that it was primarily in deference to His Majesty's views that the U.S. had not joined the Pact. The U.S. would continue to support certain aspects and aims of the Pact and it hoped that the activities of Baghdad Pact members would become such that the Pact would not seem unfriendly to Saudi Arabia. If that should happen, the U.S. might take a different attitude toward the Pact.

While the U.S. highly respected His Majesty's views regarding the Pact, the U.S. hoped very much that there would be improved relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and, in fact, the U.S. had the impression that relations were already better. It would be happy if this were to continue.

His Majesty replied that his position was the same as it had been before. It was his view that there was harm in the Pact. Especially unfortunate was the fact that one member of the Pact had attacked the Arabs, and the impression has been gained that since one member had aggressed, and no other member had condemned its



action, it must be that all Baghdad Pact members were against the Arabs. The fact that the U.S. had not joined the Pact had given the U.S. a good position with the Arabs. But how could one expect the Arabs to work with Turkey which itself worked with Israel and had economic relations with it? This was His Majesty's frank and, he believed, realistic view.

His Majesty continued by saying Pakistan had its own justification for being a member of the Pact. It was threatened by India and needed friends. It was also threatened by the USSR and this applied also to Iran and Turkey. But Iraq was a truly Arab state, and the singular position it was taking had caused a rift in the Arab front. His Majesty posed the question that if the people of Iraq themselves were against the Pact, as they were known to be, how could Iraq be an effective member? If anyone attacked Iraq, how could Iraq send an army against it since the people themselves would rise against their own government. He also said he believed that the way in which Iraq joined the Pact was not wise. If, before joining the Pact, Iraq had consulted with the other Arab states, some understanding might have been worked out.

His Majesty said that this was his position on Iraq as a Baghdad Pact member but, regarding relations with Iraq as an *Arab* state, he was ready to cooperate with it. After all Iraq had an Arab King, was an Arab state, and the people were Arab, and Saudi Arabia was always ready to help the Arabs. His Majesty said that he had expressed this same thought to King Faisal and had told him that he was ready to be a friend of Iraq: First, because both his country and Iraq were against Communism, and second, because they had common interests, some of which were outside purely Arab aims. So he was ready to cooperate with Iraq as an Arab state and in the interest of Arab nationalism.

His Majesty said he wished to say a further word about the Islamic countries. Turkey, for example, insisted it was a lay country, not an Islamic one. While it was known that when the U.S. said it opposed Communism it was sincere, others use the same excuse for nefarious ends.

The Secretary said that he considered this an important statement by His Majesty and that he was particularly happy about the statement that His Majesty would cooperate with Iraq as an Arab state. The U.S. believed that the Baghdad Pact was an effective instrument in opposing Communism, but it would regret any Baghdad Pact members interfering in the political affairs of the Arab states, as had been claimed.

His Majesty said this was true. Furthermore, he wished to assure the Secretary that Saudi Arabia was also ready to cooperate with Iran and Pakistan as *Islamic* states.

*10. U.S. Relations with Egypt and Syria*

The Secretary continued by saying that the Saudi memorandum dealt next with relations between the U.S. and Egypt and Syria. He said that the U.S. believed that one reason why Egypt has fallen on evil ways is because the President of Egypt sought to play the U.S. and Russia against each other. Nasser would say to the U.S. that if it did not do something for Egypt he would have to go to the USSR, and the U.S. did not consider that friendship. The attitude of Egypt contrasted sharply with that of His Majesty who, no doubt, had had many tempting offers from Russia but he had not taken them.

The Secretary expressed the opinion that Egypt in trying to be too smart would lose its friends. The U.S. desired to have the friendship of the government and people of Egypt and had proved this in the past in various ways. But when Egypt lashed out against the U.S., the U.S. did not consider that friendly relations could be maintained as before. This did not mean, however, that the U.S. did not want to be entirely correct in its relations with Egypt. This desire of the U.S. to be correct was proved when it came to the assistance of Egypt when it was attacked. It was one thing to be correct and quite another to be friendly, and unfortunately in present U.S.-Egyptian relations there was very little of the latter.

The Secretary said that the U.S. was ready to forget the past and make a fresh start if Egypt so desired. There was still a great deal of abuse of the U.S. being heard over the Egyptian radio, and the U.S. felt that it was up to Egypt to take the next step. For example, Egypt could give assurances regarding the Suez Canal. Egypt should also stop treating the U.S. as a country to be reviled.

His Majesty said he was sorry about what had taken place but he now asked the U.S. Government what it specifically wanted from Egypt.

The Secretary replied that there were a few specific things that could be mentioned. One thing was the conclusion or settlement of the Suez Canal dispute, based on the resolutions of the Security Council. The Secretary said that there was reason to believe that Egypt might agree to that.

The Secretary said that furthermore, the U.S. did not think it was compatible with the Armistice Agreement of 1949 that raids were continuing to take place between Egypt and Israel. The U.S. was not pressing for a signed peace at this time but it felt that attacks from both sides should cease.

His Majesty inquired whether the Secretary had read the passage in the memorandum about the Egyptian commandos where it was mentioned that Egypt did not deny that raids had taken place.

The Secretary remarked that there was evidence that these raids were in fact officially sanctioned.

His Majesty replied that it was true that before the attack on Gaza by Israel there was official Egyptian knowledge of these raids.

The Secretary said that there might be other things that Egypt could do to improve its relations with the U.S. but that he did not think that any catalogue of things to do would in itself produce that intangible spirit called friendship, such as the U.S. and Saudi Arabia enjoyed.

His Majesty replied that specific action, while not necessarily producing complete friendship, would certainly be of help in improving relations.

The Secretary said there was great confidence on the part of the U.S. in His Majesty but that it would be very difficult to describe all the reasons for this confidence, since confidence and friendship were intangible concepts based on more than mere material facts. In any event, the Secretary said, he would try to set forth to His Majesty views of the U.S. on some of the ways in which it believes American-Egyptian relations could be improved.

His Majesty said that, frankly, Nasser was willing to improve relations with the U.S. but he needed some time.

The Secretary continued by saying that in Syria Communist influence was apparently very strong. In Egypt, nationalism, which the U.S. does not oppose, was the guiding principle in the action taken, and we were displeased only that Egypt had used this nationalism in the wrong way. But in Syria, the U.S. felt there was definite Communist influence and that this influence was particularly dangerous to institutions which were tending to bring stability to the area. And it was dangerous also to Saudi Arabia.

His Majesty said that in the present circumstances in Syria the good had been mixed with the bad. Both nationalist principles and Communist principles were involved. It had to be admitted that the Communists had never failed to try to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Arab nationalism. The extremists had also taken this line. But the U.S. should not believe that the Syrian creed was a Communist one. Syrian nationalism was an extremist form of *nationalism*, and one should never forget the difference between nationalism and Communism.

His Majesty went on to say that there was no doubt that the supplying by Russia of arms to Syria had produced a favorable feeling on the part of the Syrian people toward Russia. Syria might also wrongly have thought that they could play the big powers against each other. However, as Syrian leaders had assured the American Ambassador in Riyadh recently, Syria is not Communist. His Majesty added that there might also be some distortion in the

information coming from Syria. In any case, just as with Egypt, it would be good to find ways in which Syria could act to improve its relations with the U.S.

His Majesty said one could not blame a whole country because of the evil doings of a few. God willing, and with good will, the summer clouds would be dispersed. His Majesty had told the Syrians that he was against Communism and against all verbal attacks of one country on another and that he was against all forms of extremism. His Majesty said that he felt strongly that with mutual good will among the nations the problems could be solved amicably.

#### *11. Meeting of Arab Chiefs of State in Cairo*

The Secretary noted in conclusion that the memorandum signed by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Egypt would be studied by the American Government and would be answered by a memorandum.

#### *12. UN Resolutions on Israeli Troop Withdrawal and the Gaza Strip*

His Majesty said that he wished to mention one final matter of great urgency. He had heard that a resolution was to be submitted to the UN regarding the Gaza strip. He wished strongly to advise the American Government that discussion of the future disposition of Gaza, before the settlement of the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops, would serve no good purpose. It would raise a tumult in the Arab world. His Majesty therefore felt that the question of the disposition of Gaza should be discussed only after the withdrawal of all aggressor Israeli forces.

The Secretary said that the United States understood that there should be complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces as a first step, but it would be the task of United Nations to protect and take care of 200,000 refugees in Gaza. The UN Secretary General was in touch with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and there was reason to believe that Egypt would be acquiescent on what was done by the UN.

His Majesty said he wished to re-emphasize that the raising of the question of the disposition of Gaza before the withdrawal of Israeli troops would create a very bad reaction in the Arab countries.

The Secretary replied that the problem was that if there were no discussions on Gaza before the withdrawal of Israeli troops, there would be no program for Gaza and there would be chaos in the interim between Israeli withdrawal and the time the UN could assume jurisdiction. The two UN resolutions, the one on Israeli withdrawal and the other on disposition of Gaza, were separate and should be dovetailed.

His Majesty asked whether Israel had also been ordered to withdraw from Tiran and Sanafir.

The Secretary assured His Majesty that it had.

---

**262. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, February 1, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

*Appointment with Sir Duncan Sandys, British Minister of Defense, Friday,  
February 1, 1957.*

[Here follow eight paragraphs not directly related to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East.]

Sandys asked the President how he was getting on with the King of Saudi Arabia. The President said he was very pleasant personally. He told the President his bill of particulars about the British—and the “aggression” against his territory. President is convinced the King is genuinely against the Soviets and he keeps insisting he wants to be friends with the West. He says that Nasser has “captured Arab public opinion.” The King is unhappy with Nasser.

As for the Israeli problem, the King has no solution—“just continue to be enemies.” The King is anxious to get commerce restored and income coming in again.

King is exercised about the two islands “Farisi” and Arabi (approximate spellings) taken by Iran.

The President said the King was . . . groping his way, seeking some method of getting help without having to fall into the hands of the Soviets. The President explained that we were friends of the British and would always be friends of the British, and that we wanted to be friends of the Arabs. The King has not mentioned the Baghdad Pact at all.

The President said he thought Arabia offered the best chance to break into the Southern Arab area and gain some understanding. The King seems to be anxious to find out what it is we are trying to do—he is mediaval in his approach but not unintelligent. What the President is trying to do is to convince the King that the West wants to make that country free politically and strong enough to exercise its freedom.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. No drafting information is given on the source text. It was presumably prepared in the Office of the President. The President’s appointment calendar for February 1 indicates no record of a meeting with Sandys. (*Ibid.*, Record of “President’s Daily Appointments”)

The President reviewed also his discussions with the King about the Canal, about the Fedayeen, about oil, etc.

The President believes that if the King, or someone else, can really come along with the West, we will be able to counter Nasser to a great degree and bring Syria back into friendship with the West. The King is the only one the President sees now as a possible "stone" on which to build.

There was discussion about the visit of Mollet (Sandys said "Mollet is a good fellow, very tough") and the forthcoming meeting between Macmillan and the President at Bermuda.<sup>2</sup>

At the close of the conference, the President said he would remember to speak to Dulles about some item—which I could not understand—presumably it was either the Canal or the Baghdad Pact.

---

<sup>2</sup> President Eisenhower was scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Macmillan in Bermuda, March 21–24, for discussions on matters of mutual concern to both countries.

---

## 263. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, February 1, 1957, 3:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

### SUBJECTS

1. His Majesty's Memorandum of January 30—Suggested Program for US-Saudi Substantive Meetings
2. The President's Suggestions for the Remainder of His Majesty's Visit

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Saudi Arabia*

His Majesty King Saud  
 Prince Musaad  
 Prince Fahd  
 Shaikh Yusuf Yassin  
 Jamal Bey Al-Hussaini  
 Others

#### *United States*

President Eisenhower  
 Secretary Dulles  
 Mr. Hoover  
 Mr. Herter  
 Mr. Rountree  
 Ambassador Wadsworth  
 Ambassador Richards  
 Others

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Confidential. Drafted by Stoltzfus. A copy is also *ibid.*, Central Files, 786A.5-MSP/2-257.

## INTERPRETERS

William A. Stoltzfus  
Elie Nowfel  
Abdul Aziz Majid

*1. His Majesty's Memorandum of January 30—Suggested Program for US-Saudi Substantive Meetings.*

The President asked His Majesty's permission to begin the meeting by having the Secretary review the progress of the meetings so far.

His Majesty gave his assent.

The Secretary began by saying that following the meeting between His Majesty and the President two days ago, His Majesty had submitted a memorandum. This memorandum was before the President now.

The Secretary said that the memorandum had been studied intensively and then had been the subject of meetings between himself and his advisors. These sessions had been followed by a meeting with His Majesty at the President's Guest House during which the Secretary had reviewed the memorandum paragraph by paragraph with His Majesty and his Counselors. This review has led to a useful exchange of views between His Majesty and the Secretary on several of the issues raised in the memorandum.

During the meeting it has been agreed that groups would be established representing His Majesty's Counselors and military advisors for the Saudi side and a corresponding group of military experts to be selected from the American side. These groups were to meet to discuss the military requirements of the Government of Saudi Arabia as stated in Section Two of the memorandum. The Secretary proposed that these groups begin their work tomorrow morning (February 2).

The Secretary said that the memorandum also contained suggestions with respect to long-term economic projects for Saudi Arabia. It was the view of the United States that projects of that sort might best be dealt with on a commercial basis by the World Bank or, if the project involved American companies, by the Export-Import Bank. But in any event the whole matter would be the subject of study between His Majesty's Counselors and American experts, including the World Economic Council.

The Secretary suggested that discussions of these economic projects be commenced on Monday.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> February 4.

The Secretary also said that his talk with His Majesty had revealed some difference in their respective appreciation of the dangers of international Communism in certain Arab countries, and that His Majesty had felt that most of the things that concerned the United States with regard to Communism in the Middle East were, in fact, manifestations of Arab nationalism.

The Secretary said that he had suggested to His Majesty that it might be useful for Mr. Allen Dulles to have a talk with His Majesty, and that His Majesty had graciously accepted. This talk could perhaps be held on Sunday morning (February 3).

The Secretary said that one of the important features of the memorandum was a statement dealing with the meetings recently held between His Majesty, King Hussein, President Nasser, and Syrian Prime Minister Sabri al-Asali. Those discussions dealt with the United States program for the Middle East which the President presented to Congress on January 5.

The Secretary added that in view of the fact that the Four-Power memorandum raised questions which no doubt should be answered in writing, as was, indeed, requested by His Majesty, the United States would submit its answer in the form of a written memorandum instead of verbally.

The Secretary said he believed it would be possible to clarify the President's Middle East program so as to meet the points mentioned in the Four-Power memorandum.

The Secretary then reiterated his belief that his meeting with His Majesty had produced a very useful exchange of views on a number of the subjects contained in His Majesty's memorandum.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he thought both sides might now await the results of the talks to be held in the next few days, particularly regarding military matters. That was probably the next important step.

## *2. The President's Suggestions for the Remainder of His Majesty's Visit.*

The President said that with His Majesty's permission he would like to make a few suggestions for the next few days of His Majesty's stay in the United States.

The President said that he wanted to say first that it was a source of great satisfaction to him to note the wide basis of friendliness that underlay all his talks with His Majesty. He said that he agreed with the Secretary that the Counselors and the staff of both sides should meet together and begin their substantive work. The President added that it was his understanding that His Majesty would be going to White Sulphur Springs while these talks were in progress. He felt, however, that these discussions would perhaps



take a few days and that His Majesty and he might want to have another talk after that.

The President said that he therefore wished to suggest that His Majesty and he meet at the White House a week from today (February 8) in the morning. If it were found that the discussions had terminated earlier, or His Majesty were to find that he preferred to have the meeting earlier, the President would be ready.

The President said he thought that the customary communiqué for the press should not be issued until after the final meeting. The President said he realized that press representatives would be pressing His Majesty and himself for news of the progress of the talks and he therefore suggested that His Majesty's Press Officer release a general statement soon about the developments to date and the program ahead.

The President said that he had no further suggestions to make but that he would be pleased to hear what His Majesty might wish to say at this time.

His Majesty said that he agreed with the President's suggestions. He said he wished to say further that if it were necessary for him to go to a hotel in Washington to be near where the talks were taking place, he would be ready to do so.

The President said that His Majesty and his Counselors might wish to discuss this among themselves. He would be delighted to have His Majesty stay anywhere he wished.

His Majesty replied that he thought it advisable to stay nearby the President as he wished to be on the spot during these important meetings.

The President said that he was going to be away from Washington for 36 hours over the week-end but that he was returning Monday and would stay in Washington for the rest of the week.

His Majesty said he would like to sum up by expressing his agreement with the presentation by the Secretary of what had taken place in the meetings to date and his agreement with the suggested program for the future. He asked God's help in bringing success to the work ahead.

His Majesty said there was nothing more to add except to refer to the subject he had raised in his private meeting with the President.<sup>3</sup> It was a subject in which he was most interested.

---

<sup>3</sup> The President and the King met briefly in private prior to the meeting here recorded; the subject of discussion was the problem of the Gaza Strip. A memorandum of the conversation is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.

The President said that he also was most interested in this matter and would take it up soon with the Secretary of State.

The President congratulated His Majesty on the shortness of the present meeting which thus gave him some extra time to himself during these busy days.

His Majesty replied that he took such pleasure in his association with the President that he no longer felt tired.

---

**264. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 2, 1957, 3 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECTS**

1. Arms for Saudi Arabia
2. Extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement

**PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S. Participants*

Mr. Murphy  
 Ambassador Wadsworth  
 General Cannon  
 Admiral Bergin  
 General Smith  
 Colonel Critz  
 Colonel Elliker  
 Colonel Burtenshaw  
 Colonel Harding  
 Major Owen  
 Mr. Newsom  
 Mr. Stevens  
 Dr. Evans  
 Mr. Hancock  
 Mr. Wilson  
 Mr. Seager  
 Mr. Sherwood  
 Mr. Stoltzfus

*Saudi-Arabia Participants*

HRH Prince Fahad  
 HE Yusuf Yasin  
 General Tassan  
 Major Taib  
 Major Snobar  
 Mamdouh Adib  
 Captain Badawi  
 Captain Sabri  
 Lt. Col. Muhammad Al-Namlah  
 Interpreter, Mohammad Massoud

Mr. Murphy opened the meeting by reading a statement, a summary of which follows. The USG is happy to begin these talks which were agreed upon by the President and His Majesty, the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Secret. Drafted by Sherwood and Stoltzfus. A copy is also *ibid.*, Central File 786A.5-MSP/2-257.

King. In these talks we will review for the consideration of our respective Governments certain proposals which we are prepared to make in furtherance of cooperation between our two Governments. We propose to open technical discussions on two subjects; first, the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, and secondly, on the degree to which the United States Government can assist in developing SAG armed forces. We wish at the outset to express our appreciation for the manner in which the SAG has received Ambassador Wadsworth in discussions in Saudi Arabia. We are also grateful for SAG cooperation at Dhahran during days when our attention has been diverted to the serious problems of the area. It has been the consistent view of each Government that an agreement can be reached to our mutual best interests. Since 1945 the USG has benefited from Saudi Arabian cooperation at Dhahran. We wish to make clear to the SAG that the US has world-wide commitments and each commitment must be related to our total responsibility. We also must point out that US aid is extended within the framework of existing US laws and according to the availability of funds which are controlled by the US Congress. The US wishes to continue its airbase at Dhahran and to aid in the building of a strong defense for Saudi Arabia. A part of our thinking envisions contributions to the training of SAG forces. This contribution on a somewhat more modest scale has been discussed in the past. US officials present at the meeting will emphasize the importance of providing a sound foundation for training. The real value of such a training program far exceeds its money value. This Government has received the revised program for the military equipment needs of the SAG, and the President has indicated our willingness to provide for such needs under the current reimbursable military aid agreement. We are also prepared to comment on the price and availability of these specific needs. It is also understood that separate discussions with the Ministry of Finance will take place concerning economic problems. Lastly, we will also discuss the interrelationship of the military and economic problems.

Prince Fahad then replied expressing thanks and appreciation for the opportunity of meeting with Mr. Murphy and the other officials and expressing his confidence that the discussions would lead to good results and the continued cooperation of the two Governments. Prince Fahad then referred to the detailed program which had been submitted and stated that it was SAG's wish that this plan be achieved in two years instead of the four years as originally intended.

Shaikh Yusuf speaking on behalf of the Prince stated that he wished to consider the memorandum to the President which the

King had presented on Wednesday as an agenda. He hoped this would be agreeable to the US.

Shaikh Yusuf summarized the memorandum as it pertained to the military and airbase questions. The memorandum notes the delays which have been encountered by the Saudi Arabian Government in obtaining arms from the US, and requests the President's aid on five points:

1. Agreement on the supply of sufficient arms for 13 regiments, excepting the Royal Guard and the Royal Air Force;
2. Furnishing armaments for 2 complete divisions in accordance with the program as developed in Riyadh, within two years;
3. Equipping the SAG Airforce on the basis of 100 planes of different types;
4. Fulfillment of this program in two years, emphasizing that the completion of regimental plans and airforce plans should follow the delivery of arms for the two divisions;
5. Development of the nucleus of a SAG Navy to defend the coast.

Shaikh Yusuf then proposed that the agenda incorporate the following points:

1. A listing of the items of equipment required for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Airforce, together with the dates of delivery for each of them.
2. Costing of these items and means of payment.
3. Relation to the Dhahran Airfield Agreement of such payments.
4. Training programs.
5. Agreement that all military hardware furnished must be brand new and of the most modern design.

Shaikh Yusuf said this was how SAG visualized its needs and that the USG may wish to suggest changes. SAG realizes that the USG is much better at developing tables of organization and expenses, he added, than is his Government.

Admiral Bergin commented on the SAG plan, noting that the USG recognizes the importance of his Majesty's memorandum and vital need to strengthen Saudi Arabian Government forces. He noted that a copy of the SAG plan had been received recently and that an initial review of it indicated certain changes in the program which had been previously considered. Admiral Bergin added that we have certain letters of offer prepared at this time and are prepared to deliver them. Furthermore, it now appears that additional requirements beyond these letters of offer may be necessary. Admiral Bergin proposed that representatives of the Saudi Government and the USG meet early next week to establish detailed lists. He then proposed to present an air training program which has been worked out by the USG.

Shaikh Yusuf inquired if it was the same training program which Ambassador Wadsworth had already presented. Ambassador Wadsworth replied that it was a more highly developed program aimed at the achievement of a SAG Airforce.

Prince Fahad stated that we should agree on principles and leave details to the experts. Mr. Murphy replied that we need time to study the SAG proposals but wish to give them the benefit of our preliminary thinking. He said that we seek agreement on principles as did His Highness but that we wanted a clear understanding of the problems.

Shaikh Yusuf replied that the first principle is that Saudi Arabian Governments want US arms. It was his understanding of what the President and the Secretary had said that the United States Government is ready to give arms.

Shaikh Yusuf said that it was therefore agreed that the SAG agrees to accept US arms and that the USG agrees to supply them. Mr. Murphy replied that he would prefer to phrase it in terms that the USG wished to assist the SAG. He did not think that we could say, "The USG agrees to arm Saudi Arabia". Mr. Murphy continued that whereas we wished to cooperate in achieving an armament for Saudi Arabia we feel the details should be agreed upon simultaneously.

Mr. Murphy and Ambassador Wadsworth then clarified the discussion by pointing out to the Saudi officials that a mutual agreement would depend on answering clearly the questions of "what" and "how" and "when"—i.e. what items should be delivered, under what conditions and when. Shaikh Yusuf agreed.

Mr. Murphy then said that there were two points that he wished to make. The first was our recognition of the importance which the SAG attaches to the obtaining of US equipment. The second point was the importance which the USG attaches to the question of training of personnel. This government has had much experience over many years in training foreign personnel and the importance of this cannot be overemphasized. He mentioned as one example of the failure of adequate training the case of Egypt. Mr. Murphy then said that we now hold letters of offer which will be ready at an early date.

Shaikh Yusuf replied he fully agreed on the importance of training and returning to the critical questions of "what" and

“when” and “how”, he summarized his agreement as to the “what” by saying he would agree to defer to the military experts the study on the list prepared in Riyadh. He pointed out that His Majesty in his memorandum to the President had agreed to this list with the amendment that two years instead of four be given for its fulfillment. Ambassador Wadsworth said it has been his view that the fulfillment of this plan could not be achieved in two years, but that this question would be answered in the course of the discussions between the military experts. Shaikh Yusuf then said he thought this a good omen that our work would be successful because it appeared we were coming to an agreement quickly. He said he agreed that experts on both sides should study and recommend the feasibility of completing the program in two years.

There followed a discussion of the establishment of two committees; one committee to work on the 13 regiment plan, and the other to work on the training program. Mr. Murphy said that Colonel Critz would represent the USG on the first committee, and that General Smith or his representative would be our representative on the second committee. It was agreed that the committees would meet in the Pentagon at 10 a.m. Monday morning.<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows discussion of the technical aspects of military and training programs for Saudi Arabia.]

---

<sup>2</sup> The technical military discussions held at the Pentagon on Monday, February 4, were summarized in a memorandum from Rountree to Murphy, February 6. (*Ibid.*, 786A.5-MSP/2-657)

---

**265. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 4, 1957.*

DEAR ROBERT: In view of the rapidly moving developments in King Saud's visit I believe it would be advisable for me to confirm

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/2-457. Secret.

for you the current Department of Defense views on certain of the critical issues which have arisen or are likely to arise in conjunction particularly with the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement and the quid pro quo to be offered in return therefor, including reimbursable military assistance.

Our analysis of the King's memorandum to the President in this regard indicates three major areas for coverage in the forthcoming technical discussions. These are first a request for U.S. Government approval or sanction of the projected development of the Saudi Arabian armed forces, second, the extent to which we may be able specifically to meet the King's request for justification for renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, and third, the top limit in monetary terms of our offer of quid pro quo and the source of funds.

With respect to the Saudi Arabian plan for the reorganization of their armed forces, the Department of Defense is not prepared to give specific answers to the questions which they have raised. The plan itself involves a complete reorganization of the armed forces and as such will require detailed review by our highest military authorities before it can be given governmental sanction. An initial appraisal indicates that the time phasing proposed by the Saudis is overly ambitious and should be extended appreciably. Nevertheless we will be prepared to review the specific requests for purchase of military equipment previously submitted and further are ready to discuss other proposals they may make as to additional purchases.

With regard to quid pro quo, developments to date do not indicate any necessity for changing the basic position previously agreed to, namely that we should not offer to provide any military equipment as such on a grant basis but should instead concentrate our efforts on a greatly expanded military training program. The Department of the Air Force has prepared a plan for the expansion of U.S. air training activities, a copy of which is attached.<sup>2</sup> The Army similarly has an outline plan for the expansion of its training activities, the essential elements of which are set forth in the

---

<sup>2</sup>Not found attached. A copy of the plan entitled, "Air Training Plan Saudi Arabia" was transmitted under cover of a memorandum dated February 4, 1957, from Wilkins to Rountree. (*Ibid.*, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 70 D 148, Saudi Arabia . . . U.S. Military Assistance Military Training Program)

attached copy of a memorandum from the Army to the Chief of Staff, USAF.<sup>3</sup> These plans have the approval of the Department of Defense as a basis for discussion with the Saudi delegation. However, while we would not object to the transfer of title to training equipment to the Saudi Arabian Government as recommended by the Secretary of the Air Force, it is our view that no commitment along these lines should be made to the Saudi Arabian Government at this time. Similarly we should not indicate that such transfer of title some time in the future is entirely out of the question.

It is estimated that the total cost of the above programs over a five-year period would be approximately \$45 million. The estimated breakdown of this \$45 million total is as follows: projection of current Army and Air training activities over a five-year period—\$5.5 million; recommended Air training \$32.8 million; and augmented Army training including the Army mapping project—\$6.7 million. We would be prepared to support these two programs out of Mutual Security funds up to the extent of \$35 million over a five-year period. The costs for U.S. personnel involved and related support would be met out of Defense funds. Given the \$5 million already approved by ICA for the construction of the civil air terminal at Dhahran, the cost to the United States of the total program should be approximately \$50 million over five years, the amount which Secretary Dulles has requested.

Sincerely yours,

**Gordon Gray**

---

<sup>3</sup>Not found attached. A copy of the memorandum, dated January 22, 1957, is attached to a copy of the Gray letter, *ibid.*



266. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 4, 1957<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Economic Discussions with Saudi Arabian Delegation

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S. Team*

1. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
2. Ambassador George Wadsworth
3. Robert G. Barnes, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs
4. Jack C. Corbett, Director, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs
5. Cedric Seager, Regional Director, Office of Near East and South Asia Operations, International Cooperation Admin.
6. L. Wade Lathram, Political-Economic Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs
7. Merrill C. Gay, Adviser, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs
8. John Shaw, Officer-in-Charge, Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs
9. Vance Brand, Member of Board of Directors, Export-Import Bank
10. William Welk, Economist, Export-Import Bank

*Saudi Team*

1. His Excellency Shaykh Muhammad Surur, Royal Counselor and Minister of Finance and National Economy
2. His Excellency Shaykh 'Abdullah al-Khayyal, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the U.S.
3. Rasim al-Khalidi, Vice President, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency

After the amenities, Mr. Murphy observed that a prosperous Saudi Arabia will contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East which obviously is to our mutual interest. He referred to the President's request of Congress to announce a policy of cooperation with the Middle East looking toward this objective and combatting our greatest threat, the spread of international communism. Referring to His Majesty's expressed desire for assistance on certain projects which would contribute to Saudi Arabian development, Mr. Murphy hoped we could discuss these measures and how to move forward.

Mr. Murphy hoped and believed that the current decline in Saudi Arabian revenues would soon be eradicated as a result of the progress toward reopening of the canal. He noted that Saudi Arabia had not yet joined the World Bank or the International Monetary

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/2-457. Secret. Drafted by Gay.

Fund and hoped the Saudi Government is now considering such membership. The United States was prepared to discuss ways and means to help Saudi Arabia with the technical and engineering surveys necessary in connection with projects desired. He suggested that the Ministers elaborate on the Saudi Arabian objectives, after which we could discuss ways and means of achieving these objectives. He wanted to know what development or projects were of particular interest, how the United States could best assist in the technical planning and what resources are available to be utilized.

The Minister of Finance, after commenting favorably on the introductory remarks, referred to talks with Mr. Black of the World Bank last year, which had now led to the Saudi Arabian Government's decision to join the Bank and Fund. He then undertook to explain the economic development of his country and to present related information which he felt important for these discussions, distributing a memorandum in this connection. He noted that the Saudi income before the crisis was at a level of \$350 million, one-third of which was allocated for the regular Army of three divisions, another third for government operations, security and police and the other third for projects.

He stated that the revenue would be off this year, assuming the canal opened on March 13, about \$90 million, roughly one-third of the revenue from oil (our estimate is about \$50 million covering six months closure of the canal) and that the only other source of revenue is the income tax and custom duties, both of which currently yield small returns. He said the Saudi Government had accumulated debts during the past year.

In response to Mr. Murphy's interest in the debt situation, he indicated the total debt was about \$200 million; about \$6 million is the balance of the EximBank loan, some is the remaining obligation to pay Aramco for building the railroad to Riyadh, the remainder, presumably the bulk, is internal debt. The Minister, aided by Mr. Al-Khalidi, explained the Saudi practice of borrowing from banks in anticipation of oil revenue, recognizing that these loans were in the nature of overdrafts. The same type of quasi-debt is created in connection with advances of goods by Saudi merchants. About \$90 million of the current debt was due to the Suez crisis.

The Minister then referred to His Majesty's memorandum to the President in which there was a request for economic assistance to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Murphy said this request had led him to wonder about the Saudi Government policy in respect of loans. He felt that Saudi revenues would soon be back to normal, providing a firm basis for government borrowing. Referring to the Saudi Government's traditional attitude toward loans, he observed that the United States had leaned heavily on loans during much of the period of its

economic development. Loans from Europe were prerequisite to our success e.g., in financing our railroads. He would appreciate a frank discussion of the Saudi attitude on this matter. The Minister responded by simply saying the King wished help rather than a loan. Mr. Murphy observed that loans are assistance, that we have loan programs all over the world and the United States policy is to emphasize loans; some countries in fact prefer only this type of assistance.

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador intervened along the following lines: we recognize the friendship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. King Saud has a great desire to make this friendship stronger in the mutual interest of both countries. The King would like as much as possible to avoid loans. Has the United States ever given grants to any state of supplies, money, munitions or equipment?

Mr. Murphy replied in the affirmative, adding that there had consequently been a great reaction against it. He emphasized that our grants had been to countries unable themselves to provide the necessary resources and which were without adequate credit means. These situations do not characterize Saudi Arabia which has enjoyed exceptionally large revenues and a high degree of credit worthiness.

The Ambassador asked if this meant a grant to Saudi Arabia is not possible. Mr. Murphy responded that United States policy has emphasized loans where they are possible, where there is ability to produce dollars for repayment. (The Saudi Ambassador at this point left the meeting for another appointment.) Mr. Murphy and Ambassador Wadsworth elaborated further on the United States' desire to emphasize loans where possible, on the present views of the United States Congress and on the procedures involved in obtaining funds from Congress for foreign assistance purposes. It was emphasized that Americans would not understand the need of the Saudi Government for grant assistance. Mr. Wadsworth requested the Minister to explain in as much detail as possible why the King wanted to avoid loans; we ourselves are often borrowers and it is hard to understand their point of view.

The Minister of Finance thereupon expatiated upon the economic situation of Saudi Arabia which he characterized as a country "jumping from horseback to plane in one step". He emphasized that it differed vastly from other Middle East and Arabian countries in that what it has now has mostly come during the past fifteen years. During the past ten years the Saudi Government had used a large part of its revenue for pilgrims, public utilities and projects of a type mentioned in the memorandum. If this were continued on a basis of loans, his country would eventually be shouldering heavy responsibilities and possibly find itself without sufficient income to cope

with the requirements. In short, they fear large borrowing which would be required for big projects. Having only lately stepped into the field of development, how could they cope with these large money requirements. They want agricultural and industrial development, but need much capital to get it. They do not want to face a critical situation later as a result of borrowing; therefore, they "want help, not loans".

Mr. Murphy observed that Saudi dollar income would probably double in ten years from oil revenues, reach a figure of perhaps \$600 million. There followed considerable statistical discussion, the Saudis arguing in favor of large outside requirements, the United States that loans constitute the logical means of financing Saudi economic development. The Minister mentioned that Saudi imports increased from \$26 million rials in 1943 to \$821 million rials in 1955. Mr. Murphy observed that as their expenses increased their revenues would also rise, i.e., that projects would be productive. The Minister again queried if this discussion meant no grant was possible. It was explained we have to discuss all angles, possibilities and requirements before coming to any conclusions. We could undoubtedly provide on a grant basis certain types of technical assistance, such as surveys of projects and necessary consultants.

Ambassador Wadsworth cited the views of Mr. McCloy, who had visited Saudi Arabia, on the question of financing Saudi development. In brief, that there be added something to each part of the Saudi budget bringing it up to perhaps \$400 million. In ten years Saudi Arabia would be receiving \$600 million in oil revenues a year; in fifteen years, perhaps \$900 million. Set aside \$400 million to start with and use as much of the difference as desired for projects to be paid back in fifteen years. He wondered why the Saudi Government could not accept this point of view, reiterating the difficulty of American minds seeing it differently. The Finance Minister replied that they want first to be delivered from the present crisis, then maybe they could follow Mr. McCloy's ideas; but how could they be sure of the present rate of growth and what if there were another Suez crisis?

This led to a general discussion of the necessity and universality of risk taking and that Mr. Black, as all bankers do, would accept the principal of force majeure. If we didn't have confidence in Saudi Arabia, we wouldn't talk about loans. Statistical comparisons in respect of the two countries, per capita income, per capita debt, etc., led to the Saudi observation that the United States had unlimited resources while Saudi Arabia had only one and Saudi Arabia had massive requirements. The Finance Minister then observed that there were only three days left of their visit, and His Majesty feels when the United States is aware of their need it will provide assistance in

the form of grants. He wondered if some of the projects mentioned are of the type for which the United States could give grant assistance.

Mr. Murphy said we would welcome additional information including the Saudi Government's plans regarding the projects listed, suggesting in particular the Dammam Harbor, the Medina Railroad and the broadcasting projects. The Minister proceeded to discuss in some detail the needs of Dammam Harbor. He alleged that delays in unloading were so great that some companies refuse to use the port. The increase in the cost of commodities is such that frequently it is cheaper to carry goods across the desert. They wish to enlarge the port sufficiently to service three vessels concurrently. At present many ships go to Bahrein at considerable cost to the Saudi economy. (Aramco's report on the harbor was suggested for study.) It is estimated that it would cost from \$5 to \$10 million to enlarge the port and \$20 million would cover the port, plus the road from Dammam to Riyadh. Mr. Murphy felt this to be a revenue producing project and inquired how the Saudi Arabians proposed to finance it. The Minister replied that "only later would it be a source of income, they wanted it now and could we help them have it?" He emphasized that they came for a grant. If it had to be a loan, perhaps they could get it from a bank. He was interested in knowing what the United States can offer as grant aid for the project. He implied that this was also true for the other projects. Ambassador Wadsworth observed that the Medina Railroad was so large that it certainly would require a loan.

There followed discussion of the Riyadh-Medina Railroad, and the reports that had been made respecting it. It was observed that the section up to Damascus was really a separate project involving Syria and Jordan. Ambassador Wadsworth observed that this part of the project might fit into the larger concept of area assistance. The Minister thought Syria and Libya might carry part of the cost but most of it would fall to Saudi Arabia. He wondered which of the two projects the United States is interested in helping and how much could be given as a grant.

Mr. Murphy noted that the Minister was not asking for a specific amount in either case and wondered what were his suggestions as to how the United States could participate. The Minister continued to insist on turning the question to the United States, that is, how much would we wish to help them. Mr. Murphy emphasized again that we were not in a position to answer this question, that these were after all Saudi Arabian projects; he wondered how the Saudi Government planned to contribute toward them. This raised questions re dollar cost vs rial cost, etc. The Minister's only response was that they are asking for help as one brother would ask from

another brother and that it was up to the United States to determine what it could do, if anything. In response to the further question as to how much the Minister felt was needed, he hesitated to say, but wanted to know the "percentage" of our contribution to the project. He could not say they are proposing the United States do any particular portion of the job without consulting the King, but, he queried, "are we in agreement with the 'principle' of giving aid?"

Mr. Murphy, indicating we could not directly answer this now, said the United States Government would have to consider further regarding these two projects and noted that the World Bank might be interested, which would be a factor to consider. We would need to know what the Bank could do and what the Saudi Arabians could do themselves. He proposed some discussion of the broadcasting stations.

It was reported that His Majesty had ordered expansion of a small station in Jidda and a new one built in Riyadh, both of which would cost about \$6 million excluding local costs. Ambassador Wadsworth inquired if the King would be willing to proceed with the Riyadh Railroad on a loan basis, noting that the large cost of this project, between \$120 and \$150 million, would make financing on any other than a loan basis impracticable. The Finance Minister indicated he might have an answer to this tomorrow; the King might ask for a loan to cover "their share".

Mr. Murphy reiterated he could not at this time say what the United States could do. He emphasized that, in discussing these matters with the King, the King not be given the impression that if he puts up say one-half the required resources for any project the United States will cover the rest. It is impossible for the United States to talk in such terms. We have to know, for example, what can be done through banking channels; this is the way we deal with such questions everywhere else.

The Saudi Ambassador, who had rejoined the group, asked if we could accept the principle of contributing a grant to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Murphy once again explained the United States position, emphasizing that where we give grants there has to be a demonstrated need accompanied by a lack of ability to borrow. Consequently, with all the good will in the world, we cannot answer their questions now; we have to consider what our Congress will do. He reiterated the belief that the Saudi objectives could be achieved by loans as well as by grants.

The Finance Minister concluded the meeting, which had lasted three hours, by observing that both parties need more time, but that if the United States wants to give aid to Saudi Arabia "it can find a means".

**267. Editorial Note**

On February 5, representatives of the United States, led by Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and Ambassador George Wadsworth, met with a Saudi Arabian delegation, headed by Prince Fahad, Minister of Defense, and Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Foreign Minister, to continue discussions on military assistance and the Dhahran Airfield. Discussion first focused on the types of military equipment the United States would provide, problems relating to delivery, and whether the Saudis would receive new or renovated supplies. Both Fahad and Yasin expressed concern over the latter question, indicating a preference for new equipment. Ambassador Wadsworth and Murphy assured the Saudis that they would receive the same arms with which the United States equipped its own forces. Discussion then moved to the financing of the supplies.

During the course of the conversation, Murphy asked Yasin whether he had a clear understanding of the American position. The United States, Murphy noted, was offering a 2-year credit for all Saudi orders to date, and was also ready to assume the cost of the Air Force maintenance and development programs, to augment the air training program, and to pay for the air terminal at Dhahran, provided the cost did not exceed \$5 million. The total plan, Murphy continued, would amount to \$50 million over the next 5 years and would be subject to annual congressional appropriations. Murphy stated that the United States was prepared to deliver all of this and to renew the Dhahran Agreement on a 5-year basis. Murphy then noted that there was one additional point to be discussed—the question of the United Nations resolution of November 2, 1956. The resolution, adopted by the General Assembly as 997 (ES-1), recommended, *inter alia*, that all member states of the United Nations “refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution.” (U.N. doc. A/3526)

According to the memorandum of conversation, Murphy said:

“that, as Shaikh Yusuf knew, the U.S. always wished to try to prevent an arms race in the Middle East. Thus, since the United Nations General Assembly’s resolution restricted the shipment of arms into the area of hostilities, Saudi Arabia and the United States, as members of the UN, would of course both want to avoid the appearance of having violated the UN resolution. Mr. Murphy said that he knew that the Saudi Arabian Government was as anxious as the United States Government to preserve peace in the area. Therefore, such arms as were provided to Saudi Arabia by agreement were given because His Majesty had assured the United States that the arms and equipment he would receive would be used only for internal security, for the defense of his country, and for the defense

of the Dhahran Airfield. Mr. Murphy said he believed that Saudi Arabia understood this as clearly as did the United States.

"Shaikh Yusuf said that he assumed Mr. Murphy had mentioned this so that the United States would not be accused of breaking a UN resolution.

"Mr. Murphy replied that this was the concern of both governments since Saudi Arabia had also voted for this resolution.

"Shaikh Yusuf said that as a legal precautionary measure, he thought both parties should agree to this but that, as long as the United States stipulated that the arms should be for the internal security and defense of Saudi Arabia, there was no need to mention the Dhahran Airfield. After all, was not Dhahran also a part of Saudi Arabia?

"Mr. Murphy said that the Dhahran Airfield did, of course, belong to Saudi Arabia but that in order to conform to the spirit of the UN resolution on arms to the Middle East, the U.S. felt it was essential that the defense of the Dhahran Airfield be mentioned in this connection.

"Shaikh Yusuf said that Saudi Arabia also had to keep a sharp watch on the impression its agreements would make on others. He said that he personally could say now that American arms would not be used for other purposes than for the defense of his country. He could see, he said, why it might be necessary for the Secretary of State to say to the Congress that the United States had given these arms for the defense of Saudi Arabia and then to have to say also that these arms were for the defense of Dhahran Airfield.

"Mr. Murphy asked Shaikh Yusuf whether this meant that Saudi Arabia agreed that the United States should say that.

"Shaikh Yusuf replied that Saudi Arabia was ready to agree to any necessary legal action in order to get the arms it needed. Shaikh Yusuf added, however, that in the final analysis His Majesty's approval on this point and on all the other points brought up in these talks would have to be obtained before final agreement was reached.

"Mr. Murphy said he understood Shaikh Yusuf's point." (Memorandum of conversation by Stoltzfus, February 5; Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/2-557)



268. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 5, 1957.

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabian Discussions

*Discussion*

In the economic discussion yesterday the Saudis told us that they had made a decision to join the IBRD. It was evident that they felt this would be pleasing to us and indicated that they had crossed a bridge and were willing to borrow money for some big development projects. Decision as to whether all hurdles, such as IMF membership, were overcome was not clear. They were then very insistent on a determination as to whether we would give them grant assistance in principle and if so how much? They gave the impression of badly wanting and feeling entitled to such assistance. I also had the impression that the answer to this question was directly related to the Dhahran negotiations and military assistance i.e., that the King feels it imperative that he leave with something to demonstrate to the area the fruits of cooperation with the U.S. on the President's policy.

While we did not absolutely exclude grant assistance, we followed the line of stressing loans and offering technical assistance. I fear they did not accept our position on grant assistance as final and our offer of technical assistance did not elicit interest. The following seem to be the alternatives:

*Present Package*

(a) \$50,000,000 (over 5 years) Air Force and Army training program including grant of 8 T-33 and 10 propeller aircraft (total \$2,050,266).

(b) Engineering surveys and loan assistance for economic projects.

(c) Agreement to sell \$110,000,000 in arms.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Secret. Drafted by Lathram, Newsom, and Barnes and sent through S/S.

<sup>2</sup> The additions and revisions referred to in the subsequent footnotes to this document were made by Secretary Dulles, according to another copy of this memorandum. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 60 D 473, Saudi Arabia World Bank & IBRD) A notation in an unidentified hand under point (c) reads as follows: "(Reference should be made to the area in which arms are to be used. The UN Res. on Suez prohibits the shipment of arms to the area of hostilities.)"

*Further Possible Proposals in Addition to Above*

- (a) Up to 3 year credit for sale of arms.<sup>3</sup>
- (b) Anti-aircraft defense of Dhahran on a grant basis (Suggested \$5,000,000.).
- (c) Additional grant military aid (Possibly up to \$15,000,000.).<sup>4</sup>
- (d) Offer to grant up to \$20,000,000 for economic projects such as Damman port.<sup>5</sup>
- (e) Offer to assist with the burden of the loss of oil revenues (up to \$20,000,000) as a grant.<sup>6</sup>

This would be consistent with your presentation to the joint committees but might create difficulties with other Near Eastern states which have lost a greater percentage of revenue.

Any economic assistance to Saudi Arabia is bound to cause difficulties with the Congress. Once a determination on these alternatives has been made, you may wish to consult informally with Congressional leaders.

*Recommendation:*

That you authorize us immediately to discuss alternative (a) under Further Possible Proposals and to progress to other alternatives as discussion may require.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> A notation in the margin reads as follows: "(up to \$ figure to be supplied by Def)".

<sup>4</sup> Point (c) was crossed out.

<sup>5</sup> The words "or a portion of the Hejaz railway" were deleted.

<sup>6</sup> Point (e) was deleted.

<sup>7</sup> A notation on the source text in an unidentified hand reads as follows: "Sec. orally approved to Mr. Murphy 'Present Package' plus courses of action as in 'further' a, b, & d above, as shown, & as a package."

---

## 269. Editorial Note

A message of February 5 from King Saud to President Eisenhower expressed pleasure in his meetings with Eisenhower and indicated the importance he attached to those meetings and the related U.S.-Saudi discussions but expressed dissatisfaction with the U.S. proposals for military and economic assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.56/2-557) The President replied in a letter of the same date which reads in part as follows:

"I have had the impression that the military program we are proposing is a substantial one. However, in reply to your letter I assure you that I shall look further into the details at once.

"I do hope you will not minimize in your own mind the importance of the training function. This is a long, even tedious, process. To perform this part of the work necessary to the development of an army, reconditioned equipment should be as good as the most expensive. I believe it would be to your advantage to avoid wear and tear on combat equipment while the troops are learning fundamentals." (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833)

---

## 270. Editorial Note

At 2:45 p.m. on February 5, in a telephone conversation with Reuben Robertson, the President discussed the problem of military assistance to Saudi Arabia. The memorandum of the telephone conversation includes the following exchange:

"The President told of letter just received from King of Saudi Arabia, parts of which he read on phone.

"As result of it, the President suggests Mr. Robertson's people get together with State (preferably Bob Murphy) to see if we could revise the program—to go up to a general cost of, say, \$50 million, in training personnel, ammuniton, reconditioned equipment, etc.

"As for the sale of equipment, the President thinks there should be some combination; that they ought to buy some of it, pay us a certain proportion of the cost, & perhaps we could absorb some of the price.

"As for the economic side, Defense would not get into that.

"The President thought we might tell them that we believe that loans are the best (long-term cheap loans), where there are non-self-liquidating returns. The President is writing to the King to say we are looking into it; meanwhile, Defense & State should work on getting something better. The program now seems to be the same as was discussed before the King came here; he cannot go back & report that he has done nothing better.

"Mr. Robertson said he will do all he can to help liberalize it.

"Mr. Robertson had lunch today with the Crown Prince of Iraq, & was very favorably impressed both with the Crown Prince & with his Chief of Staff. The President saw the Crown Prince this morning, & agreed he is a splendid person." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries, Memoranda of Telephone Conversations)

At 5 p.m. Robertson telephoned the President. The following exchange occurred:

"He wanted to let the President know that they had not yet laid any proposition before King Saud's people. Plan to do so at 5 o'clock today, when Bob Murphy is seeing them.

"They have gone through it entirely. Have worked it up to \$50 million on defense training equipment (which is new to them); their shopping list of \$110 million—18 M47's, 18 M41's; also \$20 million on the economic side. And this is quite an impressive total, Mr. Robertson thinks.

"He said his people are quite concerned about going higher than \$70 million on the grant basis, into the \$100 million, where we do not have a bilateral—they feel it might be very difficult on the Hill, & subsequently.

"The President said when we finally get it through the Congress, we will probably have a bilateral—if he is our friend. The King, in his letter, said we are just going through the same old drill, saddling off on them reconditioned equipment. But the President's answer explained that this equipment was just as good & would save money, & pointed out that combat equipment should not be worn out on training. The President feels his Councillors have been telling him that he is getting nothing better.

"Mr. Robertson said he could not reach Secy. Dulles; but that Bob Murphy & Gordon Gray say they are on entire new ground. For example, in Air Force they cannot absorb the 75 F86's that they want, & we are getting 40 million beyond that in the F86's. But he said we would not prepare to tie that down until they got their training program going, & their men to come here.

"The President suggested that, after today's meeting, if they find things in pretty good shape, they should let Secy. Dulles know.

"Mr. Robertson said Bob Murphy is conducting meeting without Defense sitting in; will call upon them only if he sees some lack of harmony." (*Ibid.*)

In a further conversation at 5:46 p.m. Dulles and Robertson discussed the question of assistance to the Saudis. The memorandum of conversation reads as follows:

"The Sec returned the call and R said he had a talk with Murphy—the Pres had called re meeting the Saud Picture and Gordon, Bob and R have pursued it and are as far together as we can be. The Sec said we want to hold a little back because they are great traders. But in the end the Pres will have to throw something into the kitty. R said the Pres was afraid we were holding too much back here. The Sec said the Pres had a letter from Saud indicating disappointment. The Sec was not as much frightened as the Pres because we had not put our cards on the table. We have to be careful because of the Israeli and political repercussions here. R does not think we changed anything because Bob and Gordon had gotten up to the point where Quarles, Wilson and Gordon felt we were aimed before the meeting started which involved 50 million in training in the non-grant side—I think that is what he said. The Sec said fine and R said it looks fine to us." (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

271. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 7, 1957, 3:30–7:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Further U.S.–Saudi Arabian Talks

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S. Officials*

The Secretary  
G—Mr. Murphy  
NEA—Mr. Rountree  
Ambassador Richards  
Ambassador Wadsworth  
NE—Mr. Wilkins, Mr. Newsom  
Mr. Stoltzfus, Recorder  
Mr. Nowfel, Interpreter

*Representing Saudi Arabia*

Shaikh Yusuf Yasin  
Shaikh Mohammad Surur  
Ambassador Al-Khayyal  
Mamdouh Adib, Recorder  
Abdul Aziz Majid, Interpreter

The Secretary began the meeting by saying that he had before him a memorandum that the United States had prepared in response to the Arab four-power memorandum His Majesty had brought with him from Cairo. The Secretary said he understood that the four-power memorandum expressed the views of King Hussain, President Nasser, the Prime Minister of Syria, and His Majesty. The Secretary gave a copy of the U.S. memorandum to Shaikh Yusuf.<sup>2</sup>

Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary and commented that the U.S. memorandum would be the subject of review and later comment by His Majesty. The Secretary said that he had not expected to discuss the U.S. memorandum at this meeting but he suggested that it be considered in substance as the U.S. point of view. He said the Saudis would find that the memorandum expressed the same views that he and his associates had explained orally in other discussions during the past week. Shaikh Yusuf replied that perhaps there would be time to transmit the Saudi comments on this memorandum

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/2–1057. Confidential. Drafted by Stoltzfus on February 10.

<sup>2</sup> Dated February 7, it was a reply to the Four-Power memorandum presented to the President by King Saud on January 30. In addition to responding to each of the 10 points raised in the Arab memorandum, the U.S. memorandum cited two problems which it considered “harmful” to the stability and security of the Middle East: the Palestine issue and the Suez Canal problem. For text, see *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Texts of both the U.S. and Arab memoranda were transmitted in Department of State instruction CA–6659, February 18, to Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jidda, Baghdad, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 786A.11/2–1857)

by the next morning. He had, however, been instructed by His Majesty to raise certain other subjects with the Secretary at this meeting. Some of these subjects might include points in the U.S. memorandum.

[Here follows discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict, United Nations resolutions, and the questions of the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran, and Sharm al-Sheikh.]

Shaikh Yusuf said he now wished to raise certain subjects of primary concern to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia only. With regard to the exchange of the drafts of notes between them, he said that he wished to know (1) what had been prepared by the United States concerning the subjects that had been discussed during the past week; (2) whether it would be possible to prepare a summary of these talks; and (3) what would be published on these talks.

The Secretary said that he had before him a draft note summarizing the results of Mr. Murphy's talks with His Majesty's Counselors. He suggested it might be helpful if the interpreter were to read this note to Shaikh Yusuf in Arabic. (For the text of the note, see Tab A. <sup>3</sup>) Mr. Murphy said that it had been the Secretary's suggestion that this note and the Saudi answer be supplemented by detailed memoranda covering the military and economic talks that had been held between the two sides. Mr. Murphy suggested that these supplementary memoranda could be included as annexes to the notes exchanged between the two parties since they explained in greater detail the items discussed in his talks on February 6 with Shaikh Yusuf and Shaikh Mohammad Surur.

Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary and Mr. Murphy for these summaries of the talks of the past week. He said that if he had any complaint to make it was only against the shortness of the time available. He said that it might be difficult for the Saudi side to give a prompt answer to the note and memoranda since they would require translation into Arabic before they were shown to His Majesty. He asked whether it would be possible to have copies of them the same evening so that they could be taken up with His Majesty the next day. The Secretary and Mr. Murphy agreed to have them ready before the close of the meeting.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated February 7, not printed; it indicated that the United States was prepared to consider its note and a reply by King Saud as "constituting firm agreement" between the two governments of the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield for a 5-year period. The note also confirmed U.S. intentions to provide military equipment for two infantry divisions, additional construction at Dhahran not to exceed \$5 million, and various military training programs for the Saudi Army, Air Force, and Navy. These programs were not to exceed \$50 million over a 5-year period. The note also indicated U.S. intentions to assist in certain economic projects, particularly the development of the Port of Damman.

Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary and Mr. Murphy and said that, though this was hard work, it was in the mutual interest of both parties to finish the job promptly. Shaikh Yusuf added that His Majesty could at least give his general reaction to the note before his departure. In any case, he said, the final agreement would not be a secret one and therefore the notes should be studied with a view to guarding the common interest and making certain that parts which might possibly create adverse propaganda against the two countries were eliminated. In any event he wished to have time perhaps that evening or the next day to study the notes and submit his comments.

The Secretary said he was equally anxious not to include anything in the notes which would prove embarrassing to Saudi Arabia or be incompatible with its complete sovereignty. Shaikh Yusuf said he appreciated this and believed that both sides should discuss the matter, not as two competing teams but as one team working together for the good of all.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he wished to emphasize once again to the Secretary His Majesty's point of view that Saudi Arabia's attempt to acquire adequate arms and equipment within a space of two years would impose heavy burdens on the country's economy. If the army, navy, and air programs were all to be carried out at the same time, it might well increase Saudi Arabia's total military expenditures by \$100 million a year. Unfortunately however, Shaikh Yusuf said, Saudi Arabia was behind in its military defenses and had to make up for lost time. Saudi Arabia did not wish to press its needs on the United States, but it believed the United States should be aware of the facts. Just as Saudi Arabia would be forced to pay an additional \$100 million for training and equipping its army, navy and air force, so it would also have to pay proportionately for salaries, installations and many other obligations within the country. These facts, Shaikh Yusuf said, had recently been explained in full to Ambassador Wadsworth in Riyadh by the Minister of Finance. Saudi Arabia had committed itself to carry out the full defense program suggested by the United States, but His Majesty wished his friends to realize that this program would entail heavy economic burdens on the country and he had asked whether the United States could assist Saudi Arabia in this regard either now or in the future.

The Secretary said that he understood that most of the financing would be on credit. Mr. Murphy added that Shaikh Yusuf had explained Saudi Arabia's financial problems in previous talks and that he had expressed to Shaikh Yusuf the interest, sympathy, and appreciation of the United States for these problems.

The Secretary said he would like to take this occasion to observe that, in the judgment of the President, himself, and the

Secretary of the Treasury, most of the countries of the area were engaged in excessive military programs. These military establishments were very expensive to maintain. The United States was devoting to its military establishment and to those of its allies amounts which many of the ablest economists in the United States felt were excessive. The Secretary said he noted that the Soviet Union had announced substantial reductions in its expenditures on its military forces. Of course, Russia pretended that its reason was that it wished to reduce its armaments, but the actual reason was economic. The United Kingdom was also reducing its military commitments out of financial necessity. The Secretary said he believed that in general the military establishments in most countries were too big. He said he hoped very much that Saudi Arabia would not object to his friendly and well-intentioned advice not to embark on such a large military program that it would strain the economy of the country and force it to depend on an outside power which might prove unreliable and dangerous to Saudi Arabian independence. The Secretary said that the initial financial outlay for arms and military equipment was the lowest. It was the tremendous cost of maintenance, training, and spare parts that eventually ate into the economic vitals of a country. The Secretary said he wished to assure His Excellency, however, that the United States recognized the need of Saudi Arabia for some additional military equipment in order to be better able to defend the Dhahran Airfield, and maintain internal order. He said that he sincerely hoped that Saudi Arabia would not seek so large a military establishment that it could no longer maintain a sound economy or that would be in excess of its economic resources.

Shaikh Yusuf said he was grateful for the Secretary's advice. He said that Saudi Arabia had not been able to get arms previously and thus had to make up for lost time. Saudi Arabia was now trying to get arms only in sufficient quantities to satisfy its needs, and he certainly did not feel that its requests had been excessive. The amounts that had been discussed and agreed upon were Saudi Arabia's minimum needs, which even U.S. experts agreed were essential for internal security. Even this small amount, Shaikh Yusuf said, constituted a heavy burden on the country.

The Secretary said he wondered which military experts Shaikh Yusuf referred to. His thought was that the local military experts, in making their estimates of requirements, were not always in possession of full information on budget matters or the impact on the



budget of their own recommendations.<sup>4</sup>

Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty wanted to know why the U.S. was able to offer grant aid to some countries purchasing arms from the U.S. whereas it was apparently unable to do so in Saudi Arabia's case. Shaikh Yusuf said that the only difference he could see between the agreement offered to Saudi Arabia and the Mutual Security agreements that the U.S. had with some other countries was in Article IV. Was Article IV as important as all that? Saudi Arabia was steadfast in its friendship for the U.S. and it had promised to be so in the future. The United States could find Saudi Arabia a more reliable friend than those other countries to which it had given grant aid. Shaikh Yusuf pointed out that His Majesty had, after all, managed to defend his oil fields, the pipe lines, Dhahran, and the whole country against all threats to them. This was more than could be said for some of the other friends of the United States. Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty wished only to explain in a friendly manner Saudi Arabia's burdens and to ask the U.S. to give them some consideration. The U.S. could rest assured, however, that Saudi Arabia was not now pressing for any change in the present agreement. He only hoped that the U.S. might find it possible to help later, perhaps by means of the President's new doctrine.

The Secretary then handed to Shaikh Yusuf a detailed memorandum of the military talks of the past week.<sup>5</sup> He suggested to Shaikh Yusuf that this memorandum be kept permanently secret and that the draft note be kept secret until final agreement had been obtained on its terms and arrangements made for its publication. Shaikh Yusuf expressed his agreement.

The Secretary said he had a few matters to raise with Shaikh Yusuf at this time. Referring to the islands of Farsi and Arabi, the Secretary said that the Saudi memorandum on the subject<sup>6</sup> had only been received on the sixth of February, and the Department's study of it had not yet been completed. The Secretary said that he would communicate the views of the U.S. on the subject, when its study had been completed, to the Saudi Ambassador in Washington. In

---

<sup>4</sup> According to a note to Oulashin dated February 16, attached to the source text, Sturgill noted that Macomber had approved the memorandum of conversation for distribution. Sturgill added, however, that Macomber did request that the sentence beginning with the words, "His thought was that the local military experts" be revised "to reflect that the Secretary was thinking in terms of estimates received from local military personnel not having possession of full information on budget matters or the impact on the budget of their own recommendations."

<sup>5</sup> See Enclosure 1, *infra*.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. The Saudi memorandum, entitled "Proofs and Evidence Establishing the Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the Islands of Farisiyah and Arabiyah Lying in the Arabian Gulf (The Persian Gulf)," was attached to a memorandum, February 9, from Wilkins to Murphy. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/2-957)

any event, the Secretary said, Shaikh Yusuf could be confident that if the U.S. could be useful in solving a problem between two of its friends, Saudi Arabia and Iran, it would be very happy to do so.

With respect to the Yemen, the Secretary said he wished to express the concern of the United States Government over reports that considerable quantities of Soviet bloc equipment were entering that country. The Secretary said there were also reports from Amman suggesting that Russian or Czech weapons and equipment were being delivered from Syria to Saudi Arabia.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he could guarantee absolutely that this information was not true. The true story, Shaikh Yusuf said, was as follows: During the recent crisis His Majesty had asked Syria and Egypt for some anti-aircraft guns, provided they were not of Russian manufacture. This had been done because at that time Israeli aircraft were making daily sorties over Saudi Arabian territory, particularly in the Tebuk area. The guns that His Majesty received were, he believed, of Swiss manufacture. Shaikh Yusuf said he wished to emphasize, however, that in the past the Russians had frequently offered arms to Saudi Arabia and were in fact continuing to do so. Russian agents in Pakistan, Indonesia, and many other countries were continually pressing Saudi Embassies to report Russia's offers of arms and equipment to His Majesty. Shaikh Yusuf said he would therefore like to caution the U.S. about reports it received concerning Russian arms for Saudi Arabia. His Majesty had given his word that he would take no Soviet arms and he would do nothing behind the back of the U.S. With regard to the Yemen, Shaikh Yusuf said that he wanted to know whether these Russian arms had supposedly been delivered before or after the closing of the Suez Canal. How, he asked, would they have gotten through to the Yemen with the canal closed and Israel controlling the Sinai and Aqaba. Mr. Rountree said that the reports suggested that the Soviet arms for Yemen were being flown from Egypt.

The Secretary said that in any event he wished to state that the U.S. Government understood and appreciated the position of His Majesty and Saudi Arabia on Soviet arms. He had mentioned this subject because he had wished to get the information necessary to help dissipate what he himself had felt were false rumors. Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary and said he would be gratified if he were informed of any adverse reports of this nature about Saudi Arabia; and he offered, in turn, to inform the United States if Saudi Arabia were to receive adverse reports concerning U.S. activities as well. This exchange of information, he thought, would be very useful to both countries. The Secretary concurred and said that was the way for friends to act. It would be unfortunate, he said, to allow the relations of the two countries to become estranged by what

could well turn out to be false reports. Shaikh Yusuf added that both sides needed to be very careful and watchful, because their enemies were many and capable.

The Secretary said he wished to mention to Shaikh Yusuf the difficulties that were apparently being met by U.S. official personnel regarding the shipment of their personal effects to and from Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Wadsworth added that this was a matter of long-standing and involved the general principle of the treatment in Saudi Arabia of U.S. clerical staff and Consular employees who were not bearers of diplomatic passports.

Shaikh Yusuf said he did not have any information at hand on the matter and could therefore not give a categorical answer. However, he could assure the United States that American official personnel would be treated exactly as Saudi official personnel were treated in the United States. The only exception he could think of was in regard to religious matters. He said that what he had in mind were certain established religious customs that could not be changed, as for example, the fact that only Moslems could visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

The Secretary said he would like to call Shaikh Yusuf's attention to the fact that efforts to establish closer relations with Saudi Arabia were complicated by religious factors in this country as well. The Secretary said he hoped, however, that Saudi Arabia could give consideration to the possibility of allowing U.S. citizens regardless of their religious faith to at least transit Saudi Arabian territory.

Shaikh Yusuf inquired whether the Secretary was not afraid that some of them might constitute a danger to the Dhahran Airfield. The Secretary replied that he did not think that any American citizen carrying a United States passport would constitute any such danger.

Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty had been frank during his appearance on television the day before. During his interview, His Majesty had said that there was no enmity between Saudi Arabia and the Jews as such. The Moslems respected Jews as "people of the Book," but Saudi Arabia did consider all Zionists their enemies. Thus, any Jew who could prove that he had no dealings with the Zionists would not be barred from Saudi Arabia. Shaikh Yusuf noted that in fact one Jew had had dinner with His Majesty recently in Riyadh. The Secretary said that he was glad to have that statement from Shaikh Yusuf.

The Secretary said he also wished to mention that the U.S. hoped a better relationship could be developed between Saudi Arabia on one hand and the United Kingdom and France on the other. The United States believed that although these countries had perhaps made some mistakes they were basically good countries.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he would convey this point to His Majesty. The reasons why Saudi Arabia cut off its relations with these countries, he said, were well known. If the aggression against Egypt and its aftermath could be resolved and a constructive settlement reached, nothing would be more desirable, from the Saudi Arabian point of view, than for its relations to be re-established with the United Kingdom and France. Shaikh Yusuf said that he felt the Secretary could use his good influence to help settle the outstanding difficulties, and that his influence would go a long way towards improving the whole situation. Shaikh Yusuf remarked that, unfortunately, the position with Britain was worse now than it had been when the Secretary visited Riyadh four years ago.

The Secretary said that, as a final point, he thought it would be useful to have the two sides get together immediately to work out a final draft of the joint communiqué, so that it would be ready for issuance the next day. The Secretary selected Mr. Newsom to work with a member of the Saudi party on this project. Shaikh Yusuf agreed to this procedure, and indicated that he wished to work on it himself for the Saudi side. He said that the results of the economic talks had been intentionally omitted from the Saudi preliminary draft pending final agreement on the subject between the two sides.

Referring to Buraimi, Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty had been thankful and appreciative of the Secretary's explanation of United States interest in Saudi Arabia's problems with respect to the disputed areas. Shaikh Yusuf added that, because of the current state of Saudi Arabia's relations with the United Kingdom, however, it would not be possible to allow the situation to remain indefinitely as it was. Shaikh Yusuf said that a long time ago King Abdul Aziz (ibn Saud) had asked the United States to arbitrate the question of Buraimi but the United States had declined to accept. Saudi Arabia was now again prepared to offer its support to the United States Government if it would act as mediator in this matter, and it had no objection if the United States wished to offer to both parties its views on a solution to the dispute. Shaikh Yusuf said that it would be very useful if the Secretary could find a way to make the United Kingdom accept some solution of the question, because Saudi Arabia saw little hope or use in continuing its bilateral negotiations with Great Britain. During all these months, Shaikh Yusuf said, the only thing that he had been able to discuss with Great Britain was whether the subject of Buraimi would be item number six or item number seven on the agenda.

The Secretary said he did not believe that the U.S. would want to assume the responsibility of arbitrating the question of Buraimi and the disputed areas and he doubted that the United Kingdom would, in any case, accept the U.S. in that role. The United States,

he said, still hoped that something would come out of direct negotiations. The Secretary said that he appreciated that Shaikh Yusuf was not satisfied with the course this matter had taken in recent months. The United States was not satisfied either, and had frequently talked the matter over with the United Kingdom. The Secretary said he assumed that the United States would continue to do so, since the United States and the United Kingdom representatives seldom met without having this question brought up and without United States expressing its hope for a quick solution of the problem. At the moment, the Secretary said, the U.S. could promise only to continue to use its good offices toward a solution of the dispute. The U.S. would, of course, be glad to entertain any fresh suggestions on the subject that the Saudi Arabian Government might wish to make. The Secretary added that he was sure the United Kingdom would not accept the United States as arbiter because it already felt the United States was too friendly with Saudi Arabia.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he would like Britain to understand the friendship that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia enjoyed because it was a true friendship. However, he would also like to point out that Saudi Arabia's gains meant U.S. gains as well. Shaikh Yusuf said it occurred to him that if the United States wished to see the re-establishment of relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom and France, its active intercession in the Buraimi question might be of great help in that direction. In this connection, Shaikh Yusuf said, the United States Government could suggest various alternatives that might help to solve outstanding problems between Britain and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was not obstinate and only wanted its own rights without causing bitterness.

[Here follows discussion of Egypt's frozen assets in the United States and Algeria.]

Shaikh Yusuf said that his final question was one that everyone in the Arab Middle East was asking and that was: what did the U.S. specifically want from the Arabs?

The Secretary replied that he could answer that very easily. The United States wanted nothing from the Arabs except that they be truly independent and enjoy economic stability and prosperity. The United States desired no political engagements of any kind and looked only for an expression of the sincere desire of every Arab state to maintain its own independence.

Shaikh Yusuf remarked that the Secretary's reply constituted a statement of principle. However, he also wished to know what the U.S. demanded of certain Arab states as a price for its friendship. For example, Shaikh Yusuf said, King Hussein had asked His Majesty to help him obtain U.S. assistance for Jordan, and His Majesty wanted Jordan to be helped. Syria also needed assistance and so did

Egypt. Shaikh Yusuf said his question was: what did the U.S. specifically require from these states before it would offer its aid to them. The Secretary replied that the only conditions for U.S. assistance were the ones he had already mentioned. Of course, the U.S. wished to be certain that the country requesting U.S. assistance really was seeking to maintain its own independence. For example, the Secretary said, King Hussein recently wrote a letter in which he indicated that his own Government was not being vigilant in the matters of Communist subversion and subversive elements in Jordan. If that was the judgment of the King of Jordan, the U.S. could scarcely be blamed for concluding that the Jordanian Government did not appear to be earnestly seeking to maintain the independence of the country. If other countries acted more like Saudi Arabia, the Secretary said, their relations with the United States would be good. The Secretary added that, when asked by officials of other Arab states what they should do to improve their relations with the United States, Shaikh Yusuf might simply tell them to behave as Saudi Arabia did.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he would try to make them do so.

---

## 272. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 7, 1957.*

### SUBJECT

Military and Economic Discussions with Saudi Arabians

In accordance with our understanding with King Saud, discussions were held February 2, 5, and 6, with the Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance, and Deputy Foreign Minister regarding the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement and the urgent Saudi request for arms and economic assistance. Representatives of the Departments of State (Deputy Under Secretary Robert D. Murphy)

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/2-757. Secret. A draft of the Dulles memorandum attached to the source text contains the following additional paragraph:

"As you know, the Saudis have been insistent that the United States supply military equipment. They have refused Soviet offers. There is the possibility that if we decline, they will obtain Soviet arms via Egypt. They have given every indication of a firm determination to obtain arms."

and Defense and the International Cooperation Agency participated jointly in these discussions, and the positions arrived at represent their joint views, communicated to the Saudis.

In our discussions we have made it clear that our interest centers on the defense of the Dhahran air base and the Saudis ability to resist Communist aggression and to maintain internal security.

The attached statements briefly summarize the positions developed as a result of these discussions regarding military and economic assistance. No doubt these matters will be a major element in the mind of King Saud when he meets with you tomorrow. <sup>2</sup>

John Foster Dulles <sup>3</sup>

[Enclosure 1]

SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING  
DHAHRAN AIRFIELD AND ON SAUDI ARABIAN  
REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE <sup>4</sup>

*I. Arms*

A. The United States is willing to sell the arms required for the two divisions ground force program. The rough estimated cost is \$110,000,000. Letters of offer of \$41,000,000 have been released. Sales would be in accordance with the Reimbursable Assistance Agreement of June 18, 1951.

B. Of the total tank equipment for two divisions requested by Saudi Arabia, the United States suggests the immediate sale of only 18 M-47 tanks pending tests of these tanks under conditions in Saudi Arabia.

C. New equipment could only be provided through factory order. Therefore, in order to attempt to meet the time schedule suggested by Saudi Arabia, the United States will provide equipment

---

<sup>2</sup> At 2:45 p.m. on February 7, during the course of a telephone conversation between Dulles and the President, the following exchange occurred:

"Mr. Dulles said he has sent the President a memo as to the program they have reached with King Saud in accordance with some information they received & which he knows is available also to the President. The King did not seem very enthusiastic, but Mr. Dulles thinks they went pretty far. The President said he does not think the King is easily satisfied, but that his people on the other hand do seem happy." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries, Memoranda of Telephone Conversations)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

<sup>4</sup> Secret. Drafted by Newsom, Bennett, and Murphy.

thoroughly reconditioned according to United States combat-ready standards.

D. The United States proposes an Air Force and augmented Army training program. It is prepared to provide 8 T-33 aircraft and 10 propeller driven training aircraft on a grant basis for use in this program.

E. The United States is willing to sell coastal patrol craft, and to assist in the training of Saudi Arabian personnel in their use.

F. The United States is prepared to arrange credit for a portion of the arms to be sold, credit up to \$41 million, twenty-four to thirty months term. Sympathetic consideration will be given to similar terms for the remainder of the estimated total of \$110,000,000.

### *II. Military Grant Aid and Dhahran Air Terminal*

A. The United States is prepared to assume the cost of:

1. The Air Force development training, and maintenance program as orally described to Saudi representatives by Department of Defense representatives.

2. An augmented Army training program, including the training of the Royal Guard.

3. The construction of an air terminal at Dhahran. The cost of the construction of this terminal is not to exceed \$5,000,000.

B. The foregoing under A will represent a total United States Government expense over a five year period of not exceeding \$50,000,000, subject to annual appropriations.

### *III. Conclusion*

A. The United States is prepared to agree immediately to the foregoing and to a five year extension by an exchange of notes of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement to run from date of exchange of notes.

B. Technical details related to the foregoing will be resolved by further discussions in Saudi Arabia.



[Enclosure 2]

SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES POSITION ON SAUDI  
ARABIAN REQUESTS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE <sup>5</sup>

*I. Mutual Security Program*

A. The United States is willing to consider assisting in the financing of technical and engineering studies on projects of particular interest to the Saudi Arabian Government, where such studies are required to move toward construction. This, in effect, is an offer of technical assistance on the projects listed in the King's memorandum to the President.

B. The United States is prepared in principle to offer grant economic assistance at a moderate level to specific projects such as the port of Dammam. In view of the limited amount of economic grant aid we contemplate, it is believed we should concentrate largely on the Dammam port as a project of major impact. Development and expansion of the port of Dammam will serve not only Saudi interest but will also assist American shipping and oil investments, as well as being important to operations of the Dhahran airfield. No specific monetary level was indicated to the Saudis, but we have in mind \$20 million for the Dammam project.

*II. Other Assistance*

A. The United States is prepared to lend its good offices toward consideration of financing development projects through commercial institutions, the Export-Import Bank, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. With respect to the latter institution, the United States is ready to assist toward implementation of the Saudi Arabian Government's indicated decision to join the Bank.

B. The United States suggests that construction and improvement of railways should be financed through the Saudi Arabian Government's resources or commercial borrowing. It is not suitable for United States grant economic assistance.

*III. Conclusion*

A. The United States is prepared to agree immediately to I. A. and B. above by an exchange of notes.

B. The United States suggests that technical details related to the foregoing be resolved by further discussions with the Richards Mission and United States representatives in Saudi Arabia.

---

<sup>5</sup> Secret. Drafted by Lathram, Bennett, and Murphy.

**273. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, February 8, 1957, 10:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECTS

1. Drafting of the Communiqué
2. Exchange of Notes on Buraimi

PARTICIPANTS

*Saudi Arabia*

His Majesty King Saud  
Prince Fahad  
Prince Musaad  
Shaikh Yusuf Yasin  
Shaikh Mohammed Surur  
Ambassador Al-Khayyal  
Abdul Aziz Majid (interpreter)  
Mamdouh Adib  
Khalid Bey  
Jamal Bey Hussaini

*United States*

President Eisenhower  
Secretary Dulles  
Mr. Rountree  
Ambassador Wadsworth  
General Smith  
Mr. Nowfel (interpreter)  
Mr. Stoltzfus

The President opened the discussion on the joint communiqué to be issued by the United States and Saudi Arabia. He said that there were a few expressions which meant different things to different people and he wanted to make certain that the words that were used in the communiqué would not be misunderstood by people who did not have an understanding of these matters. He wished to insure, in other words, that nothing that was said would be misunderstood. He then asked His Majesty whether he would like to bring up any points where he felt difficulties would arise.

His Majesty said he would like to discuss these points now.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus. According to the President's record of daily appointments, Eisenhower met with the King privately from 10:30 to 10:50 a.m. with only the King's interpreter present. (Eisenhower Library, Record of President's Daily Appointments) In a memorandum of his conversation with the President on February 8, Dulles noted that the President informed him that Saud had raised two points during their private talk. The first concerned the King's fear that if the Israelis were ever granted rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, the United States should assure that they could not interfere with the flow of Muslim pilgrims. According to Dulles, the President informed the King that he could not conceive of the Israelis disrupting the movement of pilgrims. The second point focused on Saud's desire to find someone in Saudi Arabia through whom he could communicate with Eisenhower on a "highly confidential basis." (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President) According to a note, February 11, from Howe to Herter, copies of the memorandum of the President's private talk with Saud had been sent to Rountree and Allen Dulles. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversations, Lot 64 D 199) For text of the Joint Communiqué issued by the White House on February 8, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1957, pp. 308-309.

The President said that this was the last time that he and His Majesty would meet and therefore it would be well if they agreed now upon the final text, that this would constitute a final settlement of the matter.

His Majesty said that if the President agreed, it would be well to clear up the minor points of difficulty he had noticed in the draft joint communiqué and that as for the other notes to be exchanged between the two governments he proposed that he leave several of his counselors behind for two or three days to consult with United States officials and join him in Spain later.

The President agreed to this procedure.

His Majesty said that it was his feeling that precipitate action might cause confusion or error and this could be avoided if his counselors and members of the President's staff would have a little more time together.

Shaikh Yusuf then explained to His Majesty that some changes had been incorporated into the United States draft of the joint communiqué which His Majesty had not yet seen. Shaikh Yusuf then explained these changes to His Majesty.

His Majesty said that while his staff was working on the communiqué he would like to assure the President that the friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia was as strong as ever and that he was sure that as a result of these talks, his visit, and his coming to know the President better, the friendship would be stronger in the days to come.

The President said that he felt exactly the same way.

His Majesty said that he and his associates knew the meaning of honesty and friendship. Saudi Arabia had long been envied for the friendship it had with the United States. It was necessary now to guard against their enemies, whose object it had been and would be to break up this friendship.

His Majesty . . . .

The President expressed his thanks and appreciation for this explanation by His Majesty.

The Secretary said that he had raised this point in his meeting with Shaikh Yusuf in order to ascertain what the true situation was and so that it would be possible to dispel any false rumors on this subject.

. . . . .

His Majesty said . . . . Regarding the joint communiqué, however, His Majesty said that although he had only had an opportunity to glance hastily at the alterations the United States had made since last night, he felt that there were several points he would like to

clarify. For example, he said, in Article II the communiqué mentioned opposing the use of force but did not refer to opposing aggression whatever the source might be. His Majesty said that he believed that the United States and Saudi Arabia should express opposition to aggression from any source.

The President said that the United States thought of aggression and force as being much the same thing and were in fact concepts that were wrapped up together.

His Majesty then suggested that it read "use of force from any source." The President agreed to this.

His Majesty then referred to paragraph 5 of the communiqué and said that he wished to omit the clause which said "with respect to military matters." The President said that he would like His Majesty to know that certain expressions had been included in order to make the agreement acceptable to the American people. The President said that as long as he put into the communiqué that the United States was willing to assist Saudi Arabia in its defense and mentioned also the defense of Dhahran, his problems would not be so difficult later. For example, he said that if general hostilities broke out in the Middle East the Dhahran Airfield would undoubtedly be the prime target of the enemy. Thus to the American people it was only logical to mention this defense.

His Majesty said that if the President insisted on that, would it be possible to include the defense of Saudi Arabia not only of Dhahran.

The President then proposed that the sentence begin with "with respect to the military defense of Saudi Arabia, including Dhahran Airfield."

His Majesty said he was agreeable to this change. . . .

The President said he would like His Majesty to understand his concept of one of the ways to promote peace and understanding. As a general rule, the President said he believed it was better to confine their attention to subjects of common interest to Saudi Arabia and the United States. If the two countries were to publish to the world that they were considering problems that concerned other countries besides just Saudi Arabia and the United States, other countries would be likely to object. The United States was trying to be friends with all of these other countries and would not wish them to feel that it was discussing their problems without their consent or in their absence. The President said that in his meeting last week with His Majesty he had said that the United States would use its good offices to help solve the problems of the frontiers and the islands, but he did not feel that the specific mention of these matters in a public communiqué would help to solve them.

His Majesty then said regarding economic development he preferred that the communiqué include the country as a whole and not mention restricting economic development to the Dhahran area only.

The President said that this also had been put in for public relations reasons since he had to tie economic help to mutual defense. He suggested, however, that the communiqué read that the United States agreed to provide economic facilities that would serve to augment the mutual security of both countries. This he said would pull the economic and military aspects of United States assistance to Saudi Arabia together.

His Majesty went on to say that he suggested "promotion of common aims" rather than "combined defense." He said that in his view the word "aims" included the concept of defense and strength.

The President said that he would have a problem here with Congress. Many people had no objection to United States assistance for the military strengthening of Saudi Arabia but were against economic assistance, because they believed Saudi Arabia to be a rich country. If the military and economic aspects of United States assistance to Saudi Arabia could be tied together, it would be possible to achieve the results they wanted. The President suggested the wording "combined interests of the two countries." His Majesty then suggested "combined aims and interests of the two countries." The President agreed to this suggestion.

. . . His Majesty said he had one final point on the communiqué. He questioned whether it was necessary in paragraph 5 to say "in accordance with United States legislative authority."

The President said it would be impossible for him under the Constitutional form of government not to include that clause and that he would not be honest with His Majesty if he did not state that this agreement was subject to legislative approval. Once this agreement had been concluded, the President said he would be going before Congress where he and his staff would be fighting as hard as they knew how to get its approval. However, Congressional authority would be essential before the agreement could be carried out. The President suggested that the wording could be changed to read "within the Constitutional processes of the United States." His Majesty agreed to this wording.

His Majesty said that he also regretted the omission of the last paragraph of the communiqué as drafted last night. This was of interest to the United States, and he wondered if it could be put back into the communiqué. The President agreed to do this.

His Majesty said he would appreciate it if the President would allow him to explain certain other matters of interest to him regarding the Saudi Arabian financial situation. He said that it was true that it was the opinion of some that Saudi Arabia was rich. In fact, however, Saudi Arabia had many problems and burdens, all of which had been fully explained to Ambassador Wadsworth some time previously in Riyadh by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance. The Finance Minister had even presented Ambassador Wadsworth with detailed information on the Saudi Arabian budget and the new budget estimates. This had been done to prove to the United States that the country was shouldering a heavy financial burden and that, unless Saudi Arabia was able to obtain the friendly help of the United States, it might well find itself in real financial difficulties and even bankruptcy. His Majesty said he would appreciate it very much if the President would look into the matter to see if he could not find ways to help Saudi Arabia in the development of its economic and military projects, which were after all in the United States interests as well as Saudi Arabia's. His Majesty added that Saudi Arabia's defense obligations would now add \$100 million to its expenditures for armaments, equipment and installation. This was something he wished to explain to the President so that, as friends, the two parties could work out some way to lighten Saudi Arabia's load.

The President replied that the United States would always look with sympathy upon Saudi Arabia's problems and give them the greatest possible consideration. His Majesty could understand, however, that the United States had acquired obligations throughout the world. In Korea and in Vietnam, and in many other countries, the United States was providing a great deal of assistance. Its obligations were heavy and thus it was necessary to study each situation thoroughly before adding to its already heavy commitments.

The President said he could assure His Majesty, however, that the United States would always study the problems of Saudi Arabia with the greatest interest and sympathy.

His Majesty said he wished to offer his sincere thanks and to assure the President that he appreciated the problems and obligations of the United States throughout the world. At the same time he hoped that the United States would carefully consider Saudi Arabia's problems, which were also its problems.

The President said that he wanted to express again to His Majesty his great appreciation for the long trip that His Majesty had undertaken and His Majesty's sincere efforts to help to promote

peace and his friendship with the United States. The President said he was sure that permanent good would come out of his visit.

The President then asked whether His Majesty agreed to making the joint communiqué as corrected public at 2:00 p.m. today.

His Majesty said he was agreeable but that it was important to contact Saudi Arabia by telephone so that the communiqué could be issued simultaneously in both countries.

The President agreed to assist His Majesty in contacting Saudi Arabia by telephone. The President said he had one final point: would His Majesty use his influence to the greatest extent possible in Syria and Egypt to help prevent them from going Communist. The President said he felt these two countries were now in great danger.

His Majesty said that he was now giving his promise to use all his influence towards this end and he believed that, God willing, Egypt and Syria would not do anything against their Arab interests. His Majesty said the President could help in this matter also.

## 274. National Intelligence Estimate <sup>1</sup>

NIE 30-57

*Washington, February 19, 1957.*

### THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA

#### The Problem

To estimate the extent and importance of UK assets and interests in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula area, the main forces

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff."

The Estimate was "Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 19 February 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction." Also included in the National Intelligence Estimate were two maps. The first entitled "Arabian Peninsula"; the second, "Arabian Peninsula Petroleum Concessions, Oil Fields, and Installations—January 1957".

working in the area, and the will and ability of the UK to maintain its present position in this region in the light of recent developments.

### Conclusions

1. The leaders of both major British political parties consider that continued and assured access to the oil of the Persian Gulf is vital to the UK. Accordingly, the UK will almost certainly make very great efforts to retain its special position in the area and would probably use force if necessary to do so. (Paras. 13–14, 23, 35)

2. Strong pressures against the British position exist, arising from the local unrest and agitation of nationalist-reformist groups, from territorial claims by Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and from the widespread influence of Arab nationalism supported especially by Egypt and the USSR. There is unlikely to be any major or lasting reduction in these pressures. (Paras. 14–22)

3. Over the next few years at least, the British appear to have a reasonably secure position in Muscat and the Trucial Sheikhdoms. It also appears unlikely that the British will be dislodged from Aden, although the containment of Yemeni pressures against the Western Protectorate is likely to be troublesome. (Paras. 28–30)

4. The outlook is more troubled and uncertain in Kuwait, where Britain's material stakes in the area are most heavily concentrated, and in Bahrein and Qatar. While the situation there may remain stable for some time to come, the UK has failed to achieve a relationship with local elements which would enable it to make an orderly adjustment to the economic, social, and political pressures which are bound to mount over the years. The Suez crisis has strengthened ultranationalist influences and has bound the UK more closely to autocratic ruling families which may themselves become more susceptible to outside anti-British influences. (Paras. 31–33)<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Notes on the Intelligence Advisory Committee meeting of February 19 by William McAfee recorded the following action taken on NIE 30–57:

"Approved subject to minor changes. In discussing this paper the Chairman commented in particular on the strategic importance of the Kuwait oil reserves. Since the British are already established in Kuwait, he felt that the statement that the outlook there was uncertain should be deleted since the UK could put in requisite force to keep the peace. In response to a request from Mr. Furnas, Mr. Symmes who had been in Kuwait for two years spoke to this problem, noting the growth of the Nationalist movement and the present comparative isolation of the British from local forces. He noted that to solve the problem of local unrest by a clear and undisguised resort to force would in effect be an admission that the area was being held for a short period because of its strategic importance, and that long-range plans for cooperative development had been abandoned. He further noted that solution of the problem by force might bring the problem within the scope of UN consideration. Mr. Dulles indicated that these were all matters which would have to be given serious

(Continued)



[Here follows the Discussion portion of the Estimate, in numbered paragraphs 5 through 35, with sections entitled: I. The British Stake in the Area; II. Challenges to the British Position; III. Strengths and Weaknesses of the British Position; IV. The Outlook for the British Position; and Appendix I, Free World Oil Reserves and Production.]

---

(Continued)

consideration and, therefore, withdrew his proposed change. He specifically requested that we ask our post in Kuwait for its comments on this estimate." (*Ibid.*, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, IAC Meetings)

---

## 275. Editorial Note

On April 2 in Washington, representatives of the Governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia completed an exchange of notes relating to the extension of American rights at the Dhahran Airfield and to economic and military assistance for Saudi Arabia. Two notes were involved in the exchange. The first, an unclassified note, confirmed the intention of the United States to provide military equipment on a reimbursable basis and to provide training programs for Saudi Arabian Army, Air Force and Naval personnel. The note also affirmed the United States commitment to undertake additional construction at the Dhahran Airfield to improve civil aviation facilities and to assist in agreed economic projects such as the Dammam port. (For text of the unclassified note, April 2, see 8 UST 402-408.)

The second note, referred to as the classified supplementary note or secret annex, specified in greater detail the nature of the military and economic assistance to be provided by the United States. (The English and Arabic texts of the secret annex are in Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 70 D 148, Defense—Bases—Saudi Arabia, Washington, April 2, 1957, Terminated.)

The texts of the notes were largely agreed upon in a series of meetings between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and Saudi officials between February 11 and 21. Records of conversations on February 11 and 21 in which Murphy participated are *ibid.*, Central Files, 786A.5-MSP/2-1157 and 786A.5-MSP/2-2157, respectively; records of other meetings held February 11-15 and 17-20 are *ibid.*, 711.56386A. Further discussions were held by Murphy and the Saudi Ambassador in three meetings between

March 5 and 15; records of those meetings are *ibid.*, 786A.5-MSP/3-557, 786A.5-MSP/3-1157, and 786A.5-MSP/3-1557.

---

276. **Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Jidda, April 11, 1957—10 a.m.*

617. From Richards. I have received effusive show of welcome Saudi Arabia. First audience afternoon April 9 was in King Saud's residence palace, where he said he had previously received no foreigners except Chiefs of State. As HM expressed it, he viewed Americans as his closest friends and not as outsiders, and he wanted to show special deference to personal representative of President Eisenhower.

I conveyed President's respects and abiding friendship. HM reciprocated these with feeling and said he was working on means of even further strengthening these friendly relations not only between two Chiefs of State but also between two peoples.

After dinner given by HM, had private audience his office, where President's gifts proudly displayed. HM began by emphasizing he was exerting "every possible effort create understanding and friendship other countries for America, that we may coordinate our efforts maintain world peace and tranquility". HM later said "I shall fight every destructive influence in this area of world".

I said my mission has been impressed by what HM has done in area relations. Said however we were disturbed by recent developments Jordan and Syria. I outlined basic elements mission goals and said we had been met everywhere so far in tour by friendly people and friendly governments. HM responded "I pray for continued success of mission".

In response my invitation for HM's comments on area developments HM first observed that he and his country were outspoken opponents of Communism, as was well-known. HM continued "your promise to come to aid of country threatened by direct Communist aggression is clear. What is not clear is definition which countries are under domination of forces international Communism. This lack of clarity enables some elements make statements against

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-1157. Secret. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, and Paris.

your interests this area. For instance, while I do not deny there are extremist elements in Syria I do not believe it is country dominated by international Communism. You should clarify these points concerning that portion of American Doctrine which relates to indirect aggression."

I said we had attempted make plain American Doctrine not designed settle intra-area disputes. As to decision re specific countries being dominated by international Communism, this must be left to good judgment of President. King asked whether we would accuse Syria of being Communist dominated and therefore come to aid of Israel in event trouble between them. I replied no governments had asked us for help against Syria. Some governments in this area have asked us for help in strengthening their internal situation so they can withstand pressures of Communist or leftist elements from within or without.

HM then presented at length problem of Aqaba. He kept reasserting his eternal friendship for President Eisenhower. HM said Aqaba question would not affect our basic friendship but he wanted friendly cooperation from USG in fighting his enemy. He was determined never to consent to Aqaba Straits being considered international waterway. "We will never permit in any way Israel transit through our territorial waters" he said he would stir up entire Moslem world to prevent this. I told him I knew he could do this, but hoped his faith in US would make him hesitate in doing such a thing, because he knew President Eisenhower and His Majesty when they sat down together could settle this great question in amicable way. I asked King Saud to consider both sides of American position on question. While we fully understood sincerity of his position, I hoped he would concede sincerity of ours. Informed him that principles involved in Aqaba question applied also to other waterways in world and stand taken by US had to apply to all parts of world. We could not make exception in Aqaba just because of Israeli situation. Called his attention to US efforts build firm structure of international law through which disputes of all nations could be settled. Said our experts state precedents point to Aqaba as an international waterway. We had shown our respect for world law and United Nations itself by condemning Israel aggression, and demanding Israel forces retire from Egyptian territory. Pointed out we had in many additional ways helped to formulate through UN respect for world morals and world law. Since we believe that under world law Aqaba waters are international waters, we would not be honest and consistent if we did not say so. I granted it was possible that we were wrong and position King Saud took might be right. In that light, I asked if HM would agree to refer matter to world court for determination and abide by its determination. I did not venture

to assert that US would be bound by decision but I presume that he assumed that we would. He would have no part of such procedure and asked that US have nothing to do with it. HM insisted whole Gulf was Arab Sea and belonged not to SA alone but to Islamic world, and that Israel had seized Aqaba as avenue of expansion. He mentioned pilgrimages to Holy places and I replied President Eisenhower had guaranteed there would be no interference and that we reasserted that principle. King remained adamant in his position and I promised him I would convey what he said to President.

I said where there is friendship and good will much can be done. HM answered "I have no doubt whatsoever President and his Government and people will always try to do what is right" . . . .

In courtesy call on Crown Prince Faisal later same evening, Faisal said "may God help and speed you in accomplishment your mission". Subject of Aqaba was again brought up and briefly discussed. Arrangements were made for technical discussions following morning with Prince Sultan, Minister of Communications and Mohammad Surur, Finance Minister. Faisal's parting words were to effect we would continue have trouble in this area so long as British and "Zionism" were present.

Wadsworth

---

**277. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Jidda, April 11, 1957—noon.*

619. From Richards. My comments on Saudi Arabia follow:

Saudi Arabia, like Iraq, obviously country in process of rapid change. Transformation of mud city of Riyadh into modern town is taking place even more rapidly and spectacularly than similar (larger scale) development Baghdad. I have no doubt great deal more progress can and will be made to develop cities, ports, transportation

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-1157. Secret. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cairo, Damascus, Paris, London, and Amman and passed to Khartoum.

On March 12, Ambassador James P. Richards, former Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and now Special Assistant to the President, left the United States for a 57-day mission to the Middle East. Richards visited 15 countries as part of an effort to explain the President's January proposals on economic and military assistance to countries in the Middle Eastern area. On April 9 and 10, Richards visited Saudi Arabia.

and communications facilities, et cetera. At same time, it is difficult to see how country so lacking in water and arable land and apparently possessing few mineral resources other than oil can in long run rival Iraq.

Also, Saudi Arabia in contrast to Iraq appears to be devoting undue proportion major effort to showy edifices rather than basic development projects. Oil revenues seem to benefit principally and ostentatiously royal family and its retainers while only trickling down to people.

Outside of oil revenues, which make possible a form of "dollar diplomacy" principal political asset of country seems to be prestige of King and custodianship Moslem holy places.

While these assets will be important in next few years, I doubt they will suffice make SA long term leader of Arab world.

I found no reason to doubt genuine good will of King toward US. He and his counsellors were at constant pains to assure us of their sincere friendship and fundamental agreement with US policies and objectives. (My mission and I were equally careful to express reciprocal sentiments and confidence in Saudi good will.) I also believe King is genuinely working, in way that seems best to him, to promote good US relations with other Arabs and to check Communist influence, to extent he sees it, in Jordan and Syria. He is clearly concerned about situation Jordan.

Nevertheless, it was clear Palestine question, Aqaba, Buraimi and in general, old issues of Zionism and imperialism loom large in Saudi thinking and could easily affect our relations quite seriously. King showed little desire even to consider basis our position re Aqaba and his counsellor became emotional whenever subject of Israeli aggression on Egypt arose. They spoke as if they themselves had been attacked. Success of US and UN in stopping that aggression did not seem to impress them as greatly as it had King who frankly ascribed success primarily to US effort.

While wishing me success and indicating general approval objectives my mission, counsellors (again in contrast to King's forthright condemnation international Communism) refrained from clear cut endorsement new ME policy, even in private conversation.

This cautious approach was highlighted in prolonged discussions with Deputy Foreign Minister Yusuf Yasin over communiqué.<sup>2</sup> We proposed statement that both parties opposed international Communism and hoped other countries in ME would take necessary steps defend themselves against it. Yasin refused absolutely even to use term "international Communism" and countered with brief draft

---

<sup>2</sup> For text of the communiqué, see *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1957*, p. 842.

merely stating mission had come to explain ME proposals and that parties had reaffirmed policy stated in Washington communiqué. When pressed, he justified this stand on grounds:

1. There had been no change in policy since King and President had met in Washington and there was therefore no need for new statement.

2. King was working hard to combat Communism and had taken even firmer stand in his country than we had in US. Actions are more important than words.

3. King was doing his best to get good reception for my mission in other Arab states. To do this he must maintain his influence in those states by sticking to moderate public position. If he came out flatly in opposition to international Communism this would be interpreted by other Arabs as siding with western imperialists unless he came out equally strongly and specifically against Zionism and imperialism, which Arabs consider their more immediate enemies. It was important to us as well as Saudis that King's influence not be weakened. We must trust their judgment, as Arabs, on this point.

After I had expressed disappointment to King, at second audience, over this attitude, he instructed Yasin to try again. Eventually, we arrived at rather unsatisfactory compromise contained in final sentence of agreed communiqué (which being telegraphed separately). In order to get word "Communist" used at all, I had to accept mention of "other forms of imperialism," but I considered this worth-while because of importance of having some sort of public statement from Saud against Communism and in view of fact US policy does oppose imperialism (in its bad sense) even though it is not strictly part of my job to spread this particular doctrine.

It was decided at insistence of Saudis to have no reference to economic aid in communiqué. They said announcement would be made when project agreements were signed. Meanwhile they requested that there be no publicity from US sources. We warned that there was always danger of leak but we undertook to make every effort to see that this did not happen either in Jidda or Washington.

Saudis, as usual, took reserved approach toward economic aid offered. They made point of insisting that our willingness to expand Dammam port was merely fulfillment of April 2 agreement which in turn was result of Washington conversations. They refused admit that this assistance came under new American doctrine or was anything more than portion of quid pro quo for extension Dhahran airbase agreement.

Tudor engineering group, after short period intensive study, had produced recommendation upon our arrival Dhahran that appeared admirably suited Dammam port requirements over next 8 years at present growth rate.

Inclusive 5 per cent contingency, Tudor recommended project costing \$20 million. Airmailing project details. Broadly, it calls for US-built port expansion, including three additional pier berths, two locomotives, adequate number railroad cars, trackage and freight handling material. Decided make foregoing firm proposal to SAG based upon my desire see good and fully adequate port engineered and constructed by Americans. I accordingly handed King aide-mémoire which is being telegraphed separately.<sup>3</sup>

Murray of Tudor group and Johnson ICA accompanied party Riyadh. Minister Communications Prince Sultan and Finance Minister Surur appeared pleased with proposal. They made reference to grandiose port construction project prepared by Egyptian engineer that Tudor estimates would cost upwards of \$150 million. Murray was convincing in pointing out defects in this plan. Saudis wished Murray remain one week to discuss technical details. Murray agreed and due Washington approximately April 25.

In line with approach indicated above, Yasin told us on last evening SAG would send Embassy counter aide-mémoire referring to ours and pointedly accepting port construction offer as part of package deal concluded in Washington.

Saudis made no reference to Hejaz survey cost and we did not bring it up.

Johnson accompanying me Yemen but will return Jidda for negotiation project agreement.

**Wadsworth**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 615 from Jidda, April 11, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-1157)

---

## 278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 25, 1957—6:59 p.m.*

1246. Embtel 832.<sup>2</sup> You should immediately seek audience with

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 986A.734/6-2457. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 832, June 24, conveyed the substance of Saudi Arabia's counterproposals to the U.S. plan for economic assistance. Wadsworth also transmitted his personal suggestions for the Department's proposed reply to the Saudi counterproposals. (*Ibid.*)

King and emphasize Dept has, since receiving report your audience with him June 5,<sup>3</sup> been giving most serious attention problems relating project agreements Dammam port and Dhahran air terminal. In recognition King's remarks June 5 audience that he could not accept project as suggested by Tudor and his emphasis on importance this work, Dept had suggested new language agreement which repeats general details contained in Ambassador Richards' aide-mémoire and agreed to by SAG. USG in good conscience, while not pressing any particular plan for port, believes further examination details desirable in interests SAG and in view variety opinions, including those of German engineers, which indicate differences with proposals of Egyptian engineer.

You should also stress strongly that, unless project agreements as proposed are signed by midnight June 30, \$25,000,000 in USG grant funds currently allocated these projects will no longer be available.<sup>4</sup> This is inevitable development under US law and Dept powerless to remedy. USG in no position make commitments for future and under new legislation proposed it is most unlikely that grant funds in this substantial amount will again be available. Stress also USG believes it has fulfilled commitment re Dammam port by current offer and is both concerned and at loss to understand difficulties which have been presented in implementing this initial phase our cooperative endeavors. USG had high hopes two Governments could take advantage special opportunities presented by availability funds this fiscal year and could work together to achieve substantial contribution to economic development Saudi Arabia as symbol our continuing cooperation.

We are particularly distressed at apparent delays re Dhahran air terminal where we did not understand major differences existed.

You may state to King that in all these matters we recognize Saudi sovereignty and fact that these projects are for Saudi Arabia. We wish reach agreement on our part through full appreciation their interest. We wish make certain our contribution is best we can make, however, and take time resolve under less pressure the doubts which we consider legitimate. Agreements as proposed make this

---

<sup>3</sup> On June 8, Wadsworth informed the Department that, in an audience with Saud on June 5, the King had expressed his displeasure with the Tudor Engineering Company's plan for the improvement of the Dammam port. The King preferred a plan drawn up by German engineers which, according to Saud, would require an additional \$20-30 million. (Telegram 774 from Jidda; *ibid.*, 986A.734/6-857)

<sup>4</sup> As a result of the agreement, concluded on April 2 by the United States and Saudi Arabia, the United States had prepared a \$25,328,450 economic assistance program for Saudi Arabia. The projects included in the U.S. proposal were an improvement in the civil airport at Dhahran, port expansion at Dammam, survey of the Hejaz Railway, and a mapping project.



possible since they do not refer to specific plans for carrying out projects.

Telegram will follow immediately commenting on proposed language changes.<sup>5</sup> Initial study, however, indicates most suggestions unacceptable from standpoint US law. You should stress that bilateral economic aid and project agreements as presented were simplest possible.

(FYI. We do not under any circumstances wish give Saudis any reason believe present offer will still be possible in future fiscal years. In event these funds lost, we will be able discuss economic assistance with them only within framework new and more restrictive legislation.)

Re Hejaz Railway survey, Dept desires you reply orally King along lines para 5 C reftel.<sup>6</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>6</sup> This paragraph of telegram 832 reiterated the continuing U.S. desire to reimburse the Saudi Government for cost of the survey and related expenses.

Although on June 28 Wadsworth informed the Department that the King had agreed in principle to the proposed texts of the economic aid agreement and project agreements for the Dammam port and Dhahran air terminal, difficulties with the language of parts of the accord prevented final agreement before the June 30 deadline. (Telegram 852 from Jidda, June 28; Department of State, Central Files, 986A.734/6–857; telegram 7 from Jidda, July 1; *ibid.*, 786A.5–MSP/7–157) Despatch 39 from Jidda, August 28, transmitted the final report on negotiations with the Saudis on the proposed economic aid agreement and related projects. (*ibid.*, 786A.5–MSP/8–2857)

---

## 279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 9, 1957—6 p.m.*

38. US and UK have completed series discussions begun at Bermuda relating problems affecting access Middle East petroleum supplies.<sup>2</sup> Among problems considered were UK–Saudi differences

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 686.86A/7–957. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree. Sent also to Dhahran and London.

<sup>2</sup> Between June 12 and 14, Department of State representatives, led by Loy Henderson, met with Foreign Office officials in London to review Middle East problems relating to the supply of oil. Among the measures which the British and American representatives agreed would ensure the continued access to Middle East oil reserves, was the settlement of disputes between the United Kingdom and Saudi

over Buraimi and frontier. UK not prepared alter position re Buraimi although willing resume talks with Saudis. UK however agreed suggestion that direct Saud–Muscat contacts be encouraged at appropriate time with view establishing friendly relationship and paving way for settlement any outstanding issues. UK would not commit Muscat or Abu Dhabi to discuss Buraimi. US prepared at time deemed appropriate approach Saud re these contacts. Present time however in view pilgrimage and Aqaba problem may not be propitious. In meantime, without discussing matter with SAG or Sultan, Jidda's comment re possible Saudi reaction, Dhahran's re Sultan's requested London review with FonOff, point out Jidda's and Dhahran's comments also being requested [*sic*].

Department has in mind approach to King making following points (UK presumably would make appropriate approach Sultan):

1. We have noted with gratification progress made in strengthening relations between Saudi Arabia and neighboring Arab states. We believe this development has had most beneficial effect on stability and security of area. Wisdom and initiative of His Majesty in this connection have thus brought great advantage to entire Near East.

2. As His Majesty knows, US continues concerned at lack of resolution of problems existing between local rulers represented by UK and Saudi Arabia in southeastern portion Peninsula. US has been discussing this problem with UK. Latter has indicated its willingness resume discussions with Saudi Arabia at any time.

3. In absence direct UK-Saudi talks these issues but in anticipation ultimate resumption, consideration might be given to possibility of direct discussions between King and Sultan Muscat in interest establishment mutual confidence and facilitation settlement common problems.

4. We venture suggest that such discussions would be desirable further step in process strengthening Saudi relations with Arab neighbors. We have in mind these might be brought about initially by meetings between envoys to be followed ultimately by meeting between King and Sultan.

5. US would not presume suggest in what way meetings should take place nor to indicate what specific topics might be discussed during proposed meeting.

**Dulles**

---

Arabia and the re-establishment of contact between the two governments, leading to the resumption of diplomatic relations.

**280. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Deputy  
Special Assistant for Intelligence (Arneson) to the  
Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 17, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: The Saudi Arabian Position with Regard to the Gulf of Aqaba

One of the results of the Suez crisis and the establishment of the UNEV has been the temporary elimination of Egyptian physical control over the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. With Egyptian acquiescence the role of spokesman for the Arabs in the matter of navigation in the Gulf has shifted to Saudi Arabia. From the Egyptian point of view this shift has several advantages. It gives Egypt a chance, if it regards it as tactically desirable, to put the blame for any lack of action upon Saudi Arabia without having to emphasize its own present inability to hinder Israeli-bound shipping in the Gulf. Furthermore, it offers an excellent opportunity to weaken the friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia and to induce Saudi Arabia to reestablish its close ties with Egypt.

Saudi Arabia has espoused the role of spokesman for the Arabs with alacrity and has utilized a number of arguments in defense of the Arab standpoint which had not been stressed before. In a characteristic mixture of Islamic law and Western international law the Saudi Government has contended that the Gulf of Aqaba is an important pilgrim route and that the Saudi Government has to safeguard it as "guardian of the Islamic holy places and the way to these places." At the same time it contends that the territorial character of the Gulf was confirmed by the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 (an apparent misinterpretation of that Convention) and that it was a "closed Arab Gulf."

The other Arab states have followed the Saudi lead with a consequent hardening of the Arab position. There is evidence that King Saud is deeply involved emotionally in this issue, and the religious connotations of the problem have been emphasized by the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 62 D 42, Near and Middle East. Secret. Drafted by Liebesny on July 16. In a note to Becker, July 17, attached to the source text, Arneson wrote:

"Herewith a copy of an IN we are sending to the Secretary this morning on the subject we discussed yesterday. Our people are also completing a fairly detailed examination of the attitudes of the various area states on the Aqaba dispute. This intelligence report is expected to be completed in a week or ten days and we will of course send you a copy as soon as it is ready.

"I am also sending a copy to Mr. Allen Dulles."

Saudi order that pilgrim traffic through the Gulf be suspended during this year's haj (pilgrimage). The emphasis on the religious issue and on the character of the Gulf as a "closed Arab Gulf" appear to leave little room for compromise with the Israeli and Western contention that the Gulf has an international character. It is unlikely that the Saudis will be able to reverse their position. If they maintain their present stand a number of courses would appear to be open.

(1) Saudi Arabia almost certainly will continue to complain about Israeli actions in the Gulf and express its dissatisfaction with US measures with a resultant gradual deterioration of US-Saudi relations.

(2) There may well be an increasing rapprochement with Egypt because of the need and possibility of a "united front" on an issue on which there is no intra-Arab disagreement.

(3) Saudi Arabia may attempt to arouse Moslem opinion generally in support of the Arab stand, but the success of such an attempt is doubtful since countries such as Turkey or Pakistan are not likely to risk their relations with the West over an issue which is of no direct concern to them and since there is little if any real pan-Islamic solidarity.

(4) At present the Saudis do not have the capabilities to interdict the Straits to Israeli or Israeli-bound shipping by force. Because of the basic distrust of Egypt by the King it is likely that he would try to prevent the establishment of Egyptian-operated bases on his soil in the absence of a decisive rapprochement.<sup>2</sup>

(5) The King almost certainly would not object to any Egyptian move in the Gulf short of the establishment of bases on Saudi territory. Egyptian naval action in or near the Straits is a possibility and the use of the newly acquired submarines cannot be excluded. It should be noted, however, that so far Egypt has avoided visit, search and seizure on the high seas, probably because of the international complications such a move would almost certainly provoke.

(6) There have been no indications so far that the King desires to bring the case before the International Court of Justice at this juncture. Such an action might be regarded by some of the more fundamentalist Saudis as undesirable because of the religious issue involved. The dispute may, however, be brought before the Security Council, particularly if there is an incident.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Under Secretary.

---

<sup>2</sup> As a result of Eisenhower's correspondence with King Saud in May, the President suggested that it might be desirable to hold talks with Saudi representatives in Washington to discuss the respective U.S.-Saudi positions toward the question of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. In June and July, Department of State representatives, led by Rountree, held discussions with Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha, King Saud's special representative.

281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 27, 1957—11:10 p.m.*

326. For Ambassador. Following guidance for your August 29 audience with King:

1. *Syria*. FYI We find very disappointing indications you have received of King's attitude toward developments in Syria. . . . In interests Saudi Arabia and in those of all NE states we are anxious that King use his political and moral authority to rally opposition in area to present Syrian regime and to facilitate generating of pressures designed to isolate Syria and to work toward an improvement of situation in that country. End FYI.

You should tell King that in our view as result accepting economic, financial and military dependence upon USSR and vast arms shipments from it, there has gradually taken place in Syria elimination of true patriots and concentration of power in hands those who accept guidance from Moscow. Time approaching, if indeed it not already arrived, when Syria will cease be effectively an independent nation but will have been taken over as was Czechoslovakia in 1948 and made into Soviet satellite having independence only in name and not in substance. We also convinced that once present group now in control Damascus has consolidated its position in Syria it will reach out in efforts subvert surrounding countries, thus propagating Communist virus and paving way for control by elements subservient to Moscow.

As President has already conveyed to King, it is our hope that King as Guardian Holy Places and bearer special responsibility in Moslem world will direct his political and moral influence against this alien influence which small group now in control in Damascus introducing into ME. We believe that such action imperative in interest security of Saudi Arabia and ME. Warning regarding Communism which King authorized Jamal al-Hussaini convey to Imam of Yemen shows King's understanding insidious nature Communism.

We have noted King's view that USSR is disinterested giant which can only colonize Arabs as Turkey did or dominate them as did West, and that if this happens result will be temporary blackout for Arabs, while if Israeli aggression not checked Arabs will be eradicated. Our wide experience with International Communism convinces us that USSR is working everywhere to extend control of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-2757. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Dulles. Repeated to London.

Communism. Should Communism take over in ME, nations there would find primary objective of this creed is to stamp out distinctive values held dear by Arabs, and it would be impossible for ME to free itself from this control without outside assistance. There would be no question of domination—it would be complete and cruel subjugation. Best way to avoid this is to take measures in advance to prevent spread of Communism.

We are aware there is strong feeling among Arab leaders that Israel represents danger to them exceeding that of Communism. We do not share this view but we do not wish debate it. We strongly opposed to aggression by Israel against any ME state, as was proved at time of Sinai invasion when the US took lead in getting Israeli troops out of Egypt and Gaza when all other efforts had failed. We went to extent of indicating willingness impose sanctions against Israel if these forces not withdrawn. This was done in face of very strong US domestic political opposition. Through Tripartite Declaration and Joint Congressional Resolution on ME we have indicated our deep interest in preservation security and independence all states in area and our willingness take steps to support integrity these nations. King and other Arab leaders should have no doubt that if Israel should embark upon a program of military expansion and conquest in Arab world, US would take strong action to prevent. Preventing Israel from carrying out conquest would present far less difficulties than preventing assumption Communist control of ME should one or more state in area become captives of Communism. Make special point emphasize King that US has never been important supplier arms to Israel and since Sinai has permitted no arms whatsoever go forward Israel but has assisted Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon acquire arms.

2. *Arms.* You should reiterate in most effective manner possible that there is no intentional delay in connection with supply of arms which Saudi Arabia acquiring in US. You may inform King that President has issued special directive that program of deliveries to Saudi Arabia be completed in shortest possible time. You should mention that USG does not have sole responsibility for completion delivery schedule since under procedure of letters of offer items are made available at US Supply Depots. It is responsibility of Saudi representatives to arrange for shipping from these depots, some of which are located interior US.

FYI We concerned that unfavorable impression apparently received by King regarding arms deliveries may arise from fact full information concerning progress may not have been made available to him by his own people. End FYI. You should give King following information:

a) The 18 M47 tanks are loaded aboard vessel *Hellenic Sailor*, expected arrive Jidda 15 September, where 5 tanks will be offloaded and Dammam 23 September, where balance will be offloaded.

b) We expect the 18 M41 tanks will be available in September or not later than mid-October.

c) The 32 40-mm guns will be available in October or perhaps sooner.

d) Small arms in which the Saudi Ambassador has expressed particular interest will be available in September.

e) We expect bulk of equipment ordered by Saudis will be made available to Saudi officials in the US before December, and possibly sooner.

3. *Relations with UK.* You should inform King that it our view in interest facilitating progress toward resolution UK-Saudi differences reestablishment relations between UK and Saudi Arabia, without prior conditions, would be desirable. Add that USG prepared to use its good offices to bring this about should King desire proceed on above basis.

FYI UK has told us that although it was Saudis who broke off relations and although would be proper for them make first overture for their renewal, British would now agree, if Saud is willing, to resume relations without prior conditions. UK emphasized that these steps should be presented so as to avoid any definition of where initiative came from. If it could be said that an intermediary, having first ascertained that both governments were prepared resume diplomatic relations, had obtained agreement of both to reopening their embassies on certain date, UK would undertake not be drawn into further comment on this statement provided Saudis on their part maintained equal silence. UK asked that US use its good offices to this end. End FYI.

4. *Yemen.* Later message will contain guidance for meeting with Imam of Yemen. If Saud raises Yemen we believe you should offer general comments and receive comments of King. . . .

Dulles

282. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 29, 1957<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Aramco Negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Fred Davies, President, Aramco  
Mr. James T. Duce, Vice President, Aramco  
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary  
Mr. Earl Beckner, FSD  
Mr. William Van Dusen, FSD  
Mr. George Bennis—NE/E  
Mr. Robert K. Sherwood—NE

Mr. Davies stated that the purpose of his call was to bring Mr. Murphy up-to-date on the recent negotiations between Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government. In these negotiations, during June and July, only three agenda items had been covered out of thirteen, and the Saudi Arabian Government had denied Aramco's position on all three questions.<sup>2</sup> The accomplishment, he remarked, was about zero. The negotiations will resume in October but there seems little prospect for any change in the attitude of the Saudi Arabian Government, which might be gauged by the comment of Tariqi, Petroleum Administrator of the Saudi Arabian Government, that there seemed no reason to rush because they might be negotiating until the year 2000 on matters between the Saudi Government and the company.

In response to Mr. Murphy's question Mr. Davies said that Onassis had told Aramco recently that the King had asked him to bid on a concession. Onassis had asked Aramco if it wished to join with him. Mr. Davies replied that the company did not take this proposal seriously. Mr. Davies said Aramco would welcome another oil company to "shoulder the burdens" of dealing with the Saudi Arabian Government. Davies believed that any oil concerns going

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886A.2553/8-2957. Official Use Only. Drafted by Sherwood on August 30.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum to Murphy dated August 29, Rountree noted that negotiations between Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government had lasted from June 17 to approximately July 24. The discussions covered 13 points relating to the company's pricing arrangements, operations, and structure. The items of dispute, Rountree added, included the following: Saudi Arabia's retroactive tax claim against Aramco for alleged Tapline profits; Aramco's proposal to create trading companies; Saudi Arabia's proposal to extend the 50-50 profit sharing principle into marketing arrangements; Saudi Arabia's proposal that the company begin to facilitate sales of oil to other than its parent companies; the appointment of Saudis to the Aramco Board of Directors; the creation of minimum production levels; payment of oil royalties in kind; and Aramco's relinquishment of undrilled land and closed oil fields. (*Ibid.*)



into the area now will be faced with 75-25 proposal, along the lines of the AGIP-NIOC agreement.

Mr. Davies believed that the principal objective of Mr. Tariqi was to bring about the complete integration of Aramco from extraction through marketing. Despite Aramco's belief that this would not result in more income for the Saudi Arabian Government, Tariqi has continued to push this idea, apparently thinking of the day when the concession agreement expires (1999 A.D.) and the Saudi Government will take over Aramco's facilities. Aramco proposed that it establish trading companies, in line with the general practice in the area, but Tariqi refused to accept the proposal, believing that it would delay progress towards his goal of a completely integrated company.

Mr. Davies said that in his farewell call on the King the latter had said that he would reconsider his government's initial refusal of the trading company proposal, and would also reconsider his government's position on its claim for \$103,000,000 which it presently is demanding as its share of profits on the Tapline which have been concealed by Aramco. The King had felt that it would be worthwhile to take all possible steps to resolve their differences without arbitration. Mr. Davies said he had pointed out to the King that Aramco had sought outside advice because of the complexities of the issues, and he suggested that the King might also seek outside advice. It was Mr. Davies' feeling that the company would of course go to arbitration if necessary but he hoped that this step could be avoided because it would destroy some of the good feeling which now exists.

In response to Mr. Murphy's question Mr. Davies stated that the Suez pipeline which had been widely discussed was not an economically feasible proposal but it was in harmony with Nasser's thinking. Mr. Duce said they had recently heard from Mr. Sabbah that Egyptian leaders may in the near future attack the western oil companies in the Near East, on the grounds that getting them out is a necessary step in the struggle against imperialism. Mr. Duce said that Mr. Sabbah would be in the United States soon and would come to Washington.

Mr. Murphy inquired what would happen should the Iraq pipeline through Syria be closed again. Mr. Davies thought the results would be short lived. He remarked that if Tapline were sabotaged Aramco could export through the Persian Gulf, using the great increase in tankers which had come about since the Suez crisis last year.

Both Mr. Davies and Mr. Duce mentioned their concern over recriminatory statements directed against the company by the British on the Oman issue. The French have publicly announced that no

Aramco associate can join in the Sahara oil concession. Following a discussion of the Syrian crisis Mr. Davies and Mr. Duce took their leave. A telegram from Colonel Eddy giving his suggestions for meeting the Syrian crisis was left (copy attached<sup>3</sup>).

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached.

---

**283. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, September 23, 1957, 11:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Meeting with Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Secretary  
NEA—William M. Rountree  
Mr. Camille Nowfel (Interpreter)

Crown Prince Faisal  
Ambassador Al-Khayyal  
Ahmad Abdul Jabbar, Chief of Crown Prince's Office

The President recalled with pleasure Prince Faisal's previous visit in 1953.<sup>2</sup> He expressed his gratification that the Prince had recovered from his operation, and inquired as to his plans. The Prince, after responding to the President's welcome, said that he was awaiting further medical reports before deciding when he would return to Saudi Arabia.

The President said that we were deeply concerned over developments in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. The United States was anxious for the countries in the area to develop in accord with their desires. We did not want the Soviets, with their history of ruthless domination of others, to get control of any of the Middle East states.

Prince Faisal said that he was hopeful that everything in the end would be worked out "in a good manner". He shared the President's

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Rountree on September 24. Crown Prince Faisal, brother of King Saud and the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, arrived in the United States on July 1 for medical treatment.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on Faisal's March 1953 visit to Washington, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IX, Part 2, pp. 2512 ff.

view regarding the seriousness of the situation. The Saudi Arabian Government strongly opposed the Soviet Union having a base in the area. Unfortunately, recent developments had taken place which made the area appear to be in a state of confusion and unrest. As the President knew, the Arabs were extremely anxious to maintain their newly won freedom and independence. He had been away from Saudi Arabia for several months, and was not fully conversant with day to day developments. However, it was clear that the situation should be dealt with a great deal of patience and wisdom. Such an approach would help prevent more serious developments in the future.

The President said that he highly valued what he believed to be the growing closeness of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia over the past two or three years. We were very pleased that King Saud had visited us and believed the visit had resulted in a better understanding of our respective positions and aspirations. The President realized that there were certain questions upon which we were not able to agree completely with Saudi Arabia as to the proper course of action. However, he could assure Prince Faisal that we would allow no aggression on the part of Israel against the Arab Nations. That commitment was made in 1950 and was reiterated after the President assumed office. While, as we saw it, Israel was an historical fact and we must recognize its existence, we would oppose any expansion by Israel at the expense of its neighbors. The United States was the sole country which had made Israeli forces withdraw from the territory occupied last Fall. Our friendship with Arab countries and with His Majesty was based on good will, involved no desire on our part improperly to interfere, and was designed to be mutually helpful. We were hopeful, as we watch the situation in Syria with patience and understanding, that we can remain close to the Saudi Arabian Government and share an understanding of developments which affect the Middle East area so much, as well as ourselves.

The President remarked that he had been talking earlier in the day with the Head of the International Bank and with the Secretary of the Treasury. Knowing that the President would be meeting with Prince Faisal, they had asked him to mention that it was the custom, when a country joined the International Bank, to send a Bank Mission on a visit to study and evaluate such matters as the new member's eligibility for loans. The President hoped that Prince Faisal would have an opportunity to talk with Mr. Black of the IBRD or with the Secretary of the Treasury about this matter. He mentioned also that the Secretary planned to talk with Prince Faisal the following day and this as well as other matters might be discussed at that time.

Prince Faisal wished to assure the President that King Saud still cherished the memories of his visit to Washington and his talks with the President and other Government officials. He hoped that the results of His Majesty's visit would continue to enhance the friendly relations between the two governments. The Prince would like to add a few comments to what he had said before.

As far as the Arabs were concerned, Prince Faisal said, Israel was a constant threat. This did not mean that the Arabs did not appreciate the United States position regarding the Soviet Union, or fail to realize the danger of communism. However, one constantly faced by a particular threat was in a different position than anyone else. Stating that he hated to refer to the past, he said that he must point out that all of the troubles in the past had been created by Israel. He hoped to discuss this at greater length with the Secretary.

The President said he understood how Saudi Arabia felt about Israel. It should be remembered, however, that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat in the world today. The United States could pledge and had pledged that it would act to restrain Israel. No power, however, could likewise act in restraining the Soviet Union if it should move into the Middle East and get under its control the countries of that area. There was a big difference between Israel and international communism.

Prince Faisal responded that he did not minimize the Soviet threat. He was against aggression no matter from what source. He was aware that the United States was concerned with the prevention of any aggression against an Arab State. However, that did not preclude the necessity for the Arab States being prepared to defend themselves against aggression. He gave as an example of the nature of his concern the fact that if in the United States he were to live in a house next door to Sheikh Abdullah, and if Sheikh Abdullah should constantly threaten him, that would constitute an immediate danger to the Prince. But, however immediate and grave this danger might be from his personal viewpoint, it would be unrelated to the danger which threatened the United States and the world as a whole. The United States considered the foremost danger threatening this country as a whole to be the Soviet Union, but to the Arabs their next door neighbor, i.e., Israel, was the more immediate threat. They admitted that communism was an international threat, but the closest danger inevitably was first in the Arab mind.

The President commented that, as the Crown Prince no doubt knew, we were going ahead with delivery of military supplies to Arab States on a high priority basis. The Prince, smiling, said that we should do even better.

**284. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Beirut, October 16, 1957—4 p.m.*

1158. Had long conversation with King Saud last evening. Only other person present was Husseini, who acted as interpreter. King received me in friendly fashion.

First discussed the significance of sending Egyptian troops to Syria.<sup>2</sup> King was obviously as displeased as he was perplexed by this development. He remarked that according to his information less than 2,000 troops had been sent, a number ridiculously inadequate to contribute to any defense of Syria. He only hoped, but had no information to that effect, that the Egyptian troops had been sent for at the instance of moderate elements in Syria and would support those elements against extremist sections in Syrian Army.

He asked me to assure the President and the Secretary that their friend (himself) was the same man who talked with them last winter in Washington and that he would continue his unremitting opposition to international communism.<sup>3</sup> He avoided stating however that declaration to that effect would be contained in any communiqué. He merely said that on the next day he was having a long personal conference with President Chamoun and the day after with members of his government. The question of communism would be thoroughly explored in those conversations.

King said western powers must accept the fact of Arab nationalism. The King said it was his firm policy (and his visits to Beirut and Damascus served that policy) to guide and restrain this nationalism within reasonable limits and to bring all Arab states to friendly cooperation with the west.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/10-1657. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Documentation on Saudi interest in the situation in Syria is *ibid.*, 786A.11 and 683.86A.

<sup>3</sup> On October 2, in a major speech before the General Assembly, Ahmed Shuqairi, chief Saudi delegate to the United Nations, was extremely critical of Western policy in the Middle East. In the course of his speech Shuqairi stated that Western policy, rather than Soviet incitement of Arab nationalism, was responsible for deteriorating Arab relations with the West. (Circular telegram 309, October 3; *ibid.*, 611.80/10-357)

To succeed in this policy however he needed all the prestige possible among his own and other Arab peoples. This prestige had been gravely affected by Israeli operations in the Gulf of Aqaba, which endangered and disturbed his country. If the US could force Israel to turn back its invasion of Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip to help Egypt, which under its present government was scarcely a friend to the US, then America should prevent Israeli use of Aqaba to help Saudi Arabia, which was a true friend of the US. Hussein did not translate this but I understood the King also to say that Haifa or Jaffa were of course of true importance to Israel but Eliath could not be important to that country.

With Senator Hickenlooper I saw President Chamoun this morning. I told President of my conversation with Saud with Hussein as interpreter. The President observed that Hussein was "an old fox of the same school as Yusuf Yasin". Hussein yesterday had brought over a draft communiqué to acting Foreign Minister Mik-kawi which contained no mention of communism. Mik-kawi refused to accept the Hussein draft, saying that a communiqué must be in all essentials the same as the communiqué issued during Chamoun's visit to Riyadh, which declared opposition to communism.

**Heath**

---

**285. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, October 25, 1957, 10:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

MTW MC 15

SUBJECT

Arabian Peninsula

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 928. Secret. Drafted by Dorman. A notation on the source text indicates that the paper was approved by Secretary Dulles. Between October 23 and 25 a British delegation headed by Prime Minister Macmillan was in Washington for discussions with the President and Secretary of State.

## PARTICIPANTS

*American*

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Robert Murphy, G  
Mr. Douglas C. Dillon, W  
Ambassador John Hay Whitney  
Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant  
Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA  
Mr. Andrew H. Berding, P  
Mr. John Wesley Jones, EUR  
Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/AE  
Mr. Marselis C. Parsons, Jr., BNA  
Mr. Isaiah Frank, OT  
Mr. William N. Dale, BNA  
Mr. John Dorman, NE

*British*

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary  
Sir Norman Brook, Foreign Office  
Sir William Hayter, KCMG, Foreign Office  
Sir Patrick Dean, KCMG, Foreign Office  
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador  
Viscount Samuel Hood, Minister, British Embassy  
Mr. Roger Jackling, Head of Chancery  
Mr. Dennis Laskey, Private Secretary/Foreign Secretary  
Mr. Willie Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy  
Mr. F.J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy  
Mr. J.C.A. Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy

The Secretary said that the US and UK were faced by two large problems: Israel and the UK relationship with Saudi Arabia.<sup>2</sup> The situation in the Yemen seemed to be improving and the West was

---

<sup>2</sup> In an October 21 memorandum to the President outlining Dulles' views on the purpose of the conference with the British, the Secretary noted in part:

"We are interested in the maintenance of the British position in the Persian Gulf and would like to persuade them to make adjustments necessary to assure maintenance of that position. In this connection, we also favor the resumption of Anglo-Saudi relations on a sound basis as soon as possible." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 033.4111/10–2157)

On October 22, in a conversation with Ambassador al-Khayyal and Faisal Badawi of the Saudi Embassy, among others, Dulles raised the question of the Arabian Peninsula. The memorandum of conversation reads as follows:

"The Secretary stated that during the forthcoming talks with British Prime Minister Macmillan, he planned to raise once again the question of a solution to problems in the southern portion of the Arabian peninsula. He said he realized previous US efforts had not been totally successful, but stated that the US had not given up. He said the US was willing to make a further attempt to find a basis for the resumption of friendly relations between the UK and Saudi Arabia, although he did not wish to create excessive hopes in Saudi Arabian minds. He added that he recognized that the British were concerned over the strength of their position in the area, but that he did not believe that it would be a sign of weakness for them to come to a settlement." (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

apparently gaining in influence in that country. However, the Buraimi question, giving rise to the UK-Saudi dispute, still bothered us.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd agreed that the situation in the Yemen was improving. As the Secretary was doubtless aware, there was a possibility of a visit to London by the Crown Prince. At the Imam's request, the British Foreign Office had sent an official to the Yemen to make the arrangements for the visit. The Imam, Mr. Lloyd said, was frightened by the Russians, wished to assure his succession by the Crown Prince, and did not know exactly how he stood with King Saud.

Turning to the Buraimi question, Mr. Lloyd said that the Sultan of Muscat would visit London in November. It would greatly relieve the situation if King Saud would recognize the present boundaries of Muscat. However, King Saud could not be nice to the Sultan since the Sultan had not been nice to the Imam.

Mr. Lloyd said that King Saud had taken the initiative in approaching the UK through Charles Malik. King Saud had recommended that conversations be held with Ambassador Khayyal, who was number two on the Saudi Arabian Delegation to the UNGA and Malik was now arranging an appointment for Sir Roger [Pierson] Dixon to see Ambassador Khayyal. Mr. Lloyd said he would have preferred to talk with Azzam Pasha, whom Mr. Lloyd knew well.

Mr. Rountree observed that Ambassador Khayyal was a good man. However, there was a certain demarcation between the responsibilities of Ambassador Khayyal and Azzam Pasha, and it was probable that the Ambassador would want Azzam Pasha to sit in on any conversations which he might have with the British. Mr. Rountree thought it might be wise to have Shukairy out of the talks.

---

## 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 9, 1957—7:29 p.m.*

4217. London's 3397.<sup>2</sup> Department appreciates proposal set forth

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.022/12-957. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3397, November 29, the Embassy suggested a joint U.S.-British assessment of the situation in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf and identification of points of disagreement as a basis for subsequent discussion to determine common lines of policy. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11-2957)



reftel and agrees on necessity minimizing to maximum extent differences in assessment between US and UK in Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf.

While Department certainly willing undertake type of joint assessment proposed we would be inclined await certain current developments before discussing this possibility with UK.

UK-SAG relations in our view remain key to improving US-UK understanding on Gulf problems. UK currently making active efforts through New York talks and through Iraqis establish basis renewal relations. Further, British themselves surveying problem of Oman and, on other side of peninsula, awaiting full assessment of implications failure London talks with Yemeni Crown Prince.

In Department's view basic differences arising from respective approaches these problems are clear to both parties and these approaches are unlikely be modified as result proposed assessment procedure in absence indication UK willingness take steps necessary to re-establish relations on satisfactory basis with Saudi Arabia. Prospect of lengthy US-UK study these problems might also provide UK opportunity to retard active steps now in progress to resolve basic problem.

Department believes full normal exchange on these problems with British should continue and is prepared, should Embassy feel it would be helpful, to request individual US posts to make assessment. We are not inclined, however, favor at this moment steps envisioned reftel.

**Dulles**

# SYRIA

DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA; SYRIA'S RESPONSE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT AND THE FORMATION OF THE EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN PACT; QUESTIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE; THE SYRIAN CRISIS OF 1957<sup>1</sup>

## 287. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs<sup>2</sup>

*Washington, December 17, 1954.*

[Here follow parts I and II.]

### III. SYRIA AND LEBANON

#### *Syria*

Of all the Arab states, Syria is at the present time the most wholeheartedly devoted to a neutralist policy with strong anti-Western overtones. This appears to be due primarily to three factors: (1) the Syrians unlike the other Arabs feel themselves free of need to look to the West for any kind of support or help (they are economically self-sufficient); (2) bitterness over Palestine, and spite against the Western powers whom they regard as the creators and supporters of Israel; (3) the tendency in the Islamic world to seek a neutral position (with an anti-“imperialist” flavor) between West and East. These factors find expression in popular neutralism and anti-Westernism; and such acts as the election of a Communist deputy to Parliament more as an assertion of anti-Westernism with pro-Soviet overtones than as an expression of actual Communist sentiment. Despite the fact that most of the members of the present Government are conservatives, and privately moderately pro-West-

---

<sup>1</sup> For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 875 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 722, Recent Developments & Planned U.S. Action in the Middle East, 1953-1955. The briefing paper was prepared for George V. Allen. Other topics covered in the paper include: Egypt and the Sudan; Israel and Jordan; Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; Arab-Israel Settlement; and Economic Affairs (Arab States and Israel).

ern in outlook, they show no signs of being willing to take a stand against popular negativism. Soviet influence in Syria has definitely increased over the past year and one-half, largely due to the Soviet tactic of backing Arab causes in the UN.

*Governmental Instability*—In February 1954 the military dictatorship of General Shishakli, which had lost the support of most civilian political groups and much of the officer corps, was overthrown by an army insurrection. A civilian government was formed, and in September 1954 parliamentary elections were held in which no party or group gained anything approaching a majority. Parliament is fragmented into 12 parties or groups with conflicting interests. In consequence the Government which was formed by the Populist and Nationalist parties under the premiership of the “independent”, and Christian, octogenarian Faris al Khuri (since neither party would concede the other the Premiership) is extremely weak. The Government is further weakened by the fact that it has little or no control over the Army, which is itself divided into numerous factions.

*U.S. Economic Assistance*—Syria is the only country in the Near East which has flatly refused to accept a U.S. technical assistance (Point 4) program. Further, an offer of economic aid (for road construction, swamp drainage and harbor development) made to Syria in September 1953,<sup>3</sup> has to date not been accepted. Whether in the face of the anti-Western popular mood in Syria, the present Government will have the courage to associate with the American “imperialists” to the extent of accepting our offer of economic aid remains in doubt.

[Here follows the remainder of the briefing paper.]

---

<sup>3</sup> For information, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1332.

---

## 288. Editorial Note

Following the release of the Turkish-Iraqi joint communiqué of January 13, indicating that the two countries would conclude a military alliance and invite other Middle Eastern states to join, the Syrian Government at first refused to commit itself to a set position on the proposed pact. On January 14, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes spoke with Syrian officials in Damascus, but the talks reportedly were inconclusive. (Telegram 323 from Damascus, January 15; Department of State, Central Files, 033.8283/1–1555) Ambassa-

dor James Moose, acting in response to Department telegram 348 to Damascus, raised the topic in separate conversations with Foreign Minister Fayid al-Atasi and Prime Minister Khuri on January 18, but neither Syrian official would express an opinion on the proposed pact. (Telegram 331 from Damascus, January 18; *ibid.*, 033.8283/1-1855; and telegram 336 from Damascus, January 19; *ibid.*, 782.5/1-1955) During the Arab League meeting in Cairo (January 22-29 and February 3-6), however, Syrian representatives took the position that Iraq had not violated the Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP). (Telegram 1077 from Cairo, January 31; *ibid.*, 780.5/1-3155; telegram 862 from Ankara, February 2; *ibid.*, 682.87/2-255; and telegram 372 from Damascus, February 4; *ibid.*, 674.87/2-455)

On February 6, members of the Syrian National Party withdrew from the Khuri Cabinet, thereby causing its downfall. At the time, Khuri maintained that the position taken by Syria at the Cairo summit was a contributing but not a major factor in the Cabinet's collapse. Syrian President Atasi, however, later told Moose that the efforts of foreign states (primarily Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and to a lesser extent France) to reverse Syria's position on the proposed Turkish-Iraqi Pact was a major cause of the Cabinet crisis. (Telegram 381 from Damascus, February 8, *ibid.*, 783.00/2-855; and telegram 427 from Damascus, February 21, *ibid.*, 783.00/2-2155) On February 13, Sabri al-Asali of the Syrian National Party, who reportedly was backed by an anti-Western coalition (telegram 394 from Damascus, February 12; *ibid.*, 783.00/2-1255), announced the formation of a new cabinet; and on February 22, in a major ministerial statement, Asali in effect committed his government to a policy of complete neutrality, rejected adherence to the proposed Turkish-Iraqi pact, and affirmed Syria's "aversion to alliances" in accordance with the recommendations of the Cairo conference. Asali also promised to spare no effort to obtain the support of all of the Arab States for this policy; he labeled Zionism the number one enemy, and excluded exclusive collaboration with the West. (Telegram 435 from Damascus, February 24; *ibid.*, 683.00/2-2455) The Asali Cabinet received a vote of confidence from the Syrian Parliament on February 24. That same day in Baghdad, Turkish and Iraqi officials signed a Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey, subsequently known as the Baghdad Pact. For text, see *United Nations Treaty Series*, Volume 233, page 199. The Pact was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3.

289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 16, 1955—3:22 p.m.*

413. Department shares your concern at unstable Syrian political situation and plans approach French.<sup>2</sup> Question of approach to SAG and GOE under consideration. Although continuing contest between pro and anti Iraqi elements and possibility military coup by either are disturbing, it does not appear in Department's present view that there is anything we can usefully do in Syria to affect situation other than continue let it be known privately that USG fully supports Turkey–Iraq agreement and Northern Tier defense concept and therefore hopes Syrian Government whatever its composition will not oppose Iraq's efforts develop realistic organization for Middle East defense.

FYI USG could not provide military aid for Syria at present moment even if pro-Iraqi group came to power and announced decision join Turk–Iraq pact. Department therefore believes it best avoid active support pro-Western groups to extent this might encourage belief tangible benefits from USG such as military or sizeable economic aid would be soon forthcoming if pro-Western group came to power. End FYI.

Would welcome your comment and that other recipient Embassies and any suggestions you may wish make as to actions we

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–1655. Secret. Drafted by Francis Allen on February 15 and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 394, February 12, the Embassy in Damascus reported its belief that the Saudis, Egyptians, French, and Soviets were supporting various elements in the Nationalist–Azm–ASRP–Independent grouping which could be expected to adopt an anti-Western foreign policy if Asali were successful in forming a cabinet. It also requested guidance from the Department in case the situation within Syria deteriorated rapidly as a result of possible Syrian failure to form a government quickly, counteraction by either pro- or anti-Iraqi elements, or resignation of the new cabinet after a brief tenure. The Embassy further suggested that the Department consider counseling the Saudis, French, and Egyptians against actions in Syria which served to undermine the Western position. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/2–1255) The ASRP (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party) was formed in 1953 when the Ba'th Party merged with the Arab Socialist Party.

Telegram 390 from Damascus, February 12, contained a report on recent efforts by French Chargé André Nègre to elicit Syrian opposition to the Turkish–Iraqi Pact. The telegram characterized the French efforts to support the status quo as playing into the hands of the Soviet Union. (*Ibid.*, 651.83/2–1255)

On February 18, the Department instructed the Embassy in Paris to explain the U.S. position on the Turkish–Iraqi Pact to the French Government and to stress that the United States was very disturbed over reports that French representatives in Cairo and Damascus had expressed disapproval of the proposed Pact. (Telegram 2925; *ibid.*, 682.87/2–1457)

should take in Syria in event coup by pro or anti Western elements or downfall new cabinet after brief tenure.

Dulles

---

290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 16, 1955—7:32 p.m.*

415. Damascus tele 401<sup>2</sup> crossed Deptel 413<sup>3</sup> conveying Department's views requested Embtel 394.<sup>4</sup>

1. Department does not at present perceive anything we can usefully do re current situation beyond suggestion made Deptel 413 but would welcome Embassy views.

2. Re Syrian requests we restrain Saudis and Egyptians we feel little to gain by approaches to Saudi or Egyptian Governments since it appears certain such remonstrances as we might make would not significantly affect their behavior. We shall discuss with French in immediate future their attitude to Turkey-Iraq agreement and its supporters in Syria but similarly are not hopeful we can do much change French attitude in short term.

3. If when you discuss situation with President Atassi he requests US action restrain Saudis, Egyptians and French you may in your discretion explain to him substance para 2 above. If you judge it appropriate you may also tell him Department appreciates his attitude and that of his associates toward Iraq's efforts develop realistic Middle East defense arrangements and that we will regard it

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-1555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Francis Allen and approved by Jernegan who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Ankara and repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 401 from Damascus, February 15, Ambassador Moose reported that, according to special Iraqi envoy Fadhi Jamali, Syrian President Atassi had expressed the desire that the United States and the United Kingdom take steps to restrain Saudi, Egyptian, and French machinations in Syria and had urged that Iraq use its influence with the United States and the United Kingdom to this end. Moose also stated that the Turkish Government had reportedly instructed its Chargé in Damascus, Ismail Soysal, to initiate contacts with several Syrian commanders in the northern part of the country so that Turkey would know who to contact in case a deterioration in the situation required extraordinary measures. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, *supra.*

as most unfortunate if new Syrian Government adopts policy hostile Turkey–Iraq Pact.

. . . . .

**Dulles**

---

**291. Editorial Note**

On February 26, Egyptian Minister for National Guidance Major Salaheddin Salim arrived in Damascus to begin discussions on an Egyptian proposal for a new Arab defense pact that would include the Arab States opposed to alliances with non-Arab powers. Upon conclusion of the talks on March 2, Syrian and Egyptian officials signed in Damascus a communiqué indicating that the Syrian and Egyptian Governments would not join the Turkish-Iraqi alliance or any other alliances, that they would establish a joint Arab defense and economic cooperation pact, and that they would advance these objectives with other Arab States. Following his visit to Damascus, Salim visited Jordan and Saudi Arabia and upon conclusion of talks in the latter country on March 6, the Governments of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia jointly announced that their armed forces would be placed under a unified command. The Saudi Arabian Government also subscribed to other parts of the Egyptian-Syrian communiqué of March 2. For text of the March 2 communiqué, which was made public on March 6, see Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs*, 1955, pages 326–327.

292. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, March 8, 1955—1 p.m.*

466. Embassy telegram 465. <sup>2</sup> Embassy believes that continuation of Asali Cabinet endangers US interests by giving opportunity to Communist-infiltrated ASRP gain control of essentials of power within few months. As participant in coalition Cabinet ASRP has co-sponsored Syrian declaration of intent to join Egypt and Saudi Arabia in basically neutralistic arrangement contrary to US interests. ASRP Cabinet expected to do its best to carry out declaration even if Jordan and Lebanon stand aside. Once in full control, ASRP ability to guide Syria into cooperation with Saudis and Egyptians as well as its capacity for embarrassing Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon will be increased; and its grip on Syrian affairs may be difficult to shake off.

(This connection, Foreign Minister Fayid Atasi recently quoted to Embassy officer statement by Nasser at recent conference of Prime Ministers at Cairo, as follows: "West has much greater need for Arabs than Arabs have for West. Let us act accordingly".)

It would be most helpful to us if Department would provide at early date an appreciation of meaning of current Syrian developments to US in terms of Near East as whole for such appreciation, together with indications of what limitations on US action here should be taken into account, will be helpful in giving Embassy perspective.

Pro-West elements here still have considerable strength but need courage to use their strength at critical moment because they fear army will intervene to install even more radical government. As method of encouragement, Embassy requests authority to remind Syrian officials both in and out of Cabinet orally that recognition of leftist government established by army pressure or violence would

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.74/3-855. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Ankara.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 465, March 8, Moose reported that, upon hearing reports of a Syrian agreement with Egypt, he spoke with Prime Minister Asali on March 5. According to Moose, Asali stated flatly that Syria had decided to side with Egypt against Iraq because Egypt was in a position to lend greater assistance in the form of a second front during any war with Israel. But Asali also asserted that Syria had retained the right to conclude a bilateral agreement with Iraq at a later date. Moose commented that the Embassy in Damascus had little confidence in Asali's interpretation that Iraq could be associated with the new Egyptian-sponsored pact by later conclusion of a bilateral agreement with Syria so long as leftist, pro-Egyptian, and anti-Iraqi elements dominated the current government. (*Ibid.*)



not be automatic. Understand British Ambassador and Turkish Chargé both have sought similar authority.<sup>3</sup>

**Moose**

---

<sup>3</sup> On March 18, the Department replied to telegram 466 as follows: "If occasion arises when you think it would serve useful purpose you may indicate Syrian officials and others as appropriate that USG would deplore establishment government by army pressure or violence. FYI Department reluctant use recognition question this connection since it might lead awkward situation later." (Telegram 487 to Damascus; *ibid.*, 783.02/3–855)

---

### 293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 13, 1955—4:09 p.m.*

692. Re Baghdad's 818<sup>2</sup> and 821<sup>3</sup> inform Foreign Minister immediately US Government would be deeply concerned over Iraqi military intervention Syria even at request Syrian President. We have repeatedly made clear our objections prospective Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, Syrian Pact to Syrians and Egyptians and propose renew them in démarche which Embassy Damascus instructed im-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/4–1355. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hart and approved by G.V. Allen who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Ankara and London and repeated to Damascus, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Moscow, Jidda, Beirut, Amman, and Tripoli.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 818 from Baghdad, April 13, Ambassador Gallman reported that during a formal reception on April 12, Iraqi Foreign Minister Shabandar took Gallman and British Ambassador Wright aside to express strong Iraqi concern over reports from Syria indicating that a military coup d'état might be imminent. Shabandar also suggested that the U.S. and British Governments might point out to the Syrians that they would look with disfavor upon a government established by army pressure or violence. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 821 from Baghdad, April 13, Gallman reported that Shabandar had summoned him to the Foreign Ministry to inform him of reports received that morning from the Iraqi Minister in Damascus, Syd Abduljalil al-Rawi, which indicated that Prime Minister Asali and Foreign Minister Azm told President Atasi that unless the proposed ESS Pact was signed immediately a coup d'état would be attempted. Atasi requested, through al-Rawi, Iraqi military aid in the event of a coup. Shabandar also told Gallman that the Iraqi Government was prepared under those circumstances to extend military aid, but that Iraqi military occupation would be temporary and designed to prevent the Communists from gaining control of Syria and to see that a legal government was established. If developments followed this course, Shabandar asked the United States to lend its moral support and to use its influence in Ankara and Tel Aviv to keep the Turks and Israelis from taking advantage of the situation. Shabandar added that a similar request had been made to the British. (*Ibid.*)

mediately to make by companion telegram and concerning which Iraqi Government to be informed. We understand and appreciate reasons serious Iraqi concern over signature tripartite pact or coup d'état resulting in left-wing military regime which not only would sign pact but likely adopt generally anti-Iraq and anti-Western policies. Such development would be no more in US interest than in Iraq's. Nevertheless US Government feels by-products military intervention incalculable and very dangerous. Gaza situation extremely tense. Intervention would heighten Israeli apprehensions and might tip balance of decision within Israel in favor activist program which could launch Israeli military action against one or several Arab states. In addition Iraqi military intervention would result in widespread belief in US that US arms aid to Iraq now being perverted and that Iraq could not be depended upon to exercise cool judgment in area defense matters which anticipated when US-Iraqi military aid agreement signed. We fear Iraq's action would be widely construed in Near East and elsewhere as outright aggression; that Turk-Iraqi Pact containing no general pledge against aggression was concluded in Iraqi anticipation of freedom of action. Furthermore Department fears mere invitation Syrian President under whatever presumed authority Syrian Constitution might not be considered sufficient expression Syrian popular will and might be vigorously opposed by much of Syrian Army. Should President of Syria's invitation be disavowed by Syrian Government and he himself put out of office, Iraq would be in position of defying Syrian Government and could be held to be violating Article 2, paragraph 4 UN Charter.<sup>4</sup>

Ambassador requested express US objections Iraqi intervention in most forceful manner possible, warning Iraq consequences such action might jeopardize entire structure Middle East relationships which Iraq itself as well as US hopes see built.

Embassy Ankara requested urgently urge GOT dissuade Iraq in accordance foregoing reasoning.

Embassy London urged make same points Foreign Office.<sup>5</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>4</sup> For text of the U.N. Charter, see Charles I. Bevans (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 3, pp. 1153 ff. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1969).

<sup>5</sup> On April 14, Gallman conveyed to Shabandar the points made in telegram 692 to Baghdad and learned that the British Government had also come out strongly against Iraqi military intervention in Syria. After listening to Gallman's presentation, Shabandar told him that in view of the U.S. and British attitudes Iraqi intervention was ruled out. Shabandar also noted that the situation in Damascus had eased somewhat as Foreign Minister Azm had left for the Bandung Conference without the Pact being signed. (Telegram 822 from Baghdad; Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/4-1455)

**294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 13, 1955—7:36 p.m.*

567. If you confirm situation Damascus as described Baghdad 818 and 821<sup>2</sup> you should take following actions:

1. Inform President Atassi (and others as appropriate) that though we understand reasons which might tempt him invite Iraqi intervention prevent Army coup d'état, we believe consequences armed intervention by any foreign state in Syrian affairs would be extremely dangerous and incalculable. We hope he will not invite such intervention. (In discussion Embassy may use appropriate contents companion telegram 692 to Baghdad.)<sup>3</sup>

2. Inform President Atassi, Asali, Azm and others as appropriate (a) in our view it most regrettable if true that army is interfering in this matter, (b) our attitude is that Syria has sovereign right conclude any type agreement it pleases but we hope important international commitments would be made by normal constitutional processes and after full parliamentary debate and approval, (c) we do not now foresee that USG will be able support proposed Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi pact, (d) we have had hope Syria would be able henceforth maintain stable constitutional parliamentary regime and would deplore any form Army intervention or coup, and (e) if you feel it will be useful, you may add your quite personal opinion new

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/4-1355. Secret. Drafted by Francis Allen and approved by George Allen. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Ankara, London, Beirut, Amman, and Moscow, and pouched to Jidda and Tripoli. Jernegan signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> See footnotes 2 and 3, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

---

Government installed by Army pressure or coup would not necessarily be automatically recognized by USG.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> Subsequent to these instructions, on April 14 Moose spoke with Iraqi Ambassador al-Rawi who stated that his reports to Baghdad were based on several conversations with President Atasi, that a coup was not expected to occur at any moment, and that Atasi was proposing Iraqi military intervention only on a contingency basis. (Telegram 580 from Damascus, April 14; Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/4-1455)

On April 16, Moose spoke separately with President Atasi and Prime Minister Asali. Moose later reported to the Department that when he had paraphrased telegram 821 from Baghdad, Atasi characterized the report as incorrect. Atasi explained that he had learned from a source other than the Prime Minister that four army officers, presumably including Chief of Staff Shuqayr and head of Army Intelligence (G-2) Major Sarraj, who claimed to represent 300 junior officers, had called on Asali and threatened unspecified action unless the ESS Pact were promptly signed. In response to an inquiry from Moose, Atasi said that he saw no imminent danger from an army coup and that he had not requested the aid of Iraqi troops. Later Asali told Moose that an army coup was not imminent. Asali also explained that the Syrian Cabinet had approved the projected ESS Pact as modified by Foreign Minister Azm's proposals (contained in telegram 552 from Damascus, April 6; *ibid.*, 786.5/4-655). According to Asali, the Pact now contained nothing anti-Western or anti-Iraqi and, in fact, envisioned subsequent adherence of Iraq and other Arab States. Azm had been authorized to proceed, while at the Bandung Conference, to prepare a final text with Egyptian and Saudi officials, but he had not been authorized to sign the Pact. From these discussions, Moose concluded that the situation was less alarming than had been described in the telegrams from Baghdad and that there scarcely existed justification for the *démarches* indicated in telegrams 567 to Damascus and 692 to Baghdad. (Telegram 589 from Damascus, April 16; *ibid.*, 783.00/4-1655)

---

## 295. Editorial Note

On April 22, Syrian Army officer Colonel Adnan Malki, member of the ASRP and reportedly the most popular and influential officer in the Syrian Army, was shot and killed while attending a soccer game in Damascus by an assassin who then committed suicide. The assassin, Sergeant Younis Abd al-Rahim of the military police, was promptly linked to the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) and before long SSNP offices were closed throughout Syria and many members of the party were arrested. The Government's investigation, run by Major Sarraj of the Army's G-2 section, took on an anti-Western cast and Syrian newspapers began to print accusations that the United States was supporting the SSNP. On April 26, during a session of Parliament, Prime Minister Asali noted that the military inquiry had developed new evidence indicating that

the assassination was part of a plot to seize power and change the country's policy and that the conspirators had "thrown themselves at the feet of a foreign state seeking its help and support in order to make an unethical coup—as they all did—to seize power". Several Syrian newspapers identified that foreign power as the United States. On April 28, Ambassador Moose received the authorization which he had sought to issue an official public denial of the accusations, but before releasing it he discussed the accusations with the Syrian Prime Minister. Asali responded by referring to evidence that members of the SSNP in New York had approached United States officials and requested assistance for a coup to be followed by Syrian adherence to the Iraqi-Turkish Pact. Asali told Moose that he was unsure as to whether the evidence was genuine and did not believe that the United States had acted upon the approach. After additional discussion, Asali agreed to Moose's request that a statement be issued which would correct the false impression given by Asali's earlier remarks to Parliament. Later that day as promised, Asali issued a statement explaining that he had not referred to any specific state as being involved, nor had he indicated any foreign state as an instigator of the plot, but had only said that the party under investigation (the SSNP) had thrown itself at a foreign state and that the state had not responded to SSNP wishes. Documentation from the Embassy in Damascus detailing the Malki assassination and its aftermath is in Department of State, Central File 783.00.

---

## 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 5, 1955—7:23 p.m.*

612. Ambassador Malik stated to Dept May 4<sup>2</sup> following re Syria: He has received personal message from Faris el Khouri sent

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.001/5-555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hart and Burdett and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, and Cairo, and pouched to Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Ankara.

<sup>2</sup>On May 4 Malik discussed the situation in Syria with Hart and Burdett, and on May 5 held separate conversations on the same subject with Secretary Dulles and again with Hart and Burdett. A summary of the May 4 conversation was sent to the Embassy in Damascus as telegram 612, May 5; *ibid.*; the memorandum of the May 5 conversation with Dulles is *ibid.*; 670.901/5-555; and the memorandum of the May 5 conversation with Hart and Burdett is *ibid.*, 783.00/5-555.

from Near East April 28 urging that all Arab countries and Western powers take immediate action prevent take over Syrian government by Communists. Malik asserts his independent assessment confirms Khouri's fears eventual Communist seizure power by technique of common front. He believes Communist ASRP Combination likely win present struggle for power and urges drastic US action. Specifically Malik suggests public statement by Dept exposing subterranean power struggle Communist forces Syria and expressing US concern. . . .

Embassy comment requested.

Dulles

---

297. **Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, May 7, 1955—5 p.m.*

646. Deptel 612.<sup>2</sup> Embassy believes Khuri-Malik warning unduly alarmist and doubts that Communist party take-over GOS imminent. However anti-west and leftist drift from which Communists, who numerically weak here, benefit and which they can continue exploit, is growing danger.

Basic features of Syrian political situation are 1) universal resentment against Israel and corollary resentment against US as power primarily responsible for Israel's existence; 2) unreasoning faith in undefined and perhaps undefinable "Arab unit"; 3) public ignorance or apathy on most other foreign issues; 4) demoralization and complete fragmentation of conservative elements in government; 5) opportunism of Syrian political figures (e.g. Asali, Shuqayr, Azm); 6) disproportionate influence of organized aggressive left-wing anti-western minority (ASRP) under indigenous leadership (Hawrani) but Communist-infiltrated; 7) army officer groups, decapitated by murder Colonel Malki,<sup>3</sup> allied to ASRP and ready intervene in politics; 8) Syria is the rope in tug-of-war between Egypt and Iraq and between Saudi Arabia and Iraq (note Ambassador Malik's reference

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/5-755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, Ankara, and Tel Aviv.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> See Document 295.

to Syria as “key” in April 8 conversation with Secretary <sup>4</sup>); 9) French intrigue in order maintain a fancied “special position” in Syria; 10) Egyptian, French and Saudi aid to left wing and opportunist elements often by means of bribes, threats or promises or a combination thereof.

Relatively favorable economic situation based on expanding agriculture has cushioned ill effects of previous military excursions into local politics.

Syrian Cabinet nominally headed by Prime Minister Asali is in fact dominated by Foreign Minister Azm. It rests on anti-west and anti-Iraqi coalition of CP, ASRP and venal politicians frequently under French, Saudi and Egyptian influence. Conservative elements (largely populist, nationalist, independent), often pro-Iraqi and less hostile to west, are disorganized and frequently lack resolution (President Hashim Al-Atasi an exception). Regardless of personal beliefs and interests, conservatives rarely willing take political risk inherent in openly pro-west attitude (CFI one) first paragraph. <sup>5</sup>

This fundamental anti-US and anti-west orientation stimulated by inevitable political histrionics about Palestine problem gives many Syrians a perverse satisfaction in opposing any US project, even when in Syria’s own interest. This is one of the Communists’ principal assets in Syria, and foreign agents use it to lead the Syrians into devious paths.

The CP headed by Bakdash and directed by Kremlin appears to have been a minor though troublesome factor thus far. If CP infiltrators succeed in taking Communist ASRP group, subversive potentialities of CP will be vastly increased. Too much importance should not be attributed to fact Bakdash and Hawrani have just had their first public quarrel over the grant of a petroleum exploration concession. Weakness of recent Syrian Cabinets, aggressive tactics and skillful propaganda moves (e.g. two Soviet vetoes in UN <sup>6</sup>) have given CP a seat in Parliament and a useful aura of respectability, while CP profits, almost without effort, from the anti-Iraqi anti-Turkish and therefore anti-western activities of ASRP and opportunist deputies.

The leftward drift toward a more uncompromising anti-west official attitude has been discernable since before the Syrian Parlia-

---

<sup>4</sup> On April 8, Malik discussed the Bandung Conference and other matters with Dulles. The memorandum of conversation, by Francis Allen, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–855)

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the Soviet votes in the Security Council on January 22, 1954 (resolution concerning the Syrian-Israeli dispute over the waters of the Jordan River), and on March 29, 1954 (resolution concerning Israeli transit through the Suez Canal). For documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1482, and footnote 2, p. 1486.

mentary elections last September. Much of the impetus comes from abroad, and few signs indicate that Syrians themselves can or will stop the trend, especially when pushed along by France, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, each for its own reasons. Naturally this Embassy has no proof of Saudi payments or details of Egyptian or French intrigue which would stand a lawyer's test. However, the circumstantial evidence and the multiple reports from respectable local sources are convincing if not conclusive. This Embassy suspects that Iraq . . . indulged in parallel intrigue but on a much smaller scale.

If the trend continues over any considerable period there is real danger that Syria will fall completely under left-wing control either by a coup or by usurpation of authority with unpredictable consequences.

Along with other members of the Embassy staff I have given much thought for several months to the problem of stopping the accelerating Syrian drift to the left. There is no easy solution. The Syrian conservatives may yet display enough courage and resolution to stop the left-wingers, but reliance solely on local politicians exposed to foreign influence and hamstrung by Palestine issue may turn out to be forlorn hope.

In my opinion, the only promising measures are those which correct the cause of the trouble. Those which only treat or publicize the symptoms might be harmful rather than helpful. The Khuri-Malik suggestion, unless backed by the kind of political influence which has currency here, is believed to be in the latter category.

Recently the GOS has been endeavoring, with only minor success, to establish a connection between the USG and January unproven SSNP plot against the state.<sup>7</sup> It is my belief that a State Department declaration, or a series of them, as suggested by Malik, would be locally interpreted as admission of US implication and that new impulse would be given toward signature ESS pact. Such signature would in any event be a political victory for the leftists, and a defeat for Iraq, Turkey and the West; but it would be a resounding triumph if carried out after public condemnation by the USG.

Arguments based on reasonableness, true Syrian interest or economic or technical aid will, in my opinion, have little appeal and be unavailing. Arms aid does not have the appeal it had in the days of Shishakli.

I see no way for the US to secure popular Syrian support for its NE objectives without some modification of US policy toward Israel.

---

<sup>7</sup> Reference is presumably to the alleged plot surrounding the assassination of Malki.



The Syrians would doubtless demand US support for imposition on Israel of the UN resolutions on Palestine, but they usually ask the maximum and settle for less. In no event would the Syrian reorientation be swift.

To secure enough conservative support in the Syrian Government, as opposed to the people and to stop the leftward drift, the following would have a positive appeal:

Tripartite powers, if French concurrence could be obtained, and in any case USG, to come out publicly against the ESS pact; US privately to lay a restraining hand on French, Egyptian and Saudi activities, and perhaps to make a few threats in private about possible Iraqi intervention as well; US and UK encourage Jordan and Lebanon enter Turko-Iraqi pact. Caution about Western non-recognition in event of a coup, a development loan (by Iraq), Turkish offer of facilities on the Taurus railway,<sup>8</sup> and Turkish generosity with regard to Syrian property rights in the Sanjak of Alexandretta<sup>9</sup> might be bargaining points (British Ambassador believes latter three points would be helpful). A suitable press and radio campaign not directly attributable to the US–UK could help. Iraqi and Lebanese assistance would be useful (Embtel 644<sup>10</sup>). Finally, constant private educational campaign should be conducted among Nationalists to make them aware of ultimate dangers to themselves of continuing cooperating with Leftists, and among Nationalists and Populists to make them see wisdom of renewing conservative cooperation. A difficulty is that each of the measures suggested above involves the US, UK, and Syria as well as other countries. Only the Department can decide which, if any, of the measures suggested above it is able and willing to adopt.

## Moose

---

<sup>8</sup> The Taurus railroad traversed the Taurus mountains in southwestern Turkey and linked inland regions with the Mediterranean Sea.

<sup>9</sup> Alexandretta, at the head of the Bay of Alexandretta, was a former port and district within the Ottoman Empire. The area was mandated to the French following World War I and later handed over to Turkey in 1939. Subsequently it was known by its Turkish name—Hatay.

<sup>10</sup> In telegram 613 to Damascus, May 6, the Department requested the Embassy's comments as to the advisability of a coordinated U.S.–U.K. campaign by Voice of America and Cyprus radio aimed at exposing the current situation in Syria. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.001/5–655) The Embassy in Damascus responded in telegram 644 on May 7: "Doubt value of suggested campaign. Detailed reply follows." (*Ibid.*, 783.001/5–755)

298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 30, 1955—6:58 p.m.*

748. In discussion with Assistant Secretary Allen during visit US, <sup>2</sup> Foreign Minister Azm said he believed "certain US officials, not Ambassador Moose" were working for Iraq-Syria union. Allen replied that question Syria-Iraq union was one for Syrian and Iraqi people to decide; he doubted very much that any US officials would interfere since they would be acting contrary US policy.

Azm also expressed concern about US pressure on Arab states to join Turk-Iraq pact. Allen replied that there had been no pressure on any state to join pact. US view is that question of whether or not join pact is matter solely for interested states themselves decide. Turk-Iraq pact has full approval and support US Government; but we believe success of this or any collective defense organization depends on voluntary support of its members, and would not attempt persuade any state which did not wish to do so to join.

**Dulles**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.13/6-3055. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by George Allen and Francis Allen and approved by Dorsey who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, and Amman, and pouched to Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Azm was in the United States to attend the U.N. commemoration of its 10th anniversary at San Francisco. On several occasions prior to the visit, Syrian Ambassador Zeineddine requested that Azm meet with Secretary Dulles during his visit. (Memoranda of conversations, June 1 and 13, 1955; *ibid.*, 310.1/6-155 and 611.83/6-1355 respectively) In a telegram to Ambassador Moose on June 27, Assistant Secretary Allen explained that it had not been possible for Secretary Dulles to see Azm at San Francisco and that Azm was "disgruntled particularly since Secretary was able see two Foreign Ministers from NEA (Naim of Afghanistan and Fawzi of Egypt)." Allen added that Azm had assumed the attitude of refusing to press for an appointment during his 1-day stop in Washington and noted that while in the United States Azm's general attitude had been anti-West. Allen commented: "I suspect he will return to Damascus quite unhappy but Secretary's inability to see him will at least have avoided building up his personal prestige." The telegram also reported that Azm had been rebuked by the Syrian Government for pro-French statements which he had made during a recent visit to Paris. (Telegram 740 to Damascus; *ibid.*, 783.13/6-2755)

299. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board  
Working Group on National Security Council Action  
1290-d<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 7, 1955.

ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN SYRIA  
(PURSUANT TO NSC ACTION 1290-d) AND  
RECOMMENDED ACTION

*I Nature of the Security Threat*

1. The primary security threat in Syria arises from inherent instability of the government, a characteristic of all governments holding office during the last eight years, and the thinly veiled intervention in her internal affairs by at least five states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Soviet Union and France. See section V.) Coups d'état, political assassinations, armed uprisings and threats of armed foreign intervention are characteristics of the existing situation. Another factor is apathy toward Communism on the part of politicians and army officers. There are no indications that this situation is likely to improve in the foreseeable future.

2. Against this background, the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party (ASRP) opportunist political leaders who hold key positions of power in the present government, and the Communist Party of Syria are capable of bringing about future deterioration of Syrian internal security.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Syria. Top Secret. On December 21, 1954, the National Security Council directed the Operations Coordinating Board to develop a program for providing assistance to countries considered vulnerable to Communist subversion. The program, brought into being by NSC Action No. 1290-d, was designed to assist those countries in developing indigenous forces adequate to combat any internal security threat. For text of NSC Action No. 1290-d, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844.

An original version of this paper, dated June 27, was discussed at the July 6 OCB luncheon meeting, where it was decided that the paper ought to be withdrawn. The paper printed here is the revised version. (Annotated Agenda, OCB Meeting—July 13; Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430) No copy of the original paper has been found. The source text is attached to a covering memorandum from Executive Officer of the OCB, Elmer B. Staats, to the Operations Coordinating Board dated June 27.

Members of the OCB Working Group responsible for the preparation of the paper printed here included: Henry S. Villard (DOS), Major General Robert E. Hogaboom (USMC), Major General J.D. Balmer (CIA), Lieutenant Colonel Bergen B. Hovell (FOA), and Dr. H.S. Craig, substituting for Livingston Satterthwaite (OCB).

According to the minutes of the July 13 OCB meeting, the Board took note of the paper and held it for final action until all 1290-d country reports had been completed. (*Ibid.*, Syria) The Board finally approved the paper, with the exception of paragraph 33 which was deleted, on December 14. A copy of the final paper is *ibid.* See also Document 317.

3. The ASRP, a left wing party, currently possesses the greatest direct subversive strength in Syria because of its following within the Army, its strength in the Legislature (15%), and its relationships with independent political figures who hold key Ministries of the government.

4. A considerable number of officers in the Army support the ASRP, and the party has collaborated with senior army officers in protecting the strong position of the army in Syrian affairs. Through its strength in the armed forces the ASRP, with Communist support, is backing a campaign to suppress the political opposition, particularly the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), whose leaders are now in prison or in hiding.

5. The ASRP controls a bloc of seventeen seats plus five supporters out of 142 in the Chamber of Deputies and ranks second in strength among the organized parties. It advocates Syrian opposition to the international policies of the Western powers, nationalization of major economic enterprises, and sweeping social reforms for the benefit of worker and peasant. It opposes Syro-Iraqi union under Hashimite control.

6. The Communist Party, although declared illegal in December 1947, has nevertheless operated continuously with sporadic success to the present. Repressed during the Shishakli regime (1951-1954) it was forced to restrict its overt activities, but continued to work through front organizations and other clandestine media. Since mid-1945 it has operated in a near-overt manner with considerable success. At present it exercises political influence disproportionate to its actual strength through extensive propaganda activity, collaboration with other political parties (particularly the ASRP) and leaders of the government, infiltration of the army, the security forces and other government offices. It supports and exploits for its own purposes anti-West, neutralist and ultranationalist elements, as well as minority groups.

7. The Communist Party of Syria is organically united with the Communist Party of Lebanon. It provides guidance as well as safe haven and other assistance to the Communist Parties of Iraq and Jordan, and some support for the Tudeh Party of Iran. It cooperates, both in Syria and Lebanon, with the USSR in the production and distribution of propaganda throughout the Middle East. Small in size and overcentralized in leadership, the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon is nevertheless the largest, best organized and best led Communist Party of the Arab world.

8. Its Syrian membership is estimated at 10,000, of whom about 600 are considered "hard core" militants. Consistent collaborating non-members probably number at least 2,000 more. Party membership is largely drawn from the Armenian and Kurdish minorities,

and the Orthodox Christian communities. Both the Christian and Moslem members of the Party come from intellectual, student and professional groups, in spite of repeated efforts of the leadership to recruit workers and peasants.

9. The Communist Party has significantly infiltrated the ASRP through efforts which began at least four years ago. In addition, the ASRP leadership as well as some independent candidates in the elections of September 1954 have consciously accepted Communist support even though they did not participate in the Communist dominated National Front. For example, Khalid Al Asm, most influential of individual political leaders and who aspires to the Presidency of Syria is an opportunist who has collaborated with the ASRP and the Communist Party both in electoral campaigns and in governmental matters. Communist collaboration with other parties has not given it control of any of those parties, but has served well the Communist aim of seriously weakening pro-Western forces and those most likely to oppose future Communist activities.

10. Through various *front groups* Communist influence on political parties of all complexions is being exerted both directly and indirectly. With more than 25 of these operating simultaneously in the confused Syrian scene, it is difficult if not impossible to assess accurately the full extent of the Communist assets and strength. Of the fronts, the Partisans of Peace are by far the most important. In addition, the Communist Party has secured control of several member unions in the largest labor federation and have undermined and demoralized the non-Communist leadership of the labor movement. Communist inroads amongst labor leaders in Syria are such that the Party threatens to effect control of the movement within two or three years. The Communists have also infiltrated Syria's educational and religious institutions. The teaching profession is penetrated with sympathizers and student organizations are prime targets for activity. The largest Christian community, the Greek Orthodox, has been influenced by Soviet propaganda and even prominent Moslem leaders have been affected by the Communist appeal to xenophobic interests.

## *II Existing Internal Security Forces and National Military Forces*

### *A. Primary Internal Security Forces*

11. Syria's 5,000 non-military internal security forces include a National Gendarmérie of 2800, a Desert Patrol of 400 and 1800 police. The gendarmérie and police are disposed in strategically located posts throughout the country. One desert patrol company is located in Central Syria and the other in Eastern Syria. Equipment is primarily small arms with very few crew-served weapons and no

artillery or armored vehicles. The standard of training is very low and the police and gendarmérie are generally inefficient.

12. In addition to the uniformed police described above, the police services include the Sûreté—a plain-clothes service of 300 men having certain intelligence functions, such as collection of political intelligence, counter-espionage, and control of foreigners within Syria. The Sûreté, partly because of internal organizational difficulties and partly because of the mass use of untrained informers, does not produce high-quality, domestic intelligence. To some extent its counter-subversive activities clash with those of the Deuxieme Bureau (Intelligence Branch) of the Army General Staff. The Deuxieme Bureau also operates agent and informer nets which conduct espionage and counter-espionage operations, gather political information and conduct surveillance on foreigners. Both the positive and the counter-espionage activities of the Deuxieme Bureau suffer from lack of trained personnel and from frequent changes in leadership. Duplication, misplacement of effort and indiscriminate compiling of information of dubious value are the result. Both the Sûreté and the Deuxieme Bureau are believed to possess fairly comprehensive files on Communists, but the majority of these are out of date. Local security officers continue to utilize their agents and activities against the CPS and are believed to keep generally informed of the Communist Party membership, organization and activities.

### *B. Military Forces*

13. Army: The Syrian Army of 35,200 is organized into six infantry brigades, 1 armored brigade, 5 artillery battalions and 1 commando battalion. Weapons and vehicles include 382 field artillery and heavy infantry weapons, 87 tanks and self-propelled weapons and 150 transport vehicles.

14. The Communist Party has made considerable progress in infiltrating the Army. Communist officers in the junior ranks are known to be spreading Party doctrine without effective interference from officers in staff positions, many of whom have leftist sympathies. Control of the important army information program, which includes publication of periodicals and conduct of orientation courses for the troops, is presently in the hands of a Communist. To some extent a pro-Iraqi element in the army tends to offset ASRP and Communist influence.

15. The Syrian Navy is an arm of the Syrian Army, and its combat effectiveness and capabilities are negligible.

16. The Syrian Air Force of 1,552 has about 100 aircraft and is capable of assisting the Army in maintaining internal security.

*III Evaluation of the Internal Security Situation*

17. In spite of weaknesses (Communist penetration, inefficiency, instability and lack of firm direction at the top) of Syria's internal security and military forces, the Syrian Communist organization is not at present sufficiently strong to take over the government. In fact, the Communist Party does not appear to have as its immediate objective seizure of power. Rather it seeks to destroy national unity, to strengthen support for Soviet policies and opposition to Western policies and to exacerbate tensions in the Arab world. It has made significant progress towards these objectives.

18. Because of Communist penetration, factionalism and lack of active encouragement from those holding political power, the non-military security forces are unable to restrict the further expansion of Communist propaganda, agitation and penetration. However, it should be noted that under the government of Shishakli and with the direction of an experienced officer existing police resources were capable of controlling the Communist Party.

19. If properly led the police and gendarmérie have sufficient manpower and equipment to control Communist-inspired civil disturbances. The Army, however, would be required to assist in suppression of any Communist insurrection.

20. There would seem to be little question that the Syrian Army if properly led could maintain internal security in the foreseeable future, including the suppression of any Communist uprising, but continued Communist success among the junior officers in the Army, coupled with the existing influence of supporters of the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party, increases the danger that the Army will aid rather than oppose extreme left-wing elements.

21. Given a continuance of trends of the last year, there is real danger that Syria may fall largely under control of the ASRP either through a coup d'état on the part of elements of the army or a gradual increase of ASRP political strength. This would result in either case in increased Communist penetration of government and army and consequent extension of Communist influence.

22. It is not likely that . . . Iraq would allow in Syria establishment of an openly Communist regime. However, they would be less likely to intervene against an ASRP-dominated government.

*IV Inventory of U.S. Programs Bearing on Internal Security*

23. No military, economic or technical assistance is currently programmed for Syria, although \$5.0 million in economic aid has been "promised" for FY 1956 if Syria cooperates with Mr. Eric Johnston<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Eric Johnston's special mission to the Middle East.

in working out a settlement of the Jordan River dispute. As for technical assistance, it cannot be said at this time whether there will be any program in FY 1956. The problem continues to be the unwillingness of the Syrian Government to conclude the basic agreement which the U.S. considers a condition precedent to assistance of any kind.

24. *A small information program*, conducted by USIA with five men and an annual budget of about \$100,000, operates in what can only be described as a discouraging atmosphere. It is difficult at best to reach the government through this program and, as much of the press is bribed by . . . foreign countries, only partial success has been achieved in placing USIA material before the public. Syrian touchiness on their minority problems militates against any USIA effort to reach these groups (although much of the USIA material in the Kurdish vernacular originating from our Iraq information centers is believed to reach the Kurdish population living in Syria).

25. *Through the Exchange Program* (PL 402) we have been able to send four or five men to Syria each year to lecture and tour the country, but Syrian hostility and xenophobia and administrative obstructions have reduced almost to nothing our efforts to bring qualified Syrians to the U.S. on Exchange fellowships under this program.

*V Political Factors Bearing on Internal Security Programs and Feasibility of U.S. Assistance.*

26. Of all the Arab states Syria is at the present time the most wholeheartedly devoted to a neutralist policy with strong anti-Western overtones. This appears to be due primarily to three factors: (1) extreme bitterness over Palestine, and hostility towards the Western powers (particularly the U.S. and the U.K.) who are regarded as the creators and supporters of Israel; (2) the popular tendency among the Moslem Arabs to seek a neutral position (with an anti-"imperialist" flavor) between West and East; (3) because of economic self-sufficiency and a feeling of geographic distance from the U.S.S.R. the Syrians, unlike the other Arabs, see no need to look to the West for support or help.

27. Moreover the growth of Soviet influence in Syria has definitely increased over the past year and a half, largely due to the Soviet tactic of backing Arab causes in the UN, further contributing to Syrian anti-Western sentiments.

28. The basic factors in the current political situation in Syria are: (1) the opportunism of the political figures who currently control the government: Foreign Minister Khalid Al Asm; General Shuqayr, the Army Chief of Staff, and Prime Minister Sabri Al



Asali. These men, though not themselves leftists, are cooperating with or accepting the support of the leftist, Communist-infiltrated Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party and its army supporters in order to further their own personal, political interests; (2) the disproportionate political influence of the aggressive, leftist anti-Western ASRP and allied army officer groups; (3) the demoralization and fragmentation of Conservative and relatively pro-Western political elements such as the Populist Party, the bulk of the Nationalist Party and conservative independent politicians; (4) Egyptian and Saudi Arabian intrigue and pressure to prevent closer Syria-Iraq relations and encourage Syrian hostility to the Turkey-Iraq pact; and Iraqi intrigue and pressure in the opposite direction; (5) French intrigue to maintain France's "special position" in Syria; (6) Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and French support of anti-Iraqi and anti-Western left-wing and opportunist elements; (7) a tendency among politicians and the public to encourage and accept Soviet support on Arab-Israel issues and to stress the importance of good Soviet-Syrian relations. This tendency is an outgrowth of the resentment against Israel and against the U.S. as the power primarily responsible for Israel's existence.

29. It is unlikely that the political situation in Syria or Syrian attitudes will change significantly in the near future in the absence of the development and successful execution by the U.S. of policies for the Near East designed to improve the situation in Syria. Such policies might, for example, include: (1) taking a firmer line with Israel, and insisting on an equitable settlement of the Jordan River water problem and the Syria-Israel boundary problem; (2) bringing Lebanon and Jordan into the Turkey-Iraq Pact (this in the long run might tend to pull Syria in the same direction); action aimed at diminishing Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and French support of leftist, neutralist and anti-American elements in Syria.

30. If the present trend continues there is a strong possibility that a Communist-dominated Syria will result, threatening the peace and stability of the area and endangering the achievement of our objectives in the Near East.

#### *VI Recommendations*

31. Since neither the present Syrian Government nor any successor which the Syrians themselves are likely to install will take effective action against communist subversion and check the trend toward communist control, the strengthening of Syrian internal security forces will not in these circumstances prevent communist domination of Syria. In fact, strengthening these forces could simply serve to perpetuate the hold of an undesirable government on Syria.

Therefore it is recommended that the United States not attempt to strengthen Syrian internal security forces.

32. In view of the foregoing and in view of the grave dangers presented to U.S. objectives in the area by the possibility of Syria's coming under a communist-dominated regime, the OCB working group concerned (NSC 5428,<sup>3</sup> Near East area) should give priority consideration to developing courses of action in the Near East designed to affect the situation in Syria and to recommending specific steps to combat communist subversion.

Responsible Agency: OCB Working Group on NSC 5428  
Timing: To begin at once.

33. Upon establishment of a firm program to implement paragraph 32 above, it is recommended that contingency aid programs be prepared and held in readiness to aid in developing the courses of action referred to in paragraph 32.

---

<sup>3</sup> The National Security Council adopted NSC 5428, "United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East" at its 207th meeting on July 22, 1954. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.

---

### 300. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, July 7, 1955—11 a.m.*

19. Embtel 14.<sup>2</sup> References in SSNP indictment US policy and US officials together with recent departure army attaché<sup>3</sup> and acting PAO<sup>4</sup> and impending transfer political officer have been used by anti-western newspapers in attempt show link between SSNP and USG. Without accepting all details, many Syrians incline to belief some bases for charge exist on theory "where there's smoke there's

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 983.61/7-755. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 14 from Damascus, July 6, Ambassador Moose reported that following the issuance of the Syrian indictment against the alleged SSNP conspirators, which included charges that SSNP officials had been in contact with USIS employees, an anti-American campaign had reappeared in the Syrian press. (*Ibid.*, 983.61/7-655)

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Robert Molloy replaced Colonel Hugh Stevenson as the U.S. Army Attaché in Damascus on February 22, 1955.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

fire". Climate has thus been created which is favorable increasing pro-Communist agitation (ostensibly on behalf "martyr" Malki).

If it has not connived at creating this state of affairs, GOS in any case bears fundamental responsibility since (A) it has authority exercise large measure control over press; and (B) inclusion in indictment of alleged letters from SSNP members in US is clear attempt implicate USG, and particularly noteworthy after my objection to Prime Minister when allegations US involvement first appeared (Embtel 619<sup>5</sup>). GOS officials have privately assured Embassy they see no basis for charge US involved but GOS public attitude demonstrates either (A) complete ineffectiveness stop civilian officials; or (B) their genuine belief that, while positive proof lacking, there is credible evidence USG connection SSNP; or (C) both. Extent to which this "evidence" accepted may be indicated by fact that portions Sharabi's alleged exposition US policy (Embtel 2<sup>6</sup>) was almost identical to Foreign Minister Azm's interpretation US policy to Parliament (Embtel 734<sup>7</sup>).

A thread of consistency in GOS actions re Malki murder is effort destroy SSNP. Attempt to establish relationship between party and USG is intended to serve that purpose.

A second thread is supplied by Syrian resentment toward US because of Palestine problem. Though not always mentioned, this resentment explains readiness of Syrians to criticize and to believe the worst of the US as well as the willingness of local politicians to pander to public prejudices.

While Department's denial was timely, I believe local situation requires that I follow up with approaches to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Suggest for Department's consideration that I say to them in substance that USG has noted (A) attempt of Syrian officials to show, by inclusion in indictment of extraneous, irresponsible and unfounded observations re US policy and officials and by other means, that USG encouraged or assisted SSNP and was implicated both in Malki murders and in alleged plot to overthrow GOS; (B) GOS indifference to vicious attacks in Damascus press against

---

<sup>5</sup> Not printed, but see Document 295.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 2 from Damascus, July 1, contained a summary of the bill of indictment handed down by the Syrian military court that had begun deliberations on June 29. The bill of indictment cited as evidence of U.S. complicity a letter by Hisham Sharabi, who had recently received a visa to teach at the Institute of Languages and Linguistics at Georgetown University in Washington. The letter allegedly indicated that SSNP leader Issam Mahayri was to visit the United States in connection with the conspiracy and that an instruction from Francis Allen had facilitated his obtaining a visa. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/7-155)

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 734, June 13, contained a summation of Foreign Minister Azm's hour-long foreign policy statement to the Syrian Parliament on June 9. (*Ibid.*, 683.00/6-1355)

USG and Embassy; (C) GOS failure to observe diplomatic amenities in arrest of Embassy employee Adil Yacoub;<sup>8</sup> (D) Foreign Minister's effort to give impression that USG was exercising pressure on Syria to influence Syrian foreign policy; (E) GOS tolerance of activities of CP, a subversive organization having a deputy in the Syrian Parliament and dedicated to the destruction of the forms of government and society now existing in Syria; (F) obvious deterioration of political situation in Syria under present cabinet to advantage of Communists and near-Communists but to prejudice of real Syrian interests, of Arab interests and of the general interest.

Suggest that I be instructed to say further that USG derive no satisfaction from the danger to Syria implicit in the developments noted above; that the pattern of recent action by the GOS inevitably raises the question whether or not the present Syrian Cabinet wishes to maintain normal friendly relationship with the US; and that in this connection the USG will give more weight to the actions of the Syrian authorities than to their assurances.

The Department may wish to make addition to the foregoing.<sup>9</sup>

**Moose**

---

<sup>8</sup> According to telegram 16 from Damascus, July 6, Yacoub, who had worked for USIS, was indicted under the name Adil Ujeimy, which he had used previously in Lebanon. Although his indictment had not been published, he was presumably being tried as a member of a secret organization and as a foreign agent. (*ibid.*, 103.02-USIA/7-655)

<sup>9</sup> On July 9, the Department directed Moose to make the following points orally to Asali and Azm:

"1. USG has noted: A, B, D and E as given third from last paragraph reftel [Damascus telegram 19] and F with omission phrase 'under present cabinet'.

"2. USG: a) regrets GOS is permitting propaganda campaign against US which will inevitably cause deterioration US-Syrian relations; b) fails understand motivation anti-US campaign in view fact, as Assistant Secretary Allen recently stressed to Foreign Minister Azm, USG has not and will not interfere in Syria affairs, and c) regrets danger to Syria implicit in GOS toleration of communist and fellow travellers and consequent deterioration political situation in Syria." (Telegram 15 to Damascus; *ibid.*, 983.61/7-755)

---

### 301. Editorial Note

The memorandum of discussion at the 255th meeting of the National Security Council on July 14, contains the following passage relating to Syria:

"Lastly, Mr. [Allen] Dulles referred to the 'unhappy situation' which continued in Syria. He stated his belief that the Soviet Union regarded Syria as the weakest point in the Western position in the Middle East. There were strong indications that Moscow felt that Syria was an area which it could exploit effectively." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

**302. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Damascus, September 10, 1955—11 a.m.*

220. Pass Army. Deptel 130.<sup>2</sup> Embassy received from Foreign Office on September 3 note dated September 1<sup>3</sup> enclosing list of military equipment (trucks, jeeps, and trailers) desired by Syrian Army on reimbursable basis from US. In conversation with C/S Shuqayr prior to receipt of note ArmAtt<sup>4</sup> suggested desirability deferring transmittal of list to Washington because of Gaza situation and Shuqayr agreed. However, September 8 Nazir Fansa<sup>5</sup> called at Embassy on behalf Shuqayr seeking real reason our desire delay transmittal and indicated Shuqayr intends press for action.

For number of reasons Embassy considers it to advantage of US to agree now to negotiate a Section 106 arms sale agreement<sup>6</sup> with Syria:

(1) Public statements of US policy have declared that US Government considers defense of ME essential to defense of US and free world;

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9-1055. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In response to several reports from the Embassy in Damascus that Syrian Chief of Staff Shuqayr was exhibiting considerable interest in the possibility of Syria concluding a reimbursable military aid agreement with the United States, the Department cautioned the Embassy on August 27 (telegram 130 to Damascus) that it was "not inclined favor negotiating Section 106 arms sale agreement at this time and Syrians should not be encouraged." The Department did, however, suggest that the Embassy make available to the Syrian Government the text of the U.S.-Lebanese military aid agreement as a model. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/8-2555) For text of the U.S.-Lebanese military aid agreement of 1953, see 5 UST (pt. 3) 2908.

<sup>3</sup> Attached to despatch 95 from Damascus, September 27. (*Ibid.*, 783.56/9-2755) The list primarily included military transport equipment such as trucks and trailers.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Robert W. Molloy, U.S. Army Attaché in Damascus.

<sup>5</sup> Chief of the Syrian Government's Department of Propaganda.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which contained provisions governing the sale of military equipment, materials, and services. (Public Law 665, August 26, 1954; 68 Stat. 836)

(2) 1950 tripartite declaration recognizes Arab States and Israel need maintain certain level of armed forces for purposes of internal security, self-defense and defense of area as a whole;

(3) ME States except Syria and Yemen have signed military aid agreements of one sort or another with US, in case of Jordan, with UK;

(4) Syria is seeking defensive equipment only (cf. list transmitted with ArmAtt report R372-55, August 29, 1955).

(5) Obtaining Syrian signature to an agreement of this sort with US would be significant development in US-Syrian relations. Follow-up would encourage Syrians believe that they can cooperate with US without danger of US intervention or any loss of independence and would create better atmosphere for winning Syrian acceptance proposals for cooperation in other fields, e.g. Jordan unified development plan, Secretary's suggestions re Palestine problem, regional defense plans. With new government coming into power<sup>7</sup> which may not be unfavorable to US objectives this area, exceptional opportunity exists to convince responsible leaders of advantages cooperation with US. Our refusal would weaken position Syrians who wish improve relations with US;

(6) Reestablishment of French position here after reverses in 1945 was accomplished largely as result French willingness sell arms, even though generally poor quality. French have continued as one of Syria's main sources supply. US in position now secure similar good will.

(7) C/S Shuqayr personally initiated this request. He appears increasingly well-disposed towards US and it is in our interest to encourage this attitude. Our willingness sell military equipment to Syria at this time will strengthen his control of army and thereby better enable him maintain internal stability. Furthermore, for better part of six years, person holding position of Chief of Staff has been most powerful single individual in Syria;

(8) If US does not supply this equipment Syria can obtain it elsewhere (see ArmAtt cable SA800, August 29, 1955,<sup>8</sup> re Syrian purchase of tanks in Czechoslovakia).

Refusal on our part to negotiate agreement now, even though we indicate willingness to reconsider at some time in future, will no doubt make Syrians believe we are singling them out for discriminatory treatment. With respect to procurement of equipment, refusal can be expected strengthen leftists and cause Syrians turn to USSR, which has just assigned first MilAtt to Syria and which is believed to be prepared to supply arms to Syria, or to increase dealings with satellites, from whom Syria has bought in past, or both. Most

<sup>7</sup> On August 18 the Syrian Chamber of Deputies elected as Syria's ninth President Shukri al-Quwatli by a vote of 91 to 41 over Khalid al-Azm, who subsequently tendered his resignation as Syria's Foreign Minister and assumed a leadership role in the opposition. Quwatli was sworn into office on September 6; and on September 13 Said al-Ghazzi, an independent deputy, announced the formation of a new cabinet in which Ghazzi held the positions of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. (Department of State, Central File 783.00)

<sup>8</sup> Not found.

important, if it is known we have rejected this request we can hardly expect Syrian cooperation in US proposals involving joint efforts.

Action on request will be necessary within a short time. I appreciate that there are other factors outside of Syria involved. However, present situation within Syria offers possibility considerable improvement US position and conclusion this agreement would provide major impulse in that direction. I urge Department's favorable consideration. Request instructions soonest. ArmAtt concurs.

**Moose**

---

**303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 21, 1955—6:01 p.m.*

188. Embtel 220.<sup>2</sup> Department appreciates your arguments in favor Section 106 Arms Sale Agreement with Syria but renewed controversy re Middle East defense arrangements will inevitably result in Israel and among Arab states if negotiations opened at this time. Current consideration of Secretary's statement<sup>3</sup> by such countries might thereafter be affected. Department continues disinclined therefore negotiate at this particular moment.

You may however supply GOS with copy Lebanese Agreement after study of which GOS might wish ask USG formally if it wish negotiate. While agreements follow similar pattern they are not rigid and are designed for country in question. Certain provisions however such as no act of aggression, use of equipment for self-defense only, and equipment not transferable without permission are required by legislation and practice.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–1055. Secret. Drafted by Dixon and Wilkins; cleared with Boardman and in draft with Gray and Frechtling; and approved by George Allen who signed for Hoover.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> On August 26 Dulles delivered a major address concerning the Arab-Israeli problem.

Meanwhile Embassy authorized accept and transmit Washington for study list equipment which GOS desires in order that pricing and availability check could be made in Defense.<sup>4</sup>

Hoover

---

<sup>4</sup> On September 27 the Embassy in Damascus forwarded to the Department in despatch 95 the Syrian note of September 1, which included a list of equipment desired. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/9-2755)

---

### 304. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Baghdad, October 4, 1955—7 p.m.*

321. Beirut for Allen.<sup>2</sup> Nuri asked me to call at Council of Ministers early this afternoon. He said he wanted to discuss Syria. He had earlier talked with British Chargé.<sup>3</sup>

From Herridge, managing director IPC who was in Baghdad a few days ago and is now back in Damascus, he had learned that Syrian Parliament is prepared to cut Haifa pipeline if present negotiations for diversion of line to a Syrian port do not lead to terms favorable to Syria.<sup>4</sup> This Nuri said, is first sign increased Communist activity next door to Iraq following Soviet arms move in Egypt. Egyptians and Saudi Arabians were now getting set to strangle Iraq through Communist element in Syria. As this situation will get progressively worse not better, he felt he had to act now. He wanted a free hand. This how he enlarged on that:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-455. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London, Damascus, Ankara, and Beirut.

<sup>2</sup> On September 27, the Egyptian Government announced that it had signed with Czechoslovakia an agreement to exchange cotton for arms. Shortly thereafter, Assistant Secretary Allen visited Egypt and other parts of the Middle East. Soviet sponsorship of the agreement had already become apparent to U.S. officials.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Robin William Hooper, Counselor of the British Embassy in Baghdad.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to one of several items under negotiation between the Syrian Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) since the previous February. The primary Syrian objective in these negotiations was to gain an increase in transit royalties from the IPC whose pipeline traversed Syrian territory. In August 1955, the United States and United Kingdom had jointly protested Syrian pressure and the setting of deadlines in these negotiations. Documentation concerning the negotiations is in Department of State, Central File 883.2553.



He was prepared in first instance just to talk seriously to Syrians urging them to be reasonable and rid the country of Communists but mere talk without backing from US and UK was useless. He could talk with effect if he knew he had backing of US and UK in approaching Syrians now and also a guarantee from US and UK that, while he was engaged in trying to set things right in Syria, US and UK would restrain Israel from aggressive move against Syria. Here I interrupted Nuri. I said that what he was telling me was that he wanted to step into Syria and bring about a change of government. He did not respond directly to this but said that he wanted to see a group of reasonable men in power in Syria. I then asked: "Are you thinking of military intervention?" He was even more evasive in his reply to this question. There are many ways of bringing about a change he said, if only he had a free hand.

I then said to Nuri that the situation in the ME right now, as he knew only too well, was very precarious and critical. This was no time to raise additional highly critical issues.

Nuri persisted, however. He said he wanted me to report immediately what he had said and get Washington's reaction as quickly as possible. He said he would guarantee Syria's independence. Whatever form of government or form of association with Iraq the people of Syria wanted would be acceptable. To determine that a plebiscite might be held under US or UK auspices or the auspices of some international agency but on this point he felt strongly: The Communists in Syria must be squelched and squelched now and a stop put to further Egyptian and Saudi Arabian intrigues in Syria. The future of Iraq was at stake. He was more immediately concerned about the threat emanating from Syria, Iraq's neighbor, than from Egypt.

I saw British Chargé later this afternoon. Nuri had spoken to him in substantially the same vein, as he is reporting to London.<sup>5</sup>

**Gallman**

---

<sup>5</sup> During a conversation on October 6 in Washington, British Ambassador Makins told Secretary Dulles that the British Foreign Office did not take Nuri's comments regarding Syria too seriously and that the Foreign Office believed that Nuri expected the Americans and British to say no. Dulles responded that the United States could not accede to giving Nuri a free hand in Syria as it would have a most harmful effect on Israeli activism in the area and on Saudi Arabia.

**305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 6, 1955—8:17 p.m.*

246. Beirut for Allen. Embtel 321.<sup>2</sup> You may inform Nuri:

1. US has long shared his concern over Communist influence in Syria. For his private information we expressed our views regarding dangers of Communist penetration to GOS some months ago. We also discussed with SAG.

2. As we have previously made clear, we take most serious view potential consequences Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. Assistant Secretary Allen made special trip to emphasize to Nasser implications his action (Deptel 227<sup>3</sup>). US is now concentrating its immediate efforts on narrowing or limiting extent Soviet-Egyptian relations, primarily by pointing out to Nasser disadvantages of Soviet penetration and advantages flowing from Egypt's relations with the West. Because of Nuri's continually cooperative attitude, we wish him understand what we are trying to do in present situation.

3. In the light of this approach, US believes precipitate intervention by Iraq in Syrian affairs would have unfortunate consequences. Such move would antagonize Egyptians, increase Saudi apprehensions and play into hands Israeli activists.

4. US maintains normal relations present Syrian government. US understands Communist threat has lessened since election and has hopes present Syrian government can contain threat.

5. The US desires keep informed on Syrian situation and appreciates any further information Nuri may have which would seem to require re-appraisal our present analysis.

You should discuss with your British colleague and concert your approach to Nuri.

FYI In view well known personal identification of Nuri with Iraq-Syria union idea and our present friendly relations with Iraq foregoing cast in moderate terms in order avoid impression curt rebuff but, should you feel that seriousness of our attitude not understood by Nuri, you may strengthen your presentation. Impression which we wish create is that we appreciate Nuri's frankness in

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-455. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and Wilkins; cleared with Dulles in draft; and approved by Hare who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Ankara, London, and Jidda, and pouched to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 227 to Baghdad, October 2, repeated to a number of Middle Eastern and other posts, contained guidance for U.S. diplomats discussing the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal with host governments. (Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10-255)

consulting us but for number of reasons feel his suggestion would have effect of exacerbating rather than improving an already serious situation.

You may, at your discretion, wish to expand thought in paragraph 3 to indicate any form of union between Iraq and Syria would, in effect, bring Iraq to borders of Israel and involve it more directly in many complications arising from Arab-Israel conflict. Among complications would be US preference not to extend grant military assistance to Israel or Arab countries which border directly on Israel.

**Dulles**

---

**306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 6, 1955—8:18 p.m.*

243. Recent messages indicate Soviet countries are continuing approach GOS officials re arms aid (Embtels 283, <sup>2</sup> 290, <sup>3</sup> 302 <sup>4</sup>).

We do not wish compete with Soviet bloc in supply of arms but we do not wish impression to arise that US is not interested in helping its friends obtain requirements necessary for their defense.

We have already authorized informal discussion of arms sales agreement with GOS on basis Lebanese agreement (Deptel 188 <sup>5</sup>). In order demonstrate our continued interest you may in your discretion query GOS whether it plans request negotiation of reimbursable military aid agreement. You may also state list equipment Embdes

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/9-3055. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and Boardman; cleared with Dixon and Frechtling; and approved by Hare who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 283 from Damascus, September 29, contained a report that Soviet Minister Belyayev had offered Prime Minister Ghazzi an arrangement whereby the Soviet Union would provide arms to Syria on the basis of a 2- or 3-year credit to be offset by Soviet purchases of Syrian cotton and perhaps other export commodities. Ghazzi reportedly neither accepted nor rejected the offer. (*Ibid.*, 461.8341/9-2955)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 290 from Damascus, September 30, informed the Department that Ambassador Moose had asked Ghazzi directly concerning the report of a Soviet arms offer and Ghazzi had responded evasively. (*Ibid.*, 783.56/9-3055)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 302 from Damascus, October 3, reported that Shuqayr had confirmed to U.S. Army Attaché Colonel Molloy that a Soviet official had inquired about Syrian military needs. (*Ibid.*, 783.56/10-355).

<sup>5</sup> Document 303. For text of the U.S.-Lebanese military sales agreement of 1953, see 5 UST (pt. 3) 2908.

95<sup>6</sup> being checked for price and availability for info of Syrians.

We assume list Embdes 95 is official statement of GOS requirements. We would like your estimate of whether conditions of agreement likely to cause rejection.

Dulles

---

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/9-2755)

---

**307. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Damascus, October 9, 1955—8 p.m.*

336. Pass Army. Deptel 243.<sup>2</sup> Syrian C/S Shuqayr has copy Lebanese agreement and expressed informally to ArmAtt opinion that none of provisions would be obstacle to GOS purchase of arms. Shuqayr has also been informed, when he asked what action being taken his request, that list (Embassy despatch 95<sup>3</sup>) being studied in Washington for price and availability data. List constitutes official statement GOS present requirements.

However, it is Embassy view, in which ArmAtt concurs, that Syrians will not sign or even negotiate reimbursable military aid agreement until they have assurance equipment they desire will be delivered to them at price they can pay. Price and approximate date of delivery are, therefore, controlling factors. Embassy doubts value of asking GOS now whether it plans request negotiation agreement.

Department is aware urgency this matter arising from reported interest Soviet bloc in supplying arms to Syria and its implications. Embassy understands considerable quantities used military equipment surplus in Austria as result departure US forces. If offer of token delivery this equipment, at used rather than "as new" price, can be made Syria, this will be interpreted by Shuqayr and other Syrians as evidence genuine interest in helping Syria obtain requirements necessary for its defense. Any offer, to be effective, must be made soonest and if delayed even matter of days may be too late.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/10-955. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/9-2755)

Request Department's urgent advice.

Moose

---

**308. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Baghdad, October 11, 1955—3 p.m.*

337. I called on Nuri this morning to discuss Syrian situation further with him (Embtel 326 October 7<sup>2</sup>). British Chargé who has now received his instructions (Deptel 246 October 6<sup>3</sup>) saw Nuri right after I did.

Yesterday I talked with British Chargé. His instructions differ in some important respects from mine. His instructions as summarized read as follows:

It is to be made clear to Nuri that his concern over Syria is understood. It is felt though that he might well adopt a "more forward policy than hitherto to make Iraqi influence felt in Syria". Suggested he take Turks into his confidence and try to enlist their cooperation. Premature action by Iraqi forces is strongly advised against. Any change of Syrian Government which did not appear as deriving from within Syria itself would create dangerous situation. Would probably lead to hailing Iraq before UN. This would not only defeat Nuri's objective but UK and US might even be compelled to condemn him.

Yesterday after British Chargé had informed me of his instructions I asked him what his understanding was of a more forward policy designed to make Iraqi influence felt in Syria. Hooper said he thought it meant that Iraq might use its "wealth" more effectively in Syria and probably also work more closely with IPC in Syria.

I began my talk with Nuri this morning with an observation based on paragraph 5 of the Department's 246 October 6 and then fashioned my remaining remarks on points brought out in para-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-1155. Secret. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Ankara, London, Jidda, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 326 from Baghdad, October 7, Gallman reported that during a conversation with Nuri al-Said on October 7, the Iraqi Prime Minister had referred to his earlier conversation with Gallman on Syria (see Document 304) and had given Gallman assurances that he would not act precipitously. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-755)

<sup>3</sup> Document 305.

graphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Deptel in that order. I made no use of Department's estimate as appearing in paragraph 4 as the tone of the most recent messages from Damascus seemed to run counter to this.

Nuri listened attentively. When I finished he asked "But what are you going to do in Syria?" Without however waiting for any response from me he brought up as he has done at various times previously Saudi Arabian bribery in Syria. Saudi Arabian bribery and intrigue were he said big contributing factors in keeping the situation unsettled and dangerous. The Saudis were using the dollars coming from an American enterprise Aramco for their bribing and intriguing. He wished that could be stopped. He wished too that Aramco would work closely with the IPC in Syria and be on its guard against the Syrians playing one off against the other. Should flow of oil across Syria be cut Aramco would suffer equally with IPC.

As time had arrived for Nuri to see British Chargé we broke off our talk at that point.

British Chargé called on me at Embassy immediately after his talk with Nuri. Nuri was emphatic in his talk with Hooper that he did not favor at this time "violent intervention" in Syria. He implied though that the Crown Prince<sup>4</sup> might. As he did with me he spoke feelingly about Saudi Arabian bribery and intrigue. He also said to Hooper that he would like to see Aramco and IPC working closely together in Syria. He then made this startling suggestion to which Hooper said he had no reply. Could not Nuri asked Hooper Aramco be induced to slow up on its operations in Saudi Arabia thus cutting down flow of dollars to Saudis with IPC and perhaps some other oil companies reimbursing Aramco for any loss it might suffer.

Hooper said Nuri's reaction to suggestion that Turks be taken into his confidence where Syria was concerned was totally lacking in enthusiasm.

**Gallman**

---

<sup>4</sup> Amir Abdul Ilah.

**309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 11, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Department Circular No. 25<sup>2</sup> Authorization for Negotiation of Agreement with Syria on Sales of Military Equipment

*Discussion:*

The Government of Syria has expressed an interest in purchasing certain military equipment from the Government of the United States under the provisions of Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.<sup>3</sup>

Section 106 requires that certain assurances be obtained before such sales are made to a country, such as Syria, which has not signed a grant aid agreement or joined with the United States in a regional collective defense arrangement. These statutory assurances stipulate that any equipment purchased is required for and will be used solely for internal security or legitimate self-defense (or to permit the purchasing country to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in collective security arrangements and measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations). The purchasing country must also give assurance that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

In addition, in order to meet the statutory requirement that Section 106 be administered "in order to carry out the purpose of this chapter", it is customary to include in agreements for the sale of military equipment assurances that the purchasing country will protect the security of any classified equipment or information furnished, and that it will not transfer title to or possession of any items purchased without the prior consent of the United States.

Such an agreement has already been concluded with Lebanon. The Embassy in Damascus believes that the Syrian Government would be prepared to agree to assurances such as those contained in the agreement with Lebanon.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/10-1155. Confidential. Drafted by Gray and Boardman; cleared with Frechtling and Phleger.

<sup>2</sup> Circular 25 contained Department of State guidelines for the proper exercise of the treaty-making power of the United States and the executive agreement-making power of the United States. Copies of the circulars are retained in the Department's Bureau of Personnel.

<sup>3</sup> Amended by Public Law 138 of July 8, 1955. (69 Stat. 283)

Such an agreement would not contain any commitment on the part of the United States to furnish Syria any arms, and would not appear to have any effect on internal law in the United States. Since an agreement of this nature is authorized and required by Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, it could properly be concluded as an executive agreement.

*Recommendation:*

It is recommended that you authorize the negotiation with Syria under Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, of an executive agreement along the lines discussed above.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> This memorandum did not gain immediate approval. On October 13, Secretary Dulles told the 261st meeting of the National Security Council of the Syrian request for military equipment and speculated that the United States would turn down the Syrian request. In the meantime, he added, the United States was awaiting the views of Nuri al-Said. (See *infra*)

The source text indicates that Hoover initialed his approval of the recommendation on December 8. (See Document 314)

---

### 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 12, 1955—6:59 p.m.*

258. Re Damascus 336.<sup>2</sup> During recent weeks GOS has been pressing US informally for price and availability list military transportation equipment consisting primarily trucks, trailers and half-tracks to be supplied under reimbursable military agreement. No artillery tanks or planes included. GOS has not wished negotiate agreement however until it had opportunity study prices and availabilities.

US responded by supplying GOS with copy Lebanese reimbursable military aid agreement as typical this type of arrangement and by offering make price and availability study. Defense has now completed study and we considering whether proceed with negotiation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/10-455. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Damascus.

<sup>2</sup> Document 307.



Major factor in our consideration is whether favorable decision likely forestall Soviet arms deal and encourage those Syrian leaders prepared rely on West. We have noted Nuri's suggestion that US provide arms needed by Syria (Baghdad's 326<sup>3</sup>). We recognize GOS may merely be probing us for information because as other reports indicate discussions with Soviet bloc now apparently taking place. Before reaching decision re reimbursable military aid agreement or supplying transportation items requested we wish Nuri's advice and counsel. We would be interested especially in his assessment Syrian intentions in raising matter with us and usefulness of favorable action in deterring purchase arms from Soviet bloc.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>3</sup> According to telegram 326 from Baghdad, October 7, Nuri told Gallman that the best thing for Iraq, Syria, and the West would be a friendly and reliable government in Syria which was armed effectively by the United States. That would mean more to Iraq, according to Nuri, than an effectively armed Egypt. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-755)

---

**311. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Baghdad, October 13, 1955—1 p.m.*

347. Have just seen Nuri (Department telegram 258, October 12<sup>2</sup>).

Nuri's response was quick and to the point. No matter what or how much US does for present Syrian Government he said that government cannot be relied on by US. It is the consistent and widespread Communist, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and French intrigue in Syria that causes that government to be weak and unreliable.

Syria he continued has no money and that in any event rules out reimbursable aid. For a stronger government friendly to the US and prepared to play a part in the defense of the area he would recommend an arms aid agreement on pattern of US-Iraqi agreement<sup>3</sup> limited to defensive arms only.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/10-1355. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Damascus.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Effected by an exchange of notes on April 21, 1954. For text, see 5 UST (pt. 3) 2496.

Through Madfai Nuri then told me he had just received a letter from President Quwwatli. In it Quwwatli complains that years of dictatorial rule in Syria had made his lot a very difficult one and that in addition he is constantly harassed by Communist, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and French intrigue and interference. In connection with this letter Nuri said he would like to suggest that through direct talks between Ambassador Moose and Quwwatli we try to find out how Quwwatli thinks the present governmental situation in Syria could be improved.

Reverting to the matter of arms Nuri reiterated his views. With a stable, reliable government in power in Syria prepared to help in the defense of the area he would recommend an arms agreement on the US-Iraqi pattern, covering defensive arms only and excluding arms designed for aggression.<sup>4</sup>

### Gallman

---

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 368, October 14, the Embassy in Damascus commented on Nuri's remarks. It agreed with Nuri's estimate that the United States could not rely on the current Syrian Government and that Communist, Saudi, Egyptian, and French intrigue contributed to that unreliability. The Embassy did not, however, consider the situation hopeless and thought that there was sufficient anti-leftist strength on which to base a government favorable to the United States and Iraq. The Embassy again recommended the sale of U.S. military equipment to Syria as an important step toward producing a change in the Syrian political climate by restoring some measure of confidence in the United States and as a means possibly of forestalling Syrian acceptance of offers from the Soviet bloc. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/10-1455)

---

### 312. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, October 14, 1955—9 p.m.*

367. On May 7 Embassy telegram 646<sup>2</sup> reported anti-West and Leftist drift in Syria; stressed that this development, discernible since before Syrian parliamentary elections of September 1954, constituted growing danger to US and West in general; opined that if trend continued over any considerable period of time there was real danger

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 101.24 NIS/10-1455. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Tripoli, Rome, and Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Document 297.

Syria would fall under Leftist control either by coup or usurpation of authority; and observed that consequences Leftist take over were unpredictable. Following trend already noted, Leftist danger has continued to grow and political situation in Syria appears about to enter new phase.

(A) Present situation in Syria

(1) Leftist group (CLP<sup>3</sup> and ASRP are virtually indistinguishable insofar as methods and aims are concerned) is well organized, well disciplined and well financed. Its members are strategically placed in the civilian and military hierarchy and its intelligence operations make use of official Syrian apparatus. It exercises a large measure of control over the local press and radio; and while proclaiming its patriotism and Pan-Arab sentiment, it uniformly acts to promote the whims of Communism. It is a vocal, intelligent, aggressive pressure group, but a small minority in the country, nevertheless.

Syrian officials, though in majority conservative, are divided among mutually antagonistic parties, with the result that ASRP group controls important and sometimes decisive votes. Local officials are reluctant to run the domestic political risks inherent in opposing the Leftist group, even when their inaction is detrimental to the country as a whole.

More specifically, Nationalists and Populists, both conservative and relative pro-West parties, have resumed their squabbles to the great advantage of the ASRP thereby dashing hopes their cooperation might continue beyond election of President Quwwatli. Quwwatli is anti-Communist but his effectiveness is diminished by conservative split as well as by constitutional limitation his powers. There also exists possibility he is subject to foreign influence unfriendly to West (see below).

(2) Parliament is a shambles with anti-Leftists, who constitute majority, afraid to speak or act in opposition to Leftist minority which uses Parliament as rostrum from which to disseminate anti-West propaganda. Fears of anti-Leftists result from threat of Leftists to use the mob and ASRP strength in army against conservative and pro-West elements. Leftists are often able veto objectionable measures and to force acceptance other measures. Leftist clique, although small is strongest influence in army and its influence appears still to be growing. C/S Shuqayr, though he declares himself anti-Communist and well-disposed towards US, lacks real ideological attachment and is primarily concerned remaining C/S regardless of type of government. Prime Minister Ghazzi is opportunist easily led by Left. Cabinet includes known Leftists and is divided and ineffective.

(3) Rural population is misinformed and inert. However, Leftists are active in rural districts as elsewhere.

(4) In cities, quasi-intellectuals provide Leftist leadership while labor is subject to increasing Communist penetration. Less favorable internal economic situation contributes toward urban unrest. Urban

<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to the local Communist Party in Syria.

population is important because control Damascus and Aleppo may mean control of Syria.

(5) Present mood of people in general is anti-West. It is noteworthy that their grudge against the West is the origin of their relatively favorable attitude toward Communist states. Principal factor responsible for this attitude is Israel, for which US primarily responsible in Syrian eyes. This issue is exploited effectively by Leftists. Cumulative effect during past 8 years of acts and attitudes US has destroyed confidence most Syrians in US wherever Israel is concerned. Syrians, under emotional pressures, have lost sense of perspective vis-à-vis Soviets. Although they profess fear of foreign domination, fear of Israel and perverse attitude toward West tend to blind them to Soviet threat. Syrians additionally suffer from inferiority complex, are aware their record of mismanagement of their own affairs but are nevertheless anxious make economic and social progress. In close relations with Soviets some Syrians claim they see opportunity acquire strength needed to stand on their own feet.

(6) Syria continues suffer disruptive effects of foreign meddling. Saudis are engaged in anti-Hashemite campaign. . . . Egyptians use Saudi money and such prestige as they enjoy locally in effort consolidate position as "leading" Arab State. French desire keep fancied "special position" by eliminating or keeping out US, UK and Turkish influence. Saudis, Egyptians, French and Leftists pursue common aim of keeping Syria "independent", i.e., weak and divided. Iraqis, attempting to exercise their influence over leading Syrians and to mobilize economic groups here with interest in good relations Iraq, provide pull in direction opposite to that just described. Soviet bloc (including Red China) devotes more and more attention to Syria. In last 15 months Communism has become respectable and Communist network is being expanded throughout country. In minds of many Syrians, failure US act in support pro-West elements in Syria (and Near East) has been disruptive influence since such elements in Syria are themselves unable provide leadership and direction. US delay in joining Northern Tier and failure urge Syria do likewise, for instance, is considered evidence by pro-West Syrians of US indecisiveness or of US amenability to Israeli influence.

(7) Further potentially disruptive factor is existence considerable quantity of arms in possession of population and evidence Communist and ASRP organizations well supplied with arms including sub-machine guns.

Given situation summarized above, Embassy believes Communist threat in Syria now substantially greater than that estimated in May. Without any definite move, Communists may soon have enough control of government to defeat any US attempt pursue its objectives in Syria. All present indications are that unless West takes counter action present current towards Left will continue. If it does a Leftist takeover of government, without need of force, is to be expected. This process can take place so gradually as to make the full takeover unpredictable beforehand and imperceptible in retrospect. If inclined use force, for which no necessity currently apparent, Leftists would probably not move now but would wait until certain of success. So far as army is concerned, if Syria unable obtain military equipment promptly from West, then relatively pro-West

and politically uncommitted nationalist officers will be silenced and Leftists will be unopposed in army.

(B) Embassy believes US has much at stake in Syria.

Subversion of Syria by Soviets can only result in spreading of Communist poison to neighboring states, including those now friendly to US and those possessing petroleum resources. Effect on Israel is imponderable. Fall of Syria will involve, as well, weakening of Northern Tier, exposure Turkey's southern flank, undermining of NATO structure and threat to US strategic air position in Near East. (N.B. all important routes of communication between Turkey and Iraq or land route between Iraq and the Mediterranean cross Syrian territory.)

The Embassy believes that the Syrian situation merits serious consideration now. The US has choice of several courses:

- (1) Of standing aside while the Russian apparatus proceeds unhampered with its plans for the NE;
- (2) Of relying on the Syrians, in their own interest, to avoid the Communist and neutralist pitfalls;
- (3) Of giving a free hand to Iraq or Turkey or another NE country to deal with situation;
- (4) Of endeavoring by positive US action to keep Syria aligned with West; and perhaps there are other courses as well.

(C) Our objectives in Syria, assuming that Department prefers course (4) above might include: restoration of confidence in US; reasonable internal stability with Western orientation; continued economic and social development; and Syrian cooperation in expansion of a regional defense organization which will serve US national interests. Achievement of the above may enhance possibility Syrian agreement to an equitable overall arrangement between Arab States and Israel.

(D) Courses of action: If foregoing aims are to be achieved, US must allay Syrian distrust by adopting and carrying out a policy wherein Israel has no specially favored position. Special US solicitude for Israel is root of Communist influence in Syria and its effect, not be eliminated unless cause is removed. Other US actions which might help are:

- (1) Prompt and sympathetic consideration of Syrian request for military vehicles (ArmAtt considers them as defensive items);
- (2) Further US effort to restrain intrigues of Saudis and perhaps effort to restrain French as well;
- (3) Caution to Iraqis of danger inherent in any attempt make Amir Abdul Illah King or Viceroy of Syria;
- (4) Encouragement to Jordan and Lebanon to adhere to Baghdad Pact;
- (5) US adherence to Baghdad Pact; and,
- (6) Concert with UK, Turkey and Iraq and when appropriate with Jordan and Lebanon in foregoing.

Embassy does not believe that a US policy favoring Israel over Arab States can be concealed by informational operations nor made more palatable to Syrians by any type of aid program. Neither can its unfortunate effects be offset by intelligence operations. These observations are believed to apply in some measure to other Arab countries.

It is realized that the above suggestions represent a high price in political coin to pay for Syrian (and other Arab) good will. Perhaps the price is too high. On the other hand, the cost of not having Syrians (and Arab) good will could be even higher.

Should the Department be unable approve the general course of action outlined above, then consideration might be given now to Nuri Pasha's plans for the future of Syria, or later to the proper course for the US to pursue after Syria has fallen under Communist influence.

Moose

---

**313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 25, 1955—10:30 a.m.*

288. In view of conclusion of Syrian-Egyptian defense pact, US Government is not able to negotiate with Syria at this moment agreement regarding military aid on cash reimbursable basis. Syria seems to be following pattern, previously observed in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, of asking for US aid and then refusing as justification for obtaining arms from Soviet bloc. Furthermore Syria's priority to buy US equipment through USG channels would be low; consequently prices would be high. Even if higher priority and correspondingly lower prices for Syria could be obtained it seems likely Syrian Government would merely use our offer for bargaining with Soviets. If questioned you may in your discretion reply that US has

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.5 MSP/10-2555. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Allen who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, and Beirut.

still reached no decision and matter is pending. Fanza<sup>2</sup> who is presently in Washington is being informed to this effect.

Meanwhile we are giving urgent consideration to ways and means of strengthening hand of pro-US and pro-Western groups in Syria and will appreciate your views in light new situation.

**Hoover**

---

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 280 from Damascus, September 28, Moose reported to the Department that Fansa had informed the Embassy that he would be visiting the United States on behalf of President Quwatli. (*Ibid.*, 033.8311/9-2855)

---

**314. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 8, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Syrian Request for Purchase of Arms

*Discussion:*

We have had a series of urgent telegrams from Embassy Damascus which emphasize Syria's determination to buy arms wherever it can get them at an early date.<sup>2</sup> Chief of Staff Shuqayr is reported as resisting Czech and Russian offers. President Quwwatli and the conservatives also are said to be opposed to Soviet bloc arms for Syria. Their position is reportedly weakening, however, and our Embassy reports that unless the US or other Western powers can sell some defensive military equipment to Syria, the Syrian Government will be under overwhelming pressure to buy from the Soviets. Moreover, the recent conclusion of an agreement with the Iraq

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/12-855. Secret. Drafted by Boardman on December 7; Frechtling concurred. A marginal notation on the source text by Barnes reads: "Approved by Mr. Hoover after talking to Mr. [Gordon] Gray. 12/8/55." Also on December 8, Hoover initialed his approval of Allen's memorandum, Document 309.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 428 from Damascus, October 30, Ambassador Moose proposed that the United States delay informing the Syrian Government of the decision contained in Document 313. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-3055) For additional information, see *ibid.*, 783.5-MSP and 783.56.

Petroleum Company for greatly increased pipeline transit payments<sup>3</sup> is expected to give Syria the immediate foreign exchange with which to make such purchases (i.e., \$42 million in the next 13 months over and above the \$7 million from other sources already appropriated for arms).

In view of the foregoing, I recommend that you authorize Ambassador Moose to negotiate a Section 106<sup>4</sup> arms sales agreement with Syria. Announcement of the agreement could be timed to US action on Israel's request for arms, it being assumed that Israel will be able to obtain certain quantities. The agreement would contain no US commitment but would require Syria to use the equipment for defense purposes only and not to undertake aggression. We already have such agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel and more than 50 other countries. For this reason, we now doubt that Israel, Iraq or Egypt can raise serious objection. If they should, we can point out that the agreement was concluded for purposes of providing Syria with necessary transport equipment. Prior to public announcement we plan, to the extent it seems desirable at the time, to inform other governments such as Israel, Egypt and Iraq.

The agreement is described in the attached Department Circular No. 25 authorization request which was prepared in October and approved at that time by Mr. Phleger as to authority (Tab A<sup>5</sup>).

I further recommend that you approve in principle the sale under this agreement of military transport equipment to Syria and that the items requested by Syria last September be spaced for delivery in accordance with Syrian needs and within Syrian capabilities. Some of the requirements in Syria's September request for trucks, trailers and jeeps totalling approximately \$13 million might be satisfied quite quickly from surplus US equipment in Libya and Germany if a 106 sales agreement were signed.

*Recommendation:*

That you (1) approve the attached request for permission to negotiate an arms sales agreement with Syria (Tab A), and (2) sign the attached telegram informing Ambassador Moose of this authority and approving in principle the sale under the agreement of the

---

<sup>3</sup> Signed November 29. (Telegram 534 from Damascus, November 29; *ibid.*, 783.5-MSP/11-2955)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the provisions governing the sale of military equipment on a reimbursable basis to foreign governments, contained in Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended on July 8, 1955. (68 Stat. 836; 69 Stat. 283)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 309.



military trucks, trailers and jeeps requested by the Syrians last September (Tab B<sup>6</sup>).

---

<sup>6</sup> Not attached to the source text but presumably the same as telegram 413 sent to Damascus at 6:28 p.m., December 8. It authorized the Embassy to inform the Syrian Government that the United States was prepared to exchange notes with Syria which would constitute an agreement for sales of military equipment along the lines of the U.S.-Lebanese agreement previously made available to Syria. Telegram 413 also authorized the Embassy to present to the Syrian Government the price and availability study prepared by the Department of Defense in response to the Syrian note of September 1. (Airgram A-35, October 11; Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/9-2755) Telegram 413 was approved and signed by Hoover.

On December 10, Moose handed Prime Minister Ghazzi a note informing him that the U.S. Government was prepared to conclude a reimbursable military aid agreement with the Syrian Government. (Telegram 573 from Damascus, December 13; *ibid.*, 783.5-MSP/12-1355)

In telegram 633 from Damascus, January 5, Moose conveyed a report obtained from Fansa that Syria would sign no reimbursable military aid agreement with the United States because Syria considered the prices too high. (*Ibid.*, 783.5-MSP/1-556)

---

### 315. Editorial Note

On December 13, the Syrian Government informed the President of the Security Council of a large-scale attack in the area east of Lake Tiberias, launched by Israel during the night of December 11/12. At the request of Syria, the Security Council discussed the item between December 16, 1955, and January 19, 1956, when a resolution was adopted, cosponsored by the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, condemning the Israeli attack. (U.N. doc. S/3538)

316. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 21, 1955.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Report: *The New Soviet Approach to Syria* <sup>2</sup>

The shift in Soviet tactics in the Middle East is analyzed in this Intelligence Report of the current Soviet approaches to Syria and I commend it to you.

Its general conclusions are as follows:

Largely during the past year Soviet policy with regard to the Arab states shifted from a largely negative approach consisting of warnings against Western influence, attacks against pro-Western leaders and reliance upon weak local Communist parties to a vigorous diplomatic offensive.

Though Moscow still utilizes the local Communist parties in support of Soviet policy goals, it relies primarily on government-to-government dealings.

This new Soviet policy may find a particularly fertile field in Syria which has been a major focus of foreign intrigues and has suffered from chronic governmental weakness.

From the Soviet point of view a Syria, neutralist but oriented against Iraq and the West, would inhibit the development of the Northern Tier structure but would not pose the problems which a Communist Syria would create.

A Communist takeover at this time might alarm the other Arab states and make them less receptive to Soviet "non-ideological" overtures.

It would also be much easier for the USSR to limit or terminate its support for a neutralist Syria, should that be desirable from a standpoint of overall Soviet policy, than to abandon a Syrian Communist regime.

It is thus not likely that dangers to the Western position with regard to Syria will arise in the near future from any dramatic Communist move within Syria. It may result rather from a Soviet-supported Syrian drift into a firmly anti-Western position.

A similar memorandum has been sent to the Under Secretary.

PA

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.83/3-2755. Secret. Macomber initialed the memorandum, but the source text contains no indication as to whether it was seen by Secretary Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Attached to the source text but not printed is Intelligence Report No. 7117, December 15, 1955, entitled "The New Soviet Approach to Syria: Diplomacy Rather than Ideology". The report was prepared by the Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa from information available through November 25.

**317. Editorial Note**

On December 14, the Operations Coordinating Board approved the paper entitled "Analysis of the Internal Security Situation in Syria and Recommended Action (NSC 1290-d)", and directed the OCB Working Group on NSC 5428 to begin work on the recommendations at once. With the exception of paragraph 33 which does not appear in the final paper, the December 14 paper is the same as the July 7 draft, Document 299. A copy of the final paper is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Syria.

On January 13, 1956, a copy of the December 14 paper was forwarded to Ambassador Moose under cover of a letter from Under Secretary Hoover which advised, among other points, that the responsibility for carrying out the operations set forth in the analysis resided mainly with the Embassy in Damascus. Hoover also expressed the hope that Moose would be able to supervise personally its implementation and to review all the reports submitted on the subject. He added that other interested departments and agencies would inform their representatives in Syria of the specific responsibilities falling to them under Moose's supervision and that Moose might want to inform the senior representatives of other OCB agencies in Syria of the program and to take whatever other measures he felt appropriate to implement the program. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 783.5/1-1356)

Moose acknowledged receipt of Hoover's letter on February 2 and added that he awaited with interest the proposed report by the OCB Working Group on courses of action in the Near East designed to affect the situation in Syria and on specific steps recommended to combat Communist subversion. (Letter from Moose to Hoover, February 2, 1956; *ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Syria)

### 318. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, January 8, 1956—10 a.m.*

645. For R.<sup>2</sup> Deptel 498.<sup>3</sup> Local press reports that Shishakli has recently been in Syria and that he is plotting coup with SSNP may explain uneasiness and suspicion of Iraq displayed by certain Syrian G-2 officers. Otherwise ArmAtt's SA 932 and SA 936 adequately cover Embassy's current information about SSNP plans.

In recent weeks and months Syrian Government has fallen more and more under influence of anti-western elements willing, if not anxious, to cooperate with Communists. Of these elements, most dangerous groups are composed of Army officers who do not openly espouse Communism, Russian model. Some call themselves Arab nationalists or partisans of ASRP. Others pretend to be adherents of Shishakli. All are amenable to Communist suggestion and propagan-da, . . . and to Egyptian pressure. . . .

A struggle appears to be taking place in Syrian Army centering on person of C/S Shuqayr, with anti-western officers attempting to remove him against opposition of more conservative army element. Outcome of this contest may provide clearest evidence yet whether or not anti-western officers have secured effective control over Syrian army and therefore over GOS.

Should anti-western officers succeed, US may be faced with a Syria which for all practical purposes will be an unfriendly country subject to large measure of Soviet influence. Many Syrian politicians, both in uniform and out, apparently believe that after entering on slippery path of cooperation with Russians, they can stop wherever they please and return whenever they choose. This belief is danger not only to Syria but to many other countries as well.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/1-856. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably Rountree.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 498 to Damascus, January 4, requested Ambassador Moose's comments on recent ArmAtt reports. (Department of State, Central Files, 121.832/1-456) Copies of the ArmAtt reports (telegrams SA 932 and SA 936) have not been found in Department of State files. Evidently in these telegrams, the Army Attaché in Damascus, Colonel Molloy, conveyed a report received indirectly of an SSNP proposal for a coup in Syria.

On January 5, the SSNP proposal was discussed at an interagency meeting attended by Wilkins, Boardman, and others. During the discussion, it was pointed out that the proposed action would be very dangerous because of its poor chance of success and because an attempted coup would create further instability. It was recommended that the plan should be discouraged, and after additional discussion, all agreed that the United States should disengage from the proposal. It was decided, however, to defer sending instructions to this effect until Moose's comments arrived. (Memorandum of conversation by Boardman, January 5; *ibid.*, 783.00/1-556)

The Embassy's views on what the US could do by orthodox diplomatic procedures to improve US position in Syria have already been communicated to Department.<sup>4</sup> Local situation has recently deteriorated to such an extent that protection of US interests may require that a thought be given to other methods. I therefore believe that plan outlined in ArmAtt's two messages should be weighed to determine whether or not it responds potential US needs.

The following factors enter into an assessment of SSSNP plan:

(1) Anti-west Syrian officers made great effort in Malki pseudo-trial to show that the US encouraged SSSNP to overthrow GOS, and their efforts have had some effect locally. Should SSSNP now attempt coup in Syria and fail, regardless of real US attitude US will inevitably be blamed, with unpredictable consequences. It is therefore in US interest either to discourage SSSNP from any attempted coup or to insure coup's success.

(2) Embassy does not know how far . . . are committed to help SSSNP or vice versa. If . . . have promised help, any US decision should take into consideration probable effects of US attitude. . . .

(3) SSSNP attempt might also have side effects in Iraq, in Egypt, in Israel, in the UN and elsewhere which we are in no position to evaluate.

(4) The anti-Communist record of . . . SSSNP and of Shishakli give them outward basis for cooperation in anti-Communist coup in Syria. Estimate of the motivation of different elements, however, should include further information about Shishakli in last two years. Appraisal of leadership of SSSNP, a quantity unknown to Embassy.

(5) A decisive consideration, of course, is capability of SSSNP (A) to carry out successful coup and thereafter (B) to install and maintain (with western help) a government in Syria which will be genuinely cooperative with west. This capability involves SSSNP relationships with more conservative Syrian elements; relationship between SSSNP and Shishakli; extent to which SSSNP plans are known to Syrian G2; how far SSSNP, largely Christian in membership and based in Lebanon, will arouse Christian-Moslem antagonisms; numerical strength and strategic position of SSSNP membership inside workings of SSSNP; propaganda aspects of plan; help expected . . . from other countries; and related questions.

. . . . .

Information available here does not yet enable Embassy properly to evaluate SSSNP plan. Rapid spread Left Wing influence in country, however, makes it prudent to consider carefully this or any other movement which holds out promise of improving situation.

ArmAtt . . . concur in foregoing.

**Moose**

<sup>4</sup> See Document 312.

---

**319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 13, 1956—7:18 p.m.*

528. Embtels 645<sup>2</sup> and 653.<sup>3</sup> We have studied reference telegrams as well as related messages carefully. Our assessment is that plans reported . . . are unlikely be brought to successful conclusion. It seems to us that these matters are of primary concern to Syrians. . . . US does not wish to become involved in any way and is much concerned lest we be accused of abetting such plans.

Since . . . knows plans have been reported Washington by ArmAtt we anticipate that some . . . SSNP members may conclude in one way or another that US approves or at least does not object to these plans. You should accordingly, in your discretion and in consultation with ArmAtt, make it clear that US has no role in . . . plans and should discourage further consultations this subject.<sup>4</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/1-1356. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 653 from Damascus, January 11, reported that a source had told Moose of an SSNP request for help in carrying out a coup in Syria. The source described the SSNP as a well-organized and disciplined group, capable of succeeding, which needed additional army and tactical guidance. Specifically, the SSNP had asked for assurance in two areas: (1) that recognition be given a new regime; and (2) that steps be taken to see that Israel did not move against Syria during the operation. Moose commented in telegram 653 that he continued to believe that the SSNP proposal merited careful study and that the source's views should carry considerable weight. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/1-1156)

<sup>4</sup> On January 15, Moose reported that the previous day he and Colonel Molloy had informed the source that the United States did not wish to pursue the matter further. In the absence of U.S. assistance, the source's initial reaction was to drop the plan entirely. (Telegram 664 from Damascus; *ibid.*, 682.83/1-1556)

320. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, January 24, 1956—11 a.m.*

688. Pass Army. C/S Shuqayr has informed Army Attaché:

(1) He and President Quwwatli wanted to sign reimbursable aid agreement with US, Prime Minister Ghazzi would probably go along but time is not ripe;

(2) Such an agreement would require parliamentary ratification and would be defeated in Parliament by Communist Deputy Khalid Bakdash aided by others. Also public opinion would be unfavorable unless Syria received some prior benefit from US not connected with any agreement;

(3) Egypt had offered Syria anti-aircraft equipment as part of Syro-Egyptian Pact. Syria had accepted offer. He said he did not know what type equipment Egypt might furnish, thought it might be either British or Czech. Added he preferred new Czech-type equipment now in Egypt;

(4) Unless Egyptians came through on offer within 10 days, Syria would have little or no choice but to accept a direct offer from Czechs made at a very low price to Syrian officer now in Prague.<sup>2</sup>

**Moose**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.5–MSP/1–2456. Confidential. Repeated to Cairo, London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> On February 20, the Embassy in Damascus reported in telegram 765 that according to a local source the Syrian Government had opened a \$22 million letter of credit through an Arab bank for Czechoslovak tanks and other military equipment. (*Ibid.*, 783.56/2–2056) On February 22, Chief of Staff Shuqayr confirmed that the Syrian Government had decided to buy arms from Czechoslovakia. Shuqayr explained that formalities had not yet been completed, but the decision in principle had been made. (Telegram 783 from Damascus, February 24; *ibid.*, 783.56/2–2456) On March 8, Allen Dulles informed the 279th meeting of the National Security Council that the delivery of Soviet bloc arms to Syria had begun.

321. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

ETW MC-1

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The Secretary  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Ambassador Aldrich  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Allen  
Mr. Rountree  
Mr. Hagerty  
Mr. Cottman

*UK*

Prime Minister Eden  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Ambassador Makins  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Sir Leslie Rowan  
Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Ian Samuel  
Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of press arrangements during Eden's visit; the draft of a declaration to be issued at the conclusion of the talks; European integration; the Arab-Israeli conflict; Saudi Arabia and the Buraimi dispute (see Document 212); and the Baghdad Pact, Iran, and Iraq.]

*Syria*

Turning to Syria, the Secretary remarked Syria seemed to be behaving much like a Soviet satellite. In most issues, he said, the Syrians were on the same side as the Soviet Union. The situation left much to be desired, and various plans had been put forward . . . to effect a change in Syria, but none seemed sufficiently sound to warrant our support.

Mr. Hoover observed that any of the suggestions thus far made . . . would put Nasser "off on a tangent" and would make it most difficult to deal with him on other problems, including an Israeli settlement.

The Secretary commented that if it should be decided to move against Nasser, it might be wise to consider Syria as well; however, that thus far there had been no sound plans put forward.

Mr. Lloyd thought that . . . it would be wise first to strengthen relations between Iraq and Jordan and to stabilize the situation in those countries.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text. The meeting concluded at 4 p.m. Prime Minister Eden visited Washington January 30-February 3, 1956.



[Here follows discussion of Jordan (see Document 16).]

---

**322. Despatch From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

No. 265

*Damascus, February 15, 1956.*

SUBJECT

NIE 30–4–55:<sup>2</sup> The Outlook for US Interests in the Middle East, Embassy Comments on

*Summary*

The Embassy's comments with respect to Syria on NIE 30–4–55 may be summarized as follows: A US decision to increase, maintain or decrease support for the Baghdad Pact is not likely to have any important effect on the US position in Syria. The basic deterrent to an improvement in US relations with Syria is the Syrian belief that the US follows a pro-Israeli, and therefore anti-Arab, policy. A change in US policy towards the Arab-Israeli dispute is, therefore, prerequisite to improved relations with Syria. The Embassy questions the assumption that Iraq has any clearly-thought-out plans for Syria. The Embassy doubts, given known Soviet objectives in the Middle East, that any "neutralization" agreement with the USSR would assure the US position in the area. Finally, the Embassy believes that the assumption that increased support for the Baghdad Pact would create threats and dangers to the US position in the Middle East requires modification. Some of those threats and dangers are, in fact, already existent. They are probably an inescapable product of the effort to assure US interests in the Middle East and are, for the most part, related not to US association with the Baghdad Pact but to previous US actions and decisions in the area.

[Here follows the remainder of the despatch.]

**James S. Moose, Jr.**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 101.21 NIS/2–1556. Top Secret. Drafted by Waggoner.

<sup>2</sup> NIE 30–4–55, November 8, 1955, entitled "The Outlook for US Interests in the Middle East," is not printed here.

---

**323. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 24, 1956—5:43 p.m.*

645. Dept recalls that last December in accordance with authority contained Deptel 413<sup>2</sup> you informed GOS of US willingness to negotiate Section 106 agreement and that upon signature US was prepared in principle to sell GOS transportation equipment.

Dept also recalls GOS reaction was negative and that since then GOS has given no indication it intends conclude agreement or purchase transportation equipment under agreement.

Recent developments in area, including December 11 Israeli attack on Tiberias and question of tanks for Saudi Arabia,<sup>3</sup> have altered public attitudes re arms shipments to area to such an extent that if Syria should now wish proceed it would be necessary for Dept to request delay pending further consideration.

It will not be necessary or desirable to inform GOS to this effect at this time. If GOS refers to these questions you should say that so much time has elapsed since original exchange of views on subject took place that you do not know whether US willingness to proceed still stands and that you will have communicate with Dept.

Further reason for responding at once in this vein when GOS refers to question is that Dept cannot now anticipate what situation in area will then be and it would not wish be placed at disadvantage by publicity flowing from sudden GOS response.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.5-MSP/2-2456. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Ankara, and Tripoli, and pouched to London and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 314.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 164 ff.

---

**324. Editorial Note**

Selwyn Lloyd recalled in his memoirs that during a conversation with Nuri Said in Baghdad on March 10, the Iraqi Prime Minister had emphasized to Lloyd that the Syrian Government was evil and that Iraq could organize friendly elements within Syria against it.

Nuri cautioned, however, that while this operation was underway, it was essential that Turkey and Israel forego any initiatives against Syria. Following his return to London, Lloyd presented to the British Cabinet on March 21 a wide-ranging set of proposals aimed at countering Nasser's leadership in the Middle East and buttressing pro-Western governments in the area. These proposals included the assertion that the United Kingdom should seek to establish in Syria a Government more friendly to the West. (*Suez 1956* (London: Jonathon Cape, 1978), pages 56–60)

---

**325. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, May 7, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Syrian Oil Refinery<sup>2</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Welk, Mr. French, Export-Import Bank  
Mr. Shaw, Mr. Roberts, NE/E

Mr. Shaw stated that the purpose of the meeting was to ascertain informally the Bank's attitude towards possible financial assistance towards establishing a government oil refinery in Syria. As a result of Syria's recent agreement with IPC,<sup>3</sup> one of the companies operating a pipeline across the country, the Syrian Government is entitled to certain quantities of crude oil at favorable prices; that in furtherance of its nationalist desires, Syria has long wanted its own refinery and in February enacted legislation establishing the Petroleum Refinery Institute which, with a capital of approximately \$25,000,000 is to establish a refinery to process 20,000 barrels of crude oil per day; the Institute may also import petroleum products and enter into the marketing thereof. The Syrian Government has

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 883.3932/5–756. Confidential. Drafted by Roberts on May 9.

<sup>2</sup> Shortly after the Syrian Government announced in January 1956 that it would open bidding for the construction of an oil refinery, the Embassy in Damascus reported that Prime Minister Ghazzi had confirmed that the Soviet Union had made an offer to build the refinery. (Telegram 678 from Damascus, January 19; *ibid.*, 883.2553/1–1956)

<sup>3</sup> Signed November 29. Under the agreement, the Iraq Petroleum Company greatly increased its payment to the Syrian Government for pipeline transit privileges. (Telegram 534 from Damascus, November 29; *ibid.*, 783.5–MSP/11–2955)

requested bids on the construction of a refinery of this capacity; May 20 is the final date for filing. So far as the Department is aware three offers of refineries, owned and operated privately, have been made to the Syrian Government: 1) by the IPC (this offer may no longer be active); 2) the Shell Company; 3) the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. The latter has offered to build and operate a refinery capable of processing 10,000 barrels per day. While we do not know the attitude of the Syrian Government towards these private offers, the Jersey Standard people do not appear to be hopeful that their offer will receive favorable action.

Mr. Welk replied that the policy of the Bank was:

1. It does not, as a matter of policy, finance projects which have to do with oil refining or with petroleum in any of its phases, the fundamental reasoning being that there is believed to be sufficient private capital available for these purposes.

2. The Bank does not ordinarily want to finance as government activities those enterprises which are generally carried on by private initiative.

3. If both of these objections did not exist the Bank would then look at the situation to see whether the country actually needed a refinery, or whether there were already adequate refining facilities in the immediate area.

He added that representations of political urgency and necessity on the part of the State Department might, at the discretion of the Directors, overrule this basic policy of the Bank.

Mr. Shaw then discussed possible alternatives. Among others was the possibility of an American or Western company offering to establish a refinery with local participation. He said that there were two groups which had put forward propositions of this kind. One group is headed by a Syrian named Ayoubi who is working with United Constructors and Ralph M. Parsons. The other group, the Syrian Oil Refining and Distribution Company, headed by Kettaneh, is connected with Foster Wheeler. The possibility of Export-Import Bank financing came up in connection with the question of should one of these groups obtain the contract and it exceeded the \$25,000,000 capitalization of the Institute, where could it obtain additional financial aid.

It was pointed out that in certain countries it was possible to provide compensating financing for projects of this kind through the aid programs but as we had no ICA program in Syria that possibility was ruled out. So far as the IBRD was concerned, Syria had three other projects pending there and they more than likely would not want to apply there.

Mr. Welk interjected that if the other IBRD loans went through the question of the capability of Syria to repay still another loan

would arise, although a refinery project would ordinarily be expected to pay for itself.

Mr. Welk thought that since there were two large American banks—the Chase Manhattan and the National City—already operating in the area and a third, the Bank of America, planned to commence operations soon, they would be the obvious sources from which to obtain the required financing. He continued that the Department of State would have to make a strong plea on the grounds of political necessity of keeping the Russians out of Syria before the Bank would consider the case and even then he could not foresee what the decision would be.

---

**326. Letter From the Ambassador in Syria (Moose) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Damascus, June 7, 1956.*

DEAR GEORGE: Among the ingredients of the witch's brew now simmering in Syria are: a martyr complex of heroic size, resentment toward Israel, hostility toward the West, arrogance inherent in Islam, general xenophobia, Egyptian influence buttressed by Saudi gold, communist subversive activities and common opportunism in an uncommon degree.

Important among these factors are Egyptian influence and Saudi gold. If we propose to take any action to improve the situation here, I suggest that thought again be given to the desirability and possibility of making King Saud uneasy about the real benefits he receives from Saudi money disbursed in Syria. An approach might be made in two principal ways, or in either one of them: 1) by questioning whether the ultimate beneficiary of current Saudi expenditures in Syria will be Saudi Arabia or the U.S.S.R. and 2) by instilling a suspicion in the royal Saudi mind that Nasser & Co., by their very nature, constitute a danger to the Saudi dynasty more menacing than any from the House of Hashim.

It is my belief that Egyptian activities and influence in Syria would be much less harmful to us if, for whatever reason, the Egyptians were deprived of Saudi financial support.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886B.00/6-756. Secret; Official-Informal.

With best personal regards,  
Sincerely,

Jimmie

---

**327. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Allen) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 19, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Commercial Transport Planes for Syria <sup>2</sup>

At luncheon today Mr. Murphy discussed with me the question of two C-54 passenger planes for Syrian Airways. He said that, following our meeting with the Secretary last Friday, <sup>3</sup> he had talked again with Mr. Hoover and that the latter had left the decision to him.

After reviewing the various factors including (a) the possibility that Syria might, in the absence of US approval of the sale of the C-54 planes, react by acquiring Soviet aircraft for their commercial line, and (b) the need for the planes to transport Syrian pilgrims to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.56/6-1956. Official Use Only.

<sup>2</sup> During May 1956, the Syrian Government submitted applications for the purchase of two second-hand, four-engine, C-54 passenger planes to be supplied from commercial sources for Syrian Airways. On June 4 in a memorandum to Murphy, Rountree stated that he was disposed to approve the sale as it "obviously is in our interest to keep as many American planes as possible in the local air lines". In a memorandum to Hoover, forwarding Rountree's memorandum, Murphy stated that he was against the proposed sale because the C-54 was capable of transporting troops. Murphy commented: "The only question for solution is whether we would serve an American interest in the sale to the Syrians. Commercially, it may be profitable for someone to sell the aircraft. Politically, I see no advantage in it." Hoover, apparently upon Murphy's recommendation, initialed his disapproval of Rountree's memorandum. On June 13, Wilkins summarized these developments in a memorandum to Rountree and noted that the Office of Near Eastern Affairs was considering an appeal to Secretary Dulles. (Rountree's and Murphy's memoranda are attached to Wilkins' memorandum of June 13; *ibid.*, 783.56/6-1356) On June 12, however, Rountree sent a memorandum to Murphy requesting that he reconsider his position in light of information recently received from the Syrian Embassy that the planes would be used to transport pilgrims to Mecca, and thus gain considerable good will in the Arab world. Murphy returned the memorandum to Rountree with a handwritten notation: "Please ask Rountree to discuss this with me."

<sup>3</sup> No record of the conversation has been found.

Mecca (in line with the considerations set forth in the attached memorandum of June 12), Mr. Murphy said he thought that we should go ahead with the sale.

He suggested that in order to avoid coincidence of an affirmative decision with the presence in Syria of Shepilov,<sup>4</sup> we should inform Ambassador Zeineddine at once that the sale was being approved. He thought we should prepare a draft press statement on the matter in case there should be publicity, which he agreed should be avoided if possible.

*Recommendations:*

1. That you inform Ambassador Zeineddine that the approval will be forthcoming.<sup>5</sup>

2. That NE prepare a draft press release for possible use if there should be publicity regarding this matter.

---

<sup>4</sup> Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov visited Syria June 22-25, 1956. Documentation concerning the visit is in Department of State, Central File 033.6183.

<sup>5</sup> Next to this recommendation Allen wrote in the margin: "Done through NE."

---

**328. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 25, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Syrian Collaboration With the Soviet Union

In response to your request, there is attached herewith a paper analyzing the extent of Syrian collaboration with the Soviet bloc. The accompanying chronology was prepared in OIR.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660.83/6-2556. Secret. Drafted by Boardman, initialed by Allen, and sent through S/S. A marginal notation on the source text by Bernau indicates that Dulles saw the memorandum and its enclosures.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

---

**[Attachment]****SYRIAN COLLABORATION WITH THE SOVIET BLOC<sup>3</sup>**

There are attached hereto: (A) a chronology of Syrian collaboration with the Soviet bloc starting with 1954 (most of these items are unclassified) and (B) an unclassified paper on Syria's voting record in the UN for the past ten years, with a confidential annex on Syrian attitudes and policies in the UN.

*General Observations*

There are 60 individual items in the chronology though they are of course uneven in significance. There are 5 items for 1954, 18 for 1955 and 37 for the first half of 1956.

The items indicate a substantial and unchecked increase in Syrian collaboration with the Soviet bloc and a UN voting record which, like the Syrian Government itself, is not Communist but which increasingly, under various pressures, reflects anti-Western stands.

Syria may be described as neutralist with an anti-Western tendency, opportunistic, and chronically unstable, but not as a Soviet satellite. In contrast to the European satellites, it does not have a Communist or Communist-dominated regime put in power directly or indirectly through the agency of the Soviet army, maintained against the wishes of its people and controlled in its actions by the USSR. The country is suffering from nearly chronic governmental weakness, but it has not lost its freedom of action in the sense that Soviet bloc countries have lost theirs. To the extent that it has lost political freedom as a result of outside intervention in the past two years, this has been due primarily to Egyptian-Saudi pressures.

The Syrian Communist Party—aided by the USSR—has become a respectable supporter of the resultant Syrian anti-Western and anti-Israeli sentiment. It has an estimated membership of 10,000 and is headed by Khalid Bakdash, a Kurd who is the only Syrian Communist Deputy in Parliament and who is generally conceded to be the shrewdest and most intelligent and influential Communist in any of the Arab countries. Bakdash, who is known throughout the area as a Communist, runs for Parliament as an independent, since the Communist Party is outlawed in Syria.

How many Communists are in the Syrian Army which numbers some 40,000, is not known, but they are well organized and influen-

---

<sup>3</sup> Secret. Drafted by Boardman.



tial. They work closely with the “little RCC”<sup>4</sup> (a clique of ambitious pro-Egyptian officers) and also with the leftist Arab Social Resurrectionist Party (ASRP) which holds 18 of the 143 seats in Parliament and two posts in the present cabinet—Foreign Affairs and National Economy. This combination of young Communists, “little RCC” and ASRP officers, virtually controls the Syrian Army. Syrian conservative political leaders—a fragmented group—are quick to respond to the Army’s wishes, fearing still another military coup d’état.

In general, Syrians are not so much pro-Communist as they are anti-West. For them, Moscow is not the home of international communism, but the seat of the only great power which supports the Arab cause. The form of government of that power is not germane to the Arab argument. Thus Syrian propaganda condemns the West as the friend of Israel and lauds the Soviet Union as the friend of the Arab. Soviet imperialism, with which the Arabs never have had direct experience, is ignored while Syrians imply that UK and French imperialism is as alive and active as it was in 1900 and that the US meanwhile has joined the ranks of the imperialist powers.

This state of affairs has increased the popularity of the USSR in Syria and incidentally has furthered the interests of the Syrian Communist Party. If a free election were held today, it is likely that the leftist party would gain seats in the Chamber of Deputies at conservative expense. The prospects are for increased Communist influence both politically and militarily, but so far not for Communist control. There is some argument that the USSR does not want Syria to become a satellite, since it can achieve many of its aims without setting up the alarm that this might raise elsewhere in the area and without assuming the responsibilities it would entail.

### *The Chronology*

The chronology attached as Tab A can be broken down according to subject and commented upon as follows:

*Arms:* The first Syro-Soviet arms transaction (Item 7) was negotiated two months after the Turco-Iraqi Pact of February 1955. It was a “strictly commercial deal”, through which Syria received 45 German Mark IV tanks from the bloc for only £8,500 (\$2,408) each. In February 1956, further Syro-Czech commercial transactions were initiated which led to the purchase of 15,000 Czech submachine guns (Items 28, 29 and 30). In March 1956, a \$23 million Syro-Czech Government arms agreement was signed for heavy arms, trucks and surgical and sanitary equipment (Item 36). The Syrian Chief of

<sup>4</sup> The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) constituted the leadership of the Free Officers’ movement in Egypt which had overthrown King Farouk in 1952.

Staff <sup>5</sup> later said that Syria would receive 20 MIGs from Egypt, that 60 T-34 Russian tanks had arrived from Egypt, that 85mm anti-aircraft guns equipped with radar had been received from Czechoslovakia under the agreement, and that three Syrian officers were in training in Czechoslovakia (Item 43). In May, following the French sale of Mysteres to Israel, our Army Attaché in Damascus <sup>6</sup> learned that more equipment and more technicians would be required from Czechoslovakia (Item 46).

*Trade Agreements:* The popular Czech-Egyptian arms agreement was followed by a spate of trade and payments agreements between Syria and the bloc (most of them for the first time) (Items 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 42 and 56). These were obviously political moves. Syrian trade with the seven Soviet states concerned was negligible. In each case signature of the agreement was preceded by a conspicuous visit of a trade delegation from the bloc country concerned.

*Economic Offers:* The principal Soviet economic aid offers have been: the offers made by the Czech and Russian Ministers in Damascus to construct Syria's first oil refinery at prices well below what US firms can offer (Item 26), the Czech offer to construct a new international airport at Damascus (Item 26) and the Polish bid for a survey of Hejaz railroad reconstruction accepted by Syria in January 1956 (Item 24). Numerous Soviet and Communist China trade missions have made other offers (Items 27, 32, 33 and 45).

*Damascus Fair:* Communist country participation has been the most striking political aspect of the Damascus International Trade Fairs of the past two years. The USSR had the best location and largest exhibit in 1954 and the Communist Chinese exhibit was the largest and most elaborate of any in 1955. The Chinese and Bulgarians were given space reserved for official Government pavilions despite the fact that their Governments had not been recognized by Syria (Items 4 and 14).

*Exchange of People:* Official visits of Syrians to Soviet countries have increased substantially in the field of labor (Items 1, 8, 15, 39 and 41); religion (Items 3 and 31); education (Item 5); legislation—18 Syrian deputies visited Moscow (Items 10, 37 and 40); "peace conventions" including 250 Syrians to a World Youth Festival in Warsaw (Items 9 and 11); military (Items 43 and 51); trade (Item 12); and law (Item 58). Syria's Communist Deputy, Khalid Bakdash was welcomed by the largest demonstration ever assembled in Syria on his return from Moscow on April 1, 1956 (Item 37). The welcome was organized and paid for by the Communists. The Ministry of Interior did nothing to check it. Meanwhile, there have been numer-

<sup>5</sup> General Shuqayr.

<sup>6</sup> Colonel Molloy.

ous Soviet trade missions to Syria as well as cultural and artistic missions (Items 16, 18, 48 and 57) and also "peace" missions—the Syrian Prime Minister gave a luncheon for the Soviet delegation which came to Damascus to present the Stalin Peace Prize to a Syrian religious leader and Partisan of Peace (Item 35). Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov is expected to visit Syria during his current tour of the Near East (Item 60).

*Diplomatic Recognition:* Syria added Rumania to the list of five Soviet countries with whom it already exchanged diplomatic missions (Item 13), agreed with the USSR to raise the legations of the two countries to Embassies (Item 21), and considered a parliamentary resolution and numerous editorials calling for recognition of Red China (Item 47).

*Press:* The press has prominently featured statements by Soviet officials as well as pro-Soviet statements by high Syrian officials (Items 6, 38, 44, 47, 50 and 54). We are informed that the President of Syria had made commitments to Col. Nasser and King Saud that he would take steps to check pro-Soviet propaganda. He has not, however, done so effectively. Statements that Syria would choose communism over Zionism if forced to the choice appear frequently (Item 44).

#### *United Nations*

For ten years Syria's voting record in the UN has demonstrated a pronounced "neutralist" tendency and in many instances has been parallel to that of the Soviet bloc. The basic pattern was substantially identical with that of such "uncommitted" Asian States as India, Burma, and Afghanistan, and such Arab States as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt. Syrian voting has stood in sharp contrast at times to the record of two Arab States, Lebanon and Iraq, on the critical "East-West" issues, but it has not been far from that of most other neutral uncommitted countries and it is difficult to pin a more definite or extreme label on Syria in the light of its votes in the General Assembly. (See Tab B for details.)<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> The paper, "Syrian Attitudes and Policies in the United Nations", attached to the source text but not printed, also noted that Syrian attitudes and policies in the United Nations were frequently colored, sometimes to a very intense and pronounced degree, by the Palestine issue, even when the issues involved had no connection of any kind with the Palestine problem or the Arab-Israeli conflict.

329. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 27, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Adib Shishakli and the Possibility of a Coup in Syria

*Introductory:* Recent undocumented reports quote Nuri and others as saying that Adib Shishakli, who was dictator of Syria when you met him in May, 1953, may return from exile to take over Syria where the situation is worsening and the newly appointed "national union" cabinet soon faces an uncertain vote of confidence. (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> This memorandum discusses Shishakli's record, his whereabouts since his overthrow in February, 1954, the concern of other governments, and his potentialities in the present situation.

*Biographic:* Adib Shishakli, now forty-seven and in Saudi Arabia, commanded a group of volunteers in the Palestine war, participated in the Husni Zaim coup d'état which overthrew President Quwwatli in March, 1949, and became Chief of Staff in December, 1949, not long after Zaim's assassination.<sup>3</sup> On the latter date he became the power behind the scenes in Syria. In November, 1951, he abolished the 12-hour anti-Western government of Maruf Dawalibi,<sup>4</sup> made Fawzi Selo<sup>5</sup> his puppet Chief of State and began to rule without a cabinet and later without a parliament. In June, 1953, he abandoned his background role, was "elected" president, and continued to rule as a dictator, though he denied that he was one. He issued more than 200 "decree-laws", some of which were helpful, but many of which never left paper. In February, 1954, he was overthrown by a civilian group—backed if not controlled by Army elements—which restored parliamentary government and reinstated Hashim Atasi as

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega-Syria, Misc.: 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Boardman; cleared with Wilkins and Rountree; initialed by Allen; and sent through S/S. The source text contains no indication that Dulles saw the memorandum. Attached to a copy of the memorandum, *ibid.*, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, is a note from Howe to Dulles, which summarizes Allen's memorandum and advises that "This memorandum is being handled with extreme care."

<sup>2</sup> Attached, but not printed. (Telegram 2174 from Ankara, June 22; *ibid.*, Central Files, 783.00/6-2256)

<sup>3</sup> Husni al-Zaim was assassinated on August 14, 1949, during a coup d'état.

<sup>4</sup> Dawalibi, a prominent member of the People's Party, had formed a government on November 28, 1951, only to be overthrown during the evening of November 28/29 as the result of the coup led by Shishakli.

<sup>5</sup> Selo held the positions of Syrian Chief of State, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense after Shishakli's coup.

President. A sketch of Shishakli's career up to this point is attached. (Tab B)<sup>6</sup>

*Recent Whereabouts:* Following his overthrow, Shishakli flew to Saudi Arabia. Later he made Paris his headquarters. He is reported to have been in France, Spain, Italy, Egypt and Turkey at various times during 1955 and to have returned to Lebanon and Syria incognito during and in connection with the Syrian presidential elections of August, 1955. (Tab C)<sup>7</sup> He returned to Paris at some point after the elections which returned Shukri Quwwatli to the presidency last August. He went to Saudi Arabia in March, 1956, and is believed to be there still. Wide speculation surrounded his return to Saudi Arabia. Was he to become commander of the Saudi armed forces and eventually of unified Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi forces? Was he being "called on the carpet" by King Saud? Was he in the "deep freeze" for possible use in Syria? (Tabs E and F)<sup>8</sup> There is no clear answer.

*Concern of Other Governments:* Shishakli's ties with other governments have recently seemed to rise and fall just as they have with Syrian groupings. (Tab D)<sup>9</sup> He has travelled at times since 1954 on a Saudi passport and is believed to have received a subsidy from King Saud, who at one time subsidized President Quwwatli and perhaps still does. Our Embassy in Jidda tends to think he is now out of favor with the King, however, for engaging in harmful and prejudicial activities in France and elsewhere. (Tabs E and F) The Egyptians apparently backed both Quwwatli, the winner, and Khaled Azm previous to the presidential elections of August, 1955, but not Shishakli. Egypt recently, however, has reportedly taken in Shishakli's family which had heretofore remained in Syria. The USSR knows of him primarily as an anti-leftist.

. . . . .

*Your Talk with Shishakli:* When you talked with him on May 15, 1953 (Tab G),<sup>10</sup> Shishakli spoke of the Arabs' loss of confidence in the US over its support of Israel, and asked for US economic and

<sup>6</sup> Attached, but not printed.

<sup>7</sup> Attached, but not printed; CA-4802, December 23, 1955, was sent to London, Paris, Damascus, and other Middle Eastern posts. (Department of State, Central File 783.00)

<sup>8</sup> Tab E, not printed, is despatch 163 from Jidda, April 14, 1956; it contains a report on Shishakli's visit to Saudi Arabia. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/4-1456) Tab F, not printed, is despatch 159 from Dhahran, March 31, 1956; it contains a report that Shishakli had visited Dhahran. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/3-3156)

<sup>9</sup> Attached, but not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Attached to the source text. For the memorandum of conversation of May 15, 1953, and the memorandum of a second conversation with Shishakli on May 16, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, volume IX, Part 1, pp. 56-64.

military aid. He said the menace of Israel and the menace of communism tied together since Syria's heavy military expenditures for defense against Israel were at the expense of development expenditures which would combat communism. He promised that Syria would never attack Israel, and he favored an Arab-Israel settlement along the lines of the UN resolution. From time to time the US has discussed military and economic aid with Syria, but no agreements have been concluded.

*Evaluation of Shishakli:* If Shishakli was once the man to govern Syria, he is not, in my judgment, the man to do so now. He may once have given Syria some stability and purpose, exercised restraint and political sagacity, shown considerable discretion and shrewdness in retaining a parliamentary facade, and taken an anti-Soviet stand. Even then, however, he was considered by our Embassy as . . . a political opportunist. Today he would be likely more than ever, I believe, to snatch at anything which would give him power. In Syria, he has never had the cooperation of many of the pro-Iraqi Populist leaders. He would find it more difficult than ever to stand up to the leftist Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party (ASRP), which now holds 18 out of 143 seats in Parliament. Moreover, his association with the conservative Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) would count against him. This is the party which the US is irresponsibly but frequently and widely charged with supporting. He is known as being close to the French. . . . He has long been a heavy drinker and is reported to have accentuated this habit to the point where his health has greatly deteriorated. Finally, the Army is the controlling factor in Syrian politics, and there is no evidence that Shishakli has the necessary support from this quarter. These factors make me believe that if he attempted to return, there might be bloodshed.

*Conclusions:*

Adib Shishakli falls clearly short of the type of leader we should like Syria to have, but he might be better than some other potential candidates. Also, his acceptability would be governed in part by the types of commitments he would be willing to give our friends. Consequently, we should bide our time and await developments before taking any positive position relative to his possible return to power.<sup>11</sup>

We will provide you separately with a verbal report on current developments.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> The source text contains lines for Dulles' approval or disapproval of the conclusions. No response is indicated.

<sup>12</sup> No record of this report has been found.

**330. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 16, 1956.*

**SUBJECT**

Soviet Bloc Bid to Construct a Refinery in Syria

*Discussion:*

Attached (Tab A) <sup>2</sup> is a . . . message . . . recommending that the United States act to stop the awarding of a contract for the construction of an oil refinery in Syria to the Soviet bloc. [Name deleted] considers the matter of critical importance and believes that the United States should subsidize, if necessary, a Western bid.

Also attached (Tab B) is a staff study discussing the pertinent factors and suggesting: (1) that one of the major U.S. oil companies, perhaps Standard of New Jersey, which has already offered to construct a refinery, be urged to present to the Syrians a sufficiently attractive offer to obtain the contract or, (2) failing this, that the United States subsidize a Western company. This recommendation is concurred in by Mr. Kalijarvi.

We agree thoroughly with the desirability of blocking the Soviet Bloc effort and that the first step should be an approach to Jersey asking it to improve its present offer. However, we see considerable difficulties in the proposal to subsidize a Western offer. These include Congressional and public reactions if it becomes known, which is probable; the precedent established for other similar situations such as the harbor works at Alexandria, the proposed refinery in Jordan and the construction of the Hejaz railway; and the general reluctance in principle to subsidizing U.S. business in this manner.

*Recommendations:*

1. That you, or if you are unable to do so, NEA, telephone Mr. Page of Standard Oil again; and: (a) emphasize to him the importance of the Syrian refinery to American oil interests in the Near East; (b) urge that Standard send a high-ranking representative

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 883.3932/7-1656. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and initialed by Allen and concurred in by Kalijarvi.

<sup>2</sup> Attached, but not printed.

immediately to Damascus; (c) suggest that Standard be prepared to improve its existing offer.<sup>3</sup>

2. That we take no steps at this time towards subsidizing a Western offer.<sup>4</sup>

### [Attachment—Tab B]

#### MEMORANDUM<sup>5</sup>

##### *Problem:*

Should the United States, in an effort to prevent a Soviet bloc country from securing the contract to build a Syrian Government refinery, use Government funds unilaterally or jointly with other Western powers to subsidize a Western bid.

##### *Discussion:*

*The Project:* The Syrian Government has enacted legislation establishing a Petroleum Refinery Institute with an appropriation of about \$25 million to construct and to operate an oil refinery. These funds are to be repaid within 15 years from the date the refinery goes into operation. During this period the prices of petroleum products are to be fixed at a level necessary to cover refinery expenses and repayment of the loan with interest. The Institute is also directed to sell and distribute refinery products and import petroleum products as required, (Tab A).<sup>6</sup>

*Bidding:* The specifications call for a refinery capacity of one million tons per year, (Tab B).<sup>7</sup> Bids have been received from Czech, Russian, British, French, Italian and Japanese firms, as well as from at least two U.S. firms, Lummus and Universal Oil Products, indirectly represented through European affiliates, (Tab C).<sup>8</sup> Interest has also been shown by Ralph M. Parsons Company and by Tuteur and Company, associated with Foster Wheeler. Embassy Damascus indicates that neither of these firms has submitted bids.

In addition to bids on the Government refinery, the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) has offered to build and operate a 10,000

<sup>3</sup> At this point on the source text, Hoover initialed his approval of the option that he telephone Howard Page of Standard Oil. No record of that conversation has been found.

<sup>4</sup> Hoover initialed his disapproval of this recommendation.

<sup>5</sup> Secret. Drafted by Shaw, Beckner, Dunn, and Boardman.

<sup>6</sup> None of the tabs are attached. According to a list at the end of the document, Tab A was the text of the law establishing the Petroleum Institute.

<sup>7</sup> Tab B was a summary of the specifications for the refinery.

<sup>8</sup> Tab C was a report on the bids received.



b/d refinery, with no Syrian participation either private or Government. Although acceptance of this offer, as an alternative to the Government-owned and operated refinery, is extremely doubtful, the Syrian Minister of Public Works<sup>9</sup> has indicated a willingness to discuss the refinery with a company representative. If the company were to inject new concepts into its offer, such as eventual Syrian ownership and joint GOS and/or private Syrian participation, this offer might be made attractive. Although when the matter was last discussed with the company there was no evidence that they wished to make their offer more attractive, this latest development was brought to the attention of Howard Page (Vice President of Standard) July 13 who expressed interest in following up on the Syrian Minister's interest in discussing Standard's offer further.

*The Syrian Government Attitude and Likely Outcome:* Syrian Government sources, the press and public opinion clearly favor a government refinery. The project is considered to be economically sound and its attractiveness is enhanced by the recent IPC-Syrian agreement under which 600,000 tons of crude are to be made available annually at a substantial discount.

June 7 was the deadline for submission of bids. Embassy Damascus reports that two refinery experts (British and Czech) have been selected to assist in reviewing the offers. The lowest Western bid submitted prior to the closing date was by an Italian firm in the amount of £42 million (\$11.8 million). A Czech offer of £36 million (\$10.1 million) is believed to be the only lower bid, (Tab D).<sup>10</sup> The Minister of Public Works claims that he is prepared not to accept a Soviet bloc bid if a better offer is made by the West. The opening of bids is expected during the week of July 15.

*Importance of Excluding the Soviets from the Project:* The Soviet bloc capability of supplying capital equipment for many industrial enterprises in the Middle East is recognized. Obviously the United States Government cannot counter every Soviet offer to subsidize industrial projects in this region. However, due to the vital importance of the Middle East petroleum resources to the Free World, it is important that every effort be made to secure the awarding of the Syrian refinery contract to a reliable Western firm.

This refinery threatens to become the first refinery to be built by the Soviet bloc in the Free World. Soviet capital and technical methods will be introduced into the Middle East and a large number of Soviet technicians, estimated at 350, will be occupied for several years in the construction and at least the initial operation of the

<sup>9</sup> Majd al-Din al-Jabri.

<sup>10</sup> The source text identifies Tab D as "Alleged relative position lowest bids submitted East and West".

refinery. Training a considerable number of Syrians in the U.S.S.R. is also likely to occur. The Soviets may be expected to use this refinery project as a means of infiltrating and influencing developments in the Syrian and Middle Eastern oil industry, including both the oil fields and transportation facilities, for their economic and political advantage.

Aside from the aforementioned situations which the Soviets can be expected to exploit, it is improbable that there would be any immediate Syrian shift away from Western controlled crude, although intensified pressure for more favorable supply terms might be expected. In any case, regardless of whether the East or the West obtains the refinery contract, the existence of a Government-owned refinery can be expected to increase the difficulties of Western companies now marketing petroleum products in Syria.

*Possible Courses of Action:*

1. The Department might discuss the problem as soon as possible with the top management of one or more of the major U.S. oil companies; for example, the Aramco parent companies which have an indirect interest because of Tapline. Two of them have a further interest through IPC. On the basis of this discussion one or more of these companies might be willing to make a sufficiently favorable offer to the Syrians to secure the contract for the West. Such an effort might help to consolidate the sentiment within the country which favors private enterprise.

a. One or more of the companies might be encouraged to undertake to build and operate the refinery on terms acceptable to the GOS. The Jersey company has already offered to build its own refinery in Syria and might be induced to modify its original position so as to make it sufficiently attractive to encourage the Government to drop its own plans, e.g. by agreeing to turn the plant over to the GOS after the expiration of a period of, say, 5 to 10 years.

b. One or more of the companies might be willing to assist one of the bidders to make its bid more competitive with the Soviet offer.

2. The U.S. might discuss with the Government of Italy the feasibility of the U.S. Government assisting, through the Mutual Security Program or the P.L. 480 Program, the Italian company which is reported to have submitted the lowest Western bid for the project. Embassy Damascus believes that this approach might have the advantage of economy, effectiveness and fairness to Western bidders, (Tab D).

This approach raises four major problems: (1) the use of U.S. Government funds for petroleum developments, particularly for gov-

ernment-owned projects; (2) the possibility that ENI,<sup>11</sup> the Italian Government oil company, and Enrico Mattei may be involved in the Italian bid; (3) the possibility of publicity to the U.S. effort through Italian Government leaks; and (4) inability to move rapidly enough on this approach in the absence of approved aid legislation. The Syrian problem may be serious enough to justify an exception in the use of U.S. Government funds. Efforts are being made to secure information on possible ENI involvement in the Italian bid; however, the seriousness of the Syrian problem may be sufficient justification to overlook possible ENI participation.

3. If the Italian Government approach is impracticable or inadvisable, a similar approach might be made to other Western governments in connection with bids by their nationals.

4. The U.S. might, with appropriate safeguards, support a Western bid with confidential public funds. A U.S. company bid, a bid of a U.S. company European affiliate, or the Italian bid might be considered in this connection. In addition to the Jersey proposal, bids are said to have been made by Kellogg, Lummus, and a European Foster-Wheeler affiliate.

---

<sup>11</sup> Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, an economic agency established by the Italian State, which was the sole lessee for exploration, extraction, and transportation of oil and gas in the Po Valley in Italy.

---

**331. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 30, 1956.*

**SUBJECT**

Activities of Syrian Ambassador Zeineddine

*Discussion:*

Syrian Ambassador Zeineddine has made a number of speeches in this country in which he has asserted that Zionists are not wholly loyal to the country where they reside because of a higher allegiance

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.8311/7-3056. Confidential. Drafted by Burdett and Boardman on July 27 and concurred in by H.

to international political Zionism. On June 26 at Normal, Illinois, he said that, "to them (Zionists), the Jews are a nation within every nation, an American Jew is not an American primarily nor even ultimately, he is only an exile, so is a Jew of any other nation". He said he had "nothing against Jews as such, neither racial nor religious".

His activities have been sharply criticized in communications to the Department from a number of organizations and individuals. Representative Boyle (Dem., Ill.), in extended remarks in the *Congressional Record* of July 3, expressed the general tenor of these criticisms when he demanded that the Department ask the Ambassador to apologize publicly to American Jews for the remarks in his Normal speech, and, if he failed to do so satisfactorily, declare him persona non grata. Mr. Boyle referred to Dr. Zeineddine's "wild, far-sweeping, vicious falsehood".

I discussed this problem with Ambassador Zeineddine on July 11,<sup>2</sup> questioning the propriety of a foreign Ambassador publicly castigating a world movement which involved many Americans. The Ambassador maintained that he had full rights to attack international Zionism. Later he handed the Department the attached lengthy note of July 16 (Tab B)<sup>3</sup> asking that the Secretary bring it to the attention of the President and the Speaker of the House. The note protests Representative Boyle's "insult" and states that if the United States fails to take appropriate action, the Syrian Embassy and Government will do "what is proper and useful".

Ambassador Zeineddine appears in some ways anxious to pose both here and in Syria as a martyr. I believe we should try to prevent the matter from assuming significant proportions and to the extent feasible, place him in cold storage. As is evident from the attached telegram from Damascus, Ambassador Moose concurs in this view (Tab C).<sup>4</sup>

*Recommendations:*

1. That you sign the attached brief reply to the Syrian Ambassador's note (Tab A).

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the memorandum of conversation, by Boardman, and related documentation are *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 545, Syria.

<sup>3</sup> None of the tabs are attached. Zeineddine's 5-page letter with its 10-page attachment, not printed, is *ibid.*, Central Files, 601.8311/7-1656.

<sup>4</sup> The source text indicates that Tab C was telegram 193 from Damascus, July 24, 1956 (*ibid.*, 601.8311/7-2456); and telegram 106 to Damascus, July 19, 1956 (*ibid.*, 601.8311/7-1956).

2. That in the future senior officials of the Department show reluctance to receive the Ambassador.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Murphy initialed his approval.

The letter from Murphy to Zeineddine, sent on August 16, reads as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated July 16, 1956 regarding reactions to your speech of June 26, at Normal, Illinois.

"I can now assure you that the appropriate officials of the Government of the United States have taken due notice of your representations.

"The wish expressed in your note under acknowledgment to see relations between our countries enhanced is of course reciprocated.

"It might be added that, as you are no doubt aware, members of the Congress enjoy the privilege of expressing their personal views on the floor of the Congress.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my consideration.

"For the Acting Secretary of State: Robert Murphy." (*Ibid.*, 601.8311/7-1656)

---

**332. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 31, 1956.*

**SUBJECT**

Assistance from Arab States in Furthering Western Bid to Build Syrian Oil Refinery

*Discussion:*

Taking advantage of a further delay in the awarding of the contract for the construction of the Syrian Government Oil Refinery, I feel we should seek to explore with Iraq and, perhaps ultimately, with Saudi Arabia the possibility of one of these countries assisting in persuading the Syrians to accept the bid of Procon.<sup>2</sup> This is the lowest Western bid, \$1,100,000 higher than the bid of the Czechoslovakian company.

We believe, in view of Iraq's close interest in Syrian petroleum developments and its traditional desire to maintain strong influence politically in Syria, this matter should be first explored with Prime

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/8-3156. Top Secret. Drafted by Newsom, initialed by Wilkins and Rountree, and sent through S/S.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Procon Ltd. of Great Britain, a subsidiary of the U.S. firm, Procon, Inc.

Minister Nuri. The attached telegram (Tab A)<sup>3</sup> seeks to do this.

In the event that Iraq is not in a position to assist, we would plan to make a similar approach to Saudi Arabia (Tab B).<sup>4</sup> In view of traditional Iraqi suspicions toward Saudi influence in Syria and our own close relations with Iraq, we believe it advisable to present the problem first to the Iraqis.

*Recommendation:*

That you approve the attached telegram (Tab A).<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Not attached to the source text, but evidently the same as telegram 309 to Baghdad, September 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/9-156) It instructed the Embassy in Baghdad to explore with Nuri al-Said the question of how the Syrian Government might be dissuaded from accepting the Czech bid and to suggest that Nuri might be able to use diplomatic pressure combined with the possibility of a loan offer to help the refinery project or to make up the difference between the bids.

<sup>4</sup> Attached to the file copy of telegram 309 to Baghdad, but not printed. The draft telegram, evidently never sent, instructed the Embassy in Jidda to discuss with King Saud the possibility of his persuading the Syrians to accept the Procon bid.

<sup>5</sup> A notation by an unidentified hand indicates that Hoover approved transmission of the telegram to Baghdad; Hoover's name appears as the approving officer on telegram 309.

In telegram 361 from Baghdad, September 4, Gallman reported that he had reviewed the subject with Nuri al-Said and that Nuri was not prepared to make a loan offer but agreed to discuss the matter with the Syrian Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/9-456)

---

**333. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 17, 1956.*

**SUBJECT**

Syrian Refinery—Proposal for U.S. Financial Support to Selective Western Bids

*Discussion:*

Reported final bids in which the United States is most interested are as follows: Procon, \$15.7 million, Czechoslovakia, \$15.5 million, Lummus, \$14.9 million, and Ralph Parsons, \$19 million. The

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/9-1756. Secret. Drafted by Shaw and concurred in by ICA and E.

Department is unable to assess, however, just how firm the foregoing bids are and whether escalation clauses and credit terms are included. Full information on the Lummus bid is not available. The Procon bid, while said to be technically very satisfactory, lacks attraction since the Company is unable to arrange credits to finance repayment over a period of ten years.

Recent conversations with the United Kingdom on the feasibility of British supporting Procon by the loan of P.L. 480 sales proceeds, while unsuccessful in terms of interesting the British Government in financing the project, have revealed the capability of the United States supporting the Procon bid, for example, through a direct loan of the proceeds of a P.L. 480 sale. (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> The policy problems raised by such a loan are summarized in the attached memorandum which was sent to U/OP as a progress report. (Tab B) While similar conversations have not taken place with the French or Italian Governments, it is believed that the United States also has a capability of assisting bids based upon French or Italian suppliers.

In view of the strong probability that a contract will be awarded shortly after the return to Damascus, September 20, of the Egyptian engineer advising on the award, the United States should enable the three U.S. groups which have been in touch with the Department on this project to know of the United States capability of assisting through loan of foreign currencies; these include Procon, Lummus and Parsons.

Due to the vital importance of Middle East oil to the Free World, every effort must be made to secure the awarding of the Syrian refinery to a reliable Western firm. A Czech bid will provide a means of entry for 300–400 technicians and a basis for infiltrating and influencing developments in the Middle Eastern oil industry, including the oil fields and transportation facilities.

*Recommendation:*

1. That we explore the willingness of France and Italy, in addition to the United Kingdom, to utilize the proceeds of new P.L. 480 sales for a loan to the successful bidder or to earmark presently available currency for such use.

2. That, if the Governments agree, interested American firms be told of the possibility<sup>3</sup> of the United States to support their bids with foreign currencies generated from P.L. 480 sales, and

---

<sup>2</sup> None of the tabs are attached. According to the source text, Tab A was "ICA exchange telegrams London TOICA 58 and ICATO 59". (Washington National Records Center, ICA Message Files: FRC 58 A 403)

<sup>3</sup> At this point, the word "willingness" appeared in the original document, but Hoover crossed it out and inserted the word "possibility".

3. That, on the basis of this assurance, the interested companies be urged to consider<sup>4</sup> bids at the lowest feasible level.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> At this point, the words "submit firm" appeared in the original document, but Hoover crossed them out and inserted the word "consider".

<sup>5</sup> Hoover initialed approval on the source text and added the comment "subject to approval by Mr. Rountree".

---

### 334. Instruction From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria<sup>1</sup>

A-35(a)

*Washington, September 21, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Consultation with Turkish Authorities Concerning Situation in Syria

The following instruction has been sent to the Ambassador at Ankara:<sup>2</sup> The Turkish Prime Minister<sup>3</sup> recently informed . . . the Syrian situation was of great concern to Turkey. Turkey does not know what plans the United States and Great Britain have with regard to Syria, if they have any. The Turks can not be mere spectators in a situation that is of such close concern to them. It was . . . impression the Prime Minister felt he was being kept "in the dark and at arm's length" with regard to our planning on Syria. . . . recommended that the United States Government pass to the Prime Minister some information about United States plans and activities concerning Syria through Department of State . . . channels.

It is important that the Turks not gain the impression that we are purposely not consulting them in our planning for Syria. You should seek an early opportunity to inform the Turkish Prime Minister and perhaps other high level Turkish officials of United States policies and actions. You should discuss these matters with the Turks orally. . . .

You should base your oral remarks to Turkish officials on the following summary which is not to be confirmed in writing:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9-2156. Secret. Drafted by Waggoner and Wilkins, cleared by Williams, and approved by Rountree.

<sup>2</sup> The instruction to Ankara has not been found.

<sup>3</sup> Menderes.



1) The United States shares the concern of the Turkish Government over the present situation in Syria and understands the security problem which a chronically unstable, leftist-oriented Syria constitutes for Turkey. The inability of conservative political leaders to cooperate among themselves to oppose the steady swing to the left, the increasing responsiveness of Syrian Cabinets to pressure from leftist elements within and without the Army, the growing tendency to accept, as unavoidable, leftist-dominated mob rule and the increasing discouragement of those elements which are traditionally well-disposed toward Turkey and the West in general are particularly important aspects of this problem. Closer ties between Syria and the Soviet Bloc and a consequent likelihood that Syria will become more dependent politically, economically and militarily on the Soviet Bloc likewise constitute an important threat to the Turkish and Western position in Syria. Egyptian . . . activities in Syria have also promoted Soviet objectives in Syria and have served to encourage Syrian withdrawal from close relations with the West.

2) While the present policy of the Soviet Union appears to be to avoid direct intervention in Syria, the Syrian Communist Party, which is believed to include approximately 10,000 members, is a well-organized and tightly disciplined instrument available for use by the Soviets when the occasion demands. Communist infiltration of the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party, of the Army, of the labor unions and of important branches of the civil service is increasingly successful. Of particular importance is Communist influence in the State-controlled educational system. Attempts to convince the Syrian public that the Syrian Communist Party is independent of Moscow and that Communism and Arab nationalism are compatible have also been relatively successful. The Communists in Syria have been able, as a result of these and other developments, to convince many Syrians that Communism is "respectable" and constitutes no threat to the independence of Syria or to the security of most individual Syrians.

3) With the above in mind, the United States has increased its efforts to counteract leftist influence in Syria and will continue to do so. Recent efforts along those lines have included the following:

a) Recognizing the considerable influence which Saudi Arabia exercises in Syria, we have on several occasions pointed out to King Saud the dangers inherent in the Syrian situation and have urged him to use his influence to stop the drift to the left. We now have reason to believe that he is aware of the problem. . . . We believe that this change in Saudi attitude will continue and we shall take every opportunity to encourage King Saud to cooperate in opposing leftist influence in Syria;

b) A source of instability in Syria has been the conflict of Iraqi and Saudi interests there. We have encouraged and continue to encourage a rapprochement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia which, we believe, would contribute substantially to an improvement of the situation in Syria;

c) We have sought and are continuing to seek means of assisting Western firms which are bidding for the contract for construction of the Syrian national oil refinery in competition with bids from the Soviet bloc. We have discussed with the

Iraqis the possibility that they might be able to assist in securing the contract for a Western firm.

4) It is unnecessary to emphasize that we respect and will welcome Turkish views on what might be done to improve the situation in Syria. Turkey, for historical and geographic reasons, is in a unique position to know and understand Syria and the Syrians. . . .

5) We understand that conservative elements in Syria, dissatisfied with the present situation, are considering steps which might be taken to bring about an improvement. We are endeavoring to obtain more information about the activities of these conservative elements. As soon as we are more fully informed concerning this development, we will be happy to discuss the Syrian situation further with the Turkish authorities.<sup>4</sup>

. . . . .

**Dulles**

---

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 864 from Ankara, October 19, Warren reported that in the absence of Prime Minister Menderes, he had discussed the Syrian situation with Foreign Secretary Birgi, who affirmed that the Turkish diagnosis of the situation was the same as that of the United States. Birgi spoke of the need for Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom to work together and carefully assess their aims; but he was cautious in projecting what could be done in the current situation. On the one hand, he maintained that the main objective should be to cast out Russian and Egyptian influence from Syria. On the other, he cautioned against being overly optimistic and noted that while they could not achieve an ideal solution, they could obtain one better than what existed. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-1956)

---

### 335. Editorial Note

On October 29, Israeli Defense Forces invaded the Sinai Peninsula setting off a chain of events which led to Anglo-French bombardment of Egypt and occupation of the Suez Canal Zone, the blockage of the Suez Canal, and United States support in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly for resolutions calling for a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of forces.

In response to the outbreak of hostilities, the Syrian Government on November 2 severed diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France and informed the United States Government of its intention to implement the Syrian-Egyptian-Jordanian Defense Pact, which had been signed in Amman on October 24, and to place Syrian forces under the command of Egyptian General Abdel Hakim

Amer. Later the Department of State received confirmation that Syrian and Iraqi troops had entered Jordan.

Also on November 2, Nazem Al-Koudsi, acting President of Syria in the absence of Shukri al-Quwatli, who was then on a state visit to the Soviet Union, sent President Eisenhower a message thanking him and the American people “for the valiant and just stand your delegation has taken at the General Assembly session in introducing the historic draft resolution [opposing the Israeli invasion] of yesterday.” Koudsi added: “In these trying hours America never failed to support the rule of law in international society being greatly truthful to her history and traditions.”

The following day three Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) pumping stations in Syria were sabotaged, thereby further reducing the flow of Middle East oil to the West already severely impeded by blockage of the Suez Canal.

A copy of Koudsi’s message to Eisenhower is in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 545, Syria. For Eisenhower’s response expressing appreciation for Koudsi’s message, see telegram 825 to Damascus, November 4; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684.86/11–456. Reports concerning Quwatli’s visit to the Soviet Union are *ibid.*, 783.11.

### 336. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, November 3, 1956—9 p.m.*

1040. My telegram 1031.<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Asali, acting Foreign Minister Kallas and Minister Public Works Jabri requested meeting 5:00 p.m. November 3. Visibly agitated they said regretted inform me sabotage IPC appeared more serious than originally thought. They believed a pumping station seriously damaged but claimed not to know where or by whom perpetrated. Investigating proceeding with assistance army G–2.

I said I feared this news would make bad impression in US. Referring to numerous incitations to violence in Syrian press and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/11–356. Confidential; Niact. Also sent niact to Beirut, Baghdad, London, Paris, Amman, Cairo, and Ankara.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1031 from Damascus, November 3, reported, among other things, that Prime Minister Asali had acknowledged an unconfirmed report of damage to the IPC line but was unable to specify the nature of the damage or its extent or location. (*Ibid.*)

radio I noted sabotage occurred after IPC communications cut by GOS 5:00 p.m. November 2 and despite assurances given me November 1 by Prime Minister and November 2 by acting Foreign Minister<sup>3</sup> that necessary protective measures would be taken. Minister Public Works confirmed IPC communications still inoperative. Replying to question Prime Minister said he had no reason connect damage IPC line with incitement to sabotage oil installations broadcast from Cairo (Cairo Embassy telegram 92).<sup>4</sup>

I said since Syria ally of Egypt I would not ask for comment but call of Cairo radio for sabotage followed so closely by damage IPC line impelled me mention credible but unconfirmed report reaching me some time ago that certain commando-type organizations trained in sabotage were stationed in Syria but under Egyptian not Syrian control. Prime Minister said he knew of no such organizations but would follow every clue as to identity of saboteurs wherever it might lead.

I expressed hope GOS would give every facility permit early repair and resumption operation IPC line. Three Ministers asserted everything possible would be done and Minister Public Works, himself an engineer, said he would help personally if needed.

In conclusion Prime Minister promised to keep me informed as investigation proceeds.

## Moose

---

<sup>3</sup> The assurances were reported in telegram 1010 from Damascus, November 2 (*ibid.*, 883.2553/11-256); telegram 1018 from Damascus, November 2 (*ibid.*, 641.83/11-256); and telegram 1025 from Damascus, November 3 (*ibid.*, 320.5774/11-356).

<sup>4</sup> Reference is evidently in error. Telegram 1248 from Cairo, November 1, reported that the Egyptian home service on November 1 had broadcast a communiqué of the Arab Labor Confederation which appeared to call for sabotage and destruction of oil installations, military bases, ships, and planes belonging to any nation attacking Egypt. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11-156)

337. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, November 8, 1956—7 p.m.*

1104. At noon November 8 I called on Syrian President Quwwatly and presented message from President Eisenhower (Department telegram 825).<sup>2</sup> Quwwatly expressed satisfaction saying, for four months he anxiously awaited US election hoping for re-election President Eisenhower. He gave me copy congratulatory telegram which he sent directly to President Eisenhower yesterday (text will be transmitted only if Department requests). I opined President Eisenhower would appreciate Quwwatly's message.

Quwwatly delivered quite a speech condemning French and British actions (but not Russian) and praising US regard for principle and its opposition to aggression and use of force. He emphasized Arab appreciation recent US acts as well as hope for application US principles in Arabs' favor. I remarked that declaration Arabs' regard for principle of resistance to aggression and use of force had been weakened by failure of Arabs, including Syria, support USGA resolution for cease-fire at Budapest and withdrawal Russian troops from Hungary.

Showing irritation, Quwwatly said, in effect, "since World War I Arabs have been menaced by Zionism, and with unrestricted immigration into Israel threat to us grows daily. Our first duty is protect ourselves and we invoke principle of non-aggression where it serves that purpose. If principle hinders attainment of our basic aims, we care nothing about it. Situation in Hungary is not our affair, and I do not care if 50 Budapests are destroyed".

When I advanced idea that attitude of a people or government dubious if claimed justice only for itself, not for others, Quwwatly repeated same theme with perhaps added heat. I remarked that Quwwatly's was frankest exposition of this attitude I had heard, but assumed that other Arabs held similar views. Quwwatly assented.

Recalling that before his departure from Damascus Quwwatly said he was going to Moscow after arms, I inquired if mission was successful. Quwwatly replied he had secured all Syria needed adding that Syria had have arms to defend itself.

I wondered aloud if Syria would not be better off without Soviet arms, advancing idea that Nasser's success in securing Soviet

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.00/11-856. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Beirut, Jidda, London, Paris, Ankara, and Tel Aviv. Eisenhower initialed the copy of the telegram in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 335.

arms some 14 months ago set in motion chain of events which brought no profit to Nasser, Egypt, other Arab states nor to world at large. Quwwatly said he disagreed but attempted no refutation. I then recalled to Quwwatly sad case of Warsaw in latter days of World War II. Poles revolted against Germans in expectation of Russian aid which came not to help Poles but only to occupy ruins of Warsaw. Quwwatly grunted.

Concluding conversation I asked about conference of chiefs of Arab states reported in local press. Quwwatly said no time or place had yet been agreed upon and no agenda fixed.

*Comment:* Quwwatly and I were alone. If called upon to confirm his statements he would no doubt deny them or claim he had been misunderstood. It is my conviction however that he let his irritation override his usual caution and revealed what he (like many other Arabs) thinks. His recent visit to Moscow too may have had its effect.

Foregoing might be borne in mind when and if White House prepared reply to Quwwatly's message of congratulations.

**Moose**

---

**338. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 10, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Syria

PARTICIPANTS

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Department of Defense  
Mr. Gordon Gray, Department of Defense  
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State

At the end of a meeting on another matter today I had a brief discussion with Mr. Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford regarding problems which might arise in our relations with Syria and the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.83/11-1056. Top Secret. Drafted by Murphy. A note attached to the source text from Kirk to Hoover reads: "Mr. Murphy thought you might be interested in the attached memorandum reporting his conversation with Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray on the current situation in Syria."

Dulles had entered Walter Reed Hospital on November 3 for surgery and remained on leave from the Department of State until early December.

Soviet Union. Admiral Radford took the personal position that the U.S. would have to draw the line somewhere, even though he appreciated the technical right of Syria as an independent country to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union. He spoke in general terms of the need he felt for an action similar to that which this Government took in the case of Taiwan.<sup>2</sup> He stated the opinion that some form of Congressional resolution would be necessary to put the Soviet Union on notice that there is a line beyond which they cannot go.

There was a general discussion of the cloud of rumors emanating from the area concerning Syria. I took the position that we do not have the facts as yet. I referred to Ambassador Moose's conversation with President Quwwatly which indicated a trend of thought on the part of the Syrian Government which is unfavorable.<sup>3</sup> I referred especially to Quwwatly's remarks that he was not interested in what happened to Budapest and that he did not care if 50 Budapests were destroyed. The flavor of that conversation would indicate that Syria is disposed to accept assistance from the Soviet Union and may well have concluded agreements relating to military assistance and even to base rights. At the present moment, we do not have these facts. Unless we can obtain a better factual knowledge of the situation in Syria, it would be difficult to propose Congressional action such as the Admiral envisaged.

I also referred to the question regarding the stability of the Syrian Government, with the thought that changes possibly could occur in the political structure which would ease the situation.

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Joint Congressional Resolution of January 29, 1955, which authorized the President to use U.S. forces in defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. For text, see vol. II, pp. 162-163.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

### 339. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, November 14, 1956—6 p.m.*

1176. Reference: Embassy telegram 1175.<sup>2</sup> Further comment: GOS itself (1) created atmosphere favorable sabotage IPC pipeline and (2) failed signally carry out promises of protection while (3) has made no move to dismiss, apprehend or punish high GOS officials known by GOS to have participated in sabotage. Now under scarcely veiled threat reprisal GOS demands that all elements IPC (Gulbenkian<sup>3</sup> interests excepted) plus Caltex make unusual efforts remedy Syrian oil shortage.

Two points can be adduced in favor compliance:

- (1) That companies should not incur risk GOS reprisal; and
- (2) That failure of Western oil companies supply Syria's needs will cause GOS seek Soviet oil thus pushing Syria further into Soviet orbit. In my opinion, neither argument is controlling. While failure companies to do Syrian bidding might cause retaliation, there is no reasonable expectation that compliance would assure them normal or profitable operations in Syria even for short time. On contrary, trend in Syria for some time has been toward progressive limitation freedom these companies to operate. Yielding to current Syrian demands would scarcely improve the companies' prospects. Only a basic change in Syrian attitude would do that.

Tapline is in position somewhat different from that of its component parts but that compliance would provide any real safety for tapline is doubtful. Tapline has gone unscathed so far, more, it is believed, because of Egyptian and Syrian reluctance to diminish Saudi oil production (and so to decrease Saudi revenues) than because of any regard to American property.

Insofar as pushing Syria into Soviet orbit is concerned, this is believed to be an eventuality to be feared less than it is a reality to be dealt with. If the Soviet bloc wished to supply Syria with gas, oil

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/11-1456. Secret. Repeated to Beirut, Jidda, Paris, London, and Rome.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1175 from Damascus, November 14, reported in part that Syrian Minister of Public Works Jabiri had asked a Tapline official that Tapline's parent-company Aramco or its participants supply Syria with 210,000 to 240,000 tons of fuel oil and gas over the next 12 months. (*Ibid.*)

Prior to telegram 1175, several reports indicated that Syrian Intelligence Chief Lieutenant Colonel Sarraj had threatened to blow up Tapline and Aramco installations in Syria if the request were not met. (Telegram 1157 from Damascus, November 13; *ibid.*, 880.2553/11-1356; and telegram CX-140 from USARMA Beirut, November 14; *ibid.*, 883.2553/11-1456)

<sup>3</sup> The Gulbenkians were a prominent Armenian family with important financial interests in Iraqi oil.



and kerosene, it is unlikely that Syria would now demand such oil of Western companies.

The companies might refrain from any extra effort to help Syria because:

(1) Compliance may merely constitute invitation to GOS to make further demands and so hasten day when marketing companies can no longer operate in Syria;

(2) Now when Syria needs oil badly might be the best time for the companies to face the basic issue of how long they must respond to GOS demands, no matter how arbitrary; and

(3) Sabotage IPC pipeline for which GOS cannot escape large measure responsibility has put additional strain on production and distribution of oil by Western companies and GOS failure provide security oil installations or punish saboteurs should give GOS lowest priority in claims for companies' help.

*Recommendation:* That Department consider adopting attitude that IPC and Aramco and their component companies, regardless of Syrian need, should give no priority to Syrian request for gas, oil and kerosene until after GOS has taken effective action punish persons responsible for sabotage IPC line, particularly GOS officials.

Moose

---

**340. Special National Intelligence Estimate <sup>1</sup>**

SNIE 36.7-56

*Washington, November 16, 1956.***OUTLOOK FOR THE SYRIAN SITUATION****The Problem**

To assess the situation in Syria with particular reference to possible moves by: (a) the USSR; or (b) one or a combination of the following powers: the UK, France, Israel, Iraq, Turkey.

**Discussion***Syria's Present Position*

1. The highly unstable but strategically located state of Syria has long been both a major target and an active arena in the power struggles in the Middle East. While previously Soviet influence in the area was exerted chiefly through Egypt, the USSR is now focusing direct attention on Syria as well. Soviet efforts are enjoying a large measure of success, primarily because the USSR is able to cater to the desire of key elements in the army and government, backed by widespread popular opinion, for support against Israel, Iraq, and the West. Sentiment in Syria in this respect has become even more intense as a result of the attacks on Egypt by Israel, the UK, and France.

2. The latter three powers, in turn, have long been troubled—not altogether for the same reasons—over Syrian trends; and the frustrations they have recently experienced in the Middle East, taken with the USSR's current forward policy in Syria, have added substantially to their concern. Their fears are shared by Turkey and Iraq

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 16. "Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

The notes for the November 16 meeting of the IAC indicate the following concerning this special intelligence estimate: "After considerable discussion in which Mr. Armstrong, among other points, expressed the view that this paper as drafted did not adequately reflect the concern felt by the Turks under present circumstances, the paper was approved as amended." (*Ibid.*, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776) No copy of the unamended version of the paper has been found.

in particular. In various ways, each of these interested parties has in the past urged upon the US the need for action to correct the situation in Syria, and the quickening tempo of Middle East developments in the past two weeks has intensified their fears. (e.g., Turkey has made urgent representations to the US within the past few days.)

*The Present Internal Situation*

3. Those Syrian groups which lean toward the West were on the defensive even before the British-French-Israeli action in Egypt, and are now increasingly overshadowed by leftist-oriented, extreme nationalist, anti-Western politicians and their counterparts in the Syrian army. The action in Egypt appears to be solidifying control of the army—the locus of power—in the hands of the pro-Egyptian “little RCC” officer group led by Lt. Colonel Sarraj, head of Syrian intelligence, and the army followers of the leftist-oriented Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (ASRP) and the Communist Party. Despite dissension within the ASRP, the pro-Soviet elements are still in the ascendant and appear to be moving toward consolidation of their control over the government. The latter are now using their power to maintain a strict censorship of news media and to exclude all but extreme nationalist and pro-Soviet propaganda. A purge of antileftists from positions of influence may be in the making.

4. The relatively pro-Western parties—notably the Populists and Nationalists—are divided, not well-organized, and plagued by weak leadership. Although nominal conservatives hold major offices in the government, some of them, including the president and prime minister, are currently riding the leftist wave. Others are intimidated by the ever present threat of an army coup, of antigovernment demonstrations and strikes by the leftist-controlled “street” and labor unions, and by the dangers of appearing to be agents of the West or traitors to “Arabism.” Rightist army elements are not well-organized and their ranks have been weakened by dismissals, imprisonment, and transfers from positions of influence. However, a number have recently been recalled to service in the face of the Israeli threat. There are also certain regional groups that are dissatisfied with the present policies of the Syrian government, particularly the Druze minority in southern Syria which has been receiving arms from Iraq.

5. Syria represents an extremely promising target for Soviet efforts—military, political, and economic—in the Arab world. A continuation of the present trend would give the USSR a number of advantages, e.g.:

a. It would be in a position to encourage and aid Syrian blackmail and boycott tactics and further physical sabotage against

Western-owned oil pipelines transiting Syria from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Especially as long as the Western Powers are denied passage through the Suez Canal, this would be of critical importance to the USSR as a strategic and economic weapon against the West.

b. A more pro-Soviet government in Syria would further weaken the military position of the Baghdad Pact countries and raise the prospect of Turkey's being encircled.

c. Stronger Soviet influence in Syria would open up greater political and subversive opportunities in the Arab world.

d. Further Soviet influence over Syria would provide additional means of exacerbating Arab-Israeli tensions which the USSR can exploit in pursuing its pro-Arab, anti-Israeli, and anti-Western policy.

*Probable Soviet Policy Toward Syria*

6. The USSR probably regards present trends in Syria as favorable for the development of its policy in the Middle East. Any open demonstration by the USSR of control over the Syrian government would entail several serious disadvantages for the USSR. It would tend to demonstrate that the USSR was playing its own selfish ends in the area and to discredit its pose as defender of the Arab cause against the Western Powers and Israel. It would alarm many non-Communist elements in the Arab world, even within the Nasser government. It might precipitate an Israeli attack, in which the Soviets would find it difficult to intervene effectively in support of the Syrian regime. Above all, the Soviets might estimate that it would lead the US, in renewed concert with its allies, to initiate a counterstroke which might very quickly develop into a general crisis.

7. The USSR will continue to provide diplomatic, propaganda, and military assistance to the pro-Soviet elements now in the ascendancy in Syria. Such support will almost certainly include additional military equipment, technicians, and some "volunteers." Particularly if the British, French, and Israelis appear to be defying the UN, the USSR might send "volunteers" in larger numbers.

8. In the event that Britain, France, Iraq, Israel, or Turkey—singly or in some combination—attempted to intervene forcibly to alter the present Syrian regime, the USSR would probably give what aid it could to support its adherents in Syria, though probably not to the extent of committing regular Soviet units. The USSR would align itself with UN action against aggression, and seek to play the same role it did in the case of the attack on Egypt, in the hope of reaping similar benefits in the Arab world.

9. The USSR would probably estimate that open and forceful intervention by the anti-Communist powers in Syria would offer disadvantages to the parties involved: to Britain, France, and Israel by increasing their isolation in world opinion and marking them more clearly as aggressors; and to the Nuri regime by further

isolating it from the Arab world and probably increasing its internal problems. The USSR, on the other hand, would be in a position to increase still further the number of its adherents in Arab countries.

10. Aircraft and armor have been furnished by the Bloc to the Syrian government.<sup>2</sup> We have no firm evidence to support reports that large quantities of Soviet air and armored equipment and personnel have arrived in Syria. In fact, no significant quantities of assembled aircraft had been introduced by as late as 12 November. However, deliveries of unidentified military equipment are continuing.

*Probable Action of Other Interested Parties*

11. There is a greater likelihood of drastic overt moves to influence the Syrian situation by one or more of the directly interested powers other than the USSR. For varying reasons, the UK, France, Turkey, Israel, and Iraq all have strong incentives to intervene to retrieve the situation in Syria. While all of them would welcome US participation and support in strong measures to check or counter the leftward trends in Syria, they might, individually or in some combination, seek to deal with the problem by themselves if US support for a solution does not appear to be in prospect. In such an event, there might again be efforts to conceal essential preparations from the US and other nonparticipants.

12. Whether or not one or more of these states intervenes in Syria will depend in part on: (a) the shifting judgment and moods of the various national leaders (and of their respective public opinions) in a still highly fluid situation; (b) the feasibility of less drastic courses of action; (c) their estimates of the probable reaction of the US and the USSR; and (d) the degree of success obtained in organizing and holding together the disparate Syrian elements whose support would be needed. In general, we see the following as the principal possibilities of major non-Soviet intervention in Syria:

a. The Nuri government in Iraq, with covert support of the UK, might seek to organize the overthrow of the present leadership in the Syrian government and army, perhaps using Iraqi troops to support an ostensibly indigenous coup. France, acting through Shishakli, might lend covert support to this action. In such an event, Turkey would probably exert military pressure along Syria's northern frontiers but would probably not intervene overtly. We think it unlikely that such a coup could succeed.

b. Israel, with French encouragement, might attack Syria on its own. However, in their present state of international isolation, the

---

<sup>2</sup> These include an estimated 20–25 MIG–15 fighters—delivered in Egypt; 130 T 34 tanks; and more than 200 armored personnel carriers. [Footnote in the source text.]

Israelis probably feel it best for the time being to avoid acts which would bring renewed pressures from the USSR, the US, and the UN.

c. Syrian noncooperation with respect to repair and future use of the oil pipelines might eventually cause the UK, Iraq, and France to employ force as a last resort, but they are unlikely to do so at this stage.

d. In the event of a serious Soviet military buildup in Syria, the UK, France, Israel, Iraq, and Turkey might, in some combination, attack. Under such circumstances, the powers concerned would almost certainly seek and expect to obtain US support.

### 341. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington 17, 1956<sup>1</sup>

#### SUBJECT

Call by French Ambassador on Mr. Murphy

#### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Robert D. Murphy—G

Mr. William R. Tyler—WE

Mr. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador

Mr. Charles Lucet, French Minister

Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, French Counselor

[Here follows discussion regarding Israel and Egypt.]

The Ambassador then discussed the problem of Syria, in response to the Department's previous questions on this subject. He said that the French Government has no plan for action with regard to Syria, but that it has been speculating on what might be done in view of the seriousness of the situation in that country. He said that Syria is becoming increasingly a tool of the Soviet Union, and that something must be done. . . . He said that France would like to discuss the Syrian situation and obtain our views. Mr. Murphy asked whether the French had held talks with the British on this subject and the Ambassador replied affirmatively, but said that these had not gone far. He asked Mr. Murphy what the policy of the United States was with regard to Syria. Mr. Murphy said that we were presently engaged in an appraisal of the situation, pending the outcome of which he was not in a position to say what our policy was. However, we did feel that it was definitely undesirable that

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/11-1756. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler.

any action with regard to Syria be taken. The Ambassador said that, nevertheless, the West must not appease the Soviet Union in that area. Mr. Murphy stressed the danger of undertaking any step which would set off a reaction. He added that there was a difference between appeasement and bad judgment.

[Here follows discussion regarding Egypt and the Suez Canal situation.]

---

**342. Memorandum of Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 30, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a list of participants and the first part of the agenda item entitled "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," which contained a briefing by Allen Dulles.]

Mr. Dulles described the drift to the left in Syria as continuing and, indeed, becoming bolder. The leftists have arrested five conservative members of the Syrian parliament, and are in general not hesitating to use force in order to intimidate the opposition. After citing the delivery figures of Soviet matériel to Syria, Mr. Dulles indicated that Kuwatly had asked for still more on the occasion of his recent visit to Moscow. In addition to the Soviet matériel, there was hard intelligence to indicate the presence in Syria of a considerable number of technical personnel. Since November 1, however, there was no real evidence that heavy Soviet military equipment had been delivered to Syria from the USSR, despite so many rumors to the contrary. In any case, these rumors have seriously alarmed Turkey. Turkey might well intervene in Syria if it came to the conclusion that its own national security was endangered. Such intervention was unlikely unless the situation in Syria became really chaotic. Mr. Dulles said he also doubted the imminence of an Israeli attack on Syria, despite the speed and ease with which such an attack could be mounted if a decision to make the attack were made. He indicated that he was watching this situation very closely.

Mr. Dulles stated that the Iraqis were also in a position to intervene in Syria, but said he was inclined to think that Nuri's

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

position was too shaky at the present time to permit any open Iraqi intervention in Syria.

[Here follow the remainder of Dulles' briefing and discussion of the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

343. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 13, 1956—8:58 p.m.*

1083. Embtel 1420.<sup>2</sup> Present following note urgently to PriMin-ister:

"I have honor refer Your Excellency's assurances given me November 3<sup>3</sup> that GOS would investigate sabotage of Iraq Petroleum Company Pipeline, wherever clues might lead, that they would keep me informed progress investigation, and that they would give every facility for early repair and resumption operation line. I am now instructed inform Your Excellency that USG considers this statement as promise on part of GOS and confidently expects GOS fulfill its commitment. I understand that GOS is in receipt letter from IPC requesting permission for entry survey party in connection with steps to restore pipeline to operation as rapidly as possible.

Reopening of pipeline in which important US interests are involved, is urgently necessary in view of acute problems resulting from shortage of oil in Europe, NE, and Asia arising out of closure Suez Canal and IPC line. In connection with withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt as result of UN action strongly supported by USG, Govt of Egypt is cooperating with UN in preliminary steps designed to reopen Suez Canal. View of USG that there is no

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/12-1156. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell; cleared with Wilkins; and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris (priority), and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1420 from Damascus, December 11, Ambassador Moose reported that, according to Syrian Prime Minister Asali, Syria preferred to wait "until after Christmas", that is until after foreign troops withdrew from Egypt, before it would approve an IPC request to repair its pipeline. Moose advised the Department that it was believed that a word from Nasser through military channels would secure a prompt Syrian approval of the proposed IPC action; and he offered several suggestions on making another approach to Asali. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 336.



justification for GOS not to take similar steps immediately with reference to IPC pipeline. USG confident GOS would not deliberately stand in way of measures which would assist in restoring normalcy to NE and strengthening regional stability, and which would assist nations of world as well as sister Arab states in their oil supply problems.

USG, which has convincingly revealed its deep interest in security of states of NE in its actions taken with regard to recent hostilities, now in most friendly fashion calls upon GOS to play its part in restoring normal conditions in NE by offering prompt and complete cooperation in connection with efforts to repair pipeline, which was sabotaged, as I have been informed by GOS, against Government's orders and contrary to its desires."<sup>4</sup>

While Department does not believe it wise Cairo request GOE assistance re GOS, substance foregoing note might be used as appropriate in any pertinent discussions with GOE. Department approaching certain governments to suggest they urge upon Syria same action.<sup>5</sup> In addition, Acting Secretary calling in Syrian Chargé to make similar representation.<sup>6</sup>

**Hoover**

---

<sup>4</sup> Moose delivered this message to Asali on December 15. (Telegram 1459 from Damascus, December 15; Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/12-1556) On December 17, Asali informed Moose that, while IPC would be allowed to repair the pipeline, the oil would not be permitted to "flow" until French, British, and Israeli troops had withdrawn from territory taken in the recent conflict. (Telegram 1473 from Damascus, December 17; *ibid.*, 883.2553/12-1756) On December 26, however, the Syrian Government issued a statement indicating that it had informed IPC representatives that their company could inspect the damage and make estimates related to repairing the pipeline, but that the Syrian Government would not discuss the subject of repair and permit the flow of oil until the evacuation of "aggressive Jewish forces from Sinai and Gaza and their implementation of UN Resolutions." (Telegram 1562 from Damascus, December 27; *ibid.*, 883.2553/12-2756)

<sup>5</sup> On December 13, the Department instructed its Embassies in Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey to inform the host foreign offices that the U.S. Government was seriously disturbed by Syrian reluctance to cooperate with the IPC in measures to reopen the pipeline and would find it extremely helpful if the host governments would make urgent representations to the Syrian Government in this matter. (Circular telegram 498; *ibid.*, 883.2553/12-1356)

<sup>6</sup> Hoover made the representations to Syrian Ambassador Farid Zeineddine on December 14. The memorandum of that conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 883.2553/12-1456)

344. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, January 11, 1957.*

1671. Following is translation text official release Jan 10:

"Syrian Government has read President Eisenhower's statement addressed to Congress January 5, 1957. While it welcomes that part of statement regarding US support, without reservation, of full sovereignty and independence of Middle East nations, Syrian Government should, however, state following:

"First—Syrian Government rejects theory that presence economic interests for a state or group of states in any area of world grants it or them right interfere in affairs that area in order protect those interests; this theory openly conflicts with principles of respect of sovereignty, which should be taken as a basis for relations between states and on which UN Charter based.

"Second—Syrian Government considers theory of vacuum is artificial theory that imperialism uses as instrument to justify its interference and domination. Government categorically rejects this theory because there is no vacuum in M. E. area since its states have acquired their freedom and independence. In addition, Arab states alone are owners of natural right of defending their independence, unity of their territory, and of exercising their full sovereignty without any control or foreign influence.

"Third—remote historic events and recent events which continue to live in minds of whole world prove in conclusive manner that there is no trace of international communist danger in our country threatening its safety, independence, and freedom. Established facts, on contrary, absolutely prove that trouble in Arab country and possibility of aggression against it are caused only by and only come from imperialism and Zionism. Perhaps a watcher of these events would trace their origin to a long history which ends with establishment of Israel in heart of Arab country. Imperialist and Zionist greeds have indeed been openly proved by collaboration of these two menaces in last aggression on Egypt.

"It is to be regretted that President Eisenhower overlooked reference to this important international event toward which America itself and President have taken stand worthy of appreciation and that aggressive states described as governments and peoples who had decent respect for opinions of mankind.

"While pointing out seriousness of Eisenhower's statement, Syrian Government announces its firm belief that task of preserving peace and security in M. E. is responsibility of inhabitants of this

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/1-1157. Priority. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission.

area, who alone have the right of defending themselves against any danger threatening them irrespective its origin."<sup>2</sup>

**Moose**

---

<sup>2</sup>In a separate telegram, the Embassy in Damascus reported that according to Ghalib Kayyali, the Syrian statement was "favorable" in that it did not constitute a flat rejection, left the door open for further Syrian consideration of the Eisenhower program, and was the best of 10 drafts considered by the Syrian Cabinet. Moose commented that it would be best for the Department to show no surprise or concern over the Syrian declaration. (Telegram 1676, January 12; *ibid.*, 611.80/1-1257)

---

**345. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Damascus, January 26, 1957—10 a.m.*

1761. Prime Minister Assali called me to Foreign Ministry morning January 25 to say GOS had just learned why Amir Abdul Ilah Iraqi Crown Prince accompanied by Iraqi notables representing Sunni Shii and Kurdish elements was making visits to Ankara, Beirut, London and Washington. Abdul Ilah is promoting plan said Sabri Bey whereby Iraq would intervene militarily in Syria, place Abdul Ilah on Syrian throne and divide Jordan between Iraq and Syria, restore IPC pipeline operation and establish order including close Syro-Iraqi relationship under aegis House of Hashim. President Chamoun of Lebanon continued Prime Minister had given scheme his blessing and Abdul Ilah was seeking support in other capitals mentioned.

Prime Minister recounted conversation January 23 when Iraq Minister Rawi told him that Iraq not pleased with Syrian attitude toward Iraq generally and with Syrian attitude toward resumption IPC pumping operations in particular. Recalling that there can be no more short profitable wars Prime Minister expressed hope USG would discourage Abdul Ilah and any allies he might have found.

Prime Minister professed desire cooperate with USG and repeated that he favored resumption of IPC operations (under threat of further interruption) but that his Ministers not all of this opinion

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.87/1-2657. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Ankara, London, and Paris.

(Embtel 5712<sup>2</sup>) and expressed determination of Israeli Government impose own conditions on evacuation Gaza Strip and Aqaba Gulf coast weakened his arguments. When I replied Minister State Khalid Al Azm shared his views I (Embtel 1680<sup>3</sup>) and the two of them should wield much influence in Cabinet, Prime Minister said he had some hope of obtaining Cabinet concurrence in three-four days. He indicated that Syrian need for IPC revenue was important factor.

I noted that plan attributed to Abdul Ilah was not new and that Colonel Shishakli had brought it to attention USG as long ago 1953. I expressed hope report was not revival of old rumor nor new rumor of Soviet origin. I recalled that Foreign Minister Bitar had asked me transmit to Washington more than one alarming but unfounded report circulated by Tass Agency. Prime Minister quickly replied report received yesterday from Cairo and so not of Russian origin.

In response to question Prime Minister asserted he had discussed report with Azm only, but he would discuss it with Soviet Ambassador Nemtchina and with authorities of Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

I said I would report conversation to Department promptly and would of course inform Prime Minister of any reaction from Washington. I recalled first of general principles guiding US policy in NE (Depcirtel 426<sup>4</sup>) and wondered if it would be applicable to situation such as he described. On other hand, I expressed belief USG could hardly object if majority Syrian people wanted Abdul Ilah as King. Prime Minister laughed and said such contingency too remote to merit consideration.

*Comment:* I do not share Prime Minister's easy confidence that report cannot be of Russian origin because it came from Cairo. In fact, because it came from Cairo I consider it only slightly less suspect than if it had come directly from Moscow.

Department may wish me to reply orally to Prime Minister that Syria might first endeavor compose its differences with Iraq by (1)

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to telegram 1712 from Damascus, January 17. (*Ibid.*, 883.2553/1-1757)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.83/1-1257)

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

authorizing IPC to resume operations and (2) abandoning its policy of vilifying Iraq.<sup>5</sup>

**Moose**

---

<sup>5</sup> On January 28, the Department responded to telegram 1761 as follows:

“In oral reply to Asali you might suggest that instead of contributing to spread of unfounded reports which increase divisions between states in area, GOS should contribute to stability and reduction of tensions by endeavoring to compose its differences with Iraq. Steps GOS could take include authorizing IPC to resume operations and cessation anti-Iraqi press and radio campaigns.”

This message was sent erroneously to Beirut as telegram 2703. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.87/1-2657). On January 30, the Department redirected the message priority to Damascus for action. (*Ibid.*, 683.87/1-3057)

---

#### 346. Editorial Note

Between January 30 and February 8, Saudi Arabian King Saud and other Saudi dignitaries visited Washington and held extensive discussions with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other high-ranking United States officials. For documentation on the Saud visit, including memoranda of discussions concerning the Syrian situation, see Documents 256 ff.

---

#### 347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 27, 1957—6:29 p.m.*

2878. For Ambassador.<sup>2</sup> While King Saud is in Cairo<sup>3</sup> and preferably in context of discussion about other ME matters you should orally refer to group prominent Syrians sentenced to death

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/2-2757. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wilkins and Rockwell and cleared by Rountree who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Raymond Hare.

<sup>3</sup> King Saud was in Cairo, February 24–27, attending a conference with President Nasser, King Hussein, and President Quwatli.

for alleged plotting against GOS.<sup>4</sup> To avoid leaving King Saud with undesirable impression you should not indicate you are speaking under instructions. Your comments might be cast along following lines:

Recall discussions in Washington in which we set forth our deep concern re increasing Communist penetration Syria and leftward swing GOS. Add you believe manner in which trial these individuals conducted and severity of sentences disturbingly similar Communist practices. Recall that important feature of Communist take-over in Eastern European countries now satellites was trumped-up trial and execution of patriotic and truly nationalist elements. Add that at this moment when solutions to difficult ME problems are being sought execution these individuals will reflect unfavorably upon Syria and whole Arab people. Express your hope that His Majesty may be willing use his influence urge upon GOS that matter be handled in accordance universal principles of justice.<sup>5</sup>

. . . . .

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> On January 8, the trial began in Damascus of 47 Syrian political figures (18 in absentia) charged with plotting to overthrow the current government and establish a pro-Iraqi one. On February 26, 11 Syrians and 1 Lebanese were sentenced to death (6 in absentia); 3 were acquitted; and 30 were given prison sentences. For documentation containing reports of the trial, see Department of State, Central Files 783.00 and 783.551. A French translation of the bill of indictment, issued on December 22, 1956, which linked the alleged conspirators with certain Iraqi officials, is attached to despatch 303 from Damascus, January 10. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/1-1057) In despatch 303, Moose noted that "to date there has been no apparent intention on the part of the Syrian authorities to implicate the United States."

Subsequent to these developments, the Iraqi Government requested that the United States intervene on behalf of the Syrian political leaders condemned to death. On February 27, Rountree informed Ambassador Shabandar that the Department believed that a U.S. approach to Syria would be ineffectual, but that it had instructed Ambassador Hare to discuss the matter discreetly with King Saud. (Memorandum of conversation by Newsom, February 27, 1957; *ibid.*, 783.00/2-2757)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 2878 arrived in Cairo subsequent to King Saud's departure, and consequently the Department directed the Embassy in Jidda to take the action requested. (Telegram 344 to Dhahran, March 2; *ibid.*, 783.00/3-257) On March 3, Embassy Counselor Alfred Jenkins discussed the matter with King Saud who responded positively. (Telegram 418 from Dhahran, March 5; *ibid.*, 783.00/3-457) On March 6, the Syrian Government announced that the death sentences for five conspirators had been commuted to life imprisonment. (Telegram 2039 from Damascus; *ibid.*, 783.551/3-657)

**348. Editorial Note**

On March 4, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion announced to the Knesset that Israel would withdraw its forces from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. On March 6, the IPC representative in Syria reported to the Embassy in Damascus that Syrian Prime Minister Asali had authorized forthwith that repairs be made on the IPC pipelines in Syria. (Telegram 4674 from Damascus, March 6; Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/3–657) One week later, the Embassy in Baghdad reported that according to the Iraqi Economic Ministry the pumping of oil through the IPC trans-Syrian pipeline had begun on March 11. (Telegram 1507 from Baghdad, March 12; *ibid.*, 880.2553/3–1257)

---

**349. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 18, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

Syrian Refinery

During the past year the United States has followed closely the competition between Western firms and the Soviet Bloc for construction of a government-owned refinery in Syria. A number of deadlines for submission of bids have come and gone, and the award has not yet been made. The latest information (Tab A) <sup>2</sup> is that the Minister of Public Works was authorized about March 6 to sign an agreement with the Czechs. The delay is reported to be due to the efforts of Syria to reduce the interest rate from 3½ to 3 percent.

*What we know about the Czech offer:* The Czech bid reportedly amounts to 54 million Syrian pounds (\$15,126,000) to be paid over a period of 10 years. The interest rate set on the amount covered by loan, perhaps as high as 50 percent, is 3½ percent. The Czechs are also reported to be prepared to take Syrian pounds. The latter point

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 883.2553/3–1857. Secret. Drafted by Shaw and Rockwell on March 15.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2035 from Damascus, March 6, not printed.

is stated to be an important reason inclining the Government of Syria to the Czech proposal.

*The Western offer:* The principal Western bid is that of Procon. This firm, if successful, will probably construct the plant in conjunction with an Italian consortium in which Ansaldo would be the prime mover. Hydrocarbon, an American engineering firm which is associated with the Mannesman Company of Duesseldorf, is reported from time to time to be still interested in the project, but is now in serious need of financial assistance. The Procon offer amounts to 56 million Syrian pounds (\$15,500,000); 30 percent is to be repaid during the period of construction and the remaining 70 percent financed over a period of 12 years at an interest rate of  $3\frac{1}{4}$  percent. The current favorable financial terms have been made possible by the willingness of the Government of Italy (Tab B)<sup>3</sup> to improve the financing which was made available as the result of the sale of P.L. 480 commodities to Italy in October 1956 which generated 6.875 billion lire (\$11 million).

*U.S. assistance to date:* The question of whether the U.S. should extend assistance to a Western offer has been thoroughly discussed within the Department. As a result of an examination of this problem last fall, the Under Secretary approved the utilization of the proceeds from possible new P.L. 480 sales for a loan to the successful bidder (Tab C).<sup>4</sup> As a result of this authority, the \$11 million fund referred to above was developed.

*Additional assistance:* The question as to whether the U.S. should give further financial help involves a number of considerations:  
Arguments against:

1. The Czech objectives are solely political; the Czechs could be expected to meet a reduction in the Western offer.

2. The U.S. Government has not historically subsidized commercial ventures for political objectives; a precedent would be established by a direct subsidy of the Western offer in this case.

3. With respect to petroleum development, the U.S. Government has followed a policy of giving no financial assistance to investments in this field since the industry itself has heretofore demonstrated a capability to finance new projects. The U.S. also has favored private ownership of refinery and production facilities where private companies are interested. (ESSO expressed an interest in building its own refinery in Syria about a year ago.)

4. As the result of the new Italian offer and other developments, Procon now has the capability of prolonging GOS deliberations on the award. These capabilities are as follows:

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 3611 from Rome, March 12, not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Not attached to the source text. Tab C was presumably the memorandum from Rountree to Hoover, Document 333.



a. The company has launched an advertising campaign to inform the Syrian people that Procon is U.S., not British, owned and has a considerable reputation in the construction of refineries. Moreover, that it is interested in the Syrian project.

b. The local agent of Procon has been instructed to discuss with officials the feasibility of some type of operating arrangement. (Procon is not interested in operating refineries, but is willing to use this idea as a means of prolonging the conversations, and hopes it may be able to interest someone else in a management contract.)

c. Within the past few days Procon has authorized a reduction in the interest rate on its offer from  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to  $3\frac{3}{4}$  percent and an extension of the repayment period from 10 to 12 years.

5. Even if the contract is lost to the Czechs, there is a possibility of going to the courts to contend Procon holds a valid letter of intent from the government which is being violated.

Arguments in favor of additional U.S. assistance:

1. The Procon bid exceeds the Czech offer and is likely to fail. A grant by the U.S. Government would enable Procon to reduce its asking price substantially below that which is being quoted by Czechoslovakia. Mr. Whyte, President of Procon, believes that their price would have to be dropped by at least 10 percent (\$1.5 million) in order to dramatically impress Syrian officials.

2. If the refinery contract were awarded to Procon as a result of a U.S. subsidy to Procon, a gain for the U.S. would have been made in the area, and a bridgehead would have been denied the Communists. If the Czechs get the contract, the Communists will have gained an opportunity for penetration and subversion activities in an industry of the Near East of critical importance to the West.

3. A decision on the part of the Syrian Government to award this project to a Western firm is likely to bring on a Government crisis. This might or might not be beneficial to Western objectives. If the crisis resulted in a new government favorable to the West, the \$1.5 million involved would have been well spent. If unsuccessful, the government would take on an even more leftist character and the contract would probably be awarded to the Czechs anyway; thus the additional financing would not be necessary.

4. If the Czechs underbid a new Procon offer based on U.S. assistance, we will have lost nothing and the frankly political nature of the Czech competition would be more clearly revealed. If the Czechs do not underbid a new U.S. offer, but the GOS still doesn't accept the U.S. bid, the anti-West policy of the GOS would be brought home to the world and to the Syrian people, who might be stirred to some kind of pressure or action against a government which so blatantly disregarded national interests.

*Recommendation:*

On balance we believe it would be desirable to give some additional U.S. assistance to Procon, probably not the substantial amount recommended by Procon, but sufficient to bring Procon

under the Czech offer (at least \$500,000). If you agree in principle, we would like to explore the possibilities within the government.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> A marginal notation by Murphy on the source text reads: "OK RM".

On March 18, the Embassy in Damascus reported that on the evening of March 16 Syrian Public Works Minister Kayali announced the signature of a contract with the Czechs, providing for the construction of the refinery for 5,420,000 pounds sterling at 3 percent interest. (Telegram 2128, Department of State, Central Files, 883.3932/3-1857)

A copy of a memorandum from Siracusa (ARA/OSA) to Rubottom, January 10, 1958, attached to the source text, reads as follows:

"Mr. Murphy agreed in principle with an NEA proposal to explore within our government the feasibility of using government funds to subsidize a western petroleum consortium to enable it to underbid Czechoslovakia on a contract to build a refinery for the Syrian Government. We did not actually execute this proposal because things moved too fast and the Czechs got the bid.

"To the extent that this idea won approval in the government, it constitutes a precedent for the use of public funds in the general petroleum industry area when the objective is to meet communist competition and combat its penetration."

---

### 350. Editorial Note

On April 10, King Hussein of Jordan, responding to leftist threats to his rule, dismissed Prime Minister Sulayman Nabulsi and moved to place his country more firmly in the Western camp, thereby precipitating a major crisis within Jordan. On April 13, the Syrian Government, which reputedly was involved in intrigues against the Hashemite Monarchy, moved armored forces into northern Jordan. That same day, Hussein dismissed Jordanian Chief of Staff General Ali Abu Nuwar who fled to Syria.

The Department of State on April 24 instructed Ambassador Warren to inform Turkish Prime Minister Menderes of United States concern that the Syrians might take advantage of the current crisis to intervene overtly in Jordan. (Telegram 2501 to Ankara; Department of State, Central Files, 782.54/4-2457) Following a request from King Hussein on May 20, the Syrian Government between May 23 and 27 withdrew its troops stationed in Jordan since the Suez Crisis. (Telegram 1637 from Amman, May 22; *ibid.*, 683.85/5-2257; telegram 1647 from Amman, May 23; *ibid.*, 683.85/5-2357; and telegram 2858 from Damascus, May 28; *ibid.*, 683.85/5-2857)

For information on the Jordanian crisis of April-May 1957, see Documents 26 ff.

### 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Damascus, May 17, 1957—5 p.m.*

2779. Two weeks after by-elections <sup>2</sup> Syria reflects further entrenchment leftist control government, strong criticism of government policy by disorganized but vocal opposition, continuing leftist ascendancy in army, stagnant business conditions partially relieved by prospects excellent harvests, increased isolation from all neighbors and increased economic, military and political intercourse with Soviet bloc.

[Here follows a detailed analysis of recent developments concerning Syrian political parties, the Syrian economy, the Syrian Army, and the Syrian Government in general.]

5. Conclusion. Pro-Western and moderate elements continue to lose ground to increasingly entrenched ASRP-Communist-fellow traveler-opportunist vanguard of proletariat which using self-induced isolation to snuggle up close to Soviet protector in economic, military, political affairs. Battle against Israel now phrased in terms of battle against imperialist US and its imperialist satellites with Soviet Union depicted as only source of strength. USSR policies of establishing influence over military by arms deal and over politicians by support in UN and outside against Zionism and colonialism (imperialism) have been effective. Syria has willfully become base for anti-American propaganda, leftist penetration of labor, sabotage and Communist activity throughout area. Centers of resistance are elements of army suspicious of Soviet Union and Communism, some large landholding families, some Moslem and Christian religious leaders, businessmen. However, opposition shows no sign of competent and courageous leadership nor of spirit of sacrifice and hard work in ranks.

6. Recommendation. View GOS readiness follow USSR Department may wish study possibility diverting Arab and world attention from Egypt to Syria as Soviet tool and base of Communist operations in Near East, and contrast with courageous Jordanian defense of independence willingness even desire Syrian ruling elements submit to Soviet domination.

**Moose**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/5-1757. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Aleppo, London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> During the Syrian by-elections held on May 4, 1957, three Syrians with Ba-th Party connections were elected to the Chamber of Deputies.

---

**352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 28, 1957—7:40 p.m.*

2270. Thoughtful analysis recent political developments Syria contained Embtel 2779 <sup>2</sup> most helpful in assessing present US position Syria and providing basis for consideration possible courses action. We particularly concerned over evidence growing Soviet influence. In general discussion Middle East at Bonn NATO meeting <sup>3</sup> Secretary stated view USSR at least endeavoring covertly establish Communist domination ME and said it may have succeeded in one case (Syria).

We believe our actions with regard Syria should be within context relations which are correct but neither friendly nor helpful. Our present thinking is that we should continue maintain minimum official contacts with GOS while endeavoring discreetly encourage elements opposed present GOS policies (numbered paragraph 5 reftel) but in general avoiding giving impression we attach great importance to our position in Syria or GOS reaction to US acts. Specifically we contemplate either delaying action on GOS requests for assistance (atomic energy agreement if and when requested, aircraft spare parts) or assigning low priority such requests. . . . We considering suspension exchange program. We studying your recommendation re limiting travel Syrian Embassy personnel and will welcome further suggestions re actions we could take which might have desirable repercussions in Syria. We also believe your suggestion re diverting attention from Egypt to Syria has merit (numbered paragraph 6 reftel) and are considering how it might most effectively be implemented.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/5-1757. Secret. Drafted by Waggoner and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Aleppo, London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the NATO meeting of May 2.

**353. Despatch From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

No. 18

*Damascus, July 15, 1957.*

## SUBJECT

Embassy-Foreign Office Discussions of United States-Syrian Relations

The Embassy transmits herewith a memorandum of my conversations of June 24 and June 27, 1957 with Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bitar at which senior officials of the Foreign Office and the Embassy were present. The purpose of the conversations, held at the instance of the Foreign Minister, was to clarify outstanding issues between the United States and Syria as a basis for discussion during my forthcoming consultation in the Department.

The first conversation was dominated by a discussion of Arab unity, whereas the second dealt with so-called "causes of misunderstanding" namely (a) Israel, (b) Aqaba,<sup>2</sup> (c) the American Doctrine,<sup>3</sup> (d) American economic aid and (e) Algeria.

The Syrian viewpoints expressed during the conversation were for the most part repetitions of familiar arguments which the Syrian Government employs to attack American policy. An outstanding omission was the failure of the Syrians directly to attack the Baghdad Pact (though perhaps frequent references to United States support of "reactionary" regimes could be construed as an indirect assault on the Pact). The Embassy attaches no particular significance to the omission, which may have been oversight.

The highlight of the conversation was a rather clear revelation of Syrian objectives vis-à-vis Israel. Foreign Minister Bitar's statement that though the Arabs do not ask the destruction of Israel or elimination of the Jewish community, they do seek to change the character of the Zionist, and what they consider to be the expansionist regime in Israel could be taken as a frank recognition that Arab military power is insufficient to overwhelm Israel. However, by forcing the return of the Arab refugees as a large disaffected element to Israel, by stopping Jewish immigration and—the Embassy would add—by a tight maintenance of the Arab economic boycott, the Foreign Minister and like-minded associates hope to cause a basic change in the nature of the state of Israel.

Subsequent to preparation of this despatch a note has been received from the Foreign Office enclosing an aide-mémoire summa-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83/7-1557. Confidential. Drafted by Barrow.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Arab complaints over Israeli transit through the Gulf of Aqaba.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

rizing the points raised in the conversation. As soon as a translation is completed, the text will be compared with the attached memorandum and a separate report made to the Department.<sup>4</sup>

James S. Moose, Jr.

[Enclosure]

**Memorandum of Conversations, American Embassy,  
Damascus, June 24 and 27, 1957**

PARTICIPANTS

*For Syria*

H.E. Salah al-Din Bitar, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Salah al-Din Tarazi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Ghalib Kayyali, Director of Western and Eastern Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

*For the United States*

Ambassador James S. Moose, Jr.

Robert C. Strong, Counselor of Embassy

Richard Funkhouser, First Secretary of Embassy

John R. Barrow, Second Secretary of Embassy

SUBJECT

Improvement of United States-Syrian Relations

*I. Conversation of June 24, 1957*

Prior to Ambassador Moose's departure for consultations and home leave, Foreign Minister Bitar expressed a desire that two sessions of talks be held to determine the areas where American and Syrian policies are in conflict and to seek means by which differences could be composed. Bitar asked Ambassador Moose to begin by outlining the basic elements of American policy.

Ambassador Moose said that the United States, having observed the extension of communist influence by methods of force and subversion in different areas of the world, stands ready to help nations of the Middle East—who regard the communist menace as we do and who express a desire for such help—to safeguard their independence. Therefore if we could agree in principle on (a) the

<sup>4</sup> The Department's report of July 29 is *infra*. A translation of the Syrian aide-mémoire attached to the report is not printed.

existence of a communist threat and (b) the desirability of safeguarding the independence of Middle Eastern nations, it might then be possible to proceed to agreements on matters of more limited scope.

Foreign Minister Bitar introduced the question of the Richards Mission stating he had been "astonished" to learn that the Mission was dissatisfied with the welcome extended by the Syrian Government.<sup>5</sup> The Ambassador briefly but frankly recalled the official, semi-official and controlled press attacks on the American Doctrine which had served to tie the Government's hands and eliminate the possibility of fruitful negotiation. The Syrian officials offered no rebuttal.

Bitar then raised the question of "Arab unity", which dominated the conversation for the remainder of the session of approximately three hours. The main points which emerged during Bitar's presentation were:

(1) Arab unity is a basic and essential urge among the Arab people;

(2) That urge must be given expression through "democratic", as opposed to "authoritarian", processes;

(3) It would be to the advantage of the United States to encourage Arab unity for the following reasons:

(a) A unified Arab world would have the strength to safeguard Arab independence;

(b) A unified Arab world would have the ability to resist penetration of communism or other foreign ideologies;

(c) A unified Arab world would have the capacity to protect oil, pipelines and communication routes.<sup>6</sup>

Ambassador Moose stated he knew of no change in American policy on Arab unity since it was defined circa 1951 by the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson: the United States would not oppose unions of Arab countries provided they were in accordance with the desires of the governments and peoples concerned.

<sup>5</sup> On April 23, Secretary Dulles instructed Ambassador James P. Richards, Special Assistant to the President who had been visiting Middle Eastern countries to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine, to forego for the immediate future visits to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. One week later, on April 30, Dulles informed Richards that he and President Eisenhower had decided to drop these countries entirely from Richards' itinerary. In regard to removing Syria from the itinerary, Dulles explained that given current circumstances the situation in Syria was not conducive to a successful visit. (Telegram 65 to Asmara, April 23; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-2357; and telegram 3901 to Athens, April 30; *ibid.*, 120.1580/4-3057)

<sup>6</sup> This point was added at the request of Mr. Kayyali on June 25, 1957. [Footnote in the source text.]

Bitar thought this policy to be too passive and conducive to division rather than unity. He urged that the United States actively promote Arab unity.

Ambassador Moose replied that it would be exceedingly difficult for the United States to assume an active role in advance of agreement among the Arab states themselves. Recent events did not encourage the belief that the Arab states were moving closer together. However, should some way be found to surmount the difficulties that presently exist, the United States would be obliged to consider carefully the advantages and disadvantages of supporting a given movement for union. Obviously if the intentions of the leadership of such a movement were hostile to the United States or in favor of opening the Near East to Soviet penetration, there would be disadvantages from the American point of view.

Bitar said that in a unified Arab world those that might be favorable toward the Soviet Union would be counter-balanced by those of opposite tendencies. He reverted again to the theme that unity must be achieved by "democratic" processes.

## *II. Conversation of June 27, 1957*

In addition to the question of Arab unity, which had dominated the previous meeting, Bitar outlined the following "causes of misunderstanding" between the United States and "the Arabs".

### (a) *Israel*

Bitar emphasized the following points:

(1) Any UN consideration of the Palestine problem should begin not only with the present situation but should comprehend the past; it should take into account the fact that Israel has existed only nine years whereas Palestine was predominantly Arab for many centuries; it should consider the injustices inflicted upon the Arabs.

(2) The Arabs do not ask the destruction of Israel or the elimination of the existing Jewish community. They have no objection to the Jews enjoying a measure of autonomy and to their developing their own culture. They would, however, like to see changed the fanatically Zionist, expansionist character of the present Israel regime. They regard this regime as a prime danger which obscures, in their minds, the communist danger.

The Arabs consider it essential a) that the Arab refugees be allowed to return to their homes and b) that further Jewish immigration be stopped. These steps, Bitar believed, would inter alia foster the changes the Arabs desire in the nature of the Israeli regime. The Arabs have no intention to revive hostilities and will continue to respect the armistice agreements, but they could not consider peace negotiations with a regime of "invaders".



(b) *Aqaba*

Bitar considered that declarations of USG officials to the effect that Aqaba is an international waterway are improper and evidence of partiality toward Israel.

In addition to political and legal arguments along lines of the Foreign Office official statement (reported in Embassy telegram 3086<sup>7</sup>), Bitar said it was feared that Israel is attempting to create at Elath a military base which inter alia would menace 100 miles of Arab coasts in the Gulf. It was to be borne in mind, he said, that Israel claimed certain areas near and including Medina as part of its "future" Zionist state. Nor did the Arabs consider that Israel needed use of the Gulf for purposes of economic expansion.

Asked why the Arabs did not press for an opinion by the International Court of Justice or other competent tribunal, the Syrians said the question could be asked in reverse, since it is Israel who portrays itself as the injured party. They also emphasized that the UN Resolution of November 2, 1956 provided for a return to the status quo before the British-French-Israel invasion of Egypt. Israel did not use the Gulf prior to the invasion.

(c) *American Doctrine*

Bitar said that although the USG had stressed safeguarding the independence of Middle Eastern nations, it was evident that the USG does not comprehend the Arab desire for an "independent" foreign policy. The United States, he said, equates Arab nationalism with communism; it characterizes everything as either pro-Communist or pro-West, failing to recognize that there is a "third way". The United States recognizes only a Communist menace and ignores the Zionist and imperialist menaces.

Further, the United States finds friends for its policy only among reactionary, dictatorial, police regimes which have become divisive forces obstructing Arab unity.

Such regimes, in Bitar's opinion, cannot endure. The United States would better serve its interests by encouraging Arab nationalism and Arab unity, which ultimately would be effective safeguards against Communist penetration.

(d) *American Economic Aid*

Admitting that the Arab countries, including Syria, need economic aid, Bitar said that such aid must be given "without political conditions". Perhaps it was difficult to define just what constituted "political conditions", but Syria would consider aid given to reactionary regimes for the purpose of suppressing "democratic" elements and dividing the Arab world as certainly constituting "conditional" aid. Bitar specifically criticized American aid to Jordan.

Bitar said that American aid would be palatable a) if given to the Arab countries in bloc (rather than to individual regimes) and b) if given through UN auspices to show that it was not intended to change the character of any given regime.

(e) *Algeria*

Bitar said the French were not only obstructing Algerian independence but were engaging in a war of extermination en masse.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

---

The United States should take stronger measures to persuade France to cease this inhumanity and to recognize Algerian aspirations.

At the conclusion of Bitar's presentation, Ambassador Moose said he would present the Minister's views to the authorities in Washington in the best fashion possible. He feared, however, that he would be unable to answer on the basis of information given him by the Foreign Minister inevitable questions from Washington authorities. He thought, for example, that considering everything the United States has done to promote the independence of Arab countries, including the independence of Syria, United States Government officials would be shocked at Bitar's contention that the United States does not recognize Arab nationalism and equates it with communism.

As regards the so-called "conditions" which we imposed on economic aid, Ambassador Moose noted that among the Arab countries from North Africa to the Persian Gulf (including Egypt) only Syria has found American "conditions" too onerous. And if the Foreign Minister's objection to "conditions" were raised in Washington someone might ask "What has Syria itself done?". Syria and Egypt have both withdrawn economic aid from Jordan because the latter has not conformed to Syrian and Egyptian policy.

Bitar said that Syria and Egypt had offered aid to Jordan to promote Arab unity which he did not regard as a "condition" but a basic aspiration of all Arabs. The present Jordan regime is receiving American aid and acts contrary to the people's aspirations for unity. Syria and Egypt thus consider the regime has no need for their aid.

354. Despatch From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

No. 43

Damascus, July 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

Syrian Foreign Office Note on United States-Syrian Relations

The Embassy transmits an informal translation of a note dated July 8, 1957 from the Syrian Foreign Office enclosing a detailed memorandum setting forth Syrian views with respect to current relations with the United States.<sup>2</sup> The memorandum was drafted pursuant to conversations between Foreign Minister Bitar and myself with members of our respective staffs on June 24 and June 27, 1957 as reported in Embassy Despatch 18.<sup>3</sup> According to Mr. Ghalib Kayyali, Acting Director of the Syrian Broadcasting System and "consultant" to the Foreign Office, the note contains modifications and addenda to the oral discussions that preceded it.<sup>4</sup>

At the request of Mr. Kayyali, an Embassy Officer discussed with him line-by-line the Embassy's translation of the memorandum and Mr. Kayyali requested further modifications in the English which are indicated in the text. Mr. Kayyali corrected the Arabic text to conform to the English wherever he considered it necessary and initialled the corrections.

There follows under the heading "Background" an account of the Embassy Officer's conversations of July 18, 19 and 20 with Mr. Kayyali, and under the heading "Discussion" Embassy comment with respect to points raised in the note.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83/7-2957. Confidential. Drafted by Barrow. An official-informal letter of July 31, from Counselor of the Embassy in Damascus Robert Strong to Ambassador Moose who was then in Washington, indicates that despatch 43 was airpouched to Washington under cover of Strong's letter for Moose's review and signature. (*Ibid.*, NEA/NE Files: Lot 59 D 38, Syria Correspondence—Damascus) No indication has been found as to whether Moose revised the despatch.

Strong's letter of July 31 also made the following comment concerning the situation in Syria:

"Things are not improving here, as you can imagine, and more Syrians are being intimidated by the G-2 into avoiding association with Americans. There may be trouble with the military over a run-in Chefic had last evening with a carload of Syrian officers while driving me back to Damascus from a dinner with Anwar Kotob near Bludan. Syrian military police and G-2 agents have appeared outside the Embassy scrutinizing the car and Chefic. Perhaps the matter will be dropped after some demonstrations of this sort. I have told Chefic to proceed normally; if there is trouble I'll do my best to protect him. This is a cheerful note for a letter to you."

<sup>2</sup> The 22-page informal translation is attached to the source text but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Inclusion of criticism of the Baghdad Pact is an example. [Footnote in the source text.]

*Background*

Most of Mr. Kayyali's modifications did not affect substance but on two points there was some revealing discussion, viz.:

1. The Embassy Officer queried the statement on page 17 reading, "The Syrian Government looks to the United Nations which led to the creation of Israel, to be itself the final arbiter in the settlement of the Palestine problem and it cannot be said in any way that the presence of Israel is its settlement." He recalled that Foreign Minister Bitar in his oral presentation had said that the Arabs do not ask the elimination of Israel. The foregoing might thus be subject to misinterpretation.

With the request that he not be quoted, Mr. Kayyali said that the existence of Israel could be "part" of a settlement; he agreed during the discussion to change the sentence to read, "The Syrian Government looks, etc. . . .<sup>5</sup> and it cannot be said that the mere creation of Israel represents a solution of the Palestine problem." The Arabic text as received, however, was not modified accordingly. Therefore the Embassy has left the original phraseology in the attached translation.

2. In the discussion on page 18 of the "New American Policy" Mr. Kayyali asked that the specific mention of international communism in paragraph A be changed to refer to attempts "by any foreign power to create internal subversion". Mr. Kayyali stated (with some justification) that the original phraseology was in conflict with the discussion that followed. Mr. Kayyali took pains to emphasize, however, that whereas the Syrian Government does not believe international communism constitutes "the first and major danger", it does recognize that international communism constitutes "a danger", but did not wish explicitly to say so. The Embassy Officer thereupon objected that the subsequent description of international communism as a "non-existing danger in reality" was inconsistent with what Mr. Kayyali had just said. During the conversation Mr. Kayyali agreed to change the latter phrase to read "a non-imminent danger" but the Embassy translator says a closer rendition of the Arab text, as corrected, would be "a non-existing danger *at present* in reality".

Mr. Kayyali said that the intended implication of the Syrian Government's criticism of the American (Eisenhower) Doctrine is that the United States should give firmer guarantees that it would oppose attacks on Arab States from any quarter, rather than merely from international communism.

---

<sup>5</sup> All ellipses are in the source text.

The Embassy Officer expressed the belief that King Saud, on behalf of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, had raised this point during his visit to the United States in the winter of 1957 and had appeared satisfied with the assurances given him (paragraph 3 of United States-Saudi Joint Communiqué, February 8, 1957).<sup>6</sup> Mr. Kayyali said assurances given Saud could not be considered sufficient as regards Syria.

### *Discussion*

From the amount of labor the Syrian Foreign Office has expended in holding conversations and in producing and amending the attached note, the Embassy would infer that certain Foreign Ministry officials at least take it seriously and hope for a response to the points raised. Mr. Kayyali in fact discussed the possibility of publishing the note and the response as a kind of White Paper on United States-Syrian relations.

The Memorandum is full of ambiguous accusations and imprecise language which illustrate the confusion in the collective Syrian official mind. It contains little which has not been said before. It is a tissue of misinterpretations, part truths and half-concealed falsehoods woven from the tangled skeins of exaggerated self-pity, political irresponsibility, intellectual dishonesty and desire to capitalize on the nuisance value of a small state: all characteristic of the army clique now controlling Syria.

The Memorandum calls into question the faithfulness of the United States Government to its announced principles; accuses the United States of second-degree imperialism, and by implication of direct imperialism; asserts that the United States foments tension and instability in the Near East, etc., etc. False premises and fallacious reasoning inevitably lead the Government of Syria to erroneous conclusions. My own experience with the present Syrian Foreign Minister leads me to believe that he reached his conclusions first, and worked backward to contrive premises and fancied circumstances which would justify his preconceived views.

It is worthy of note, and characteristic of the present Government of Syria, that the Foreign Ministry has everywhere assumed that Syria is blameless and is *always* the offended party. To the Ministry, therefore, it is obvious that the task of improving Syrian relations with the free world is the responsibility of the free world, not of Syria. Furthermore, invoking the formula of Arab nationalism, the Foreign Ministry appears to believe that the United States

---

<sup>6</sup> For text of the Joint Communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1957, pp. 308-309.

Government is answerable to Syria for American policy toward all "Arab" states, e.g., Tunisia and Morocco.

Much more could be said along the same lines. The readiness of Foreign Ministry officials to state their views in writing and to invite the United States Government's comment thereon may be explained by a Syrian desire to improve relations between the two countries by the elimination of misunderstandings and the reconciliation, insofar as possible, of differences. Their readiness is subject to another possible interpretation: that the Syrian Foreign Ministry wishes to achieve maximum publicity for its criticism of American policy and actions. Since a large portion of this criticism is presented on behalf of "the Arab nation", the Syrian Government may be endeavoring to establish its position as a spokesman for other "Arab" governments.

If the American government fails to make prompt reply to the Memorandum, the Syrian Government might seize upon this circumstance in an effort to show that the United States is, in fact, unwilling to improve Syro-American relations or to help ease the situation in the Near East. Unless carefully drafted, any American reply might be used by the Syrian Government for the same propaganda purpose.

It is my belief that a reply to the substance of the Memorandum can be made only by challenging the assumptions and the so-called facts on which the Memorandum is based, and proceeding thence to an attack on the Ministry's conclusions and its suggestion that the United States Government can improve Syro-American relations by adopting a foreign policy in harmony with the views of the clique now controlling Syria. Such a response would probably produce little of benefit in Syria: even if it induced the civilian officials to re-appraise the basis of Syro-American relations, there is scant prospect that the reply would have a similar effect on the Syrian army group which controls the constitutional authorities.

Rather than to attempt to answer the Memorandum in extenso, perhaps the best course would be to deliver a brief Note Verbale to the Syrian Embassy in Washington dismissing the Memorandum as being false, slanted, prejudiced or erroneous to a point where a detailed discussion promises no benefit. In drafting a reply, the Department might wish to consider the use of a few illustrative points couched in suitable language, chosen from the Syrian Memorandum. The following points, which by no means constitute an exhaustive list, have been chosen to illustrate the basic dishonesty of the Memorandum.

- 1) The Government of Syria, in its memorandum, does not confine itself to a presentation of Syrian views, but presumes to express the views of "the Arab nation". Without contesting the existence of an "Arab nation", the United States Government might

point out that it has diplomatic relations with several sovereign Arab states, each one uniquely qualified to speak on its own behalf, and not one for another. Until the views put forth in the Memorandum in the name of "the Arab nation" are confirmed by the other Arab states, the United States Government should consider them exclusively as the views of the Syrian Government.

2) In the transmitting Note, third paragraph, the Syrian Foreign Ministry accuses "various American circles" of conducting a violent and biased campaign which has given a false picture of conditions in Syria. In view of the hostile attitude of the Syrian Government for the past three years and the false, violent and malicious campaign it has conducted against the United States, beginning with the malodorous Adnan Malki trial, the Department might wish to suggest that the Syrian Government set its own house in order before complaining about "various American circles".

3) Section 1. of the Memorandum excoriates "imperialism" which appears to be any aspect of British, French or United States policy which the present Syrian Government in its role as champion of "Arab nationalism" dislikes. Besides being unconvincing, the indignation of the Government of Syria is ludicrous so long as Syria remains indifferent to Soviet imperialism (Hungary, East Germany, Latvia), Indian imperialism (Hyderabad, Kashmir), Indonesian imperialism (Western New Guinea), Communist Chinese imperialism (South-east Asia, Tibet), and especially as long as Syria itself, in concert with Egypt, attempts to practice imperialism in the name of Arab unity (Jordan, Iraq).

4) Section 2. of the Memorandum opens by asserting that "the policy of positive neutrality advocated by Egypt, the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and Jordan has been exposed to a biased campaign illustrating it in a manner contradictory to its reality." The Embassy was not aware that the Saudi Arabian and Jordanian Governments followed the same policy of positive neutrality, so-called, as Egypt and Syria. All evidence in possession of the Embassy is to the contrary.

5) Section 2.C. contains the following: "(The Baghdad Pact's) basic aim is to tie the countries which recently liberated themselves from the yoke of imperialism to a new imperialist system and to throw its states into a war between the two camps in which they have no interest. By compelling Iraq to enter the Baghdad Pact, Britain has destroyed the basic interests of the Arab people because it has created a division and hostility among the Arab states in addition to the fact that it has impaired the independence of this Arab country." The Syrian Foreign Minister knows that this assertion is untrue. The defense of this vicious statement, if there is one, might be that the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not originate it, but merely parroted the Soviet propaganda line—under orders.

6) Section 2.C. of the Memorandum expatiates on "the principle of non-alignment" followed by the Government of Syria. If credence is to be given to the recent statements of Syrian officials, even lip service for a policy of non-alignment was scrapped during the visit of the Syrian Acting Minister of Defense, Khalid Bey al-'Azam, to Moscow.

7) Section 2.D. of the Memorandum asserts that "these states" have agreed to coordinate "these interests" according to the United Nations Charter which provides for the non-interference of states in

the affairs of others. It is to be hoped that the Syrian Government will, in the future, observe this principle with regard to neighboring sovereign states, especially the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

8) Section 2.E. states in part: "Although we welcome unconditional economic aid coming from any source, we nevertheless believe that the United Nations and its competent organizations are the best means for the presentation of this aid considering this is safer for the state giving it and the state receiving it . . . ." Recent Syrian agreements with the USSR seem to provide for important bilateral aid publicly described as unconditional. The purchase of Soviet arms by Syria was likewise characterized as unconditional. The Department has been informed of at least a part of the political conditions attached to the purchase of Soviet arms, and so cannot accept uncritically assertions that Soviet economic aid to Syria is, in fact, without conditions.

9) Section 3. maintains that Israeli immigration policy is not a domestic Israeli matter, but that it is international in character and should be determined in a manner conforming to the views of the Syrian Government. Few states would accept an extension of this rule to their own immigration policy. Would Syria?

10) Section 3. of the Memorandum attributes to Mr. Ashkul<sup>7</sup> a statement which is indefensible—as indefensible, for example, as the repeated statements by Syrian officials to the general effect that Syria will not tolerate the continued existence of Israel.

11) Section 4. of the Memorandum contains the following: "Britain and France previously took as an excuse the Communist infiltration into what they called the Middle East and gave themselves the right to attack, exert pressure, interfere in the internal affairs of this area and maintain the division between its states. The American Government has proved that it adopts the same logic because it ended with the same results previously reached by the British-French imperialist policy". That this statement is untrue is known to the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

12) Section 4. of the Memorandum also contains: "Finally, the result of the application of the (American) Doctrine by means of force and coup, as happened in Jordan, was not simply to widen the gap between the Arab countries which were proceeding on the road toward unity, to divide them, and to create a large gap between the rulers and the ruled, but it also made of the Arab countries a center of the cold war, and increased tension and lack of stability in the area to the detriment of the interest of peace, which is the basic necessary condition for the economic and social development needed more than anything else by the peoples of the area." It is fair to assume that by accusing the United States Government, the Syrian authorities hope to conceal their subversive actions a) in first promising and then refusing financial aid to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and then b) in encouraging elements endeavoring to overthrow the government of King Hussein.

---

<sup>7</sup>The Syrian note quoted a statement purportedly made by Israeli Finance Minister Levi Eshkol during a conference of Israeli Ambassadors in Western Europe to the effect that the purpose behind Israeli immigration was to reduce the proportion between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East and that a large number of immigrants were about to enter Israel.



13) Section 6. reads, in part, as follows: "By reviewing these problems and by debating them with a spirit of complete frankness, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again reaffirms its definite desire to reach settlements of these problems consistent with the principles of international law, right, justice, the United Nations Charter, and the basic human customs agreed upon. . . ." The Embassy will be gratified when the Government of Syria brings its actions into conformity with its professed principles. Since the Ministry has expressed its views of United States policy with complete frankness, it will no doubt be happy to have comment of the United States Government which is equally frank, if not equally comprehensive.

*Action Requested*

That the Department consider delivery to the Syrian Embassy in Washington of a Note Verbale along the general lines discussed above.<sup>8</sup>

James S. Moose, Jr.

---

<sup>8</sup> No response to the Syrian note has been found.

---

**355. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 13, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Proposed Steps in Response to Syrian Government Actions Against the United States

*Discussion:*

The Syrian Government over the past several months has been taking an increasingly unfriendly attitude towards the United States and concurrently establishing closer ties with the Soviet Union. It has just made the following specific moves:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-1357. Confidential. Drafted by Burdett and Waggoner and concurred in by Lightner and Reams. A marginal notation on the source text by Rountree indicates that the memorandum was approved on August 13 by Herter, Henderson, Murphy, and Moose (who was then in Washington for consultation) and on August 14 by President Eisenhower. Herter was acting in the absence of Dulles who was vacationing.

1. Issued on August 12, through the Government-controlled Syrian Broadcasting Station, an official statement alleging an American plot to overthrow the present Government. The statement named Howard Stone, Attaché and Political Officer, and Frank Jeton, Vice Consul, as being directly involved.<sup>2</sup>

2. Stopped and searched the official car of our Diplomatic Courier at the Syrian border on August 12.<sup>3</sup>

3. Surrounded the American Embassy Chancery at Damascus on August 12 with approximately 30 armed Syrian security forces.

4. Declared as persona non grata Howard Stone, Frank Jeton and the Army Attaché, Colonel Robert Molloy on August 13. The Syrian Government demanded that they leave the country by 12:00 noon, Wednesday, August 14.<sup>4</sup>

I believe that we must act quickly and decisively in response to these openly hostile actions by the Syrian Government.

*Recommendations:*

1. That I summon the Syrian Chargé this afternoon and:

a. Protest the vicious campaign against the United States carried on by the Syrian press and Government-controlled radio culminating in the fabricated charges of United States involvement in a plot against the Syrian Government.

b. Protest the declaration of the three officers mentioned above as persona non grata.

c. Protest interference with our Diplomatic Courier.

d. Inquire regarding the significance of the posting of security forces around the Embassy Chancery.

e. Hand the Chargé the attached note (Tab A)<sup>5</sup> declaring Ambassador Zeineddine and Dr. Yassin Zakaria, Second Secretary, persona non grata. Zeineddine is now in Syria. We would demand that Zakaria leave within 48 hours.

<sup>2</sup> The broadcast was made at 11:45 p.m. Damascus time on August 12. At 1 a.m. on August 13 in Damascus, Strong notified the Department of the broadcast and of the fact that the Embassy building had been surrounded by approximately 30 armed Syrian security forces since 9 p.m. that evening. (Telegram 411; *ibid.*) A translated text of the broadcast was transmitted to the Department in telegram 419 from Damascus, August 13. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Reported in telegram 408 from Damascus, August 12. (*Ibid.*, 116.32/8-1256)

<sup>4</sup> At 1:45 p.m. on August 13 in Damascus, Syrian Foreign Office Secretary General Tarazi informed Strong that three members of the Embassy staff had been found working against Syria and that in order to preserve good relations between Syria and the United States it was necessary for the Syrian Government to declare them persona non grata. (Telegram 423 from Damascus, August 13; *ibid.*, 783.00/8-1357) Telegram 435 from Damascus, August 14, transmitted to the Department the text of a Syrian Foreign Office communiqué concerning the action which had been printed in the Syrian press. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/8-1457) For additional reports and comments from the Embassy in Damascus concerning the situation, see *ibid.*, 783.00.

<sup>5</sup> Not attached to the source text, nor found elsewhere.

Zeineddine has a long record of unfriendly and pro-Soviet activities. We welcome an opportunity to expel him from this country. . . . Zakaria . . . is the member of the Embassy staff who has maintained the closest contacts with the Soviet Embassy here. The Military Attaché has only recently arrived. . . . The action recommended would leave a Syrian Embassy staff consisting of the Chargé, a First Secretary, and the Military Attaché. Despite the existing restrictions on our personnel in Syria which may be expected to increase, we do not wish to invite the Syrians to close down our establishment completely. Therefore, we believe it inadvisable to act against additional Syrian officers in this country at this time.

2. That we issue a press release (Tab B)<sup>6</sup> simply recounting the steps which we have taken because of the demonstrated hostile attitude of the present Syrian Government.

3. That with respect to the Syrian charges of United States involvement in a plot and similar ones now being levied by the Egyptian Government, we would continue to take the position that they are only the latest and most extravagant of a long series of obvious fabrications.

4. That we instruct Ambassador Moose not to return to Syria, thus forestalling possible Syrian action declaring him *persona non grata*. Our intentions in this respect would be mentioned in the press release, but we would not inform the Syrian Chargé.

5. That we suspend visits to Syria by groups and persons under our Cultural Exchange Program. The Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra and two professors are scheduled to leave shortly for Damascus.

Depending upon the Syrian reaction to these various moves, it may be necessary for us to take further steps, such as banning American travel to Syria. However, we do not believe that any additional steps need be taken immediately.

---

<sup>6</sup> Not attached to the source text. Presumably, it is the same as Department of State press release 462, issued on August 14, and printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, September 2, 1957, pp. 388-389.

356. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, August 14, 1957<sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Acting Secretary  
William M. Rountree—NEA

SUBJECT

Present Situation in Syria

The Acting Secretary handed the President the NEA memorandum of August 13,<sup>2</sup> together with its attachments, outlining proposed steps in response to recent Syrian Government actions against the United States. He told the President that this matter had been reviewed thoroughly by him with Messrs. Henderson, Murphy, Moose and Rountree, and he felt the proposed course should be followed. After reading the paper, the President said he fully agreed with the proposals, and suggested that the Syrian Chargé be called in without delay.

Mr. Rountree said we were fully aware that the suggested course involved certain dangers; indeed, it was possible that the Syrians would sever diplomatic relations with the United States. This would leave a fairly open field to the Russians, since the British and French did not have representation in Syria. The President responded that this risk would have to be taken since he felt the United States must react to the Syrian measures. Moreover, severance of relations by Syria would at least demonstrate to the public the seriousness of the situation in that country.

The President said that in taking these measures against Syria, it might be very helpful if we could appropriately announce some action or measures which we would take to benefit our friends among the Arab states. While he had no specific suggestion, one thought was the possibility of saying something about aid to Arabs in connection with the completion of the Congressional action on the MSA bill.<sup>3</sup> It was agreed that we would give further thought to the possibility of some favorable statement.

The President suggested that we immediately telephone Senators Knowland, Johnson, Wiley and Green, and Representatives Gordon, Chipperfield, and Morgan, to inform them of what we are doing.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-1457. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rountree.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> The Mutual Security Act of 1957 was approved by the Congress on August 14, 1957. (71 Stat. 355)

There arose in discussing this matter the question of military aid to Jordan. The President restated the views which he had previously discussed with Secretary Dulles about offensive military equipment being provided under our military aid program. He was aware that the Jordanians were extremely anxious to receive heavy equipment and said he was inclined to believe we should be prepared to meet their request to some extent. The possible Israeli attitude was discussed, the President feeling that this could not be the determining factor in connection with the policy which we decide upon if it were in our interests to provide some heavy equipment. He indicated that he would favor a reply to the most recent messages from Amman to the effect that at least some tanks would be included in the program.

---

**357. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 14, 1957—6 p.m.*

319. Respective missions should immediately approach King Jordan, PriMin Iraq, President Lebanon and Saudi King concerning Syrian statement alleging American plot against Syrian Government. Using background being cabled separately <sup>2</sup> you should make following points orally:

a) We desire discuss frankly with our friends significance of Syrian actions as we see it.

b) We believe Government being approached must be distressed as we are at Syrian adoption of Communist technique of false accusations re plots against Government and of totally unfounded requests for recall diplomatic personnel. One purpose this technique is to frighten people of country adopting it into supporting unpopular regime. This development extremely disturbing in that it, coming close upon discussions between Syrians and Russians in Moscow, apparently reveals increasingly close relations between USSR and GOS with attendant dangerous implications for security of NE and for Arab unity.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83/8-1457. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Rountree who signed for Herter. Also sent to Baghdad, Beirut, and Jidda, and repeated to Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to circular telegram 138 sent as a joint State-USIS message on August 14. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/8-1457)

c) Falseness of Syrian statements obvious to everyone. Of course statement that US would agree to Syrian intervention in Lebanon and that it would consider similar Syrian action regarding Iraq and Jordan is manifestly absurd.

d) US earnestly desires reestablishment of traditionally friendly relations with Syria. US has endured without reaction months of vilification and abuse at hands GOS. However, in face hostile and totally unwarranted action against US now taken by clique of officials in control GOS, USG had no alternative but to defend its interests by declaring Syrian Ambassador to US and Second Secretary Syrian Embassy persona non grata.<sup>3</sup> We very much regret that GOS has seen fit take steps which brought about present situation. GOS must have known USG could not permit Syrian action to pass unnoticed.

e) Syrian action is merely latest and most convincing evidence of willingness GOS promote instability in NE by endeavoring sow suspicion and distrust throughout area, thereby advancing Soviet interests. Obvious falsehoods in statement seeking implicate Lebanon and Jordan particularly reveal this purpose.

f) We have wanted to speak frankly to our friends about the Syrian action because of its implications for security of ME and because of the unfounded charges. We would welcome any observations our friends may care to offer.

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> At Rountree's request, Syrian Chargé Mamun Hamui met with Rountree at 4 p.m. on August 14. During this meeting, Rountree delivered a strong oral protest against Syrian actions over the past few days and then handed Hamui the note while explaining orally that the U.S. Government was declaring Ambassador Zeineddine and Second Secretary Zakaria persona non grata and desired that Zeineddine not return to the United States and that Zakaria not remain in the United States later than August 16. The memorandum of conversation, by Waggoner, is *ibid.*, 611.83/8-1457. A copy of a briefing paper, prepared by Waggoner and forwarded to Rountree by Rockwell on August 14, is *ibid.*, NEA/NE Files: Lot 61 D 59, U.S.-Syrian Relations.

358. Daily Top Secret Summary<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 19, 1957.

*Near East:*

*Syria's Neighbors Express Grave Concern*—Embassies Beirut, Amman, Baghdad, Ankara and Jidda all report that the respective governments have expressed grave concern over Syrian developments. . . . The present situation, Chamoun stated, emphasized the urgency and importance of our furnishing Lebanon with additional arms and equipment. Although the amount requested would be insufficient to enable the Lebanese Army to withstand overt aggression from Syria, it was vital for maintenance of internal security and the morale of the Lebanese Army.

King Hussein told Mallory he is sending a personal letter to King Saud suggesting that they meet to consider steps to protect their interests; this was a first step and if the Saudis were promptly forthcoming the meeting could be enlarged, possibly to a four power meeting. Hussein then requested that the US impress upon King Saud the gravity of the situation. In the meantime, Hussein is considering offering positions in Jordan's army at their same rank to Syrian army officers who were passed over or summarily dismissed. Prime Minister Jawdat of Iraq observed to Gallman that the Syrian situation was very dangerous to the whole area but particularly so for Iraq. He was most disturbed by a report from the Iraqi Legation in Damascus that the prevailing situation was such that friends of Iraq, with whom he had hoped to work closely, were now completely powerless.

The Turkish Prime Minister<sup>2</sup> has informed Warren that a meeting would take place shortly, at the request of the President, between the Turks and Iraqis to discuss the Syrian developments. Turkish military officers have told Warren that Turkey's concern was not only for the Soviet threat from the north but also for the ominous stock-piling of Soviet material in Syria which produces a situation tailor-made for a two-pronged attack on Turkey by Soviet forces. Finally, King Saud has sent word to Wadsworth to the effect that he views the Syrian situation with great concern and has summoned his Counselor, Yusuf Yasin, and his Ambassadors to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, *Daily Summaries*: Lot 60 D 530. Top Secret; Eyes Only for Designated Recipient. According to the cover sheet, the Top Secret Staff Summary was "the joint work of S/S-RO, the policy information officers in various areas of the Department and the Department's research and intelligence organization."

The Top Secret Summaries were routinely distributed to the Secretary of State and other principal officers of the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> Menderes.

---

Syria, Lebanon and Jordan to report to him at once. Beirut 441 8/16 (TS); Amman 304 8/18 (S); Baghdad 228 8/17 (C); Ankara 416 8/17 (S); Jidda 180 8/17 (S) <sup>3</sup>

[Here follows the remainder of the Summary.]

---

<sup>3</sup> The telegrams are respectively in Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-1657; 783.00/8-1857; 783.00/8-1757; *ibid.*; and 611.83/8-1757.

---

**359. Notes of the Secretary's Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, August 19, 1957, 9:15 a.m. <sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow paragraphs 1-4.]

5. *Syria*—Mr. Rountree gave the Secretary <sup>2</sup> a status report including a report on the difficulty which the Embassy is having in carrying on its normal functions, surrounded as it is with police and harassed by police interference with servants. He said that the Communist Chief of Staff <sup>3</sup> seems to have taken over firmly and is conducting a purge. He noted that the President <sup>4</sup> was not strong and true to form had left the country in the crisis, was in Egypt where he had seen Nasser and was now apparently in the hospital. Governor Herter noted that Strong had done very well. The Secretary indicated that it would be necessary to have a conference on this subject later in the day.

[Here follows the remainder of the notes.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Drafted by Howe.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles returned from vacation on August 18. (Dulles Appointment Book; Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>3</sup> On August 16 the Embassy in Damascus reported the Syrian announcement that Colonel Afif Bizri, a Communist, had been promoted to Major General and appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Syrian Army. (Telegram 465 from Damascus, August 16; Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-1657)

<sup>4</sup> Quwatli.



360. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 19, 1957, 3:45 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

[Secretary Dulles]  
The Under Secretary  
G—Mr. Murphy  
O—Mr. Henderson  
NEA—Mr. Rountree  
NEA—Mr. Rockwell  
Ambassador Moose  
Ambassador Richards  
R—Mr. Cumming  
U—Mr. Reams  
S/S—Mr. Howe  
CIA—Mr. Archie Roosevelt  
CIA—Mr. Frank Wisner  
CIA—General Cabell

Mr. Rountree reviewed for the Secretary the situation as it has developed over the course of last week, including the PNG of the US officials and the most recent take-over by the Communist Chief of Staff.

He then reviewed the possible courses of action in the current situation along the general lines of the enclosed "talking paper."<sup>2</sup>

In the hour-long discussion which ensued, the various aspects of the problem were gone over thoroughly, including particularly an appraisal of the various personalities presently involved in the situation or who might be involved. The attitudes and possible actions by the various other Middle Eastern countries was also canvassed. No action resulted other than for the Secretary to ask Mr. Rountree to prepare for him, the Secretary, to review a briefing statement on the Syrian problem for the President's press conference.

The CIA representatives discussed the situation as they saw it. . . .

Ambassador Richards cautioned not to move too fast in a situation which might well change character and ease off in a few days or weeks.

Ambassador Moose noted that while the situation was very serious, the most powerful man in Syria, Serraj, was still in place and apparently not yet touched by the new regime.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Secret. Drafted by Howe.

<sup>2</sup> A notation on the source text indicates that the document was destroyed on August 22.

. . . . .

The Secretary concluded that we must view the situation as wholly unacceptable. This did not mean that any particular course of action should be taken either immediately or in the next weeks but that all of our effort should be directed on the basis that we could not afford to have exist a Soviet satellite not contiguous to the Soviet border and in the midst of the already delicate Middle East situation. He also agreed that we should capitalize on the present alarm felt by our friends over the situation in Syria, an alarm which tends to subside over a period of time. We could not consider that time is on our side and we should be particularly careful that more violent action, especially on the part of Israel, was not precipitated.

---

**361. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 20, 1957.*

On the Syrian matter, I think it important that you avoid any statement or implication that you have as yet determined that Syria is now "controlled by International Communism" within the meaning of the Middle East Resolution. On the other hand, I would avoid any statement that you think it is *not* so controlled. The situation is still confused. There is a tight censorship. Our Embassy is virtually blockaded and we cannot yet make a clear political judgment as to the actual extent of Communist penetration.

For your confidential information, Ambassador Moose, who is here in Washington, feels it possible that the change has not been as great as appears on the surface, and that the Leftist take-over is not yet complete.

I think it important that you should say nothing which would encourage Israel, for example, to stimulate an incident with Syria on the theory that we have judged Syria to be Communist controlled. On the other hand, we would want to keep freedom of action to make such a decision under certain contingencies. We would like to keep the Syrian Government uncertain as to our intentions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Confidential.

I suggest that the line to take is that recent charges against the United States have been a smokescreen for anti-Western and pro-Soviet elements to seek to strengthen their control in the government. There is evidence in Syria of the development of a dangerous and classic pattern. The Soviets first promise and extend aid, military and/or economic. With this aid they promote the control of any positions by pro-Soviet persons. The end result sought is that the country will fall under the control of International Communism and become a Soviet satellite, whose destinies are directed from Moscow. All of this is under a smokescreen of false charges that others are conspiring, e.g., the United States.

We do not yet know how far along this pattern Syria has yet gone, but certainly what has already happened is a sign of danger and should be a warning to others who are sought to be lured by the Communist technique.

The Middle East, as we know, has recently become a prime target of Communist aspirations. The Soviet and Chinese Communists have sought every opportunity to promote instability and disunity in this area. We are following with concern developments in Syria as they affect the peace, tranquillity and prosperity of the area.

JFD

---

**362. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Ankara, August 21, 1957—5 a.m.*

445. Reference: Embtel 438. <sup>2</sup> (My interview with Prime Minister <sup>3</sup> Istanbul delayed until afternoon August 20. Consequently this message drafted en route Izmir, flown back with Air Attaché Ankara

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8–2157. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:26 a.m. Repeated to Baghdad.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 438 from Ankara, August 20, Warren informed the Department of a request from the Turkish Foreign Office that he see Menderes as soon as possible. In particular, Menderes wished to discuss a recent meeting Turkish officials had had with the Iraqi royal party, headed by Crown Prince Amir Abdul-illah, which had been visiting Turkey. Telegram 438 also contained an update of recent discussions with Turkish officials on Syria. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/8–2057)

<sup>3</sup> Menderes.

and transmitted direct from Embassy, although I am at present Izmir for opening fair and planning return Ankara night August 21.)

Prime Minister desired tell me about meeting with Iraqis mentioned Embtel 416.<sup>4</sup> Separately Embassy is telegraphing memo on that conference which held August 19<sup>5</sup> (not August 18 as reported Embtel 438). Memo speaks for itself. Herewith are comments by Prime Minister.

Prime Minister found Iraqis much concerned about Syrian developments. They want to seek some means of alleviating situation. All taking part in conversations were in agreement re situation and desirability taking appropriate action.

He developed his ideas thus:

*(Begin Prime Minister's statement)*

In present situation unless USA takes definite position and decisions, nothing can be done. Up to now USA has been very cautious, very diplomatic—she has been bound by diplomatic forms and theory.

USA always feared that measures might be taken might be considered intervention in the internal affairs of an independent nation. Consequently, we were very grateful last autumn for USA decision (Eisenhower Doctrine) which insured independence of the countries of the ME. This was a defensive measure but one that could not stop Communist infiltration in Syria. Now we see Syria unfortunately has become a Soviet satellite. Perhaps a little time remains to us in which to do something about this dangerous, unfortunate situation. Now is [*in*] a short time there will be achieved the formalities remaining for Syria to become a complete and typical Soviet satellite. That will mean USSR has come into the center of the ME, between Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and other countries. There will be "a very profound repercussion". It will be felt no doubt in Jordan and Iraq. Of course, Lebanon will not be excepted. From today it is not a mistake to consider Syria a part of USSR. Therefore to deal with Syria will mean to deal with USSR. The danger is so great that Syria does not hesitate to challenge USA, dangerously and openly, with the purpose of destroying USA prestige in this area. Unless USA responds to our appeal to her, we cannot move in any way. Consequently, our first task is to let the USG know how we consider the situation. We are awaiting "solid decision" in order to be able to take appropriate measures.

Ninety percent of Syrian people, many deputies, many notables are against what is taking place in Syria. They may come to Turkey and Iraq. That would bring UN into picture. All future action will depend upon what USA is thinking about these developments.

We have considered situation of Saudi Arabia as important. Iraqis say that present situation and its great danger must be explained to all Arab countries, including Egypt and Nasser. All

<sup>4</sup> Not printed, but its contents are included in Document 358.

<sup>5</sup> Sent in telegram 446, August 19, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-2157)

Arab countries must be aroused. At this time there should be no demonstrations (expressions) on behalf of Israel. They would only aggravate matters and also give Soviets ample ground for exploitation. Let me repeat: All of us are agreed upon the meaning of these developments and upon my remarks to you, the American Ambassador.

We consider this entire matter very urgent. Very important. In a short time we will face great difficulties and great dangers with Syria. Iraqis told me they will send similar message from Baghdad.

*(End Prime Minister's statement)*

I then repeated from a carefully prepared talking paper <sup>6</sup> the gist of information recently received in two messages from Amman and Tel Aviv. (See Amman 304 <sup>7</sup> and Tel Aviv 155 <sup>8</sup> to Department.) I passed it on as unevaluated information received from the south and stressed it was not from Washington. The Prime Minister remarked that the information only confirmed Turk-Iraqi understanding of situation. He added that Turk-Iraqis had advised Hussein to delay his trip to Turkey for time-being.

*Comment:* Esenbel was present for entire conversation and acted occasionally as interpreter. The Prime Minister was relaxed but serious and alert. He will be looking forward to Department's reply.

Department please repeat as desired.

Warren

---

<sup>6</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed, but its contents are included in Document 358.

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 155, August 16, Baxter transmitted a report of conversations with a "well-informed, if somewhat extravagant" Israeli journalist and with Colonel Harkavi, the Chief of IDF intelligence. According to the journalist, Israeli officials were deeply concerned over the Soviet presence in Syria, and the impact which it would have on Syria's neighbors, particularly Jordan and Turkey. Harkavi anticipated a spread of Soviet influence in the area and a decline of the Baghdad Pact, unless the United States could administer a "shock treatment in [a] large dose." The Embassy in Tel Aviv commented that it had insufficient background on current developments in Syria to be able to evaluate these statements. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-1657)

363. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, August 21, 1957, 11:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

*Syria*

I said I was much concerned about the situation. I felt that unless there was some reaction the consequences might be very serious indeed. The neighbors of Syria were all much concerned and it was a good time to mobilize that sentiment. All in turn were watching what the United States thought. I said that we planned a meeting at the State Department at 2:30 and I would report to him fully after that. I said that General Goodpaster would be present. The President suggested that John Eisenhower also be present.

The President agreed with my estimate and threw out the suggestion that we might give arms and money rather freely to Syria's neighbors as part of some program.

[Here follows discussion concerning disarmament and China.]

JFD

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

---

364. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 21, 1957—7:52 p.m.*

289. Please transmit following message from President to King Saud:

“Your Majesty:

I wish to share with you the concern which I feel regarding recent developments in Syria. It seems that by a series of steps, first seemingly innocent and now reaching a rapid pace, the Communists are taking over and effectively driving out the duly constituted authorities. There seems to be serious danger that Syria will become a Soviet Communist satellite.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.00/8-2157. Top Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Drafted and approved by Dulles and cleared by Rountree.

We are in receipt of messages of concern from the neighboring Arab countries—Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Turkey, too, feels that it is in danger of being caught within a Soviet vice.

No doubt Your Majesty has also heard similar voices of fear and concern.

The United States has no purpose or desire to intervene. The recent extravagant stories put out from Damascus alleging United States plots and intervention are part of a slanderous campaign to distract attention from the actual Communist intervention that was going on. Of course, under the doctrine which Ambassador Richards explained to you, we would sympathetically consider a request to assist any country that was attacked by a Syria which itself was dominated by International Communism. We believe, however, that it is highly preferable that Syria's neighbors should be able to deal with this problem without the necessity for any outside intervention.

In view of the special position of Your Majesty as Keeper of the Holy Places of Islam, I trust that you will exert your great influence to the end that the atheistic creed of Communism will not become entrenched at a key position in the Moslem world.

May God have you in His safekeeping.

Your sincere friend, DDE"

Observe Presidential Handling.

Dulles

---

**365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 21, 1957—7:54 p.m.*

146. Please convey following to PriMin from Secretary:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am sure that you share our concern over recent developments in Syria. We have received messages indicating that other states in the area, particularly those which are immediate neighbors of Syria, are very much disturbed. We are giving urgent consideration to this problem and shortly will wish to exchange views with your government concerning it. Meanwhile, I hope I can proceed on the assumption that no action will be taken which would involve the Syrian

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-2157. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and Dulles and approved and signed by Dulles.

matter in aspects of the Arab-Israel dispute. I need that assumption to be able to find what I think could be a constructive solution.

Sincerely yours, Foster Dulles''

Dulles

---

**366. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 21, 1957—7:59 p.m.*

512. Embtel 445, 446.<sup>2</sup> Please inform Turk and Iraqi group in Turkey we share deep concern on Syrian situation and appreciate their thoughts as to what might be done about it. Their messages being given most urgent consideration at highest level and we will be in further communication with least possible delay.

Leave to Ambassador's judgment whether message to Iraqi should be conveyed through Turk PM or direct. No action on this message required Baghdad unless GOI officials there take initiative in presenting proposals to Embassy.

Dulles

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-2157. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rountree; and revised, approved, and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 362 and footnote 5 thereto.

---

**367. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 21, 1957.*

1491. Please deliver following personal message from Secretary to Foreign Minister:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-2157. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted and signed by Dulles and cleared by Rountree.



"Dear Selwyn: We are deeply concerned, as I know you are, about developments in Syria. It seems to us that there is now little hope of correction from within and that we must think in terms of the external . . . deep concern of the Moslem States having common borders with Syria. We must perhaps be prepared to take some serious risks to avoid even greater risks and dangers later on. We are giving this matter our most concentrated attention and will no doubt want to exchange views with you tomorrow or Friday.

Sincerely yours, Foster"

Dulles

---

**368. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Tel Aviv, August 22, 1957—6 p.m.*

175. Re Deptel 146.<sup>2</sup> Ben Gurion, whom I saw at his Tel Aviv office within hour receipt reference telegram, said he could gladly give assurances requested, if USG meant that it wished to be assured Israel had no intention of initiating trouble with Syria, and expressed warm gratitude for Secretary's desire to exchange views on Syria. He made following points.

(1) He shares US concern with Syrian developments, for it is impossible, he said, "to distinguish between Syria and Russia." Israel is ultimate target of weapons which USSR is pouring into Syria although theoretical case can be made that they are threat to Lebanon or other Arab states. He would be most anxious to know what USG would do if Israel is attacked by Russia through Syria.

He said Soviet press, which never is without purpose, has been sinister recently in its attacks on Israel. He cited, as examples, reports that Eilat had been relinquished to US as base and that France and Israel were preparing attack against Syria.

He also cited remark which this government appears to regard as particularly ominous made by Soviet Ambassador Abramov to Mapam MK Hazan to effect Israeli cities had not yet experienced bombing attacks (cf. Eban's letter to Under Secretary Herter July 25, 1957).<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-2257. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 6:25 p.m. Rountree was notified concerning the telegram at 8:15 p.m. A copy of telegram 175, in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, was initiated by Eisenhower.

<sup>2</sup> Document 365.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

(2) He said what is called for is bold move by US of sort which had checkmated Soviets in recent case of Sixth Fleet's approach to eastern Mediterranean bolstering Jordan, and earlier US declaration in support of Formosa.

(3) He was mildly reproachful in noting that Syria receives vast quantities of arms from Russia which pose greater threat to Israel than to anyone else. While US is supplying arms to Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, Israel is still boycotted, apparently under November 2 UN resolution,<sup>4</sup> though "why I have no idea".

(4) He studied penultimate sentence in Secretary's letter<sup>5</sup> at length and read it carefully aloud, asking if I could supply interpretative details. I replied that at present we had nothing more than letter itself. I could only assume USG hoped GOI did not consider that situation in Syria required it to undertake some sort of counter action. When he asked why USG would think Israel wanted to start trouble, I said I had no indication Washington believed that to be case but there was always fear that, unless extreme caution exercised, minor border disturbances would lead to broader consequences. USG obviously hopes nothing will be done to complicate already extremely precarious situation. Ben Gurion said Israel is doing and will continue to do everything in its power to avoid providing excuse for an attack on Israel by Soviets through Syria. Recent GOI request to UNTSO to establish observation posts on Israeli side of Syrian frontier had been just such precaution. If Israel were attacked, that would be a different thing, but "you can assure Secretary, if what is meant by this sentence is possibility of clash provoked by Israel, such thought has not entered our minds".

(5) He reiterated his gratitude for Secretary's offer to exchange views and said he would particularly welcome indications of what we had in mind as "constructive solution".

*Comment:* Fluency with which Ben Gurion spoke immediately after reading letter probably indicates he gave me distillation GOI's thinking as developed through several days constant preoccupation with recent affairs its northern neighbor. Our conversation was in even, unexcited tempo, but he frequently repeated "we are worried, very worried". He indicated we could expect formal reply to Secretary's letter in near future when he has had opportunity discuss subject with Eban, who was waiting in anteroom as I left after our 20-minute conversation.

We agreed that to newspaper inquiries, we would reply I had called at my request for discussion current matters of mutual interest. If asked whether Syria had been discussed, I would say that

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-I) adopted at an emergency session of the General Assembly which had begun on November 1, 1956.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 365.

both of our countries were naturally interested in recent Syrian developments.

**Baxter**

---

**369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 23, 1957—3:41 p.m.*

544. For Henderson from the Secretary. While objectives your mission discussed at length with you orally, your departure on such short notice precluded my reducing instructions to writing. Although following connotes no change in oral instructions, in view importance of matter, I believe it should be set forth for the record.

1. Turkish and Iraqi officials have expressed to us their grave concern Syrian developments and possibility that Syria is becoming full-fledged Soviet satellite. They consider developments in Syria represent severe threat their security and security other states bordering on Syria. They have set forth certain provisional ideas as to how their interests might be preserved and have asked for US views.

2. US shares deep concern over Syrian development and believes fear on part of Syria's neighbors by no means unjustified. You should, therefore, discuss matter fully with Turkish officials and, if you deem it appropriate, with officials of other countries, such as Iraq and Jordan, who are now in Turkey, to obtain their estimate of situation and their suggestions for dealing with it.

3. In your discussions you should of course bear in mind US policy of supporting the principles of the UN and opposing unprovoked military intervention in any country. At the same time US must be fully alert to obvious dangers of situation in which Syria, under increasing Soviet influence, is receiving large amounts of military goods obviously exceeding those required for Syria's defensive needs. We must take into account any legitimate military planning required by Syria's neighbors to be prepared to protect themselves from any Syrian aggression. Indeed, it is the purpose of the Middle East Doctrine to assist the countries in the area to develop their economic and military strength to resist communist

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13-HE/8-2357. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rountree and approved and signed by Dulles.

threats and to make clear the preparedness of the US to come to the assistance of any of them requesting such aid which is the victim of an attack by a country under the control of international communism.

4. It is understood that you will be in communication with me after your initial conversations with the Ambassador and foreign officials. Further instructions will be given as appropriate.

Dulles

---

### 370. Editorial Note

On August 23, the Department of State established a special handling category for cables and memoranda concerning sensitive aspects of policy or operations relating to the Syrian situation. Telegram 540 to Ankara, August 23, instructed the Embassy that it should use the caption designating the special handling category only for messages containing sensitive information directly relating to special policy and operations and should not refer to such messages in other communications. In an August 23 memorandum to Newton and Arneson, Fisher Howe directed that the Executive Secretariat would make all necessary distribution of documents bearing this caption both inside and outside the Department. In a September 9 memorandum to Rountree, Howe cautioned that the caption did not designate an operation in the way that "Overlord" had been used to designate the 1944 invasion of Normandy but referred to the procedures which had been established to control the dissemination of information concerning particularly sensitive elements of U.S. policy in the Syrian crisis.

According to a list in Department of State files, a total of 226 persons had access to documents in the special handling category, including President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, Secretary Quarles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, and other specified officials on the White House staff, at the Departments of State and Defense, at the Central Intelligence Agency, and at the Embassies in Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, and London, and the Consulate General in Istanbul. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)

371. Letter to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 24, 1957.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just received the following message from [name deleted] which he suggested I pass on to you as representing his personal views.

"Jernegan and I met with Loy last night during brief Rome stopover and learned nature his mission. My views follow:

Syrian developments have followed predicted trends. I have felt for some time that situation there would get worse before we would have much chance of bringing about improvement. Fact that this trend dramatized by publicity, charges and counter charges and by rapid deterioration is probably not what Soviet wishes as USSR probably hoped for a quieter and slower takeover.

Syria is weak militarily and inept politically. No amount of Soviet arms or advisers will quickly alter this situation. I doubt Soviets will try to send volunteers in any large numbers and to do so covertly is extremely difficult. If they should attempt this and be caught out the basis for our action is much clearer.

. . . . .

I feel we still have substantial assets for longer range fresh approach to situation:

A. All border states of Syria are hostile to present Syrian regime. (I recognize that both Jordan and Iraq will be subject to new pressures from Syrians and Egyptians and may need more bolstering from us.) This hostility over period of time should produce pressures, economic and other, border incidents, sabotage, etc.

B. Soviet has never had experience with geographically isolated satellite such as Syria.

C. My info is that result of break with USA has been considerable shock to Syrian people and that we are not wholly without friends within Syria or without Syrian friends abroad. . . .

D. As long as Syria permits Aramco and IPC pipelines to function it is evidence that Syria has not wholly gone over to Soviets. Interruption by Syrians in addition to alienating both Saudis and Iraqis would give us better position for action and these lines are therefore a kind of hostage in reverse. If action started against Syria from outside we must reckon that both lines would go.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Secret. A note attached to the source text from the duty officer in S/S, R.A. McKinnon, to Howe, August 24, indicates that the letter was delivered to Rountree at 2:45 p.m. on August 24 in Berry's presence and that Rountree said he would deliver the letter to Secretary Dulles later in the afternoon.

E. Economic pressures should be available if all border states cooperate. While Soviet could supply Syria's basic economic needs it could not do much for the small local traders whose lines of foreign trade are established.

6. [*Sic*] To summarize:

A. I do not view Syrian situation as necessarily wholly irremediable over long run. . . .

. . . . .

C. If we encourage others to move we must be ready either to go to their aid or face possibility of their failure.

D. I do not feel Soviet would now risk war over Syria if it had any other acceptable way out.

7. . . . Suggest you pass this to the Secretary of State as my personal views. Since I am not in possession of all the available facts though I have followed situation quite closely, suggest you add your comment if my analysis differs from that taken by the . . . . Recognize that this presents somewhat ambiguous situation but assume from request that I meet with Loy and from what he said to me that my personal views desired."

Sincerely,

[Name and title deleted]

**372. Telegram From the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Istanbul, August 25, 1957—6 p.m.*

190. From Henderson. 1. At suggestion made to me by Esenbel, Secretary General Foreign Office, this morning I requested audience through Jordan Ambassador Haydar for Ambassador Warren and myself with King Hussein. Esenbel had informed me that King was

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:43 p.m. A notation on the source text indicates that it was read by Cabell and A. Roosevelt.

Howe forwarded a copy of telegram 190 along with four other messages from Henderson (telegrams 191, 192, 193, and 197) to the White House on August 26 under cover of a note indicating that Secretary Dulles had asked that President Eisenhower be shown the telegrams. Howe's covering note and its attachments are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material.

departing early afternoon for Spain and would be pleased to receive me on my request.

2. Jordan Ambassador told us King desired talk not only re problem Syria but re other matters pertaining US-Jordan relations.

3. I told King I would have brought personal messages for him if Washington had known prior my departure that he would be in Istanbul. In any event I would like to tell him how much he was admired in US for courage and wisdom which he had displayed in preventing developments from taking place which would have ruined his country and done great damage to Arab and free world.

4. King asked if I could tell him what US thinking was re Syria and purpose my present mission. I told him we looked with just as much concern upon recent developments in Syria as we understood did Syria's neighbors. Before my departure from Washington we had received messages from our Embassies in Amman, Beirut, Ankara and Baghdad describing how disturbed Near Eastern countries were re Syria. Also message from Embassy Ankara referred to certain conversations which had taken place between Iraqis and Turks in Istanbul. In view urgency situation and difficulties in clarifying our views by written exchanges, we decided that I should expedite my visit to Near East so I could without delay consult personally with our Ambassador and with Prime Minister Menderes. I then gave him analysis of the Syrian situation as we saw it, emphasizing that we were prepared to give appropriate support to Syria's Moslem neighbors in case Syrian provocations would force them to take some kind defensive action. I pointed out that we were not urging any particular type of action. We felt that Syria's Moslem neighbors could best decide among themselves what they could and should do. It was important however that no action by Syria's neighbors be taken except in circumstances which would enable them to defend themselves before UN.

5. King said he fully agreed with our analysis re Syria. He convinced that if present Syrian Government remained in power for several months it would be so firmly entrenched it would be almost impossible dislodge it. He did not however indicate that his government was prepared to take immediate action. He asked whether in our opinion Iraq was pre[pared] to do anything. I replied I had not yet had opportunity to talk with Iraqis. . . .

He doubted whether Syrians had as yet learned to handle this equipment. It is possible Soviet technicians in Syria would man this equipment themselves. I asked him whether in his opinion Jordan Army was superior to that of Syria. He replied Syrians far better equipped although Jordanese had advantage in training, organization and morale. King inquired what in our opinion attitude Saud would be. I said I thought he might know answer to that better than I. He

said he had sent message to Saud and had reason believe Saud would be sympathetic to Jordan in case of dispute between Jordan and Syria but he had not as yet received reply. He had also no reply as yet to messages he had sent to Arab countries in North Africa. He thought however that governments these countries were quite disgusted with Egypt and Syria.

6. King expressed concern re Israel and Soviet Union. He said that if Israel should attack any Arab country it would be playing into hands of Communists since all Arab countries would immediately unite against Israel. Furthermore if there should be armed hostilities involving Jordanese troops, Jordan would be seriously weakened militarily even in case of Syrian defeat and might become easy victim for Israel. Soviet intervention might also result in disaster for those struggling against communism.

7. I told King that in my opinion Israel would not attack Arab countries in present circumstances since Israel fully aware that such move could lead only to its ruin. We had already communicated with Israel pointing out necessity for it to exercise utmost restraint. We also appreciated problem re Soviet Union and were determined not to allow Soviet Union to decide fate of ME either by threat or by actual intervention.

8. I asked what in his opinion Turkey should do. He said Turkey should not participate in fighting. It . . . could give diplomatic support but it would be unwise for Turks to become involved in hostilities in Arab World. . . .

. . . . .

9. King said he was handicapped because he had no member of his government with him. He might however arrange for certain consultations even before his return to Jordan. His plans had called for ten days absence from Jordan. He was proceeding this afternoon to Italy where he would remain one day and thence to Madrid. If we wanted to get in touch with him in Rome we could do so through his Legation. I expressed concern that he should be absent from Jordan just at this time. He said that his trip had been planned some time ago but in case situation should warrant he could return Amman on short notice.

10. King said that unfortunately Jordan was handicapped in radio duel with Syria because lack equipment. He understood five more months would elapse before radio equipment he was receiving from US could be installed. Furthermore some time ago Jordan had requested sorely needed arms from US. No favorable action had thus far been taken on his request. He hoped this matter would be looked into urgently. He also referred to Jordan's present financial situation.



He thought with financial aid being given to him by US he could carry on during this year. He had sought financial assistance from Iraq but his efforts in this direction had thus far not been successful. I promised to bring these two matters to immediate attention Washington.

Miner

---

**373. Telegram From the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Istanbul, August 26, 1957—5 p.m.*

203. From Henderson. I arrived Istanbul simultaneously with Ambassador Warren noon August 24. At 6 pm we were received by Prime Minister Menderes accompanied by Zorlu and Esenbel.

The Prime Minister opened our lengthy conversation by describing in detail views exchanged during his meeting with Iraq and Jordan Kings and their advisers that day and previously. He stressed concern and seriousness with which they all viewed situation. Although Lebanon not represented in Istanbul meeting PM was keeping close touch Lebanese Government and convinced Lebanon was equally concerned.

Istanbul meetings had discussed wide range of possible moves to counter communization Syria including diplomatic activities, possibility utilizing Syrian leaders in exile, assessment of military strengths of Iraq, Jordan and Syria. There possibility para-military action might be required in case unbearable provocation.

Arab conferees were hopeful that they could secure at least moral support other non-Communist Arab States against Syria becoming Soviet satellite. In addition his message to King Saud (of which Department aware) King Hussein had also communicated with leaders of Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. No replies had yet been received. Iraqis are also getting in touch directly with Saud to allay any fears he might have as to their aims. No communications have been sent to Nasser. Some of the Iraqis thought it might be desirable for record to appeal to him in name Arab unity but Hussein felt such appeal would be useless.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-HE/8-2657. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ankara.

Prime Minister then mentioned that conferees were concerned at possible attitude USSR, Egypt, and Israel. He said any move by Israel would be fatal as it would unite Arab world. I told him we had expressed to Israelis hope it would act with greatest restraint. As for Egyptians I said I hoped we would be able make clear them inadvisability any action their part. I added presence certain elements Sixth Fleet in eastern Mediterranean waters might have restraining influence as well.

Major problems posed by Soviets attitude would require of course most serious study. Soviet threats would not deter US from continuing assist any friendly governments against international communism.

At Prime Minister's request I then set out current Washington thinking concerning Syrian crisis in accordance my instructions. I said US deeply concerned Syrian developments and believed real danger Syria might become Soviet satellite, as present ruling clique consolidated its power and Soviet arms and technicians continued pour into Syria. It Washington's belief that if processes now taking place in Syria remain unchecked Syria in short time will as fully fledged satellite state become member Soviet bloc. Washington therefore thoroughly understood concern Syrian neighbors and their feeling that their security menaced. I could assure him US would give all appropriate support in UN and otherwise to Syria's Moslem neighbors in case they were forced to take some kind defensive action in response Syrian provocations. Armed force should not be used however except in circumstances fully justifiable under Charter UN. Immediate and high-level attention had been given to Turk and Iraqi communication forwarded by Ambassador Warren. It had been decided that I should expedite my planned visit to ME to consult personally with Ambassador Warren and Prime Minister Menderes and if considered desirable with Arab leaders currently in Istanbul. Prime Minister was visibly pleased at US interest and attitude.

In response my question Turkey's role in Syrian crisis, Prime Minister said Arab conferees believed any initiative must come from Arabs but Turkey would be prepared if necessary enter picture at secondary stage. Following inconclusive discussion possible ways and means considered in previous Turks and Iraqi conferences of offsetting Syrian communization, Prime Minister said he was to meet Arab Kings and their advisers and would tell them US understanding and sympathetic. Subsequently, it might be desirable for me to meet Hussein and Feisal and their advisers.

Department repeat where desired.

374. **Telegram From the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Istanbul, August 26, 1957—6 p.m.*

205. From Henderson.

1. Following luncheon meeting August 25 with President Bayar, Menderes and other GOT officials at which Turks expressed some pessimism at possibility useful and decisive action by Iraq and Jordan to solve Syrian problem, Warren and I met in evening with Turks and Iraqis, including King, Crown Prince, Minister Defense and Chief-of-Staff.

2. At Prime Minister's request I outlined US views in Syrian situation and purposes my Mid-East mission along same lines as previously. I stressed dangers inherent in Syrian situation and US readiness to support Turkey, Iraq and various Arab countries in their efforts solve Syrian problem. I emphasized any action taken must be of nature that could be justified in UN.

3. Crown Prince stated he prepared personally assure Saud Iraq had no territorial or political ambitions re Syria. He asked that we arrange his interview with Saud but readily agreed when I said I considered it preferable he use his own channels.

4. After short discussion various aspects of Syrian question, Crown Prince said he considered matters so urgent he was returning to Iraq August 26 to begin consultations and planning. Contrary to impression given earlier by Prime Minister Menderes Iraqis appeared desirous take effective action to solve Syrian problem.

**Miner**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-HE/8-2657. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ankara.

375. **Memorandum of a Conversation With the President,  
White House, Washington, August 28, 1957, 10:30 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles  
Mr. Rountree (part-time)  
Mr. Gerard Smith (part-time)  
Mr. Hagerty (part-time)  
Major Eisenhower

*Middle East*

Secretary Dulles initially referred to two incoming messages, one from Mr. Macmillan<sup>2</sup> and one from Ambassador Henderson,<sup>3</sup> now touring the Middle East. The President read them over for his own information. The President was also informed that a Mr. Beeley, the British expert on the Middle East and Mr. Rountree's counterpart, may come over to the U.S. for discussions on the entire situation. Some aspects of the situation are too sensitive to deal with by cable.<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary then reported to the President on the situation in Lebanon. A cable has been received from that country indicating that the internal situation there is tending to deteriorate.<sup>5</sup> Apparently Syrian bandits and saboteurs are being sent across the border. Opinion is that if this present Lebanese government is to survive, it must do so on a coalition basis. The last elections were won by the party in power too sweepingly. Many friends of the West were swept out of power and apparently given rough treatment. . . .

The discussion then shifted to the Syrian situation, particularly with relation to Saudi Arabia. The President was concerned over the

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. A separate memorandum of the conversation by Rountree is in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. It contains a briefer account of the conversation than Eisenhower's memorandum printed here.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence 1955-1959)

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in telegram 527 from Ankara, August 27, not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)

<sup>4</sup> According to Rountree's memorandum of conversation, Secretary Dulles "also showed the President the draft of a proposed new message [to Macmillan] suggesting that the Prime Minister send a representative to Washington for discussions following Mr. Henderson's return. The President was agreeable to both messages, and approved the inclusion in the latter of a statement to the effect that he, as well as the Secretary, hoped that the Prime Minister would accept the suggestion."

The draft message is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. The revised message was transmitted for delivery to the Embassy in London in telegram 1656 at 12:04 p.m. on August 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.13-HE/8-2857)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 553 from Beirut, August 27, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 783A.00/8-2757)

two messages he had received the previous day from King Saud, both of which were couched in extremely tough language.<sup>6</sup> The chief cause for concern is the fact that Saud is now prepared to blame the U.S. for much of the difficulty in Syria. The President was curious as to the time and motivation for the cool treatment we have been given by Syria of late. In this connection, Secretary Dulles pointed out that we had made offers to Syria in 1955 but that the USSR was able to overbid us in that country. The President desired that this fact be pointed out to King Saud.

The Saud situation per se comprised the next subject for discussion.

[Here follows discussion of the Gulf of Aqaba question and of how the United States might better communicate with King Saud.]

Mr. Rountree then reported to the President on a debriefing of Colonel Malloy, who was recently declared persona non grata as Chief of the MAAG in Syria. Colonel Malloy has confirmed many impressions previously held by this government on the effectiveness of Soviet techniques in Syria and Egypt. The technique used thus far has been for the Soviets to send in small numbers of technicians, to insist that they behave well, to insure that they take no apparent political interest in the country, and to send them back immediately upon completion of their job. The first contingent consisted of only some 15 officers and 50 technicians. The next contingent, according to Mr. Rountree, will probably be some 100 officers and 600 men. By their scrupulous conduct and apparent lack of political motivation, these technicians are negating our propaganda that they are primarily political agents.

[Here follows discussion on the disarmament question. At this point in the conversation Smith replaced Rountree.]

**John S. D. Eisenhower**  
*Major, Infantry, U.S. Army*

---

<sup>6</sup> Reference is presumably to two messages of August 25 from Saud, one concerning the Gulf of Aqaba and one concerning the Syrian situation.

376. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy  
in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 28, 1957—5:31 p.m.*

737. For Henderson. Instructions issued at highest level to fulfill MAP commitments to ME countries as quickly as possible. Directive applies to all MAP ME nations but Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in sequence named given overriding priority. If necessary to meet commitments contained in approved MAP programs including Richards commitments, items will be pulled from active units.

In implementation this policy following matériel being air lifted to Iraq: Thirty-six 4.2 inch mortars, eighty-two 106mm recoilless rifles, 162 AN/GRC-9 radios, six OandL aircraft and ammo for 106 rifles.

Air lift of following authorized for Jordan immediately: 40 jeeps mounted with 106mm recoilless rifles, ammo for 106mm rifles and 40,000 rounds 50 caliber rifle ammo. Urgent consideration being given remainder Jordan program.

Regarding Saudi Arabia top priority assigned items sold pursuant exchange notes of April 2. To expedite fulfillment training commitment Air Force being directed fly five F86Fs to SA immediately and to provide 2 replacement T33s.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13-HE/8-2857. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burdett; cleared in substance with Colonel Shepley, Greene, and Murphy; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles.

377. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Tel Aviv, August 28, 1957—8 p.m.*

199. Beirut for Henderson. At Israeli initiative I called at Foreign Ministry today for talk about Syria with Herzog, Comay and Shiloah latter now functioning in newly created position of adviser to Foreign Minister on political and policy planning affairs.

When I said I welcomed opportunity to hear their views but that current study of situation by Washington had not resulted in distillation of US views to transmit to GOI they indicated that this negative information itself added discouragement to their already discouraging estimate of prospects for future. Time they felt was of essence. Every day of delay in expression of some strong and positive reaction by the United States as the leader of the western world increased dangerous possibility that gravity of threat posed by Syria would be discounted. In the absence of any indication that steps were under consideration or in motion to reverse current trend in Syria tendency would grow nurtured by wishful thinking for acceptance of fallacious thesis which Syria and Kremlin wish to promulgate, i.e. shake up in Syria represents merely shift of government by constitutional means to left but not creation of Communist state or Soviet satellite as first feared. Shiloah drew analogy with Egypt in 1955 when west made attempt to play down significance Czechoslovakian arms deal in belief now proved mistaken that west could still do business with Nasser and that strong reaction to Czech deal might only serve to drive him more rapidly into Soviet camp. GOI also believes it is whistling in dark to think Nasser is disturbed by events in Syria. He may have tried to give such impression to western diplomats but it was he who persuaded Kuwatly to reverse his decision to resign.

In opinion GOI "Arab experts" Syria can much more easily be turned into Soviet satellite than Egypt. Nasser though willing tool of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8-2857. Secret; Priority. Received at 5:33 p.m. Also sent niact to Beirut and repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Paris, London, and Moscow.

On August 29, Howe forwarded to Goodpaster copies of telegram 199 from Tel Aviv and telegram 563 from Beirut under cover of a note indicating that Dulles wished the cables to be shown to Eisenhower. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/8-2957) Copies of the telegrams are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.

In telegram 563 from Beirut, August 28, Henderson reported on his initial meetings with Foreign Minister Malik, Prime Minister Solh, and President Chamoun following his arrival in Beirut that day. During these discussions, the Lebanese officials emphasized the seriousness of subversion from Syria which Lebanon faced; Henderson explained that the United States shared this fear for Lebanon and other neighboring states. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.13-HE/8-2857)

Soviets insists that they work thru him and he has firm control over all elements of Egyptian Government. On other hand there is well-developed Communist movement in Syria with cells ready to take over all functions and every level of government. Unless something done to halt this we can expect step by step purge which will result in another Hungary against which west will be powerless to move. However GOI feels that a little time still remains in which Syrian elements opposed to present course could be assisted and encouraged to reverse trend. . . .

Israel is also part of the area Foreign Ministry officials emphasized and is as vitally concerned at prospect of "Soviet base" on its frontier as are other countries of area. Henderson has been dispatched on special mission to hear views of "certain of Syria's neighbors." He has already been in contact with Turkey, Iraq and Jordan and it is now reported that he will travel to Beirut. The impression may soon arise that US does not consider Israel "part of the area or a neighbor of Syria."

When Shiloah expressed opinion that Turkey, Jordan and Iraq must have learned something of Department's preliminary views or direction of thinking from Henderson which not available to assist Israel in its deliberations on situation I stated my belief that Henderson's mission was exactly as announced in the press that he was only on fact-finding mission to report views of area leaders directly to the Secretary in order assist Department to evaluate Syrian developments. He did not ask if Henderson intended include Israel on his trip but volunteered that GOI would be happy to receive him if he should wish to come.

**Baxter**

---

**378. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 29, 1957—7:09 p.m.*

766. For Henderson from Secretary. Urtel 567.<sup>2</sup> We had assumed that Iraqi Crown Prince would be urgently returning from

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rountree and Rockwell and approved and signed by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 567 from Beirut, August 29, Henderson reported his plans to leave Beirut for Washington on August 30. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 110.13-HE/8-2957)



Turkey to Baghdad, after which it would be possible more accurately to evaluate prospects. . . . At moment it appears important element missing is definitive information on the attitude and plans of the Iraqi Government itself. Whether this can best be obtained by your return to Turkey or otherwise we leave to your discretion. You no doubt will be discussing it with Gallman. You can thus best decide yourself when you should return, although we certainly most anxious consult with you as soon as possible.

Through separate messages you have learned of expedited delivery to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan of military equipment under existing Military Aid programs. The military here are also urgently working on estimates of additional equipment necessary further to increase effectiveness of the Iraqi Army. However we do not want to assume commitment to the Iraqis or provide them with this extra equipment unless they . . . require additional strengthening of their forces. Therefore this information should be used, if at all, with discretion.

The President and I are grateful for the skill with which you have handled your delicate mission. You are discharging your responsibilities with the great ability and effectiveness which we have all learned to appreciate so deeply.

**Dulles**

---

**379. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Cairo, September 1, 1957—7 p.m.*

608. Beirut for Henderson; Rome for McSweeney. Noform except as otherwise indicated by Department. As reported Embtel 604, <sup>2</sup> talk with Nasser yesterday was a 1- $\frac{3}{4}$  hour affair which began

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9-157. Secret. Received at 9:17 a.m., September 2. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and Khartoum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 604 from Cairo, August 31, Hare reported that he had had a 1- $\frac{3}{4}$  hour conversation with Nasser on August 31. The gist of Nasser's comments regarding Syria paralleled previously reported remarks made by Haikal to Embassy officials in Cairo, except that Nasser's tone on August 31 had been more moderate than Haikal had described. According to Hare, Nasser made repeated appeals that the United States approach the Syrians directly, particularly through a Henderson visit to Damascus, and warned that failure of the United States to do so would give the

as exchange of views on Syria but also covered fundamental aspects of US–Egypt relations. In fact, even when Syria was under discussion parallel with situation here was often so close that it sometimes seemed Nasser might be speaking one word on behalf Syria and two on behalf Egypt. Although two subjects were intertwined in discussion following is re-arrangement by subject.

Regarding Syria I opened by outlining substance Deptel 559.<sup>3</sup> Nasser took several minutes before replying; then said he did not think situation as serious as we see it. He had full information and convinced no intent go over to Russians. Real problem had been caused by suspicion and fear not only for security of country but also for safety of persons involved (a phenomenon which Nasser also indicated present in Egypt although he disclaimed any personal concern). This was key to situation and much would depend on how US handled it. Must be understood that people in power in Syria are young and will react violently to efforts to exert pressure; not possible to intimidate them (here again Nasser indicated parallel with Egypt).

Regarding arms, Syria had much same experience as Egypt. It had turned to US and UK without success and finally sought arms from Russians as only course left open in face of arms build-up in Israel with French assistance and also in light of other area developments. But he was certain that stories regarding Soviet technicians were greatly exaggerated. He could not furnish exact figure without checking but was certain number would not exceed 50 and most of these were there temporarily for assembling material and similar tasks. No need for Russians for training purposes because training of all types Syrian units being done in Egypt.

Concerning Soviet economic assistance, story was similar of having no place else to turn in time of acute need. For instance, Syria had been refused loan by World Bank.

However, despite these Force Majeure transactions, Nasser felt confident Syrians (including government, Bath and military) have no intention of abandoning independence and becoming subservient to Russians. Not only that but he convinced it mistake to assume Syrians do not want friendly relations with US. As matter of fact situation in Syria now much better, much calmer; there is greater feeling of security. There is opportunity in this atmosphere for USC to come to understanding with Syrians if it takes initiative. Important thing is to remember that basic difficulty in Syria is fear. In such circumstances it is mistake to talk in terms of 6th Fleet,

---

impression of action hostile to Syria and would contribute to the increase of tension. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/8–3157)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/8–2657)

bringing about change in government, supplying arms to dissidents, Turkish threats or isolating Syria. These will be contra productive and run risk of producing results which we are now talking about in terms of accomplished fact. This is very dangerous because an attempt at isolation which drove Syria into arms of Russians would mean that Syria by its geographical situation could not only isolate other countries of area economically and control pipelines but could also constitute ideal "carrier" for Soviet air force.

Nasser's recommendation in this situation was that USG should go in for bit of "psychiatry" (his own word) and deal gently with Syrians in such way as relieve their fears. That is line that GOE is following and results reassuring. Nasser admitted however, that he had been very disturbed about 10 days ago, particularly because he feared USG might precipitate crisis and that Syrians would react rashly. That was why he had sent Haikal to see me (Embtel 537).<sup>4</sup>

Regarding Henderson mission Nasser said he had formerly had reservations because Henderson's Baghdad Pact associations but that personal contact with him on occasion Menzies mission had revealed him to be most reasonable and understanding. He therefore hoped he would visit Syria on present trip and see things for himself. Failure to do so would not seem consonant with real fact-finding mission. Furthermore, fact that consultations restricted to governments unfriendly to Syria carried threatening implications, which he repeated was thing most to be avoided.

Regarding US relations, parallelism of facts and background with Syrian situation were so obvious that I felt appropriate use occasion for another basic review.

I began with following general exposition:

(1) Our fundamental objective is preservation and promotion of area peace and stability.

(2) In pursuing that policy we have assisted countries of area to attain independence and we now want to see independence maintained. We are sympathetic with Nationalism provided it is of constructive character. We welcome area co-operation directed to promotion of peace and stability. Although we think neutralism unwise and short-sighted, we have no necessary quarrel with countries which follow that policy provided that it is real neutralism which respects rights of others to adopt policies designed promote their own best interests.

(3) Main problem, as we see it is threat of international Communism to independence of countries of area. To be emphasized here that what we are specifically talking about is predatory international Communism with world domination as its objective. It is also true that we strongly disapprove of national [Communism?] as practical

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 537 from Cairo, August 23, reported one of the conversations between Hare and Haikal mentioned in footnote 2 above. (*Ibid.*, 780.00/8-2357)

matter we prepared deal with Nationalist Communist countries such as Yugoslavia on realistic basis.

(4) Specific danger NE is development of increasing intimacy and dependence on Communist bloc which, although intent may be innocent, will in turn lead to loss of independence and in process to perversion of Nationalism and neutralism. Also only Arab unity possible in such circumstances would be common status as Soviet satellites. Thus, in seeking promote these objectives by naive means, independence, nationalism, neutrality and unity would all go out window.

(5) This is why Syria important. Situation in Egypt differs in certain respects but same dark clouds on horizon. It is our sincere and honest judgment that Egypt steering course which could lead to disaster for it and area and in circumstances we can not adopt attitude toward Egypt which would indicate acceptance of what we convinced wrong.

(6) I had heard argument advanced, some times by Nasser himself, that East-West conflict is battle of giants to be fought out between them while small countries like Egypt remained to one side and look to their own immediate problems. Nothing could be more fallacious. Clear prospect, based on many precedents and current developments, is not that Russians will in foreseeable future seek to come to grips with US direct but rather that their immediate concentration of effort will be where picking is easiest and clear indication is that NE at top of priority list for subjugation. It is NE, including Egypt, that is in immediate path of Soviet predatory action.

As military man, Nasser should appreciate that a division commander on basis of his appraisal of situation in his immediate area might think desirable conduct campaign in quite different way than would commander-in-chief with full information of whole war area. Thus, as regards international Communism, we are in position to analyze it on global basis not merely theoretically but as result of experience gained the hard way. We are confident we know what we are talking about and believe Nasser would be wise to profit by our counsel.

(7) Conclusion is that we not motivated by an *Imus* [*animus?*] toward Egypt or by opposition to objective it espouses provided they are constructive in intent. We are convinced however that way in which Egypt is going about attaining its objectives (here I cite not only Soviet relationship but also attacks on other Arab countries not following Egyptian lead) is not only misguided but dangerous. There is the problem.

Nasser listened attentively and, after pause for reflection, said he was in general agreement with foregoing analysis. However, having said this, he immediately and characteristically went over to defensive.

He said he always tried analyze all factors in situation and recognized that Soviet threat was one of them. However, there were other factors which impinged more immediately on Egypt and one of these was American pressures and efforts isolate Egypt. If we

continue to follow these tactics, he would have to fight back. He did not know how he would do it but he could not remain passive. We were making same mistake in Egypt as in Syria by failing understand inevitable reaction to our policies. Exertion of pressures not only results in reaction from fear but it also offends sense of dignity. Senator Fulbright had understood this in his criticism of way Aswan Dam matter handled.

Nasser said he strongly opposed domestic Communism and repeated story of how he was prepared crack down on local Communists before elections but had held his hand when he learned that anti-government leaflets of American origin were being circulated.

Regarding dealings with USSR Nasser said he now has enough arms for next 5 or 6 years by which time most of it would probably be obsolete. He had also taken precaution of laying in 6-year supply of spare parts; in fact,  $\frac{1}{3}$  of arms purchases had consisted of spare parts. He did not wish take any changes which would put him at mercy of Russians in that regard. Regarding ammunition, he was building factories which should make Egypt self-sufficient. Regarding economic dealings, he did not wish become dependent on Russians and for that reason had not accepted proffered gold loan earlier in year but met situation by special arrangements with India, China, Greece, Spain and Saudi Arabia. However, can not buy from US without dollars and in circumstances trade with USSR necessary. More we apply economic pressure, more economic relations with USSR increase. General situation is that we always refuse and Russians always help out. Egypt would like come to understanding with US but we leave no room.

Nasser said that following helpful stand which we had taken at time Suez invasion he had entertained hopes that new page could be turned in relations with US, but that those hopes had been dashed by new policy of pressures to weaken Egypt internationally and by Eisenhower Doctrine to isolate Egypt externally. It was foregone conclusion Egypt could not agree to Doctrine and he wondered what we felt we had gained by it. It seemed to him that all that had happened was we had given \$170 million to number of countries which already were on our side and that only case where new country had come over to US was Lebanon where main results seemed to be it had become country divided against itself. He could not help wondering how we assessed value of this expenditure as compared with \$54 million for Aswan Dam.

I observed that seemed we were going through same old routine where we were always wrong and GOE always right. Did not he have anything more constructive to offer? Nasser replied he could not be placed in position of coming to us with regrets and excuses. It would be contrary to Egypt's dignity. Then with grin he said he did

have one proposal to make: We should forget past and our complexes and begin all over again. Then, more seriously, he cited case of Sudan, where when things had not gone as Egypt had hoped, he had been advised by some to adopt policy of retaliation but he had vetoed idea and relations with Sudan now good.

Although, despite its length and depth, conversation produced nothing really new, it was obvious that Nasser very much wanted to talk and that he was trying at least to give impression of desire mend his fences with us but, despite repeated probing, it was impossible find anything to indicate that he was prepared to make any real concessions. However, I believe that on balance conversation was useful if for no other reason than to clarify our position in way Nasser seemed to understand even though he could not bring himself to agree.

Hare

---

**380. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, September 2, 1957, 3 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

*The Middle East.*

I said that there was nothing very conclusive over the weekend and that probably Loy Henderson could not get back before the President left for Newport.<sup>2</sup> We discussed the possibility of my coming to Newport and the President said he thought perhaps it might be better for him to come back here and he would tentatively plan to be here Saturday morning, possibly using as a reason that a niece of his was being married at Baltimore that day and he might drop by at the reception.

I said that nothing had altered to change the unanimous verdict of Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey that unless something were done to alter the course of events in Syria within the next 60 days, probably a Communist directed regime would be so solidly installed that it could not be dislodged and that would have a grave impact upon the neighboring states. However, the Iraqis, who logi-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private.

<sup>2</sup> Eisenhower left for the summer White House at Newport, Rhode Island, on September 4. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments Record)

cally should have the initiative were somewhat wobbly, the government was weak and it might be desirable that Nuri Pasha should go back. I said I might discuss this with Caccia and Bishop this afternoon.<sup>3</sup> The President concurred. I said that there had been a somewhat cryptic post script to one of Henderson's latest messages which said in effect that the Turks were in deadly earnest and hoped that we were too.<sup>4</sup> I said that undesirable as it would be that the Turks should take any initiative perhaps it could not be prevented unless one of the Arab States was prepared.

[Here follows discussion concerning Saudi Arabia.]

JFD

---

<sup>3</sup> Later that afternoon Dulles met with Ambassador Caccia and Macmillan's private secretary, Frederick Bishop, who had arrived in Washington earlier that day. The memorandum of the conversation by Rountree, who was also present, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123) In a letter to Dulles, dated August 30, but presumably handed by Bishop to Dulles on September 2, Macmillan indicated that Bishop had his complete confidence and was one of only two or three men in London with whom Macmillan had discussed "our immediate problems". (*Ibid.*) Dulles gave a copy of the letter to Eisenhower on September 3. The copy is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to telegram 226 from Istanbul, September 1. In it, Henderson reported on a conversation with Menderes following his return to Istanbul on September 1. During this conversation, Menderes expressed great concern over Iraq's wavering attitude. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)

---

### 381. Telegram From the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Istanbul, September 2/3, 1957—midnight.*

228. 1. I did not have opportunity talk with Crown Prince Iraq (Consulate General telegram 226)<sup>2</sup> alone during course of day. However, he participated in 2-hour discussion this evening with Prime Minister Menderes, Minister State Zorlu, Ambassador Warren and myself.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:04 a.m., September 3. Forwarded to General Goodpaster at the White House on September 3 under cover of a note from Howe. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 226 from Istanbul, September 1, contained an account of a conversation between Henderson and Menderes. The Turkish Prime Minister had suggested that Henderson might be able to talk with Abdul-illah shortly after his arrival in Istanbul on September 2. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)

2. Conversation was frank and in my opinion helpful. Crown Prince said he having difficulty with Iraq Government. Prime Minister Jaydat kind, helpful sort of person averse to making difficult decisions and to assuming serious responsibilities. His Foreign Minister Ali Mumtaz also indecisive person preferring drift to action. There must be shifts in government if successful action to be taken. . . . Crown Prince said he intended send telegram immediately asking Nuri Said return to Baghdad where he would probably be made Deputy Prime Minister. Crown Prince said he might also bring Tewfik Suedi into Cabinet as Minister of State and Jamali to handle propaganda.

3. I said my return stop in Istanbul was prompted in part by my hope that while here I would obtain information which would permit me report to Washington attitude which Iraq had decided to assume. I would regret in making my report to leave blank space when referring to Iraq. I asked Crown Prince whether or not Iraq had yet assumed definite attitude. Crown Prince said he regretted it had not. Its indecision was primarily due to weak Prime Minister. In absence King Feisal, Crown Prince had hesitated give categoric orders to Prime Minister. He was certain, however, that when King returned Baghdad in few days appropriate orders would be given. . . . He had already spoken to Ambassador Gallman re some of Iraq's military needs. Iraq Chief of Staff<sup>3</sup> was now in Istanbul. They would like talk with me. I told him I had just received telegram from Ambassador Gallman that he was arriving later in evening. At Crown Prince's suggestion it was agreed that he, his Chief of Staff, Ambassador Gallman and I would have discussion re some of Iraq's problems shortly before midnight tonight. It also agreed that early tomorrow morning (September 3) there should be another meeting which would include three American Ambassadors, Turks, and Iraqis. This meeting must be short since I departing for airport shortly before 10 o'clock.

4. Crown Prince said he had sent message to King Saud expressing concern re Syria and suggesting he might visit King in order discuss matter personally. Early this morning Saudi Ambassador to Baghdad had given him Saud's reply. Saud had also expressed concern at Syrian developments and intimated Nasser largely to blame. Saud also indicated that there should be no resort to arms but other methods should be used to bring about changes with Syria. Saud also said that in his opinion visit Crown Prince just now to Saudi Arabia might be misunderstood and should therefore be postponed. Crown Prince stated that he intended to write another

---

<sup>3</sup> General Rafiq.



letter to Saud giving in more detail reasons why Iraq could not afford remain inactive. . . .

5. Considerable discussion re Jordan. Both Menderes and I did our best to persuade Crown Prince to make every effort effect improvement relations between King Hussein and himself and between Jordan and Iraq. Crown Prince admitted lack of mutual trust between Hussein and himself. Although he did not promise to undertake heal breach he nevertheless seemed impressed. It seems to us close cooperation between Jordan and Iraq necessary if any effective action to be taken re Syria. It appears easier, for instance, for Iraqi troops to penetrate Syria through Jordan than to cover vast roadless distance lying along Iraqi-Syrian borders.

6. Menderes reminded Crown Prince that Turks and Iraqis had sent message to US asking that US give its view re Syrian problem. US Government had sent me here to present these views. It would be too bad if I should be compelled to return US with report Iraq still had not decided what to do. He hoped Crown Prince would discuss this matter at once with King. King and Crown Prince enjoyed such position in Iraq that if they should make firm decision any Iraq Government would follow it. Turkey had been informed by its friends, the Arabs and US, that since Syrian problem primarily Arab affair Turkey should not intervene. However, existence of Communist-controlled Syria represented so grave threat Turkish security that if Arabs unable take action themselves Turkey would be compelled to consult with US re what it should do.

7. Warren and I had feeling Crown Prince left our meeting determined to talk with King and to take more positive line in dealing with Iraqi Government re Syrian danger.

8. Both Turks and Iraqis stressed how important it was that American military advisers or "commission" be sent this area urgently authorized to give advice from strategic and tactical point of view and to assist and make recommendation re needs for arms. I told Crown Prince that it would be useless to consider sending such mission to this area before Iraq had decided what its course of action would be.

**Miner**

**382. Telegram From the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Istanbul, September 3, 1957—3 p.m.*

231. From Henderson. 1. Crown Prince Iraq returned Istanbul from Baghdad September 2, participated in conversation that evening with Turk Prime Minister Zorlu, Ambassador Warren and myself. Crown Prince reported he felt there must be some government changes in Jawdat government if resolute attitude to be adopted. He was telegraphing Nuri Said to return Baghdad from London, probably to become Deputy Prime Minister. Tewfik Suedi might be brought into Cabinet as Minister State and Jamali charged with propaganda matters.

2. Crown Prince said that morning he had received reply from King Saud to his message suggesting their early meeting to discuss Syrian situation. Saud's reply express concern Syrian developments, inferred Nasser to blame and felt that change should be brought about in Syrian Government other than through force of arms. Saud stated Crown Prince visit at this juncture might be misunderstood and should therefore be postponed. Crown Prince expressed intention write again to Saud but Menderes suggested it would be better have no further correspondence with Saud for time being.

3. There was considerable discussion concerning Jordan. Necessity for improvement relations between King Hussein and Crown Prince Iraq and between two countries was stressed, particularly by Menderes. Menderes also urged necessity of early adoption firm attitude by Iraq towards Syria.

4. Later same evening Crown Prince, King Feisal and Chief of Staff Rafiq met Ambassador Warren and Gallman and myself. Hour's discussion brought forth no new points. However King stated: You may inform your government that I fully agree with assessment which US has made of Syrian situation. You may state that I shall do all that I can to see that Iraqis helpful in finding a solution.

5. Crown Prince expressed concern King Saud's attitude and General Rafiq stressed necessity of closer cooperation between Iraq and Jordan.

6. Remarks made during these two conversations indicated that King Feisal as well as Crown Prince would shortly return Baghdad.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13-HE/9-357. Top Secret; Priority.

Department repeat as desired.

Miner

---

### 383. Special National Intelligence Estimate <sup>1</sup>

SNIE 36.7-57

*Washington, September 3, 1957.*

#### DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SYRIAN SITUATION <sup>2</sup>

##### The Problem

To assess the current situation in Syria, especially the degree of involvement with the Soviet Bloc, and prospects for a change in present trends. <sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." The estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on September 3, 1957. "Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

<sup>2</sup> The notes of the September 3 IAC meeting, by Howe, indicate the following discussion concerning SNIE 36.7-57:

"This paper was approved after extensive discussion resulting in certain changes and amendments, particular attention being given to Paragraph 4 on the question of Soviet advance planning, and to Paragraph 14 which analyzed Syrian reaction to various forms of intervention. With respect to the first of these situations Mr. Cumming pointed out that Syria had long been identified as a 'soft spot' and that the Soviets had been most careful to see that it stayed soft. He noted that the events which have recently transpired resulted from the inter-play of domestic forces and the overall Soviet handling of matters relating to Syria over many months. With respect to the second question, General Cabell stressed the importance of the IAC's avoiding a rationalization on the effect of Turkish intervention. ONE was asked to prepare a re-draft of this section which was later submitted to the meeting and approved as amended.

"No Post-Mortem was prepared. A Validity Study will be submitted to the IAC next week. The estimate was approved for release to USIA." (*Ibid.*, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776)

<sup>3</sup> The estimate is concerned primarily with events within Syria, not with external reactions. [Footnote in the source text.]

*Introduction*

1. Syria has for about two years been dominated by a group of extreme Arab nationalists—army officers and civilian politicians—whose chief common motivation has been hatred of Western “imperialism” and of Israel and whose objectives lent themselves to exploitation and intensification by the Soviet Union. The composition of this group has varied with shifting Syrian loyalties and its membership is not entirely known. The group has elected to follow the example of Nasser in dealing with the Soviet Bloc,<sup>4</sup> but has shown less caution than Nasser in doing so.

2. During the past month this group consolidated its position and openly confirmed its policies by having the Syrian government:

a. Send to Moscow a mission which agreed in general terms on additional aid for Syria in an atmosphere of extravagant statements on Syrian-Soviet friendship, following up this mission by a delegation presently in Moscow to work out details;

b. Carry out a purge of moderate and rightist officers in key army posts; and

c. Publicize an alleged American plot against the government and members of the group, declare three members of the US Embassy in Damascus *persona non grata*, and mount an intensive propaganda campaign against the US and Western “imperialism” in general.

3. The reasons for these events taking place in conjunction and at this particular time are not wholly clear. The dominant group was obviously concerned at the increased US influence in the area which seemed to be resulting from Hussein’s dismissal of a leftist government in Jordan, the success of King Saud’s visit to the US, and the rapprochement between the two monarchs. Accelerated development of the Syrian-Soviet relationship would have been an almost instinctive reaction, and the mission to Moscow may have been hastened by Syrian difficulties in meeting payments on previous credits. The Syrian leaders may have thought that an American-inspired coup was in fact imminent and that it could be forestalled by exposure. And whether or not they believed in the alleged plot, they may have felt that their story would provide justification for their new agreement with the Soviets. Khalid al Azm, the Acting Minister of Defense, may have gone farther in his protestations of solidarity with the USSR than had been anticipated before he left Damascus. It has been reported that Nizam al Din, the Syrian Chief of Staff who accompanied al Azm to Moscow, expressed disapproval of the lat-

<sup>4</sup> Attached are: Annex A, Syria Agreements with the Sino-Soviet Bloc; Annex B: Soviet Bloc Equipment Now Held by Syria. [Footnote in the source text; the annexes are not printed.]

ter's action while in the USSR. The purge which followed removed Nizam al Din and other potential sources of opposition within the armed forces.

4. While all the recent actions of the Syrian government were in accord with objectives long held by the dominant group, the evidence indicates that the timing and arrangement of the government's actions were influenced by the course of events and by unanticipated developments. While the Soviets were undoubtedly alert to opportunities to exploit the softening situation in Syria in accord with their general and area strategy,<sup>5</sup> there is no clear evidence that these actions were taken in accordance with a prearranged over-all plan or that they were carried out on Soviet orders.

#### *Current Situation in Syria*

5. The members of Syria's current ruling group differ widely in background, outlook, and objectives. Colonel Sarraj, G-2 of the Syrian Army and hitherto the most widely known of the group, is an admirer and imitator of Nasser's policy. He has worked closely with the Arab nationalist, socialist, and Communist-infiltrated ASRP,<sup>6</sup> of which a number of army officers on the fringes of the ruling group are members. General Bizri, the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the army, is reputed to have long been a Communist sympathizer and has shown himself to be pro-Soviet. General Nafuri, the new Deputy Chief of Staff, is an opportunist with a record of shifting from one side to the other. Among the civilians in the dominant group is Khalid al Azm who is an opportunist without principles. Akram Haurani, Michel Aflaq, and Salah al Din Bitar of the ASRP are Arab nationalists who believe in uniting all the Arab states into one nation and who are socialist but differ on the extent of cooperation with Syrian Communists.

6. Khalid Baqdash, the Moscow-trained leader of the Syrian Communist party and an influential member of Parliament, is close to members of the ruling group. This is primarily because he shares the group's views on Syria's regional interests and objectives, and because he represents the indigenous group most friendly to the USSR. It appears improbable that Baqdash, despite his undoubted influence, is in a position to wield as much authority as members of the group.

7. The most important element within the dominant group and probably its original nucleus consists of half a dozen army officers

<sup>5</sup> The Soviets may have felt it particularly desirable, in view of the impending debate on Hungary in the UN, to make of the Syrian situation an issue which could be used against the US and the West. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>6</sup> Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party. [Footnote in the source text.]

organized in July 1955 and sometimes referred to as the "little RCC." Sarraj may still hold the balance of power within the "little RCC" and probably exercises influence over other members, despite the emergence of Bizri who is a later adherent. Sarraj, however, prefers to work behind the scenes.

8. Although conclusive evidence is lacking, it appears that the dominant group in Syria is neither the tool of a single strong man nor a committee but that it is a loose coalition which functions by means of the combined influence and resources of its members. The principal internal resources of the ruling group are: (a) street mobs, which it is able to organize and control; (b) the army, which appreciates having new Soviet weapons and which is now commanded by members and supporters of the group; (c) the ASRP, which is a relatively compact and well-organized political party with its own important faction in the army; (d) the Communist party, which is also well-led and well-disciplined; and (e) the military intelligence organization, which under Colonel Sarraj is a formidable political and police weapon. Behind all this is the support of the Soviet Union.

9. The President, the Prime Minister, and most of the members of the cabinet and Parliament go through the motions of governing without actually doing anything contrary to the wishes of the dominant group. At least so far, the routine work of the government is carried on from day to day by the career bureaucrats.

10. The chronic political instability of Syria over the past several years has left the general public apathetic to developments, although there is some popular support for the coalition's policies. So long as it retains control of the army and other security forces the coalition can dispose of any likely effort from within Syria to establish a new regime. There are a number of opposition groups—the conservative Nationalist and Populist parties, the Syrian Social National Party, the tribes of the East and South, and many merchants of Aleppo. However, over the past two years the coalition has taken action against them, and they are at present largely disorganized and lack effective support as well as determination and leadership.

#### *Involvement With the Soviet Bloc*

11. We believe the dominant coalition in Syria entered its present relationship with the Soviet Bloc: (a) to obtain arms with which to build up the Syrian armed forces; (b) to build up the Syrian economy; (c) as an act of defiance and of retaliation for the West's part in the creation of Israel and Israel's humiliation of Syria and the other Arab states. It appears that the Syrians have often taken the initiative in developing their present relationship with the

Soviet Bloc. We have no evidence that, except in the case of Baqdash, and perhaps Bizri, the actions of the Syrian coalition have been influenced by Communist ideology.

12. The Bloc has exploited this situation by selling Syria all the arms it wants, by arranging economic assistance programs to be paid for on easy credit terms, by making trade agreements, by sending military and civilian technicians and advisers to Syria and accepting Syrian trainees in the Soviet Bloc,<sup>7</sup> and by giving Syria vague assurances of Soviet protection against "imperialist" aggression. The Bloc has also continued an intensive propaganda campaign within Syria and has given propaganda and diplomatic support to the Syrian position and Syrian policy outside the country.

13. The Syrian relationship with the Bloc appears to differ in important respects from that envisioned in Nasser's doctrine of "positive neutralism." Syria has already accepted a degree of dependence upon the Soviet Bloc and of alienation from the West which gives the Bloc significant political and economic warfare capabilities. Furthermore, the Syrian leaders have gone so far in their hostility toward the West and uncritical trust of the Bloc that they are almost as susceptible to Soviet influence as they would be if Syria were actually a member of the Bloc. Indeed, they probably are more useful to the Bloc as nationalists than as Communists. The Syrian leaders profess to be much concerned about maintaining Syrian independence and sovereignty, but it appears likely that their suspicion of the West and their neighbors, their hatred of Israel, their desire to remain in power, and their own unrealistic appraisal of their ability to withstand Soviet penetration will make them reckless of precautions in this regard.

#### *Prospects*

14. In the absence of forceful intervention from outside Syria, the presently dominant coalition, or a variant thereof, probably will be able to maintain control for some time. No opposition group within the country, civilian or military, is likely to challenge the coalition effectively. Some groups within the country may hope for intervention from the outside. However, if the Israeli hand were apparent in any such move, Syrians would be united in bitter opposition. Most Syrians would also oppose unilateral Turkish intervention and few would rally to a movement which appeared to be dominated and directed by Turkey. On the other hand, intervention by one or more Arab states would be favored by members of the

---

<sup>7</sup> At present there are 150–200 Bloc military and about 175 civilian technicians and advisers in Syria and about 100 Syrian trainees in the Bloc. [Footnote in the source text.]

opposition even though they would suspect that it had Turkish support and that some degree of overt Turkish participation would be likely at some point. The degree of Syrian support for such intervention would depend in some measure on the effectiveness with which Turkish initiative could be concealed and, more importantly, on indications of the likelihood of the success of the intervention.

15. In order to preserve the appearance of legitimacy, the coalition will probably retain a facade of parliamentary government as long as possible. If the coalition should extend its purge into the working level of the bureaucracy, essential government functions might be impaired. In view of the country's current financial and marketing difficulties, the coalition will find it necessary to give greater attention to economic affairs, but because of its overriding preoccupation with political matters and its economic naivete it may be unsuccessful in these efforts. It seems probable that the Syrian economy will become increasingly oriented toward the Soviet Bloc, thus restricting Syria's freedom of economic action. Large scale Bloc credits, such as those envisaged by the Soviet-Syrian communiqué of 6 August 1957, are likely to accelerate this process. The coalition may use the threat of nationalization to squeeze all possible revenue out of the pipelines which cross the country, but will probably not interrupt the flow of petroleum unless it is confronted with what it considers a major provocation demanding immediate retaliation. Such a real or imagined provocation may come from Israel, from other hostile neighbors, or from the West.

16. The coalition's greatest weakness is probably the delicacy of its present equilibrium. While the civilian and military elements can agree on negative goals and motivations, such as hatred of Israel and the West, and opposition to union with Iraq or association with the Baghdad Pact, they lack common positive goals. Khalid al Azm's eagerness for the presidency is likely to set him at odds with the other members of the coalition. There are two factions in the ASRP group. The more prominent members of the military group were engaged in a struggle for power among themselves a few months ago. The personal antagonism between Sarraj and Nafuri is reported to be as strong as ever. Thus it is unlikely that the present coalition will long remain unchanged. While there is insufficient information available to make possible a judgment on the probable evolution of the coalition, Sarraj, with his influence in the "little RCC," the mechanism of the military intelligence organization at his disposal, his ability to avoid over-reaching himself, and the possibility of some ASRP support, appears to have more prospects for survival than other members. It is not expected, however, that any changes



in the composition of the dominant group will reduce the group's willingness to look to the USSR for support.

17. The Syrian-Soviet relation has enhanced the Soviet position as a great power concerned with the affairs of the Middle East. It has given the USSR greatly increased opportunities for harassing the West. At the same time, the USSR has shown some caution in accepting commitments in the Middle East. We therefore believe that the USSR will not wish to treat Syria as a new satellite but will find it expedient to deal with it as an Arab nationalist state and to render economic and political support, as well as military aid, to the presently dominant group. The Soviets are likely to find Syria useful to their interests as a sphere of influence, as an example of the benefits of Soviet friendship, and as a base for operations in the Middle East.

---

**384. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, September 5, 1957, 1:14 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary read to the President the proposed press release to be put out on Loy Henderson's trip.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary said he would discuss with Mr. Hagerty after he was through talking with the President.

It was decided that the President should come to Washington on Saturday since a large group was involved, including Twining. The Secretary recommended Twining's inclusion in the meeting since he said T's observations were extremely relevant. The President said he wanted to do it in a way that would cause the least panic. The Pres. said Hagerty would announce at five o'clock that because of work in Washington he would be coming down.

The Secretary said our "cousins" are very anxious to get a letter from him (the Sec.) in reply to the long one received. The Sec. said he had thought of sending them a sort of analysis of the situation without any commitments. The Sec. said he would like to show it to the Pres. first but mentioned that he would like to get it off tonight. The Pres. said we should caution against anything that isn't sure.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Asbjornson. The President was in Newport, Rhode Island.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. Presumably the same as the statement that White read to newsmen on September 5. See *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, p. 1037.

That would, he said, be the worst thing that could possibly happen. He said he did not think we should rush anybody until they felt perfectly confident we were fulfilling our commitments with respect to the strength of those people.

The Sec. said the problem would be to hold one of our friends back. One is already beginning to move. The Pres. said they wanted a firm statement out of us when a firm statement might hurt. Our hearts are in the right place. The best thing to do was to just saw wood. He mentioned helping our friends as far as we can, including the one that looks temperamental.

The Sec. mentioned there was a bare possibility that HM<sup>3</sup> might be coming to Canada this week end and he mentioned going to Duck Island—more or less impromptu to see the Sec. Pres. said if that was the case HM could pay a call on him. Sec. said perhaps that wouldn't be wise. Sec. was not sure if it was wise for him (the Secretary) to do it. He would like to appraise it. The Communist propaganda has been indicating we are getting ready to intervene in Syria. Pres. agreed this was bad. . . .

[Here follows discussion of a forthcoming speech unrelated to the Middle East.]

---

<sup>3</sup> Harold Macmillan.

---

### 385. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 5, 1957.*

DEAR HAROLD: As I trust Harold Caccia has made clear your long message to me received August 28<sup>2</sup> has been an immense help. I went over it with Harold Caccia paragraph by paragraph, indicating with some commentary our large measure of agreement with the analysis.

Since then Loy Henderson has returned. I have asked the Department to prepare a little analysis of alternatives taking into

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles to Macmillan Correspondence, 1955–1957. Top Secret. The source text is a carbon copy of the original. Attached to the source text is an earlier draft of the letter with Dulles' handwritten changes. Dulles sent a copy of the letter to Eisenhower on September 6.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence 1955–1959)

account what Henderson learned. Caccia is getting a copy of this and no doubt will transmit it to you.<sup>3</sup> There is nothing that looks particularly attractive and the choice of policy will be hard. We are not completely satisfied with any of the alternatives which have thus far been suggested. There are risks involved in and objection found to all of them. We are continuing to explore other possibilities and I shall let you know if we come across any which might seem to be more promising of success to any of those dealt with in the memorandum. I hope you will reciprocate.

On certain points I feel clear. For example:

We must work together in this matter.

Any positive action, once begun, must, even at great risk, be pushed through to a success.

Speed and simplicity are very important elements.

It is not possible to fit all alternatives into neat slots. Whatever is planned will be different.

I do not by the foregoing mean to suggest that we have reached any conclusion in favor of encouraging positive action. However, Loy Henderson has the impression that the Turks are desperately serious about this situation and I do not think either of our governments wants to try to impose what could be another Munich.

I have not had the benefit of consultation with, or direction from, the President since Loy returned. He is at Newport, but will be back here on Saturday morning when we can confer together at length.

Both he and I have given thought to the possibility of one or the other of us working out a personal meeting with you. We both much share your thought of how good it would be if we could be in the same room and talk all this over as we have done before. However, so far, our ingenuity has proven unequal to overcoming what seemed to be the risks that such a meeting would build up into a public spectacle that would be exaggerated and misinterpreted.

I am delighted that Bishop is staying on for a few days more.

Faithfully yours,

**John Foster Dulles**<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed as the enclosure to Dulles' note to Eisenhower.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 6, 1957—4:46 p.m.*

523. For Ambassador from Secretary. Please deliver orally following message from me to the Crown Prince. "Mr. Henderson has given me an account of the conversations which took place in Istanbul during his recent visit there and in which His Majesty and you participated. We fully share the concern which His Majesty and you and the various Iraqi representatives present expressed with regard to recent developments in Syria. Since we regard this matter as of the utmost importance, we are giving it careful and urgent study. Within the next few days we may send one or more Air Force or Army officers to Baghdad to discuss with you and with appropriate Iraqi leaders some of the problems involved and to assess Iraq's most pressing needs and means for meeting them. It seems to me that if any action is to be effective it should be taken without delay since the problem is likely to become more difficult day by day.

I wish to thank you and would be grateful if you would convey my thanks to His Majesty for the courtesies which were extended to Mr. Henderson while he was in Istanbul and for the frankness with which His Majesty and you exchanged views with him and Ambassador Gallman. If any further ideas have occurred to you as to what might most effectively be done, I hope that you will pass them to me urgently through Ambassador Gallman. It seems to me that it is most important that there be close cooperation between Iraq and Jordan in the face of this mortal danger. If there is anything which we might do to promote such cooperation please do not hesitate to let me know." You might take occasion to ask the Prime Minister whether or not Nuri Said is returning to Baghdad and if so how soon.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Secret; Limit Distribution.

387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 6, 1957—4:47 p.m.*

712. From Secretary for Ambassador. Please deliver in person and orally following message from me to Prime Minister Menderes:

"Loy Henderson has given me an account of the conversations which took place during the course of his recent visit to Istanbul and Ankara. I can well understand your deep concern and your feeling that the developments which are taking place in Syria have such dangerous potentials for Turkey that no responsible Turkish Government can afford to ignore them.

We realize the urgency of the matter and are studying various alternatives for dealing with it. If you have any further information with regard to the present thinking of the Iraqis, we would appreciate it if you would convey it to us through Ambassador Warren. We would also be glad to have any ideas which may have occurred to you subsequent to Mr. Henderson's departure.

I wish particularly to thank you and would be grateful if you would convey my thanks to President Bayar for the courtesies shown Mr. Henderson during his visit and for the frankness with which you exchanged views with him and Ambassador Warren.

I believe that Mr. Henderson told you that he thought that following his return to the US we would talk with the British with regard to the substance of the discussions which had taken place in Istanbul. We are already engaging in talks with the British at a high level and on a most secret and restricted basis. We consider that British cooperation in connection with the solution of the problem facing us would be most helpful, and we hope that we shall have it.

We are planning to send to Turkey within the next few days one or more Army or Air Force officers to discuss Turkish needs and ways for meeting them on a realistic and urgent basis."

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Henderson and approved and signed by Dulles.

388. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President,  
White House, Washington, September 7, 1957, 10:07 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles  
Mr. Loy Henderson  
Secretary Rountree  
Secretary Quarles  
General Twining  
General Whisenand  
General Cabell  
Mr. Wisner  
General Cutler  
General Goodpaster

Secretary Dulles said the meeting was to enable Mr. Henderson to report and comment upon his trip to the Middle East. He had seen the top Turkish, Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese officials, and also our ambassadors in the area. His broad conclusion is that there is a deep concern at what is going on—*anxiety that the Soviets may be able to topple the regimes in each of these countries through their action in Syria. Lebanon is doing an effective job in picking up infiltrators, but the government feels that if something is not done to remove the Soviet-dominated regime in Syria, Lebanon will not survive as an ally of the West . . . . One matter reported by Henderson (which was surprising to the whole group) was that there is evidence of animosity between the royal houses of Jordan and Iraq, which we have thought in harmony because they are both Hashemites. . . . Also the Crown Prince of Iraq favors strong action; the Prime Minister, however, is weak. The Iraqis are very cautious of the power Syria holds over them through control of the pipelines. Oil revenues account for half of the Iraqi income. The Iraqis are stressing the need for a build-up and preparations—lasting perhaps six months. The regime is not confident that it would have the support of the people, and there is some feeling of paralysis; the Prime Minister is weak. The Crown Prince is talking about getting Nuri Said back—perhaps as Vice Premier, since it was the Crown Prince who had him ousted as Premier recently after a quarrel.*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. Attached to the source text are handwritten notes of the meeting by Goodpaster, Wisner, and Cutler. The memorandum of conversation printed here is a composite of those notes. A separate memorandum of the conversation by Rountree is in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Appointments. (Eisenhower Library)

. . . . .

The Secretary said Mr. Henderson reported general agreement on two major propositions—first, that no military actions would be taken unless there were provocations by the Syrians giving a basis for invoking self-defense; second, the objective can only be to restore Syria to the Syrians—all disavow the objective of taking over any Syrian territory.

He went on to recall that we have maintained close contact with Israel and have urged them to adhere to a policy of quiescence. To date they have followed this policy, but we cannot assume that they will continue indefinitely.

The President said he was troubled by the report of animosity between the royal houses of Iraq and Jordan. Mr. Henderson said he had talked very frankly to the Crown Prince of Iraq about this, and told him that the royal houses must get together. (The estrangement apparently dates back to a feeling by the Iraqis that they were promised by King Abdullah of Jordan that their branch of the houses would succeed him in case of his death.)

Secretary Dulles said that the United States has been reviewing all possibilities . . . . He referred to indications that the Soviets may now be manning the communications nets in Syria. . . .

The Secretary said that in this situation we have maintained close contact with the United Kingdom. There is genuine, intimate and effective cooperation, stemming directly from Macmillan—this is the first instance in his service as Secretary wherein we have had anything like this attitude.

. . . . .

At this point the Secretary told the group that he had worked up a paper of findings and recommendations.<sup>2</sup> He circulated it but said he had certain comments to make before the group discussed it. He asked that it be considered in relation to our over-all relation with the Soviet Union. He said he thought General Twining would confirm (and he did) that there has been no military redeployment by the Soviets indicative of preparation for general war. However, political and propaganda moves of the Soviets in the last few weeks clearly indicate an intensification of the cold war, and in his judgment signify a period of the greatest peril for us since the Korean War ended. He cited as evidence of, or contributions to, this situation a sudden dropping of any interest in cultural exchanges;

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated September 6, not printed. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material)

the Syrian take-over by rapid and flagrant measures; their naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean; the threatening tone in their announcement concerning the ICBM; the note they have just sent us on the Mid-East situation,<sup>3</sup> which is couched in the rudest and most provocative terms of any received during his tenure (he indicated he was considering recommending refusing to accept it); a breaking up of the disarmament talks in an atmosphere of curtness and refusal to give our proposals consideration; and accelerated and increased arms movements into the Middle East, including the Yemen in particular.

He thought this probably indicated not an intention to precipitate general war, but rather an intention to step up the cold war, to make gains outside of the USSR and divert attention from the internal stresses evidenced in the struggle of last June which Khrushchev barely survived. He said he did not want to exaggerate the gravity of those internal stresses, however. He said he thought that Khrushchev was an extremely dangerous man to be at the head of the state. He is crude and impulsive rather than calculating and careful as previous Soviet leaders have been. The Secretary thought that the pendency of the UN Special Session on Hungary may have caused great Soviet bitterness on the way that situation is being used against them. He thought that many of the leaders in Russia consider Khrushchev too dangerous—and this may have been the origin of their effort to topple him—but he was resourceful enough to pull himself through. His policies since then are those of an egotist. He is more like Hitler than any Russian leader we have previously seen. He displays much of the same erratic quality.

The President, after reading the paper,<sup>4</sup> said he found a deficiency in it. It did not indicate specifically what we aim to do, . . . . He thought we may be late with our actions even now. The Secretary said he felt the United States should not assume the responsibility either to push these countries into action or to hold them back from actions they may deem vital—he included Turkey among them. We certainly do not want to repeat the type of pressures that were used on Czechoslovakia to force them to accept Hitler's demands. He did feel that the Middle East countries are entitled to know what we will do in various contingencies, so long as we do not usurp their responsibility to make the critical decisions. The President questioned whether we should not lay out exactly what we will do in the event certain things occur. We don't try to make their decisions for them, but we can draw them toward certain decisions through this means.

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Khrushchev's letter to Eisenhower of September 3.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material)



Secretary Dulles said the British, . . . would like to send over a secret task force. We ourselves are constituting such a task force of State and Defense representatives. Also we are sending secret representatives to Baghdad and Ankara, a general officer in each case.

The President said he thought we should do everything possible to stress the "holy war" aspect. Mr. Dulles commented that if the Arabs have a "holy war" they would want it to be against Israel. The President recalled, however, that Saud, after his visit here, had called on all Arabs to oppose Communism. He said he thought we should at once send an emissary out to Saud who had asked for such an individual three times in order to avoid having to send messages through his diplomatic channels.

In response to a question by the Secretary, the President indicated he was in accord with the action proposed—in fact, he thought that we had agreed upon this policy as a result of his conversations some days ago. . . . He then asked about keeping Congressional leaders informed. Secretary Dulles said the handling of the Congress is extremely difficult. If there is much discussion with them, they will become alarmed and spread the reports, making the United States appear to be the center of decision in the matter—which we certainly do not want. He indicated he would give careful thought to the matter, however, and mentioned the names of Senators Knowland and Mansfield as people to talk to.

The President suggested assurances that Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan might exchange among themselves as to coming to each other's aid if attacked. He suggested a line we might take with Lebanon to encourage them, with Jordan to get them to get closer to Iraq and Iraq to let them know they should get themselves in position . . . . He then gave his approval for actions to go ahead on this paper.

In further discussion Secretary Dulles indicated that if the Soviets pulled this operation off successfully he was afraid the success would go to Khrushchev's head and we might find ourselves with a series of incidents like the experience with Hitler. Speaking of the problem of Americans now in Syria, he thought we should take any excuse we can to get them out—possibly using the mob actions and anti-American demonstrations as the basis. Mr. Rountree and General Twining commented that this would cause speculation that we intend to take military action. After further discussion the President said we should try to get our people out quietly, without public announcement—certainly not a detailed announcement of the type shown him in draft.

The President then reviewed the statement Secretary Dulles proposed to give the press and endorsed it with one or two minor amendments. He asked that the basis for a possible White Paper

regarding developments in Syria, and specifically our relations with them over the last few years, be prepared.

Finally, he said he would approve rejecting the Soviet note if that were the State Department recommendation. We should be prepared to put out the whole story promptly in case we do.<sup>5</sup>

G

---

<sup>5</sup> After the meeting adjourned, Secretary Dulles issued a statement containing an account of the discussion. He noted that President Eisenhower had affirmed his intention to carry out the Congressional Joint Resolution of March 9 and had authorized the accelerated delivery of military and economic assistance to countries in the area. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 23, 1957, p. 487.

---

### 389. Editorial Note

At 12:30 p.m. on September 7, Dulles and Rountree met with Bishop, Garran, and Morris at Secretary Dulles' residence. The memorandum of the conversation by Rountree is not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123) During this meeting, Dulles handed to Bishop the Department of State memorandum of September 6 (see footnote 4, *supra*) and informed him that President Eisenhower had approved the paper for planning purposes. Bishop read the paper and said that he wanted to make certain that the intention was not to finalize the matter until Macmillan had seen the document and commented upon it.

After this meeting Bishop returned to London.

---

### 390. Editorial Note

During the evening of September 10, the Department of State transmitted to certain Middle Eastern posts a series of messages to be delivered orally to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, Prime Minister Menderes, Crown Prince Abdul-illah (who was then in Turkey), President Chamoun and Foreign Minister Malik, and King Hussein. (See Documents 391-394) Secretary Dulles discussed drafts of the messages with Ambassador Caccia on September 8 and 10. During

the latter conversation, Caccia conveyed comments on the drafts which he had received from the British Foreign Office. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, September 8; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123; Memorandum of conversation by Rockwell, September 10; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, S/Miss Bernau)

---

**391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 10, 1957—9:50 p.m.*

226. Convey following orally to Prime Minister, emphasizing need for absolute secrecy.

Consonant with its desire to consult with GOI on problems affecting Middle East, and having now reached certain conclusions concerning the situation in Syria, US desires convey following views to GOI.

US judges that Syria has become, or is about to become, base for military and subversive activities in Near East. This same view is taken by Moslem nations bordering on Syria, and as Government of Israel has made clear to Government of US, is likewise shared by Israel.

Decision as to what action should be taken to meet danger existing in Syrian situation is in US view essentially one for Moslem nations in area to take. Nations in question have been so informed by USG, and reassured that US policy as set forth in the Middle East resolution remains valid.

US thus does not know what countries under reference will decide to do. However, US continues believe it vital that their attention not be diverted from measures to meet danger of situation in Syria by any action undertaken by Israel. US gratified that Government of Israel has revealed its complete agreement with USG on this point.

US does not see in Syrian situation immediate threat to security of Israel. Security of Syria's Arab neighbors is more directly endangered owing to demonstrated ability of Syria to undertake subversive

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9-1057. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell; cleared with Dulles; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Amman, and Beirut.

activities in these countries. Israel, however, can have no doubt of deep US interest in preservation integrity and independence of Israel.

FYI UK Ambassador being instructed take same position in general conversations with top Israeli officials. Secretary seeing Eban September 12.<sup>2</sup>

If further information conveyed re Syria it will be cabled Embassy. End FYI.

Dulles

---

<sup>2</sup> A summary of the conversation was transmitted to the Embassy in Tel Aviv on September 12 in telegram 235. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/9-1257)

---

### 392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 10, 1957—9:59 p.m.*

754. Deptel 752.<sup>2</sup> Following decisions re Syrian crisis have been reached at highest level US Government. We desire you after reading reftel convey them orally to Menderes immediately emphasizing pressing need to maintain absolute secrecy.

1. US has been gratified by close and valuable consultations with GOT in connection with grave danger to security of ME represented by current events in Syria. US has now reached at highest level certain conclusions concerning this problem and in spirit community of interest which exists between our two countries desires to convey these conclusions to GOT. Certain of these conclusions are also being conveyed to Governments of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon.

2. Nations are confronted at periods in history with need to take decisions fundamentally affecting their own destinies. US believes such momentous decisions may be taken only by nation concerned. Holding to this belief, US does not consider it can assume responsibility of urging Turkey to follow any specific course of action or inaction. US is making following views known to Turkey in thought

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and Burdett; cleared in draft with Dulles; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, and Amman.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

that Turkey is entitled to have available all relevant information regarding US attitude in formulating Turkish policy regarding Syrian situation.

3. The United States judges that Syria has become, or is about to become, a base for military and subversive activities in the Near East designed to destroy the independence of those countries and to subject them to Soviet Communist domination.

4. If the aggressive spirit which is being inculcated into Syria by means of Soviet arms, propaganda, etc., should, as seems likely, manifest itself in actual deeds—and some such manifestations have already occurred in Lebanon—the United States would hold that a case existed for individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and that there would be no violation of Article I of the NATO Treaty.<sup>3</sup>

5. The United States believes, however, that Israel should, irrespective of provocation other than large-scale invasion, show restraint so as not to unite and inflame the Arab world against Israel and in support of Syria on the theory that Israel has aggressive purposes and territorial ambitions.

6. The United States further believes that Turkey should not act other than in requested reinforcement of Arab defensive action. . . .

7. If Syria's Moslem neighbors should consider their security endangered by the threat of Syrian aggression and should request from the United States economic assistance and military supplies in connection with a concrete plan effectively to meet such aggression, the US would give prompt and sympathetic consideration to such a request. If any one or more of Syria's Arab neighbors, responding to provocation, should act pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, the United States would, upon request, and pursuant to the Middle East Resolution, extend such countries economic assistance and military supplies; it would support such countries if attacked in the UN SC or the GA.

8. If any of Syria's Arab neighbors were physically attacked by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the United States, upon request, would be prepared to use its own armed forces to assist any such nation or nations against such armed aggression. This would include the organized use of "volunteers" from Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.

9. If hostilities between Iraq and Syria should result in the closing of the pipelines and the cutting off of revenues from Iraq, the United States would, as a temporary emergency measure, help to mitigate the financial consequences of this to Iraq.

10. If, despite what is said in (6), Turkey should feel compelled to react to armed provocations which implied a serious threat to its

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 471–475.

own national integrity and independence, or if Turkey should come to the aid of any of Syria's Arab neighbors engaged in hostilities with Syria, the United States would support Turkey in the UN. The US also would not stand idly by if the Sino-Soviet Bloc should attack Turkey, directly or by organized volunteers. In that case the US would honor its obligations under the NATO Treaty, and the Middle East Resolution would also be applicable.

. . . . .

12. If any of Syria's neighbors should become involved in hostilities with Syria, it is a precondition to any US support that it be made clear that such hostilities are not for the purpose of impairing the political independence or the territory of Syria but are merely for the purpose of restoring Syria to the Syrians.

13. The United States will continue to deploy the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

14. US has consulted with UK which is in complete agreement with this position.

15. In separate telegrams we are repeating messages conveyed to Governments of Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. These messages should also be conveyed orally to GOT.

16. We appreciate the Prime Minister's expressed intention to keep in contact with us in view of the delicacy and importance of the Middle East situation.<sup>4</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>4</sup> At 11:30 a.m. on September 12 in Ankara, Warren conveyed to Menderes the contents of the messages sent to Menderes, Abdul-illah, Chamoun and Malik, and King Hussein (see *infra*). According to Warren's report, Prime Minister Menderes, Zorlu, and Kunalp, who were also present, listened carefully, nodded their heads in agreement from time to time, and occasionally interrupted Warren to ask that he repeat certain phrases and clauses. Later that day, Kunalp queried the Embassy in Ankara about the differences in wording between paragraph 8, which referred to the use of U.S. "armed forces" to assist "Syria's Arab neighbors," and paragraph 10, which had stated that the United States "would not stand idly by" if the Sino-Soviet bloc should attack Turkey. (Telegram 698 from Ankara, September 12; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)

Upon receipt of telegram 698, Secretary Dulles discussed the Turkish question by telephone with President Eisenhower. Dulles asked Eisenhower's permission to respond that there was no difference between the two statements. Eisenhower agreed. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, September 13, 1:07 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

**393. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 10, 1957—10:09 p.m.*

755. Deptel 752.<sup>2</sup> FYI Following decisions re Syrian crisis have been reached at highest level US Government. We desire Ambassador Warren, after reading reftel, convey them orally to Iraqi Crown Prince immediately emphasizing pressing need maintain absolute secrecy.<sup>3</sup>

1. US has been gratified by close and valuable consultations with GOI in connection with grave danger to security of ME represented by current events in Syria. US has now reached at highest level certain conclusions concerning this problem and in spirit above consultations desires to convey these conclusions to GOI.

2. Nations are confronted at periods in history with need to take decisions fundamentally affecting their own destinies. US believes such momentous decisions may be taken only by nation concerned. Holding to this belief, US does not consider it can assume responsibility of urging Iraq to follow any specific course of action or inaction. US is making following views known to Iraq in thought that GOI is entitled to have available all relevant information regarding US attitude in formulating Iraqi policy regarding Syrian situation.

3. US judges that Syria has become, or is about to become, base for military and subversive activities in Near East designed to destroy independence of those countries and subject them to Soviet Communist domination. If aggressive spirit being inculcated into Syria by means of Soviet arms and propaganda should manifest itself in actual aggressive deeds—and some such manifestations have already occurred in Lebanon—US would hold that case existed for individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

4. If Syria's Arab neighbors should consider their security endangered by threat of Syrian aggression and should request from US

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and Burdett; cleared in draft with Dulles; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad, Amman, and Beirut.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 584 to Baghdad, September 12, the Department of State directed Ambassador Gallman immediately to inform Prime Minister Jawdat of the message sent to the Crown Prince. The telegram commented: "We have reached this decision after further consideration of likely unfavorable effects of not informing Prime Minister." (*Ibid.*)

economic assistance and military supplies in connection with a concrete plan effectively to meet such aggression, US would give prompt and sympathetic consideration to such request.

5. If any one or more of Syria's Arab neighbors, responding to provocation, should act pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, US would, upon request, and pursuant to Middle East Resolution, extend such countries economic assistance and military supplies; it would support such countries if attacked in UN Security Council or General Assembly.

6. If any of Syria's Moslem neighbors were physically attacked by Sino-Soviet Bloc, US upon request, would be prepared use its own armed forces to assist any such nation or nations against such armed aggression. This would include organized use of "volunteers" from Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.

7. If hostilities between Iraq and Syria should result in closing of the pipelines and the cutting off of revenues from Iraq, US would, as temporary measure, help to mitigate financial consequences of this to Iraq.

. . . . .

9. If any of Syria's neighbors should become involved in hostilities with Syria, it is a precondition to any US support that it be made clear that such hostilities are not for purpose of impairing political independence or territory of Syria but are merely for purpose of restoring Syria to the Syrians.

10. US believes that if any action were taken in respect to armed provocation to eradicate danger represented by current Syrian situation, initiative in first instance should come from Arab state or states. . . .

11. In light of current developments US has already approached Government of Israel to request that it refrain from intervening in situation, and US prepared to continue to endeavor to restrain Israel.

12. US will continue to deploy Sixth Fleet in Eastern Mediterranean.

13. US is informing Turkey of its position on this matter and is speaking in general terms to Governments of Jordan and Lebanon.

14. US has consulted with UK which is in complete agreement with this position.



We are repeating for your information and guidance telegrams sent to Amman, Tel Aviv and Beirut. Substance messages to Amman and Beirut may be conveyed to Crown Prince.<sup>4</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>4</sup> At 6 p.m. on September 12, Warren, accompanied by Miner, delivered the message to Crown Prince Abdul-illah on board the Iraqi royal yacht in the Bosphorus. Warren reported that the Crown Prince listened intently and nodded his head from time to time. During their discussion, among other points Abdul-illah emphasized the need for Iraqi-Jordanian cooperation in any military action against Syria, particularly on geographic grounds, and showed great interest over the references to "volunteers" and U.S. financial assistance in mitigating effects if the pipeline were cut. (Telegram 704 from Ankara, September 12; *ibid.*)

---

#### **394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 10, 1957—10:19 p.m.*

904. After reading instructions Deptel 900,<sup>2</sup> you should convey following orally to Chamoun and Malik immediately, emphasizing pressing need maintain absolute secrecy.

1. US has been gratified by close and valuable consultations with President Chamoun and Foreign Minister Malik in connection with grave danger to security of ME represented by current events in Syria. US now wishes to convey following additional observations to President and Foreign Minister.

2. Nations are confronted at periods in history with need to take decisions fundamentally affecting their own destinies. US believes such momentous decisions may only be taken by nation concerned. Holding to this belief, US does not consider it can assume responsibility of urging Lebanon to follow any specific course of action or inaction.

3. US judges that Syria has become, or is about to become, base for military and subversive activities in Near East designed to destroy independence of those countries and subject them to Soviet Communist domination.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and Burdett; cleared with Dulles; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and Amman.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

4. . . . Should Lebanon conclude that it must take action . . . to preserve its vital interests, US is prepared to lend Lebanon appropriate assistance in exploiting assets Lebanon may have or be able develop. . . .

5. Through the Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East the US has affirmed that it regards as vital to the US national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. On September 7, in a statement concerned with the Syrian situation, the President, speaking through Secretary of State, affirmed his intention to carry out the national policy as expressed in the Joint Resolution, and to exercise as needed the authority thereby conferred on the President.<sup>3</sup>

6. In light current developments US has already approached Government of Israel to request that it refrain from intervening in situation. US is prepared to continue to use its influence to restrain Israel. Declaration made by US in May 1950<sup>4</sup> regarding its determination to take action either in or outside UN in event of any effort to alter armistice lines by force remains fully valid.

7. US will continue to deploy Sixth Fleet in Eastern Mediterranean.

8. US has consulted with UK which is in complete agreement with this position.<sup>5</sup>

**Dulles**

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 388.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Tripartite Declaration on Middle East security issued by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on May 25, 1950. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886; for documentation concerning its formulation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 167 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Heath delivered the message to Chamoun at 7 p.m. on September 11. According to Heath's report, Chamoun "was visibly pleased with the message and expressed gratification therewith. He remarked it was the logical result of talks with Henderson here." (Telegram 716 from Beirut, September 11; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)

Heath delivered the message to Malik on September 12. According to Heath's report, Malik "observed that whatever was to be done must be done quickly with unwavering determination." (Telegram 732 from Beirut, September 12; *ibid.*)

**395. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 10, 1957—10:29 p.m.*

542. Deptel 537.<sup>2</sup> Following decisions re Syrian crisis have been reached at highest level USG. We desire you after reading reflet convey them orally to King Hussein immediately upon his return, emphasizing pressing need maintain absolute secrecy.

1. From previous consultations with King Hussein and Jordan Government US believes two countries hold similar views regarding grave danger to security of ME represented by current events in Syria.

2. Nations are confronted at periods in history with need to take decisions fundamentally affecting their own destinies. Jordan faced and successfully overcame such a test last April under the courageous and firm leadership of His Majesty. US believes that in such moments the necessary decisions can only be taken by nation concerned. Holding this belief, US does not consider it can assume responsibility of urging Jordan to follow any specific course of action or inaction with regard to the Syrian problem. US is making following views known in thought that King entitled have available all relevant information regarding US attitude in formulating his policy regarding Syrian situation.

3. US judges that Syria has become, or is about to become, base for military and subversive activities in Near East designed to destroy independence of those countries and subject them to Soviet Communist domination. If aggressive spirit being inculcated into Syria by means of Soviet arms and propaganda should manifest itself in actual aggressive deeds—and some such manifestations have already occurred in Lebanon—US would hold that case existed for individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

4. Through the Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East the US has affirmed that it regards as vital to the US national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. On September 7, in a statement concerned with the Syrian situation, the President, speaking through Secretary of State, affirmed his intention to carry out

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and Burdett; cleared with Dulles; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and Beirut.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

the national policy as expressed in the Joint Resolution, and to exercise as needed the authority thereby conferred on the President.

5. US strongly hopes that if there should be need to react to armed provocation by Syria, the initiative would be taken by an Arab state or states. US is conveying same view to Government of Iraq.

6. If any of Syria's neighbors should become involved in hostilities with Syria, it is a precondition to any US support that it be made clear that such hostilities are not for purpose of impairing political independence or territory of Syria but are merely for purpose of restoring Syria to the Syrians.

7. In light of current developments US has already approached Government of Israel to request that it refrain from intervening in situation. US is prepared to continue endeavor to restrain Israel. Statement issued in name of President on April 24<sup>3</sup> regarding importance to US of independence and integrity of Jordan as well as declaration made by US in May 1950 regarding its determination to take action either in or outside UN in event of any effort to alter armistice lines by force, remain fully valid.

8. US will continue to deploy Sixth Fleet in Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>4</sup>

## Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> At a news conference in Augusta, Georgia, on April 24, Press Secretary Hagerty stated that he had been authorized to say that both the President and Secretary of State regarded the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital. The statement is not printed. For text, see Eisenhower Library, Kevin McCann Collection of Press and Radio Conferences and Press Releases, 1952-1961.

<sup>4</sup> Mallory delivered the message to King Hussein on September 13. According to Mallory's report, Hussein assured him that Jordan would respect Syrian independence, agreed that any action taken should be by Syria's Arab neighbors, and to this end had sent proposals to Saud for a meeting. (Telegram 492 from Amman, September 13; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)

**396. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Senator William F. Knowland, September 11, 1957, 2:40 p.m. <sup>1</sup>**

**TELEPHONE CALL FROM SEN KNOWLAND IN CALIFORNIA**

The Sec said he called K and then explained why the situation does not look good. The Soviets are getting pretty nasty. Gromyko's press conference <sup>2</sup> is one of the most vicious attacks on us and our allies that has been made and contains threats towards Turkey and they are putting the screws on Turkey very hard. The Soviet Amb is seeing Menderes today and there is some reason to think they may deliver an ultimatum. <sup>3</sup> Our disposition is to stand back of the Turks and tell them they are members of NATO and if attacked by the Soviets the ME Res would apply and they should not be intimidated. Mansfield <sup>4</sup> will get in touch with Lyndon Johnson and the Sec may send someone to Texas to talk with him and K too if he wishes if the situation gets worse as it may tomorrow. K is speaking today and the Sec approved his wanting to lay the foundation to give support by saying we have a vital interest there, that we spell out Turkey is a member of NATO and the Sec added also mention the ME Res. The Sec said reference could be made to the fact which was mentioned in the Pres' original message to Congress that the Soviets have been trying historically to get control of the area.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Gromyko's news conference for Soviet and foreign correspondents in Moscow on September 10. Excerpts from his statement are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 1038-1039.

<sup>3</sup> On September 11, the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey delivered a letter to Menderes from Bulganin. The Soviet Government released the text of the letter on September 13 and it was printed in *The New York Times* on September 14. For excerpts, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 1041-1043.

<sup>4</sup> At 12:30 p.m. that day, Dulles spoke with Senator Mansfield about the Syrian situation. The memorandum of the conversation by Macomber, who was also present, is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations.

---

**397. Editorial Note**

In response to Turkish and Iraqi requests that United States military advisers be sent to the area to discuss and advise upon military aspects of the Syrian situation (see Document 381), on

September 11 the Department of State informed the Embassies in Ankara and Baghdad that the Chief of the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, Major General Armistead D. Mead, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Middle East Planning Committee, Major General Verdi B. Barnes, had been named officers for consultation with Turkey and Iraq, respectively. Subsequently, Barnes arrived in Baghdad on September 17; Mead, who had been in Washington for consultation, returned to Ankara at approximately the same time. The Embassies in Baghdad and Ankara transmitted their reports to the Department of State, which in turn relayed them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Copies of the reports and other documents pertaining to the mission are in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123.

---

**398. Memorandum of Discussion at the 336th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 12, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

Present at the 336th NSC Meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (participating in Items 2, 3 and 5); the Acting Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy (attending for Items 1-5; participating in Item 2); the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Item 2); the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (participating in Item 1); the Chairmen, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (for Items 2 and 3); General Lyman L. Lemnitzer for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Counselor, Department of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President (for Items 1-4); Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Items 2

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on September 13.

and 3); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follow agenda items 1–3 pertaining to economic defense policy, Poland, and assistance to Yugoslav refugees.]

*4. Significant World Developments Affecting U. S. Security*

[Here follows the beginning of Director of Central Intelligence Dulles' briefing: a discussion of the Soviet announcement of the successful launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile.]

Mr. Dulles then reminded the Council that the intelligence community had recently prepared a special estimate on the situation in Syria. He then proceeded to read the conclusions of SNIE 36.7-57 ("Developments in the Syrian Situation").<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Dulles then summarized significant developments which had occurred since the completion of the above-mentioned estimate. With reference to a comment by Mr. Allen Dulles on the recent statement by Gromyko,<sup>3</sup> Secretary Dulles intervened to point out that the statement had taken some two hours to deliver, and much of the text was not known in this country and had not been published. All the same, it constituted perhaps the bitterest attack ever made by a Soviet official on the United States.

. . . . .

*The National Security Council:*<sup>4</sup>

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to recent developments in the USSR ballistic missiles program, and with respect to the Syrian situation.

---

<sup>2</sup> Document 383.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to Gromyko's remarks made during a press conference on September 10.

<sup>4</sup> The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1783, approved by the President on September 16. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

5. *United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East* (NSC 5428;<sup>5</sup> NSC Actions Nos. 1629,<sup>6</sup> 1753<sup>7</sup> and 1771;<sup>8</sup> Progress Report, dated August 7, 1957, by OCB on NSC 5428<sup>9</sup>)

After briefing the Council on the latest developments in the Near East, as set forth in the OCB Progress Report, Mr. Cutler said he understood that the Secretary of State wished to say something about one significant development in this area.

Secretary Dulles said that the earlier report by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation in Syria indicated that there was a considerable hazard in the Middle East area which could involve another interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the Free World. The two pipelines that pass through Syria could be blown up, and Egypt might even make trouble again in the Suez Canal. The United Kingdom has indicated to us its concern about these possibilities, and the President had stated last Saturday that the State Department could advise the British that if new difficulties arose with respect to Middle Eastern oil, the United States could re-create the Middle East Emergency Committee. Secretary Dulles said he did not know whether this would require action by the National Security Council or action by the Attorney General.

Mr. Gordon Gray replied that we could promptly re-create the Middle East Emergency Committee if the legal basis for such action were sound. He would like the Attorney General's opinion on this.

The Attorney General replied that he was satisfied as to the legal basis for such an action if the national interest required it and the President ordered it. He did, however, wish to point out the opposition which had existed in the Senate to the Middle East Emergency Committee.

Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Dulles whether the Record of Action of the Council meeting should note the possibility to which he had alluded. Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative. The Attorney General asked Secretary Dulles whether he thought that this possibility of re-creating the Middle East Emergency Committee should be mentioned to the U.S. Senate. Secretary Dulles replied in the negative. The Attorney General then said he judged that no positive action by the Department of Justice was required yet. Secretary Dulles replied that no such action was desired at this time; he was only suggesting that we be in a position to act if it proved necessary.

---

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. ix, p. 525.

<sup>6</sup> NSC Action No. 1629 pertained to European oil supply and was taken at the 303d meeting of the National Security Council on November 8, 1956.

<sup>7</sup> Taken at the 331st meeting of the National Security Council on July 18, 1957.

<sup>8</sup> Taken at the 334th meeting of the National Security Council on August 8, 1957.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed here.



In that case, said the Attorney General, it might be well to have a letter of justification sent to the Department of Justice.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>10</sup>

a. Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Noted the statement by the Secretary of State that, in view of the possibility that another interruption of oil supplies from the Middle East might develop out of the Syrian situation, it would be prudent to be prepared to reconstitute the Middle East Emergency Committee if developments require.

*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, ODM.

[Here follow agenda items 6–8 relating to Iran, the Philippines, and military programs for FY 1958 and FY 1959.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

<sup>10</sup> Paragraphs a and b and the Note constitute NSC Action No. 1784. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

---

**399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 16, 1957—10:51 p.m.*

841. For Ambassador. Please immediately orally inform government to which you are accredited:

In view of virtual certainty that Soviet Union will launch an attack in UNGA on Turkey and the Western Powers for alleged

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1657. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rountree and approved by Dulles. Also sent priority to Amman and Baghdad and repeated to London and Beirut.

plotting against and intimidation of Syria and will probably introduce some resolution along the lines of recent Soviet notes and utterances, the US deems it essential to take an initiative. Accordingly Secretary Dulles in his opening address on Thursday plans to recite the background of Soviet plotting in the Middle East, to indicate a revival of that plotting over the past two years and to point to Syria as the place where indirect aggression is being plotted in violation of "the Essentials for Peace Resolution" of December 1, 1949<sup>2</sup> which, among other things, called upon every nation "to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any state". He may also suggest that the General Assembly adopt a resolution requesting the Security Council to designate the non-permanent members to investigate the situation in Syria.

United States officials will discuss this matter at New York with British and Lebanese Foreign Ministers. However, in the case of the government to which you are accredited and the other two addressee Arab states, we feel that guidance to their UNGA delegations should in the first instance come from their home governments.<sup>3</sup>

**Murphy**

---

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/1167. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. II, pp. 143-145.

<sup>3</sup> In response to this telegram, Ambassador Mallory spoke with Jordanian Foreign Minister Abd al-Hadi and subsequently reported that Abd al-Hadi considered a statement by Dulles to be desirable and suggested that references to Syria's plotting against its neighbors be in general terms without reciting the names of neighboring countries. (Telegram 538 from Amman, September 18; Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9-1857)

**400. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 17, 1957—6:15 p.m.*

Topol 723. You should convey following information to Spaak, stressing matter obviously one requiring exceptional secrecy. You should not take initiative in proposing private session of NAC but you should leave it to Spaak to decide whether he considers matter warrants such special restricted meeting for purpose of imparting information to Perm Reps.

US takes very serious view situation in Middle East arising out of developments in Syria. We judge that Syria has become or is about to become base for military and subversive activities in ME designed to destroy independence of those countries and to subject them to Soviet Communist domination. We understand that this same view is taken by Governments of all five nations bordering on Syria. Latter are deeply concerned over threat to their security represented by impetuous pro-Soviet Syrian regime. Hostile and provocative attitude toward its neighbors adopted by Syrian Government, together with close connection of latter with Government of USSR, reinforces their fear. Already subversive agents carrying explosives have been infiltrated into the Lebanese territory from Syria.

This situation seems to carry a special threat to Turkey against which Turkey has taken certain defensive military precautions. The Soviet Union seems however to treat this as a threat against itself and has itself publicly threatened Turkey suggesting that it will mass troops on the Turkish border.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement of September 10 indicates a reversion to the old measures of attempting to terrorize nations of free world and break down their will to defend their independence

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.54/9-1757. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell on September 12. Revised by Dulles and Elbrick on September 13, and approved by Dulles, evidently prior to his departure for New York on September 16.

During a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on September 12, it was agreed that a need existed for the Council to obtain more information and study the situation developing in Syria and the Middle East. (Polto 569 from Paris, September 12; *ibid.*, 780.00/9-1257) Subsequent to that meeting on September 13, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Ankara of its belief that NAC permanent representatives should receive more information concerning U.S. attitude toward the problem. In the same telegram, the Department transmitted a verbatim text of the instructions to Perkins printed here and instructed the Embassy to discuss the matter with the Turkish Government and inquire whether they had any objections. (Telegram 806, September 13; *ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123) Menderes and other Turkish officials approved the proposed U.S. initiative to the Council during a meeting on September 16. (Telegram 752 from Ankara, September 16; *ibid.*)

and sovereignty. Reinstitution of this policy takes on new meaning when one considers that impetuous and unstable Khrushchev is now in control of Soviet Government, there having been removed from authority individuals who, while pursuing same Soviet objectives as Khrushchev, were cool and calculating and fully aware of risks involved.

US has informed Turkey that in the event the latter is attacked by Sino-Soviet bloc US will come to its assistance with armed force. In addition US has decided that in event of need US would immediately reactivate MEEOC to meet effects of any interruption of flow of oil to Free World markets which might result from closure of trans-Syrian pipelines or Suez Canal.

US will continue to deploy Sixth Fleet in eastern Mediterranean.

**Murphy**

---

#### 401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 17, 1957—7:26 p.m.*

Topol 727. Deliver Perkins by 9:00 a.m. September 18. Polto 589.<sup>2</sup> Department hopes discussions of Syrian and ME situation mentioned reftel can begin September 18. Although complete replies to all questions contained in NATO I.S. paper are not readily available now, questions are so general that more definitive replies would not be likely to result from delaying discussions additional week.

Following are our views re correspondingly numbered paragraphs reftel:

1) We believe Syria is not yet "satellited" but is certainly "on the road to satellization". In absence of intervening events present trend will end in complete domination present Syrian regime by USSR, particularly insofar as foreign policy is concerned. Syrian

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/9-1357. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dorman and Rockwell and approved by Berry who signed for Murphy. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and London.

<sup>2</sup> Polto 589 from Paris, September 13, contained the text of a paper prepared by the International Secretariat of the North Atlantic Council, which set forth a possible framework for a discussion on the Syrian and Middle East situation. A covering note to the paper suggested that the subject be considered in private session following the regular NAC meeting on September 18. (*Ibid.*)

Government is utilizing propaganda media characteristic of Communist tactics.

Syrian attempts smuggle arms into Lebanon, stepped up activities of Syrian G-2 agents within Lebanon and recent bitter press campaign against Lebanese Government are Communist methods now being employed by Syria against smallest of Syria's Arab neighbors. Degree of dependence of Syrian Government on Moscow not now clear although continuing attacks by USSR against Western "imperialism", Russian notes to US, UK and France on ME,<sup>3</sup> and USSR note threatening Turkey are indications of close connection between USSR and Syria. Russian-Syrian economic talks have opened way to Soviet penetration of Syrian economy. Communist bloc advisors and technicians are known to be training Syrian Army.

Syrian Government now attempting persuade world it truly independent of Moscow and seeking to lull other countries into complacency. Such attempts include declarations that Syrian Chief of Staff Bizri is not Communist but independent nationalist, that US has hatched entire Communist tale, and that USSR is champion of Arab nationalism. Facts are that present Syrian Government is infiltrated by Communists and in control of pro-Soviet officials who are opening doors of Syria to USSR. Thus, Syria is becoming base of international Communism in heart of Arab World which will serve as center for subversion against neighboring governments designed to destroy independence of those countries and to subject them to Soviet Communist domination.

2) A) Evolution of Syrian situation poses immediate danger for West because of unpredictable, impetuous and ruthless nature of pro-Soviet officials controlling Syrian Government and their aggressive attitude toward pro-West neighbors of Syria. Large build-up of Soviet arms in Syria threatens peace in ME.

B) Syrian situation poses long-term danger of infiltration and subversion neighboring countries. Neighbors of Syria are genuinely concerned by this. Undermining of Governments these countries and their replacement by regimes on Syrian model would have seriously adverse effect on position of West in area.

C) Situation in Syria thus poses both immediate and long-term danger for West.

3) Those counter-measures which Western countries might adopt against long-term dangers include: a) Helping to strengthen internal security of neighboring Moslem countries; b) Helping to strengthen their armed forces; c) Assisting in countering hostile propaganda from Cairo and Damascus; d) Offering economic aid to strengthen neighboring Moslem Governments; e) Standing by com-

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a Soviet note of September 3, not printed here.

mitments to assist in safeguarding territorial integrity and independence.

4) Re nature of threat, see above. In addition, long-term threat to Syria's neighbors might well be military action, as soon as Syrian Army has been sufficiently trained in use of Russian arms. Economic threat to neighbors could be either immediate or long-term or both, i.e. cutting of oil pipelines would have an immediate and long-term effect on economy of both Iraq and Lebanon.

5) As result recent visit Syrian mission to Moscow, agreement appears to have been reached whereby USSR will loan Syria \$100-150 million for Syrian development projects repayable over 12 year period at 2.5 percent. According reports USSR also agreed buy surplus Syrian agricultural commodities in amount of approximately \$15 million, half proceeds to be applied to deliveries Soviet equipment and balance to be made available in foreign exchange. Soviet technicians are reportedly to assist in development projects including roads, railroads, hydro-electric plants, irrigation projects and industrial establishments. Effect these agreements, if carried out, will be to reduce Syrian economy to complete dependency on Soviet bloc.

6) Propaganda media which could be used to counteract hostile propaganda might include broadcasts from West, broadcasts from neighboring Arab states, utilization of press friendly to West, appropriate statements in UN, other media such as replies to Soviet note on ME.<sup>4</sup>

## Murphy

---

<sup>4</sup> During a private session of the North Atlantic Council on September 19, the U.S. Representative delivered the comments set forth in Topol 727. (Polto 632 from Paris, September 18; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/9-1857) The North Atlantic Council continued to discuss the Middle East and Syrian situation intermittently for the following several weeks. Documentation concerning these discussions is *ibid.*, 780.00 and 783.00.

402. **Memorandum of a Conversation, the Secretary's Suite in the Waldorf Astoria, New York, September 18, 1957, 11 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary  
Mr. Reinhardt

*Lebanon*

Mr. Charles Malik

SUBJECT

Middle East

The Secretary said he wanted to talk about the Middle East. He referred to Dr. Malik's conversations with Mr. Henderson which had been fully reported to Washington and referred as well to his message to Dr. Malik. He said that the United States was gravely concerned with the situation and was prepared to do anything reasonable to check or help the present trend of developments. It was important that there be no action by Israel and we are inclined to believe they share our view. Yet there was some danger that elements in Syria might succeed in provoking Israeli reaction in order to put the problem in the framework of the Arab-Israeli dispute instead of the Communist-Free World dispute. The Secretary believed the Israelis would exercise restraint if there were any prospect of the present movement being checked. If on the contrary, it looked as though this trend would go forward and that within a year or two they would be surrounded by highly armed and excited enemies, they would be inclined to do something. In short the Secretary thought that if there were hope the Israelis would be inclined to exercise restraint. It was also undesirable for any initiative to be taken by Turkey. Although he thought the Turks were not feared as much as Israel in the Near East, he judged that there was still strong anti-Turk feeling derived from the days of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey felt itself threatened by an encirclement which would sap its strength. What was desirable was for Syria's Arab neighbors to take the initiative, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. (Dr. Malik interrupted to add the name of Saudi Arabia.)

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt. The source text is marked "draft", but contains handwritten corrections. The text printed here is the corrected version.

Dr. Malik said he had asked King Saud<sup>2</sup> how he ran his country when he was absent, and had been told that the King was in constant contact by telephone and wireless. The Secretary recalled that in 1953 following a dinner in Rhyad with the old King there had been a party in the present King's rose garden and on every table there was a telephone which the Arabs were constantly using as a sort of symbol of authority.

Jordan, the Secretary continued, was weak. There was danger that the 100,000 refugees could be whipped up into a state of riot. . . .

With respect to Iraq the Secretary thought the Crown Prince was a pretty strong element, but the present Prime Minister not so. It would be better if Nuri were back. He had heard that Nuri was returning to Baghdad in a day or two but did not know whether he would be offered a government post. As far as Lebanon was concerned, the Secretary said Dr. Malik himself was the best judge of the situation.

The Secretary said we must devise some program of action. . . . It must be recognized that if there were any provocation the Turks would act. He referred to the recent Soviet note threatening Turkey and said he did not know what the answer would be. He had no doubt that the Turks were fully confident that any Soviet attack would bring NATO forces into play. The Soviets probably realized this and we do also.

The Secretary said that in his speech tomorrow he would refer to Communist techniques of indirect aggression and to the Essentials for Peace Resolution. He said that he might suggest the General Assembly recommend to the Security Council some investigation in Syria to see whether the resolution was being complied with. This was the best thing we could think of at the moment. The Secretary said he had to speak about the situation in the Near East, but didn't regard this as any solution or substitute for our own efforts. He went on to say that as soon as we had the details the United States Government would make \$2 million worth of light equipment available for the Lebanese Gendarmerie.

Dr. Malik said that Lebanon was in the very forefront of this matter. He had had many talks with Henderson who had also seen the President and Prime Minister at length. He was in constant

---

<sup>2</sup> King Saud had stopped in Beirut on September 7 en route to West Germany for medical treatment. Malik later spoke with Heath concerning Saud's conversations with Lebanese officials and Heath conveyed a report to the Department of State. (Telegram 670 from Beirut, September 8; *ibid.*)



contact and in fact he had just seen him before leaving Beirut. This present situation was the most serious thing that Lebanon had faced in at least a decade. The most important thing was the Communist capability for subversion. The Lebanon Government did not think there would be overt aggression for at least a year or two. Subversion was the immediate danger. The enemy was spending millions with agents all over the place. This had to be met with courage and horsesense. If the Communists got entrenched in Syria as they may if no action is taken, it will be disastrous. Once this Syrian regime felt itself fully entrenched then he, Dr. Malik, would give Jordan one month, Lebanon three, Iraq six and Saudi Arabia perhaps a year. This was a threat not merely to Lebanon but to the whole Middle East in fact to the peace of the world. Time was of the essence. Dr. Malik said he could not overemphasize this point. His people were getting scared. The psychology of border peoples was unstable and there was the danger of a sudden shift if they felt the wind coming from another quarter. He said the Secretary's recent statement<sup>3</sup> had had a soothing effect, but it was bad for waverers. Many people had gotten cold feet and thought the United States was drawing back.

The Secretary said no one was as surprised as he at the interpretation put on that statement by the press. He had said he did not think United States forces would be required in the area. The press had picked it up. Unfortunately, there was no middle ground for the press. They presented everything as being either black or white. Dr. Malik said this was not the moment to strengthen the wavering and hesitating forces in the area. A measure of Communist penetration was the wide spread existence of these elements. Dr. Malik said he was happy to hear the Secretary speak of positive action and that we must put our heads together. . . . Iraq must be brought in. Nuri was a fine man but showed no inclination to help Syria. Ali Jawdat was also a fine man but he didn't grasp the situation. Nuri should be encouraged by the United States and the United Kingdom. Heath had told him that we were working together. . . .

Dr. Malik asked rhetorically what Lebanon could say at this moment. The Secretary's speech would be a great and good thing and he hoped the Secretary would give it punch. We may live to regret every moment wasted. Dr. Malik said he could be frank with the Secretary but he did not know whether he could make a speech.

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to remarks made by Dulles during a press conference on September 10. In response to questions, Dulles stated that the United States had not yet made a determination that Syria was dominated by international communism within the meaning of the Middle East resolution, the situation in Syria was still in the "borderline-gray area," and the situation "will probably work out." For a transcript, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 30, 1957, pp. 526-532.

Dr. Malik said the Russians were exceedingly interested in this problem and that when he called on Gromyko it was clear he had no other subject on his mind. They were apparently in it up to their necks. He was amazed at the depth of Gromyko's feeling and was convinced, judging by Gromyko, that the Russians were thinking about this all the time. It was a curious situation wherein the two greats were coming head on in Syria.

The Lebanese Government, he said, was prepared to do everything it could. The Syrians had many agents in his country and there was a Syrian opposition but it had been kept in parliament down to 15%. The country was unfortunately already a little softened up and time was of the essence. Lebanon was willing to put its resources at the disposition of a common effort. . . . Already two weeks ago an official of the Vatican had told him that the Vatican felt the United States was then two weeks too late. The Secretary said the United States would not try to hold back any such effort . . . . The United States would give assurances under the Eisenhower Doctrine. There was no unwillingness to take risks even that of global war. This had been fully discussed but we could not undertake to launch armed attack on Syria. This would violate all our principles and would not be supported by the Congress. There must be initiative in the area . . . . The Iraqi Government was not incisive and he did not know whether Nuri would come back. The Secretary felt that tactically it was a long way to the Syrian border. Iraq had more of an advantageous approach through Jordan. He agreed that the matter was urgent. That when things are urgent you can't do complicated things. Dr. Malik observed that planning could be done to which the Secretary replied it was being done.

The Secretary believed Nasser was encouraging these developments in Syria. He was a complicated person full of moods and difficult to judge. But the Secretary believed he was under the illusion, which others had shared before, that you can encourage the Soviets to come in and work with them and still maintain some respectability. We had seen this phenomenon in Czechoslovakia in 1948 where Benes and Masaryk had thought they could work closely with the Russians and maintain their independence. He thought Nasser was under the same illusion. The Russians had built up his vanity and the Secretary recalled the chapter in Nasser's book entitled "The Situation in Need of a Hero". He thought the Russians could build him up in this sense.

Dr. Malik said Nasser thought that he had received assurances in 1953 that the United States would give him a free hand in the Middle East. Now he was bitter. Malik asked whether it was true that the Secretary had told him that United States policy was to work through him with the Arab world. The Secretary replied that

he would have to check memoranda of conversation to find out exactly what he had said to Nasser. It was possible that he had said we recognized that he had a position of leadership in the Arab world, but if Nasser thought we had given him any so farreaching assurances, he was crazy.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> The Department of State's Executive Secretariat subsequently examined the 1953 records.

---

#### 403. Special Staff Note, Prepared in the White House<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 20, 1957.*

*From Defense:*

*Expedited MAP Deliveries to Middle East Countries.*—Current status of the special action directed by the President to expedite shipment of undelivered programmed items to Middle East countries, with overriding priority to be given Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the sequence named, are as follows:

*Iraq*—Received by airlift August 28-31, 1957: 36 Mortars, 4.2"; 82 Recoilless Rifles, 106mm, with ammunition; 162 Radios; 6 L-19a Observation and Liaison aircraft. Majority of remaining programmed U.S. items will be delivered by sea by end October, and balance by end CY 1957.

*Jordan*—Received by airlift September 9, 1957: 40 Recoilless Rifles, 106mm, mounted on 40 jeeps together with ammunition. Remainder of \$10 million program consisting of both British and US-type matériel will be shipped by sea on an expedited basis. US-type items, including 36 M-47 tanks and 60 additional Recoilless Rifles and jeeps are expected to be delivered to port of Aqaba by end September 1957.

*Saudi Arabia*—12 F-86 jet fighters were delivered by air August 30. 2 T-33 jet trainer aircraft are en route by air. 6 T-28 primary trainer aircraft and one H-34 helicopter will be shipped by vessel on September 21. 18 M-47 medium tanks and ammunition arrived September 4. 18 M-41 light tanks and all small arms are scheduled for shipment in September. All artillery is scheduled for shipment in October.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. Eisenhower initialed the source text.

*Iran*—3 T-33 jet trainer aircraft are en route by air. Major part of end items on Army program has been delivered. 2 Howitzers 8" were shipped end of August and are due to arrive mid October. Remainder of program is being processed for shipment on an expedited basis.

*Turkey*—Miscellaneous Air Force equipment and parts, (totalling \$1 million in value), are en route by sea. 50 M-47 tanks are scheduled for shipment from Europe in October and 47 additional by December. 91 M-24 light tanks will be shipped during October and November. 1027 trucks  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton will be shipped during September and October. 2457 trucks 2- $\frac{1}{2}$  ton will be shipped at rate of 300 per month beginning in September.

---

#### 404. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 25, 1957—4:50 p.m.*

278. Joint State-USIA message.

1. To seek to counteract unfavorable repercussions in ME area of Syrian developments and to achieve greater appreciation of gravity of Syrian situation State and USIA have decided that stepped up psychological campaign should be launched immediately. This campaign should receive support from all elements of Embassy.

US recognizes that it faces three major psychological handicaps with respect to events in Syria, namely a) while Soviet threat has made little impact on Arab mind, there is a ready audience for contentions that US is hostile to Arab nationalism and unity; b) US is identified in Arab eyes with support for Israel while Soviet Union has sided openly with Arabs; c) bulk of Arab people, preoccupied with Israel and target of intense and skillful Soviet propaganda, fail to apprehend gravity of Syrian situation. Reluctance of friendly Arab

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9-2557. Secret. Drafted by officials in NEA and USIA; cleared with officials in USIA, NEA, and PA. Approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Sent to the Embassies in Jordan, Turkey, Greece, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, the United Kingdom, Morocco, Israel, Libya, Tunis, and Iran; and pouched to the Embassies in Ghana, Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Spain, Liberia, India, France, and Italy, and to the consulate general in Jerusalem.

USIA Director Larson informed President Eisenhower of the contents of circular telegram 278 in a memorandum of September 28. Eisenhower initialed the memorandum. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, USIA)

leaders to reveal publicly concern they express to us privately about Syrian situation is further obstacle; to extent US policies appear to succeed leaders may be willing take more open position.

2. Following lines suggested for use as appropriate in rebutting theme of US opposition to Arab nationalism (1a above): a) US favors principle of Arab unity and freedom; b) Arab nationalism working with West brought about freedom and independence of Arab states; c) US has consistently supported genuine nationalism within last decade and contributed realization independence of Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan; d) Arab freedom, independence and unity are jeopardized by Syrian policy which currently playing into hands of Soviet imperialists; e) Soviet policy has consistently been to make satellites of countries coming under its influence; f) no country has maintained as close relations with USSR as Syria now does and remained free; g) US would not support efforts by one Arab state to dominate others; h) US opposition to aggression from any quarter and concern with maintenance integrity all Arab states demonstrated by position during Suez crisis.

3. Following are illustrative of lines which may be used as appropriate in dealing with item 1(b) above: a) stress firm US opposition to Israeli expansion at expense its neighbors, emphasizing fact that US assurances of assistance against aggression apply to attack from any quarter (cite US statement of April 24 re: Jordan;<sup>2</sup> US action against Israel in Sinai campaign; US statement of April 9, 1956<sup>3</sup>); b) give publicity to US arms already sent and still going to friendly Arab states; c) make discreet mention any complaints from Israeli or pro-Israeli sources about US military and economic aid to Arab states; d) present Soviet support Arab states as purely tactical and motivated by desire increase influence in ME. Point out that Soviet Bloc supported establishment Israel and partition Palestine, furnished arms to Israel during Palestine war, and switched views only recently in hope establishing beachhead in ME.

4. Implementation of 1(c) above particularly difficult. It important that every effort be made impress following points on Arab peoples and those countries which presently uncertain or vacillating in their estimation gravity Syrian situation: a) portray Syrian regime as introducing communism, the enemy of religion, into Near East with gravest dangers to Syrian people and Syria's neighbors; b) demonstrate that Syrian regime is destroying Arab unity and betraying true Arab nationalism; c) place onus for threatening peace of Near East on Syrian regime and its supporters, the Soviet Bloc and Egypt; d) exploit indications that Syria has openly hostile intentions towards Iraq,

---

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 395.

<sup>3</sup> Printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, pp. 592–593.

Jordan and Lebanon and, together with Egypt, is engaged in subversion in neighboring countries; e) show that Syrian ruling clique is characterized by irresponsibility, opportunism, personal ambitions and naiveté; f) if considered appropriate in individual countries, make reference to US determination to oppose, if requested, Soviet Bloc aggressive activities in Near East. Cite ME Resolution<sup>4</sup> and Secretary's statement from White House on September 7, 1957.<sup>5</sup>

5. All suggested themes paras 2, 3 and 4 may be used as local conditions warrant in official, attributable output. We aware that aspects this program difficult to implement immediately. However it important that recipient posts use every resource available pursue this program. State and USIA will provide continuing materials but must rely on field posts to generate indigenous editorials, comment, stories for cross play. Advise USIA re themes, research and background required.

6. It important to bear in mind USG objective is to obtain to extent possible area wide recognition that a) pro-Soviet regime in Syria does not have support of Syrian people; b) opposition to present Syrian regime is led by "free" Arab countries who see their hard-won independence and their security threatened by traitors to nationalist cause, betraying Arabs to new foreign (Soviet) imperialism; c) "free" Arab countries do not compromise their position with respect to Israel by cooperation with Free World.

7. Within limits set forth herein, posts are requested devote to this program maximum available initiative, imagination and talent, giving top priority to project until further notice.<sup>6</sup>

**Dulles**

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Joint Resolution of the Congress of March 5, 1957.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 388.

<sup>6</sup> For responses to this instruction from recipient posts, see Department of State, Central File 783.00.

On October 1, U.S. and British representatives met in Washington to discuss, among other matters, the implementation of circular telegram 278. As a result of these meetings, it was agreed that an ad hoc committee consisting of Department of State-USIA-British Embassy representatives would meet in Washington on approximately a weekly basis to discuss coordination of output, to exchange policy guidances and research documents, and to assess the psychological implications of current or planned policies. Certain Middle Eastern, African, and European missions were informed of this meeting and offered additional guidance in Joint State-USIA Circular, CA-980, October 17, 1957. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/10-1757)

Within the U.S. Government a small interagency group, headed by Ambassador Moose and including representatives from the CIA, Departments of Defense and State, and USIA, was formed to study the reasons why the U.S. psychological warfare program in the Middle East had not achieved a satisfactory degree of success and to make recommendations for a new approach. For documentation concerning the group's activities during November 1957, see Washington National Records Center, USIA/IAN Files: FRC 63 A 190, Lot 61 D 233, Moose Committee 1957.

**405. Letter From the Chargé in Syria (Strong) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) <sup>1</sup>**

*Damascus, October 16, 1957.*

DEAR BILL: I have been pondering, perhaps too long or perhaps not long enough, advocacy of a modification of the United States posture toward Syria. A letter to you now appears to be timely. Since my proposals are controversial I thought I might submit them informally, formal transmission to occur later only if desired.

United States efforts . . . toward Syria having failed, what alternatives do we have? Force is ruled out. . . . A hard line from the West alone would only drive Syria closer to the Soviet Bloc. Unhappily there is no satisfactory alternative, as far as I can see, to leaving the handling of the problem to King Sa'ud and other moderate Arabs. They are as deeply or more affected than the United States by the Syrian situation, and in their own interest they must try to modify it. However, they can do better if allowed to take the initiative in their own way; whatever the United States does should be (1) quiet, from behind the scenes, and (2) designed to assist our Arab friends.

Pronouncements by United States officials hostile to Syria serve to strengthen Syrian extremists and weaken our Arab friends, both in and outside Syria. Public questioning of the friendship and motives of Sa'ud (and the Iraqis) merely assist the extremists to undermine Sa'ud's influence. Limited economic warfare measures which annoy but do not have any serious effect only justify the extremists in their course and render a Syrian return to sanity and to better relations with the United States that much more difficult. Continuation of . . . military threats simply gives the Soviets and Syrian extremists another golden propaganda opportunity.

The Soviet Union, thanks to the Palestine problem, has gotten a foothold in Syria. In my opinion we cannot now destroy that foothold. Therefore we should endeavor to prevent the Soviets from gaining a grip on Syria and from obtaining first a foothold in and then a grip on other Arab states. We cannot by ourselves, even with the cooperation of King Husayn, keep the Soviets out of Jordan and later Iraq. Husayn and his moderate regime can be sustained only by Sa'ud and the Iraqis, and by Israeli silence (any serious act of violence by Israel against Jordan or Syria would be catastrophic).

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-1657. Secret; Official-Informal.

The best we can hope for from Syria for a long time would be genuine neutrality. No one in Syria can bring Syria back into the western camp under any foreseeable circumstances. We can contribute to adoption of truer neutrality by Syria and to insulation of other Arab states, but we cannot do it by ourselves.

Therefore the course I propose for the United States, difficult as it may be, but less dangerous than continuation of an overtly hostile line toward Syria, is as follows: place our trust in the friendly Arab states; seek ways in which we can strengthen them quietly (arms and economic aid in small quantities are *not* the answer) by political measures and propaganda; tell them of our trust and consult with them on measures, within our political possibilities, which will be helpful to them; endeavor to keep the Israelis and Turks quiet, and maintain relative silence ourselves; avoid making our Arab friends appear to be United States stooges; seek to place our relations with Syria on a better footing including termination of embargoes and quotas; permit normal travel to Syria; accept Syrian neutrality and attack only unneutral acts by Syria; be subtle in propaganda, avoiding material of obvious United States origin; ignore acquisition of Soviet arms by Syria; examine alternative methods of assistance to Syrian development ambitions including peaceful uses of atomic energy; should this course appear to produce some results, assign a new Ambassador, replace Funkhouser and myself, and reinstitute cultural exchange.

The foregoing course may involve some loss of face, and the Syrians in any case will be difficult. The Israelis will probably accuse us of selling out, but in fact they are in no danger from the Syrians for twenty years unless the Soviets get hold of their army and turn it into something.

I believe that such a course would not only help our Arab friends but also would assist measurably the forces of moderation inside Syria.

There are many other details I might have included but I believe that the lines of thinking are clear. I have discussed this with all elements of the Embassy, who are in full agreement, . . . .

Sincerely,

**Bob**



## 406. Editorial Note

On October 15, the Syrian Government requested that an item entitled "Complaint about threats to the security of Syria and to international peace" be inscribed on the General Assembly's agenda for the current session. In an explanatory memorandum accompanying the request, Syria pointed to an "unprecedented and unwarranted concentration of Turkish troops" along the Syrian-Turkish border, violations of Syrian air space, armed raids originating from Turkish territory, and efforts to overthrow the Syrian Government. Among other points, Syria called for a commission to examine the border area and report to the General Assembly. (U.N. document A/3699)

In a letter to the President of the General Assembly dated October 16, Soviet Representative Gromyko noted the possibility that the situation might lead to armed conflict and accused the Turkish General Staff, with the help of United States military advisers, of working out detailed plans for a Turkish attack on Syria immediately after the Turkish elections scheduled for October 27. Gromyko also noted that the Soviet Government could not regard impassively military provocations being planned close to its southern borders. (U.N. document A/3700)

---

 407. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 18, 1957, 10:15 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

## SUBJECT

Syrian Item in the United Nations

## PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The Secretary  
 Mr. W. M. Rountree, NEA  
 Mr. S. W. Rockwell, NE  
 Mr. J. Dorman, NE

*UK*

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary  
 Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador  
 Viscount Samuel Hood, Minister, British Embassy  
 Mr. Willie Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.00/10-1057. Secret. Drafted by Dorman on October 19. Dulles' Appointment Book indicates that Ambassador to the

The Secretary suggested that the Syrian complaint in the United Nations be discussed first. He said the United States had proposed to amend the title of the item to read “. . . <sup>2</sup> threat to the independence and integrity of Syria,” a phrase which had been lifted from the original Syrian note. The Secretary hoped that the UK Delegation could support this wording. Mr. Lloyd said that the UK could certainly support the title as amended. He would support the US position in the debate and would point out that the entire item was merely a Soviet propaganda gambit.

The Secretary felt that we should avoid a resolution of a nature which would put Turkey on the spot. We did not want to be put in the position of appearing to support a move against our staunchest Middle East ally. The Turks, the Secretary said, might counter the Syrian complaint with their own request for an investigating commission to report on the Russian build-up along the Turkish-Soviet border. Any resolution of this kind would certainly be rejected by the USSR and would give Turkey a precedent for similar action with respect to any resolution calling for an investigation in Turkey. Mr. Lloyd suggested that the Turks might also ask for a UN-sponsored investigation along the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier along which there had been recent reports of military activity.

Mr. Lloyd felt that the appointment of an investigating commission by the General Assembly would set a dangerous precedent and yet he could not readily see how it could be avoided. . . .

Mr. Rountree indicated that whatever tactic we might use in the United Nations, we should make a careful assessment of the general atmosphere as it exists today and carefully weigh in advance the support which a US-sponsored resolution regarding a Russian military build-up might receive. It was entirely possible that such a resolution might be defeated. Mr. Lloyd concurred.

In reply to a question from the Secretary, Mr. Rountree indicated that while we had no definite word on the Turkish position, the Turks had left with us the impression that they could not accept an investigating commission. Both the Secretary and Mr. Lloyd agreed that Turkey would be in a very difficult position if it ignored a resolution which had been passed by the UN.

The Secretary pointed out that Turkey was far from being the only country in the area which had received arms, since this was true also of Jordan, Iraq, and especially Syria.

---

United Kingdom John Hay Whitney was also present. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

Mr. Lloyd felt that the best possible solution was a resolution in the General Assembly which would refer the matter for prompt consideration to the Security Council. The Secretary agreed, citing the UN provision that the General Assembly should refer to the Security Council any action on an item constituting a threat to the peace.

Mr. Lloyd suggested that a resolution might be presented in the Security Council calling for the establishment of an investigating commission. We might then broaden the terms of such a resolution to include an investigation of the Russian frontier. The Russians would, of course, veto any such resolution.

(At this point the Secretary called Mr. Wadsworth at the USUN and established that the Turks might have no strong objection to a resolution calling for the creation of an investigating commission to look into the alleged military build-up along the Turkish-Syrian frontier.)

Lord Hood felt that following a General Assembly discussion we should recommend that the Security Council appoint an investigating commission, determining its terms of reference. Mr. Rountree observed that this had been our previous position. In considering the possibility of broadening the investigating commission's terms of reference to include the Russian and Bulgarian frontiers, Mr. Rockwell suggested that a possible division of votes might result in the defeat of the resolution. The Secretary said that if a resolution was killed in the Security Council we could return the item to the General Assembly.

. . . . .

**408. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 18, 1957—9:15 p.m.*

1268. Embtel 1140.<sup>2</sup> You should speak to Turks along following lines regarding tactics in face of Syrian complaint in GA:

1) We desire closest collaboration with Turkish Government and Turkish delegation New York on this issue.

2) We believe we should make every effort to turn this matter to our advantage and to point up the threat to independence of Syria arising from indirect Soviet aggression and to security of ME arising from pile-up of Soviet arms in Syria. We also believe that outright Soviet threat against Turkey, and reported Bulgarian military movements on Turkish border if latter substantiated will lend themselves to exploitation.

3) Debate will of course give opportunity make clear that charges of aggressive intent made against Turkey, and allegations that US attempting to foment war against Syria, are entirely unfounded.

4) Our tentative thinking regarding tactics in GA, prior to ascertaining attitude other countries, is that we should work for reference of this matter to SC as organ of UN charged with primary responsibility for consideration of items involving alleged threats to peace, and better able to exercise responsibility on continuing basis. We believe that in this matter we should follow orderly procedure. See Charter Art. 11(2).

5) We have in mind introduction of resolution whereby Assembly, after discussion, would decide to refer Syrian complaint to SC with request that Council determine scope of investigation which should be made. Assembly may, however, insist on seeking itself to direct the investigation.

6) We would like urgently to receive views of Turkish Government regarding desirability of an investigating committee being despatched to area. If such a body were to go forward we would hope it might be composed of non-permanent members of SC. Although Syrian complaint calls for a UN group to investigate

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10-1757. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell; cleared with Walmsley and Brewster; and approved and signed by Dulles. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1140 from Ankara, October 17, Warren conveyed Esenbel's comments that the time had arrived for a U.N. debate and that Turkey and the United States should work closely together on it. Esenbel also requested the Department of State's position on the debate and requested any constructive suggestion that Secretary Dulles might have. (*Ibid.*)

situation on Syrian-Turkish border, we are considering whether it would not be desirable for such group to be authorized also to investigate armaments situation in Syria and situations on Soviet-Turkish and Turkish-Bulgarian borders with particular reference to possible military movements. Soviets and Bulgars would probably not accept investigating group.

7) You should emphasize to Turks that these views are entirely preliminary, that we have not yet had an opportunity for full consultation with other delegations, and that we have reached no final determination with regard to procedure. We would welcome urgent and continuing consultation with Turks.<sup>3</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> On October 20, Warren reported that after being informed of the U.S. position contained in telegram 1268 to Ankara, Esenbel commented to Warren that Turkey was not in a position to make a decision on an effective resolution, intended to request that the U.N. debate be postponed until after the Turkish national elections, and did not want an investigation in Turkey during the elections. If an investigating committee should be sent after the elections, Esenbel said, Turkey would want its frame of reference to be expanded along the lines described in paragraph 6 of telegram 1268 to Ankara. (Telegram 1161 from Ankara; *ibid.*, 682.83/10-2057)

---

#### 409. Editorial Note

During the evening of October 19, Saudi Counselor Husayni conveyed to Chargé Heath a message from King Saud indicating that the King had offered his good offices to reduce tension between Syria and Turkey and had asked that the United States use its influence to persuade Turkey to accept the mediation. (Telegram 1207 from Beirut, October 20; Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10-2057) The following day, the Saudi Arabian Government publicly announced that King Saud had offered to mediate the dispute and that both Syria and Turkey had accepted the King's offer and had agreed to send missions to Saudi Arabia within the next 2 days. On October 21, the Turkish Government officially announced its acceptance of Saud's offer. The Syrian Delegation at the United Nations, however, issued a statement indicating that reports of mediation between Syria and Turkey were not in conformity with the facts. For texts of the Saudi, Turkish, and Syrian statements, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, page 1052, footnotes 98-100. Ambassador Lodge expressed United States

support for Saud's offer during a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on October 22. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 18, 1957, pages 776-777.

---

**410. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 21, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Syrian Complaint

*Discussion:*

We have now reached the point where the United States must be prepared to submit a resolution to the General Assembly if we are to forestall an undesirable initiative by Syria or the USSR. Ambassador Lodge also strongly recommends this course. (Tab C)<sup>2</sup>

However, until it becomes clear whether the initiative by King Saud is stillborn, we must withhold submission of any proposal. On the other hand, if his efforts fail, we believe we can take advantage of the atmosphere favoring mediation created by his proposal to submit a resolution calling for the extension of good offices through the UN. This approach would buy further time, at least until the Turkish elections are over; would put Syria on the spot if it refused to participate in such discussions; and would move us toward a possible means of disposing of the Syrian item without the necessity of dealing now with proposals for an investigatory committee but without foreclosing such other possibilities in the future. A draft telegram, under which the Delegation would consult on a contingent basis with key delegations, is attached for your approval. (Tab A)<sup>3</sup>

In the event it should develop that efforts to pursue matters along the lines of mediation or good offices should be fruitless, we believe our interests would best be served by initiating a resolution designed to dispose of the Syrian complaint by focusing attention on

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10-2157. Secret. Drafted by Brown and concurred in by Rountree, Murphy, Becker, and Elbrick.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached to the source text. Reference is presumably to Delga 217 from USUN, October 21. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Not attached to the source text.

the pertinent provisions of the “Essentials of Peace” resolution, calling upon all Members to observe the provisions of this resolution faithfully and to refrain from any provocative actions or statements, and expressing the confidence of the General Assembly that the Security Council will exercise its responsibilities under the Charter when the situation in Syria requires. A draft resolution for your approval is attached. (Tab B)<sup>4</sup> We reason that even if good offices should prove successful, it might be desirable to wind up GA consideration of the Syrian complaint with a general resolution focusing on the “Essentials of Peace” resolution, which has the advantage of highlighting the problem of indirect aggression, i.e., Soviet penetration in the area. However, we believe the decision on this should be deferred for the present.

*Recommendations:*<sup>5</sup>

1. That you sign the attached telegram. (Tab A)<sup>6</sup>
2. That you<sup>7</sup> approve the draft resolution for subsequent use if appropriate. (Tab B)<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Attached, but not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendations.

<sup>6</sup> A marginal notation on the source text indicates that the telegram was sent to the communications division at 8:30 p.m. on October 21 and transmitted at 9:01 p.m. in Gadel 57 to USUN.

Gadel 57 contained the text of a draft resolution and directed the U.S. Delegation to consult with key delegations about it on a contingency basis, in the event that Saud’s mediation efforts broke down. The operative paragraph of the draft resolution requested the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself (or to appoint the Secretary-General), to undertake informal discussions with the representatives of Syria and Turkey, and with such other representatives as might be useful, and to report to the General Assembly as soon as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10–2057)

<sup>7</sup> At this point Dulles inserted the word “tentatively”.

<sup>8</sup> In Gadel 59 to USUN, October 22, the Department of State transmitted to the Mission the text of the draft resolution and noted that it had received Dulles’ tentative approval. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10–2257)

**411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 22, 1957—3:44 p.m.*

171. View shortage of time and rapidity of developments in UNGA re Syria, Schwinn should convey on most urgent basis following to King:

Secretary October 22 in exchange of views with Saudi Ambassador<sup>2</sup> indicated US interested in and encouraged by King's mediation proposal. In furtherance US view problem should be settled through regional efforts, if possible, US desires cooperate with King and prepared consider any suggestions King may have with respect current Syrian complaint.

In response Ambassador's question whether Secretary might wish convey through him any comments or suggestions to King, Secretary stated it might be helpful if Saudi delegation could officially inform UNGA of Saudi mediation efforts, indicate effort continuing and offer remains open. Secretary also stated if King felt postponement UN action might facilitate his mediation efforts, Saudi delegation might be instructed cooperate with moves postpone debate.

(FYI: Ambassador stated he would relay Secretary's suggestion to King, but indicated to Secretary personal belief that, while Saudis might be willing inform UNGA, SAG might not wish propose any formal UNGA recognition or support Saudi efforts. Ambassador said, however, postponement debate and resolution might help King's efforts. End FYI)

In event King's mediation effort not successful, Secretary stated US might make effort build on King's efforts in UN and support mediation by SYG or President UNGA. Secretary indicated Department also considering possible introduction broader resolution which would also request investigation charges leveled against US, but Department realizes disadvantages broader debate and has made no decision this matter. He stressed US prefers settlement on regional basis and referred Article 33 UN Charter.<sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10-2257. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Newsom; cleared in draft with Wilcox and Howe; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Jidda, Ankara, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum of the conversation by Newsom is not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Article 33 of the U.N. Charter called for the use of regional agencies or arrangements, as well as other means, in seeking a peaceful solution to disputes.



**412. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, October 24, 1957—9 p.m.*

Delga 266. Re: Syria. Fawzi (Egypt) saw us at our request in order discuss next steps on Syrian item.

We told Fawzi we had supported motion for short delay in hopes King Saud effort could materialize. We had felt at time three days was sufficient to permit it to develop but as matters now stood, it appeared it would not succeed. In this connection we noted we were being criticized, e.g., by Hamilton in *Times* this morning, for not having sought two weeks postponement.

We told Fawzi in our opinion his statement on Tuesday,<sup>2</sup> of which he had given us advance notice, was restrained and we appreciated tone he had struck in it. We said we believed objectives which he had outlined to us for handling this item, and for which he had prepared working paper,<sup>3</sup> were shared by U.S. Fawzi said Egypt and U.S. shared desire see in Middle East peaceful, constructive, independent states, free from outside interference of any kind.

We told Fawzi we had studied his working paper carefully and had concluded our common objectives would better be achieved by having SYG take on necessary duties in connection Syrian situation rather than to work for commission, especially since we believed unity could be got behind Hammarskjold and could not for a commission. There would be problems in connection composition of commission and its terms of reference which would not exist in seeking utilize SYG. We added that going ahead on SYG proposal was contingent upon whether Saud's efforts would succeed.

Fawzi said he appreciated our initiative and our approach which, as far as he was concerned, represented a clean slate from which to start. He would be willing do everything which Egypt could do to try to make such proposal work. First step would be for him to see to what extent Syrians were susceptible to this line. Assuming they were, which he would have to ascertain, it would be important that transition from attempts utilize Saudi mediation offer to this approach be made carefully.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10-2457. Confidential; Priority. Received at 11:15 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> See Fawzi's remarks before the U.N. General Assembly on October 22. (U.N. doc. A/PV.708)

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted to the Department of State in Delga 229 from USUN, October 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10-2157)

Before Fawzi saw text<sup>4</sup> he asked two questions re content of our idea. First was whether SYG would be acting under mandate of assembly or under his constitutional authority. Second was whether SYG would act alone or, as had been suggested in some quarters, seek assistance of small group. If latter, he asked, would that group be committee of governments designated by GA or advisory committee to SYG, perhaps picked by him?

Our answer to first question was it was definitely our idea to have GA request SYG do this. As for second question, we had in mind involving also SYG although of course he could have benefit of any assistance he deemed necessary.

Fawzi noted use of word "informal" in operative paragraph 1. He said it might be this would assist in getting Syrians to agree. On other hand, it might make it more difficult for them. He assumed there would be no objection to deleting it if necessary. We said as far as we concerned, text still very flexible. Fawzi suggested changing "calls upon" to "requests" in last operative paragraph. We indicated agreement to this also.

Fawzi said he was always willing see us at any time and would let us know results of his soundings.

**Lodge**

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to the text of the draft resolution transmitted to USUN in Gadel 57 on October 21; see footnote 6, Document 410.

**413. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, October 25, 1957, 10:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

MTW MC 12

SUBJECT

Syria in the United Nations

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Robert Murphy, G  
Mr. Douglas C. Dillon, W  
Ambassador John Hay Whitney  
Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant  
Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA  
Mr. Andrew H. Berding, P  
Mr. John Wesley Jones, EUR  
Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/AE  
Mr. Marselis C. Parsons, Jr., BNA  
Mr. Isaiah Frank, OT  
Mr. William N. Dale, BNA  
Mr. John Dorman, NE

*U.K.*

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary  
Sir Norman Brook, Foreign Office  
Sir William Hayter, KCMG, Foreign Office  
Sir Patrick Dean, KCMG, Foreign Office  
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador  
Viscount Samuel Hood, Minister, British Embassy  
Mr. Roger Jackling, Head of Chancery  
Mr. Dennis Laskey, Private Secretary/Foreign Secretary  
Mr. Willis Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy  
Mr. F. J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy  
Mr. J. C. A. Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy

Mr. Rountree said that the US delegation had been in close consultation with the UK delegation on the Syrian item in the General Assembly. It was now planned to have ready a resolution calling on the Secretary General to investigate the Syrian-Turkey situation. Mr. Rountree pointed out that the timing of any action at the UN on this problem was extremely delicate and should be worked out in New York. It was most important that the position of the friendly Arab states be taken into account. The US did not wish, by prematurely putting in a resolution to assume the onus of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret.

rejecting King Saud's offer of mediation if it was still valid, but on the other hand the US did not wish to count too heavily on King Saud's mediation offer if the Arabs turned from it and the Syrians should be prepared to put in a resolution unacceptable to us. The issue would probably clarify itself during the session this afternoon, but possibly not in time for the US to table the draft resolution which it had prepared.

Mr. Lloyd said that the Arab delegations had held a meeting last night and all had agreed, with the exception of the Egyptians, that Syria should accept King Saud's offer of mediation. Mr. Rountree said he had heard the same report from an Egyptian journalist who had added that the meeting of the Arab delegations had been adjourned until noon today. Mr. Rountree said we had received word from New York and elsewhere which supports the thesis that attempts of King Saud to mediate had been a blow to the Russian position and a source of embarrassment to the Syrians.

Mr. Lloyd pointed out that there was only one slight difference in tactics between the US and UK positions on the Syrian problem. Of course, the UK and US would prefer King Saud's mediation but they must be ready with an alternative solution. The UK would prefer in the first instance the tabling of a fairly strong resolution from our viewpoint, and then under pressure yield to modifications. In this manner we could eventually accept an investigation by the Secretary General, thereby giving the impression that we had made an important concession.

The Secretary commented that, from many years of experience at the UN, he had felt that it was necessary to have a definite line of action. This would give an opportunity to line up supporters for a specific resolution. It was impossible to maneuver rapidly in the UN since many delegations would feel it necessary to receive instructions before taking a final position. Insofar as the US position was concerned, the Secretary was inclined to give Ambassador Lodge a free hand on tactics employed in New York since the Ambassador's long experience had served him in good stead.

Mr. Lloyd commented that, provided the resolution was not revised or watered down considerably in order to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote, the UK would have no objection to supporting the US resolution as it appeared in the original wording.

The Secretary emphasized the fact that we could not permit the investigating committee to investigate Turkey alone, but that Russia and Bulgaria would also have to be included. He added that we have sensitive installations in Turkey in connection with our NATO commitments, and it would be impossible to permit a committee of neutralists to inspect those installations unless the committee was also permitted to visit military installations in Russia and Bulgaria.

**414. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, October 25, 1957, 2:50-3:45 p.m. <sup>1</sup>**

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Prime Minister Macmillan  
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Secretary Dulles

We discussed the position in the Middle East, particularly Turkey and Syria. I said that I interpreted the extraordinary activities of the Russians in their radio, press conferences, speeches, appeals to Socialist Parties, United Nations activities and the like as being due to a genuine fear on their part that they might be confronted with either backing down or fighting in the Middle East, and that they did not want to fight at the present time. Perhaps in two or three years from now it might be different. I said this offered a tempting opportunity to force upon the Russians a serious loss of prestige. On the other hand, if this did happen it would certainly give the Russians a powerful incentive to attempt elsewhere or hereafter to regain that prestige at our expense and we might have started a cycle of challenge and response which would lead to general war.

Furthermore, the situation was not conducive to military action, although, of course, it might become so as a result of Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian tactics. If Turkey were provoked into war with Syria the Arab neighbors of Syria, whatever their governments really felt, would feel compelled to rally to Syria's support and it would be difficult to see how Turkey could extricate itself without leaving the Arab world united and strongly backed by the Soviet Union against all manifestations of Westernism.

The situation was not like Czechoslovakia where France and Britain were pressing Czechoslovakia to back down and consent to dismemberment, France doing so despite formal treaty obligations with Czechoslovakia. <sup>2</sup>

I said on the other hand I considered it essential to take no action which could be misinterpreted by the Turks as indicating that we had lost our nerve or become frightened by Soviet bluster. The situation in this respect called for the most careful handling.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President's Daily Appointments. Prior to this conversation, Dulles and Macmillan discussed the Turkish-Syrian matter and agreed that it should have serious consideration with the President before Macmillan left Washington. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, October 24; *ibid.*, General Memoranda of Conversation)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Anglo-French dealings with Germany over the status of Czechoslovakia in 1938.

I mentioned in this connection that I learned that it was planned to send our Fleet to the Western Mediterranean and that I had asked that this not be done.

The President and Mr. Macmillan indicated agreement with my diagnosis.

Mr. Lloyd then brought up the question of . . . support the friendly governments of Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. He felt that the latter two in particular ought to be told what military help they could count upon if they felt that they were in trouble and how quickly it could be brought to them.

It was agreed that this would be urgently studied and appropriate assurances given by the two of us wherever we could feasibly act.

Mr. Lloyd brought up the question of economic assistance as in the case of Lebanon apples, Sudan cotton, etc. It was agreed that this would be jointly studied as a matter of urgency.

[Here follows discussion of how the question of China would be handled in the Anglo-American communiqué to be issued later that day.]

JFD

---

**415. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and General Lauris Norstad, Department of State, Washington, October 28, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

General Norstad expressed himself rather critically . . . in relation to maneuvers near the Syrian border and also with respect to the movements in the Western Mediterranean of the Sixth Fleet and air lift to Jordan. He said that this was creating a bad impression with some of our NATO Allies. . . . I said that the matters he referred to related primarily not to NATO but to Middle East problems as to which probably and naturally he was not fully informed. . . . The vast shipment of Soviet arms into Syria and the promiscuous arming of the people created a danger that there might be armed aggression against Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq, where the governments were disposed to be pro-Western. There was already considerable unrest along these borders. If fighting broke out, for

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

example, between Syria and Iraq, Turkey might be involved as a member of the Baghdad Pact. In any event the presence of Turkish forces near the Syrian border would tend to “cool off” Syrian hotheads. Furthermore, Turkey had a legitimate concern that the Soviet Union would not, in effect, establish a second border to the south of Turkey and thus put Turkey within a Soviet pincers.

The air movement of arms to Jordan had been done in that way not because the United States wished to be flamboyant but because that was the way in which the Government of Jordan wanted the arms delivered. The movement of the Sixth Fleet was done for a purpose just as earlier the movement of the Sixth Fleet had encouraged Hussein to withstand subversive movements. A show of strength was needed again. I urged General Norstad not to judge everything just from the standpoint of Western Europe. . . .

I said that this was a time, when the Soviets were trying everywhere to give the impression that they were now the “top dog” and that the United States was intimidated and showing weakness, that we had to show strength. I particularly urged that strength be shown in relation to Berlin.

At this point we were joined by Ambassador Burgess and Mr. Timmons.<sup>2</sup>

JFD

---

<sup>2</sup> After this conversation, Dulles telephoned General Twining at 6:45 p.m. According to the memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, at one point “The Sec said he talked with Norstad and he was upset re the ME—they agreed he does not know what he is talking about. The Sec told him it is a ME problem etc. rather than NATO. . . . He mentioned how the Baghdad Pact might come into the picture. I said Norstad got away before he could see him and he is sorry about it. . . . I thanked him for calling and he will take action. The Sec said it is a scare where 99 times out of 100 nothing happens.” (*Ibid.*, General Telephone Conversations)

416. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Chargé in Syria (Strong) <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 29, 1957.*

DEAR BOB: Thank you for your interesting letter of October 16 <sup>2</sup> giving me your views regarding our relations with Syria. It is very useful for those of us in the Department dealing with this problem to have your carefully considered opinions and to compare them with our own. Since your presentation treats the problem in considerable detail, my comments will follow your points in the order presented.

I think that all of us here agree with your basic assumptions. A "hard line" toward Syria has not brought about the desired change in the internal situation there. . . . We do believe, however, that the "hard line" was initially the correct one both as a necessary response to Syrian charges against personnel of the Embassy in Damascus and to alert the world, including the other Arab states, to the extent of Soviet penetration of the Syrian Government and Army. Although our Arab friends have not found the courage to stand up and confirm their concern, the pro-Soviet trend in Syria has been highlighted in such a way that Syria has been placed on the defensive vis-à-vis her Arab neighbors, and in world opinion. We believe this development may have been helpful in inhibiting pro-Soviet elements in Syria from consolidating the advantage they acquired in August when moderate elements were removed from the Syrian Army.

The disadvantages of . . . continuing a "hard line" toward Syria led us in recent weeks to work toward decreasing tensions in the area and encouraging the initiative of King Saud and other moderate Arabs.

Regarding pronouncements by U.S. officials, we are aware of possible adverse reaction in the area to overt hostility toward Syria. On the other hand, we must meet threats by the Soviet Union with firmness whatever the reaction of the Syrian Government or press may be. However, you have probably noticed that lately we have concentrated our fire in public statements on the Russian role in the Near East and have refrained from public comment on the Syrian regime. Of course, we must face the fact that through a controlled

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 59 D 38, Syria—Correspondence Damascus. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Waggoner on October 28.

<sup>2</sup> Document 405.



press and radio Syria is able to distort statements, whatever their content, to its own advantage.

The Turks have a genuine, and I think reasonable, fear of the implications for their security of the build-up of Soviet presence in Syria. That they should move their forces within their territory as a result is understandable. I agree, however, that such a course has important disadvantages and I believe that the Turks will place less emphasis on troop movements in the future.

I agree with your statement that "The best we can hope for from Syria for a long time would be genuine neutrality". I would add that we must also live with the fact that the Syrian Army will be equipped with Soviet bloc arms for the foreseeable future. I should like to expand your proposition, however, to include the following negative, but I believe important, objective: the hope that the Syro-Soviet relationship may prove disadvantageous to Syria as compared to the relationship of Syria's Arab neighbors with the West. In other words, a Soviet-oriented Syria should not be allowed to serve as a successful example of the benefits of "positive neutralism" which is really "pro-Sovietism". We should, I believe, use every effective means at our disposal to achieve the above objective.

Your suggested tactics (page 2, para. 3) for the most part are in accord with those developed in the Department. I shall, therefore, comment only on those to which we take some exception as to substance or timing.

1. We do not now favor an unrestricted economic policy toward Syria as we believe the present regime would thereby be strengthened. We do, however, intend to keep our policies continuously under review so that unrealistic or unproductive restrictions are not perpetuated.

2. As tensions ease we should expect travel to Syria to become more normal. At the present time, as you know, there is no prohibition on such travel.

3. We realize that publicity concerning the acquisition of Soviet arms by Syria provokes varying reactions in the Middle East. Although we can exercise caution in official statements in that regard, we cannot expect that the subject will be entirely ignored.

4. Any initiative by the United States to assist Syrian economic development ambitions could, we believe, at this time have unfortunate repercussions in the Middle East, without affecting substantially Syria's pro-Soviet orientation. We have constantly in mind the position of our friends in the area. We feel that with good reason they would be dismayed by any steps on our part which would seem to indicate acceptance by us of present Syrian policies. We do not wish to contribute to the stabilization of the Syrian regime unless there are solid grounds for belief that such a contribution would cause Syria to make a significant move toward real neutrality rather than merely to strengthen the appeal of pro-Soviet "positive neutrality". The time may yet come when antagonism toward the

Syrian Communists and dissatisfaction with Syrian dependence on the USSR might be exploited in the ranks of Arab nationalists and socialists by an offer of assistance from the United States that would seriously undermine the Soviet position in Syria. At the moment, however, development assistance to Syria would, we think, do much more harm than good in terms of our area relations.

5. Reinstitution of cultural exchanges (which have never been extensive on an official level) would constitute a gesture rather than a significant step to influence Syrian cultural orientation. We would, therefore, consider taking such a step only when some such gesture might be expected to produce a small but useful advantage.

In spite of the above reservations, I believe it is apparent that we agree on basic assumptions and that our ideas on tactics diverge primarily on the question of timing. For the immediate future of our relations with Syria we hope to achieve a degree of *dégagement* that will permit the moderating influences of Saud and others to be most effective. Our official relations with Syria should continue to be correct but no more. We intend that the size of the staff in Damascus should for the time being be kept at the present level. There is no objection to the development of personal relations between members of the staff and Syrian Government and Army officers on as friendly a basis as the Syrians make possible. We should, of course, remain firm in asserting our rights and diplomatic privileges.

A period of *dégagement* would, we hope, provide an opportunity for the traditional elements of instability to undermine the cohesion of the Syrian Government and Army coalitions. Furthermore, with time, the natural advantages to Syria of maintaining satisfactory relations with the West might become more apparent to the Syrian Government. Piecemeal offers to the present Syrian Government that do not effectively compete with support given Syria by the Soviet Union should, we believe, be avoided. Rather, Syria should be brought to realize the value of those elements of economic and political support that can only be found in the West.

As far as Israel is concerned, we believe that Tel Aviv is aware that its own interests require non-involvement in the Syrian issue at this stage.

I want to tell you again how much we here have appreciated the fine performance of the Embassy in Damascus under your direction, during an exceedingly difficult period in our relations with Syria.

Sincerely yours,

William M. Rountree <sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

417. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Howe) <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 29, 1957.*

Today's GA meeting on Syria was adjourned at the lunch hour. The GA will reconvene Wednesday morning to continue.

The estimates today are somewhat less optimistic than last night on the termination of the debate. It seems that Fawzi is working very hard on the Syrians not to submit the resolution for an investigating commission but, on the other hand, to accept the proposed offer by the Secretary General. This is borne out by the circumstantial evidence of the Syrians having scratched themselves from the speakers list when they had expected to put forward their resolution. Although the Syrians had spoken earlier this morning, they had re-inscribed themselves for a later intervention.

Fawzi had been in consultation with the Secretary General who is reported to be redrafting the statement that he would make at the appropriate time. <sup>2</sup> We have not yet seen the text. The indications are that the minimum that the Egyptians would settle for, and we have to assume this represents the position of some other Arabs as well, is the constitutional intervention in the affair by the Secretary General with, of course, Syrian consent.

The Soviet speech this morning is regarded by our people in New York as a pro forma rebuttal, without much punch and has had no visible effect on attitudes.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10-2957.

<sup>2</sup> A report on Hammarskjöld's talks with Fawzi and Gromyko, based on information received from the Secretary-General, was transmitted to the Department of State in Delga 296 from USUN, October 28. (*Ibid.*, 682.83/10-2857)

**418. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 31, 1957—7 p.m.*

Delga 331. Re Syrian item. After numerous rumors and meetings today, following seems to be fairly firm outline of how Syrian matter will be resolved and how it came about:

Egyptians asked Engen (Norway) to speak to Syrians, with Loutfi present, this afternoon. Previously, Engen had told Fawzi that time was "over-ripe" for coming to conclusion of this matter. In response to Fawzi's question, he said preferable outcome would still be to have neither side press its resolution to vote<sup>2</sup> and perhaps conclude with statement by SYG. Fazwi said he thought he could convince Syrians of advisability of doing this. When Engen saw Egyptians and Syrians, he made clear to them what he had said to Loutfi. Bitar suggested that a disinterested third party (Indonesia has agreed) should take floor tomorrow and state that under circumstances it would be desirable for neither resolution to be pressed to vote. Then Bitar would take floor and concur for his part, followed by Engen on behalf of seven powers who would do same. That would conclude consideration of item without any closing statement by Hammarskjold.

After reporting above, Engen returned to Bitar to inform him seven powers would agree. It was agreed this was triumph for Western point of view which had been made possible by courage and steadfastness with which we had pursued our course. However, likewise agreed that it desirable to restrain any elation over this in order make it as easy as possible for Syrians to cave.

Subsequently, Engen reported he had confirmed above arrangement with Bitar, only change being that he would speak first on behalf seven powers saying that seven powers were agreeable to not pressing to vote provided Syria did same.

We are informing other co-sponsors of this development and are avoiding display of elation. However, Zeineddine has been talking to many delegations informing them of arrangement, adding that of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10-3157. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> On October 30, Syria introduced a draft resolution providing for the establishment of a seven-member commission to investigate the Syrian-Turkish frontier area and make a preliminary report within 2 weeks. (U.N. doc. A/L.226) Japan then submitted a seven-power resolution which noted that efforts to settle the dispute peacefully (as defined by Article 33 of the Charter) were being made and expressed confidence that the Secretary-General would be available to the parties and could proceed, if necessary, to the countries concerned. (U.N. doc. A/L.227)

course Assembly still remains seized of item. This latter phrase appears to be Syria's way of justifying its capitulation.<sup>3</sup>

**Lodge**

---

<sup>3</sup> The proceedings of the 714th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on November 1 followed substantially the path projected in Delga 331. Both the seven powers and Syria agreed to withdraw their resolutions, Syria with the proviso that the item be kept under consideration and with the admonition that Turkey cooperate in reducing tension. A summary of the proceedings on November 1 was transmitted by Walmsley to Howe in a memorandum of that date; not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/11–157)

---

**419. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, November 7, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

US-Syrian Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Salah El-Bitar, Foreign Minister of Syria  
Dr. George Tomeh, Syrian Consul-General in New York  
Mr. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Rountree called on the Syrian Foreign Minister in his suite at the Savoy-Plaza Hotel before his return to Damascus, and opened the conversation by saying that he was glad to have this opportunity for a private talk. He referred to the present unhappy state of US-Syrian relations and said he felt that it would perhaps be profitable to discuss the situation as he would like the Minister's views as to the possibilities for improvement in the relations between our two countries. Mr. Rountree said that he had concerned himself for over 15 years with the general area of the Middle East and that it was a source of real personal regret to him that Syria and the US should not be on good terms with each other. The Foreign Minister echoed Mr. Rountree's general sentiments, stating that he was pleased to have this opportunity of making Mr. Rountree's acquaintance, and that he also felt that a conversation such as Mr. Rountree had suggested was useful.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83/11-757. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.

Mr. Rountree referred specifically to some of the recent activities by the Syrian Government directed against the US Embassy in Damascus, which began with the arrest on August 12th of a US diplomatic courier at the Syrian frontier. He said that this was only the start of a long series of harassments and persecutions of US and local employees of the Embassy. He mentioned a number of specific incidents, protests of which had been made by our Embassy in Damascus to the Syrian Government. Such conduct, he said, seemed to be the result of a deliberate plan, and was obviously incompatible with the maintenance of normal and friendly relations between two countries. He asked whether the Foreign Minister could tell him what motivated such actions. It looked to some as though the Syrian Government was trying to find a way to drive US representation out of Syria. Was this the case? Such actions might be the work of elements which were seeking deliberately to drive a wedge between the two countries. The nature of some of the actions suggested that they might have been planned by the military, specifically G-2, rather than civil authorities. Mr. Rountree said he would be very much interested in the Foreign Minister's views.

The Foreign Minister did not attempt to question the incidents mentioned by Mr. Rountree. He said he was already aware of these and that he could say they had not been planned by the Syrian Government. He said that of course the present situation in Syria was one which led to tensions of all kinds. For example: When Syrians crossed the Turkish frontier by train it often happened that they were insulted and reviled by Turkish border guards. It also happened sometimes that when Iraqi nationals came over into Syria they were taken to task by Syrian officials and upbraided for being members of an aggressive pact. He wished to assure Mr. Rountree that the incidents which had occurred were due to "excessive zeal" on the part of individuals and were disavowed by the Syrian Government. He said that he himself had studied some of these cases and that on his return he would look into these matters personally.

Mr. Rountree said that he was pleased that the Minister would go into the matter. He then turned to the subject of US foreign policy in the Middle East, and the Eisenhower Doctrine. He said that both were widely misunderstood because they were misinterpreted by unfriendly elements. This was clear from all kinds of statements which had been made in public, and which not only distorted US foreign policy but accused the US of false activities and objectives. He said he had followed the Syrian press which was filled with wild accusations against the US and the West on every subject, while praising everything to do with the Soviet Union. He deplored this

state of affairs and felt it did great harm to US-Syrian relations, as well as Syria's relations with the non-Communist world generally.

Mr. Rountree then spoke at some length, setting forth the fundamental principles and objectives of US policy in the Middle East in relation to:

- (1) The freedom and independence of the Arab States;
- (2) Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity;
- (3) The issue of colonialism;
- (4) Israel; and
- (5) Relations between the Middle East and the USSR (including neutralism).

The Foreign Minister then gave his version of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the reasons why, he said, Syria felt both that it was an unsatisfactory approach to the problems of the Middle East and that it was directed against Syria and the independence of the Arab countries. He recalled that Ambassador Moose had come to see him late in 1956 and had outlined to him six major principles underlying US foreign policy in that area. The Foreign Minister had told Mr. Moose that he considered the principles were fine but had suggested that they not be made public unilaterally by the US. However, shortly afterward, the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine had been published. It seemed to the Syrian Government that it had been a mistake on the part of the US not to have consulted with the Arab countries before formulating the Eisenhower Doctrine. If this had been done, perhaps the US might have received some useful counsel and suggestions, and US foreign policy might have been more effective subsequently. He wondered whether the aim of the Eisenhower Doctrine really was, as Mr. Rountree had said, to help the Arab States maintain their freedom and independence. He thought that its aim seemed to be to divide Arab countries among themselves, and to set some against the others, instead of bringing unity and support to the Arab world. He felt that the US was making a big mistake in depending on certain governments in the Middle East, while alienating the populations of the Arab countries. There were some governments, he said, which did not represent at all the feelings of the people, as was evidenced by the difficulties in which they found themselves. He referred to political difficulties in Lebanon. He said that the prisons in Iraq and Jordan were full of political prisoners which showed that these governments were unpopular. He said that in the case of Jordan, it was US action which had been responsible for the overthrow of a socially-minded, progressive, government and the installation of a new government against the will of the people. On the other hand, the Syrian Government had distributed arms to its people in a moment of national danger and this showed that the Government was not afraid of the people, but,

on the contrary, was supported by the people. He said that the Eisenhower Doctrine purported to protect Arab countries against military aggression. This was well and good, and certainly any Arab country would gladly receive help should it be the victim of aggression. But why, he asked, was International Communism the only source of aggression mentioned? Aggression could come from other quarters. Moreover, the Eisenhower Doctrine went further than this and claimed to be an effective instrument against indirect aggression or subversion. The Foreign Minister said that the Syrian Government had carefully read and studied the Senate Hearings at the time of the passage of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and had noted that, in answer to a question on this point by Senator Fulbright, Mr. Dulles had replied that the US would make use of other means to force out governments which were not pleasing to the US. The Syrian Government, he said, was neither systematically hostile to the US, nor was it Communist, but it could not tolerate intervention and threats as implied under the Eisenhower Doctrine. This Doctrine might be good for old-established democracies, but it was quite another matter trying to apply it to the Arab States. It was for these reasons, he concluded, that Syria regretted that the US had not consulted with the Arab countries before launching the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Mr. Rountree said he had already observed earlier in the conversation that US foreign policy and the Eisenhower Doctrine were widely misunderstood, largely because they had been misinterpreted by Communist propaganda which was given wide distribution in Syria. He could now only comment that His Excellency's remarks on these subjects perfectly illustrated the truth of his earlier observation. He said he felt it was most important that the true character of the role and the intentions of the US should be known in the Middle East, and that this could not be expected to happen so long as wild and vicious campaigns of distortions and accusations were systematically waged against us.

Towards the end of the conversation the Foreign Minister said that the US should make an effort to move closer to Syria and to Egypt and to pay less attention to the voices of certain Arabs who might not be good friends. He made two specific suggestions: (1) That there should be visits to Damascus by well-informed and responsible Americans who are qualified to explain and discuss US foreign policy with representative Syrians; (2) that instead of constantly placing so much emphasis on the problem of Israel, the US should approach the issue of relations with the Arab countries on its own merits. Mr. Rountree did not comment on the suggestion regarding visits by Americans to Syria, but referred to the fact that the US [and Syria?] at present had no ambassadors at our respective capitals. What did the Minister feel about the present situation with



regard to diplomatic relations? The Foreign Minister immediately replied that the Syrian Government would like to normalize diplomatic relations with the US and that he thought it would be a helpful move in connection with any effort to restore better relations between the two countries. With regard to point (2) made by the Minister, Mr. Rountree observed that he would like to see a situation develop in which US-Arab discussions would place [less?] emphasis on the Arab-Israel problem, but that, in his experience, the question of Israel was nearly always brought up by the Arab States in discussions with the US, which was told by most Arabs that little progress could be made because of it.

The Foreign Minister returned to the subject of the Eisenhower Doctrine and claimed that President Eisenhower, after Mr. Henderson's return to the US on September 9th, and Secretary Dulles in his UNGA speech on September 19th, had both called on the Syrian people to overthrow their Government, and that this was the kind of thing which did not improve the feelings of Syria toward the USA. Mr. Rountree forcefully refuted this accusation and said that neither the President nor the Secretary had said any such thing. He suggested that this was yet another example of the misunderstanding and misinterpretation to which he had already referred.

The conversation ended with renewed assurance by the Foreign Minister that the Syrian Government would like to normalize the diplomatic situation with the US, and was disposed to seek to find ways and means of improving relations.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>The United States and Syria held additional conversations concerning the normalization of diplomatic representation. For documentation, see *ibid.*, 611.83.

---

#### 420. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Cairo, December 11, 1957—4 p.m.*

1426. [Name deleted] came to see me this morning to say he had been commissioned by Nasser deliver very urgent and serious message. According [name deleted], Nasser had investigated recent information we had given him relative to the communist connections

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/12-1157. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Noform. Received at 10:54 a.m. Repeated to Damascus.

of Bizri and is now convinced Bizri a communist and that something must be done about it. Nasser believes responsibility is Egypt's and that Egypt should tackle it with courage and vigor, and should be able achieve effective results. He asks of us only that we keep hands off Syria for a maximum period of three months and particularly that we do nothing which could have unintentional effect of making heroes out of Bizri, Bakdash and Khalid Al Azm. (In this connection, [name deleted] asked that we not attack this group through VOA, statements of public officials, or the like, on ground this would strengthen rather than weaken them internally.) [Name deleted] said Nasser also wanted knowledge of Egypt's intentions held to absolute minimum and said on Egyptian side only Nasser, Amer and himself presently cut in, making special point that Fawzi and Ahmad Hussein have not been informed (although he later said Hussein might be told prior his departure for Washington). He asked that we maintain absolute secrecy and that we not inform any foreign government placing particular emphasis on danger advising Baghdad Pact powers (especially Turkey) which might use knowledge for own purposes.

Speaking for self, [name deleted] said several ways of attacking Syrian problem. For example, Turkey might intervene, but only by making war. US might overthrow Bizri, but only at cost being branded imperialist throughout Afro-Asian area. Only country with capability succeed, and which can do so with minimal repercussions is Egypt. Of countries primarily concerned with Syrian situation, US and Egypt have greatest interest in ensuring that country a stable, anti-communist government. Their cooperation therefore necessary.

On departing, he stressed urgency and asked whether reply might be expected within week's time. I answered this might be difficult view Secretary's attendance at NATO parley, but that I would request early reply.

*Comment:* Any approach this type naturally arouses question its bona fides. Egyptians could merely be attempting buy time for motives unknown to us. Proposal, however, fits in with what appears be present Egyptian tactics as reported in recent Embassy telegrams from Damascus, i.e., support of ASRP against Azm and Communists and exertion of influence on GOS to calm situation. It also appears to be a particular application of general statements

made to me by Ali Sabry and reported in Embtel 1424.<sup>2</sup> It is possible, therefore, that Egypt, though largely responsible for present chaos in Syria, may now be prepared exert serious effort to pull situation out of fire.

Hare

---

<sup>2</sup>In telegram 1424 from Cairo, December 11, Hare reported that during a conversation on December 10, Ali al-Sabri noted that the main difference between the United States and Egypt was their attitude toward nationalism. Egypt felt that nationalism among the masses was a driving force which would prevail, whereas the United States elected to deal with governments which Egypt believed were out of touch with basic reality, such as Lebanon, Jordan, and "even Saudi Arabia." Regarding the U.S. fear that nationalism might be diverted to the left, Sabri maintained that Egypt would be even more concerned about such a prospect than the United States since Egypt had to live in the area and could not escape the consequences. (*Ibid.*, 674.00/12–1157)

---

#### 421. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 12, 1957—5:36 p.m.*

1600. Embtel 1426.<sup>2</sup> We agree bona fides this matter open to question but view reports from Syria, such as Damascus 1628 repeated Cairo 201,<sup>3</sup> we believe affirmative response should be given. . . . we would welcome action designed impede Communist penetration Syria, which we have for some time believed poses grave threat security of Syria and entire ME. While we obviously cannot bind ourselves not to take action re Syria in next three months . . . we wish avoid impeding any Egyptian efforts to bring about change and in particular appreciate considerations re Bizri, Bakdash and Azm which [name deleted] has set forth. We agree to keep information [name deleted] has given us in tightest secrecy.

FYI—We have decided it is in our best interests seek agrément for new Ambassador to Syria, which not yet granted. This does not

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/12–1157. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Damascus.

<sup>2</sup>*Supra.*

<sup>3</sup>In telegram 1628 from Damascus, December 10, Strong conveyed a report received from a "well-informed Arab source" that, according to Prime Minister Asali, Azm was working with the Soviet Union and Syrian Communists. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/12-1057)

reflect any change our appraisal dangerous situation in Syria but rather believe we will be in better position exert influence there if represented at top level. Prior to announcement we will send circular containing points you may convey to GOE concerning this move. While latter may be considered in area as build up for GOS and thus for Bizri, Bakdash and Azm, we believe it is not type of action which [name deleted] cautions against. Please comment. End FYI. <sup>4</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to the text of the draft resolution transmitted to USUN in Gadel 57 on October 21; see footnote 6, Document 410.

# YEMEN

## UNITED STATES INTEREST IN YEMEN <sup>1</sup>

### 422. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State <sup>2</sup>

*Jidda, October 31, 1955—5 p.m.*

201. Following reports highlights my Yemen visit October 25–29.

Imam, Crown Prince <sup>3</sup> and Hasan Ibrahim (Yemen Minister to London, now acting as chief Royal Counselor for Foreign Affairs) spoke with me at length and with unprecedented frankness of country's political and economic problems.

Imam had obviously decided, following extensive negotiations with Gabler-Awalt Party, grant exclusive mineral concession covering entire country to newly formed Yemen Development Corporation. <sup>4</sup> It followed, if I read his mind correctly, that he should be able look to US Government for helpful cooperation in broader political and economic fields as well, notably in seeking basis for conciliation Yemen-British relations which had now reached impasse.

I could sense in their attitudes atmosphere of high dramatic decision. Yemen for first time would frankly open door to foreigners, as Saudi Arabia had done in signing Aramco concession twenty years ago. Development program based on known agricultural resources and assumed great mineral wealth could not fail, especially if undertaken with American financial and related technical assistance.

Crown Prince in particular listened intently my exposition US policy aims and effort contribute towards area stability and progress.

---

<sup>1</sup> For previous documentation on U.S. interest in Yemen, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IX, Part 2, pp. 2617 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123 Wadsworth, George. Secret. Repeated to London and Cairo; the Embassy asked that the telegram be pouched to Aden and other posts as the Department desired.

<sup>3</sup> Muhammed al-Badr.

<sup>4</sup> On November 2, the consulate in Aden informed the Department that the Imam had authorized and approved the signing of a minerals and petroleum concession with an American-owned company, the Yemen Development Corporation. (Telegram 26 from Aden; *ibid.*, 846C.2553/11–255)

I tend share Abu Tuleb's view modernization program must center on his person.

As first steps he hopes undertake projects already approved by UNTA experts (Hodeida Port, Sanaa electricity and triangular Hodeida-Sanaa-Taiz road) but readily seized concept concurrent need for economic-financial survey (as in Iraq) as basis long-term development program. He has charged Gabler with preparing project for privately financed cement plant.

Special political questions discussed were Yemen-British relations, raised by Imam, and Soviet overtures raised by me as directed Deptel 198, October 21.<sup>5</sup>

On former Imam was bitterly expostulatory. My audience, he apologized, had been delayed half hour so he might personally hear British Government's answer to his latest proposal that they cooperate in establishing peaceful conditions as prelude to discussion outstanding differences. British military action against southern (protectorate) tribesmen had been "barbarous"; he could not ignore their suffering, for they had always looked to Imam as spiritual leader and for succor. British answer had been "spurning of hand he had extended".

Hasan Ibrahim later explained reply had ignored Imam's offer and "stiffly" asserted Britain had no intention intervene in Yemen affairs and would expect Imam refrain from intervention in those of Aden protectorate. He added that he himself had received similar rebuff from Macmillan last August: Britain could and would itself maintain order in territories under its protection.

(*Note:* This would seem another example of "pattern of toughness" in British handling of south Arabian affairs, latest other examples being occupation of Buraimi October 26 and RAF "buzzing" October 28 and 29 of Aramco gravity meter camps in southwestern region of Saudi Arabia-Abu Dhabi "disputed area."<sup>6</sup> Details of latter will be given Department by Duce of Aramco.)

Re Soviet overtures, Imam forcefully reaffirmed opposition communism but with equal force stressed Israeli threat to Arabs. I was however able elicit later from Hasan Ibrahim and Crown Prince reasonable assurance that affirmative action was unlikely on current

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>6</sup> For information on U.S. interest in the Buraimi affair, see Documents 164 ff.

Soviet proposal<sup>7</sup> for exchange diplomatic missions. Details by pouch.<sup>8</sup>

**Wadsworth**

---

<sup>7</sup> On November 1, the Embassy in Cairo reported that Yemen and the Soviet Union had concluded a Treaty of Friendship on October 31. (Telegram 859; Department of State, Central Files, 661.86H/11-155) On November 2 the Embassy in Cairo forwarded the text of the new accord. (Despatch 490; *ibid.*, 661.86H/11-255) The Embassy in Jidda reported, in part, on November 4: "Our impression is that simultaneous signing October 31 of Yemen-Soviet Treaty and Yemen development corporation concession is further example hardening Arab trend towards policy of neutralism as between East and West and endeavor profit from both. We still believe Yemen unlikely accept diplomatic mission from Moscow." (Telegram 205; *ibid.*, 661.86H/11-455)

<sup>8</sup> On January 16, 1956, the Embassy in Jidda transmitted the record of Wadsworth's visit to Yemen in despatch 95; *ibid.*, 123-Wadsworth, George.

---

**423. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 26, 1956—1:16 p.m.*

490. Information . . . concerning increasingly frequent contact between high-level Yemeni representatives in Cairo and Soviet agents there, coupled with known proliferating arms sales by USSR to Near Eastern countries, is causing Department considerable concern over real possibility that Yemeni-Soviet trade agreement signed on March 8 may well be a prelude to Yemeni purchases of arms from Soviet bloc. Department believes that King Saud also would have reason to be gravely concerned if Yemen were to add itself to procession of countries closely neighboring on Saudi Arabia that have permitted themselves thus to fall under real threat of Communist penetration and direction. Train of events started by Nasser of Egypt would, in event substantial arms purchases by Yemen, reach a stage that would offer a tangible threat to balanced and peaceful relations that have subsisted between Saudi Kingdom and Yemen.

USG has been impressed by exemplary bearing of King Saud in face of ostensibly luring offers of Communist arms and by his informed comprehension of implications of these offers not only to Saudi Arabia but also to other nations surrounding his country.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 461.86H41/3-2656. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Rountree.

Department therefore believes you should in absence countervailing considerations, bring such of above thoughts and considerations as you may think appropriate to Saud's attention at your earliest possible convenience. You may intimate to King that he may wish in interests of brotherly relations that exist between him and Imam to advise Imam against thus mortgaging his country's resources to Communists and exposing his country to manifold dangers of Communist influence. You may also wish request from King benefit his wise and experienced counsel in advising us how such a Soviet thrust might best be frustrated.

Dulles

---

424. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 29, 1956—7:18 p.m.*

2354. Embassy requested convey following message Abu Taleb for Imam from USG.<sup>2</sup>

We have received from representatives Your Majesty's Government and US representatives in area expressions concern over apparent delays in commencement operations US company in Yemen.

We have passed to company Your Majesty's desire that activities be started at early date and are now informed by company that President Gabler on way to Yemen and expects visit your officials and arrange early commencement activities. We hope activity within next few months will write further chapter in history cordial relations between our two Governments. Similarly we are pleased that US airline, through Saudi Arabian Airlines, is now able assist you in your operations.

Department has noted Your Majesty's remarks to Ambassador last October on threat posed to Yemen and all Arab world by

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886H.2553/3-2956. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Allen. Repeated to Jidda and Aden.

<sup>2</sup> On March 28, in a memorandum to Allen referring to the problem of possible Soviet arms shipments to Yemen, Wilkins suggested that the United States send a message to the Government of Yemen through the Yemeni Ambassador in Cairo, Abd al-Rahwan Abu Taleb. Wilkins also recommended that the Department might mention "generally" to George E. Allen, Chairman of the Board of the Yemen Development Corporation, the "critical state of our relations with the Yemen and the importance of early action on the part of his company." (*Ibid.*, 786H.56/3-2856)



Communist imperialism. Department likewise aware problems which exist between Yemen and United Kingdom and has, in recent talks with British, emphasized desirability peaceful settlement all existing disputes in Arabian Peninsula.<sup>3</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup>On March 31, the Embassy in Cairo informed the Department that it had conveyed the message to Abu Taleb and Mohamed Ibn Abdulla al-Amri. (Telegram 1958; *ibid.*, 886H.2553/3-3156.

---

**425. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 2, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Soviet Bloc and Egyptian Activities in Yemen

*Discussion:*

A. At our request DRN prepared the attached study on Soviet Bloc arms shipments to the Yemen.<sup>2</sup> On the basis of this and of other reports we note the following concerning the present situation with respect to Yemen:

1. There has been at least one major shipment of Soviet arms to the Yemen, accompanied by some Soviet Bloc technicians. There are unsubstantiated reports that this shipment included planes.

2. Minerals concessions to Western powers have been matched by Soviet trade deals of unknown extent. Some of these may have been masks for the arms deals.

3. In approaching the Soviet Bloc, Yemen appears to have been stimulated by:

(a) The desire to increase ability to raid the Aden Protectorate. The lack of a Yemen Air Force would appear to preclude any major Yemeni offensive against the Protectorate.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.56/1-257. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Wilkins.

<sup>2</sup> The study, entitled "Soviet Bloc Arms to the Yemen," dated December 4, 1956, is *ibid.*, 786H.56/12-456.

(b) Flattery of Yemen by the Soviet Union and Egypt who give the impression that they consider Yemen a major Arab power.

(c) The desire to gain from both sides in the East-West conflict.

4. Egypt has assisted by training Yemeni officers in the use of Soviet arms. Yemen has accepted this assistance despite earlier Egyptian support of an anti-Imam movement.

5. In assisting the Yemen, both the Soviet Bloc and Egypt might have in mind ultimate control of the mouth of the Red Sea. AF has reports of increased cultural propaganda and economic activities by the Soviet Bloc and Egypt in Ethiopia, Somaliland and Eritrea.

6. Saudi Arabia has granted loans to the Yemen which may have been used to purchase Soviet arms. Despite King Saud's anti-Communist policy, we have no evidence that he is concerned about current developments in the Yemen, which he tends to see in an Arab context.

7. The Yemen is the only place in the Arabian Peninsula where the Soviet Bloc has made successful inroads. While Egypt has been active in the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, her activity has not been matched by active Soviet interest.

8. The United States Government has not in recent months made any active efforts to increase its influence in Yemen. Both Ambassador Wadsworth and the Consul in Aden have been busy with problems in their respective primary areas and have not visited the Yemen with any frequency. Although the establishment of a U.S. diplomatic mission in the Yemen has been considered at various times, the need has not been considered sufficiently great to justify the expense involved. A U.S. mission would also be faced with the problem of extraordinary restrictions on its operation. A foreign flag, for example, cannot be flown in the Yemen and there would be serious problems of staffing and supply.

9. The Yemen has made no request to the United States for grant assistance. An application to the Eximbank for a loan by Yemen is pending further information on the Yemeni economy, but the Bank is not optimistic that Yemen's economic position can support a loan. Point Four assistance to Yemen was considered within the U.S. Government last year and disapproved.

10. The major private U.S. company in Yemen, the Yemen Development Corporation, does not presently consider that further mineral exploration on its part is justified by commercial possibilities.

B. It seems to us that recent movements by the Soviet Bloc in the Middle East, and especially in the Yemen at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, make it imperative that we obtain up-to-date information as soon as possible. We also need additional information regarding Saudi-Arab and Egyptian activities in the Yemen. It would also be useful to know from American officials how the American-owned Yemen Development Corporation and the other companies are faring in that country. Unfortunately, neither Ambassador Wadsworth, who is resident in Jidda, nor Consul Lake-

land, who is resident in Aden, nor their staffs have had an opportunity, because of the rapid pace of recent developments, to spend any time in Yemen. Because of these factors, it is believed that we should take early steps, either through increasing the staff of the American Embassy in Jidda or the American Consulate in Aden, to provide personnel to cover Yemen exclusively. One officer and possibly one clerk-stenographer at either post would be adequate.

C. There appear to be a number of steps which we could take immediately:

1. Assignment of one additional officer and, if necessary, one clerk-stenographer to Jidda or Aden. Further consideration within Department of approach to Government of Yemen on economic assistance through Point Four or a long-term development loan for a specific project in Yemen.

2. Consideration within Department of approach to Government of Yemen on military assistance through an offer of a Section 106 reimbursable aid agreement with Yemen.

3. Summarize factual information re Soviet arms in Yemen and make summary available to King Saud.

4. Informally discuss the Yemen situation with British representatives in Washington and counsel the desirability of an early British-Yemeni agreement regarding the border with the Aden Protectorate.<sup>3</sup>

*Recommendation:*

That you approve foregoing steps.

---

<sup>3</sup> The memorandum bears no indication of approval or disapproval.

On January 11, the Department informed the Embassies in Jidda and Cairo and the consulate in Aden that, among other things, the situation on the Yemen-Aden border was receiving "increasing stress" in Soviet bloc and "Egyptian-directed" propaganda and that there were indications that this might represent a "coordinated Soviet-Egyptian bloc policy seriously to undermine British position in Aden area." (Telegram 496 to Jidda; *ibid.*, 646C.86H/1-1157)

---

## 426. Editorial Note

At the 309th meeting of the National Security Council on January 11, with President Eisenhower presiding, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Yemen in the course of an oral briefing for the Council on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles stated that it was difficult to get hard information on what is really happening in Yemen. However, he was inclined to think that the Yemeni have occupied certain areas along the under-marked border with Aden. The British problem was, therefore, how to get them out. Mr. Dulles said that he could not see any reason why the British would themselves wish to penetrate into Yemen at this particular time. He predicted further difficulties in this area, but pointed out that the British have adequate forces in the Aden area to control any situation likely to develop." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

At the 312th meeting of the Council on February 7, with the President presiding, Dulles again commented on developments in Yemen in the course of his briefing. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion reads as follows:

"Mr. Allen Dulles stated that the situation in Yemen had heated up considerably in the two weeks' interval since he had last discussed it at a Council meeting. In these circumstances, it was very strange that the British had removed a battalion of their troops from Yemen and sent them back home. This leaves a rather small British force in Yemen, approximating about 1300 men. This was all that the British had to defend both the Aden colony and the Aden protectorate. The situation was quite 'worrisome', particularly in view of the fact that arms for Yemen are on their way from the USSR." (*Ibid.*)

---

#### 427. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Addis Ababa, April 15, 1957—4 p.m.*

745. From Richards. Flew Sana April 12 to visit Crown Prince-Foreign Minister Badr. Dinner at palace with Crown Prince, Ministers Interior, Finance, and Justice and conversation following dinner. Recurrent theme Crown Prince's conversation was British "aggression" against Yemen and necessity small country seek aid from any source in this struggle against "imperialistic" enemy.

Following dinner explained purpose my mission. Crown Prince expressed thanks to President Eisenhower and mission. Asked permission make frank comments. Complained US has stood too far

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-1557. Secret. Repeated to London and Jidda and pouched to Aden. For additional information on the Richards mission, see Documents 276 ff.

from Yemen. Yemen has witnessed US help other Arab countries but has received none itself. Hopes this visit will be beginning new relationship. Stressed Yemen's need for aid greater than that of any other Arab country. Places much hope in US but desires clarify certain matters and wants his views conveyed to President and US Government.

Yemen holds no basic enmity for UK but must oppose UK aggression. British describe situation as being merely tribal warfare. Whatever description must remember men, women and children being killed. Yemen wishes be friends with UK but friendship must be based on equality. Yemen does not desire expand and wishes live in peace with British.

Yemen will never turn to Communism because of its religion. "When I went to Russia I told them I had come in answer to their invitation and to renew an old friendship but could not adopt their principles". Yemen must do everything possible gain support for its cause, gain votes in UN and avoid Russian veto. Because of action it has taken, Yemen at least assured that Russia will be neutral. Wishes assure US that no military pact exists with USSR. Have enough problems on borders and certainly not going to complicate issue by permitting Communists create disturbances internally. "We are anti-Communist".

Endeavoring build up military forces for protection. (I took this as indirect explanation and excuse for purchases Soviet bloc arms.)

Regarding American-owned Yemen Development Company, concession has been granted to explore for oil but no action yet taken by company. This should not be considered complaint but hope mission will urge company to do something productive. I replied Yemen Development Company private company. Must realize proper surveying takes time. Prince asked if reason for delay has been his visit to "other countries". I assured him such was not the case. Prince replied he merely being frank and had raised question only because Gabler (Vice President Yemen Development Company) had arrived in Yemen with mission. He hoped mission "could give him push". I assured him I would give Gabler push but that Gabler's presence had nothing to do with mission visit. Prince stated fact he was trying persuade me push an American company, i.e., Yemen Development Company, was proof he was not "Red Prince" British newspapers have called him.

Conversations extremely friendly throughout. Prince showed himself intelligent and possessed of good sense humor. . . .

Simonson

428. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Addis Ababa, April 15, 1957—8 p.m.*

751. From Richards. Roundup on Yemen. Playing in tougher league now—batting average hit slump.

After two and one-half days of negotiation and one day of waiting, Mission talks in Yemen came to abrupt end last night (April 14) in short but dramatic interview with King, when he asked that we consider our proposals had never been made. I have therefore made no aid commitments and there will be no joint communiqué.

Following our initial discussions with group headed by Qadi al Amri and our visit to Crown Prince in Sana (reported proceeding telegrams) we held further work in revived talks with Amri group during which tentative agreement was reached on draft communiqué I considered satisfactory. It contained clear though slightly indirect endorsement American Doctrine and condemnation of communism as "inconsistent with religious principles." (Text being forwarded by despatch.)<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, after considering long list of projects submitted, without supporting data, by Yemenis, I had decided offer \$2 million grant for improvement road between Hodeida and Sana and additional \$50,000 for construction paved road along Hodeida waterfront and to airport about three miles north. While it was impossible make accurate judgment regarding cost or need for any of proposed projects, it seemed obvious that Hodeida-Sana road was basic necessity, and Yemenis themselves gave it top priority. (At present this road is scarcely more than a track and average transit time for distance of about 185 miles is 18 hours. Freight cost per ton is between \$25 and \$30.) I thought this project and Hodeida airport road would also have popular impact, since construction work and ultimate resulting improvements would be easily visible to large number of people.

Therefore, after preliminary agreement reached on communiqué draft, we handed Yemeni representatives draft aide-mémoire setting forth proposed grant of \$2,050,000 for these projects. Aide-mémoire further said I would recommend negotiation of agreement for establishment small technical assistance mission. On insistence Yemeni representative Tarcici, we added statement that I would report to

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-1557. Secret. Repeated to Jidda, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, London, Paris, Aden, New Delhi, Tel Aviv, Karachi, Kabul, Ankara, Athens, Tehran, Tripoli, Beirut, Baghdad, Rabat, and Tunis.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

Washington other projects submitted by Yemenis for future consideration but without any commitment on part of USG. (Aide-mémoire text being forwarded by despatch.)<sup>3</sup>

Yemeni delegation was clearly disappointed at amount offered and expressed concern lest King would consider it far too small. Chief representative Amri, however, did not at any time make specific request for increase or cite any figure which he thought would be acceptable. We explained at length difficulties confronting mission in recommending even this amount of aid in view our lack of information and absence of any resident American personnel who could provide reliable picture Yemeni economic situation. Stressed that we were able make grant only because of extraordinary authority vested in mission and were willing to do so only because of desire give special impetus to Yemen-American friendship in context new ME policy. We considered initiation concrete program, even though small, could be beginning of fruitful relationship and establishment US technical assistance mission could lead to further aid in future years.

At final informal session early last evening with Amri and company, Jernegan got impression these arguments might have had some effect, at least on Amri and Tarcici. However, they made clear throughout that decision could only be made by King, and it appeared he was suffering so severely from rheumatic pain during time our visit that he was able to give little attention to whatever reports were made to him and probably had only brief if any personal discussion with his representatives who were conducting negotiations. During above mentioned final talk with Jernegan, Amri read handwritten note which he said came from King to effect that he considered US friendship as of extreme importance and agreed with principles of American Doctrine. Note indicated in general terms he was dissatisfied with economic proposals and suggested economic aid question be left aside for present. However, Amri said this did not represent final specific decision, which could come only from King himself in person.

Around 10 p.m. April 14 we were suddenly summoned to see King. When Ambassador Wadsworth, Jernegan and I arrived, we found Jamal Husseini, Counselor of King Saud, also present. After very brief preliminary remarks in which he expressed admiration for President Eisenhower, endorsement of Doctrine, and appreciation for our visit, King went directly to subject our aid offer. He asked first whether \$2 million was intended pay for surveys or for actual construction. I replied latter was the case. He then asked whether amount would be enough to do satisfactory job. When I said our

---

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

estimates indicated it would be sufficient he questioned accuracy of estimates. I expressed belief that if sum proved insufficient additional funds could be found later and promised exert my influence to this end.

King said Yemen had many other important projects requiring aid. Wadsworth interjected that he would be coming back and could talk further about other projects. I commented we could not promise anything for future but that I intended report Yemen needs to Washington and recommend establishment technical assistance mission. I emphasized that since I had no authority beyond this fiscal year it was important to make start on aid project now.

King then abruptly switched subjects and declared no people like communism. Some have tried experiment, but Communist success has been possible only when people compelled accept it. Yemen hoped not be compelled to do so. He thought Communist take-over could not happen here. (I remarked others had thought this and found they were mistaken.) Nevertheless, King went on, sometimes nation might be forced accept Communist help as result of attacks by other countries. (I took this as reference to Yemen dispute with British over south.)

King went on to remark that he would take no position re American Doctrine until he presented question to his allies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc., and had seen whether they were unanimously in agreement on it. If they were not he would have to act accordingly. Ambassador Wadsworth suggested he ask King Saud's representative, Jamal Husseini, about Saud's attitude. Husseini demurred, saying he was not present for this purpose. There followed brief interchange about "Arab Big Four" meeting in Cairo, at end of which King suddenly arose from his chair and said in excited tones: "Only one percent of the \$200 million has been offered to Yemen. How can I release anything to the press on this? It will be harmful to my prestige and I shall be shamed before the people of Yemen. It is much better therefore to leave everything in its place, as if nothing had been raised. Let us bury it and cover it with stones." As he finished this statement he walked hurriedly out of room without saying goodbye to anyone.

Husseini and King's advisers present (Amri, Naib of IBB, and Tarcici) remained few minutes longer with us and tried to suggest formulas which might satisfy King; (A) To omit any dollar figure from our proposal, simply undertaking to build road, or (B) to leave question of amount of aid open for later discussion with special Yemeni mission which might come to see me in Washington at end of my trip. I rejected these suggestions on ground they would either result in undefined commitments or raise hopes I could not fulfill. I made clear that I had done all I could on this mission. At same time,



I emphasized I did not intend close door to future US cooperation with Yemen and would recommend USG give sympathetic consideration to Yemen's needs. We parted amicably.

My general impressions of Yemen are:

1. It is amazingly primitive country. Bulk of people appear to live very much as they must have in Biblical times. Ruling class seems to have mentality of middle ages, although a few like Amri have greater appreciation of modern world and show desire enter into it. They are all highly suspicious of each other and of foreigners.

2. King is not only absolute ruler but delegates no authority to anyone, not even Crown Prince. He is sick man . . . . At same time he reportedly believes he must show people economic progress and feels obliged accept aid from any source in order to do so. Our prolonged discussions with his advisers and word reaching me from people familiar with country's political situation lead me to conclude King's rejection my aid offer was not due to any special prejudice against US, but rather to fear that if he publicly aligned himself with American Doctrine he would jeopardize chances of further Soviet and Egyptian aid. . . .

3. Along with, or possibly because of, their internal preoccupations, Yemenis are obsessed with what they call "aggression" by British on southern frontier. They made repeated efforts to extract from me some expressed or implied statement of support for them in this connection and frankly said this problem was far more alarming to them than communism, even though they readily agreed communism was contrary to their religious beliefs. In talking to me they gave no indication they considered there could be two sides to "question of South Yemen". It should be reported, however, that our consul at Aden, who was present during my visit, found considerable indication that Yemenis would in fact be receptive to conciliatory offer by British and would not insist on pressing their demands to extremes.

4. It is extremely difficult obtain reliable information about political or economic situation in country. Most of our reports came from . . . who was most cooperative and who appears to have close contacts with top officials, including King. . . .

5. We received little new direct information regarding extent of Communist bloc activities. Crawford, Consul in Aden, learned there are now 24 Russian and Czech technicians in country. Both Crown Prince and Amri indicated Yemen anxious have USSR support in Aden dispute. (However, they implied they would be much happier have similar support from US. We of course steered away from this.) Primitive nature of country, xenophobia and religious feelings pose

---

high barriers to establishment by USSR of formidable position in Yemen in short term.

6. It seems clear nothing can be done in a hurry in Yemen. I extended my own stay by one day, at his request, in order give King time recover from his attack of illness, since our visit would have been more than futile if we had not seen only man with power make decisions. However, I now believe it would have been necessary remain two or three weeks in order reach satisfactory agreement of any kind. Suspicions of Yemenis, their bargaining mentality and their internal intrigues are such that they cannot be expected make rapid decisions.

7. Nevertheless, I do not believe we should abandon the attempt to increase our contacts and influence . . . . In view strength of religion in country and obvious interest of ruling family in preventing Communist domination, this should not be impossible talk [*task?*]. It is worth an effort not only because of strategic location of country but even more so . . . . I therefore recommend that we work patiently toward preliminary understanding, attempt to establish small economic mission and, subsequently, a resident legation. If necessary, we should be prepared offer somewhat larger amount of aid than I considered myself justified in offering at this time—after we have obtained better information and plans on which to base such assistance.

**Simonson**

---

#### 429. Editorial Note

Throughout the summer of 1957, American officials continued to view the situation in Yemen with increasing uneasiness. Concern focused primarily on the prospects of increasing Soviet influence in the area and the lack of an effective American presence to counter the prospects of Russian military and economic assistance. On May 13, during a meeting attended by Secretary Dulles, Herter, Murphy, Henderson, Allen Dulles, and Kermit Roosevelt, among others, Rountree, at the Secretary's request, initiated discussion on the situation in a number of Middle Eastern countries. Regarding the situation in Yemen, the memorandum of conversation reads:

"Soviet penetration was noted and Saud's awareness and unhappiness with this. The Imam is playing into the hands of the

Russian technicians and Russian policy . . . The need for a U.S. Mission there was emphasized even though there is no present budget plan for a Mission." (Memorandum of conversation by Howe, May 13; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

At the May 28, June 4, and June 11 meetings of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the question of Soviet-Egyptian influence in Yemen and the problem of opening a mission were discussed. (*Ibid.*, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, IAC Meetings)

On July 3, at the 329th meeting of the National Security Council, the President presiding, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles noted that the Soviet Union was supplying Yemen with "large shipments" of military equipment which would necessitate the deployment of Soviet experts to train the Yemeni Armed Forces. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

#### 430. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Jidda, June 9, 1957—9 a.m.*

777. At annual diplomatic dinner given by King Saud May 31 I said Imam Ahmad (mytel 746<sup>2</sup>) had charged me convey his greetings together with assurance he had decided take King's advice "to depend on the United States." King appeared gratified and asked me to private audience June 2 (at which he spoke also of Lebanese crisis, Aqaba policy and Saudi economy, all to be reported in subsequent telegrams).

At June 2 audience King said that prior my visit to Yemen he had sent two telegrams to Imam. First advised Imam reach agreement with US, be prepared compromise, and remain in close contact with US until mutual confidence established; also said he was ready whenever needed to mediate "between my two friends" and advised Imam not allow anyone enter Yemen except US. Imam's reply, said King, was "not bad; it said he would take my counsel although displeased with Richards Mission and hating British".

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86H/6–957. Secret. Repeated to Damascus and Cairo.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 123–Wadsworth, George)

King said he then sent second telegram warning Imam against Communists and their motives in approaching Yemen and adding: "Do not let them deceive you. Your country is poor and you have enemies. Communists will not be helpful but will only bring disorder. Syria and Egypt are not helpful either." In reply Imam had expressed agreement but insisted had been forced obtain arms from Syria for defense.

After expressing appreciation King's intercession, which I sensed had been most effective, I said Imam and leading members Yemeni Government including Sayaghi (Naib of IBB and Minister Interior) agreed Yemen would never be strong enough attack British and arms needed for defense only. However, as I had been told total value Czech arms shipments was approximately \$3 million, how could Yemen, out of estimated yearly budget for country of only 10 million, pay for them?

King said he agreed arms were for defense since Yemen had received no heavy equipment; but, he added "Imam has enough money. He has been hoarding riyals—he is very miserly. We have given him \$3 million to build Port of Hodeida . . . we must take into account way they do things and show them sympathy. That is my personal view. Imam always asks my advice when has decision to make".

King then asked if I had obtained indication Imam's present views on Egypt and Syria. I replied that generally noncommittal attitude of Imam on this subject had contrasted sharply with Crown Prince Badr's forceful presentation his views that Nasser, Bitar, and company were "Communists" and not to be trusted, and that their governments were pursuing very dangerous course.

**Wadsworth**

**431. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 2, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Technical Mission for Yemen

*Discussion:*

We understand Mr. Hollister has raised with you the question of the desirability of sending the proposed technical survey mission to Yemen at the present time.

We have for several months considered Yemen one of the most critical areas of the Near East. The Soviets and their satellites have been steadily extending their influence in Yemen through the supply of substantial quantities of arms and through economic measures. The two Western diplomatic residents in Yemen, the Italian and the British, have been stressing to their Foreign Offices the importance of increasing Western influence in Yemen on an urgent basis.

After considerable delay, the Imam of Yemen in April agreed to receive the Richards Mission. While the Imam did not accept the proposals of Ambassador Richards, the Mission left with the understanding that the door remained open for further discussions. ICA did not believe they could make any substantive decisions on economic assistance for Yemen without further information and suggested that a group of experts be sent to Yemen to investigate possible projects in which US-Yemeni cooperation might be feasible. This suggestion was made to the Imam by Ambassador Wadsworth in May, and the Imam accepted.<sup>2</sup> The Imam was notified by note on July 8 that the United States was prepared to send the mission. The Yemenis replied on July 29 and suggested the month of August for the visit.

The technical group was prepared to depart early in July but their departure was delayed because a reply had not been received to our note. We were apprehensive that a reply might not be received at all because of reports of the failing health of the Imam and of the possibility of a struggle for the throne, which might seriously

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886H.00-TA/8-257. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> Wadsworth visited Yemen in late May. Telegram 1071 to Jidda, May 23, instructed him to inform the Yemenis of U.S. willingness to cooperate with the Yemen Government in the field of economic development. (*Ibid.*, 123-Wadsworth, George) Wadsworth reported in telegram 746 from Jidda, June 1, that his mission had been successful. (*Ibid.*)

disrupt conditions in Yemen. The Imam has long been in ill health, however, and reports of his imminent passing have been heard before. His condition now seems to be improved and he has asked our Consul in Aden to come to Yemen, apparently to express his concern over the delay in the sending of the U.S. technical mission. We believe we have a commitment to the Imam, that conditions are as favorable now as they are likely to be, and that it is essential to send the technical group forward at the earliest possible moment.

The British Embassy has been keeping us informed of the reports of the British Chargé in Yemen and agrees with our assessment that urgent steps should be taken to improve the general Western position in Yemen. The British believe that U.S. economic activity in Yemen would bolster conservative elements and would make a settlement of their own differences with the Yemen on the frontier more likely. We have kept the British generally informed of our intentions in Yemen and will inform them as soon as a substantive decision is made regarding the technical group. No decision has been reached concerning the extent or type of economic assistance which might be given to the Yemen and no commitments have been made to the Yemenis other than to send a technical group. We anticipate, however, that, based on the recommendations of the technical group, we would suggest U.S. participation in one important economic project within Yemen, possibly the major road from Sana to Hodeida.

*Recommendation:*

That you inform Mr. Hollister that we consider an immediate increase in U.S. influence in Yemen to be of great importance and request that he authorize the sending of the proposed technical group at the earliest possible moment.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Acting Secretary Herter initialed his approval on August 3. That same day Herter forwarded a copy of Rountree's memorandum to Hollister, requesting that the technical mission be sent to Yemen. (*Ibid.*, 886H.00-TA/8-357) On August 22, in a memorandum to Herter, Hollister indicated that ICA had dispatched a technical survey mission to Yemen headed by Henry W. Wiens, Chief of the Near East Division of the International Cooperation Administration. (*Ibid.*, 886H.00-TA/8-2257)

432. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 28, 1957—4:06 p.m.*

329. Following are Department's views regarding your visit to Yemen requested Jidda's 211.<sup>2</sup>

Believe you should plan depart September 2. Zabarah informed you propose leave this date travelling in USAF plane with Embassy officer, Embassy consultant and plane crew of five. He has requested Imam's urgent approval and is of opinion you should leave as scheduled even in absence of reply.

Zabarah has no information regarding specific subjects Imam wishes discuss. Judging from Jamal Hussaini's report to you and Crawford's conversations in Yemen following may arise regarding which you should take positions indicated.

*UK-Yemen Dispute.* We continue to attach highest importance to normalization of relations between UK and Yemen and restoration tranquility on border. These are matters which can be settled only by parties directly concerned. We have been encouraged by indications that Imam is favorably considering discussions aimed at implementation 1934 and 1951 agreements.<sup>3</sup> We hope Yemen will soon make specific proposals to UK regarding level and venue of talks. Important thing is to get discussions started without attaching conditions or attempting obtain prior agreement on details. We believe UK would be receptive to immediate conversations on this basis and continue prepared urge UK agree such talks. If question Kamaran Island raised by Yemenis you should express view differences regarding its status should not be allowed impede start talks with UK.

*Syria.* (You should seize opportunity raise this matter.) Draw as appropriate upon previous guidance provided you, especially Deptel 326.<sup>4</sup> You might suggest Imam may wish to consider implications

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Wadsworth, George. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Aden, Dhahran (to be passed to the Commander, Second Air Division), and London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 211, August 25, Wadsworth reported his conversation with Jamal Husayni on the subject of Yemen. According to the Ambassador, Husayni had called on August 24 to bring him up to date on the situation in Yemen. Wadsworth also solicited the Department's views on the subject of British-Yemeni disputes and on the possibility of establishing a diplomatic mission in Yemen. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> The agreement of 1934 presumably is the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United Kingdom, India, and Yemen of February 11, 1934. The full text of the accord is in *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1934, vol. 137, pp. 212-215. The agreement of 1951 is presumably a reference to the Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Yemen regarding relations between the two countries. For text of the notes, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. 158, pp. 469-472.

<sup>4</sup> Document 281.

for Yemen which may be drawn from Syrian experience. We recall that Soviet-Syrian relations commenced with purchases of arms.

*Establishment of Diplomatic Mission.* You may indicate US interested in establishment of resident diplomatic mission. We would be prepared to start preparations for such a mission whenever Imam thinks it desirable. In meantime we suggest more frequent visits for longer periods by officers of our Consulate at Aden.

*Yemen Development Corporation.* We understand Corporation has promised submit detailed plans for future action within two months and is diligently attempting locate additional financial backing. US Government has provided YDC with all appropriate assistance within its traditional commercial policy of not favoring any one particular American firm. We believe Imam will wish to await forthcoming YDC proposals before determining future course. FYI You should endeavor correct any impression that Corporation's difficulties attributable to lack US Government backing which we understand from your 211 YDC may have given Imam. End FYI.

*ICA Mission.* We are glad that ICA Mission has now arrived in Yemen and hope that it will complete its work expeditiously. Mission's report should provide solid basis for determining Yemen's most pressing needs and what assistance toward meeting them may be rendered by US. Should Mission be encountering any special difficulties from Yemenis, you may wish to discuss with Imam.

Dulles

---

**433. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 8, 1957—5:09 p.m.*

667. Jidda's 289. <sup>2</sup> Dept gratified helpful exchange of views with Imam reported reftel. In response you instructed in manner you believe most appropriate make following points to Yemen Govt in Taiz:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.86H/9-1557. Secret. Drafted by Brewer and approved by Henderson. Repeated to London, Cairo, and Aden.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 289, September 15, Wadsworth transmitted the highlights of his visit to Yemen between September 4 and 12, and of part of his conversations with the Imam. (*Ibid.*) A more complete record of the Ambassador's visit was forwarded in despatch 65 from Jidda, September 29. (*Ibid.*, 123-Wadsworth, George)



1. Dept appreciates assistance extended ICA Mission and is giving urgent consideration economic aid program;
2. Dept welcomes Imam's request for establishment resident US diplomatic mission and is prepared comply;
3. USG contemplates establishment independent Legation Taiz headed for present by senior Chargé d'Affaires with two or three assistants;
4. Administrative arrangements will require time but Dept hopes Legation can be opened early next year;
5. To assist in planning foregoing, Dept would appreciate Yemen Govt views re following rights and privileges accorded by international practice, and apparently encompassed by US–Yemen Treaty 1946,<sup>3</sup> to diplomatic establishments (including Yemen Leg here): (a) right to fly flag; (b) free entry privileges; (c) communications, including use of diplomatic codes; (d) freedom of movement within country. (FYI—We would regard (b) and (c) as essential. Article 2 US–Yemen Treaty of 1946 states diplomatic representatives each Party shall be granted by other Party "rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities accorded under generally recognized principles of international law" but Dept uncertain how far Yemen in fact prepared go re foregoing specific items. End FYI.)

In discussing foregoing with Yemenis you should bear in mind that, while Dept intends open Legation Taiz, it is hoped maximum freedom movement for Legation staff, subject, if necessary, appropriate advance notice to GOY, can be agreed upon with Yemen authorities in advance. Experience UK Legation staff may prove helpful this connection.

**Herter**

---

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States and Yemen, see Charles I. Bevans, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949*, vol. 12, p. 1223. The exchange of notes took place at Sana'a on May 4, 1946, and the treaty entered into force that same day. For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1312–1318, and *ibid.*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 924–926.

---

434. Memorandum for the Record, by Thomas A. Cassilly of  
the Executive Secretariat <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 13, 1957.*

Meeting with the Secretary 4:00 p.m., November 12, 1957

U.S. ACTIVITIES IN YEMEN

PRESENT

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Rountree, NEA  
Mr. Newsom, NE  
Mr. Cassilly, S/S

*Action:*

1. Approved efforts to expedite an economic development program for Yemen.
2. Authorized an approach to the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey to take over the concession of the Yemen Development Corp. and the coastal strip concession now held by inactive German interests.
3. Authorized instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth to discuss the Yemen Development Corp. with the Imam.
4. Concurred that the British should be advised on this matter.

. . . . .

Mr. Rountree pointed out that the situation in Yemen required immediate attention since the Soviets are reported to have 79 technicians, 10 aircraft, 30-40 tanks and self-propelled artillery in the country. The only U.S. interest so far has been the Yemen Development Corporation whose concession has now expired. The Yemeni Chargé here has been reluctant to cancel this concession because he is afraid this might provide a further opening for the Soviets. Only one U.S. firm, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, has shown any interest in taking up the concession, but they insist this would be only to preserve the U.S. position on the Arabian peninsula and not for commercial reasons. The Department must decide whether we should urge Standard Oil to take over this concession and also try to take over the coastal strip concession now held by inactive German interests.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86H/11-1357. Secret.

The Secretary asked whether the price for this concession might not skyrocket once the Yemen Development Company found out that Standard Oil was interested. The Under Secretary suggested that it might be better to let the old concession lapse and draw up a new one for Standard.

Mr. Rountree explained that pro-Soviet elements in the Imam's court might prevent the granting of another American concession. The proposed U.S. aid program includes an aerial and geological survey which would be an inducement to any investor. . . . All this would help indicate to Standard Oil the seriousness of our interest in the area.

The Under Secretary asked whether the British should not be advised, and Mr. Rountree agreed that they should, especially since the London talks with Crown Prince Badr seem to be progressing satisfactorily.

Mr. Rountree mentioned that the recent ICA survey mission in Yemen had been very successful and had recommended a \$5 million program including the two surveys already mentioned, roads, technical assistance in agriculture and air transport.

. . . . .

The Secretary mentioned that if oil were discovered, Congress might say that the Department had spent the taxpayers' money for surveys that benefited a private company. Mr. Rountree pointed out that the Development Corporation had done everything possible to interest other firms but had not been successful. The Under Secretary also mentioned that Defense was very much interested in an aerial survey.

The Secretary asked how important Yemen really was in the scheme of things. Messrs. Rountree and Newsom pointed out that it dominated the southern entrance to the Red Sea and that the prospect of a pro-Soviet Yemen was appalling. The only way this could be prevented was by showing strong U.S. interest in the country.

The Secretary accordingly approved the three actions listed above.

TAC

**435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 5, 1957—7:06 p.m.*

783. Joint State-ICA. For Ambassador. Department hopes it will be possible for you proceed Yemen prior your departure for US for presentation economic aid proposals to Imam and other top Yemeni officials. You should indicate to them US willingness undertake economic assistance to Yemen initially along following lines: (FYI. Regulations and policy considerations require that you adhere closely to wording numbered paragraphs. End FYI.)

1. USG is prepared undertake aerial photography of Yemen providing for aerial photographs, photomosaic maps and probably rephotographing certain areas on larger scale as required for road planning and irrigation studies in Tihama. (FYI. If asked, may say contemplate undertaking work through contract with Aero Services now concluding work in Saudi Arabia. Flying could start promptly on basis your aide-mémoire in order not miss favorable winter flying season. Arrangements for entry and stationing necessary ground crews, with provision adequate police protection and other details can be subsequently negotiated per paragraph 6 below. End FYI.)

2. USG prepared have US Geological Survey undertake geological survey of Yemen to develop data which would assist GOY in its efforts develop mineral resources of country and which we hope would be useful in seeking to interest reputable foreign firms in prospecting for minerals. It is expected three geologists would be required work in Yemen. Their work would be complemented by simultaneous photogeology analysis of aerial photographs using most recently developed techniques this field. USG believes geologists could commence work shortly after photographs available, presumably six months after initiation aerial survey. (FYI. If asked you may inform Yemenis that approximately 24 months would be required for completion survey and analysis which constitute essential first step in any program mineral development and prospecting. End FYI.)

3. USG prepared assist Yemen in establishing and developing public roads unit capable conducting road betterment and maintenance program and willing provide advice and assistance with respect organization and operation including training of supervisors, mechanics, machinery operators etc. and demonstration equipment

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886H.00-TA/12-557. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wiens, Newsom, and Lakeland and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Aden.

and supplies. Concept would include initiation by demonstration work on Ta'iz-Sana'a route beginning along Ta'iz-Ibb sector.

4. USG prepared send promptly to Yemen a team of Bureau Public Roads engineers to examine in more detail recommendations of Survey Mission as first step in undertaking construction on Hodeida-Bajil portion of Hodeida-Sana'a route. (It is not in interest either Yemen or US to embark on subject this magnitude and kind without careful review requirements, methods and costs.) Their inquiry would involve detailed survey covering costs estimates, soil analysis, determination of design standards and such additional data as required in connection with engineering and construction. In addition they would expect discuss with GOY problems involved in unloading heavy construction equipment at port, road locations, expropriation procedures and other elements which would be involved in drafting a project agreement with GOY and proceeding with such project expeditiously. Report of this expert team would provide a basis for further intergovernmental discussion and decision as to scope of project to be initially undertaken. (FYI. BPR could have team in field approximately 30 days after authorization. End FYI.)

5. USG also prepared start forthwith on agricultural assistance by detailing to Yemen an irrigation farming expert to undertake 1-2 month survey of irrigation system and practices in Tihama to provide information as guide to program planning in this field. We would also detail coffee expert to make periodic visits to Yemen to study problems connection with coffee production and marketing throughout 1958 production season in order make appropriate recommendations for improvement and expansion of coffee industry which important as dollar earner. (FYI. It would be our intention not to sign project agreement covering these experts and those described paragraph 4 but if GOY receptive, you may leave aide-memoires based on this paragraph and paragraphs 1 and 4 requesting GOY confirm acceptability and willingness facilitate travel and investigations these experts within Yemen. End FYI.)

6. With respect paragraphs 1 through 3 above if GOY willing proceed on basis outlined therein you are authorized state USG will promptly send representatives to negotiate necessary agreements to

---

cover these activities. (FYI. We do not intend discuss cost of projects with GOY. End FYI.)<sup>2</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>2</sup> Wadsworth visited Yemen December 19–28 and met with al-Shami and the Imam. Telegram 598 from Jidda, December 29, stated that although the Yemenis had not accepted the U.S. proposals, they might agree to them in part; it commented that “the ball is now still in the Yemeni court”. (*Ibid.*, 886H.00–TA/12–2957) Wadsworth further reported his conversations in telegrams 580, 600, and 606 from Jidda, December 25, 29, and 30, and despatch 133, December 31. (*Ibid.*, 886H.00–TA/12–2557, 886H.00–TA/12–2957, 886H.00–TA/12–3057, and 886H.00–TA/12–3157, respectively) Telegram 904 to Jidda, December 30, requested Wadsworth’s views as to whether steps should be taken to bring the U.S. offers to the attention of the Crown Prince, who had been absent during Wadsworth’s visit. (*Ibid.*, 886H.00–TA/12–3057)



# Index

- Abd al-Hadi, Awni, 54, 157, 705*n*  
Abdullah, King, 68, 686  
Abramov, Aleksandr N., 648  
Abu al-Huda, Tawfiq, 1, 3*n*, 4-5, 17, 22  
Abu Dhabi (*see also* Buraimi dispute), 252*n*, 497  
Abu Taleb, Abd al-Rahwan, 751, 752*n*  
Acheson, Dean, 622  
Adams, Sherman, 285*n*, 404  
Aden Protectorates, 286, 309, 363-364, 367, 487, 752, 754-755  
Adenauer, Konrad, 122  
Adib, Mamdouh, 449, 468, 481  
Aero Services, 771  
Afghanistan, 578  
Aflaq, Michel, 676  
Air Force, U.S. Department of the:  
    Dhahran Airfield, 255-256, 260, 268*n*, 273, 290, 344-347, 380, 382, 386  
    Libya, U.S. military aid to, 307  
    Saudi Arabia, U.S. military aid to, 411, 454  
Aldrich, Winthrop W., 6, 20, 28-29, 32*n*, 280-281, 291*n*, 293, 301-302, 324, 327, 329, 334, 337, 388*n*, 567  
Alexandretta, 528  
Algeria, 46, 624-625  
Allen, Francis O., 170, 173*n*, 174*n*, 516*n*, 517*n*, 522*n*, 526*n*, 529*n*, 538*n*  
Allen, George E., 751*n*  
Allen, George V., 12*n*, 20, 40*n*, 173*n*, 177*n*, 185*n*, 249, 266*n*, 272*n*, 278*n*, 291*n*, 296*n*, 306*n*, 327, 395*n*, 396*n*, 520*n*, 522*n*, 542*n*, 551*n*, 557*n*, 565*n*, 579*n*, 751*n*  
Arab-Israeli dispute, 170*n*  
Baghdad Pact, 5, 8  
Egypt, 543*n*, 545  
Jordan, 15-16, 23-26, 34  
Allen, George V.—Continued  
    Lebanon, 171-176, 181-182, 184-185  
    Middle East, 309-310  
    Saudi Arabia, 251-254, 257-259, 289*n*, 301*n*, 303, 325, 336, 354*n*, 361-362, 393-394  
    Aramco, 250*n*, 264-265, 289*n*  
    United Kingdom, relations with, 314-317, 319, 322*n*, 338-340, 355, 362  
    U.S. military aid to, 290-291, 306*n*, 341-342, 360*n*, 368, 379-382, 387*n*, 389*n*  
    Syria, 513*n*, 529, 539*n*, 543, 567, 574-583, 586-588  
    U.S. aid to, 550-551, 558-560, 573, 574*n*  
    United Kingdom, 304, 305*n*, 313*n*, 329, 334, 377*n*  
Alphand, Hervé, 605-606  
Amer, Gen. Abdel Hakim, 593-594, 745  
American Doctrine. *See* Eisenhower Doctrine.  
al-Amri, Ibn Abdullah Mohamed, 752*n*, 760  
al-Amri, Qadi, 757-759  
Anab, Brig. Radi, 27  
Anderson, Robert B., 341-342, 403-404  
Aqaba, Gulf of, 25-26, 43, 66, 87, 231, 245, 428, 481*n*, 498, 508-509, 624  
    Israeli use of, 116, 120-121, 428, 481*n*, 490-491, 499, 508-509, 624  
Arab Collective Security Pact, 515  
Arab Labor Confederation, 595*n*  
Arab League, 1, 172, 253*n*, 287  
Arab League Collective Security Pact, 1  
Arab League Committee, 25  
Arab Legion, 15-18, 42-43, 47



- Arab Legion—Continued  
 British economic aid for, 2–3, 8, 50, 67–68  
 Dismissal of British officers, 26–35, 37–38, 68
- Arab nationalism, 447, 667  
 Arabian Peninsula, 487  
 Arab–Israeli dispute, 36  
 British foreign policy, 315  
 Egypt, 6, 202–203, 442, 487, 746*n*  
 Jordan, 6, 84  
 Lebanon, 202–203  
 Oil industry, 14  
 Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, 315  
 Saudi Arabia, 309, 317*n*, 374, 447, 508  
 Soviet position, 487  
 Suez Canal crisis, 84, 487  
 Syria, 442, 525, 592, 622–623, 628–630  
 U.S. position, 83, 624–625, 715–716
- Arab States (*see also* Arab–Israeli dispute; Arab League; Arab Legion; Arab nationalism; *and individual countries*):  
 Beirut meeting, 406  
 Cairo meeting, 84, 421, 423, 427–430, 443, 515, 597, 759  
 Four–power memorandum, 468–469  
 Neutralism in, 513  
 Regional defense, 172  
 Syrian crisis, 656–657, 731  
 United States, relations with, 171–172, 175, 201–202, 476–477, 715, 743–744  
 U.S. military and economic aid to, 64–65, 77*n*, 132, 137, 170*n*, 171, 176, 185–186, 190–191
- Arabian–American Oil Company (Aramco) (*see also* TAPLINE):  
 Aden Protectorates, 286  
 Buraimi dispute, 282, 284, 287*n*, 294, 437  
 Dammam Harbor, 460  
 Riyadh–Medina railroad, 457  
 Saudi Arabia, relations with, 250, 253, 254*n*, 271, 299, 315, 403, 503–505, 748  
 Israeli boycott demand, 264–267, 271–272  
 Onassis agreement, 249–252, 259  
 Saudi revenues, 293, 319, 321, 332–334, 337, 347–348, 492, 549  
 Syria, 585, 600, 652  
 United Kingdom, relations with, 284, 749
- Arab–Israeli dispute (*see also* Israel; Palestinian refugees):  
 Arab nationalism, 36  
 Arms race, 356  
 Border fighting, 428, 441–442  
 British role, 36  
 Egyptian position, 14–15, 41, 176, 190  
 ESS Pact, 41, 190  
 Fedayeen activity, 70, 120, 428–429  
 Gaza strip, 13, 443  
 Israeli attack on Gaza, *Feb. 1955*, 13  
 Israeli attack on Syria, *Dec. 1955*, 560, 569  
 Jordan, 6–7, 13, 22–23, 33, 69, 166, 655  
 Jordan Valley plan, 15  
 Lebanon, 179–180, 183, 187, 201–202  
 Palestine government proposals, 14, 157  
 Palestinian refugees, 157, 187, 623  
 Partition plans, 14–15  
 Saudi position, 21, 41, 190, 257, 269, 270*n*, 279*n*, 408, 443, 507  
 Soviet position, 316, 603, 715–716  
 Syrian position, 41, 190, 526, 535, 538, 578*n*, 596, 609, 620, 623, 627, 677, 743–744  
 U.N. role, 14, 62, 257, 270*n*, 623, 627  
 U.S. military aid to Arab States, 64–65, 77*n*, 132, 137, 170*n*, 171, 176, 185–186, 190–191  
 U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 269, 356, 434, 462–463  
 U.S. position, 14–15, 175, 197, 257, 300, 506, 535, 538, 557, 655, 715–716  
 U.S.–Saudi relations, 257, 300  
 U.S.–Syrian relations, 535, 538, 568, 620, 623
- Arabian Peninsula (*see also* Abu Dhabi; Kuwait; Muscat and Oman; Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms; Saudi Arabia; Yemen):  
 Arab nationalism in, 487  
 British role in, 486–488  
 Disputed Territory, 355, 749  
 Soviet influence in, 224  
 U.S. policy toward, 309–310, 348
- Aramco. *See* Arabian–American Oil Company.
- Armstrong, William P., 72*n*, 102–103, 375–377, 561, 601*n*
- Army, U.S. Department of the, 149, 345–346
- Arneson, R. Gordon, 498–499, 651

- Asad, Shaikh, 357
- al-Asali, Sabri, 427, 516*n*, 519*n*, 523-525, 535-536, 610-611, 612*n*, 636-637
- Arab heads of state meeting, 421*n*, 447, 468
- IPC pipeline, 594-595, 607, 614
- Syrian political situation, 520*n*, 522-523, 526, 538, 638, 677, 746*n*
- Asbjornson, Mildred, 15*n*, 680*n*
- Aswan Dam, 74, 668
- al-Atasi, Fayid, 515, 538-539
- al-Atasi, Hashim, 515, 517, 520, 521-523, 526, 579
- Atomic energy, 419
- Australia, 247
- al-Ayoubi, Ali Jawdat, 571
- Azkoul, 200
- al-Azm, Khalid Pasha, 525, 529, 535-536, 580, 611, 630, 675, 676, 679
- Syrian political situation, 520*n*, 522-523, 526, 532, 538, 539*n*, 541*n*, 658, 675, 745-747
- Azores, 381
- Azzam Pasha, Abdel Rahman, 296, 303, 305, 387, 499*n*
- United Kingdom, 287-288, 314*n*, 332, 335-336, 363, 365, 392, 396, 511
- Badawi, Capt. Faisal, 449, 511*n*
- al-Badr ben Ahmad, Crown Prince Muhammed, 511-512, 748-749, 751, 755-757, 760, 770, 773*n*
- Baghdad Pact:
- Economic committee, 44
- ESS opposition to, 41, 224, 518
- Formation of, 515
- Iranian participation, 515
- Iraqi participation, 19, 36, 349, 440, 521
- Israeli position, 7
- Jordanian participation, 1, 4, 11, 22, 44, 71, 125, 528, 536, 556
- British position, 5, 8-9, 13, 15, 20, 24, 69
- Public opinion, 37, 68, 91
- Lebanese participation, 1, 5, 171, 528, 536, 556
- Pakistani participation, 515
- Saudi Arabia, 224, 251, 253-254, 258-259, 303*n*, 347, 349, 409, 412, 414, 439-440
- Soviet Union, relations with, 157
- Syria, 5, 514-518, 528-529, 536, 568, 620, 630, 679, 734
- Baghdad Pact—Continued
- Turkish participation, 440
- United Kingdom, 4-5, 29, 409, 412, 515
- U.S. military aid to, 4-5
- U.S. position, 29, 516-518, 529, 556, 568
- U.S.—Saudi relations, 251, 253-254, 258-259, 303*n*, 439-440
- Bahrain, 284-285, 310, 384, 403-404, 460, 487
- Bahri, Yunis, 25
- Bailey, Ronald W., 34, 86-88, 351, 388*n*
- Bakdash, Khalid, 58, 526, 566, 575, 577, 676, 678, 745-747
- Balfour Declaration, 393
- Balmer, Maj. Gen. J.D., 530*n*
- Bandung Conference, 262, 523*n*
- Bank of America, 572
- Bapco, 284-285
- Barbour, Walworth, 5, 10*n*, 17-18, 223-225, 301*n*, 304-305, 307-308
- Barnes, Robert G., 313*n*, 324, 389*n*, 456, 464*n*, 558*n*
- Barnes, Maj. Gen. Verdi B., 701
- Barrow, John R., 620*n*, 626*n*
- Bashayan, Burhan al-Din, 96, 127
- Baxter, William O., 644*n*, 648-650, 662-663
- Bayar, Celal, 658, 684
- Becker, Loftus E., 498*n*, 725*n*
- Beckner, Earl R., 503, 583*n*
- Beeley, Harold, 229, 232*n*, 247, 659
- Belyayev, Vasilii A., 546
- Ben Gurion, David, 14, 26, 55*n*, 97, 104, 297*n*, 394, 614
- United States, 115*n*, 118*n*, 646-650, 689-690
- Bennett, William T., 379, 478*n*, 480*n*
- Bennsky, George M., 503
- Berding, Andrew H., 510, 730
- Bergin, Rear Adm. Charles K., 449, 451-452
- Bergus, Donald C., 8*n*, 12*n*, 23*n*, 31*n*, 37*n*, 40*n*, 41*n*, 43*n*, 44*n*, 48*n*, 51*n*, 60*n*, 66*n*, 67*n*, 74*n*, 76*n*, 80*n*, 83*n*, 95*n*, 112*n*, 126*n*, 129*n*, 132*n*, 134*n*, 140*n*, 146*n*, 148*n*, 154*n*, 164*n*, 167*n*
- Jordan, 57-58, 98-99, 104
- Saudi Arabia, 338
- Bernau, Phyllis D., 98, 109, 207*n*, 574*n*, 700*n*, 734*n*
- Berry, James Lampton, 57*n*, 86-88, 126*n*, 132*n*, 154*n*, 164*n*, 652*n*, 707*n*

- Bevans, Charles I., 521*n*, 768*n*  
 Bevin, Ernest, 153  
 Bey, Khalid, 287–288, 481  
 Bey, Sabri, 610  
 Birgi, Nuri, 593*n*  
 Bishop, Frederick A., 670, 682, 689  
 Bitar, Salah al-Din, 611, 620–628, 676, 763  
 al-Bizri, Gen. Afif, 639, 676, 677–678, 708, 745–747  
 Black, Eugene R., 457, 459, 506  
 Blackiston, Slator C., Jr., 37*n*, 57*n*  
 Boardman, Francis, 181, 184*n*, 185*n*, 191*n*, 542*n*, 546*n*, 558*n*, 563*n*, 574*n*, 579*n*, 583*n*, 586*n*, 587*n*  
 Bowie, Robert R., 20, 327, 329, 334, 567  
 Boyle, Charles A., 587  
 Brand, Vance, 456  
 Brentano, Heinrich von, 122  
 Brewer, William D., 767*n*  
 Brewster, Herbert D., 723*n*  
 British Development Board, 39  
 Brook, Norman, 510, 730  
 Brown, Elizabeth Ann, 725*n*  
 Bulganin, Nikolai A., 268, 297*n*, 351, 700*n*  
 Bulgaria, 577, 721–724, 731  
 Bullard, Reader, 274, 281  
 Buraimi dispute:  
   Aramco, 282, 284, 287*n*, 294, 437  
   Arbitration Tribunal, establishment of, 274–275  
   British occupation, 280–288, 331, 339  
   British position, 29, 223*n*, 289, 291*n*, 308, 322–324, 328, 330–333, 377, 497, 511  
   British–Saudi direct talks, 315, 321, 323–324, 331–332, 335–336  
     British position, 363, 364–365, 392–393  
     Saudi position, 354–355, 475–476  
     U.S. position, 340–341  
   And Muscat and Oman dispute, 222, 232, 234, 244–245  
   Neutral zone, 336–337, 339, 355  
   Oil industry, 286, 335  
   Public opinion, 330  
   Refugees, 355  
   Riyadh line, 280, 328, 330–331  
   Saudi–Egyptian relations, 29, 285, 367  
   Saudi position, 244–245, 282–284, 286–288, 291, 294–295, 330, 333  
   Saudi troop movements, 363  
 Buraimi dispute—Continued  
   Soviet military aid to Saudi Arabia, 282  
   Truman declaration, 306–307, 333  
   U.N. role, 286–287, 292, 294–295, 302, 304  
   British position, 308, 323, 336  
   Saudi position, 222, 305, 364  
   U.S. position, 282, 307–308, 315–316, 319–320, 324, 339–340  
   U.S.–British relations, 223–225, 230, 282–284, 293, 303–308, 314*n*, 318, 320–321, 324, 377–378  
   Eden talks, 328–337, 338–339  
   U.S. position, 289, 295–296, 362, 396–397, 405, 749  
   U.S.–Saudi relations, 252–253, 287–288, 295, 300, 303, 312*n*, 325, 328, 351, 355–356, 436–437, 475  
 Burdett, William C., 30*n*, 177*n*, 185*n*, 231*n*, 273*n*, 347*n*, 388*n*, 582*n*, 586*n*, 632*n*, 661*n*, 691*n*, 694*n*, 696*n*, 698*n*, 766*n*  
   Jordan, 139*n*, 143–145  
   Saudi Arabia, 379*n*  
   Syria, 524*n*  
   United Kingdom, 366  
 Burgess, W. Randolph, 734  
 Burma, 78, 578  
 Burrows, Bernard, 244  
 Butler, Col. Edward G., 291  
 Byroade, Henry A., 378*n*  
 Cabell, Lt. Gen. C.P., 640, 653*n*, 674*n*, 685  
 Caccia, Harold, 20, 79*n*, 106–107, 247, 327, 510, 720  
   Jordan, 92–94  
   Muscat and Oman, 226, 238–247  
   Saudi Arabia, 307–308, 329, 334, 412–413  
   Syria, 243, 567, 670, 681–682, 689–690, 730  
 Cain, Leighton, 359  
 Caltex, 599  
 Canal Convention of 1888, 419, 429  
 Cargo, William I., 237*n*  
 Carrigan, John W., 225, 283–285, 287, 399–402, 405–406, 408–409  
 Case, John E., 249–250, 264, 271  
 Cassilly, Thomas A., 769–770  
 Central Intelligence Agency, 310  
 Ceylon, 78

- Chamoun, Camille, 46, 103, 180,  
192-194, 201*n*, 219, 406*n*, 508-509,  
610
- Jordan, 112-115, 117
- Syria, 183, 636-638, 662*n*, 689, 693*n*,  
696, 697*n*, 711
- U.S. economic aid to Lebanon,  
170-174, 178*n*, 183-184, 186*n*, 187,  
198, 208-211
- U.S.-Lebanese relations, 196, 204*n*,  
207*n*
- U.S. military aid to Lebanon, 176,  
186-187, 198, 199*n*, 210-211, 217*n*,  
218
- Chapin, Selden, 270*n*
- Chase Manhattan Bank, 572
- Chehab, Fuad, 191*n*, 192, 210-211
- China, People's Republic of, 64, 66-70,  
261-264, 577, 642
- Chiperfield, Robert B., 635
- Churchill, Winston Spenser, 330
- Coghill, Patrick, 26
- Collins, Brig. Gen. Richard, 94-95
- Colombia, 247
- Comay, Michael S., 662
- Compton, Arthur A., 161*n*
- Congress, U.S.:  
Jordan, 168  
Middle East, 343  
Middle East Emergency Committee,  
703  
Mutual Security Act, 1954, 217, 540*n*  
Saudi Arabia, 286*n*, 298*n*, 307, 456,  
467, 484  
Syria, 688, 713
- Convention of Constantinople of 1888,  
498
- Cooper, John S., 311
- Corbett, Jack C., 456
- Cottman, James S., Jr., 20, 327, 329, 334,  
567
- Coulson, John Eltringham, 8, 106, 340
- Craig, H.S., 530*n*
- Crawford, 760, 766
- Crossman, Richard, 14
- Crosthwaite, Ponsby Moore, 237*n*, 238*n*,  
241
- Cuba, 247
- Cumming, Hugh S. Jr., 234-235, 640,  
674*n*
- Cutler, Robert, 685, 701, 703
- Cyprus, 18-19, 35, 233, 366
- Czechoslovakia, 93, 185, 206, 713, 732
- Czechoslovakia—Continued  
Egyptian arms deal, 13, 177*n*, 187, 278,  
577, 662  
Saudi Arabia, economic aid to, 541,  
558, 566, 577, 580, 593-594  
Syrian oil refinery, 583-584, 588-590
- Dale, William N., 510, 730
- Davies, Fred, 294, 333, 406, 503-505
- Dawalibi, Maruf, 579
- De Palma, Samuel, 237*n*
- De Visscher, Charles, 274, 281-282
- Dean, Patrick Henry, 510, 730
- Defense, U.S. Department of:  
Jordan, military aid to, 135  
Lebanon, 188, 195  
Saudi Arabia, 253, 259-260, 268*n*,  
301*n*, 307, 346, 353, 379-382, 387*n*,  
415, 466-467  
Syria, 551  
Yemen, 770
- Dhahran Airfield. *See under* Saudi Arabia.
- Dhahran-Riyadh Railroad, 348
- Dhofar, 225-226
- Dihigo, Ernesto, 274
- Dillon, C. Douglas, 510, 730
- al-Din, Abd al-Baqi Nizam, 675-676
- Dixon, Pierson, 246*n*
- Dodds-Parker, Arthur D., 365, 393
- Dorman, John, 163*n*, 509*n*, 510, 707*n*,  
720, 721*n*, 730
- Dorsey, Stephen P., 249, 250*n*, 529*n*
- Douglas, James H., 290
- Dubai, 355
- Duce, Terry, 281-282, 355, 503-505, 749
- Duke, Charles Beresford, 4-5, 12*n*, 22,  
26-28, 59
- Dulles, Allen, 212, 236, 281-282, 447,  
481*n*, 486*n*, 651, 702, 761-762  
Jordan, 19, 89, 98, 102*n*, 131  
Middle East, 145, 498*n*  
Syria, 540, 606-607
- Dulles, John Foster, 34*n*, 230*n*, 231*n*,  
481*n*, 706*n*  
Arab-Israeli dispute, 21, 179-180,  
443-444, 542*n*  
Arab nationalism, 202-203, 447  
Arab States, 447, 468, 476-477  
Baghdad Pact, 5, 517-518  
Bandung Conference, 526*n*  
Buraimi dispute, 281, 289*n*, 291-293,  
301-302, 327-328, 351-352, 363,  
388-389, 392-393

- Dulles, John Foster—Continued  
 Egypt, 146, 378–379, 441–442  
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 103, 105–106, 108–109, 743  
 Germany, Federal Republic of, 122  
 Iraq, 43–45, 52–53, 56, 520–521, 529, 544*n*, 663–664, 683, 694–696  
 Israel, 104, 118*n*, 122, 337, 646–650, 662*n*, 690–691  
 Jordan, 43–45, 52–53, 56, 73–74, 76–77, 104, 152–154, 163  
   Baghdad Pact, 5, 517–518  
   Eisenhower Doctrine, 103, 105–106, 108–109  
   Political situation, 19–20, 26*n*, 41–42, 98, 104, 109, 161–164  
   United States, relations with, 6–7, 15–16, 40–41, 83, 698–699  
   U.S. military and economic aid to, 67*n*, 72–79, 128, 132–134, 139*n*, 144, 146, 147*n*, 148–149, 155–156, 158–159, 636  
   U.S. policy toward, 12, 102–103, 105–106, 108–115, 117, 167–168  
 Kuwait, 487*n*, 488*n*  
 Lebanon, 172–173, 207*n*, 220, 659, 696–697, 710–714  
   U.S. military and economic aid to, 178, 182, 185–186, 191–192, 198–200, 216–218  
 Middle East, 29–30, 49–50, 221, 309, 404, 470–471, 622*n*, 685–688, 689*n*, 733–734  
   Communist influence in, 438–439  
   U.S. military aid to, 194–196, 201–202, 342*n*, 661  
 Muscat and Oman, 225–226, 227*n*, 229, 236, 240–242, 247–248  
 Overseas bases, 381–382  
 Pakistan, 152–154  
 Saudi Arabia:  
   Anticommunism, 263–264, 273–274, 418, 500–501  
   Dhahran Airfield, 296–297, 306–307, 395–399, 415–416, 419, 435  
   France, relations with, 474–475  
   Israel, relations with, 501  
   Jordan, relations with, 76–77, 163  
   Syrian political situation, 645, 660  
   United States, relations with, 322, 333, 351, 417, 420–421, 423, 431–432, 437–440, 473–474, 482, 645  
 Dulles, John Foster—Continued  
 Saudi Arabia—Continued  
   United States, relations with—Continued  
     Buraimi dispute, 295–296, 302–303, 307, 436–437  
     Oil industry, 271–272, 432  
     State visit, 374, 413–415, 430*n*, 445–449, 469–470, 477–478, 481*n*, 505, 612  
   U.S. economic aid to, 435–436, 446, 494–496  
   U.S. military aid to, 272–273, 275–277, 279–280, 370–371, 389–392, 410–411, 433–435, 446, 464, 467, 470–472, 494–496, 501–502  
 Soviet Union, 219*n*, 642, 687, 702, 704–705  
 State Department communication systems, 638*n*, 651  
 Syria, 517–518, 541, 645–651, 653*n*, 663–664, 683, 690–691, 694–699  
   Iraq, relations with, 520–521, 529, 544*n*  
   Political situation, 524–525, 545–546, 579, 591–593, 612–613, 619, 746–747  
   U.N. role, 703–705, 720–722, 730–731  
   U.S. position, 522–523, 565, 640–642, 645, 652–653, 715–717  
   Soviet Union, relations with, 551–552, 561, 566*n*, 567, 574, 641–642, 687–688  
   Turkey, relations with, 725, 726*n*, 727  
   United States, relations with, 442–443, 639, 744  
   U.S. military and economic aid to, 516–517, 542*n*, 546–547, 551–552, 569, 573  
 Turkey:  
   United States, relations with, 647, 650–651, 653*n*, 684, 691–693, 700, 723–724  
 United Kingdom:  
   Buraimi dispute, 222–223, 301–302, 388–389, 392–393  
   Muscat and Oman, 231–233, 239, 243–247

- Dulles, John Foster—Continued  
 United Kingdom—Continued  
   Saudi Arabia, relations with, 281, 327–328, 332, 338, 362–364, 396–397, 474–475, 502, 510<sub>n</sub>, 511<sub>n</sub>  
   Syrian political situation, 647–648, 680–682, 689–690, 732–733  
   United States, relations with, 29–30, 304<sub>n</sub>, 313<sub>n</sub>, 329, 334, 365–366, 377, 404, 510–512, 647–648, 680–682, 689–690, 732–733  
   Yemen, 750–752, 754–755, 761, 766–767, 770–773
- Dunn, William C., 583<sub>n</sub>
- Eagleton, William L., 198<sub>n</sub>
- Eban, Abba, 118<sub>n</sub>, 121–122, 648–649, 691  
 Jordan, 98–99, 104–105, 107, 115, 118–120
- Ed-Din, Niyam, 101
- Eden, Anthony, 2<sub>n</sub>, 6, 15<sub>n</sub>, 21  
 Jordan, 14, 15<sub>n</sub>, 25–28, 32<sub>n</sub>  
 Saudi Arabia, 280, 284, 319, 322<sub>n</sub>, 327–328, 334–340  
 Visit to United States, 19–20, 314<sub>n</sub>, 317, 321, 404, 567  
 United States, 303, 304<sub>n</sub>, 308, 313–314, 324, 329–333, 336, 437
- Effendi, Muhammed, 325–326, 358, 385–387
- Egypt (*see also* Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi (ESS) Pact; Gaza Strip; Suez Canal crisis):  
 Aqaba, Gulf of, 498–499  
 Arab League Collective Security Pact participation, 1  
 Arab nationalism, 6, 202–203, 442, 487, 746<sub>n</sub>  
 Aswan Dam, 74, 668  
 Communist influence in, 176–177, 203, 206, 209  
 Czech military aid to (*see also* Soviet bloc military aid to *below*), 13, 177<sub>n</sub>, 187, 278, 577, 662  
 Gaza Strip, 428–429  
 Iraq, relations with, 525  
 Israel, relations with, 5, 441–442  
 Jordan, relations with, 2, 55, 59, 68, 70, 84, 89  
   Baghdad Pact, 9  
   Israeli position, 120
- Egypt—Continued
- Jordan, relations with—Continued  
 Political intrigue:  
   British position, 18, 20, 29<sub>n</sub>, 159–161  
   Israeli position, 120  
   Jordanian position, 24, 122–123  
   Turkish position, 168  
   U.S. position, 23, 33, 36, 100–101, 104, 108, 111, 113, 131, 156, 158, 161–162  
 Possible partition, 29  
 Turkish position, 168
- Lebanon, relations with, 177, 178, 183<sub>n</sub>
- Middle East, role in, 145  
 British position, 570  
 Iraqi position, 111<sub>n</sub>  
 Lebanese position, 202
- Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, relations with, 753
- Saudi Arabia, relations with, 29, 231, 337, 351–352, 365, 367, 386–387, 415, 572  
 Aqaba, Gulf of, 231, 499  
 British position, 328, 365  
 Buraimi dispute, 29, 285, 367  
 Yemeni–Saudi–Egyptian treaty, 363
- Soviet bloc military aid to (*see also* Czech military aid to *above*), 6, 124, 177, 187, 206, 278  
 Israeli position, 662  
 Lebanese position, 177
- Soviet military aid to, 6, 201, 273, 420, 435, 545, 596–597, 668  
 Iraqi position, 543
- Soviet Union, relations with, 168, 441, 545  
 Saudi position, 427
- Syria, relations with, 145, 508, 525, 566, 577, 580, 593–595  
 Egyptian political intrigue, 516<sub>n</sub>, 517, 526–528, 530, 536, 553, 555, 563, 572, 592, 634
- United Kingdom, relations with, 21, 377
- U.N. voting record, 578
- United States, relations with, 18, 50, 65, 146, 162, 429–430, 441–442, 667–669  
 1953 assurances, 713–714  
 U.S.–British discussions, 567  
 U.S. military and economic aid to, 171, 195, 476–477, 668

## Egypt—Continued

- Yemen, relations with, 363, 378, 753, 763
- Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi (ESS) Pact (*see also* Egypt; Saudi Arabia; Syria):
  - Arab–Israeli dispute, 41, 190
  - Baghdad Pact, opposition to, 41, 224, 518
  - British position, 313
  - Formation of, 518
  - Iraq, 44*n*, 52, 519*n*
  - Jordan, military and economic aid to, 11–12, 30*n*, 31, 37–38, 40, 58, 78–80, 85, 87, 313
  - Jordan, relations with, 2, 4, 25, 36, 38, 41, 43, 46*n*
  - Lebanese participation, 189–190, 191*n*
  - Saudi participation, 224
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 41, 313
  - Syria, 520*n*, 523*n*, 527, 566
  - U.S. position, 43, 520–522
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 19, 456, 596, 648*n*, 651
  - Arab heads of state meeting, 423, 468*n*
  - Arab oil boycott proposal, 403–404
  - Egypt, 168, 429, 486
  - Eisenhower Doctrine (*see also separate entry*), 108–109, 195*n*, 196, 205, 422, 609–610
  - Iraq, 686
  - Israel, 211, 430, 662*n*
  - Joint Congressional Resolution, *Jan.* 1955, 598*n*
  - Jordan, 6–7, 59, 87*n*, 103, 108–109, 113–115, 130–131, 212, 686, 699*n*
    - Political situation, 26, 89, 98, 131–132
    - U.S. military aid to, 137–139, 148, 155–156, 636
  - Lebanon, 176, 179–180, 204, 206–209, 212, 217, 659
  - Middle East, 49, 119, 145, 204–205, 215, 221, 342–343, 470–471
    - U.S. policy toward, 175, 213, 687–689
  - Muscat and Oman, 226–227, 230–231, 236, 238*n*, 239*n*, 240–242, 244, 246
  - Mutual Security Act, 199*n*
  - Saudi Arabia, 336, 354*n*, 368*n*, 405, 417–418, 421, 423–430, 439, 506–507
    - Arab–Israeli dispute, 407, 428–429, 499*n*

## Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued

- Saudi Arabia—Continued
  - Dhahran Airfield, 299–300, 369, 373, 380, 382, 389, 415, 419
  - Economic development, 425–426
  - Iran, relations with, 426–427
  - Saud visit, 374–375, 405–406, 413, 445–449, 478*n*, 481–485, 505, 612
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 427
  - Syria, relations with, 500
  - United Kingdom, relations with, 319, 334–338, 340, 396, 510*n*, 511*n*
  - U.S. military aid to, 370, 408*n*, 424–425, 466–467
- Syria, 429, 486, 594, 632*n*, 744
- Syrian crisis, 635, 640, 645, 653*n*, 659–660, 670*n*, 680–681, 715*n*, 732–733
- Turkey, 693*n*
- United Kingdom, 304, 308, 313–314, 329–333, 336, 444–445, 670*n*, 680–681, 682*n*, 732–733
  - Saudi Arabia, relations with, 319, 334–338, 340, 396, 510*n*, 511*n*
  - Yemen, 754–755, 762
- Eisenhower, Maj. John S. D., 645
- Eisenhower Doctrine (*see also* Middle East: U.S. military and economic aid to), 195*n*
  - Egyptian position, 197, 668
  - Iraqi position, 643
  - Jordanian position, 84, 91, 123
  - Lebanese position, 196–197, 202, 205, 209
    - And neutralism, 220
    - Propaganda, 716–717
    - Saudi position, 422, 489–490
    - Syrian position, 197, 609–610, 620, 624, 627–628, 631, 742, 744
    - Turkish position, 643
  - U.S. policy toward Jordan, 85, 93, 103, 105–106, 108–109, 115–116, 119, 122, 168
  - U.S. policy toward Lebanon, 198, 208, 215, 219–221
  - U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia, 418–419, 422, 489–490
  - U.S. policy toward Syria, 620–622, 624, 627–628, 631, 646, 650–651, 692–693, 695, 697–699, 713, 741–744
  - U.S. policy toward Turkey, 700

- Elbrick, C. Burke, 81*n*, 304, 397*n*, 706*n*, 725*n*
- Emmerson, John K., 177*n*, 178*n*, 179–180, 183–184, 186*n*
- Engen, Hans, 739
- Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), 586
- Eritrea, 753
- Erskine, 94–95
- Esenbel, Melih, 644, 653, 656, 723*n*, 724*n*
- Eshkol, Levi, 631
- ESS Pact. *See* Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi (ESS) Pact.
- Ethiopia, 753
- Evans, Allan, 449
- Evans, Delaven, 359
- Export-Import Bank, 255, 446, 457, 480, 570–572, 753
- Fahd ibn Saud, Prince, 96, 417, 431, 445, 481  
     U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 391*n*, 402, 433, 435, 449–451, 462, 477
- Faisal II, King, 43, 367, 373, 406*n*, 656–658, 671–673, 683
- Faisal ibn al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al Saud, 261–263, 311  
     China, People's Republic of, 261–262  
     Iraq, 349–350  
     Israel, 507  
     Jordan, 111–112, 131, 132*n*, 134, 153  
     United Kingdom, 282, 294–295, 307*n*, 335–336, 365, 393, 396  
     U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 260, 267*n*, 296–297, 298*n*, 373–374, 389, 402  
     U.S.–Saudi relations, 253, 255*n*, 256–257, 270–271, 287–288, 302*n*, 303*n*, 387, 505–507
- al-Fansa, Nazir, 540, 558, 560*n*
- al-Faqih, Sheik Asad, 257–259, 296, 299*n*, 300*n*, 413, 488*n*, 489*n*, 727
- Farhan, Hamad, 157
- Farouk, King, 27*n*, 576*n*
- Farsi and Arabi Islands, 425, 427, 437–438, 444, 472–473
- Fawzi, Mahmoud, 420*n*, 529*n*, 728–729, 738–739, 745
- Field, Col. Fred, 359
- Finn, Richard B., 192*n*
- Follis, Ralph Gwin, 331, 337
- Food and Agricultural Organization, 366
- Foster, Austin T., 264*n*, 271, 368*n*
- Foster Wheeler Company, 571, 586
- Fox, Lt. Gen. Alonzo P., 359
- France (*see also* Suez Canal crisis), 46, 182, 207, 247, 624  
     Saudi Arabia, relations with, 403, 408–409  
     Syria, relations with, 516*n*, 517, 526–528, 530, 536, 541, 553, 555, 593, 604–605
- Frank, Isaiah, 510, 730
- Frechtling, Louis E., 542*n*, 546*n*, 558*n*
- Fritzlan, A. David, 56*n*, 249, 254*n*, 257*n*, 259*n*, 393, 395*n*
- Fulbright, James W., 668, 743
- Funkhouser, Richard, 719
- Furnas, Howard E., 487*n*
- Gabler, Walter S., 748–749, 751, 756
- Gallman, Waldemar J., 49*n*, 96*n*  
     Iraq, 63, 322, 349, 664, 671, 683, 694*n*  
     Iraqi-Jordanian relations, 43, 44*n*, 45*n*, 53–54, 56*n*, 63, 141–143  
     Jordan, 51*n*, 52*n*, 111*n*, 127, 128*n*  
     Saudi Arabia, 291, 322, 349  
     Syria, 520*n*, 521, 543–544, 548–549, 552–553, 589*n*  
     Syrian crisis, 636, 664, 671, 683, 694*n*  
     Turkey, 673
- Gamon, David L., 237*n*
- Gargoni, Khalid, 269–271, 273, 278
- Garran, Isham Peter, 689
- Gay, Merrill C., 249, 264*n*, 456
- Gaza Strip, 176, 428–429, 443, 448–449, 521  
     Israeli occupation, 13, 64, 166, 428, 508, 614
- Geneva Conference, 268
- George, Walter F., 343
- Geren, Paul F., 317*n*, 378*n*
- Germany, Federal Republic of, 122
- el-Ghazzi, Said, 11, 183, 541*n*, 546*n*, 554, 560*n*, 566, 570
- Gleason, S. Everett, 606–607, 701–704
- Glubb, Lt. Gen. John Bagot, 10, 19, 22, 47  
     Dismissal, 26–28, 30–34, 37, 41, 57, 65, 68, 84
- Goodkind, Louis W., 334
- Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 130*n*, 285*n*, 404, 406*n*, 414–415, 645, 662*n*, 670*n*, 685–689
- Gordon, Thomas S., 635
- Graves, Hubert Ashton, 334
- Gray, Gordon, 268*n*, 334*n*, 341–342, 369*n*, 379, 389*n*, 415, 467, 542*n*  
     Saudi Arabia, 344–347, 453–455



- Gray, Gordon—Continued  
 Syria, 597, 703
- Greece, 109, 356, 434
- Green, Theodore F., 635
- Greene, Joseph N., Jr., 67*n*, 247, 661*n*
- Gromyko, Andrei A., 700, 702, 706, 713, 720, 738*n*
- Grover, Brig. Gen. Orrin L., 255
- Hagerty, James C., 103, 108–109, 327, 329, 334, 341–342, 567, 659, 680, 699*n*
- Haikal, Mohamed, 664*n*, 666
- Hamid Ad-Jin, Ahmad bir Yahya Muhammed, 500, 511, 748–749, 751, 757–769, 773*n*
- Hamilton, Charles W., 728
- Hammarskjöld, Dag, 15, 167, 420, 728, 731, 738–739
- Hamui, Mamun, 633, 637*n*
- Hananiya, Anastas, 130*n*
- Hancock, William, 359, 386, 395*n*, 396, 449
- Hare, Raymond A., 260, 270, 356, 545*n*, 612, 613*n*, 664–669, 744–746, 747*n*
- Harkavy, Yehoshafat, 644*n*
- Hart, Parker T., 170, 173, 174*n*, 249, 250, 251*n*, 520*n*, 524*n*
- Hasan, Ibrahim, 748–749, 751
- Hasan, Mahmud, 274
- Hashim Bey, Ibrahim, 10*n*, 17*n*, 109, 150
- Hawrani, Akram, 525–526, 676
- Hayter, William Goodenough, 159, 510, 730
- Heath, Donald B., 46*n*, 194  
 Lebanon, 114, 176, 184–185, 191*n*, 193*n*, 196–197, 199*n*, 208–211, 219*n*, 711*n*  
 U.S. military and economic aid to, 185–188, 208–209  
 Saudi Arabia, 508–509, 711*n*  
 Syria, 243, 697*n*, 712, 724
- Hedding, Adm. Truman, 379–381
- Hejaz Railway, 310–312, 349, 353, 369, 373, 577, 582
- Henderson, Loy W., 67*n*, 159, 232, 342, 496*n*, 632*n*, 767*n*  
 Iraq, 685–686  
 Israel, 662  
 Lebanon, 697*n*, 710–711  
 Middle East, 661, 680  
 Syrian crisis, 635, 640, 650, 652–653, 656, 658–659, 663–664, 666, 669–670, 680–682, 744
- Henderson, Loy W.—Continued  
 Turkey, 684  
 Yemen, 761
- Herter, Christian A., 122, 134*n*, 147*n*, 445, 481*n*, 510  
 Israel, 118–119, 121–122  
 Jordan, 92–97, 118–119, 126, 140–141, 154–155  
 Muscat and Oman, 234–238, 239*n*, 241–242  
 Syria, 632, 635–637, 639–640, 648, 730  
 Turkey, 730  
 Yemen, 761, 764, 765*n*, 767–768, 770
- Herzog, Chaim, 662
- Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 509
- Hill, Robert C., 342
- bin Himyar, Suleiman, 229
- Hiyari, Ali, 34, 94, 100–101, 157
- Hogaboom, Maj. Gen. Robert E., 530*n*
- Hollister, John B., 147, 411*n*, 764–765
- Holman, Eugene, 321
- Hood, Samuel, 510, 720, 722, 730
- Hooper, Robin William, 543–545, 548–549
- Hoover, Herbert, Jr., 20, 34*n*, 67*n*, 222*n*, 287, 309*n*, 327, 389*n*, 392*n*, 417, 431, 445, 597*n*  
 Egypt, 567  
 Iraq, 48–49, 349–350  
 Jordan, 30–32, 48–49, 51, 66–67, 74–75, 79*n*  
 Kuwait, 169  
 Lebanon, 177–178, 193  
 Middle East, 60–62, 343, 404  
 Saudi Arabia, 254–256, 285–286, 322, 326, 333–334, 336, 347–349, 351, 353, 404  
 Iraq, relations with, 349–350  
 Israel boycott demand, 264–267, 271*n*, 272*n*  
 Soviet Union, relations with, 267–268  
 United Kingdom, relations with, 289, 296, 302, 314–319, 332, 334–338, 364–365  
 U.S. military aid to, 259–261, 265–266, 344, 360*n*, 369*n*, 370, 414–415  
 Syria, 542–543, 550–551, 557–561, 567, 573, 582, 583*n*, 588–589, 590*n*, 591*n*, 607–608  
 United Kingdom, 193, 283, 303–304, 305*n*, 324, 329, 377*n*, 412–413

- Hoover, Herbert, Jr.—Continued  
 United Kingdom—Continued  
   Saudi Arabia, relations with, 289, 296, 302, 314–319, 332, 334–338, 364–365
- Hovell, Lt. Col., Bergen B., 530*n*
- Howe, Fisher, 130*n*, 481*n*, 579*n*, 639*n*, 652*n*, 653*n*, 662*n*, 670*n*, 674*n*, 727*n*  
 State Department communications systems, 651  
 Syrian crisis, 640, 738  
 U.S.—British relations, 377*n*
- Howison, John M., 154*n*
- Humphrey, George M., 341, 404
- Hungary, 60, 438, 596, 687
- al-Husayni, Jamal, 417, 423*n*, 431, 445, 481, 508–509, 724  
 Dhahran Airfield, 389, 391, 399  
 Yemen, 500, 758–759, 766
- Hussein, Ahmad, 378*n*, 745
- Hussein, King, 10, 12*n*, 83–84, 135, 165  
 Arab heads of state meeting, 406*n*, 421*n*, 447, 468, 612*n*  
 Baghdad Pact, 2  
 Egypt, 379  
 Iraq, 17–18, 350, 672  
 Jordanian foreign relations, 64, 66–70, 80–81, 111, 112*n*, 133, 158  
 Jordanian political situation, 14, 20–22, 34–38, 41–42, 45–47, 57–58, 60, 64, 89, 123, 124, 156–157, 159–162, 617, 675  
   U.S.—Israeli discussions, 115–116, 119–120  
 Military and economic aid for Jordan, 3–5, 8–9, 11, 72–79, 86, 127, 129*n*, 148–149, 155, 158–159  
 Middle East, 145  
 Saudi Arabia, 133*n*, 163, 379  
 Soviet Union, 718  
 Syrian crisis, 636–638, 644, 653–657, 689, 693*n*, 698, 699*n*  
 Turkey, 673  
 United Kingdom, 26–28, 29*n*, 30–33, 37, 62*n*, 64  
   U.S.—Jordanian relations, 40–41, 110, 112–114, 125, 130–131, 132*n*, 144*n*, 164–168, 734
- Hussein, Maj. Amin, 156
- Ibn Saud, King Abdul Aziz, 270*n*, 305, 307, 333, 384, 475, 711
- Ibrahim, Muhammad, 101
- Iceland, 381
- Ilah, Abdul (Abul Ilah ibn Ali ibn Husain al-Hashimi), 610, 685, 711  
 Jordan, 672, 686  
 Saudi Arabia, 671–673  
 Syrian crisis, 658, 671–673, 683, 689, 693*n*, 694, 696*n*  
 Turkey, 642*n*, 663–664, 670, 673
- Ilah, Amir Abdul, 35, 143, 466, 549, 556
- India, 78, 225, 262, 440, 578  
 Indonesia, 473, 739
- Innab, Maj. Gen. Radi, 27*n*, 45, 47, 48*n*
- Intelligence Advisory Committee, 102–103, 674*n*
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD):  
   Saudi Arabia, 435–436, 446, 456–457, 461, 464, 480, 506  
   Syria, 571–572, 665
- International Cooperation Administration (ICA):  
   Jordan, 7, 38–39, 66, 85–86, 118, 132  
   Lebanon, 183, 192, 195, 200, 217  
   Saudi Arabia, 416, 455, 494  
   Yemen, 764, 767–768, 770
- International Court of Justice, 321
- International Monetary Fund, 456–457, 464
- Iran, 121, 250–251, 356, 425, 427, 434, 437–438, 531, 715
- Iraq:  
   Arab League participation, 253*n*  
   British military aid, 124  
   Communist Party, 531  
   Economic situation, 62–63  
   Egypt, relations with, 525  
   ESS Pact, 44*n*, 52, 519*n*  
   Israel, relations with, 52, 55, 119  
   Jordan, possible intervention in, 17–18, 25, 90–91, 95, 105, 108  
     British position, 35  
     Iraqi position, 53–54, 59, 96*n*, 97, 99, 107  
     Israeli position, 52–55, 97, 116, 120  
     U.S. position, 52, 54–55, 93, 97, 110–111, 114  
   Jordan, relations with, 2, 19, 38, 41, 65, 69, 96, 103–104, 151, 158, 567  
     British position, 35  
     Economic aid, 43–45, 48, 49*n*  
     Israeli position, 96*n*, 97  
   Jordanian political situation, 96, 103–104  
   Possible Iraqi intervention, 90–91, 93, 95, 96*n*, 97, 99, 105, 107–108

## Iraq—Continued

- Jordan, relations with—Continued
  - Possible partition of Jordan, 25, 38, 68, 610
  - Syrian crisis, 672–673, 683, 685–686, 696*n*
  - Union proposal, 7, 14, 153
  - U.S. position, 43–44, 48–49, 68, 70–71, 164
- Lebanon, relations with, 177*n*, 180
- Muscat and Oman, 247
- Oil industry (*see also* Iraq Petroleum Company), 128
- Political situation, 35, 145–146, 322, 349, 671, 673, 685, 711, 742
- Saudi Arabia, relations with, 96, 145, 318–319, 349–350, 355, 365, 367
  - Baghdad Pact, 439–440
  - British position, 367, 368*n*
  - Hejaz Railway, 349
  - Syria, 525, 656, 658, 671–673
- Soviet Union, relations with, 718
- Syria, relations with, 349, 516, 519, 525, 528–529, 536, 575, 592, 656, 671–673
  - British position, 21, 548
  - Iraqi intervention, possible, 520–522, 523*n*, 528, 544–545, 548–549, 556, 568, 604–607, 610–613
  - Iraqi political intrigue, 527, 530, 555, 569–570
  - Oil industry (*see also* Iraq Petroleum Company), 349, 588–589, 611–612
  - Union proposal, 529, 545–546, 679
  - U.S. military aid to Iraq, 521, 661, 664, 700–701
- Turkey, relations with, 21, 549, 638, 642–644
- U.N. voting record, 578
- United Kingdom, relations with, 35, 259
- United States, relations with, 39, 42, 110–111, 466
  - Saudi Arabia, 253
  - Syria, 545–546, 647, 658, 683, 694–696, 700–701
- U.S. economic aid to, 692, 695, 696*n*
- U.S. military aid to, 52, 56, 182, 194–195, 199, 661, 714
  - Israeli position, 649
  - Jordanian position, 4, 124
  - Saudi position, 253, 356, 434

## Iraq—Continued

- U.S. military aid to—Continued
  - Syria, 521, 661, 664, 694–695, 700–701, 714, 733
  - U.S. military bases in, 384
- Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), 133*n*, 142
- Lebanon, 180
- Syrian pipeline, 548–549, 558–559, 570, 685
  - Sabotage, 504, 543, 594–595, 599–600, 607–608, 610–612, 614, 652, 703, 707, 709
  - U.S. aid to Iraq, 692, 695, 696*n*
- Israel (*see also* Arab–Israeli dispute; Suez Canal crisis):
  - Aqaba, Gulf of, shipping, 116, 120–121, 428, 481*n*, 490–491, 499, 508–509, 624
  - Arab position, 501
  - British military aid, 40
  - Economic situation, 119, 121–122
  - Egypt, relations with, 5
    - Border raids, 441–442
  - French military aid, 46, 665
  - German Federal Republic, relations with, 122
  - Immigration policy, 121, 620, 623, 631
  - Iraq, relations with, 52, 55, 119
  - Jordan, relations with, 31, 157–158
    - Fedayeen activity, 70
    - Israeli intervention, possible, 90–91, 93–97, 103–104, 106, 108
    - Jordanian partition, possible, 25, 29, 38
  - Jordan Valley Plan, 25, 99
  - Lebanon, relations with, 176–177, 184–185, 211
  - Military capabilities, 78*n*, 165
  - Oil industry, 264–265, 271*n*, 272
  - Political situation, 521
  - Saudi Arabia, relations with, 119, 269, 318, 333, 365, 424–425, 434
  - Sinai, withdrawal from, 614
  - Soviet policy toward, 648
  - Syria, relations with, 525, 536, 555, 648–649
    - Immigration policy, 620, 623, 631
    - Israeli intervention, possible, 604–607
  - Tiran and Sanafir Islands, 438, 444
  - Tiran Straits shipping, 116, 119–121
  - Turkey, relations with, 440
  - United Kingdom, relations with, 64
  - United States, relations with, 69, 166

- Israel—Continued  
 United States, relations with—  
 Continued  
 Jordan, 96–97, 99, 104–106, 110, 112,  
 114–116, 118–122  
 Saudi Arabia, 253, 360<sub>n</sub>  
 State visit proposal, 430  
 Syrian crisis, 646–650, 662–663,  
 690–691  
 U.S. military aid to Lebanon, 194,  
 199  
 U.S. forces in, 18  
 U.S. military aid to, 40, 45–46, 139<sub>n</sub>,  
 185–187, 194, 269, 341<sub>n</sub>, 360, 501,  
 559, 649  
 U.S. policy toward, 7, 82, 119, 120, 277  
 And U.S. Zionism, 394  
 Italy, 583, 585–586, 615
- Jabbar, Sheikh Ahmad Abdul, 299<sub>n</sub>,  
 300<sub>n</sub>, 326<sub>n</sub>, 505
- Jabr, Salih, 35
- al-Jabri, Majd al-Din, 584, 594–595, 599<sub>n</sub>
- Jackling, Roger William, 510, 730
- Jamali, Muhammed Fadhi, 517<sub>n</sub>, 671, 673
- Japan, 583
- Jawdat, Ali, 638, 671, 673, 683, 685, 694<sub>n</sub>,  
 711–712
- Jenkins, Alfred leSesne, 282–283, 613
- Jennings, Brewster, 271, 272<sub>n</sub>
- Jernegan, John D., 173, 259<sub>n</sub>, 263<sub>n</sub>, 267<sub>n</sub>,  
 516<sub>n</sub>, 517<sub>n</sub>, 524<sub>n</sub>, 652, 758
- Jerusalem, 18
- Jeton, Frank, 633
- Johnson, Charles E., 213<sub>n</sub>
- Johnson, John A., 290
- Johnson, Lyndon B., 635, 700
- Johnston, Eric, 2<sub>n</sub>, 13, 45, 73, 79–83, 91,  
 150–152, 160, 494, 534–535
- Johnston Mission, 534–535
- Johnston Plan. *See* Jordan Valley Plan.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
 Jordan, 107–108  
 Lebanon, U.S. military aid to, 188–191  
 Overseas bases, 381–382  
 Saudi Arabia, 290, 344, 383–385, 415
- Joint Strategic Plans Committee, 188–191
- Jones, John Wesley, 510, 730
- Jordan (*see also* Arab Legion; Arab States;  
*and* Jordan and Jordanian subentries under  
*other subjects*):  
 Anticommunism, 83–84  
 Arab Legion, 15–18, 42–43, 47
- Jordan—Continued  
 Arab Legion—Continued  
 British economic aid for, 2–3, 8, 50,  
 67–68  
 Dismissal of British officers, 26–35,  
 37–38, 68  
 Arab nationalism, 6, 84  
 Bedouins, 6, 94–95, 108  
 British economic aid to, 38, 58, 66–70,  
 74, 78, 81, 85, 87, 313  
 Arab Legion, 2–3, 8, 50, 67–68  
 British position, 76, 82–83  
 Development loans, 85  
 Jordanian position, 72  
 Payment deferments, 123–124, 126,  
 129, 140, 154  
 British military aid to, 2–4, 8, 11, 30<sub>n</sub>,  
 31–32, 51, 69, 87, 137
- China, People's Republic of, relations  
 with, 64, 66–70
- Communist influence in (*see also* Soviet  
 intrigue *under* Political situation  
*below*):  
 British position, 17, 20–21  
 Jordanian position, 23–24, 59, 123,  
 477  
 U.S. position, 16, 19, 23, 36, 75, 104,  
 111, 158, 245
- Economic situation, 7, 124, 140,  
 142–143, 146, 153  
 U.S.–British position, 150–151
- Egypt, relations with, 2, 9, 55, 59, 68,  
 70, 84, 89  
 Israeli position, 120  
 Possible partition, 29  
 Turkish position, 168
- Egyptian intrigue:  
 British position, 18, 20, 29<sub>n</sub>, 159–161  
 Israeli position, 120  
 Jordanian position, 24, 122–123  
 Turkish position, 168  
 U.S. position, 23, 33, 36, 100–101,  
 104, 108, 111, 113, 131, 156,  
 158, 161–162
- Egyptian military and economic aid to,  
 3, 42<sub>n</sub>, 46, 140–141, 143, 146, 625
- ESS Pact military and economic aid to,  
 11–12, 30<sub>n</sub>, 31, 37–38, 40, 58,  
 78–80, 85, 87, 313
- ESS Pact powers, relations with, 4, 25,  
 38, 41, 43, 189–190, 191<sub>n</sub>
- Iraq, relations with, 2, 19, 38, 41, 65,  
 69, 151, 158, 567

## Jordan—Continued

- Iraq, relations with—Continued
  - Jordanian political situation, 96, 103–104
  - Possible partition of Jordan, 25, 38, 68, 610
  - Syrian crisis, 672–673, 683, 685–686, 696*n*
  - Union proposal, 7, 14, 153
  - U.S. position, 43–44, 48–49, 68, 70–71, 164
- Iraqi forces in, 102, 123, 594
- Iraqi intervention, possible, 17–18, 25, 90–91, 95, 105, 108
  - British position, 35
  - Iraqi position, 53–54, 59, 96*n*, 97, 99, 107
  - Israeli position, 52–55, 97, 116, 120
  - U.S. position, 52, 54–55, 93, 97, 110–111, 114
- Iraqi military and economic aid to:
  - British position, 62*n*
  - Iraqi position, 49*n*, 56, 63, 111*n*, 127, 128*n*, 142
  - Jordanian position, 65, 127
    - And U.S. aid, 44, 48, 52, 70–71, 140–144
    - U.S. position, 40, 43–45, 48, 51, 63, 69, 81, 126, 128–129, 132
- Iraqi–Saudi talks, 127–128, 134
- Israel, relations with, 31, 157–158
  - Fedayeen activity, 70
  - Israeli intervention, possible, 90–91, 93–97, 103–104, 106, 108
  - Jordan, possible partition of, 25, 29, 38
- Israeli policy toward, 96–97, 99, 104–106, 114–116, 118–122
- Kuwait, relations with, 151
- Lebanon, relations with, 36, 46
- Military situation, 124, 151
- National Guard, 42
- Neutralism, 36–37
- Pakistan, relations with, 4, 153
- Palestinian refugees, 14, 45, 103
  - British position, 74, 151
  - Economic situation, 153
  - Political situation, 6, 13, 15*n*, 20–22, 24, 37–38, 57, 95, 108, 151, 162, 711
  - U.N. aid for, 13, 38
  - U.S. aid for, 13, 66, 77–78
  - U.S. position, 45, 151

## Jordan—Continued

- Political situation (*see also* Communist influence *and* Egyptian intrigue *above*), 6–7, 9, 10*n*, 12–13, 33–34, 47, 88–89, 90, 100–102, 163, 192
- Anti-British sentiment, 64
- Arab nationalism, 23, 33, 84, 104
- Army role, 84, 89, 94–95, 98, 108, 160, 162
- Bathiyiin, 84, 90–91, 157
- Bedouin role, 6, 94–95, 108
- British position, 20–22, 24–25, 35, 150–151
- Communist Party, 57–58, 84, 91, 531
- Coup attempt, *Apr. 13, 1957*, 92
- Dissolution of parliament, 57–58
- Egyptian position, 98, 146
- ESS influence, 38, 41
- Hiyari resignation, 100–101
- Iraqi position, 48*n*
- Iraqi role, 96, 103–104
- Israeli position, 99, 120
- Jordanian position, 122–123, 130–131
- Lebanese role, 104
- Liberation Party, 157
- Martial law, 106, 109
- Moslem–Christian conflict, 33, 37–38
- National Socialist Party, 90, 101
- Rioting, 9–10, 15–17, 19, 23, 37–38
- Saudi role, 20–21, 24, 96, 99, 102*n*, 103–104, 313
- Soviet intrigue, 122, 161–162
- Syrian intrigue, 100–101, 104, 108, 111, 113, 122–123, 156, 158–162, 617, 631
- Syrian position, 742
- U.S. position, 103, 106–107, 150–151, 711
- Partition, possible, 25–26, 29, 38, 68–69, 151, 610
- Riyadh–Medina Railroad, 460
- Saudi Arabia, relations with, 2, 133*n*, 158, 318
  - Israeli position, 116, 120
  - Jordanian political situation, 24, 96, 99, 102*n*, 103–104, 313
  - Saudi intervention, possible, 93–95, 108, 110–112, 120, 123
  - Jordanian partition, possible, 25, 29, 38, 69
  - Syrian crisis, 638, 699*n*
  - U.S. position, 69–71, 96, 99, 111–112, 151, 163–164, 350

## Jordan—Continued

- Saudi military and economic aid to, 128, 143–144, 146–147
  - Iraqi position, 142
  - U.S. position, 76–77, 79, 81, 126, 128, 134, 140–141
- Saudi forces in, 102–103, 108, 119, 123
- Saudi–Iraqi talks, 127–128, 134
- Soviet bloc military aid to, 42, 46
- Soviet Union, relations with, 6, 11, 40, 59, 64, 66–68, 76, 78–80, 82, 103, 106, 313, 718
- Syria, relations with, 11, 25, 68–69, 78–79, 89, 146
  - Defense pact, 59, 593–594
  - Jordanian political situation, 100–101, 104, 108, 111, 113, 122–123, 156, 158–162, 617, 631, 742
  - Jordanian partition, possible, 610
  - Syrian intervention, possible, 91, 93, 95, 105, 107, 110, 115–116, 594, 617, 631
- Syrian forces in, 102, 105, 108, 123, 617
- Syrian military and economic aid to, 140–141, 143, 146, 625, 631
- United Kingdom, relations with (*see also British subheadings above*), 4*n*, 5–7, 13–14, 22, 69, 73, 87, 151, 153
  - Baghdad Pact, 5
  - Dismissal of Arab Legion officers, 26–35, 37–38, 68
  - Jordanian position, 24–26
  - British intervention, possible, 18, 25, 35, 54*n*, 92–93, 107, 159–161
  - Severing of relations, 61–66, 68, 72, 81*n*, 84, 87–88, 129
  - Templer Mission, 7–8
  - U.S. position, 19, 31–32, 39–40, 41*n*, 72, 78–79
- U.N. economic aid to, 7, 13, 38–39, 66, 80
- U.N. role in, 60–61, 167
- United States, relations with, 12, 30–31, 65, 90, 130–131
  - Anti-U.S. rioting, 9–10, 15–17, 19, 23, 37–38
  - Arab–Israeli dispute, 46
  - Eisenhower Doctrine, 85, 93, 103, 105–106, 108–109, 115–116, 119, 122, 168
  - Israeli position, 69, 71, 105, 119–120

## Jordan—Continued

- United States, relations with—Continued
  - Jordanian position, 14, 164–166, 653–654
  - Palestinian refugees, 24
  - Possible U.S. intervention, 93, 103, 105–106, 108–109, 114–116, 159–161
  - Propaganda, 7, 38–39
  - Richards Mission, 96, 102, 105, 113, 117–118, 122
  - Sixth Fleet deployment, 108, 112, 114, 117, 122
  - Syrian crisis, 654–656, 698–699
  - Templer Mission, 20, 105
  - U.N. statement, 704–705
  - U.S. policy, 6–7, 38–39, 68–71, 74–75, 95–96, 110–113, 151, 162
  - U.S.–British discussions, 80, 86–88, 93–94, 139, 149–152, 154–155
  - U.S. economic aid to, 13, 44, 50, 74–75, 113, 117–118, 129, 132, 134, 140, 153–154
    - And British economic aid, 50, 66, 70
    - British position, 79*n*, 83, 88
    - Iraqi position, 63*n*
    - Iraqi role, 65, 69–70, 112*n*, 127, 133–134, 142–145, 147
    - Israeli position, 69, 71
    - Jordanian position, 59, 61*n*, 64, 68, 72, 77, 123–124, 127, 130*n*, 165, 655–656
    - Off–shore procurement, 143–144
    - Richards Mission, 133*n*
    - Saudi position, 112*n*
    - Saudi role, 73, 133–134
    - Syrian position, 624–625
    - Technical assistance, 39, 85
    - Turkish position, 89
    - U.S. position, 74, 76, 78, 80–82, 85–86, 125, 144–147, 167–168
  - U.S. military aid to, 3, 7–8, 56, 66, 72, 113, 117, 128–130, 152, 167–168, 501, 661, 714
    - Arab–Israeli dispute, 64–65
    - Baghdad Pact, 4*n*, 5
    - Conditions for, 476–477
    - Equipment, 3, 148–149, 155–156, 158
    - Iraqi position, 51, 55, 59
    - Iraqi role, 52, 54, 56, 65, 69, 127, 136–137
    - Israeli position, 155*n*, 156*n*, 636

## Jordan—Continued

- U.S. military aid to—Continued
  - Jordanian position, 46, 61*n*, 124, 165, 655
  - Off-shore procurement, 137–138
  - Saudi role, 73, 127, 136–137
  - Syrian crisis, 654, 661, 664, 714, 733–734
  - Training, 149
  - U.S. position, 40, 46, 82, 85, 125, 132–141
  - U.S. missionaries in, 38
  - Western orientation of, 1, 55, 80, 95, 157, 192
  - Yarmuk River, 85
- Jordan Valley Plan, 2*n*, 7, 13, 15, 23, 25, 99, 171, 177, 535–536
- Kalijarvi, Thorsten V., 582
- al-Kallas, Khalil, 594–595
- Karam, Georges, 179, 180*n*
- Kayyali, Ghalib, 610*n*, 622*n*, 626–628
- Kellogg Company, 586
- Kelly, Thomas R., 249
- Kern, Harry, 299*n*, 326*n*
- al-Khalidi, Fakhri Husayn, 90*n*, 95, 100–101, 104, 109
- al-Khalidi, Rasim, 456–457
- al-Khayyal, Sheikh Abdullah, 361–362, 393–394, 456, 458, 461, 468, 481, 505
  - Buraimi dispute, 289*n*, 303
  - United Kingdom, 338–339, 355, 362, 364, 511
  - U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia, 275–277, 279–280, 289*n*, 303
- Khouri, Victor A., 181–182, 184–185, 220, 524–525
- Khrushchev, Nikita S., 278, 351, 687–688, 707
- al-Khuri, Faris, 514–515
- King, Gen. Richard, 359
- Kirk, Roger, 37*n*, 392*n*, 396*n*, 597*n*
- Kirkbride, Alec S., 32*n*
- Kirkpatrick, Ivone A., 28–29, 223–225, 301*n*, 304, 307–308
- Knowland, William F., 343, 635, 688, 700
- Korea, 485
- Kotob, Anwar, 626*n*
- al-Koudsi, Nazim, 594
- Kuneralp, Zeki, 693*n*
- Kuwait, 151, 169, 315, 339, 355, 426–427, 487
- Kuwait Oil Company, 169
- Kuwatly. *See* al-Quwatli, Shukri.
- Laboulaye, François de, 605
- Lahud, Salim, 178*n*
- Lakeland, Albert A., Jr., 191*n*, 753–754, 771*n*
- Lang, William, 359
- Larson, Arthur, 715*n*
- Laskey, Dennis Seward, 73, 510, 730
- Lathram, L. Wade, 456, 464*n*, 480*n*
- Lavrentyev, Anatoliy Iosifovich, 269
- Lawson, Edward B., 97*n*, 99, 115–116, 118*n*, 119
- Lebanon (*see also* Arab States; *Lebanon and Lebanese subheadings under other subjects*):
  - Arab nationalism, 202–203
  - British military aid to, 178, 182, 193, 199*n*
  - Christians in, 172
  - Communism in, 183, 201, 209, 531
  - Egypt, relations with, 177, 178, 183*n*
  - ESS Pact, 189–190, 191*n*
  - French military aid to, 182
  - Iraq, relations with, 177*n*, 180
  - Israel, relations with, 176–177, 184–185, 211
  - Jordan, relations with, 36, 46
  - Jordan Valley Plan, 171, 177
  - Middle East regional defense, 172, 174–175, 309
  - Military capabilities, 190
  - Oil industry, 180, 709
  - Palestinian refugees, 187–188
  - Political situation, 172, 177–178, 201, 206, 211, 219, 313
    - Army role, 202
    - Egyptian intrigue, 194, 201, 206, 209–210, 212, 216, 219
    - Soviet intrigue, 216
    - Syrian intrigue, 194, 201, 206, 209–210, 216, 219, 742
    - Syrian crisis, 659, 685, 692, 694, 698, 706, 708, 713
  - Saudi Arabia, relations with, 508
  - Soviet bloc military aid to, 189–190
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 187, 201
  - Syria, relations with, 177*n*, 178, 183, 186, 210–211, 709
  - U.N. voting record, 578
  - United States, relations with, 39, 175–176, 204–207
    - Eisenhower Doctrine, 198, 208, 215, 219–221
    - Jordan, 71, 114–115
    - Syrian crisis, 696–697, 710–714

- Lebanon—Continued
- U.S. economic aid to, 170*n*, 171, 173, 187, 192, 195–196, 198–200, 208–213, 215, 219
    - British position, 178
    - Egyptian position, 668
    - U.S. forces in, 108
    - U.S. military aid to, 188, 190–193, 212, 215–216, 220, 501, 546–547, 550–551
    - And Arab–Israeli dispute, 170*n*, 176, 179–180, 184–187, 199
    - Baghdad Pact, 3
    - British position, 178
    - Eisenhower Doctrine, 198
    - Israeli position, 649
    - Lebanese position, 170–172, 174–176, 181, 183, 186, 200–202, 207, 209, 219
    - Syrian crisis, 638, 697, 733
    - U.S. position, 173–174, 179–180, 182–185, 188–191, 194–195, 210–211, 217–218, 540–543
    - U.S. policy toward, 196–197, 213–215
    - Western orientation of, 171–172, 181, 189, 200, 202
  - Leishman, Frederick John, 510, 730
  - Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 701
  - Libya, 109, 307, 346, 381–382, 460, 656
  - Liebesny, Herbert J., 234*n*, 498*n*
  - Lightner, E. Allen, Jr., 379, 632*n*
  - Lilienthal, Alfred, 394
  - Lindsay, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 290
  - Lister, Ernest A., 334
  - Lloyd, Selwyn, 20–21, 29, 73–76, 79*n*, 94, 159–160, 509–510
    - Buraimi dispute, 322–324, 327–328, 331, 365–366, 377–378, 388–389, 392–393
    - Middle East issues, 732–733
    - Muscat and Oman, 228–230, 231*n*, 232–233, 236, 241, 244, 246–248
    - Saudi Arabia, 322–324, 327–329, 330–331, 334–336, 364–366, 370, 377–378, 396–397
    - Syria, 569–570, 647–648, 720–722, 730–733
  - Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 246–247, 414, 724–725, 728–731, 739–740
  - Loutfi, Omar, 739
  - Luce, Henry Robinson, 262*n*
  - Lucet, Charles E., 605
  - Lummus Company, 583, 586, 589–590
  - McAfee, William, 102, 487*n*
  - MacArthur, Douglas, II, 70, 315, 327, 329, 334, 351–352, 370, 377*n*, 382, 404, 567
  - McCardle, Carl W., 16, 334*n*
  - McGuire, E. Perkins, 379–382
  - McKinnon, Robert A., 652*n*
  - Macmillan, Harold M., 87*n*, 137, 178, 304*n*, 681, 749
    - Buraimi dispute, 289, 293, 301–303, 305, 511*n*
    - Muscat and Oman, 226–227, 230–233, 238*n*, 239*n*, 240–242
    - Saudi Arabia, 289, 293, 509*n*, 510*n*
    - Syrian crisis, 659, 670*n*, 681–682, 689, 732–733
    - U.S.–British relations, 510*n*, 686
  - Macomber, William B., 73, 196*n*, 313*n*, 375*n*, 472*n*, 561*n*, 700*n*
  - McSweeney, John M., 664
  - Mahayri, Issam, 538*n*
  - Mahdi, Mohammad, 275, 361, 393
  - Main, Charles T., 171*n*
  - al-Majali, Haza, 9–10, 57, 101, 127–128
  - Majid, Abdul Aziz, 431, 468, 481
  - Makins, Roger M., 17, 20, 285*n*, 327, 392*n*
    - Jordan, 34–35, 81–82
    - Kuwait, 169
    - Saudi Arabia, 285, 303–304, 317–318, 322*n*, 329, 334, 351, 377*n*, 396, 397*n*
    - Syria, 544*n*, 567
    - U.S.–British relations, 313*n*, 377*n*
  - Malik, Charles, 179, 192, 200–203, 387, 511, 526*n*
    - Lebanese political situation, 194, 206, 219
    - Syria, 524–527, 662*n*, 689, 693*n*, 696, 697*n*
    - U.S. aid to Lebanon, 170–173, 209–211
    - U.S.–Lebanese relations, 174–176, 196–197, 204, 207–209, 220, 710–714
  - Malki, Col. Adnan, 523–525, 527, 538, 564, 630
  - Mallory, Lester D., 49–50, 55–56, 67*n*, 83*n*, 124
    - Baghdad Pact, 1–2, 8–9
    - Jordan:
      - Arab States, relations with, 45–47
      - Foreign aid to, 2–5, 11–12, 31, 42*n*, 80–81, 127
      - Iraq, relations with, 44, 90



## Mallory, Lester D.—Continued

## Jordan—Continued

Political situation, 10, 12–17, 21–23,  
32–34, 36, 41, 88–91, 100–102,  
122–123, 156–158, 160

Saudi Arabia, relations with, 133*n*,  
699*n*

United States, relations with, 6–7,  
130*n*, 131*n*, 164–166

U.S. economic aid to, 59, 61*n*, 64–67,  
72–73, 75*n*, 78*n*, 79*n*, 85–86, 125

U.S. military aid to, 59, 85, 112, 125,  
132*n*, 152, 155*n*, 158, 165–166

Soviet Union, 705*n*

Syrian crisis, 636, 699*n*

United Kingdom, 26–28, 61*n*, 72

## Mannesman Company, 615

Mansfield, Mike, 688, 700

Markham, Comdr. Richard, 359

Martin, Maj. James, 359

Massoud, Muhammed, 352, 391*n*, 399*n*,  
431, 449

Mead, Maj. Gen. Armistead D., 701

Mediterranean Refining Company, 180

Meir, Golda, 97*n*, 115–116, 118*n*, 119

Menderes, Adnan, 168

Iraq, 258, 514, 670

Syria, 591, 617, 638

Syrian crisis, 642–644, 647, 654,  
656–658, 670, 672–673, 684, 689,  
691, 693*n*, 706*n*

Merchant, Livingston T., 20, 327, 329,  
334, 510, 567, 730

Metzger, Stanley D., 210*n*

Middle East (*see also individual countries*):

Arab nationalism in, 197, 202–203, 206,  
447, 666–667

British military aid to, 195, 541

British policy toward, 18–19, 29, 36,  
49–50, 137, 207, 570, 631

Chinese People's Republic policy  
toward, 642

Communist influence in, 14, 75,  
201–203, 418, 420

Lebanese position, 205–206

Saudi position, 206, 325*n*, 447

U.S.–Saudi talks, 438–439

Egyptian role in, 111*n*, 145, 202, 570

European military aid to, 195

French policy toward, 49, 207, 631

Jordanian role in, 97, 108

Lebanese role in, 214

Neutrality in, 14, 268, 666

NATO role in, 692–693

## Middle East—Continued

Oil industry, 403, 496–497, 504, 584,  
590

Regional defense (*see also* Northern Tier  
defense organization), 170*n*, 172,  
174–175, 309, 688

Saudi role in, 351, 405, 432, 445

Soviet military aid to, 206, 687

Soviet policy toward, 7, 60, 268, 278,  
531, 561, 642, 655, 666–667, 732

Possible intervention, 193, 197

U.S. position, 74, 500–501, 657, 667,  
680, 704–705

Syrian role in, 556, 712

Turkish role in, 655

U.N. economic aid to, 631

U.S.–British relations, 366–368, 659

U.S. military and economic aid to (*see  
also* Eisenhower Doctrine),  
342–343, 541, 559, 624–625, 689*n*

And Syrian crisis, 342–343, 635, 645,  
650–651, 654

Syrian position, 624, 631

U.S. policy toward (*see also* Eisenhower  
Doctrine), 49, 60, 204, 207, 213,  
432, 556, 666–667, 704–705,  
711–712

Middle East Emergency Committee,  
703–704, 707

West, distrust of, 201–202

Middle East Doctrine. *See* Eisenhower  
Doctrine.

Middle East Emergency Committee,  
403–404, 703–704, 707

Miller, Elliot H., 249

Miner, Robert Graham, 653–658,  
670–673, 696*n*

Mishaal, Prince, 267*n*, 276*n*, 287,  
325–326, 357, 387

Moline, Edwin G., 412

Mollet, Guy, 404, 445

Molloy, Col. Robert W., 537*n*, 540*n*, 546,  
563*n*, 565*n*, 633, 660

Moose, James S., Jr.:

Middle East, 568, 717*n*

Syria, 537*n*, 572, 587, 609–610,  
622–623, 634, 640–641

Iraq, relations with, 515, 529,  
610–612

Oil pipeline, 594–595, 599–600, 607*n*,  
608*n*

- Moose, James S., Jr.—Continued
- Syria—Continued
- Political situation, 515, 517*n*, 519–520, 523*n*, 525–528, 537–539, 553–557, 562–564, 613*n*, 618
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 546*n*, 596–597
  - United States, relations with, 523–524, 540–542, 558*n*, 565*n*, 620–623, 625–632, 635, 742
  - U.S. military aid to, 547–548, 558*n*, 559, 560*n*, 566
- Morgan, Thomas E., 635
- Morocco, 244, 381, 629, 656
- Morris, Willie, 8, 20, 92, 94, 327, 329, 510, 567, 689, 720, 730
- Morton, Thruston B., 342
- al-Mufti, Said, 9, 47, 57, 90, 100, 157
- Mumtaz, Ali, 671
- Murphy, Robert D., 67*n*, 134*n*, 237*n*, 238*n*, 254*n*, 268*n*, 334, 342, 370, 375, 377*n*, 379, 381–382, 387*n*, 404, 472*n*, 478*n*, 480*n*, 510, 661*n*, 725*n*
- Middle East, 707–709
- Muscat and Oman, 238–240, 241*n*, 243–244
- Saudi Arabia, 251, 254*n*, 278–279, 456–461, 469–470, 488*n*, 489*n*, 503–504
- U.S. military aid to, 344, 347*n*, 449–450, 452–453, 462, 464–467, 477
- Syria, 573–574, 586, 588*n*, 597–598, 605–606, 614, 632*n*, 635, 640, 730
- Turkey, 706–707, 730
- United Nations, 463, 704–705
- Yemen, 761
- Musaad, 417, 431, 445, 481
- Muscat and Oman (*see also* Buraimi dispute):
- Arab position, 238
  - British position, 223–227, 234, 236–241, 244–247
  - Egyptian role, 227, 232, 235
  - Iraqi position, 244, 247
  - Oil industry, 226*n*, 227*n*, 230–231, 236
  - Press coverage, 226*n*, 227*n*
  - Saudi Arabia, relations with, 223–225, 227, 229, 232–236, 244
  - Treaty of al-Sib, 1920, 228*n*, 242, 245
  - Soviet role in, 235, 247
  - Syrian role in, 235
- Muscat and Oman—Continued
- United Kingdom, relations with, 314, 331, 487
  - Military intervention, 228–229, 236, 304
  - U.N. role, 237–242, 244–248
  - United States, relations with, 225–226
  - U.S.—British cooperation, 222–223, 228–231, 236, 238–240, 243–246
  - U.S. position, 231–232, 236
- Mutual Defense Act, 1949, 265*n*
- Mutual Security Act, 1954, 135–137, 139, 191*n*, 199, 210*n*
- al-Nabulsi, Sulayman, 57*n*, 72–79, 84, 86, 88–89, 98, 100, 124, 617
- Jordanian political situation, 83*n*, 89, 90*n*, 91, 95, 120, 151, 161
- al-Namlah, Muhammad, 449
- Nasser, Gamal Abd'al, 27*n*, 49–50, 111*n*, 125, 146, 444, 567, 570, 678, 763
- Arab heads of state meeting, 421*n*, 447, 468, 612*n*
  - Arab-Israeli dispute, 14–15
  - Arab nationalism, 55, 84, 104, 145, 151, 202, 207, 273, 414
- Baghdad Pact, 5
- Czechoslovakia, 278
- Israel, 46*n*
- Jordan, 18, 28, 38, 41, 112–117, 120, 142, 157, 159, 162, 168
- Lebanon, 194
- Muscat and Oman, 227, 230, 236
- Saudi Arabia, 351–352, 377–378, 403, 409, 429, 572
- Soviet Union, 6, 427, 441, 545, 596, 713
- Suez oil pipeline, 504
- Syria, 445, 519, 578, 607*n*, 608*n*, 675–676, 744–745
- Syrian crisis, 639, 643, 656, 662, 671, 673
- United Kingdom, 2*n*, 21
  - U.S.—Egyptian relations, 65, 274, 298, 442, 714
  - Yemen, 750
- Nasser, Sheriff, 89, 160
- National City Bank, 572
- National Intelligence Advisory Committee, 189
- National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 30–57, 486–488

## National Security Council:

- Actions:
  - 1290-d*, 530, 562
- Documents:
  - NSC *5428*, 249*n*
- Jordan, 19, 89, 98, 131, 145
- Lebanon, 212
- Meetings:
  - 255th*, 539–540
  - 272d*, 19
  - 303d*, 403–404
  - 305th*, 606–607
  - 309th*, 754–755
  - 310th*, 414
  - 319th*, 89, 212
  - 320th*, 98
  - 323d*, 131
  - 326th*, 145–146
  - 329th*, 762
  - 336th*, 701–704
- Middle East, 189
- Oil industry, 249*n*, 403–404
- Saudi Arabia, 414
- Syria, 539–540, 606–607, 701–704
- Yemen, 754–755, 762
- Nègre, André, 516*n*
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 225, 262
- Nelson, Harold S., 84, 124
- Nemtchina, Sergi S., 611
- Newsom, David D., 111*n*, 128*n*, 133*n*, 222*n*, 263*n*, 265*n*, 267*n*, 271*n*, 272*n*, 278*n*, 285*n*, 291*n*, 296*n*, 301*n*, 302*n*, 305*n*, 306*n*, 309*n*, 347*n*, 349*n*, 363*n*, 364*n*, 370*n*, 378*n*, 389*n*, 395*n*, 396*n*, 410*n*, 464*n*, 478*n*, 494*n*, 511*n*, 545*n*, 588*n*, 727*n*, 751*n*, 752*n*, 764*n*, 771*n*
- Buraimi dispute, 274, 338, 339*n*
- Saudi Arabia, 275–277, 321, 359, 361, 374, 379, 380*n*, 382, 449, 468, 475
- Yemen, 770
- Nickerson, Albert, 264
- al-Nimr, Abd al-Halim, 90
- Nixon, Richard M., 413
- Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 733–734
- North Africa, 46, 300, 655
- North Atlantic Council, 706, 707*n*, 709*n*
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 7, 174, 161, 672–673
- Sixth Fleet deployment, 733
- Turkey, 700, 711
- Northern Tier defense organization, 7, 157, 516, 555, 561
- Iraqi participation, 253–254
- Lebanese participation, 170*n*, 171–172

## Northern Tier defense organization—

- Continued
- Saudi position, 253–255, 259, 270
- U.S. support for, 259
- Norway, 739
- Nowfel, Camille, 468, 481, 505
- Nuwar, Maj. Gen. Ali Abu, 34*n*, 47, 48*n*, 59–61, 68, 617
- Jordanian foreign relations, 62*n*, 64, 66–67, 78
- Jordanian political situation, 64, 90, 92, 94, 100–102, 124, 160–161
- Ohliger, Floyd, 406
- Oil industry:
  - Aden Protectorates, 286
  - And Arab nationalism, 14
  - British interests, 226*n*, 227*n*, 230–231, 323, 487, 496–497
  - Buraimi dispute, 286, 335
  - Dhofar, 225–226
  - Egyptian position, 309
  - Farsi and Arabi Islands, 438
  - Iran, 250–251
  - Iraq, 128
  - Iraq Petroleum Company, 133*n*, 142
  - Syrian pipeline, 548–549, 558–559, 570, 685
  - Sabotage, 504, 543, 594–595, 599–600, 607–608, 610–612, 614, 652, 703, 707, 709
  - U.S. aid to Iraq, 692, 695, 696*n*
- Israel, 264–267, 271–272
- Kuwait, 169, 487*n*
- Labor problems, 310
- Lebanon, 180, 709
- Muscat and Oman, 226, 227*n*, 230–231, 236
- Persian Gulf sheikdoms, 310, 315, 323, 487
- Saudi Arabia, 258, 264–267, 323–324, 328–330, 348, 405, 432, 503–505
- Israel boycott demand, 264–265, 271*n*, 272
- Labor problems, 310
- Onassis agreement, 249–252, 259
- Revenues from, 293, 319, 321, 332–334, 337, 347–348, 492, 549
- Syrian refinery construction, 588–589
- U.S. interests, 309, 320, 375–377
- Western boycott proposal, 403–404
- Western interests, 317*n*, 375–377, 496–497, 584, 590
- Socony Mobil, 250, 264–267, 271*n*, 272

- Oil industry—Continued  
 Standard Oil Company, 271*n*, 321, 331, 337, 571, 582–585, 769–770  
 Suez Canal crisis, 403, 419, 607, 707  
 Suez pipeline, 504  
 Syria (*see also* Iraq Petroleum Company *above*), 585  
   Refinery construction, 570–571, 577, 582–586, 588–593, 614–617  
 TAPLINE, 71, 180, 503*n*, 504, 585, 599  
 Western boycott proposal, 403–404  
 Western interests, 317*n*, 375–377, 496–497, 584, 590  
 Yemen, 756
- O’Keefe, Brig. Gen. Richard J., 359
- Oman. *See* Muscat and Oman.
- Omar, Caliph, 362
- Onassis agreement, 249–252, 259
- Onassis, Aristotle Socrates, 249*n*, 250, 503
- Operations Coordinating Board, 213–215, 415, 530–537, 562, 703
- Oulashin, Eric E., 392*n*, 396*n*, 472*n*
- Owen, Maj. Edwin B., 359, 449
- Page, Howard, 582, 583*n*, 584
- Pahlavi, Shah Mohammed Riza, 270, 427
- Pakistan, 4, 153, 400, 440, 473
- Palestinian refugees, 14, 24, 45, 103  
   And Arab–Israeli dispute, 157, 187, 623  
   British position, 74, 151  
   Economic aid for, 13, 38, 66, 77–78  
   Jordanian economic situation, 153  
   Jordanian political situation, 6, 13, 15*n*, 20–22, 37–38, 95, 108, 151, 162, 711  
   Lebanon, 187  
   U.N. aid for, 13, 38  
   U.S. aid for, 13, 66, 77–78  
   U.S. position, 45, 151
- Parker, Richard B., 86–88, 117*n*, 118, 148*n*, 161*n*
- Parke, Roderick W., 332, 335, 363*n*, 365, 393
- Parsons, Marselis C., 412, 510, 730
- Perkins, George W., 706*n*, 707
- Persian Gulf, 438, 491
- Persian Gulf sheikhdoms:  
   Arab nationalism in, 315  
   Egypt, relations with, 753  
   Oil industry, 310, 315, 323, 487  
   Saudi Arabia, relations with, 245, 309  
   Soviet policy toward, 753  
   Persian Gulf sheikhdoms—Continued  
   United Kingdom, relations with, 29*n*, 231–232, 236, 245, 292, 309–310, 314, 328–331, 355, 486–488  
   Oil industry, 323, 328, 487  
   U.S. policy toward, 226, 284, 309  
   Petroleum Refinery Institute (Syria), 370–371, 583  
   Philby, St. John, 358  
   Philippines, 247  
   Phillips, Horace, 287, 340, 341*n*  
   Phleger, Herman, 342, 404, 559  
   Poland, 310–312, 353, 577  
   Prochnow, Herbert V., 334  
   Procon Ltd., 588–590, 615–617  
   Public Roads, U.S. Bureau of, 772
- Qatar, 280*n*, 310, 331, 396, 487
- Quarles, Donald, 290–291, 380, 382, 467, 651, 685
- al–Quwatli, Shukri, 312, 406*n*, 408*n*, 579–580, 596, 612*n*
- Egypt, 145, 409, 662
- Saudi Arabia, 409, 580
- Soviet Union, 558, 578, 594, 596–597, 606
- Syrian political situation, 54*n*, 553–554, 639, 662, 677
- U.S.–Syrian relations, 558*n*, 566
- Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 103, 191*n*, 334, 379–380, 383–385, 597–598
- Rafiq Arif, Maj. Gen. Amir Al–Liwa Muhammad, 658, 671, 673
- al–Rahim, Sgt. Younis Abd, 523
- Ralph M. Parsons Company, 571, 583, 589–590
- Ras al–Khaima, 355
- al–Rawi, Abduljalil, 520*n*, 523*n*, 610
- Rawi, Najib, 387
- Raymond, John M., 210*n*
- Reams, Robert B., 632*n*, 640
- Red Sea, 753, 770
- Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 710
- Richards, James P., 113, 117, 133, 622*n*, 661, 755, 764
- Jordan, 83, 85, 88–91, 96, 100, 102, 105
- Lebanon, 115, 208, 210, 212, 215–216
- Saudi Arabia, 417, 431, 445, 468, 489–493
- Syria, 640, 646
- Richards Mission, 87–88, 133*n*, 439, 480, 622, 757–762, 764
- Jordan, 96, 102, 105, 113, 117–118, 122

- Rifa'i, Abdul Monem, 16, 21-26, 30-31, 88-89
- al-Rifai, Samir, 17, 26, 33, 47, 166
- Jordanian political situation, 18, 21-23, 25, 34-36, 122-124, 150, 160-161
- U.S.-Jordanian relations, 125, 130*n*, 132*n*, 140*n*, 148-149, 152, 164, 166
- Rimawi, Ba Thi, 90, 91, 101, 120, 161
- Riyadh-Medina Railroad, 457, 460-461
- Roberts, Randolph, 570
- Robertson, Reuben B., 334, 379, 381, 404, 466-467
- Rockwell, Stuart W., 49*n*, 52*n*, 61*n*, 74*n*, 83*n*, 154*n*, 158*n*, 164*n*, 193*n*, 195*n*, 198*n*, 199*n*, 219*n*, 500*n*, 607*n*, 612*n*, 614*n*, 636*n*, 637*n*, 646*n*, 663*n*, 690*n*, 691*n*, 694*n*, 696*n*, 698*n*, 706*n*, 707*n*, 723*n*, 746*n*
- Jordan, 92, 94
- Lebanon, 220
- Syria, 640, 720, 722
- Roosevelt, Archibald, 640, 653*n*
- Roosevelt, Kermit, 761
- Roper, John Charles Abercromby, 510, 730
- Rose, Michael, 9
- Rountree, William M., 31*n*, 34*n*, 41*n*, 43*n*, 44*n*, 48*n*, 51*n*, 52*n*, 56*n*, 57*n*, 60*n*, 61*n*, 66*n*, 74*n*, 76*n*, 83*n*, 95*n*, 117*n*, 128*n*, 129*n*, 133*n*, 148*n*, 161*n*, 167*n*, 184*n*, 191*n*, 193*n*, 301*n*, 329, 349*n*, 363*n*, 453*n*, 494*n*, 511*n*, 569*n*, 579*n*, 588*n*, 591*n*, 607*n*, 612*n*, 619*n*, 636*n*, 645*n*, 647*n*, 648*n*, 650*n*, 652*n*, 661*n*, 663*n*, 670*n*, 685*n*, 690*n*, 691*n*, 694, 696*n*, 698*n*, 715*n*, 725*n*, 727*n*, 746*n*, 750*n*, 766*n*, 771*n*
- Israel, 118, 120-122, 499*n*
- Jordan, 30*n*, 67*n*, 98-99, 104-105, 118, 120, 134-139, 140*n*, 143, 145*n*, 146-147, 153
- Lebanon, 216-217, 220
- Middle East, 194-196, 659-660
- Saudi Arabia, 351, 370-371, 374-375, 404, 414-415, 417, 431, 445, 454*n*, 468, 481, 499*n*, 503*n*, 505
- State Department communications systems, 651
- Syria, 567, 573-574, 588-591, 613*n*, 614-617, 740-744
- Syrian crisis, 632-635, 637*n*, 639-640, 659-660, 685, 688, 718, 720-722, 730-731, 735-737
- Rountree, William M.—Continued
- United Kingdom, 20, 80, 247, 315, 317, 319, 327, 329, 364, 366-368, 510-511, 689, 770
- Yemen, 473, 752, 761, 769-770
- Rowan, Thomas Leslie, 20, 327, 329, 334, 567
- Rumania, 578
- Russell, Francis H., 273*n*, 315
- Ryan, Andrew, 280*n*
- al-Sabah, Abdullah al-Salim, 169
- Sabri, Capt., 449
- al-Sabri, Ali, 746
- Sadat, Anwar, 176
- Al bu Said, Said ibn Taimur, Sultan, 274, 392:
- Muscat and Oman, 225-226, 231-232, 246*n*, 252*n*
- Saudi Arabia, 235, 241, 244, 330-331, 339, 497, 511
- United Kingdom, 222-223, 230-232, 314, 330-331, 511
- al-Said, Gen. Nuri Pasha, 35
- Baghdad Pact, 19, 258, 409
- Iraqi political situation, 62*n*, 145-146, 671, 673, 683, 685, 711-713
- Jordan, 21, 42-45, 48-49, 63, 107, 110, 112-113, 117, 144
- Iraqi aid to, 51-54, 56, 63, 111*n*, 127-129, 133-134, 136, 141-143, 144*n*
- Muscat and Oman, 244
- Saudi Arabia, 322, 349, 367
- Soviet Union, 552, 711-712
- Syria, 543-546, 548-549, 551*n*, 552-553, 557, 569-570, 579, 588-589, 603-604, 606-607, 670
- United Kingdom, 82-83, 259
- Salah, Walid, 1
- Salim, Maj. Salaheddin Moustafa, 172, 518
- Samuel, Ian, 20, 317, 321, 327, 329, 334, 567
- Sanafir Islands, 438, 444
- Sandys, Duncan, 444-445
- Sanger, Richard H., 160
- Sarraj, Col. Abd al-Hamid, 523, 599*n*, 602, 640, 676-677, 679
- Satterthwaite, Livingstone, 530*n*
- Saud, King ibn Abd al-Aziz, 43, 258, 262*n*, 336, 675, 711
- Anticommunism, 206, 261-264, 273-274, 301*n*, 418, 439, 688

- Saud, King ibn Abd al-Aziz—Continued  
 Arab heads of state meeting, 406*n*,  
 421*n*, 423, 447, 468, 612*n*  
 Arab-Israeli dispute, 407–408, 420,  
 428–429, 438, 443–444, 474,  
 490–491, 499*n*  
 Arab nationalism, 447, 688  
 Baghdad Pact, 439–440  
 Buraimi dispute, 286–288, 291–292,  
 294–295, 314, 321, 339*n*, 363, 388,  
 392  
 U.S.–Saudi relations, 295–296,  
 302–303, 305, 307, 332, 351–352,  
 354–356, 436–437  
 China, People's Republic of, 261–262  
 Dhahran Airfield, 296–297, 298–300,  
 306, 369, 372–373, 379–380, 382,  
 384–386, 395*n*, 396*n*, 397–398,  
 399–403, 419, 435  
 Egypt, 351–352, 378*n*, 429, 441–442,  
 486  
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 408*n*, 422, 628  
 France, 409  
 Iran, 426–427, 437–438  
 Iraq, 322, 349–350, 367, 671–673  
 Jordan, 73, 84, 98, 112–117, 124, 131,  
 142, 163  
   Saudi aid to, 79, 127, 129, 136  
   Saudi Arabia, relations with, 24, 36,  
   76–77, 93–94, 96, 112*n*, 132*n*,  
   133*n*, 134*n*, 158  
 Middle East, 145, 508–509  
 Muscat and Oman, 227–229, 232–233,  
 235, 241, 244, 497  
 Oil industry, 264–265, 271–272, 504  
 Saudi economic development, 311–312,  
 425–426, 435–436, 477–478, 485,  
 495  
 Soviet Union, 267, 269–272, 427  
 Syria, 429, 442–443, 578, 580, 636–637,  
 660  
 Syrian political situation, 486, 500, 572,  
 592, 612–613, 638, 645, 654–656,  
 658, 718  
 Syrian–Turkey relations, 724, 726*n*,  
 727–728, 731, 735, 737  
 Truman Doctrine, 408*n*  
 United Kingdom:  
   Saudi Arabia, relations with, 230,  
   245, 323–324, 331, 333, 335–336,  
   338*n*, 341*n*, 355, 365, 409  
   United States, relations with,  
   377–378  
 U.S.–Israeli relations, 430
- Saud, King ibn Abd al-Aziz—Continued  
 U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 211,  
 260, 266, 279, 343*n*, 353, 356–360,  
 368*n*, 370–371, 389–392, 409–411  
 U.S.–Saudi relations, 325–326, 405,  
 417, 421, 431–432, 489, 492,  
 506–507  
   U.S.–Saudi talks, 423–430, 433–435,  
   444–445, 465, 467, 477– 478  
 Visit to the United States, 326, 368*n*,  
 374–375, 404–406, 413–415,  
 445–449, 469–470, 481–484, 612  
 Yemen, 750–751, 753–754, 761–763  
 Saud ibn Jilewi, Amir, 283–284, 285*n*  
 Saudi Arabia (*see also* Arab States;  
 Arabian-American Oil Company;  
 Buraimi dispute; Egyptian–Syrian–  
 Saudi (ESS) Pact; *and Saudi subheadings*  
*under other subjects*):  
 Anti-Western orientation, 320–321,  
 326  
 Aqaba, Gulf of, 116, 481*n*, 498–499,  
 508–509  
 Arab nationalism, 309, 317*n*, 374  
 Bedouins, 425  
 British military and economic aid to,  
 66, 87, 424–425  
 Chinese People's Republic, relations  
 with, 261–264  
 Communist influence in, 177, 309,  
 317*n*  
 Dammam Harbor, 460  
 Dhahran Airfield, 255–256, 268,  
 271–272, 296, 300, 303*n*, 306, 309,  
 374, 385–386, 387*n*, 391, 397–399,  
 401, 416, 419, 469–470  
   Air training program, 253, 255, 291,  
   299, 346, 360, 395, 398, 410–411,  
   479  
   Airport terminal, 346, 369, 395, 398,  
   410, 455, 462, 479, 495–496  
 Buraimi dispute, 282  
 Cash payment, 346, 382, 387*n*  
 Civilian airline proposal, 382  
 Dulles memorandum, 477–479  
 Egyptian position, 390  
 Exchange of notes, 488  
 Joint communiqué, 483  
 Saudi position, 251, 267*n*, 270, 278*n*,  
 279*n*, 288, 298, 353–354, 373,  
 387*n*, 389–390, 400, 403, 421,  
 435  
 Soviet position, 390

## Saudi Arabia—Continued

## Dhahran Airfield—Continued

Strategic importance, 253, 260,  
290–291, 344–347, 380–381,  
383–385

U.S.–Saudi talks, 415, 435, 450–453

Valuation, 273, 275, 299, 307, 345,  
359, 369, 380

Disputed Territory, 355, 749

Economic situation, 252, 258, 319,  
425–426, 456, 458, 485, 491–492

Egypt, relations with, 351–352,  
386–387, 415, 572

Aqaba, Gulf of, 231, 499

British position, 328, 337, 365

Buraimi dispute, 29, 285, 367

Muscat and Oman, 231

Yemeni–Saudi–Egyptian treaty, 363

Farsi and Arabi Islands, 425, 427,  
437–438, 444, 472–473

France, relations with, 403, 408–409

Hejaz Railway, 310–312, 349, 353, 369,  
373, 577, 582

International Bank for Reconstruction  
and Development, 435–436, 446,  
456–457, 461, 464, 480, 506

Iran, relations with, 425, 427

Iraq, relations with, 96, 145, 318–319,  
322, 349, 350, 355, 365, 367

Baghdad Pact, 439–440

British position, 367, 368*n*

Hejaz Railway, 349

Syria, 525, 656, 658, 671–673

Israel, relations with, 119, 269, 318,  
333, 365, 424–425, 434

Jordan, relations with, 2, 103–104,  
133*n*, 158

British position, 20–21, 24, 99, 313,  
333

Partition of, possible, 25, 29, 38, 69

Saudi intervention, possible, 93–95,  
108, 123

Syrian crisis, 638, 699*n*

U.S. position, 69–70, 102*n*, 164,  
318–319

Jordanian economic aid to, 76–77, 79

Lebanon, relations with, 508

Middle East regional defense, 309

Muscat and Oman, relations with,  
223–225, 227, 229, 232–236, 244

Oil industry, 258, 264–267, 323–324,  
328–330, 348, 405, 432, 503–505

Israel boycott demand, 264–267,  
271–272

## Saudi Arabia—Continued

## Oil industry—Continued

Labor problems, 310

Onassis agreement, 249–252, 259

Revenues from, 293, 319, 321,  
332–334, 337, 347–348, 492, 549

Syrian refinery construction, 588–589

U.S. interests, 309, 320, 375–377

Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, relations with,  
245, 309

Political situation, 349, 332–333, 350*n*,  
378–379

Riyadh–Medina railroad, 457, 460–461

Saud visit to the United States, 326,  
374–375, 386, 405–408, 413–415

Dulles talks, 431–444

Economic talks, 456–462

Eisenhower talks, 417–430, 445–449,  
481–486

General talks, 468–469, 472–477, 612

Military aid talks, 433–435, 449–453,  
462–466, 470–472

Soviet bloc military aid to, 473

Soviet military aid to, 267–270,  
272–274, 282, 312, 353, 365, 424,  
477*n*, 750–751

Soviet Union, relations with, 224,  
262–264, 267, 269–270, 272, 304,  
313–314, 427

Syria, relations with, 21, 313, 349, 473,  
500, 516*n*, 517, 526–528, 530, 536,  
549, 553, 555, 572, 580, 588–589,  
592

Tiran Straits shipping, 116, 119

Turkey, relations with, 440

United Kingdom, relations with, 20–21,  
24, 41*n*, 99, 313–314, 321–322, 321,  
328, 333, 408–409

Aden arms distribution, 363–364

Anti-British activities, 363–364, 366

Boundary disputes, 309, 329–330,  
412, 487

Locust Mission, 363–364

Suez Canal crisis, 403, 475

U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia,  
424–425

U.S. position, 230–231, 245, 314–315,  
317*n*, 412–413, 474–475, 502

U.N. voting record, 578

United States, relations with (*see also*  
Arabian–American Oil Company),  
39, 41*n*

Aqaba, Gulf of, 490–492, 508–509

Arab–Israeli dispute, 257, 300

## Saudi Arabia—Continued

United States, relations with—  
Continued

- Baghdad Pact, 251, 253–254, 258–259, 303*n*, 439–440
- Buraimi dispute, 252–253, 287–288, 295, 300, 303, 312*n*, 325, 328, 351, 355–356, 436–437, 475
- Communism, 261–262, 489–490, 492–493, 507, 688
- Egyptian–Czech arms deal, 278
- Eisenhower Doctrine, 418–419, 422, 489–490
- Farsi and Arabi Islands, 472–473
- Hejaz Railway, 369, 373
- Iraq, U.S. military aid to, 253
- Israel boycott demand, 264–267, 271–272
- Jews, discrimination against, 361–362, 393–395, 474
- Joint communiqué, 481–486, 492–493
- Jordan, 71, 111–112, 163
- Oil industry, 432
- Press coverage, 262
- Saudi position, 269, 298, 353
- Suez canal, 403, 419–420
- Syrian crisis, 612–613, 645–646, 659–660, 727
- U.S. investments, 309
- U.S. personnel, 474
- U.S.–British relations, 293, 305, 348, 388–389, 444–445
- U.S. economic aid to (*see also* Dhahran Airfield *above*), 269–271, 273, 275–277, 425–426, 464
- Broadcasting stations, 460–461
- Dammam Port, 465, 469*n*, 480, 488, 493–494, 495–496
- Dulles memorandum, 480
- Exchange of notes, 488
- Export–Import loans, 255, 446, 457, 480
- Point IV, 258, 270, 276, 436
- Riyadh–Jidda Railroad, 254–255, 257, 300
- Saud talks, 435–436
- Saudi economic situation, 252, 258, 270
- U.S.–Saudi talks, 456–461
- Weather service, 399*n*
- U.S.–Iraqi relations, 253
- U.S. military aid to, 265–266, 296, 300, 303*n*, 365–366, 370–371, 374, 386, 387*n*, 397–399, 402, 661, 714

## Saudi Arabia—Continued

## U.S. military aid to—Continued

- Amount of, 401, 415–416, 455, 467, 479
- Arab–Israeli dispute, 269, 356, 434, 462–463
- British position, 259–260
- Defense Department position, 415–416, 453–455, 466–467
- Deliveries, 501–502
- Dulles memorandum, 477–479
- Exchange of notes, 488
- Five-year plan, 296–299, 301*n*, 345, 356–358, 360–361, 371, 390–391
- Grant aid, 270–271, 273, 275–277, 297–298, 306, 373, 390, 400, 410, 454, 464–465, 467, 472
- ICA funds, 416, 455
- Israeli position, 337, 649
- Joint Chiefs of Staff position, 344–347, 415
- Joint communiqué, 483
- Jordanian position, 165
- Lebanese position, 171
- Military Assistance Advisory Group, 265, 268, 299, 301*n*, 325–326, 401, 411, 433
- Public relations, 341–343
- Reimbursable aid, 276, 297–299, 344–345, 395, 400–401, 450, 454, 478
- Saudi–British relations, 424–425
- Saudi economic situation, 270
- Saudi–Egyptian relations, 415
- Saudi position, 269, 279, 294*n*, 353, 406*n*, 407*n*, 409, 433–435, 451, 465, 470–472
- And Soviet military aid, 267
- And Syrian crisis, 661, 664, 714
- Training programs, 254–255, 265–266, 346, 360, 410–411, 416, 450–455, 462, 466, 479, 488
- U.S. influence, 255
- U.S.–Israeli relations, 253, 360*n*
- U.S. military aid to Lebanon, 194, 199
- U.S. position, 277, 279–280, 326–327, 372, 453–455, 464–467, 471
- U.S. public opinion, 185*n*, 186*n*
- U.S.–Saudi talks, 450–453, 462–463
- Yemen, relations with, 363
- Saudi Arabian Airlines, 751
- Schlatter, Brig. Gen. George F., 267*n*, 287–288, 300



- Schow, Maj. Gen. Robert A., 102
- Schwinn, Walter K., 226, 727
- Seager, Cedric, 140–143, 449, 456
- Selo, Fawzi, 579
- al-Shabandar, Moussa, 520, 521*n*, 613*n*
- Shakhbut ibn Sultan, Shaikh, 252*n*, 274, 392–393
- al-Shami, Sayyid, 773*n*
- Sharabi, Hisham, 538
- Shaw, John F., 143*n*, 154*n*, 456, 570–571, 583*n*, 589*n*, 614*n*
- Shell Company, 571
- Shepilov, Dimitri T., 574, 578
- Shepley, Col. Phillip, 359, 661*n*
- Sherwood, Robert K., 449, 503
- Shiloah, Reuven, 104–105, 119–122, 662–663
- al-Shishakli, Adib, 514, 527, 531, 534, 536–564, 579–581, 604, 611
- Shuckburgh, Charles Arthur Evelyn, 5, 20–22, 26, 301*n*, 327, 331, 567
- Saudi Arabia, 305, 308, 314–319, 322, 326, 329, 332, 340–341, 364, 366–368
- U.S.–British talks, 182, 303, 304*n*, 366–368
- Shuqayr, Gen. Shawkat, 91, 523*n*, 525, 535–536, 540–541, 546*n*, 547, 554, 558, 563, 566
- Simonson, Joseph, 755–761
- Sinai, 166, 403, 614
- Sixth Fleet deployment:
- Jordan, 108, 112, 114, 117, 122
- Syrian crisis, 649, 657, 665, 693, 695, 697, 699, 707, 733–734
- Smith, Gerard C., 510, 659, 730
- Socony Mobil (*see also* Arabian-American Oil Company), 250, 264–267, 271*n*, 272
- Solh, Sami, 178, 192, 194, 196, 198*n*, 210–211, 662*n*, 711
- Somaliland, 753
- Soviet Union (*see also* *Soviet Union and Soviet, Communism, and Communist subheadings under other subjects*):
- And Arab nationalism, 487
- British policy toward, 224
- ESS Pact, 41, 313
- Foreign policy, 686–687, 706–708
- Hungary, 60
- Military expenditures, 471
- Pakistan, relations with, 440
- Saudi position, 500
- Soviet Union—Continued
- Turkey, relations with, 700, 706, 708, 711
- United States, relations with:
- Gromyko statement, 702, 706–707
- Khrushchev letter, *Sept. 1957*, 687, 689
- U.S. policy toward, 224
- Soysal, Ismail, 517*n*
- Spaak, Paul–Henri, 706
- Spain, 381, 400
- Special National Intelligence Estimates:
- SNIE 36.7–56, 601–605
- SNIE 36.7–57, 674–680, 702
- Staats, Elmer B., 530*n*
- Standard Oil Company, 271*n*, 321, 331, 337, 571, 582–585, 769–770
- Stassen, Harold E., 334
- Stevens, Eli, 294–295, 449
- Stevenson, Col. Hugh, 537*n*
- Stoltzfus, William A., Jr., 431, 445*n*, 449, 463*n*, 468, 481
- Stone, Howard E., 633
- Straits of Tiran. *See* Tiran Straits.
- Strong, Robert C., 626*n*, 633*n*, 639, 718–719, 735, 746*n*
- Sturgill, Robert G., 472*n*
- Sudan, 669
- Suedi, Tewfik, 671, 673
- Suez Canal:
- Israeli use of, 121, 204, 428–429
- Western use of, 603
- Suez Canal crisis, 68, 108, 120, 420
- Arab nationalism, 84, 487
- British–Jordanian relations, 6, 68
- British–Saudi relations, 403, 475
- Egyptian position, 401, 668
- French–Saudi relations, 475
- Aqaba, Gulf of, 498
- Jordanian reactions to, 84
- Lebanese position, 193, 197
- Oil industry, 403, 419, 607, 707
- Syrian reactions to, 593–594, 601
- U.N. role, 62, 78, 121, 204–205, 405*n*, 420, 441, 593–594
- U.S. position, 49–50, 75, 167, 204, 419–420, 441
- U.S. role, 146, 401, 408, 668
- U.S.–Saudi relations, 403
- Suhrawardy, Hussain, 152–154
- Sukarno, Ahmad, 261–262
- Sullivan, Charles A., 359
- Sultan, Prince, 491, 494

- Surur, Muhammed Shaikh, 387, 417, 431, 436, 456-461, 468-470, 477, 481, 491, 494
- Sweden, 174, 247
- Sweeney, Lt. Col. James L., 27
- Switzerland, 174
- Symmes, Harrison M., 487*n*
- Syria (*see also* Arab States; Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi (ESS) Pact; Syrian crisis; *Syria and Syrian subheadings under other subjects*):
- Alexandretta, 528
  - Anti-Western orientation, 513, 526, 553, 555, 563, 576
  - Aqaba, Gulf of, 624
  - Arab nationalism in, 442, 525, 592, 622-623, 628-630
  - Arab Socialist Resurrection Party, 516*n*, 519, 525-526, 530-534, 535, 554, 576, 581, 592, 602, 676-677, 679, 745
  - Baghdad Pact, 5, 514-518, 528-529, 536, 568, 620, 630, 679, 734
  - Bulgaria, relations with, 577
  - Chinese People's Republic economic aid to, 577
  - Communist influence in, 442, 500, 513, 525-526, 536, 538-539, 545
    - Egyptian position, 744-746
    - Iraqi position, 543-544
    - Jordanian position, 123
    - Lebanese position, 203, 206, 525
    - Saudi position, 261*n*, 442-443
    - Syrian position, 553, 555, 609
  - Czech military and economic aid to, 541, 558, 566, 576-577, 614-617
  - Economic self-sufficiency, 513, 535
  - Egypt, relations with, 145, 508, 525, 566, 577, 580, 593-595
  - ESS Pact, 520*n*, 523*n*, 527, 566
  - France, relations with, 541, 593, 604-605
  - Hejaz Railway, 310*n*, 577
  - IBRD loans, 571-572, 665
  - IPC pipeline, 548-549, 558-559, 570, 685
    - Sabotage, 504, 543, 594-595, 599-600, 607-608, 610-612, 614, 652, 703, 707, 709
    - U.S. aid to Iraq, 692, 695, 696*n*
  - Iraq, relations with, 21, 349, 516, 519, 521, 525, 528-529, 536, 548, 575, 588-589, 592, 611-612, 656, 671-673
- Syria—Continued
- Iraq, relations with—Continued
    - Union proposal, 529, 545-546, 679
  - Iraqi intervention, possible, 520-522, 523*n*, 528, 544-545, 548-549, 556, 568, 604-607, 610-613
  - Israel, relations with, 525, 536
    - Immigration policy, 620, 623, 631
  - Israeli attack on, *Dec. 1955*, 560, 569
  - Israeli intervention, possible, 604-607
  - Jordan, relations with, 11, 25, 68-69, 78-79, 89, 146
    - Defense pact, 59, 593-594
    - Jordanian partition, possible, 610
    - Syrian intervention, possible, 91, 93, 95, 105, 107, 110, 115-116, 594, 617, 631
    - Syrian political intrigue, 100-101, 104, 108, 111, 113, 122-123, 156, 158-162, 617, 631, 742
  - Lebanon, relations with, 177*n*, 178, 183, 186, 210-211, 709
  - Middle East regional defense, 309
  - Military capabilities, 433-434, 532-533
  - Neutralism, 177*n*, 513, 515, 519, 535, 561, 568, 575, 578, 630, 678, 719, 736
  - Oil industry (*see also* IPC pipeline *above*), 349, 611-612
    - Aramco, 585, 600, 652
    - Refinery construction, 570-571, 577, 582-586, 588-593, 614-617
  - TAPLINE, 599
  - Operations Coordinating Board analysis, 530-537
  - Political situation (*see also* Syrian crisis and Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party and Communist influence *above*):
    - Army role, 522, 523*n*, 525, 531, 533, 563, 575-576, 581, 602, 735
    - Baghdad Pact, 515, 524, 536
    - British position, 521*n*, 544*n*, 601-602
    - CFI, 526
    - Communist Party, 513, 525-526, 530-534, 554, 575, 592, 602, 676
    - Egyptian intrigue, 516*n*, 517, 526-528, 530, 536, 553, 555, 563, 572, 592, 634
    - ESS Pact, 520*n*, 523*n*, 527
    - French position, 516*n*, 517, 526-528, 530, 536, 553, 555, 601-602, 605
    - Iraqi position, 527, 530, 549, 552, 555, 569-570, 601-602

## Syria—Continued

## Political situation—Continued

- Israeli position, 601–602
- "Little RCC," 576, 602, 676–677, 679
- Malki assassination, 523–525, 527, 537–538, 630
- Minorities, 535
- Nationalist Party, 514, 528, 554, 602, 677
- Partisans of Peace, 532
- Populist Party, 514, 528, 554, 602, 677
- Quwatli government, 541, 553–554
- Revolutionary Command Council, 576
- Shishakli, role of, 579–581
- Soviet intrigue, 516 $n$ , 530
- Soviet–Turkish relations, 706, 708
- Special National Intelligence Estimate, 675–680
- Syrian position, 742
- Syrian Social National Party, 523–524, 527, 531, 537–538, 563–565, 581, 677
- Turkish position, 591, 593 $n$ , 601–602, 606
- U.S. position, 519–520, 522
- U.S. role. *See* U.S. plot accusations and U.S. propoganda under United States, relations with *below*.
- U.S.–Saudi discussions, 612–613
- Riyadh–Medina Railraod, 460
- Rumania, relations with, 578
- Saudi Arabia, relations with, 21, 313, 349, 473, 500, 516 $n$ , 517, 526–528, 530, 536, 549, 553, 555, 572, 580, 588–589, 592
- Soviet bloc military and economic aid to, 124, 546–547, 582–585, 588–589, 593, 604, 677–678
- Soviet economic aid to, 577, 679, 709
- Soviet influence in (*see also* Syrian crisis), 516 $n$ , 530, 535, 540, 561, 602, 605, 618–619
- Lebanese position, 209
- Soviet military aid to, 420, 541, 546, 552, 557–558, 576–577, 598, 606, 660, 733
- Egyptian position, 665
- Israeli position, 649
- Publicity, 736
- Saudi position, 442

## Syria—Continued

## Soviet military aid to—Continued

- Soviet military aid to Yemen, 766–767
- Turkish position, 638
- U.S. position, 596–597, 631, 708
- Soviet Union, relations with, 157, 160, 243, 536, 555, 567, 601–604, 660, 713
- Arab–Israeli dispute, 677
- Exchange of persons, 577–578
- Oil supplying, 599–600
- Public opinion, 576
- Saudi position, 427, 505–506
- Shepilov visit, 574 $n$ , 578
- Soviet policy in the United Nations, 514
- U.S. position, 505, 675, 677–680, 707–709, 735–736
- Taurus Railway, 528
- Turkey, relations with, 21, 517 $n$ , 604–607
- United Kingdom, relations with:
  - Baghdad Pact, 630
  - Oil refinery construction, 583–584, 588–590, 615–617
  - Possible intervention, 604–605
  - Suez Canal crisis, 593
- U.N. voting record, 575, 578
- United States, relations with, 441, 529 $n$ , 545, 596, 632–633
- Algeria, 624–625
- Aqaba, Gulf of, 624
- Arab–Israeli dispute, 535, 538, 568, 620, 623
- Arab nationalism, 622–623, 628–630
- Baghdad Pact, 516–518, 528–529, 536, 568, 630
- Cultural exchanges, 634, 737
- Diplomatic relations, 743–744
- ESS Pact, 526
- Eisenhower Doctrine, 620–622, 624, 627–628, 631, 646, 650–651, 692–693, 695, 697–699, 713, 741–744
- Exchange program, 535
- IPC pipeline sabotage, 594–595, 599–600, 607–608
- Israel, 527–528, 536, 555–557, 568
- Richards Mission, 622
- State visit proposal, 429
- Suez Canal crisis, 594
- Syrian memorandum, 626–632

- Syria—Continued
- United States, relations with—
    - Continued
    - U.S. plot accusations, 523–524, 527, 537–538, 564, 581, 633–634, 636–637, 642, 675
    - U.S. propaganda, 528, 535, 660, 709, 715–717
    - U.S.–Syrian discussions, 614–625
    - Zionism, 586–588
  - U.S. banks in, 572
  - U.S.–British discussions, 567
  - U.S. economic aid to, 527, 534–535, 619, 624
    - Export–Import Bank loans, 570–572
    - Oil refinery construction, 582–586, 590, 592–593, 615–617
    - Passenger planes, 573–574
    - Refusal of, 514
    - Syrian crisis, 736–737
  - U.S. military aid to, 516, 527, 540–543, 546–547, 550–551, 556, 559–560, 566, 660–661
    - Conditions for, 476–477
    - ESS Pact, 559
    - Iraqi position, 552–553
    - Soviet military aid, 552, 553<sub>n</sub>, 557–558
    - U.S. public opinion, 569
  - U.S. policy toward, 243, 556–558, 562, 598, 618
  - U.S.–Turkish relations, 591–593
  - Yemen, relations with, 763
- Syrian Airways, 573
- Syrian crisis:
- Arab States position, 646, 652, 654, 656–657, 669, 690, 706, 708, 715–716
  - Arab States response, 656, 678–679, 686
    - U.S. position, 688, 699, 710, 718–719, 735
  - Bizri takeover, 639–640, 676
  - British response, 688
  - Egyptian position, 662, 664–666
  - Egyptian response, 744–747
  - Egyptian role in, 713
  - Iraqi–Jordanian relations, 672–673, 683, 685–686, 696<sub>n</sub>
  - Iraqi position, 643, 650, 669
  - Iraqi response, 638, 658, 664, 669–672, 685, 710
    - Lebanese position, 712
    - Turkish position, 658, 673
- Syrian crisis—Continued
- Iraqi–Saudi relations, 656, 658, 671–673
  - Israeli response, 644<sub>n</sub>, 648, 662–663, 669, 710, 737
    - Jordanian position, 655
    - Turkish position, 657
  - U.S. position, 641, 649, 655, 686, 690, 692, 695, 697, 699, 710, 716, 718, 737
    - Jordanian response, 638, 654, 669, 699<sub>n</sub>, 710
    - Turkish position, 658
  - Lebanese response, 243, 638, 710–713
  - Lebanon, effects on, 685, 692, 708, 713
  - Oil industry, effects on, 666, 679, 685, 692, 695, 696<sub>n</sub>, 703, 707, 709
  - Saudi–Jordanian relations, 638, 699<sub>n</sub>
  - Saudi response, 638–639, 655, 659–660
  - Soviet response, 700, 702, 704–708, 711, 713, 720, 732
  - State Department communications systems, 651
  - Turkish–Iraqi discussions, 638, 642–644
  - Turkish military maneuvers, 733–734
    - Arab States position, 731
    - Egyptian position, 728–729, 738–739
    - Saudi mediation offer, 724–728, 730–731
    - Soviet position, 706–708, 711
  - Syrian U.N. complaint, 720–725, 738–740
    - U.S. position, 733–734, 736
  - Turkish response, 650, 657, 669, 706, 708, 710
    - Arab States position, 672
    - Jordanian position, 655
    - U.S. position, 670, 672, 678–679, 692–693, 710, 732
  - And U.N. Charter, 692, 694–695, 698
  - U.N. role, 643, 657, 704–705, 711
  - U.S.–British cooperation, 243–244, 648, 670<sub>n</sub>, 681–682, 684, 686, 693, 695, 697, 717<sub>n</sub>
  - U.S. Embassy harassment, 633–634, 741
  - U.S.–Iraqi relations, 647, 658, 683, 694–696, 700–701
  - U.S.–Israeli relations, 646–650, 662–663, 690–691
  - U.S.–Jordanian relations, 654–656, 698–699
  - U.S.–Lebanese relations, 696–697, 710–714

- Syrian crisis—Continued  
 U.S. military and economic aid to the Arab States:  
 Iran, 715  
 Iraq, 661, 664, 694–695, 700–701, 714, 733  
 Jordan, 654, 661, 664, 714, 733–734  
 Lebanon, 638, 697, 733  
 Saudi Arabia, 661, 664, 714  
 Turkey, 650–651, 692, 700–701, 707, 715  
 U.S. responses, 633–637, 640–642, 646, 652–653, 657–658, 674–681, 687–689, 707–709, 718–719, 735–737  
 Economic aid to Iraq, 692, 695, 696*n*  
 Egyptian position, 665–666  
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 650–651, 689*n*, 692–693, 695, 698–699, 713, 716–717  
 Iraqi position, 672  
 Israeli position, 648–649, 662  
 Lebanese position, 712  
 Propaganda, 660, 709, 715–717, 719  
 Sixth Fleet deployment, 649, 657, 665, 693, 695, 697, 699, 707, 733–734  
 Turkish position, 643–644, 672  
 U.S.–Saudi relations, 612–613, 645–646, 659–660  
 U.S.–Syrian relations, 740–744  
 U.S.–Turkish relations, 647, 650, 658, 684, 691–693, 700–701, 723–724  
 Western response to, 708–709  
 Syrian–Egyptian–Jordanian Defense Pact, 593  
 Syrian Oil Refining and Distribution Company, 571
- Taiwan, 244, 598  
 Taiwan Resolution, 245  
 Talbott, Harold E., 259, 260*n*  
 Talhouni, Raisdiwan, 26  
 Talib ibn Ali, 229, 234–235, 449  
 TAPLINE. *See* Trans-Arabian Pipeline.  
 Tarazi, Salah al-Din, 633*n*  
 al-Tariqi, Abdallah, 503–504  
 Tassan, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim, 449  
 Templar, Gerald, 7–9, 20, 57, 105  
 Templar Mission, 7–8, 20, 105  
 Theotokis, Spiros, 366  
 Timmons, Benson E.L., 334, 734  
 Tiran and Sanafir Islands, 438, 444  
 Tiran Straits, 26, 116, 119–121, 499*n*
- Tomeh, George, 740  
 Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE), 71, 180, 503*n*, 504, 585, 599  
 Transworld Airlines (TWA), 382  
 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United Kingdom, India, and Yemen, 1934, 766  
 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States and Yemen, 1946, 768  
 Trevelyan, Humphrey, 18  
 Trucial State, 280, 304, 487  
 Truman, Harry S., 270, 305–307, 333  
 Tunisia, 629, 656  
 Tunner, Gen. William H., 352, 406*n*  
 Turkey, 157, 440, 603  
 Iraq, relations with, 21, 549, 638, 642–644  
 Israel, relations with, 440  
 Jordan, 89, 117  
 Saudi Arabia, relations with, 440  
 Soviet Union, relations with, 700, 706, 708, 711  
 Syria, relations with (*see also* Syrian crisis), 21, 517*n*, 604–607  
 United States, relations with, 117, 707  
 Syria, 591–593, 647, 650, 658, 684, 691–693, 700–701, 707, 723–724  
 U.S. forces in, 108  
 U.S. military aid to, 356, 434, 650–651, 692, 700–701, 707, 715  
 Turko-Iraqi Pact. *See* Baghdad Pact.  
 Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 680, 685–686, 688, 734*n*  
 Tyler, William R., 605, 740*n*
- Ujeimy, Adil, 539*n*  
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union.  
 United Kingdom (*see also* Arab Legion; Buraimi dispute; *United Kingdom and British subheadings under other subjects*):  
 Aramco, relations with, 284, 749  
 Disputed Territory, 749  
 Kuwait, relations with, 169, 487  
 Oil industry, 323, 328, 496–497  
 Pakistan, military aid to, 4  
 United States, relations with, 139, 149, 182*n*, 207, 366–368, 496–497, 659, 770  
 Arabian Peninsula, 510–512  
 China, People's Republic of, 329  
 Egypt, 567

- United Kingdom—Continued  
 United States, relations with—  
 Continued  
 Jordan, 80, 86–88, 93–94, 139,  
 149–152, 154–155  
 Muscat and Oman, 222–223,  
 228–231, 236, 238–240, 243–246  
 Oil industry, 226*n*, 227*n*, 230–231  
 Saudi Arabia, 293, 305, 348,  
 388–389, 444–445  
 Syria, 648, 681–682, 684, 686,  
 720–722, 730–733  
 Yemen, relations with, 309, 770
- United Nations:  
 Aqaba, Gulf of, 624  
 Arab–Israeli dispute, 14*n*, 40, 46,  
 204–205, 270*n*, 560, 578*n*, 623  
 Buraimi dispute, 286–287, 292,  
 294–295, 302, 304  
 British position, 308, 323, 336  
 Saudi position, 222, 305, 364  
 U.S. position, 282, 307–308, 315–316,  
 319–320, 324, 339–340  
 Egypt, 60–61, 75, 578  
 Hungary, 687  
 Iraq, 578  
 Jordan, 38, 60–61, 72, 93, 105, 113, 167  
 Economic aid to, 7, 13, 38–39, 66, 80  
 Lebanon, 193, 578  
 Middle East, 60–61, 221, 631  
 Middle East emergency force, 200–201  
 Military aid resolution, 462–463  
 Muscat and Oman, 237–242, 244–248  
 Saudi Arabia, 29, 366  
 Soviet vetoes in, 526  
 Suez Canal crisis, 62, 78, 121, 204–205,  
 405*n*, 420, 441, 593–594  
 Syria, 548, 575, 578, 711, 720–725,  
 738–740  
 Syrian crisis, 643, 657, 692, 694–695,  
 698, 704–705, 711  
 U.S. role in, 204  
 U.N. Charter, 40, 105, 521, 630–631, 692,  
 694–695, 698
- United Nations Relief and Works  
 Agency for Palestine and the Near  
 East (UNRWA), 7, 13, 37–39, 66, 80,  
 171*n*
- U.S. Geological Survey, 771  
 U.S. Information Agency, 38–39, 535,  
 537*n*, 715  
 Universal Oil Products, 583
- Van Dusen, William, 503
- Vatican, 713  
 Vietnam, 485  
 Villard, Henry S., 530*n*  
 Voice of America, 528*n*
- Wadsworth, George E., 278*n*, 417, 431,  
 445, 456, 468, 481  
 Aqaba, Gulf of, 489–491  
 Buraimi dispute, 286–288, 294–295,  
 302–303, 305, 307*n*, 321*n*, 354–356  
 Dhahran Airfield, 260*n*, 306*n*, 368–369,  
 373–374, 379, 380*n*, 382, 385–387,  
 389, 391*n*, 392*n*, 395–396  
 Counter–proposal, 291*n*, 396*n*,  
 399–403  
 Jordan, 79, 112*n*  
 Palestine, 407  
 Saudi Arabia, 252–253, 255*n*, 261–263,  
 325–327, 351–354, 372, 474, 500  
 Iran, relations with, 437  
 Iraq, relations with, 322, 350*n*  
 Oil industry, 266*n*  
 Richards Mission, 494  
 Saud visit to the United States,  
 374–375, 405, 413  
 Soviet Union, relations with,  
 269–271  
 United Kingdom, relations with, 335,  
 338*n*, 340, 341*n*, 355  
 U.S. economic aid to, 310–312,  
 458–461, 494*n*, 496*n*  
 U.S. military aid to, 259*n*, 267*n*,  
 276*n*, 297–301, 343*n*, 356–358,  
 359–361, 370–371, 408–410, 433,  
 450, 452–453, 462, 470  
 Syria, 638–639  
 U.S.–Egyptian relations, 378*n*  
 U.S.–Turkish relations, 722  
 Yemen, 748–751, 753, 758–759,  
 762–764, 766*n*, 767*n*, 769, 771,  
 773*n*
- Waggoner, Edward L., 192*n*, 195*n*, 199*n*,  
 217*n*, 220*n*, 568*n*, 619*n*, 632*n*, 637*n*,  
 735*n*
- Wagner, Robert, 413–414  
 Walid, Khalid Bey, 282–283, 373, 431  
 Walmesley, Walter N., 723*n*, 725–726,  
 738
- Warren, Fletcher, 117, 591, 593*n*, 617,  
 704–705, 723*n*, 724*n*  
 Syrian crisis, 636, 642–644, 647, 653,  
 656–658, 670, 673, 684, 694, 696*n*
- Welk, William, 456, 570–572

- West Bank, 9–10, 15<sub>n</sub>, 25, 38, 74, 91, 102, 105–106, 120
- Western Europe, 309, 405
- Western Protectorate, 487
- Wheelus Field Agreement, 307, 346
- Whisenand, Brig. Gen. James, 685
- Whitney, John Hay, 159, 228–230, 232–233, 510, 721<sub>n</sub>, 730
- Wiens, Henry W., 765<sub>n</sub>, 771<sub>n</sub>
- Wilcox, Francis O., 334, 727<sub>n</sub>
- Wiley, Alexander, 635
- Wilkins, Fraser, 37<sub>n</sub>, 44<sub>n</sub>, 57, 76<sub>n</sub>, 106<sub>n</sub>, 147<sub>n</sub>, 184<sub>n</sub>, 199<sub>n</sub>, 200, 204<sub>n</sub>, 222<sub>n</sub>, 267<sub>n</sub>, 271<sub>n</sub>, 272<sub>n</sub>, 285<sub>n</sub>, 290, 291<sub>n</sub>, 305<sub>n</sub>, 317, 340, 378<sub>n</sub>, 389<sub>n</sub>, 454<sub>n</sub>, 468, 472<sub>n</sub>, 542<sub>n</sub>, 545<sub>n</sub>, 546<sub>n</sub>, 551<sub>n</sub>, 557<sub>n</sub>, 565<sub>n</sub>, 569<sub>n</sub>, 579<sub>n</sub>, 588<sub>n</sub>, 591<sub>n</sub>, 607<sub>n</sub>, 612<sub>n</sub>, 752<sub>n</sub>
- Buraimi dispute, 289<sub>n</sub>
- Jordan, 8–9, 34–35, 80–81
- Saudi Arabia, 289<sub>n</sub>, 301<sub>n</sub>, 354<sub>n</sub>
- Syria, 563<sub>n</sub>, 573<sub>n</sub>
- Yemen, 751<sub>n</sub>, 752–754
- Williams, Murat W., 591<sub>n</sub>
- Wilson, Charles E., 383, 416
- Wilson, Evan M., 449
- Wilson, James M., 359, 381<sub>n</sub>, 411<sub>n</sub>
- Wisner, Frank G., 640, 685
- Withers, Charles D., 154<sub>n</sub>
- World Bank. *See* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- World Economic Council, 446
- Wright, Michael Robert, 520<sub>n</sub>
- Yacoub, Adil, 539
- Yasin, Yusuf Shaikh, 255, 274–275, 311, 352, 417, 431, 445, 462–463, 481
- Arab heads of state meeting, 468
- Buraimi dispute, 287, 302
- Dhahran Airfield, 299, 373, 389, 391, 396<sub>n</sub>, 399, 402, 469–470
- France, 474–475
- Soviet Union, 262, 269, 473
- Syria, 638–639
- United Kingdom, 287, 355, 474–475
- U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia, 357–358, 449, 451–453, 462, 470–472, 476–477
- U.S.–Saudi relations, 326, 395, 474, 482, 492–493
- Yemen, 429, 511
- Aden Protectorate, relations with, 309, 752, 754–755, 760
- Egypt, relations with, 363, 378, 753, 763
- ICA Mission, 767–768
- Neutralism in, 750<sub>n</sub>
- Oil industry, 756
- Political situation, 760
- Saudi Arabia, relations with, 750–751, 753, 761–762
- Soviet bloc, relations with, 420, 473, 687, 752–753, 760–761
- Soviet Union, relations with, 351, 749–751, 756, 761–762, 769
- Syria, relations with, 763
- United Kingdom, relations with, 309, 329, 487, 748–749, 752, 754–756, 760, 765–766
- Exchange of Notes, 1951, 766
- Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 1934, 766
- U.N. voting record, 578
- United States, relations with, 753–754, 761–762
- Development projects, 748–749, 750<sub>n</sub>, 751, 756–760, 767, 769
- Diplomatic relations, 767–768
- Eisenhower Doctrine, 757–760
- Technical mission, 764–765
- Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, 1946, 768
- U.S. military and economic aid to, 753–756, 768, 771–773
- Yemen Development Corporation, 748, 751<sub>n</sub>, 753, 756, 767, 769–770
- Yost, Charles, 747<sub>n</sub>
- Young, Richard, 287–288, 296
- Yugoslavia, 667
- Zabarah, Ahmad Ali, 766
- Zaim, Husi, 579
- Zakaria, Yassin, 633–634, 637<sub>n</sub>
- Zeineddine, Farid, 529<sub>n</sub>, 574, 586–588, 608, 633–634, 637<sub>n</sub>, 739
- Zionism, 393–394, 474, 515, 586–588
- Zorlu, Fatin Rustu, 168, 656, 670, 673, 693<sub>n</sub>



















