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# INFORMATION BULLETIN

BRANDENBURG GATE




NO. 146

OCTOBER 19, 1948

THIS • ISSUE • **BERLIN SITUATION**



# US MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY





## COVER PICTURE

*BRANDENBURG GATE*—Symbol of the dividing line between the Soviet and western sectors of Berlin, it was the arch through which militaristic forces of Germany's past marched to parade up *Unter den Linden* (in distance). The slogan placed along the top of the gate by Communist supporters reads: "Although forbidden, we are demonstrating! Against fascism, against the division of Germany."

(US Army Signal Corps photo)

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# MILITARY GOVERNMENT

# INFORMATION BULLETIN

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OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (US)  
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# Change in Overseas Salaries Announced

The 25 percent overseas differential pay applied to the salaries of Department of the Army civilian employees in the European Theater will be discontinued in January 1949, according to the Office of the Personnel Officer, OMGUS.

Executive Order 10,000, implementing US Public Law 491, provides for the discontinuation of the overseas differential and authorizes payment of quarters allowances, cost of living allowances and "post differentials." The order will affect Department of the Army employees at all overseas stations.

A quarters allowance will be authorized in the European Theater. The effect of this allowance will be to provide quarters at no charge to employees.


The "post differential," which may range up to 25 percent of base pay, will be determined by the Department of State. There is no information at this time as to what amount will be set at any post in the European Theater. The Executive Order authorizes payment of the differential in areas where conditions of employment differ substantially from conditions of employment within the continental limits of the United States. The payment of the differential is based upon such factors as "extraordinarily difficult" living conditions, extensive hardships and notably unhealthful living conditions.

The cost of living allowance is intended to compensate for differences in living costs between an overseas area and Washington, D. C. There is no indication at this time whether this allowance will be authorized in the European Theater.

These allowances and post differentials are not considered part of the basic compensation, as is the present 25 percent overseas allowance, and will not, therefore, be subject to retirement reduction nor to the present \$10,300 salary limitation. The quarters allowance will not be subject to income tax deduction, according to the Office of the Personnel Officer.

The Office of the Personnel Officer said it is difficult to judge at this time the full effect of these new regulations upon the income of employees in the European Theater. Any part or all of the present overseas allowance may be restored, in effect, by the payment of quarters allowances, post differential and cost of living allowances.





# Berlin Divided

## Development of Political Schism

### BY LOUIS GLASER

**I**N A LOCAL SENSE Soviet Russia has imposed its will upon the people of Berlin, upon the city government of Berlin and upon the western Allies.

Russia has split the city government, has capitalized on the battle of the currencies (Lenin said: "Let me put my hands on the currency and the revolution is mine.") and has the armed forces with which it may physically take the city when it wishes to do so.

IN A BROAD AND HISTORICAL SENSE, however, Russia has lost its fight for Berlin—lost the power to achieve its purposes of making Berlin a second Prague by "spontaneous uprising of the people."

Even into October, the western Allies still were in Berlin, the city government was still functioning without communist domination, plans for development of the West German state were progressing with participa-

*Part of the 250,000 Berliners who gathered before the ruins of the Reichstag building on Sept. 9 to voice their protest against the Soviet blockade of the city and the attempt to implant a totalitarian regime.*

(photo by permission of Mr. G. M. Jones, Jr., O/SG, OMGUS. Reprint prohibited)

tion of Berlin democratic political leaders, and the people of Berlin had not been starved into submission.

Diplomacy, political action, coercion, threats, propaganda and communist sophistry, utilized by the Russians, had all failed. It had remained for Russia to use force (and beget the reaction of counter force) and face the certainty, in that field, of eventual failure also.

**B**UT THE WHOLE SITUATION on Sept. 10, 1948 was one, suddenly, of clarification and definition. On that date a line seemed to be drawn across the face of Berlin. As though a gigantic axe had crashed upon the city, there was sharp cleavage of political

action and administration. Long anticipated and with the details accurately foreseen, nevertheless the break when it came carried shock to many observers and sober thought to all.

Fumbling attempts at unified administration might go on for a short time (at the will of Soviet authorities) or there might, for a time, be some token official intercourse between the western Allies and the Russians, but for practical purposes the city of Berlin was cut into two parts.

The western three sectors, containing two-thirds of the population, under the administration of a Magistrat and City Assembly, which claimed legal authority over the whole city but was totally unrecognized in the eastern sector, recognized the

**MAP OF BERLIN ON PAGES 24-25**



military government control of Great Britain, France and the United States.

The eastern sector, with one-third of the city's population, recognized the military authority of the USSR and their tools, the SED, therefore necessarily repudiated the legal government of the city.

**B**Y SEPT. 10, the following were the highlights of the Berlin situation:

The US-British airlift of food into Berlin, in defiance of the Soviet threat to starve the people of the western sectors unless they capitulated in political submission, was in its third month, bringing in more than 4,000 tons of supplies a day.

The four military governors had been meeting to untangle the questions presented by the Western Powers—Soviet conferences which had taken place in Moscow. The meetings of the military governors had been complicated by a volcanic outburst of temper on the parts of political leaders of Berlin who petitioned the three western governors to make no compromises and offer no appeasement "in order to provide comfort and security for the people of Berlin."

On the contrary, it was urged that the people of Berlin be permitted to demonstrate their hatred of political slavery and the totalitarian system by making sacrifices, cutting down on food and clothing, going without fuel, suffering loss of work and transportation.

There had been a succession of riots, staged by a small group of professional Communists, which had prevented the City Assembly from meeting.

There had been a counter demonstration in the Platz der Republik before the old Reichstag (ruins of former German capitol in the British Sector), attended by 250,000 indignant citizens.

The City Assembly had moved out of the City Hall (Stadthaus) in the Soviet Sector and into the Taberna Academica (Students' Inn) in the British Sector.

Various members of the Magistrat had left the city temporarily.

Certain departments of the city government had moved to the western

sectors, including a majority of the police force.

Abductions and seizures of city government personnel had continued under Soviet orders.

United States, British and French

**Mr. Louis Glaser, before he left Berlin to return to the United States last month, wrote a comprehensive summary of the political situation, interpreting the events since the beginning of the occupation to the current crisis in the former German capital. His summary has been adapted for publication in the *Information Bulletin*.**

Mr. Glaser had been chief of the Civil Administration and Political Affairs Branch of OMG Berlin Sector since the arrival of the American forces in Berlin in July 1945. He had been in almost continual daily contact with the German public officials and with the Russians and had received full reports about the Russians and Communist activities from all other branches of OMGBS.

He had joined the MG detachment when it was being set up and prepared in Paris in 1944 to take over the Berlin assignment. Col. Frank L. Howley, director of OMGBS, sent him then to London where he took an important part in making plans for the Military Government of Berlin.

A former newspaperman, public relations expert and president of a national advertising agency before the war, he came to Europe in 1943 and headed the Information and Intelligence Section, G-5, SHAEF. He had been promoted to the rank of colonel before he civilianized in late 1946.

Mr. Glaser was author of the article "Berlin Elections" in the *Information Bulletin*, No. 62 of Oct. 7, 1946.

officers had been treated in a high-handed and insulting manner by German police under Soviet orders.

The three non-communist political parties were united in condemnation of the communist tactics. Also the leaders of the three parties declared openly that the SED had acted upon the instigation and orders of their Soviet masters, and called upon Berlin not to surrender itself to the Russian brand of totalitarianism.

The Communist activist body (Volksrat) stood ready to take over the city of Berlin, and to offer its services in the same capacity for all Germany.

A "Democratic Bloc" of Communists and political bed-fellows had organized and was ready to serve as a spurious "people's government."

**T**HE RECORD of events in Berlin since the first of January 1947 is best introduced by a statement that when the first meeting of the Allied Kommandatura took place in July 1945, the Russian had occupied Berlin for more than two months during which they had established a basis for the kind of Berlin they desired.

The USSR recognized at a very early stage that Berlin would be a focus point for implementation of their postwar German plans. They undoubtedly were aware of the future possibilities when their agreement was signed in November 1944, also at the Crimea Conference which tied the hands of the western Military Government operations.

They were especially alert when they insisted upon "taking Berlin" and reduced US and British authorities to acquiescence that no time-table for western participation in Berlin government should be fixed; in other words that the Russians should "set the stage."

The hardships of the people of Berlin were intensified by systematic looting of the city by the Russians plus the imposition by all of the Allies of a currency which was expanded by the Soviet printing presses without Allied limit or control.

The move of the Russians to liquidate the Social Democratic Party was beaten by the political courage of the people of Berlin which was again exhibited in the city election of



Oct. 20, 1946. (SPD polled 49 percent of the total vote.)

**B**ERLIN had been given a temporary constitution which in itself was a sound document but emasculated by Russian interpretation and insistence upon their veto right, plus a combination of confusion and frustration on the part of the other Allies, in both the Allied Control Council and the Allied Kommandatura resulting, when, in some cases, they accepted the Soviet interpretations and in other cases had these interpretations forced upon them.

On Dec. 10, 1946, the matter of prior approval of elected representatives (a step which tended to make a complete farce of any political democracy offered to the Germans) was accepted by the Allied Kommandatura after a long debate. This point of view was, however, repudiated on Dec. 19 by US and British representatives.

On Dec. 30, the US representative stated: "It is clear that we sent this order without permitting it to affect the principles involved and the United States view is that elected members of the government do not require prior approval of the Allied Kommandatura." This statement cleared the record but did not save the situation. Soviet representatives insisted on the precedent act of Dec. 10.

The temporary constitution was designed to restore political freedom and place it in the hands of the people of Berlin by concentration of authority in their elected representatives. This high purpose was never fully realized because of certain reservations under Article 36.

This article stipulated that all legal enactments of the City Assembly and ordinances by the Magistrat must receive unanimous approval by the Allied Kommandatura. This applied also to the appointment and discharge of leading officials of the city administration. Veto by one power prevented Allied Kommandatura approval and this right was exercised indiscriminately by the Soviet authorities to hamper, frustrate or obstruct the city administration whenever it suited their purposes.



*Mr. Louis Glaser, author of this article, and an aide discussing political matters with German leaders. (left to right) Ernst Reuter who was elected mayor of Berlin but "vetoed" by the Soviets; Mr. Glaser; Mrs. Ella Kay, SPD leader, dismissed by the Soviets as borough president of Prenzlauer Berg, Soviet Sector; Jakob Kaiser, chairman of the CDU party; Dr. U. E. Biel, chief of the Political Affairs Section, OMGBS.*

(US Army Signal Corps photo)

**T**HE CITY ASSEMBLY is composed of 130 representatives elected by secret, direct ballot by the citizens of Berlin on the rule of proportional representation. The Magistrat, chosen by the City Assembly, comprises the mayor (Oberbuergermeister), three deputy mayors (Buergermeister) and 16 members (Stadtraete), each of whom heads a city department.

Legislative authority for city matters is exercised by the city assemblymen (Stadtverordneten) who serve for a two-year term. Besides choosing the Magistrat, they fix taxes, prepare the budget and perform other important duties. Work of the City Assembly is channeled through 22 standing committees which deal with finance, economics, labor, food, public education, public health, and so on.

Leading political party in the City Assembly, chosen at the Oct. 20, 1946 election, is the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with 63 members, followed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 27, the communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party (SED) 22, and the Liberal Democrats (LDP) 18.

The Magistrat is the executive authority which carries out the ad-

ministration of the city and represents Berlin externally. By a two-thirds vote of the total membership of the City Assembly, the Magistrat may be dismissed from office, provided the Allied Kommandatura concurred.

Ordinances and statutes are issued by the Magistrat for implementing or executing legislative measures of the City Assembly or the Allied Kommandatura. Resolutions (legal enactments) by the City Assembly require agreement by the Magistrat but non-concurrence by the latter can be overruled by a two-thirds vote of the City Assembly.

For the purposes of local administration, the city of Greater Berlin is divided into 20 administrative districts or boroughs (Verwaltungsbezirke), each headed by a borough president (also known in German as Buergermeister) as the city executive officer. Each borough president also presides over a district administrative office (Bezirksamt) composed of himself, nine members and a deputy president, all of whom are elected by the district assembly (Bezirksverordnetenversammlung) which in turn is elected by the citizens of each borough at the same time that elec-

tions for the main City Assembly are held.

Each District Assembly has 30, 40 or 45 members depending on the total population of the borough. By a two-thirds vote of the total membership of the District Assembly the borough president and the other members of the administrative office can be removed from office provided the sectoral Military Government concurs.

In general the District Assembly deals legislatively with local matters not covered by city-wide legislation and with directives or orders issued by the City Assembly and the Magistrat relating to the borough, which require further legislative elaboration or implementation. Its meetings are public and are held at least once a month.

The 20 district administrative offices are supervised by the Magistrat and each borough president is subject to the supervision of the city's mayor. Together the 20 borough presidents and the city's mayor form the Council of Mayors which meets for the purpose of coordinating local and central administration.

The division of the 20 boroughs among the sectors of the four occupying powers is: British (4)—Wilmersdorf, Charlottenburg, Spandau and Tiergarten; French (2)—Wedding and Reinickendorf; US (6)—Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Tempelhof, Neukoelln, Schoeneberg and Kreuzberg; Soviet (8)—Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain, Treptow, Koepenick, Lichtenberg, Weissensee and Pankow.

**T**HE FIRST PHASE of Allied occupation in Berlin was also the first phase of political development. For two months the Russians were the only occupying force in the city and activation of Soviet political plans was the over-all purpose.

The Russians brought along with them about 20 German Communists who had been trained and designated for Berlin (chiefly in Moscow) in many cases for a matter of years. For a long time the Russians had a highly developed plan for the spread of their ideology and in this plan the possible occupation of Berlin had a high priority.

Consequently the Russian activities during their period of unilateral control of the city were swift and sure, including establishment of a "sympathetic" city administration, organization of a Communist-dominated trade union, and formation of various Communist front organizations, for example: Kulturbund (Association of Culture).

They also authorized a Communist political party, the KPD, and three other political parties, the SPD, CDU and LDP, with insistence that the four political parties must work together



*Maj. Gen. A. G. Kotikov, commander of the Soviet garrison and commandant of the Soviet Sector of Berlin, at Allied Kommandatura meeting.*

(photo by PIO, OMGUS)

and with encouragement that arbitrary control must be organized from top to bottom, rather than from bottom to top.

In all cases the Russians saw to it that their people occupied vitally key positions (even if ostensibly subordinate) rather than the first representative places. They did not care about the person of the mayor providing he was sufficiently compliant, but they were very much concerned about the head of the Personnel Department and the important persons in fields of labor, education, etc. The general tendency of the USSR, using the Ger-

man Communists as a tool, was to create an immovable status quo in as many social and political situations as practicable.

**T**HE SECOND PHASE continued from July 1945 to the spring of 1946. During this period the western Allies arrived on the scene and signed an agreement certifying what had been done by the Russians, without scrutinizing the situation carefully. The USSR participated in at least an appearance of Allied unity and their blocking of Kommandatura interference with progress of the Communist plan was done in an apparently cooperative atmosphere.

Change of name of the KPD to SED and forced amalgamation of the SPD was ordered and accomplished in the Soviet Zone but was blocked in Berlin. With Allied support of the right of the Berlin Social Democrats to retain their political independence, it became clear that Soviet relations with the other Allies were neither sincere nor devoted to a common purpose.

The third phase, which may be described as lasting from the spring of 1946 to Oct. 20, 1946, was one of apparently successful cooperation since a temporary constitution for Berlin was agreed upon, also an election under democratic guarantees. The effort to achieve cooperation was so pronounced that when in August 1946 the SPD complained to the Allied Kommandatura of terror tactics used against them in the Soviet Sector, the US, British and French representatives agreed, at the request of the Soviet commandant, to warn the SPD of speedy punishment if they did not cease making such accusations.

It is possible that the Russians only agreed to the election in order to test how successfully was the SED camouflage of the KPD. The result was the predictable SED flop, the party polling less votes than the Communists had in elections held prior to 1933.

**T**HE FOURTH PHASE has continued from the first postwar Berlin elections to the present time and has been signified by a steady deterioration of Allied relations, *i. e.* USSR vs. western Allies, and by the suc-

(Continued on Page 18)



# DENAZIFICATION NEARS COMPLETION

**By Mr. Theo E. Hall**

*Chief, Public Safety Branch  
Civil Administration Division*

OMGUS

history questionnaire, the well-known Fragebogen, and from document centers, newspapers, files and intelligence sources. After the assembled data was studied an applicant found himself placed in one of five categories of employability: mandatory removal; discretionary removal with adverse recommendation; discretionary removal with no adverse recommendation; no evidence of Nazi activity; and evidence of anti-Nazi activity. Unless the applicant's case was appealed to the USFET appeal board, Military Government's decision was final.

**Special Branch Denazification Findings**

Cumulative as of 31 May 1946

Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden, Hesse

Non-Employment Mandatory . . . . .	247,193
Employment Discretionary (Adverse Recommendation) . . . . .	101,077
Employment Discretionary (No Adverse Recommendation) . . . . .	396,506
No evidence of Nazi Activity . . . . .	770,908
Evidence of Anti-Nazi Activity . . . . .	6,148
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,521,832</b>

June 1946 marked a dramatic change in the US Zone's denazification program: Military Government relin-

quished to the German governments the task of eradicating remnants of Nazism from their own people. Only a few positions, such as those in the US forces and in the new German denazification ministries, were subject both to German and MG screening. By this time the screening of persons by Military Government in public and semi-public offices had been virtually completed and there was no danger of assumption of control by former Nazis.

**T**HIS TRANSFER of power followed the US basic occupation policy of offering responsibility to the Germans as soon as possible without allowing leadership in the US Zone to fall into the hands of ex-Nazis.

On March 5, 1946, the Military Governor approved a draft German law submitted by the three states then forming the US Zone: Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Hesse. Afterward, each state enacted an identical law, known as the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, placing the responsibility for denazification upon the German people, establishing the legal bases for the charges, decisions and punishments (known as sanctions), and creating the legal machinery to operate the law. In this phase of denazification, the de-

**A**FTER THREE YEARS of effort, the primary mission of the denazification procedure in the US Zone is virtually completed. Practically all first trials have been disposed of and the personnel of denazification tribunals and ministries is being progressively decreased. More than 12,500,000 Germans have been assessed sanctions or exonerated depending upon their activities during the Nazi regime.

Originally a Military Government function, the denazification program is being concluded by the Germans themselves. Designed to strengthen democratic elements in Germany, to provide security and to punish the active Nazis and militarists, denazification was in the hands of MG Special Branch offices up to June 1, 1946.

Special Branch investigated the political backgrounds of Germans in public office and in important positions in quasi-public and private enterprise to remove more than nominal Nazis and militarists from their posts. The procedure for carrying out these investigations had been established by SHAEF prior to the invasion of Normandy. After the dissolution of SHAEF, a new denazification directive was published by USFET on July 7, 1945, which was in force in the US Zone until the promulgation on March 5, 1946, of the German Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism.

**M**ILITARY GOVERNMENT gathered its information about individuals from a detailed personal-

*Franz von Papen (right), pre-Nazi German chancellor, vice chancellor under Hitler and Nazi ambassador to Turkey, hears himself sentenced to hard labor by a German denazification tribunal at Nuremberg. He previously had been acquitted of war crimes charges by the International Military Tribunal.*

(US Army Signal Corps photo)



cisions were judicial and the whole procedure was conducted with the full force of law.

Under the provisions of the Law for Liberation, everyone over 18 years of age resident in the US Zone had to register and to complete a personal questionnaire called Meldebogen, showing his political history and other pertinent data. By May 31, 1948, approximately 13,000,000 persons had registered.

**M**INISTRIES of Political Liberation were created in each state as well as courts known as trial tribunals in each city and county, appellate courts, and a prosecuting staff. The law made chargeable not only Nazi officials and party members, but also all members of the Nazi formations except the Hitler Youth (HJ) and the Association of German Girls (BDM). All chargeable persons were removed summarily from any positions above ordinary labor and could not be reemployed in them until there had been a final tribunal decision in their favor.

Because of natural local pressure by less incriminated persons, tribunals developed a tendency during the first few months to devote all their energy to disposing of the not-chargeable and the less-incriminated cases.

**Denazification Cases not Chargeable Completed by Trial Tribunals**

October 1946—March 1947

Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden, Hesse

During Month of	Found Not Chargeable	Completed by Trial Tribunals
1946 October	210,982	32,034
November	211,569	39,432
December	111,563	36,710
1947 January	270,824	28,323
February	436,453	28,145
March	697,532	28,396

There were, for example, 3,527,000 chargeable cases at the close of March 1947. The average monthly rate for the preceding six months had been 32,173 trials completed. At this rate, it would have taken eight and a half years to complete the trials of those who were incriminated.

How, then, could the work-load of the trial tribunals with justice be re-

duced? One method was to simplify the trial process by extending an amnesty to those whose party records showed only nominal associations as party members. The Youth Amnesty already had been extended in August 1946 to those who would be charged as follower or less and had been born after Jan., 1, 1919.

On Dec. 24, 1946, the amnesty principle was extended to those whose chargeable status would not be higher than follower, and who were either in a low income group or at least 50 percent disabled. This amnesty, called the Christmas Amnesty, removed about 1,200,000 chargeable persons from trial. During this period the efforts of all denazification personnel were concentrated on determining who should come within the terms of the amnesties and in so notifying them.

**T**HERE WAS considerable variation between the charges filed by the prosecutors and the findings of the tribunals, due to the fact that the prosecutors were required to charge persons in the categories named in the appendix to the law irrespective of the evidence. It followed in many cases that the evidence presented at the trial did not sustain the charge.

Not only was there considerable variation between the charges and the findings, but there was also considerable variation between the previous findings by Military Government and those of the trial tribunals. This variation was to be expected, however, because the status as determined by Military Government was an administrative decision and not a judicial finding, and was determined on the basis of a categorical approach and in relation to fitness for a particular post or activity.

In addition to the SHAEF directives on the removal of active Nazis from posts of responsibility, the occupying forces were directed automatically to arrest and intern specified categories of Nazi leaders, persons in high governmental posts during the Third Reich, and members of the organizations indicted as criminal by the International Military Tribunal. Under this

program, by the end of 1945, more than 100,000 persons had been arrested and interned by US forces.

In February 1946, the categories of mandatory arrestees and internees were curtailed, and those who no longer fell in the automatic arrest categories were screened by the US forces. Those who were not suspected of war crimes or wanted as witnesses were released. This program continued until October 1946, when the civilian internment enclosures were progressively transferred to the German Denazification Ministries.

In Bremen state a Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism became effective on May, 9, 1947.

**Bremen Denazification Data**  
Cumulative as of March, 31, 1947

	Number
Registration received . . . . .	153,089
Registrants apparently not chargeable . . . . .	114,408
Cases instituted . . . . .	7,479
Cases completed . . . . .	4,821

The close of March 1947 represented the end of the first period of activity under the Law for Liberation, as the backlog of non-chargeable cases had been reduced to a negligible number.

**D**URING the latter part of the denazification program, Military Government, concerned with the acceleration of trials, gradually removed its controls and supervision. Military Government also made an examination of the extent to which the legal restrictions on employment of Nazis, as set forth in the Law, and the employment sanctions imposed by tribunals, were being observed in public agencies and private enterprises. In addition, it made a study of the enforcement of sanctions.

The status of denazification as of May, 31, 1947, based upon a survey of the three states made by the ministers of political liberation, showed that of the 11,900,000 registrations received up to that time, 959,000 had been classified by the prosecutors as belonging to persons who were heavily incriminated and would be charged as major offenders, offenders, or lesser-offenders. An additional 472,000 would be charged as being less



heavily incriminated, but subject to trial. Of the remainder, 8,631,000 had been determined to be not chargeable under the law. Under the youth amnesty, 888,000 had been amnestied, and 973,000 more cleared under the Christmas amnesty. Of the heavily incriminated group, 18 percent had been tried, and of the less heavily incriminated group, 38 percent had been tried.

It was apparent that the program was far from completed, and amendments to the Law for Liberation were considered.

The results of the mandatory charge provisions of the law had long been a matter of concern to the staffs of the ministries and were being carefully watched by Military Government. The German authorities held that public prosecutors should have the right to determine the charge on the basis of each investigation and the evidence available. Military Government had seen that, in spite of the mandatory charge provisions, the tribunals had based their findings upon evidence of activity during the Nazi regime and not solely upon rank in the Nazi party or membership held.

Another problem was that of the "followers," who had not been included in the amnesties and who continued to insist on early trials so they would not be compelled to remain in positions of ordinary labor. Therefore, in October 1947 when the German state governments presented amendments to correct these two points and thereby expedite the processing of chargeable cases, they were approved by Military Government.

**T**HESE AMENDMENTS provided that the charges previously required of major offender, offender and lesser offender would no longer be mandatory for those persons who were not members of organizations which had been found criminal by the International Military Tribunal and against whom there was no evidence of activity in the Nazi party other than membership; that persons chargeable as followers under the law might resume all positions prior to their appearance before a tribunal except certain key posts; and, that tribunals

would have discretion in settling the length of probation for lesser offenders, previously set at a minimum period of two years.

The amendments did not change the basic objective of denazification, which continued to be the seeking out and punishing of the real offenders of the Nazi regime. They did permit, however, charges to be made in accordance with the actual evidence, and not merely in accordance with the mandatory provision of the law. In addition, persons who were subject to charge as followers could resume positions other than ordinary labor pending trial. Finally, a discretionary factor was approved in setting the probation term for a lesser offender, in view of the penalties under which he had been already placed since the passage of the law. These penalties included exclusion from all jobs other than ordinary labor, blocking of property and limitation on rights of citizenship.

**A**N INVENTORY of cases still to be completed was made in January 1948 which permitted an ap-

proximate time schedule of the program to be set up. In the US Zone on Jan. 31, there remained to be tried 519,697 cases (or 4.2 percent of the 12,265,046 total number of registrants) of which 287,795 (or five percent) would be subject to the expedited trial process arising from the amendments. This left a greatly reduced number, 231,902 (45 percent) to be tried in the normal manner. The latter number was 1.9 percent of the total number of registrants.

This situation represented a complete reversal from that at the end of December, when the data submitted indicated that 62 percent of the backlog still remained to be tried by normal procedures, and only 38 percent of the backlog was subject to the expedited process.

In spite of the wholesome effect of the amendments of October, there still remained factors that continued to retard the processing of the trial cases. Further amendments to the Law for Liberation were made, therefore, in March 1948. These amendments allowed public prosecutors full dis-

## ARTICLES ON DENAZIFICATION

Denazification was from the start of the occupation one of the top priority aims and the early issues of the *Information Bulletin* carried many articles, giving instructions, information and reactions on this subject. Some of these were the following:

- The Drive to End Nazism**, No. 1, July 28, 1945.
- Former Propagandists** (German reaction), No. 1, July 28, 1945.
- Denazification is Your Job**, No. 2, Aug. 4, 1945.
- Farmers Like Free Speech** (German reaction), No. 3, Aug. 11, 1945.
- The Abrogation of Nazi Law**, No. 4, Aug. 18, 1945.
- The Future Nazi Propaganda Line**, No. 4, Aug. 18, 1945.
- German Moral Rearmament Demanded** (German reaction), No. 4, Aug. 18, 1945.
- Denunciation and Cooperation** (German reaction), No. 5, Aug. 25, 1945.
- Removal of Nazis and Militarists** (by Major Keith Wilson), No. 8, Sept. 15, 1945.
- Qualified Approval of Denazification** (German reaction), No. 8, Sept. 15, 1945.
- Danger of Nazi Solidarity in Small Towns** (German reaction), No. 8, Sept. 15, 1945.
- General Eisenhower Reaffirms Total Denazification**, No. 9, Sept. 2, 1945.
- The "Plight" of the Innocent Young Nazi** (German reaction), No. 9, Sept. 22, 1945.
- Law No. 8 — Prohibition of Employment of Nazis**, No. 10, Sept. 29, 1945.
- What to Do with the Nazis?** (German reaction), No. 11, Oct. 6, 1945.

- Nazi Purge: Mental Side** (German reaction), No. 12, Oct. 13, 1945.
- Reaction to Law 8** (German reaction), No. 13, Oct. 20, 1945.
- The Necessity of Law No. 8** (German reaction), No. 16, Nov. 10, 1945.
- Denazification — Unfinished Business**, No. 18, Nov. 24, 1945.
- German Political Leaders on Denazification** (German reaction), No. 19, Dec. 1, 1945.
- Denazification Policy Unified** (ACA action), No. 27, Feb. 2, 1946.
- Proposed Denazification Program for the US Zone**, No. 27, Feb. 2, 1946.
- Denazification by Germans** (German Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism), No. 32, March 9, 1946.
- German Press Favors New Denazification Law**, No. 35, April 1, 1946.
- Are There "Good" Nazis?** (outstanding and often-reprinted article), No. 37, April 15, 1946.
- Germans Begin their own Denazification**, No. 38, April 22, 1946.
- Denazifying the Reichspost**, No. 40, May 6, 1946.
- MG Agencies Winding up Denazification Affairs**, No. 43, May 27, 1946.
- German Organizations under the Third Reich**, No. 44, June 3, 1946.
- Two New Decrees Point toward Further Denazification**, No. 46, June 17, 1946.
- Now It's Up to the Germans**, No. 49, July 3, 1946.
- Proof of Nazi Guilt**, No. 58, Sept. 9, 1946.
- Denazification: German Version**, No. 64, Oct. 21, 1946.
- The Verdict** (part on criminal organizations), No. 62, Oct. 7, 1946.

cretion in filing charges against incriminated persons except those charged as Class I offenders before the tribunals; removed pre-trial restrictions against all untried persons except those in the Class I categories (Class I includes presumptive major offenders), allowing them to reenter all positions in private industry and business except key positions; and allowed tribunals in passing sentence on lesser offenders and followers to consider pre-trial restrictions under which chargeable persons had been living.

In addition, during April, Military Government directly assisted the German denazification agencies by making available to them MG facilities, records and assistance in selecting the most heavily incriminated cases for formal trials. Prosecutors were authorized to dispose of the remainder of the untried cases by routine written proceedings where there was no evidence except nominal rank or membership in the Nazi party.

**T**HE DATE of May, 1, 1948, which had been set for the completion of all first trials, was met with the exception of a relatively small number (32,000) of heavily incriminated cases, which still remained to be tried, and which constituted about 0.03 percent of the total denazification program. This number did not include new registrants who continued to register under the law at the average rate of about 20,000 per month. These persons included returning PW's, refugees and infiltrees and other persons establishing domicile in the US Zone for the first time.

Status of Denazification Operations  
As of May, 31, 1948  
US Zone (incl. Bremen)

	Number	Percent
Total Registrants . . . .	12,797,703	100.0
Not Chargeable Cases . .	9,467,073	74.0
Total Chargeable Cases	3,330,630	26.0
Chargeable Cases Completed . . . .	3,238,923	26.3
Amnestied without Trial . . . . .	2,373,115	18.5
Trials Completed . . . .	865,808	6.8
Chargeable Cases to be Completed . . . . .	91,707	0.7
By Trial . . . . .	31,707	0.2
By Expediting Process	60,000	0.5

(Those cases to be completed by expediting process occur in Bavaria

only and are completed, except for routine clerical work.)

By the end of June progress had been made in reducing the backlog of appeal cases and of the number of persons awaiting trial. There were 3,545 new cases received in June and 6,643 taken off the docket either by adjudication (5,711) or refusal to accept (927). As of June 30, 28,961 appeal cases had been adjudicated, more than half of which (16,143) were cases of persons who had been found to be lesser offenders by trial tribunals. Of the latter, 109 had been upgraded to offender; 3,099 affirmed as lesser offenders; 7,235 downgraded to follower; and the remaining 5,703 exonerated or amnestied.

**I**N THE FIELD of quadripartite denazification, Control Council Directive No. 24, which was based on the early MG directive, was promulgated shortly before the Law for Liberation was enacted in the US Zone (March, 5, 1946). Therefore, the US delegation introduced another proposal in the Control Council which would extend to all of Germany the definitions of categories and the sanction contained in the US Zone Law for Liberation. In October 1946, after further months of negotiation, this proposal was enacted as Control Council Directive No. 38.

In April 1947 the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Moscow, agreed on a five point denazification program for Germany. When the Control Council received the Council of Foreign Ministers directive, negotiations began immediately to implement the program in Germany. Each of the delegations presented a proposal for implementing the Council of Foreign Ministers' agreement in the light of its own interpretation. However, it was not possible to achieve agreement and no uniform implementation of the CFM agreement on denazification was promulgated by the Control Council. Again, as in the case of the two previous quadripartite denazification directives, the agreement of the Council of Foreign Ministers is being implemented in full in the US Zone.

## Penalty of Negligence

Bavarians were urged by Military Government to study their constitutional rights, following an incident in which due process of law was suspended in violation of the Bavarian constitution. The case concerned a youth who was deprived of liberty without hearing or trial, through negligence on the part of the German police and a German court.

Bernhard Stersinsky, 17, was arrested on May 4 on charges of illegal border crossing. The youth was held by the police for a full week without being interrogated. Another 10 days elapsed before the local German court issued a proper arrest order and granted him a hearing. He was tried on May 31 and acquitted after almost a month of detention.

In a letter to the Bavarian minister president, OMG for Bavaria pointed out that this is a contravention of a basic concept of due process of law, since the Bavarian constitution provides that every person arrested by public authority must be brought before a competent judge not later than one day after the arrest, be informed of the grounds for the arrest and be given an opportunity to raise objections thereto.

Similar provisions are contained in Control Council and MG laws.

The minister president has been requested to investigate the case and take disciplinary measures against the individuals concerned.

"Regulations such as these are fundamental and sacred rights which a democracy accords to every person as an element of due process of law, and the people must understand their rights and privileges under the constitution so that they may protest themselves from infringement by public authority," Mr. Leo Goodman, chief of the German Courts Branch, Legal Division, OMGB, said in a statement.

### Constitution Approved

The constitution and statutes of the International College and the Institute of European Affairs at Marburg, Hesse, have received ministerial and parliamentary approval. Budgetary allotments sufficient for the next few months have been made.





Members of the Falcons (Falken) shown as they assembled in Stuttgart's Neckar stadium from all sections of the US Zone. (DENA-Bild)

# Youth ORGANIZATIONS

**V**OLUNTARY YOUTH organizations have given an important stimulus to youth work in the US Zone of Germany. It is through these organizations—churches, sport groups, trade unions and others—that young people in Germany have found a means of expression for their religious, athletic and social interests.

Membership in youth organizations increased from 200,000 in 1946 to more than 1,200,000 at the end of March, 1948. Of this number, approximately 90 percent belong to the three major youth organizations: religious, sport and trade union. About 55 percent of the members are male. However, in certain groups, notably religious, there are more girls than boys.

Religious youth organizations are still the largest numerically of all

youth groups in Germany. As of last March there were more than 468,770 members in these youth groups, as compared with 358,696 a year ago. A little less than two-thirds of them are Catholic, more than half of whom are in Bavaria.

The Evangelical youth groups make up the other third, with the Free Church organizations composing a very small percentage. There are also a number of youth groups of special organizations including Quakers, Christian Scientists, Bahai and Old Catholic.

Although religious groups are numerically the strongest, their influence on German youth has not appeared to be greater than the others. In general, they have been closely related to the official churches and

there has been little opportunity for the young people themselves to exert any influence.

**A**N OBSERVER, after attending a meeting of Protestant youth pastors from all four zones, made the following indicative statement: "It was evident that the pastors, far from encouraging the development of self-initiative and self-government in their youth groups, exercised very close control of them, seeking first and foremost to guard them from any possible contact with the youth of other groups."

A similar attitude is noticeable in a number of counties, where the religious groups have refused to register with county youth committees for fear of control. Some have refused to turn in reports on membership to



Military Government, unless given direct orders to do so. It has also been observed that certain church groups are the least interested in receiving assistance from GYA.

On the other hand, among the Catholic and Evangelical church youth elements a few noteworthy events have taken place. The so-called "Boys Town" at Vilbel, Hesse, operated by the Evangelical Church of Hesse with the assistance of a US Military Post MP battalion, is one of the most hopeful projects in Germany today.

The recent establishment of the Young Catholic Workers, similar to and inspired by the Jeunesse Ouvriere Catholique (Catholic Working Youth) in France and Belgium indicated that certain groups in the church are aware of their responsibility to all young people.

What is believed to be the first meeting of its kind in Germany was held in Berlin when a Catholic priest, a Protestant pastor and a Jewish rabbi addressed a group of young people representing all three faiths.

Although the German YMCA and YWCA are still closely connected with the church, special mention should be made of their independent activities. Both organizations have full time leadership training schools, the YWCA at Herzfeld, Hesse, and Berlin, and the YMCA at Kassel.

The latter, managed by the same persons who ran it before 1933, has shown a keen interest in the returned prisoners of war, many of whom learned of the YMCA for the first time in PW camps. It has set up a number of rest homes in an effort to help them become rehabilitated. Furthermore, the YMCA has begun work for juvenile delinquents in industrial areas.

In spite of these encouraging developments, the majority of religious groups do not conceive of youth work as much more than Bible study and related activities. Most of them seem to have a fear of anything connected with socialism and are often reluctant to cooperate with non-religious groups.

**I**N SPITE OF limited facilities and equipment, the sports organizations throughout Germany have made pro-

gress. In Baden, different types of sports follow organized schedules; in Wuerttemberg, 3,224 teams were enrolled in all categories of different soccer leagues, and 1,700 teams participated in German handball during September, 1947.

The first athletic stadium to be rebuilt since the occupation began opened Sept. 7, 1947, at Karlsruhe-Muehlberg, Wuerttemberg-Baden, with a seating capacity of 2,000 and standing room for 18,000. Athletic matches have attracted capacity crowds every Sunday in virtually all cities throughout Germany.

During the past year, members of sport groups increased from 280,454 to 418,707, about one-third of whom are women; but in view of the fact that the adult and youth sections of sports groups are not separated, it is impossible to determine what percentage of the total comprises the younger set.

A discussion developed among sports leaders concerning the type of organization which German sports should follow: one single all-inclusive-organization vs. organization by type of sport. The issue came to a head in Wuerttemberg-Baden, where the state Sport Association assumed that it had an exclusive hold on all sports because it was licensed by Military Government.

After Military Government explained that this was a misconceived notion, five independent sports groups requested licenses. The licenses, which were granted led eventually to the dissolution of the association. However, the independent organizations did cooperate voluntarily in the formation of a mutual coordinating committee.

This type of organizational structure was considered more favorable, since it is opposed to the development of one centralized sports organization, such as existed under the Nazi regime. Foreign sports groups have indicated that they are hesitant to recognize German sports as long as they are organized on a centralized basis.

**S**PORT ENTHUSIASTS in Germany have regretted the fact that their teams have not been able to resume playing matches with other countries, although a few tentative attempts have been made by the latter to renew contacts. A German tennis champion played in Sweden several times, and in Wuerttemberg-Baden in November, 1947, a Swiss soccer team played the first international match in Germany since the beginning of the occupation. A number of German teams have, in addition, competed in various sports with teams of



One hundred twenty-five boys and girls from the US Sector of Berlin arrive in Stuttgart to take part in a meeting of socialistic youth. (DENA-Bild)



the occupation forces or displaced persons.

In order to meet the need for trained sport leaders, a sport college was opened in Cologne during the summer of 1947. It serves both the British and US Zones, but because of housing conditions in Cologne only 12 US Zone students of the 163 enrolled could be accommodated during the last semester. Entrance to the college requires the same qualifications as admission to any institute of higher education.

The school provides a two-year course, but a number of sport organizations in the US Zone have begun to sponsor short-term courses (two weeks to two months) for physical education instructors, who are needed to reduce the prevailing deficiencies in the number of such instructors for sport groups and schools.

In addition, a sport school was opened in Bavaria, the primary function of which is the training of school teachers who can devote part of their time to teaching physical education in the public schools.

**T**HE MOST rapidly growing youth group in Germany today is that of the young trade unionists, which had a membership of 162,751 members in March. It is the third largest type of youth organization in the US-occupied area, and its growth has been due largely to help from the adult trade unions and the very important role which these associations play in Germany.

The first interzonal conference of the trade union youth was held in Hallthurm, near Berchtesgaden, Bavaria, on Jan. 15-17. A total of 51 representatives of the four zones and Berlin were present.

Trade union youths have held weekend training courses on political and labor questions, and on the cultural and civic prospects for young workers. Since this group composes the largest number of young people outside the school, and since no other youth group has the same appeal to working youth, the trade unions hold a strategic position in the over-all youth picture.

Boy and Girl Scout organizations (Pfadfinder) have been permitted in the US-occupied area for the past two

years, and by last March there were 7,000 scouts in Germany, of whom about 1,000 were girls. One of the main reasons for this smaller number is that it has been difficult to find satisfactory leaders for either group. In Hesse and Berlin a number of proposed Boy Scout leaders were disapproved by Military Government for political and other reasons.

The Girl Scouts have been better advised and have worked slowly, stressing the need for good leaders before establishing any organization. One of the most stimulating of their leadership courses was a set of two training conferences held in July, 1947, at Ruedesheim, Hesse, attended by Girl Scout leaders from four foreign countries.

Through such international contacts, including a four-week training program in Sweden, the Girl Scout

**This summary of youth organizations was taken from the recently-issued cumulative review, "Education and Cultural Relations," an annex of the Monthly Governor, No. 34. A similar article on youth activities appeared in Issue No. 144 of the Information Bulletin.**

movement has received real impetus, but it has been necessary for the Girl Scout organizations to separate themselves administratively from their male counterparts, so that they might develop freely and independently.

Representatives of Girl Scout groups from the US Zone met in Stuttgart in October, 1947, to plan cooperation among the various groups, particularly with a view toward obtaining eventual recognition by the World Bureau of Scouts.

The Boy Scouts have not progressed as much as the Girls Scouts in taking steps to gain world recognition. Today certain small nuclei are falling in line with international scouting policy—the Eangelical Scouts, Catholic Scouts (St. George), and certain non-confessional groups. In Bavaria and Bremen they have all agreed to work together, consequently forming a Pfadfinder association in which each group maintains its independence.

**O**NE OF THE leading politically-minded youth groups to reappear after the war is the Falcons (Falken), frequently referred to as the socialistic youth movement of Germany, which has developed along similar lines in all states and Berlin, resulting in a strongly centralized organization. The headquarters of the "working committee" of the Falcons is in Hanover, Lower Saxony. In March the Falcons had 33,809 members in the US-occupied, or 2.6 percent of the total membership of all youth groups.

In structure and philosophy the Falcons are closely related to the Social Democratic Party but there is reason to believe that it has been able to maintain independence of action, even though receiving various kinds of support from the SPD. Its leaders are young, and in many cases more imaginative than the older politicians of the SPD.

The Falcons were forbidden by Hitler in 1933 and for 12 years had no opportunity to train leaders for its organization. The present ones are youthful, energetic and enthusiastic, but often lack experience.

To assist and to orient them, the Falcons established a leadership training school at Walkmuehle, Melsungen, Hesse, on May 12, 1947, an old traditional territory that belonged to the Falcons before 1933. Besides this, a number of the Falcons have had the opportunity to meet with other socialistic youth groups abroad and have attended conferences in Denmark, Sweden and France.

One of the strongholds of the Falcons is in Hanau, Hesse, where the members have reconstructed their own youth center, one of the few instances where a youth group has acted on its own initiative.

The Falcons' chief event during the past year was the Socialistic Youth Congress in Stuttgart Aug. 29-31, 1947, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the socialistic international youth.

The organizers had expected 15,000, but less than one-third that number attended. Immediately before the Congress, 2,000 had participated in a two-week tent camp which was criticized by the local population, particularly because of the general misconduct of a number of the

campers. It is evident that such large demonstrations have more of a political character than any educational or social purpose.

**T**HE OTHER politically-minded group, the Free German Youth (FDJ), is smaller than the Falcons but more active. In March it had almost 10,000 members in the US-occupied area, including 2,514 members in the Society of Youth in Wuerttemberg-Baden.

The latter organization, while claiming to be completely independent of the FDJ, has nevertheless requested permission to become associated with the FDJ of Bavaria and Hesse, with which it can be compared in its general activity. The request has never been made to organize the FDJ in Wuerttemberg-Baden, since it is quite obvious that the Society of Youth is a partner organization.

Like the Falcons, the FDJ is highly centralized. Its headquarters are in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, and it is still the only youth organization permitted in the Soviet Zone, where it claims to have about 500,000 members. While purporting to be supraparty, 11 of the 16 members of its central committee belong to the Communistic Social Unity Party (SED).

At a meeting of this committee in January the three non-SED members

resigned, leaving only the religious representatives and the SED members. In March, however, representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) were replaced, apparently to keep the semblance of non-party affiliation and the appearance that the organization is open to all. Whereas the Falcons do not always follow the SPD line, it is obvious that the Free German Youth is controlled by the SED.

However, the FDJ has assumed a radically-different approach to youth problems in the eastern zone than in the western: in the former the FDJ has been more positive in its activity; in the latter almost completely negative. This was demonstrated at meeting of the Hesse FDJ state association, when the first day of the conference was spent in criticizing all other youth groups, German youth officials, and Military Government.

The leadership of the FDJ is in the hands of well-trained and capable persons. Some of them have received their training outside of Germany, although on the local level most of the younger leaders are indigenously trained, a number of whom attended the main FDJ leadership training school at Waldhof, near Berlin.

Here, 60 to 80 students take part in an eight-weeks course which is divided into three-fourth theory and about onefourth practical youth work. The FDJ claims to have 36 other leadership schools where over 6,000 young people have received training.

**T**HE FDJ is the only youth organization that has appealed to the Allied Control Authority for recognition on a "national" scale. The application, however, was rejected by a three-to-one vote on the ground that the time is not yet favorable for national youth organizations.


On the local level, the FDJ has had several of its proposed constitutions returned for revision because they were undemocratic. One proposal provided that 100 percent of the membership dues should be turned over to higher headquarters.

The Friends of Nature (*Naturfreunde*) have 18,276 members in the US Zone, drawn mainly from among the working class. This organization was first established in 1895 in Vienna, Austria, with the following aims and objectives:

"Striving for the better enjoyment and understanding of nature; improvement of the standard of living of the workers through socialism; establishment of hostels which will offer workers and their children an opportunity to spend the night or vacations in the woods at a very cheap price."

These principles are still accepted by the Friends of Nature today, although the leadership in certain areas recently began to show communistic influence. In Bavaria, the Friends of Nature have 21 buildings, in contrast to more than 50 before 1933, and in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 19.

At the end of March, delegates from 12 states in the three western zones met in Hesse to coordinate and standardize practices and goals among the state organizations. Emphasis was placed on the need for cooperation between the Friends of Nature and other organizations, and with Military Government. Specific plans were made to organize homes for delinquents and homeless youth.



Members of the 1948 championship football (European) team of Germany being introduced by Hans Hofmann, president of the First Football Club of Nuremberg, at a sports banquet recently. Lt. Col. J. C. Barnett, MGO at Nuremberg, was host and toastmaster. It was the seventh time the Nuremberg club had won the championship. Following the banquet, motion pictures of American football and of the second Louis-Walcott boxing fight, were shown.

(Army Signal Corps)



# RIAS

## RUNDFUNK IM AMERIKANISCHEN SEKTOR

**T**HE *New York Times* recently noted that MG's Berlin radio station, RIAS, had very effectively dramatized the famous Kosenkina case for its large German audience. A few days earlier, the *United Press* mentioned RIAS for highly useful reporting of the attempted coup in the Berlin city hall, the same source which previously credited RIAS with a "scoop" on the mysterious death of Jan Masaryk. The world press, therefore, is beginning to take notice of the effectiveness of a radio station which broadcasts truth 120 miles behind the iron curtain.

The story of Radio RIAS began nearly three years ago when quadripartite discussions over the control of Radio Berlin broke down. When the city was captured by the Red Army the Russians found that Radio Berlin, including technical equipment, studios and thousands of recordings, was intact and in working order. Less than a week after the capitulation of the city, Radio Berlin was on the air—under Soviet control.

That control has never been relinquished. The western Allies were confronted with the strange situation of Radio Berlin studios located in the British Sector, the transmitter and antenna located in Tegel in the French

*Mr. William F. Heimlich, US station director, confers with his reporters during mass rally before Reichstag building Sept. 9.* (photo by Brandt, RIAS)



Sector, and the Russians allowing none of the other occupying powers to use the facilities of the radio station.

**F**REQUENT and persistent attempts were made by US Military Government to negotiate the turnover of Radio Berlin to quadripartite control throughout the fall of 1945. When it became apparent that the Soviets would not relinquish unilateral control of the station, the US authorities decided to open their own station on a small, not directly competitive scale. This station went into operation on Feb. 7, 1946, as "Drahtfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor" using the Drahtfunk (wired radio) method of long-wave transmission over telephone lines with programs daily from 5 p. m. to midnight.

The programs were first transmitted in the US Sector, then extended in the next several months to the British Sector in an exchange agreement with the British. Attempts to make Drahtfunk a city-wide service failed due to Soviet opposition.

US Military Government, still pressing for quadripartite control of Radio Berlin on various levels in the Allied Control Authority, warned that the Soviet attitude was forcing the Americans to bring in a transmitter and broadcast to the entire population of the city. This action was taken.

A mobile 1,000 watt transmitter was brought to Berlin from Frankfurt and placed in operation on Sept. 5, 1946. The program schedule was expanded to nine hours daily and 13 hours Sundays, containing newscasts, special features and "Voice of America" broadcasts which emphasized democratic objectivity in juxtaposition to the Soviet-controlled Radio Berlin one-sided presentation.

At that time there was also initiated special political broadcasts including a series "Spoken Election Posters"



*RIAS reporter interviews workers on the street concerning reactions to currency reform.*

(photo by Kessler-RIAS)

which gave all political parties equal air time which had been denied by Radio Berlin in favoring first the Communists, then the SED, the so-called Socialist Unity Party.

**W**ITH THE PLACING of the station, on the air, its name was changed to Rias (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor). While the American staff of four officers remained at the same strength, the original staff of 80 Germans had been increased to 200.

The technical service of the station was still considered inadequate. The power was increased to 2,000 watts by installation of a new German transmitter late in 1946 and to 20,000 watts on June 1, 1947, by installation of a former German army mobile transmitter that had been captured in Italy and used by US forces in Austria and Germany.

Two months after installation of the 20,000 watt transmitter, a public opinion survey showed that RIAS' popularity in Berlin jumped 100 percent to an equal footing with Radio Berlin. Letters from listeners and



(left) German officials congratulate the RIAS director on the opening of their new office building: (left to right) Mrs. Louise Schroeder, acting mayor of Berlin; Jakob Kaiser, Dr. Otto Suhr, Ernst Reuter and Mr. Heimlich. (right) View of RIAS building in Schoeneberg borough of the US Sector.

(photos by Brandt, RIAS)

reports of travelers indicated a quickly rising popularity of RIAS in the Soviet Zone.

Meanwhile the station had outgrown its original quarters in a wing of the Telephone Exchange Building near the Allied Control Authority building. Additional quarters were taken in two other buildings nearby. Reconstruction of a building large enough to house the necessary studio and other facilities needed for expansion was undertaken in the autumn of 1947.

The staff moved into the new quarters during the winter and spring and formally opened the structure on July, 1948.

The station had, in March, expanded its airtime from nine hours a day to 12 hours, and then gradually additional hours were added until at the present time the station is on the air 22 hours a day.

On July 6, 1948, the coverage of the station was increased by the addition of a 75,000 watt short-wave transmitter located in the US Zone and beamed to eastern Europe. Over the two transmitters, middle-wave and short-wave, go the "Voice of America," 19 news programs a day, two special programs, Berlin report by RIAS (Berlin im RIAS) and news flashes (BLITZ-FUNK), which are designed to keep the people of central and eastern Germany informed on the Berlin situation.

They also counteract the propaganda of the Soviet-controlled stations and indicate to some 22,000,000 Germans within its listening range the policies and aims of the United States and western European governments.

**A**S THE STATION strengthened its physical plant, it enlarged its program content. In addition to the programs mentioned above, additional commentators were carefully selected, the facilities of the station were granted to the democratic parties in order that they might express their views and opinions, the proceedings of the Berlin City Assembly were broadcast for all to hear and discussion groups were scheduled regularly. The latter include representatives of the trade unions, political parties, educational institutions, welfare organizations and religious groups.

The musical program was more carefully developed and greatly expanded in order to compete with the splendid music of the Soviet-controlled radio station.

Special attention has been given to combatting the lies, rumors and propaganda of the Soviet stations. For example, when a Soviet official recently spoke in Leipzig and denounced US policy as "monopoly-capitalism" and described the ranking US official in Germany as "a tool of the Wall Street bankers," RIAS answered immediately with several highly effective programs dealing with the revival of

industry in the western zones, the success of the monetary reform and the arrival of goods and services under the Marshall Plan.

When the Soviet Military authorities began the blockade of Berlin, the hypocrisy of that statement "technical difficulties" was exposed, derided and labeled for what it was—an attempt to starve two and a half million persons in the western sectors in order to force the political will of the Communists upon those peoples.

When the airlift began bringing relief to the city, more than 200 separate reportages were made including the loading in the western zones, the flight from Frankfurt to Berlin, the unloading process, interviews with pilots and broadcasts from the control tower.

At the same time that the Soviet-controlled radio and press were saying that the airlift was ineffective and indeed designed only to plunder the city, RIAS reports and interviews revealed such statements as contrary to fact.

**T**HEN CAME the attempts of the Communists to take over city hall and the raids in Potsdamer Platz. These incidents were carefully reported by RIAS at the time the events took place. When, on Sept. 6, the Communists attempted to overthrow the city government, RIAS announcers gave an on-the-spot broadcast of the mob violence against the Berlin City Council at the city hall.

This broadcast was picked up by radio stations in the US Zone and was



later developed into a special documentary newscast, "What is Happening in Berlin," for the Soviet Zone listeners. RIAS' eye-witness reporting, which could not be refuted, stirred up strong public indignation against the Communist mob tactics.

When the electric power was shut off due to lack of coal, citizens of the western sectors were no longer able to listen to RIAS. The station immediately installed 22 permanent loudspeakers in the US Sector at traditional gathering places. The British Military Government installed 50 such loudspeakers in order that RIAS might be heard in that sector.

Four loudspeaker trucks were provided by Berlin Military Post and these trucks began running regular schedules through the western sectors of the city, halting in those places which have no permanent loudspeakers and sending the news out over the trucks' loudspeakers. It is estimated that 150,000 people hear the news in this manner every day.

Meanwhile, of course, there was no power shortage in the eastern sector and the eastern zone and the RIAS programs were heard normally in those areas.

**I**N THE MIDST of the excitement accompanying the beginning of the blockade RIAS opened its new broadcasting house which most effectively told the population of eastern Germany and of Berlin that the Americans were here to stay. The new studio building provides eight broadcasting studios and adequate facilities for the technical installations including news room and monitoring space.

The acting mayor of Berlin, Mrs. Louise Schroeder, spoke at the

**Mr. William F. Heimlich, director of RIAS, was one of the first Americans to enter Berlin after the war's end. As a lieutenant-colonel in the original "Operation Berlin" planning group, he helped arrange the entry of Americans into the city to participate in the Four-Power administration. Before the war, Mr. Heimlich was program supervisor for Radio Station WOSU, Columbus, Ohio, and a graduate of Ohio State University.**

dedication of the new building and pointed out that "RIAS has given new hope and new heart to the people of the city." Franz Neumann, leader of the Social Democratic Party, stated publicly that the city government was saved in recent weeks by the existence of a free police force in the western sectors and the free voice of Radio RIAS.

Thus RIAS today is one of the most effective voices which Military Government has in Germany. It not only brings the American message to the people of Berlin and eastern Germany, it counteracts the propaganda of the Soviet stations which are the only German-language stations besides RIAS which can be heard plainly in that area.

More than 600 German employees of the station build the programs under the direction of four Americans. That the job is being well done is clear: in the last public opinion survey conducted by ISD it was

revealed that Radio RIAS had at any given time 80 percent of the total listening audience in the city of Berlin, an astonishing figure when one considers that it is a new station in competition with several other transmitters.

Eighty percent of the Berliners, also said that they preferred RIAS over all stations; here at last they had a voice to give them new courage in their fight against police-state methods and political pressures.

### Weights of Berliners

Reports by nutrition teams indicated that the population of Berlin entered the period of the Soviet blockade weighing slightly more than the comparable population in the US Zone.

This situation, however, could not continue because the zone ration levels have been increased and large quantities of food are ration free, while in the western sectors of Berlin increases have not been made in the ration and, as a result of the blockade, very small quantities of vegetables have appeared in the shops.

### Price Reduction Demanded

Throughout the US Zone, credit and price problems raised by currency reform brought demands for drastic reductions in book prices. Publishers' associations expressed opposition on the ground that rising costs of paper and printing would soon necessitate an upward adjustment if prices were lowered.

*(left) Crowds gather on street corner to hear the latest news over RIAS' mobile loud-speakers. (photo by Brandt, RIAS) (right) Broadcasting team covers mass rally at the Reichstag building. (photo by Eschen for RIAS)*



## Berlin Divided

cessful emasculation of democratic government by Soviet authorities.

By a weird interpretation of Article 36 of the Berlin constitution the Russians have held that practically every act of the city government requires the approval of the Allied Kommandatura and in the Kommandatura they have used their veto as a two-edge sword to accomplish:

(1) The preservation of the carefully planned status quo (maintenance of their "agents" in significant positions, preservation of certain "front" organizations, maintenance of the fiction that certain Berlin institutions belong under Soviet Zone control—notably the University of Berlin and Radio Berlin).

(2) Denial of fundamental rights of the city government as, for instance, election or transfer of officials, handling of internal administration.

In contrast, the western Allies endeavored to give the city administration a high degree of genuine self-government. They sometimes stumbled, as for instance:

When the American commandant hastily agreed to order the dismissal of the head of the Education Department, an elected official, without a hearing and without consideration that the charge against him (brought by the Russians) was simply that he had violated an old Military Government order, though in doing so it was evident he had obeyed a subsequent order of the Allied Kommandatura.

When in the Control Council the US representative agreed to make the election of the mayor subject to a Soviet veto although denial of this veto had been (and since has been) a cornerstone of United States policy.

The deterioration has two spring boards. One was the failure of the Moscow Conference in the spring of 1947, the other the failure of the London Conference in December 1947. Since these events, the Berlin public

has witnessed the outbreak of ideological warfare between the Allies which has largely taken the form of slanderous statements in the Soviet-sponsored German press.

**T**HE SOVIET AUTHORITIES have been unrelenting in their drive to place the Soviet Zone—and Berlin—in the position of having one political party. They have been successful in the zone where, by taking over the CDU (through control of party leadership) and the LDP (through subversion of party leadership), they have given total political authority to German Communists, having previously eliminated the SPD.

They failed in Berlin because the western Allies refused to recognize the Russian repudiation of the Berlin CDU and LDP and where the SPD still enjoys an active political life and the bulk of public confidence.

There were other minor setbacks for the USSR. Their Communist-controlled labor organization, the FDGB, experienced a revolt within its ranks and there is now definite split with an independent labor organization completely severed from Communist control.

While new Communist front organizations have been recognized by the Allied Kommandatura, notably the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend, or FDJ) and the Women's League (Frauenbund) of Germany, this has been accomplished by the Russians only at the painful price of also recognizing democratic organizations in the same fields.

The very existence of a City Assembly in which independent voices were constantly raised attacking the economic and political strangulation of Berlin (by the USSR) has been a constant source of irritation to the Russians.

**I**T HAS BEEN OBVIOUS since the Control Council meeting on May 2, 1947, that the conflicting views of the Allies could not be harmonized. At that meeting the US Military Governor stated that the Allies' gift of a con-

stitution to Berlin resembled the wooden horse of the Trojans, and that whereas the Kommandatura had promised a democratic constitution and the delegation of a measure of responsibility to the German people, only confusion and maladministration had resulted, the city government—an elected body—having less authority than it had when it had been an appointed body.

During this period one of the most conspicuous events was the forced resignation of the city's mayor, Dr. Otto Ostrowski. Elected as a member of the SPD, he found his city administration so frustrated and blocked that he attempted to enter into a contract of cooperation with the SED. When this was discovered he was denounced by his own party and forced to resign.

It was a price of accepting the resignation and ordering the election of a new mayor that the other Allied representatives made the agreement in the Control Council that the election of a successor would be subject to veto in the Allied Kommandatura. Consequently when Ernst Reuter was elected mayor by an overwhelming majority, he was denied office by Soviet veto.

Of the many interpretations and misinterpretations of Allied Kommandatura orders which reveal the clash of ideas and techniques between the Americans and the Russians (and also reveal a certain amount of political ineptness on the part of Soviet authorities who, while trying to win German approval with propaganda, create violent antagonism by crushing natural German impulses) may be mentioned the matter of non-political organizations those offshoots of social and economic life that represent the life of any community.

They include women's clubs, professional associations, sports organizations, debating societies, and the like. The Allied Kommandatura having authorized such organizations generally, the Soviet representatives would agree to authorize practically none specifically. However, there was an escape clause in the regulation which



permitted sectoral recognition of organizations which were not "city-wide" in character.

It is significant that in the US Sector approximately 250 such organizations have been authorized. Practically all of them were subject of protests by Soviet authorities that the American authorities had no right to do so. The Russians objected to the Free Masons on the ground that they were political in character, and to the Boy Scouts because they were "militaristic."

In the Soviet Sector, when the last report was given in the spring of 1948, there had been only seven such organizations authorized by the Russians. As simple a matter as this authorization of the life of a people to continue with some aspects of normality was made the focus of bitter clashes in hours of debate.

**A**NOTHER MATTER revealing fundamental differences was the long debate on the sozialization bill. This bill was passed by the city government Feb. 13, 1947. It still was being debated in the Allied Kommandatura in June 1948, having been the subject of many hours of heated discussion by the local government committee, the deputy commandants and the commandants.

While US opinion was that socialization was not indicated for a city in physical and economic collapse and that the step could intelligently be postponed until a peace treaty and establishment of a German government gave free play for intelligent legislation and implementation, US authorities nevertheless conceded that the elected representatives of the people had a right to enact socialization measures for Berlin.

But the Soviet representatives at all levels insisted the bill must be accepted in toto, as presented to the Allied Kommandatura. When US,

British and French authorities pointed out that it made no provision for foreign owned property, inadequate provision for compensation, was legally so confused that it permitted interested parties to sit in judgment, and other deficiencies, and offered to accept the bill subject to correction of these points, they were accused by the Russians of "denying the will of the people."

**T**HE SPRING of 1948 was politically distinguished in Berlin by two events. The first was the approval of a new provisional constitution by the City Assembly, which was under discussion in the Allied Kommandatura at the time of the Russian withdrawal from that body—but there was no chance of agreement. This is a significant comment since the possibility of holding a new election this year, as required by the present constitution, may be denied if the Russians maintain that acceptance of a new constitution is a prerequisite.

This matter of a new constitution and elections for Berlin is tied in very closely with the second event—the meeting of the so-called People's Congress (Volkskongress) and the commencement on May 21 of circulation of a petition for "German unity" in the name of the People's Congress. This petition was outlawed in the US Sector, as well as in the French Sector, on the legal basis that the People's Congress had never received quadripartite approval in Berlin. It also was banned on the grounds that the People's Congress purported to be non-partisan whereas in fact it was entirely Communist controlled, making the petition a fraud-

ulent appeal for a curious kind of "German unity." The petition was also banned in the US Zone.

But in the Soviet Zone, and in Berlin as well, the petition resulted in a success, claiming a total of 13,000,000 signatures. The "success" was not surprising in view of the fact that residents of the Soviet Zone had no option but to sign, and in Berlin the signatures were collected by a combination of questionable methods, including the disguise of a petition for better meals, for extermination of household pests, etc.

The intent of the People's Congress petition is more serious than the fraudulent methods used in its implementation. Since the formation of the People's Congress and election of the Communist activist body (Volksrat) it has been plain that they would be used as the basis for a "people's government" when the Russians decided to use purely arbitrary methods in Berlin and in whatever part of Germany they could finally control.


**T**HE EVENT of Sept. 6 in Berlin were believed by many political observer to have revealed so clearly the Russian purpose in connection with Berlin that while the Soviet Military Administration won a temporary victory in driving the City Assembly out of the City Hall, in actuality it demonstrated the weakness of its position: a dominance based entirely upon force, lacking the confidence or good will of the population, the tragic effect of a pitifully small minority to impose its will upon more than three million persons.

At approximately 9 p. m. on Sept. 6, a force of German policemen, observed by and apparently acting under orders of a detachment of Soviet soldiers commanded by a captain, pushed into Room 103 in the City Hall of Berlin,

*US Constabulary troopers and Military Police patrol the US Sector during periods of tension. (left) Constabulary armor car M-8. (center) MP captain briefs detail on assignment near Potsdamer Platz. (right) Constabulary jeep patrol.*

(US Army Signal Corps photos)





*Panoramic view of the Sept. 9 mass rally in the British Sector. At left is the Russian memorial to its entry into Berlin, guarded by a solitary Soviet soldier in front of the pedestal and cordoned off by British Military Police and German police. In the left center are the ruins of the Reichstag building. It was the seat of the*

over the objection of the US Army captain there and forcibly removed 20 Germans, member of western sector police in plain clothes.

Room 103 is plainly marked "United States Liaison Office" and is an office assigned to the US Military Government for Berlin. The entry was by force and over the objection of the US liaison officer.

Approximately 30 minutes before the forcible entry, the Soviet liaison officer had ordered the US liaison officer to vacate the premises and to see that all uniformed personnel were removed from the City Hall in order to expedite the search for the western sector German policemen. The same order was given to the French and British liaison officers.

The Soviet officer was informed by the US liaison officer that the former's order would not be obeyed. Then

followed the attack on the US liaison office and seizure of the plainclothes policemen who were under the protection of the US liaison office at the time. The policemen who were seized were handcuffed and removed from the premises.

**T**HE FOLLOWING night the liaison offices of the French, British and Americans were broken into and searched. The same night the French liaison officer was held in a hallway by German police for four hours before he was permitted to enter his office. In the US liaison office, the US representative was practically blockaded by the Soviet Sector police. These incidents were by order of the Soviet authorities.

This incident followed the third attempt of the City Assembly to hold a meeting in the face of disorderly

obstruction of a Communist mob. Parts of the mob were transported to the scene in Soviet military vehicles. Most of the ring leaders have been identified as working for the Soviet AG's (Soviet industrial monopolies) which means that they were given official permission to "participate."

The actions of the mob have been defended and applauded in the Soviet-licensed press. The mob was encouraged by not only the apathy of the Soviet Sector German police—under the authority of the SMA—but also by the active assistance of the SMA controlled police. There is photographic evidence of this.

The facts concerning the collapse of the City Assembly meeting, through mob action, are well known. Also beating and injuries were suffered by at least three Americans and one





*German parliamentary government before Hitler. It was never fully repaired after the 1933 fire which the Nazis blamed on the Communists and its walls are still pockmarked from the fighting during the battle of Berlin. At the right is the Brandenburg Gate.*

(Photo by Mr. G. M. Jones, Jr. O/SG, OMGUS. Reprint Forbidden)

German working for the US-controlled radio station RIAS.

**T**HE PRESENCE of the plainclothes policemen in the City Hall resulted from attempts by the acting mayor, Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg, to supply some measure of protection for the City Assembly. Previous requests addressed to the SMA requesting that Soviet Sector police be ordered to protect the meetings of the assembly had met only with a contemptuous reply from Maj. Gen. A. G. Kotikov, commander of the Soviet garrison and commandant of the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

With reference to the Sept. 6 meeting, Dr. Friedensburg had authorized certain employees of the Magistrat to guard the gates of the building and the doors of the assembly and at his request approximately 50 German

policemen from the western sectors had volunteered to go to the City Hall and assist in maintaining order within the building.

After the mob had crashed the gates and broken windows, to effect an entrance—with more than 150 Soviet Sector police under the command of the Protection Police Chief Wagner either looking on or assisting the mob—most of the western sector plainclothes policemen sought refuge in the various offices of the US, British and French liaison suites at the City Hall. At the request of Dr. Friedensburg and also as a natural impulse of the various liaison officers, the men were permitted to remain in the "safety" of the Allied liaison offices.

Wagner, the Soviet police commander, plainly stated that his men were in the building to arrest persons

who were illegally on the premises. When asked if he meant the Communist mob which had broken in, he replied that he did not mean them, that they represented the voice of the people and had a right to be in the building.

The SMA was aware of the entire proceeding and, at the end, openly took charge of it. A detachment of Soviet troops, armed with tommy guns, appeared. A Soviet officer and half a dozen soldiers bearing tommy guns were present when the attack was made on the US liaison office.

US, French and British Military Governments were insulted and treated with contempt in general, and two US officers were insulted and abused in particular. The plainclothes policemen who were seized were manacled and carried away over the protest of the US, British and French repre-

representatives of their respective Military Governments.

The next night the remaining 26 policemen were "released," Brig. Gen. Jean Ganeval, commanding general of the French Military Government of Berlin, having obtained a personal guarantee from General Kotikov that the men would not be molested or restrained. The French dispatched trucks to take them away from the City Hall, but in a matter of minutes after leaving the building Soviet Sector police arrested the entire 26.

**A**TTENDING the protest meeting before the old Reichstag on Sept. 9 was a crowd of 250,000. It was a mass meeting of workers, men and women who felt outraged and angry and determined to make their voice heard. The piling up of the currency situation, the Soviet attempt to starve the city into submission, the Communist attempts to take over the city government, and the realization that the imposition of Soviet will upon Berlin was no longer a matter of conjecture but of progressive fact, had driven the people of the city to the breaking point.

The mass meeting was addressed by political leaders of the non-Communist parties, by city officials and by labor leaders. Excerpts from the speeches follow:

Franz Neumann, leader of the SPD Berlin: "The victims of totalitarianism, between 1933 and 1948, must be remembered. They gave their lives

for freedom. The concentration camps have remained the same only today the hammer and sickle flies over them instead of the swastika. Berlin must continue the battle for freedom and democracy. In the battle we need the assistance of all countries—Berlin calls to the world!"

Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg, first deputy mayor and at the time acting mayor of Berlin: "As long as humanly possible the Berlin administration must stay at its post in Parochialstrasse (site of the City Hall in the Soviet Sector), where they had been placed by the people of Berlin. We must fight a battle for the whole people of Berlin, including the Soviet Sector."

Dr. Otto Suhr, president of the City Assembly: "The Communists now use force against us, having failed in everything else, but they would not dare use force if the Russians were not in back of the attacks. General Kotikov has not answered my letter requesting a boundary around the City Hall but today Berlin will give him an answer—we say to him that there no longer is any freedom whatever in the Soviet Sector of Berlin."

Ernst Reuter, head of the city's Traffic Utilities Undertakings Department and originally elected the city's mayor but barred by the Soviet veto from taking office:

"Berlin must be freed from the tyranny of the East Sector. And from such actions as the arrest of plain-clothes policemen stationed in the City

Hall. They were promised freedom and immunity—but before the cock had thrice crowed the Russian General Kotikov had broken his word of honor.

"The SED needs a new symbol to add to their clasped hands—handcuffs, the handcuffs with which the Germans were led from the City Hall. Handcuffs is a proper symbol for those who sell their people for 30 pieces of silver to a foreign power.

"Diplomats and generals now are discussing the fate of Berlin. Now that there is a pause in the talks it would be well if they could hear the voice of the people of Berlin. We tell them that we do not want to be the subject of bartering; they cannot barter and sell us with compromises."

Neumann: "Here is a paper, a memorandum, it is the story of the oppression of the East Zone (Soviet). I am going to take it to the secretariat at the Allied Control so it may reach the proper persons. Let all who believe in solidarity follow me."

**F**OLLOWING the meeting, Neumann took four folders, one addressed to each of the military governors, to the Allied Control Council building in the US Sector. He was followed by thousands of persons from the crowd. The folders contained a covering letter, signed by the leaders of the democratic parties, and a memorandum outlining alleged acts of terror and totalitarian brutality inflicted upon the German people by the Russians and by the SED.

At the ACA grounds, the crowd surged within the gates and up to the doors of the building but at Neumann's

*Two Different Demonstrations—(left) Crowd waits in front of the ACA building on Sept. 9 as Franz Neumann delivers protest notes to the four military governors. (right) Communist-led crowd assembles for so-called "spontaneous" demonstration at the Berlin City Hall on Aug. 26. Note Soviet-issued plate on truck bringing demonstrators to assembling place.*

(US Army Signal Corps photos)





request they moved back to the street. Some time later Neumann came out of the grounds and told the thousands still waiting that he delivered the folders and had been promised they would be forwarded to the military governors.

**I**N THE MEANTIME at the Brandenburg Gate, on the British-Soviet Sectors boundary near the Reichstag building, Russian soldiers in a jeep were sneered at by many in the crowd, and in retaliation fired a volley. Another jeep containing Soviet soldiers was attacked by the crowd which hurled bricks and rubble, breaking the windshield. British military police rescued the Soviet soldiers and maintained a cordon around the nearby huge Soviet memorial, commemorating the Red Army's capture of Berlin.

Soviet Sector police fired on the crowd and a youth of the SPD Falcons (youth organization) was shot and killed. Another youth climbed to the top of the Brandenburg Gate and tore down the Communist banner which was trampled under foot and burned by the infuriated crowd.



Reinforced Soviet Sector police, backed by a small detail of Soviet soldiers (who fired in the air) returned to the gate and were met by a storm of bricks and other missiles. They fired on the people, wounding at least seven or eight—estimates run as high as 20. The crowd then dispersed.

Rally of the Communist trade union federation on May 1 in the Lustgarten, Soviet Sector. (DENA-Bild)

It is evident that the symbolism of Berlin is all important to the Russians, that if they are threatened with an ideological defeat, they may resort to any means to consolidate their grip on the city and on the East Zone.

## Previous Articles Published in Information Bulletin


For background material and allied subjects dealing with Louis Glaser's "Berlin Divided" and the US White Paper "The Berlin Crisis" in this issue, the following articles in previous issues of the *Information Bulletin* are cited:

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 Founding of the SED, No. 136, June 1, 1948.  
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 Berlin's Trade Union Fight (by Albert H. Ber- man), No. 137, June 15, 1948.  
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 Meaning of Six-Power Agreement for Germany (by John Elliott), No. 138, June 29, 1948.  
 OMGUS Rejects Soviet Charges (by Col. Frank L. Howley), No. 139, July 13, 1948.  
 Mail out of Berlin (by Richard J. Elwood), No. 140, July 27, 1948.  
 The Real Issue in Berlin Crisis (by Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan), No. 140, July 27, 1948.  
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 Soviet Blockade Fails to Subjugate Berlin (by Col. Frank L. Howley), No. 143, Sept. 7, 1948.  
 Constitution-Making at Bonn (by John Elliott), No. 144, Sept. 21, 1948.  
 Impact of Currency Reform (resume), No. 144, Sept. 21, 1948.





FRENCH HQ

FR.

BR.

U.S.A.



SCHÖNWALDE AIRFIELD



TEGEL AIRFIELD



STAAKEN AIRFIELD



GATOW AIRFIELD



TEMPELHOF AIRFIELD

HAVEL

WANN-SEE



TEGELER SEE



FUNK TURM



REICHSTAG



BRANDENBURG GATE



UNIVERSITY



CATHEDRAL



CITY HALL



CASTLE



CITY HALL




ANDREW BARRACKS




M° NAIR BARRACKS



ALLIED KOMMANDATURA



U.D. EICHEN



U.D. EICHEN

SCHÖNWALDER CHAUSSEE

FALLENHAGEN CHAUSSEE

HEER STR.

WILHELM STR.

HAVEL

POTS DAMER CHAUSSEE

RUPPINER CHAUSSEE

KÖNIGLICHES RING

AM JULIUSTURM KONNENNDAMM ALLEE

AN DER HEERSTR.

AVUS BAHN

KRONPRINZ ALLEE

BERLINER STR.

BERLINER STR.

ORANJENBURGER STR.

BERLINER STR.

BERLINER S. SEIDEL S.

TEGELER WEG

KAISER DAMM

KURFÜRSTEN DAMM

KRONPRINZ ALLEE

BERLINER STR.

BERLINER STR.

BERLINER STR.

QUANLENBURGER STR.

SCHARNWEBER S.

MÜLLER STR.

BISMARCK S.

KURFÜRSTEN DAMM

BERLINER STR.

BISMARCK STR.

BERLINER STR.

RESERVE STR.

OSLOER STR.

BORNHOLMER S.

BAD STR.

BRUNNEN STR.

REICHSTAG

BRANDENBURG GATE

CHARLOTTENBURGER STR.

BERLINER STR.

SCHLOSSER STR.

BLANKENFELDER STR.

BERLINER STR.

BRUNNEN STR.

REICHSTAG

BRANDENBURG GATE


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
BERLINER STR.

AUTOBAHN TO HELMSTEDT





# GRAPHIC MAP OF BERLIN



OMGUS  
GRAPHICS  
CONTROL OFFICE



# Occupational ACTIVITIES

**Army Lends Potatoes**—In a move to get quantities of dehydrated potatoes in a hurry for shipment by the airlift to Berlin, the EUCOM Quartermaster agreed to lend the Berlin Magistrat 1,000,000 pounds of dehydrated potatoes from US Army stocks. But the German economy is to pay back in spring potatoes next March and April. Bipartite Food and Agriculture officials say that the airlift can transport approximately eight times as much in caloric value in dehydrated as in fresh potatoes in the same number of planes.

**European Recovery Program**—Food purchases totaling \$5,690,000 had been delivered by the end of September in the Bizonal Area under the third quarterly period of the 1948 Bizonal Recovery Program, according to the ERP Secretariat of BICO. Of the \$139,416,000 total of ECA aid requested by the Bizone for the three month period July through September, contracts have either been concluded or were in process of negotiation for the ECA approved purchase of \$98,059,000 of critical food or industrial items, in addition to the more than \$5,500,000 worth of foods which have been delivered. Freight charges account for \$12,500,000 of the remaining balance awaiting ECA approval.

**School Art for President**—Dr. Hans Ehard, minister-president of Bavaria, presented Mr. Murray D. Van Wagoner, director of OMG Bavaria, a portfolio of paintings to be given to President Truman. The 50 paintings were selected from more than 800,000 done by school children throughout Bavaria in a contest held to show their appreciation for the American-sponsored school feeding program. The school feeding program, sponsored by Military Government was begun in Bavaria in April, 1947, growing until 820,000 children received a 350 calorie meal five days a week.

**Coal for Berlin**—A special issue of 110 pounds of coal is being furnished every western sector family having two or more children along with its October food ration . . . 30,000 Esbit stoves and 400,000 packets of solid fuel have been purchased from a Frankfurt firm for western sector families. They are to be taken to Berlin by the airlift and distributed by the City Council . . . The millionth bag of coal taken into Berlin by the airlift arrived Sept. 20 from Fassberg airfield in the British Zone.

**International Agreements**—German authorities were advised by the Bipartite Board that negotiations with sovereign countries should not be conducted by German state governments. This advice followed the board's ratification of an agreement, negotiated by the Bavarian government, over diversion of waters on rivers bordering Bavaria and Austria . . . The Bipartite Board also approved conditionally the bizonal ordinance to accure claims arising out of equalization-of-burdens legislation.

**Agricultural Extension Started**—A ten-man board has been designated by Minister-President Reinhold Maier to administer the new agricultural extension service in Wuerttemberg-Baden. Its president, elected by the board, is Dr. Adolf Muenzinger of Hohenheim Agricultural College.

**Trade Unions**—Georg Reuter, general secretary of the Bavarian Trade Union Federation, and Erich Buehrig, executive board member of the British Zone Metal Union, were named to head respectively the departments for organizational matters and labor law of the Bizonal Trade Union Secretariat . . . The executive committee and general council of the Trade Union Federation in the British Zone have resolved to take no further part in interzonal trade union conferences as previously conducted, thus emphasizing

the impossibility of continuing cooperation with the representatives of the trade unions in the Soviet Zone . . . A temporary agreement has been concluded for the shoe industry, providing for a 12.5 percent increase in time and piece rate wages.

**Cash Gifts from United States**—Funds, payable in dollars, for charitable, personal and family purposes may be sent in any amounts from the United States to persons residing in the British, US and French Zones. The remittances are to be paid through the Bank of German States (Bank Deutscher Laender) at Frankfurt in Deutsche marks at the 30-cent rate, after deduction of small German service charges. No cash is to be sent to Germany, but all dollar funds to cover the remittances are to be deposited at the Federal Reserve Bank at New York to the account of the Bank of German States.

**Youth Faces New Court**—The first major trial to come before the recently civilianized MG Court system is the case of Johannes Wilfred Helm, 17-year-old German, charged with the murder of a German policeman and an American criminal-investigation agent. The trial is scheduled for Oct. 19 in Munich. Chief Judge William Clark is to preside with Mr. Don Noggle and Mr. James Greenhill as prosecutors. Helms is accused of slaying the two men in an automobile May 10 while being returned from Wiesbaden to Munich on another charge.

**Miscellaneous Items**—Hesse's employment curve, on the decline since currency reform, suddenly took an upward swing in mid-September. Also job-openings increased . . . Frankfurt became the first city in the US Zone to have three daily newspaper with the licensing of the Abendpost. Udo Bintz, licensee of the Offenbach Post, is the publisher . . .



# EDITORIAL OPINION in GERMAN PRESS



## UN Conference at Paris Viewed with Gloom

nations share a common will that it be abolished."

## Youth's Sentences Protested

The 25-year prison sentences (subsequently reduced) imposed on five German youths by Soviet military authorities in connection with the Sept. 9 disturbance at Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, aroused most editors of the US-licensed press in Germany.

The *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich) said: "The cold, sarcastic voice of Freisler (dreaded chief justice of the Nazi People's Court) has hardly died away before all those cruel memories are being revived by a sentence of the Russian tribunal in Berlin... Moscow is supposed to smile and Berlin to tremble. Does it tremble? According to reports a tremor is felt not only in Berlin, but through all Germany. Instead of fear, however, it expresses indignation... This is the total denial of all those constitutional rights for which we waited 12 long years..."

The *Stuttgarter Nachrichten* demanded action:

"The world regards the sentences... with horror and contempt... In reality they represent the murder of youth according to the accursed system of Dachau, Sachsenhausen and Auschwitz... The Berlin judgment illustrates an attitude that makes one's blood run cold... It should make clear to the political world that henceforth necessary decisions must be made without consulting Russia. Nations which exclude themselves from efforts for peace and humanitarianism must be completely isolated. They must sooner or later be outlawed. Their diplomatic and trade emissaries will have to be expelled; that is inevitable..."

The *Neue Presse* (Coburg) said: "Anybody who feels and thinks democratically must regard this kind of justice as barbaric. But it is also grist for the mills of nationalists and warmongers. We don't want to be identified with them. The warmongers

"We believe that Moscow is merely waiting for a propitious moment to liquidate its participation in what has become an uncomfortable institution. Hitler set a precedent in 1933 in the League of Nations... Only if the West takes advantage of its preponderance of power and threatens Russia with war may it still be possible to force the Soviets into cooperation for peace."

The *Fuldaer Volkszeitung* also viewed the Paris UN proceedings in a pessimistic light: "Germany will only be invisibly present among the delegates, but its shadow on the deliberations will be heavy.... The outlook is most gloomy... The disarmament committee had to forsake its labors; in the end the Western representatives had to realize that peace could only be secured through rearmament. There is therefore a comprehensible fear the United Nations may go the way of the League of Nations..."

"The decision will once again be up to the four great powers, who will be faced with the same fundamental problem that arises whenever they meet—that is, the division of the world. The United Nations is the last safety fuse in the electric field of power between East and West. It cannot compel any great power to peace, but it has a certain moral force. That has been its only usefulness to the nations up to now."

The *Fraenkische Landeszeitung* (Ansbach) saw little chance for a successful conclusion to UN deliberations unless Russia can be made to see the futility of its dreams of world conquest: "Today's European drama lies in the fact that two civilizations, two ways of life, face one another without an intermediate power, such as Germany, to act as a buffer.... Agreement in Paris is hardly to be expected.... War will only be conquered when all the

Editorials of the western German press were devoted in late September almost entirely to the third plenary session of the United Nations assembly at Paris, considered to be decisive for a lasting peace.

The *Stuttgarter Nachrichten* wrote that "the air at Paris is certainly cleaner and more full of hope for a settlement of the differences than at Moscow." The paper contended that Russia "must stop its expansion or it must face a united world working against her."

The same warnings to Russia was given by the British-sponsored *Die Welt* at Hamburg. "However, the struggle over Berlin and a reform of the United Nations may develop," the paper claimed. "The military potential of the western world, which is presently being strengthened, is the only weighty reality that can induce the Kremlin to a revision of its policies. It is the only guarantee for the maintenance of peace."

Karlsruhe's *Badische Neueste Nachrichten* asked whether "the world has finally arrived at the point where it will no longer endure the Soviet policy of irresponsibility against the justified longing of countless millions for peace," while the *Sueddeutsche Allgemeine* at Pforzheim emphasized "that the lives of millions are at stake, because Russia does not stop playing with the fire."

However, the *Mittelbayerische Zeitung* (Regensburg) took a pessimistic view of the UN Congress in Paris: "At most one may expect the display of new propaganda tricks by the Kremlin... magnificent examples of dialectic until the day... when the theme Berlin is introduced.... This may well result in a Soviet threat to withdraw from UN.... Russia's sending Vishinsky rather than Molotov to Paris shows considerable lack of interest in the meeting...."



of other days and the Nazi gangsters have no right to get excited about things which stem from their school. We, however, who have always rebelled against the inhumanity of Nazism, have the right and the duty to . . . point out that all that happens in the Soviet Zone today . . . represents a neo-fascism of the most inhumane kind; it differs from its predecessor only in emblems . . ."

### Views on West-East Strife

Commenting on the current Western Powers—Soviet strife, the **Fuldaer Volkszeitung** said: "The latest events on the world stage make it certain that decisive developments are taking place these days. The worried question: 'Is there going to be war (and when)?' . . . overshadows the question whether there might possibly be peace. There are many signs that we are nearing a showdown and that humanity approaches what (the late President) Roosevelt called 'a rendezvous with destiny.' Diplomacy has not too much time left for its work; the period of transition is drawing to a close."

The **Schwaebische Post** (Aalen) believed that the Russians have played with the Western Allies in the Moscow negotiations and that taking the Berlin impasse to the United Nations won't help either:

"What will happen in Berlin, meanwhile? The city is sinking ever deeper into the abyss. The food supply is assured, thanks to the air corridor. But what about fuel for the winter, what about currency, what about unemployment? The Berliners will share the fate of the five convicted demonstrators. Even though the whole world protests against such methods, the Russian grip on Berlin will not be relaxed until free democratic life is strangled and they have become masters of a living corpse."

### Comments on Bernadotte

The **Sueddeutsche Zeitung** (Munich) commented on the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, UN mediator, in Jerusalem:

"A few days before his sudden end a book was published in Stockholm with the title: 'In Place of Arms.' Folke Bernadotte, who has now been

silenced forever, will be able through this book to continue to talk to us of his hope that the insanity of a new war can be avoided . . ."

The **Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung** (Heidelberg) saw "volcanic powers" behind Bernadotte's assassination:

"He was hated by nationalists on both sides because he was resolved to ruin their business, which is war . . . If it is true that the assassins were members of a Jewish organization, then it is an indication of the dangers which confront the Jewish state from . . . Jewish fascism . . . The world has become a volcano in the last 35 years, and resolutions and diplomatic threats no longer suffice. May the UN states . . . take the lesson to heart."

### German Workers Criticized

In the **Muenchner Merkur** (Munich), R. Friesinger, a German Catholic labor leader, who has frequently visited MG offices, reported that he was treated by US personnel "with promptness and distinction," then added:

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## German Writer Contrasts Greetings

In his second article on the US trip of 15 German journalists, Heinrich Kierzek reported in the **Fuldaer Volkszeitung** on an incident at the airfield in Amsterdam, while the journalists were conversing in German:

"When they were called to take their seats in the plane a shrill, female voice cried: 'The damned Nazis go first. They must, of course, get the best seats.' Such things are understandable when one remembers Hitler's invasion into peaceful Holland, the mass murder of Rotterdam, execution of numerous Dutch patriots . . . Should we be angry because the Dutch have not forgotten the Nazi misdeeds as quickly as we in Germany, where today a man like Schacht can be exonerated?"

Kierzek contrasted Dutch hostility with US friendliness, where for instance Columbia University has engaged German-speaking waiters to serve the visiting journalists. Of New York he said:

"Surprisingly enough, it was not the skyscrapers which made the deepest

"I was disgusted, on the other hand, by the treatment I received from minor German employees. In (one office in Munich,) an elderly (German) gentleman with horn-rimmed glasses provides information. He shouts at the people who make inquiries like the worst 'Spieß' (first sergeant) at the rookies in a barracks yard. He permits no counter-questions. His bellowing divides the stream of people . . ."

"But this is no isolated case. I talked to a number of other German employees in various US offices. They are ill-humored and bureaucratic and threaten to throw one out of the office. On the other hand, they show extreme subservience to the least-important American typist . . ."

"Do these German employees imagine that the Americans are impressed by such a nattitude? After all, who pays the salaries of the (German) employees of Military Government? Isn't it their own people who have to bear the costs of occupation?"


impression. We had gained a general idea of it already through photos and films. Much more exciting was New York's traffic, its indescribable volume and speed . . .

"Still more confusing are the neon signs which in the evening make of the monster city a sea of glittering red, green, yellow and blue light with all kinds of ingenious effects . . ."

"Even the churches share in this kind of publicity. A gigantic running sign on Broadway proclaims, for instance: 'Death is the reward of sin, but God promises eternal life through our Lord Jesus Christ' . . ."

"We stop in front of a delicatessen on Broadway. In the shop-window are all kinds of liquor, hams, and salamis weighing 10 pounds. The shop is open late at night, but the sales personnel stand idly by. Instead, people stream into the movie next door and pay 85 cents for the cheapest seats. Such superabundance of food once existed in our own country, too. A very long time ago . . ."





(left) View of the recently reconstructed Leipheim Bridge, spanning the Danube River near Ulm on the Munich-Stuttgart highway. (right) Mr. Charles M. LaFollette, OMGB director, and Mr. Murray D. Van Wagoner, OMGB director, greet shortly before the cutting of the tape opening the bridge to public traffic.

(photos by L. S. Partegas for PIO OMGB)

## Rebuilt Bridge at Ulm Dedicated

**T**HE REBUILDING of the moral bridges between states and nations was stressed by the Military Government directors of Wuerttemberg-Baden and Bavaria in speeches at the dedication Sept. 15 of the new superhighway bridge across the Danube River near Ulm.

The 1,200-foot long span, 36 feet wide, known as the Leipheim Bridge, replaced the double-road structure destroyed by the retreating German army in April 1945. Reconstruction started the following August. Its opening ended a major detour on the superhighway (Autobahn) between Stuttgart and Munich.

The span was consecrated in an impressive Catholic ceremony conducted by Bishop Franz Eberle of Augsburg, followed by brief dedication ceremonies held by Deacon Schiepl representing the Evangelical church and Dr. Aaron Chrenstein representing the Jewish faith.

Following the religious ceremonies, Mr. Murray D. Van Wagoner, state director of OMG Bavaria, and Mr. Charles M. LaFollette, state director

of OMG Wuerttemberg-Baden, offered congratulatory messages to the people responsible for the rebuilding of the bridge.

In his address director Mr. Van Wagoner said: "It is important that so many bridges throughout Germany and Europe are being reconstructed once again. I mean not only bridges of concrete and steel such as this one, but bridges of ideas and ideals as well."

"At Bonn, today," he continued, "a group of political engineers representing all the states of western Germany, are at work on a very special kind of bridge. When this span is completed, it will link all those states in a government of freedom and co-operation. The bridge builders at Bonn are constructing a new constitution which must require the union of all German states in a common effort towards recovery, while allowing them the state rights which will guarantee the greatest freedom for the individual.

"The drafters of our American Constitution faced the same problem

in 1787. They were successful in constructing a national charter which has withstood the test of time. I am convinced the men at Bonn can be just as successful."

In his speech Director LaFollette said: "Humanitarians such as Goethe in Germany and Lincoln in the United States recognized that the possibilities of war would virtually disappear if people had the opportunity to know and understand each other.

"Through the years planks of bridges of mutual understanding were carefully put into place... exchange scholarships, encouragement of international tourists, international youth groups; free exchange of information, and other similar efforts.

"Bridges of understanding between Germany and the outside world were blown up by Hitler in 1933. One of our tasks during these critical days is to rebuild, those shattered moral bridges, as well as the physical bridges, such as this one today."

At the conclusion of the speeches Dr. Willi Ankermueller, Bavarian minister of interior, opened the bridge to the convoy of official cars waiting to cross.

# Personnel Changes Announced

Mr. Samuel Kramer, consultant to the director of the Legal Division, OMGUS, has been named legal counsel to the Committee on Tripartite Military Government Organization, US Element, CINCEUR (see Information Bulletin, No. 139, July 13, 1948).

Mr. F. C. Kempner, who has been special assistant to the economics adviser, OMGUS, has been appointed special assistant to the director general, JEIA.

Dr. C. H. Hammer, formerly with the Food Production Branch, BICO, has been named special adviser to the chief of the Food, Agriculture and Forestry Group, BICO, on agricultural research education and extension work.

Mr. Mortimer Kollender was promoted to chief of the Administration of Justice Branch, Legal Division, OMGUS, succeeding Mr. Charles H. Kraus, who returned to the United States. Mr. Kollender was formerly chief of the Ministry Section and deputy chief of the Administration of Justice Branch.

Mr. P. G. Barter was transferred from chief of the Food Planning and Statistics Branch, BICO, to head the Agriculture Committee of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in Paris.

Mr. B. A. Cash-Reed, formerly chief of the Inspectorate Branch BICO, was named to succeed Dr. Barter as chief of the BICO branch.

Mr. Thomas F. Sullivan, former assistant chief of police of Hartford, Conn., has been appointed police inspector and investigator for OMG Hesse.

Mr. David B. Bernstein, veteran MG judge and head of the legal departments in Kassel and Frankfurt, has ended four years of service with Military Government to return to the United States. He was succeeded by Mr. Fred J. Cohen, senior legal officer for Darmstadt.

Mr. H. J. Gilman, relinquished his posts as deputy chief of the Commerce & Industry Group, BICO, and chief of the Commerce & Industry Elements, CCG(BE), in the British Zone, to



*Leroy Vogel, on leave as professor of modern European history at Centenary College, was appointed deputy chief of the Education and Cultural Affairs Division, OMG Hesse. (OMGH PIO photo)*

return to private business in the United Kingdom. He was succeeded by Mr. E. V. Deldy.

Dr. Omar Pancoast became ECA special adviser in addition to his duties as OMGUS-BICO liaison officer of the Food, Agriculture and Forestry Group, BICO.

Mr. Louis J. Simonich, chief of the Wuerttemberg-Baden field office of the Bipartite Communications Group, returned to the United States after four and a half years of military and civilian service in Europe.

Mr. John S. Meadows, chief of the Bavarian field office of the Bipartite Communications Group, succeeded Mr. Simonich in Stuttgart.

Mr. J. C. Lynn, chief of the Food Supply Branch, BICO, returned to the United States to become special assistant to the president of the American Farm Bureau Federation.

Mr. Leland E. Spencer resumed his duties as chief of the Bipartite Commerce and Industry Group, BICO, after a two-month visit to the United States.

Representatives of the Bipartite Food, Agriculture and Forestry Group,

BICO, at the recent four-day meeting of world food officials in Geneva, Switzerland, were Mr. G. E. Hughes, Mr. H. A. Taster and Mr. J. C. Lynn. Three German food officials accompanied them.

Dr. Karl Loewenstein, prewar professor at the University of Munich and now professor of Political science at Amherst College, completed a four-month lecture tour in southern Germany, speaking on governmental and constitutional topics at US Information Centers. He was an adviser to the Legal Division, OMGUS, in 1945 and 1946.

Four civilian consultants to the surgeon general of the US Army toured army installations and hospitals in the European Command. They were Dr. David Preswick Barr, Dr. Vernon Lewis Hart, Dr. Luman Elmer Daniels and Dr. John Vernon Ambler.

A party of American Medical Association officials, headed by its president, Dr. Roscoe Sensenic, conferred with MG public health officials on a tour of the US Zone. Others in the party were Dr. Elmer L. Henderson, Dr. John Kline and Dr. Craighen Barker.

The Rev. Delmar L. Dyreson, associate director of the General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains, toured EUCOM installations talking with chaplains and troops. He is editor of "The Chaplain" and "The Link" magazines.

Prof. Herta Kraus of Bryn Mawr College and Dr. Kaete Radtke of Catholic College, St. Louis, were guests of the first postwar conclave of German social workers recently in Wiesbaden.

Dr. J. A. B. Cathie, prominent British physician of Great Ormond Street Children's Hospital in London, advised German doctors in the British and US Sectors of Berlin on the uses of the new drug, streptomycin.

## Newspaper Competition

The state publisher associations of the US Zone have agreed to relax former geographical restrictions by opening all areas of the zone to competition from all zonal newspapers.



# INDUSTRY CONTINUES TO RISE IN AUGUST

**I**NDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY in the Bizonal Area is rising towards the 1936 level. The continued upward rise is shown by the new index of the volume of industrial production for the Bizonal Area that has been constructed by the German Bizonal Department of Economics at the request of, and in cooperation with Military Government. The new index, which in August became official for the Bizonal Area, is constructed on a truly bizonal basis.

The provisional index, used since December 1947, was a combination of the existing indexes for the US and British Zones of Occupation. While these bizonal indexes were not strictly comparable, the methods used in constructing them were similar enough to permit their combination to secure a provisional index which was used pending the construction of the new index from data on a bizonal basis.

Preliminary figures for August showed that the new index stood at 67 percent of 1936, as compared with 66 for the old index. Both indexes indicated an increase of eight percent over July, for which the revised index showed 62 and the old index 61 (revised). On the average for the year August 1947—July 1948, the new index was 4.6 percent higher than the old.

The general method used in constructing the new index is the same as that previously used for both zonal indexes. Production of each important item, expressed in quantity units, in the current month is compared with the monthly average production of the same item in 1936.

The items are arranged in 19 industry groups for the most part in accordance with the established German industrial classification. Indexes for the groups are made by combining the items according to the relative importance of their 1936 production in the groups. The industry groups are weighted together on the basis of value added by manufacture in each group in 1936.

For a few groups, production data for August were not available, but these groups have been estimated on the basis of value of production deflated for price changes, employment adjusted for changes in labor efficiency, and consumption of iron and steel in the industry.

**B**OTH THE NEW and old indexes included mining and production of electricity and gas but excluded construction (other than iron and steel construction) and food processing, for which no adequate data were available. With the above exclusions, virtually every industry group is re-

presented in the new index either by production of important individual items or by a substitute series. The revised index also incorporated numerous corrections and revisions in base-period figures and current production data.

For the purposes of comparison, the two series are shown (in the adjoining table) by month for the period January 1946 to August 1948 for the Bizonal Area.

## Press Licensing to End

US Military Government is preparing to relinquish its licensing powers in the field of newspapers, books, periodicals and other publications, Col. G. E. Tector, director of Information Services Division, OMGUS announced. The present MG licensing system will be terminated as soon as German legislators have enacted laws which will adequately protect freedom of the press in the US Zone of Germany.

With the ending of MG licensing, it is not intended that a German licensing system be inaugurated. It will then be possible for individuals or groups, such as political parties, labor unions, religious organizations or educational bodies to enter the publishing field without the necessity of obtaining a special license to publish. Only such requirements as are made of other businesses will be required of publishers in the future.

State OMG directors are being requested to inform the German ministers-president of the necessity for passing adequate press legislation, which will prohibit censorship, protect the press from governmental domination or domination by special-interests and which will guarantee that there be no arbitrary interference by the police or other administrative bodies in the free flow and dissemination of news and printed matter.

Conferences are being initiated with political leaders in the states of the US Zone to acquaint them with the MG decision.

### Indexes of Volume of Industrial Production

(excluding food processing and construction)

(Not adjusted for seasonal variations)

100 represents 1936 average

	1946		1947		1948	
	revised	old	revised	old	revised	old
Monthly Average	34	(33)	40	(38)		
January	27	(26)	31	(29)	47	(44)
February	28	(27)	29	(28)	48	(45)
March	31	(30)	34	(33)	51	(48)
April	31	(30)	39	(37)	54	(50)
May	34	(32)	41	(39)	48	(46)
June	34	(33)	41	(39)	52	(51)
July	38	(36)	42	(42)	62	(61)
August	39	(37)	42	(42)	67 •	(66) •
September	39	(37)	43	(42)		
October	40	(38)	46	(43)		
November	39	(38)	45	(44)		
December	33	(32)	45	(43)		

• Preliminary



# The Berlin Crisis

## A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948

The United States Government issued on Sept. 28 a 25,000-word White Paper, setting forth in detail the events and negotiations concerning the Berlin crisis. The text of the exposition, entitled "The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948," follows.

### Soviet Interference with Access to Berlin

The Soviet government has maintained first that its measures restricting communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and western Germany were necessitated by "technical difficulties" and then that they were "defensive" against conditions created by the currency reform in western Germany and western Berlin. The following chronological record of events reveals that many of the Soviet restrictive measures were imposed months before the currency reform and that they have been systematic products of a deliberate coercive purpose rather than the results of "technical difficulties":

On March 30, 1948, ten days after the Soviet delegation had walked out of the Allied Control Council meeting, the Soviet deputy military governor, General Dratvin, stated in a letter to the United States Military Government that supplementary provisions regarding communications between the Soviet and US Zones of occupation in Germany would go into effect on April 1, 1948. These provisions, which were contrary to practice established since the quadripartite occupation of Berlin, set forth that:

- (1) US personnel traveling through the Soviet Zone by rail and highway must present documentary evidence of identity and affiliation with the US Military Administration of Germany;
- (2) Military freight shipments from Berlin to the western zones must be cleared through Soviet check points by means of a Soviet permit; freight shipments into Berlin would be cleared by accompanying documents;
- (3) All baggage must be inspected at Soviet check points, with the exception of personal belongings of US personnel carried in a passenger railway car or a passenger automobile.

Similar letters were delivered to the British and French Military Government authorities.

On March 31 the Chief-of-Staff, US Military Government, replied that the new provisions were not acceptable and that such unilateral changes of policy could not be recognized. In this letter General Gailey states:

"I am prepared to have each train commandant of passenger trains furnish you at an established entry point a passenger list accompanied by copies of the orders of each passenger. Likewise each train commandant of freight trains will furnish you at the entry point with a manifest of cargo.

"However I cannot agree to permit your representatives to enter these trains for the purpose of examining individual documentation or belongings or inspecting cargo.

"I shall be glad to discuss with you or your representatives the procedure which I have outlined above, although not on 24 hours notice."

In the same letter, General Gailey also stated:

"The agreement under which we entered Berlin clearly provided for our free and unrestricted utilization of the established corridors. This right was a condition precedent to our entry into Berlin and our final evacuation of Saxony and Thuringia. I do not consider that the provisions you now propose are consistent with this agreement."

In his reply of April 3, General Dratvin challenged this statement and claimed that there was no agreement "concerning the orderless and uncontrolled traffic of freight and personnel through the territory of the Soviet Zone of occupation." He termed the new regulations "an internal matter" concerning the Soviet occupation authorities and

The text of the US White Paper, "The Berlin Crisis," was provided by the Office of the Political Adviser, CINCEUR, and the Information Services Division and Public Information Office, OMGUS. ISD prepared a German translation of the full text and made it available to German newspapers and other informational media.

saw no possibility of changing the new regulations.

In his reply of April 4, General Gailey pointed out that on June 29, 1945 a clear understanding was reached between Marshal Zhukov and US representatives that the US Forces in Berlin would have free and unrestricted use of the established corridors to meet their requirements, subject only to normal regulation of movements. He reiterated our willingness to provide appropriate documents for both passenger and freight trains, made up as military trains, but refused to agree to entry of representatives of another power into our military trains while in transit between Berlin and our zone of occupation.

Meanwhile on April 1, two US passenger trains were stopped at the Soviet Zone border and turned back upon refusing to accept Soviet inspection. Two British trains were turned back under the same condition.

Beginning April 1, the Soviets refused to permit mail cars containing packages to depart from Berlin to the west, and demanded the filing of additional forms, the character of which was not adequately clarified. On April 3, 1948 the Soviets closed the Hamburg-Berlin and Bavaria-Berlin rail routes requiring all freight to move to Berlin via Helmstedt.

On April 2, the Soviets requested the American authorities to close down effective May 1, the US aid station which was midway

on the only automobile highway available between Berlin and Helmstedt. Later they also requested removal by April 15 of US Signal Corps personnel stationed in the Soviet Zone at Weimar for the maintenance of repeater stations required for our official telephone communications with Berlin. The British received a similar request to remove their Signal Corps men from Magdeburg. The request was protested by our letter of April 9, but the personnel were removed on April 14.

On April 20, the Soviets imposed the requirement for individual clearance of barges moving through the Soviet Zone to and from Berlin. Protest by the British had no effect.

On April 23, international train service from Berlin was suspended by a Soviet order prohibiting the two international coaches from being attached to the interzonal train between Berlin and Osnabrueck.

On May 20, a new documentation requirement for barge traffic entering the Soviet Zone was instituted. When British authorities thereupon reciprocally introduced similar requirements on barge traffic, a temporary suspension of all barge traffic across zonal boundaries resulted. Subsequently this traffic was resumed for a time on a reciprocal basis.

On June 9, the Soviets introduced unilaterally new regulations for German travel into the Soviet Zone, demanding special authorization in contravention of Allied Control Council directives.

On June 9, the Soviet authorities, by orders to German railway officials, tried to interfere with operations in the railroad yards in the US Sector of Berlin. This interference was prevented by the appearance of US military guards.

On June 12, the Soviets announced the closing of the Elbe bridge on the Autobahn (superhighway) between Berlin and the west for repairs. A detour and ferry service were arranged.

On June 16, the Soviet delegation walked out of the Allied Kommandatura of Berlin.

After the announcement on June 18 of the currency reform for all of western Germany (but not western sectors of Berlin), the Soviets on June 19 suspended all passenger train traffic between western and eastern zones. All road traffic from western zones into the Soviet Zone, including traffic on the Autobahn to Berlin was also stopped. Incoming rail freight was reduced in volume by change of technical procedures and water transport was subject to stricter regulations.

The French commandant, chairman of the Berlin Kommandatura, invited on June 19 the other members to a special meeting to discuss the effects of the currency reform on Berlin, but the Soviet member declined the invitation.

On June 22, at the request of the three western powers, a quadripartite meeting of financial and economic advisers took place in Berlin to discuss the problem of currency for Berlin. The Soviet representative insisted that there could be no currency for Berlin different from the currency of the surrounding Soviet Zone. They would not accede to quadripartite control of the currency for Berlin. Immediately after the meeting the Soviet authorities issued their orders for currency reform in the Soviet zone and all of Berlin.

In view of the inability to obtain agreement on a currency for Berlin under quadripartite



control, the western Allies informed the Soviets of their intention to introduce into the western sectors of Berlin the new Deutsche mark of the western zones (over-stamped "B" for Berlin). The public announcement was made on June 23.

On June 23, the Soviets suspended all railroad passenger and freight traffic into Berlin, because of alleged "technical difficulties" on the Berlin-Helmstedt rail line. They also stopped barge traffic on similar grounds.

Shortly before midnight of June 23, the Soviet authorities issued orders to the Berlin central electric switch-control station (located in their sector) to disrupt delivery of electric power from Soviet Zone and Soviet Sector plants to the western sectors. Shortage of coal was given as a reason for this measure.

Soviet traffic restrictions issued on June 19 were followed by subsequent prohibitions in the following week. West-bound road traffic only was still permitted for a time, subject to Soviet control at check points. Mail and parcel post traffic was completely suspended. On June 24, because of these unacceptable restrictions, the American and British authorities ordered all freight trains from US and British zones to the Soviet Zone stopped. Traffic from the East continued to be accepted.

On June 24, the Soviets issued orders prohibiting the distribution of any supplies from the Soviet Zone to the western sectors of Berlin thereby violating a four-power agreement for supplying Berlin from a common pool. The western powers thereupon forbade distribution of any supplies from western sources to the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

On June 26, General Robertson in a letter to Marshal Sokolovsky protested against interruption of essential freight traffic between Berlin and the West.

On June 29, Marshal Sokolovsky answered General Robertson's letter. He described the restrictions on interzonal passenger traffic as connected with the currency exchange and announced the reestablishment of rail facilities for movement of the German population. He declared that the restrictions on motor traffic must be retained to prevent conveyance to Berlin of currency from the western zones. He announced that the technical defects on the railroad line were in process of elimination and his expectation that traffic would recommence as soon as possible. He protested against British stoppage of freight train movements between the Soviet and the British Zones.

General Robertson answered this letter on July 3, stressing the positive elements of the letter and reiterating his willingness to discuss use of one currency in Berlin. He repeated his request for resumption of normal transportation facilities between Berlin and the West.

On July 3, Generals Robertson, Noiret and Clay visited Marshal Sokolovsky. General Robertson inquired what the technical difficulties were which according to Sokolovsky's letter were holding up train traffic. He asked for assurance that traffic could be resumed at an early date, and when. He further drew attention to the fact that no alternative routes had been made available. Marshal Sokolovsky stated that the question raised by Robertson was important to the Western Allies and that they wanted it treated alone, whereas there were other questions important to him. He continued that he had never said that traffic on the railway was held up for other than technical reasons and that these reasons still applied.

He declared at length that the Western Allies as a result of their London Conference had created economic disorders in the Soviet Zone which made it impossible to provide alternate routes. He reiterated that the present stoppage was for technical reasons, although he would not guarantee that when these technical difficulties had been cleared, others might not occur elsewhere.

It became thus evident that further endeavors by the western military governors to

settle the Berlin problem locally would serve no useful purpose.

## The Moscow Discussions

### Exchange of Notes on Berlin Crisis

Accordingly the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France decided to make formal representations to the government of the USSR. The three western powers on July 6 delivered similar notes to Soviet representatives in Washington, London and Paris.

The American Note of July 6. In the American note, the Soviet government was informed that the United States regarded the blockade measures as "a clear violation of existing agreements concerning the administration of Berlin by the four occupying powers." The United States categorically asserted that it was in occupation of its sector of Berlin with free access thereto "as a matter of established right deriving from the defeat and surrender of Germany and confirmed by formal agreements among the principal Allies." The United States also emphatically declared that it would "not be induced by threats, pressures or other actions to abandon these rights."

This consideration, together with responsibility for the physical well-being of the population of its sector of Berlin including hundreds of thousands of women and children, obliged the United States to insist that "in accordance with existing agreements the arrangements for the movement of freight and passenger traffic between the western zones and Berlin be fully restored."

The United States emphasized again its willingness to settle by negotiation, or by any of the other peaceful methods provided for in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, any disagreement which might exist between the USSR and the United States over the administration of Berlin, but it stressed that such negotiation could not be entered into as a result of duress. Specifically, the United States offered, once blockade measures were lifted to participate in negotiations in Berlin among the four Allied occupying authorities. The full text of the American note follows:

"The United States government wishes to call to the attention of the Soviet government the extremely serious international situation which has been brought about by the actions of the Soviet Government in imposing restrictive measures on transport which amount now to a blockade against the sectors in Berlin occupied by the United States, United Kingdom and France. The United States government regards these measures of blockade as a clear violation of existing agreements concerning the administration of Berlin by the four occupying powers.

"The rights of the United States as a joint occupying power in Berlin derive from the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany. The international agreements undertaken in connection therewith by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union defined the zones in Germany and the sectors in Berlin which are occupied by these powers. They established the quadripartite control of Berlin on a basis of friendly cooperation which the Government of the United States earnestly desires to continue to pursue.

"These agreements implied the right of free access to Berlin. This right has long been confirmed by usage. It was directly specified in a message sent by President Truman to Premier Stalin on June 14, 1945, which agreed to the withdrawal of United States forces to the zonal boundaries, provided satisfactory arrangements could be entered into between the military commanders, which would give access by rail, road and air to United States forces in Berlin. Premier Stalin replied on June 16 suggesting a change in date but no other alteration in the plan proposed by the President. Premier Stalin then gave assurances that all necessary measures would be

taken in accordance with the plan. Correspondence in a similar sense took place between Premier Stalin and Mr. Churchill.

"In accordance with this understanding, the United States, whose armies had penetrated deep into Saxony and Thuringia, parts of the Soviet Zone, withdrew its forces to its own area of occupation in Germany and took up its position in its own sector in Berlin. Thereupon the agreements in regard to the occupation of Germany and Berlin went into effect. The United States would not have so withdrawn its troops from a large area now occupied by the Soviet Union had there been any doubt whatsoever about the observance of its agreed right of free access to its sector of Berlin. The right of the United States to its position in Berlin thus stems from precisely the same source as the right of the Soviet Union. It is impossible to assert the latter and deny the former.

"It clearly results from these undertakings that Berlin is not a part of the Soviet Zone, but is an international zone of occupation. Commitments entered into in good faith by the zone commanders, and subsequently confirmed by the Allied Control Authority, as well as practices sanctioned by usage, guarantee the United States together with other powers, free access to Berlin for the purpose of fulfilling its responsibilities as an occupying power. The facts are plain. Their meaning is clear. Any other interpretation would offend all the rules of comity and reason.

"In order that there should be no misunderstanding whatsoever on this point, the United States government categorically asserts that it is in occupation of its sector in Berlin with free access thereto as a matter of established right deriving from the defeat and surrender of Germany and confirmed by formal agreements among the principal Allies. It further declares that it will not be induced by threats, pressures or other actions to abandon these rights. It is hoped that the Soviet Government entertains no doubts whatsoever on this point.

"This government now shares with the governments of France and the United Kingdom the responsibility initially undertaken at Soviet request on July 7, 1945, for the physical well-being of 2,400,000 persons in the western sectors of Berlin. Restrictions recently imposed by the Soviet authorities in Berlin have operated to prevent this Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France from fulfilling that responsibility in an adequate manner.

"The responsibility which this Government bears for the physical well-being and the safety of the German population in its sector of Berlin is outstandingly humanitarian in character. This population includes hundreds of thousands of women and children, whose health and safety are dependent on the continued use of adequate facilities for moving food, medical supplies and other items indispensable to the maintenance of human life in the western sectors of Berlin. The most elemental of these human rights which both our governments are solemnly pledged to protect are thus placed in jeopardy by these restrictions. It is intolerable that any one of the occupying authorities should attempt to impose a blockade upon the people of Berlin.

"The United States government is therefore obliged to insist that in accordance with existing agreements the arrangements for the movement of freight and passenger traffic between the western zones and Berlin be fully restored. There can be no question of delay in the restoration of these essential services since the needs of the civilian population in the Berlin area are imperative.

"Holding these urgent views regarding its rights and obligations in the United States Sector of Berlin, yet eager always to resolve controversies in the spirit of fair consideration for the viewpoints of all concerned, the government of the United States declares that duress should not be invoked as a method of attempting to dispose of any disagreements which may exist between the Soviet government and the government of the

United States in respect of any aspect of the Berlin situation.

"Such disagreements if any should be settled by negotiation or by any of the other peaceful methods provided for in Article 33 of the Charter in keeping with our mutual pledges as copartners in the United Nations. For these reasons the government of the United States is ready as a first step to participate in negotiations in Berlin among the four Allied occupying authorities for the settlement of any question in dispute arising out of the administration of the city of Berlin. It is, however, a prerequisite that the lines of communication and the movement of persons and goods between the United Kingdom, the United States and the French sectors in Berlin and the western zones shall have been fully restored.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

The Soviet Note of July 14. The Soviet reply to the American note, dated July 14, 1948, contained no reference to the previous explanation of the blockade measures as due to "technical difficulties." Rather, it was now openly admitted that the blockade was in effect retaliation against actions of the western powers in their own occupation zones of Germany. For the first time, and despite all agreements to the contrary, the Soviet Government put forward the claim that Berlin "is a part of" the Soviet Zone. The Soviet note ended with the contention that Berlin problems were inseparably linked with questions involving the whole of Germany and that negotiations would be effective only if they encompassed the entire German situation. Moreover, the Soviet government refused to permit restoration of the lines of communication between the western zones and Berlin, which restoration had been declared by the United States government to be a prerequisite for any negotiations. Translated text of the reply follows:

"1. The Soviet government has familiarized itself with the note of the government of the United States of America of July 6, 1948 in which the situation which has been created at the present time in Berlin is described as a result of measures taken by the Soviet side. The Soviet government cannot agree with this statement of the government of the United States and considers that the situation which has been created in Berlin has arisen as a result of violation by the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France of agreed decisions taken by the four powers in regard to Germany and Berlin which (violation) has found its expression in the carrying out of a separate currency reform, in the introduction of a special currency for the western sectors of Berlin and in the policy of the dismemberment of Germany. The Soviet government has more than once warned the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France in regard to the responsibility which they would take upon themselves in following along the path of the violation of agreed decisions previously adopted by the four powers in regard to Germany. The decisions adopted at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences and also the agreement of the four powers concerning the control mechanism in Germany have as their aim the demilitarization and democratization of Germany, the removal of the base itself of German militarism and the prevention of the revival of Germany as an aggressive power and thereby the transformation of Germany into a peace-loving and democratic state. These agreements envisage the obligation of Germany to pay reparations and thereby to make at least partial compensation for the damage to those countries which suffered from German aggression. In accordance with these agreements the governments of the four powers took upon themselves the responsibility for the administration of Germany and bound themselves jointly to draw up a statute for Germany or for any areas including Berlin which were part of German territory and to conclude with Germany a peace treaty which should be signed by a government of a democratic Germany adequate for that purpose.

"These most important agreements of the four powers in regard to Germany have been violated by the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France. Measures for the demilitarization of Germany have not been completed and such a very important center of Germany military industry as the Ruhr district has been taken out from under the control of the four powers. The execution of decisions concerning reparations from the western zones of occupation of Germany has been interrupted by the governments of the USA, the UK, and France. By the separate actions of the governments of the USA, Great Britain, and France the four power control mechanism in Germany has been destroyed and the Control Council as a result thereof has ceased its activity.

"Following the London meeting of the three powers with the participation of Benelux, measures have been undertaken by the governments of the USA, Great Britain, and France directed towards the division and dismemberment of Germany including preparations which are now in progress for the designation of a separate government for the western zones of Germany and the separate currency reform for the western zones of occupation carried out on June 18th of this year.

"In as much as the situation created in Berlin as well as in all Germany is the direct result of the systematic violation by the governments of the USA, Great Britain, and France of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and also of the agreement of the four powers concerning the control mechanism in Germany, the Soviet government must reject as completely unfounded the statement of the government of the US to the effect that the measures for the restriction of transport communications between Berlin and the western zones of occupation of Germany introduced by the Soviet command for the defense of the economy of the Soviet Zone against its disorganization are allegedly in violation of the existing agreements concerning the administration of Berlin.

"2. The government of the US declares that it is occupying its sector in Berlin by right arising out of the defeat and capitulation of Germany, referring in this connection to agreements between the four powers in regard to Germany and Berlin. This merely confirms the fact that the exercise of the above mentioned right in regard to Berlin is linked to the obligatory execution by the powers occupying Germany of the four-power agreements concluded among themselves in regard to Germany as a whole. In conformity with these agreements Berlin was envisaged as the seat of the supreme authority of the four powers occupying Germany, in which connection the agreement concerning the administration of "Greater Berlin" under the direction of the Control Council was reached.

"Thus the agreement concerning the four-power administration of Berlin is an inseparable component part of the agreement for the four power administration of Germany as a whole. After the USA, Great Britain and France by their separate actions in the western zones of Germany destroyed the system of four-power administration of Germany and had begun to set up a capital for a government for western Germany in Frankfurt-am-Main, they thereby undermined as well the legal basis which assured their right to participation in the administration of Berlin.

"The government of the United States in its note points out that its right to be in Berlin is based also on the fact that the United States withdrew its forces from certain regions of the Soviet Zone of occupation into which they had penetrated during the period of hostilities in Germany, and that if it (the United States government) had foreseen the situation, which has been created in Berlin, it would not have withdrawn its forces from those regions. However, the government of the United States well knows that in removing its troops to

the boundaries of the American Zone established by agreement of the four powers concerning zones of occupation in Germany it was only carrying out an obligation which it had taken upon itself, the execution of which could alone accord the right of the entry of the troops of the US into Berlin. An examination of the letter referred to in the note of the government of the USA of President Truman to Premier Stalin of June 14, 1945 and the letter in reply of Premier Stalin of June 16, 1945 confirms the fact that, thanks to the agreement then reached, the forces of the USA, Great Britain and France were given the opportunity to enter not only the capital of Germany, Berlin, but also the capital of Austria, Vienna, which as is known, were taken only by the forces of the Soviet Army. In addition, it is known that the agreements referred to concerning the question of Berlin and also of Vienna were only a part of the agreements concerning Germany and Austria upon the fulfillment of which the Soviet government continues to insist.

"3. The government of the United States declares that the temporary measures put into effect by the Soviet Command for the restriction of transport communications between Berlin and the western zones have created difficulties in supplying the Berlin population of the western sectors. It is impossible, however, to deny the fact that those difficulties were occasioned by the actions of the governments of the USA, Great Britain and France, and primarily by their separate actions in the introduction of new currency in the western zones of Germany and special currency in the western sectors of Berlin.

"Berlin lies in the center of the Soviet Zone and is a part of that zone. The interests of the Berlin population do not permit a situation in which in Berlin or only in the western sectors of Berlin there shall be introduced special currency which has no validity in the Soviet Zone. Moreover, the carrying out of a separate monetary reform in the western zones of Germany has placed Berlin and the whole Soviet Zone of occupation as well in a situation in which the entire mass of currency notes which were cancelled in the western zone threatened to pour into Berlin and the Soviet Zone of occupation of Germany.

"The Soviet command has been forced therefore to adopt certain urgent measures for the protection of the interests of the German population and also of the economy of the Soviet Zone of occupation and the area of "Greater Berlin." The danger of the disruption of the normal economic activity of the Soviet Zone and of Berlin has not been eliminated even at the present time, in as much as the United States, Great Britain and France continue to maintain in Berlin their special currency.

"Furthermore, the Soviet command has consistently displayed and is displaying concern for the well being of the Berlin population and for assuring to them normal supply in all essentials and is striving for the speediest elimination of the difficulties which have arisen recently in this matter. In this connection, if the situation requires, the Soviet government would not object to assuring by its own means adequate supply for all "Greater Berlin."

"With reference to the statement of the government of the United States that it will not be compelled by threats, pressure or other actions to renounce its right to participation in the occupation of Berlin, the Soviet government does not intend to enter into discussion of this statement since it has no need for a policy of pressure, since by violation of the agreed decisions concerning the administration of Berlin the above-mentioned governments themselves are reducing to naught their right to participation in the occupation of Berlin.

"4. The government of the United States in its note of July 6 expresses the readiness to begin negotiations between the four



Allied occupying authorities for consideration of the situation created in Berlin but passes by in silence the question of Germany as a whole.

"The Soviet government, while not objecting to negotiations, considers, however, it necessary to state that it cannot link the inauguration of these negotiations with the fulfilling of any preliminary conditions whatsoever and that, in the second place, four-power conversations could be effective only in the event that they were not limited to the question of the administration of Berlin, since that question cannot be severed from the general question of four-power control in regard to Germany.

"Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my highest consideration."

#### Preliminaries to Stalin Meeting

**Western Request for Discussions with Stalin and Molotov.** The Government of the United States, as well as the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, considered the Soviet reply to their notes of July 6 unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, desiring to leave no stone unturned in the interest of peace, they decided to make another appeal to Soviet authorities. A request for an appointment on July 30 for representatives of the three powers to meet with Foreign Minister Molotov met with a reply from Mr. Molotov's principal secretary, Erfeev, to the effect that the Foreign Minister was "on vacation," and the suggestion that in view of Mr. Vishinsky's absence as well, the matter be taken up by Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin. US Ambassador Smith pointed out that the matter was of great importance, and inquired whether Molotov personally might be available "within a few days."

Erfeev promised to investigate; but later the same day he reported that since Molotov's vacation had only just begun, it would be necessary for the western representatives to see Zorin. It was decided to present the problem to Zorin. At 6 p. m. on July 30, a meeting with Zorin was held and he was handed by Ambassador Smith the following aide memoire (similar to those handed simultaneously to Zorin by the British envoy, Mr. Roberts, and by the French Ambassador, Mr. Chataigneau, on behalf of their respective governments):

**US Aide Memoire.** "The United States Government has given the most serious consideration to the note delivered by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and has exchanged views with the British and French governments on the similar notes received by these governments. The United States government does not accept the contention in the Soviet note that the right of the Western occupying powers to participate in the occupation of Berlin no longer exists, and while they do not wish to enter into a detailed discussion of the allegations contained in Mr. Panyushkin's note of July 14, they would like to make it plain at the outset that they cannot accept the Soviet version of the facts nor the interpretation placed on them.

Whatever may be the reasons which have led the Soviet authorities to decide the restriction of communications between Berlin and Western Zones of occupation of Germany, whether these reasons be technical as was first stated, or political, as Mr. Panyushkin's note would seem to indicate, the measures taken by the Soviet authorities in Berlin have created an abnormal and dangerous situation, the gravity of which does not need to be emphasized.

The Soviet reply of July 14 offers no constructive suggestion for the bringing to an end of the abnormal situation in Berlin. Nevertheless the United States government as a peace-loving government, holds the view that this situation is capable of settlement. They trust that the Soviet government shares this view: the question of negotiation has never been, and is not

the issue. The willingness to negotiate in the absence of duress has always been there. In the opinion of the United States government, the best way to a solution of the present difficulties lies in direct approach. They think that a frank discussion between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Molotov on one side and the representatives of each of the three Western occupying powers on the other side should give the opportunity of finding a solution. I accordingly have been instructed by my government to request that you should arrange an interview between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Molotov on the one hand and the French Ambassador, the UK Charge d'Affaires and myself on the other hand in order to discuss the present situation in Berlin and its wider implications."

**Conversation with Zorin.** The reaction of Mr. Zorin to the western representation was described by US Ambassador Smith as "uncompromising." Zorin stated that the absence of Mr. Molotov on vacation prevented for the time being the granting of the requested meeting. He then said that there was no indication in the aide memoire of any change in the position of the US or of any subjects which would make profitable a discussion with Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Molotov. However, he would transmit the request to his government for consideration. Ambassador Smith replied that the presentation had been brief since the general position of the US had already been made clear. It would be redefined and amplified during the proposed discussions.

Mr. Zorin said that he could only say that the position of the Soviet government had also been clearly defined in its note of July 14 but that he would, as previously stated, present the request to his government.

**Preliminary Meeting with Molotov, July 31.** On the day following the Zorin interview, the representatives of the western powers were informed that separate appointments with Mr. Molotov had been arranged for the same evening. At the meeting with Ambassador Smith, Molotov referred to the aide memoire and asked what kind of discussion and negotiations the western governments had in mind, at present and for the future. On Smith's replying that the aide memoire was intentionally brief and lacking in detail, since it was the purpose of the proposed conversations to develop necessary detail, Molotov repeated the point made in the Soviet note of July 14 to the effect that conversations regarding Berlin were not practical except within the framework of conversations regarding all of Germany. He then pressed for a statement of US views as to problems relating to Germany as a whole. Ambassador Smith reported that in reply he stated the formal position of the two governments had been made clear in the two notes which had been exchanged, but the formal written word was very rigid and much more could be accomplished by informal exploration.

#### First Meeting with Stalin

The requested interview between representatives of the western powers on the one side and Stalin and Molotov on the other side took place on Aug. 2 at nine in the evening.

Ambassador Smith opened the conversation by presenting the following oral statement to Generalissimo Stalin:

"It is not our purpose at this time to rebut in detail the charges contained in the Soviet note. It is highly important, however, to make completely clear certain fundamental points in the position of the United States, the United Kingdom and France and to clarify the position of the Soviet Union which in certain respects is obscure. The three governments must reemphasize their right to be in Berlin to be unquestionable and absolute. They do not intend to be coerced by any means whatsoever into abandoning this right.

"Action taken by the Soviets in interfering with rights in connection with occupation, derived through the defect and surrender of Germany and through international agreement and usage, by interrupting communi-

cations between Berlin and the western zones, thus interfering with duties of Allied military forces of occupation, is viewed with extreme seriousness by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. It is incumbent on them to take such measures as are necessary to assure the supply of their forces and discharge of their occupational duties. The United States, the United Kingdom and France do not wish the situation to deteriorate further and assume that the Soviet government shares this desire. The three governments have in mind restrictive measures, which have been placed by Soviet authorities on communication between the western zones of Germany and western sectors of Berlin. It was the feeling of our governments that if these measures arose from technical difficulties, such difficulties can be easily remedied. The three governments renew their offer of assistance to this end. If in any way related to the currency problem, such measures are obviously uncalled for, since this problem could have been, and can now be, adjusted by representatives of the four powers in Berlin. If, on the other hand, these measures are designed to bring about negotiations among the four occupying powers they are equally unnecessary, since the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France have never at any time declined to meet representatives of the Soviet Union to discuss questions relating to Germany. However, if the purpose of these measures is to attempt to compel the three governments to abandon their rights as occupying powers in Berlin, the Soviet government will understand from what has been stated previously that such an attempt could not be allowed to succeed.

"In spite of recent occurrences, the three powers are unwilling to believe that this last reason is the real one. Rather they assume that the Soviet government shares their view that it is in the interest of all four occupying powers, of the German people and of the world in general to prevent any further deterioration of the position and to find a way by mutual agreement to bring to an end the extremely dangerous situation that has developed in Berlin.

"The Soviet government will, however, appreciate that the three governments are unable to negotiate on the situation which the Soviet government has undertaken the initiative in creating. Free negotiation can only take place in an atmosphere relieved of pressure. This is the issue. Present restrictions upon communications between Berlin and the western zones offend against these principles. When this issue is relieved such difficulties as stand in the way of resumption of conversations on the lines set out above should be removed."

Molotov then said that he would report to his government on the US, British and French approaches; that he hoped Stalin would agree to meet representatives of the three governments; and that his purpose in this talk was simply to clarify our proposals.

The remainder of the two hour meeting was taken up with a discussion which developed from the points brought out in Ambassador Smith's statement.

Premier Stalin, though emphatically maintaining that it was not the purpose of the Soviet government to oust allied forces from Berlin, reiterated the contention of the Soviet note of July 14 that the western powers no longer had a juridical right to occupy Berlin. This, of course, was categorically rejected in the statement just presented by Smith which declared that the three western governments "reemphasize their right to be in Berlin to be unquestionable and absolute. They do not intend to be coerced by any means whatsoever into abandoning this right."

Discussion of the possibility of resumption of negotiations on Berlin and of a four-power meeting to consider problems relating to Germany as a whole revealed agreement as to the desirability of such developments. But to a suggestion by Stalin as to items to be included in the agenda of a four power meet-

ing, the western representatives replied that they were not in a position to consider an agenda, and that in any event negotiations on broad German problems would not be possible until duress in Berlin was removed.

Stalin developed the argument that the communications restrictions in Berlin had been made necessary because of the decisions taken at London in regard to the establishment of a new German government at Frankfurt and because of the introduction of a special western currency in Berlin. The western representatives explained that, contrary to the Generalissimo's apparent understanding, it had never been contemplated that the government at Frankfurt would be a central German government.

The agency now to be set up under the London decisions would in no way hamper eventual understanding on a central government for a united Germany. The western representatives added that they were not authorized to discuss the London decisions. They would report Stalin's views; but in the meanwhile they felt strongly that agreement should be reached on the immediate issues in regard to Berlin.

At the opening of the meeting, Smith had specified in his prepared statements after emphasizing that the three western powers were in Berlin as a matter of right and as co-equals, that if the blockade measures were "in any way related to the currency problem, such measures are obviously uncalled for, since this problem could have been, and can now be, adjusted by representatives of the four powers in Berlin." There seemed no reason, consequently, why agreement could not immediately be reached with respect to the Berlin situation. However, Smith stated that he was not himself an expert on currency matters and that the western representatives were not competent to deal with technical arrangements of the currency question; with this view his British and French colleagues associated themselves.

At the end of the discussion Stalin asked whether the western representatives wanted to settle the matter that night. If so, he could meet them and make the following proposal:

(1) There should be a simultaneous introduction in Berlin of the Soviet Zone Deutsche mark in place of the western mark B, together with the removal of all transport restrictions.

(2) He would no longer ask as a condition the deferment of the implementation of the London decisions although he wished this to be recorded as the insistent wish of the Soviet government.

Ambassador Smith then asked Stalin about the announcement of a resumption of negotiations on Berlin and holding a four-power meeting to consider other problems affecting Germany. Stalin said they should be included. Following this the three western representatives agreed to present Stalin's proposal to their governments.

**Reaction to Stalin Meeting.** It was the belief of the western governments that the progress made in the discussion with Stalin and Molotov was such that the settlement of the immediate Berlin crisis could be effected. The Soviet authorities were prepared to remove all transport restrictions between Berlin and the western zones. Resumption of negotiations on Berlin and a four-power meeting to consider other outstanding problems affecting Germany was accepted without conditions, although Stalin wished it recorded as the insistent desire of the Soviet government that the execution of the London decisions with respect to the establishment of a western German government be suspended until such time as the four powers met and tried to reach an agreement concerning Germany.

There remained the problem of working out general details with Molotov, and the arrangement of technical matters regarding the


substitution of the Soviet Zone mark for the western B mark in Berlin.

In order, however, that there should be no misunderstanding of the position of the American government in regard to finalizing the currency proposal developed at the meeting, the following specific instruction was sent to Ambassador Smith:

"We agree to the outline of the draft statement developed at your Aug. 2 meeting with Stalin and Molotov.

"Our acceptance of Soviet Zone currency in Berlin cannot be unconditional and its use must be subject to some form of quadripartite control. This requirement is essential for the maintenance of our position in Berlin and is made doubly necessary because of Soviet action of the last few days in freezing the accounts of western sector enterprises in Berlin.

"The substitution of the Soviet Zone mark for the B mark in Berlin can now be accepted in principle but our agreement must be supplemented by a satisfactory agreement providing for quadripartite control of the availability and use of the Soviet currency



Mr. Walter Bedell Smith, US ambassador to Moscow, is interviewed by an American correspondent at Tempelhof airport during a stop in Berlin on his way back to the Russian capital in May. (US Army Signal Corps photo)

in Berlin. In our opinion such agreement should include control of credit, uniform application of credit rules and currency issue within Berlin, availability of sufficient funds for occupation powers, and some arrangements to cover trade between the western zones and Berlin. Arrangements of this character are necessary for the orderly use of separate currencies in the eastern and western zones."

Although the interview with Stalin had ended without his having made it a condition precedent to settlement of the Berlin crisis that there should be a suspension of the execution of the London decisions with respect to the establishment of a western German government, his earlier expressed concern with that development received careful consideration, both by the western representatives in Moscow, and by this government. Having it in mind, the Department of State sent Ambassador Smith the following for his information in case this question should arise again:

"September 1 does not represent the date of formal establishment of such a governmental organization. It is rather the date on which representatives from the German states will begin the exploratory study of the problems involved in the setting up of the common organization. It is certainly not intended that any conclusions that they reach

shall preclude or contravene any agreement arrived at by the four powers on a government for all Germany."

#### Drafting Meetings with Foreign Minister Molotov

On the basis of the foregoing and other similar instructions, as well as points developed in conversations with the British and French, Ambassador Smith joined with his British and French colleagues acting under the instructions of their respective governments in an endeavor to arrive at a draft implementation of the conversation with Prime Minister Stalin to be brought into final form in a further conversation with Foreign Minister Molotov. To this end they then arranged a meeting with the latter which in fact became a drawn out series of meetings with him, on Aug. 6, 9, 12 and 16, some of them over three hours long, ending in failure to arrive at any satisfactory agreement.

This failure to reach agreement in drafting a concrete implementation of the principles for terminating the Berlin crisis, as discussed with Stalin, resulted from the fact that the fundamental objectives from which Molotov approached the drafting were diametrically opposed to those of the western representatives. This fundamental conflict is reflected in the differences between the initial draft suggested by the latter, and the counter-draft proposed by Molotov.

**The Initial Western Draft.** The initial draft proposed by the western representatives and rejected by Molotov was in the form of a draft communique for issuance in the name of the four governments. Its text is as follows:

"As the result of discussions held in Moscow between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Molotov, and French, United Kingdom and United States representatives, the governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed as follows:

"All restrictions which have been imposed on the transport of persons and goods in either direction between the three western zones of Germany and Berlin shall be immediately removed, and freedom of communications shall be maintained.

"Meetings shall be held among representatives of the four governments to consider any questions which may be outstanding as regards Berlin and any other outstanding problems affecting Germany as a whole.

"Soviet Zone mark will be accepted as the sole currency for Berlin and the western mark will be withdrawn as soon as quadripartite arrangements have been agreed upon by the four military governors for the issue and control of currency in Berlin. These arrangements shall ensure: No discrimination or action against holders of either eastern or western zone currency; equal treatment as to currency and provision of fully accessible banking and credit facilities for all sectors of Berlin; adequate funds for budgetary purposes and occupation costs; and a satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and the western zones. Implementation of these arrangements shall be carried out by the Berlin Kommandatura."

**Mr. Molotov's Counterdraft.** Mr. Molotov rejected the foregoing draft and, at the second meeting, on Aug. 9, made his own counterproposal in the following substitute text:

"1. All restrictions which have been imposed after the announcement of currency reform in the western zones on the transport of persons and goods in either direction between the three western zones of Germany and Berlin shall be removed on Aug. 15 and freedom of communications shall be maintained in accordance with the present agreement.

"2. All restrictions which have been imposed after the announcement of currency reform in the western zones on the traffic of goods to and from the Soviet Zone and the three western zones of Germany shall be



removed on Aug. 15 and freedom of communications shall be maintained.

"3. Meetings among representatives of the four governments in the form of the Council of Foreign Ministers or a separate conference of representatives of the four powers shall be held in the near future to discuss:

"(A) Any questions which may be outstanding as regards Berlin and

"(B) Any other outstanding problems affecting Germany as a whole.

"In the negotiations which took place between representatives of the four powers consideration was given to the wish of the Soviet government to defer the implementation of the decisions of the London conference on the creation of a west German government until the results of the above mentioned meeting of representatives of the four governments have been ascertained. In this connection the representatives of the three western powers stated that the governments of these powers do not propose for the time being to deal with the question of the formation of a government for western Germany.

"4. The German mark of the Soviet Zone shall be accepted as from Aug. 15 as a sole currency for Berlin and the western mark "B" shall be simultaneously withdrawn from circulation in Berlin.

"The regulation of currency circulation in Berlin shall be undertaken by the German bank of emission of the Soviet Zone of occupation through the credit establishments operating at present in Berlin and shall be equally extended to the whole of Berlin without discrimination against any part of Berlin; organizations, enterprises, firms and private persons in Berlin shall be allowed to maintain unhampered trade and economic connections with third countries and the western zones of Germany through the German export-import agency of the Soviet zone.

"Occupation costs resulting from the presence of forces in Berlin shall be met from the budgets of the respective zones of occupation of Germany, Berlin being exempted from defraying occupation costs."

**Fundamental Differences.** The fundamental differences between these two drafts are evident. The western draft proceeds from the position that the western occupation forces in Berlin are there as a matter of established right, and seeks to liquidate the present crisis on an orderly basis which would permit the use of the Soviet Zone currency throughout Berlin provided that the terms of such use could be agreed upon among the four powers and that this agreed use would be under quadripartite control. The Molotov counterdraft proceeds from the position that the western Allies have lost their right to be in Berlin but would be permitted to remain there by "the present agreement" which in turn would enable the Soviet authorities to exercise full economic control over Berlin and to block further development of plans for the formation of a western German government, while remaining able at any time to resume obstruction of our access to Berlin if they considered we were not complying with "the present agreement."

The Molotov draft provided for lifting of communication restrictions imposed "after the announcement of currency reform in the western zones" (i. e. June 19). This would have meant the continuation of a large number of hampering measures which had been put into effect between March 30 and June 19 (see above), and would have constituted tacit acceptance of the Soviet contention that its inauguration of a blockade had been "defensive" in character, a contention which the western governments categorically rejected.

Molotov's version also reintroduced the question of implementation of the London decisions regarding western Germany, despite the fact that it had been understood at the Stalin meeting that this issue would not constitute a condition to agreement on a settlement of the Berlin crisis. Furthermore, the

Molotov draft would have delegated control over Berlin's currency and credit to a bank subject to exclusive Soviet control, and similarly would have entrusted the conduct of Berlin's external trade entirely to a Soviet dominated agency.

The western representatives immediately voiced their objections to this draft. They said they would, of course, transmit it to their respective governments, but that they were sure that it would be found unacceptable, for reasons which they pointed out forthwith. Considerable time was also devoted to an examination of its details in order that the western representatives might also give their governments the benefit of an analysis of Molotov's thinking concerning it to facilitate the search for some acceptable basis for agreement.

As anticipated by Ambassador Smith, the United States government found the Molotov formula quite unacceptable. The objections to certain of its features are specified in the following excerpts from instructions sent to Ambassador Smith:

"We find, as you correctly informed Molotov, the Soviet counterdraft unacceptable in its present form. It is apparent from this draft and from the statements of Stalin and Molotov on the subject that the Soviet government is seeking to establish its thesis that quadripartite control of Germany and consequently of Berlin as well has lapsed and therefore whatever agreement may be reached in the Moscow discussions will constitute the only (repeat only) four-power agreement concerning Berlin. This position is of course completely unacceptable to this government. We have maintained and will continue to maintain that mere Soviet assertion cannot vitiate the quadripartite agreements, including those defining the rights and duties of the western powers in Berlin. We feel it extremely important that this point be covered in order to avoid any misunderstanding in the future as otherwise the Soviet authorities will probably maintain that the three western powers in effect accepted the Soviet thesis that the previous four-power agreements concerning Germany and Berlin are no longer valid and that failing any four-power agreements at the Council of Foreign Ministers or elsewhere we have no rights in Berlin other than those accorded by the agreements set forth in the proposed announcement.

"As previously stressed, we cannot recognize Berlin as part of the Soviet Zone and it follows from this that we cannot accept the conduct of Berlin's external trade through the medium of the Soviet Zone's trade monopoly. Because of their supplies of food and raw materials to Berlin, the western nations have a substantial interest in the city, and in seeking agreement on the regulation of trade matters they are asking for no more than an assurance concerning the proper and efficacious use of their contributions. The economic well-being of Berlin depends on the maximum freedom of its trade with the other parts of Germany. In the interest of simplification and in order to obviate a currency war, the western nations are willing to accept a Soviet Zone mark as the sole circulating medium but four-power supervision of its use in Berlin is essential to establish a satisfactory economic relationship between Berlin and the rest of Germany."

The British and French Governments were also unable to accept the Soviet position reflected in Molotov's counterdraft. The three representatives informed him of the positions of their governments in the next meeting which was held on Aug. 12. At this meeting, the following agreed statement was made by Ambassador Smith on behalf of the three powers:

"We have now received and compared instructions from our respective governments and find, as anticipated at the conclusion of the Aug. 9 conference, that the Soviet proposals in their present form are unacceptable. Mr. Molotov will recall that at

the last conference we each directed particular attention to paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Soviet draft and stated they raised issues which our governments regarded as of fundamental importance. I will refer to these issues again during our detailed discussion of the Soviet draft and reemphasize the position of our governments with respect thereto.

"1. The Soviet government has inserted into the original western draft the words 'after announcement of currency reform in the western zones.' The other three governments cannot agree to insertion of those words. Their inclusion would mean that certain restrictions on communications between Berlin and the western zones which began long before currency reform took place in western Germany would not be wholly removed. However, as said before, the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to settle as between the Allied commanders in Berlin the necessary regulations to prevent illicit black market operations in currency, etc., between the western and eastern zones of Germany or between the western zone of Germany and the western sectors of Berlin, which we understood from Mr. Molotov to be a major concern of the Soviet government.

"The Soviet draft also inserts at the end of paragraph 1 the words 'in accordance with the present agreements.' which are not included in paragraph 2. Our governments are unable to accept these words which imply a new agreement is now being made derogatory to or possibly even invalidating established rights of the French, British and American governments in regard to Berlin. These rights were clearly set forth in the oral statement made to Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Molotov on Aug. 2 and have been reiterated emphatically at our subsequent conferences. Our governments are not prepared to make any new agreement now which might be held in any way to weaken these rights.

"2. It is clearly the intention of all four governments that paragraphs 1 and 2 should be uniform in so far as possible. Accordingly our governments consider that the words 'after the announcement of currency reform in the western zones' should also be deleted from paragraph 2 although we are unaware of any restrictions placed on interzonal trade before currency reform was introduced in the western zones.

"3. Our governments are not in any circumstances prepared to agree to the additional subparagraph inserted by the Soviet government. As they understand the position, it is that Generalissimo Stalin made an oral statement regarding the insistent desire of the Soviet government for deferment of the physical establishment of a west German government. In reply I made an oral statement on behalf of the United States government with which the representatives of the French and British governments associated themselves, and this statement went as far as possible to meet the generalissimo's oral statement. The generalissimo expressly declared that this statement was not a condition for issuance of the joint statement now under discussion in Moscow. The statements made on the one hand by the generalissimo and on the other hand by the British, French and American representatives were made privately but have been recorded. Our governments cannot agree to any statement on this matter being inserted in a published communique representing preliminary agreement by our four governments nor are they prepared to accept any suggestion that negotiations have taken place on this subject. As we stated very clearly in the original conference with Stalin and yourself at the outset of our conversations, our governments are only prepared to undertake negotiations in an atmosphere free of all pressure and cannot accept any position which carries implication of negotiating under duress.

"4. While the principle implied in the first sub-paragraph is acceptable, the paragraph as

written in the Soviet draft is unacceptable for reasons given to Mr. Molotov on Aug. 9. Our governments consider that the redraft proposed by the Soviet government involves a fundamental question of principle. They can only interpret the wording of this paragraph in the Soviet draft as implying a Soviet intention to incorporate Berlin fully into the Soviet Zone. The position of our respective governments on this question and its essential connection with four-power discussions on Germany as whole have been stated on several different occasions during our earlier conversations and need not be repeated now. Consequently, while prepared to accept substitution of the Soviet Zone mark for the western mark as the sole currency for Berlin, such acceptance is possible only if some four-power regulation of the flow and use of the Soviet currency in Berlin proper is provided which safeguards the rights and interests of our three governments in Berlin and the legitimate interests of the Berlin population, while taking fully into account as explained in our previous meeting, the legitimate interests of the Soviet occupation authorities, and their responsibilities for safeguarding the economic situation in the Soviet Zone, which we fully recognize. In the opinion of our governments the Soviet draft of paragraph 4 completely fails to take into account these basic considerations, which are concerned not only with fundamental issues of principle but also with essential and practical issues of daily economic life in Berlin. I repeat that while ready to consider and assist in a practical solution of the currency problem in Berlin on a basis of sole use of Soviet currency, our governments can only do so if the Soviet government is prepared to recognize our basic rights in Berlin. This is really the crux of the matter, but I will mention further details.

"Aside from these fundamental questions of principle, clarification is required of the phrase in sub-paragraph 2 concerning 'discrimination against any part of Berlin'. We think our intentions are the same. In the draft we submitted on Aug. 6 this phrase read 'no action or discrimination against the holders of eastern or western zone currency'. If, as we assume, the Soviet draft covers discrimination not only against any part of Berlin but against all persons, firms, etc., resident in any part of Berlin, this corresponds to our own intention and in that case our governments suggest that the phrase in the Aug. 6 draft would be clearer.

"Then we come to trading agencies. This brings us back to our fundamental point. We cannot recognize Berlin as part of Soviet Zone, and it follows from this that we cannot accept conduct of Berlin's external trade through the medium of Soviet Zone trade monopolies. Our governments have a substantial interest in the city and in seeking agreement on regulation of trade matters, we are asking for no more than assurances concerning proper and effective use of our very extensive contributions to the economy of Berlin. The economic well-being of Berlin depends on maximum freedom of its trade with other parts of Germany. This confirms again, from our viewpoint, the necessity of technical discussions in Berlin and the impossibility of such discussions among us here. In the interest of simplification and to obviate a currency war our governments are willing to accept the Soviet mark as sole circulating medium but I must say again that four-power supervision of its use in Berlin is essential to establish satisfactory economic relationship between Berlin and the rest of Germany. It is possible that Molotov misunderstood the wording in our draft: 'For the issue and control of currency in Berlin. We do not insist on control over the total issuance of Soviet Zone currency. What we are seeking is agreement for quadripartite regulation of the flow and use of Soviet Zone currency within Berlin and in trade. Our governments are convinced it is necessary to provide for non-discrimination as to availability of currency throughout Berlin through equitable budgetary and credit procedures and the orderly conduct of trade between Berlin on one hand and the western and eastern zones

and third countries on the other. This can only be done by some quadripartite authority in Berlin.

"While our governments consider the question of occupation costs a pertinent one, they do not believe the Soviet proposal in sub-paragraph four of paragraph four is best adapted for this purpose. The Soviet draft implies that the British, French and American governments have no right to claim occupation costs in or from Berlin. Our governments cannot accept this position and they maintain their rights to call on the Berlin Magistrat to meet such charges, and are not prepared to obtain what is their fully established right from sources under the control of another power. Our governments have for a long time past been contributing largely to the supply of Berlin with food and coal with no appreciable reimbursement and they see no reason why Berlin, which is part of Germany, should not bear its due share of the occupation costs, particularly since the heavy costs of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany are, according to the Soviet proposal, to be borne by the Soviet Zone surrounding Berlin. This question might be dealt with as proposed in our draft of Aug. 6 or postponed for discussion at the time when the Four-Powers meet to discuss the question of Berlin and Germany in all its aspects. I must, however, emphasize that the view of our governments on this question is one of principle affecting their juridical rights in Berlin."

Mr. Molotov's reaction to this statement was summarized by Ambassador Smith as follows:

"Molotov's reply was very cursory in regard to the first two paragraphs. He suggested words 'in conformity with what is set forth below' as substitution for last phrase of paragraph 1, and remarked that satisfactory alternative wording could probably be found which would more specifically define restrictions which were to be removed, in lieu of the wording to which we objected in paragraph 1 and 2. He then reverted to paragraph 4. Today, however, he did not as on previous occasions reject our position in Berlin nor did he insist that quadripartite control had lapsed nor maintain any demand for the Soviet wording of this paragraph.

"His conversation seemed to me to be generally exploratory, in order to determine whether or not we had reached our definite and final bargaining position. We continued to press strongly the point that our entire discussions really hinged on one basis factor—our right to be in Berlin and to continue quadripartite regulation and control of the flow and use of the new currency when introduced. Molotov never directly challenged any of our statements in this connection. He also readily admitted that certain practical questions would have to be settled in Berlin. The point to which he reverted most frequently and on which he seemed to concentrate today was the specific mention of a date on which the currency change would be made and the restrictions lifted.

"Discussions of this subject became involved and protracted and finally, to bring matters to a head, we suggested the possibility that a tentative date be accepted toward which planning would begin immediately in Berlin by the four military commanders, pointing out that until the machinery for the control and use of the Soviet mark was established any date was meaningless. This subject also Molotov did not directly challenge or reject, although he criticized it as vague. It was our opinion that at the least he willfully misunderstood it.

"Molotov then discussed occupation costs briefly, taking the attitude that he could not see any reason in our objection to the Soviet formula or the exempting Berlin from cost of occupation since all four powers were treated alike. An interesting feature of this phase of the discussion was that again he failed to challenge our juridical right, stating that Soviet proposals in this matter did not affect juridical rights of either side to be in Berlin,

and that the problem was purely a practical one. We took note of this.

"Our final statement was that the solution of the question of occupation costs was dependent on solution of the basic question which remained to be dealt with in the first part of that paragraph. This brought us back to the question of currency, and after lengthy discussion Molotov suggested as an alternate solution that the Soviet government might be willing to agree to the issue of the same quantity of Soviet Zone marks for the western sectors of Berlin as have been issued or introduced in Berlin by western powers, arguing that this would dispose of the technical question. We rejected this on the ground that it did not cover our basic requirement which was quadripartite control of currency in Berlin, and did not provide enough currency for our present and future operations.

"After this Molotov again came back to the question of a fixed date for the introduction of Soviet currency in Berlin and the lifting of traffic restrictions, and proposed that we draw up a list of questions relating to the flow of currency to be discussed by the representatives of the Soviet Union and western powers in Berlin. We replied that we would be perfectly willing to accept a tentative date and in fact proposed such discussion, but that the commanders in Berlin must be provided with terms of reference which covered the basic points on which we insisted, and the technical points which we felt must be settled with regard to new currency. There was still outstanding the major question of four-power control in Berlin and until this was decided, nothing could be done. We said it would be worse to fix a date and fail to meet it than to leave things as they are now.

"We then asked Molotov if he could meet us on the question of four-power regulation of currency. He evaded direct reply to this by reverting to the second part of paragraph 3 (London Agreements) although not aggressively. We repeated our governments' past objection to the Soviet wording on the lines of paragraph 3 in the following telegram. He then suggested substituting for the second part of paragraph 3 our oral statement of Aug. 6. We reiterated that our instructions were specific and our governments could not agree to any statements of this nature being inserted in a communique representing preliminary agreement. However, I said I was willing to ask my government if the oral exchange between Generalissimo Stalin and ourselves might be confirmed confidentially by written notes, providing agreement was reached on all other points.

"Roberts then suggested that insertion of this material would unbalance the document, pointing out that articles I and II were to our mutual advantage, and insofar as the Soviet Government might think part I benefited us more than part II benefited them, this was more than balanced by paragraph 4. Paragraph 3 would, we hoped, be to our mutual advantage. Molotov agreed, and at this point for a few minutes I thought that he was going to accept and conclude the conference.

"However, he recovered himself and re-discussed some of the parts of paragraph 4, during which occasion was taken to point out that he would have to meet us on the basic point of principle under 4 if we were even to consider his proposal under 3, emphasizing again that unless our basic requirement for four-power control and regulation of currency in Berlin were accepted, the rest of the document would automatically fall.

"Molotov terminated the conversation shortly afterward by saying that he would report our statements to his government, who would consider them carefully. We said we would report his comments and proposals and would inform him when we were ready for further discussions."

Though failing to produce definitive progress toward final agreement, the atmosphere of the Aug. 12 meeting was sufficiently encouraging



to induce the western powers to examine exhaustively among themselves the issues in controversy, and to reduce their demands to absolute essentials in the hope that Soviet objections would be overcome. These efforts resulted in the following draft text which was presented to Molotov at the fourth and last drafting meeting, that of Aug. 17:

"One. On Aug. 25 all restrictions which have been imposed since March 1 on transport of persons and goods in either direction between the three western zones of Germany and Berlin shall be removed and freedom of communications shall be maintained.

"Two. On Aug. 25 all restrictions which have been imposed since March 1 on traffic of goods to and from the Soviet Zone of Germany shall be removed and freedom of communications shall be maintained.

"Three. The four military governors are charged with the duty of making all arrangements necessary to ensure that the provisions of paragraphs one and two above are brought into effect on Aug. 25.

"Four. In addition to meetings of military governors meetings among representatives of four governments in the form of CFM or other conferences of representatives of four powers shall be held in the near future to discuss: (A) Any questions which may be outstanding as regards Berlin and (B) any other outstanding problems affecting Germany as a whole.

"Five. As from Aug. 25 the German mark of the Soviet Zone shall be accepted as the sole currency for Berlin and the western mark "B" shall be simultaneously withdrawn from circulation in Berlin provided however that before that date the four military governors shall have worked out arrangements for continued issue and use in Berlin under quadripartite authority, of the German mark of the Soviet Zone.

"The arrangements shall ensure no discrimination or action against holders of German marks of either the Soviet Zone or western zones; equal treatment as to currency and provision of full and accessible banking and credit facilities throughout all sectors of Berlin; unhampered trade and economic connections with third countries and with all zones of Germany subject only to such provisions as may be agreed from time to time among four military governors; and provision of sufficient currency for budgetary purposes and occupation costs. These arrangements shall be implemented by the four military governors."

This latest redraft was received by Mr. Molotov in much the same way as the first draft. The western representatives discussed it with him for nearly four hours. His reaction to it appeared to be mainly exploratory, to try to sound out the western representatives.

After a lengthy discussion of specific points in it, much along the lines of the earlier discussions, Smith and his colleagues were unable to convince Molotov that their draft met his requirements. Breaking off the discussion of particular points, Molotov suddenly suggested that he could provide a simple formula to deal with paragraphs 1, 2 and 5, and that the other paragraphs could be left for later discussion as being relatively unimportant. He then wrote down and read out the following proposed directive to the military governors in Berlin:

"The Governments of France, Great Britain, US and USSR have agreed that the following steps should be taken simultaneously:

"(A). Restrictions recently imposed on both sides on communications between Berlin and the western zones shall be lifted;

"(B). The German mark of the Soviet Zone shall be introduced as the sole currency for Berlin, and the western mark 'B' shall be withdrawn from circulation in Berlin.

"In connection with the above you are instructed to examine, together with your colleagues, within the shortest time possible and if possible before Aug. 25, the detailed arrangements necessary for the implementation of this agreement and to inform your government of the exact date on which provisions under 'A' and 'B' above can be brought into effect."

As the discussion had already gone on for more than two hours, and Molotov showed no disposition to give serious consideration to accepting the draft proposed by Smith and his colleagues, they stated that they would be willing to submit his new proposal to their governments but that it would serve no useful purpose to do so unless the directive he suggested were completed by adding an additional paragraph covering all the points in the second part of their draft paragraph 5 which their governments consider the absolute minimum that could be accepted in the way of a directive to the four military governors.

Molotov argued against this, taking the line, contrary to his previous position, that the military governors in Berlin might very well be able to work out practical solutions of the technical problems without specific instructions. Smith pointed out that this would simply transfer the unsolved problems from Moscow to Berlin, with even less hope of a solution in the absence of agreement in Moscow on the two or three basic issues which still remain unsettled. He then agreed to go through the western draft together with the Soviet draft to see whether it would be possible to bring them into conformity and set down principles under which the four military governors could work.

Further discussion of details again and again brought the western representatives face to face with a point of principle on which they had to repeat their position, reminding Mr. Molotov that while their governments were willing to accept Soviet currency as the sole currency in Berlin, they would not be willing to accept terms for the use of that currency which would endanger the financial and economic life of the city.

Smith repeated that it was quite useless to send any directive to the military governors unless there was agreement in Moscow on the basic issues. It would be equally useless to propose a vague and undefined directive to the three military governors which would still be obliged obtain answers to the basic questions they had already raised. He repeated that there was no point in simply transferring to Berlin problems which it had not been possible to solve in Moscow through direct contact with Mr. Molotov.

The meeting was finally adjourned with Smith and his colleagues recording their disappointment at the lack of progress. Smith

suggested that they study and report the results of the meeting to their governments in case they should have any final instructions or additional guidance. He said he would then ask for a final conference.

### Second Meeting with Stalin Aug. 23.

After considering the fruitless series of drafting meetings with Molotov, the three governments then decided to request another meeting with Stalin. This was held on Aug. 23.


In preparation for it the three governments had agreed upon a new draft to put before Stalin, embodying the points discussed in the first meeting with him, and taking into account the points raised meanwhile by Molotov in so far as these could be harmonized with the rights and duties of the western occupation forces in Berlin. This draft took the form of a directive to the military governors in Berlin to work out the concrete means for implementing the principles with respect to currency and transport restrictions, together with a communique to be issued by the Moscow conferees on behalf of the four governments, finalizing the arrangements worked out by the military governors.

Stalin began the meeting by producing a Soviet draft for this purpose which he said he had prepared after studying the reports of the drafting meetings with Molotov. Smith then produced the draft just mentioned, suggesting that Stalin read it while the western representatives were reading the Soviet draft. Following a general discussion of the two drafts, Stalin withdrew from the meeting and Molotov and the western representatives continued in drafting session to try to harmonize the two drafts.

During the discussion with Stalin, he and the western representatives noted that the two drafts were in many respects close to each other. Stalin thought, however, that the directive to the commanders should contain more concrete wording with regard to safeguarding the Soviet zone currency from depreciation. Smith pointed out that this point was covered in the western draft. Stalin replied that it should be made more explicit. He also discussed the provision for the exchange of currency, and for the issue of currency thereafter by the German bank of issue of the Soviet zone and for the establishment for these purposes of a financial commission composed of the four commanders to control their practical implementation. He considered these points essential. He then added that it would also be desirable to have some indication in the draft of a postponement of the establishment of a western German government on the basis of the London decisions. On this point the western representatives rested on the position which had already been made clear.

Smith then again reiterated the necessity for managing currency matters in Berlin on a basis which would provide absolute equality of control and would respect the juridical position of the western governments in Berlin. Stalin replied that if German unity were restored by confirming the decisions of previous four-power conferences, Berlin would

*Elbe River crossing near Magdeburg, Soviet Zone, scene of early motor traffic difficulties before the Soviet authorities completely closed the land corridor between Helmstedt (British Zone) and Berlin. (left) Temporary span with wreckage of war-destroyed highway bridge in background. (right) Ferry, ten miles away, carrying two Berlin-bound buses of the CCG(BE).*  
(US Army Signal Corps photos)



remain the capital of Germany and then there would be no objection to the Forces and authority of the three western powers remaining in Berlin and sharing the control of the German government in Berlin with the Soviet Union. If this did not happen, then Berlin would lose its standing at the capital of Germany.

Smith expressed the hope that such a situation would not arise and took occasion again to explain fully our view of the juridical position of the western powers in Berlin. It was decided that drafting details should be worked out with Molotov with a view to finding a final wording for a directive to the military governors in Berlin, requesting them to report back their recommendations within about a week after the directive was issued to them.

Before Stalin withdrew, Ambassador Smith specifically took occasion to bring out clearly certain questions on which he wanted to get an unequivocal clarification of the Soviet position. With respect to transport restrictions, it is worth quoting the following excerpt from the transcript of the meeting of Aug. 23 in Moscow:

"The US Ambassador then asked if he could first query one or two points, for example, the Soviet wording with regard to the transport restrictions. Molotov remarked, after a certain amount of discussion, that the Soviet government meant the restrictions imposed since the 18th of June. We indicated that this was unsatisfactory. Stalin then suggested that it might be better to say 'the restrictions lately imposed,' and confirmed that if there were any imposed before that date they would also be lifted."

It was with this understanding, personally confirmed by Premier Stalin, that a directive was ultimately sent to the military governors in Berlin to work out the technical arrangements necessary to give effect to the above agreement.

The principle of quadripartite supervision over the currency within the city of Berlin was an important issue in the discussion at Moscow. On this point Premier Stalin, during the discussion, gave the following confirmation of the interpretation to be placed on the language of the directive dealing with the power of the financial committee:

"Stalin stated that the German bank of emission controlled the flow of currency throughout the whole of the Soviet Zone, and it was impossible to exclude Berlin from the Soviet Zone. However, if the question was asked whether it did so without being controlled itself, the answer was 'no.' Such control would be provided by the Financial Commission and by the four commanders in Berlin, who would work out the arrangements connected with the exchange of the currency and with the control of the provision of currency, and would supervise what the bank was doing."

"Stalin said the Soviet draft had kept the word 'control' with reference to the four-power-finance committee and the Soviet government did not object to it. But from the point of view of financial science and political economy, it was impossible to exclude the German bank of emission from Berlin. To avoid abuse in its operations, the word 'control' had been included. The US Ambassador then suggested that the mention of regulation by the German bank of emission should be made after the financial commission. Stalin replied that the subjects had been mentioned in the logical order and that the authority conducting the operations had been mentioned first and afterwards the body controlling this authority had been mentioned."

It was on this clear understanding of these points that Smith and his colleagues continued the discussion and drafting.

Stalin expressed persistent interest in having something said about the London decisions. He suggested insertion of the following or some similar wording:

"The question of the London decision was also discussed including the formation of a western German government. The discussion took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding."

Smith said he would inform his government of Stalin's desire but did not anticipate that his government could accede to any such wording unless it were also made explicit that no agreement was reached on this subject since it was not considered a condition attaching to the lifting of transport restrictions.

The ensuing drafting meeting with Molotov elaborated a joint draft which was then submitted to the government for consideration.

The United States Government, in expressing its views to Ambassador Smith, took occasion among other things to corroborate Smith's own view that a provision such as Stalin desired with respect to western Germany would be open to misinterpretation and, therefore, could not be accepted. Any such provision should make clear that we do not refuse to discuss this point at some subsequent time but are not prepared to make any commitments whatsoever for postponement of the London decisions in connection with the present negotiations. Smith was instructed to make this clear to the Soviet authorities and to agree at most to a statement that:

"During the conversations the Soviet government expressed its wish that the implementation of the decisions of the London conference should not result in the establishment of a government for western Germany before the representatives of the four powers had been able to meet to discuss the whole German problem. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France affirmed the desire of their governments for a four-power agreement whereby a government for the whole of Germany would be established. They explained that the London decisions did not preclude such an agreement and, while they were not able to agree to any postponement to the implementation of the London decisions, they would make a sincere endeavor to ascertain whether there is a real prospect of agreement among the four powers. Further discussion of this point was accordingly deferred."

In framing its further instructions to Ambassador Smith, this government proceeded from the following basic requirements, upon which it had insisted from the beginning:

- (1) Insistence on our co-equal rights to be in Berlin;
- (2) No abandonment of our position with respect to western Germany;
- (3) Unequivocal lifting to the blockade on communications, transport and commerce for goods and persons; and
- (4) Adequate quadripartite control of the issue and continued use in Berlin of the Soviet mark.

After the three governments had consulted each other and instructed their respective representatives in Moscow, the latter met with Molotov and Vishinsky on Aug. 27 and worked out the following drafts for the communiqué and directive under discussion:

#### "Communique"

"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR have agreed that the following measures under (A) and (B) shall be put into effect simultaneously, and have approved detailed arrangements for their implementation jointly worked out by the four military governors.

"(A) The restrictions which have recently been imposed on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones and between the various zones of Germany shall be lifted, and freedom of communications, transport and commerce shall be maintained.

"(B) The German mark of the Soviet Zone shall be accepted, on the basis agreed between the four military governors, as the sole currency for Berlin and the Western mark 'B' shall be simultaneously withdrawn from circulation in Berlin.

"The four governments have also agreed that in addition to meetings of the four military governors, meetings among representatives of the four governments in the form of the Council of Foreign Ministers or other conferences of representatives of the four powers shall be held in the near future to discuss:

"(1) Any outstanding questions regarding Berlin and (2) any other outstanding problems affecting Germany as a whole."

#### "Directive"

"The governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR have decided that, subject to agreement being reached among the four military governors in Berlin for their practical implementation, the following steps shall be taken simultaneously:

"(A) Restrictions on communication, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones and to and from the Soviet zone of Germany which have recently been imposed shall be lifted;

"(B) The German mark of the Soviet zone shall be introduced as the sole currency for Berlin, and the western mark B shall be withdrawn from circulation in Berlin.

"In connection with the above you are instructed to consult together with your colleagues so as to make, in the shortest time possible, the detailed arrangements necessary for the implementation of these decisions, and to inform your government not later than September 4 of the results of your discussions, including the exact date on which the measures under (A) and (B) above can be brought into effect. The four military governors will work out arrangements involved in the introduction of the German mark of the Soviet Zone in Berlin.

"The arrangements relating to the currency changeover and to the continued provision and use in Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet Zone shall ensure:

"(a) No discrimination or action against holders of western marks B in connection with the exchange of those western marks issued in Berlin. These shall be accepted for exchange for German marks of the Soviet Zone at the rate of one for one;

"(b) Equal treatment as to currency and provision of fully accessible banking and credit facilities throughout all sectors of Berlin. The four military governors are charged with providing adequate safeguards to prevent the use in Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet Zone from leading to disorganizing currency circulation or disrupting the stability of currency in the Soviet Zone;

"(c) A satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and third countries and the western zones of Germany. Modification of this agreed basis to be made only by agreement among the four military governors;

"(d) The provision of sufficient currency for budgetary purposes and for occupation costs, reduced to the greatest extent possible, and also the balancing of the Berlin budget.

"The regulation of currency circulation in Berlin is to be undertaken by the German bank of emission of the Soviet Zone through the medium of the credit establishments operating at present in Berlin.

"A financial commission of representatives of the four military governors shall be set up to control the practical implementation of the financial arrangements indicated above,



involved in the introduction and continued circulation of a single currency in Berlin."

During this discussion, as during previous ones Molotov endeavored again, without success, to insert some provision into the communique that would tie the hands of the western governments with respect to the London decisions. The most noteworthy feature of this particular conversation was that he reversed completely his former position that details about the currency should be settled and agreed in Moscow before any reference to the military governors in Berlin.

After a final review by the several governments it was arranged with Molotov on Aug. 30 that the directive to the military governors be dispatched to them by midnight calling for a report from them by Sept. 7.

Although the directive was finally agreed and sent, it was not possible to reach final agreement on the ultimate draft communique, because Molotov still insisted on a final paragraph concerning the London decisions.

Smith told him that regardless of the finally agreed text, when the communique was made public we would be obliged to publish a statement that the agreement represented by it was entered into without prejudice to the co-equal rights, duties and obligations of the western occupying powers in Berlin. Molotov's reply to this was that the position of the Soviet government was well known and that it would undoubtedly make a similar public reservation.

The attitude of the Soviet representatives at this Aug. 27 conference was less pleasant than hitherto. The western representatives referred to the disturbed situation in Berlin and pointed out the desirability of maintaining a peaceful atmosphere during the deliberations of the military governors. Molotov declined to pursue the matter further, stating that the Soviet military governor already had his instructions. It was impossible to issue any interim communique to inform the public that technical questions were being referred to Berlin because Molotov refused to agree to any text for it except in his own terms.

He tried to extend the period for discussion in Berlin to Sept. 10, being reluctant to agree to limit the discussions to one week ending Sept. 7.

The directive finally dispatched to the military governors was one on which it might be possible to work out a solution of the technical details if the Soviet authorities did in fact wish to settle the Berlin crisis. Whether this was so remained to be seen during the course of the discussions in Berlin.

#### Technical Discussions in Berlin

On Aug. 31 the four commanders and their staffs met for the first time to work out, under instructions from their governments, the implementation of the directive. They continued these meetings daily throughout the week allotted for the Berlin discussions.

It soon became apparent that Marshal Sokolovsky was not ready to honor the understandings reached in Moscow. During the course of the meetings it was evident that he was seeking to increase, rather than to decrease, the restrictions on transport, and also to eliminate any measure of quadripartite control over the German bank of issue for the Soviet Zone with respect to Berlin, and to assert for the Soviet Military Authority sole jurisdiction over the trade between Berlin and the western zones of Germany as well as third countries.

With respect to the transport restrictions, Sokolovsky began by declaring that he would agree to removal of only those restrictions imposed after June 18, the date of the currency reform. This position was taken in spite of Stalin's categorical statement on Aug. 23 that under the final wording of the directive any restrictions imposed before that date would also be removed. Sokolovsky even endeavored to discuss the imposition of new restrictions on the existing air traffic. When the western commanders sought to discuss

freedom of passage for military trains, the condition of the railroad tracks, and the need of more paths, Sokolovsky began by declining to discuss rail traffic unless the western commanders would agree to discuss the imposition of new restrictions on the existing air traffic. General Clay and his colleagues refused to do this, pointing out that the directive referred only to the removal of existing restrictions, not to the imposition of new ones. In justifying his adherence to the date of June 18, Sokolovsky argued that since traffic restrictions were being removed in exchange for the currency provisions of the directive, the latter must refer only to traffic restrictions imposed after the western currency reform of June 18; he went on to say that traffic restrictions imposed before that date were connected with the London conference. He later receded from his initial position on this point, but continued to try to put new limitations on the existing air traffic.

With respect to the provisions of the directive concerning the currency itself, Sokolovsky took the position (despite the clear understanding confirmed by Stalin in Moscow), that the proposed four-power financial commission should have no authority whatever to control the operations of the German bank of issue with respect to Berlin.

Yet without such authority over the institution issuing, and promulgating regulations concerning, the currency of Berlin it is obvious that the financial commission would have been quite incapable of discharging the function assigned to it in the directive, i. e. controlling the practical implementation of the financial arrangements involved in the introduction and continued circulation of a single currency in Berlin. Sokolovsky's repudiation of the understanding reached on this point with Stalin in Moscow was sufficient in itself to frustrate any agreement upon genuine quadripartite administration of the currency of Berlin, quite aside from other differences which arose concerning the detailed financial arrangements for Berlin.

With respect to trade arrangements between Berlin and the western zones of Germany and third countries, Sokolovsky asserted for the Soviet authorities the exclusive right to control such trade. This claim obviously contradicted the clear meaning of the agreed directive to the four military governors, and in no way constituted a reasonable approach to the problem of working out a mutually "satisfactory basis" for the trade of Berlin.

Marshal Sokolovsky in Berlin thus took a position contrary to the explicit assurances given by Stalin in Moscow, with respect to transport restrictions, currency and trade. Moreover, he manifested increasingly an attitude of indifference about the progress or failure of the negotiations.

The week of technical discussion in Berlin thus proved even more futile and frustrating than the month of negotiations in Moscow.

The military governors were unable to submit an agreed report; Marshal Sokolovsky remarked that there was nothing to report.

#### A New Aide Memoire

The three governments therefore instructed their representatives in Moscow to deliver the following aide memoire to Stalin and Molotov:

"1. The governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States having received and studied reports from their military governors of the discussions in Berlin find it necessary to draw the attention of the Soviet government to the fact that the position adopted by the Soviet military governor during the meetings in Berlin on a number of points deviate from the principles agreed at Moscow between the four governments and contained in the agreed directive to the four military governors. As the Soviet government is aware, the terms of this directive were finally agreed after long and careful consideration, and after clarifications as to interpretation had been received from the Soviet government.

"2. The specific issues on which in the opinion of the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Soviet military governor has departed from the understandings reached at Moscow relate to: (1) restrictions on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones; (2) the authority and functions of the financial commission, and in particular its relation to the German bank of emission; and (3) the control of the trade of Berlin.

"3. As to the first, the Soviet military governor has presented a proposal which falls outside the agreed principle that the restrictions, transport and commerce be lifted. He has proposed that restrictions upon air traffic, not heretofore existing, should now be imposed, and in particular that air traffic to Berlin should be strictly limited to that necessary to meet the needs of the military forces of occupation.

"4. As the Soviet government is aware, the directive makes no mention of air transport and this question was not discussed at Moscow. The directive reads: 'Restrictions on communications, transport, and commerce between Berlin and the western zones and to and from the Soviet zone of Germany which have recently been imposed shall be lifted.' There have been and are no such restrictions on air traffic. The purpose of the directive is to lift restrictions and not to impose new ones. The proposal of the Soviet commander-in-chief, therefore, falls outside the scope of the present discussions and is unacceptable.

"5. Secondly, on the question of the authority and functions of the financial commission there should be not the slightest grounds for any misunderstanding. At the meeting on Aug. 23 attended by Premier Stalin and Mr. Molotov and the representatives of the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the intention of the directive in regard to the powers of the financial commission including its power to control the operations in Berlin of the German bank of emission was clearly and specifically confirmed by Premier Stalin. The Soviet military governor has refused to accept both the meaning of the directive and the clear understanding of the four powers reached at Moscow.

"6. Thirdly, there is the question of the control of the trade of Berlin. The position of the Soviet military governor during the discussions in Berlin in regard to matters relating to the control of trade between Berlin and the western zones of Germany amounts to a claim for exclusive Soviet authority over such matters. Such a claim is a contradiction of the spirit and meaning of the directive to the four military governors to which the four governments gave their approval and is therefore unacceptable.

"7. In bringing these major points of difference to the notice of the Soviet government, the government of the United States, the United Kingdom and France do not wish to imply that these are the only points of difference which have arisen during the conversations in Berlin.

"8. The governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have understood clearly the principles agreed to in Moscow and the assurances given by Premier Stalin. Their military governors in Berlin have acted in accordance with those principles and assurances. The position taken by the Soviet military governor, on the contrary, has constituted a departure from what was agreed in Moscow and strikes at the very foundation upon which these discussions were undertaken. The divergencies which have accordingly arisen on these questions are so serious that the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States feel compelled to inquire whether the Soviet government is prepared to affirm the understandings outlined herein and to issue the necessary instructions to the Soviet military governor, confirming the agreed intention of the directive in regard to

"(a) the lifting of all restrictions on communications, transport and commerce imposed after March 30, 1948, without imposition of any new air or other restrictions; and

"(b) the control by the financial commission of the financial arrangements contemplated in the agreed directive, including control of the operations of the bank of emission with respect to Berlin as specifically confirmed by Premier Stalin; and

"(c) a satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and third countries and the western zones of Germany in accordance with an agreement to be reached between the four military governors which does not involve the unilateral control of such trade by the Soviet Trade Administration and which recognizes the right of each of the occupying powers to import in fulfillment of their respective responsibilities, and to control the proceeds from food and fuel imported for the use of the Berlin population and industry.

"The belief that only if the steps proposed in the aide memoire are taken would it be possible for the military governors to continue their discussions."

#### Return to Moscow

Stalin being out of town and unavailable, this aide memoire was delivered to Mr. Molotov by the three western envoys on Sept. 14.

Molotov expressed the view that progress could be facilitated if, instead of an immediate exchange of communications at the government level, the military governors were first to prepare an agreed report of their discussions, and he proposed that they be given two days to do this. The western envoys pointed out that military governors had already found it impossible to agree on such a joint report. Molotov then reluctantly agreed to submit the aide memoire to his government for study and reply.

On Sept. 18, Mr. Molotov invited the western envoys to the Kremlin and handed them the Soviet government's reply, which was likewise in the form of an aide memoire. The text was as follows:

"1. The government of the USSR has acquainted itself with the aide memoire, dated Sept. 14 last, of the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the US which gives a unilateral account of the course of discussions among the four military governors in Berlin and which presents incorrectly the position adopted by the Soviet military government during those discussions.

"The Soviet government believes that consideration of the difference referred to in the said aide memoire, which arose during the Berlin discussions in regard to the interpretation of the directive to the military governors, would have been facilitated and expedited had the four military governors submitted to their governments a joint report with an account of the course of discussions. In that event the discussions in Moscow would not have been based on any unilateral communications but on an accurate statement of the positions adopted by all four military governors, both on points already agreed among them and on points left outstanding. Since, however, the representatives of the three governments have refused to follow that method of discussion, the Soviet government finds it necessary to reply to the questions raised in the aide memoire.

"The aide memoire of Sept. 14 refers to the following three questions: 1. restrictions on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones; 2. the authority and functions of the financial commission, and in particular its relation to the German bank of emission; 3. the control of the trade of Berlin.

"At the same time it is asserted that the Soviet military governor allegedly deviated from the understanding reached on these questions in Moscow.

"The Soviet government believes this assertion to be without foundation, because during

the Berlin discussions the Soviet military governor strictly followed the agreed directive and the clarifications which had been given by the Soviet government when it was being drawn up in Moscow. Study by the Soviet government of all materials relating to the Berlin discussions has shown that the reason for the differences which arose during the Berlin discussions lies in the desire of the US, the UK and the French military governors to interpret the directive agreed upon in Moscow in a unilateral manner, and to give it an interpretation which had not been implied when it was being drawn up and which constitutes a violation of the directive, and with this the Soviet government is unable to agree.

"2--The directive to the four military governors states the following in regard to the first question referred to in the aide memoire of Sept. 14: 'restrictions on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones and on the traffic of goods to and from the Soviet Zone of Germany which have recently been imposed shall be lifted.'

"The concrete proposals submitted by the Soviet military governor on this point are in full conformity with the directive and have for their purpose the lifting of all restrictions on communications, transport and commerce, which have been imposed after March 30, 1948, as was stipulated when the directive was drawn up. During consideration of this question the Soviet military governor pointed to the necessity of the other three military governors complying strictly with the regulations imposed by the Control Council's decision of Nov. 30, 1945, on air traffic for the needs of the occupation forces, and this had never been disputed by any of the military governors since the adoption of these regulations three years ago.

"There is no foundation whatsoever, for regarding this justified demand of the Soviet military governor as an imposition of new restrictions on air traffic, because these regulations had been imposed, as far back as 1945, and not after March 30, 1948. Nevertheless, the USA has attempted to deny the necessity of observing the regulations which had been imposed by the Control Council on air traffic of the occupation forces and which remain in force to this very day.

"In view of the above, the Soviet government believes that the position of the Soviet military governor on this question is absolutely correct, while the position of the USA military governor, far from being based on the agreed directive, is in contradiction with it. An interpretation to the contrary might lead to an arbitrary denial of any decision previously agreed upon by the Control Council, and to this the Soviet government cannot give its assent.

"3--The directive to the military governors also contains a clear statement regarding the authority and functions of the financial commission and regarding the German bank of emission:

"The arrangements relating to the currency changeover and to the continued provision and use in Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet Zone shall ensure:

"(A) No discrimination or action against holders of western marks in connection with the exchange of those western marks B issued in Berlin. These shall be accepted for exchange for German marks of the Soviet Zone at the rate of 1 for 1.

"(B) Equal treatment as to currency and provision of fully accessible banking and credit facilities throughout all sectors of Berlin. The four military governors are charged with providing adequate safeguards disrupting the stability of currency in the Soviet Zone of occupation.

"(C) A satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and third countries and the western zone of Germany. Modifications of this agreed basis to be made only by agreement among the four military governors;

"(D) The provision of sufficient currency for budgetary purposes and for occupation costs, reduced to the greatest extent possible, and also the balancing of the Berlin budget.

"The regulation of currency circulation in Berlin is to be undertaken by the German bank of emission of the Soviet Zone through the medium of the credit establishments operating at present in Berlin.

"A financial commission of representatives of the four military governors shall be set up to control the practical implementation of the financial arrangements indicated above, involved in the introduction and the circulation of a single currency in Berlin."

"This directive was drawn up in full conformity with the preliminary clarifications on this matter made by Premier J. V. Stalin on Aug. 23, and referred to in the above-mentioned aide memoire.

"It will be seen from the above text that the authority and functions of the financial commission and of the German bank of emission are precisely laid down in the directive, and it was by this that the Soviet military governor was guided. According to that directive and to the understanding reached in Moscow by the four powers, the financial commission should not exercise control over all operations of the bank of emission in regard in Berlin, but only over those operations of the bank of emission in Berlin which are specifically provided for in paragraphs (A), (B), (C) and (D) of the directive. The proposal to establish control of the financial commission over the whole activity of the German bank of emission in Berlin was not accepted during the discussion of this question in Moscow because this would have led to such interference on the part of the financial commission in matters of the regulation of currency circulation as is incompatible with the Soviet administration's responsibility for the regulation of currency circulation in the Soviet Zone of occupation.

"Accordingly, the Soviet government cannot agree to the incorrect interpretation of the agreed directive given in the aide memoire of the governments of France, the UK and the USA and believes it necessary that the directive should be strictly followed.

"4--As to trade, the previously agreed directive is confined to an instruction to the military governors to work out as satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and third countries and the western zones of Germany. It will be recalled that on Aug. 23 during the discussions in Moscow, the Soviet government submitted a definite proposal on this subject, but the question was not considered in detail and was referred to the military governors for discussion.

"The proposals on this subject made by the Soviet military governor give no reason to assert that they are a contradiction of the spirit and meaning of the agreed directive. On the contrary, the intention of those proposals is to have the directive fulfilled in accordance with the agreements reached in Moscow.

"However, for the purpose of expediting the drawing up of practical arrangements in Berlin, the Soviet government proposes that the military governors be given more detailed instructions on this matter than those contained in the agreed directive. The Soviet government agrees to have trade between Berlin and third countries and the western zones of Germany placed under the control of the quadripartite financial commission, which control should provide at the same time for the maintenance of the existing procedure regarding the traffic of goods in and out of Berlin under license of the Soviet military administration. The Soviet government believes that such an instruction would be of help in the drawing up of a concrete agreement on matters of trade with Berlin.

"5--The Soviet government believes that discussions between the military governors in Berlin can yield positive results only in the event that all the military governors follow strictly the directives and instructions agreed between the governments of France, the UK, the USA and the USSR."

The western envoys, after reading this document, stated that they would submit it to



# US NOTE TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL

*The United States charged the Soviet Union with action in the Berlin situation constituting a threat to the peace under the meaning of the UN Charter, and requested the UN Security Council consider the case as soon as possible.*

*The US request, signed by Warren Austin, permanent delegate to United Nations, was sent to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie Sept. 29 as identical letters from Great Britain and France were also delivered. Following is full text of US notification:*

I have the honor on behalf of the government of the United States of America, in agreement with the governments of the French Republic and the United Kingdom, to draw your attention to the serious situation which has arisen as the result of the unilateral imposition by the government of the USSR of restrictions on transport and communications between the western zones of occupation in Germany and Berlin.

Quite apart from the fact that it is in conflict with the rights of the government of the USA and the governments of France and the United Kingdom with regard to the occupation and administration of Berlin, this action by the Soviet government is contrary to its obligations under Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and creates a threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter 7 of the Charter.

It is clear from the protracted exchange of notes and the conversations which have taken place on the initiative of the three governments between them and the Soviet government that the three governments, conscious of their obligation

under the charter to settle their disputes by peaceful means, have made every effort to resolve their differences directly with the Soviet government. Copies of these relevant documents are submitted separately.

In particular, attention is drawn to the summary of the situation which is contained in the notes of the US government and the governments of France and the United Kingdom, dated September 26-27, 1948, as follows:

"The issue between the Soviet government and the western occupying powers is therefore not that of technical difficulties in communications nor that of reaching agreement upon the conditions for the regulation of the currency for Berlin. The issue is that the Soviet government has clearly shown by its actions that it is attempting by illegal and coercive measures in disregard of its obligations to secure political objectives to which it is not entitled and which it could not achieve by peaceful means. It has resorted to blockade measures; it has threatened the Berlin population with starvation, disease and economic ruin; it has tolerated disorders and attempted to overthrow the duly elected municipal government of Berlin.

"The attitude and conduct of the Soviet government reveal sharply its purpose to continue its illegal and coercive blockade and its unlawful actions designed to reduce the status of the United States, the United Kingdom and France as occupying powers in Berlin to one of complete subordination to Soviet rule, and thus to obtain absolute authority over the

economic, political and social life of the people of Berlin, and to incorporate the city in the Soviet Zone.

"The Soviet government has thereby taken upon itself sole responsibility for creating a situation in which further recourse to the means of settlement prescribed in Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations is not, in existing circumstances, possible, and which constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

"In order that international peace and security may not be further endangered the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, therefore, while reserving to themselves full rights to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain in these circumstances their position in Berlin, find themselves obliged to refer the action of the Soviet government to the Security Council of the United Nations."

Accordingly, the government of the United States requests that the Security Council consider this question at the earliest opportunity.

*The request was accompanied by 13 documents detailing the official exchange as the western representatives, in Moscow and Berlin, tried for nearly three months to settle the Berlin matter by negotiations with Soviet Union. The documents included the final identical notes delivered to Soviet ambassadors the previous weekend by the US, British and French governments, and also the directive agreed to in Moscow, by Soviet Premier Stalin and the western envoys and sent to the four military governors in Berlin, only to be disregarded by Soviet military governor.*

their governments for consideration, but warned that it would scarcely be acceptable.

## Note to Soviet Government of Sept. 22

After studying the reply just quoted, the three governments delivered to the Soviet Embassies in Washington, London and Paris on Sept. 22 identical third-person notes in the following text:

"1—The government of the United States, together with the governments of France and the United Kingdom, has now reviewed the discussions which have taken place on the Berlin situation and which have culminated in the Soviet reply of Sept. 18 to the aide memoire of the three governments of Sept. 14, 1948.

"2—The three governments find that the Soviet unwillingness to accept previous agreements, to which reference is made in their aide memoire of Sept. 14, is still preventing a settlement. The reply of the Soviet government in its aide memoire of Sept. 18 is unsatisfactory.

"3—The final position of the three governments on the specific points at issue is as follows:

(a) They cannot accept the imposition of any restrictions on air traffic between Berlin and the western zones.

(b) They insist that the finance commission must control the activities of the German bank of emission of the Soviet Zone in so far as they relate to the financial

arrangements for the introduction and continued use of the Soviet Zone mark as the sole currency in the city of Berlin.

(c) They insist that trade between Berlin and the eastern zones and other countries must be under quadripartite control, including the issuance of licenses.

"4. After more than six weeks, of discussion, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France feel that the Soviet government is now fully acquainted with the position of the three governments, and that further discussions on the present basis would be useless.

"5. It is clear that the difficulties that have arisen in the attempts to arrive at practical arrangements which would restore

normal conditions in Berlin derive not from technical matters but from a fundamental difference of views between the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France and the Soviet government as to the rights and obligations of the occupying powers in Berlin, their right to have access by air, rail, water and road to Berlin and to participate in the administration of the affairs of the city of Berlin. The blockade imposed by the Soviet authorities together with other of their acts in Berlin are in violation of the rights of the three western occupying powers.

"6. Accordingly, the government of the United States, in agreement with the governments of France and the United Kingdom, asks the Soviet government whether, in order to create conditions which would permit a continuance of discussions, it is now prepared to remove the blockade measures, thus restoring the right of the three western occupying powers to free communications by rail, water and road, and to specify the date on which this will be done.

"7. The foreign ministers of the three governments will be meeting shortly in Paris, and they will be glad to have the reply of the Soviet government as soon as possible."

#### Soviet Reply of Sept. 25

In reply, on Sept. 25, 1948, the Soviet government sent the following identical note (unofficial translation) to the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France:

"The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents his compliments to the acting secretary of state of the United States and has the honor, under instructions of the Soviet government, to communicate the following:

"1. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has acquainted itself with the note of the government of the USA of Sept. 22, 1948, concerning negotiations of the four powers which have taken place in Moscow and Berlin on the question of the introduction of the German mark of the Soviet Zone as the sole currency in Berlin and concerning the removal of the restrictions on communications, transport and trade between Berlin and the western zones of Germany.

"In connection with this, the Soviet government considers it necessary to declare that the position taken by the government of the USA not only does not facilitate, but on the contrary complicates the reaching of agreement concerning the settlement of the situation which has arisen in Berlin as a result of carrying out a separate currency reform and the introduction of a separate currency in the western zones of Germany and in the western sectors of Berlin, which constituted an extreme and most far-reaching measure in execution of the policy of partitioning Germany being carried out by the governments of the USA, Great Britain and France.

"2. In its note the government of the USA refers to three disputed questions which were mentioned by the governments of the USA, Great Britain and France in the aide memoire of Sept 15 and by the government of the USSR in the aide memoire of Sept. 18, 1948.

"The government of the United States of America states that the continuation of the negotiations on the above-mentioned questions on the present basis would be useless and considers that in order to create the conditions which would permit a continuation of the negotiations, there would have to be a removal of the temporary transport restrictions between Berlin and the western zones which were introduced by the Soviet command for the purpose of protecting the interests of the German population as well as the economy of the Soviet zone of occupation and of Berlin itself.

"Such a statement of the government of the USA is in direct conflict with the agreement reached on Aug. 30 in Moscow among the four governments (the directive to the Military Governors), in which it was stated:

"The governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR have decided that, subject to agreement being reached among the four military governors in

Berlin for their practical implementation, the following steps shall be taken simultaneously:

"(A) Restriction on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones, and also on the movement of cargoes to and from the Soviet Zone of Germany which have recently been imposed, shall be lifted.

"(B) The German mark of the Soviet Zone shall be introduced as the sole currency for Berlin, and the western mark B shall be withdrawn from circulation in Berlin."

"From the text of the agreement cited above it is evident that the four governments agreed during the negotiations in Moscow on the simultaneous lifting of restrictions on trade and communications between Berlin and the western zones and introduction of the German mark of the Soviet as the sole currency in Berlin. The Soviet government insists on this, since the situation created by the separate measures of the western powers means that the three governments are not limiting themselves to their sovereign administration of the western zones of Germany, but wish at the same time to administer in currency and financial matters the Soviet Zone of occupation as well, by means of introducing into Berlin, which is in the center of the Soviet Zone, their separate currency and thus disrupting the economy of the eastern zone of Germany and in the last analysis forcing the USSR to withdraw therefrom.

"The Soviet government considers it necessary that the agreement reached in Moscow be carried out and considers that further negotiations can be successful only in the event that the other three governments likewise observe that agreement. If the government of the USA repudiates the agreement reached on Aug. 30, only one conclusion can be drawn therefrom: namely, that the government of the USA does not wish any agreement among the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France for the settlement of the situation in Berlin.

"3—Inasmuch as the position of the governments of the USA, Great Britain and France on the three disputed points was set forth in the note of Sept. 22, the Soviet government considers it necessary to do likewise:

"(A) As regards air communication between Berlin and the western zones, the establishment by the Soviet command of a control over the transport of commercial cargoes and passengers is just as necessary in this case as in the case of railway, water and highway transport. The air routes cannot remain uncontrolled, since an understanding has been reached between the four governments to the effect that the agreement must envisage the establishment of a corresponding control over currency circulation in Berlin and the trade of Berlin with the western zones.

"(B) In the directive to the military governors adopted by the four governments on Aug. 30, the functions of control by the four-power financial commission of the execution of measures connected with the introduction and circulation of a single currency in Berlin were explicitly provided for.

"The Soviet government considers it necessary that this agreement be carried out, including the maximum reduction of occupation costs in Berlin and the establishment of a balanced budget in Berlin (not considered up to this time in the Berlin conversations), which were provided for in that agreement.

"(C) The Soviet government has already expressed its agreement that trade between Berlin, third countries and the western zones of Germany should be placed under the control of the four-power financial commission. The Soviet government now declares its readiness to agree to the establishment of four-power control likewise over the issuance of import and export licenses, provided agreement is reached on all other questions.

"4—Thus the reaching of agreement about the situation in Berlin now depends above all on whether the governments of Great Britain,

the United States of America and France are seeking such agreement."

#### Final Western Note

The following day, Sept. 26, 1948, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France sent identical notes to the Soviet government summarizing the various steps they had taken to work out with the Soviet government a solution to the problem of Berlin, and announcing their decision "to refer the action of the Soviet government to the Security Council of the United Nations."

The text of this note follows:

"1—The governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, conscious of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means, took the initiative on July 30, 1948, in approaching the Soviet government for informal discussions in Moscow in order to explore every possibility of adjusting a dangerous situation which had arisen by reason of measures taken by the Soviet government directly challenging the rights of the other occupying powers in Berlin. These measures, persistently pursued, amounted to a blockade of land and water transport and communication between the western zones of Germany and Berlin, which not only endangered the maintenance of the forces of occupation of the United States, France and the United Kingdom in that city, but also jeopardized the discharge by those governments of their duties as occupying powers through the threat of starvation, disease and economic ruin for the population of Berlin.

"2—The governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom have explicitly maintained the position that they could accept no arrangement which would deny or impair the rights in Berlin acquired by them through the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany and by four-power agreements. They were, however, willing to work out in good faith any practical arrangements, consistent with their rights and duties, for restoring to normal the situation in Berlin, including the problems presented by the existence of two currencies in that city.

"3—After long and patient discussion, agreement was arrived at in Moscow on a directive to the four military governors under which the restrictive measures placed by the Soviet military government upon transport and communications between the western zones and Berlin would be lifted simultaneously with the introduction of the German mark of the Soviet Zone as the sole currency for Berlin under four-power control of its issue and continued use in Berlin.

"4. In connection with the lifting of restrictions and the maintenance of freedom of communication and the transport of persons and goods between Berlin and the western zones, the agreed directive provided that restrictions recently imposed should be lifted. Generalissimo Stalin during the discussions personally confirmed that this meant the removal also of any restrictions imposed prior to June 18, 1948.

"In connection with the currency situation in Berlin, the Soviet authorities insisted that the German mark of the Soviet Zone be accepted as the sole currency for Berlin. The three Western occupying powers declared that they were ready to withdraw from circulation in Berlin the Western mark B issued in that city and to accept the German mark of the Soviet Zone subject to four-power control over its issuance, circulation and continued use in Berlin (i.e., in Berlin only, and not in the Soviet Zone). After long discussions Generalissimo Stalin, on Aug. 23, 1948, personally agreed to this four-power control and himself proposed the establishment of a four-power financial commission which would control the practical implementation of the financial arrangements involved in the introduction and continued circulation of a single currency in Berlin and which, Generalissimo Stalin specifically stated, would have the power to control the German bank of emission of the Soviet Zone



in so far as its operations with respect to Berlin were concerned.

"5. It was with these understandings, personally confirmed by Generalissimo Stalin, that the agreed directive was sent to the four military governors in Berlin to work out the technical arrangements necessary to put it into effect.

"6. Despite these clear understandings, the Soviet military governor soon made it plain in the discussions held by the four military governors that he was not prepared to abide by the agreed directive.

"Although the directive called for the unqualified lifting of the restrictions on transport and communications between the western zones and Berlin, the Soviet military governor failed to comply. What is more he demanded that restrictions should be imposed on air traffic. He endeavored to support his demand by a false interpretation of a decision of the Control Council of Nov. 30, 1945. Actually, during the discussions leading up to the decision of the Control Council of Nov. 1945, to establish air corridors, the military authorities in Berlin had suggested that the traffic in the corridors should be limited to the needs of the military forces. Neither the Control Council, however, nor any other four-power body accepted this proposal and the traffic in the corridors has since been subject only to those safety regulations which agreed on a four-power basis. Other than these agreed safety regulations, no restrictions whatsoever have been or are in existence on the use by aircraft of the occupying powers of air communications in the corridors between Berlin and the western zones of Germany.

"In regard to four-power control of the German mark of the Soviet zone in Berlin, the Soviet military governor refused to admit, despite the agreement in Moscow, that the financial commission should exercise control over the operations with respect to Berlin of the German bank of emission of the Soviet zone.

"Furthermore, with respect to the question of the control of the trade of Berlin, the position of the Soviet military governor amounted to a claim for exclusive Soviet authority over the trade of Berlin with the western zones of occupation and with foreign countries. This claim was a contradiction of the clear meaning of the agreed directive to the four military governors.

"7. Even while discussions were in progress, the Soviet authorities in Berlin tolerated attempts on the part of minority groups sympathetic to their political aims forcibly to overthrow the legal government of the city of Berlin, constituted by democratic elections held under four-power supervision. On Aug. 30, the representatives of the three western occupying powers in Moscow had drawn Mr. Molotov's attention to the disturbed situation in Berlin. They suggested that instructions be sent to the four military governors that they should do all in their power to preserve a favorable atmosphere in Berlin, but Mr. Molotov claimed that such instructions to the Soviet military governor were unnecessary. Nevertheless, after that date, these attempts to overthrow the city government increased in violence.

"8. On Sept. 14, 1948, the representatives of the governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, acting on specific instructions, called the attention of the Soviet government to the Soviet military governors disregard of the agreements reached during the Moscow discussions and requested that he be instructed to give effect to them.

"9. The Soviet government's reply of Sept. 18, however, upheld the Soviet military governor's position. The Soviet government further confirmed its intention to disregard its commitment to lift the restrictions imposed on transport and communications by seeking to impose restrictions which had not before been in effect.

With respect to trade, the Soviet requirement that the licensing of trade with Berlin be placed in the hands of the Soviet military

authorities made plain the Soviet government's intention to obtain exclusive control over the trade of Berlin.

"As regards the powers of the four-power financial commission, the Soviet reply asserted that the western occupying powers desired to establish control over all operations of the German bank of emission. In fact the United States, United Kingdom and French military governors sought only to secure the Soviet military governor's acceptance of the agreed principle that the four-power financial commission should control the operations of the bank with respect to the financial arrangements relating to the currency changeover and to the continued provision and use of the German mark of the Soviet Zone in the city of Berlin, (i.e. in Berlin only and not in the Soviet Zone). In the light of Mr. Molotov's statements during the discussion of the Soviet reply, it became clear that no assurance was given that the Soviet military governor would be prepared to proceed on the previously agreed basis. Thus in this matter, as in others, the intention of the Soviet government was manifestly to impose conditions nullifying the authority of the western occupying powers and to acquire complete control over the city of Berlin.

"10. For the governments of the UK, USA and France to continue discussions when fundamental agreements previously reached had been disregarded by the Soviet government would have been futile. It would have been equally fruitless to continue such discussions in the face of the unmistakable intention of the Soviet government to undermine, and indeed to destroy, the rights of the three governments as occupying powers in Berlin as a price for lifting the blockade, illegally imposed in the first instance and still unlawfully maintained. The three governments therefore dispatched identical notes on Sept. 2 to the Soviet government. In those notes, after restating their position on the specific points at issue, they asked the Soviet government whether it was prepared to remove the blockade measures which it had imposed and thereby to establish conditions which would permit a continuation of discussions.

"11. The reply of the Soviet government in its notes to the three governments of Sept. 25, 1948, is unsatisfactory.

"As regards the introduction and continued circulation and use in Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet Zone, the Soviet government misrepresents the position of the three western occupying powers. The latter have made it clear from the outset that they do not desire to exercise any control over the financial arrangements in the Soviet Zone of occupation, but are insisting on those conditions only which would provide adequate four-power control over the financial arrangements for the introduction and continued circulation and use of the German mark of the Soviet Zone as the sole currency in Berlin.

"As regards control of the trade of Berlin the Soviet government, contrary to its previous attitude, now states its willingness to agree to the establishment of four-power control over the issuance of licenses for the import and export of goods provided that agreement is reached on all other questions. It is clear, after more than six weeks of discussions, from the Soviet government's persistent refusal to remove the blockade measures and its continued insistence on other conditions which would enable it to destroy the authority and rights of the United Kingdom, the United States and France as occupying powers in Berlin that this conditional concession is illusory.

"As regards air traffic between Berlin and the western zones of occupation, the Soviet government, while neither affirming nor withdrawing the demand for the particular restrictions put forward by the Soviet military governor during the discussions in Berlin and confirmed in its reply of Sept. 18, introduces another requirement to the effect that transport by air of commercial freight and passengers must be placed under the control of the Soviet command.

"The Soviet government's note of Sept. 25, therefore, not only ignores the request of the three governments that the blockade measures should be removed in order that conditions may be established which would permit the continuation of discussions. It also seeks to impose restrictions on transport and communications between Berlin and the western zones which would place the maintenance of the forces of occupation of the three western occupying powers and the whole life of the Berlin population within the arbitrary power of the Soviet command, thus enabling the Soviet military authorities to reimpose the blockade at any moment in the future if they so desired.

"12. Accordingly, it is apparent the Soviet government had no intention of carrying out the undertakings to which it had subscribed during the Moscow discussions in August. In the face of the expressed readiness of the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to negotiate with the Soviet government all outstanding questions regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole in an atmosphere free from duress, the Soviet government has, in fact, persisted in using duress. It has resorted to acts of force rather than to the processes of peaceful settlement. It has imposed and maintained illegal restrictions amounting to a blockade of Berlin. It has failed to work out in good faith four-power arrangements for the control of the currency of that city. Even while the western occupying powers were seeking agreement on measures to implement the understandings reached in Moscow, the Soviet military authorities condoned and encouraged attempts to overthrow the legally-constituted municipal government of Berlin.

"These actions are plainly attempts to nullify unilaterally the rights of the western occupying powers in Berlin, which are co-equal with those of the Soviet Union and like them are derived from the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany and from four-power agreements to which the Soviet government is a party. Moreover, the use of coercive pressure against the western occupying powers is a clear violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

"13. The issue between the Soviet government and the western occupying powers is therefore not that of technical difficulties in communications nor that of reaching agreement upon the conditions for the regulation of the currency for Berlin. The issue is that the Soviet government has clearly shown by its actions that it is attempting by illegal and coercive measures, in disregard of its obligations, to secure political objectives to which it is not entitled and which it could not achieve by peaceful means. It has resorted to blockade measures; it has threatened the Berlin population with starvation, disease and economic ruin; it has tolerated disorders and attempted to overthrow the duly elected municipal government of Berlin.

"The attitude and conduct of the Soviet government reveal sharply its purpose to continue its illegal and coercive blockade and its unlawful actions designed to reduce the status of the United States, the United Kingdom and France as occupying powers in Berlin to one of complete subordination to Soviet rule, and thus to obtain absolute authority over the economic, political and social life of the people of Berlin, and to incorporate the city in the Soviet Zone.

"14.—The Soviet government has thereby taken upon itself sole responsibility for creating a situation, in which further recourse to the means of settlement prescribed in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations is not, in existing circumstances, possible, and which constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In order that international peace and security may not be further endangered, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, therefore, while reserving to themselves full rights to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain in these circumstances their position in Berlin, find themselves obliged to refer the action of the Soviet government to the Security Council of the United Nations."

# Excerpts Taken from Official Instructions

## TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS

Changes in functional responsibility in the field of economics have, in general, rendered those technical instructions no longer appropriate. Many functions previously performed by the Economics Division, OMGUS, and the states have since been assumed by German state and bizonal agencies or by the Bipartite Control Office.

Except as set forth below, all Economics Division (numbered) Memoranda including Nos. 1 through 75 are rescinded.

The provisions of Economics Division Memorandum No 17, "Method of Obtaining Industrial Explosives from the British Zone," April 1, 1946, and Memorandum No 48, "Storage, Safeguarding, Transport and Use of Industrial Explosives Within the German Economy," Aug. 2, 1946, will continue in effect until superseded by published instructions or regulations. — From OMGUS letter AG 300.6 (EA), July 22.

### Charge for Controlled Property

The cost of supervising the administration and custody of foreign owned property in the US Zone of Occupation in Germany which has been placed under control under MG Law No. 52 for reason of absentee ownership has previously been borne entirely by the state governments.

The state governments are hereby authorized to charge fees to cover the cost of supervision by the German state property control agencies of property under control which is owned by residents of countries outside Germany and which is subject to the provisions of the decontrol program announced by Military Government on June 25, 1947 and Oct. 30, 1947.

In the enactment of legislation for the charging of such fees it shall be provided that fee for supervision together with the fee or salary of the custodian of the property shall not substantially exceed the sum of the fees permitted under the German Civil Code for a curator in absentium and the court fee for exercising supervision over the curator. Fees charged and collected shall be used to defray the costs of supervising the administration and custody of properties under control for reason of absentee ownership only and for no other reason.

The total of the fees collected shall not exceed the amount that is necessary to defray the costs of supervising the administration and custody of this category of property. — From OMGUS letter AG 004.21 (PD), Sept. 14.

### Comfort Items Discontinued

The American Red Cross will discontinue the distribution of comfort items to the able-bodied troops Jan. 1, 1949. The Red Cross assumed this responsibility during combat to supplement military issues that at times were not available or were delayed.

The only exceptions where distributions of comfort items to the able-bodied will be effected are replacement depots, ports of embarkation, ports of debarkation and maneuver areas. Also not affected is distribution of comfort items to patients in medical installations. — From EUCOM Weekly Directive No. 37.

### JEIA POL Coupons

Persons ineligible to purchase petroleum products through US Army or EUCOM Exchange System facilities may be serviced at German POL stations upon surrender of JEIA POL coupons. JEIA coupons may be purchased against dollar instruments in the office of the German Travel Agency (Reisebuero) and in the JEIA hotels. — From EUCOM cable SC-16422.

### Snack Bars Restrictions

Indigenous guests will not be permitted in EES snack bars where such snack bars are located within the confines of an ESS store or where the only entrance to a snack bar is by means of an EES store. — EUCOM cable SC-15049.

## Travel by Private Car

The Comptroller General of the United States has held that in cases where the government is not required to pay fare for any travel which might have been performed by rail in Germany, there is no authority for reimbursement of expenses of official travel performed by privately owned conveyance. In view of this decision reimbursement will not be made for official travel in Germany performed by privately owned conveyance. — From EUCOM Weekly Directive No. 35.

## Prohibition on Purchasing

Individual members of the US Occupational Forces, including civilian employees, dependents and authorized Allied and neutral military and civilian personnel within the US Area of control, are prohibited from purchasing food or agricultural supplies such as seeds, plants, fertilizer, tools or machinery from German civilians or business establishments, including producers, wholesalers, retailers, restaurants, or other sources.

Appropriate military commanders are required to enforce such prohibitions under existing and current EUCOM directives and the OMG for each state will render full cooperation and assistance to such military commanders to insure compliance therewith. — Change 4, MGR, Title 15.

## Visiting Foreign Countries

French police have authority to arrest and take action against all personnel subject to EUCOM jurisdiction who violate French laws or regulations while in France. Visiting an Allied country is a privilege accorded members of the US forces by that country.

Personnel apprehended in France for violations will be reported to their unit commanders by the French authorities through the French Liaison Section, whether the French have taken action in the case or not.

Appropriate disciplinary action may be taken and personnel will be denied the privilege of visiting foreign countries. — From EUCOM Weekly Directive No. 35.

## Communications Services

In order to provide efficient teletypewriter service within authorized budget and personnel ceilings, it is directed that the following methods of communication be used to the extent practicable in lieu thereof, according to the urgency and nature of the communication: 1. Army Postal Service; 2. Signal Messenger Service.

Originators of messages are directed to review carefully each proposed message to determine the necessity for transmission by electrical means and, when time permits, dispatch via the above channels. Messages which must be transmitted by electrical means will be edited thoroughly to eliminate unnecessary phrases, with the maximum use made of authorized abbreviations. This will materially reduce the number of words to be transmitted.

Personnel responsible for processing messages, such as executives, adjutants and administrative officers, will review the messages; whenever it appears that the use of other means of transmission would have been appropriate, reconsideration by the originator will be requested. — From EUCOM letter AG 311.1 SIG-AGO, Sept. 2.

## Identification Required

All purchasers except uniformed personnel of the US Armed Forces and Coast Guard will be required to present their valid Identification Card or Passport and EUCOM Exchange System Ration Card upon entrance to an EUCOM Exchange System installation selling merchandise.

Ration cards will be presented by all personnel for each counter purchase of rationed items. Ration cards will be presented by all personnel except uniformed personnel

of the US Armed Forces and Coast Guard for all counter purchases of unrationed items to include the purchase of POL books. — From EUCOM cable SC-17071, Sept. 23.

# Official Instructions

Secondary Training Missions, AG 353 GOT-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 17 Sept. 1948.

Destruction of Classified Trash, Signal Technical Circular No. 19, O/CSO, Hq EUCOM, 17 Sept. 1948.

Local Procurement in Germany by Appropriated and Nonappropriated Fund Agencies of the US Occupation Forces, AG 400.12 GSF-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 22 Sept. 1948.

Appropriation and Projects pertaining to Non-Occupation Costs of JEIA (Indigenous Funds), AG 120 BUD-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 22 Sept. 1948.

Feeding in Approved IRO (PCIRO) Operated and Controlled Refugee and Displaced Persons (UNDPs) Assembly Centers, in US Areas of Control in Germany, AG 383.7 (EA), OMGUS, 23 Sept. 1948. Amends OMGUS letter of Sept. 16, 1947.

Weekly Directive No. 38, Hq EUCOM, 24 Sept. 1948. Lists following:

Sec I—Mail Service in the United Kingdom.

Sec II—Prompt Reply to Communications.

Sec III—Requirements of Selective Service Act of 1948.

Sec IV—Local Procurement Procedures.

Sec V—Signal Corps Training Film. Lists: "Exercise Polar Bear."

Sec VI—Closing of Office of the Field Director, OFLC, Marburg, Germany.

Sec VII—Hotel Accommodation in Paris. Cites Restriction.

Sec VIII—EUCOM Confinement Facilities.

Sec IX—Shoes, Low-Quarter Tan.

Sec X—EUCOM QM School Center Courses.

Sec XI—Signatures on Receiving Reports.

Sec XII—Consolidation of Class B Clubs and Class B Messes.

Sec XIII—Salary Payments to Personnel Outside the US Occupied Zones.

Sec XIV—Quotas for the 7701 EUCOM Band Training Unit.

Sec XV—Disposition of Military Payment Certificates, Transient Personnel.

Sec XVI—EUCOM Multiple Addressee Letters and Cables. Covers Sept. 17 to 23.

Military Government Ordinance No. 34, Amendment No. 3 to Military Government Ordinance No. 6 "Military Government Court for Civil Actions", AG 010.6 (LD), OMGUS, 27 Sept. 1948.

Computation of Occupation Costs, AG 120 (BFD-B), EUCOM Hq (Berlin), 27 Sept. 1948.

Discontinuance of Report MG/Food/72/F, "Food Requirements, Deliveries and Stocks for Displaced Persons in Assembly Centers." AG 383.7 (EA), OMGUS, 28 Sept. 1948.

Appointment of Members to Board of Review, Under Military Government Law No. 59, "Restitution Law", AG 334 (Gen) (PD), OMGUS, 28 Sept. 1948.

Regrading of Security Classification, AG 312.1 AGO, Hq EUCOM, 28 Sept. 1948.

Amendment No. 1 to Military Government Law No. 63, "Third Law for Monetary Reform (Conversion Law)", AG 003 (LD), OMGUS, 29 Sept. 1948. Changes date in par 1 Art 15 from Aug. 20, 1948 to Oct. 20, 1948.

Regulation No. 1 under Military Government Ordinance No. 31, AG 010.6 (LD), OMGUS, 92 Sept. 1948. Establishes Deutsche Mark equivalent for jurisdictional purposes.

Legislation on Freedom of the Press, AG 000.76 (IS), OMGUS, 20 Sept. 1948.

Copies of Official Instructions listed in the Information Bulletin may be obtained by writing directly to the originating headquarters.



# STATION LIST

## MILITARY GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS

### Wuerttemberg-Baden

State Director: Mr. Charles M. LaFollette, Stuttgart.

### 7780th OMGUS Gp., WB Section

Executive Officer: Lt. Col. E. J. Drinkert, Stuttgart.

### Field Relations Division

OMG Wuerttemberg-Baden, APO 154, Stuttgart.

Chief: Mr. Eugene P. Walters, Stuttgart.

### Wuerttemberg Area

MGO, Stuttgart: Mr. M. L. Hoover, Stuttgart.  
MGO, Heilbronn: Mr. J. W. Butler, Heilbronn.  
MGO, Ulm: Mr. J. F. Capell, Ulm.  
MGO, Aalen: Maj. C. A. Palette, Aalen.  
MGO, Backnang: Capt. H. W. Bynum, Backnang.  
MGO, Boeblingen: Mr. L. L. Goldman, Boeblingen.  
MGO, Crailsheim: Capt. R. C. Lawton, Crailsheim.  
MGO, Esslingen: Mr. N. Semaschko, Esslingen.  
MGO, Goepfingen: Mr. N. W. Barber, Goepfingen.  
MGO, Heidenheim: Maj. E. P. Schouten, Heidenheim.  
MGO, Kuenzelsau: Capt. E. L. Poland, Kuenzelsau.  
MGO, Leonberg: 1st Lt. W. B. Henry, Leonberg.  
MGO, Ludwigsburg: Mr. T. E. Griswold, Ludwigsburg.  
MGO, Mergentheim: Mr. B. V. Bloom, Mergentheim.  
MGO, Nuertingen: Capt. C. N. Matthews, Nuertingen.  
MGO, Oehringen: Mr. P. C. Nelson, Oehringen.  
MGO, Schwaebisch-Gmuend: Capt. P. K. Felton, Schwaebisch-Gmuend.  
MGO, Schwaebisch-Hall: Mr. E. E. Oja, Schwaebisch-Hall.  
MGO, Vaihingen: Capt. A. J. Matheny, Vaihingen.  
MGO, Waiblingen: Mr. C. H. Wright, Waiblingen.

### Baden Area

MGO, Karlsruhe: Lt. Col. A. G. Spitz, Karlsruhe.  
MGO, Pforzheim: Mr. R. Lascoe, Pforzheim.  
MGO, Mannheim: Mr. H. Mair, Mannheim.  
MGO, Heidelberg: Mr. W. T. Neel, Heidelberg.  
MGO, Bruchsal: Capt. F. J. Gerken, Bruchsal.  
MGO, Buchen: Maj. F. A. Hubbard, Buchen.  
MGO, Mosbach: Mr. J. Zecca, Mosbach.  
MGO, Sinsheim: Capt. J. Welch, Sinsheim.  
MGO, Tauberbischofsheim: Mr. L. A. McCracken, Tauberbischofsheim.

### Hesse

State Director, Dr. James R. Newman, Wiesbaden.

### Liaison & Security Control Division

OMG Hesse, APO 633, Wiesbaden.  
LSO, Office Bergstrasse: Mr. C. E. Blackman, Heppenheim.  
LSO, Office Darmstadt: Mr. H. P. Radigan, Darmstadt.  
LSO, Suboffice Gross-Gerau: Mr. E. C. Breitenkamp, Gross-Gerau.  
LSO, Office Dieburg: Mr. N. G. Turner, Dieburg.  
LSO, Suboffice Erbach: Mr. G. I. Laskowski, Erbach.  
LSO, Office Eschwege: Maj. A. M. Tunstall, Eschwege.  
LSO, Office Frankfurt: Mr. G. C. Sola, Frankfurt.

LSO, Office Friedberg: Mr. J. W. Jergensen, Friedberg.  
LSO, Suboffice Usingen: Mr. E. S. Wilkens, Usingen.  
LSO, Office Fritzlar-Homberg: Mr. P. E. Perry, Fritzlar.  
LSO, Suboffice Melsungen: Mr. N. A. Hackney, Melsungen.  
LSO, Office Fulda: Mr. M. S. Clark, Fulda.  
LSO, Suboffice Lauterbach: Mr. W. J. Hoffman, Lauterbach.  
LSO, Office Gelnhausen: Mr. J. A. Goodnight, Gelnhausen.  
LSO, Suboffice Schluechtern: Mr. F. J. Green, Schluechtern.  
LSO, Office Giessen: Mr. G. P. Moore, Giessen.  
LSO, Suboffice Alsfeld: Mr. C. M. Henderson, Alsfeld.  
LSO, Office Hanau: Maj. W. P. David, Hanau.  
LSO, Suboffice Buedingen: Capt. T. L. Vitullo, Buedingen.  
LSO, Office Hersfeld: Capt. R. W. Smith, Hersfeld.  
LSO, Suboffice Huenfeld: 1st Lt. A. Abraham, Huenfeld.  
LSO, Office Kassel: Mr. R. A. Goetcheus, Kassel.  
LSO, Suboffice Hofgeismar: Mr. Z. S. Stangwild, Hofgeismar.  
LSO, Suboffice Wolfhagen: Mr. E. L. Kelly, Wolfhagen.  
LSO, Office Marburg: Mr. S. R. Combs, Marburg.  
LSO, Suboffice Biedenkopf: Capt. J. C. Irwin, Biedenkopf.  
LSO, Office Obertaunus: Capt. R. W. Emerson, Bad Homburg.  
LSO, Office Offenbach: Mr. W. R. Sheehan, Offenbach.  
LSO, Office Rotenburg: Capt. H. H. Morrison, Rotenburg.  
LSO, Office Waldeck: Mr. C. Stanton, Korbach.  
LSO, Suboffice Frankenberg: J. M. Lamb, Frankenberg.  
LSO, Office Wetzlar: Mr. J. R. Hyde, Wetzlar.  
LSO, Suboffice Dill: 1st Lt. S. L. Maxwell, Dillenburg.  
LSO, Suboffice Obrelahn: Mr. J. S. Burns, Weilburg.  
LSO, Office Wiesbaden: Maj. C. A. Vollrath, Wiesbaden.  
LSO, Suboffice Limburg: Mr. J. S. Huffner, Limburg.  
LSO, Suboffice Main/Taunus: Capt. J. W. DaLoach, Hofheim.  
LSO, Suboffice Rheingau: Mr. John D. McCabe, Ruedesheim.  
LSO, Suboffice Untertaunus: Mr. G. A. Vadney, Bad Schwalbach.  
LSO, Office Witzenhausen: Capt. D. W. Ross, Witzenhausen.  
LSO, Office Ziegenhain: Mr. R. F. Didlo, Ziegenhain.

### Bavaria

State Director: Mr. Murray D. Van Wagoner, Munich.

### Field Operations Division

OMG Bvaria, APO 407, Munich.  
Director: Mr. K. E. Van Buskirk, Munich.  
Deputy Director: Mr. W. J. Moran, Munich.  
Control Officer: Mr. P. W. Deibel, Munich.

### Branch "A"—Lover Franconia (APO 800)

Branch Chief: Mr. B. N. Narvid, Wuerzburg.  
Deputy Branch Chief: Mr. V. R. Hurst, Wuerzburg.

### Area Bad Kissingen

Area Commander: Mr. A. Robb, Bad Kissingen.  
MGO, Office Bad Kissingen: Lt. S. F. Turner, Bad Kissingen, with suboffice for Neustadt.  
MGO, Office Schweinfurt: Mr. R. L. Rigg, Schweinfurt, with suboffices for Hofheim, Hassfurt and Geroldzhofen.

MGO, Office Mellrichstadt: Lt. C. M. Taylor, Mellrichstadt.  
MGO, Office Bruckenuau: Mr. R. Fogg, Bruckenuau.  
MGO, Office Hammelburg: Lt. J. M. Kinsman, Hammelburg.  
MGO, Office Koenigshofen: Lt. W. C. Clifton, Koenigshofen.

### Area Wuerzburg

Area Commander: Mr. E. C. Wimberly, Wuerzburg.  
MGO, Office Wuerzburg: Mr. P. Bubser, Wuerzburg, with suboffices for Ochsenfurt, Marktheidenfeld, Karlstadt and Gmunden.  
MGO, Office Aschaffenburg: Mr. F. D. Rossborough, Aschaffenburg, with suboffices for Alzenau, Oberruberg, Miltenberg and Lohr.  
MGO, Office Kitzingen: Lt. M. O. Harness, Kitzingen.

### Branch "B" — Upper and Middle Franconia (APO 696)

Branch Chief: Mr. R. M. MacWorter, Nuremberg.  
Deputy Branch Chief: Mr. S. White, Nuremberg.

### Area Nuremberg

Area Commander: Mr. H. T. Lund, Nuremberg.  
MGO, Office Nuremberg: Lt. Col. J. C. Barnett, Nuremberg.  
MGO, Office Fuerth: Mr. J. S. Hilliard, Fuerth.  
MGO, Office Schwabach: Capt. S. G. Real, Schwabach.

### Area Coburg

Area Commander: Mr. S. P. Sussell, Coburg.  
MGO, Office Coburg: Mr. R. D. Walston, Coburg, with suboffices for Ebern, Lichtenfels and Staffelstein.  
MGO, Office Kronach: Lt. S. S. Smith, Kronach.  
MGO, Office Kulmbach: Capt. W. F. McCarthy, Kulmbach.

### Area Hof

Area Commander: Mr. J. D. Brooks, Hof.  
MGO, Office Hof: Capt. A. A. Stanchos, Hof, with suboffice for Munchberg.  
MGO, Office Rehau: Capt. J. M. James, Rehau.  
MGO, Office Wunsiedel: Mr. J. W. Vonier, Wunsiedel.  
MGO, Office Naila: Capt. J. H. Campbell, Naila, with suboffice for Stadtsteinach.

### Area Bayreuth

Area Commander: Mr. C. L. Leven, Bayreuth.  
MGO, Office Bayreuth: Mr. C. M. Pace, Bayreuth, with suboffice for Ebermannstadt.  
MGO, Office Pegnitz: Capt. L. Griffin, Pegnitz.  
MGO, Office Lauf: Maj. W. A. Kelly, Lauf.  
MGO, Office Hersbruck: Lt. L. J. Chamberlain, Hersbruck.

### Area Bamberg

Area Commander: Mr. N. R. Preston, Bamberg.  
MGO, Office Bamberg: Lt. S. R. Mooers, Bamberg.  
MGO, Office Erlangen: Lt. Col. M. K. Barrett, Erlangen, with suboffice for Forchheim.  
MGO, Office Hochstadt: Capt. S. E. Witty, Hochstadt.  
MGO, Office Scheinfeld: Lt. W. J. Hennesy, Scheinfeld, with suboffice for Neustadt.  
MGO, Office Uffenheim: Capt. Q. A. Mitchell, Uffenheim.

### Area Ansbach

Area Commander: Mr. J. C. Joubanc, Ansbach.  
MGO, Office Ansbach: Capt. J. T. Reader, Ansbach, with suboffices for Feuchtwangen and Gunzenhausen.  
MGO, Office Weissenburg: Mr. M. R. Aliff, Weissenburg, with suboffice for Hilpoltstein.  
MGO, Office Eichstadt: Capt. I. W. Edgar, Eichstadt.



MGO, Office Rothenburg: Mr. F. Roessler, Rothenburg.  
MGO, Office Dinkelsbuehl: WOJG R. S. Whaley, Dinkelsbuehl.

### Branch "D" — Lower Bavaria and Upper Palatinate (APO 225)

Branch Chief: Mr. E. F. Warnke, Regensburg.  
Deputy Branch Chief: Mr. J. J. May, Regensburg.

#### Area Regensburg

Area Commander: Mr. L. F. Kealy, Regensburg.  
MGO, Office Regensburg: Capt. W. R. Smallwood, Regensburg, with suboffices for Mallersdorf, Riedenburg and Kelheim.  
MGO, Office Cham: Capt. G. Lafountain, Cham, with suboffices for Neuburg v/W, Roding, Waldmunchen and Koetzing.  
MGO, Office Parsberg: Mr. J. O. Lipman, Parsberg, with suboffice for Beilngries.  
MGO, Office Burglengenfeld: Capt. L. T. Chaquette, Burglengenfeld.  
MGO, Office Neumarkt: Capt. J. B. Spencer, Neumarkt.

#### Area Amberg

Area Commander: Mr. A. J. Dann, Amberg.  
MGO, Office Amberg: Capt. R. J. Van Campen, Amberg, with suboffice for Sulzbach.  
MGO, Office Weiden: Maj. G. H. Swick, Weiden, with suboffices for Oberviechtach and Nabburg.  
MGO, Office Eschenbach: Capt. E. S. Parr, Eschenbach, with suboffice for Kemnath.  
MGO, Office Tirschenreuth: Capt. L. O. Thibodeau, Tirschenreuth.  
MGO, Office Vohenstrauß: Capt. M. C. Gibbons, Vohenstrauß.

#### Area Straubing

Area Commander: Mr. J. T. Lawrence, Straubing.  
MGO, Office Straubing: Maj. C. P. Kropowski, Straubing, with suboffice for Bogen.  
MGO, Office Landshut: Maj. T. G. Shackelford, Landshut, with suboffices for Mainburg, Dingolfing Vilsbiburg and Rottenburg.  
MGO, Office Regen: Lt. W. M. Gardner, Regen.  
MGO, Office Deggendorf: Maj. R. E. Timberlake, Deggendorf, with suboffice for Viechtach.  
MGO, Office Landau: Capt. F. W. Adams, Landau.

#### Area Passau

Area Commander: Mr. A. V. Diguini, Passau.  
MGO, Office Passau: Mr. M. Glossop, Passau, with suboffice for Grafenau.  
MGO, Office Wegscheid: Lt. R. Demarc, Oberrzell.  
MGO, Office Wilshofen: Capt. R. W. Buffington, Wilshofen.  
MGO, Office Griesbach: Capt. J. H. Honour, Griesbach.  
MGO, Office Pfarrkirchen: Mr. C. R. Hansen, Pfarrkirchen.  
MGO, Office Eggenfelden: Lt. I. J. Cooper, Eggenfelden.  
MGO, Office Wolfstein: Lt. R. H. Rivet, Freyung.

### Branch "E" — Upper Bavaria (APO 407)

Branch Chief: Mr. R. F. Wagner, Munich.  
Deputy Branch Chief: Mr. J. A. Walker, Munich.

#### Area Freising

Area Commander: Mr. F. K. Wiest, Freising.  
MGO, Office Freising: Mr. L. W. McAnnally, Freising.  
MGO, Office Pfaffenhofen: Mr. W. Rubin, Pfaffenhofen, with suboffice for Schrobenuhausen.  
MGO, Office Dachau: Capt. G. Jacobson, Dachau, with suboffice for Aichach.  
MGO, Office Erding: Capt. J. F. Nordgren, Erding.  
MGO, Office Ingolstadt: Maj. H. E. Reed, Ingolstadt.

#### Area Garmisch

Area Commander: Mr. William Garlock, Garmisch.  
MGO, Office Garmisch: Capt. R. L. Roye, Garmisch.

MGO, Office Weilheim: Mr. E. W. Schoening, Weilheim.

MGO, Office Schongau: Lt. R. J. Schermer, Schongau.

MGO, Office Starnberg: Mr. J. C. Midzor, Starnberg.

MGO, Office Furstenfeldbruck: Lt. T. C. Wickman, Furstenfeldbruck.

#### Area Munich

Area Commander: Mr. J. H. Kelly, Munich.  
Deputy Commander: Mr. L. Roberts, Munich.

#### Area Toelz

Area Commander: Mr. G. H. Godfrey, Bad Toelz.  
MGO, Office Toelz: Mr. F. F. Egger, Bad Toelz.  
MGO, Office Aibling: Mr. F. W. Schillig, Aibling, with suboffice for Ebersberg.  
MGO, Office Wolfratshausen: Mr. M. A. Weightman, Wolfratshausen.  
MGO, Office Miesbach: Mr. W. R. Corbett, Miesbach.

#### Area Rosenheim

Area Commander: Mr. L. Emerik, Rosenheim.  
MGO, Office Rosenheim: Lt. J. L. Allison, Rosenheim.  
MGO, Office Traunstein: Mr. R. A. Wickman, Traunstein, with suboffice for Laufen.  
MGO, Office Wasserburg: Capt. L. Jones, Wasserburg.  
MGO, Office Muhlendorf: Mr. G. F. McMahon, Muhlendorf.  
MGO, Office Altoetting: Mr. W. G. Keene, Altoetting.  
MGO, Office Berchtesgaden: Lt. Col. S. R. Place, Berchtesgaden.

### Branch "G" — Swabia (APO 178)

Branch Chief: Mr. W. C. Rhine, Augsburg.  
Deputy Branch Chief: Mr. H. D. Hart, Augsburg.

#### Area Augsburg

Area Commander: Mr. D. S. Root, Augsburg.  
MGO, Office Augsburg: Mr. R. Q. Pettifils, Augsburg, with suboffice for Friedberg.  
MGO, Office Schwabmunchen: Lt. M. E. Hecht, Schwabmunchen.  
MGO, Office Gunzburg: Mr. J. R. Barker, Gunzburg, with suboffice for Krumbach.  
MGO, Office Neu-Ulm: Capt. R. S. Hardison, Neu-Ulm, with suboffice for Illertissen.  
MGO, Office Dillingen: Capt. J. T. Mulcahey, Jr., Dillingen, with suboffice for Wertingen.  
MGO, Office Neuburg a/D: Mr. T. E. Eshelman, Neuburg a/D.  
MGO, Office Donauwoerth: Mr. D. G. Reck, Donauwoerth.  
MGO, Office Landsberg: Mr. A. J. Sikora, Landsberg.

#### Area Kempten

Area Commander: Mr. S. Siskind, Kempten.  
MGO, Office Kempten: Mr. J. P. Montgomery, Kempten.  
MGO, Office Sonthofen: Mr. J. K. Huston, Sonthofen.  
MGO, Office Fuessen: Capt. R. W. Anderson, Fuessen.  
MGO, Office Markt Oberdorf: Capt. E. E. Jones, Markt Oberdorf.  
MGO, Office Memmingen: Mr. D. J. Angers, Memmingen.  
MGO, Office Mindelheim: Mr. J. L. Ott, Mindelheim.  
MGO, Office Kaufbeuren: Maj. M. G. Norum, Kaufbeuren.

### Bremen

State Director: Mr. Thomas F. Dunn, Bremen.  
OMG Bremen, APO 751, Bremen.  
MGO, Bremerhaven Det.: Mr. Edward E. Merone, Bremerhaven.

### Berlin Sector

Director: Col. Frank L. Howley, Berlin.  
OMG Berlin Sector, APO 742-A, Berlin.  
Liaison Officers (with mayor and borough presidents):  
Berlin City: Mr. K. F. Mautner.  
Neukoelln: Mr. Daniel J. Harkins.  
Kreuzberg: Mr. C. J. Melchers.  
Schoeneberg: Mr. C. J. Melchers.  
Steglitz: Mr. Walter J. Pugh.  
Tempelhof: Mr. Daniel J. Harkins.  
Zehlendorf: Mr. Walter J. Pugh.

## Firms Off Blacklist

The Joint Export-Import Agency has announced that 27 firms have been deleted from the US-UK government list of foreign firms considered undesirable business contacts (see Information Bulletin, No. 137, June 15, 1948).

The following firms have been deleted from the "undesirable" list and German firms, therefore, may now do business with them:

#### Sweden:

Adol, AB., Stockholm.  
J. M. Boehm, AB., Stockholm.  
Deutsche Amerika Line Svenska, AB., Dalagatan 6, Stockholm.  
Duerkopf, AB., Goeteborg.  
H. & A. Gratenau, AB., Smalandsgatan 4, Stockholm.  
Mey-Kragen, AB., Camla Brogatan 32, Stockholm.  
Forvaltningstaktiebolaget Mona, AB., Malmoe.  
Nordisk Stenindustri, AB., Goeteborg.  
Svenska, AB., Rember, Stockholm.  
Wolff, Otto, AB., Stockholm.

#### Spain:

Sociedad Espanola del Acumulador, SA.

#### Switzerland:

Dornier Werke, AG., Altenheinn, St. Gallen.  
Lorenz, C., AG., Berlin, Zweigniederlassung Bern, Bubenberplatz 10, Bern.  
Manometer, AG., Andreasstr. 9, Zurich.  
Scientia AG., Feldeggstr. 12, Zurich.  
Stallman, Gebr., Heiden.

#### Portugal:

Beiras (Soc. Miniera Das), 441, Rua da Constituicao, Oporto.  
Castelos (Soc. Miniera Das), 441, Rua da Constituicao, Oporto.  
Folgar, Cia. Miniera De, Rua da Constituicao 441, Oporto.  
Lisbonense, AG., Soc. Miniera, 441, Rua da Constituicao, Oporto.  
Mat da Bainha, Lda., 441, Rua da Constituicao, Oporto.  
Sabrosas (Empresa Miniera Da), 441, Rua da Constituicao, Oporto.  
Siemens Reiniger, Sarl, Rua de Santa Marta 33A and 31, Lisbon, and Rua Candido dos Reis 120, Oporto.  
Silvicola (Cia. Miniera), 441, Rua da Constituicao, Oporto.  
Trancosa (Soc. Miniera De, Lda), Rua da Constituicao 441, Oporto.  
Tungstenia Lda, 441, Rua da Constituicao, Oporto.  
Volfrestania, Lda, 441, Rua da Constituicao, Oporto.

## EUCOM Changes

The EUCOM Central Locator File of the Machine Records Branch, AG Division, EUCOM headquarters, is now located in Heidelberg and can be reached by telephoning Heid Mil 02101/02116/02197.

Machine Records Branch, AG Division, EUCOM headquarters, moved to Heidelberg on Sept. 20. Morning reports and related documents prepared subsequent to that date are to be forwarded to Hq EUCOM, APO 403, US Army (Attention: AG Machine Records Branch). — From EUCOM Weekly Directive No. 37.

## New APO Addresses

Effective Sept. 20, APO 124 commenced operations at Burtonwood, England, and APO 125 at Bushey Park, Hampton Court, Middlesex, England. The address for the Third Air Division will be APO 125.