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
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
BERLIN SECTOR, FROM JULY 1, 1945 TO SEPT. 1, 1949











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# A FOUR YEAR REPORT

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Territory

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT U. S. SECTOR, BERLIN

JULY 1, 1945 - SEPTEMBER 1, 1949

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
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**F**RANK L. HOWLEY came to Berlin on July 1, 1945, lecding an American Military Government detachment of some 300 officers and men. Since that date, as U.S. Commandant and Director of Military Government, he has worked in close, continuous contact with the top officials of three other nations, seeking together to administer and revive the battered former capital of Germany.

This four-power city, where a second World War ended and a third could have begun, has for four years been a crucial area of clash for the opposing ideologies of West and East. And much of the success of America's stand in Berlin can be credited to the energy, the leadership, and the decisiveness of Brig. Gen. Howley.

The Berlin assignment was, and has remained one without precedent in history. An international Kommandatura, at which unanimity was the rule, administered the city. A degree of autonomy was retained, however, by each of the four Commandants for intra-sectoral problems.

The city was physically shattered, having been the target for 75,000 tons of bombs during the war, and the scene of vicious, no-quarter street fighting during the closing days of the Nazi regime. Its population was undernourished, epidemic-ridden, and demoralized. A twelve-year tradition of National Socialism had to be deracinated and in its place planted new spirit which would permit a democratic Germany once again to join the family of nations.

To the monumental job of U.S. Commandant, Howley, now 46, brought a broad background of leadership and practical experience. He was educated at New York University and at the Sorbonne in Paris. During the depression years he built a Philadelphia advertising agency into a nationally-known business.

He entered the Officers Reserve Corps in 1932 and eight years later was called to active duty. His first assignment was as Captain and Commanding Officer of an Air Corps ground school. In 1941, he became Operations Officer of the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas.

With the Third Cavalry Regiment at Camp Gordon, Georgia, he was assigned Executive Officer and promoted to Lieut. Col. A maneuvering accident forced his transfer to Civil Affairs.

In 1943, in England, he was given command of the British-U.S. Civil Affairs Detachment, A1-A1. During the invasion of Normandy, the detachment accompanied combat troops across Omaha Beach.

While the Ninth Division pushed the Germans out of Cherbourg and strong fighting was still in progress in the city, Colonel Howley's group re-organized the local government and resuscitated the stunned city administration.


The Cherbourg Civil Affairs operation was subsequently described by Allied observers as "efficient beyond all expectations".

His next assignment was in Paris, where he headed a combined British-U.S.-French detachment of 136 officers and 300 enlisted men, and entered the French capital with the first combat troops.

In Berlin, Brig. Gen. Howley has conferred more than 2,000 hours with the Russians, British, and French.

The retiring U.S. Commandant will not be soon forgotten in Berlin, where, with a team of topflight specialists, he symbolized for four years America's stand against Soviet pressure, threats, and siege.

Behind him in Berlin, Brig. Gen. Howley leaves the extraordinary appreciation and gratitude of its German population, whom he has been instrumental in guiding towards the ideals of a truly democratic and responsible society.





AMORAL HERIZOG

III

OPEL - OLYMPIA



Berlin's first post-war winter was cold, hungry. The tasks of Military Government were immense.

> Military Government policies upon the Germans has been tremendous.

> By unanimous vote we have succeeded in giving the City of Berlin a complete school reform which is the basis for the end of class distinction in the city. We have created a city constitution and held

city-wide elections under Four-Power supervision. Nazis were removed from all levels of public influence.

The list of accomplishments is long. Any comments which are made in this report are not comments of those who have failed completely in quadri-

partite matters, but of those who have come closer to succeeding than any other agency which has yet been tried.

The number of agreements at the Allied Kommandatura Berlin exceeds 1,200 and even includes agreed loans to Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish churches.

We have succeeded in reviving the social and political life of the city. We have guided Berlin Germans to a concept of democracy similar to our own. We have *not* succeeded in reaching agreements in those fundamental conflicts between Russian communism and western democracy.


In Berlin, as elsewhere in the world, the aims of the Communist Party, called the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), have been to get complete control of the economic and political life of the city. The German Communist Party in this struggle has been aided, advised, directed, and supported by the Russian occupying troops and by the Russian Military Administration. It is



impractical to separate the missions of the Soviet Military Administration and the Communist Party.

Before our arrival, on the first of July, 1945, the control of the city was entirely in the hands of the Soviet Administration and the Communist Party. The government had been set up with certain "non-party" front men, but

7



the real power was in the hands of such persons as Deputy Oberbürgermeister Maron, of Chwalek, Jendretzki, and Schlimme in control of trade unions, Markgraf for police, Mittag of the Magistrat as head judiciary. (His background was that of locksmith.) Education was under Wildangel. Control of labor for the government was under Schmidt.

These leaders and other key individuals were all Moscow-trained German communists.

From an economic point of view, the city had been stripped, particularly the western sectors. Everything movable of real value from the equipment of the American-owned Singer Sewing Machine Company plant to the power equipment of the modern Berlin-West Power Plant had been removed.

way of the Soviet printed "Allied invasion currency".

Upon the arrival of the Western Military Governments all actions which had been taken by the Soviet Military Administration and its appointed city government were confirmed by us. In fact, by a sweeping order of the Allied Kommandatura Berlin, we approved all orders which had been issued by the Soviets and the Soviet-appointed city government.

We tried to understand and to sympathize with the type of economic and political set-up which we found here on the basis of its being reasonable in the light of the circumstances. We were determined to "get along" with our great war-time friend.


We did, however, insist upon early elections, so that the people would have a chance to choose for themselves the type of government they wanted. The elections held on October 20, 1946, resulted in an emphatic rejection

of the Communist Party. It received less than 20% of the votes throughout the city. Both the economic and political control of the city began to slip from the hands of the Communist Party and the Soviet Military Administration.

Their efforts to hold and increase those controls have been the basic cause of Allied friction in Berlin. The Western Commandants on their side have simply insisted that agreements be lived up to and that both the political and economic control of the City of Berlin be a mutual responsibility with all four occupying powers sharing in that responsibility.

The first step taken after the October, 1946 elections by the Soviets and the Communist Party was that of pressure upon the elected officials to force coalition action with the communist minority. The impeach-





ment of Oberbürgermeister Ostrowski resulted.

A greater leverage grew out of the fact that all legislation and all acts of the city government had to be approved unanimously in advance at the Allied Kommandatura Berlin. Therefore, the Soviet representative, by means of the veto, was able to give the German government communist minority reflected veto power over the actions of the majority.

When the elected city government refused to acquiesce to various indirect threats and pressures, direct action was taken against the elected government by the Soviets. Organized communist mobs hauled to the scene in Russian tanks and trucks used violence against the elected democratic city officials, while Soviet controlled police stood by refusing protection.

Even so, the city government refused to capitulate. It moved to the western sectors for protection. Outstanding proof of the people's support was given when more than 300,000 Berliners walked to the *Reichstag* area in the British Sector and in a mass demonstration publicly proclaimed their belief in the government which they had elected.

When the German government and the Berlin people refused to capitulate, it was natural that pressure should be directed against the Western Powers to drive them from the city. It was recognized by all that, if the Western Powers were not in the City of Berlin, the Germans would have no choice except to bow to a one-party communist system and to Soviet economic exploitation.

The squeeze to drive the Western Powers from Berlin began intensively the first week in March, 1948. First the Allied Kommandatura Berlin had its effectiveness ended by the Soviet Com-

mandant, his deputy, and committeemen.

This was coupled with a violent newspaper and press campaign, blaming the Western Powers for what the Russians were themselves doing. The Soviet press campaign was also designed to make the Western Allies unpopular with the German population.

The final act was the blockade of Berlin, carried out by the Russian Army and supported by the Communist Party.

First, the Western Powers were refused the use of the only main road into Berlin from the West—the Autobahn. The reason given was that the bridge (which incidentally had been built by American engineers) was in need of repairs. Vehicles were subjected to driving miles down a poor road to cross over the Elbe by a hand ferry. The



reason for cutting off the canal traffic from the West was given as "need of lock repairs", and finally, when on June 22, 1948, the railroad was completely shut off, Marshal Sokolovski's excuse was "technical difficulties".

The plan was very obvious. Nearly two and a quarter million persons, along with the Allied families and troops in Berlin, were to be starved out of the city. It was believed that the people would rise up in their suffering and ask us to leave so that they might live.

That a Berlin "horror story" did not take place was not due to any Soviet change of heart. It didn't happen, because we Westerners prevented its happening. As early as March, the Western Commandants began to stock food, coal, and medical supplies in the western sectors in anticipation of just such an emergency.

We refused to believe that our "Ally" would do this, but as military men we were compelled to think of the possibility in view of the growing Soviet hostility and in view of the unguarded remarks which were reaching us by way of German political, social, and religious leaders.



The job of reconstruction, both physical and moral, has been a tremendous one.

When the Russian-imposed blockade struck, the Western Powers had thirty-six days' supply of food, thirty days' supply of coal and other items of vital importance. These stocks gave us time to think and to plan.

In Berlin, the three Western Commandants met with their experts and calculated the minimum tonnage which would be necessary to keep the western sectors alive. It was no small task to condense the requirements of over two million persons from 20,000 tons of imports a day to a maximum average of 8,000 tons a day. Meantime, at higher levels calculations and plans were being made.

On June 26, 1948, the American Headquarters for Germany informed me that the small Air Lift which had been bringing in supplies for the military garrison would be increased immediately to bring in essential stocks for the German population.

There were those in the Berlin tripartite discussions who felt that the population of Berlin could not be maintained by air. They felt that the population would desert their newly-acquired democratic ideas and would, for the sake of avoiding personal privations, swing their loyalities to the East.

Even some of the leading German officials were uncertain of the population. We in OMGBS never questioned that the vast majority of Berliners would stand by their newly-acquired independence.

Within two weeks the calculations were agreed to by the three Western

Commandants in Berlin. The first big cut in tonnage came in food—all food became dehydrated, starting with potatoes.

When the planning was made in the summer of 1948, in the back of everyone's mind was the fear of a cold winter. We had had such a cold winter in 1946/47 when, even with road and railroad facilities available to bring in coal, hundreds of persons froze to death in this city, which is as far north as Labrador.

It is a great tribute to the courage of the Western Powers and to the technical knowledge of the experts that successful plans were prepared to cover the period of July, 1948, to the first of March, 1949.



The West Berliner has visibly profited from the experience of seeing democracy at work.

All of these calculations were worked out on a tripartite basis at Berlin level and coordinated into schemes at higher levels, including the meshing in with the British and American Air Forces.

One year of Air Litt has been completed, facilities for handling goods by air have reached up to 12,000 tons per day. The Russian blockade completely failed to drive the Western Powers from Berlin and failed to drive the German people into the arms of communism. The counter-blockade measures of the Allies were strongly felt by the Soviet-controlled areas.

Furthermore, the propaganda value in Europe of the Air Lift to counter the continuous din in the communist press of the economic and moral collapse of the western democracies was tremendous.

Today, the US and its Allies, Great Britain and France, enjoy a prestige in Berlin greater than at any time since the war. Berlin looks forward to an opportunity to continue its progress along the path of democracy.

In the Office of Military Government, Berlin Sector we have followed a business-like policy of realism in dealing with our Allies, with the Russians and the German people. This report tells how each of the branches of U.S. Military Government in Berlin played its part. Since July 1, 1945, the individuals have changed. (The turnover of personnel on this back-breaking job has been approximately 300%). We have never faltered in our determination to make no compromise of American principles.

frantil

# STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OF GREATER BERLIN

FROM THE BERLIN CONSTITUTION: "The whole of the German citizens of Greater Berlin express their will through their elected representative bodies."

**IS COMMITTEES :** 


# CITY ASSEMBLY (STADTVERORDNETEN - VERSAMMLUNG)

CHAIRMAN: DR. OTTO SUHR (SPD) DEPUTIES: RAUSCH (CDU), MARKEWITZ (FDP)

#### 130 ELECTED ASSEMBLY MEMBERS

FROM THE BERLIN CONSTITUTION: "The Stadtverordneten-Versammlung is constituted on ground

of general, equal, direct and secret election by the inhabitants of Berlin, who are entitled to vote according to the principles of proportional representation



\* TOTAL OF 18 DEPARTMENTS AUTHORIZED BY CONSTITUTION

Berliners voled overwhelmingly against Communist policies and methods in the 1946 city elections

# CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Political developments in Berlin, as shaped by the Allied Occupation since Germany's collapse, fall roughly into four major phases:

Exclusive Soviet Occupation (May, June, 1945), Quadripartite control on a relatively smooth basis (July, 1945—October, 1946),

Soviet obstruction and deterioration of Allied relations (October, 1946—June, 1948), and

Blockade and post-blockade period with increasing German legislative responsibility (June, 1948—).

During the initial period, the Soviet Military Administration installed communists, communistsympathizers, or figureheads whom they thoroughly controlled in practically all important offices in the Magistrat and in the twenty borough administrations.

Although this initial Soviet Occupation period was characterized by many verified instances of rape, looting, and various other acts of terror, these events were merely coincidental to Soviet political plans to impose a totalitarian system on all of Berlin like that now established in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Functions of the Civil Administration and Political Affairs Branch

1) Supervision of the operations of government in the U.S. Sector of Berlin and representation of U.S. policy in supervision of citywide government and city officials. The handling of elections, census, and supervision of political organizations.

2) Representation on the Local Government Committee (later changed to Civil Administration Committee) of the Allied Kommandatura and advice to U.S. representatives on quadripartite (later tripartite) bodies in connection with politics and governmental affairs.

3) Advice and planning in connection with the operation of political parties and the necessary liaison with political leaders and political agencies, together with a continuing study of the political situation.

4) The preparation of reports and analyses pertaining to political operations, the political situation, and municipal administration.

Berliners were shocked and apathetic following the city's surrender and were concerned almost exclusively with problems of food and shelter. During their two months alone in Berlin, the Soviets took full advantage of this apathy, and were extremely active in establishing new political parties, in the formation of a city-wide, communistdominated trade union (the Free German General Trade Union), and various communist-front organizations, such as the so-called *Kulturbund*.

> The four political parties authorized by the Soviets on June 10, 1945, included the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

> The program and aims of the overt Communist Party require no comment. The SPD stood for evolutionary socialism by democratic means (the ballot), had strong trade union affiliations, and was largely a working class party. The CDU was moderately conservative, anti-Marxian, had strong ties with both Catholic and

Protestant (Lutheran) groups, and may be called a "middle class party". The LDP (whose name changed to Free Democratic Party early in 1949) stood for private enterprise and the restoration of church and state and it, too, has been a middle class party.

The second phase of political development in the city, from the inception of the quadripartite control of Greater Berlin on July 11, 1945, until the autumn of 1946, was characterized by a relatively smooth working, on the surface at least and with minor exceptions, of the Allied Kommandatura and its various constituent committees.

Explanation of this era of seeming "good feeling" lies in part at least in the fact that the British, French, and U.S. representatives, in the spirit of good will and mutual trust, agreed to accept as valid all decrees and administrative acts of the Soviets during the two-month period preceding the establishment of quadripartite control. These included, as mentioned, the installation of communists or other persons controlled by the Soviets in virtually all key positions in the city government.

TO THE BER	LIN MAGISTRAT:
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WE FEEL THAT THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT TO.THE CITY OF BERLIN IS A HISTORIC OCCASION. IN FORWARDING THIS DOCUMENT TO THE MAGISTRAT...THE OCCUPATION FORCES RETT-ERATE THEIR PURPOSE TO ESTABLISH FOLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN ESCLIN AND TO RESTORE TO THE PROFILE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETER-MINATION IN THEIR GOVERNMENT. "BEERLIN FOR THE FIRST TIME RECEIVED A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITU-TION IN 1920. BUT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE NAZI REGIMZ, FOLITICAL LIBERTY DETERIORATED UNTIL THE AIMINISTRATIVE AND GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY OF THE CITY BECAME MERELY A TOL IN THE HANDS OF THE FASCIST FOWER.

"THIS CONSTITUTION OF 1946 IS A TEMPORARY TO ED TO RESPORE POLITICAL FREEDOM AND FLACT THE PEOPLE OF BERLIN. IT PLACE Commandants' IN THE HANDS OF THE ELECT letter which accompanied INTO A CONTACT APProval of Berlin's temporary constitution.

Consequently, the Soviets directly or indirectly exercised a very great degree of influence on all phases of municipal administration in Greater Berlin, until a new administration was chosen by elected representatives of the people in the fall of 1946.

In the second half of 1945 and in early 1946 the Soviets made a great effort to strengthen and expand the position of the Communist Party by attempting to form an Anti-Fascist Unity Front with the other three parties, in which the Communist Party would be the "coordinator". This scheme failed.

Nevertheless, the Soviets managed to engineer the "merger" of a small group of SPD functionaries and central board members with the Communist Party in mid-April, 1946, to form the so-called "Socialist Unity Party" (SED), although in a referendum on March 31, 1946, the SPD rank and file in the three western sectors had voted overwhelmingly against merging with the KPD. (The referendum was banned in the Soviet Sector by the Soviet Military Administration.)

In view of the unrepresentative character of the Soviet-appointed Magistrat city administration and its declining popularity, the U.S. delegation at the Allied Kommandatura early in 1946 began pressing for city-wide elections which, in turn, necessitated the prior drafting of a constitution.

The Soviets advanced a number of arguments against popular elections—that it would be years before Berliners were sufficiently advanced politically, that an extensive census would have to be undertaken, and so on—but in the end they agreed to an election to be held on October 20, 1946, after the matter had been referred to the Allied Control Authority.

# **Temporary Constitution Approved**

A temporary constitution for Berlin was approved by the Allied Kommandatura on July 19, 1946, on the basis of a draft submitted by the Magistrat that was similar to the Berlin Constitution of 1920 and the amendments of 1931. Differences in national concepts had to be adjusted and compromised at the various meetings of that committee in rewriting the Magistrat's draft, many essential features of which were retained.

Among other things, the constitution provided for a City Assembly of 130 members, elected for a two-year term, as the legislative body, a Magistrat headed by the *Oberbürgermeister*, as the executive, and also set forth the powers and responsibilities of both bodies.

The Allied Kommandatura's letter of August 13, 1946, signed by the four Commandants, which accompanied the new constitution to the Oberbürgermeister, stressed that it was a temporary document intended to restore political freedom and to place it in the hands of the people of Berlin.

Article 36 of the temporary constitution of Berlin, however, contained a stipulation that all legislative enactments of the City Assembly, as well as ordinances and instructions of the Magistrat and the appointment and discharge of leading officials of the administration or resignation of the Magistrat or any of its members, required the sanction (approval by unanimous vote) of the Allied Kommandatura, in order to become effective. This article, it later developed, was misused by the Soviet delegation to obstruct and virtually disrupt the city administration.

# **Communists Trounced in 1946 Elections**

The first democratic elections in Berlin in 14 years were held on October 20, 1946. Extensive preparations were made by the Local Government Committee of the Kommandatura, serving as a quadripartite election committee, to provide quadripartite teams carefully briefed to ensure free and fair elections.

The election campaign was characterized, however, by terror tactics on the part of the Sovietsponsored SED against the SPD, coupled with outbursts of vituperation by the Soviet-controlled press, which were calculated to intimidate the electorate, but which definitely boomeranged, as shown by the election results.

Everything went smoothly on election day, however, and there was considerable international interest in the outcome, as far as it was indicative of an ideological and a political test of the Berlin electorate. The SED apparently did not foresee the degree of its defeat at the polls, and the showing by the SPD was greater than had been anticipated. The election results on October 20, 1946, were as follows:

Party	Popular Vote	% of Total	Assembly Seats
SPD	1,015,609	48.7	63
CDU	462,425	22.2	29
SED	412,582	19.8	26
LDP	194,722	9.3	12

Qualified voters totalled 2,307,122, of whom 2,128,677 (or 92.3%) cast ballots. Invalid votes numbered 43,339 (or 2%). The participation per-



Communist Party propaganda flooded the city during the 1946 election campaign. Campaign poster on right reads: "Fascist terror robbed us of our freedom. But it did not break our spirit." Below: East Sector police banner proclaims: "The Soviet Union is Germany's best friend."



centage of total eligible voters greatly exceeded that registered in all the Berlin city-wide elections held during the Weimar Republic.

Although the poor showing of the SED was in part an expression of disapproval by the Berlin electorate for the Soviet Military Administration, which more or less openly backed the SED, the conclusion was obvious that the people of Berlin were dissatisfied with the municipal administration unilaterally imposed on them by one power at the outset and that they wanted a change. In striking contrast to the attitude towards the city government which the Soviets had appointed in May-June, 1945, the Soviets employed every possible means to hamper and obstruct the democratically elected city government that arose from the October 20, 1946 elections.

This third phase of Berlin's political and municipal, development under Allied Occupation continued from the October, 1946 elections until the Soviet imposition of the road, rail, and water blockade of Berlin on June 24, 1948. The period was marked by a steady deterioration of Allied relations (i. e., U.S.S.R. vs. Western Allies) and the withdrawal of the Soviets from both the Allied Control Council and the Allied Kommandatura.

# **New Civil Administration Problems**

A new Magistrat of 18 members, headed by Dr. Ostrowski (SPD) as Oberbürgermeister, was chosen on December 5, 1946, by the recently elected City Assembly (Stadtverordnetenversammlung). This action immediately precipitated a bitter dispute in the Allied Kommandatura, because the Soviets persisted in the untenable claim that, according to Article 36 of the temporary constitution (discussed above), elected officials of the city government required prior approval by the Allied Kommandatura before they could take office.



All but two of the eighteen elected Magistrat members finally received Allied Kommandatura approval, however, but the Soviets continued to use Article 36 to prevent the removal by the elected Magistrat of any of the large number of Sovietappointed leading officials of the city administration, the greater number of whom were not politically in sympathy with the newly elected city government, but rather strongly opposed to it.

This meant that Magistrat heads of departments, such as Economics, Labor, Finance, Food, Public Welfare, and so on, were saddled with deputies or other leading officials upon whom they could not rely.

Moreover, the Soviet delegation systematically abused the veto right, also under Article 36, requiring Allied Kommandatura approval of all legislative acts of the city government, in order to obstruct legislation not in line with Soviet plans. In contrast, the U.S., British, and French delegations endeavored to give the city administration a high degree of genuine self-government.



Nonetheless, Dr. Ostrowski, the new SPD Oberbürgermeister, soon realizing that Soviet intransigence was practically making the proper functioning of the city administration impossible, made a deal with the Soviet-sponsored SED in February, 1947. This was promptly discovered by the SPD, and his action was disavowed in the City Assembly on April 11, 1947, by 80 votes against 20 SED votes in opposition.

The Soviets then tried unsuccessfully to block the acceptance of Dr. Ostrowski's resignation, and vetoed on June 27, 1947, the election of Professor Ernst Reuter (SPD) as *Oberbürgermeister*, who had been chosen by a City Assembly vote of 89 to 17 and against whom they were unable to produce any derogation of a factual nature.

# **Reuter Unanimously Elected Mayor**

On the contrary, Professor Reuter was an experienced and capable municipal administrator of considerable reputation, but the Soviets objected because he had been secretary general of the KPD for a very brief period following World War I and had then become a Social Democrat.

*Frau* Louise Schroeder (SPD) then continued as Acting *Bürgermeister* until December 7, 1948, two days after the West Berlin elections, when Professor Reuter was unanimously elected Oberbürgermeister.

The Allied Kommandatura, after months of discussion and argument in its Local Government Committee, authorized in a regulation issued on March 22, 1947, the formation of non-political organizations, but the Soviet delegation, it later developed, would agree to authorize practically none of the specific applications filed for this purpose.

Fortunately, there was an escape clause in the regulation, providing for sectoral authorization, under which approximately 300 non-political organizations (clubs and associations of various kinds) were approved in the U.S. Sector by the spring of 1948. During this period only seven non-political

organizations were reported authorized in the Soviet Sector.

Political organizations could be authorized on a city-wide basis only in an Allied Kommandatura regulation of January 23, 1947, and here again the Soviets were very reluctant to act favorably on applications other than communist-front organizations, such as the Free German Youth (FDJ) and Democratic Women's League (DFB).

In exchange for the U.S., French, and British agreement to authorize the two organizations named, the Soviets had to pay the distasteful price of authorization for corresponding genuinely democratic groups sponsored chiefly in the west sectors.

Fundamental differences between the Soviets and Western Allies were reflected in the many hours of heated debate in the Local Government Committee and at higher levels of the Allied Kommandatura on the Socialization of Industry Bill and the Implementing Regulation submitted by the city government in March and September, 1947, respectively.

The Bill and Implementing Regulations were vague, ambiguous, and indefinite as to compensation and certain other essential features. But the Soviets steadfastly refused to agree to a correction of these defects up to the time they walked out of the Kommandatura on June 16, 1948.

# **Vicious Soviet Press Attacks**

Accelerated political activity by the Soviets was evidenced toward the end of 1947 and early 1948 after the abortive outcome of the London Conference in December of 1947. The Soviet-licensed press in Berlin became more vituperative in its attacks on the Western Allies, especially the United States, and on non-communist German political leaders. U.S.-licensed publications were repeatedly confiscated in the Soviet Zone and Soviet Sector in violation of Allied Control Authority Directive No. 55.

The city government held an impressive centennial celebration of the German revolution of 1848 at the *Städtisches Opernhaus* on March 18th.

A special session of the City Assembly was also held on the same date in the presence of the West Berlin Commandants.

The so-called Volkskongress (People's Congress). a communist-controlled group presuming to represent the people of Germany, met in Berlin at the Staatsoper on March 17-18, 1948, attended by some 2,000 "delegates". The Soviet-inspired group, including its consultative organ, the so-called Volksrat (People's Council), has apparently not lived up to expectations. When Marshal Sokolovsky walked out of the Control Council two days later, March 20, 1948, he declared, among other things, that the Volkskongress should draw up a new constitution for a German republic, in order that the Control Council might be replaced as soon as possible.

A new draft constitution for Greater Berlin was passed by the City Assembly with an 80 percent majority vote (only the SED opposed it) and was submitted for approval to the Allied Kommandatura on April 28, 1948. Judged by modern legal standards, the new constitution represented advanced liberal thinking, with the rights and security of the individual comprehensively defined and emphasized.

It met with strong Soviet opposition in the course of several Local Government Committee meetings prior to the Soviet withdrawal on June 16th, although the U.S., British, and French were prepared to accept the new draft in principle. The new draft constitution contained no veto provisions corresponding to those of Article 36 of the temporary constitution of 1946, which the Soviets had invoked so frequently to harass and stymie the elected city government.

# Heated Debates in Kommandatura

The Soviets intensified their efforts to discredit and paralyze the conduct of quadripartite control activities. On May 28, 1948, a meeting of the Commandants at the Allied Kommandatura was characterized by fifteen hours of vilification and abuse on the part of the Soviet delegation.

At a subsequent Commandants' meeting on June 16th, almost as long and equally abusive in tone, the Soviet delegation walked out on the pretext that the U.S. Commandant had been discourteous in leaving the meeting (see page 26), although the Chairman (French) had given permission for the U.S. deputy to take over.

A communist-inspired riot occurred at the City Assembly meeting on June 23, 1948, in which some of the Assembly members were beaten up. This was the first of the SED mob demonstrations at the City Hall which later necessitated a shift of the City Assembly from the Soviet to the western sectors.

The increasing travel and transport restrictions imposed by the Soviets on traffic between Berlin and Western Germany, beginning on April 1, 1948. culminated in the complete rail, water, and road blockade imposed on June 24, 1948, in the final effort to force the Western Allies out of Berlin, so that the entire city would be in Soviet hands.

# Soviets Violate Finance Agreement

Concurrently, the Soviet Military Administration on June 23, introduced unilaterally the new East Mark as sole currency for Greater Berlin in violation of quadripartite control agreements. This led to the introduction of the West Mark as a supplementary currency in the west sectors, but the Soviets banned it in their sector.

This Soviet unilateral action in the financial field had severe political and governmental repercussions, not to mention the economic and financial effects on the life of Greater Berlin, as described in this history under Finance.

When the Soviets imposed a complete land blockade on West Berlin, the reaction of the citizenry showed a more alert and conscious attitude than ever before in regard to their political liberties. The three democratic parties—the SPD, CDU, and LDP (now FDP)-held a number of joint demonstrations.

One held at the Schöneberg Borough Hall on July 11, 1948, was especially noteworthy, since Oberbürgermeister Reuter condemned the Soviet blockade in very sharp language and reiterated the unshakable will of the Berliners to resist an attempt to starve them into political submission.

In a courageous resolution adopted by the City Assembly (meeting at its regular place in the Soviet Sector) on July 29, 1948, the immediate cessation of the blockade was demanded and its instigators were charged with perpetrating a "crime against humanity".

Inasmuch as the City Hall, housing the Magistrat and City Assembly, was located within the Soviet Sector, it was anticipated that attempts would be made shortly after the blockade began to stage a communist "putsch" against the city government.

# Leading Political Figures in West Berlin



Jacob Kaiser (CDU) Walter Schreiber (CDU) Franz Neumann (SPD) Otto Suhr (SPD)

Carl Schwennicke (FDP)

The SED mob demonstration at the City Hall on June  $23^{rd}$  had already been a preview of such action.

# **Stumm Appointed Police Chief**

The first split in the city government took place in the police department on July 26, 1948, when Paul Markgraf, Soviet-appointed police president, who had for several weeks defied the Magistrat's demand for his resignation, was suspended from office and Dr. Stumm (SPD) appointed Acting Police President. The Magistrat had requested the Allied Kommandatura to approve Markgraf's dismissal in March, 1948, on account of insubordination, but the Soviets had blocked quadripartite action until their withdrawal from the Kommandatura.

The Soviets refused to recognize Markgraf's suspension by the Magistrat, although it was approved the following day by the U.S., British, and French, and although formally and technically the suspension (as distinguished from discharge) did not require Allied Kommandatura approval. Shortly afterwards, the West Berlin police headquarters were set up under Dr. Stumm.

A similar split occurred in the Central Food Office headed by City Councillor Füllsack (SPD), due to direct Soviet interference in the management of that office. This in turn necessitated a physical removal of the Central Food Office to West Berlin, which was officially announced on August 10.



Communist mobs storm the City Hall in September, 1948.

While there was no formal split in the Finance, Department until November 30, 1948, the action of the Soviets in blocking the city reserves after currency reform, in prohibiting disbursements for certain purposes in West Berlin, and in other high handed measures, led to a critical disruption of the city's financial administration. Salary payments to city employees were frequently in arrears.

Other departments of the Magistrat were also more or less split, including those of Post and Telecommunications, Labor, Traffic and Municipal Enterprises, and Economics. The heads of the last two, City Councillors Reuter and Klingelhöfer, respectively, were "dismissed" by the Soviets in mid-November, 1948, but were accorded a vote of full confidence by the City Assembly shortly afterwards.

During this period, however, more than 1,000 city employees, mostly in the borough administrations, were dismissed in the Soviet Sector for political reasons at the instance of the SED or, in some cases, directly by the Soviet Military Administration.

# **Five Thousand Communists Attack City Hall**

As a sequel to the SED mob demonstrations at the City Hall on June 23, some 5,000 SED demonstrators, many transported in trucks bearing Soviet license plates, converged on the City Hall in the early afternoon of August 26, where the City Assembly was scheduled to meet. They carried red banners and signs denouncing the Magistrat, demanding "unity", and displaying other communist slogans. The City Assembly chamber was broken into.

Karl Litke, Co-Chairman of the Berlin SED, told the assembled crowd that a session would then be held with the SED faction and the masses, that the other Assemblymen had fled, and that it was time to install a new city government.

On the same day, in front of the former *Reichstag* building, a counter-demonstration of some 10,000 participants' against the Soviet-inspired attack on the City Assembly was held at 5 o'clock under the sponsorship of the three democratic parties. Inspiring and vigorous speeches were made by the various political leaders, and the size of the meeting was considered a success in view of the short notice given.

## **Continuing Soviet-Inspired Violence**

On August 27<sup>th</sup>, Dr. Suhr (SPD), Chairman of the City Assembly, wrote to General Kotikov, the Soviet Commandant, requesting adequate protection for the meetings of that body in the City Hall, but at midnight of the same day he received a cynical and evasive reply. A City Assembly meeting, scheduled for August 31<sup>st</sup>, was called off when communist demonstrators again gathered in front of the City Hall.

In a final test to see if the City Assembly could function at its seat in the Soviet Sector, unmolested by communist mob violence, a meeting was set for September 6th. Again the mob demonstrators assembled. But this time they were better organized and directed than previously and were supported by some 200 Soviet Sector German police.

On the morning of September 6th the mob crashed the gates of the City Hall and occupied the Assembly chamber and other parts of the building.

These incidents aroused great indignation in Berlin and made it unmistakably clear that the Soviets would no longer tolerate the functioning



A meeting of the legally-elected Berlin City Assembly before it was split by communist mob violence.

of the popularly elected City Assembly in their sector. Consequently, the City Assembly moved to the British Sector the same day and held its scheduled meeting there, in the course of which it set the date for new city-wide elections for November 14th (later changed to December 5, 1948).

## **Mass Anti-Soviet Demonstration**

Three days later—on September 9th—the biggest democratic demonstration in Berlin's political history was held at the *Platz der Republik* in front of the former *Reichstag* in the British Sector with approximately 300,000 participants.

Although sponsored by the three democratic parties and UGO (the West Berlin general trade union), this vast assemblage of protesting Berliners from all walks of life was directed against the communist attempts to take over the city government and against the Soviet blockade attempt to starve the city into submission.

The morale of the West Berlin population appeared to be higher in September and October than in August, because many Berliners had then had misgivings as to what might result from the Four-Power discussions initiated on Berlin, particularly in regard to the currency—a fear that the East Mark might be adopted as sole currency, which in turn would mean Soviet financial control.

The strong stand of the Western Allies in Paris and, in part, the announced increase in rations, together with the increasing capacity and technical performance of the Air Lift, were among the factors accounting for this psychological upswing.

On September 3<sup>rd</sup>, the so-called "Democratic Bloc" was formed by the 26 SED Assembly members, the spurious Soviet Sector CDU und LDP splinter groups, and a few SPD renegades. Little attention at the time was given to the formation of this Soviet-inspired political faction, except for some speculation that it might be designed to supplant the City Assembly or Magistrat, or otherwise bolster the waning political strength of the Soviet-controlled groups.

With the election campaign in full swing in West Berlin for the December 5th poll, but with elections banned in the Soviet Sector because of the Soviet realization that the SED would be roundly defeated in a free democratic election, an event occurred which made the split of the government of Greater Berlin final.

# SED Spawns Illegal Magistrat

This was the establishment, on November 30, 1948, of a puppet "City Magistrat" in the Soviet Sector, headed by Friedrich Ebert, jr. Ebert was "unanimously elected" by a group of SED representatives and persons from various communist-front organizations, including the "Democratic Bloc", claiming to act as the legal City Assembly, who met in the *Staatsoper* (State Opera House). This action was a direct violation of the Berlin Constitution (approved by the Soviets) and of quadripartite agreements pertaining to Berlin.

General (then Colonel) Howley, U.S. Sector Commandant, released a communiqué on the same day to the press, pointing out that the meeting was "an arrogant action ... in flagrant violation of the existing constitution of Berlin and of all quadripartite agreements pertaining to the city."

While the eventual establishment of a separate administration in the Soviet Sector was anticipated, the timing of this particular operation was unexpected. It was generally thought that the Soviets would not move in this direction until after the December 5th elections in West Berlin and would then try to place the blame for splitting the city administration on the Western Allies when the new Magistrat took office.

On October 5th the three Western Sector Commandants approved the Election Regulations (Wahl-

Two young Russian soldiers guard a blockade barrier on Potsdamer Platz in the center of Berlin.



ordnung) and the holding of Berlin elections on December 5th, as proposed a week earlier by the City Assembly and Magistrat. The Soviet Sector Commandant waited until October 20th to reply to Dr. Friedensburg, the Acting Oberbürgermeister in an evasive letter making fantastic charges of "terrorism, political persecution, and Fascist war propaganda" in the three west sectors.

Consequently, the election regulations were amended to suspend election preparations in the Soviet Sector until such time as free, democratic elections would be possible there and to hold over for inclusion in the new City Assembly the 32 members (16 SPD, 11 SED, and 5 CDU) chosen from that sector in the October, 1946 elections.

To the average Berliner the issues involved in this election were crystal clear in contrast with many past elections involving a multiplicity of party programs. This time it was simply a choice between two fundamentally opposed political systems—



Defeated in every fair election held in Berlin, the communists have had to seek dominance by mob incitement and flamboyant, meaningless propaganda.

totalitarianism supported by a police state devoid of any basic civil rights for the individual, and Western-World democracy, where the traditional constitutional safeguards of individual rights and political liberty prevail.

In view of this, the election campaign by the three democratic parties—the SPD, CDU and LDP was not conducted along strictly party platform lines, but more against totalitarianism and its Sovietsponsored standard-bearer, the SED, together with related front organizations.

The SED refused to let its party's name appear on the ballot, because it had supported the Soviet blockade and dared not face the Berlin electorate in a free election.

The SED and the Soviet-licensed press indulged in the most bitter vituperation and invective against the democratic party leaders and the legal city government. This was coupled with SED-inspired rumors that the polling lists, bearing the names of voters checked off, would later fall into Soviet hands following the early evacuation of Berlin by the Western Allies.

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To add plausibility to this and other rumors in the whispering campaign designed to frighten the Berliners into keeping away from the polls, the Soviet occupation organ, *Tägliche Rundschau*, on the day before elections carried an ADN (Sovietlicensed news agency) dispatch on its front page with the banner headline, "The Western Powers Will Leave Berlin in January."

# Another Election Victory for Democracy

On election day, however, the Berliners turned out in great numbers and the polling was conducted in a fair and democratic manner. There was no disorder at the polls (contrary to SED threats), and only a few minor incidents were noted.

Voting participation by the qualified electorate on December 5th reached 86.3 percent, a higher participation than many Berlin political leaders had anticipated.

The election results by party, with comparative figures for the three western sectors in the October, 1946 elections indicated in parentheses, were as follows:

	Party	Pop	ular Vote	% of	Total A	ssembly Seats	
	SPD	858,461	(674,209)	64.5	(51.7)	76 (63)	
	CDU	258,664	(316,205)	19.4	(24.4)	26 (29)	
	LDP	214,145	(133,433)	16.1	(10.2)	17 (12)	
•	LDP	214,145	(133,433)	10.1	(10.2)	17 (12)	

Eligible voters totaled 1,586,461 in the three western sectors, of whom 1,369,492 (or 86.3 percent) cast ballots. Of these, 38,222 (or 2.7 percent) were invalid, or only 0.8 percent more than in the 1946 elections, despite the SED exhortation this time to cast spoiled ballots as a vote against the democratic parties.

Two days after the December 5th elections, the City Assembly still in office elected City Councillor Ernst Reuter as Oberbürgermeister to replace Acting Oberbürgermeister Louise Schroeder (whose place had been taken by Bürgermeister Dr. Friedensburg during her long illness). Frau Schroeder reverted to her status as Bürgermeister.

The newly elected City Assembly convened for the first time on January 14, 1949, to elect the New Magistrat. *Oberbürgermeister* Reuter was reelected and the remaining members of the Magistrat were elected four days later, including *Frau* Schroeder and Dr. Friedensburg as mayors.

The new Magistrat's "State of the City" message, outlining a general program for its two-year tenure, was presented to the City Assembly on February 1st by *Oberbürgermeister* Reuter. It reaffirmed the legality of the Magistrat as government of the whole of Greater Berlin and set forth a plan for complete coordination and simplification of Western Berlin's 12 borough administrations.

The message also stressed the necessity for certain economic and financial measures, especially the



The first truck-load of fresh vegetables reaches Berlin from Western Germany after the 11-month siege is lifted.

introduction of the West Mark as sole legal currency, inclusion of Berlin as the twelfth state (*Land*) in the forthcoming Federal German Republic, and the hope that control of the police and judiciary would gradually be transferred completely to the city administration.

# The Blockade Is Ended

The Soviet-imposed blockade of almost 11 months duration had affected the life of virtually every Berliner directly or indirectly. Consequently, the announcement of the Lake Success agreement to lift the blockade on May 12<sup>th</sup> was received in Berlin with great relief, coupled with a degree of scepticism as to how the agreement would work out in actual practice on the Soviet side in the light of Russian unreliability in the past.

The Russian agreement to lift the blockade in return for Western Allied agreement to end the counter-blockade and to discuss the German problem at a Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris was considered a victory for the city government and the steadfastness of the population, which had been made possible by the Air Lift and other forms of Western Allied support.

The City Assembly held a special ceremonial meeting on the morning of May 12th to mark the lifting of the blockade. The Western Military Governors and Commandants werehonored guests, together with delegates from the Bonn Parliamentary Council.

General Clay, then U.S. Military Governor of Germany, in farewell words to the City Assembly and the people of Berlin, referred to the severe test that they had successfully withstood during the blockade, which gave promise that Berlin would stand firm in the

Over 200,000 West Berliners gather at a mass meeting outside the Schöneberg City Hall to celebrate the end of the blockade, another Red defeat future for the maintenance of free democratic government processes in Germany.

# Greater Powers for the Berlin City Government

The Occupation Statute agreed to in Washington on April 9th by the Foreign Secretaries provided for the exercise of broad powers by the forthcoming Federal German Republic, when the latter comes into existence after the August 14th Western Germany elections to the *Bundestag*. This broad grant of federal authority is subject only to such reserved powers by the Military Governors as are necessary to ensure the fundamental aims of the Occupation.

When the Basic Law, the constitutional basis of the Federal German Republic, was approved by the Military Governors on May 12th, they reaffirmed their position that Berlin could not for the present be included as a *Land* in the initial organization of the forthcoming Federal Republic, but could send a small number of advisory delegates to the federal legislative bodies. On the other hand, the Foreign Secretaries agreed in Washington that the provisions of the Occupation Statute should be applied to Berlin as far as practicable.

On May 14, 1949, two days after the lifting of the blockade, the Allied Kommandatura forwarded to the City Government the document commonly referred to as the "Little Occupation Statute", but officially entitled "Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin."

In a covering letter the Western Commandants stated that it had been decided to apply, as far as possible, the same liberal measures to Berlin which the Occupation Statute will apply to the German Federal Republic, reserving only such additional powers "as are necessary in the present exceptional circumstances, in order to ensure the security, the good order, and financial stability of the city."

Under the Statement of Principles any amendment to the temporary constitution, any new draft



#### ALLIED KOMMANDATURA BERLIN

SUBJECT: Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship Between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin

- 1. (a) Greater Berlin shall have, subject only to the limitations set out in this statement, full legislative and executive and judicial powers in accordance with the Temporary Constitution of 1946 or with any subsequent Constitution adopted by the City Assembly and approved by the Allied Kommandatura in accordance with the provisions of this statement;
  - (b) Article 36 of the Temporary Constitution of Berlin will be held in suspense and BK/O (47)34 and BK/O(47)56 which were issued in implementation of that article, will be annulled.

2. In order to ensure the accomplishment of the basic purpose of Occupation, powers in the following fields are specifically reserved to the Allied Kommandatura, including the right to request and verify information and statistics needed by the Occupation Authorities.

- (a) Disarmament and demilitarisation, including raised fields of scientific research, prohibiand restrictions on industry and civil av
   (b) Restitution, reparations, decartelized over non-discrimination in trade matters
- non-discrimination in trade matters500 RomeBerlin and claims against Berlinmandatura(c) Relations with authorities aborders were cancelled by the State-(d) Displaced persons and thement of Principles which(e) Protection, prestige sturned over sweeping legisla-

dependants, employee tive powers to the city authorities

constitution or amendments thereto, and legislation in the field of reserved powers require express approval by the Allied Kommandatura before becoming effective. All other legislation submitted by the City Government, however, becomes effective 21 days after official receipt, unless previously disapproved by the Allied Kommandatura, provisionally or finally.

Moreover, such legislation will not be disapproved by the Allied Kommandatura, unless it is considered inconsistent with the constitution in force, legislation or directives of the Occupation authorities, or the provisions of the Statement of Principles, or unless such legislation is considered a grave threat to the basic purposes of the Occupation.

In order to bring the nature and extent of the controls exercised by the Allied Kommandatura into harmony with the Statement of Principles, the West Berlin Commandants approved the document, "Revised Procedure of the Allied Kommandatura Berlin," effective June 8<sup>th</sup>.

The number of committees was then reduced from 18 to 7, and they now act chiefly as advisory bodies to the Commandants instead of also having executive powers as formerly, except those specifically given them by the Commandants or Deputy Commandants.

#### The Paris Conference and its Aftermath

General political reaction in Berlin, except in communist circles, was that the final communiqué of the Paris Conference on June 20th indicated little in the way of positive, tangible results in regard to Berlin and, least of all, in the political field.

There was no great disappointment at this outcome, however, because there had been little expectation that the Soviets would substantially modify their general position on Germany, and on Berlin in particular, in the course of the negotiations.

Oberbürgermeister Reuter declared in a radio address on the evening of June 20th that Berliners would soon see if the meaning of the Paris agreement was actually to be realized in practice, and he warned that their struggle for freedom was by no means over.

# Political Struggle for Berlin Continues

Berlin was a focal point in the East-West "cold war" conflict during the Soviet-imposed blockade, and will likely continue in that role, as long as Germany is divided politically and economically and as long as one occupying power strives to impose a totalitarian ideology and police state system on the German people.

Berlin has been a crucial testing ground for the fundamentally

opposed East-West ideologies in the course of the past four years. In the free, democratic elections of October, 1946, and of December, 1948, the Berlin electorate unmistakably indicated its choice between the two basically opposed political systems.

Despite threats, intimidations, and blandishments of various kinds by the Soviet sponsored SED and related front organizations, the Berlin population, the leaders of the three democratic parties, and the democratically elected government stood firmly and courageously together during the Soviet-imposed blockade, which is now known to have been calculated to coerce the city into political submission by starvation.

Western Berlin stands today as a symbol of political and social freedom to a great many Germans living in the Soviet Sector and Soviet Zone who are politically disfranchised in terms of modern democratic standards and are subject to arbitrary arrests and even confinement in concentration camps, or worse.

Under the wide grant of legislative, executive, and judicial powers through the Statement of Principles of May 14th, it is expected that the people of Western Berlin and their democratically chosen administration will make further rapid progress in the development and maintenance of the democratic processes of government.

And there is good reason to hope that West Berlin will serve as a symbol and inspiration to Western Germany and the forthcoming German Federal Republic.

# CALENDAR OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN BERLIN

2 May 45	Soviets complete conquest of Berlin.
14 May 45	그는 전화 가지 가지 않는 것 같아요. 이렇게 나는 것은 것 같은 것 같아요. 가지 않는 것이 것 같아요. 가지 않는 것 같아요. 가지 않는 것 같아요. 가지 않는 것 같아요. 가지 않는 것 같아요.
	Communists flown in from Soviet Union. All major Magistrat offices
	are situated in what was to be the
11 26 Jun 45	Soviet Sector. Foundation of political parties (KPD,
11-20 Juli 45	SPD, LDP, CDU) and trade unions (FDGB) in Soviet Zone and Berlin.
	(FDGB) in Soviet Zone and Berlin.
1 Jul 45	U.S. troops occupy southwest quarter of Berlin.
11 Jul 45	First session of Allied Kommandatura.
	Agreed that all ordinances previously issued by Soviets remain in effect.
21 Apr 46	Merger of Soviet Zone and Soviet Sector
12 4 40	KPD and SPD. Form SED. Allied Kommandatura forwards Tem-
13 Aug 46	porary Constitution to Lord Mayor.
20 Oct 46	First free elections give SPD 48.7%,
26 Nov 46	CDU 22.2%, SED 19.8%, LDP 9.3%.
5 Dec 46	First meeting of elected City Assembly. Magistrat elected. Ostrowski (SPD)
	Lord Mayor. Temporarily prevented
	from taking office through coor- dinated action of old Magistrat and
	Soviets in Allied Kommandatura.
11 Apr 47	Ostrowski forced to resign by his own party because he signed working
	agreement with SED.
24 Jun 47	Reuter elected Lord Mayor. Soviet veto subsequently prevents his ap-
	proval by Allied Kommandatura.
20 Mar 48	Soviet delegation leaves session of Control Council.
1 Apr 48	Soviets demand right to control Allied
	traffic between Berlin and western zones. Traffic discontinued.
11 Jun 48	Both Allied and German rail traffic
	between Berlin and Western Ger-
12 Jun 48	many interrupted for two days. Elbe bridge of Autobahn "closed for
	repairs".
18 Jun 48 23 Jun 48	Currency Reform in West Zones. Introduction of West Mark in western
25 Jun 40	sectors. Beginning of almost com-
	plete blockade of West Berlin.
	Communist demonstrators before and in City Hall temporarily prevent City
	Assembly session and attack Assem-
26 Jun 48	bly members. Air Lift begins.
29 Jun 48	City Assembly resolves appeal for inter-
	vention to UN. SED abstains from voting.
1 Jul 48	Soviets declare that four-power ad-
	ministration of Berlin by the Allied Kommandatura has ceased to exist.
26 Jul 48	Suspension of Police President Markgraf
	by Magistrat. Police split. Soviets notify Magistrat that "Soviets will
	supply food for whole city".
2 Aug 48	First meeting of Western envoys at Moscow with Stalin to discuss Berlin
	problems.
26 Aug 48	SED attempts to overthrow Magistrat and replace it with a city-Soviet.
31 Aug 48	Four Military Governors meet for first
	time since March, 1948, to seek com- promise on the basis of Moscow talks
	on Berlin.

6 Sep 48	A communist mob in City Hall prevents
5. S.	session of the City Assembly. Soviet
	Sector police arrest western sector
	police. Their immediate release, pro-
	mised by Soviet Commandant, is not
	effected. City Assembly holds first
	British Sector session.

9 Sep 48 300,000 protest Soviet Sector terror at Platz der Republik meeting. One person killed, Red flag hauled from Brandenburg Gate. Democratic leaders march to ACA Building to submit memo on untenable Berlin conditions.

29 Sep 48 Western Powers submit notes on Berlin problem to UN Security Council.


20 Oct 48 Soviet Commandant Kotikov rejects holding of elections demanded by temporary constitution "until democratic conditions prevail again in the western sectors".


- 30 Nov 48 SED faction of City Assembly calls a meeting of "Democratic Bloc" and "representatives of the mass organizations" to 'elect' a "Magistrat of Greater Berlin".
- 1 Dec 48 City Assembly proclaims a "political emergency". All Magistrat offices are moved to western sectors.
- 5 Dec 48 Elections in West Berlin give SPD 64.5%, CDU 19.4%, LDP 16.1%. Participation is 86.3%.
- 21 Dec 48 Allied Kommandatura resumes work without Soviet Delegation.
- 18 Jan 49 Beginning of counter-blockade.
- 18 Feb 49 UGO (Independent Trade Union Organization) recognized by Western Commandants.
- 20 Mar 49 Introduction of West Mark as sole legal currency in western sectors.
- 11 Apr 49 The millionth ton is flown into Berlin by Air Lift.
- 27 Apr 49 The U.S. requests Soviet statement regarding conditions under which blockade would be lifted.
- 4 May 49 The U.S., Britain, France, and the Soviet Union resolve in New York to lift blockade and counter-blockade on May 12, 1949.
- 12 May 49 Blockade lifted. Military Governors and delegation of Parliamentary Council attend extraordinary session of City Assembly.
- 14 May 49 Allied Kommandatura promulgates the "Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin".
- 21 May 28 Jun 49
   S-Bahn strike (Western Berlin resident S-Bahn workers strike for West Mark wages).
- 7 Jun 49 Allied Kommandatura adopts a revised internal procedure based upon and in accordance with the "Statement of Principles..." It reduces the number of AK committees and makes them advisory bodies only.
- **1 Aug 49** Air Lift begins to taper off as surface transport again becomes normal.

# STRUCTURE

# OF THE ALLIED KOMMANDATURA BERLIN

(Following the Devolution of Authority to the Magistrat on May 14, 1949)





The Allied Kommandatura Berlin is a modest administration building in the southwest corner of the former German capital, a building which for the past four years has witnessed—on a down-to-earth level—the most crucial effort at international cooperation since the end of the war.

For here representatives of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States have sought together to administer and to revivify the battered city of Berlin. And here has been played out in close focus the world-wide struggle for dominion of widely contrasting ideological concepts.

It was on July 11, 1945, while fires still smoldered and many of the war dead were still unburied, that the Four-Power Commandants first met, and two weeks later the Allied Kommandatura Berlin was formally established in its permanent headquarters. At their first meetings the Commandants agreed that the basic functions of Military Government—problems of communications, of food and fuel supply, transportation, education, and public health—would be handled by quadripartite committees within the Kommandatura.

## Sectoral Autonomy Retained

Gradually the number of committees was expanded to more than twenty, covering nearly all aspects of Berlin life. The Kommandatura was concerned, however, only with problems common to all four sectors of Berlin. Questions peculiar to one sector were handled by the Sector Commandant without consultation with his colleagues. Committees were obliged to obtain unanimous agreement on all problems, and in the event of disagreement the subject was referred up to the Deputies or to the Commandants. Unless the Commandants could reach unanimity, the paper was withdrawn, or—in the case of problems with ramifications beyond the city level—the Commandants could refer the problem to the Allied Control Authority, the highest governing body in Germany. The Kommandatura worked well during its first months of existence. It was not difficult to reach agreement as to the restoration of railroads and repair of essential buildings, the quantity of food to be rationed to the Germans, the security and public health measures to be taken.

#### Soviets Force Political Issues

As the months passed, however, political aspects of the Kommandatura's work began to take on a

	ORDER	
of the	Inter-Allied Military K	Command atur a
	of the City of Berli	n
ll Jul	<b>y</b> 1945	Berlin

The Inter-Allied Kommandatura has today assumed control over the City of Berlin.

Until special notice, all existing regulations and ordinances issued by the Commander of the Soviet Army Garrison and Military Commandant of the City of Berlin, and by the German administration under Allied Control, regulating the order and conduct of the population of Berlin, and also the liability of the population for the violation of such regulations and ordinances, or for unlawful acts against Allied occupation troops, shall remain in force.

First of nearly 1,200 quadripartite orders to the Magistrat.



deeper tone. It became increasingly apparent that the Soviets intended to pattern Berlin political life as much as possible after that existing in Russia.

The colonizing of German city departments with puppet communists, the retaliatory measures taken against Germans who did not follow the communist "party line," the strident propaganda

campaign undertaken against the Western Allies in the Soviet-sponsored press and radio—these and other tactics more and more characterized the attitude and activities of the Russians in Berlin.

In the Kommandatura itself dilatory and harassing techniques were increasingly employed by the Soviet delegation. Meetings, which previously had lasted from ten o'clock in the morning until three or four o'clock in the afternoon, now continued until midnight and beyond. It became clearly evident that the Russians, having failed to achieve their total aims in Berlin, were seeking an excuse to bring to an end the entire Allied Kommandatura.

## Soviets Walk Out

On the night of June 16, 1948—when rumors were circulating that the Western Allies would shortly institute a currency reform in the western zones of Germany—the Soviet delegation abruptly withdrew from the Commandants' meeting.

The meeting had been wrangling all day and there had been success in reaching agreement on only one minor subject. Towards midnight, Colonel Howley stated that he was tired, would ask to be excused, and would leave his deputy to carry on.



Committee meetings also developed into heated exchanges of strongly opposing views. Four-Power agreement, towards the end, became difficult on even simple technical matters.

Bitter wrangling increased month by month at Commandants' and Deputies' meetings as the Soviets used every trick to gain complete control of Berlin by quasilegal tactics. Sessions which had previously lasted 5 or 6 hours now extended deep into the night.



Although it was perfectly proper procedure for a deputy to replace his commandant, the Soviets after hasty consultation with their political commissar—decided to take offense at Colonel Howley's action. The Soviet Commandant, Major General A. G. Kotikov, declared that his group would not return until Colonel Howley had apologized for his actions, and,

to a man, the Soviet group walked out of the meeting.

Quadripartite committees continued to function for nearly a fortnight, although the Soviet member did not appear at all scheduled meetings. On July 1, 1948, (nearly a week after the Soviet blockade had been imposed on West Berlin), the Soviet Chief of Staff announced that his delegation would no longer participate in the quadripartite meetings on any level. A Soviet clerical staff remained in the building until August 1, gradually moving out its files and equipment. On that date, the red flag was pulled down and the four-power Kommandatura ceased to exist.

From the Soviet defection onwards, the three Western Commandants continued to hold unofficial meetings in the offices of their headquarters. Committees carried on their usual activities without their fourth member. Instead of issuing Berlin Kommandatura orders, however, the Commandants issued unilateral orders, each to his own sector, but simultaneously and in accord with each other.



This state of affairs continued until November 8, 1948, when it was decided that the committees would resume their work at the Allied Kommandatura. The Commandants and their Deputies followed them shortly after. Since that time, the Allied Kommandatura has operated as before, despite the absence of its fourth member.

During the Soviet-imposed blockade of Berlin, from June 24, 1948, until May 12, 1949, the character



Kotikov scowls at a French proposal during one of the last quadripartite sessions of the Berlin Kommandalura.

of the work at the Allied Kommandatura changed considerably. It was no longer possible to sit at committee tables and to work solely for the rehabilitation of the city. It was necessary during this critical period to maintain the basic life of the city on a minimum level of subsistence, and to counteract the repeated efforts of the Soviets to wean the German population from the ideals of western democracy to those of Russian communism.

# Firm Tripartite Cooperation During Blockade

Cooperation between the three Western Allies, on all levels of the Kommandatura reached a new high. Disagreements were infrequent, but the strain of anticipating Soviet moves and of preparing counter-measures in time became very great.

Shortly after the blockade was imposed, the Air Lift Coordination Committee (see page 31) was added to the Kommandatura, and it became for the duration of the emergency one of the most important committees. Commandants' meetings, which formerly had been held on a regularly scheduled basis, were now called on very short notice as one crisis arose after another.

During this period also, the Commandants came into increasingly closer relationship with the elected German city officials. When, for example, the question of outlawing Soviet Zone currency in the western sectors was agreed upon, German officials were informed in advance and were asked to make suggestions to the Kommandatura Finance Committee. When the question arose as to whether Berliners should have more food or more coal, a German opinion proved valuable.

The population of the western sectors remained solidly behind the moves taken by the Western Commandants, even through the long, cold winter of 1948-49. An increasing sense of responsibility on the part of elected officials and the people's growing consciousness of their role in the government made it possible on May 14, 1949, to alter considerably the relationship of the Kommandatura to the Berlin City Government.

# Sweeping Powers To City Government

On that date, the Kommandatura issued a "Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin". That declaration devolved great legislative authority to the Berlin City Government, cancelling more than half of the orders issued by the Kommandatura during the previous four years and retaining only a minimum of reserved powers for the Allied military governments.


The procedure of Kommandatura administration was revised. Commandant voting, which previously had to be always unanimous, was now to be on a majority basis, except in the case of reserved powers. Moreover, legislation passed by the German City Assembly, which was formerly required to have Kommandatura approval before becoming law, now automatically became operative twenty-one days after its submission to the Kommandatura, unless specifically disapproved.


In accordance with the four-power Paris Agreement in June, 1949, the four Commandants of Berlin met on July 12th to discuss a *modus vivendi* for the city. The meeting was short and not especially



The Soviet member of the Kommandatura Guard—and the Soviet ilag—have been absent since July, 1948.

successful. The three Western Commandants asked the Soviet representative why, for example, truck transport was not moving normally into Berlin, as had been required by the Lake Success order ending the blockade. The Soviet Commandant disclaimed any knowledge of such a situation and displayed the same specious tactics of evasion, quibbling, and equivocation as a year earlier. It is thus still impossible to determine whether the Russians have any desire to cooperate in solving the problems of a split city.





O n June 22, 1948, the Soviet Military Administration announced the closing of the railroad and highway between Helmstedt in the British Zone and Berlin, locking off the last means of surface access to the international island city over 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain.

# **Victory Through Starvation**

A ruthlessly cold-blooded attempt was thus begun by the Soviets to force the three Western Allies to evacuate Berlin and to starve the city's western population of over two millions into political submission.

The reason for the total Soviet failure is already well-known. It was the creation, almost overnight, of the boldest and most spectacular aerial supply operation in the history of aviation: the British and American Air Lift to Berlin.

The history of the Air Lift—"Operation Vittles" to the U.S. Air Force, and "Operation Plainfare" to the British—has already been told in the world's press, radio, and film. This report, therefore, shall be limited to describing in light detail the rôle of Berlin Sector experts, technicians, and economists in helping to make the incredible enterprise possible.

Its beginnings were improvised, hasty, precarious. A handful of war-time C-47s—"Gooney Birds" their pilots called them, for they were tired, old planes—were rushed into service from military airfields in the western zones of Germany. Each carried, in a two-hour flight, about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  tons of supplies for the

occupation forces and the civilian population of 'Western Berlin.

Quickly the British and American operations were coordinated; most of the C-47s were replaced by giant U.S. C-54s (carrying a ten-ton payload) and by British Tudors, Yorks, and special tanker planes.

As evidence of the effectiveness of the C-54 in this type of operation, it is significant that these U.S. planes flew to Berlin  $77^{0/0}$  of the net tonnage for the German civilian economy, as against only  $23^{0/0}$ carried by British planes. Of the total number of flights made by both British and U.S. planes, however, U.S. aircraft accounted for  $68^{0/0}$  and British  $32^{0/0}$ .

# **Tanker Planes Used**

To solve the problem of handling and shipping liquid fuels, the British authorities contracted for commercial tanker planes and supplied the needs of the three Western Allies and the Berlin civilian economy with all requirements of gasoline, diesel oil, and kerosene, succeeding even in building up sizeable reserves of these products.

The world's most modern radar apparatus was set up on the Berlin airfields of Gatow (British Sector) and Tempelhof (U.S. Sector) to guide the supply planes at night and in bad weather.

A third airfield, at Tegel in the French Sector, was constructed out of marshlands. The land was cleared, dikes levelled, and water drained; and two runways were laid down to handle the largest aircraft. This feat, carried out by the U.S. Engineer



Corps, assisted by thousands of German laborers, was accomplished in record time.

The other two Berlin airfields were extensively improved: runways were reinforced and lengthened; turn-around, loading, and unloading aprons were built, as well as a myriad of ramps, platforms, and other elements, to increase the delivery tonnage.

Moreover, nearly all equipment for this work, including massive bulldozers, cranes, dredges, etc., had to be flown to the city as part of the Air Lift's initial cargoes.

Within short weeks the new airfield had been completed. Up to 20,000 German civilians had assisted the work and, conscious of the importance and the urgency of the job, labored night and day under the direction of U.S. Army Engineers.

#### **Turnover Techniques Refined**

The Transportation Corps of the three Western Allied Armies in Germany were made responsible for loading and unloading the planes at the bases of both departure and arrival. This developed, as the Air Lift expanded, into a tremendous operational

and planning job, requiring the constant refinement of techniques, as experience proved the need.

An idea of the efficiency of the operation lies in the fact that a plane was only thirteen minutes on the airfield from the time it stopped; it was completely unloaded of its 10-ton cargo, swept out, and ready to leave again.

On October 20, 1948, the efforts of the two Air Forces were integrated into the Combined Air Lift Task Force, with Maj. Gen. Tunner (U.S.) as Commanding Officer, and Air Marshal Williams (Br.) as Deputy Commander.

After this integration, additional fields were provided in the British Zone, with the result that the Air Lift operated eventually from eight landing fields in the zones. U.S. groups operated from Rhein-Main (outside Frankfurt-am-Main) and Wiesbaden in the U.S. Zone and from Fassberg and Celle in the British Zone. British squadrons operated from Wunstorf, Lübeck, Fuhlsbüttel, and Schleswig Land, all in the British Zone.

#### **Intricate Logistical Job**

At the outset of the operation, it was obvious that a very careful logistical job would have to be undertaken and that planning would have to be controlled by a single central source. This planning entailed the three western military authorities' determination of the daily tonnage needs for each of Berlin's three Western Sectors, for the support of occupational personnel on an austerity basis, and for the maintenance of minimum stock piles for the civilian economy.

Because of the need for conserving every possible ton of Air Lift space for the German civilian economy, luxury and other non-essential items were excluded from the requirements of the occupational personnel and items of lesser essentiality were kept to a bare minimum.

Responsibility for effecting this extensive and detailed planning—to meet the needs of some 2,100,000 Germans and over 20,000 Allied troops and civilians—was vested in the three Western Sector Commandants: Brig. Gen. Howley (U.S.), Maj. Gen. Herbert (U.K.), who was succeeded early in 1949 by Maj. Gen. Bourne, and Général de Division Ganeval (Fr.).

With the information supplied by a staff of experts, the three Commandants determined the minimum rates of consumption of each required commodity to maintain the life of the city, the minimum amount of transport that had to be operated (subway, trolley, and bus), the minimum ration of gas, electricity, and food, the quantities of medicines and pharmaceuticals, the tonnages of raw materials, semi-finished goods, and component parts



Big. Gen. Howley and Tempelhof air base official greet the last of 1,383 flights to arrive on the record-smashing day when 12,849 tons of supplies were flown to Berlin for the German civilian economy.

required for maintaining the essential industries, and the minimum needs of all kinds of essential consumer goods.

It was agreed by the Commandants that a minimum stock-pile of not less than 21 days' supply had to be maintained in each of the essential commodities, mainly food and fuel, which represented about 80% of the total Air Lift tonnage.

#### **Central Coordination Set**

In order to avoid conflicting orders from the various units engaged in supplying the needs of both German civilians and occupational personnel in Berlin, the Military Governors requested the Western Sector Commandants to establish a central agency for ordering all required commodities and materials.

For these purposes, an Air Lift Coordinating Committee was established in the Kommandatura. Each month the committee received from the Air Task Force an estimate of its forecast of daily average tonnages for the ensuing month. Based upon needs and the stocks on hand, the committee apportioned these tonnages among the various claimants according to commodities.

Counterpart committees were formed in the Western Zones to accept delivery directives from




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#### AIR LIFT PLANES INTO BERLIN



the Kommandatura group and to apportion each commodity to the appropriate zonal airfield. The Zone Coordinating Committee was also responsible that both the military authorities and the West Zone Germans would deliver the required commodities in the correct amounts to the proper airfields on schedule

The work of the committees was outstanding.

Despite the unpredictability of the weather, the performance of the aircraft-and, not least, the constant interference by Soviet fighter planes in the Lift corridors-there was not a single day when there was insufficient supplies of the goods reaching the city over each aerial artery, nor ever any undue tie-up of either road or rail facilities because of excessive deliveries.


#### **Midwinter Crisis**

In general, from the beginnings of the Air Lift through December, 1948, deliveries to Berlin did not reach forecasted estimates, and it was only by the most stringent conservation and control of consumption that West Berlin was maintained through the winter.

The foggy weather in November and December was in part responsible for the situation. This did not alter the fact, however, that, when in early January coal stocks had dwindled to only a 19-day supply, drastic steps became necessary.

Utilities cannot operate effectively with less than a 14-day supply on hand, and on the basis of receipts, it appeared that that point would be reached within a week or ten days. Food stocks, however, approximated a 31-day supply.

In the hope of a break in the weather and a consequent better flow of deliveries, it was determined to have coal



The planes were unloaded into 10-ton trailers, which were hauled to distribution and storage points in Berlin.

deliveries made at the expense of food, rather than to reduce further the extremely low levels of services and rations of gas and electricity.


This action caused food stocks to dwindle to a 27-28 day level, but served to hold coal stocks at the 19-20 day level.

Shortly afterwards the bad weather ended, and from that point onward deliveries climbed regularly. By constantly improving techniques the Air Force was able to increase the number of flights and the number of cargo tons to Berlin.

#### Nine Tons a Minute

The Lift's record day was on April 16, 1949, when, in 1,383 flights, 12,849 short tons of supplies arrived at the city's three airfields. On that day one plane landed in Berlin every 63 seconds!

Even before the blockade was lifted on May 12, 1949, deliveries had increased to such an extent that




Monthly Air Receipts


it was possible to permit larger consumption and higher ration levels, and still build stocks against the next winter's needs.

The Air Lift did not stop with the ending of the blockade, though the pressure was off. Through

May, June, and July, 1949, aerial deliveries continued at the rate of between seven and eight thousand tons daily. At the beginning of August, however, when several months' stocks of all major commodities and fuel had been built up—and the possibility of a reimposition of the blockade had diminished—the giant air operation was slackened off. By the end of the month, there was only the occasional roar of single C-54s arriving at one of the three airfields.

#### **Total Net Receipts**





Though its airfields and installations are being maintained against another emergency, the Lift will soon be a matter of history, for supplies are now regularly reaching the city by surface transportation.

The Air Lift will not be soon forgotten by the citizens of Western Berlin, however. It will not be forgotten by the people who for more than a year heard the unceasing roar of four-engined cargo planes overhead, who know that 70 British and American airmen and passengers were killed in the operation, and who witnessed at first hand the determination of the Western Allies to stand by their commitments against any bluff, pressure, or threat from the East.



Grateful Berliners renamed one of their main squares "Air Lift Plaza" and feted British and American flyers at an inaugural ceremony on June 25, 1949.

## COMMUNICATIONS

New, modern switchboard systems have replaced the war-battered equipment of the West Berlin Telephone Exchange

On the arrival of U.S. Military Government in Berlin on July 4, 1945, the communications picture of the city was very disheartening. Of the 28 telephone exchanges in the U.S. Sector, none was in operation due to bomb damage or the physical removal of their equipment by the Russians.

All post offices were closed and mail service could not be resumed until the Allied Kommandatura had authorized a new series of stamps.

Transportation of the *Reichspost* was non-existent. Many former post office employees, in both technical and postal fields, had either fled before the Russians or were considered nominal Nazis and, therefore, could not be employed.

Thus, the communications of the largest city in Europe were completely paralyzed. The initial job given the Communications Branch was to reestablish communications in sufficient quantities to meet the demands of the city government and essential industries for maintaining the bare necessities of life in Berlin.

#### POSTAL SERVICE

3

In the initial stage of the Occupation, postal facilities in the U.S. Sector included a large parcel post office (SW 77, located in Schöneberg) and eight branch post offices, which could be put into immediate operation.

It was then necessary that the *Reichspost* be reorganized for the resumption of postal service in the city. Designs of a temporary "*Stadt Berlin*" postage stamp were approved by the PTT Committee of the Allied Kommandatura. On August 2, 1945, postal service was inaugurated within the city. This service was limited to post-cards and unsealed letters.

On October 15, 1945, a further step was made to expand the postal services of the city. The Allied Kommandatura on this date authorized postal service to be resumed between Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Occupation.

#### **Interzonal Service Begun**

On October 24th the Allied Control Council authorized the inauguration of interzonal postal service to all four zones of Germany, permitting postcards and letters up to 500 grams to be accepted and delivered.


Thus, by the end of 1945 postal services were beginning to operate on a limited scale, meeting the minimum necessities of the city. As this extension of service to all four zones of Germany was made effective, the volume of mail increased steadily, with the greatest portion of mail being handled between Berlin and the Soviet Zone.

As the *Reichspost* neared the end of its first year of operation, the postal department found itself beginning to function in a smooth and efficient manner and, consequently, was able to handle an average of 250,000 outgoing letters daily, as well as receive some 200,000.

#### **Physical Problems Hamper Work**

Internal difficulties at this time in the physical delivery of mail, as well as its collection, however, were beginning to interfere seriously. The post

#### **GERMAN LETTER MAIL**



office had a total of 175 vehicles at this time. Of this number, nearly one-third were without tires. The remaining 125 were operating on an allocation of 4,500 liters of gasoline per month. This amount constituted approximately one-half of what was considered necessary.

Consequently, delays in the delivery of mail to and from the western zones amounted to some

30 days, while the delivery of local mail was often delayed six or seven days.

In January, 1947, the Control Council opened gift parcel service to all of Germany that permitted a large volume of overseas gift parcels, which were being held in the port of Bremen, to be delivered to Berlin. Parcel post service in general had grown by this time to a point where the Berlin post office was handling approximately 30,000 parcels daily.

The question of stamps, however, was beginning to cause considerable trouble, as the postage stamp being used by the Berlin Reichspost was a temporary one and the question of a permanent stamp was still under consideration by the Control Council. On March 1, 1947, a permanent issue of stamps was approved by the Control Council and placed on sale.

#### **Soviet Obstruction Tactics**

The PTT Committee of the Allied Kommandatura had achieved an exceptional record of unanimity with regard to postal services until this time. However, it became obvious that the comparative harmony of the committee was coming to an end.


The Soviet delegates became more and more persistent in placing matters on the agenda such as a request for a special issue of stamps for the "Women's Congress for Peace", a communist organization, and a proposal to turn over all undeliverable gift parcels to the Central Welfare Organization, which had Soviet zonal implications and, therefore, was communist-dominated.

This was the beginning of the political invasion of the *Reichspost* and the PTT Committee of the Kommandatura. Such efforts were to become more and more intense as time went on.

In November, 1947, the Soviet military authorities issued an order blocking the accounts in the postcheck office, located in the Soviet Sector, of many banks in the U.S. and British Zones. The immediate loss to the *Reichspost* amounted to some 17 million *Reichsmark*.

At this time also, the *Reichsbahn* under the control of the Soviet Military Administration

### BERLIN STAMP ISSUES



refused to provide necessary rail cars to transport parcels to the West, resulting in a continuing backlog of parcels which by April, 1948, amounted to some 450,000 parcels held in SW 77 Post Office, pending shipment to the western zones. These parcels at the beginning of the Berlin blockade were still retained by the Berlin *Reichspost*.

#### Parcel Post via Air Lift

The Allied Kommandatura at this time instructed the PTT Department to deliver parcels to Tempelhof and Gatow airports to be airlifted to the western zones. By the end of July, 1948, the parcel backlog had been cleared and deliveries of parcels to the western zones were made daily via the Air Lift. The Soviet military authorities during this period established a parcel post office within the Soviet Sector, and in press announcements informed the Berlin population that their parcels could be posted there to the Soviet and western zones.

Pilferage and censorship, however, as well as delays of sometimes 35 to 40 days, convinced the Berliners that no confidence could be placed in the Soviet postal administration of the east sector and zone.

Postal service from the western zones to Berlin, nonetheless, was becoming extremely difficult. The counter-blockade by the western zone administrations prohibited the forwarding of parcel post or first-class mail through the Soviet Zone. This resulted in the suspension of parcel post service to Berlin from the West.

First class mail was flown to Berlin by an American commercial airline after having been surcharged for air postage in the western zones. This situation continued until approximately May 25, 1949. At that time the blockade was lifted and service by rail was resumed temporarily.

#### Rail Strike Blocks Deliveries

As the subsequent Berlin railway strike progressed (see *Manpower*), the *Reichsbahn* refused to accept postal cars from the *Reichspost* for dispatch to the western zones. This constituted in effect a resumption of the blockade in so far as postal matters were concerned. On July 1, 1949, at which time the Berlin railway strike was settled, postal services could not be resumed by railway.

Until the present time parcel post, as well as first class mail, has been carried via Air Lift to the western zones. This situation, however, will be changed, in order that the Air Lift burden be reduced to a minimum.


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35

#### **TELEPHONE SERVICE**

Upon the arrival of Military Government in Berlin, the immediate problem of the provision of telecommunications to military organizations and the Military Government Headquarters located in Berlin was pressing.

Military equipment designed for use under combat conditions could no longer care for the increased requirements placed upon these organizations. Therefore, the *Reichspost* was instructed to establish a telephone exchange to be used solely by the Occupying Powers.



An empty telephone power room, stripped by the Russians of its generator and power board for reparations.

Another pressing problem presented to Military Government was one of providing telephone communications to a city of 3,500,000 people scattered over an area of 880 square kilometers.

The *Reichspost* was instructed to begin immediate work upon the five remaining intact dial units in the U.S. Sector that could be placed in operation with a minimum of delay.

A priority list of those persons to receive the service was established by the Allied Kommandatura. This relatively crude priority list was used as a yardstick for the processing of telephone applications, of which thousands were received daily.

By the 1st of January, 1946, there was a total of 5,000 telephones installed in the U.S. Sector, as compared to approximately 200,000 telephones installed in 1939 in the same area.

#### **Interzonal Service Prepared**

Interzonal telephone service at this time was under discussion by the Allied Control Council, and the civilian long distance central office located in the U.S. Sector was being prepared for operation. Proposals for interzonal telephone circuits to all four zones of Germany had been forwarded to the Control Council for consideration.

Interzonal telephone service from the Berlin Fernamt was actually opened to the Berlin population on February 7, 1946. The first circuits established led to the Soviet Zone. Immediately afterwards, circuits to the western zones in limited numbers were authorized and installed.

The *Fernamt* building, which had been utilized for the past several months as a military switching central for telecommunications terminating in Berlin, was in very bad condition due to bombings and, therefore, a major reconstruction program was necessary to place this building in condition for operations.

In July, 1946, the Allied Kommandatura considered a general reconstruction program for telephone service, in order to provide a minimum amount of communications necessary for the efficient operation of the city. This amounted to an increase of some 20,000 telephone installations and simultaneously a general rehabilitation of the city's telephone cable network.

#### **Special Dial Exchange Installed**

As of July 1, 1947, there were approximately 100,000 telephones installed in the city, of which some 45,000 were located in the U.S. Sector.

At this time, due to the need of expanding civilian communications facilities, the U.S. Army installed an internal dial telephone network in the form of four small dial exchanges, thus permitting the service to the Berlin population to be expanded by 6,000 additional telephones.


During the remaining part of the year 1947, telephone service in Berlin remained fairly constant in that no additional interzonal trunk circuits were provided and, therefore, interzonal services could not be expanded. Local services continued to expand as a result of deliveries of telephone instruments by manufacturing firms in the city.

This state of comparative harmony was upset about January, 1948, when the Soviet communications office authorized all subscribers within the Soviet Sector equal priority with those of the three western sectors for placing interzonal telephone calls. This superimposed a great burden on the already overcrowded long-distance office, and thereby paved the way for a split in the city's interzonal service.

During 1948, telephone service in general progressed very smoothly and the *Reichspost* was able to

#### GERMAN TELEPHONE INSTALLATIONS





INLAND-2	over Ferno AND ABROA		Berlin Tel.l <u>ERVICE</u>	Vr. 00	2	- In 1947 about hali
	to Soviet Zone.	Effective Date opened	to Western Zone.	Effective Date opene d	Services Do	of the pre-war long distance tele- near phone facilities
Special Conversations	Special Conversation	-	Special Conversations	;		were restored in
Urgent State Conversations (SD) <u>Service</u> (AD) <u>Air</u> (L)	Urgent State Conversations Service * * Air * *	26. 11. 47 26. 11. 47 26. 11. 47	Urgent State Calls Aviation Calls	26. <i>II.</i> 47 26. <i>II.</i> 47	International Telephone Service (	Berlin. The fol- lowing year inter- national service
* <u>Press</u> * * (DP) <u>Didinary Service Conversations(A)</u> <u>Urgen1 Conversations</u> (conversation with double charge)	Urgent conversations	31. 1. 47 8. 1. 47	Ordinary Service Conversations	25. 2. 46 8. 1. 47		was resumed.
Express calls (Blitz) (conversation with tenfold change	(conversation with double charge		(conversation with double charge			
<u>XP-call</u> (to fetch a person) <u>V - calls</u> ( $pre-booking$ conversations with certain persons)	V - calls (pre-booking, conver-	26. 11. 47 26. 11. 47	$\frac{XP-Call}{V-Calls}$ (pre-booking, conversations with certain persons)	26.11.47 26.11.47		
$\frac{R-calls}{by}$ (paying of the charge by the subscriber called for)	<u><i>R</i>-calls</u> (paying of the charge by the subscriber called for.)	8-1.47	<u>R-Calls</u> (paying of the charge by the subscriber called for)	8.147		

#### COMMUNICATIONS

## TELEGRAPH SERVICE

	in Effect Now		Types of Services in Effect Now	Date opened	Service		Darte opened
Berlin Pneumatic Tube					International TelegrophServ.erc	ept spain	1.12.47
Secondary Telegraphs					only business telegrams	apan	
special Telegraphs			4.		or prepaid abroad		1910
Private Telegraphs	Private Telegraphs	24.10.45					
Public Teletype network Sub. Teletype Sv. (Tw network)					Single Private Telegrams		1. 4. 48
State - Telegrams	State - Telegrams	15.11.47	State - Telegrams	15.11.47	in urgent cases with		
Telegraph Service	for Local service	8. 10. 45.			approval of Sector -		
Express Telegrams	from all Sectors	22.11.45			Commandant		
	Urgent Telegrams	1. 6. 47	Urgent Telegrams	56.47			
Ordinary Telegrams	Ordinory Telegrams	8.10.45					
Press Telegrams	(from R: sector ) " all sectors )	24.10.45	Press Telegrams	15 11.47			
Telegraphic Money Orders	Telegraphic Money Orders Payment Cords (Mul)	24.10.45		10100 C 200 C 200			
Weather & Water Level Announcements	Weather & Water Level Announcements	15. 11. 47					
Deferred Telegrams							
Letter Telegrams & Reduced Rates							
Semaphor Telegrams	Semaphor Telegrams	15. 11. 47	Semaphor Telegrams				
Picture Telegrams							
Picture Letter Telegrams							1.
Telegrams with Prepaid Reply	Telegrams with Prepaid Reply	15. 1. 47	Telegrams with Prepaid Reply	15. 1. 47			
the second s	Express Messenger Paid	15. 11. 47.	Express Messenger Paid	15.11.47			
Replys Messenger Paid	Reply & Messenger Paid	15. 11. 47.	Redys Messenger Paid	15.11.47.			
Telegram to Several Recipie T	Telegrom to Several Recipients	15. 1. 47	Telegram to Several Recipients	15. 1. 47.		.4.	
Multiple Adressed Telegrams	Multiple Adressed Telegrams	15: 1. 47	Multiple Adressed Telegroms	15. 1. 47.			
elegrams with Collection 7	Telegrams with Collection						
elegrams with Telegraphic Receipt					Telegrams with Telegraphic Receipt		26.11.47
elegrams with Written Receipt					Telegrams with Written Receipt		26.11.47
and an and a second	Poste Restante	26.11.47	Poste Restante	26.11.47	Poste Restante		26.11.47
Prnoment Telegrams(Inland Sv.)							
to be forwared							

Most of the pre-war telegraphic facilities have been restored in Berlin. Private "picture telegrams", however, are still only a memory.

at a time fixed before) N-calls ( communications to

post-positions etc. for passing on to certain persons) Month - calls (arrangement of connection daily at the same time, to be booked at least for one mon Week-calls (same as month calls. Booking for seven successive days or multiple of it.) Hour-calls (duration of the conversation at least one hour) Wireless-calls (with travellers on ships and airplanes) Television - calls ( conversation between the television-lelephones Berlin, Leipzig, München and Nurnberg (slopped during wartime,



Workmen repairing one of the nine telephone exchanges in the U.S. Sector damaged by war-time bombing.

carry out an extensive program of the cable repair of the city's bombed and shattered network. Also during this period reconstruction of buildings took top priority and, consequently, by the end of the year 1948 the post office recovered so sufficiently that it was able to make capital investments to the extent of 10% of its gross income.

The Soviet blockade of the city did not in any way affect telephone communications.

However, in anticipation of interruptions of communications to the western zones, the U.S. Military Government installed several radio telephone links to provide against the event of emergency.

On April 12, 1949, the Soviet Military Administration re-routed all telephone circuits between the Berlin *Fernamt* and the Soviet Zone. Numerous



Underground cables required extensive repairs after the aerial and land pounding Berlin had undergone.

protests have been made by the Western Allies regarding this arbitrary act. As of this date, however, the situation has not altered. The removal of these circuits from use by the western sectors has, moreover, deprived the Berlin *Reichspost* of approximately 20 million Marks yearly.

#### TELEGRAPH SERVICE

The Main Telegraph Office for Berlin is located in the Soviet Sector and is directly controlled and supervised by Soviet communications officials. In 1945 this office was instructed to carry out extensive preparations for the resumption of telegraph service to the four zones of Germany.

In October, 1945, telegraph service within Berlin was resumed, permitting telegrams to be filed at post offices or by telephone. In February, 1946, interzonal telegraph service was authorized by the Allied Control Authority.

As the main telegraph office was located in the Soviet Sector, delays in handling telegrams increased, due to Soviet censorship which required an average of three to five hours.



Switchboard operators wrapped themselves in heavy blankets during the first post-war winters, for the walls were often half-demolished from bombing and shelling.

Despite numerous delays and inefficient operation, an average of 105,000 messages over some 75 telegraph circuits were processed daily. Telegraph service from this time until November, 1948, progressed very satisfactorily.

New international services were installed and negotiations between the Soviet Zone officials and each of the Western Military Governments were carried out at intervals. The U.S. Military Government has continued a program of attempts to align telegraph service in Berlin with that in the western zones. This would include the extension of "sender keep all" agreements to the western sectors. These agreements would permit the reduction of personnel necessary for maintaining accounts and records and, therefore, increase the net profits.

As of this date, however, this extension has not been completed and negotiations are continuing.

#### PERSONNEL

In 1945, the Communications Branch of OMGBS inherited the tremendous problem of denazifying some 30,000 employees of the *Reichspost*. Of the initial 3,422 employees processed, 106 were



Denazification procedures in Berlin eliminated only a small percentage of the city's communications personnel.

discharged, two were arrested, and 21 demoted to the level of ordinary worker.

Because of the quadripartite nature of denazification, the task proceeded very slowly as a result of insufficient personnel for maintenance of service and as a result of disagreements with the Soviet authorities regarding the appropriate methods of completing this work.

In general, the quality of personnel in the *Reichspost* left much to be desired. Approximately 80% of all male employees were over 40 years of age and 5% of all employees were over 60. Consequently, the *Reichspost* faced a very difficult and trying period in attempting to:

- 1. establish an adequate pension plan for pensioning all old employees who no longer were capable of rendering efficient service, and
- establish schools for the instruction of new employees, as well as the converting of many postal employees into technicians.

However, by February 1, 1947, the *Reichspost* had established a post school for postal and telecommunications workers and was graduating students at the rate of some 1,300 a year. The *Reichspost* had also employed from private industries some 4,000 new workers that could be utilized immediately without being passed through the post school.

The personnel situation became quite satisfactory in this respect and by January 1, 1948, the *Reichspost* was able to discharge incompetent personnel and retire many aged employees under a pension plan which provided small amounts of pension benefits.

#### Soviets Purge Postal Workers

In November, 1948, however east sector officials initiated a purge of *Reichspost* employees, forcing

out approximately 2,800 employees who refused to sign communist pledges.

This situation has gradually righted itself through the pensioning of employees and the expansion of services. Denazification has been completed; the schools of the *Reichspost* have been expanded and modernized; a new pension plan of the city has been placed in effect; and the post office is now able to compete with private industry on an equal footing in the procurement of intelligent and qualified personnel.

Thus, in the past four years of operations the Berlin *Reichspost* has progressed from an almost totally destroyed communications network, postal service of the "horse and buggy" type, and very little telegraph service, to resume its status as a center of European communications with one of the most modern networks on the continent.

#### **Progress Towards Pre-War Standards**

In 1939, the Berlin *Reichspost* had a total of 600,000 telephones in the city and today has some 120,000 telephones re-installed. Letter mail service now is almost as great as that handled by the postal department in 1939.

However, the one serious set-back the *Reichspost* has suffered, is that in 1945 the Berlin Post Office was placed in trust of the City Magistrat and has




Berlin postal delivery service, though increasingly efficient, is still carried out in trucks of pre-war vintage.

not yet been permitted to participate in a national organization. In no country of the world is the postal department subject to such control and supervision by a local city administration as the Berlin *Reichspost.* The establishment of a central administration for the whole of Germany is not foreseeable, however, due to the political implications involved.

The *Reichspost* of Berlin has progressed steadily toward its goal of a general rehabilitation of communications and postal services.

With progress continuing at its present rate, another five years should see very little difference in the general appearance or physical structure of the Berlin *Reichspost*, as compared to that existing in 1939.

## Value Of Export Freight Air Lifted From Western Berlin To West Germany During The Soviet Blockade





"A Blockaded City Helps Itself." The spectacular Air Lift was not a one-way operation. Not only were precious tons of food, fuel, and medicine brought in to supply over two million people, valuable cargoes were flown out of the city.

Finished goods, including much-needed electro-technical equipment, were exported westward from Berlin by air during the 11-month siege. Nearly a quarter billion West Marks were thus earned from export by the industry of the blockaded city.

Berlin's industrial and commercial life had to be rebuilt from war debris such as these typesetting machines.

# ECONOMICS

Four distinct periods mark the economic history of Berlin from the initial efforts to revivify and reconstruct the shattered city in 1945 to the present phase of assigning responsibility to the Germans and ending Military Government controls.

Major emphasis during the first months—which may be called the Reconstruction Period, from July, 1945, to August, 1946—was placed on the urgent tasks of feeding, housing, and clothing the population and on rekindling the completely prostrate Berlin economy. All policy and operational control during this time was in the hands of Military Government. The Berlin Magistrat merely carried out orders and directives received from the Kommandatura or the individual Sector Commandants.

During the second period, from August, 1946, to June, 1948, although Military Government continued to revive German industry, the first independent operational responsibilities were turned over to the Magistrat. Initially, this meant only permitting the Magistrat to consolidate industrial reports and to grant operating licenses to business enterprises. Under this guidance, industry gradually expanded its production.

#### Increased Responsibilities for Germans


By June, 1948, the German authorities had assumed responsibility for practically all activities, with the exception of those under Law 43 (restricted and prohibited industries), Law 25 (scientific research) and the disposition of captured Axis war materials, U.S. Army surplus, rationed commodities, interzonal trade, and trade with foreign governments. The third phase, from June, 1948, to May, 1949, took place during the Soviet blockade and Allied counter-blockade. Because of prevailing emergency conditions in the city, Military Government was forced to resume a much larger share of operational supervision over the Magistrat and Berlin industry than would otherwise have been necessary.

#### Immense Logistic Job for Air Lift

The first characteristic of this period was defensive, and was marked by intense activity on the part of Military Government and the western sector Germans to build up the Air Lift supply of Berlin (see page 29). This involved many new demands on the Economics Branch. Its sections were called on to determine requirements for Berlin compatible with the increasing limits of Air Lift freight, to secure local materials for the construction of a new airfield and the expansion of two others, and to arrange with the German authorities internal transport facilities for moving Air Lift freight from the airfields to the warehouses.

During this period also, however, the veto power of the Soviets was no longer felt in the Kommandatura. It was thus possible to make important progress in reviving trade associations, chambers of commerce and industry, cooperatives, and other economic organizations—progressive groupings which the Soviets had steadfastly opposed, because they interfered with the Russian concept of monopolistic control.

Private industries during the blockade maintained skeleton staffs and produced an average of only



Little over a tenth of the city's pre-war industrial capacity was intact in 1945. The remainder had been bombed or was carried off by the Russians as war reparations.

 $50^{\circ/\circ}$  of their pre-blockade quotas. Because much of West Berlin's production had formerly been sold to the Soviet Sector and Zone, and because this was largely blocked during the siege period, a great effort was made to increase export to the west of Germany.

Millions of dollars of finished products were in fact exported from Western Berlin to the three western zones—flown out in Air Lift cargo planes and each crate or package was stamped "Made in Blockaded Berlin", as part of a large-scale advertising campaign.

The Western Allies soon took the offensive and imposed a stern counter-blockade against the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the Soviet Zone. Orders from the Military Governments absolutely prohibited the export of certain strategic commodities from Berlin to the Russian areas of control, commodities critically needed by the Soviets. Non-strategic items could be exported to the Soviet area of control upon specific approval of the Sector Military Government when the transaction was to the advantage of West Berlin's economy.

The future of Berlin industry now depends on the reduction of production costs, and on an extensive sales campaign at competitive prices in the west zones. There is good reason to believe that



Travel in Berlin was at first a severe trial amidst bombcratered streets, torn bridges, and mountains of debris.

Berlin could and should become a great trading and processing center between Western and Eastern Europe.

Semi-fabricated products from the West should be processed here and sent to the East. Raw materials from the East should, in turn, be fabricated in Berlin and sent to the West in exchange.


Berlin skills and rationalized factories should permit the city to be completely self-supporting by supplying items in the electro-technical, pharmaceutical, and clothing fields to all of Europe, both East and West. A stable political scene, however, is indispensable to this achievement, as well as the availability of long-term capital (some 200—500 million Marks) to provide for efficient modern tools.



With the ending of the blockade, housewives once again could buy as much as their purses could afford. Retail shops did a land-office business during the first reckless days of rejoicing.




"Made in Blockaded Berlin"-slogan of a city under siege which, thanks to the Air Lift, was able to fly its products to Western Germany and the outside world.



## s much as 85% of production facilities in the

highly industrialized metropolis of Berlin had been destroyed, dispersed, or looted by the time American Military Government assumed control of the city's south-western quarter in July, 1945.

The former heart and industrial nerve center of Germany had suffered some forty devastating air bombardments (and scores of lighter raids), had witnessed days and nights of the heaviest and most desperate street-fighting in the history of war, and had been ruthlessly plundered by its Red Army conquerors.



Soon after the surrender, however, scattered efforts were begun to restore some degree of industrial productivity. Firms began at once a program of rehabilitating the machinery of production; raw materials and some equipment began to flow into the city from Western Germany. Other equipment was salvaged from battlefield material and war surplus.

The rehabilitation program during the past four years has progressively brought Berlin's industrial capacity back towards normalcy. But many factors have impeded progress, and there remains a long way to go.

A large, though indeterminate, amount of productive equipment has been re-established in the U.S. Sector. But, although repairs have given the productive potential of this area a large portion of its pre-war capability again, the efficiency of the existing facilities is extremely low, founded as it is on a heterogeneous accumulation of obsolete machinery, much of it resurrected from scrap.

#### **Berlin's Pre-War Dominance**

Before World War II, the industries of Berlin exercised a large measure of dominance in the electrical equipment and clothing manufacturing fields and in the printing trades. In most instances, however, the plants were not completely self-sufficient, but were an integrated part of the industrial complex comprising the entire city and the semi-urban area of Land Brandenburg surrounding Berlin.

The progressive Soviet blockade of Berlin, which reached total force in June, 1948, began as early as March of that year, as far as industry was concerned. For it was in that month that the Soviets claimed jurisdiction over all shipments leaving the western sectors.

From then on, the industrial position of West Berlin became progressively more critical. Production decreased sharply due to lack of power, fuel, and raw materials, and also to the necessity of establishing West German sources of supply and markets to replace traditional trade connections with the Soviet Zone.

With the nominal lifting of the blockade in May, 1949, the inefficiency of industrial production methods, and equipment in the U.S. Sector, dependent as they were on old methods and old tools, was sharply pointed up in the extreme sales difficulties encountered in the buyers' market of Western Germany, which was in competition with the completely modern and efficient plants operating there.

#### War Materials Serve Peace-time Needs

In common with other highly industrialized cities in Germany, Berlin had been a heavy producer of war materials for the former German *Reich*. Although the productive machinery was in large



Smashed war equipment which littered the city was salvaged for scrap, urgently needed for reconstruction.

measure destroyed or looted by the beginning of the U.S. occupation in 1945, large stocks of finished and semi-finished war materials were stocked in Berlin factories. Considerable quantities of battle-field equipment also remained in the city following the fighting which preceded its surrender.

In March, 1948, a quadripartite agreement was reached by which all combat equipment abandoned by either German or Red Army forces in the U.S. Sector became the property of the U.S. Army for purposes of demilitarization.


The Magistrat was ordered to demilitarize, under the supervision of U.S. Military Government, the war equipment in the factories and warehouses and to receive title of the material. Much of it has since been salvaged and converted, and serves today for peace-time purposes in Berlin.

#### Looted Industrial Equipment Restored

Large amounts of non-cultural objects, principally machinery and equipment looted by the former German Armed Forces in territories outside Germany, had been brought to Berlin during the war. Much of this plundered material was in turn looted by the troops of the USSR during the first weeks of their exclusive occupation of the city.

A program to restitute the remaining items to the rightful owners has been in progress since 1946 and is now ninety percent completed.

Berlin had been a world-famous center of scientific research, sponsored both by the industrialists within



A few spinning mills were almost undamaged in the U.S. Sector, and were immediately set to work. The shortage of clothes, blankets and sheets was a dire one after the war.

the city and by pure research establishments. The largest such institute in the U.S. Sector comprised parts of the *Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut*.

In implementing Allied Control Authority Law 25, about 150 scientific research establishments in the U.S. Sector have been licensed since 1946 after inspection by Military Government officers.

#### Soviets Block Free Economy

Commercial trading in Berlin at the end of the war was almost at a complete standstill. Shops and warehouses were destroyed; stocks, records, and office equipment had been wrecked or looted. Yet gradually some order was re-established.



Gas masks were converted to ladles and saucepans. Shell casings became stove covers. Conversion industry became an important one in the recent battlefield of Berlin.



Berlin has tried hard to pay its way in the growing competition of postwar commerce. Zeiss Ikon lens and glass industry, above, has helped. Another, in center, is the Lorenz Radio company with a large production for both domestic sale and export.





Some industries in the western zones depended on Berlin auxiliary plants to finish their finely-turned machinery. During the Soviet-imposed blockade, a part of this two-way operation was retained—with the Allied Air Lift supplying the transportation by C-54.

Slowing the restoration of normal commercial activities was the continued effort of the Soviets to impose their system of planned and regimented economy on the city. Moreover, the Soviet Military Administration had orders to secure as many goods as possible for their unilateral program of reparations, and it purchased heavily in the U.S. Sector with inflated *Reichsmarks* with which Soviet agents were plentifully supplied.

During the blockade period, although strategic and essential commodities were not allowed to be exported eastward, there was nonetheless some commercial activity across the Iron Curtain.

Most of such exchanges, however, were on a barter basis, for the East Mark had a value of approximately only one fifth or sixth that of the neighboring West Mark. It could, moreover, be used only for Soviet Sector or Zone purchases.

Before the war, Berlin was one of the greatest trading centers of Europe, supplying jobbing and wholesale distributing services to the neighboring area, now constituting the Russian Zone and the former German territories east of the Oder River.

Additionally, large trade functions were performed in Berlin as a center for both rail and inland water transport, together with the supply of trade services to the present Polish and Russian territory, formerly the Prussian province of the German *Reich*.

These trade facilities have now almost entirely disappeared. No effective means have yet been found in Berlin for the support of a free enterprise economy dealing with the Soviet economic pattern.


While there is, barring a complete reversal in the Soviet policy of totally regimented economy, no possibility of reviving trade and industry in West Berlin in its pre-war pattern, there is no cause for grievous misgiving as to the future of commerce and industry.

Continued application of the initiative and energy displayed in this field during the last four years, on the groundwork laid by Military Government guidance, can establish a healthy and vital economy in West Berlin.

The present difficulties of lack of capital for modernization of the productive plant and the necessity for development of new purchasing and marketing patterns can be surmounted by the independent actions of German firms and investors themselves.



Favorite east-German markets of before the war have been largely cut off. But the toy industry of Berlin has not died; the city itself contains nearly half a million children.



Bricks, which once made up the walls of a million Berlin homes, are processed to make well-surfaced new bricks—to build the walls of new Berlin homes.

Even Berlin's daily bread had to come by Air Lift during the blockade. Only water was available locally.



### FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

The most immediate and basic problem facing Military Government in Berlin—as in any conquered area—was that of supplying food to the civilian population and organizing its distribution. In the destroyed German capital, however, this problem was many times more complex than elsewhere in Europe.

The U.S. Sector of Berlin was nearly three hundred miles from the U.S. Zone of Occupation and was more than a hundred miles behind the Russian Zone frontier. Access to the city from the zonal hinter-



Cattle herds had to be shipped hundreds of miles to Berlin by the Western Allies to replace those seized and taken east by the Russians as reparations on the hoof.

land was along a single rail line and a single highway. Moreover, even the U.S. Zone was a deficit food area, and it was actually necessary to import supplies from the United States to feed the city.

The food life-line for the U.S. Sector of Berlin stretched over 3,000 miles to the Atlantic ports of the United States; and at times 90% of the rationed food in Berlin was of American origin.

To complicate the problem further, food stocks in Berlin at the end of the war were in very short supply. The Soviet-imposed rationing system was extremely primitive, irrational, and unfairly discriminatory.

Responsibility for feeding the civilian population in Berlin has continued to be that of Military Government. Although certain administrative functions could be assigned to German officials, it was the task of Military Government to ensure that the people did not go hungry. Berlin civilians, moreover, considered this a logical and necessary concomitant of the Occupation.

In the early stages, U.S. troops and civilian personnel physically undertook the distribution of food in their sector. The amount of food furnished to considerable segments of the population was insufficient to maintain health for any extended period of time.

From then on, progress in feeding the population consisted in improving the transportation, handling, processing, and distribution of food, in the total amount of food made available, and in its equitable and fair rationing among the people.

This required planning for an external supply of livestock, the local creation of a small livestock industry—for the Red Army had driven all herds eastward, when it overran Berlin and adjoining regions—and the provision of food for the livestock.

From the beginning, organization of the feeding of Berlin was carried out quadripartitely. This gave the problem a special character and brought about a series of crises that finally resulted in the blockade of the western sectors.

U.S.-Soviet relations in the feeding of Berlin, in fact, make up the history of these crises, beginning almost on the first day, when the Soviets insisted that the U.S. Military Government immediately undertake full food responsibility for the population of its sector, and leading three years later to the blockade, when the Soviets bent every effort to prevent U.S. Military Government from doing just that very thing.


Between these two events there was a whole series of lesser crises, when the Soviets repeatedly sought to use food as a political weapon.



Meat: a precious, closely-rationed, well-guarded Berlin commodity in 1945/46 has now become available in proportion to the amount of money in the shopper's purse.

During the food-deficiency period, which only now is beginning to be solved, the population of West Berlin was fed almost entirely from stocks originating outside Germany and purchased with dollars or sterling.

It is estimated that during the four years since the installation of U.S. Military




Blitzed areas were levelled with imported American bull-dozers to help West Berliners plant small vegetable gardens and beat the attempted Soviet starvation blockade.

During the blockade period the food ration apparatus in the western sectors was put to a severe test. Its success was manifest, in that ration levels were not only maintained, they were raised and the weights of the population—as determined by Public Health research—actually increased during the siege.

At the beginning of the blockade the population received an average of 1,779 calories daily. Five months later this was increased to an average of 1,998 calories daily, or 219 calories more than the pre-blockade ration.

Since the end of the blockade, rations and "free" supplies have been steadily increased to permit an average consumption of well above 2,200 calories daily. And it may be expected that in the near future the amount of food consumed by West Berliners will depend almost exclusively on the purchasing power of the individual buyers.

Prices are still high in relation to pre-war levels but the essential basis of a plentiful supply has been attained since the end of the blockade.



CONSUMPTION OF RATIONED FOOD IN TERMS OF

the installation of U.S. Military Government in Berlin the following quantities of food have been imported from all sources into the U.S. Sector for ration distribution:

Flour	434,821	Metric T
Cereals	70,079	"
Fat	25,061	P
Meat and fish	64,334	"
Polatoes, fresh	523,561	"
Sugar	36,862	"
Coffee ersatz	8,333	"
Milk, dry skim	9,220	"
Milk, dry whole	3,074	"
Cheese	1,327	"
Salt	10,575	"
Vegetables, fresh	27,500	"
Fruit juice	441	N'
Canned fruits	36	"
Dried fruits	615	"
Fresh fruits	645	"
Battle rations	479	"
	1 216 063	Metric T

47

Briquettes, made of pressed coal-dust, had to be rationed almost by the piece to Berlin's population against the cold post-war winters.

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A tone of the first Kommandatura meetings in, July, 1945, it was agreed in principle that the Western Allies would supply two-thirds of Berlin's total requirements of coal and POL (petrol, oil, and lubricants) from their zones, and the Soviets would furnish the remaining third from theirs.

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In December, 1947, a new agreement was reached between the Western Allies and the Soviets, providing Berlin with increased supplies of coal and electric power. The commitments of the Occupation authorities were based on the population of their respective sectors, i. e., western sectors—63.2%and Soviet Sector— $36.8^{0}/_{0}$ .



The city's parks and woodlands were thinned in Berlin for firewood during the unprecedently hard winter of 1946/47, and again during the blockade winter of 1948/49.

Immediately, controversy arose in the Allied Kommandatura when the Soviet Authorities sought to interpret the new agreement in such a manner as to obtain unlimited supplies of coal and electric power for their reparation industries.

It was fortunate that there were large stocks of coal on hand at public utilities' depots and coal merchants' yards when the blockade began. It was also fortunate that, as it was late June, coal consumption was seasonally declining.

On July 7th, the first Air Lift shipments of coal arrived at Tempelhof airfield: 261 tons, loaded in American Army duffle bags. Deliveries to the British airfield at Gatow began shortly afterwards. By early September, daily receipts of Air Lift coal equalled daily consumption, and the steady decline in the overall stockpile position was halted.

During November, however, bad flying weather greatly curtailed receipts. Coal stocks fell rapidly, until, by the middle of January, alow of 65,000 tons had been reached. Thereafter, good weather—and the assigning of top priority to coal shipments on the Air Lift—made it possible once again to rebuild stocks.

#### **Blockade Coal Thinly Rationed**

In December, 1948, in the midst of the blockade, an issue of 25 pounds of coal was made to each individual household in the western sectors. An additional 50 pounds were allocated to households having children below school age or sick, incapacitated, or blind persons.

At the same time, an intensive firewood program was undertaken throughout the west of the city. Forests were thinned and many trees were stripped from parks and along streets, so that several boxes of wood could be issued to each household.

Everywhere throughout the city during those weeks, Berliners could be seen sawing and chopping down trees and chipping at half-buried roots, in order to obtain firewood. Fortunately, the winter was an unusually mild one.

By the end of the blockade, coal and POL stocks in the western sectors were no longer a matter of concern. Actual stocks were equal to or in excess of those existent before it was imposed.

With the reopening of rail and barge transportation, daily receipts of coal increased rapidly. During July, average daily receipts approached 15,000 tons, as a program of stockpiling winter requirements got well underway. Five-sixths of all bridges in the U.S. Sector were destroyed or damaged in 1945. Today, nearly all have been repaired or replaced.




### TRANSPORTATION

Transport facilities in captured Berlin were virtually non-existent when American troops entered the city in July, 1945. Railroad centers had been targets for repeated RAF and USAAF heavy bombardments and all other forms of surface transport had suffered enormously during the suicidal struggle for the German capital.

#### Subway Flooded, Canals Blocked

The underground *U-Bahn* had in many areas been subjected to artillery fire and flooding, as the Red Army scorched and drowned out the last desperate resistance. Rivers and canals were blocked by



Subways in which the Red Army and the Nazi SS fought out the last bitter battles of the war had to be pumped dry before they could be operated again. Today Berlin U-Bahn service is once again on pre-war schedules.

blown-up bridges, sunken barges, and a mass of debris.

Yet a rehabilitated transport system in the metropolis was of the first importance, for the normal life of a modern city depends on the ability of its citizens and goods to move freely and quickly.

#### City-Wide Needs Surveyed

The Traffic Department of the Magistrat, guided, and helped by Military Government, undertook a



A scene from the first months: a British Tommy rides the only German taxi available. Only in July, 1949 were car taxis again licensed for civilian use in Western Berlin.

city-wide program to repair, replace, and restore transport facilities. An extensive survey was carried out to determine the needs of the municipal transport system, and a plan was prepared to provide equipment, rolling-stock, and spare parts both from local production and from factories all over Germany.

The subway system was pumped dry and cleared. Canals and rivers were dredged, bridges rebuilt. New roadbeds and tracks were laid for the street car and railroad system. Until the blockade was imposed, good progress was thus being made in rehabilitation.



One of Berlin's main stations, the Anhalter Bahnhof, was a tangled jungle of girders and smashed masonry after the war. Today it links all Europe by rail.

#### Repair Work Halted by Blockade

Then, for one year, progress virtually halted. The Air Lift could not simultaneously supply the needs of 2,100,000 people and provide massive equipment to rebuild the transport system.



New cars and busses can be seen in Berlin today in almost as great profusion as in most other European capitals.

Moreover, road and water facilities were immediately called upon to form a Berlin support

service for the Air Lift. A special railway was established to transport coal from the Tempelhof airfield to the main coal yard on the Teltow Canal. There barge transports carried stocks to public utilities.

Fleets of trucks—whose gas, oil, and spare parts were flown into Berlin by Air Lift—moved food and industrial commodities from the airfields to warehouses and consumers.

#### **Rail Strike Stagnates Movement**

Even after the blockade was officially ended on May 12, 1949, transportation difficulties were not solved. An extensive strike of western sector railroadmen (see page 119) stagnated the movement of all trains. And persistent Soviet frontier interference with truck and barge traffic continued for weeks after the siege was proclaimed at an end.

Moreover, under Allied Control Council agreement, the operation of the Berlin railroads had been originally assigned to the Soviets. Rehabilitation of this transport medium has been especially slow, and it has proved to be a constant bottleneck in providing adequate rail facilities in the U.S. Sector.



Hundreds of trucks were pressed into service to serve the city during the railroad strike in May-June, 1949.

In Berlin today, however, one can see the changes that have been effected since the end of the war. Large numbers of well-equipped trucks and trailers, carrying payloads of 10 to 30 tons, leave the city for all points in Europe. Street-car and bus services are approaching normalcy, and electric buslines are gradually appearing to replace obsolete streetcars.


The subway and elevated railway systems are now functioning at approximately their pre-war efficiency, and international trains—to Paris, Brussels, Warsaw, and Prague—are running on pre-war schedules.

And the presence of new, sleek cars, handsome busses and train coaches provides visual evidence of the trend towards normalcy at least in the field of transportation.

#### Berlin Public Transportation in Operation by Year since 1938.

	Dec. Aug. 31 Dec.						July 1	
Type of transportation	1938	1945	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	
U-Bahn (subway)					39. s.			
Passenger motor coaches	625	395	321	349	365	371	394	
Trailers	481	323	271	318	313	334	350	
Streetcars								
Passenger motor coaches	1557	511	621	648	458	578	486	
Trailers	1266	445	550	707	617	643	629	
Busses	655	87	35	25	20	43	106	
Taxis	3004		<u> </u>	<u></u>	199	199 <u>-</u> 19	100	

Only one fifth of Berlin's million and a half dwellings remained undamaged after the tremendous aerial and ground pounding the city underwent during the war.



he first operation of Military Government in the field of building and housing was that of requisitioning. Billets were needed for occupation troops and office space for the branches of the U.S. Sector Military Government authorities.

In fulfilling this mission, it was often necessary



Sometimes a bathtub or a sturdy radiator was left hanging crazily in the air. Sometimes a stairway spiralled upward to nowhere. Sometimes there was just nothingness: Berlin lost seventy percent of its homes and buildings during the tremendous Allied bombardments.

to take emergency action, resulting in 'midnight requisitions' as they came to be known. This phase ended, however, within a few months after the establishment of U.S. troops in Berlin.

Soon the field of this activity expanded to that of ensuring equitable housing facilities for the German civilian population. The Allied Control Council Law 18 (Housing Law) was predicated on a desire to eliminate the unbalanced distribution of living space that resulted from discriminatory Nazi practices,

#### **U.S. Requisitions of Berlin Real Estate**

Six month periods	Real estate requisitioned during period	Real estate released during period	Total active real estate under requisition
1 Jan-30 June 47	17	378	2,483
1 July-31 Dec. 47	71	265	2,289
1 Jan-30 June 48	30	210	2,109
1 July-31 Dec. 48	9	885	1,233
1 Jan-15 July 49	9	37	1,205

the scattering of the German population, and the destruction of housing and industrial space during the war.

It was no easy task. Of the million-and-a-half dwelling units existent in Berlin in 1939, only onefifth remained undamaged by the summer of 1944, and heavy air bombardments continued for almost a year after that. It was estimated in 1945 that ten trains of fifty cars each could leave the city daily, fully loaded with rubble-and still Berlin's debris would not be cleared for sixteen years.

At the rate of the 1927-1937 building boom, it

would take more than twenty years merely to *replace* its former dwelling units.

U.S. Military Government's first consideration, however, was that of available space and its use. German housing authorities were given full responsibility to requisition houses and apartments in favor of three preferential categories of needy individuals:

Victims of Facism and the Nazi Nürnberg edicts, Persons having large families and young children, old people, invalids and disabled persons, and

Persons whose assignment to suitable housing space was considered to be in the direct interest of the Occupation Forces.



Repair work often had to start from the ground up. Germany's Lebensraum problem—a Nazi excuse for aggression—was somewhat intensified during the war.

As a matter of policy, members of the Nazi Party and their families were subjected to requisition and/or restriction of their housing space in proportion to their contribution to the Nazi regime.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction activities have been more than adequate in coping with the increase in the population of the U.S. Sector. Density of room

occupation, in fact, has dropped from 1.7 to 1.6 persons per room. But building work has been relatively small because of the distances over which material must be transported from the western zones.

During the critical days of the blockade and counter-blockade building activities dropped considerably. Stocks of material had never been very high, and during that period they had to be flown to the city by Air Lift or smuggled through the blockade.

On the other hand, the blockade —by increasing unemployment and so making labor readily available—



One-room shacks could sometimes be seen hidden away in the bomb-shattered wrecks of once big buildings. And window-ledge gardens showed the spirit wasn't dead.


indirectly helped in the extensive salvage and repair operations which have been going on in West Berlin since the end of the war.

Before the blockade, the Magistrat was engaged in a program of demolishing all buildings which had been 50% or more destroyed. Salvaged materials were stockpiled, processed, and used in new construction or repair. During the blockade this activity was greatly accelerated, as can be seen by a tabulation of city expenditures for the program:

1945	RM 25,008,693
1946	<sup>''</sup> 40,096,996
1947	" 19,341,783
1948	DM 82,578,660
	" 40,734,398 (first six months)

By Kommandatura order, Berlin was declared a "closed city" during the early days of the occupation. This status still exists. Exceptions were permitted during the past four years to allow certain individuals to return to their original homes and to rejoin their families.

#### Number of Dwelling Units Repaired in Berlin Since 1945



<text>

Legal activities in Berlin since the end of the war have passed through three major phases. The first covered that early period of our occupation in Berlin when Military Government was preponderately responsible for practically all activities, with very little supervisory participation by the Germans.

By early 1946, the reorganization activities of Military Government had reached a point where, during the second phase, increasing responsibilities could be entrusted to local German officials who had been carefully screened and chosen for various positions in the reconstituted judicial system of Berlin.

#### Soviets Block Progressive Measures

This policy of gradually transferring greater responsibilities to the Germans was, however, consistently hampered by the Soviet authorities in Berlin, who under quadripartite rules of procedure were in a position to exercise veto rights against many democratic legal measures favored by the three Western Powers.

In the third phase, and following the withdrawal of the Soviet authorities from participation in the Allied Kommandatura, many legal measures long stalemated could at last be implemented in the western sectors of Berlin.

The program of assigning increasing responsibilities to the Germans for the administration of justice in Berlin culminated in the "Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship Between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin" on May 14, 1949. In this devolution of authority, the Germans were made responsible for the administration of justice.

#### Allied Kommandatura Legal Committee

One of the early accomplishments of the Kommandatura Legal Committee was the reorganization of the courts in Berlin, along with prosecution offices and the prison system. Until the publication of the "Statement of Principles" on May 14, 1949, the Legal Committee exercised rather extensive supervisory functions over the administration of justice, formerly the responsibility of the Prussian Minister of Justice.

With Germany's defeat, the former Prussian ministries ceased to exist and the Allied Kommandatura assumed its supervisory functions, insofar as Berlin was concerned. Under the general supervision of the Legal Committee, the highest judicial official (president of the *Kammergericht*) headed the German courts and the *Generalstaatsanwalt* headed the prosecution offices and German prisons. All appointments, promotions, or dismissals of judges and prosecutors, admission of lawyers, appointment of referendare and lesser court officials, creation of new chambers of courts, etc., until recently required final approval of the Legal Committee.

While under the "Statement of Principles" the Legal Committee was relieved of these duties, which now became the responsibility of the Berlin City Administration, work of a different nature now requires much of the time of the Legal Committee. Under the "Statement of Principles", legislation submitted by the Berlin city government on non-reserved subjects becomes effective 21 days after submittal, unless disapproved by the Allied Kommandatura within that time. The Legal Committee now studies a steady flow of enactments passed by the Magistrat to the Kommandatura for approval.

In addition, the Committee supervises the Spandau Allied Prison, where seven former Nazi leaders, convicted to terms of imprisonment by the International Military Tribu-

nal at Nürnberg in 1946, are now confined.

#### **Military Government Courts**

Full preparations had been made in advance for creating a Summary Military Court in each of the six Verwaltungsbezirke (boroughs), one Intermediate Military Court, and one General Military Court for the whole sector upon the arrival of U.S. Occupation Forces in Berlin in July, 1945.

These courts were established under the provisions of Military Government Ordinance 2 and had authority to try violations of Military Government laws, orders, and ordinances, committed by Germans and certain others subject to the jurisdiction of these courts.

On the day occupation activities began in the U.S. Sector all summary military courts were ready for operation. Later, during 1946, all of the courts were



The four-power prison at Spandau, detention place for war criminals convicted at Nürnberg, is one of the only remaining quadripartitely administered activities in Berlin.

gradually centralized in one place for the sake of efficiency and to save personnel.

A total of 7,810 cases were tried in the U.S. Military Government courts under the old system, running the gamut of simple cases of theft, of

NO. D	DATE	NAME	AGE	CHARGE (S)	SENTENCE	FINE	FORFEITURE
1 10	0/21	BRINK, Irmgard	F 19	<ol> <li>Having unlawful ros session of an automatic pistol, make MAUSER, cal. 7.65 mm, together with 86 rounds of ammunition fitting said pistol, in viol. of ACA OC CRD NO. 2.</li> </ol>	l year - suspended.	none	l automatic pistol, make MAUSLR, cal. 7.65 mm.
2 10	)/21	FLADE, Willy	к 39	<ol> <li>For his own profit concealing L sacks each containing 100 lbs. of sugar, which he knew had be on ob- tained by means of an offense, in viol. of SEC 259 of the GENEAN FENAL CODE.</li> </ol>	Continued for further hearing.		
3 10	/21	FISCHER, Erwin	¥ 30	<ol> <li>Together with other perpetrators stealing one bag containing 52 lbs. of fresh meat from a 10-ton tuck parked at the Tempelhof Airbase, which meat was brought to Berlin by the Airlift, ip vial, of rRD 1 APT 1, SEC '9</li> </ol>	the		From cord, U.S urt, Berlin

Allied property, and other minor offenses tried in the summary courts, to illegal possession of weapons, illegal manufacture and possession of war material, abduction, and even murder, tried in Intermediate and General Military Courts.

This system of courts was replaced in Berlin by the new District Court system on November 2, 1948. The Military Government district courts do not operate under the Directors of Military Government in the *Länder* (states) and the U.S. Sector of Berlin, but function under the Office of Military Government for Germany.

Upon assuming Military Government functions in the U.S. Sector of Berlin early in July, 1945, it was found that the Soviets had already established *Amtsgerichte* throughout the city. Seven of these were located in the U.S. Sector. These were immediately reduced to six courts, one for each Verwaltungsbezirk.

The *Amtsgerichte* established by the Soviet authorities had complete trial jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters, where formerly they had only limited jurisdiction. A *Landgericht*, which formerly had jurisdiction of the more important cases, had not been re-established.

As a court of appeal, the Soviet Military Government established what was called the *Stadtgericht*, a court previously unknown in the German legal system.

Because the *Amtsgerichte* were endowed with an authority far beyond that given to them under the German law, steps were immediately taken to restrict these courts in the U.S. Sector to the proper jurisdiction. It then became necessary to create a court on the second level, the *Landgericht*, to try the more important cases and to act as a court of appeal from judgments rendered in the *Amtsgerichte*.

An agreement was reached in principle between the British, Soviet, and U.S. Military Governments to open a *Landgericht* in each sector. The *Landgericht* in the U.S. Sector was opened on August 6, 1945.

#### **Establishment of Courts on a City-Wide Basis**

It was obviously unsatisfactory to have different court establishments in the various sectors of the same city. The Soviet Sector had a *Stadtgericht* and the *Amtsgerichte*; the US. Sector had the *Landgericht* and the *Amtsgerichte*; the British and French Sectors had only the lower courts. In order to establish the courts on a city-wide basis, a committee of German jurists was selected to draw up a plan for the reconstruction of the German legal system in Berlin as it existed before the Nazi regime.

This system comprised the Amtsgerichte, the Landgericht, and the Kammergericht. A plan for the reorganization of the court system on a city-wide basis was prepared and approved by the Allied Kommandatura and went into effect on October 15, 1945.

The Landgericht, which originally operated in the U.S. Sector, continued to have the same president and enlarged its jurisdiction to include the entire city. The Kammergericht began its labors with four senates.

The Amtsgerichte were reduced in number from 20 to 14, of which 5 are located in the U.S. Sector.

#### **German Prisons**


Under the plan as approved by the Kommandatura, the administration of prisons was created on a city-wide basis under the *Generalstaatsanwalt* or Chief Prosecutor at the *Kammergericht*. Also an *Anwaltskammer*, or Bar Association, was created under this plan.

The prison system of Berlin, which had sustained substantial damages during the war, was gradually repaired, until now adequate facilities exist and former overcrowded conditions have been eliminated.

#### **Establishment of Administrative Courts**

The Legal Committee of the Kommandatura designated three former judges of the administrative courts to draft a plan for the re-establishment of the administrative courts in Berlin. This plan was submitted, but quadripartite agreement on the re-establishment of administrative courts on a citywide basis could not be obtained.

Therefore, on November 19, 1945, administrative courts were established unilaterally in the U.S. Sector, followed soon after by the British in their sector. These were the first administrative courts to be re-established anywhere in Germany.



Lower courts in post-war Berlin were initially set up in schools, libraries, and private homes, until adequate accommodation could be found in 1946 for their location.

The period from the beginning of the blockade in late June, 1948 until February 4, 1949 (marking the split of the Berlin court system) was one in which Soviet non-concurrence with the plans of the Western Powers for creating a democratic German court system in Berlin hampered and throttled the activities of the German courts and prosecution offices, until there was danger that the efficiency of



Chambers of the Berlin Landgericht, the higher German court, hear major civil and criminal cases, as well as appeals brought against decisions of the Amtsgerichte.

the city's judicial system might be seriously impaired, if not brought to a standstill.

The courts suffered from a shortage of judges and prosecutors and there was also a shortage of lawyers, all due to the refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit a re-instatement of persons who had been properly denazified, or to restore to their positions persons who had been erroneously removed because of alleged Nazi activities.

#### Kammergericht Transferred to West Berlin

The most important event of the blockade period was the transfer of the *Kammergericht* Berlin and the *Generalstaatsanwaltschaft* from the Soviet Sector to the western sectors on February 4, 1949, by the German supervisory authorities. This was necessary because of continuous interference by the Soviets with the proper functions of these agencies of justice.

While this led to a split in the city-wide court system, it also had some decided beneficial results. Freed from Soviet domination, the German courts in the western sectors recovered quickly and the Legal Committee was now able to issue necessary authorizations, so that the situation suddenly became the reverse of that which prevailed prior to February, 1949.

That is, instead of a shortage, there was and is now an adequate supply of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. This is due, first, to the fact that many of them moved of their own volition from the Soviet Sector to the western sectors, while others were discharged by the Soviets in the east sector; and, secondly, the Legal Committee, acting tri-partitely, quickly authorized the reinstatement of denazified judges, prosecutors, and lawyers.

The rapid recovery and improvement in the morale of the German court system continued until the "Statement of Principles" was announced, under the terms of which the administration of justice in the western sectors of Berlin was transferred to and became the responsibility of the Berlin city administration, thus ending direct supervision by Military Government.

In taking over the administration of justice in Western Berlin, the city authorities have thus far substantially continued the system organized under Military Government supervision and in which German judicial officials had participated from the beginning.

Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities have unilaterally set up an independent court system in their sector, wholly disregarding the legally constituted court system, now operating only in the western sectors, which had received full quadripartite approval in October, 1945.

While the courts established in the Soviet Sector of Berlin carry the same names as those operating in the western sectors, there are many reports that lay persons without legal training have been appointed as "Volksrichter" (People's Judges) and as prosecutors, thus following the pattern of the German court system reported to exist in the Soviet Zone.

#### **Cultural And Re-orientation Activities**

Under policies which were formulated during the latter phases of U.S. Military Government activities in Germany, considerable emphasis was placed on developing an effective cultural exchange and reorientation program.

Legal Branch is charged with carrying out in Berlin that part of the cultural exchange and reorientation program listed in the Inter-divisional Re-orientation Committee publication "Cultural Exchange Program" (February, 1949), which outlined U.S. policy on this subject. This includes:

a) Lectures on constitutional law, international law, and comparative law to the members of the Bench and Bar of Berlin, law students, and the general public, designed to explain and facilitate the adoption of certain Anglo-Saxon principles, which are the foundation of American democracy, into the legal system of Berlin, so that the newly granted constitutional rights of the citizens of Germany may be protected and enjoyed.

Additional lectures are being arranged, using not only experts visiting from the U.S.A., but also qualified legal personnel employed by Military Government in Berlin. Questions asked by the German audiences during the discussion following each lecture give valuable clues to the effectiveness of the lectures and to suitable subjects for future forums.

**b)** Selecting and arranging for certain members of the Berlin Bench and Bar to visit the United States for the purpose of observing and studying democratic legal institutions in action.

c) Selecting law students and referendare to visit

the United States for study at American law schools. Many applications have been received and are being processed. Selections will be made as soon as the number allocated for Berlin has been ascertained. Conferences have been held with the faculty and representative students of the Free University of Berlin.

**d)** Selecting and distributing law books to the German judiciary, the law school at the Free University of Berlin, and libraries.

#### **Good Foundation Laid**

In considering the legal phases of post-war Berlin in retrospect, it is felt that a strong foundation has been established for the future of the administration of justice.

The problems have been numerous and difficult in converting the pre-Occupation Nazi court system into one based on principles of democracy. However, it may be safely said that in the western sectors of the city a person can now be assured of his day in court before an impartial and fair tribunal.

Even in the eastern sector, where its judicial system has come under Soviet domination during the past year, one can feel confident that Soviet influence will be negated to a large extent as a result of continued comparison with the judicial system operating in the adjacent western sectors.

It is possible that the constructive effects of this comparison may even have an important influence in the surrounding Soviet Zone of Germany.



Courthouse in Berlin-Lichterfelde, where U.S. and German courts function simultaneously in the same building.

PUBLIC HEALTH

O minous health conditions existed in Berlin when U.S. troops arrived in July, 1945. An epidemic of dysentery—claiming over 2,000 victims and 300 deaths a week—was widespread throughout the city. Hospital bed space was far below the minimum needed and medical supplies of all sorts were in dire shortage.

Mass inoculations saved Berlin from epidemics in the precarious, post-war years.

The re-established City Health Department was functioning with a skeleton staff. Reports of communicable diseases were forwarded to the central office on foot or by bicycle.

Motor ambulances were non-existent. Transportation of the sick was effected

by hand-stretchers, carts, or improvised stretchers on wheels.

Sick beds, which had reached a peak of 38,000 in 1943 for the entire city, had been reduced to 9,300 by July 1, 1945. Few hospitals had anaesthetics, there was a scarcity of narcotics, sulfa drugs, and bandaging materials, and sera and vaccines were in very limited supply and great demand.

Public health officers met at the Allied Kommandatura on July 16th for the first time. From then on steady improvement can be noted in the complex process of restoring the city's health services and in protecting the population.

#### **COMMUNICABLE DISEASES: Top Priority**


The control of communicable diseases has been uppermost in the concern of Military Government Public Health Service. It has often been necessary for Allied health officers to initiate comprehensive health programs in the city and to force effective action on the part of the German authorities.

In many cases no action was taken by the Germans despite Military Government pressure and despite the fact that existing German health laws were in most cases entirely adequate. This attitude on the part of Berlin health officers, charac-

> terized by complacent resignation and attempts to rationalize any deterioration of conditions as a sequel to the Occupation, has steadily increased.

> Nonetheless, there has been but one epidemic of any consequence, that of poliomyelitis in the summer of 1947. This outbreak reached true epidemic proportions. There were 2,462 cases reported, of which 220 were fatal, and a high proportion of the remaining cases were left with residual paralysis of varying severity.


> The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis of America flew a team of specialists to Berlin. Six respirators (iron



"Such action will be taken to control communicable diseases and to alleviate suffering among the civilian population as will ensure success of the Commander's missions and will' prevent medical hazards to the Allied Forces...

"Civilian public health organizations are to be used to the fullest extent possible...

"Control is maintained over civilian public health authorities to insure that such authorities provide the measure of civilian health control necessary for the protection of the Allied Forces..."



lungs), several hot pack-machines, and other equipment were also flown to the city. The American Women's Club of Berlin generously donated thousands of cans of fruit juices, mineral oils, soaps, soups, and other items otherwise unobtainable in the city.


A series of lectures by American poliomyelitis specialists, attended by over two thousand Berlin physicians, was held during the epidemic.

In succeeding years the incidence of the dread disease never again passed the average stage of poliomyelitis for a city of Berlin's size.

#### **Tuberculosis: Continuing Problem**

Since the end of World War II, tuberculosis has been the leading reportable disease in Berlin. Its control and cure are intimately linked up with the larger problem of a deficient German economy and cannot be viewed separately. Widespread shortages of supplies and facilities made life especially difficult for patients.

Hospitals and sanatoria need many supplies and equipment which are in general demand by the



entire population throughout the country. There is thus a continuing competition between the sick and the well for such supplies. With supply conditions gradually normalizing, it has now become the responsibility of the Germans to determine the relative priority of need, and to distribute that which is available as wisely as possible.


The problem of isolating open cases of tuberculosis, which is the immediate and vital step in any program of control, has still not been solved. Berlin has only 0.8 hospital beds per annual death, and the recommendation of American health authorities is 2.5 beds per annual death.

Shortages in building materials and workers have hampered the expansion of tuberculosis bed facilities, so that at present, facilities are just barely adequate to care for the patients.

Tuberculosis continues to be a disease of great import in Berlin. Sub-standard living conditions and the relatively low nutritional status of Berliners is the greatest causative factor and, until these conditions are rectified, tuberculosis will continue to be a disease of immediate importance.

#### TYPHUS

Cases and Deaths in U.S. Sector



#### **Typhus Fever Stamped Out**


As a result of the Typhus Fever Control Program, instituted soon after the arrival of U.S. Forces in Berlin, this disease has been virtually stamped out in the city.

Only one case has been reported in the U.S. Sector since June, 1948. There have been two cases reported in the Soviet Sector since July, 1946.

#### Mass Immunization to Combat Diphtheria

The mass immunization program effected at the beginning of the Occupation has been continued, and the incidence of diphtheria and its mortality toll greatly reduced.


The Kommandatura ordered that all children be immunized against the disease by the end of their second year of life, and that they be re-immunized during the first and last years of school attendance up to 15 years of age, in accordance with existing German laws.



DIPHTHERIA

The disease incidence was initially high, as compared with the United States, but by the early part of 1946 the monthly average fell to 48.3 per 10,000 population, and from then on continued to fall gradually.

Credit for keeping the disease to a minimum incidence is given to the energetic immunization program, which has achieved great results against a malady that in the past was one of the worst causes of death among children in Europe.



SCARLET FEVER


**Progress Against Scarlet Fever** 

As can be seen from the above graph, the incidence of scarlet fever has been brought down by  $59^{0/0}$  in the city of Berlin and by  $56^{0/0}$  in the U.S. Sector. Deaths were also reduced by 85% and 75%, respectively.

#### **Enteric Diseases Sharply Reduced**

The remarkable reduction in the incidence of typhoid fever, para-typhoid, and dysentery illustrates the value of preventive medicine. German authorities had to be convinced of the value of mass immunization programs, however, and the task was not easy. Mass vaccination with typhoid and para-typhoid vaccines was reluctantly accepted by the German authorities, although there were thousands of cases of the disease when the Allies entered Germany. And Berlin was no exception.


During the first six months of the occupation of Berlin, for example, there were over 13,000 new cases of typhoid and para-typhoid fever and over



15,000 new cases of dysentery, the latter having a mortality rate of  $23.6^{0/6}$ .


It became necessary in the spring of 1946 to order that the entire population, without exception, be immunized. People were then unable to acquire their food ration cards, unless they could prove they had been vaccinated. By April 20, 1946, approximately  $83^{0/0}$  of the population of the U.S. Sector had thus been immunized.

The program has since been repeated each year, and persons who were previously vaccinated were given a "booster" shot, or the full series of injections if they could not prove they had been previously vaccinated.



Lakes and swamp areas were sprayed with DDT in 1945 to fight the dangerous spread of insect-borne diseases.

59




In regard to dysentery, the problem was more complex, although the incidence of the disease dropped sharply after the first protective measures were undertaken. A widespread educational program was carried out among the general public as to its dangers, sanitary measures, the importance of having early professional attendance, and isolation. Pamphlets based on Army experiences in the Middle-East were distributed to physicians, and quantities of sulfa drugs were distributed to practicing doctors.

#### **Venereal Diseases: A Social Problem**

The situation regarding venereal diseases in Berlin has shown remarkable improvement since the early days of the Occupation. The accompanying charts illustrate the reduction in the incidence of gonorrhea and syphilis. The incidence of the diseases among U.S. personnel in Berlin is the lowest in the European Command.

In spite of this optimistic picture, it must be pointed out that constant vigilance is necessary in Berlin—as, indeed, elsewhere—in the control of venereal diseases. The problem here is perhaps more acute, for prostitution in Berlin is closely linked with the economic situation and the general




#### GONORRHEA Cases in U.S. Sector

emotional frustration of the average young Berlin girl.

Unless there is success in solving the social problem involved, there will be little success in stamping out prostitution. At the present time, for example, approximately 3,000 girls who have been named as venereal disease contacts by either Germans or Allied personnel have not been apprehended and treated, because in many cases they have been able to bribe their way clear with money or merchandise.

#### SYPHILIS

Cases in U.S. Sector



#### **NUTRITION: Steady Improvement**

The nutritional state of the population of Western Berlin has steadily improved during the past four years. The ration system in 1945 was broken down into five categories:

I — Heavy workers and certain		
professional workers	2,486	Calories
II — Moderate workers	1,992	
III — Maintenance personnel,		
janitors etc	1,559	
IV — Children under 15 years		
of age	1,384	"

V — Remainder of population 1,247

In the fall of 1945, a special Allied Nutrition Survey Team carried out extensive research in the U.S. Sector of the city to determine how the population was faring on this diet. Its findings may be summarized as follows:

- a. The general health of the population was quite good,
- b. There was a generalized weight loss due to the low caloric intake,
- c. No evidence of an abnormal incidence of nutritional deficiency was found,
- d. There was some evidence of vitamin and mineral deficiencies.

In January, 1946, therefore, the Kommandatura effected certain changes in the food ration categories, raising in general the rations of young people.

Several subsequent changes were made in the ration allowances with the aim of gradually raising the nutritional level. The latest increase, in No-


60

vember, 1948, brought the ration categories to the following levels:

Category				
"	II —	2,202		
	III —	1,802		(the lowest adult category)
"	IVa —	1,786		(children aged 0—6)
	IVb —	1,633		(aged 6-9)
" 🔪	IVc —	1,834	"	(aged 9—15)

#### **MEDICAL AFFAIRS: Guidance and Help**

The Medical Academy in the U.S. Sector was formally opened in July, 1948, after having had to postpone its plans for the construction of a special building in the *Behring* Hospital, and after diffi-



Iron lungs and other modern equipment were flown to Berlin to combat the 1947 infantile paralysis epidemic.

culties with the conversion of its 200,000 Mark fund following the currency reform.

Several special programs, which included lectures by visiting international experts, have been presented to the practising medical profession each month. An extensive program of refresher courses was prepared for the season 1948-49.

	1939	1945 Last 6 months	1949 First 6 months
Death Rates per Thousand Population per Annum	14.3	55.4	18.0
Infant Mortality Rate per 100 Live Births	5.9	36.0	10.1
Live Birth Rate per Thousand Population per Annum	15.7	8.6	1,0.7

THE RETURN OF BERLIN BIRTH/DEATH RATES TO NORMALCY

The medical faculty of the Free University (see also page 104) was opened in November, 1948, and it solved the problem of what to do with the noncommunist medical students who had been evicted from the *Charité* Hospital. Some of the students had previously been engaged as temporary ward assistants in the *Auguste-Viktoria* Hospital. The Free University Medical School opened with more than 300 students in the clinical semesters. To date, however, there are no pre-clinical courses available.

Three sectoral medical associations have been separately licensed because of Soviet objections to a city-wide association. Three separate western sector organizations of dentists were similarly authorized in May, 1948, by the Allied Kommandatura.

#### **HOSPITALIZATION: Blockade Problems**

Occupancy of hospital beds in the U.S. Sector is still generally below the safe limit of  $90^{0/0}$ . A certain tendency to fill general beds with old and chronic cases has been repeatedly observed, but it is most difficult to control.

During the blockade, hospitals in the western sectors were beset with great difficulties. The provision of electricity for only two separate two-hour periods a day necessitated drastic rearrangement of operating and x-ray schedules.

A small number of hospitals were fortunately equipped with generators, but additional generators were ordered and flown to the city by the Air Lift for the hospitals which had none. A few hospitals were given extra hours of electricity, and the polio station of the *Auguste-Viktoria* Hospital received continuous current to operate its iron lungs.

The coal shortage during the blockade also caused enormous problems. The heating of certain special hospital departments was authorized on October 25, 1948, and general space heating was authorized at

the beginning of November of that year. Hospitals were adequately heated with few exceptions, although they did not receive enough heat to accord with normal standards. Doctors' and denoffices, tists' however, were barely heated, if at all, during blockade the winter of 1948-1949.

All major hospital reconstruction had to be abandoned during the




Many of the drugs and sera, including penicillin, used in Berlin hospitals were contributed by individuals and organizations in the United States.

blockade but it was possible to achieve the minimum goal of weatherproofing the severely damaged hospitals that were not yet repaired.

A quota of 45 tons monthly for medical supplies, was brought to Berlin by the Air Lift. While not up to normal peace-time needs, the overall supply of medical materials during the blockade was no worse than at any other time since the end of the war.

### THE FOUR SECTORS OF BERLIN



#### **RELATION BETWEEN POST-WAR POPULATION AND PRE-WAR POPULATION (CENSUS, MAY 1949)**

	100% = 4.3.	21.5				100% = 2.7.	34.0		
BERLIN CITY					WESTERN				
C// /	2.807.4	3.189.5	3.3/2.7	3.252.4	SECTORS		2.0/6.3	2.088.8	2.055.8
S. Carl	65%.	74 °/o	77%	75 %		1.233.6			
						45 %o	74 %	76%	75 %
	AUG. 1945	OCT.1946	1.JAN 1948	1.JAN.1949		AUG. 1945	OCT.1946	1.JAN. 1948	1.JAN. 1949
	100 % = 1.33	1.2		·		100% = 521.	2		
US SECTOR					FRENCH		Section and		
		980.6	1.006.2	1.000.9	SECTOR	376.7	428.8	440.9	433.537
	846.2	74.04	75.0					1.2. 1. 2. 2.	
	64 °/o	74 °/o	75 %	75 %	and the second	73 %	83 %	85 %	83 °/o
	100% = 881.1	6				100 % = 1.58	7.5		
BRITISH			a church	化的现在分词	SOVIET				
SECTOR		606.9	641.7	621.4	SECTOR	1.000.0	1.174.2	1.223.7	1.196.6
	5/0.7					1.073.8			
	58 °/o	69 °/o	73 %	70%		67 °/o	73 %	77%	75 %
a Albert Contract States of	1140250		3 1 1 3 1 4			MAR SALA		A Sharak	

#### PUBLIC SAFETY

A revitalized, re-equipped police force is responsible for the steadily declining crime rate in West Berlin.

## PUBLIC SAFETY

When the Americans arrived in Berlin in 1945, they found that the police and fire departments then in existence had been recruited by the Soviets almost from nothing. In their recruitment the Russians had placed a hard core of communists in most of the strategic positions, as well as a considerable number in the rank and file.

Buildings, equipment, transportation, uniforms, weapons, communications, and records were almost non-existent and the newly recruited personnel were inexperienced and untrained.

#### **Recruit Training First Task**

The first two years were devoted to sorting out the mass of raw recruits and training them in their professions. This was a prodigious task. The uniformed police, for example, numbered 11,000 men and in the first two years there was a turnover of 10,000 in this group alone.

Of these 10,000 policemen approximately  $25^{0/0}$  were men who entered the police force, because they needed employment quickly, and they left when they found positions more to their liking. Another  $25^{0/0}$  were discharged, either for misdemeanors committed while policemen or because their previous criminal records were discovered. The remaining  $50^{0/0}$  were discharged because of former participation in Nazi activities.

Buildings were found or repaired to house police stations; telephone and teletype systems were installed and expanded; the first real uniforms replaced the original catch-as-catch-can clothing; some (though not enough) means of transportation was obtained. Sufficient pistols to arm the police actually on duty were issued, and gradually the records necessary to efficient police operation were reassembled or made. Training was started with short lectures at the stations where the men reported for duty, and it later developed into two schools, one in the Soviet and the other in the British Sector.

During this period the basic conflicts between the communist and western ideologies began to appear and to grow. These conflicts were not limited to the Soviets and Western Powers in the Allied Kommandatura, but were also evident within the body of the police itself.

Basically, the conflict revolved around the problem of whether Berlin was or was not to become a police state.

Since the police headquarters was in the Soviet Sector, the police president (a Russian-appointed officer captured at Stalingrad), and all personnel officers, as well as many of the other top police officials, were communists, the Western Powers found they almost had no control over the police, • even in their own sectors.

A reorganization of the police department was proposed in the Kommandatura, but agreement could not be reached. A compromise agreement at the Allied Control Council, however, gave the Western Powers on October 4, 1946, control in their individual sectors through the establishment of sector assistants to the police president. This was closely followed by the city-wide elections in which the Russians and their communist collaborators discovered that they polled less than 20% of the votes.



The uniformed Berlin policewoman, a post-war novelty to this city, works as hard as her male counterpart.

After the 1946 city elections came a six-month period in which the elected city government was getting itself organized and attempting to learn to function under its temporary constitution, in spite of Soviet opposition and the disruptive tactics of the 19.8% elected communists. Also seriously disruptive to the Magistrat's work was an overwhelming majority of subordinate officials in almost every branch of the government, holdovers from the government originally appointed by the Soviets (in May-June, 1945), who could not be removed because of the ever-present Soviet veto power.

#### **Communists Seek Police Rule**

Running through these first two years, one can now see the first signs of the Russian-communist determination for absolute control of the police. An old time German police official named Heinrich, who was discharged when the Nazis came to power, was

appointed by the Russians to command the uniformed police.

It soon developed that Heinrich was no more palatable to the communists than he had been to the Nazis, and in the late summer of 1945, Heinrich disappeared and has not been heard from since. The vice-president of the police was such an unsavory character that even the Russians agreed to his dismissal without argument. Then came a tug-of-war over the individual to replace the discharged vice-president.

#### **Tussle Over New Police Deputy**

Two candidates were outstanding—Dr. Johannes Stumm, the next ranking official (chief of the Präsidialabteilung), and Hans Seidel, the personnel officer of both the uniformed police and the police presidium. Agreement could not be reached, since the Russians vetoed Stumm and the Western Powers would not agree to Seidel, who had already begun to show his true colors as a communist hatchet man.

The Russians demanded a four-power investigation of Stumm, which resulted in a unanimous decision that cleared him. The U.S. delegation then brought charges against Seidel, which resulted in four-power agreement that Seidel be discharged and not reemployed by the Berlin police in any capacity whatsoever, though the discharge should not otherwise adversely effect his future.

Still the Russians would not agree to Stumm as vice-president. Though later they agreed to pay him the salary of vice-president and he actually performed the duties of that position, he was never given that title. Stumm was another pre-Nazi official

#### **Relation between Population and Area and Police Department Personnel**


(All figures as of	Jan 1,	1949,	unless	otherwise	noted)
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	Popu- lation	%	Police Dpt.Personnel		Area in sq.	%	Uniformed Police		War Damage to Housing in %*)		
			Number	per 1000pop.	miles		Number	per sq. mile	totally destroyed	repair- able	usable
Steglitz ' Zehlendorf Kreuzberg Tempelhof Schoeneberg Neukoelln Traffic SQ & Amt Auxil. Police	145,250 81,235 205,026 114,861 176,633 277,843 —	8 20 11 18	$\begin{array}{r} & 463 \\ 444 \\ 816 \\ 387 \\ 667 \\ 659 \\ 464 \\ 1,015 \end{array}$	$     3.2 \\     5.4 \\     4.0 \\     3.4 \\     3.8 \\     2.4 \\    $	$ \begin{array}{c} 12.3 \\ 27.2 \\ 4.0 \\ 15.6 \\ 4.7 \\ 17.2 \\ - \\ - \\ - \\ \end{array} $	$     \begin{array}{r}       15 \\       34 \\       5 \\       19 \\       6 \\       21 \\      $	$\begin{array}{r} 394\\ 384\\ 698\\ 321\\ 555\\ 543\\ 425\\ 1,015\end{array}$	$ \begin{array}{r} 26\\11\\174\\19\\92\\26\\\\\\-\end{array} $	29.2 8.8 39.9 18.3 30.8 11.8 	$9.9 \\ 11.8 \\ 15.1 \\ 19.5 \\ 16.0 \\ 10.5 \\$	60.9 79.4 45.0 62.2 53.2 77.7
US Sector	1,000,853	100	4,915	4.9	81.0	100	4,335	53	21.9	13.2	64.9
US Sector British Sector French Sector	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	30 19	3,360	$4.9 \\ 5.4 \\ 4.4$	$\begin{vmatrix} 81.0 \\ 64.0 \\ 42.7 \end{vmatrix}$	$24 \\ 19 \\ 12$	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$53\\46\\40$	$\begin{array}{c} 21.9 \\ 26.8 \\ 13.8 \end{array}$	$13.2 \\ 8.0 \\ 7.9$	$ \begin{array}{c c} 64.9 \\ 65.2 \\ 78.3 \end{array} $
Western Berlin	2,055,800	100	11,889	5.3	187.7	55	$\begin{array}{c}(9,006)\\9,214^{**})\end{array}$	50			
Soviet Sector	1,196,555	37	(?)		155.5	45	-		16.3	7.2	76.5
Berlin	3,252,355	100	16,141***)	5.0	343.2	100	11,882***)	35	19.5	9.3	71.2

Note: Population as reported by Magistrat Bureau of Statistics,

\*) Official survey 1946, Berliner Statistik, Heft 3, 1947, pg. 47 \*) Including Police Hq. Personnel

\*\*\*) Latest available figures, 1948, July



Trend of Crime by Category in Berlin 1946–1948

whom the Russians had reappointed, and they were taking no more chances.

With the disappearance of Heinrich in late 1945, another pre-Nazi official, Hans Kanig, was appointed to command the uniformed police. Kanig was a seeker of personal aggrandizement and was neither overly intelligent nor particularly courageous. Certainly he was not a good administrator.

Though none of the four powers wanted to support Kanig, the Western Powers were forced to oppose his dismissal, since it was obvious by the time this matter came to a climax in late 1947 and early 1948 that unanimous agreement on a successor would not be reached and the deputy, an old line communist, would automatically take his place. Finally, in early 1948, Kanig was called to a Russian office and frightened into leaving.

#### **Police Chief Attends Kommandatura Sessions**

During all this period and well into the third, year, the Public Safety Committee of the Kommandatura was unique among all the committees, in that the police president, Markgraf, attended all the meetings of the committee and was given advance copies of the agenda, so that he could come prepared to give advice or answer questions. Only when confidential matters were discussed was he excluded.

In early 1947, one of the western representatives suggested that perhaps the police president should be excluded, except when the committee or one of its members specifically asked for him. This suggestion was violently opposed by the Russian member, but early in 1948 the Russians reversed their decision and demanded his exclusion. The Western Powers could only agree, because his presence did not conform to normal practice. Thereafter, the police president could attend only when summoned by one or more members of the committee through the chairman.

This was the first sign of decreasing confidence in their appointee on the part of the Russians and it was brought on because police president Markgraf seemed gradually to be realizing that it was the western representatives who wanted a democratic police department and increased pay, pensions, and the necessary equipment and supplies to permit the building of a good police force, and that it was always the Russian representative who vetoed improvements proposed by the other committee members.

From the very beginning of the Occupation in 1945, people have disappeared from Berlin. How many thousands of these were kidnappings or



Teamwork between American MPs and the police of Berlin's western sectors since 1945 succeeded well.



Political demonstration: a recurring Berlin police problem.

illegal arrests will perhaps never be known. Some, no doubt, were people who felt endangered and simply left, purposely leaving no trace. But so many cases have been traced directly to the

Russians and Soviet-controlled police agencies that there can be no doubt that the great majority of the thousands who have disappeared did so on Russian-communist orders, or were abducted.

In the past 18 months, numerous a attempts at kidnapping have been averted by the western sector police and in several cases the would + be kidnappers have been arrested and sentenced to prison. Without exception they were members of +000 Soviet Sector or Soviet Zone police agencies.

The period from mid-1947 to mid-1948 was notable only for the increasingly difficult attitude of the Soviets toward all public safety <sup>2</sup> matters. They refused to agree to better police communications, they attacked all high-ranking police <sup>8</sup> officials who were not communists, and they argued procedural matters for hours in the Public Safety Committee. Less and less progress was made during this period, until finally there was none. <sup>2000</sup>


The Soviets and the police president were planning to have the Soviet Sector Assistant resign "because of poor health". The western 4 representatives discovered the real reason to be a previous criminal record of four convictions and current connections with a gang of criminals. When this was brought out in the committee meeting on May 13, 1948, the Russian delegation walked out of the meeting in anger.

In the early part of 1948, works council elections were held within the police department. The results, when finally announced on June 4th, proved that the communists had not been able to gain control of the individual policemen.

#### **Communist Election Defeat**

Of 233 works councillors elected, 131 were noncommunists, 12 of no party, and 90 communists. Only four communists were elected in the western sectors, while 32 non-communists were elected from the central offices in the Soviet Sector.

On July 26, 1948, the Oberbürgermeister suspended Markgraf for repeated insubordination and appointed Dr. Stumm in his place. Stumm on July 28th announced he would set up his presidium in Friesenstraße in the U.S. Sector as of August 2nd and ordered all presidium employees to report there for duty on that date. Approximately 1,500 of the 2,000 persons concerned reported as ordered. The police department was thus the first agency of the city government to be split.





Cold, hunger, despair make a crime-provoking climate. Yet Berlin's post-war record has been as good, per capita, as that of most cities in the United States.

September was marked by communist riots at the City Hall in the Soviet Sector, where the Magistrat and City Assembly were still attempting to conduct their business. Since the Markgraf police made no attempt to control this violence, one of the mayors arranged privately for western sector police to come to the next meeting to provide protection for the city government.

The City Hall was surrounded by Markgraf police and Soviet troops, and 47 of the west sector policemen were arrested and held without trial for approximately six weeks. Finally, all but three were released. These three were tried in a Soviet military court, two of whom were sentenced to six months and the third to one year in prison.

#### Heavy Demands On Police During Blockade

The blockade of the western sectors was increasingly tightened by the Soviets and it made more and more demands on the police. Many unusual events requiring police action occurred during this period, but only a few of the more important highlights are listed here.

Throughout the blockade it was the task of the police to prevent illegal actions of the Soviet Sector and zonal police within the western sectors. When the counter-blockade was ordered, it fell to the police to enforce these restrictions, and they did it well.

Since almost every street and road entering the western sectors from either the Soviet Sector or Zone was blocked by Soviet soldiers and Sovietcontrolled police, and many of these points during the final months were actually physically blockaded with heavy barriers, it was necessary to place west sector policemen just inside the western borders facing these posts. That there were very few border incidents between these opposing posts is a tribute to the training and level-headedness of the police.


The effectiveness of the western counter-blockade in Berlin was also largely due to police watchfulness. There were numerous occasions when the police had to be on duty around the clock for many days at a time, but on each such occasion their duties were performed in a very commendable manner.


#### UGO Rail Strike: Another Police Problem

Hardly had the blockade been lifted on May 12th, when the railroad strike started (see page 119). Since 1945, east sector railway police had patrolled the railway and *S-Bahn* stations even in the western sectors. In the first three days of the strike there were numerous outbreaks of violence between railway police and the strikers. Several of these resulted in shooting by the railway police, during which one person was killed and at least 20 injured.

After three days of disorder the western police were ordered to assure the maintenance of law and order on all railway property in the western sectors. They moved into all stations on May 24th and ordered the railway police to leave. The latter left peacefully and there was no further violence during the remainder of the strike.

Throughout the four post-war years a police department has been built from the ground up. While performing its normal functions of maintaining law and order in abnormal years (a more than full-time





5\*

job for any police department anywhere), the department has been buffeted from all sides and confronted with a variety and volume of problems which few police departments have ever faced in so short a period of time.


#### **Statistics Record Growing Police Skill**

That the police were and are today performing their normal functions very well can be seen from available statistics. Records for 1945 are so few and unreliable that no attempt is made to show them. Records for the Soviet Sector have not been available since the split in the police; therefore, only statistics of the U.S. Sector are shown, though the same trends may be assumed for all three western sectors.

It should suffice here to mention only one item total crimes known to the police in the U.S. Sector during the first six months of 1946-1949, inclusive.

Total crimes in the U.S. Sector in the first six months of 1946 numbered 24,618; there were 27,028 in 1947; 27,782 in 1948; and 17,950 in 1949. The total for 1949 is  $27^{0/6}$  below 1946 and  $35^{0/6}$  below 1948.

#### Transport Available to German Police U.S. Sector, Berlin



#### **Special Recruit Training**

Every police recruit now receives three months' training in a special police school in the British

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J 5000 FFENSES KNOWN 4000 4000 3000 3000 OFFENSES CLEARED FROM PREVIOUS MONTH 68 2000 2000 NO DATA PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE KNOWN OFFENSES PERCENTAGE OF KNOWN CLEARED OFFENSES CLEARED 1000 SAME MONTH 1000 1946 1947 1948 1 1 1949 1

S. Sector All who did not undergo such training before they began their duty in the years 1945-1948 must now complete this course. There are courses of the same length for

> for administrative police. The police in the U.S. and British Sectors have two-way radio patrol cars and these will soon be expanded to the French Sector. Other types of communication are almost complete and there is adequate motor transportation and other equipment. The department is completely armed with pistols, and before winter every uniformed member of the police will have received a complete new uniform.

> Sector before starting regular duty.

superior officers, for detectives, and

On June 17, 1949, following the assignment of greater authority to the Magistrat in most fields, the Kommandantura also made the city authorities responsible for the maintenance of the police force. The Allied order pointed out that the police are individually responsible for their actions and are subject to the rule of law, that the force is responsible for its own administration, and, with the Gestapo crimes of the Nazi era in mind, it stressed that there would be "no secret police .... or force of police other than is already in being".

The city fire department, while not completely equipped as it should be, has adequate manpower and equipment which has, considering conditions in Berlin since 1945,

## Relation Between Offenses Known and Offenses Cleared, U.S. Sector

permitted it to do a more than adequate job.

Two sets of figures will suffice to illustrate both the elimination of fire hazards and the improvement in fire fighting efficiency:

The estimated fire losses in the U.S. Sector in 1947 were 4,282,624 Marks, but in 1948 this figure was only 1,548,505 Marks. Deaths from fire in all of



The dread secret Gestapo of the Nazi police state is fading into memory. In its place in Berlin today is the friendly, helpful "corner cop", not very different from the one at Main and Market in Everytown, U. S. A.

Berlin in 1947 were 125 (more than 70 of these died in one restaurant fire), but in 1948 only 10.

The fire department headquarters is in the U.S. Sector and, while it also was split as the other government agencies, it was one of the last to be



Two-way radio patrol cars have improved the speed of operation and the efficiency of West Berlin police.



There seemed little left to burn in the bomb- and shell-destroyed German capital of 1945, yet the Berlin Fire Department has since been kept adequately and successfully busy.

affected. Complete control of the fire department has been returned to the city government.

#### **Denazification Nearing Completion**

Denazification in Berlin has never been conducted under the same rules as in the zones, because the Soviets at the Allied Kommandatura refused to implement ACA Directive 38. This directive, in the zones, resulted in the passing of the Law for

# DENAZIFICATION APPEAL CASES AS OF JULY 12, 1949

#### **Borough Commissions level**

Boroughs of U. S. Sector			De- nied	Up- held	Cases transf. to Magistrat or for file only	Back- log
Total	48,210	47,596	3,271	39,053	5,272	614*

\* These will have been completed by approximately July 31, 1949.

Sector Commission level

Total cases filed	Total	Denied	Upheld	Cases transf. to Magistrat or Screening Sub-Section	Back- log
3,174	2,656	105	2,401	150	518

#### **Magistrat Commission level**

Magis-	Total					
trat Comm.	cases filed	Total	Back- log			
Total	5,245	2,106	49	2,018	39	3,139

Liberation by the Germans. The amnesties which were granted in the zones were later granted in Berlin.

July 31st, approximately, will have seen the completion of all pending appeals except those of approximately 3,000 persons in special categories, whose cases are pending before city-wide specialist commissions. After that date, the residue of denazification will be a matter for the city government to handle.



Weekly periodicals in Berlin—that treat of religion, of politics, and of burlesque—were regularly available on blockade newsstands to inform and divert a besieged population.

Paper supplies, as for daily newspapers and books, were flown in by Air Lift. But a free, critical press is one of the underlying purposes of Military Government; so newsprint—along with food, fuel and medicine—was a priority cargo.

(Over-printed figures are those of weekly circulation.)

The Cold War has been bitterly fought in Berlin's East- and West-licensed press.

# **INFORMATION SERVICE**

WALEIRES

Thastrierte

West Berlin is the only place behind the Iron Curtain where the printed and spoken word is effectively free. Hence the high-level priority assigned by Military Government to its reorientation mission.

Hence nearly ten thousand tons of air-bridged

newsprint to keep the democratic printing presses of the U.S., British and French Sectors of Berlin rolling through the blockade, in which the throttling of West-licensed press was a collateral objective of the Soviets.

DIE CT WELT

DIE NEUE ZED

DER TAGESSP

Sosialdemokra

nanzonischer Tute

MOSAIK

Hence the expanding U.S. Information Centers of Berlin with their library, reading room, lecture, and exhibition services for a half-million visitors each year; thousands of miles of motion picture film documenting the Berlin story for the people of all the world.

So, too, the strong challenging voice of the American radio station in Berlin, RIAS, reaching further and more effectively each year to the still-hopeful, little people Excerpts from Mil. Gov. Regulations, Title 21 (Information Services):

"Basic Policy Regulating German Information Services: U. S. Military Government holds that free access to public information, freedom of expression and the free exchange of ideas throughout Germany and between Germany and other nations are essential to the establishment of a sound and healthy democratic society in which the individual German, made conscious of his responsibilities as a cilizen, is encouraged to express his convictions and to take an active and intelligent part in public affairs ...

"The press will be protected from governmental domination or domination by special interests.

"The prerogatives of a free press in obtaining and publishing information of public interest will be guaranteed.

"There will be no arbitrary interference by the police or other administrative bodies in the free flow and dissemination of news and printed matter ...

"In addition to establishing and carrying out procedures for effecting the reconstitution, control and guidance of German-operated public informational media, Information Services personnel will plan and carry out certain overt activities designed to further the democratic orientation of Germany, and to foster the assimilation of the German people into the society of peaceful nations through the revival of international cultural relations."

behind the Iron Curtain of Soviet silence, party-line half truths, and communist distortion.

Berlin Sector possesses the only remaining Information Services Branch of U.S. Military Government in Germany still charged with the full implementation of Military Government Regulations.

> Title 21. Beginning as the Information Services Control Detachment on July 6, 1945, it has evolved through the early occupational, denazification, and quadripartite phases of the inevitable mutable mission of Military Government in Berlin.

> Within the last year the Branch has changed its designation from "Information Control" to "Information Services". Its Research and Screening Section which was so important in the denazification phase was, in the same period, transferred to Public Safety Branch; and its Theater and Music Section to the Education Branch for the same reasons of shifting emphasis in mission, arising out of current developments in Berlin.

The past year also marked almost complete liquidation of the Monuments and Fine Arts Section and the creation of a new section charged with daily evidential documentation of the Soviet pressure pattern exerted against Berlin.

Because Information Services Branch deals exclusively with the minds of a people calloused by totalitarian propaganda for nearly two decades, the detailed story of its evolving functions and mission is highly technical.

Newspapermen and public relation specialists, for instance, would find a meaty volume in details of the East-West newspaper war during the Berlin blockade alone. For radio men there is another potential text book in the development of RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor) and its effective techniques.

But for the purposes of this unofficial report the following presentations give at least an outline of the American effort to develop and ensure a free press and radio for the people of the quartered city.

# PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS

**B** y the beginning of July 1946, after one year of U.S. occupation in Berlin, the Press and Publications Section had licensed 26 publishers. These included 14 book publishers, 11 publishers of peri-

odicals and one newspaper publisher. At the present time, three years later, there have been 56 licenses issued, and the licensees have produced 851 books and pamphlets, are publishing 65 periodicals, and two newspapers, *Der Tagesspiegel* and *Der Abend*.

The periodicals fall into the following categories:

Youth		1.					2
Women .							6
Illustrated							1
Professiona	l a	nd	tra	ide			36
Miscellaneo	ous	lit	era	ary			4
<b>Religious</b> .							15
Political .					:		4

The books and pamphlets published include textbooks, scientific books, novels, art books, and approximately 40 translations of American authors.

During the past year, this section has maintained a Magazine Servicing Unit by which articles printed in American magazines have been made available to Berlin publishers. It is also possible for any publisher to request an article on practically any subject concerning American life, economics, politics, etc.

Such articles have been secured through the New York Field Office. Additionally, a Publishers' Reading Room has been established, where approximately 150 American magazines are kept on file for the use of German publishers. A limited library



Press, film, radio and the theater: these are the mass media which reach all Germans, and which Military Government has used energetically during the past four years to diffuse its theme of responsible citizenship in a world community. Proof of the campaign's effectiveness has been the resolute stand of West Berliners against the pressure and threats of communist-coated totalitarianism.



INFORMATION SERVICES

of available translation rights is also maintained in the Reading Room.

Four Berlin newspaper or magazine publishers have been sent to the United States on orientation trips. Two other publishers were processed and were ready to leave, but the serious financial difficulties for Berlin publishers since March 20, 1949, made it impossible for them to go.

Also under the jurisdiction of the Press and Publications Section is the Deutscher Verlag, the largest printing plant in Berlin. This printing



Front-line newsstand: this kiosk, just west of the Soviet Sector border in central Berlin, is probably the farthest point east in Europe where the free, uncensored press can be found openly displayed.

house, which was founded by the Ullstein brothers and which, before the Nazi regime, was the biggest publishing house in Europe, was nothing but a damaged shell when American occupation troops came into Berlin in 1945.

The Nazi government had acquired this plant in 1934 and made it one of their chief propaganda mills. The Russians, during the period when they were in Berlin alone, had taken all movable and working equipment out of the plant for transportation to the east zone or to Russia.


and rotogravure printing for newspapers, periodicals and books. The daily newspapers Der Tagesspiegel (U.S.), Der Abend (U.S.), Die Neue

set

Zeitung (overt U.S.), Die Welt (overt British), Der Tag (British) are all printed at the Deutscher Verlag.

Approximately 60 percent of the book publishing and at least 50 percent of the periodical publishing in the three western sectors of Berlin is done in this plant. Because of restitution claims on the part of the Ullstein brothers, the plant is still operated under U.S. Property Control.

Berlin publishing, which had been restricted since the occupation by limited paper supplies, faced an



It was necessary to equip the plant from bombed and rusted machinery after a long and difficult process of repair. At the time the American occupation began in Berlin there were only two linotype machines in the plant in operating order. There are now 47.


The plant is now

equipped with 75 cm ro-

tary presses, 63 cm ro-

tary presses, and it can

produce letterpress, off-



Once one of the largest publishing houses in Europe, the Deutscher Verlag had to rebuild from bombed scrap. Today it handles over half the press, periodical, and book printing trade of the three western sectors.

increasingly difficult situation in July, 1948, with the imposition of the blockade. Prior to and during the war Berlin publishers depended upon Saxony for their paper supplies. Since this is in the Russian Zone of Occupation and since even before the blockade no paper supplies came from the east zone to Western Berlin except through the black market, U.S. Sector publishers were dependent for paper upon the Bavarian mills and one mill in Württemberg-Baden.

# Paper from West Zones


When paper went on the free list in July, 1948, the mills were naturally disposed to favor customers in their normal trade area, and even without the blockade Military Government intervention would have been necessary to obtain enough paper for the normal needs of Berlin publishers. Despite the blockade and the consequently reduced demands of Berlin publishing, it was necessary for the German Economic Commission in Frankfurt to order the mills to supply Berlin with the necessary paper.

With the beginning of the blockade, it was necessary for the three Western Powers through the Allied Cultural Affairs Committee to make provisions for enough paper to keep the newspapers of Western Berlin alive. It was decided at that time to pool all paper stocks and to allocate supplies with the intent to make them last until September 1st.

# Special Newsprint Rolls by Air Lift


Meanwhile, investigation was made as to the possibility of bringing newsprint into Berlin by Air Lift. It was found that by getting the mills to make newsprint rolls of approximately 500 lbs. weight it would be possible to keep the newspapers in Berlin supplied by air.

An allocation of 210 tons of newsprint per week was set up for Berlin, and the airlifting of paper was begun in the last weeks of August. At no time during the blockade did any West Berlin newspaper



# **"OPERATION BACKFIRE"**

What Six Months of Soviet Blockade Did to the Circulation of Soviet Licensed Press and Publications in West Sectors and Zones.



In July and August for all Berlin; September to January west sectors only. (Inset in left-hand chart indicates monthly totals.)

miss an edition, although at one time (during the foggy period in November, 1948) newsprint stocks of 75 cm paper, which three of the western-licensed dailies used, were reduced to a precarious six tons.

At the beginning of the blockade, book and periodical publishers were told that very little, if any, paper could be brought in for their enterprises. It was possible during the blockade to allocate small amounts of newsprint to periodical publishers, and stocks of paper that had been impounded at the beginning of the occupation were allocated to book publishers. By February, 1949, however, it was possible to airlift 60 tons of book and periodical paper per month.

During the first few months of the blockade, western sector publishers sold their newspapers and periodicals for West Marks. The heavy encroachment of Soviet-licensed papers and periodicals which could be sold for the cheaper East Marks made it necessary to find some means by which at least the newspapers could sell for the latter.

The proposal of allowing the newspapers to convert 25 percent of their total East Mark income into West Marks at a rate of 1:1 was approved by the Kommandatura, put into effect on September 1, and lasted until the currency reform on March 20, 1949.

It was more difficult to show the necessity of a similar move for the periodical publishers. But in December, by agreement with the Economics Department of the Magistrat, 900,000 East Marks were converted for periodical publishers in the western sectors. The situation of the book publishers was less acute, however, because (1) there was very little paper available in Berlin for them and (2) all of them who could move the major part of their publishing program to the western zones during the blockade were aided in so doing by Military Government.

#### Soviets Bar Western-Licensed Press

From the beginning of the blockade in June, 1948, there were constant activities on the part of the Soviet Military Administration to bar all westernlicensed publications from the east sector and zone. Soviet-controlled distribution agencies were set up which refused to handle western sector publications and the east sector and zone *Postzeitungsamt* was closed to western publications.

In spite of this move, a considerable circulation of newspapers, periodicals, and books was maintained in the eastern sector and zone, so long as it was possible for western sector publishers to pay a part of their wages and to purchase a part of their supplies in East Marks.

#### West Berlin Press in Financial Difficulties

The currency reform of March 20, 1949, had the effect of confining the Western Berlin publishing market to the three western sectors and a small percentage of sales in the western zones. The consequent effect upon the publishing industry of Western Berlin has been disastrous, and unless some means



Soviet "return to sender" slips which accompanied rejected western-licensed newspapers. The serum of truth and the disease of communism cannot cohabit.

can be found within the next few weeks to make the eastern market available to Western Berlin publishers, all except a few of them will be forced to go out of business.

To the submission date of this report, four periodicals had to suspend publication because of these financial difficulties. One periodical, *Insulaner*, important because of its political significance, had to be refinanced and efforts are now being made to save *Der Tagesspiegel*, the only U.S.-licensed morning daily in Berlin, from bankruptcy.

The serious condition of the publishing industry in the U.S. Sector of Berlin has been brought to the attention of high level occupation officials. It is problematical, however, as to just how far the Allied High Commission will be willing to go in saving the publishing industry that Military Government has spent three years in building up.

It is to be expected that 60 percent of the licensed publishers in the U.S. Sector will be forced to go out of business if a larger market area is not made available to these publishers, in which they can operate profitably.

The possibility of trade agreements with the east sector and zone seems at this time to be the only solution. The currency differences make that possibility a very slim one unless such trade agreements are accompanied by a provision by which Western Berlin publishers can buy printing supplies in the east zone for East Marks.

# **FILM**

The great problem in the Berlin film industry when U.S. Military Government began to function was to find competent German operators, artists, and technicians who were not Nazis. This was a difficult task, since the German film industry for then years had been a virtual *Reich* monopoly.

Individuals were found, however, who could qualify to be licensed for production and distribution. The next step was to procure German capital to enable the producers to make new films. This, too, was finally accomplished.



Production of "The Murderer Is in our Midst" — first German feature film to be made in Berlin after the war.

The major difficulty that could not be overcome in the divided city was that of studio facilities. The finest studio in Germany was the new UFA studio located in Babelsberg in the Russian Zone. The Babelsberg studio is occupied by DEFA, the East German film monopoly.

The only functioning studio in the U.S. Sector of Berlin was the original *UFA* studio at Tempelhof. It had always been small; the bombings of Tempelhof airfield made it even smaller.

Tempelhof studio was rebuilt and has been in continual operation. Unfortunately, it cannot handle



Berlin audience reaction to an American feature film. The theater has also been a valuable medium for explaining Military Government purposes to the people.

more than one feature production at a time. As a result much of the feature work, which had always been centered in Berlin, has moved since the end of the war to Munich and other areas.

As part of the UFA organization there was AFIFA, a large film laboratory, near the Tempelhof studio. Allthough badly bomb-damaged, it has been restored and is now a first class film plant capable of processing 8,000 meters of picture negative and 10,000 meters of sound negative daily, and 64,000 meters of 35 mm positive and 12,000 meters of 16 mm positive per day.

One large aspect of film work in Germany, as in other countries where English is not the language, is the synchronization of American and British movies into the native tongue. Tempelhof studios rebuilt new synchronization rooms until now it can handle the synchronization of three to four feature length films per month.

Mosaik Film Studio was rebuilt and re-equipped and is under lease to MPEA (Motion Picture Export Association), the combined U.S. film industry in Germany, to synchronize features and shorts. In addition, Mosaik has its own complete laboratories, so that all of the work can be done in one establishment.

In May, 1947, the Documentary Film Unit of Information Services Division, OMGUS, moved into Tempelhof studio, occupying offices, and cutting rooms

and renting the projection and synchronization, facilities as it needed them.

#### **Special Blockade Newsreel Distributed**

During the blockade, the Documentary Film Unit, in cooperation with Film Section, OMG BS, produced and distributed a special Berlin newsreel. This newsreel had a great significance to the German citizens in the western sectors of the city in terms of morale, political information, and education. The special newsreel terminated with the end of the blockade, but the film is anything but dead for it

remains one of the most interesting historical visual documents produced during this period.

At the same time, the Documentary Film Unit produced other films, some of which had a special significance to Berlin. All of these films have been exhibited in Berlin with great success, especially Nürnberg, the story of the war crime trial; The Bridge, a film about the Air Lift; and Between East and West, which gives the political and economic background of the Cold War in Berlin.

A crack team of newsreel cameramen has always been maintained in Berlin for Welt im Film, the overt Anglo-American newsreel. This team operates under Film Section, OMG-BS, and records the events of Berlin.

One of the largest problems

prevent this, all films were ordered to be

turned into Film Section where they could

At one time there

keep the distributors and film houses

almost 15,000 films in the vaults. Since then the number has diminished. In the meanwhile the struggling, newly-established German producers were not turning out enough products

to

in

be checked.

were

business.

was not only the re-opening and registering of the motion picture theaters, but also keeping them in operation. The same was true of the distributors who ran the film exchanges. The latter had to have films to rent to the former.

The problem was: what films could be shown to the German public? Certainly not the films made by Nazis which reflected Nazi ideology. In order to

Military Government asked the U.S. movie industry to send films suitable for German audiences. The film industry obliged by setting up the MPEA (Motion Picture Export Association), a legal combine of all the major film companies. Pictures were rushed into synchronization and to the theaters where, for the first time in ten years, German audiences could see films made in the United States. The French and British did the same with their films.

Such a program had many benefits: it kept the theaters open and helped get the German film industry started-useful during the blockade winter

months-it provided theaters where our news reel, Welt im Film, and our documentaries could be seen-an important phase of Military Government's reorientation and education program.

There are now 76 movie theaters in operation in the U.S. Sector of Berlin with a seating capacity of 34,765. The blockade played havoc with theater attendance: at one time it dropped to approximately 30 percent of capacity, but the average has been 50 percent.


During the full blockade it also cost the theaters more to operate, for electric power rationing forced them either to close down or buy generators and gasoline to run the generators.

Since the end of the blockade, theater attendance has not increased. This was anticipated, for theater attendance drops off during summer months and picks up in October. There is a large number of films at the German exchanges but unfortunately, most of them are of poor quality.

It seems likely, however, that there will be more U.S. films available, since

some of the major American companies are leaving MPEA and starting their own synchronization and distribution in Germany.

MGM has already contracted with Film Studio Tempelhof to synchronize 18 films in the next five months. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Studios recently began the filming of Two Corridors East at Tempelhof, the first wholly German-made U.S. film.







Theater billboards have returned to Berlin. Poster in upper center advertizes post-war satire: "The Thousand-Year Reich - 1933-1945".

# RADIO

The story of RIAS begins with the organization of the Drahtfunk by Information Branch, OMG-BS, on February 7, 1946. The so-called wired radio or Drahtfunk was brought into being because of the unwillingness of the Soviet Occupation Authorities to permit the Western Allies to participate in the broadcasting or direction of the Berliner Rundfunk (Radio Berlin).

As the date of the first post-war elections in Berlin approached, it was realized that the non-communist

parties were being discriminated against by Soviet authorities in the broadcasting field just as elsewhere.

On September 4, 1946, RIAS came into being as a radio sender, primarily through the efforts of the Information Control Division, OMGUS, which provided a 1,000-watt transmitter. In the beginning of 1947, power was increased to 2,500 watts and on July 1, 1947, a 20,000-watt station went on the air. The transmitter was a mobile unit captured from the German Wehrmacht in Italy and, though old and inefficient, increased the effective RIAS range to about 75 km.

Considerable difficulty was experienced and is still being experienced

in the matter of frequency. RIAS transmissions were on assigned European frequencies including Florence, Belgrade, and the Norwegian Sender.

#### **Operation "Back-Talk"**

On February 12, 1948, General Clay announced his policy of exposing the Russian brand of communism and created the position of Director of RIAS. Operation "Back-Talk" has been most powerfully implemented in the subsequent period.

The original studios located in the telephone office in the U.S. Sector of Berlin were exceedingly primitive and because of the lack of facilities permitted only a limited number of transmission hours per day. On March 1, 1948, RIAS increased its time on the air from eight hours daily to 13 hours. U.S. Army engineers rushed to completion a new modern broadcasting plant located in Schöneberg, U.S. Sector, and officially opened it on July 6, 1948.

In the meantime, Soviet occupation authorities had clamped down the blockade. RIAS immediately began transmission 24 hours a day in order to provide radio service for the people of Berlin at any time they had power; and secondly, at the request of the Air Force to provide a homing beacon for the pilots carrying necessary materials for the besieged city.

Concurrent with the improvement of the technical and physical plant, an all-out effort was made to make RIAS the spearhead in the drive against the communists and to provide the democratic elements of Germany with a voice powerful enough to keep up the spirits and hopes of the vast majority of German citizens who were opposed to a new dictatorship.

This was accomplished by the careful selection of

top-notch commentators,

by broadcasts from par-

liamentary sessions, by the introduction of the

political cabaret, round-

tables, open forums, and

direct broadcasting from

political assemblies.meet-

In addition, a far strong-

er news- und repertorial

department was organi-

zed with monitoring ser-

vice on Russia and its

satellite neighbors, which

permitted RIAS to anti-

cipate political actions

and to counteract their

of this mission, RIAS has

seen its reporters kid-

napped by the Soviet

police and beaten up by

communists in the City

Hall. Most of the com-

mentators have been

subjected to threats and

In the accomplishment

propaganda attack.

ings and conferences.

The Voice Behind the Curtain COPENHAGEN TV DAN PIIN COLOGNE PRAGUE OSTRAVA BRNO O MUNICH

Chart shows the expansion of RIAS coverage: I - primary area before July 1, 1949; II - secondary area; III - new primary area of the 100,000 watt transmitter; IV - new secondary area deep into Poland, and reaching even the smallest radio sets in Soviet-occupied Germany.

> intimidation as well as personal attacks. The American Director of RIAS has been repeatedly attacked in the Soviet press and radio. The effectiveness of



In addition to supplying information and entertainment to the blockaded Berlin population, RIAS has been the spearhead of America's efforts to share the truth with the suppressed people of Eastern Europe.

WARSAW

#### INFORMATION SERVICES

RIAS as a propaganda instrument, however, may be judged by the following statistics:

In the winter of 1947/48 RIAS, by independent surveys, was found to have  $34^{0/0}$  of the listening audience at any given time. By March of 1948, the survey showed  $56^{0/0}$ ; in October 1948,  $80^{0/0}$  and in July 1949,  $91^{0/0}$ .

Accompanying this steady rise in the effectiveness and popularity of the station there has been a steady decline in the Soviet-controlled radio instruments, including Radio Berlin.

RIAS has become such a powerful factor that its broadcasts must be most carefully controlled, since



"Man in the Street" surveys have kept Military Government in close touch with public opinion trends.

they definitely affect the thoughts and actions of the majority of residents within the listening area. This area at present embraces a part of Germany including Berlin with a population of some 11 millions.

Shortly after the administrative transfer of RIAS from OMG-BS to OMGUS, on June 15, 1949, a new 100,000-watt transmitter was completed. When permission is granted for it to commence sending, the RIAS orbit will include a population group of some forty millions.

RIAS, at the time of its transfer to OMGUS, had a

German staff af approximately 600 and an American staff of four. The effectiveness of its operation from the economic standpoint may be measured by comparison to other German stations:

Radio Berlin, the key Soviet station, has a staff of more than 1,300 and a budget exceeding 30 million Marks per year. This is also true of Radio



Reading room facilities in the U.S. Information Center have helped thousands of Berliners to become better acquainted with the meaning of American democracy.

Hamburg. Radio Munich and Radio Frankfurt have staffs of approximately 800 and budgets in access of 20 million Marks.

RIAS, with its staff of 600 and a budget of approximately one million Marks a month, broadcasts more hours per day, more effectively, in a more dangerous situation than any station in Germany.

# **U.S. INFORMATION CENTER**

U.S. Information Center, Berlin, saw the light of day on February 28, 1946, when a library of 1,200 volumes, all of them in English, was opened in rooms in Schöneberg.

Since then the number of books has grown to 19,000 in the English language and 4,000 in German.



Communist propaganda in Berlin since the war's end has generally consisted of blocking main streets with Stalin's picture and of supplying irresponsible mobs with red banners, crude placards, and empty slogans.



A lively and popular lecture and discussion program was initiated in the fall of 1946 and at the present time there is at least one activity every day in one of the centers or reading rooms.

This policy of bringing our wares to the Berlin population has been more than justified. During the month of June, 1949, for example, the number of visitors to the three reading rooms was well over ten thousand.

The blockade did not affect the number of books circulated nor the number of our activities. These, however, were held at an earlier hour to enable people to come by underground *U-Bahn*, though they had to return by *S-Bahn*, the overhead railway, which involved considerable time and energy.

During the winter months many Berliners used the centers as a refuge from the blackout and the cold. This was to be expected and it was encouraged on humanitarian grounds.

#### **DOCUMENTATION SECTION**

How the Soviet policy of pressure has been applied to the people of Berlin and the western Occupation Powers is the story that the Documentation Section of ISB has been putting together since July, 1948.

It is represented by more than 800 displays. Included in its contents are translated newspaper articles, cartoons, periodicals, original photographs of evidential value, brochures, monographs, posters, stickers, legal documents, and significant official orders of the Soviet Military Administration and its subordinate organizations.

Included also is the complete week-to-week story of Berlin under the blockade as told by *Welt im Film* and supplemented by news stills and documentary films on the same theme.

The entire operation of the Documentation Section is devoted to describing in visual detail what the Soviet Military Government has done to Berlin and the pattern of that doing.

#### MONUMENTS AND FINE ARTS

Responsibility for the supervision and protection of seven monuments and fine arts' installations in the U.S. Sector was delegated to OMG-BS on March 16, 1947. In July of the same year, Information Services Branch was assigned the task of administering these monuments together with the attendant restitution work.

At the beginning of the Berlin blockade in June, 1948, restitutional investigations of procedure had been cleared to the point where the section was a token operation of dwindling importance except for the seven remaining Monuments and Fine Arts installations. These included:

Prehistoric Museum, 110 Stresemann Straße, Kreuzberg. Museum für Völkerkunde (Ethnological Museum), 23 Arnim Allee, Berlin-Dahlem,

Kunstbibliothek (Arts and Craft Library) 23 Arnim Allee, Berlin-Dahlem,

Magazinbau of the Ethnological Museum, 23 Arnim Allee, Berlin-Dahlem,

Botanisches Museum, 69 Königin Luise Straße, Berlin-Dahlem.


Preußisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv (State Archives) 12-13 Archiv Straße, Berlin-Dahlem,

Jagdschloß Grunewald (Hunting Lodge Grunewald).

These buildings and their contents represented millions of Marks and many more millions in historic and artistic values,

City elections of December 5, 1948, set up a responsible West-Berlin Magistrat and eliminated East-thinking influences and pressures on monuments and fine arts installations in the U.S. Sector. Following the general U.S. policy of delegating responsibility and returning functions to German agencies whenever possible, OMG-BS turned back to the City of Berlin in May, 1949, administration of and responsibility for all these installations.

A new section of the Magistrat Educational. Department, created at the suggestion of U.S. Military Government, is now fully responsible for these installations as well as all preliminary investigation on restitutional matters.



# 

The history of Berlin city finances since July, 1945, may well be divided into two periods. The first was that covering the attempted quadripartite administration of the city; and the second was that following the break-up of the four-power Kommandatura and the complex era of a divided city.

The first phase was especially characterized by the relative importance of political considerations in all high-level financial undertakings. From a purely economic and financial point of view, negotiations in the Kommandatura's Finance Committee during this time were primarily political and only secondarily practical.

During the period of attempted quadripartite administration, negotiations were distinctly fruitless, insofar as the realization of U.S. Military Government objectives was concerned.

In the field of finance, the ideological differences between East and West were particularly apparent. These differences were so extreme that there existed only the most meager basis for discussion or mutual understanding of most of the problems confronting the City of Berlin.

When the first detachments of American paratroopers and tankmen entered Berlin on July 4, 1945, they found a great metropolis not only physically wrecked, but in a state of financial chaos.

The degree of stagnation was not readily apparent because of the easy availability of inflated currency and the fact that rationing procedures used during the war had been retained. Yet the city was indeed financially moribund, and strong measures were necessary to revive its economy.

6

Berlin was operating without a budget. The newly-installed—and in many cases incompetent— German fiscal officials were unable to make headway in their attempts to formulate a city budget under the existing confused situation.

Berliners hurry to exchange their

These conditions, however understandable in view of the catastrophic end of the war for Germany, were in sharp contrast to those normally prevailing in Berlin.

In addition to tax receipts, the city's income had previously included rents from buildings owned by the central *Reich* administration and profits from the metropolitan public utilities.

Before the end of the war, Berlin had been the only city in Germany which did not share in the distribution of federal revenues for the support of cities and towns. Berlin had always been selfsupporting.

A preliminary survey conducted by U.S. finance officers showed that taxes were being collected, on both national and municipal level, at pre-Occupation rates.

There was no evidence of tax evasion, but collections were almost at a standstill, because all pre-Occupation bank accounts had been blocked by the Soviet authorities.

All of the city's banks were closed by order of the Soviet Commandant. In their stead, the Soviets had ordered the formation of a *Berliner Stadtbank* (later to become the *Berliner Stadtkontor*) and the *Sparkasse der Stadt Berlin.* These institutions were respectively intended to serve all commercial and savings requirements in the city.



Army finance officers, in the early days of the Occupation, examine hoards of European currencies found in enormous quantities in the vaults of city banks.

Soviet Financial Monopoly

Both were entirely and city-owned the Western Allies were thus confronted with a monopolistic banking system that was already an accomplished fact. This condition was further aggravated by the fact that the Soviets were entirely satisfied with the arrangement and conveniently used

their	righ	t of	veto	in	the	Kommandatura	a to	pre-	
vent	any	alter	ations	in	the	status quo.			

During repeated meetings of the Finance Committee in 1946, 1947, and the spring of 1948, the Soviets effectively vetoed every effort by the Western Allies to establish a free, competitive banking system in Berlin.

As the economic life of the city recovered, the *Stadtkontor* became, quite understandably, larger and more prosperous. It developed into an institution of 69 branches and, after 1946, became a self-sustaining organization. This self-sufficiency, however, was realized only because the Allied Kommandatura authorized the bank to make no interest payments on deposits, including savings deposits.

In the spring of 1946 a limited system of bank clearings among the zones was established through the following ten institutions:

Berlin Stadtkontor Bank Provinzialbank Mark Brandenburg, Potsdam Bank der Provinz Sachsen, Halle/Saale Sächsische Landesbank, Dresden Landesbank Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Schwerin Landesbank Thüringen, Weimar Reichsbankhauptstelle Hannover Reichsbankhauptstelle Hamburg Reichsbankhauptstelle Frankfurt/Main Reichsbankstelle Speyer This clearing system permitted the transfer of funds upon the order of the Occupation Forces in the respective zones. The *Berliner Stadtkontor* acted as clearing house and all members kept accounts with this interzonal clearing office.

The expenses for the management of the system were borne by the member banks in accordance with services rendered.

The clearings represented the authorized transfers of goods between the zones, and unfortunately did not provide for either capital transfers or such essential current transactions as taxes, insurance premiums, etc.

#### **Closed Berlin Banks**

Probably no question that has come before the Finance Committee brought out the differences in thinking between East and West as clearly as that of the closed Berlin banks. The Soviet Commandant's authority to close the banks is unquestioned, as a

Date	Berliner Stadt- kontor*)	Sparkasse der Stadt Berlin	Berliner Volks- bank	TOTAL	
	(1000RM)	(1000RM)	(1000RM)	(1000RM)	
Dec.31, 1945	990,234	91,312		1,081,546	
June30,1946	1,825,769	167,806	11,445	2,005,020	
Dec.31, 1946	2,362,901	183,139	23,820	2,569,860	
June30,1947	2,639,927	171,673	31,495	2,843,095	
Dec.31, 1947	2,928,252	159,949	40,834	3,129,035	
May31, 1948	3,161,902	188,461	49,494	3,399,857	

moratorium was probably necessary.


It was the question of reopening the banks and allowing their orderly reorganization or liquidation, over which so much disagreement occurred.

Two events did take place which gave cause for some optimism. The Finance Committee was finally able to agree on the establishment of a Collection Commission

in April, 1947. The four-man commission, responsible only to the Kommandatura, was charged by very general instructions with the collection of outstanding loans and mortgages of closed Berlin banks.



Unfinished goods: the war ended too soon for the Nazis to finish wrecking Europe's economy: these notes, for flooding occupied countries, had only been printed on one side before the Allied armies over-ran all Germany.



The Berlin Staatsdruckerei, where banknotes, stamps, government bonds, and official papers are printed.

While its creation was regarded as a step in the right direction, however, the results of the commission's work were far from spectacular. The commission was designed as an interim measure to help prepare the banks for whatever decision might be made as to their ultimate disposition.

But the physical destruction in Germany, the communications difficulties, and the fact of a widely scattered population made its work extremely difficult. Additionally, records located in banks in the Soviet Sector of Berlin had been for the most part removed by the Soviet authorities.

A second development in connection with the closed banks began in May, 1948. The Kommandatura Finance Committee prepared and reported a plan for the liquidation of the banks. A British paper was submitted and found acceptable by both French and American delegations as a basis for discussion.

It was countered, however, by a Soviet paper which was indeed no liquidation plan at all and was entirely unacceptable to the other three delegations.

The result of lengthy discussions was to refer the entire matter to the Collection Commission, instructing it to prepare a plan of liquidating the banks for submission to the Finance Committee.

This compromise was not viewed with much optimism. In fact, the commission was never able to agree on a plan, and none was submitted to the Kommandatura.

#### **Insurance in Sounder Condition**

Insurance companies had suffered a somewhat less disastrous fate than Berlin banks, due probably to an oversight on the part of the Soviet authorities. The some 284 companies licensed to operate in the city found themselves more solvent than the banks.

Whereas the banks had compulsorily invested some  $80^{0/0}$  of their assets in *Reich* bonds and similar

government certificates of indebtedness, the insurance companies were burdened with fewer *Reich* liabilities, but held a higher percentage of mortgage bonds, real estate and similar non-governmental credits.

Nonetheless, the full payment of pre-war insurance claims was out of the question, and the companies mutually agreed to meet all post-war claims and a percentage of pre-war claims that would increase as their liquidity improved.

One notable achievement during the quadripartite period was the approval and establishment of the Insurance *Aufsichtsamt*. This organization and its supervision of insurance practices and policies effectively took these companies out from under the Magistrat's complete domination, allowing for a freer and more competitive insurance in Berlin.

It was never possible to secure quadripartite approval for the establishment of either security or commodity exchanges in Berlin. A stock exchange for the city was looked upon by the Soviets with great misgivings, and it was scarcely possible to have the subject objectively discussed in fourpower committee meetings.

#### Financial Problems in a Split City

The second and more complex period of Berlin's financial history began in June, 1948, when—despite continuous quadripartite efforts at understanding it had finally become clear that disagreements between East and West were basic.

During the months of negotiation, the inflationary conditions in the western zones of Germany had become so severe that they threatened to prevent any substantial revival of the German economy. To prevent this, and to provide a basis for healthy economic recovery, the British, French, and U.S. Military Governors ordered a currency reform for the western zones on June 20, 1948, generally devaluating the Mark to one-tenth its former worth.

Revenue and Expenditure (actual) of the City of Berlin

	Fiscal year 1945—1946	Fiscal year 1946—1947	Fiscal year 1947—1948	Period from 1.4.48—30.9.48
	(1000 RM)	(1000 RM)	(1000 RM)	(1000 RM)(*
Revenue	901,587	1,875,952	2,165,965	1,037,304
Expenditure	1,068,853	1,268,159	1,513,167	765,058
Surplus or Deficit	-167,266	+ 607,793	+ 652,798	+ 272,246

(\* From 24/6/1948 in DM)

This measure was taken with reluctance and only after the Military Governors were convinced that quadripartite agreement on a unified currency for the whole of Germany—as envisaged in the 1945 Potsdam Agreement—was entirely impossible. In the announcement of the currency reform, it was pointed out that the new measures were not to be applied in Berlin because of its four-power Allied Kommandatura government.

The Soviets, however, were quickly forced to carry out, on June 23, 1948, a similar currency reform

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in their zone of Germany. The terms of the Soviet action included all of Berlin. This was of course unacceptable to the Western Commandants, and 24 hours later the new western zone currency, overstamped with a "B", was introduced in the western sectors of Berlin.

Thus, two separate currencies circulated in the city, although up to this date it was still governed by a single Magistrat.

#### West Mark Warmly Received

The technical difficulties of introducing the Westmark into Berlin had been enormous, but its reception by the population was whole-heartedly favorable. While the reform was drastic and caused considerable hardship, the people of West Berlin felt that the reform had been inevitable anyway, and almost anything was better than the highly inflated *Reichsmark*.

On the assurance of the Soviets that the funds of the Magistrat, located in the head office of the *Stadtkontor* in the Soviet Sector, would be converted into the Eastmark, it was agreed that the city budget would continue to be drawn in Eastmarks.

Westmarks were made available to the residents of the western sectors in the form of a head quota also by a conversion of *Reichsmark* balances and

afterwards in a proportion of their wages. The proportion varied as did the ability of the employers to acquire Westmarks.

The fact that the Westmark immediately became a premium currency was extremely irritating to the Eastmark authorities, and in reprisal the Soviets refused to convert the Magistrat's reserves in the Berliner Stadtkontor.

This measure made the city government bankrupt almost overnight.

Between the time of the currency reform and the final split of the city government in November, 1948, the activities of the Finance Branch, as for that matter of the Magistrat, were largely concerned with trying to supply the city with the Eastmarks needed for its commitments. Often municipal salaries were paid several days after coming due because of lack of cash, and the payment of contractors' bills was sometimes several weeks late.

Moreover, the situation was further worsened during the blockade when, due to commercial and industrial stagnation and resulting unemployment, the Magistrat's tax receipts were seriously reduced.

The Finance Committee of the Kommandatura has worked and is still working with the Magistrat, trying to solve the almost insurmountable problems connected with the claims of and against the Magistrat resulting from the two currencies and the splitting of the city.

The Western Magistrat has maintained that it is the legal and original city government. The question then arises as to what liabilities of the former city government should now be borne by the West Magistrat.

The many outstanding *Reichsmark* and Eastmark claims against the original Magistrat become quite complicated and will require the cooperation of the

BERLINER STADTBANK

east sector Magistrat to make equitable settlement.

The West Magistrat has no intention of taking all of the liabilities of the former city government, having lost all of its assets located in the east sector.

With the final split of the city government and the establishment of the West Magistrat at the end of 1948, it became immediately apparent that Berlin's deficit of some thirty million Eastmarks a month would have to be met by outside help.

This support came in the form of food supplies and



West Berlin banks, after the split of the city system, have steadily improved their financial position. They are no longer subject to Soviet whims, orders, and confiscations.



FINANCE

other commodities from the western zones, payment for which was charged against a joint United States United Kingdom account. The West Magistrat was allowed to use the proceeds from the food and commodity sales in Berlin. Despite this support and efforts to reduce the city budget, however, the finances of the Magistrat remainded precarious. This was regarded by all concerned as inevitable, since the Magistrat had lost its entire capital in the head office of the *Stadtkontor*, as well as other assets and tax receipts from the east sector. by the City Assembly, it was announced that the Eastmark would cease to be legal tender in West Berlin.

The new measures, known as the Third Ordinance for Monetary Reform, brought into existence a *Berliner Zentralbank*. While not serving as a bank of issue, it became the highest German authority for the control of monetary and credit policies in Berlin. It serves as banker for the city administration and deals in foreign exchange transactions under regulations issued by the *Bank Deutscher Länder*. The bank has progressively been able to take over

#### **City Banks Split**

The split of the city also required a division in the banking system. The Berliner Stadtkontor, the Sparkasse der Stadt Berlin, and the Volksbank werethusimmediately split, and each established fully independent offices in the western sectors. Their operations began under the handicap of having lost their share of the reserves located in the former head offices, but they have nonetheless been able to report con-



The three Western Commandants explain the Third Ordinance for Monetary Reform at a press conference. The questions were technical; the answers thoughtful.

tinued and steady progress since that time.

During the winter 1948/49 growing criticizm of the provisions of the Westmark currency reform developed in the western sectors. The Eastmark, for example, was still legal currency in the western sectors, although the Westmark was banned—and any discovered holders of Westmarks were severely punished—in the east sector.

The West Berlin public also complained that, while all wages were fixed in Marks, the real value of wages received depended largely on the currency —Westmarks or Eastmarks—in which the person was paid. For after the currency reforms the Westmark quickly gained a purchasing power tripling and quadrupling that of the Eastmark.

Moreover, West Berliners were permitted to pay for rationed foods, medicine, taxes, and rent in Eastmarks, and this quickly brought about a situation where almost all other goods and services were obtainable only for the Westmarks. This situation not only hampered production and distribution, but made price control very difficult and facilitated tax evasion by allowing businessmen and speculators to juggle the two currencies in their accounts.

#### East Mark Barred in West Sectors

By March, 1949, it became evident that certain modifications would have to be made in the currency reform ordinances, the UN Security Council having been unable to work out a satisfactory solution to the Berlin currency and trade problems. On March 20th, therefore, and in response to a unanimous request more functions performed in the past by the Military Governments.

Many matters of city financing, the unblocking and transfer of funds from Berlin, and problems of credit policy were effectively assumed by the Zentralbank.

The value of the Westmark has steadily increased. The average free market rate of exchange between Eastmark and Westmark for the month of April, 1949, was one Westmark: 4.15 Eastmarks. In

August, 1949, the average rate had increased to one Westmark: 5.68 Eastmarks.

The budgetary problems of the city were not eased by the adoption of the Westmark as sole legal tender. Since the splitting of the city, the West Magistrat operated on a hand-to-mouth budget basis.

A draft budget drawn up for the year 1949/50, for example, anticipated a deficit of some 500,000,000 Marks. During the first six months of 1949, support from Allied counterpart funds had amounted to some 60,000,000 Marks per month. Additional assist-


#### **DEPOSITS IN WEST BERLIN BANKS**

	31. 12	. 1948	30. 6.	1949
with	DM-West (1000)	DM-East (1000)	DM-West (1000)	DM-East (1000)
Berliner Stadt- kontor West	78,728	143,058	134,558	139,529
Sparkasse der Stadt Berlin West	10,349	2,003	15,747	2,864
Berliner Volks- bank West	2,893	5,178	6,287	2,958
Totals	91,970	150,239	156,592	145,351

ance, varying between 25 and 40 million Marks per month, had been contributed by the west zone *Länder* (from a special coffee tax, postal levies, etc.). In June, 1949, the Military Governors decided

that the responsibility for meeting Berlin's deficit MILLIONS should rest entirely upon the three western zones. The US/UK Counterpart Fund was urgently needed in the western zones for long-term investment purposes, and could no longer be made available to help Berlin solve its budgetary ailments. By November, 1949, the three western zones of Germany will bear full responsibility for any deficits in the Berlin budget.

It has now become necessary, therefore, for the Magistrat to convince the western zone *Länder* that Berlin's deficits are justified. Previously, when the proceeds from sales of food from the West—the original purchase of which represented dollars and



Sterling—figured in the budget, the Military Governments closely scrutinized all Berlin's city receipts and expenditures. This scrutiny, it may be reasonably anticipated, will now be carried out by the *Länder*.

During the blockade, considerable progress was made in the three-power Kommandatura in the field of finance. In the absence of the Soviets it was possible to achieve many progressive measures. New private banks have been licensed, the first opening for operation in June, 1949. Insurance regulations have been approved and insurance companies are functioning on a progressive and sound basis. can and will be able to solve these problems.

Middle- and long-term credits of the city and of its industry are being worked out between the authorities in Berlin and appropriate agencies in the zones. Legislation for the equalization of war damage claims has been prepared by the City Assembly.

1945.

The Quadripartite Col-

lection Commission was

reformed and is now func-

tioning much more ef-

ficiently. Effective plans

for the re-organization or

liquidation of the closed

banks of Berlin are being

After the lifting of the

blockade, the financial

problems of the city, its

industry, and individual

residents were far from

solved, however. The rôle

of Military Government in

this respect, as in nearly

all its fields of activity,

has changed vastly since

current problems

The solution of most

rests primarily in German

hands. Fortunately, how-

ever, the Military Govern-


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
drawn up.

Money remains in very short supply in Berlin, and financial experts believe it probably will and should remain in short supply for a long time to come. Without political unity, it is difficult to envisage an early end to the city's present deficits.



# **BERLIN CURRENCY**

FINANCE



The pattern of property control in the U.S. Sector of Berlin has been shaped during the past four years by three basic considerations closely integrated into the overall purpose of the American occupation of Germany.

It has been necessary to restore looted properties and those acquired by the Nazis under duress to their original owners.

It has been necessary to remove designated persons, in line with the demilitarization of Germany, from positions of power which they held by possessing important properties.

And it has been necessary to break up large economic combines and cartels, most of which were instrumental in making almost possible the mad Nazi dream of world domination.

The problems and the complexities of the program have been many. During one several months' period, U.S. Military Government in Berlin had under its control properties valued at 1,315,000,000 pre-war *Reichsmarks*—more than half a billion dollars.

The volume of cases treated by Occupation officials from June, 1948, to July, 1949, can be measured by the volume of correspondence received and handled during that period. There were approximately 22,000 items of incoming correspondence requiring attention.

Upwards of a thousand custodians, agents, and administrators—during the peak period of activities in 1948—were employed in the management and administration of properties under control.

Two underlying problems have faced Military

Government in this field during the past four years of operation:

To devise methods of locating, placing in custody, safeguarding, and administering various specified categories of property under control, and

To release properties after decisions had been made providing for their ultimate disposition.

Initial emphasis was placed on organizing a workable system of locating properties subject to control, on placing such properties under custody, and providing for their proper administration. Five chief custodians were assigned the duty of investigating what properties should be seized.

On the basis of Military Government Law 52 (Blocking and Control of Property) six major categories of properties were established. These included:

Properties of United Nations, neutral, and other absentee owners,

Properties of the former German *Reich*, and states (Länder),

Properties of former Nazi organizations (e.g. property of the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront*),

Properties of *NSDAP* members (Nazi Party members including blacklisted persons),

Properties of the IG Farbenindustrie, and

Properties claimed by persons as having been transferred under duress.

As Berlin was originally governed by a quadripartite Kommandatura, no law concerning property control could be issued in the individual sectors without the approval of that body. The problem was largely solved by operating unofficially under the provisions of Military Government Law 52 insofar as that was possible without a formal exactment of the law.

This procedure was, however, not recognized officially until the end of August, 1945, when the Kommandatura passed a resolution permitting the Commandant of each of the city's sectors to apply the laws in effect in his respective zone of occupation.

#### How Custody Was Effected

The work of locating and investigating property of United Nations, neutral, and other absentee owners was facilitated by the use of the records of the former Enemy Alien Property Custodian in Germany (Reichskommissar für die Behandlung feindlichen Vermögens). Records of properties of the former German Reich were found available in the Finanzamt für Liegenschaften, the administrative office for Reich property.

In the Vermögensverwertungsstelle, a central agency for the administration of confiscated Jewish properties, records were located concerning properties transferred by confiscation or expropriation. Valuable information was also furnished by the records of the Vermögensverwaltung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront regarding the enormous holdings of that organization. And information about the holdings of Nazi Party members was largely obtained from local authorities. citizens of the United Nations and neutral nations. and the program was later extended to nationals of former enemy countries with whom peace treaties had been signed.

Properties of Nazi Party organizations are being transferred to the trade unions, cooperatives, and other democratic organizations which formerly held title to the properties. If such organizations no longer exist, the properties are then transferred to new groups whose aims are found to be similar to those of the former organizations, or to the City of Berlin.

#### **How Control Was Exercised**

In order to standardize measures of control, properties were classified into three groups: operating properties, other income-producing properties, and non-income-producing properties.

In the case of operating properties—business and industrial enterprises, manufacturing plants, and trading organizations—which normally require a larger share of attention than properties consisting of real estate or other rentable units, it was the practice to appoint a custodian for each business enterprise.

Other income-producing and non-income-producing real estate—including rentable properties and destroyed properties—were normally managed by administrators responsible to the chief custodians,

Reason for Control		1945			1	946		24.2	1	947			1	948		1	949
	31.7.	30.9.	31.12.	31.3.	30.6.	30. 9.	31.12.	31.3.	30.6.	30. 9.	31.12.	31.3.	30.6.	30. 9.	31.12.	31.3.	30.6.
United Nations, neutral, and other absentee owners	13	210	315	574	801	978	1,034	1,324	1,396	1,497	1,577	1,744	2,094	2,146	2,115	1,957	1,10
German states (Länder) etc., Reich	_	6	7	565	586	656	672	1,403	1,402	1,405	1,404	1,433	1,534	1,540	1,523	1,438	12
Nazi Party organizations NSDAP members	-	} 7	9	564	683	874	1,032	1,100	1,198	244 943	229 1,353	251 1,466		220 1,419		332 1,087	
Duress	—	7	19	454	474	565	630	1,060	1,023	1,204	1,369	1,481	1,700	1,811	1,887	1,955	2,061
Other (blacklisted persons, external loot, mis- cellaneous)	_	2	8	19	22	38	62	68	66	91	107	134	216	238	369	333	295
Totals:	13	232	358	2,176	2,566	3,111	3,430	4,955	5,085	5,384	6,039	6,509	7,388	7,374	7,422	7,102	4,785

#### COMPARATIVE STATEMENT SHOWING UNITS OF PROPERTIES UNDER CONTROL

A property was normally placed under control whenever it was established that the provisions of MG Law 52 were applicable.

Property control was carried out in two phases, the first being that of locating and adequately protecting the properties seizable under Law 52. As early as June, 1947, the second phase was begun: that of releasing properties from control and returning them to their rightful owners.

In that month a program was announced providing for the decontrol of properties belonging to whose activities were in turn supervised by the Property Control Branch of Military Government.

For the control of many smaller enterprises owned by leading *NSDAP* members, or of units taken over by the Berlin Magistrat under its denazification program in the early days of the occupation, a plan had been worked out whereby custodians were appointed for each of the six U.S. boroughs and were responsible to Military Government.


It was the duty of the custodian to manage and operate the properties under his supervision in a manner that would best achieve the following purposes:

to preserve the corpus in the best operating condition,

to husband and increase the resources, and

to produce the largest income.

The problems involved in property control were rendered more difficult and complex because Berlin was a ruined and defeated city. Some 75,000 tons of bombs had avalanched down on the metropolis



Hinz, paper and furniture factory, is typical of many damaged plants in Western Berlin under property control.

in giant day and night aerial attacks during the war. In some areas destruction was greater than ninety percent; and overall damage has been variously estimated at between sixty and seventy percent of all built-up properties.

Moreover, many business enterprises which were operating before the end of the war, including large industrial plants, had been dismantled by the Soviets. Their machinery, raw materials, and finished products had been shipped to Russia as war booty and reparations. Numerous concerns which were subject to Allied control were struggling to carry on operations on a greatly reduced scale.

Under the circumstances, the most immediate task was to find suitable custodians and administrators capable of handling and improving the properties subject to control. Real estate custodians were encouraged to use available surplus funds (from rentals) for the rehabilitation and repair of buildings. Custodians appointed for operating properties were given authority to carry on normal business transactions.

Much of the property control officer's time was devoted to helping and advising custodians in solving their problems, handicapped as they were by inadequate machinery and material, lack of transportation and other means of communication, and, above all, shortage of funds. It will be recalled that the financial institutions operating in Berlin before the collapse of Germany had been closed (see page 81) and all credit balances of depositors blocked ever since.

In order to start operations and to accomplish necessary rehabilitation work, extensive loans to some of the larger concerns were approved. To cope with the increasing detail of the activities, an adequate file system was devised, in which all property records and other relevant information could be distributed for easy reference. Later, an accounts and audits section was added to check custodian's financial reports and record surplus funds.

A large number of small businesses, shops, and the like, owned by Nazi Party members and not warranting administration by custodians, were leased to third persons pending denazification of the owners.

When the Soviets decided, in March, 1948, to withdraw their representatives from the Control Council and to restrict the movement of persons and goods between Berlin and the western zones, it was agreed for reasons of security to transfer the bulk of surplus funds to the *Landeszentralbank* in Frankfurt-am-Main. Twenty-one million *Reichsmark* were thus transferred and later converted by approval of the Allied Banking Commission into West Marks at the rate of 10:1 in accordance with MG Law 63.

The Soviet blockade and the resulting drastic curtailment of gas and power supply, the shortage of raw materials, and lack of transportation resulted in a considerable reduction in sales by Berlin firms to customers in the western zones. Thus, the financial position of many operating properties quickly deteriorated and the restoration of damaged properties was greatly curtailed.

On the other hand, the financial condition of real estate since the promulgation of the third ordinance on monetary reform (see page 85), which made the West Mark sole legal tender in the western sectors of Berlin, has shown signs of improvement.

# How The Program Has Been Administered

The six categories of properties under control are not administered identically. The administration of property of absentee owners (first category), for




Lorenz, an important West-Berlin radio tube and appliance plant under U.S. property control, did a large export business via the Air Lift during the blockade.

example, is intended to protect it until such time as the owners can take protective steps themselves.

Until the middle of 1947, there was no communication of a transactional nature and only limited travel to and from Berlin. On June 25, 1947, just after the restoration of transactional communications, it was announced that owners of property in Germany owners who resided outside the country—could apply under certain conditions for the release or decontrol of their properties to nominees who were permanent residents of Germany and who would be given properly executed powers of attorney.

It was soon evident, however, that owners were slow in assuming responsibility for their possessions. One apparent reason was that they felt property control custody afforded protection which would not be present after decontrol. Nonetheless, all pro-

Value of Properties Under Control By Category — July, 1947-June, 1949



perties in this category will have been released, it is estimated, by the end of September, 1949.

A large number of properties in the second category (former *Reich* or state property) were not taken under control, because many of them—the *Reichsbahn*, *Reichspost*, and Inland Waterways, properties used to house or facilitate functions of the city government, or properties under requisition by the Military Government—were under supervision of either the Magistrat or interested branches of the U.S. or other Allied Occupation Forces.

On April 20, 1949, MG Law 19 was promulgated, transferring title to all properties in this category to the City of Berlin, either as trustee for a subsequent German state or as owner.

Units in the third category (former Nazi organizations) number 331 with an estimated value in *Reichsmark* of 35,129,600. In April, 1947, the Control Council issued Directive 50, which provided for the disposition of properties having belonged to Nazi organizations.

In Berlin the directive was implemented by a

Kommandatura order on February 3, 1949, which called for a special commission to be established by the Magistrat. The commission will invite, receive, and examine appeals by the claimant organizations in question and will decide on the validity of such claims and transfer title to the respective properties subject to Kommandatura approval.

Properties of leading Nazi Party members were taken into custody as part of the overall program of the denazification and demilitarization of Germany.

In line with the general Military Government policy of transferring greater responsibility to German governmental authorities, the custody and administration of this category of properties will be assumed in the near future by the Magistrat of Berlin.

IG Farben properties (fifth category) were taken under control on the basis of General Order 2. In July, 1948, all *IG Farben* properties under control—numbering 24 units with a value of *RM* 43,319,800—were released to disignated agents of the *IG Farben* Control Officer.

Control has been exercised over any property in the sixth category for which a claim has been filed alleging that the property had been transferred under duress.


Attempts were made in Berlin through long drawn out negotiations on quadripartite and, later, on tripartite bases to develop a uniform restitution



Osram, a leading light-bulb manufacturer in West Berlin, has been under property control since the end of the war.

program. Fundamental differences among the occupation powers prevented agreement for a long time.

On July 15, 1949, however, a Restitution Law was signed by the three western sector Commandants providing for the creation of restitution agencies charged with effecting amicable settlement of claims between the parties, and providing judicial procedures for the proper adjudication of claims in the event that no amicable settlement can be reached.



E arly Military Government interest in Berlin welfare problems focused, naturally enough, on the tragic situation of the displaced persons, millions of whom were scattered throughout Europe

and nearly all in immediate need of assistance.

By February, 1946, when that problem was assigned to other U.S. authorities, 16,670 displaced persons (DP's) in the U.S. Sector of Berlin alone had been processed and sent on their way homeward. One of the last projects in this field was the opening of a special camp in southwest Berlin to house Polish Jewish DP's.

The Düppel Camp was created within forty-eight hours almost from nothing. Ninety German laborers worked two days and nights preparing barracks to house 2,500 refugees, installing kitchens and equipment, and for months afterwards the camp served as a temporary home for displaced persons passing though Berlin. The work of the Public Welfare Branch during the past four years has fallen under the following categories:

**Displaced Persons and Refugees**—until February, 1946, thousands of displaced persons were cared for, processed, and sent on their way home.

**Public Welfare Services**—the planning of budgets, selection of personnel, institutional facilities, and the processing of relief supplies for public programs.

**Care For Children**—the establishment of day care centers, homes, correctional services, adoptions, and holiday and recuperation programs.

Foreign Relief Supplies and Services—special feeding programs, neighborhood centers, and programs to meet special needs.

**Private Welfare Agencies**—organization and authorization of church and non-denominational agencies, institutional needs, and training programs.

**Quadripartite Matters**—supervision of central city welfare administration, establishment of welfare policies, and approval of new welfare programs and voluntary agencies.

Welfare Activities of the American Community --facilitation of the work of women's clubs and other groups interested in welfare.

## **Infrequent Four-Power Agreement**

During the quadipartite period of control in Berlin (July, 1945—June, 1948) agreement could be reached on few important matters. In reviewing the work of

> the Welfare and Refugee Committee of the Kommandatura, one is impressed mainly with the delays and the inconclusive character of the committee's own activities. Fundamental concepts of the problems at hand were in too many cases at wide variance between the East and West.

> Up to December, 1947, some 30 applications were received from welfare organizations for permission to operate on a city-wide basis. Unanimous agreement on their approval, however, was not possible in any instance.

The Soviet delegation argued for the recognition of only a few organizations, so that they might be carefully controlled. The three associations which the Soviets were

#### **REFUGEE MOVEMENTS — U.S. SECTOR BERLIN**

	<b>1945</b> July thru Dec.	1946 Jan. thru Dec.	1947 Jan. thru Dec.	1948 Jan. thru Dec.	1949 Jan. thru June
Incoming	409,530	80,965	13,998	4,183	16,765
Outgoing	402,572	85,336	15,451	4,986	3,711
Costs	RM 832,702.	RM 2,459,384.		not available	

Note: The 1945-46 figures of refugee movements represent to a large extent persons moving through the sector in search of relatives or enroute to their former homes.

Since 1947, the character of the refugee movement has changed and those coming to West Berlin are mainly persons fleeing from unfavorable political or economic conditions in their home countries or in the Soviet Zone.

The figures for 1948 are incomplete, since there was no central office and many refugees lived on the black market.

The upward trend of 1949 may result from the better weather conditions, which encourage travel.

The movement of refugees has continuously been a serious burden on welfare authorities, who are without funds or housing accommodations.

willing to approve—one organization for the blind, one for war injured, and a Red Cross Society—had already been working for some time in the east sector, and each was heavily dominated by communists.

Finally, agreement was reached on the recognition of two politically affiliated welfare groups to operate on a city-wide basis: The *Sozialhille*, a Communist Unity Party (SED) affiliate, and the *Arbeiterwohlfahrt*, sponsored by the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The second-named, however, was never really allowed to operate in the Soviet Sector.

A few matters in another field of welfare were carried through to agreement: recognition of CRALOG and CARE for city-wide distribution of relief supplies; the re-establishment of *Pestalozzi-Fröbel-Haus*, an institution for the training of social workers; and agreements permitting former residents to return to Berlin, although officially it was a closed city.

#### Heavy Burden on City Welfare

The public welfare departments in the boroughs of Berlin have carried a heavy burden since the end



A few of the nearly one million CARE parcels which have been distributed in Berlin since the end of the war.

of the war. In most respects they have operated as before, except that all former privileged categories of relief recipients were abolished and Nazi Party members were removed from their positions.

Victims of Nazi persecution, on the other hand, were placed in a special category, entitling them to priority in allocation of housing and distribution of clothing, and were given a higher ration classification. These were rehabilitative measures.

The return of men who had been in the army and the re-uniting of families began to lighten the relief rolls as early as January, 1946. A month-by-month drop occurred in the number of people receiving relief from 501,582 in Greater Berlin in 1945. to 120.427

December of 1945, to 139,437 on July 1, 1948.

At the time of the currency reform in June, 1943 (see page 83) the number of people in the three western sectors being aided by public relief was

NUMBER OF PERSON (3 WESTERN SE RECEIVING PUBLIC (Including Depen	CTORS) C SUPPOI	
	June 1946	June 1949
I. RELIEF RECIPIENTS	216,501	135,236
II. VAB PENSIONERS	134,236	255,426
III. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION	xxxx	285,734
Totals	350,737	676,396

88,542. But the reform measure had a marked adverse effect on the relief figures. Many old people who had had savings, or who were assisted by relatives, now had to ask for help. There was much less money in circulation—the Mark was in fact devaluted to one-tenth its former, inflated worth and marginal businessmen and even former black marketeers now found themselves on the public welfare lists.

This situation was further aggravated during the Soviet blockade, when for lack of fuel, raw materials, and customers many industries closed down in the western sectors or worked only part time. By September, 1948, the number of persons on relief had increased by 15,400—a rate of about 1,000 a week.

By June, 1949, there were 135,236 persons on relief in the three western sectors.

Moreover, in addition to the above figures on that date, there were 255,426 persons drawing social insurance payments and 285,734 receiving unemployment compensation. So in some respects the situation in June, 1949, was worse than that in July, 1945. More than a third of the population of the western sectors (counting dependents) were living on public grants.



War-time evacuees return to their homes in Berlin: a special problem for public welfare agencies in 1945/46, as most of them were poor, hungry, and homeless.

#### Clothing, Blankets, Food by Air Lift

The blockade caused great misery among the population during the winter of 1948/49. There was a\_dire shortage of coal, gas, and electricity for households and welfare institutions. To help meet, the new problems, an Air Lift allowance was made for clothing and blankets and an extensive plan was developed for public "warming centers".

The east sector was also badly affected by the blockade, and relief lists lengthened there as well



The return of thousands of German prisoners from forcedlabor in Russia also presented a special problem, as most were in ill health, undernourished, and demoralized.

as in the west. Certainly the communists were faced with an impossible task in trying to present Russia as a benevolent friendly power, when relief trucks with food supplies were confiscated or turned back to the western zones in the fall of 1948. Thereafter, church and other voluntary agencies had to abandon their attempts to truck in relief supplies.

The Swedish Red Cross brought in some supplies by ship and rail from Sweden through the Soviet Zone to carry out a feeding project during the winters of 1947/48 and 1948/49 for groups of approximately 20,000 small and undernourished children. In December, 1948, however, the Soviets prohibited the Swedish Red Cross from transporting amy of the supplies into the western sectors and the project was prematurelly ended a few months later.

The International Red Cross shipped food supplies by rail through Czechoslovakia during the blockade with Russian permission. These supplies were used to carry out the badly needed old-age feeding



Soup-kitchens set up alter the war near lower grade schools in Berlin—with U.S. Army equipment and supplies helped prevent epidemics among the city's underfed youth.

project in Greater Berlin, until the Russians refused permission to transport any supplies into the western sectors. Consequently, in January, 1949, this project was abandoned in the west.

#### **Child Welfare Stressed**

Military Government has had from the outset a special interest in child welfare, not only because such welfare agencies in Germany have played an important role in the life of nearly every German child through its kindergartens, recreation, and special programs, but also because child welfare has a liberal tradition and is better able to accept new and democratic ideas.

The progressive, forward-looking record of the pre-Nazi child welfare leaders is reflected in the National Child Welfare Law of 1922, which says— "Every German child has the right to education for the development of its physical, mental, spiritual, and social competence".

Juvenile delinquency has shown a fluctuation in numbers between a serious increase in the early occupation period to a slight decrease in recent months. German authorities believe this may be due partially to better food supplies and the lessening of black market activities. Also, undoubtedly there is now better cooperation between German juvenile courts and youth offices in the treatment of youthful delinquents.

During the blockade period, however, offences were found to be of a more serious nature among the older group. Assistance was extended by Military Government to the German agencies in efforts to combat the delinquency problem, both in relation to a better understanding of the need for specialized services and in the treatment of cases.



Problem Number One for public welfare agencies: food, clothing, and guidance for tomorrow's citizens of Germany.

SENTENCES BY QUARTERLY PERIOD	1945	1946	1947	1948 Jan	. thru June 1949
January thru March		- 597	485	776	510
April thru June	No	488	676	695	518
July thru September	Records	655	796	745	
October thru December		635	638	321 (amne	esty)
		2,375	2,595	2,537	1,028
Thereof sentenced by M	lilitary Court	266	299	294	109
Breakdown by sex:—					
	boys	2,031	2,206	2,136	914
	girls	344 (15%)	389 (15%)	401 (16%)	114 (11%)

The first accomplishment in this connection was the establishment of "Jugendhof", a boys detention home, in November, 1946. By the fall of 1948 the population at the institution had increased from 207 to 300. This, however, should not be judged as an indication of increased delinquency, but, rather, that many boys, formerly committed to insti-



Santa Claus became reality for the children of destroyed Berlin with the airborne arrival of hundreds of tons of gift clothing parcels from America during the blockade.

tutions in the Soviet Sector, were no longer accepted there and that more commitments were now being made to *Jugendhof* rather than to prisons.

The continuing need of adequate facilities for institutions, day care centers, and foster homes, both public and private, is reflected in present overcrowded conditions.

Child guidance clinics are functioning within the framework of the welfare offices on a limited scale. Special emphasis has been placed on encouraging the German agencies to develop mental hygiene

clinics in accordance with modern thinking in this field. In this connection, assistance has been given in planning for demonstration projects under the

	N CHANGES — Children's ns and Day Care Centers
	Number of Children in Institutions
January, 1947 January, 1948 April, 1949	30 Homes with 1,249 Inmates           63         " 2,046           67         " 2,361
	Number of Children in Day Care Centers
January, 1947 January, 1948 April, 1949	186 Centers with 7,384 Inmates           213         ''         7,850         ''           231         ''         9,092         ''

direction of professional experts from the U.S. and other foreign countries.

Among the outstanding accomplishments of the German authorities in the field of child welfare have been the child welfare conferences held in Berlin during May, 1948, and May, 1949.

The "Interzonale Sozialpädagogische Tagung und Ausstellung" in 1948 was the first conference of its kind to be held in Germany. It brought together teachers, supervisors, and all persons actively working with children. Approximately 1,000 persons attended the conference to discuss developments in this field in the U.S., Switzerland, and other countries.

The subject of adoption has been a much debated, one for the entire period of Occupation. There has been considerable interest on the part of Americans in the adoption of German or Allied national children.

Many legal difficulties had to be met, but in December, 1947, an adoption law for nationals of the U.S. was issued and put into effect in the U.S. Zone



More than 15,000 children were airlifted from Berlin to temporary homes in the western zones during the Soviet blockade. All returned heavier, rosy-cheeked, happier.

and U.S. Sector of Berlin. Since the program began, 88 applicants for adoption, involving a total of 105 children, have been handled.

A problem of major concern in the field of child welfare is the large proportion of children suffering from undernourishment and malnutrition. In order to combat this, many children's recuperation homes have had to be established. One of the most successful homes is operated by the borough of Neukölln. This home, since its inception, has provided care for a period of one month to a total of 2,078 children.



Gift parcels of food, clothing, and shoes from a generous American public were received with wide-eyed enthusiasm by orphans in Berlin public welfare institutions.

#### GIFT PACKAGES DISTRIBUTED IN BERLIN

	FOOD	CLOTH- ING	TOTAL	PER- CENT- AGE	VALUE IN DOLLARS
1946/47	Assistant				at the second
CARE	345,508	13,993	359,501	62.1	3,595,010
CARITAS	186,669	17,855	204,524	35.3	1,227,114
SWISS	15,044	-	15,044	2.6	90,264
	547,221	31,848	579,069	100.0	4,912,388
1948			- 1816 876	Sec. Sec.	a state and a state
CARE	213,921	14,199	228,120	49.0	2,281,200
CARITAS	142,532	7,597	150,129	32.3	900,774
SWISS	87,215		87,215	18.7	523,290
	443,668	21,796	465,464	100.0	3,705,264
1949 (January thru August)					
CARE	179,875	18,160	198,035	55.4	1,980,350
CARITAS	65,318	-	65,318	18.3	391,908
SWISS	71,803		71,803	20.0	430,818
NETHERLAND		12000			Some Software
CARITAS	22,500	-	22,500	6.3	135,000
	339,496	18,160	357,656	100.0	2,938,076
GRAND TOTAL	· Marganese	1.1.1.1.1	and the state	1.44	10.1.1.3.22
CARE	739,304	46,352	785,656	56.0	7,856,560
CARITAS	394,519	25,452	419,971	30.0	2,519,796
SWISS	174,062		174,062	12.4	1,044,372
NETHERLAND	Charles and	1	19.12.24		ALC: NO.
CARITAS	22,500		22,500	· 1.6	135,000
	1,330,385	71,804	1,402,189 packages	100.0	\$ 11,555,728

In October, 1948, plans were made in cooperation with the British public welfare and German officials for additional help for malnourished children through placement in the western zones. A total of 15,450 children were transported to the zones during the period of October, 1948, to March, 1949. The first 55 of these children returned to Berlin on May 22, 1949.

Other assistance to malnourished children has been through feeding programs, such as those con-



New hope came to the near-hopeless—thousands of old people in city institutions—when U.S. and other relief agencies sent large shipment of blankets, books, food.

ducted under the direction of the Swedish Red Cross, and through the summer recreation and feeding programs. In addition, through the Berlin American Women's Club and "General Clay's Children's Christmas Fund" many other families and institutions were helped. Still other contributions were made available by the American Women's Press Club and the "Little Vittles" chocolate program, sponsored by the men in service.

The Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce voluntarily organized a project to clothe the 80 children under



Despite shortages of every kind, Berlin municipal children's homes saved thousands of war-orphaned youngsters.

care at the *Blindenschule*. Likewise, through special "adoption projects", many individual children's institutions have received generous and repeated gifts of food and clothing.

There is still much to be done to bring German child welfare into line with sound democratic practices. Too many children are in institutions, considerable resistance to foster home care still exists, and there is only an embryonic beginning of child guidance programs.

There are extremely few trained workers for specialized child welfare services and for leadership in this field. The public authorities need help in developing youth recreation activities which are free from military regimentation or political indoctrination.

Better methods of dealing with delinquency and coordination of child welfare services also are needed. Although the 1922 law is basically sound, the experience of American child welfare workers is needed to implement it and focus the thinking

and action of welfare authorities on developing plans for youth recreation, specialized services for children, and preventive work in the field of juvenile delinquency.

#### **Community Projects**

It was early recognized that the doling out of food and clothing could not in itself do much to improve community life in Germany and give individuals greater freedom and security. Borrowing from experience in the United States. where a tremendous amount has been done through demonstration projects, efforts were made to find sponsors for "service" projects.



Community "self help" became the keynote of Welfare Branch. Vegetable gardens amidst the levelled rubble helped supply fresh food to defeat the Soviet blockade.

The American Friends Service Committee was the first of the foreign welfare societies to undertake a service project in Berlin. Their neighborhood conference and rest home center, called *Mittelhof*, opened in June, 1947. Military Government has assisted in many ways in getting this and several other such projects started and counselling those in charge, so that they serve as channels of reorientation.

To assist the Berlin schools of social work in developing new and much needed teaching material, Military Government made a small grant of funds to a working committee of social workers. This



Police arrest black marketeers: a war-nurtured ailment that only now is disappearing from Europe's cities.

group adopted the name Arbeitsgruppe für die Herausgabe sozial-pädagogischer Arbeitshefte and outlined six pamphlets in July of 1948. This valuable work will have been completed by the fall of 1949.

> There are many similar ways in which the Germans can be helped to help themselves. All this falls under the heading of "community organization" in the U.S. Such work requires some personnel and funds, but in proportion to its cost. community organization is an economical and practical way to plant seeds and to foster programs which can have a significant, long-term effect.

#### Foreign

# Relief Supplies Program

The Foreign Relief Supplies Program, sponsored by Military Government and carried out through the cooperation of the foreign welfare and German governmental and private agencies began in January, 1946.

Since that time, the program has depended mainly on gift supplies and packages made through CRALOG, IRC, CARE, Swedish Red Cross, and the Mormons. All supplies and packages received under this program have been distributed in all Berlin, despite the lack of Russian cooperation, in approximately the following percentages:

Soviet Sector	36.6 %
American Sector	30.5 %
British Sector	19.4 º/o
French Sector	13.5 %



Displaced persons and refugees: a continuing problem in Berlin, with thousands forced to flee the countries of East Europe for political and economic reasons.



Under other circumstances these young people would be strutting Nazis. U.S. Military Government offered an alternative which they have not been slow to take.


During the period of January, 1946-September, 1949, a total of 37,348,409 pounds of bulk foreign relief supplies for distribution by German welfare agencies and worth \$14,855,927 were received in Berlin. During the same period, 1,402,189 individual gift

CRALOG	Council of Relief Agencies licensed for Operation in Germany	American sponsored— serves as forwarding agency for 16 American welfare, religious, labor, and civic groups	CENTRE	Centre d'Entraide Internationale aux Populations Civiles	A Swiss agency sponsor- ed by 9 welfare organiza- tions in Switzerland. Si- milar to CRALOG, and CARE		
IRC .	International Committee of the Red Cross	Swiss sponsored—sup- plies come mainly from Switzerland, but also from other national Red	Mormons	Church of the Latter Day Saints	Sponsored by the Ameri- can Church—help for German Mormons.		
LICDOSS		Cross societies.	Adventists	7th Day Ad- ventists	Sponsored by the Ameri- can and Canadian Chur-		
LICROSS	League of Red Cross Societies	Membership consists of national Red Cross or- ganizations of many		ventists	ches—help for Germar Adventists.		
		countries. Supplies large- ly come from U.S.	NCM	Netherlands Caritas Mission	Sponsored by Dutch Ca tholic Church—help i		
CARE	Cooperative for American Remit- tances to Europe	Sponsored by 26 Ameri- can welfare, labor, reli- gious, and civic agencies. Distributes individual		Caritas mission	mainly for Dutch cit izens stranded in Berlin since Nazi period.		
	gift packages.		AFSC	American	Sponsored by the Ameri		
S <sub>RC</sub>	Swedish Red Cross	Carries out welfare- health projects sponsor- ed by several Swedish agencies. All supplies come from Sweden.		Friends Service Committee	can Friends Church. In addition to bringing in relief supplies, the AFSC has sponsored the <i>Mittel-</i> <i>hof</i> Neighborhood Center		
BHAC	Berlin <i>Hilfswerk</i> Action Commit- tee of the western zones	Organized by govern- mental and civic groups in three western zones to provide assistance to the people of the three western sectors of Ber- lin during the blockade.	MSC	Mennonite Service Committee	Sponsored by the Ameri- can Mennonite Church. In addition to bringing in relief supplies, the MSC has sponsored the Kreuz- berg Neighborhood Cen- ter.		

#### FOREIGN RELIEF AGENCIES OPERATING IN BERLIN

7

One of the positive results of the blockade period was the Berlin *Hilfswerk* Action Committee. Established by Germans of the west zones to help Ger-





Blockade scene: children stealing coal from a delivery truck to warm their homes against the long, cold nights.

mans of the western sectors of Berlin, this agency raised five million Marks and nearly two million pounds of food supplies and clothing between January and August, 1949.

The many forms of material aid from the U.S. have been a significant factor in demonstrating to Berliners the sympathy America and other countries had for them in their fight for democratic self-determination.

Welfare in its broadest sense touches a great many people. Moreover, it has a fairly liberal tradition in Germany. If reorientation efforts are to continue the important work of helping people to help themselves, programs which recognize the dignity and individuality of all people should not be overlooked.

There is much that needs to be done: to take old people out of institutions, improve the training of the handicapped, put the treatment of the delinquent child and youth on a higher level, and improve the training of social workers, group leaders, and day center workers.

There are German workers who see the need for all this. They need support in various ways over a period of years. It is in such ways as this that a reorientation program can be made effective.

#### FOREIGN RELIEF BULK SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTED IN BERLIN

WEIGHT IN POUNDS

	FOOD	CLOTH- ING	MISCEL- LANE- OUS	TOTAL	PER- CENT- AGE	VALUE \$
1946/47						A STATE
CRALOG	595,715	324,414	42,967	963,096	8.8	340,936
IRC	4,900,439	124,778	540,523	5,565,740	50.9	1,635,360
ADVENTISTS	80,430	12,804	4,415	97,649	.9	48,825
SWEDISH R. C.	2,962,472	450,331	-	3,412,803	31.2	1,706,399
MORMONS	551,578	340,554	_	892,132	8.2	446,066
1948	9,090,634	1,252,881	587,905	10,931,420	100.0	4,177,586
CRALOG	2,354,973	786,976	245,533	3,387,482	21.3	1,198,158
IRC	7,312,205	228,185	799,497	8,339,887	52.3	2,683,069
LICROSS	11,037	20,320	139,300	170,657	1.1	118,402
ADVENTISTS	136,149	46,185	14,908	197,242	1.2	98,621
SWEDISH R. C.	958,057	267,108		1,225,165	7.7	612,583
MORMONS	2,333,934	2,625		2,336,559	14.6	1,168,280
BERLIN HILFSWERK	— — · · · ·	—	281,840	281,840	1.8	140,920
1949 (January thru August)	13,106,355	1,351,399	1,481,078	15,938,832	100.0	6,020,033
CRALOG	1,820,465	465,587	253,533	2,539,585	24.2	898,893
IRC	983,442		56,033	1,039,475	9.9	307,788
LICROSS	. 15	1,587	27,385	28,987	.3	16,572
ADVENTISTS	148,668	13,680	3,215	165,563	1.5	82,782
SWEDISH R. C.	46,358			46,358	.5	23,179
MORMONS	747,620	<u> </u>	1,250	748,870	7.2	374,435
BERLIN HILFSWERK NETHERLAND	1,721,844	10,636	17,464	1,749,944	16.8	874,972
CARITAS	2,876,375	1,283,000	—	4,159,375	39.6	2,079,687
GRAND TOTAL	8,344,787	1,774,490	358,880	10,478,157	100.0	4,658,308
CRALOG	4,771,153	1,576,977	542,033	6,890,163	18.5	2,437,987
IRC	13,196,086	352,963	1,396,053	14,945,102	40.0	4,626,217
LICROSS	11,052	21,907	166,685	199,644	.5	134,974
ADVENTISTS	365,247	72,669	22,538	460,454	1.2	230,228
SWEDISH R. C.	3,966,887	717,439	_	4,684,326	12.7	2,342,161
MORMONS	3,633,132	343,179	1,250	3,977,561	10.6	1,988,781
BERLIN HILFSWERK NETHERLAND	1,721,844	10,636	299,304	2,031,784	5.4	1,015,892
CARITAS	2,876,375	1,283,000	-	4,159,375	11.1	2,079,687
	30,541,776	4,378,770	2,427,863	37,348,409 Ibs.	100.0	14,855,927

99

food and clothing packages, worth \$11,555,728, were received and distributed.

The bulk of gift supplies and packages originated in America, with Switzerland and Sweden following in the order mentioned.

1045

No

inmate

859

42

759

1,660

16.958

5,789

No.

homes

30

3

20

53

Additional Welfare Institutions:

Homes:-

Convalescent

Apprentices

Detention &

Correctional

Refugee Camps 18

Day Care Centers

for Children 107

with average attendance

Children

Aged

Blind

Other

Total

WELFARE INSTITUTIONS - U.S. SECTOR BERLIN

1947

No

inmate

2.458

128

141

97

245

472

5,245

7,850

1,704

No.

homes

66

3

3

56

5

2

11

146

8 | 1,134

213

1948

No.

inmates

2,657

137

143

2.002

118

289

651

5,997

331

8,376

No.

homes

71

3

4

6

3

9

155

4

227

59

1949

No.

inmates

2.734

214

140

2,048

126

460

514

6,236

(fed only)

8.462

5 | 1,348 plus 1,644

No.

homes

70

6

4

60

6

4

9

159

231

1946

No

inmates

1.884

1,604

69

44

46

64

232

3.943

2,587

7.384

No.

homes

58

3

2

45

4

1

4

117

10

186

Seventy-five percent of all Berliners Helped

It is estimated that at one time or another

during the period from 1946 to July, 1949, 75 % of

relief programs. This does not include 1,809,429 gift packages received through the mail mainly from the U.S., plus several hundred thousand gift packages which were brought into the city, generally by agencies without proper Allied clearance.

> A substantial number of additional individual packages have been shipped into Berlin by commercial gift package concerns which have been licensed by the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA).

The Berlin CRALOG Committee, representing the Magistrat Departments of Public Welfare, Youth, Health, and Labor, and the main German and foreign welfare agencies, has been responsible for allocating the foreign relief supplies, except those coming through the International Red Cross.

Under this committee supplies have been allocated and distributed through carefully

selected and approved projects. Through the main projects sponsored by the CRALOG Committee approximately 780,000 persons—a quarter of the population—benefited by the distribution of about 6,890,000 pounds of food and clothing.

MAIN PROJECTS RECEIVING CRALOG SUPPLIES ALLOCATED BY THE BERLIN CRALOG COMMITTEE, From Jan., 1949 to Sept., 1949

	Total	780,000 persons	Appx. 6,890,000 lbs. of food and clothing
Summer recreation program for children and youths	Summer, 1949	84,000	1 hot meal per day
Old people completely depen- dent on public welfare	July, 1949	40,000	Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food
	July, 1949	8,000	Each received 4 lb. pkg. of assorted food
Expectant mothers			Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food
Help for victims of Fascism	Oct-Nov, 1948	40,000	1 hot meal per day
6-14 years Same as above for youths	24 days during 1948 10 days during 1948	60,000 40,000	2 rolls per day
Summer recreation program for children 3-6 years Same as above for children	40 days during 1948	12,000	1 hot meal per day
		211,000	2 rolls per day for students
Roll (Brötchen) program	April-July, 1948	277,000	1 roll per day for school children
social welfare workers Expectant mothers	March-April, 1948 April-May, 1948	6,000 7,000	Same as above Same as above
Physically exhausted		0,000	Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food
clearance ( <i>Trümmerfrauen</i> ) Student aid	March, 1948 March-April, 1948	18,000 3,000	Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food
Women working on rubble	1947-1948		
Old age feeding	December, January, February, and March,	54,000	1 hot meal per day
Widowed, self-supporting women with children	June, 1948 May, 1947	11,000	Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food
Returning prisoners of war	Continuous from	25,000	Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food
Clothing distribution	Continuous from August, 1947	125,000	550,000 pieces of clothing and pairs of shoe
PROJECT	PERIOD OF PROJECT	NUMBER BENEFITING	SUPPLIES RECEIVED

U	B	L	I	C	W	E	L	F	A	R	E	

P

# the 3,300,000 population of Greater Berlin have P received substantial help through these foreign a

98



ADMINISTRATION Personnel'Financial | Legal Office | Office | Office

A DAMES CAN DE DORCH					
MAIN SCHOOL OFFICE					
School Adminis- tration	School Super- vision				
Personnel Records	Local School Super- vision				
School Buildings & Equip- ment	Secondary Schools				
School Materials	Prof. & Pri- vate Schools				
School Hygiene	Social Pedagogy				
School Feeding	Special Schools				
Statistics	Technical Sections				

#### MAIN OFFICE FOR SCIENCE RESEARCH

- 1. Office for Higher Institutes & Scientific Institutes
- 2. Office for Higher Technical Schools
- 3. Office for Adult Evening Schools

# MAIN OFFICE FOR ART AND LITERATURE

- 1. Office for Theater and Stage
- 2. Office for Music
- 3. Office for Art Schools
- 4. Office for Museums, Palaces, Parks
- Office for Literature Books: Publishing Trade Loan Libraries Public Libraries

#### MAIN OFFICE FOR GYMNASTICS



Berlin students help build their own Free University in the U.S. Sector.

# EDUCATION

The school system of Berlin had already been reorganized and was operating on a limited scale when U.S. troops entered the city in July, 1945. A trio of Moscow-trained Germans, Wandel, Winzer and Wildangel, headed the Public Education Department of the city government. All three were Communist Party members and their work was closely controlled by the Soviets.

The Public Education Department of the Magistrat (the Volksbildungsamt) was heavily col-

onized by communists, and the problem of establishing a less lop-sided political supervision became an immediate and lasting headache for the Western Allies.

After the October, 1946, general elections (see page 15), the communist Winzer was replaced by the Social Democrat Party candidate, Dr. Nestriepke. Efforts by the latter to combat communist influence, however, brcught on Soviet wrath and eventually his dismissal, despite American opposition.

In July, 1947, Walter May (Social Democrat Party) replaced Nestriepke. Only after four months of haggling at the Allied Kommandatura, however, did the Soviets recognize May. It was on their insistence, moreover, that May retained Wildangel, who claimed the status of Deputy.

(After the final split in the city government—November, 1948—May moved to the British Sector, and the Soviets established Wildangel as head of the *Volksbildungsamt* of the east sector rump Magistrat.)

#### First Problems: Buildings, Books, Fuel

Political conflict in the Kommandatura was only one aspect of the problems faced in the educational

field. A more basic and urgent problem was that of the physical conditions of schools in the sectors.

Some 222 schools existed in the U.S. Sector in 1945, with 70,679 pupils and only 1,795 teachers (excluding higher education instructors). Denazification procedures eliminated many otherwise competent teachers, and the ratio of students to one trained teacher rose from 60 to 88. Many teachers of apprentice status, with only sketchy training and often no field experience, were of necessity employed to bridge the emergency period.

Forty-six percent of all school buildings in the U.S. Sector were destroyed or in need of major

The work of the Education and Cultural Relations Branch during its past four years of operation has been five-fold:


Supervision and control of the schools, scientific institutes, and institutions of higher learning in the U.S. Sector of Berlin,

Supervision of and assistance to youth activities, adult education, vocational education, and women's affairs,

Control of and assistance to religious atfairs, and theater and music activities,

Administration of a program of exchange of cultural personnel and materials,

Administration of various reorientation fund projects, and the operation of the Educational Service Center and numerous youth centers. repairs, and sixty-six school buildings were being used for purposes other than school work, many of them as hospitals. All schools were cold, lacking in sanitary facilities, and seriously over-crowded.



Nearly half the schools in the U.S. Sector were destroyed, badly-wrecked, or used for other purposes. This damaged girls' school housed an emergency hospital in 1945.

Pupils and teachers alike were badly-clothed. Many were in poor health, and all schools were desperately in need of textbooks, visual aids, and instructional materials. Even commonplace essentials such as pencils and chalk were rarities.

Despite these obstacles, much progress was achieved in the first period of readjustment and planning towards the eradication of Nazi influences in the Berlin school system. An Education Committee began meeting at the Kommandatura in August, 1945. Despite underlying differences of view, the four-power members of the committee succeeded in establishing a basic

policy under which the city's school system has since operated.

### **Sweeping School Reform Passed**

Of outstanding importance among the four-power decisions was the agreement on the School Reform Law for Berlin; approval of the historyteaching outline for grades 5-12; abolition of corporal punishment in the schools, provision for religious instruction in schools; and the establishment of a much-needed school feeding program.

The Berlin school law, put into effect on June 1, 1948, was the first school reform bill anywhere in Germany since the war. It provided for a unified school system of 12 years (*Einheitsschule*), compulsory for all children aged 6-18.

The bill also provided for the supply of free textbooks and other teaching aids to schools, for a coeducational attendance system, and for the advanced training of all teachers.

The underlying principles and the


outlines for history teaching in grades 5-12 were drafted and accepted by the Kommandatura in the spring of 1947. Until this legislation was promulgated, there was no post-war teaching of history in Berlin schools. Therefore, a committee of German historians and history instructors was formed, and it began preparing textbooks for those eight grades.

### **Denazification, Food, Teaching Techniques**

Denazification procedures increased sharply the problem of finding qualified teaching personnel. It also tended to increase the average age of remaining instructors (by July, 1946, the average age of a Berlin school teacher was 57).


Approximately a quarter of the employees of schools and of branches of the Public Education Department had been dismissed by the Magistrat

### SCHOOL FEEDING



before U.S. Military Government arrived in Berlin. From July, 1945, onward, 650 additional teachers (including religious instructors) were dismissed under denazification laws. Of these, however, 326 were later permitted to be reinstated.

A special school feeding program was instituted by Military Government in cooperation with the Central Food Office of the Magistrat, Soups and



other foods made available to children at their schools throughout the city provided 350 additional, much-needed calories daily.

By November 2, 1945, 120,000 school books, printed under American auspices, had been distributed to Berlin schools.

In February, 1946, approval was given a Magistrat plan for an eight months' teacher training program for the four sectors of Berlin. It was also during this month that the Kommandatura sent a delegation of representative teachers to witness the Nürnberg War Crimes Trials to inform Berlin educators and children of the fair



U.S. Army equipment and guidance helped create summer camps, where thousands of needy Berlin youth found refuge from the city's ruins and want.

legal processes used to bring their former Nazi leaders to justice.

Films and lecture courses also assisted in a broad program of teacher training. A Curriculum and Textbook Writing Center (later known as the Educational Service Center) has been functioning since August, 1947—with up-to-date professional books, periodicals, library facilities, and conference rooms —to help reorient and broaden school administrators and teachers. The library at the Center, for example, now has over 10,000 books.

### **Guidance for Youth Emphasized**

The formation of voluntary groups of young people for cultural, religious, and recreational purposes has been strongly emphasized by U.S. Military Government in Berlin.

A youth center under U.S. sponsorship was opened in Zehlendorf, in the southwest of the city, in December, 1946, with facilities for 1,200 German young people. Six months later a summer camp was opened on Peacock Island on the *Wannsee*. During



Sports help bring home the meaning of Democracy: team-spirit. And American baseball has become a favorite game among youngsters of West Berlin.

the summer of 1948, 6,500 selected boys and girls enjoyed the wholesome food and facilities of the camp which had been equipped with the cooperation of the U.S. Army.

The Wannsee Center for Youth Work celebrated its first anniversary on February 20, 1949. The Center has served to provide educational facilities for Berlin's youth leaders and prospective community leaders. Groups of forty young people between 17 and 24 years of age are accommodated for 12-day periods. During its first year of work the Center was thus able to give this special training to 700 young people.

### Four Main Youth Groups

There are today four main youth organizations in Berlin, one of which—the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* —is Soviet-sponsored and communist-controlled. In



Seal of the Free University of Berlin

July, 1949, the FDJ had a membership of 13,000, of which only 1,600 were from the U.S. Sector.

The other three groups are located in the western sectors and include the *Falken*, a Social Democratic oriented group with a membership of 7,000, the *Bund Deutscher Jugend*, which follows Boy Scout lines of organization and activities and has become a strong, non-political group of 3,800 members, and the *Demokratischer Jugendverband*, a group more interested in discussions and camping, with 1,000 members.

One of the most recent and most helpful contributions to German-American relations in the youth field was the establishment of a large *Haus der Jugend* in the U.S. Sector to serve as headquarters for the three organizations. Maintenance, rent, and salaries for its administrators are paid by the U.S. Army.

The Berlin city government has gradually expanded its activities for youth in the past months, and, except for specific examples of help, Military Government has gradually been able to relinquish its role of initiator and sponsor. During the summer of 1949, for example, the Berlin Magistrat was able

to sponsor a variety of youth activities which reached nearly 100,000 of the city's young people.

### Higher Education: Soviet Monopoly Broken

Continuous efforts were made between 1946 and 1948 by U.S. Military Government to bring the University of Berlin, located on Unter den Linden in the Soviet Sector, under quadripartite control. The Russians were determined to keep the school, which had re-opened in January, 1946, under their own control.

Both professors and students were selected on a political basis and any kind of academic freedom of study was denied. The university served, in fact, as a

training ground for young communist" intellectuals" and professionals. Those students who were not able to advance politically as well as academically were expelled.

An aspect of the Soviet attitude towards students is contained in the following report from a group of Berlin University pupils who spent four weeks of their summer vacation in Thuringia (Soviet Zone) to pursue field studies. They had been induced to do this by the communist-dominated "Students' Union". On their arrival they were treated as forced laborers; they spent their four weeks cutting down trees and were allowed no time for their intended study.

### Free University Projected

The need for a free university steadily increased at that time, as In the summer of 1948, plans were advanced to create a new university in the west of Berlin. Professor Ernst Reuter, later to become Head Mayor

From a report by the OMGBS Education Officer, July, 1946:

"No single phase of public life is more important for the development of a country than is the education of its youth. For the future of Germany as a free and peaceful land, and thus in a larger sense for the future of the entire world, the training of German youth is a task of enormous significance; and the duty of those charged with its accomplishment is a grave and serious duty...

"There was never a richer opportunity. Elements of Fascism undoubtedly persist, elements of the youth who still cling blindly and desperately to a belief in Hitler and National-Socialism. The vast percentage, however, is bitterly disillusioned. The only system of life most of them have ever known has collapsed about them, leaving them nothing to work for. And yet, being young, they will believe, they will hope, they will work. "Perbare no generation of young people

"Perhaps no generation of young people has ever before been so receptive, so hungry for knowledge. The old has failed them, and they want to have something new. The totalitarianism offered them through the Communist Party seems to them often only a repetition of Nazism. What they are to learn and what new ways they are to take is the trust of their teachers and their leaders in the fields of religion and of youth activities..." of Berlin, was appointed chairman of a twelve-man committee to study the problems which first would have to be solved.

By the end of July, a newlyorganized secretariat was able to move into an empty building in the borough of Dahlem, and by September students were busy furnishing another building across the street and repairing the wing of a large museum three blocks away, preparing them to house the new school.

During November, a faculty committee interviewed and screened more than 3,500 students. Finally, 2,200 were advised that they might enroll. The first semester's classes were organized under three faculties of philosophy, law-economics,

and medicine-dentistry. On December 4, 1948, the *Titania-Palast* was crowded to its more than 2,000 capacity for the inaugural ceremony of the Free University. General Frank L. Howley, U.S. Sector Commandant, Head Mayor Reuter, and the novelist ThorntonWilder,addressed the gathered stu-

Today, at the close of its first scholastic year, there are 4,000 students working in the 15 buildings of the Free University. There is a waiting list of more than 4,000 prospective students for the next term.

dents and civic leaders.


Of those young men and women now in attendance—many of them helped repair the school buildings in their spare time—nearly a third are from the Soviet Zone. A quarter are from the Soviet-controlled Berlin University, from which they transferred as soon

Objective learning has replaced totalitarian propaganda in West Berlin schools. The Free University has 4,000 students, with thousands more on the waiting list.

did the demands of leading Berliners for a new university in the western sectors of the city, where objective education, and not propaganda for totalitarianism, could be emphasized in the class-room.

as there was an alternative. Forty-two of the remaining students are from outside Germany. Qualified observers report that the university has already attained a high academic standard.






TREND OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT

### **Education Department Splits**

The establishment of the Free University was preceded by the transfer of the Public Education Department of the Magistrat from the Soviet Sector to the West. On November 27, 1948, *Stadtrat* May reported to U.S. Military Government that his "deputy", Wildangel had been conspiring with the Soviets to break up the Department. He declared






that the Magistrat would probably suspend the communist agent; and that the Soviets would in retaliation probably suspend May.

In anticipation of such an action, therefore, May transferred his headquarters and all important files of the Public Education Department to the British Sector, and about 50% of the department personnel followed him. The immediate problem then was to provide a haven for the many east sector officials, teachers and principals who were forced to flee immediately because of their known sympathies with the West.

May's new office was so swamped with applications for positions in the western school system that a policy was adopted accepting only those who were in immediate professional or personal danger.

A week later, it was decided that the *Pädago*gische Hochschule (Teachers' College) located in the Soviet Sector—with 104 instructors and 1,160 students—should be moved at once to the west. On December 3rd, *Stadtrat* May was able to announce that 771 students and 75% of the teachers of the Teachers' College were established in new quarters in the U.S. Sector.

By the middle of December, 1948, seven vocational and professional schools—with an enrolment of 5,653 students and 226 teachers—had left the Soviet Sector and were established in the west. The number of schools increased to fifteen within the next several months, eight of them located in the American Sector. Their problems of equipment,




TREND OF VOCATIONAL SCHOOL ENROLMENT

books, and money have been difficult, but are now being gradually solved.


Assistance, both financial and educational, has been forthcoming from U.S. Military Government for more than five thousand needy students at the several advanced schools in the city.

### Freedom of Faith Restored

The U.S. Sector of Berlin at the end of the war contained thirty-six separate and distinct religious groups, of which the Evangelical Church was the largest with nearly 700,000 adherents, and the Roman Catholic Church second, with 120,000.



Note: Graphs refer to enrolment in U.S. Sector.



The revival of free worship is typified by this Jewish service held openly for the first time in over a decade in a city where anti-Semitism was once a vicious fad.

An important step in the field of religious affairs was the re-establishment of the Evangelical theological seminary, the *Kirchliche Hochschule*, which at first had been forced underground and then liquidated by the Nazis. A second step was a Kommandatura order permitting religious instruction in Berlin schools to all children whose parents so desired.

Aid has also been given during the past four years to church leaders to assist in the resumption of religious services, in the repair of churches—of which 65% were totally destroyed or badly damaged and only one percent remained intact—and in the printing of several approved church publications.


Other Kommandatura orders facilitated the interzonal travel of religious authorities and made possible the radio broadcasting of religious services. Officers of Military Government have also been able on many occasions to help religious leaders to reorganize the adherents of their faiths after long periods underground during the Nazi regime.

### Strong Revival in Cultural Field

Theater and Music, formerly a concern of the Information Services Branch, was transferred to the Education Branch in December, 1948. Activities in this field during the past months have consisted of supervision and assistance to the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra and ten American-licensed theaters, the distribution of American plays on request, and the registration and political clearance of artists, publishers, and agencies.

Titania Palast, the largest theater in the U.S. Sector, was formerly the home of the American radio station, RIAS. It now houses four cultural organizations, the Berlin Philharmonic, the *Bühne der Jugend*, RIAS Symphony, the *Freie Volksbühne*, and acommodates visiting foreign artists.

The world-known Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra has made extensive tours through the British and



American Zones and completed this past spring its first guest tour of England since the war. The orchestra is also scheduled to make a series of guest appearances in Edinburgh during August, 1949.

American and other foreign dramatic productions have been in great demand since the war in Berlin theaters. The ten theaters in the U.S. Sector have produced a large number of successful adaptations during the past four years, ranging from "A Midsummer Night's Dream" to "Three Men on a Horse".



Only one percent of Berlin's churches remained intact in 1945. But with the enthusiastic help and willing labor of their faithful, many have since been restored.

# <complex-block>

B erlin is the world's largest city in area. Its 880 square kilometers (compared with 655 for London, 588 for New York, 500 for Paris) were before the war only about 28 % fully developed. Lakes and forests cover 27 % of the city, with the remaining 45 % mainly undeveloped and consisting of scattered small houses and industries.

During the war Berlin's population decreased from about  $4^{1/4}$  to  $3^{1/4}$  million, making the city's population density less than one-third that of New York.

Because of the large area and lower density of population, the utility problems of Berlin are somewhat different from those of other large cities. The wholesale destruction suffered by the city through air bombardment and artillery fire during the war also altered these problems considerably.

After four years of repair and restoration of public works and utilities, there are still restricted allocations and rationing of electricity and gas throughout Berlin. The major difficulties experienced in the rehabilitation and maintenance of the city's utilities since the war has been the shortage of all types of repair and construction materials and the shortage of labor, especially trained and experienced technical employees.

A high percentage of the present utilities workers are far above normal age for the occupation. (Before the war the average age of electric company employees was 33 years; it is now 45 years. The average age of gas company employees is 50, compared with a pre-war age of 42.)

An additional major problem is absenteeism,

amounting to 15 to 20 percent in winter and 8 to 10 percent in summer. Obvious reasons for this high rate are shortages of food, housing, and other perponal problems, as well as recurring sickness.

### **British-Soviet Power Agreement**

The Berlin utilities companies, and indirectly the consumers, were benefited by the Coal and Import Power Agreement reached between British and Soviet zonal authorities in the latter part of 1947. This agreement, effective for one year beginning October 1, 1947, specified the amounts of coal and import power to be brought into Berlin. Before the agreement, the city's utilities had no advance indication as to what amounts of imported electricity and coal would be available.

The supply of materials and repair parts from the zones was increasingly important because of the nearly complete exhaustion of the small reserves previously available in Berlin. Increased difficulty was encountered by Berlin utility companies in attempting to purchase materials and supplies from the zones. On the other hand, quadripartite agreements and assistance from Military Government officials improved the availability of some of the more critical repair items.


Because of the shortage of coal supply and limited production capacity of utility plants, rationing of gas and electric service continued. Under the provisions of Allied Control Authority Law # 19, penalties for consumption in excess of allocation were severe, varying from a surcharge at the rate of 100 times the normal charge to the same surcharge plus 30 days disconnection of supply and up to three months imprisonment.


Quadripartite operation of the public utilities was split by the Soviet Military Government on June 23, 1948, when the Soviets ordered the stoppage of the distribution of import power. A second Soviet order forbade the distribution of electricity to the western sectors from power plants located in the eastern sector, breaking the Coal and Import Power Agreement formulated in the latter part of 1947.


A blockade of all transportation facilities in and out of Berlin followed the power blockade. Coal stocks for all utilities, at the beginning of the blockade, totalled approximately 90,000 tons. In an effort to conserve coal, restrictions were immediately ordered. Since coal deliveries into Berlin were completely halted, further restrictions were orderd July 8 and August 8, 1948.

Although the Air Lift was immediately inaugurated, coal deliveries were small until late July, 1948. Prior deliveries were only sufficient to meet the daily demand, thus presenting a stock-piling problem for winter consumption vital to public utility operation.


**Coal Consumption by Public Utilities** 








Water and Sewerage Service





On approximately August 1st, deliveries began to exceed consumption. On November 1st, the stocks again reached the 90,000 ton mark. Dense fogs and cold weather during November, December, 1948, and February, 1949, played havoc with coal deliveries. During this critical period, coal stocks dwindled to approximately 30,000 tons amounting to a 12-day stock. Beginning March 15, 1948, coal stocks began rising due to the increase of Air Lift and seasonal decrease of consumption.

### ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

The City of Berlin is supplied with electric power by one company, the Berliner Kraft- und Licht Aktiengesellschaft (Berlin Power and Light Company, Inc.), known as BEWAG. It was one of the first joint stock companies in Germany, formed as a private enterprise in 1885.

Before and during the war, two-thirds of Berlin's electric power were generated in nine local power plants and one-third was imported over six overhead lines. As a result of war damages, the capacity of the local plants dropped from 800,000 to 175,000 KW, while the imported power dropped from 202,000 to 130,000 KW.

The imported power, under control of Soviet authorities, has been unreliable. Even since May 12, 1949, when the siege was lifted, import power has been less reliable than before the blockade.

The British-Russian agreement on the importation of coal and electricity provided that 650,000,000 KWH and 812,000 tons of coal be imported for the BEWAG system from October 1, 1947, to September 30, 1948, and guaranteed a minimum of 60,000 KW of import power during peak load periods. This minimum of import power would have aided considerably in stabilizing the electricity situation, had it not been broken by the Soviets on June 23, 1948.

### **Operation of Power Plants**

The following table lists the power plants of the BEWAG system for the City of Berlin, indicating

installed and available boiler and turbine capacities, as of August, 1949:

Power Plants	Installed KW	Available KW	Installed KW	Available KW	PLANT CAPAC- ITY KW
Klingenberg (s)	182,000	131,000	230,000	145,000	131,000
Rummelsburg (s)	50;000	30,000	76,000	60,000	30,000
Charlottenburg (w)	60,000	24,000	43,000	22,500	22,500
Charlottenburg (Ruths accum)			40,000	40,000	20,000
Moabit (w)	54,000	27,000	65,500	30,000	27,200
Spandau (w)	16,000	12,000	14,000	5,000	5,000
Wilmersdorf (w)	18,000	9,500	25,000	25,000	9,500
Steglitz (w)	11,500	9,600	6,000	3,000	3,000
Schöneberg (w)	8,700	4,200	7,500	7,500	2,000
Unterspree (w)	16,000	8,000	31,700	22,000	8,000
TOTAL	416,200	255,500	538,700*	360,000*	258,200


**Boiler and turbine capacities** 

TOTAL 416,200 255,500 538,700\* 360,000\* 258,20

\*) Including Ruths accumulator turbine capacity. This capacity can be maintained for two hours.

(s) Power Plants located in Soviet Sector

(w) Power Plants located in western sectors



"Berlin West", a modern power station, stripped bare by the Russians in 1945 for war reparations.

Due to repairs and scheduled overhauling of two of the three units at Klingenberg, the output of this plant has decreased, requiring the older power plants to operate at maximum capacity. This, combined with the nonavailability of repair parts, has shortened the life of the old equipment. As a result, continuity of service from this old equipment cannot be depended upon. The breaking of the British-Russian agreement on the

importation of coal and electricity and discontinuance of electric power transfers from the Soviet Sector and Zone forced the western authorities to harness all available power plants in the western sectors. These plants, with an average age of approximately 35 years, had a specific coal consumption of approximately 1 kg of coal per KWh. The continuity of service was greatly impaired by full utilization of old power plant equipment. Fortunately, weather conditions for the winter of 1948/49 were mild and restrictions were well enforced. Therefore, no serious difficulties were presented by failure of power plant equipment. By the shifting of load and balancing the distribution system, the specific consumption was improved to .9 kg coal/kwh.

### "Berlin West" Being Restored


In April, 1948, BEWAG was ordered to rehabilitate the power plant known as Berlin West, one of the city's most modern local power plants. Before the war this plant was one of Berlin's largest single manufacturers of electricity, with a capacity of 228,000 KW.

The plant was completely dismantled and removed as reparations by the Russians. It is now being rehabilitated to a capacity of 100,000 KW with a target completion date of December 1, 1949. Over 7,000 tons of construction material and machinery from the western zones are required for the rehabilitation of the Berlin West plant.

Considerable planning was required to transport about 1,500 tons of heavy and bulky items via Air Lift. With the completion of this power plant, some of the older plants will be removed from service, resulting in greatly increased efficiency and capacity.

Early in December, 1948, the Soviet Military

Government effected a split in the BEWAG administration, thus creating separate administrations for BEWAG East and BEWAG West. The grid system connecting the east and west sectors, however, was not af-



fected by the administrative split, and power continued to flow from the east sector to the west sectors and vice versa.

### **Rationing of Electricity**

The first order relative to the rationing of electric power was issued on August 20, 1945, permitting a maximum consumption of 2,700,000 KWh per day. On November 15, 1945, this was increased to 3,400,000 KWh per day and on January 17, 1946, to 4,900,000 KWh per day.

A new basic order was issued to the mayor of Berlin on January 29, 1946, providing rationing principles, specific regulations for domestic consumers, specialists, etc., rules for operation and penalties. By this order the City Council established individual allocations for various types of industries.

Because of the shortage of coal deliveries and small plant capacity, however, the Allied Kommandatura ordered on November 30, 1946 a reduction of all allocations established in the city. On June 5, 1947, this order was revoked and a new maximum allocation of 3,726,000 KWh per day was established. Due to difficulties in repairing and maintaining power plants, as well as the decrease of coal shipments, the city again was forced to reduce the allocations during the winter of 1947/48.

This second reduction remained in effect until February 1, 1948.

A Kommandatura order of March 13, 1948, established a new rationing system and granted higher allocations of electricity for domestic consumers. The order stated in part:

"The electricity allocation for domestic consumers for lighting, ironing, and minor purposes is fixed at 300 WH per day per family, plus 100 WH per day per person. If electric cooking is the only means of preparing a meal, an additional allocation of 700 WH per day per family plus 600 WH per day per person will be granted."

An additional 100 WH per day was authorized to children under five, families living in cellars without natural light, and sick persons certified as needing the extra allocation for recovery.

### **Current Cuts To Save Coal**

The current and transportation blockade imposed by the Soviets forced the western sectors to reimpose current interruptions in an effort to conserve coal stocks and provide an equitable current distribution with the limited available capacity. Effective June 24, 1948, current interruptions in effect during the winter of 1947/48 were reestablished. Electric allocations were reduced to the following percentage of the previous allocations:


Industries	•	25 %
Cooking allocation, domestic consumers		75 %/0
Lighting, ironing, domestic consumers .		50 º/o
Municipal buildings		25 %
Transportation		50 º/o
Medical-educational group		75 %

On July 8, 1948, a further reduction of electric consumption by consumer groups and coal consumption for electric plants was placed into effect. Effective August 6th, a reduction from 1,000 tons per day to 750 tons per day was ordered and an additional  $25^{0/0}$  reduction of cooking allocation for domestic consumers.

On May 21, 1949, after the blockade had been lifted, the allocations were again restored to presiege level, made possible by increased coal stocks and partial lifting of the transportation and power blockade. On July 1, 1949, the allocation for domestic cooking was increased by 1 KWh per day per household until September 30, 1949.

In an effort to improve the supervision and control of electric consumption, the Kommandatura established a Ration Control Office in November, 1945. Inspectors made continuous surveys throughout the city to determine whether or not the orders of the Kommandatura covering electricity rationing were being obeyed.

Any failure on the part of the Magistrat or its employees, the BEWAG or its employees, in complying with Kommandatura directives were reported



## ELECTRICITY SUPPLY OF BERLIN

to the quadripartite Public Utilities Committee of the Kommandatura. Any violations of individuals or establishments in carrying out orders of the Magistrat or BEWAG were reported to the Magistrat. In spite of the blockade and breaking of quadripartite operation by the Soviets, the Ration Control Office functioned until December, 1948.

Due to the increase of load, shortage of available capacity, and shortage of coal, the power demands have exceeded the plant capacity during the winter months. It has been necessary therefore to disconnect electric circuits throughout the city during peak load periods. The difference between supply and demand was so great by January, 1947, that interruptions of eight to ten hours per day were necessary. Disconnections were reduced by March, 1947, to four hours per day, and almost com-

pletely eliminated by April, 1947.

Beginning in September, 1947, however, disconnections were again initiated with scheduled interruptions for periods of two to four hours per day, and were, in October and November, 1947, increased to four to six hours. The implementation of the British and Russian Power Agreement increased the amount of import power sufficiently, so that interruptions were discontinued after December 20, 1947.

Disconnections were again initiated the latter part of June, 1948, with the discontinuance of import and locally generated power by the Soviets. These interruptions

were for periods of 17 to 20 hours per day and continued until the end of the blockade on May 12, 1949.

### GAS SUPPLY

In 1923, the Berlin municipality formed the *Berliner Städtische Gaswerke AG* (GASAG)—(Berlin City Gasworks, Inc.) to operate its various gas properties. This is a city-owned and operated corporation, controlling all of Berlin's 120-year old gas industry.

From 1940 to 1945, Berlin received gas by pipe line from coke plants about 125 miles west of the city. The maximum capacity of this line was 1,600,000 cbm per day, with an average daily import of 601,000 cbm. The pipe line was partly removed by the Soviets in 1946, and has not been replaced.

During the war, gas was generated in eight widely separated gas plants in Berlin. The highest gas consumption was reached during the period 1942/1943 and amounted to 2,150,000 cbm per day.

As a result of war damages the capacity of the gas plants was reduced to approximately 32,300 cbm. One gas plant was totally destroyed by air raids. Another was shut down after the war. The other six plants are in operation, although none are back to pre-war capacity.

Most of the city's gas holders were destroyed during the war. Their capacities were, at the beginning of the war, 2,100,000 cbm. By the end of the war this figure had been reduced to 360,000 cbm. At the present time the capacity os 750,000 cbm.

The rehabilitation of the gas distribution system in Berlin is indicated as follows:

Pipe Lines	Kilometers Beginning of the war	Kilometers End of the war	Kilometers July, 1949	
High Pressure	290	260	290	
Middle Pressure	120	116	120	
Low Pressure	6,598	2,270	6,104	
Total	7,008	2,646	6,514	

Service to the center of the city has been discontinued. In this district the low pressure pipe lines were so completely destroyed that the whole district had to be cut off. Plans have not yet been

### CAS SERVICE OF BERLIN July, 1945 — June, 1949 - all 4 sectors - 3 Western Sectors - 3 Western Sectors - 3 Western Sectors - 4 Way of the sectors - 5 Western Sectors - 5 Way of the sectors -

completed for the rehabilitation of gas supply to this section.

The restoration of service to gas consumers is as follows:

Consumers	of war	September 1, 1945	time
Factories and industr	ial		
enterprises	22,000	0	22,500
Small trades and hous	e-		
holds	1,353,000	180,000	918,500
Tota	1 1,375,000	180,000	941,000


Before the war  $80^{\circ/\circ}$  of Berlin's street lighting was done with gas, with 87,300 gas lights in operation. From a complete discontinuance of all gas lights at the end of the war, 14,200 have now been re-installed. During the blockade, all street lights were discontinued, except at dangerous intersections, to help conserve the coal stocks.

### **Gas Rationing**

The first order by the Kommandatura establishing a domestic gas ration was issued on October 8, 1945, and provided for the preparation of one hot meal per day. The original order has been revised twice, increasing the allocation by about  $50^{\circ}/_{\circ}$  for an average household of three persons.

The allocations for individual commercial and industrial undertakings are fixed by the City Council

### GAS ALLOCATION IN BERLIN



from group allocations established by the Kommandatura.

On July 10, 1948, because of the blockade, a  $50^{0/0}$  reduction of all gas consumers, and a coal consumption not to exceed 600 tons per day, was ordered. To conserve further the rapidly decreasing coal stocks, GASAG was ordered a month later to reduce the coal consumption to 550 tons per day and to reduce the gas pressure in the pressure net to five mm between nine o'clock at night and five o'clock in the morning.

The coal allocation was increased to 1,000 tons per day on December 1, 1948, which allowed a production of 300 tons of coke per day for distribution to households and industries. This also allowed an increase of the domestic gas allocation to  $75^{9/9}$  of the normal allocation. By May 16, 1949, the normal gas allocation had been restored.

The Soviet Military Authorities, on March 26, 1949, ordered a split in the administration of GASAG east and west. This did not affect the physical operation of the gas plants, how-

ever, since gas mains leading to the east sector had to be disconnected because of limited capacity and shortage of coal stocks.

### WATER SUPPLY

Before 1945, Greater Berlin was supplied with water by two companies, the Berlin Municipal Water-Works and the Charlottenburger Water and Industrial Works Inc. In September, 1945, the two firms incorporated as "Berlin Water-Works", with the controlling shares held by the City of Berlin.

At present, the Berlin Water-Works has under its control 16 water plants with a daily capacity of 1,200,000 cubic meters of water. In addition there are five booster stations with a daily total capacity of 500,000 cubic meters, seven water towers with a storage capacity of 12,000 cubic meters cast iron pipe distribution system, 6,400 kilometers in length and varying in diameter from eight to 150 centimeters, and 69 reservoirs with a total storage capacity of 475,000 cubic meters.

The annual total water output of all plants in 1939 amounted to 175,000,000 cubic meters. In 1945 it had decreased to 147,000,000 cubic meters. After the completion of a two-year repair and reconstruction program, water production has been increased to the present figure of approximately 234,000,000 cubic meters.

Approximately 90  $^{6}/_{0}$  of Berlin's water supply is obtained from 1,800 wells, which vary in depth from 100 to 160 feet. All water is filtered, aerated, and stored in 69 reservoirs, where chlorine is added before it is pumped into the distribution system.

During hostilities, one of the city's 16 water plants was totally destroyed, eight were partially destroyed, six slightly damaged and one undamaged. Of the 69 reservoirs, seven were damaged. Five booster stations were damaged and six of the seven water towers were partially destroyed.

By the end of 1945, repairs were completed sufficiently to restore water service to most of the city. Now, after more than four years of intensive reconstruction, the Berlin Water Works has repaired  $96^{\circ}/_{\circ}$  of all known breaks in the distribution system,  $88^{\circ}/_{\circ}$  of its plant destruction, more than  $60^{\circ}/_{\circ}$  of the booster station damage, and  $90^{\circ}/_{\circ}$  of the demolished water towers. Of 140 bridge lines destroyed, more than 60 have been permanently reconstructed.


With the exception of the split in the administration, March 26, 1949, the water works operated normally during the period of the blockade.

### SEWERAGE SERVICE

Before the war, the sewerage system in Greater Berlin consisted of a network of pipes constructed of stoneware, clay, cast iron, and wrought iron, with

### July, 1945 - June, 1949 com x 10 month \_\_\_\_\_23\_\_\_ -22 -21 20. 19 18 17 16 15 14 . 13 12 11 10 8 7 JASONDJFMAMJJAJONDJFNAMJJASONDJFNAMJJASO -1945 1946 1947

WATER SERVICE OF BERLIN



channels built of cement and bricks. This system consisted of approximately 3,750 miles of gravity lines, 437 miles of pressure lines, 87 pumping stations, and two clarification plants.

At the end of the war, the gravity and pressure pipe network had 4,354 known major breaks. Of the 87 pumping stations, five were totally destroyed, 10 partially destroyed and 33 slightly damaged. The remainder of the pumping stations were inoperative because of the numerous breaks in the drainage and collecting system.

Approximately 400,000 cbm of sewage flowed daily into the lakes, rivers, and canals, creating a serious health problem. The clarification plants sustained major bomb damages during the war and the irrigation fields were honeycombed with craters. Two gas collectors and a sludge bed were destroyed, resulting in the loss of the use of the digestor tanks. The digestor tank and gas collection reservoir located at the city's other installation were also destroyed.

Due to current interruptions during the blockade, many of the pumping stations became inoperative. The sewerage was discharged by gravity flow into the canals and lakes of the western sectors. The Sewage Department was not effected by the blockade, however, except for the splitting of the administration, in December, 1948.

### STREET CLEANING AND GARBAGE REMOVAL

In Berlin, street cleaning and garbage removal

are combined under one city department. The Street Cleaning Section is responsible for the cleanliness of 50,000,000 square meters of public streets in the city, of which 17,000,000 square meters are in the U.S. Sector.

Before the war the department had 745 trucks, sweepers, sprinklers, and other special street cleaning equipment in operation. During the war and after the capitulation of Berlin, 740 of these vehicles were destroyed, damaged, or removed. Moreover, most of the maintenance and repair shops were either totally or partially destroyed during the war. A combination of these two losses resulted in a complete collapse in the entire cleaning and disposal system.

### **Clean-Up Campaigns**

Since July, 1945, this department has made a remarkable recovery by restoring to full time operation more than 300 pieces of damaged street cleaning equipment. This is augmented by additional horsedrawn vehicles and a substantial number of manually-drawn carts. During the spring of 1947, and again in 1948, the Street Cleaning Department, implementing a U.S.


Military Government order, conducted a special clean-up campaign to remove accumulated refuse from the U. S. Sector. Because of war damages which had not yet been repaired, thousands of apartments, houses, and other buildings had no toilet or kitchen-waste disposal connections to the city sewerage system. Toilet and kitchen refuse was dumped into garbage cans or strewn in the back yards. The purpose of the campaign was to eliminate these breeding places of disease-carrying insects and rodents.


During the clean-up drive in 1947, 187,000 tons of refuse were removed from the U.S. Sector by more than 4,800 laborers and 335 trucks, including 60 U.S. Army trucks.

In the 1948 clean-up campaign the Street Cleaning Department removed a total of 30,000 tons. Approximately 1,400 laborers and 175 vehicles, including 25 U.S. Army trucks, were employed to complete this drive.

At the end of the war, the entire system of collecting and removing garbage in the City of Berlin was completely disorganized. Four hundred and forty-four pieces of motorized, horse-drawn, and hand-operated equipment were either destroyed or damaged. Rail transportation facilities for removing garbage were destroyed. Barges that normally carried garbage through the city waterways to outlying dumps could not operate because the

# GARBAGE REMOVAL IN U.S. SECTOR





canals were not navigable. Rail loading platforms and barge loading docks for garbage removal were destroyed.

Since July, 1945, almost half of the total amount of equipment damaged during the war has been repaired and pressed into service. With the restoration of rail transportation facilities, opening of the waterways, and the procurement of new garbage removal equipment during 1945-1947, the Garbage Removal Department made satisfactory progress towards reaching its pre-war capacity. In 1945, the worst year in the history of the Garbage Removal Department, only 125,000 tons of garbage were removed, while in 1947 1,500,000 tons were removed. Seventy-eight percent of the pre-war capacity was reached in 1948.



Bridge repairs in Berlin were essential before normal transportation could be resumed. Five out of every six bridges in the U.S. Sector had been destroyed.

The blockade of Berlin presented difficulties to the garbage department due to lack of rail and barge facilities for garbage disposal. Garbage incinerators were established in large bomb craters and this proved to be a very effective method of garbage disposal. As in other departments of public utility functions, the Soviets also split the administration of the garbage removal department on December 1, 1948.

### STREETS AND BRIDGES

The reconstruction and repair of public streets in Berlin began in July, 1945. The first step was carried out by the civil population in clearing rubble from main thoroughfares and sidewalks. The second step was the repair of road surfaces, which was accomplished with a limited number of skilled road laborers.

Main traffic lines and connecting streets were the first to be repaired. The work was undertaken by 160 private contractors, with 20 of these firms repairing asphalt roads and the remaining


140 working on stoneblock or cobblestone streets.

Public streets in the U.S. Sector of Berlin total 1,070 kilometers, with an overall surface area of 7,500,000 square meters. Since July, 1945, 5,500,000 square meters of street surface and 2,500,000 square meters of sidewalk have been repaired in the U.S. Sector.

Of the 225 street bridges in Greater Berlin, 165 were demolished or badly damaged during the war. Within the U. S. Sector, 51 of 65 bridges were either destroyed or damaged. Ten of these U. S. Sector bridges have been reconstructed by the City Bridge Department. Five were repaired by the U. S. Army Engineers during the early days of the occupation. Remnants of 11 bridges were entirely removed from the canals to open the waterways. Eight bridges are presently under reconstruction or repair, with plans completed to rebuild the remaining seventeen.



Electric, gas, and water meters were closely watched in blockaded Berlin and ration offenders severely punished.



M ilitary Government has sought for the past four years to awaken among German workmen a sense of initiative, cooperation, and understanding of the meaning of freedom. That real progress has been achieved is evident from the revival of responsible trade unionism and from the courage and self-confidence of the workers of Western Berlin.

At the beginning, we found the Germans thoroughly cowed, apathetic, and fearful of displaying any initiative. Today, these same people have openly and repeatedly resisted the physical threat of communist domination. We have found labor union leaders emerge from the mass, assert themselves, gain wisdom, and organize an effective grouping, the UGO, which has successfully resisted Soviet pressure and blandishments of all kinds.

We have seen, during the blockade period, German labor office personnel working daily in cold, unheated offices, in order to pay out vitally-needed unemployment compensation to their fellowcitizens.

This heartening progress has not been without problems, hurdles, and sometimes heartbreaks. And it has been made against a tumultous background of continuing conflict between East-West ideologies, a conflict in which the Berlin workman has played a front-line role.

### The Magistrat Labor Department

The three Western Allies fell heir to an administrative frame-work which had been established by the Soviets in May and June, 1945. It followed closely the form of the pre-war German city governmental system.

Each of Berlin's twenty boroughs (*Bezirke*) has a district labor office responsible for the registration and administration of its local population. Above these offices is the main Labor Department of the Magistrat. Its major responsibilities are five-fold:

Labor allocation Wage tariffs and labor standards Labor protection Vocational training and re-training Social insurance

The Allied Kommandatura authorized the continued use of pre-1945 wage tariffs, and has since permitted relaxations of the salary ceilings when. necessary. In this field, Military Government advisers have always maintained a specialized relationship with the Labor Department of the Magistrat.

All apprentices and vocational training facilities were placed under the Magistrat's supervision in 1945. During the blockade, emergency regulations were issued, setting up twelve special workshops because—with the considerable decrease in industrial activity—there were no longer facilities enough for apprenticeships.

Compulsory insurance for all workers, employees, and independent tradesmen (who do not employ more than five persons) was established by Kommandatura order at the beginning of the Occupation. This insurance is financed by a  $10^{0/6}$  tax on employers against their gross wage bill and an equal rate of tax on employees against their gross wage.


At the present time, approximately 900,000 Berliners from the three western sectors are active paying members of the scheme.

The split of the VAB (Social Insurance Institute) in February, 1949, upset its financial position. A large percentage of its assets were retained in the Soviet Sector, and it was necessary for the Magistrat to issue credits to it.

Today, the VAB has no reserves and exists on a hand-to-mouth basis. Its total monthly income is about 35 million Westmarks; its monthly expenditures in benefits are 33 million Westmarks, and administration expenses require the remaining two million.

Some 12,000 German civilians are at present employed by the U.S. Occupation Forces and Mili-

NUMBER OF PERSONS RECEIVING PUBLIC SUPPORT IN BERLIN 3 WESTERN SECTORS



tary Government in Berlin. This is a sharp reduction from the figure of 45,000 in 1947.

The service of this labor force is charged against Occupation costs, and its administration is the responsibility of the military organization.

Manpower Branch is in continuous contact with the problems of labor allocation, wage tariff, and employment practices as they arise, and is thus able to guide the U.S. German Personnel Office in aligning its policies with those prevailing among the mass of workers.

### **Employment Drops During Blockade**

Until the currency reform and the Soviet blockade, employment in Greater Berlin had always been very high.

Allied Control Authority Order 3 required the compulsory registration of all males between the ages of 14 and 65 and of all females between 15 and 50. Thereafter, if a worker refused to accept a job assigned him by the district labor office, his food ration card was withdrawn.

On the other hand, the inflated *Reichsmark*, the widespread black market and the generally low morale following the collapse of Germany had an adverse effect on working standards. (The black market sale of a single package of cigarettes, for example, would finance three months' supply of rationed food, rent, telephone, and transportation costs.)

There was, therefore, little incentive for the average person to work diligently and faithfully. Employers were compelled in many cases to have over-sized staffs to accomplish the same work that a smaller group could have done before the war.

At the beginning of the blockade, the total labor force in the three western sectors was 940,000. At the present time it is 1,091,000.

Employment fell rapidly during the blockade because of the much reduced supplies of fuel, power,

and raw materials. At the same time the number of persons seeking work increased, because the currency reform had wiped out *Reichsmark* holdings and greatly decreased black marketeering.

Elaborate demolition and rehabilitation projects were drawn up by the Magistrat to absorb the everincreasing number of laid-off workers. Eventually over 40,000 people were employed in the various public schemes.

At the beginning of the blockade, 35,000 people were registered as "unemployed and seeking work". By the end of the blockade, this figure had increased to more than 150,000.

Three months later, 178,000 persons are now registered as seeking work, and 913,000 are actually employed.


Western Berlin is also heavily

burdened with an unproductive population, including many thousands of welfare, social insurance, and unemployment compensation recipients. Before



WPA-like projects, sponsored by the Magistrat, helped absorb blockade unemployment in Western Berlin and clear some of the mountainous debris from the city's ruins.

and during the war an important segment of the city's population was employed in federal government jobs. Unless Berlin is restored as a federal capital or there is a great commercial-industrial boom in the city, it is to be expected that the present level of unemployment will be continuous.



Note: The T.L.F. increased from approx. 940,000 in July, 1948 to approx. 1,091,000 in June, 1949; unemployed from approx. 40,000 in July, 1948 to approx. 178,000 in June, 1949. Total available labor force = 100 %.

### **Trade Union Development**

Military Government has from the beginning encouraged the re-development of democratic trade unionism in Germany.

From June, 1945, until May, 1948, the Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB) was the union federation of Berlin. This was a highly centralized organization controlled by officials appointed by

or elected through the influence of the communist faction or the Soviet Military Administration.

In such a federation the unions existed as departments and not as autonomousunits.Finances were centralized through the collection of individual dues by the central treasury, with the resulting financial subjugation of individual union activities to the will of the central federation.

The control from the central federation was effected through district offices manned by paid FDGB officials, who were directed primarily not by individual unions but by a 45-member managing committee of the FDGB, consisting of 40 communists and five independents.

The character of the *FDGB* has been shaped by the policies of German communists working under the direction of the Russians. Chief emphasis has shifted from matters primarily the concern of trade unions to political activities. This political stress was reflected in the almost exclusive use of political propaganda in so-called trade union schools, the straight communist line of the official newspaper of the *FDGB*, the suppression of differing points of view in trade union councils, the political manipulation to exclude other than communists from key positions of the leadership, interference and competition with the functions of the Magistrat and political use of those functions such as food and clothing allocation.


There developed within the *FDGB*, however, an increasingly strong group opposed to the communist concept of unionism and in favor of the development of a non-partisan federation of autonomous unions based on the maintenance of individual rights, freedom, and responsibilities and upon the free expression of differing points of view.

The spearhead of the opposition appeared in two unions which soon achieved a majority opposition vote, namely, the Commercial Employees' and the Technicians' Unions. Majority opposition also appeared in the Teachers' and Agricultural Unions.


In the fall of 1947, opposition members were estimated at approximately 120,000 to 150,000 out of a total of 600,000.

In November, 1947, union leaders consolidated the various opposition groups into a single force, on a non-partisan basis, which was quickly made representative of all opposition forces in all existing unions.

In the elections of the communist-dominated FDGB in the spring of 1948 the opposition polled a majority which was stolen by the communist election committee. At this point the opposition declared itself to be the provisional management of the FDGB of Greater Berlin and established its own headquarters and its own operating mechanism.



On June 9, 1948, the U.S. Commandant recognized the provisional management of the FDGB as the authoritative governmental body of the trade union federation in Berlin. At the same time, recognition of the U.S. Military Government was withdrawn from the executive committee of the FDGB, whose headquarters are in the Soviet Sector, as the properly elected representatives of the trade unions.



UGO trade union members in West Berlin have learned the meaning and the importance of the secret ballot.

This action on the part of the U.S. Commandant was based on the result of the 1948 spring elections when the provisional management of the *FDGB* received a clear victory of  $75-80^{\circ/\circ}$  in the 12 western boroughs. They won a minimum of  $45^{\circ/\circ}$  in the Metal Union and a majority in the Public Services', Commercial Employees', Railroad, Post, Technical Employees', Teachers' and Agricultural Unions.

The estimate of the popular vote for all of Berlin was that the opposition achieved approximately a 60% majority. Within the next month, recognition came to this democratic trade union federation from the two great federations in America, the CIO and AF of L (including the Brotherhoods of Railway Workers), and from the Trade Union Congress of Great Britain.

In July, the three Western Commandants authorized the Oberbürgermeister to recognize the new trade union federation, which had by then become known under its new name (Independent Trade Union Organization—UGO), as the competent agency to conclude wage agreements under German labor law in the western sectors.

The Independent Trade Union Organization embarked at once on a broad program of trade union activity, developing collective bargaining, education, training of apprentices, and relations with the Magistrat in an advisory capacity.

Although faced with incredible financial difficulties due to the currency reform and the impact of blockade unemployment, it forged ahead on all fronts including the development of active international relations in the labor field.


Fifteen of its members have gone to America since the summer of 1948, either as members of special visiting groups or as official German delegates to trade union conventions. A Berlin member of UGO, who was an official delegate of Germany at the Geneva Conference in June, 1949, called for the formation of the international democratic trade union federation. Nearly every individual union within UGO has been invited to join its corresponding international federation.

In terms of democratic organization, UGO has in its short life developed individual union autonomy to a high degree. Although young leadership is lacking, the existing leaders, most of whom are of the pre-1933 era, bring to their work a thorough knowledge of trade unionism and a growing grasp of democratic principles.

In combatting the effects of the Soviet blockade, the Independent Trade Union Organization has taken its place in the front ranks of Berliners. It has been a stabilizing influence in maintaining the workers' morale; it has assumed obligations in order to maintain the trade union unemployment benefit payments. The leaders of UGO have taken the initiative in developing personal relations with the leaders of industry.

In spite of the depression which inevitably descended upon the population when factories closed and lights went out in the summer of 1948, *UGO* rallied to the standard of trade unionism hundreds of young people, who spent many hours of their time in groups for discussion and study in the new trade union center, *Leuschner-Haus*.

The new democratic trade union federation fruitfully maintained its non-partisan position. This attitude contributed toward a most successful relationship of individual trade unionists with the political parties of their choice.



It was on the initiative of trade union leaders that the demonstration of 300,000 Berliners took place before the *Reichstag* on September 9, 1948. The Soviet blockade reduced industrial activity

by 60 to 75 percent, forced curtailed use of electric

power, gas, and coal, and brought in its train the many hardships that inevitably accompany the strangling of an economy. On the other hand, it brought to the foreground the strength and courage of people who have convictions which they will fight for.

It evoked a new kind of cooperation between the trade unions and the city government, on one hand, and the employer, on the other. It called forth increased initiative in meeting the problems of readjustments. It called forth also new willingness and desire on the part of the states of Western Germany to aid their fellow workers in Berlin.

Not all of the credit for accomplishments in Berlin is due to the workers. But it is true that the action of the democratic trade union leaders of Berlin in 1947, in breaking away from communist leadership, was a leading factor contributing to the confidence with which the workers and the people of the city now face an uncertain future.

### Railroad Strike of 1949

Among the workers hardest hit by the first currency reform in June, 1948, were the railroadmen who live in Western Berlin. They represented the largest single body of people who did not receive any Westmarks in wage payments. (The general practice in Western Berlin from June, 1948,

to March, 1949, was to pay 25% of wages in Westmarks, vitally supplementing the buying power of the worker's income.)

In March, 1949, when the Westmark was made sole legal tender in Western Berlin, the railroad workers could no longer contain their discontent. They were actually suffering because their employer, the Soviet-controlled Reichsbahndirektion, refused to abide by the law of the territory in which it was operating.

From the rise of the opposition trade union federation, the Reichsbahndirektion had discriminated against UGO adherents by discharging lifelong railroad workers without cause. By April 1, 1949, the number of people so discharged had reached approximately 1,200 to 1,500. This was a second cause for the strike.

A third cause was simply the worker's strong desire for the freedom which he understood democracy to offer. He asked only that he have the right to join any legitimate organization without fear of persecution, discrimination, or reprisal.

Accordingly, on May 6, 1949, the railroad union voted to strike. They postponed action to give the Magistrat time to try to persuade the Reichsbahndirektion to negotiate with the workers or with the

Magistrat as a mediator. With the failure of these efforts, the possibility of a peaceful solution was gone.

The union, with the support of the federation, stopped work at 12.01 a.m., May 21, 1949. Its demands, immediately made public, were:

- a. Payment of wages in Westmarks in accordance with the law.
- b. Justice for persecuted employees.
- c. The right of "free coalition", which means freedom of speech and assembly.

Approximately 11,000 people joined the work stoppage, led by the 3,000 members of the UGO railroad union. During the next few days the number of strikers increased to about 15,000, and within a relatively short time the membership of the union increased to 8,000.

Immediate response by telegrams and shipments of supplies came from the major western trade union federations: the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the British Trade Union Congress, and the International Transport Workers Federation.

Recognizing the delicate international situation, the Berlin union and the federation declared at the outset that they would retain emergency crews to

operate all traffic growing out of the Paris Agreement ending the blockade.

When, through perhaps a certain lack of foresight and planning, incoming trains began to jam the yards, the union renewed its offer in writing to increase emergency crews and place them under Reichsbahndirektion orders. All such offers were categorically refused by the Reichsbahndirektion.

properties Railroad were patrolled by Soviet-controlled railroad

Rail-yard battle: rifles and tommyguns were the police. On May 21, the Russians brought into all stations in the western sectors large reinforcements of Soviet railroad police, supplemented by thousands of Volkspolizei from the Soviet Zone, FDGB (communist trade unionists) FDJ (communist youth organization members), and civilians in and out of uniform, many of whom

were armed with carbines, pistols or tommy-guns. The intended strike-breakers were brought in on special trains and they debarked in squads. The peaceful picketing of UGO was immediately

disrupted by mob violence accompanied by the use of firearms.

The Western Commandants thereupon ordered the Soviet police out of the stations and assigned responsibility for maintaining law and order to the



weapons of communism-"the upholder of workers' rights"—against a legitimate railroad strike in Berlin.

and

west sector police, after which no single act of violence was recorded during the entire strike.

The Soviet strike-breaking procedure pointed up to the public of Berlin and to the world the Soviet methods of dealing with working people. It stiffened the determination of the members of the railroad union to achieve their objectives.

Once again the Magistrat (May, 27-May, 30) urged the *Reichsbalindirektion* to negotiate with the workers, or with an acceptable mediator as being the simple, direct, and right way to settle the strike.

An offer by the Oberbürgermeister to conduct a meeting of the conflicting parties on June 1st was refused, but the *Reichsbahndirektion* informed the Mayor that it would announce a settlement negotiated between themselves and the communist labor federation (*FDGB*).

On May 31st, Soviet front pages blazoned the terms of the so-called settlement of the strike between the *Reichsbahndirektion* and the *FDGB*. These terms were: (a) The railroaders would return to work at six a.m. on June 1st; (b) the railroad would collect Westmarks for west sector services; (c) it would pay 60% of the wages of west sector resident workers in Westmarks; (d) it would permit no reprisals against striking workers.

This was the occasion for the first strike referendum which was held on June 2nd, and recorded a 95% opposition to accepting a proposal which

was in no sense an agreement between the striking workers and their employers.

The three Western Commandants, recognizing that Military Government not only had an interest in this strike, but also shared responsibility, initiated a meeting with the Soviet Commandant on June 3rd, prepared to propose a number of possible solutions.



Striking UGO railroadmen run for cover when the Soviet-directed Reichshahn police open fire in Berlin.

The Soviet Commandant refused to admit that a strike existed, because he did not recognize the UGO, and refused to listen to as many as six reasonable solutions proposed by the Western Commandants.

A mediation proposal by the U.S. Sector Commandant was the next step. This proposal, agreed to by the other Western Commandants, was simply that General Howley—acting as a mediator—would obtain personal confirmation of the terms of the *Reichsbahndirektion-FDGB* agreement from General Kvashnin (Soviet transport chief), deposit these terms with the Western Magistrat, and announce the terms publicly to UGO.

This he did in a letter of June 10th, addressed to UGO announcing the conversation with Kvashnin

and the confirmation by the Soviet General and urging UGO to accept this method of settlement.

The labor leaders were prepared to accept this method, although there was much misgiving concerning Soviet sincerity. So great was this misgiving that, instead of ordering the railroaders to return to work, the union leaders submitted the question in the second referendum to be voted on June 14th. The leaders confidently expected the majority to favor the Howley mediation plan.

A typical Soviet surprise move was carried out during the night of June 13th. Waiting until it was impossible for other papers than their own to get the news, the Russians issued a release which appeared in the Soviet-licensed *Tägliche Rundschau* on the morning of June 14th, denying that there was any validity in the Kvashnin assurances to General Howley.

A resurgence of fear among the people produced, on June 14th not an overwhelming vote to return to work, but rather an overwhelming vote not to return to work.

The Western Commandants then asked Maj. Gen. Kvashnin to re-confirm his conversation with General Howley in writing. To everyone's surprise he did this on June 20th. His letter lacked clarity and directness, but on the basis of it the Western Commandants asked the UGO leaders to accept the compromise terms as a basis for settlement.

On June 22nd, the UGO railroad union leadership voted not to accept the Kvashnin letter as an adequate guarantee of their safety.

The Deputy Military Governors then conferred with the Berlin Commandants, and a plan was evolved on June 25th to break the impasse.

The union thereupon called on all West Berlin railroaders to resume their duties on June 28th at eight a.m.

The terms of the settlement were:

 a. Renewed expression of the Western Commandants' continued support of UGO.
 b. Acceptance at their face

value of General Kvashnin's written assurances.

- c. Acceptance at its face value of the *Reichsbahn*direktion promise to pay at least  $60^{0/0}$  of the wages of West Berlin railroaders in Westmarks, accompanied by an authorization of the Western Commandants to the Magistrat to exchange for railroad workers residing in the western sectors the difference between what the *Reichsbahndirek*tion might pay and  $100^{0/0}$  of the wages in Westmarks for a period of three months.
- d. Workers who through fear of reprisals did not wish to return to work might indicate that in writing and would be given every possible aid in finding other employment.

The railroaders returned to work and were ready to operate the trains on June 28th.

### Subject: Economics (Food) Pages from a liaison To : Director Füllsack Called on the Carpet July 23, 1948 officer's reports to Füllsack was today ordered to bort to Colonel Yelizaroff, who Headquarters. report to Colonel Yelizaroff, who accused him of sabolaging Soviet food supplies for the city. Director Subject: food supplies for the city. 2. Füllsack is not too worried. He feels that the population and the Western Powers have confidence in him, and that Col. Y really was only going on record, and looking for a scape-goat for the eventual failure of the widely publicized plan of the Soviets to feed the whole city. Subject: Civil Administration SED Meetings in West Sector EDA Oclober 26, 1948 1948 the CDU ctober. This sims that the during This Subject. Civil Administration lains that the SED western Sectors. SPDas Period SED is suppr En. December 1. City LIAISON ACTIVITIE

### **Political Liaison**

M ost branches of Military Government, as of any government, have a technical function. Liaison has almost none, and political liaison has the least. It has no clear-cut objectives, because it deals with intangibles, like ideas or known and unknown human factors.

Military Government in Berlin felt strongly from the first day how much it needed political liaison. The quadripartite character of the city made it desirable not only to strive for certain objectives but also to achieve them with the least friction.

Sometimes it was wiser to postpone an objective than to succeed at a too great expense of good will; for quadripartite government meant always quadripartite competition, sometimes between the Allies and sometimes between them and the Germans.

Nowhere in the U.S. Occupation area is political life more fluid than in Berlin, with its peculiar lines of connections and disconnections between enemies, allies, aggressors, and victims.

### Local Problems of World Concern

In this city, international politics often appear first as local politics and are then inflated to international politics, problems for the great capitals of the world.

One fact especially is of great import: it is today not yet determined whether Berlin is only the shadow or still has the substance of a national capital. Political liaison has not only continuous, close contact with the whole alphabet of German politicians from Adenauer to Ulbricht, but exists also to guide, advise, and influence by warning, prompting, and creating good will. Its customers are also the members of Military Government's own staff.

### **Politics and Protocol**

Some of the specialists had to learn' by experience that technical problems are not technical problems in Berlin. Questions like the exchange of meat for fish or the prevention of a non-authorized meeting are frequently decided upon suggestion by Political Liaison for extraneous reasons.

As a result, public welfare and public utility experts are today almost politicians themselves after years of Berlin experience.

Political liaison in Berlin had to establish many precedents proving that a final line between policymaking level and operational agency does not exist.

In the early days of non-fraternization it already had very friendly contact with the political world of the city, with the result that nobody today doubts the genuinely democratic character of the West Berlin population.

Political liaison in Berlin shows as the net result of its work that, over a hundred miles east of the western zones, the Brandenburg Gate—once the symbol of militant Prussianism—is today the European counterpart of the Statue of Liberty in the harbor of New York City.

### Liaison with the Magistrat

The activities of the liaison office with the Magistrat have developed from those of a purely control agency to a genuine linking up of Military Government and the local German authorities, smoothing the relations and communicating to each side the point of view of the other.

During the first phase of liaison work with the Magistrat, it became increasingly evident that the Soviet liaison officer and his superiors considered the communist members of the city government as friends, and the noncommunist memberstogether with the liaison officers of the three Western Allies—as enemies

Unilateral commands, transmitted from the Russian officer, were uniformly designed to undermine the noncommunist members of the Magistrat and to



A town-hall bulletin board in one of the six U.S. Sector boroughs—where a complex multiplicity of neighborhood business has been transacted since the war: bartering, lostand-found, work wanted, search for war-estranged relatives...

embarrass the elected government as a whole. This attitude crystallized eventually with the split

in the city, the blockade, and the complete breakdown of Russian-U.S. parallel liaison work. There was, in fact, no longer even physical contact, for the Russians remained in the Soviet Sector, controlling their illegal parliament and Magistrat, and we remained in the west.

### Liaison in the Boroughs

At the beginning of the American Occupation in Berlin, detachments were stationed in each of the seven boroughs (later condensed to six) of the



A borough city hall, the focal point of local politics, where people gossip over the latest rumors and queue up for their new food and clothes ration cards. Right: A Berlin Sector liaison officer, Military Government's link between the policy and the people, hears a local problem.

U.S. Sector. In the two months of their exclusive occupation, however, the Soviets had effectively adapted borough administration similar to that to their own political structure in the USSR.

Many communists had been appointed borough mayors and the majority of leading public employees were communists or sympathizers. Initially,

> the U.S. detachments retained the Sovietappointed officials in office. But gradually many of them were weeded out through denazification procedures.


> Eventually, the system of house and street stewards was abolished, and this was an important blow against the communist influence in the U.S. Sector.

> During early 1946, the U.S. detachments were abolished, and liaison officers appointed, in line with the policy of gradually devolving more authority to the Germans.


Since that time, there has been a steady increase of faith in the west, and it has been proportionately possible to alter the relationship of Military Government liaison officers to the German authorities. Since the statement of principles (see page 21) was promulgated in May, 1949, the liaison offices have acted as the eyes and ears of Military Government, rather than as controlling or directing agencies.

The continuing task is clearly to make German motives understandable to Military Government, and American motives to the Germans. Only through the maintenance of mutual trust and understanding will it be possible to keep in Berlin a strong bulwark against Soviet totalitarianism.






These are the West Berliners—here attending a mass anti-communist demonstration—who have been brought to increasing political consciousness and civicresponsibility by the guidance and leadership of Military Government. They are ready now for the next step towards partnership in the world community.



Part of the OMG-BS Staff which Served During the Soviet Blockade



Colonel William T. Babcock Deputy Director and Deputy Commandant



Mr. A. W. Moran Deputy for Air Lift



# The Men and Women Attached To U.S. Military Government BERLIN SECTOR

July 1, 1945—Sept. 1, 1949

Addy, Major James H. — Economics Adelman, Miss Rachel — Admin. Ahlschier, Mr. Joseph B. - Admin. Alex, Captain Millard A. - Executive Alexeeff, Mr. Alexander G. - Pub. Safety Allard, Dr. Lucile E. - Education Allison, Mr. Joe F. - Executive Ammann, Mr. Eugene O. — Pub. Safety Anderson, Mr. George T. - Pub. Safety Angers, Captain Henry A. - Executive Arner, Miss Norma W. - Pub. Health Arnold, Captain Lewis F. - Infor. Services Arnoldy, Major Francis N. - Admin. Arnow, 2nd Lt. Robert O. - Pub. Safety Aronovitz, Captain Sidney M. - Admin. Artzrouni, Mr. P. Leon — Admin. Ashworth, Mr. Ray - Pub. Safety

Babcock, Col. William T. - Deputy Director Bachman, Mr. Lawrence P. - Infor. Services Baker, Mr. Porter - Prop. Control Baker, Mr. Sigmund — JEIA Ballard, Mr. Charles R. — Communications Barbour, Mr. Philip L. — Civ. Admin. Barkan, Lt. Mark - Education Barnhart, Captain William S. - Liaison Barringer, 2nd Lt. Fred A. - Admin. Barten, Lt. Col. George A. — Kommandatura Bassett, Pvt. Walter E. - Economics Bauce, Mr. Adileno E. - Pub. Safety Bean, Major Stephen S. - Legal Beckner, Dr. Meta S. - Education Behm, Captain Howard J. - Admin. Bell, Pfc. Murray - Intelligence Benedetto, Mr. Nicholas - Legal Benedik, Mr. Frank P. — Kommandatura Bennett, Mr. Lowell - Pub. Relations Benning, Dr. Charles H. - Pub. Health Connors, Mr. T. - Communications Biel, Dr. Ulrich E. - Liaison Billings, Miss Mary A. - Education Birnkrant, Mr. Arthur A. - Legal Bitter, Mr. John - Infor. Services Blakemoore, Pvt. George E. - Admin.

Bleistein, Mr. Fred B. - Infor. Services Boecker, Mr. Virgil R. - Admin. Bond, Mr. Charles C. - Pub. Safety Bond, Lt. Col. Eugene H. - Legal Booze, Mr. Virgil L. - Admin. Bosley, Mr. Jackson W. - Pub. Relations Brackett, Mrs. Elsie W. — Kommandatura Bracksmayer, Mr. Joseph - Legal Brand, Mr. Edward C. — Intelligence Brantley, Captain Francis E. — Admin. Bright, Lt. James L. - Pub. Safety Broome, Dr. Edwin C. - Education Brossard, Mr. George W. - Legal Brown, Lt. Charles G. - Admin. Brown, Mr. Clark F. — Manpower Brown, Mr. Ralph A. — Infor. Services Brown, Mr. Samuel A. — Education Buchanan, Captain Robert J. — Liaison Buckland, Lt. Col. Charles O. - Executive Buglion, Mr. Godfrey — Legal Bullard, Colonel Peter C. — Kommandatura Burgess Jr., Lt. Col. John S. - Economics Burke, Lt. Frederick R. - Economics Burke, Mr. James W. - Pub. Relations Burnham, Major Lee H. — Liaison Butterwick, Mr. John T. — Civ. Admin. Buttles, Mr. Brune — Infor. Services Butze, Mr. Paul L. — Economics Byran, Lt. George W. - Legal Byrne, Captain Norman T. - Infor. Services Callender, Mr. John R. — Kommandatura Campanella, Major Samuel S. - Pub. Works Canales, Miss Laudelina P. - Executive Carlson, Mr. Harald G. - Intelligence Celis, Mrs. Martine S. — JEIA Cerio, Major James M. — Liaison Chamberlain, Colonel Robert W. - Pub. Safety Charles, Miss Eulalia M. — Intelligence Chaskel, Miss Ruth - Pub. Welfare Chipchin, Mr. Nelson — Kommandatura Chrisinger, Miss V. Irene - Pub. Safety Clark, Captain Laura A. - Pub. Health Clausen, Mr. Fred L. - Legal

Claybaugh, Mr. Eugene M. — JEIA Cline, Mr. Hubert F. — Admin. Cobb, CWO Jack R. — Executive Coe, Mr. Francis M. — JEIA Coleman, Mrs. Marion S. — Infor. Services Colton, Mr. Ernest J. — Infor. Services Conlin, Captain John P. — Pub. Safety Conner, Lt. Col. Ray M. — Pub. Health Connors, Mr. T. — Communication Cottam, Captain Henry E. — Liaison Cozart, Mr. David L. — Education Cranmer, Miss Betty J. — Admin. Cunneen, Major Odell R. — Economics Curran, Mr. Owen S. — Economics

Dahlin, Mr. William F. — Economics Dame, Captain Hartley F. - Pub. Safety Daoust, Miss Florence C. - Civ. Admin. Darling, Mr. Joseph W. - Economics Davidoff, Lt. Milton - Liaison Davis, Miss Lyndal M. – Pub. Relations Davis, Mr. William O. - Pub. Relations Davis, Captain William R. — Pub. Safety Davisson, Major John E. — Pub. Safety Demaret, Captain Allen N. - Economics Denamur, Mr. Louis — JEIA Derthick, Mr. Lawrence G. - Education Diebold, Mr. Peter B. - Economics Dietz, Mr. Waldemar E. — Infor. Services Diggs, Mr. John C. - Pub.Works Dilger, Mr. Frederick A. - Civ. Admin. Dismukes, Miss M. Adeline - Pub. Safety Dix, Mr. Charles A. - Economics Dobbs, 1st Lt. Joseph W. - Economics Dodge, Mr. George G. - Economics Doering, 2nd Lt. William F. — Economics Downs, Mr. Kenneth T. - Infor. Services Draper, Lt. Arthur F. — Communications Duke, Major Cecil A. - Economics Durst, Mr. Leon H. - Pub. Relations

Eisenberg, Mrs. Lorraine M. — Pub. Health Eliot, Lt. Mather G. — Infor. Services Entin, Mr. Gary — Pub. Safety Erdreich, Mr. Emil — Economics van Eyck, Mr. Peter — Infor. Services Eyre, Major Frank R. — Liaison

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