



## Prince Lichnowsky's "Memorandum".

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# PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S "MEMORANDUM"

First Detailed Publication of Suppressed  
Memorandum in Which the Kaiser's Former  
Ambassador at London Acquits England of  
Wanting War

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## PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S PROPHECY

*"And what result have we to expect from the struggle of people? The United States of Africa will be British, like the United States of America, Australia, and Oceania; and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. They will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely to Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist.*

*"In Asia, the Russians and Japanese will expand with their limitations and their customs, and the South will remain to the British.*

*"The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late, and the world war has destroyed the last possibility of catching up the lost ground, of founding a Colonial Empire."*

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## STINGING WORDS FOR GERMANY

"We (the Germans) had always backed horses which it was evident would lose."

"Trade jealousy, so much talked about among us, rests on faulty judgment of circumstances."

"On Aug. 2, (1914), when I saw Asquith in order to make a final attempt, he was completely broken, and, although quite calm, tears ran down his face."

"Of course it would only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold (Austrian Foreign Minister in August, 1914), satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply."

"The impression became ever stronger that we (Germany) desired war in all circumstances."

"Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy."

"I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be fallacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost."

The war has produced few human documents of the importance of Prince Lichnowsky's "Memorandum." It throws a flood of light upon the diplomatic correspondence published by the belligerent chancelleries in the opening months of the war, particularly upon the German White Paper, whose reservations it exposes, whose enigmas it untangles, whose lies it lays bare.

It is the diplomatic story of the Prince's Ambassadorship at London, from 1912 until the war drove him home to Berlin in August, 1914, when he was deprived of rank and distinctions.

It was written at his country seat, Kuchelna, in the Summer of 1916, and finished in August. He says that he wrote it for his family archives and that these "purely private notes found their way into wider circles by an unprecedented breach of confidence."

Be that as it may, one copy reached the Wilhelmstrasse, where it created a great scandal; another fell into the hands of some member of the Minority Socialists Party, and another reached the office of the Politiken of Stockholm, organ of the Extreme Left of the Swedish Socialist Party, which began to publish it on March 15, and was then stopped by the Government.

The next day there was a furious debate in the Main Committee of the German Reichstag. Herr von Payer, Vice Chancellor of the German Empire, and Under Secretary von Stumm, of the Foreign Office, sought to explain to representatives of the German people the diplomatic catastrophe of which the Kaiser's Government was the victim. Herr von Jagow, who had been Germany's Foreign Secretary during the closing days of Prince Lichnowsky's career at London, was assigned to reply to the famous memorandum which the author had entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914." This reply was published in The New York Times on April 7.

Meanwhile, the German Socialist organ Vorwaerts had published what it called "decisive chapters" of the memorandum—the diplomatic passages which pointed out Germany's criminality and foretold the result of this criminality in history. The Muenchener Neueste Nach-

richten then gave its readers the chapters dealing with the African and Bagdad treaties negotiated by the Prince, and on March 26 of the Politiken, renewed publication of the Lichnowsky writings.

In addition to the Lichnowsky disclosures, the proceedings in the Reichstag incident to them, sensational statements by a former Krupp Director, and some caustic comments on the devious ways of German diplomacy by Valentine Chriol, formerly correspondent of The London Times in Berlin, are published below. Comments appearing in the German press are also included.

The earlier installment issued by the Stockholm paper appears to be the complete introduction to the main chapters of the memorandum. It appeared in The New Europe of London. It is as follows.

#### THE LONDON EMBASSY.

"Kuchelna, 16 August, 1916.

Baron Marschall died in September, 1912, having held his post in London for a few months only. His appointment, which was due mainly to his age and the plotting of a younger man to get to London, was one of the many mistakes made by our Foreign Office. In spite of his imposing personality and great reputation, he was too old and tired to be able to adapt himself to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat and a lawyer than a diplomat or statesman. He set to work to convince Englishmen of the harmless character of our fleet, and naturally succeeded in strengthening an entirely opposite impression.

"To my great surprise I was offered the post in October. After many years' work I had withdrawn to the country, as no suitable post had been found for me, and I spent my time on my farm and in my garden, on horseback and in the fields, but I read industriously and published occasional political articles. Thus eight years passed, and thirteen since I had left Vienna as Ambassador. That was actually my last political employment. I do not know to whom my appointment in London was due. At all events, not to his Majesty, as I did not belong to his immediate set, although he was always gracious to me. I know by experience that his candidates were frequently successfully opposed. As a matter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter wanted to send Baron von Stumm to London. He met me at once with undisguised ill-will, and tried to frighten me by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was amiable to me, and had visited me shortly before at Gratz. I am, therefore, inclined to think that they settled on me as no other candidate was available. Had Baron von Marschall not died it is unlikely that I should have been dug out any more than in previous years. The moment was obviously favorable for an attempt to come to a better understanding with England.

#### The Morocco Question.

"Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a state of suspense and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a long time in Paris, said to me, 'The French had begun to forget la revanche. You have regularly reminded them of it by tramping on their toes.' After we had declined Delcasse's offer to come to an agreement regarding Morocco, and then solemnly declared that we had no political interest there—an attitude which agreed with Bismarckian political conditions—we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both manifestations concluded as they were bound to conclude, with a retraction,

if we were not prepared to start a world war. The pitiable conference of Algeciras could alter nothing, and still less cause Delcasse's fall. Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and Russo-British rapprochement. In face of 'the German peril' all other considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another Franco-German war had been patent, and, as had not been the case in 1870, such a war could not leave out Russia or England.

#### Worthless Agreements.

"The valuelessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated at Algeciras, and, immediately afterward, the equal worthlessness of the agreement made there when the Sultanate fell to pieces, which was, of course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the belief was spreading among the Russian people that our foreign policy was weak and was breaking down under 'encirclement,' and that cowardly surrender followed on haughty gestures. It is to the credit of von Kiderlen-Wachter, though otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he cleared up the Moroccan situation and adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether the world had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a question I do not touch. This event was hailed with joy in Germany, but in England caused all the more uneasiness in that the British Government waited in vain for three weeks for a statement of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd-George's Mansion House speech, intended to warn us, was a consequence. Before Delcasse's fall and before the Algeciras conference we could have obtained harbors and bases on the West Coast, but that was no longer possible.

"When I came to London in November, 1912, people had become easier about the question of Morocco, especially since an agreement had been reached with France and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had failed, it is true, as we demanded promises of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a treaty which would insure us against a British attack or any attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made such an attempt first on economic and colonial grounds. Through the agency of that qualified and expert Councilor of Embassy, von Kuhlmann, an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal of the Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of interest both the above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. The British statesman, old points in dispute both with France and Russia having been settled, wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to isolate us but to make us in so far as possible partners in a working concern. Just as he had succeeded in bridging Franco-British and Russo-British difficulties, so he wished as far as possible to remove German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties—which would finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question—to secure the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had lent itself to a co-operation with the Entente, which contained a mutual assurance against the danger of war.

#### Grey's Desires.

"This was Sir Edward Grey's program in his own words: 'Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contain no aggressive elements, and no binding obligations for England; to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together.'

"In England, as with us, there were two opinions, that of the optimists, who believed in an understanding, and that of the pes-

simists, who considered war inevitable sooner or later. Among the former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well as leading Liberal organs, such as The Westminster Gazette, The Manchester Guardian, and The Daily Chronicle. To the pessimists belong especially Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made his meaning clear to me; leading soldiers such as Lord Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of conscription, and on 'the writing on the wall'; and, further, the Northcliffe press, and that leading English journalist, Mr. Garvin of The Observer. During my term of office they abstained from all attacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 1908 and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused them to think that it might one day come to war. Just as with us, the former are now dubbed shortsighted and simpleminded, while the latter are regarded as the true prophets.

#### Balkan Questions.

"The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for many years. Since the salvation of Turkey in Europe was no longer feasible, only two possibilities for settling the question remained. Either we declared we had no longer any interest in the definition of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left the settlement of the question to the Balkan peoples themselves, or we supported our allies and carried out a triple alliance policy in the east, thereby giving up the role of mediator.

"I urged the former course from the beginning, but the German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter. The chief question was Albania. Our allies desired the establishment of an independent State of Albania, as Austria would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Valona or even the territory north of Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favored Serbian, and France Greek, desires. My advice was now to consider the question as outside the alliance, and to support neither Austrian nor Italian wishes. Without our support the establishment of Albania, whose incapability of existence might have been foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to the coast; then the present world-war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have remained definitely divided as to Greece, and the Italians, had they not wished to fight France alone, would have been obliged to consent to the expansion of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. The greater part of civilized Albania is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and, at the time of the Conference of Ambassadors, deputations from the larger towns came to London to carry through the annexation to Greece.

"In Greece today whole groups are Albanian, and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The amalgamation of the preponderating Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with the Greek State was, therefore, the best solution and the most natural, if one leaves out of account Scutari and the northern part of Serbia and Montenegro. His Majesty was also in favor of this solution on dynastic grounds. When I encouraged the monarch by letter to this effect, I received violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Austria's opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, and even direct correspondence. We had eventually, however, to abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East and to acknowledge our mistake, which consisted in identifying ourselves with the Turks in the south and the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of that policy, which

we began at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently carried on zealously, was bound in time, should the necessary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and a world war.

#### Turkey, Russia and Italy.

"Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to drive out of Constantinople, and confining ourselves to economic interests in the East, whilst at the same time refraining from all military and political interference and being satisfied with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constantinople and to the Mediterranean lay through Berlin. Instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, which were once free and are very different from the Russians, of which fact we have already had experience, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The dire mistake of our Triple Alliance and our Eastern policies, which drove Russia—our natural friend and best neighbor—into the arms of France and England, and kept her from her policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more evident, as a Franco-Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated from our calculations.

"As to the value of the alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war, with or without our alliance. That our alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The alliance consequently was worthless.

#### Austria's Position.

"Austria, however, needed our protection both in war and peace, and had no other point d'appui. This dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic grounds; and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, no Vienna Minister had been so self-conscious with us as Count Aehrenthal was during the last year of his life. Under the influence of a properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and is tied to us even without an alliance and without reciprocal services; under the influence of a misguided policy, however, we are tied to Austria-Hungary. An alliance would therefore be purposeless.

"I know Austria far too well not to know that a return to the policy of Count Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for return to the German Kaiserdom, even with a Habsburg-Lorraine at its head. They are striving for an internal Austrian Federation on a national basis, a condition which is even less likely of realization within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look on Berlin as the centre of German power and Kultur, and they know that Austria can never be a leading power. They desire as close a connection as possible with the empire, but not to the extent of an anti-German policy.

"Since the seventies the conditions have changed fundamentally in Austria, and also perhaps in Bavaria. Just as here a return to Pan-German particularism and the old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so there a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg is not to be contemplated. But by a constitutional union with Austria, which even without Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabited at least to the extent of one-half by non-Germans, our

interests would suffer; whilst, on the other hand, by the subordination of our policy to the point of view of Vienna and Budapest, we should have to 'épouser les querelles de l'Autriche.'

#### Balkan Quarrels.

"We therefore had no need to heed the desires of our allies. They were not only unnecessary but dangerous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia, if we looked at eastern questions through Austrian eyes. The transformation of our alliance with its single original purpose into a complete alliance, involving a complexity of common interests, was calculated to call forth the very state of things which the constitutional negotiations were designed to prevent, namely, war. Such a policy of alliances would, moreover, entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Peninsula, which were ready to turn to us and open their market to us. The contrast between dynastic and democratic ideas had to be given clear expression, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. King Carol told one of our representatives that he had made an alliance with us on condition that we retained control of affairs, but that if that control passed to Austria it would entirely change the basis of affairs, and under those conditions he could no longer participate. Matters stood in the same position in Serbia, where against our own economic interests we were supporting an Austrian policy of strangulation.

"We had always backed horses which, it was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, and finally—and this was the most miserable mistake of all—Count Berchtold.

"Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan War, since, at the outbreak of that war, we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French Government to join in a declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the powers. The British statesman maintained from the beginning that England had no interest in Albania, and would, therefore, not go to war on the subject. In his role of 'honest broker' he would confine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away difficulties between the two groups. He, therefore, by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his good-will and powerful influence toward the establishment of an understanding. Instead of adopting the English point of view we accepted that dictated to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London and I was his second.

#### Grey Always Conciliatory.

"My duty was to support his proposals. The clever and experienced Count Szogyenyi was at the helm in Berlin. His refrain was 'casus foederis,' and when once I dared to doubt the justice of this phrase I was seriously warned against Austrophobism. Referring to my father, it was even said that I had inherited it. On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbors in the Adriatic, Scutari, and in the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war—which was afterwards brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise,

there would have been war over this matter, as we should never have dared to ask 'our allies' to make concessions.

"Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved he proposed a formula which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives.

#### Austria and Russia.

"Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against the strength characterizing our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Russia.

"As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian program without German interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimize the mistake of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg question—the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian question—was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the result that it led to the abyss.

"The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy.

"His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to myself were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many qualities of a good diplomat—tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France.

"I once said, 'The feeling in Russia is very anti-German.' He replied, 'There are also many strong, influential pro-German circles there. But the people generally are anti-Austrian.'

"It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic interests."

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#### PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY.

The following extracts, which had formerly been suppressed by the Swedish Government, appeared in the *Politiken* of Stockholm on March 26:

"At the same time (1913) the Balkan Conference met in London, and I had the opportunity of meeting the leading men of the Balkan States. The most important personage among them was M. Venizelos. He was anything but anti-German, and particularly prized the Order of the Red Eagle, which he even wore at the French Embassy. With his winning amiability and *savoir faire* he could always win sympathy.

"Next to him a great role was played by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. He gave the impression of being a capable and energetic man, and even the influence of his friends at Vienna and Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, was attributable to the fact that he had let himself be drawn into the second Balkan war and had declined Russian intervention.

"M. Take Jonescu was often in London, too, and visited me regularly. I had known him since the time when I was Secretary at

Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter's friends. His aim in London was to secure concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Daneff. In this he was supported by the most capable Rumanian Minister, M. Misu. That these negotiations were stranded by the Bulgarian opposition is known. Count Berchtold—and naturally we with him—was entirely on the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff in obtaining the desired satisfaction for the Rumanians and have bound Rumania to us, as she was by Austria's attitude in the second Balkan war, while afterward she was estranged from the Central Powers.

"Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan war and Serbia's victory, as well as the Rumanian advance, naturally constituted a reproach to Austria. The idea of equalizing this by military intervention in Serbia seems to have gained ground rapidly in Vienna. This is proved by the Italian disclosure, and it may be presumed that the Marquis di San Giuliano, who described the plan as a 'pericolosissima adventura,' (an extremely risky adventure), saved us from a European war as far back as the Summer of 1912. Intimate as Russo-Italian relations were, the aspiration of Vienna must have been known in St. Petersburg. In any event, M. Take Jonescu told me that M. Sazonoff had said in Constanza that an attack on Serbia on the part of Austria meant war with Russia.

"In the Spring of 1914 one of my Secretaries, on returning from leave in Vienna, said that Herr von Tschirschky (German Ambassador in Vienna) had declared that war must soon come. But as I was always kept in the dark regarding important things, I considered his pessimism unfounded.

"Ever since the peace of Bucharest it seems to have been the opinion in Vienna that the revision of this treaty should be undertaken independently, and only a favorable opportunity was awaited. The statesmen in Vienna and Bucharest could naturally count upon our support. This they knew, for already they had been, reproached several times for their slackness. Berlin even insisted on the 'rehabilitation' of Austria.

#### Anglo-German Relations.

"When I returned to London in December, 1913, after a long holiday, the Liman von Sanders' question had led to our relations with Russia becoming acute. Sir Edward Grey called my attention with some uneasiness to the consequent unrest in St. Petersburg, saying: 'I have never seen them so excited.' Berlin instructed me to beg the Minister to urge calm in St. Petersburg and help to solve the difficulty. Sir Edward was quite willing, and his intervention contributed not inconsiderably to smoothing matters over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in St. Petersburg served in a like manner on several occasions when it was a question of carrying through something of which our representative there was completely incapable.

"During the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: 'If ever you want something done in St. Petersburg you come to me regularly, but if ever I appeal for your influence in Vienna you refuse your support.' The good and dependable relations I was fortunate in making not only in society and among influential people, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with others at public dinners, had brought about a noticeable improvement in our relations with England. Sir Edward devoted himself honestly to further this rapprochement, and his intentions were especially noticeable in two questions—the Colonial Treaty and the treaty regarding the Bagdad Railway.

#### AFRICAN AGREEMENT.

The following extracts, which deal with the African treaty which was negotiated while Prince Lichnowsky was Ambassador at London, are taken from the *Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten*:

"In the year 1898 a secret treaty had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt (then German Ambassador in London) and Mr. Balfour, which divided the Portuguese colonies in Africa into economic-political spheres of interest between us and England. As the Portuguese Government possessed neither the power nor the means to open up or adequately to administer its extensive possessions, the Portuguese Government had already, at an earlier date, thought of selling these possessions and thereby putting their finances in order. Between us and England an agreement had been reached which defined the interests of the two parties and which was of all the greater value because Portugal, as is well known, is completely dependent upon England. This treaty was no doubt to secure outwardly the integrity and independence of the Portuguese Empire, and it only expressed the intention of giving financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Consequently, it did not, according to the text conflict with the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dating from the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles II, and which guaranteed the territories of the two parties. Nevertheless, at the instance of the Marquis Soveral, who presumably was not ignorant of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty—the so-called Windsor treaty—which confirmed the old agreements, was concluded in 1899 between England and Portugal.

#### England's Generous Attitude.

"The object of the negotiations between us and England, which had begun before my arrival, was to alter and amend our treaty of 1898, which contained many impossible features—for example, with regard to the geographical delimitation. Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which entirely accorded with our wishes and interests. All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, was allotted to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thome and Principe, which lie north of the equator and therefore really belonged to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to make lively, although vain, representations. Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the frontier was formed by the Likungo. The British Government showed the utmost readiness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended to prove his good-will to us, but he also desired to promote our colonial development, because England hoped to divert Germany's development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the world-sea and Africa. 'We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development,' a member of the Cabinet said to me.

"Originally, at the British suggestion, the Congo State was to be included in the treaty, which would have given us a right of pre-emption and a possibility of economic penetration in the Congo State. But we refused this offer, out of alleged respect for Belgian sensibilities! Perhaps the idea was to economize our successes? With regard also to the practical realization of the real but unexpressed object of the treaty—the actual partition at a later date of the Portuguese colonial possessions—the new formulation showed considerable advantages and progress as compared with the old. Thus the treaty contemplated circumstances which would enable us to enter the territories ascribed to us, for the protection of our interests. These conditional clauses were so wide that it was really

left to us to decide when really 'vital' interests were concerned, so that, in view of the complete dependence of Portugal upon England, we merely needed to go on cultivating our relations with England in order, later on, with English assent, to realize our mutual intentions.

"The sincerity of the English Government in its effort to respect our rights was proved by the fact that Sir Edward Grey, before ever the treaty was completed or signed, called our attention to English men of business who were seeking opportunities to invest capital in the territories allotted to us by the new treaty, and who desired British support. In doing so he remarked that the undertakings in question belonged to our sphere of interest.

#### Wilhelmstrasse Intrigues.

"The treaty was practically complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. A conversation then took place in Berlin under the Presidency of the Imperial Chancellor (Herr von Bethmann Hollweg), in which I took part, and at which special wishes were laid down. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of my Counselor of Embassy, von Kuhlmann, who was working upon the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, in putting through our last proposals also. It was possible for the whole treaty to be initialed by Sir Edward Grey and myself in August, 1913, before I went on leave. Now, however, new difficulties were to arise, which prevented the signature, and it was only a year later, shortly before the outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authorization for the final settlement. Signature, however, never took place.

"Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only if the treaty was published, together with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899; England has no other secret treaties, and it is contrary to her existing principles that she should conceal binding agreements. He said, however, that he was ready to take account of our wishes concerning the time and manner of publication, provided that publication took place within one year, at latest, after the signature. In the (Berlin) Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage (the reference is apparently to Herr von Stumm), who played the part of Herr von Holstein, was claiming the London Embassy for himself, it was stated that the publication would imperil our interests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would show their gratitude by giving us no more concessions. The accuracy of this excuse is illuminated by the fact that the old treaty was most probably just as much long known to the Portuguese as our new agreements must have been, in view of the intimacy of relations between Portugal and England; it was illuminated also by the fact that, in view of the influence which England possesses at Lisbon, the Portuguese Government is completely powerless in face of an Anglo-German understanding.

#### "A Disastrous Mistake."

"Consequently it was necessary to find another excuse for wrecking the treaty. It was said that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlohe, and which was merely a renewal of the treaty of Charles II., which had never lapsed, might imperil the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as being a proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that we desired to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions! In spite of repeated conver-

sations with Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister made ever fresh proposals concerning publication, the (Berlin) Foreign Office remained obstinate, and finally agreed with Sir Edward Goschen (British Ambassador in Berlin) that everything should remain as it was before. So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than one year's work, had collapsed because it would have been a public success for me. When in the Spring of 1914 I happened at a dinner in the embassy, at which Mr. Harcourt (then Colonial Secretary) was present, to mention the matter, the Colonial Secretary said that he was embarrassed and did not know how to behave. He said that the present state of affairs was intolerable, because he (Mr. Harcourt) wanted to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as to whether he should follow the old treaty or the new. He said that it was therefore extremely desirable to clear matters up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair which had been hanging on for so long.

"When I reported to this effect I received a rude and excited order, telling me to refrain from any further interference in the matter.

"I now regret that I did not go to Berlin in order to offer his Majesty my resignation, and that I still did not lose my belief in the possibility of an agreement between me and the leading (German) personages. That was a disastrous mistake, which was to be tragically avenged some months later.

"Slight though was the extent to which I then still possessed the good will of the Imperial Chancellor—because he feared that I was aiming at his office—I must do him the justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last conversation before the outbreak of war, he gave his consent to the signature and publication. Nevertheless, it required further repeated suggestions on my part, which were supported by Dr. Solf (German Colonial Secretary) in order at last to obtain official consent at the end of July. Then the Serbian crisis was already threatening the peace of Europe, and so the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. The treaty is now one of the victims of the war."

#### BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY.

The following extracts were published in the *Politiken* of Stockholm on March 26:

"At the same time (while the African agreement was under discussion), I was negotiating, with the effective co-operation of Herr von Kuhlmann, the so-called Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in fact, at the division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward Grey declared repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor.

"In the presence of the Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions in connection with the German treaty were settled mainly in accordance with the wishes of the Ottoman Bank. The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey made me personally was the continuation of the line to Basra. We had not insisted on this terminus in order to establish connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. The shipping on the Shatt el Arab was to be in the hands of an international commission. We also obtained a share in the harbor works at Basra, and even acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, hitherto the monopoly of the firm of Lynch.

"By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the district of Bagdad and the Anatolian railways.

"The British economic territories included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna Aidin railway, the French Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had both treaties been concluded and published, an agreement would have been reached with England which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of an Anglo-German co-operation.

#### German Naval Development.

"Most difficult of all, there remained the question of the fleet. It was never quite rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into its most important naval power had at least to be recognized by England as uncomfortable. This presumably cannot be doubted. To maintain the necessary lead and not to become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the British World position was made in that our policy allowed the possibility of warlike development to appear. This possibility was obviously near during the Morocco crisis and the Bosnian question.

"People had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to the British and constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England's joining hands with Russia and France. On account of our fleet alone, however, England would have drawn the sword as little as on account of our trade, which it is pretended called forth her jealousy and ultimately brought about war.

"From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that in spite of the fleet it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and rapprochement if we did not propose new votes of credit, and, above all, if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. I also avoided all mention of the fleet, and between me and Sir Edward Grey the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one occasion at a Cabinet meeting: 'The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me.'

#### Understanding Possible.

"During my term of office the then First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the question of a so-called naval holiday, and proposed, for financial reasons as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party, a one year's pause in armaments. Officially the suggestion was not supported by Sir Edward Grey. He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. Churchill spoke to me on repeated occasions.

"I am convinced that his initiative was honest, cunning in general not being part of the Englishman's constitution. It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill to secure economies for the country and to lighten the burden of armament, which was weighing heavily on the people.

"I maintain that it would have been difficult to support his intention. How about the workmen employed for this purpose? How about the technical personnel? Our naval program was settled, and it would be difficult to alter it. Nor, on the other hand, did we intend exceeding it. But he pointed out that the means spent on portentous armaments could equally be used for other pur-

poses. I maintain that such expenditure would have benefited home industries.

"I also succeeded, in conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, in keeping away that subject without raising suspicion, although it came up in Parliament, and preventing the Government's proposal from being made. But it was Mr. Churchill's and the Government's favorite idea that by supporting his initiative in the matter of large ships we should give proof of our good-will and considerably strengthen and increase the tendency on the part of the Government to get in closer contact with us. But, as I have said, it was possible in spite of our fleet and without naval holidays to come to an understanding.

"In that spirit I had carried out my mission from the beginning, and had even succeeded in realizing my program when the war broke out and destroyed everything.

"Trade jealousy, so much talked about among us, rests on faulty judgment of circumstances. It is a fact that Germany's progress as a trading country after the war of 1870 and during the following decades threatened the interests of British trade circles, constituting a form of monopoly with its industry and export houses. But the growing interchange of merchandise with Germany, which was first on the list of all European exporting countries, a fact I always referred to in my public speeches, had allowed the desire to mature to preserve good relations with England's best client and business friend, and had gradually suppressed all other thoughts and motives. The Englishman, as a matter of fact, adapts himself to circumstances and does not tilt against windmills. In commercial circles I found the greatest good-will and desire to further our common economic interests.

"In other circles I had a most amiable reception, and enjoyed the cordial good-will of the Court, society, and the Government.

#### Influence of the Crown.

"The King, very amiable and well meaning and possessed of sound understanding and common sense, was invariably well disposed toward me and desired honestly to facilitate my mission. In spite of the small amount of power which the British Constitution gives the Crown, the King can, by virtue of his position, greatly influence the tone both of society and the Government. The Crown is the apex of society from which the tone emanates. Society, which is overwhelmingly Unionist, is largely occupied by ladies connected with politics. It is represented in the Lords and the Commons, consequently also in the Cabinet.

"The Englishman either belongs to society or ought to belong to it. His aim is, and always will be, to be a distinguished man and a gentleman, and even men of modest origin, such as Mr. Asquith, prefer to be in society, with its elegant women.

"British gentlemen of both parties enjoy the same education, go to the same colleges and university, and engage in the same sports—golf, cricket, lawn tennis, and polo. All have played cricket and football in their youth, all have the same habits, and all spend the week-end in the country. No social cleavage divides the parties, only political cleavage. To some extent of late years the politicians in the two camps have avoided one another in society. Not even on the ground of a neutral mission could the two camps be amalgamated, for since the Home Rule and Veto bills the Unionists have despised the Radicals. A few months after my arrival the King and Queen dined with me, and Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner in order not to be together with Sir Edward Grey. But there is no opposition from difference in caste and education as in France. There are not two worlds, but the same

world, and their opinion of a foreigner is common and not without influence on his political standing, whether a Lansdowne or an Asquith is at the helm.

#### Poitics and Society.

"The difference of caste no longer exists in England since the time of the Stuarts and since the Whig oligarchy (in contradistinction to the Tory county families) allowed the bourgeoisie in the towns to rise in society. There is greater difference in political opinions on constitutional or Church questions than on financial or political questions. Aristocrats who have joined the popular party, Radicals such as Grey, Churchill, Harcourt and Crewe, are most hated by the Unionist aristocracy. None of these gentlemen have I ever met in great aristocratic houses, only in the houses of party friends.

"We were received in London with open arms and both parties outdid one another in amiability.

"It would be a mistake to undervalue social connections in view of the close connection in England between society and politics, even though the majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government. Between an Asquith and a Devonshire there is no such deep cleft as between a Briand and a Duc de Doudeauville, for example. In times of political tension they do not foregather. They belong to two separate social groups, but are part of the same society, if on different levels, the centre of which is the Court. They have friends and habits in common, they are often related or connected. A phenomenon like Lloyd-George, a man of the people, a small solicitor and a self-made man, is an exception. Even John Burns, a Socialist Labor leader and a self-taught man, seeks society relations. On the ground of a general striving to be considered gentlemen of social weight and position such men must not be undervalued.

"In no place, consequently, is an envoy's social circle of greater consequence than in England. A hospitable house with friendly guests is worth more than the profoundest scientific knowledge, and a learned man of insignificant appearance and too small means would, in spite of all his learning, acquire no influence. The Briton hates a bore and a pedant. He loves a good fellow.

#### Sir Edward Grey's Socialism.

"Sir Edward Grey's influence in all questions of foreign policy was almost unlimited. True, he used to say on important occasions: 'I must lay that before the Cabinet'; but it is equally true that the latter invariably took his view. Although he did not know foreign countries and, with the exception of one short visit to Paris, had never left England, he was closely informed on all important questions, owing to many years' Parliamentary experience and natural grasp. He understood French without speaking it. Elected at an early age to Parliament he began immediately to occupy himself with foreign affairs. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he became in 1906 Secretary of State under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and filled the post for ten years.

"Sprung from an old North of England family of landowners, from whom the statesman Earl Grey is also descended, he joined the left wing of his party and sympathized with the Socialists and pacifists. He can be called a Socialist in the ideal sense, for he applied his theories even in private life, which is characterized by great simplicity and unpretentiousness, although he is possessed of considerable means. All display is foreign to him. He had a small resi-

dence in London and never gave dinners, except officially, at the Foreign Office on the King's Birthday. If, exceptionally, he asked a few guests to his house, it was to a simple dinner or luncheon in a small circle with parlor maids for service. The week-ends he spent regularly in the country, like his colleagues, but not at large country house parties. He lives mostly in his cottage in the New Forest, taking long walks, and is passionately fond of nature and ornithology. Or he journeyed to his property in the north and tamed squirrels. In his youth he was a noted cricket and tennis player. His chief sport is now salmon and trout fishing in the Scotch lakes with Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. Once, when spending his week-ends with Lord Glenconner, he came thirty miles on a bicycle and returned in the same way. His simple, upright manner insured him the esteem even of his opponents, who were more easily to be found in home than in foreign political circles.

"Lies and intrigue were foreign to his nature. His wife, whom he loved and from whom he was never separated, died as the result of an accident to the carriage driven by him. As is known, one brother was killed by a lion.

"Wordsworth was his favorite poet, and he could quote him by the hour. His British calm did not lack a sense of humor. When breakfasting with us and the children and he heard their German conversation, he would say, 'I cannot help admiring the way they talk German,' and laughed at his joke. This is the man who was called 'the Liar Grey' and the 'originator of the world war.'

#### Mr. Asquith and His Family.

"Asquith is a man of quite different mold. A jovial, sociable fellow, a friend of the ladies, especially young and beautiful ones, he loves cheery surroundings and a good cook, and is supported by a cheery young wife. He was formerly a well-known lawyer, with a large income and many years' Parliamentary experience. Later he was known as a Minister under Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and friendly to an understanding with Germany. He treated all questions with an experienced business man's calm and certainty, and enjoyed good health and excellent nerves steeled by assiduous golf.

"His daughters went to a German boarding school and speak fluent German. We quickly became good friends with him and his family, and were guests at his little house on the Thames.

"He only rarely occupied himself with foreign affairs. When important questions cropped up, with him lay the ultimate decision. During the critical days of July Asquith often came to warn us, and he was ultimately in despair over the tragic turn of events. On Aug. 2, when I saw Asquith in order to make a final attempt, he was completely broken, and although quite calm, tears ran down his face."

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#### SERBIAN CRISIS.

The Vorwaerts of Berlin, in printing in the original German the following extracts declared that these "decisive chapters are reproduced without abbreviations:"

"At the end of June, 1914, I proceeded to Kiel by order of the Kaiser. A few weeks before I had been given the honorary degree of Doctor at Oxford, a distinction conferred upon no German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen. On board the Meteor (the Kaiser's yacht) we heard of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the Austrian Throne. His Majesty expressed regret that his efforts to win

the Archduke over to his ideas had thus been rendered vain. Whether the plan of pursuing an active policy against Serbia had already been determined upon at Konopisch I cannot know.

"As I was uninformed about views and events at Vienna, I attached no far-reaching importance to this event. Not until later was I able to establish the fact that among the Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other sentiments. One of his Majesty's other guests on board the Meteor was an Austrian, Count Felix Thun. Although the weather was splendid, he lay all the time in his cabin, suffering from sea sickness. When the news arrived he was well; he had been cured either by the shock or by joy.

#### Berlin Was Warlike.

"When I arrived in Berlin I saw the Imperial Chancellor, and said to him that I regarded our foreign situation as very satisfactory, since our relations with England were better than they had been for a very long time past. I also remarked that a pacifist Ministry was in power in France.

"Herr von Bethmann Hollweg seemed not to share my optimism, and he complained about Russian armaments. I tried to calm him, and insisted especially that Russia had no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would, moreover, never obtain the support of England and France, as both countries wanted peace.

"I then went to Dr. Zimmermann (the Under Secretary), who was representing Herr von Jagow (Foreign Secretary), and from him I learned that Russia was about to raise 900,000 fresh troops. His words showed an unmistakable animosity against Russia, who, he said, was everywhere in our way. Difficulties about commercial policy were also involved. Of course I was not told that General von Moltke (Chief of the General Staff) was pressing for war. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschky (German Ambassador in Vienna) had received a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.

"I went to Silesia, and on my way back to London I spent only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to proceed against Serbia, in order to put an end to an intolerable state of affairs.

"Unfortunately, I underestimated at the moment the importance of the news. I thought that nothing would come of it, after all, and that, if Russia threatened, the trouble could easily be composed. Now I regret that I did not stay in Berlin and say at once that I would have no share in any such policy.

"Subsequently I learned that at the decisive conversation at Potsdam on July 5 the inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all the personages in authority; indeed, they added that there would be no harm if a war with Russia were to result. So, at any rate, it is stated in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador received in London. Soon afterward Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to discuss everything with Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister.

#### Grey's Coadjutors.

(The following appeared in the Stockholm Politiken on March 28:)

"Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir William Tyrrell had the greatest influence in the Foreign Office. The former was not our friend but his attitude toward me was consistently correct and obliging. Our personal relations were of the best. Neither did he wish for war, but when we (moved) against France he undoubtedly worked for immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague, and was in constant touch with him, and was destined to

succeed Lord Bertie in Paris. As is known, Sir Arthur was formerly Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and had concluded the treaty of 1907, which enabled Russia to turn again to the West and the Near East.

"Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, had far greater influence than the Permanent Under Secretary of State. This unusually intelligent man had been at a school in Germany, and had then entered the Diplomatic Service, but he was abroad only a short time. At first he belonged to the modern anti-German school of young English diplomats, but later he became a determined supporter of an understanding. To this aim and object he even influenced Sir Edward Grey, with whom he was very intimate. After the outbreak of war he left the department and went to the Home Office, probably in consequence of criticism of him for his Germanophile leanings.

#### Cabals Against Lichnowsky.

"The rage of certain gentlemen over my success in London and the position I had achieved was indescribable. Schemes were set on foot to impede my carrying out my duties, I was left in complete ignorance of most important things, and I had to confine myself to sending in unimportant and dull reports. Secret reports from agents about things of which I could know nothing without spies and necessary funds were never available for me, and it was only in the last days of July, 1914, that I heard accidentally from the Naval Attaché of the secret Anglo-French agreement for joint action of the two fleets in case of war.

"After my arrival I became convinced that in no circumstances need we fear a British attack or British support of a foreign attack, but that under all conditions England would protect France. I advanced this opinion in repeated reports with detailed reasoning and insistence, but without gaining credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal of the formula of neutrality and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis were clear indications. In addition, the above-mentioned secret agreements were known to the department.

"I repeatedly urged that England as a commercial State would suffer greatly in any war between the European great powers, and would therefore prevent such a war by all available means, but, on the other hand, in the interest of the European balance of power and to prevent Germany's overlordship would never tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane told me this shortly after my arrival. All influential people spoke in the same way.

(The continuation of this part of the memorandum is taken up at this point by Vorwaerts:)

"I then received instructions that I was to induce the English press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the 'death blow' to the great Serbian movement, and as far as possible I was by my influence to prevent public opinion from opposing Austria. Recollections of the attitude of England during the annexation crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, recollections also of the benevolent promotion of national movements in the time of Lord Byron and Garibaldi—these and other things spoke so strongly against the probability of support being given to the projected punitive expedition against the murderers that I considered it necessary to give an urgent warning. But I also gave a warning against the whole project, which I described as adventurous and dangerous, and I advised that moderation should be recommended to the Austrians, because I did not believe in the localization of the conflict.

## LICHNOWSKY'S ACCUSATIONS

*"As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:*

*"1. We encourage Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference.*

*"2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply.*

*"3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.*

*"In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world war."*

### Jagow Would "Risk It."

"Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not ready; there would doubtless be a certain amount of bluster, but the more firmly we stood by Austria the more would Russia draw back. He said that Austria was already accusing us of want of spirit, and that we should not squeeze her. On the other hand, feeling in Russia was becoming ever more anti-German, and so we must simply risk it.

"This attitude, as I learned later, was based upon reports from Count Pourtales (German Ambassador in Petrograd) to the effect that Russia would not move in any circumstances; these reports caused us to stimulate Count Berchtold to the greatest possible energy. Consequently I hoped for salvation from an English mediation, because I knew Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be turned to use in favor of peace. So I used my friendly relations with Sir Edward Grey, and in confidence begged him to advise moderation in Russia if Austria, as it seemed, demanded satisfaction from the Serbs.

"At first the attitude of the English press was calm and friendly to the Austrians, because the murder was condemned. But gradually more and more voices were heard to insist that, however necessary the punishment of the crime, an exploitation of the crime for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly urged to show moderation.

"When the ultimatum appeared all the newspapers, with the exception of *The Standard*, which was always in low water and apparently was paid by the Austrians, were at one in their condemnation. The whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, and indeed world-war. The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for a review, was not demobilized.

"At first I pressed for as conciliatory an answer as possible on the part of Serbia, since the attitude of the Russian Government left no further doubt of the seriousness of the situation.

"The Serbian reply was in accordance with British efforts; M. Pashitch had actually accepted everything, except two points, about which he declared his readiness to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted war, in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard-of (Austrian) note would have remained unanswered.

#### Sir Edward Grey's Proposal.

"Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, and pointed to the conciliatory attitude of the Government at Belgrade. We then discussed his mediation proposal, which was to arrange an interpretation of the two points acceptable to both parties. M. Cambon (French Ambassador in London), the Marquis Imperiai (Italian Ambassador in London), and I should have met under Sir Edward Grey's presidency, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the disputed points, which in the main concerned the participation of Austrian officials in the investigation at Belgrade. Given good-will, everything could have been settled in one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the tension and would have further improved our relations to England. I urgently recommended the proposal, saying that otherwise world war was imminent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing to gain. In vain! I was told that it was against the dignity of Austria, and that we did not want to interfere in the Serbian business, but left it to our ally. I was told to work for 'localization of the conflict.'

"Of course it would only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been.

"After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer (from Berlin) than that it was an enormous 'concession' on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.

"Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand.

"The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude in a question which, after all, did not directly concern us was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonoff (Russian Foreign Minister), later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuliano (Italian Foreign Minister) and of Bollati (Italian Ambassador in Berlin), my urgent advice—it was all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred.

"The more I pressed, the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was not to have the success of saving peace in the company of Sir Edward Grey.

"So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. I replied that I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly: 'If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.'

### Grey Still Sought Peace.

"After that events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.

"Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape. In the morning of Aug. 1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Should we remain neutral if France did the same? I understood him to mean that we should then be ready to spare France, but his meaning was that we should remain absolutely neutral—neutral therefore even toward Russia. That was the well-known misunderstanding. Sir Edward had given me an appointment for the afternoon, but as he was then at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, after Sir W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. But in the afternoon he spoke no longer of anything but Belgian neutrality, and of the possibility that we and France should face one another armed, without attacking one another.

"Thus there was no proposal whatever, but a question without any obligation, because our conversation, as I have already explained, was to take place soon afterward. In Berlin, however—without waiting for the conversation—this news was used as the foundation for a far-reaching act. Then came Poincare's letter, Bonar Law's letter, and the telegram from the King of the Belgians. The hesitating members of the Cabinet were converted, with the exception of three members, who resigned.

"Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the part of England. My French colleague also felt himself by no means secure, as I learned from a private source. As late as Aug. 1 the King replied evasively to the French President. But in the telegram from Berlin which announced the threatening danger of war England was already mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned upon war with England.

"Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on Aug. 5 at his house. I had gone there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and, 'We don't want to crush Germany.' Unfortunately, this confidential conversation was published. Thereby Herr von Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of reaching peace via England.

"Our departure was thoroughly dignified and calm. Before we left, the King had sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to me, to express his regret at my departure and that he could not see me personally. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family lamented our going. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the embassy to say good-bye.

"A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honor was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy.

"At the railway station in London Count Mensdorff (Austrian Ambassador) appeared with his staff. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain in London. But to the English he said that it was not Austria, but we, who had wanted the war.

### Retrospect.

"When now, after two years, I realize everything in retrospect. I say to myself that I realized too late that there was no place for me in a system which for years has lived only on tradition and routine, and which tolerates only representatives who report what one wants to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judg-

ment are combated, want of ability and of character are extolled and esteemed, but successes arouse hostility and uneasiness.

"I had abandoned opposition to our mad Triple Alliance policy, because I saw that it was useless and that my warnings were represented as Austrophobia and an *idee fixe*. In a policy which is not mere gymnastics, or playing with documents, but the conduct of the business of the firm, there is no such thing as likes and dislikes; there is nothing but the interest of the community; but a policy which is based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must end in hostility to Russia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe.

"In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who, at any rate, reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Starits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sazonoff was saying to us: 'Lachez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français,' and M. Cambon (French Ambassador in Berlin) said to Herr von Jagow: 'Vous n'avez (pas) besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout.'

"We needed neither alliances nor wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and others, and which would guarantee us an economic development for which there had been no precedent in history. And if Russia had been relieved of trouble in the west, she would have been able to turn again to the east, and then the Anglo-Russian antagonism would have arisen automatically without our interference—and the Russo-Japanese antagonism no less than the Anglo-Russian.

"We could also have approached the question of limitation of armaments, and should have had no further need to bother about the confusions of Austria. Austria-Hungary would then become the vassal of the German Empire—without an alliance, and, above all—without sentimental services on our part, leading ultimately to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interests demanded exactly the contrary.

"I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be fallacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.

#### Arrival at Berlin.

"On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe of which our Government had made itself guilty in opposition to my advice and my warnings.

"The report was persistently circulated by official quarters that I had let myself be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because if he had not wanted war Russia would not have mobilized. Count Pourtales, whose reports could be relied upon, was to be spared, if only because of his family connections. He was said to have behaved 'splendidly,' and he was enthusiastically praised, while I was all the more sharply blamed.

"'What has Russia got to do with Serbia?' this statesman said to me after eight years of official activity in Petersburg. It was made out that the whole business was a perfidious British trick which I had not understood. In the Foreign Office I was told that in 1916 it would in any case have come to war. But then Russia would have been 'ready,' and so it was better now.

#### Question of Guilt.

"As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:

"1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world-war

must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference.

"2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply.

"3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

"In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world war.

"Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Were these people not right who prophesied that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi dominated the German people—the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil; that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values—not the civilian gentleman; that the love of duelling, which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had not the events at Zabern and the Parliamentary debates on that case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are valued among us, when questions of military power are on the other side?

"Cramb, a historian who has since died, an admirer of Germany, put the German point of view into the words of Euphorion:

Träumt Ihr den Friedenstag?  
Träume, wer träumen mag!  
Krieg ist das Lösungswort!  
Sieg, und so klingt es fort.

"Militarism, really a school for the nation and an instrument of policy, makes policy into the instrument of military power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a soldier-kingdom renders possible an attitude which would not be permitted by a democracy which had disengaged itself from military-Junker influences.

"That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization, and in spite of Socialistic organization, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany, will be achieved.

#### Our Future.

"Today, after two years of the war, there can be no further doubt that we cannot hope for an unconditional victory over Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, and that we cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our enemies. But we can reach a compromised peace only upon the basis of the evacuation of the occupied territories, the possession of which in any case

signifies for us a burden and weakness and the peril of new wars. Consequently everything should be avoided which hinders a change of course on the part of those enemy groups which might perhaps still be won over to the idea of compromise—the British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. Even from this point of view our Polish project is just as objectionable as any interference with Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens—to say nothing of the mad submarine war scheme.

"Our future lies upon the water. True, but it therefore does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France and Servia. That is a reversion to the Holy Roman Empire, to the aberrations of the Hohenstaufens and Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not the policy of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes.

"Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into the past, a revolt from the future, from Imperialism, from world Policy. Central Europe is mediaevalism; Berlin-Bagdad is a cul de sac, and not a road into the open, to unlimited possibilities, and to the world mission of the German people.

"I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State; I am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims, and to bring us on to the sloping plane of Continental policy. It was not German policy, but Austrian dynastic policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance as a shield, under whose protection they could make excursions at pleasure into the East.

"And what result have we to expect from the struggle of peoples? The United States of Africa will be British, like the United States of America, of Australia, and of Oceania; and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. They will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely to Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist.

"In Asia the Russian and Japanese will expand their borders and their customs, and the south will remain to the British.

"The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late, and the world war has destroyed the last possibility of catching up the lost ground, of founding a Colonial Empire.

"For we shall not supplant the sons of Japheth; the program of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of mankind in British expansion and British Imperialism, will be realized.

Tu regere imperio populos Romano, memento,  
Hae tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem,  
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos."

#### Krupp Director Confirms Prince.

Coincident with the publication in Germany of the famous memorandum of Prince Lichnowsky squarely putting the blame for the outbreak of the world war upon the Kaiser and the German militarists, there also appeared in circular form in Germany a letter written by a certain Dr. Mühlön, a former member of the Krupp Directorate now living in Switzerland, corroborating the charges made by the Prince. The Mühlön letter was briefly referred to in an official dispatch from Switzerland received in Washington on March 29 as having produced an animated discussion throughout the empire.

A copy of the Leipziger Volkszeitung of March 20, just received here, tells how, in a discussion of the Lichnowsky and Mühl-

lon memoranda before the Main Committee of the Reichstag on March 16, Vice Chancellor von Payer tried to minimize the value of Dr. Mühlon's statements by asserting that the former Krupp Director was a sick, nervous man who no doubt did not intend to injure his country's cause, but who was hardly responsible for his actions because of his many nervous breakdowns. Later, the Berliner Tageblatt printed the text of Dr. Mühlon's letter, which was evidently written before the resignation of Dr. Karl Helfferich as Vice Chancellor last November. As translated by The London Times, Dr. Mühlon's memorandum reads:

#### Talk with Helfferich.

"In the middle of July, 1914, I had, as I frequently had, a conversation with Dr. Helfferich, then Director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now Vice Chancellor. The Deutsche Bank had adopted a negative attitude toward certain large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey, in which the firm of Krupp, for business reasons—delivery of war material—had a lively interest. As one of the reasons to justify the attitude of the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Helfferich finally gave me the following reason:

"The political situation has become very menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering into any further engagements abroad. The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Serbia, with a very short interval for the answer. The ultimatum will contain demands such as punishment of a number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal investigations in Serbia by Austrian officials, and, in fact, a whole series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria-Hungary will declare war on Serbia."

"Dr. Helfferich added that the Kaiser had expressed his decided approval of this procedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these two countries in which he would permit no other State to interfere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize also. But in his case mobilization meant immediate war. This time there would be no oscillation. Helfferich said that the Austrians were extremely well satisfied at this determined attitude on the part of the Kaiser.

"When I thereupon said to Dr. Helfferich that this uncanny communication converted my fears of a world war, which were already strong, into absolute certainty, he replied that it certainly looked like that. But perhaps France and Russia would reconsider the matter. In any case, the Serbs deserved a lesson which they would remember. This was the first intimation that I had received about the Kaiser's discussions with our allies. I knew Dr. Helfferich's particularly intimate relations with the personages who were sure to be initiated, and I knew that his communication was trustworthy.

#### Kaiser for War.

"After my return from Berlin I informed Herr Krupp von Böhlen and Halbach, one of whose Directors I then was at Essen. Dr. Helfferich had given me permission and at that time the intention was to make him a Director of Krupps. Herr von Böhlen seemed disturbed that Dr. Helfferich was in possession of such information, and he made a remark to the effect that the Government people can never keep their mouths shut. He then told me the following: He said that he had himself been with the Kaiser in the last few days. The Kaiser had spoken to him also of his conversation with the Austrians, and of its result; but he had described

the matter as so secret that he (Krupp) would not even have dared to inform his own Directors. As, however, I already knew, he could tell me that Helfferich's statements were accurate. Indeed, Helfferich seemed to know more details than he did. He said that the situation was really very serious. The Kaiser had told him that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time people would see that he did not turn about. The Kaiser's repeated insistence that this time nobody would be able to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been almost comic in its effect.

#### **German Duplicity.**

"On the very day indicated to me by Helfferich the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia appeared. At this time I was again in Berlin, and I told Helfferich that I regarded the tone and contents of the ultimatum as simply monstrous. Dr. Helfferich, however, said that the note only had that ring in the German translation. He had seen the ultimatum in French, and in French it really could not be regarded as overdone. On this occasion Helfferich also said to me that the Kaiser had gone on his northern cruise only as a 'blind'; he had not arranged the cruise on the usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at hand and keeping in constant touch. Now one must simply wait and see what would happen. The Austrians, who, of course, did not expect the ultimatum to be accepted, were really acting rapidly before the other powers could find time to interfere. The Deutsche Bank had already made its arrangements, so as to be prepared for all eventualities. For example, it was no longer paying out the gold which came in. That could easily be done without attracting notice, and the amount day by day reached considerable sums.

"Immediately after the Vienna ultimatum to Serbia the German Government issued declarations to the effect that Austria-Hungary had acted all alone, without Germany's previous knowledge. When one attempted to reconcile these declarations with the events mentioned above, the only possible explanation was that the Kaiser had tied himself down without inviting the co-operation of his Government, and that, in the conversations with the Austrians, the Germans took care not to agree upon the text of the ultimatum. For I have already shown that the contents of the ultimatum were pretty accurately known in Germany. Herr Krupp von Böhlen, with whom I spoke about these German declarations—which, at any rate in their effect, were lies—was also by no means edified. For, as he said, Germany ought not, in such a tremendous affair, to have given a blank check to a State like Austria; and it was the duty of the leading statesmen to demand, both of the Kaiser and of our allies, that the Austrian claims and the ultimatum to Serbia should be discussed in minute detail and definitely decided upon, and also that we should decide upon the precise program of our further proceedings. He said that, whatever point of view one took, we ought not to give ourselves into the hands of the Austrians and expose ourselves to eventualities which had not been reckoned out in advance. One ought to have connected appropriate conditions with our obligations. In short, Herr von Böhlen regarded the German denial of previous knowledge, if there was any trace of truth in it, as an offense against the elementary principles of diplomacy, and he told me that he intended to speak in this sense to Herr von Jagow, then Foreign Secretary, who was a special friend of his.

#### **German Government Blamed.**

"As a result of this conversation Herr von Böhlen told me that Herr von Jagow stuck firmly to his assertion that he had noth-

ing to do with the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that Germany had never made any such demands. In reply to the objection that this was inconceivable, Herr von Jagow replied that he, as a diplomatist, had naturally thought of making such a demand. When, however, Herr von Jagow was occupying himself with the matter and was called in, the Kaiser had so committed himself that it was too late for any procedure according to diplomatic custom, and there was nothing more to be done. The situation was such that it would have been impossible to intervene with drafting proposals. In the end, he (Jagow) had thought that non-interference would have its advantages—namely, the good impression which could be made in Petersburg and Paris with the German declaration that Germany had not co-operated in the preparation of the Vienna ultimatum."

Herr Mühlon authorized the *Humanite*, a Paris Socialist paper, through its Swiss correspondent, to publish the following remarkable letter which he addressed from Berne, on May 7, 1917, to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, then Imperial Chancellor:

"However great the number and weight of the mistakes accumulated on the German side since the beginning of the war, I nevertheless persisted for a long time in the belief that a belated foresight would at last dawn upon the minds of our Directors. It was with this hope that I put myself to a certain extent at your disposal, in order to collaborate with you in Rumania, and that I indicated to you that I was disposed to help in Switzerland, where I am living at present, if the object of our efforts was to be rapprochement of the enemy parties. That I was, and that I remain, hostile to any activity other than reconciliation and restoration I proved soon after the opening of hostilities by the definite resignation of my Directorship of Krupps' works.

"But since the first days of 1917 I have abandoned all hope as regards the present directors of Germany. Our offer of peace without indication of our war aims, the accentuation of the submarine war, the deportations of Belgians, the systematic destruction in France, and the torpedoing of English hospital ships have so degraded the governors of the German Empire that I am profoundly convinced that they are disqualified forever for the elaboration and conclusion of a sincere and just agreement. The personalities may change, but they cannot remain the representatives of the German cause.

"The German people will not be able to repair the grievous crimes committed against its own present and future, and against that of Europe and the whole human race until it is represented by different men with a different mentality. To tell the truth, it is mere justice that its reputation throughout the whole world is as bad as it is. The triumph of its methods—the methods by which it has hitherto conducted the war both militarily and politically—would constitute a defeat for the ideas and the supreme hopes of mankind. One has only to imagine that a people exhausted, demoralized, or hating violence, should consent to a peace with a Government which has conducted such a war, in order to understand how the general level and the chances of life of the peoples would remain black and deceptive.

"As a man and as a German who desires nothing but the welfare of the deceived and tortured German people, I turn away definitely from the present representatives of the German regime. And I have only one wish—that all independent men may do the same and that many Germans may understand and act.

"In view of the fact that it is impossible for me at present to make any manifestation before German public opinion, I have

thought it to be my absolute duty to inform your Excellency of my point of view."

#### Reichstag Debate on Lichnowsky.

The Main Committee of the Reichstag dealt with Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum on March 16. Herr von Payer, Vice Chancellor, stated that Prince Lichnowsky himself on March 15 made a statement to the Imperial Chancellor, in which he said:

"Your Excellency knows that the purely private notes which I wrote down in the Summer of 1916 found their way into wider circles by an unprecedented breach of confidence. It was mainly a question of subjective considerations about our entire foreign policy since the Berlin Congress. I perceived in the policy hitherto pursued of repelling (in der seitherigen Abkehr) Russia and in the extension of the policy of alliances to Oriental questions, the real roots of the world war. I then submitted our Morocco naval policy to a brief examination. My London mission could at the same time not remain out of consideration, especially as I felt the need in regard to the future and with a view to my own justification, of noting the details of my experiences and impressions there before they vanished from my memory. These notes were intended in a certain degree only for family archives, and I wrote them down without documentary material or notes from the period of my official activity. I considered I might show them, on the assurance of absolute secrecy, to a very few political friends in whose judgment as well as trustworthiness I had equal confidence."

#### Lichnowsky Resigns Rank.

Prince Lichnowsky then described in his letter how the memorandum, owing to an indiscretion, got into circulation, and finally expressed lively regret at such an extremely vexatious incident.

Herr von Payer said that Prince Lichnowsky had meanwhile tendered his resignation of his present rank, which had been accepted, and as he had doubtless no bad intention, but had simply been guilty of imprudence, no further steps would be taken against him. The Vice Chancellor proceeded:

"Some assertions in his documents must, however, be contradicted, especially his assertions about political events in the last months preceding the war. Prince Lichnowsky was not of his own knowledge acquainted with these events, but he apparently received from a third, and wrongly informed quarter, inaccurate information. The key to the mistakes and false conclusions may also be the Prince's overestimation of his own services, which are accompanied by hatred against those who do not recognize his achievements as he expected. The entire memorandum is penetrated by a striking veneration for foreign diplomats, especially the British, who are described in a truly affectionate manner, and, on the other hand, by an equally striking irritation against almost all German statesmen. The result was that the Prince frequently regarded Germany's most zealous enemy as her best friend because they were personally on good terms with him. The fact that, as he admits, he attached at first no great importance to the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, and was displeased that the situation was judged otherwise in Berlin, makes it plain that the Prince had no clear judgment for the events that followed and their import."

The Vice Chancellor then characterized as false all Prince Lichnowsky's assertions about General von Moltke's urging war at the Potsdam Crown Council of June 5, 1914, and the dispatch of the Austrian protocol on "this alleged Crown Council" to Count Mensdorff, containing the postscript that it would be no great harm even if war with Russia arose out of it.

### Payer's Defense.

Herr von Payer also denied the statement that the then Foreign Secretary was in Vienna in 1914, as well as the statement that Count von Pourtales, the German Ambassador in Petrograd, had reported that Russia would in no circumstances move. The Sukhomlinoff trial had shown how unfounded were Prince Lichnowsky's reproaches against Germany for replying to the Russian mobilization by an ultimatum and a declaration of war. It was also false to assert that the German Government rejected all Great Britain's mediation proposals. Lord Grey's last mediation proposal was very urgently supported in Vienna by Berlin. The aim of the memorandum was obvious. It was to show the reader how much better and more intelligent Prince Lichnowsky's policy was, and how he could have assured the peace of the Empire if his advice had been followed.

The Vice Chancellor continued:

"Nobody will reproach the Prince with this belief in himself. He was also free to make notes about events, and his attitude toward them, but he should then have considered it a duty that his views should not have become known to the public, and, no matter how small his circle of readers was, it was his duty to state nothing contradicting facts which he knew. As things now are, the memorandum will cause enough harm among malevolent and superficial people. The memorandum has no historical value whatever."

### Suffered from Nerves.

Referring to a manifolded copy of a letter from Dr. Mühlön, who is at present in Switzerland, and at the outbreak of war was on Krupp's Board of Directors, Herr von Payer said that the letter related to the utterances of two highly placed gentlemen from which he drew the conclusion that the German Government in July, 1914, lacked a desire for peace. Both these gentlemen had stated in writing that Dr. Mühlön had suffered from nerves, and he (Herr von Payer) also took the view that his statements were those of a man of diseased mind.

In the discussion that followed, Herr Scheidemann said that the Socialist Party regarded imperialism as the fundamental cause of the war. Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum, in which he attempted to put the blame for the war on Germany, could, in his opinion, only make an impression on so-called out-and-out pacifists.

Herr Müller-Meiningen said that, notwithstanding what Dr. Mühlön and Prince Lichnowsky had said, he was absolutely convinced that the overwhelming majority of the German people, the Chancellor, and the representatives of the Foreign Office, and, above all, the German Emperor, always desired peace.

Herr Stresemann expressed a desire to see the last White Book supplemented. Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum could not be taken seriously.

Herr von Payer, intervening, said that the question as to whether criminal or disciplinary action might be taken against Prince Lichnowsky was considered by the Imperial Department of Justice. The result was that, on various legal grounds, neither a prosecution of the Prince for diplomatic high treason in the sense of Paragraph 92 of the Penal Code, nor proceedings under Paragraph 89 or Paragraph 353, the so-called Arnim paragraph, would have offered any chance of success. After the Prince's retirement, there was no longer any question of disciplinary proceedings against him. The Prince has been prohibited by the Foreign Office from publishing articles in the press.

### Lichnowsky's "Optimism."

Herr von Stumm, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, replying to a question as to who was responsible for Prince Lichnowsky's appointment in London, said that the appointment was made by the Kaiser, in agreement with the responsible Imperial Chancellor. While in London the Prince had devoted himself zealously to his task. His views, it was true, had frequently not agreed with those of the German Foreign Office. That was especially the case regarding his strong optimism in reference to German-English relations. When his hopes aiming at a German-English understanding were destroyed by the war, the Prince returned to Germany greatly excited, and even then did not restrain his criticism of Germany's policy.

Herr von Stumm continued:

"His excitement increased owing to attacks against him in the German press. All these circumstances must be taken into consideration when gauging the value of his memorandum. It was unjustifiable to draw conclusions from it regarding the Ambassador's activity in London and blame the government for it. Regarding the German White Book, the Under Secretary admitted that it was not very voluminous, but it had to be compiled quickly, so as to present to the Reichstag at the opening a clear picture of the question of guilt. The Blue Books of other States, it was true, were much more voluminous. The German White Book, however, differed from them in so far to its advantage as it contained no falsification. A new edition of the German White Book is in preparation."

Dr. Payer then discussed the revelations of Dr. Mühlon, at present in Switzerland. Dr. Mühlon, an ex-Director of Krupps, had made a statement according to which he had a conference with two exalted personages in the latter half of July, 1914, from which it appeared that it was not the intention of the German Government to maintain peace. The Vice Chancellor alleged that Dr. Mühlon was suffering from neurasthenia at the time, and that no importance could be attached to his revelations, since the two gentlemen referred to had denied making the statements attributed to them.

In the subsequent discussion disapproval of Prince Lichnowsky's attitude was expressed, but some speakers urged the need for the reorganization of Germany's diplomatic service.

According to the report of the debate published by the Neues Wiener Journal, Herr von Payer himself acknowledged that prior to the war German diplomacy had made some bad blunders and that reform was urgently needed. Herr Müller (Progressive) sharply criticised Herr von Flotow, who was German Ambassador in Rome at the beginning of the war, and charged him with having declared to the Marquis di San Giuliano, then Italian Foreign Minister, that there existed for Italy no *casus foederis*. Prince Bulow also came in for severe criticism.

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### CHIROL'S COMMENT.

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#### Former Foreign Editor of London Times Tells of German Duplicity.

"The publication of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum furnishes evidence which even the most skeptical Englishman can hardly question of the peculiar system of dualism practised by the German Foreign Office in the conduct of its diplomacy abroad. To those who had opportunities of observing its methods at close quarters this is no new revelation. The German Foreign Office has almost invariably conducted its diplomatic work abroad through two or

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
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respects a man of great integrity and with many admirable qualities, including, besides a certain rather cynical frankness, a thoroughly un-Prussian contempt for the gew-gaws of official life, he was so saturated with the Wilhelmstrasse tradition that he was rather proud than otherwise of the unsavory part he had played toward his Paris chief, and had, therefore, the less hesitation in disclosing to me, when he thought it served his purpose, the existence of equally peculiar relations between Count Wolf-Metternich, then Councillor of Embassy in London, and the then Ambassador, Count Hatzfeld.

"In the face of such a confession as Prince Lichnowsky's, it would be amusing, were it not so pitiful, to see the same British politicians who were so egregiously duped by Germany's 'secret' diplomacy before the war still venting their chagrin in the House of Commons, not on their German 'friends,' by whom they were constantly fooled, and are apparently quite prepared to be fooled again tomorrow, but upon the British Foreign Office, whose timely appreciation of the German menace they invariably derided and whose endeavors to forearm the country against it they did their utmost to defeat."

VALENTINE CHIROL.

(In The Times of London, March 26, 1918.)



more different channels, for it was always too tortuous and complicated to be entrusted to any single agent. There was the public policy directed towards more or less avowable ends to be propounded in official dispatches and conversations, and there was 'the higher policy' to be promoted by means of discreet propaganda in the press and in society, and especially by appropriate appeals to the prejudices or interests of political and financial and commercial circles. Hence in the more important posts abroad it was the habit of the Wilhelmstrasse to rely mainly upon the Councillor of Embassy both to check the proceedings of the Ambassador and to manipulate all the complicated threads of its diplomatic network in which, for various reasons, it was deemed inexpedient for the Ambassador to get himself entangled, sometimes lest inconvenient disclosures might impair his influence with the Government to which he was accredited, and sometimes—as in the case of Prince Lichnowsky in London, and of the late Prince Radolin in Paris—because the Ambassador's personal sense of honor or his belief in the superiority of honorable statesmanship recoiled from the duplicity of the 'higher policy.' \* \* \*

"I gained an insight into this complex machinery when I went to Berlin as correspondent of *The Times*, in the early years of the present Emperor's reign, through Baron Holstein, who was then known as the 'eminence Grise' of the German Foreign Office from the commanding influence he yielded without the slightest ostentation of power. Owing to accidental circumstances, I came into much closer intimacy with him than he was wont to allow, not merely to journalists, but even to the chief foreign diplomatists in Berlin; and, subject to occasional intermittences when he resented somewhat ferociously my expositions of German policy, I maintained friendly relations with him long after I had ceased to reside in Berlin and he had himself outlived the Emperor's favor, for which he lacked the courtier's obsequiousness. He had been bred in the Bismarckian tradition; he had been a member of the old Chancellor's staff throughout the Franco-Prussian War, and had acted as his confidential agent when he was Councillor of Embassy in Paris under Count Harry von Arnim, whose sensational downfall he helped to bring about at Bismarck's behest. Although in other respects a man of great integrity and with many admirable qualities, including, besides a certain rather cynical frankness, a thoroughly un-Prussian contempt for the gew-gaws of official life, he was so saturated with the Wilhelmstrasse tradition that he was rather proud than otherwise of the unsavory part he had played toward his Paris chief, and had, therefore, the less hesitation in disclosing to me, when he thought it served his purpose, the existence of equally peculiar relations between Count Wolf-Metternich, then Councillor of Embassy in London, and the then Ambassador, Count Hatzfeld.

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