

Counterinsurgent Bodies: Social Welfare and Psychological Warfare in French Algeria, 1956-1961

By
Terrence G. Peterson

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This dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:

Laird Boswell, Professor of History
Suzanne Desan, Professor of History
John Hall, Professor of History
Richard Keller, Professor of History of Science and Medicine
Mary Louise Roberts, Professor of History

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Table of Contents

<i>Introduction</i>	1
<i>Chapter 1</i> Integrate: Colonial Reform, Social Regeneration, and the Fourth Republic	17
<i>Chapter 2</i> Pacify: the Army, the Population, and France's 'Hot' Cold War	71
<i>Chapter 3</i> Organize: 'Psychological Action' and the Framing of a New Algerian Society	119
<i>Chapter 4</i> Evolve: Social Welfare and the 'Modernization' of Muslim Women	181
<i>Chapter 5</i> Train: Youth, Sports, and National Regeneration	243
<i>Conclusion</i>	283
<i>Bibliography</i>	291

Acronyms and Abbreviations


ALN	Armée de libération nationale
AFAA	Attachée féminine des affaires algériennes
AMG	Assistance Médicale Gratuite
AP	Action psychologique
ASSRA	Assistante sanitaire sociale rurale auxiliaire
BRAP	Bureau régional d'action psychologique
CHEAM	Centre des hautes études d'administration musulman
CHPT	Compagnie des hauts parleurs et des tracts
CIPCG	Centre d'Instruction pacification et contre-guérilla
DGAP	Directorat general des affaires politiques
DGR	Doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire
EMSI	Equipes médico-sociales itinérantes
FLN	Front de libération nationale
FS	Foyer sportif
FSNA	Français de souche nord-africaine
GAD	Groupes d'auto-défense
GGA	Gouvernement general en Algérie
MNA	Mouvement national algérien
MSF	Mouvement de solidarité féminin
OI	Officier itinérant
OPA	Organisation politico-administrative
PFAT	Personnel féminine de l'armée de terre
SAS / SAU	Section d'administration spécialisée / urbaine
SFJA	Service de formation des jeunes en Algérie

Archival Acronyms

AN	Archives nationales de France, Paris and Pierrefitte-sur-Seine
ANOM	Archives nationales d'outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence
BNA	Bibliothèque nationale d'Algérie, Algiers
BNF	Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris
CDHA	Centre de documentation historique sur l'Algérie, Aix-en-Provence
CHSP	Centre d'histoire de Sciences Po, Paris
ECPAD	Etablissement de communication et production audiovisuelle de la défense, Ivry-sur-Seine
IHTP	Institut d'histoire du temps présent, Paris
MAE	Ministère des affaires étrangères, La Courneuve
OURS	Office universitaire de recherche socialiste, Paris
SHD	Service historique de la défense, Vincennes

Figures

- 1.1 A SAS Officer inaugurates public housing. © ECPAD
- 1.2 Robert Lacoste and Maurice Papon. © ECPAD
- 2.1 Maps of the global Communist advance presented at SHAPE
- 2.2 "Algeria in the International Balance book"
- 2.3 Map of Soviet-bloc aid to North Africa, 1959.
- 3.1 A Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in action. © ECPAD
- 3.2 Jean Servier in the Dahra, 1957. © ECPAD
- 3.3 A rallied "political commissar" speaks in Mazouna, 1957. © ECPAD
- 3.4 *Assistance médicale gratuit* in Orléansville, 1957. © ECPAD
- 3.5 A Self-Defense Group in Orléansville, 1957. © ECPAD
- 3.6 A Psychological warfare officer in the Dahra, 1957. © ECPAD
- 3.7 The French military hierarchy in Algeria, December 1957.
- 3.8 Organizational Chart of the Fifth Bureau, July 1958.
- 4.1 An ASSRA demonstrates how to bathe an infant, 1959. © ECPAD
- 4.2 EMSI team members bathe a small boy, 1959. © ECPAD
- 4.3 EMSI team members redress the boy, 1959. © ECPAD
- 4.4 An ASSRA leads a sewing circle in Boulet, 1958. © ECPAD
- 4.5 Organizational Chart for the MSF, 1959.
- 4.6 Madame Salan visits Algerian women in September 1958. © ECPAD
- 4.7 Three Propaganda posters aimed at women.
- 4.8 Algerian women chat in front of army propaganda. © ECPAD
- 5.1 Algerian children train for cross-country © ECPAD
- 5.2 Physical training in Boulet, Oran, 1959 © ECPAD
- 5.3 The sports club in Waldeck-Rousseau, 1958 © ECPAD
- 5.4 Charles de Gaulle at CEMJA in Issoire, 1959 © ECPAD
- 5.5 Youths perform at a sports competition in Djelfa, 1959 © ECPAD
- 5.6 The Algerian Sports Club Championship Finals, 1959 © ECPAD



The military organization of Algeria in 1959. Source: Guy Pervillé and Cécile Marin, *Atlas de la guerre d'Algérie de la conquête à l'indépendance* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2011)

- Army Corps HQ
- Operational Zone HQ and administrative center of the civil Department
- Sector HQ and administrative center of the civil Arrondissement

Z: Operational Zone

N: North
O: West
S: South
E: East

O: Oran

A: Algiers

C: Constantine

S: Sahara

With the exception of Nemours and Marnia, the boundaries of military sectors and civil arrondissements correspond.

The circled region around the city of Arris roughly corresponds to the Aurès Mountain range.

A Note on Terminology and Language

Throughout the text, I have translated most French terms and institutional or official titles into English, except where translation would diminish or flatten their meaning. In most instances, I have also provided the original French term in parentheses or in the footnotes. In some cases, I also employed shorthand titles where the full version proved cumbersome; the use of 'social assistant,' for example, reads much more easily than 'Auxiliary Rural Social Sanitary Assistant.' In the footnotes, I have left document titles and terms largely untranslated to facilitate the work of other historians. For towns, cities, and regions, I have utilized colonial-era nomenclature, and therefore deferred to French spellings of place-names.

Several terms require precision. First, to describe Algeria's heterogeneous settler population, I have employed the term 'settler' or 'European' rather than 'pied-noir,' which emerged largely at the end of the Algerian War and in close association with a particular postcolonial identity. Inversely, while they did not become 'Algerian' until after independence, I employ this term – along with 'colonial subject' or 'autochthone' – to refer to Algerians. The term 'indigenous' in French (*indigène*) carries racial connotations, and in colonial usage, 'Muslim' constituted a legal category which often served to signal race in addition to (or regardless of) religion.¹ Where I do employ it in discussions of legal status, the term appears in quotes.

¹ For an extended discussion of these terms, see Raphaëlle Branche, *La guerre d'Algérie: une histoire apaisée?* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2005), pages 349-359; and Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006), chapter 1.

Introduction

In the early hours of November 1st, 1954, a series of attacks shook the French territory of Algeria. In the capital, Algiers, bombs shattered buildings at the gas utility plant and at an oil depot. In Dra-el-Mizan, nestled in the mountains of Kabylie, a group of insurgents assassinated an Algerian forest ranger. The easternmost province of Constantine was hardest hit. Armed bands launched an hours-long assault on the small town of Arris, and on the road from Biskra, stopped a bus at an improvised roadblock. After forcing the passengers to dismount, the gunmen fired on them, killing a Muslim official, and wounding a young couple from the metropole who had just arrived to work as teachers in a nearby village. The husband bled to death on the side of the road before help could arrive. In Algeria and in metropolitan France, officials and the public reacted with shock. The unknown group who claimed responsibility for the attacks called themselves the *Front de Libération Nationale* – the National Liberation Front (FLN) – and extolled the Algerian people to rise up and fight for an end to

colonial rule. Though few realized it, the violent struggle over Algerian independence had begun.

The war of Algerian Independence was a formative event for France, Algeria, and the postwar world. It redrew the human and geographic borders of the Mediterranean, and played a pivotal role in the global process of decolonization. Intensely violent, highly mediatized, and international in scope, the conflict served as a crucial test-case for anticolonial independence movements, and a crucible for the viability of imperial rule in an era of human rights. The war dealt a climactic blow to a fracturing global empire. It led to the collapse of one French Republic and the creation of another, the exodus of hundreds of thousands of European settlers across the Mediterranean, the deaths of 24,614 French soldiers, and an estimated 300,000 Algerians civilians and combattants killed.¹ The contentious debates that swirled around the conflict provoked international crises, and transformed global politics; even as the Algerian War helped bring an end to one global political system, and laid the foundations for another.

As violence erupted in Algeria in 1954, the French Empire was in the midst of a transition. In the aftermath of the Second World War, policymakers attempted to forge a more equitable model of empire, which they rechristened the French Union. Its 1946 constitution abolished the arbitrary colonial penal codes, instituted a massive development fund for sub-Saharan territories, and expanded the rights of many colonial subjects, which included, for an educated minority, the right to elect deputies to the French National

¹ Historians have debated the number of Algerian deaths ardently but have more or less reached a consensus around the figures established by Charles Robert Ageron. Martin Evans summarizes the debate and the calculations nicely in *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pages 335-338.

Assembly.² Within the French Union, as under the empire, Algeria occupied a unique place. Since 1848, the French constitution had enshrined the Algerian territory as part and parcel of France. Algeria bore the largest settler population of the French Union – 1 million out of a total 10 million inhabitants – who had established a well-entrenched but highly inequitable society. Policymakers included Algeria in the reforms in 1946, but under the settler lobby rendered such reforms mostly hollow. Nevertheless, few observers saw the violence in November 1954 as a sign of an impending eight year war, and Algerian independence was for most unimaginable, particularly within the framework of a purportedly liberalizing French Union.³

Even as policymakers attempted to elaborate a more egalitarian, progressive vision of empire, however, the French Union had begun to strain. The events of the Second World War had profoundly shaken French authority in colonies like Indochina, and the Cold War superpowers placed increasing pressure on French hegemony in Africa and elsewhere. After eight-years of hard-fought combat against the Viet Minh in Indochina, the army suffered a crushing defeat at Diên Biên Phu in May 1954, and France withdrew from Southeast Asia. Authorities now grappled with the rising nationalist challenges in Tunisia and Morocco. Within Algeria itself, popular nationalism had fermented, driven with renewed vigor by a growing crisis of landlessness and unemployment that struck Algerians in the 1940s and 1950s. As the

² On France's postwar efforts to develop its empire, see See Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* (New York: Berg, 2002); and Andrew W.M. Smith, "Of Colonial Futures and an Administrative Alamo: Investment, Reform, and the Loi Cadre (1956) in French West Africa," *French History* 28, vol. 1 (2014).

³ Both Fred Cooper and Todd Shepard have argued convincingly that the end of empire was never inevitable. Both historians emphasize instead the contingency of the postwar period. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society and Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005; Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

French army sought to halt the rapid growth of violence in Algeria in 1955 and 1956, the defeat in Indochina and the tensions elsewhere in the French Union framed its actions. Here, in the territory tied most closely to France, officers saw same process at work. In the face of popular national liberation movements, they insisted, combat alone was proving insufficient. To defeat the FLN in Algeria, the army also needed to win Algerians over to its cause.

This dissertation recounts the emergence and evolution of a military strategy that sought to win the affection and loyalty of Algerians, known as 'Pacification.' Confronted with the mounting international challenges to colonial rule and growing popular support for the FLN's armed independence movement, French generals, officers, and civil officials responded not only with force, but with a large-scale effort to renovate and regenerate colonial society. Military leaders viewed Algeria's colonized population as the human terrain of the conflict, and sought to capture Algerian hearts and minds through an array of programs aimed at their social and economic integration. This dissertation explores the development of these programs, the theories that shaped them, and the individuals who drove them from 1956 to 1961. It asks why in the mid-1950s the military command placed the conquest of Algerians' loyalties at the center of its war effort, and why Algerians' bodies often became a focus of the military's action. I do not aim to narrate the broad arc of combat operations in Algeria, or to explain the more overt forms of violence such as torture that have dominated both public debates and historical inquiry on the conflict. Nor do I intend to settle questions about the political intrigues that shaped the rise of the Fifth Republic or the end of French rule in Algeria. Rather, this work explores the political culture of a generation of officers who in the light of the conflict came to see Algerian colonial society as expired and sought to remake it.

Pacification combined population development projects with the techniques of applied mass psychology in an attempt to remake Algerians in the image of French men and women. Officers believed that in so doing, they would forge a new colonial society capable of enduring in a rapidly changing postwar world. Pacification represented not only an intensification of longstanding modes of colonial governance, but the convergence of these practices with other dynamics such as postwar developmentalism, colonial political reform, and a rising tide of military statism. In this sense, Pacification echoes the “high modernist ideologies” traced by James C. Scott.⁴ In their attempt to counter the FLN by forging a more ‘modern’ vision of Algerian society, French leaders subtly translated both France’s civilizing mission and many of the longstanding practices of colonial rule for a postwar era. Pacification reconfigured Algerian difference as social and economic, and rewrote the civilizing mission as a developmentalist, rationalist, and ostensibly humanitarian project to ‘modernize’ the territory.⁵ French leaders emphasized the alterity of Algerian ‘Muslims’ not as a strategy of exclusion, but as the basis for a radical project of *inclusion* that justified the intense disciplinary intervention of the state to make Algerians more fully and properly ‘French’.

⁴James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Kristin Ross and Herman Lebovics have both argued that the French state responded to decolonization by importing a centralized, rationalist nationalizing project from the colonies to the metropole. She underestimates, however, to what extent such techniques emerged as a response to decolonization within the Empire itself. See Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995); and Herman Lebovics, *Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the Global Age* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

⁵ For the seminal text on the French civilizing mission, see Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). Matthew Connolly also highlights French efforts to “recast” the ‘civilizing mission’ as a ‘modernizing mission’, but underestimates both the extent to which such a recasting drew on a tradition of imperial *mise-en-valeur* and administrators’ commitment to pursue such a project as a means of regenerating imperial rule. See Connolly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, chapter 1.

Historians have devoted considerable attention to the French army in Algeria. However, public debates on the widespread use of torture and popular representations of the conflict conveyed by films such as Gillo Pontecorvo's neorealist masterpiece *The Battle of Algiers* or the writings of Frantz Fanon continue to exert a powerful pull over the historiography.⁶ As a result, much of the literature on the conflict has focused on the more spectacular forms of violence that characterized the conflict such as torture and urban warfare, and historians have often neglected to examine the broader institutional culture of the army or its impact on the war, particularly in Algeria's rural hinterlands, known as the 'bled'.⁷ The military's resettlement policy which forcibly dislocated nearly a million Algerians, for example, has only generated a handful of academic studies.⁸ This dissertation offers a counterbalance

⁶ For an excellent and prolonged discussion of the public debates surrounding the war and their impact on the historical literature, see Raphaëlle Branche, *La guerre d'Algérie: une histoire apaisée?* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2005). For the definitive works on the army's use of torture, see Raphaëlle Branche, *La torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001); and Jean-Luc Einaudi, *La Ferme Améziane: enquête sur un centre de torture pendant la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991).

⁷ The key works on the army in Algeria include Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972); Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (New York: Longman, 1994); Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaïsse, eds, *Militaires et guérillas dans la guerre d'Algérie* (Brussels: Complexe, 2001); Martin S. Alexander, et al, eds., *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, eds, *France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy* (London: Frank Cass, 2002). These blindspots can be traced back to two of the earliest synthetic works on the war, Alistair Horne's *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: New York Review of Books Classics, 2006) (originally 1977), and Yves Courrière's four-volume *La guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Fayard, 1968-71), but also to the restrictions imposed on research by the military archives themselves (on the archives, see Branche, *Une histoire apaisée?*). Notable exceptions which pay particular attention to the political and institutional cultures of the French military and their impact on the strategies and forms of violence that characterized the Algerian War include; Raphaëlle Branche, *La torture et l'armée*; Jacques Frémeaux, *La France et l'Algérie en Guerre: 1830-1870, 1954-1962* (Paris: Institut de Stratégie Comparée / Economica, 2002); Sylvie Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris: Flammarion, 2005). A number of recent works have also focused on Pacification or the Fifth Bureau, and particularly their actions toward women. See Diane Sambron, *Femmes Musulmanes, Guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962* (Paris: Autrement, 2007); Marnia Lazreg *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Neil MacMaster, *Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the 'Emancipation' of Muslim Women, 1954-1962* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2010).

⁸ The literature on the regroupments is sparse, and only the most recent work by Fabien Sacriste draws extensively on archival research. See Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le déracinement: La crise de l'agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1964); Michel Cornaton, *Les regroupements de la*

by examining the evolving efforts of the army to capture the 'hearts and minds' of rural Algerians.

Approaching the Algerian War through the lens of social engineering allows me to pose new questions about the unfolding of the conflict and the connections between Cold War ideologies, the process of decolonization in North Africa, and France's role in postcolonial geopolitics. For the military command, 'Pacification' was not a euphemism or alibi for violence in Algeria, but a corpus of techniques and institutions that aimed to isolate the Algerian population from the FLN and bind them to the French administration.⁹ Confronted by an often-unknown enemy that drew broad financial, material, and moral support from the population, the army turned to the moral conquest of Algerians as the key to victory. Alongside repressive efforts aimed at detecting and eliminating the clandestine structures of the FLN, civil and military authorities developed from late 1956 an array of programs designed to reestablish contact with rural Algerians and draw them into active participation in national civic life. These programs sought to enmesh Algeria's colonized population in a surveillance apparatus that would allow the army to more effectively combat the FLN. But more importantly, they also endeavored to resolve what French authorities perceived as the root

décolonisation en Algérie (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1967); and Fabien Sacriste, "Les camps de 'regroupement.' Une histoire de l'État colonial et de la société rurale pendant la guerre d'indépendance algérienne (1954-1962)" (PhD diss. In History, Université de Toulouse II Le Mirail, 2014). Other topics, such as the army's recruitment of thousands of indigenous auxiliaries known as *Harkis* or the operations of the more than 700 Special Administrative Sections (SAS) have seen equally sparse academic treatment. On the *Harkis*, see Fatima Besnaci-Lancou and Gilles Manceron, *Les Harkis dans la colonisation et ses suites* (Paris: l'Atelier, 2008); and François-Xavier Hautreux, *La Guerre d'Algérie des harkis, 1954-1962* (Paris: Perrin, 2013). On the SAS, see Gregor Mathias, *Les Sections Administratives Spécialisées en Algérie: entre idéal et réalité, 1955-1962* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998) and Jacques Frémeaux, "Les SAS (Sections Administratives Spécialisées)," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 208 (2002): 55-68.

⁹ I have capitalized 'Pacification' throughout the text in order to differentiate the specific French strategy from a wider use of the term as a euphemism for repression across colonial contexts.

causes of the 'rebellion': endemic poverty, a skyrocketing birthrate, and an overwhelming sense of alienation provoked by a distant and exclusionary colonial state. Free medical aid, social welfare, and workforce development programs sought to promote the social and economic advancement of Algerians, and to provoke the social and cultural rapprochement of Algeria's settler and subject populations.¹⁰ Army strategists believed that repression and reform must work hand-in-hand. Alone, they argued, neither effort would successfully restore Algerians' loyalty to French rule. By the beginning of 1958, military commanders had shaped these efforts into a systematized program of Pacification that structured the army's strategy in Algeria through late 1961.

The postwar international context critically informed this project. A new wave of historical inquiry has begun to examine how the Algerian War impacted the birth of Third Worldism, the transformation of international diplomacy, and even the role of non-governmental organizations in global politics.¹¹ But most histories of the war still present

¹⁰ A growing body of new scholarship focuses on French efforts to police Algerians in the metropole during the war and emphasizes the ties between welfare and repression. But scholars have still not devoted much attention to similar programs in Algeria, which often inspired or informed them. See, for example, Emmanuel Blanchard, *La Police parisienne et les Algériens, 1944-1962* (Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2011); Amelia H. Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); and Ed Naylor, "Une Âne dans l'ascenseur: Late Colonial Welfare Services and Social Housing in Marseille After Decolonization," *French History* 27, No. 3 (2013): 422-447.

¹¹ Key works include Robert Malley, *The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Irwin Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Martin Thomas, *The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945-1962* (London: Macmillan, 2000); and Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (2001): 221-245. A newer wave of scholarship has emphasized the war's ramifications for nongovernmental and religious organizations, as well as transnational processes like European integration. See Darcie Fontaine, "Treason or Charity? Christian Missions on Trial and the Decolonization of Algeria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44 (2012): 733-753; Jennifer Johnson-Onyedum, "Humanize the conflict: Algerian Health Care Organizations and Propaganda Campaigns, 1954-1962," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44 (2012): 713-731; Fabian Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria*, trans. Dona Geyer (Philadelphia:

French military actions in Algeria as an extension or intensification of the colonial project, driven by dynamics almost entirely internal to the North African context. This dissertation places the actions of military and civil leaders within this international context. The economic, cultural, and political shifts that shaped the postwar world also framed the process of Algerian decolonization and profoundly shaped French military strategies in Algeria. In turn, the Army's actions helped to fashion postcolonial forms of 'Western' intervention in a newly-independent global south.

For many within the military's highest ranks, the conflict that had erupted in Algeria was not a localized nationalist struggle, but one front in a broader wave of Communist subversion that swept the colonized world. Reflecting on their defeat at the hands of the Viet-Minh in Indochina, military thinkers attempted to define new strategic and operational orientations that would allow them to counter what many saw as the same conflict extended to Algeria. The imaginary of Maoist subversion provided these thinkers a framework to comprehend the accelerating fragmentation of France's Empire. But it also served as the basis for a new way of theorizing warfare in the global South. For strategic thinkers, the threat of atomic warfare had pushed large-scale military conflicts out of the realm of possibility. Wars now became subversive struggles for the allegiance of local populations that spilled into all domains – social, economic, political, and even psychological. Faced with such a threat, these thinkers argued, the economic inequalities and long-simmering racial tensions that characterized Algeria's 'expired' colonial society presented grave risks. Victory in Algeria

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); and Muriam Davis, "Producing Eurafrica: Development, Agriculture, and Race in Algeria, 1958-1965" (PhD diss., New York University, 2015).

required new forms of warfare to secure the FLN's defeat, and a wide-ranging effort to forge a new colonial society capable of withstanding subversion by external or internal enemies.

A small but growing literature recognizes the important impact that Cold War ideologies made on French military doctrine in Algeria and in other colonies.¹² Likewise, historians like Matthew Connelly and Irwin Wall have convincingly demonstrated the central role the Algerian War played in transforming international politics during the Cold War.¹³ But the narrative of the Cold War's interaction with decolonization remains largely a story of Soviet or American interventions into the 'Third World,' or of indigenous peoples' use of the competing political visions offered by these superpowers to pose new claims on political rights.¹⁴ Such a perspective often misses the diverse ways in which historical actors

¹² On the 'Doctrine of Revolutionary Warfare' (DGR) and its wider development, see Gabriel Périès, "De l'action militaire à l'action politique: Impulsion, codification, application de la doctrine de la 'guerre révolutionnaire' au sein de l'armée française, 1944-1960 (PhD diss., Université Paris-I, 1999); Marie-Monique Robin, *Escadrons de la mort, l'école française* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004); Paul et Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *La République et son armée face au 'péril subversif': Guerre et action psychologiques 1945-1960* (Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2005); and Mathieu Rigouste, *L'ennemi intérieur: La généalogie colonial et militaire de l'ordre sécuritaire dans la France contemporaine* (Paris: La Découverte, 2009). These works tend to favor institutional or discursive analyses, rather than examine the relationship of the ideologies grouped under the rubric of 'DGR' in relation to practice. For the impact of these theories on the Algerian War, see Raphaëlle Branche, *Torture et l'armée*; Denis Leroux, "Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d'Algérie: Le Centre d'instruction pacification et contre-guérilla d'Arzew, 1957-1959." *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire* 120 No. 4 (2013): 101-112; and Fabien Sacriste, "Les camps de 'regroupement.'" For its application in Cameroon between 1955 and 1971, see Thomas Deltombe, Manuel Domerge, and Jacob Tatsitsa, *Kamerun! Une guerre cachée aux origines de la Françafrique, 1948-1971* (Paris: La Découverte, 2011). In English, Peter Paret's *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1964) offers a competent if somewhat dated overview, while Marnia Lazreg's *Torture and the Twilight of Empire* presents a one-dimensional and often overstated analysis of the doctrine as a 'psychologized' version of colonial racism that led inexorably to torture.

¹³ Irwin Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*; Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*; and Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *The American Historical Review* 105 No. 3 (June 2000): 739-769.

¹⁴ See for example the exemplar of the new Cold War historiography, Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Several recent collective works have emphasized the regional character of many Cold War conflicts, and the ways in which middle powers and non-state actors engaged Cold War ideologies. See Virginia Garrard-Burnett, et al., eds, *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013); Luc van Dongen, et al., eds. *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014); and Lorenz Lüthi, ed., *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East*

understood and mobilized Cold War ideologies within Empire.¹⁵ The possibilities for military action in Algeria were bounded by an emerging global political system which emphasized individual rights and socioeconomic development. But such a shift was not imposed on Empire. Rather, military leaders perceived that the model of colonial rule operating in Algeria no longer fit the realities of the Cold War world, and actively sought to build a new state that did. Pacification did not intend to restore the colonial status quo, but to build an industrialized, democratic “New Algeria” at an accelerated pace. This *Algérie Nouvelle*, they imagined, would serve as the pivot of Eurafrica, an integrated bloc of European and African territories and a third global superpower to protect France and its Empire from both Soviet and American encroachment.¹⁶ Such a project built upon a wider-ranging effort to reimagine the Empire as a federative French Union after 1945, but it was precisely the perceived ‘Maoist’ character of the FLN that justified the army as it transformed this political project into a massive program of

Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points (Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Stanford University Press, 2015). Histories of decolonization have fared better because they recognize Imperial administrations’ efforts to transform empire following the Great Depression and the Second World War. But these works also largely neglect to examine how imperial states like France, Britain or Portugal imagined their empires fitting into a self-consciously ‘Cold War’ world. See Martin Shipway, *Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008); and Martin Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

¹⁵ Michael Cresswell, for example, only mentions Indochina briefly, while Irwin Wall’s focus on De Gaulle pushes alternative French Cold War visions to the sidelines. Matthew Connelly and Mark Atwood Lawrence remain focused on diplomatic circles, but make an effort to engage with the ideas of colonial administrators. See Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*; Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*; Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); and Michael Cresswell, *A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

¹⁶ An examination of the full array of political and economic transformations effected by the Algerian War lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. For an overview of the endurance after Algerian independence of many of the political and economic bonds forged during the Algerian War, see and Phillip C. Naylor, *France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000); Daniel Lefeuvre, *Chère Algérie: La France et sa colonie, 1930-1962* (Paris: Flammarion, 2005); and Davis, “Producing Eurafrica.”

state-directed social engineering.¹⁷ This effort imploded as Algeria won its independence, but it profoundly shaped French leaders' understanding of the conflict and their attempts to resolve it.

In their efforts to combat the FLN and remake Algerian society, civil and military authorities developed a coherent ideology and set of practices; a self-consciously 'new' way of understanding warfare and its role in a Cold War world. This emerging doctrine, which strategists named 'counter-subversive' or later 'counter-insurrectional' warfare, defined Pacification, and oriented it along particular axes: intelligence gathering, population control, psychological warfare, and the moral conquest and transformation of the population. The war effort became a weaponized form of developmentalist social engineering. The French army was not the only military to employ unconventional methods of warfare in the postwar period – the British and American militaries also developed their own models in Malaysia and Vietnam.¹⁸ But the Algerian War crystalized an epistemological shift in modern warfare that

¹⁷ A number of recent histories have emphasized the importance placed not on nation-states but on supranational or transnational constellations. See Frederick Cooper, "Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa," *Past & Present* 6 (2011), 196-210; Todd Shepard, "À l'heure des « grands-ensembles » et de la guerre d'Algérie. L'état-nation en question," *Monde(s): Revue d'histoire transnationale* 1 (2012), 113-134; Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); and Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015). For more on the idea of Eurafrica and French efforts to include Algeria in the nascent European Union, see Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014); and Muriam Davis, "Producing Eurafrica." Jennifer A. Delton has argued that anticommunism actually enabled social welfare, economic redevelopment, and civil rights in the United States during the 1950s, and a similar process seems to be at work in the Algerian context. See Delton, *Rethinking the 1950s: How Anticommunism and the Cold War Made America Liberal* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹⁸ It should be noted that these models emerged in dialogue. For general histories of counterinsurgency and its emergence as a dominant paradigm for understanding global conflict in the postwar period, see D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007); Colonel Gian Gentile, *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency* (New York: The New Press, 2013); Hannah Gurman, ed., *Hearts and Minds: A People's*

saw the postwar period as a distinctly new era characterized by small, population-focused conflicts – in short, as an era of counterinsurgency. The growing historical literature rightly emphasizes the broad continuities of counterinsurgency with wartime practices stretching back into the 19th century.¹⁹ But these histories often forget that an international language of counterinsurgency and global security emerged *through* the violent conflicts of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, rather than structuring them at the outset. Military strategists in Algeria attributed the conquest of ‘hearts and minds’ an unprecedented importance equal to that of combat, and set out to achieve it on an entirely new scale.

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This dissertation draws extensively on the archives of the French military and civilian administration in Algeria, as well as diplomatic, socialist party, and private archives. In an effort to escape the institutional perspectives imposed by the archives and recover the voices of historical actors left out of the documentary record, I have also supplemented archival research with more than a dozen interviews in France and Algeria. The dissertation’s five chapters advance chronologically, and narrow from the high sphere of governmental

History of Counterinsurgency (New York: The New Press, 2013); and Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹⁹ Douglas Porch makes the important point that the ‘newness’ of unconventional warfare is essentially a myth; ‘conventional’ wars, he argues, really only occurred between European powers, and nearly all wars fought by Europeans and American armies in the global South took unconventional forms. Along with Porch and Polk, see Ian F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750* (New York: Routledge, 2001); and Thomas Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33 No. 5 (2010): 727–758. The techniques of Pacification in Algeria did draw heavily on existing practices elaborated in Algeria or in other colonial contexts such as Morocco and Indochina. Jacques Frémeaux cautions, however, that while they employed a similar vocabulary, the actions of the military from 1954 to 1962 differed substantially from those in during the 40-year conquest of Algeria from 1830 to 1870. See Frémeaux, *La France et l’Algérie en Guerre*. On the French army’s 19th-century conquest of Algeria, see Benjamin Claude Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); and Jennifer E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

policymaking to focus on the individual programs that came to comprise Pacification and the relationships they engendered at the local level. The title of each chapter bears an imperative of Pacification drawn directly from the Psychological Warfare Bureau's theoretical literature: Integrate, Pacify, Organize, Evolve, and Train. Collectively these chapters examine the origins and evolution of these concepts in tension with their practice and material effects. Through the ensuing chapters, I weave the arguments outlined above – that the Algerian War was at its core an international conflict with international ramifications, that the army sought to combat the FLN by transforming Algeria, and that they sought to effect this transformation through Algerian bodies – into a narrative of the evolving strategy of Pacification.

Chapter One (Integrate) argues that compounded by mounting international challenges to the exclusionary practices of Empire, the nascent war in Algeria pushed French administrators to recognize the fundamental inequalities of colonial society and reconceptualize their colonial project as a program of accelerated social and economic development. I explore how the colonial state sought from 1955 to counter growing popular support for the FLN with an array of reforms to grant Algerians equal rights and social programs that ostensibly promoted their social advancement on a mass scale. Chapter Two (Pacify) explores the Cold War worldview of a generation of Generals and Superior officers whose experiences in Indochina drove them to see the Algerian War not just as an anti-colonial struggle, but as an extension of Communism's global war on the West. Such a perspective, I argue, drove the French army to see Algerians as the principal terrain in the struggle against the FLN. Chapter Three (Organize) traces the rise to preeminence of the army's Psychological Action Bureau, known later as the Fifth Bureau. In their search for new methods of

conditioning Algerians' loyalty, the officers of the Fifth Bureau transformed Pacification into a massive program of social engineering. Chapters Four (Evolve) and Five (Train) address two of the programs created by the Fifth Bureau in their efforts to alter the comportments and cultural preferences of Algerian Muslims: the Itinerant Medico-Social Teams that targeted Muslim women, and the youth-oriented Sports Clubs. Both programs sought to alter the embodied habits of Algerians to more closely reflect those of their French counterparts, an action that army strategists believed would promote mutual understanding between the settler and subject populations, accelerate the erasure of economic and social disparities, and eliminate the prejudices and racial tensions that defined French rule in North Africa since 1830. Reality, however, only rarely reflected the army's aspirations.

1 Integrate

Colonial Reform, Social Regeneration, and the Fourth Republic

On the 8th of March 1956, the new socialist President of the Fourth Republic, Guy Mollet, and his new Resident Minister in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, stood in front of the French National Assembly. This visit was no mere formal appearance. Over the course of two days, the burly minister and the greying president, decked in his distinctive horn-rimmed glasses, proposed an ambitious set of policies on the question that had quickly become a central and dividing preoccupation in France: the accelerating struggle for independence in Algeria. The North African colony, widely considered part and parcel of France, had plunged into violent conflict due to the emergence of a new nationalist organization, the National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*, or FLN). The group had announced their commitment to liberating Algeria through armed struggle in a series of coordinated bombings and attacks on All Saint's Day, 1954. By the early months of 1956, the situation had become critical.

To the National Assembly, Lacoste and Mollet offered a two-pronged solution of repression and reform that they labeled 'Pacification'. "Make no mistake," Mollet affirmed, "France will not yield. The will of the French Nation is unshakable." However, he continued, "Profound reforms, immediately applied wherever possible," were necessary to "provide proof of France's faithfulness." France must, Lacoste declared the following morning to the assembled deputies, "begin – through genuine actions – to demonstrate to Muslims that the days of contempt and of inequality are over." France's crucial task, he argued, was not only to protect civilian lives or to defend the bonds that united Algeria to France, "but also to assure the peaceful coexistence of the two distinct ethnic elements, to inspire their efforts for common prosperity, to respond to the need for justice of the most underprivileged, and to create, on that basis, a harmony that can build a Franco-Muslim community of free men, equal in rights and duties." The re-establishment of order and the pursuit of reforms must go hand-in-hand, Lacoste concluded, "because these measures are mutually dependent."¹ The members of the National Assembly agreed overwhelmingly: the following Monday, March 12th, they voted 455 to 76 to grant Lacoste sweeping powers to suspend the normal rule of law, restructure the colonial state, and promote the social and political equalization of indigenous Algerians.

The reforms that Lacoste and Mollet envisioned were not, as their republican language might suggest, simply a move to reemphasize the outwardly-progressive elements of France's well-worn colonial ideology of 'assimilation'. Nor was the repeated insistence that 'France

¹ Excerpts from Mollet and Lacoste's speeches are published in *Programme Gouvernemental. Mesures de pacification et réformes en Algérie* (Algiers: Service de l'information du Cabinet du Ministre résidant en Algérie, April 1956). A copy can be located in the Bibliothèque nationale de France, 4-LB60-555.

would never abandon Algeria' a sign of French leaders' blind refusal to face of the realities of decolonization. Rather, the actions proposed by the President and his Resident Minister sought to break with the colonial status quo through an unprecedented extension of political and social rights to Algerian 'Muslims.' An expanding body of scholarship cautions against teleological readings of decolonization that erase alternative historical possibilities, perspectives, and social visions.² And indeed, the emphasis placed by histories of the war on the repressive aspects of the 'special powers' granted to Lacoste in 1956, although important, has often eclipsed the broad consensus that underlay the Republican Front government's vision of reform in Algeria.³ Mollet called in March 1956 to create a "genuine Franco-Muslim community...where the word 'fraternity' is not void of meaning."⁴ Such a project constituted only one iteration of a broader movement among center-left politicians and administrators to reimagine and reconstruct the relationship between France and Algeria – and between the state and its colonial subjects – known as 'integrationism.'

First proposed in January 1955 by Minister of the Interior François Mitterrand, then theorized and initiated by Jacques Soustelle during his brief term as Governor-General of Algeria from January 1955 to early 1956, and finally institutionalized under Mollet and Lacoste,

² See Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The labor question in French and British Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* (New York: Berg, 2002); and Andrew W.M. Smith, "Of Colonial Futures and an Administrative Alamo: Investment, Reform, and the Loi Cadre (1956) in French West Africa," *French History* 28, No. 1 (2014).

³ For example, Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Historical memory on the Left in France reserves particular vitriol for Mollet, whom many see as having betrayed Socialism's commitment to universalist values in pursuing a 'colonial' war. See the preface to Denis Lefebvre, *Guy Mollet: Le mal aimé* (Paris: Plon, 1992).

⁴ *Programme Gouvernemental. Mesures de pacification et réformes en Algérie*, 3.

the policy of “integration” emerged from the context of a postwar search for the renewal of France’s empire. Though efforts to improve the political and economic situation of Algerians only began to gain true momentum, as Todd Shepard has noted, at “precisely the moment when post-1944 French attempts to relegitimize their empire definitively foundered,” integration envisioned a renewed and reaffirmed future for Algeria within the bounds of the French nation.⁵ The echoes of European integration in the policy’s name were not accidental: Integrationism sought to draw Algeria and France progressively closer together through legal and economic harmonization, common economic development, and the extension of full French citizenship to Algerians.⁶

Integration imagined the creation of a durable and harmonious new society in Algeria, where equality of rights and social access would foster national solidarity and ensure the long-term survivability of French sovereignty. The policy sought to initiate this new Algeria by breaking with the previous assimilatory requirements of full French citizenship and recognizing the compatibility of political equality with cultural and ethnic difference. Integrationists acknowledged France’s history of racist colonial exclusion, and engaged in a series of state projects aimed at the social promotion of Algeria’s ‘Muslim’⁷ population to combat its effects

⁵ Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 45.

⁶ The connection was often made explicit in contemporary literature explaining Franco-Algerian integration. See, for example, training causeries 5 and 6 of the Centre d’Instruction Pacification et Contre-Guerrilla d’Arzew, the primary instruction facility for military personnel headed to Algeria. SHD 1H/2524.

⁷ In colonial legal usage, “Muslim” referred broadly to indigenous colonial subjects, not necessarily to individuals ascribing to the Islamic faith, and often carried racial or ethnic connotations. For a discussion of colonial terminology and its use by historians, see Raphaëlle Branche, *La Guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée?* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2005), particularly section three, chapter three, and the first chapter of Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*.

through education, social welfare, and workforce development – a strategy that in many ways paralleled ‘affirmative action’ programs later created in the United States.⁸

The framers of integration drew on a progressive – if minority – tradition of colonial reformism in Algeria dating back to 1920s to reimagine the role of the French state in Algeria. But their efforts to retrench French sovereignty stood firmly grounded in a Cold War political climate that emphasized human rights and population development, encouraged an increasing formalization of relationships between states and territories, and forecast the withering of nation-states in favor of supranational ensembles. Such international pressures on colonial states combined with a larger search for ideological renewal within the French Empire to drive the growing perception within French political circles that the existing model of rule in Algeria was not only overdue for an overhaul, but that it was dangerously out of sync with the realities of the postwar world. Invested with a sense of historical duty, Jacques Soustelle, Robert Lacoste, Guy Mollet, and other partisans of integration sought to reimagine France’s mission in Algeria as a project of accelerated social, economic, and political ‘modernization’ that would prepare Algeria to assume its place at the heart of the French nation and the center of a “renovated” French empire reconceived as the French Union.⁹

In this chapter, I explore the integrationist policies put into place in Algeria by two successive governors in Algeria, Jacques Soustelle (January 1955 to January 1956) and Robert Lacoste (February 1956 to May 1958), from within the broader context of France’s postwar

⁸ Todd Shepard was the first to draw this explicit comparison. See *The Invention of Decolonization*, 50.

⁹ In his speech to the National Assembly on 8 March 1956, Guy Mollet asserted that fusion of metropolitan France and the “Franco-Muslim community” of Algeria would be the decisive element for “fixing the structure of a renovated French Union, whose necessity you and I recognize.” See *Programme Gouvernemental. Mesures de pacification et réformes en Algérie*, 4.

empire. How did their visions of integration propose to break from past models of colonial rule in Algeria like 'assimilation' to reimagine the place of Algerians within the French nation? How did an emerging international political system that offered increasing challenges to colonial rule inform French officials' understandings of the 'Algerian problem'? And why, in the search for solutions, did proponents of integration seek to transform France's 'civilizing mission' into a "modernizing mission?"¹⁰ Historians have increasingly recognized the importance of the legal transformations of French citizenship envisioned in the postwar era and the ideological debates integrationism provoked.¹¹ But integrationism was not simply an expansion of the boundaries of French citizenship. In the short period from Soustelle's arrival in January 1955 to Lacoste's assumption of power in February 1956, integration radically reconfigured assimilationist policies from a mechanism of colonial exclusion into a project of intense state intervention, aimed at transforming Algerians into industrialized, democratic subjects capable of fulfilling the basic requirements of French citizenship. Integration drove French administrators to see humanitarian reform – coerced if necessary – as an integral component of the war effort against the FLN. Imbued with a sense of eschatological urgency by the explosion of a nationalist revolution in an international climate already hostile to Empire,

¹⁰ Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27.

¹¹ On postwar legal reform, see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, and *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). The most well-developed discussions of integrationism appear in Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 43-54, and Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, particularly his discussion of what he terms 'third-way reformism' in chapters 5 and 6. Stephen Tyre also provides a cogent and thorough exploration of Jacques Soustelle's personal understanding of 'integration' and its use by Gaullists as well as the settler far-right in "From Algérie Française to France Musulmane: Jacques Soustelle and the Myths and Realities of 'Integration,' 1955-1962," *French History* 20, vol 3 (2006): 276-296. James D. Le Sueur discusses intellectual debates during the war surrounding the concept of integration as a theory of colonialism in *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).

integration became for many French administrators not just one possible solution opposing Algerian independence, but the *only* possible solution.

From Assimilation to Integration

The Mollet government's call to pair reforms with repression represented the decisive adoption of a policy which emerged piecemeal over the course of the preceding year. Events in Algeria drove an increasing consensus on both sides of the Mediterranean that profound change – both ideological and institutional – was necessary to resolve the expanding conflict. While it drew in many ways on existing colonial policy and practice, integration resulted from a self-conscious search for a new political system that could address the underlying roots of the violence erupting in North Africa. It represented an ideological shift in how French lawmakers and administrators viewed their empire. Driven by the broadly-held perception that France's colonial ideology had collapsed, integration presented a radical vision of the place of Algerians within the French nation; a vision which drove the state to intervene in the lives of Algerians on a massive new scale.

While violence was mostly contained to the mountainous Aurès region of eastern Algeria, throughout the winter and spring of 1955 the accelerating number of attacks produced a generalized climate of insecurity and disorder across the North African colony.¹² The French army's ineffectiveness combatting groups of nationalist guerillas in a terrain to which they were poorly adapted only accentuated this fear. Even after the French government declared a

¹² Drawing on statistics assembled by the Ministry of the Interior, Sylvie Thénault lists the number of attacks as 178 in November 1954, 201 in December, and after a lull during the winter, 139 in March 1955, 196 in April, 455 in May, 501 in June, and 441 in July. *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne*, 46.

state of emergency and expanded police powers on April 3rd, it remained clear to colonial administrators that violent repression alone no longer constituted an effective strategy for resolving the conflict as it had for similar insurrections as late as 1945.¹³ Increased repression had led to an expansion of insurgent activity in rural areas. A spiraling guerilla war in these regions drew increasing support from local populations. French military morale was deteriorating. Algeria's settler population grew restive or outright hostile to a beleaguered and ineffective administration. Widespread opposition began to build in France against the escalation of military involvement and the continued reliance on obligatory military service. And political debates at the national level had failed to produce a cohesive or coherent policy on the conflict.¹⁴ The nation stood on the cusp of a crisis.

The apparent inability of French lawmakers to provide meaningful solutions amplified the sense of instability provoked by FLN violence. It pushed many French policymakers to question the reality of France's colonial rhetoric in ways that few outside communist or nationalist organizations had before 1954.¹⁵ Already-modest efforts to liberalize the colonial

¹³ On May 8th, 1945, demonstrations organized by Algerian nationalists in the cities of Setif and Guelma turned violent. After the deaths of several Europeans at the hands of the primarily indigenous crowds, paramilitary groups and military units embarked with the approval of local officials on a series of repressions and massacres that lasted until the 26th of June, resulting in what Jean-Pierre Peyroulou estimates to be 6,000 to 17,000 Algerian deaths. Despite the important role these events played in driving many Algerians to embrace more extreme nationalist politics, the events largely escaped global media attention. See Annie Rey Goldzeiguer, *Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie, 1940-1945. De Mers el-Kébir aux massacres du Nord-Constantinois* (Paris: La Découverte, 2002), and Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, *Guelma 1945. Une subversion française dans l'Algérie coloniale* (Paris: La Découverte, 2009).

¹⁴ For a more narrative account of events, see Martin Evans' excellent recent history, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) or Sylvie Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris: Flammarion, 2005). Alistair Horne's classic account of the war shows its age, but nonetheless sketches an engrossing narrative portrait: *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962*, new edition (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006).

¹⁵ On the convergence of Communist and nationalist critiques of the French colonial states in Algeria, see Emmanuel Sivan, *Communisme et nationalisme en Algérie, 1920-1962* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des

state in Algeria and extend political rights after the Second World War had largely stalled in the Algerian Assembly – the colony’s settler-dominated postwar legislative body – or had been blatantly circumvented by colonial governors.¹⁶ France’s “civilizing mission” had justified Empire by promising to uplift French colonial subjects through the benefits of French culture, education, and industrial development. But the widespread poverty, institutionalized exclusion, and daily racism most Algerians experienced contradicted this vision.¹⁷ In theory race-blind, the official policy of “assimilation” promised to confer Algerian “Muslims” full and equal rights through naturalization once they reached a sufficient level of cultural and social acclimation. In practice, however, the colonial state consigned colonized subjects to a secondary legal status under customary law, known as ‘civil status,’ and excluded the vast majority of Algerians from full French citizenship on the basis of an identity constructed largely in racialized terms.¹⁸

sciences politiques, 1976). For a comprehensive overview of the evolving strains of Algerian nationalism before and after 1954, see Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire Intérieure du FLN, 1954-1962* (Paris: Fayard, 2002).

¹⁶ The Algerian Assembly was created in 1947 with the intent to provide Algerian colonial subjects divided into two colleges – one for settlers, and one for indigenous Algerians. During the first elections in 1948 under Governor General Marcel-Edmond Naegelen, the colonial state massively manipulated the vote to ensure only pro-French candidates were elected. See Charles Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine, 1830-1988* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990).

¹⁷ On the notion of a “civilizing mission,” see Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

¹⁸ On the theory of assimilation and its partner theory, ‘association’, see the classic text by Raymond F Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), or Jean-Loup Amselle’s short but nuanced text *Affirmative Exclusion: Cultural Pluralism and the Rule of Custom in France*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). For a comprehensive overview of Algerians’ changing legal status and its relation to debates about Assimilation, see the first chapter of Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization* and Patrick Weil, *Qu’est-ce qu’un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2002), particularly pages 225-246. Patricia Lorcin explores the construction of racialized categories in the colonization of Algeria in *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999).

By 1955, many observers perceived assimilation to be less a progressive doctrine than an “alibi of inaction,” as President Edgar Faure quipped in a debate in front of the National Assembly.¹⁹ Nationalist leader Ferhat Abbas, who still supported some maintenance of French sovereignty in February of that year, lambasted the collapse of the Mendès-France government, calling the French to recognize that it exposed the falsity of the “colonial lie,” revealing the “sad reality: the rapacity and ill-will of colonialists on one hand, and the miserable condition of colonized peoples on the other.” Assimilation was no longer a “valid choice,” he argued; “everything we have inherited from a century of colonialism in terms of injustices and political and social inequalities must disappear to make way for a true democracy and a real equality.”²⁰ The FLN’s actions succeeded in shaking the ideological foundations of French rule in Algeria, and catalyzed a scramble for a new colonial vocation.

Into this moment of ideological crisis stepped Jacques Soustelle. The dispassionate and methodical academic was an ideal figure to elaborate a new, more progressive vision of Empire. An early member of the Free French, Soustelle had served as Charles de Gaulle’s director of intelligence and later as Minister of Colonies for de Gaulle’s provisional government in 1945. Soustelle was also an intellectual, whose ethnographic work on indigenous tribes in Mexico brought him into close contact with both dispossessed native peoples and projects

¹⁹ Quoted in Jacques Frémeaux, *La France et l’Algérie en Guerre. 1830-1870, 1954-1962* (Paris: Économica et Institut de Stratégie Comparée, 2002), 278.

²⁰ Ferhat Abbas, “Choix du colonisateur et choix du colonisé,” *République Algérienne*, 25 February 1955. Reproduced in Mohammed Harbi, *Les archives de la révolution algérienne* (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1981), 107-108. Abbas broke definitively with his earlier support of assimilation and then a federalist model of association with France in September 1955, when he joined the FLN. From 1958 until 1961, he served as the provisional president for the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, the FLN’s government-in-exile.

aimed at recognizing their social and cultural rights.²¹ For all these reasons, he received a cold welcome from Algeria's largely anti-reformist settler population on his arrival as the new Governor General in January 1955.

From the first days of his term, Soustelle made it clear that he would pursue policies along the broad lines laid out that month by Minister of the Interior François Mitterrand. Mitterrand had announced that the government intended to respond to nationalists' criticisms of the colonial state by initiating ambitious public works projects in Algeria, improving Algerians' access to voting, and restructuring the rural colonial administration.²² Soustelle brought his experiences as both an administrator and ethnologist to bear, and left his distinctive mark by defining what 'integration' entailed as a policy orientation. In a February 23rd speech in front of the Algerian Assembly, his first public pronouncement in his new capacity as Governor General, Soustelle articulated the framework of his project. "We must not close our eyes to reality and mechanically apply to this African land that which has been conceived and carried out elsewhere." "We must," he continued, "on the contrary take fully into account the geography, the history, and the ethnology proper to this region." "The anticipated goal is clearly marked," Soustelle concluded: "to make Algeria each day more fully a province that, while certainly unique, is clearly French."²³

²¹ For a general biography of Soustelle, see Bernard Ullmann, *Jacques Soustelle: le mal aimé* (Paris: Plon, 1995). On Soustelle's experiences in Mexico and their influence on his policies for Algeria, see Todd Shepard, "Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO: a transnational history of antiracism and decolonization, 1932–1962," *Journal of Global History* 6 (2011): 273–297 and Stephen Tyre, "From Algérie Française to France Musulmane," particularly pages 281–28

²² Soustelle later stated that the term "Integration" had been "suggested" to him by Mendès-France and Mitterrand. See Odile Rudele's 19 February 1979 interview with Jacques Soustelle and Jean Vaujour, Centre d'histoire des Sciences Politiques (hereafter CHSP), Archives carton OR3.

²³ Quoted in Jacques Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie* (Plon: Paris, 1956), 36.

Where assimilationist doctrine eschewed legal acknowledgments of racial or ethnic difference in favor of a universalizing definition of citizenship modeled on metropolitan realities, Soustelle called for a recognition that social and cultural conditions differed in Algeria. The failure of past administrations to account for these differences, Soustelle argued, had only retarded Algerians' incorporation into the nation, and driven the institutionalization and proliferation of discriminatory practices, despite any formal legal equality. The exclusion of Algerians from greater French society resulted not solely from their religion or their reticence to abandon 'tradition' – a stock justification for legal exclusion throughout the history of the colony – but also from the effects of a "complex of racial and cultural superiority" on the part of Algeria's settler population.²⁴ "One side says 'to be a good Frenchman it is necessary to cease to be a Muslim'," Soustelle later elaborated in print; "the other: 'to be a good Muslim, you must not be or become French.' This convergence of blindnesses blocks the reasonable and peaceful evolution of Algeria."²⁵

Soustelle called on France to admit the role racial discrimination had played in structuring colonial society as the foundation for a counter-effort to promote and institutionalize the equality of Algerians. He sought to achieve this institutionalized equality through the progressive incorporation of metropolitan and Algerian law. In Soustelle's formulation, integration implicated several radical shifts in colonial policy. It recognized the

²⁴ Ibid, 67. Soustelle's treatise on the 'Algerian question', published in 1956, became the major point of reference for a wide range of integrationist projects until the end of the war, and references to it appear frequently in civil administration documents. See, for example, the Mission d'Etudes, 'Bilan des solutions institutionnelles qui ont été proposées pour l'Algérie.' ANOM 81F/177. On Pied noirs' eventually quite enthusiastic embrace of integrationism, see Tyre, "From Algérie Française to France Musulmane," 292-294.

²⁵ Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 70.

“irreducible and legitimate originality” or “personality” of Algeria, meaning in essence that the French state would recognize a civil status based in Islamic law as a permanent and equal – though distinct – category of citizenship. Tied to this recognition was the extension to Algerians of the full political and social rights of French citizenship enjoyed by their metropolitan and settler counterparts.²⁶ Soustelle insisted, however, that the creation of a truly equal society in Algeria required not merely a legal redefinition of equality – after all, Algerians had formally been full citizens since 1947 – but a comprehensive effort to reduce social and economic disparities and to equalize access to education, employment, and social assistance. “Banning all discrimination to [Algerians’] detriment is not enough,” Soustelle asserted, “we must not hesitate to establish [discrimination] to their *advantage* where necessary, because true equity requires us to weigh down the side of the balance that is too light to restore an equilibrium.”²⁷ Todd Shepard has argued that integrationism “revealed a willingness to confront France’s history of racist colonial oppression...grounded in the belief that France had the capacity to deal with that heritage, and, in so doing, keep Algeria French.”²⁸ But integration, as Soustelle’s remarks suggest, was never just the extension of full French citizenship to Algerians. As a radical vision of the role of the state within society, it also contained profound implications for colonial policymaking.

Soustelle’s notion of integration broke from previous colonial policies in Algeria. First, it sought to create a place for social or cultural difference within the bounds of republican

²⁶ Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 93.

²⁷ Ibid, 74. Emphasis added.

²⁸ Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 47.

citizenship. There would be no “pure and simple alignment” of metropolitan and Algerian legislation; rather, Algeria as a province could carry out public education in Arabic and retain customary laws regarding civil matters, similar to the operation of local law in Alsace-Moselle.²⁹ And second, integration asserted the principle that the Republic had an obligation (devoir) to ensure the progressive achievement of equality in social and economic as well as legal domains, through programs of positive discrimination, if necessary.³⁰ Integration proposed a profoundly different vision of the colonial state’s role within colonial society, even if the means French administrators later deployed in pursuit of integration drew heavily on well-worn colonial practices.

Integration remained the “neighbor of assimilation,” however, by aiming to harmonize the economy and governmental structures of Algeria with those of metropolitan France.³¹ Integral to the extension of full political rights to Algerians, for Soustelle, was a need to “sweep away the expired vestiges of a supposed autonomy” in fiscal and administrative matters.³² Explicitly rejecting a federal relationship between France and Algeria as posing too great a risk of secession, integrationism envisioned a fusion of the two by extending national governmental structures to the North African territory. In practical terms, this meant the suppression of the Algerian Government General and Algerian Assembly and the absorption of their competencies by national ministries and the National Assembly. It also meant the

²⁹ For more on the functioning of ‘droit local’ in Alsace-Moselle, see the website of the Institut du droit local Alsacien-Mosellan, accessed August 15, 2014, <http://www.idl-am.org/>.

³⁰ Mission d’Etudes, “Bilan des Solutions Institutionnelles qui ont été proposées pour l’Algérie: Eléments d’une solution d’Intégration.” ANOM 81F/177.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 93.

economic rapprochement of the two territories through the merger of metropolitan and Algerian budgets, the absorption of the Bank of Algeria by the Bank of France, and the creation of a common market.³³ Such a merger provided the foundation for Algerians' equal representation, as they would now directly participate in the election of representatives to the National Assembly.

For integrationists, the absorption of Algeria into metropolitan political and economic structures laid the foundation for the progressive, egalitarian society they envisioned. It sought to "end the inferiority complexes that [fed] nationalism" and demonstrate clearly that Algeria's future was more, not less, French.³⁴ Metropolitan oversight was also necessary to ensure that the settler population and autochthonous population got along. Marc Lauriol, deputy from Algeria to the National Assembly and professor of law in Algiers, argued that the essential problem of finding a balance between Algeria's "two communities"³⁵ required

³³ "Bilan des Solutions Institutionnelles qui ont été proposées pour l'Algérie: Eléments d'une solution d'Intégration."

³⁴ Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 245

³⁵ Algeria's population was in fact not as homogenous as administrators imagined. The 'indigenous' population of Algeria had been shaped by centuries of political and economic migration in the Mediterranean, and comprised of culturally diverse groupings of Amazigh peoples including the Chaouia, Kabyle, Tuareg, and Awlad Na'il, as well as populations with Arab and Turkish cultural and linguistic heritages. The settler population was also heterogenous, containing large numbers of immigrants issuing from Spain, Italy, and Malta, as well as France and other European nations, and had only become majoritarian French on the eve of the First World War. Algerian Jews, who seem to have escaped the concerns of contemporary administrators, occupied an even more ambiguous position. For a large part indigenous, Algerian Jews received citizenship en masse with the Crémieux decree in 1870 and occupied an ambiguous role in Algerian society vis-à-vis the settler and subject populations. On French ethnography and the creation of homogenizing categories of indigenous peoples, see Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, George V Trumbull IV, *An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria, 1870-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), and John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: the Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). On the settler population, see David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On Algeria's Jewish population, see Prochaska, Michael M Laskier, *North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), and Joshua Schrier, *Arabs of the Jewish Faith: the Civilizing Mission in Colonial Algeria* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University press, 2010).

“external arbitrage,” something only the metropolitan administration –less biased, in their estimation – could provide.³⁶ Soustelle and others agreed: Algeria’s “European” population was not suited to the task because of their racism, which had only grown more extreme in the wake of nationalist violence.³⁷

Soustelle’s vision of integration profoundly influenced French policies in Algeria. Subsequent governments adopted its central tenets: a recognition of Algeria’s ‘personality,’ an equalization of rights and access for Algerian ‘Muslims,’ and a program of political, social, and economic rapprochement between Algeria and France. Importantly, however, they also retained integration’s “deliberate reformism” and willingness to question all institutions of the colonial state in the search for a “new order” in the colony.³⁸ Though efforts to initiate reform drove Mendès-France and Mitterrand out of office in early 1955, the left-center Republican Front coalition that dominated the ballot box in January 1956 came together over such a project.³⁹ While future Président du Conseil Guy Mollet avoided explicitly using the term “integration,” his platform of equal rights, collective coexistence, and recognition of Algeria’s unique character echoed that of Soustelle.⁴⁰ The National Assembly’s broad support of this

³⁶ Mission d’Etudes, ‘Bilan des Solutions Institutionnelles qui ont été proposées pour l’Algérie’: “Projet de M Lauriol,” ANOM 81F/177

³⁷ See the brief “Notes politiques” from Soustelle to Edgar Faure, dated June-July 1955. AN fonds Edgar Faure, 505 AP II 344. On the growth of anti-settler sentiments on the New Left during the conflict, see Todd Shepard, “Pieds-Noirs, Bêtes Noires: Anti-‘European of Algeria’ Racism and the Close of the French Empire” in Patricia M Lorcin, ed., *Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

³⁸ Raoul Girardet, *L’Idée Coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1972), 256.

³⁹ Officially unveiled a month before the elections, this coalition consisted, as Martin Evans describes, of “the Socialist Party, Francois Mitterrand’s Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance, supporters of Mendès-France, and a rump of left-wing Gaullists.” See Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War*, 144-147.

⁴⁰ Mollet detailed his platform in a public speech in early January. See “Pour la Paix en Algérie, Pour une Algérie Nouvelle: Déclaration de M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil, sur la politique française en Algérie, 9 janvier 1957.” OURS, fonds Guy Mollet, AGM 82.

reformist platform led its deputies to vote by a margin of 420 to 71 (with 83 abstentions), to accept the Mollet government on February 1st, 1956.

Beyond the projects pursued under Soustelle and then Mollet and Lacoste, integrationism continued to play a determinant role in shaping policy in Algeria. It defined the aims and major fields of action for De Gaulle's Constantine Plan from 1958, even as the idea of a common Franco-Algerian future appeared more and more troubled.⁴¹ But the notion of integration came increasingly to stand for much more than a plan of legal and administrative reform. For the army, it became an important objective, central to their efforts to establish a new order in Algeria as the sole "idée force" that could effectively oppose independence.⁴² Army commanders believed that integration presented a regenerative path through which the evolution of nationalism could be reversed and eventually effaced, and the nation recreated in a form that assured its vitality in a new postwar political culture and that reemphasized France's commitment to its republican principles.

Soustelle's project drew broad support amongst colonial administrators and military leaders because it offered a relatively clear set of diagnoses and solutions to the 'Algerian problem.' It also addressed broadly-held anxieties that France's empire in its current form was outmoded or unsustainable, and had lost the orienting principles of the civilizing mission that legitimated colonial rule. With integration, policymakers recognized the ills of assimilationist policies while leaving France's role as a 'paternalistic educator' unquestioned, and recast, at

⁴¹ See Daniel Lefeuvre, *Chère Algérie: La France et sa colonie, 1930-1962* (Paris, Flammarion: 2005), 367; and Muriam Davis, "Restaging Mise en Valeur: 'Postwar Imperialism' and The Plan de Constantine," *Review of Middle East Studies* 44, vol 2 (2010), 176-186.

⁴² Centre d'Instruction Pacification et Contre-guérilla (Arzew), "Principes généraux d'action psychologique." SHD 1H/2524.

least for French observers, France's intervention to defend imperial rule as progressive and humanitarian without undermining France's place as a universal model of progress or modernity.⁴³ Integrationism remapped Algerian difference as social and economic, and saw programs fostering social and economic rapprochement as temporary solutions to erase Algerians' particularism in the long term. In reconfiguring France's civilizing mission as a form of developmentalism, integrationists widened the boundaries of French citizenship to include Algerians more fully. They also, however, reemphasized the cultural and temporal distance between 'Algerians' and 'Frenchmen': France was modern and Algeria was anti-modern; and Algeria could not advance to modernity without the guidance and expertise provided by France.⁴⁴ Rather than abandoning the assimilationist notion that Algerians would eventually become culturally 'French,' integrationism gave new impetus to programs that actively worked to transform Algerians into Frenchmen.

Why, in 1955 and 1956 did French policymakers attempt to radically rethink the French empire? Why, if efforts to initiate reforms in Algeria had consistently met defeat previously, did they now find a broad consensus? Few French politicians or administrators admitted Algerian independence as a real possibility until late 1959.⁴⁵ What drove the sense of historical urgency behind France's search for new models of Empire?

⁴³ I borrow this term from Le Sueur, *Uncivil War*, 20.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 204, or the memoirs of General Paul Ely, Head of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff in Algeria from 1956 to 1961: Paul Ely, *Memoires: Suez... Le 13 Mai* (Paris: Plon, 1969). This notion, phrased in such direct terms, also became a staple of French army propaganda. Le Sueur discusses the notion of temporal distance between French and Algerian culture in *Uncivil War*, 23-24.

⁴⁵ On the late-war invention of decolonization of a category of historical time, see Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*.

An 'Obsolete Regime'

Algeria was far from France's only concern in early 1956. Morocco and Tunisia, both officially French protectorates but considered important parts of France's empire, were both embroiled in nationalist struggles that would result in their independence early in the year. In May 1954, the Viet Minh had dealt French forces a decisive blow in *Điện Biên Phủ*, ending the French colony of Indochina. In French West Africa, labor movements had, since 1946, made increasingly forceful new claims on the French imperial state for political and social rights. The United States and the Soviet Union, had emerged from the Second World War as major players in the global economy and in international politics. They had put new pressures on the French state in both domains. France's colonies – Algeria included – were proving less productive than colonial administrations needed them to in order finance improvements to the living standards of colonial subjects, or even to balance colonial budgets.⁴⁶ And the process of European unification had stalled out as efforts to negotiate European political and defense communities collapsed in April 1954. The Algerian Revolution materialized at a moment of acute uncertainty about the future of the French Empire and France's place in the world.

The struggle over Algerian independence unfolded against this larger backdrop of postwar shifts in France's empire and an emerging international political culture premised in a language of human rights and national self-determination. French officials proved keenly aware that they existed in an "increasingly interdependent world," and that they therefore

⁴⁶ On the role of Moroccan independence in the Algerian War, see Benjamin Stora, "Le Maroc et les débuts de la guerre d'Algérie (1953-1956)" in *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Algérie*, ed. Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaisse (Paris: André Versaille, 2012). On Bourguiba's role as the leader of a newly-independent Tunisia, see Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*. On labor strikes, economic changes, and the growth of claims-making by West Africans on the French colonial administration after 1946, see Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*

stood subject to local and domestic constraints, and to wider intra-empire and international contingencies as well.⁴⁷ The reformist vision of Algeria forwarded by integrationists and their ideological predecessors must be understood from within this broader context. Debates surrounding Integration profoundly engaged questions about France's future. Both the recent Algerian past and the accumulating pressures on the French empire since 1945 informed French politicians' shared sense that they were witnessing a tectonic shift in the course of History.

While the FLN later successfully 'internationalized' the Algerian War by forcing the conflict into public debates at the United Nations, for many French observers the conflict was already international. The broadening support for nationalism arose in their minds not from its powerful appeal to disenfranchised Algerians, but rather as a symptom of France's tardiness and lack of commitment to adapting its empire to the changing "tide" of History, now flowing in the favor of the Third World.⁴⁸ The institutional and ideological solutions which coagulated into a theory of integration were not novel inventions in 1955; they were the culmination of reflections on failed reform efforts, and of a series of small postwar crises of colonial legitimacy provoked by France's international entanglements. In the minds of French policymakers, external pressures combined with repeated failures to liberalize colonial rule in Algeria to drive both a sense that world events had outstripped France's model of colonial rule, and that the

⁴⁷ Connelly, 33. Tony Chafer calls historians to recognize that "decolonization is not the product of free choices, but often a chaotic process in which the variables of international, national, regional, and local politics, as well as accidents of luck and timing, all played a role." And Frederick Cooper argues that events in Indochina echoed across the French Empire to shape French policies in Africa. See Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa?* p. 21, and Frederick Cooper, "Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa," *Past & Present* supplement 6 (2011), page 199.

⁴⁸ Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, xi. Connelly discusses this sense of the historical significance of the moment more in-depth in his book. See in particular the Preface, Chapter 3, and the Conclusion.

effects of this model itself, rather than a nationalist alternative, now drove Algerians to support the FLN's burgeoning revolution. The 'tide of History' may have necessitated a rethinking of the modalities of colonial rule for French officials, but it certainly did not indicate the expiration of France's republican mission, nor any sense that Algeria could not be kept French.

Following the First World War the center-left repeatedly floated proposals to reform the colonial state in Algeria and extend greater rights to Algerian 'Muslims'. In 1919, Radical and Socialist party members spearheaded an attempt to loosen restrictions on naturalization and facilitate Algerians' access to full French citizenship, in recognition of Algerians' service to the nation from 1914 to 1918. The result, the 'Jonnart Law' named for Algeria's Governor General at the time, did succeed in exempting large numbers of Algerians from the capricious and repressive indigenous penal code, the *indigénat*. The law also created a new judicial process for Algerians to obtain French citizenship.⁴⁹ While the allowed 'Muslim' municipal representatives and extended electoral rights in local matters, however, strong opposition from the settler population in Algeria ensured that the local application of electoral reforms remained minimal.⁵⁰ A second attempt in 1936 under the Popular Front succeeded less in its aims of broadening the Algerian electorate than in radicalizing politics in the North African colony. Known as the Blum-Viollette law for its authors, Socialist Leon Blum and former Governor of Algeria Maurice Viollette, the modest proposal envisioned granting only 24,000 Algerian electors the right to vote alongside settlers for national representatives. But the

⁴⁹ On the Indigénat, see Sylvie Thénault, *Violence ordinaire en Algérie coloniale: Camps, internements, assignations à résidence* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2012).

⁵⁰ Patrick Weil, *Qu'est-ce qu'un Français?* 238-242.

project provoked the ire of the settler bloc, reticent to cede any electoral power to Algerians. The frustration of Algerian political movements crystalized as they witnessed the paralysis and then failure of a measure many of their adherents regarded as insufficient to begin with. The French senate rejected the bill, after much heated debate, in 1938.⁵¹

While French policymakers began to see these reforms as a series of “missed opportunities” in the mid-1950s – a discourse which still circulates in connection with colonial nostalgia in France – such projects remained until after the Second World War minority movements, dominated particularly by the Socialist Party and, to a lesser extent, left-leaning Radicals. After 1944, calls for reform began to draw broader support, notably from Gaullists. The Rally of the French People (RPF) party, under the direction of chief electoral strategist Jacques Soustelle, began in 1947 to embrace a platform of Franco-Muslim rapprochement, and members like Michel Debré became vocal advocates of colonial reform throughout the early 1950s.⁵² But Socialists remained the most vocal proponents of change in Algeria, and continued to see reform in Algeria as their particular political calling, so much so that socialist deputy (and later Foreign Minister under Mollet) Christian Pineau felt justified in declaring in July 1955 that the Socialist Party remained the “sole great hope of [France’s] overseas populations today.”⁵³

⁵¹ Messali Hadj’s Etoile Nord-Africaine party rejected the Blum-Violette project as working against “the hope of national liberty for the Algerian people,” but other high-profile groups like the Fédération des élus initially supported the Popular Front’s measures, until its political paralysis became apparent in 1937. See Charles Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine, Tome II: De l’insurrection de 1871 au déclenchement de la guerre de libération (1954)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), pages 449-466 (quote on page 454), and Laure Blévis “Quelle citoyenneté pour les Algériens?” in *Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale, 1830-1962*, ed. Abderrahmane Bouchène et al. (Paris: La Découverte / Barzakh, 2012).

⁵² On the Rassemblement du Peuple Français’ promotion of postwar reform in Algeria and later support of Integration, see Tyre, “From Algérie Française to France Musulmane.”

⁵³ Quoted in Etienne Maquin, *Le Parti Socialiste et la Guerre d’Algérie, 1954-1958* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1990), 48.

The broadening support for reform in Algeria after World War Two grew largely from wider transformations taking place across the French Empire. Nazism and the French state's own experiment in *pétainisme* had thoroughly undermined the notions of racial or civilizational superiority that structured colonial authority before the war, and, as historian Frederick Cooper argues, "universalistic notions of social progress...offered a seemingly more plausible basis for assertions of imperial hegemony."⁵⁴ From the conference of Brazzaville in early 1944, French policymakers sought to reimagine the empire as a voluntary union "founded on an equality of rights and duties" and on reciprocal obligations between the metropole and its colonies to "develop their respective civilizations, increase their well-being, and assure their security."⁵⁵ The 1946 constitution of the French Fourth Republic reframed the empire as a French Union, and extended – at least in theory – French Union citizenship to all colonial subjects, eliminating the distinction between the two categories. This reconfiguration enshrined development and democratization as state duties, and opened greater possibilities for colonial subjects to place new and multiplying demands on the French imperial state for social and legal equivalence, phrased in the language of social progress and democratic rights.⁵⁶

The creation of the French Union both opened and curtailed new possibilities for Algerians to participate in national politics. Most Algerian men gained limited voting rights under the Lamine Gueye law of May 1946, and could therefore begin to elect a modest fifteen representatives to the French National Assembly. And the 20 September 1947 Statute of

⁵⁴ Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 173.

⁵⁵ From the preamble of the October 1946 Constitution. Quoted in Girardet, *L'Idée Coloniale en France*, 199.

⁵⁶ For a discussion of this ideological reconfiguration of the French Empire and how colonized populations employed this language of 'citizenship, progress, democracy, and rights,' see Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, especially chapter 7.

Algeria, which defined Algeria's relationship to the metropole within the new French Union, laid out a series of reforms to extend further rights and harmonize Algerian governance with that of France. While the statute appeared superficially progressive, the settler lobby had more or less rendered it impotent by the time of its adoption by the National Assembly. The law created an Algerian Assembly composed of 120 representatives, but these deputies were elected by a double electoral college that allowed the settler minority to retain a majority within the Assembly. Moreover, any reforms envisioned in the statute required approval by the settler-dominated Assembly, ensuring that they remained a dead letter.⁵⁷ The theatricality of the whole system was thrown into sharp relief by the unabashed manipulation of the April 1948 legislative elections by the new Governor General, Marcel-Edmond Naegelen, who intended to refuse nationalist parties a voice even in the lopsided parliament.⁵⁸

Though changes to the rights or material situations of Algerians and other African colonial subjects under the French Union remained minimal, this vision of 'Greater France' placed an crucial emphasis on a language of equality.⁵⁹ A generation of policymakers and politicians of metropolitan and colonial origin struggled from 1946 into the mid-1950s to elaborate a more progressive vision of empire. It was the repeated failure of efforts to make such a vision a reality that drove many during this decade – from the highly visible and influential nationalist Ferhat Abbas to more purely administrative figures like legal advisor

⁵⁷ For an overview of the reforms envisioned, see Tayeb Chenntouf, "L'Assemblée Algérienne et l'application des reformes prévues par le statut du 20 septembre 1947," in *Les Chemins de la décolonisation de l'empire français, 1936-1956* (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1986).

⁵⁸ Naegelen's government arrested nationalist party members, rigged ballots, and refused to issue voter registration cards on a wide scale. See Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* 105-106.

⁵⁹ Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 216.

Roland Maspétiol – to criticize the colonial status quo increasingly vocally. And they were not alone. A postwar international political climate disposed toward self-determination offered mounting challenges to French rule. While the American government formally supported European Empires until the late 1950s, Washington's fears of alienating nationalist movements in the face of Soviet diplomacy meant that the Americans also pressured French leaders to grant greater autonomy to colonial subjects and to abandon, in the words of the American ambassador to France, "outmoded colonialist formulas" lest the French get themselves "kicked out." By 1953, President Eisenhower and the State Department were hedging their bet on continued French rule in North Africa by actively, if quietly, cultivating relationships with nationalists in Algeria's neighboring country, Morocco.⁶⁰

Within international institutions, the French saw themselves challenged more directly, as members of loose, emerging 'Third Worldist' movements began to utilize such public forums to dispute the hegemony of colonial powers. In 1952, Pakistani and Arab delegates successfully raised Tunisian and Moroccan independence as issues of debate for the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.⁶¹ In April 1955, organizers of the first Africa-Asia conference in Bandung, Indonesia invited representatives of the FLN to attend along with the heads of state of twenty-nine African and Asian nations. During the course of the meeting, the assembled delegates unanimously voted to support Algerian Independence. And as the war in

⁶⁰ Quoted in Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 45. Connelly discusses America's growing willingness to intervene on the behalf of nationalist movements in order to protect its own Cold War geopolitical interests in chapter 2 of this book, as well as in "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence" *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 105, No. 3 (June 2000): 739-769.

⁶¹ See L. J. Butler, Bob Moore, and Martin Thomas, eds., *The Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975* (London: Hodder Education, 2008), 216-221

Algeria progressed, the FLN progressively transformed international politics by mobilizing global public opinion with growing success through the United Nations.⁶²

By the early 1950s, however, smaller incidents had begun to expose creeping tensions between French understandings of its reinvented empire and shifting international perceptions. French efforts to attach Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco to the European, rather than the Eastern Mediterranean regional office of the World Health Organization in 1951 drew withering criticism from Egyptian delegates and forced the French representatives to defend their claims that North Africa was more closely linked, both spatially and culturally, to France than to other Arabophone regions of the world.⁶³ Likewise, by signing the 1953 UN Convention of the Political Rights of Women, French policymakers hoped to demonstrate France's strong commitment to universal democracy to an international audience by taking a progressive stance on the issue of women's rights. However, France repeatedly insisted in 1953 and again in 1957 that it could not grant political rights to Algerian Muslim women on the basis of their subordinate position in "Muslim" society; an excuse that rang increasingly hollow, particularly in the face of the extension of some political rights to women in independent Muslim nations like Syria, Egypt, and later Tunisia.⁶⁴ As the French Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked

⁶² For more on the FLN's use of international institutions like the UN to further the cause of Algerian Independence and undermine the international legitimacy of the French Union, see Robert Malley, *The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), and Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*.

⁶³ Jessica Pearson-Patel, "Re-mapping the Borders of Imperial Health: The World Health Organization and the International Politics of Regionalization in French North Africa, 1945-1956," article forthcoming.

⁶⁴ Note to the Minister of the Interior, "Muslim Women's Vote," dated 18 December 1954. ANOM 81F/1218. For a lengthier discussion of efforts to reform the rights of Muslim women between 1948 and 1959 with particular attention to their international ramifications, see Neil MacMaster, *Burning the veil: The Algerian war and the 'emancipation' of Muslim women, 1954-1962* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), pages 51-56, and Ryme Seferdjeli, "French 'Reforms' and Muslim Women's Emancipation During the Algerian War," *The Journal of North African Studies* 9, No.4 (2004): 19-61.

euphemistically to the Secretary General of Algerian Affairs in March 1959, it was clear that such a request “had not encountered...a unanimously favorable welcome.”⁶⁵

The danger of such disputes, and of France’s growing embeddedness in formalized systems of international law more broadly, lay in their potential to undermine claims that the North African colony comprised an integral, legally indistinguishable part of the French metropole. Indeed, two legal opinions solicited from the French Council of State in 1947 and again in 1951 argued that in juridical terms the Algerian Departments were Overseas Departments, and that “the expression ‘metropolitan territory’ did not include Algeria.”⁶⁶ In the face of new questions about the legitimacy of empire, such a discrepancy between French understandings of the ties binding Algeria to France and their legal reality when negotiating with other sovereign powers threatened to pose serious problems.

Tensions between France’s international interests and its ties to Algeria came to a head during negotiations over the stillborn European Political Community in 1953. The draft constitution adopted on March 10th, 1953, by an ‘ad hoc’ assembly of representatives from the ‘Europe of Six’⁶⁷ envisioned a federalist supranational body with representative structures and jurisdictional powers over the signatory states. The proposed constitution confronted French administrators with a powerful dilemma. Including in the Political Community required the extension of direct universal suffrage for the election of European parliament candidates. In Algeria, this meant dramatic reforms to Algerians’ political rights that would be difficult, if not

⁶⁵ Letter on the “Convention relative to the political rights of women,” dated 6 March 1959. ANOM 81F/1218.

⁶⁶ “Avis du Conseil d’Etat du 27 mars 1947 et 22 mai 1951.” ANOM 10CAB/118

⁶⁷ Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

impossible, to carry out in the immediate future.⁶⁸ Excluding Algeria, however, threatened to legally separate it from the metropole in international law, setting a dangerous precedent and undermining claims about Algeria's integrality.⁶⁹ In either situation, it became clear to French officials that European integration, which many saw as vital to the Empire's future as well as that of France, implicated profound changes in the French imperial state.⁷⁰

None of these incidents threatened French claims to Algeria as powerfully as the debates over Algerian independence in the UN General Assembly came to do after 1957. But these multiplying challenges to French sovereignty outside the metropole helped to shape French administrators' understandings of the problems confronting their empire. The difficulty of justifying the slowness of transformations taking place within the French Union to outside observers – and to colonial subjects themselves – did not escape a generation of policymakers and administrators struggling to translate the administrative and institutional implications of the French Union into reality. Often, behind the more visible turnover of governments and political postings in the Fourth Republic, high functionaries and

⁶⁸ For an analysis of the constitution and its implications for the French Union more broadly, see the 23 April 1953 report on "Le Projet de constitution européenne de l'Assemblée 'ad hoc' et l'Union française," authored by the Direction des Affaires Politiques, Commission chargé d'étudier l'intégration des TOM dans la CEE. ANOM 1AFFPOL/2314. For concerns about Algeria specifically, see the letter from Governor General Roger Leonard to the Minister of the Interior on the subject of the "Participation éventuelle de l'Algérie à la communauté européenne," dated May 7th, 1953. ANOM 10CAB/118.

⁶⁹ Algeria, an internal study notes, had already been excluded from the European Coal and Steel Community and had found itself able to participate in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation had only by virtue of its tax union with the Metropole. See "Situations qui peuvent être provoqués en Afrique du nord par les traités entre la France et les organismes de l'Europe, le 27 mars 1952." ANOM 10CAB/118.

⁷⁰ While French policymakers and legislators rejected this model of the European Political Community and its sister organization, the European Defense Community, they framed this rejection in an affirmation of European integration's importance and the critical need to study frameworks that could draw the French Union in its entirety together with Europe. For an example of the importance French administrators assigned to European integration for the remaking of the French Empire, see the note "La Coopération Européenne en Afrique." ANOM 1AFFPOL/2316. On its importance for Algeria specifically, see Governor General Leonard's letter, cited above.

administrators remained constant.⁷¹ This ensured both a continuity of perspectives and the transmission of studies undertaken in response to the varying challenges to French sovereignty that arose throughout the period.⁷² Figures like Lucien Paye, who oversaw reforms to Muslims' civil status under Lacoste, or Roland Maspétiol, who authored a defining 1955 report on necessary reforms in Algeria, had played an important role in earlier reforms and efforts to defend the legitimacy of French sovereignty in international forums. Paye, for example, had directed civil service reforms in Algeria in 1947, while Maspétiol had served as legal councilor in the debates over North Africa at the World Health Organization.⁷³ Integrationism emerged and drew broad support from such a milieu of self-consciously reformist civil servants with direct experiences in colonial administration.

The growing international challenges to France's empire in the decade following the Second World War refocused the French administrative gaze externally when searching for the causes of unrest in Algeria. For many French officials, blame for the explosion of violence in November 1954 and the advancement of the nationalist cause afterward lay not with Algerian political movements, but in the battery of external actors putting pressure on French rule in North Africa. Roger Leonard, Governor General of Algeria at the moment of the conflict's eruption, attributed the violence to a "command word coming from abroad," citing Radio Cairo's transmission of the FLN's call to revolution.⁷⁴ This perspective was broadly shared: in a

⁷¹ Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne*, 66-67.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ On Maspétiol, see Pearson-Patel. Lucien Paye's signature as "Director of Reforms" appears on several documents dating from 1947 reforming civil services and the organization of Djemâas, or village councils. For an example, see the Government General of Algeria publication, *Pour l'Algérie, Pour la France: Directives aux autorités locales, avril 1956* (Algiers: Imprimerie officielle du Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, 1956), 69.

⁷⁴ Quoted in Maquin, 27.

January 1957 speech, Mollet denounced Nasser's "intervention... to support an insurrectional movement launched on our territory," calling it a violation of international law.⁷⁵ Likewise, Soustelle ascribed Egyptian pan-Arabism a key role in aiding, financing, and motivating "Algerian terrorists" who might have otherwise remained passive autonomists.⁷⁶ For many observers, these concerns merged with anxieties about Communist subversion. Lacoste later explained that he and others feared Algeria would fall under Soviet influence should French control diminish.⁷⁷ Soustelle had raised the specter of a communist invasion of the Mediterranean in 1952, when he called for renewed international support of French sovereignty in Morocco and Tunisia, both embroiled in debates over national independence.⁷⁸ Few French officials seemed willing – in public or private – to grant the FLN full agency for its insurrection. Instead, they saw the shadowy hand of foreign intervention behind anticolonial violence. Such a perspective laid the groundwork for a reform-focused policy like integration because it located the war's roots in French policy failures rather than the widespread appeal of the FLN's message.

The continuing difficulty of carrying out postwar reforms and the lack of political will on the part of colonial governments also drove French officials' attention increasingly inward. While few recognized the legitimacy of FLN calls for independence or even of nationalist calls for a federal relationship between metropole and colony, the eruption of violence forced many

⁷⁵"Pour la Paix, Pour une Algérie Nouvelle: déclaration de Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil, sur la politique française en Algérie, 9 janvier 1951," OURS, AGM 82.

⁷⁶ Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 21-22. For more on the threat of Pan-Arabism, see Maquin 104 and Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 34-37.

⁷⁷ 21 February 1978 interview conducted by Odile Rudelle with Robert Lacoste and Jean Vaujour. CHSP OR2.

⁷⁸ Jacques Soustelle, "France and Europe: A Gaullist View," *Foreign Affairs* 30, vol. 1 (1951/1952), 550.

policymakers to acknowledge that the realities of colonial rule in Algeria differed vastly from the progressive rhetoric of rights favored by the French Union since 1946. If foreign elements had ignited and nourished the growing nationalist “rebellion,” many argued, the insurrection owed its sustained success to France’s failure to do away with the inequitable and arbitrary practices that had characterized colonial rule before the Second World War. Such a failure created favorable conditions for an uprising. Algeria is “a sick person,” Soustelle argued in a confidential note to Faure, “whose debilitated body cannot resist a virus introduced from the exterior.”⁷⁹ Politicians had made too many promises to Algerians they did not keep, some observers within the French state argued. Those charged with carrying out political reforms in Algeria before 1955 had failed in their duties, precipitating the crisis.⁸⁰

Far from embodying the progressive rhetoric of the French Union, advocates of integrationism began to see the colonial administration as a contributing factor to Algeria’s unrest. The official memorandum outlining Soustelle’s new policies for civil servants and government officials declared that local administrators had “lost contact” with the populations they governed. Many had an insufficient knowledge of the region they administered, had never visited villages in their circumscription, and had never cultivated relationships with important local notables. Bureaucratic mentalities and “invasive red tape,” an overly-complex administrative structure that encouraged social segregation between different services, a general lack of personnel: all had contributed to an “abstract and distanced” administration, and an Algerian ‘Muslim’ population that felt “ignored or neglected.” Such a situation allowed

⁷⁹ Soustelle to Faure, “Notes politiques,” June-July 1955, AN fonds Edgar Faure, 505/AP/II/344.

⁸⁰ See, for example, Ely, *Memoires: Suez... Le 13 Mai*, 46, or Colonel Lanusse, “Algérie 1956: Action Psychologique et Action Politique,” August 1956. IHTP ARC 2010/II.

subversive propaganda to gain a foothold “without our knowledge, only to reveal itself brutally at a moment of crisis.” Algeria, the memorandum continued, “illustrates this danger all too well.”⁸¹

For those attempting to analyze the roots of the ‘Algerian problem,’ an ongoing failure to extend full political rights and an alienating and ill-adapted administration only compounded a looming economic and demographic crisis that threatened to split open the disparities inherent in colonial society. A series of studies beginning in 1947 and culminating with the 1955 ‘Maspétiol Report’ – named for the head of a commission appointed by François Mitterand to study economic and social development in Algeria – played a key role in shaping French officials’ understanding of demographic and economic concerns in Algeria through the end of the war.⁸² These studies laid out in plain terms the systemic economic disparities which structured Algerian society. Algeria’s indigenous population was overwhelmingly impoverished: three quarters of Algerians lacked milk, meat, eggs, or high-quality fats in their diets, which consisted primarily of grains that many Algerians only procured through emergency distributions by French state. Chronic, widespread unemployment, particularly in rural areas, further exacerbated Algerians’ economic insecurity.⁸³ While such studies noted that such poverty resulted partially from a lack of industrialization, they also pointed to the

⁸¹ Circulaire N° 6.098 CC du 22 juillet 1955, aux Préfets, Sous-Préfets, Maires, Administrateurs des Services Civils chefs de Communes Mixtes, Directeurs et Chefs des Services de l’Administration Centrale, reprinted in *Pour l’Algérie, Pour la France: Directives aux autorités locales, avril 1956*, 73-75. See also Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 26.

⁸² Mitterand assembled this commission in October, before the opening of the Algerian War. According to Lefevre, French administrators had been aware since at least 1952 of rising demographic and economic problems. Under Lacoste, the Maspétiol group continued its work and expanded its study into the *Perspectives décennales de développement économique de l’Algérie*, published by the Ministère de l’Algérie in 1958, that heavily informed de Gaulle’s Constantine Plan. See Lefevre, *Chère Algérie*, 335-351.

⁸³ Chevalier, 91, 96.

concentration of wealth in the hands of settlers. Out of 9 million inhabitants, the Maspétol Report noted, 6 million 'Muslims' collectively possessed 99.1 billion francs, while the settler-dominated upper and middle classes comprising 610,000 individuals collectively controlled 128.9 billion francs.⁸⁴

An exploding birthrate on the part of Algeria's autochthonous population further exacerbated such wealth disparities. The 'Muslim' population had grown in size from 6,066,400 to 7,234,700 individuals between 1926 and 1936, far outpacing the growth of the settler population, even though its birthrate had risen as well. In 1947, the 'European' population was expected to drop from 13.97% of Algeria's total population in 1936 to only 10.31% by 1960.⁸⁵ This provoked anxieties that Algeria's mostly-urban settler population would be increasingly outnumbered by an underdeveloped "indigenous mass."⁸⁶ Maspétol and other commentators also doubted Algeria's future economic viability. Algeria's agricultural productivity needed to grow just to ensure sufficient resources to keep up with rising birth rates, let alone to raise the already-abysmal standard of living for the majority of inhabitants.⁸⁷ A serious effort at industrialization and economic rationalization, administrators argued, had become imperative.

⁸⁴ Lefevre, 86-87. Lefevre rightly points out that such a figure erases many nuances: not all settlers were wealthy, and some Algerians existed in the upper social strata of colonial society. But in general terms, settlers were better off than their indigenous counterparts, earning an average revenue of 250 versus 80 Francs per month, according to a 1960 study.

⁸⁵ These figures come from Louis Chevalier, *Le Problème Démographique Nord-Africain – Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques Travaux et Documents Cahier N° 6* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947), on which Daniel Lefevre offers a helpful explanation in *Chère Algérie*, 70-72.

⁸⁶ Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 18.

⁸⁷ Léon Tabah, "La Population Algérienne., Croissance, Niveau de Vie, Investissements" *Population: Revue trimestrielle de l'Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques* 11, no. 3 (1956). A copy can be located in the personal papers of Guy Mollet, OURS AGM 81. This short study essentially echoes the conclusions of Chevalier.

For many high administrators and functionaries, existing models of colonial rule had expired, politically, socially, and economically. In their view, France had a moral duty to enact profound changes to the political structure of its Empire. "The era of colonization had passed," Jacques Lenoir, Préfet of Batna in 1956, recounted. "It was necessary to create a new political framework, where the Algerian could advance."⁸⁸ "It is the spirit of a generous and humane France that calls us to break with the routines of the past." Soustelle proclaimed in January 1956. "No to the rebellion, with its obscurantism and savagery;" but also: "No to the immobility that is found in the precarious maintenance of an obsolete position!"⁸⁹ For Socialists in power from March 1956, the war had two fronts: a campaign against 'terrorism', and a struggle against colonial privilege.⁹⁰ Integrationists positioned themselves as anti-colonial. They did not question the legitimacy of maintaining a relationship of French dominance over its colony, but they constructed their vision of regenerated ties between France and Algeria in opposition to the discriminatory practices that had characterized colonial rule in the past.

This rhetorical shift on the part of reformers was not entirely new. The democratic language of the French Union had pushed colonial administrators to search for new vocabularies to qualify France's relationship to its colonial holdings.⁹¹ After 1945, politicians on

⁸⁸ Lenoir began his career in Algeria as a sous-Préfet in Batna and continued to serve in various capacities attached to the French state in Algeria until 1961. Undated interview conducted by Odile Rudelle with Jacques Lenoir. CHSP OR3.

⁸⁹ Quoted in Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 203.

⁹⁰ Declared at the Socialist Party congress in July 1956. See Martin Evans, "Guy Mollet's Third Way: National Renewal and the French Civilizing Mission in Algeria," *French History and Civilization* 2 (2009), 178.

⁹¹ Emily Marker, "Obscuring Race: Franco-African Conversations about Colonial Reform and Racism After World War Two and the Making of 'Colorblind' France, 1945-1950," *French Politics, Culture & Society* (forthcoming).

the metropolitan political left frequently positioned their visions of a developmentalist, modernizing empire in Africa against the maintenance of “un colonialisme périmé” (an expired colonialism). Officials skeptical of opening the French Union too broadly to European economic agreements also warned against restoration of “colonialism,” shorthand, in this case, for purely extractive economic relationships.⁹² But the unfolding conflict in Algeria lent new immediacy to calls for reform, and made French policymakers more willing to break with existing colonial structures or practices in order to combat the economic and political inequalities created by the colonial state. By adopting emerging third-worldist critiques of colonialism and pointing to ‘outdated’ state structures as the principal cause of the Algerian revolution, integrationists made state-sponsored political and economic ‘modernization’ programs into an antidote to nationalism.⁹³ Thus by 1960, a study disseminated by the head of the commission on “institutional solutions” in Algeria could cite Albert Memmi’s description of the psychology of colonizer and colonized to call for the “decolonization” and renewal of the French state in Algeria.⁹⁴

Faced with what they perceived as the end of the colonial era, and confronted with what many considered the failure of France to honor its civilizing mission in Algeria,

⁹² Smith, “Of Colonial Futures and an Administrative Alamo,” 108. For an example of warnings about the dangers of a possible reversion to “colonial” relationships within the bounds of a European community, see former Minister of Colonies Marius Moutet’s comments in the parliamentary debates over the “Rapports entre l’Union française et une organisation politique de l’Europe” in the *Journal Officiel*, 6 March 1953. ANOM 1AFFPOL/3255.

⁹³ Etienne Maquin suggests that Socialist Party members were “seduced” by Third-Worldist ideas, which fit ideologically with both French Republican traditions and socialist internationalism. See Maquin, *Le Parti Socialiste et la Guerre d’Algérie*, 210.

⁹⁴ See the correspondence between G. de Wailly, Inspector-general of Finances and the head of the Mission d’Etudes, bilan des solutions institutionnelles qui ont été proposées pour l’Algérie, and members of then-President Charles de Gaulle’s cabinet, like Bernard Tricot, and Pierre Racine, ANOM 81F/177. G. de Wailly cites a study by M. Lacomte, entitled “Pour une politique de décolonisation en Algérie” (citing Memmi) dated December 1959, also present in this dossier.

integrationists argued that the nation stood at a crossroads. "There are only two possible solutions for Algeria today," Pierre Maisonneuve stated in a foundational January 1956 policy report, just before he became head of Lacoste's civil and military cabinets. "Political independence," or the "absorption" of Algeria by France. The "proclamation of grand principles" alone would be insufficient to resolve the 'Algerian problem.' Only an immediate and palpable shift in colonial policy, Maisonneuve argued, could keep Algeria French.⁹⁵ Integrationism drove efforts to radically transform the colonial status quo – a "revolution by law" in the words of Soustelle – and viewed the war effort as a project of 'democratic' nation-building, rather than a simple exercise in military repression.⁹⁶ Imbued with the mystique of a cure-all by partisans of integration, administrative reforms and 'modernization' projects soon came to represent the tools for the social and political regeneration of French Algeria necessitated by a changing world.

Renew the Administration; Regenerate Algeria

Beginning in 1955, Governor General Jacques Soustelle and his successor under the new title of Resident Minister, Robert Lacoste, worked to implement a series of reforms and to elaborate new institutions that could address the economic, political, and social causes of the revolution in Algeria.⁹⁷ In their view, to make it viable in the long term, France needed to adapt

⁹⁵ Pierre Maisonneuve, "Esquisse d'un plan de politique algérienne," January 1956. A copy can be found in the archives of Edgar Faure, AN 505/AP/II/344.

⁹⁶ Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 35.

⁹⁷ This change in titles is not insignificant: while the Governor General headed a semi-autonomous government, the Resident Minister was officially attached to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic, signaling an end to any separation of governance. See decree N° 56-196 of 16 February 1956 relative to the attributions of the Resident Minister in Algeria, reprinted in *Programme Gouvernemental. Mesures de pacification et réformes en Algérie*, 15.

Algeria to an evolving global political and economic order that had outstripped changes in colonial policy since 1945. Their solution to decades of poor administration and institutionalized discrimination was a massive 'modernization' program that proceeded along three main lines: the restructuring and purging of the colonial administration, a rationalization of Algerian political and economic structures and their harmonization with those of the metropole, and the creation of an array of programs designed to draw Algerians into a regular, active engagement with the state and promote their social and political equalization. This project of social and economic development would not only undercut foreign and nationalist criticisms and resolve Algeria's structural poverty, but draw settlers and Algerians closer together by renewing and reinvigorating Algerian social and economic life. The reforms pursued under Soustelle and Lacoste drew inspiration from contemporary development theories, and looked to metropolitan society as a "prefabricated model for directed social progress" that could guide Algeria's evolution.⁹⁸ Industrialization became a "civilizational imperative," and the social-cultural uplifting of Algeria's indigenous population gained renewed life, albeit in a language of struggle against social and economic underdevelopment rather than cultural inferiority, as the *raison d'être* of integration.⁹⁹

But while such programs seemed to depoliticize French actions by displacing part of the state's efforts to counter Algerian nationalism into the realm of socioeconomic development projects, they also reproduced the assimilatory drive of earlier colonial policies, and drew on conventional knowledge about Algerian 'Muslims'. Integrationism did recognize Algerian

⁹⁸ Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 178. On the role of modernization/development theory, see Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*.

⁹⁹ Davis, "Restaging *Mise en Valeur*," 178

'particularity'. In practice, however, its originality lay less in its conceptual difference from assimilation, or in the means it sought to employ to incorporate Algerians into the nation, than in the scale and invasiveness of intervention it provoked on the part of a colonial state seeking to rapidly and massively transform Algerian society.

"Development was," Frederick Cooper notes, "a statement about empire: that it had a future, and it was a long one and a just one."¹⁰⁰ And integration promised exactly that: to build a utopian "Algérie Nouvelle" (New Algeria), defined by an "equality of all individuals" and Franco-Muslim "fraternity and close solidarity" that could endure far into the future.¹⁰¹ This vision of a regenerated Algerian society stood central to the future of France. The decline of the nation-state characterized the postwar period, a new era of 'grands ensembles.'¹⁰² The growing hegemony of the U.S. dollar and the threat of Soviet totalitarianism trapped Europe and reduced it to "no more than the coastal strip of Eurasia, politically disunited, economically weak, militarily indefensible."¹⁰³ Isolated from its empire or some form of a united Europe, France would become nothing more than "a small France, prey to the great empires of our times and condemned to be nothing more than a satellite."¹⁰⁴ In the minds of many French

¹⁰⁰ Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 120.

¹⁰¹ Teaching materials for the Centre d'instruction de pacification et contre-guérilla d'Arzew, "Formation politique," dated 21 November 1958. SHD 1H/1115, dossier 1.

¹⁰² Todd Shepard traces the frequent citation by French officials of the necessity of supranational states in this period in "À l'heure des « grands-ensembles » et de la guerre d'Algérie. L'état-nation en question," *Monde(s): Revue d'histoire transnationale* 1 (2012), 113-134.

¹⁰³ Pierre Nord, *L'Eurafrique, notre dernière chance* (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1955), 114. These sentiments seem have been widely shared by many within colonial policy groups. See, for example, the report by the Directorate General of Political Affairs (DGAP) for the Minister of Overseas France "La Coopération Européenne en Afrique," (undated, likely 1953). ANOM 1AFFPOL/2316.

¹⁰⁴ Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 240.

policymakers, France desperately needed to bring Europe and Africa together to create a 'third force' powerful enough to resist the pressures of the two Cold War superpowers.

For politicians on the French left and many representatives of overseas France like Léopold Sédar Senghor or Sourou Migan Apithy, the imperative to take concrete steps toward creating this envisioned "Eurafrica" gained increased relevancy after the rejection of the European Political and Defense Communities in August 1954, largely due to the communities' perceived incompatibility with the structures of the French Union.¹⁰⁵ The unravelling conflict in Algeria only added to this relevancy. France, including its integral province of Algeria, comprised the lynchpin that could unite the two continents, with the metropole leading Europe and Algeria at the head of the African territories.

Merging Europe and Africa would drive the progress of both: Africa was underdeveloped and vulnerable, in need of European guidance, while Europe needed African resources and hoped to ensure the stability of the continent, lest it fall to subversive forces.¹⁰⁶ Mollet's public declarations placed Algeria as central to a "Eurafrican ensemble," and the incorporation of Algeria into such a body as central to its future prosperity and peace. "What would Algeria become alone?" Mollet demanded in a speech outlining his Algerian policies in early 1957, and "what would be its future, on the contrary, as one of the foundations of the

¹⁰⁵ For a description of Senghor's vision of Eurafrica, see Gary Wilder, "Eurafrrique as the Future Past of Black France: Sarkozy's Temporal Confusion and Senghor's Postwar Vision," in Keaton, Sharpley-Whiting, and Stovall, eds., *Black France / France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012). For editorials by deputies Senghor (Senegal), Apithy (Dahomey) and others like Jean Silvanire (Soudan) in support of a notion of Eurafrica during debates over the European Defense Community and European Political Community, see the massive dossiers of press clippings collected by the DGAP in ANOM 1AFFPOL/2314 and 1APPFOL/3255.

¹⁰⁶ "Formation politique," SHD 1H/1115 (cited above).

Eurafrican community now coming together?"¹⁰⁷ Such an image of a mutually-beneficial and harmonious community echoed 19th-century Saint-Simonian visions of a utopian fusion between Algeria and France that would regenerate both, inaugurating a new political order.¹⁰⁸ The visions of Eurafrica and the 'New Algeria' carried similar messianic valences. Partisans of integration argued that by substituting mutual cooperation for colonial tutelage, and mutual economic and social development for exploitation, they would not merely undermine the nationalist project and carry Algeria into the 'modern' era. They would also renew France's place as a global political and economic power.¹⁰⁹

If the future that Jacques Soustelle and his successors envisioned for France and Algeria offered a radical break with the past, the practical measures Soustelle began to outline in mid-1955 were perhaps less novel. Soustelle's proposed reforms primarily aimed to carry out in reality the changes that the 1947 Statute of Algeria had already laid out on paper, but that the settler-dominated Algerian Assembly had blocked. These consisted primarily of projects to restructure and decentralize the colonial administration and to subdivide Algeria into new *départements* (sub-national administrative circumscriptions); efforts to extend local and national voting rights to all Algerians, including women; and programs to promote Algerian 'Muslim' access to civil service positions.¹¹⁰ Soustelle also sought policies that would recognize

¹⁰⁷ "Pour la Paix en Algérie, Pour une Algérie Nouvelle: Déclaration de M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil, sur la politique française en Algérie, 9 janvier 1957," OURS AGM/82.

¹⁰⁸ On Saint-Simonians and utopian socialism in Algeria, see Osama W Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), particularly the introduction and chapter 1; and Patricia Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, pp. 108-117.

¹⁰⁹ See, for example, Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 240-245.

¹¹⁰ Soustelle cites these precedents in *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 54. These measures were not particularly new in 1947 either; Guy Pervillé traces their origins back to a series of studies seeking to reinitiate the failed 1936 Blum-Viollette Plan initiated in 1944 by the French Committee of National Liberation. See Pervillé, "La Commission des reformes musulmanes de 1944 et l'élaboration d'une nouvelle politique algérienne de la France," in Charles-

Algeria's provincial 'personality' and promote Algerians' social advancement, such as the instruction of Arabic in public schools, efforts to ameliorate poverty, and bills designed to fight corruption and venality in the colonial administration.¹¹¹

Soustelle played a key role in theorizing and promoting integration. But his efforts to radically shift colonial policy while in office remained limited. Soustelle still faced the intransigence of settler representatives in the Algerian Assembly. And after a series of polarizing FLN-led massacres and brutal French reprisals around Philippeville in August 1955, he also faced the opposition of Algerian elites. On September 26, a group of 61 indigenous representatives to the Algerian Assembly, the National Assembly, and the Assembly of the French Union signed a statement publicly condemning military repression and denouncing Soustelle's policy of integration as "now obsolete" in the face of Algerians' overwhelming support of "the national idea."¹¹² The metropolitan press quickly followed suit and labeled integration as a surpassed strategy.¹¹³ Soustelle, however, continued pursuing the policy, despite its apparent failure to generate the enthusiasm it sought amongst Algerians.

The greatest impact of Soustelle's short tenure in office came not through grand legal reforms but with the series of new institutions he created to carry out social development

Robert Ageron, ed. *Les Chemins de la décolonisation de l'empire colonial français, 1936-1956* (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1986). For a more comprehensive overview of the 1947 reforms, see Tayeb Chenntouf, "L'Assemblée Algérienne" in the same volume.

¹¹¹ See, for example memoranda numbers 4684, 4685, and 4686 /C.C. of 15 June 1955 concerning the "fight against venality," reprinted in *Pour l'Algérie, Pour la France*, 19-24. For a full list of reforms proposed under Soustelle, see the "Note sur le Plan de Reformes proposé par le Gouverneur Général et adopté par le Gouvernement." ANOM 11CAB/80.

¹¹² "La Motion des 61," reprinted in Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, eds., *Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962* (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 220-221.

¹¹³ Courrière, *Le Temps des Léopards*, 196.

policies and to reinvigorate the colonial administration at the local level. These programs drew considerable inspiration from Soustelle's experiences with *indigenismo* policies in Mexico, and from recent work by ethnographers and sociologists in Algeria.¹¹⁴ The Social Centers Service which Soustelle developed in collaboration with fellow ethnologist Germaine Tillion, for example, sought to address urban Algerians' socioeconomic disadvantages by providing general educational instruction to children and adults, economic assistance to families, and basic medical services.¹¹⁵ But the Special Administrative Sections (SAS) quickly eclipsed other initiatives in 1955, and came to serve as a central building block of a new administration, as well as the most direct and generalized means of effecting social change.

The SAS served as the institutional vector for integration, directing social welfare programs aimed at raising the living conditions of Algerians and educational efforts seeking to prepare them for full political participation in the French nation. The SAS would serve, in Soustelle's words, as "the beating heart of France in each douar (village)".¹¹⁶ Trained by the army but officially operating under the orders of the local civilian prefect, the officers of the SAS held joint civil and military powers over a small territorial circumscription considered to be under-administered or threatened by the revolution.¹¹⁷ Their central role was to be "ensembliers," or "bringer-togethers": individuals who could restore extended contact

¹¹⁴ See Todd Shepard, "Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO", and Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 83.

¹¹⁵ For more on the Service de Centres Sociaux and Tillion's role, see Le Sueur, *Uncivil War*, chapter 3, and Fabien Sacriste, *Germaine Tillion, Jacques Berque, Jean Servier et Pierre Bourdieu: Des ethnologues dans la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2011), pages 55-72.

¹¹⁶ Courrière, *Le Temps des Léopards*, 97.

¹¹⁷ Despite the massive extension of SAS across Algeria during the conflict, the historiography remains under-developed. Gregor Mathias' short and occasionally partisan *Les Sections Administratives Spécialisées en Algérie: entre idéal et réalité, 1955-1962* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998) remains the best introductory volume on the topic.

between local communities and the state.¹¹⁸ The task of SAS officers was to create a locally-run administration as quickly as possible, and draw Algerians into collaboration with it, in the process creating a “communitarian spirit” and sense of fraternity that could cement Algerians’ attachment to France.¹¹⁹ The arabophone officers acted as ‘men on the spot,’ gathering intelligence on FLN movements, carrying out limited military actions, directing construction projects, and mediating local disputes.



Figure 1.1: A Special Administrative Sections (SAS) officer clad in the signature blue képi dedicates housing constructed for inhabitants of Aïn Tindamine, near Sidi-bel-Abbès, 10 May 1958. (Source: ECPAD ALG/58/24/RC). © ECPAD

¹¹⁸ Service de l'Information et du Cabinet du Ministre de l'Algérie, *Action du Gouvernement en Algérie : Mesures de pacification et réformes* (Algiers, October 1957), 34. IHTP ARC 2006/11.

¹¹⁹ Colonel Schoen, “Quelques conseils aux jeunes Officiers d’Affaires Algériennes,” 19 November 1955. Reprinted in *Pour l’Algérie, Pour la France: Directives aux autorités locales*, avril 1956, 45-60.

Soustelle and his collaborators saw the population as a principal terrain of the conflict in Algeria, and the SAS as the tool to win the population's renewed loyalty to the French cause. In theory, the SAS officers would replace the paternalism of colonialism with sympathetic, "good faith" relationships, and fill the "moral and intellectual gap" separating Algeria's 'European' and 'Muslim' populations.¹²⁰ They would supervise the material and administrative tasks of integration and accomplish its psychological dimensions as well, by drawing Algerians into the French nation socially, politically, and affectively. In these capacities, the SAS drew conceptually on the long heritage of French military units with specialized ethnographic and linguistic knowledge that worked to convince local populations in North Africa of the 'benefits of French civilization'. The Arab Bureaus that operated in 19th-century Algeria had filled a similar role, as had more recently the Indigenous Affairs officers in the French protectorate of Morocco. Veterans of the Indigenous Affairs bureau formed the majority of the initial corps of SAS officers recruited by Soustelle in 1955.¹²¹ Useful to the administration both as a means to police the population and as a tool to drive integration at the local level, the SAS proliferated. SAS circumscriptions multiplied rapidly throughout the conflict to number 688 in 1961, and more than 4,000 officers passed through the ranks of the SAS.¹²² Through the SAS integration

¹²⁰ Soustelle, Note attached to Circulaire N° 6.098 CC of 22 July 1955 on the policy of "Contact," and Schoen, "Quelques conseils," in *Pour l'Algérie, Pour la France*, pages 77 and 54.

¹²¹ Claude Collot characterizes the SAS as "the former Arab Bureaus from the period of conquest, modernized, disposing of more men and materials and money." See Collot, *Les institutions de l'Algérie durant la période coloniale, 1830-1962* (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1987), 146. For a short history of the role of Indigenous Affairs (AI) officers in the SAS, see Mathias, pp. 19-28. On the Bureaux Arabes, see Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity*. Colonel Schoen, who authored the advice to young officers cited above, was himself a former AI officer.

¹²² Jacques Fremeaux offers the figure of 4,000 officers in "Les SAS (sections administratives spécialisées)," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 208 (2002/4), 55-68. An anonymous report in Lacoste's files places the number of SAS circumscriptions at 180 in January 1956 and 490 in January 1957, attesting to their rapid growth. Collot lists the number of SAS at 641 in December 1959; 661 by the end of 1960; and 688 in 1961. See "Vers une Algérie Nouvelle," ANOM 12CAB/152, and Collot, 156.

gained an institutional form with enormous material impact, embodying the tensions between repression and reform inherent in the project. Despite their goals of promoting fraternity, the SAS became, in the words of journalist Yves Courrière, “half bureaus of charity; half bureaus of tears.”¹²³

Soustelle’s vision of integration and its institutional incarnations became a driving force behind French policies with the arrival to power of Robert Lacoste, who served as Resident Minister of Algeria beginning in February 1956. In many ways, Lacoste was an unlikely reformer. Unlike Soustelle, Lacoste had little prior experience with either Algeria or colonial reform. He was, however, a devoted member of the Socialist party establishment. Mollet appointed Lacoste only after a disastrous first visit to Algeria on February 6th, 1956, when angry crowds of settlers pelted the new president with rotten tomatoes and clods of dirt in protest against his proposed integration reform policies. The event led to the resignation of Mollet’s original appointee, General Georges Catroux, former Governor General and outspoken advocate of reform. Several other notable socialists refused the position before Mollet finally convinced Lacoste to accept it. But despite his lack of colonial credentials, the bullish and pragmatic Lacoste, a staunch admirer of the army with a reputation for coarseness and forcefulness, entered office committed to taking decisive action to resolve the ‘Algerian problem.’

Under Lacoste, integrationism remained the core solution to this problem. Lacoste’s policies drew heavily on Soustelle’s ideas, and he publicly recognized his indebtedness to his predecessor for “illuminating [Algeria’s] problems and dressing a preliminary list of reforms to

¹²³ Courrière, *Le Temps des Léopards*, 97.

accomplish without delay in order to restore the confidence of Muslims.”¹²⁴ But Lacoste’s label for his own policy – “Pacification” – reflected his willingness to enforce integrationist policies against all opposition. His pessimism regarding the colonial status quo and his willingness to strong-arm change past any opposition were apparent: upon arriving in Algiers he announced his intentions to completely reorganize “this shitshow of an administration,” a sentiment that found strong support in Mollet’s private encouragements to “kick the functionaries to the curb” so that real change could be pursued.¹²⁵

To launch the series of accelerated reforms and intensify repression, Lacoste and Mollet turned to the National Assembly to demand sweeping powers for the new Resident Minister. On March 12th, following two days of impassioned speeches in front of the deputies assembled in Paris, the President and his Resident Minister succeeded in drawing the overwhelming approval of the National Assembly for a law granting Lacoste ‘special powers’.¹²⁶ The law authorized the economic development of Algeria, fiscal and administrative reforms, and programs aimed at raising the living standards and promoting the social progress of Algerian ‘Muslims’. It also conveyed Lacoste the ability to rule by decree, which he immediately utilized. The morning following the vote, Lacoste granted full police powers to the French army, and a month later he dissolved the Algerian Assembly, “content,” he

¹²⁴ Lacoste’s speech to the French National Assembly, 8 march 1956. Excerpted in *Programme Gouvernemental. Mesures de pacification et réformes en Algérie*, 6. Lacoste later claimed in interviews not to have liked the term “Integration,” though policy brief and memoranda published under his leadership, particularly those authored by the army, frequently employed the term. See Odile Rudelle’s interview with Robert Lacoste, cited above.

¹²⁵ Courrière, *Le Temps des Léopards*, 282 and 272.

¹²⁶ For the full text of the law, see Loi N° 56-258 du 16 mars 1956 granting “Special Powers authorizing the Government to put into action in Algeria a program of economic expansion, social progress, and administrative reform, and authorizing it to take all exceptional measures for the reestablishment of order, the protection of persons and goods, and the security of the territory,” reprinted in *Programme Gouvernemental. Mesures de pacification et réformes en Algérie*, pp. 16-17.

reflected, "to rid myself of an opposition."¹²⁷ The Pacification of Algeria had begun in earnest, and integrationist policies stood central to Lacoste's strategy.



Figure 1.1: Prefect Maurice Papon (left) and Resident Minister Robert Lacoste (center) at a 'Youth Festival' in Constantine, 8 June 1957. (Source: ECPAD ALG/57/317). © ECPAD

The dizzying array of reforms laid out by Lacoste and Mollet beginning in March and April 1956 reflected the new government's desire to remake Algeria. Communal restructuring, programs granting Algerians favorable access to civil service jobs, and efforts at administrative decentralization and restructuring all aimed to grant Algerians greater access to French political life and a larger role in governing their territory. Likewise, agricultural modernization projects and the incorporation of metropolitan and Algerian currencies, fiscal regimes, and

¹²⁷ Interview with Robert Lacoste. CHSP OR₃.

banking systems sought to lay the basis for massive investments in Algeria's industrialization and create jobs for Algerians.¹²⁸ Such actions were not entirely unique to Algeria within the French Union. From the beginning of his presidential term, Guy Mollet prioritized efforts to replace "tutelage" with "a free cooperation in reciprocal confidence" in all of France's overseas territories.¹²⁹ In June 1956 the National Assembly passed the *Loi-cadre* by a margin of 446 to 98, devolving powers to territorial governments and instituting universal suffrage across the French Union, but also retrenching economic ties to metropolitan France. With the *Loi-cadre*, Lacoste attempted to regain the initiative of reform in the face of rising internal and international criticisms of colonial rule, and like integrationism, emphasized local legal structures over imported metropolitan models.¹³⁰ Lacoste pursued parallel changes in Algeria, which French lawmakers excluded from the 1956 law. The institution of a universal electoral college, the transfer of certain executive powers to departmental governments in Algeria, and other structural changes he could not unilaterally enact under the special powers law, Lacoste proposed to the National Assembly in the form of an Algerian *loi-cadre* in September 1957. Initially rejected, then diluted by a deluge of amendments that washed out its intended impact

¹²⁸ In a note laying out the broad aims of 'Pacification', Lacoste noted the central importance of employing "Muslim French citizens who constitute the reservoir of possible rebels," since individuals with a stable economic situation, in his reasoning, were less likely to participate in destabilizing violence. See Lacoste, Note No 5848/cc on "Pacification," dated 10 July 1956. ANOM 12CAB/79. Claude Collot provides a clear and comprehensive overview of all these changes and their intended aims. On fiscal and budgetary integration, see *Les institutions de l'Algérie*, pages. 18-19. On communal and territorial reform, see pages 138-143.

¹²⁹ Quoted in Denis Lefebvre, *Guy Mollet: Le mal aimé*, 200.

¹³⁰ On the 1956 *Loi-cadre*, see Smith, "Of Colonial Futures and an Administrative Alamo."

on Algerian and international audiences, Lacoste's *loi-cadre* finally passed in late January, 1958.¹³¹

The administration in Algeria was unique in its efforts to compel the social transformation of colonial subjects. While in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1950s France sought to "disengage from the management of social change," Lacoste's government, like Soustelle's, placed an increasing emphasis on projects aimed at the social, cultural, and economic transformation of Algerians.¹³² The question of how to make 'Muslims' into full members of the French nation, not merely in legal but in affective and cultural terms, became a dominant preoccupation and a driving force behind Lacoste's project of "Pacification" in Algeria.¹³³ The creation of a harmonious New Algeria, Lacoste declared, required not just legal and economic change, but efforts to lift up the "under-administered, under-evolved, under-employed, under-fed" Algerian population to "a level comparable to that of western countries."¹³⁴

Both Soustelle and Lacoste saw Algerians as "primitive" and "ill-prepared for life."¹³⁵ Integrating 'Muslims' into the French nation required compelling them to adopt social norms and practices deemed sufficiently 'modern'. If assimilation had held up a metropolitan model

¹³¹ On the Algerian Loi-cadre, see "La Loi-Cadre du 5 février 1958 sur les Institutions de l'Algérie," ANOM 81F/177, and Shepard, "À l'heure des « grands-ensembles », " pp. 166-167.

¹³² Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 391.

¹³³ Much of the historiography positions Mollet as the motor of reforms, and while his impulsion played a significant role, a broad view of the colonial archives suggests that Lacoste's administration was driven by its own internal dynamics. This is corroborated by Christian Pineau's assertions that Mollet granted Lacoste and his other ministers broad initiative in forming policies. See Pierre Brana and Joëlle Dusseau, *Robert Lacoste (1898-1989): De la Dordogne à l'Algérie, un socialiste devant l'histoire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2010), 184.

¹³⁴ General Directive destined for Officers and Subordinate Officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Stationed in Algeria," dated 19 May 1956, and reprinted in *Programme et Action du Gouvernement en Algérie: Mesures de pacification et réformes* (Algiers: Service de l'information du Cabinet du Ministre résidant en Algérie, August 1956), 75-76.

¹³⁵ Lacoste's 8 March 1956 speech to the National Assembly, in *Programme Gouvernemental. Mesures de pacification et réformes en Algérie*, 5; Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, 83.

of French identity as a tool to exclude Algerians from full participation in the nation, integrationism now deployed very similar models as templates for state-directed social change. "To make the spirit of the [new laws] a reality, to transform legal equality into a real equality of rights and duties," the head of Lacoste's cabinets Pierre Maisonneuve argued, the administration must engage in a prolonged and profound "action to educate and train the masses."¹³⁶ The remaking of Algerians into full citizens capable of participating in industrialized democratic society no longer constituted a mere nebulous endpoint of colonial ideology. Under Lacoste, effecting such a transformation became the central vocation of the state. By May 1956, Lacoste had articulated the broad "elements of a new policy" in Algeria: a "revolutionary transformation" of the economy, an "elementary political education" for the "under-developed masses" of Algeria, and a sweeping "social transformation" of the territory through administrative desegregation and the social promotion of Algerians.¹³⁷ Mollet confirmed this program of Franco-Muslim "reconciliation" as the official policy of the French government in a public declaration on January 9th, 1957, as French paratroopers began their first counter-subversive operations in the Casbah of Algiers, pairing repression with reform.¹³⁸

To carry out this vision of state-sponsored social change, Lacoste turned to the French military. The army, he argued, constituted the most immediate and direct means of interacting with and restoring control over far-flung rural populations. The forces charged with waging war in Algeria also became the heralds of peace. Soldiers must serve as

¹³⁶ Pierre Maisonneuve, "Esquisse d'un plan de politique algérienne," 46. AN 505/AP/II/344.

¹³⁷ Lacoste, "General Directive," 76.

¹³⁸ "Pour la Paix en Algérie, Pour une Algérie Nouvelle: Déclaration de M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil, sur la politique française en Algérie, 9 janvier 1957," OURS AGM/82.

"representatives" of a new vision of Algeria, working to establish humane and amicable relationships with the local population, combat old prejudices, and publicize France's "generous reforms." "The current ordeal can reinvigorate... the 'national' ideology, a love of France," Lacoste declared in his General Directive to all officers and subaltern officers in May 1956, "It is up to you to help me foster it here."¹³⁹ But beyond individual interactions, Lacoste found the army as a useful institutional alternative to the civilian state for pursuing difficult and accelerated reforms with a minimum of bureaucratic interference. "For all these measures," Lacoste asserted in a secret note on his program of 'Pacification' addressed to commanding officers and prefects in July, "one of the essential elements for success is the speed of decision and execution." "You must ensure," he continued, "that administrative circuits are abridged and the business at hand is freed of all paralyzing formalism." Any functionary who "constituted an obstacle to the oeuvre of Pacification" should be suspended or transferred.¹⁴⁰

Where Soustelle had created the SAS to give integration an institutional expression, Lacoste turned to the military writ large. The Resident Minister made integration the central duty of not only the civil administration, but of the military. In addition to the SAS, the army, operating under Lacoste's close supervision, assumed the task of regenerating Algerian society. And as 1956 wore into 1957, many officers in Algeria embraced integration as the army's particular vocation. The utopian promise of a regenerated 'New Algeria', defined by Franco-Muslim fraternity and equality came to constitute the centerpiece of the French army's efforts to win the 'hearts and minds' of Algerians. This reformative mission increasingly

¹³⁹ Lacoste, "General Directive," 77-78.

¹⁴⁰ See Lacoste, Note 5848/cc on "Pacification," dated 10 July 1956. ANOM 12CAB/79.

converged with a sympathetic set of doctrinal ideologies and interpretations of Cold War geopolitics gaining momentum within the French officer corps, which viewed France and the French Empire as besieged by subversive communist forces. Integration offered French officers and administrators an alternative to French political and military defeats at the hands of nationalist revolutionaries in Indochina, Morocco, and Tunisia; to the very real possibility of France's diminished place in a Cold War world dominated by superpowers; and to the failing ideologies of Empire. The army saw integration as a revolutionary response of France's own, seen as capable of renewing colonial society and keeping Algeria French.

Integration represented an attempt to confront the collapse of imperial ideologies without discarding the French civilizational project. Proponents of integration openly recognized the failure of France's 'civilizing mission,' and attempted to imagine a renewed basis for French claims to universalism as a model of progress or modernity by recasting France's imperial role as developmentalist and modernizing. Integrationists sought a regenerative path through which the advances of anti-colonial nationalism could be reversed and eventually effaced, and the imperial nation-state recreated in a desegregated, progressive form that assured its vitality in a global political climate where the legitimacy of imperial sovereignty had begun to disintegrate. In their efforts to envision a heterogeneous society, architects of integrationism like Soustelle and Lacoste relocated the principal roots of nationalism in socioeconomic difference, rather than in religion or culture, and sought the means to bridge the former while accommodating the latter. Besieged on all sides, colonial

rule appeared on the verge of collapse. For French policymakers, integration offered a solution – perhaps the only solution – to preventing such a cataclysm in Algeria.

The looming question confronting military and civilian leaders alike was how to create the society integration envisioned. How could the state translate national belonging in *law* into national belonging in *fact*, particularly when those subjects it now wished to draw more fully within the bounds of the national community seemed at best ambivalent toward, and at worst, hostile to the maintenance of French sovereignty? What, French officials asked, drove nationalists' resolute commitment to independence, and how could they deploy integration as a counterweight in the fight for the adherence of the population? Granted accumulating authority over reform efforts as over repression, the French military assumed an increasingly dominant role in efforts to create a 'New Algeria'.

2 Pacify

The Army, the Population, and France's 'Hot' Cold War

On a cold but clear day in November 1957, General Jacques Allard stood in the meeting hall of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe (SHAPE). The Commander of the Army Corps of Algiers, Allard had travelled to SHAPE's base of operations at Camp Voluceau outside Paris to brief the Allies on the developing conflict in Algeria. But as he began to speak, his presentation took on a perhaps surprisingly international tone. "For Twelve years," he announced to the audience, "the Communist bloc has had an almost continuous series of victories in the Free World." The growing insurrection in Algeria was "only a stage in this conflict; a stage whose outcome is vital for the survival of the Free World."¹ Allard continued: incapable and unwilling to launch a direct frontal assault on Europe and provoke a


¹ "Les missions de l'armée française dans la guerre révolutionnaire d'Algérie, conférence donné à SHAPE par le Général Corps d'Armée Allard, Commandant le Corps d'Armée d'Alger, avec l'assistance des Colonels Godard et Goussault, le 15 Novembre 1957." SHD 1H/2411. Also reprinted under the title "Vérités sur l'affaire Algérienne," *Revue de Défense Nationale* 14 (January 1958), 5-41.

thermonuclear war, the Soviet Union had instead begun a vast maneuver to encircle Western Europe, passing through China, South Asia, the Middle East, and finally North Africa. This encirclement was “now almost a reality,” he warned. Global Communism needed “nothing more to achieve its goal but to wrest Algeria from France.”²

As Allard spoke, the projector whirled and clicked as it displayed two maps. Arrows spread from Russia into the Middle East like red and black ink stains, changing color as they passed through Damascus and into Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia – Communism taking the guise of Pan-Arabism. The war in Algeria was not a nationalist conflict, nor was it a war fought by classical means, Allard explained. Rather, the insurrection in Algeria presented “an ideological fight for the conquest of spirits and souls,” a battle for the support of the population whose principle weapons were propaganda and terrorism. “In Algeria,” the General argued, did not face a conventional enemy, but a subversive fifth column “of Marxist inspiration” that hid itself amidst the population. By recognizing the conflict early as a Maoist-type “Revolutionary War,” however, and by fighting to destroy the hold of the National Liberation Front (FLN) over the Algerian population and to construct a “new order” in the colony, France stood a chance. With the proper counter-strategy, France could not only ensure the future of French Algeria, but defend the “Free World and Western Civilization” from Communism’s advance.³ General Allard was not merely pandering to the Cold War sensibilities of his NATO peers. Rather, his description of the political machinations at work in Algeria reflected a wider set of doctrinal

² “Les missions de l’armée française” SHD 1H/2411.

³ *Ibid*, including maps.



theories circulating in the French armed forces and beyond, loosely known as 'Revolutionary Warfare.'⁴

From roughly 1955 to 1959, military authorities viewed the armed struggles for colonial independence igniting across the French Union through a Cold War lens. But which Cold War lens?⁵ For a well-placed core of Generals, officers, and defense officials, this vision reflected more than simple American containment theory. Profoundly marked by their experiences in Indochina and Algeria, many officers understood the Cold War as a Revolutionary War: a global Communist assault the democratic 'West', carried out through subversive assaults on the colonized world.⁶ While its theorists attributed the authorship of Revolutionary Warfare to France's adversaries, it in fact emerged as a cultural product of an officer corps coming of professional age at the height of the armed struggles over decolonization. The fantasy of external subversion provided a means to explain the decline of France's own empire—and crucially, to do so without questioning France's global role as a universal model of progress or modernity. Theories of Revolutionary Warfare helped strategists to conceptualize and comprehend the geopolitical shifts driving the successes of anticolonial nationalist

⁴ "Guerre Révolutionnaire." Also known as insurrectional warfare ("guerre insurrectionnelle") or Subversive Warfare ("guerre subversive") to its promoters, this ensembles of theories and practices is most commonly referred to in contemporary scholarship (principally francophone) as the 'Doctrine of Revolutionary Warfare.' As the word 'doctrine' implies a rigid, established set of practices, and no such formalized doctrine emerged until 1959 under General Challe, I will utilize the terms 'theory' or 'discourse', to encompass the broad and diverse discussions taking place around the concept of Revolutionary Warfare.

⁵ Matthew Connelly has urged historians to 'take off the Cold War lens', to abandon the clichéd and monolithic image of an American-dictated Cold War narrative to explore the multiple and mobile discourses that constituted the global Cold War system. Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence" *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 105, No. 3 (June 2000): 739-769. See especially 742 and 769.

⁶ Denis Leroux, "Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d'Algérie: Le Centre d'instruction pacification et contre-guérilla d'Arzew, 1957-1959" *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire* 120, No. 4 (2013), 101-112.

movements, and to attempt to contain them.⁷ For the French Army in Algeria, the Cold War was not cold, but hot. And Algeria was the war front where its fires burned hottest.

This Cold War worldview profoundly impacted how the army approached its task of re-establishing order in the North African colony. Revolutionary Warfare theories provided a means for interpreting the early operations of the FLN, but also the theoretical basis for the French response. To counter the perceived techniques of their Maoist adversaries, strategists sought to appropriate them. Because they understood their enemy to be waging a war for the population, theorists of Revolutionary Warfare made civilians their primary target. The strategy of 'Pacification' in Algeria, which military leaders conceived as a holistic response to Revolutionary Warfare, was always broader than combat. More than a mere euphemism for police action or repression, the larger mission of Pacification embodied the constantly-repeated dialectic: "DESTROY – CONSTRUCT."⁸ Many histories of the Algerian War have focused on the Army's efforts to destroy the clandestine organizations of the FLN: military

⁷ Most English-language texts, have framed French military actions as motivated by the trauma or shame of defeat in Indochina. See Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1964), page 100 especially, or Marnia Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). More recent works in French have sought to place the doctrine back into the institutional frameworks of its development stretching back to the end of the Second World War, or to emphasize the crucial formative role played by the Algerian War itself. See Paul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *La République et son armée face au « péril subversif »: Guerre et action psychologiques en France 1945-1960* (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005); Gabriel Périès, *De l'Action militaire à l'action politique: impulsion, codification, et application de la doctrine de la Guerre Révolutionnaire au sein de l'Armée française, 1944-1960* (Thèse en Sciences Politiques, Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 1999) ; and Denis Leroux and Fabien Sacriste, eds. *La « Doctrine de la Guerre Révolutionnaire » : Théories, Pratiques, et Continuités* (forthcoming, Publications de la Sorbonne).

⁸ Allard referred to the missions of the army as classified into these two categories, which were "inseparable, to destroy without reconstructing would be to carry out a negative work; to construct without first destroying would be an illusion [leurre]". This notion of the Army's dual mission to 'Destroy and Construct' is widely reflected in the writings of partisans and theorists of Revolutionary Warfare like Lacheroy, Ximénès, Souryis, and others, and became the operational motto of the emergent Bureau of Psychological Action, discussed in the next chapter. On Allard see the SHAPE conference, SHD 1H/2411.

repression, extensive surveillance and counterintelligence apparatuses, and the generalized use of torture, all captured in the enduring image of the highly-mediatized Battle of Algiers.⁹ Few scholars, however, have explored what it was that the Army sought to construct in Algeria.

Witness to changing geopolitical and military landscapes, and confronted with enemies often indistinguishable from local populations, military strategists grew frustrated with the hesitation of politicians in the face of the growing politicization of warfare. Military leaders sought novel solutions that could resolve the threat of anticolonial nationalism definitively and inoculate colonial society against Marxist or Maoist subversion. In their view, the advent of the atomic bomb had rendered conventional war unfeasible; any conflict now risked provoking nuclear war. As a result, they argued, the conflict between Marxism and democracy moved into the social, ideological, and economic realms. Colonial societies no longer appeared sustainable in the face of colonized peoples' calls for equal rights and equal status, especially when such calls furnished the principal ammunition for subversive agents. Revolutionary Warfare necessitated armed forces to move beyond conventional warfare in order to defend the nation effectively. In the face of metropolitan politicians' and settlers' petty squabbling, the Army saw itself as the *only* force capable of responding to the Communist offensive across all domains. Lacoste and other high officials like Prefect of Constantine Maurice Papon agreed. By 1956, military and civil leaders in Algeria saw the military as the driving force for

⁹ On repression during the Algerian War, see Philippe Bourdrel, *Le Livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Plon, 2003) and Jacques Frémeaux, *La France et l'Algérie en Guerre, 1830-1870, 1954-1962* (Paris: Economica et Institut de Stratégie Comparée, 2002). On torture and counter-intelligence, see Raphaëlle Branche, *La Torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002) and Jean-Luc Einaudi, *la Ferme Améziane: enquête sur un centre de torture pendant la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991). On the Battle of Algiers, Alistair Horne's *1977 A Savage War of Peace* (New York: New York Review Books, 2006).

national renewal. The Army's role was not merely to defend Algeria; it was to revolutionize it: to eliminate the abuses of 'colonialism', to establish a new social order, and to create a national community united by fraternity, spanning the Mediterranean.

This chapter examines concepts of Revolutionary Warfare and its impact on the Algerian War. What did a "Revolutionary War" look like? How did theories of Revolutionary Warfare drive and shape the ensemble of practices which emerged as "Pacification" in Algeria? And how did they impact French officers' perceptions of the conflict and the army's role within it? Revolutionary Warfare emerged as a coherent strategic vision by mid-1957. I will trace its contours, its impact on French strategy, and its role shaping military institutional culture in Algeria.¹⁰ As the most influential theorist of Revolutionary Warfare Colonel Charles Lacheroy warned in front of an audience of more than two thousand assembled officers, "one does not wage a revolutionary war with a regular army; one does not wage a revolutionary war with a peacetime administration; one does not wage a revolutionary war with the Napoleonic Code."¹¹ The unspoken implication left hanging in the air was that the French could not defeat a revolutionary war with these things, either. To pacify Algeria, the army needed to engage in its own revolutionary war.

¹⁰ Several detailed histories on the intellectual development of these theories exist, and it is not my intention to exhaustively trace these concepts or their origins. See Villatoux and Villatoux, Paret, and Périès, cited above.

¹¹ Colonel Lacheroy, then head of the National Defense Psychological Action and Information Service, delivered this talk, entitled "Revolutionary Warfare and Psychological Weapons" in front of more than two thousand reserve officers gathered at the Sorbonne on July 2nd, 1957. The speech was later reproduced in print from a recording as a pamphlet, which was widely distributed and read across military and civilian circles. A copy can be found in the Archives Nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (hereafter AN), Archives Maurice Papon, 99 AJ 19, dossier "Lacheroy," or reprinted in facsimile in Anne-Catherine Schmidt-Trimborn, ed. *Charles Lacheroy: Discours et conférences* (Metz: Centre de Recherche Universitaire Lorrain d'Histoire, 2012) pp. 171-200.

Diagnosing the Illness

From 1955 to 1959, military commanders convinced of the need for strategic reform dominated defensive discussions in Paris and Algiers. The vision they traced, which came to be known collectively as the theory or doctrine of Revolutionary Warfare, reframed anticolonial struggles as fronts of the global war between Communism and the 'West'. Though the concept of Revolutionary Warfare encompassed a range of diverse visions, its theorists shared a broad understanding of conflicts in the postwar colonial world. According to these theorists, wars now aimed at the conquest of the population rather than territory, and anticolonial nationalism emerged in a large part as an ideological tool exploited by subversive communist forces. Multiple visions of the changing nature of warfare in the postwar world circulated within army policymaking circles. But a majority in the high command and officer corps saw the necessity of searching for new grand strategies, and by the mid-1950s, Revolutionary Warfare had become a defining feature of the army's mental landscape.

The theory Revolutionary Warfare was, for French officers, a self-consciously new concept of war. Shaped first by the experience of the war against the Viet-Minh in Indochina and later by the early events of the Algerian War, "Revolutionary Warfare" described not the strategies of French forces, but rather what officers perceived as the methods of their adversaries. The emergent theory sought to explain the changing nature of warfare after the Second World War, and the successes of guerrilla armies that drew their strength from their close ties to local populations, rather than numerical or technological superiority. And they sought over all to explain how such inferior forces like the Viet-Minh and FLN could undermine the legitimacy of established colonial governments and turn the local population against

French colonial rule. Revolutionary Warfare theories indelibly marked the army's strategies, first by providing an analysis of the conflict in Algeria that led the army to focus on the Muslim civilian population as a target of moral and ideological conquest, and second by providing a model for the elaboration of the methodologies and practices of this conquest.

'Revolutionary Warfare' was never a unitary or monolithic doctrine, but rather an ongoing and evolving discourse within the institutions of the army, which military leaders like General Allard sought to actualize and systematize in Algeria. Theories of Revolutionary Warfare and their corollary strategies of counter-insurrection became both justification and motivation, and did not merely allow but propelled the radical extension of the army's activities beyond the traditional boundaries of combat. The concept of Revolutionary Warfare provided a vision of the Cold War world that appeared to allow for the diagnosis of the 'Algerian problem', and a set of utopian solutions for treating it.

While several of the military leaders writing on Revolutionary Warfare began to do so while active in Indochina, they articulated the most influential and developed theories in 1955 and after, as they reflected on their Indochinese experience in search of solutions for Algeria.¹² Writing in the pages of military journals like *Revue de Défense Nationale* and *Revue Militaire d'Information*, officers and generals set forth the major theoretical outlines of Revolutionary Warfare in the search for new strategic and doctrinal orientations that could counter growing unrest across the empire. Key theorists such as General Lionel-Max Chassin, Colonel Charles Lacheroy, Colonel Jean Nemo, Captain André Souyris, Captain Maurice Prestat, Captain Guy Caniot, and Captain Jacques Hogard all served in Indochina, many in the colonial infantry in

¹² See Villatoux and Villatoux, chapters 12-14 especially.

other corners of the empire from the mid-1940s to the early 1950s.¹³ Lacheroy, for example, served as the Commander of the Bien Hôa sector in Vietnam from 1951-1953 after stints in Syria and Morocco, and Souyris served in Cambodia from 1952. While there, many participated in non-conventional military programs: Caniot and Lacheroy worked with the emergent Psychological Action service. Several, including Lacheroy, spent time as prisoners in Viet-Minh reeducation camps.¹⁴

According to this generation of military theorists who reached their professional peak in Indochina and Algeria, Revolutionary Warfare was a new type of warfare; a post-World War Two phenomenon that escaped more conventional, Clausewitzian logics of war. It was also a type of warfare for which France was poorly prepared. For many, the advent of nuclear war had largely pushed the question of large-scale conventional wars out of the realm of possibility, since they risked provoking the use of thermonuclear weapons. The result was that

¹³ Chassin was Commander of Air forces in Indochina from 1951-1953. Nemo served twice as a commander in the colonial infantry, from 1946-1948 and again from 1952-1955. Souyris served in Cambodia from 1952, and Hogard commanded colonial infantry units across Indochina from 1945 to 1953. See Villatoux and Villatoux, *La République et son armée* 294, 322 n. 1205, 273, 325 n.1171, and 381-382 respectively. It is worth noting here that despite his recently renewed popularity in American strategic circles, Lieutenant-Colonel David Galula was never a central thinker in the elaboration of Revolutionary Warfare theories, and remained consistently marginal in the formulation of French counterinsurgency strategies. Recent republications of his work by the Rand Corporation and books like A.A. Cohen's *Galula: the Life and Writings of the French officer who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger, 2012) largely misconstrue his importance. For a thorough debunking of Galula's importance, see Grégor Mathias, *Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory* (New York: Praeger, 2011).

¹⁴ For more on Lacheroy's biography, see Paul Villatoux, "Le colonel Lacheroy théoricien de l'action psychologique" in Jean-Charles Jauffret, *Des hommes et des femmes en guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2003). Perhaps also significant, Nemo, Hogard, Prestat, and Lacheroy all graduated from the prestigious Saint-Cyr Military School, and many of the most fervent future supporters of Revolutionary War theories also attended the Centre des hautes études d'administration musulmane (CHEAM) in Paris, including Lacheroy, Caniot, and many of the leaders of the Psychological Warfare Bureau in Algeria like Colonel Feaugas and Lieutenant-Colonel Bruge. For a list of alumni, see the back pages of the journal *L'Afrique et L'Asie: Revue politique sociale et économique et Bulletin des Anciens du CHEAM*, which regularly published updates on graduates.

guerilla or partisan warfare took on new strategic importance.¹⁵ "The dagger took its place alongside the atomic bomb" as the principle armaments of the atomic era.¹⁶ The rise of the Communist bloc and the generalization of guerilla tactics created a context without precedent that necessitated the rethinking of national defense strategies. "It is becoming urgent," warned General de la Chapelle in February 1956, "to renovate concepts that are by all accounts expired and to build...a new doctrine and a new system"¹⁷ Minister of Defense Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury agreed, declaring in June 1956 that it was "high time that we take notice of the validity of these new and now essential elements" which had until this point been considered "secondary."¹⁸

But Revolutionary Warfare was not simply guerilla warfare. Directed externally by Communists or their sympathizers, it was intrinsically subversive, aimed at the overthrow of the established state. Colonel Gabriel Bonnet, former professor at the Ecole supérieure de guerre in Paris, expressed revolutionary warfare in an equation: *partisan warfare* + *psychological warfare* = *Revolutionary warfare*. Guerilla action did not primarily seek military victories, but rather "always evaluate[d] itself in function of its political and psychological impact." Guerillas fomented "social rot" [pourrissement]: to splinter society, to promote fear and suspicion, and drive a wedge between the state and the governed.¹⁹ Arguing that it was

¹⁵ See, for example, General Chassin, "Vers un encerclement de l'Occident," *Revue de Défense Nationale* (May 1956), 537, or Colonel Nemo, "A la recherche d'une doctrine" *Revue militaire générale* (March 1958): 335-358.

¹⁶ Claude Delmas, *La Guerre Révolutionnaire* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 6.

¹⁷ General Frédéric de la Chapelle, "Les aspects particuliers de la guerre possible," *Revue de Défense Nationale* (February 1956). General de la Chapelle was head of the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre at the French Defense Ministry from 1952 to 1956.

¹⁸ Bourgès-Maunoury, "L'Armée de demain et ses problèmes," *Revue Militaire d'Information* 272 (June 1956), 5.

¹⁹ Gabriel Bonnet, *Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l'antiquité à nos jours* (Paris: Payot, 1958), 60, 62-63.

political at its core, theorists of Revolutionary Warfare characterized it *ideological, permanent, and total*.²⁰

Revolutionary Warfare was *ideological* because it deployed anticolonial ideologies to undermine the legitimacy of existing states. Revolutionary wars were not born of material considerations or diplomatic failures like “classic wars,” but of a “well-developed political will” of Marxist inspiration.²¹ But this form of warfare was also ideological in that it utilized ideas as its principle weapons. “Racism and xenophobia” were tools to ferment popular hatred towards “invading and spoiling whites”; slogans like “Africa for Africans” and “Justice for blacks” served to expose the “defects and errors” of Western civilization and promote disenchantment and disillusionment with colonial tutelage.²² What appeared to be nationalist struggles for autonomy were in fact, according to theorists of Revolutionary Warfare, Communism “dissimulat[ing] behind an ideology which it does not believe, but which it judges well-adapted to the ‘mass’ it seeks to conquer.” In Indochina, this ‘idée-force’ was “popular democratic nationalism”; in Algeria, the “triumph of the God of Islam and the Arab race.”²³ Exploiting liberal and universalist discourses, Communism “bluffed democracies with their own

²⁰ These three terms appear in the writings of Lacheroy and Hogard and were generally adopted as the three defining features of Revolutionary Warfare by other thinkers and later by the Army’s Bureau of Psychological Action.

²¹ Delmas, 23.

²² General Chassin, “Vers un encerclement de l’Occident,” 542. General Allard echoes similar anxieties, arguing that calls for independence for ‘peoples under tutelage’ hide the imperatives of a new form of colonialism. See Jacques Allard, “L’O.T.A.N. et l’Afrique du Nord,” *Revue de Défense Nationale* (June 1958), 910.

²³ Commandant Hogard, “Guerre Révolutionnaire ou révolution dans l’art de la guerre,” *Revue de Défense Nationale* (December 1956), 1502. This concern over Islam’s role as a central ‘ideology’ or ‘dogma’ of the Algerian revolution became much more pronounced among officers stationed in Algeria seeking to understand the insurrection and propose solutions. See the teaching materials on Muslim Sociology used at the Center for Pacification and Counter-Guerilla Instruction (CIPCG) in Arzew, SHD 1H 2524 bis.

principles,” highlighting their failures to call for a change of regime.²⁴ An effective ideology was central to creating a state of social uncertainty and tumult that would allow subversive elements to win supporters.

Drawing from the language of Mao Tse-tung, military theorists also described Revolutionary Warfare as *permanent*, the unending and infinitely-renewing campaign of Communist revolutionaries against the ‘West’.²⁵ There were not ‘revolutionary wars,’ so to speak, but a singular Revolutionary War “for the conquest of the world.”²⁶ Local conflicts in the Far East, Europe, and North Africa were nothing more than “hot manifestations of the Cold War.”²⁷ Like the larger war itself, Colonel Nemo argued in 1956, these conflicts “offered no front lines” but spread out ambiguously over spaces and extended through time “not days, but months and years,” slowly and progressively ‘rotting’ their target “like leprosy attacks a sick person, depriving them little by little of the usage of their limbs and organs before bringing them death.”²⁸ Like a “contagious disease,” Revolutionary Warfare insidiously “contaminated

²⁴ Suzanne Labin, *Il est moins cinq: propagande et infiltration soviétiques* (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1960). Labin, a noted anti-communist activist and president of the French branch of the World Anti-Communist League, was not affiliated directly with the Army, but like many of the proponents of ‘Revolutionary War’ theory like Lacheroy, Carret, and Souyris had attended CHEAM. Her works reflected many of the same concerns about soviet propaganda and thus she was cited as an important resource by members of the Army’s 5th Bureau, the successor to the Psychological Action Bureau. See SHD 1H 4214, dossier 2.

²⁵ For more on Mao’s notion of a “permanent revolution” and for a sense of how it was discussed in the French context during the period, see Stewart Schram, *La révolution permanente en Chine* (Paris: Mouton, 1963).

²⁶ Hogard, “Guerre Révolutionnaire ou révolution dans l’art de la guerre,” 1498

²⁷ Colonel Nemo, “La Guerre dans la foule,” *Revue de Défense Nationale* (June 1956): 723-724. The orders of the Head of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chef d’Etat-major Général) from 1956-1961 General Paul Ely regarding Psychological Warfare reflect very closely this understanding. See the “Note au Sujet de la Guerre Psychologique” N° 1159/CEMGFA/CAB dated 21 February 1958, reproduced in Maurice Faivre, *Le General Paul Ely et la Politique de Défense, 1956-1961* (Paris: Economica et Institut de Stratégie Comparée, 1998), 105.

²⁸ Nemo, “La Guerre dans la foule,” 724, 725. The notion of “pourrissement” (rot or spoliation) is a dominant recurring motif in DGR literature. Populations can be ‘spoiled’ or ‘rotted’ by their contact with subversive elements.

everything.” But unlike a disease, which “does not recur again in the same subject,” the defeat of a subversive outbreak “on the contrary, confers no immunity.”²⁹

While this permanent global offensive served the interests of Communism and extended its dominion, the presence of actual communists was not necessary for the spread of Revolutionary Warfare. As Captain André Souyris argued in a highly-influential 1957 article, most nationalists were intimately familiar with Marxist ideas, and Lenin himself argued that a proletarian revolution in the colonies must be preceded by a nationalist revolution.³⁰ Because it adapted to and exploited local conditions, Revolutionary Warfare presented mutable and diverse faces and posed a permanent and renewable threat to France’s Empire.

Finally, warfare in the post-1945 world had become “more and more *total*.”³¹ This was both because the long reach of nuclear weaponry now meant that fronts were, as Nemo suggested, more or less meaningless in the atomic age, and because Revolutionary Warfare carried the struggle into new domains: psychological, political, and economic.³² Marx and Engels were the “fathers of total war,” and Marxist strategy actively sought to generalize the war effort across political and economic fronts, where it complemented military action as part of a “united and indivisible” offensive against the enemy.³³ The subversive war effort mobilized not only “all the commercial, agricultural and industrial powers” of a country,

²⁹ Bonnet, *Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l’antiquité à nos jours* 7-8.

³⁰ Captain A. Souyris, “Les Conditions de la Parade et de la Riposte à la Guerre Révolutionnaire,” *Revue Militaire d’Information* 281 (February-March 1957), 93-94. Claude Delmas extends this argument, suggesting that the “conditions...for the conquest of power have been codified by Marxist doctrines.” Delmas, 21.

³¹ Nemo, “La Guerre dans la foule,” 723 (Emphasis mine).

³² General de la Chapelle, “Aspects particuliers de la guerre possible,” 151. See also Hogard, “Guerre Révolutionnaire ou révolution dans l’art de la guerre,” 1498.

³³ Bonnet, *Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l’antiquité à nos jours*, 138 and 141.

according to Colonel Lacheroy, but also engaged “all children, all women, all elderly, all who think, all who breathe, with all the force of their enthusiasm and hatred, and throws them into the war.”³⁴ Revolutionary warfare attacked on all fronts, seeking to undermine colonial regimes’ power by any means possible.

Theories of Revolutionary Warfare were not just an attempt to justify French imperialism with the threat of a “shadowy adversary.”³⁵ Rather, the military establishment took these concepts seriously enough to attempt to have their legitimacy recognized by France’s Cold War allies. France, many of them argued, held a particularly privileged understanding of Communism’s new global strategy, and the dangers it presented. As the only NATO member to have encountered a subversive war in its own territory, General Allard argued, France was a “forward guard;” the first in combat against the new type of threat.³⁶ Allard’s presentation at SHAPE in November 1957 was only one instance of military authorities’ efforts to convince their international allies of the dangers of Revolutionary Warfare. In March 1956, the French representative a NATO warned that the conflict in Algeria was a Soviet “proxy war.”³⁷ Apparently unsatisfied with the response of his colleagues in 1957, Allard warned NATO again of the strategic importance of North Africa in the pages of the *Revue de défense*

³⁴ Lacheroy, “Guerre Révolutionnaire et arme psychologique.” ANPS 99 AJ 19

³⁵ Marnia Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire*, 21. Lazreg suggests that DGR simply ‘shored up’ colonial rule and “continued” the French civilizing mission, justifying continued colonial rule. While it is true that DGR attempted to renew colonialism for a new era, I suggest that her reading is too simplistic. It overly-functionalizes officers’ intellectual and emotional investment in the doctrine, it ignores a history of reformist colonialism from which they were drawing (see chapter 1), and it ignores their repeated and vehement assertions that a return to the colonial ‘status quo’ was impossible.

³⁶ Allard, “L’O.T.A.N. et l’Afrique du nord,” 911. Similar sentiments appear in Nemo, “Guerre dans le milieu social,” Lacheroy, “Guerre Révolutionnaire et arme psychologique,” and Souyris, as cited by John Steward Ambler, *The French Army and Politics, 1945-1962* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), 315.

³⁷ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 160.

nationale in June 1958.³⁸ And as late as October 1960, the French pushed for a “joint policy of defense against the multiple forms subversive warfare,” principally focused on Revolutionary Warfare, at the Western European Union, an early attempt at constructing a common European defensive policy.³⁹

The theorists of Revolutionary Warfare saw the threat it posed as a matter of life and death for “Western Civilization.” The impending third world war was “already being won or lost.”⁴⁰ Algeria was as a final stand, the “Verdun of the revolutionary war.”⁴¹ “Any deviation from the plan of French Algeria,” argued one officer, “is an open door to the communist invasion...in ten years, it’s all of Europe in the hands of the Communists.”⁴² But France stood alone in defense against the new front of Communism’s monumental subversive offensive against the West. France’s allies “appear[ed] not to have understood” that the new war had already begun in Algeria and beyond.⁴³ Democratic ideology had lost its strength in the postwar period, and “tired, decadent” Europeans, Frenchmen and others alike, were trapped in

³⁸ General J Allard, “L’O.T.A.N. et l’Afrique du Nord”

³⁹ Assembly of Western European Union, Sixth Ordinary Session. “Definition of a joint policy for defense against the multiple forms of subversive warfare; report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments by Mr. Pisani, Rapporteur, 25 October 1960,” ANOM 91/5Q/156. The draft recommendation was adopted by a vote of 16 to 0 (1 abstention).

⁴⁰ Chapelle, “Les aspects particuliers de la guerre possible,” 153

⁴¹ Major Cogniet, future adjunct to the Head of the 5th Bureau in Algiers and chief editor of the military journal *Contacts*, in a lecture at the ESG in Paris. Quoted in Ambler, 314

⁴² ‘Colonel N’ of the 5th Bureau – Psychological Action. Quoted in Claude Dufresnoy, *Des Officiers Parlent* (Paris: René Julliard, 1961), 29. This book consists of a series of brief interviews between the author (a journalist) and anonymous officers in Algeria conducted from April 1959 until November 1960, aimed at revealing what officers on the ground in Algeria thought about the conflict.

⁴³ Allard, “L’O.T.A.N. et l’Afrique du Nord,” 911.

“wishful thinking” that a new armed struggle could be avoided.⁴⁴ Many within the military viewed the situation as apocalyptic.

The eruption of the Algerian War in November 1954 followed fast on the heels of the French defeat in Indochina in August of the same year. The wartime experience in Indochina served as the immediate object of strategic reflection for Algeria, and partisans of Revolutionary Warfare made a conscious effort to place Algeria and Indochina within a larger context of global struggle. The image of Western decline in the face of Communist subversion became a powerful lens for understanding and explaining the evolution of politics in the colonized world, the apparent postwar weakness of the French Union, and the internationalization of conflicts once deemed ‘internal’ matters of Empire. French commanders interpreted conflicts in Greece, Iran, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tunisia as Revolutionary Wars, along with perhaps more obvious cases like Korea.⁴⁵ While the Iranian and Greek states had defeated the revolutions in their respective countries, Tunisia demonstrated the very real threat of Communism’s international offensive on the African continent, on the very borders of Algeria.⁴⁶ The imaginary of a global Maoist war of subversion provided a means to comprehend the accelerating fragmentation of France’s Empire.

⁴⁴ Quote, General Chassin, “Vers un encerclement de l’Occident,” 550. Here he uses the term “wishful thinking” in English. On the powerlessness of democratic ideology on the world stage, see Commandant Hogard, “Cette guerre de notre temps,” *Revue de Défense Nationale* (August-September 1958), 1317.

⁴⁵ See the chart “Quelques Guerres Révolutionnaires au XXe Siècle,” *Revue Militaire d’Information* 281 (February-March 1957), 22.

⁴⁶ For an interpretation the Neo-Destour’s successful independence movement as Revolutionary Warfare, see Captain André Souyris, “Le mécanisme de la révolution tunisienne, 1934-1954,” *Revue de défense nationale* (October 1956): 1216-1229.

The global political realignment provoked by the Cold War undermined the structures of European Empires. The East-West power struggle between the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact offered an alternate and competing geopolitical vision to existing imperial systems. As Matthew Connelly demonstrates, the transnational system that emerged in the postwar period undermined and transcended state borders in ways that questioned the civilizing mission that had justified imperial rule *and* the necessity of Empire itself.⁴⁷ Many within the higher ranks of the military administration and officer corps recognized this shift. Experiencing third world liberation movements firsthand, they perceived the fundamental transformation in global politics that threatened the cohesion of the French Union.

Many theorists of Revolutionary Warfare insisted that the world had changed radically following the Second World War. The “colonized no longer believe in the legitimacy of colonization,” and all the old diplomatic equations and equilibriums were now “fundamentally provisory.”⁴⁸ Like many of his peers, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Ely saw this shift as a new stage in the evolution of global society, a natural push towards the emancipation of peoples. The “responsibility” of France, he argued in July 1957, was to recognize this evolution, to abandon policies that work “counter to the current of history,” and to create a system that allowed colonized peoples to keep “their beliefs, their traditions, and their traits” while still ensuring communal defense against Communism under the leadership of France.⁴⁹ Ely and others with similar viewpoints like General Chassin did not at all advocate

⁴⁷ Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford, 2002), 281-287.

⁴⁸ Delmas, 115, 117.

⁴⁹ Army General Ely, “Notre politique militaire,” 1051.

independence, but rather greater autonomy within the framework of French Union. Both Ely Chassin saw colonized peoples as “politically immature” and in need of further guidance, especially in the face of the growing Communist threat.⁵⁰

Like their civilian counterparts, many military officials saw the decline of nation-states or even empires in favor of supranational structures as the defining feature of the post-1945 era.⁵¹ The world was internationalizing irrevocably, Captain Hogard lamented in January 1957. The “notion of a national war, true until 1945, has today been surpassed.” Transnational processes—in this case Revolutionary Warfare—now drove internal conflicts in the French Union.⁵² Taking the nascent process of European integration as a model, some within the army even argued that the world was entering a supranational stage, and that nations themselves were bound to pass away: “in several dozens of years there will be no more France, Germany, Italy, or England, but one country: Europe.” The imperative for France was to unite “vulnerable” Africa with the nascent Europe of Six in an economic and political union, to ensure that both Africa and Europe could resist the pull of American capitalism and the threat of Soviet invasion and become a third global political bloc.⁵³

While Revolutionary Warfare theories received relatively short shrift in diplomatic circles, French efforts to share their ‘privileged insights’ into the new methods of countering

⁵⁰ Ely, “Notre politique militaire,” and Chassin, “Vers un encerclement de l’Occident.”

⁵¹ See Todd Shepard, “À l’heure des « grands-ensembles » et de la guerre d’Algérie. L’état-nation en question,” *Monde(s): Revue d’histoire transnationale* 1 (2012): 113-134. On such the views held by French administrators in Algeria, see Chapter 1.

⁵² Commandant Jacques Hogard, “L’Armée française devant la guerre révolutionnaire,” 83.

⁵³ Note “Formation Politique” used in *Opération Pilote*, SHD 1H 2536 dossier 1, pages 10-11. The idea that France needed to join its empire to an emerging European union seems to have been widespread: the popular spy novelist Pierre Nord wrote an entire volume dedicated to promoting the concept of EurAfrica: *L’Eurafrique, notre dernière chance* (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1955).

"Communism in action" among international military circles received greater interest.⁵⁴

French officers participated in intellectual exchanges between mid-level military personnel, sharing counter-subversive strategies with Iranian and Greek officers who had recently quashed insurrections of their own, but also with British, Portuguese, Belgian, American, and Argentinian officers.⁵⁵ The Army's Center for Pacification and Counter-Guerilla Instruction (CIPCG) in Arzew was by 1957 a veritable Revolutionary Warfare doctrinal training school, and frequently hosted training stages on the "anti-Communist struggle" for foreign officers on Algerian soil from 1957.⁵⁶ Whether or not they believed French claims that the FLN was a front for Communist infiltration, the international military community were interested in the tactical and technical lessons they could draw from French forces in Algeria.⁵⁷

Totalizing, ideological, and subversive, Revolutionary War presented a new type of threat; one which bypassed traditional strategic positioning and which hid its true face. For a growing number of military leaders, particularly those who had fought in a chain of colonial conflicts since 1945, the threat of Revolutionary Warfare necessitated a profound rethinking of military doctrine. But if the officer corps found theories of Revolutionary Warfare convincing, it was not solely because of its conspiracy-tinged explanatory power. Rather, these theories

⁵⁴ Nemo, "Guerre dans le milieu social," 606.

⁵⁵ For an overview of these exchanges and the various uses of Revolutionary War theory in Greece and Argentina, see Périès, Tome III Chapter III, or Marie-Monique Robin's *Escadrons de la mort, l'école française* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004). On Portuguese officers' adaptation of Revolutionary Warfare concepts for their African colonies, see John P Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997)

⁵⁶ See ANOM 3R 542, dossier "Stages." These training stages took place under the guidance of the 5th Army Bureau (psychological action/warfare), discussed in the next chapter.

⁵⁷ Paret argues that international observers were not interested in the anticommunist aspects of the doctrine, but this conclusion seems to be countered by more the more recent studies cited above. See Paret, 99.

provided one way to understand a postwar shifts in the French Empire and beyond, and provided a crucial resource for efforts to rethink colonial rule and military strategy alike.

In Search of a Cure

The diagnosis of this new form of warfare was not a mere exercise in philosophy, but a search for new strategies that could respond effectively to armed anticolonial movements. Theorists of Revolutionary Warfare sought to appropriate the techniques of their adversaries in order to counter them. French strategists dubbed these practices 'Counter-subversive' or 'Counter-insurrectional' warfare. More broadly, the army's grand strategy in Algeria reflected an effort to engage subversive forces through the population. The army referred to its actions not a repression, but "Pacification," a name that reflected less a penchant for euphemism than a conviction that the conflict would be won by securing the loyalty of Algerians. Revolutionary Warfare theories oriented Pacification along particular axes – intelligence gathering, suppression of clandestine networks, and the moral conquest and transformation of Algerians – where they remained for the duration of the war. Officers modeled their own proposals for action closely on what they understood to comprise the central theories of Revolutionary Warfare. An effective military response, they argued, required not only new weapons, but the extension of military action into domains previously controlled by civilian authorities.⁵⁸

But how did revolutionary warfare function? According to its theorists, it conducted its struggle first and foremost through civilians. Fond of citing Mao's famous quote that guerillas should be to the people as a fish to water, theorists of Revolutionary Warfare saw the human

⁵⁸ Ximénès, "La Guerre Révolutionnaire et ses données fondamentales," 20.

population of a territory, rather than its terrain, as the modern field of battle.⁵⁹ Just as classic military strategy took the land into consideration when making its preparations, so too, they argued, military strategists must now take into account the social milieu within which combat took place: its psychology, its means and modes of life, its socio-economic composition.⁶⁰ More than a mere battlefield, however, the population also comprised the objective of the war. By conquering the inhabitants of a country physically and morally and by engaging them actively in the subversive struggle, revolutionaries could take power and supplant the established regime as the source of moral and political legitimacy.⁶¹

This conquest operated, for many partisans of Revolutionary Warfare theory, through a mechanism of population structuring known as “parallel hierarchies.” Colonel Charles Lacheroy closely modeled his concept of parallel hierarchies on his interpretation of the Maoist techniques employed by the Viet-Minh. The concept reverberated widely in the works of other theorists of Revolutionary Warfare, and became a central feature for many.⁶² A “perfectly Machiavellian system of politico-police coercion,” Lacheroy wrote in 1955, the organization of parallel hierarchies ensured that each member of Indochinese society was submitted to not

⁵⁹ See for example ‘A Group of Officers’, “La Guerre du Viet-Minh,” *Revue Militaire d’Information* 281 (February-March 1957), 25; or Bonnet, 202.

⁶⁰ Nemo, “La Guerre dans la foule,” 728 and Ximénès, “La Guerre Révolutionnaire et ses données fondamentales,” *Revue Militaire d’Information* 281 (February-March 1957), 18.

⁶¹ Ximénès, 8.

⁶² Hogard, Ximénès, and Delmas speak directly in their works about ‘parallel hierarchies,’ and the notion seems to have gained wider traction, particularly in connection with the development of the French Army’s mechanisms of psychological warfare. See Periès Tome II Chapter 3. The particularly strong influence in the works of Hogard and Captain Prestat (Ximénès) may be explained by their close relationship with Lacheroy: Hogard was his colleague and “faithful disciple” at the Centre militaire d’information et de specialization pour l’outre-mer (CMISOM) in Paris in 1955, where Lacheroy also came into contact with Prestat. See Villatoux and Villatoux, 314-316.

one, but two Viet-Minh surveillance apparatuses “from cradle to tomb.”⁶³ The first hierarchy, territorial and vertical, grouped individuals under a party apparatus organized on more organic familial and geographic lines: “the individual in the family, the family in the neighborhood, the neighborhood in the village,” and so on to the top level of the Territorial Command. But the second, crucial to the complete “structuring” [encadrement] of the individual, built a horizontal hierarchy on individual socio-economic placement within an association under the control of Lien Viet, the embryonic Vietnamese state:

With the hierarchy of the Lien Viet – and this is what makes the system effective – we face a different segmentation of the same group of inhabitants. The human being is considered as an individual and classified following their age, sex, employment, and eventually according to their religion...Each association therefore forms a more or less homogenous bloc of members having, on the whole, the same needs, the same tastes, and above all, who are receptive to a same propaganda.⁶⁴

Compulsory membership in associations constructed around common interests or shared socio-economic statuses—women’s groups, youth clubs, student organizations, or worker’s guilds—functioned as a second means of grouping the population into organizations under the surveillance and control of the Viet-Minh, a sort of *gleichschaltung* of the nascent independent state.⁶⁵

⁶³ Charles Lacheroy, “Action Viet-Minh et Communiste en Indochine ou une leçon de Guerre Révolutionnaire,” 1955, reproduced in Anne-Catherine Schmidt-Trimborn, ed. *Charles Lacheroy*, 118, 120.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 123-124 (Emphasis in original).

⁶⁵ *Gleichschaltung* was the National Socialist program to ‘coordinate’ German society through the submission of all social groups and organizations to control by the party that took place in 1933 to 1939, which often included the creation of compulsory organizations for various segments of the population. For more on these policies, see Claudia Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2003).

The doubled nature of the hierarchies allowed for a more effective ideological education of individuals through the tailoring of propaganda to target groups, as well as a more complete surveillance of the population. The system permitted, Lacheroy argued, “not only the rapid detection of errors, but also their localization and correction without losing time and before they reach a state where they have grave consequences.”⁶⁶ A third hierarchy—that of the Communist Party—ensured an internal surveillance of the first two hierarchies. Organized in this way, Lacheroy insisted, individuals found themselves enmeshed in a nearly-perfect network that allowed the Viet-Minh total control to coerce, transform, and direct the population.

This transformative element, for Lacheroy and others, was crucial, and intimately linked to what they saw as the new arm par excellence of Revolutionary Warfare: psychological warfare.⁶⁷ Parallel hierarchies only proved effective insofar as they could secure complicity, and it was this securing of complicity that turned the population against the established state and allowed for the further extension of subversive hierarchies.⁶⁸ Psychological weapons were the key to securing this complicity. For Lacheroy, however, these meant more than simple propaganda. Forms of direct action such as directed discussions, the communist practice of

⁶⁶ Lacheroy, “Action Viet-Minh et Communiste en Indochine,” 122.

⁶⁷ While certainly one of its most vocal advocates, Paul Villatoux stresses that Lacheroy was neither the inventor of the term ‘psychological warfare’ nor the principle promoter of its use in Algeria in 1955-1956. Villatoux asserts that during this period Lacheroy was a victim of the success of his own ideas, trapped in high military circles in Paris and therefore isolated from active strategic debates in Algeria. As I will show later in the following chapter, it was not in fact Lacheroy but students of his thought who put psychological warfare to action in Algeria. See Paul Villatoux, “Le Colonel Lacheroy théoricien de l’action psychologique,” in Jauffret, *Des Hommes*, 494.

⁶⁸ Captain André Souryis, “Un procédé efficace de contre-guérilla: l’Auto-défense des populations,” *Revue de Defense Nationale* (June 1956), 697.

self-criticism,⁶⁹ and indoctrination were also important tools for inculcating ideological convictions in target populations.⁷⁰ Through their experiences in Russia, China, North Korea, and Vietnam, Communists had calibrated and successively adjusted the joint deployment of parallel hierarchies and psychological warfare. The threat, Lacheroy warned, was grave: these new arms could be employed in any part of the French Union.⁷¹ Though more fantasy than reality, this understanding of Viet-Minh tactics played an important role in shaping military strategies in Algeria. Parallel hierarchies not only constituted a lens for understanding FLN activities vis-à-vis the population, but increasingly, under the influence of the Psychological Action Bureau, the foundation for France's own programs aimed at restructuring and remaking the Algerian population.

The first defense against the threat of subversive organizations, many theorists of Revolutionary Warfare asserted, was their early detection. Such an assertion served to bolster their calls for civil and military leaders to recognize the growing insurrection in Algeria as a nascent revolutionary war. While they disagreed in the details, theorists like Lacheroy and Hogard described similar visions of the process by which such a conflict unfolded. Captain Jacques Hogard proposed a war in five phases. The first phase consisted of the composition of clandestine organization for "agitation and propaganda," aimed at diffusing the ideology selected for the territory and "preparing the terrain." The second phase witnessed the extension of secret activist networks, the selective elimination of oppositional elements, and

⁶⁹ Auto-critique, as Lacheroy perceived it, consisted of an individual's examination of his or her own moral attitudes and daily practices, guided by a member of the communist party, to assess whether or not that individual's commitment was 'pure'.

⁷⁰ See Lacheroy, "Action Viet-Minh et Communiste" in Trimborn, 124-139.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 143

the creation of a climate favorable to revolution through the organization of large events like strikes and riots. In phase three, armed guerillas appeared, and used widespread terror to intimidate enemies. Phase four began with the generalization of combat, the creation of “free zones” where the rebellion can operate with impunity, and new efforts to alienate the masses from the existing government. Finally, in stage five, the rebellion opened a general offensive against the established state on all fronts; political, military, etc. Hogard noted that the “schema is infinitely flexible,” and that the process of Revolutionary War often passes to and from various stages.⁷² While Hogard’s model could approximate the conflicts in Indochina or North Africa, his audience would not have missed the close parallels to the early events of the Algerian War.

Colonel Lacheroy’s “Scenario-type” proposed a similar five-stage model. Lacheroy’s first stage consisted of a period of calm followed by a “spectacular” display of violence aimed at winning the public’s attention. In phase two insurgents employed targeted violence to silence opposition, to spread fear, and to provoke draconian police reprisals that would spill over into the neutral population. In the third phase, activist cells formed and launched a guerilla war as well as a campaign to “compromise” the civilian population. Like Hogard’s schema, stage four saw the growth of guerillas and their transition to regularized units, and stage five consisted of a generalized offensive aimed at conquering entire territories. For Lacheroy, the process relies heavily on the “doubling” of legal authorities by “rebel” parallel hierarchies. Such structures, he argued, formalized over time and became “less and less

⁷² Commandant Hogard, “Guerre Révolutionnaire ou révolution dans l’art de la guerre,” 1504-1505. Hogard also notes that while the distinction between the stages may appear “artificial,” strategists should note the very real distinction between the first two and last three stages.

secret,” emerging as an already-functioning alternative state at the moment when the colonial state’s legitimacy collapsed.⁷³

Rather than propose a rigid set of phases to be recognized by officers hoping to detect Revolutionary Warfare, the authors writing under the pseudonym ‘Ximénès’ suggested in early 1957 a more sophisticated model relying on a series of flexible processes: *crystallization*, *organization*, and *militarization*. *Crystallization* occurred when insurgents succeeded in rallying of the population around a motive to resist. Subversive forces drove and reinforced this process by demoralizing their adversary and by psychologically indoctrinating the population of a target territory. *Organization* resulted from the creation of parallel hierarchies and ‘bases of support,’ autonomous regions controlled entirely by insurgents. And *militarization*, as in the works of Hogard and Lacheroy, consisted of the establishment of increasingly complex military organizations.⁷⁴ These three processes worked in constant dialogue. Echoing his colleagues, Ximénès argued that Revolutionary Warfare simultaneously destroyed existing social structures and allegiances and constructed new ones. Revolutionary wars progressively detached the population from the colonial state and reattached them to a clandestine state that would take its place.⁷⁵

Because Revolutionary Warfare waged an ideological war, its theorists argued, so too must the French army. An early consensus emerged around two principles: the need to fight

⁷³ Charles Lacheroy, “Scénario type de guerre révolutionnaire,” 1955, reproduced in Anne-Catherine Schmidt-Trimborn, ed. *Charles Lacheroy*, 166-169.

⁷⁴ Ximénès, “La Guerre Révolutionnaire et ses données fondamentales,” 13-16. Ximénès notes that militarization is perhaps the least important process: if population is not structured by parallel hierarchies, or not ideologically convinced, then a sufficiently large military occupation can win them back. However, if they are both organized and crystallized, then the “spoiled” population is much harder to “reabsorb.”

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 8.

the war in Algeria on 'all fronts,' which implicated the creation of a coordinated joint civil-military command, and the need for new methods like psychological warfare to reconquer the population. If the adversary "carries the struggle into the heart of societies and consciences," so too must the French respond on these fronts.⁷⁶ The Soviet Union had erased the barrier between politics and warfare, and between wartime and peacetime. Military institutions could no longer be built around these old distinctions, argued Maurice Mégret, charged with studying psychological warfare by the Permanent General Secretary for National Defense in Paris.⁷⁷ The political role of the army must be recognized and defined, Mégret argued, particularly for colonial forces with a tradition of political action.⁷⁸

For many within the army, this meant the creation of a joint military-political administration, conjoining the action of the civilian administration and the armed forces at all levels. This administration generally took the form of a decentralization and delegation of power to mixed consultative bodies composed of civil administrators, political leaders, and military officials. Such a model allowed the army to share its critical insights into the actions of the enemy, advise appropriate responses, and take part in policy deliberations.⁷⁹ A joint command allowed more flexibility in defending against subversion: military and civilian

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Mégret worked for the General Information and Psychological Action Service (SIGAP) attached to the Permanent General Secretary for National Defense from 1951, notably as one of France's delegates to a secret NATO committee for the coordination of information and psychological action in Europe. See the archives of the French Defense Ministry, SHD 5Q/21.

⁷⁸ Maurice Mégret, "Fonction et Intégration politiques de l'armée," in *La Défense nationale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958): 154-156. Mégret hoped that this recognition would also constrain the military's political involvement.

⁷⁹ See General André Zeller, "Armée et Politique," *Revue de défense nationale* (April 1957), 499-517 and Commandant Jacques Hogard, "L'Armée française devant la guerre révolutionnaire," *Revue de défense nationale* (January 1957): 77-89.

officials could respond across all fronts, tailor their activity to local conditions, and react quickly with standing territorial military units. Several authors were careful to note, however, that authority should ultimately remain in the hands of the civilian government.⁸⁰

Just as revolutionaries sought to destroy existing social structures and construct new ones, counter-insurrection sought to demolish subversive networks and rebuild society in a way that would insulate it from future subversions. The techniques elaborated to detect and destroy clandestine FLN structures, developed and perfected by devotees of Revolutionary Warfare theories such as Colonel Roger Trinquier and Colonel Yves Godard (both memorialized as the cold-blooded Colonel Mathieu in the film *Battle of Algiers*), have received considerable scholarly and public attention, particularly for the generalized use of torture.⁸¹ But the accompanying task of restructuring the population was equally important in the eyes of army strategists. "Preparing the establishment of a new order," asserted Allard at SHAPE, "this is the mission of Pacification."⁸²

A successful 'counterattack' to Revolutionary Warfare depended on the mobilization of the population on the side of the established government. But how would this work? Theorists provided no systematized procedures. These emerged only in 1957 and 1958 under

⁸⁰ Hogard and Ely, among others, called for a similar conception of standing territorial units. Both published around the time that the French army adopted the strategy of 'Quadrillage,' or the division of surface territory into blocs overseen by territorially-bounded military units. See Hogard, "L'Armée française devant la guerre révolutionnaire," and General Ely, "Notre politique militaire" *Revue de défense nationale* (July 1957): 1033-1051.

⁸¹ For more on the strategies developed by Trinquier, Godard, and others to gather intelligence and root out clandestine networks, and their institutionalization in the form of , see Raphaëlle Branche, *La Torture et l'Armée pendant la Guerre d'Algérie*, 176-211; Roger Trinquier's extended reflection, published as *La Guerre Moderne* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1960); and Colonel Godard, "Le démantèlement de l'organisation du F.L.N. de la zone autonome d'Alger et l'assainissement de l'agglomération Algéroise," Annex I to Allard's SHAPE conference, SHD 1H/2411. On torture, see Branche or Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire*.

⁸² Allard SHAPE conference. SHD 1H/2411.

the guidance of the Psychological Action Bureau. They did, however, offer the broad outlines of possible action. The first step to defend against subversion was the detection and correction of conditions that favored social unrest. If Revolutionary Warfare relied on the ideological exploitation of social or racial inequality, class conflict, or religious tensions to seduce the inhabitants of a territory, then an "x-ray" of society could help the army determine along what lines the adversary attacked.⁸³ The colonial administration could then pursue reforms, suggested Captain Souyris, to "eliminate or at least attenuate these 'internal contradictions' that form the cultural 'bouillon' of the revolution."⁸⁴

But reforms alone were not sufficient. As Souyris warned, Communists exploited reforms as a sign of capitulation or weakness. Authorities must combine reforms to an effective psychological action; propaganda and information campaigns "destined to consolidate the morale of the population and remove them from the influence of the adversary."⁸⁵ A national counter-ideology stood central to these efforts. "Against faith, faith," proclaimed General Chassin in the *Revue de défense nationale*, "to propaganda, propaganda; to an insidious and powerful ideology, a superior ideology capable of winning the hearts of men."⁸⁶ To defeat the FLN, Chassin and others argued, the army also must carry out a spiritual and ideological war for the Algerian population.

To counter Revolutionary Warfare, French officers sought to adopt its techniques. While theorists such as Colonel Nemo stopped just short of advocating the adoption of a

⁸³ Ximénès, "Le Raisonnement du Chef Révolutionnaire," *Revue Militaire d'Information* 281 (February-March 1957): 75-88.

⁸⁴ Souyris, "Les Conditions de la Parade et de la Riposte," 99.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁸⁶ General Chassin, "Vers un encerclement de l'Occident," 548.

system of parallel hierarchies like that employed by the Viet-Minh in Indochina, others proved less hesitant. Colonel Lacheroy asserted repeatedly from 1952 to 1957 that “we respond to gas with gas; to ‘strategic’ bombings with strategic bombings; to the atomic bomb with the atomic bomb. Otherwise, we admit defeat and go home.” The war against the Viet-Minh, Lacheroy argued, could *only* be won through a total mobilization of the population using parallel hierarchies.⁸⁷ Lacheroy and his intellectual successor Colonel Michel Goussault, head of the Psychological Action Bureau in Algeria from December 1956, sought to put such ideas into action.⁸⁸ Under the guidance of Goussault and other ‘apostles’ of Revolutionary Warfare, the increasingly influential Psychological Action Bureau rapidly developed and expanded the methodologies of psychological warfare and population control. Such techniques became a structural component of Pacification.

Faced with an externally-driven subversive war and feeling abandoned by their international allies, many of the proponents of Revolutionary Warfare grew frustrated by 1956. The perceived ineffectuality and indecisiveness of French lawmakers only compounded strategists’ fears that the colonial state was failing to carry out a unified plan of action at the time when it was most needed. Many officers came to see the armed forces as the sole institution in Algeria capable of undertaking the necessary action to ensure the colony’s durable attachment to France. The army could act as the engine of reform. By correcting the

⁸⁷ Colonel Lacheroy, “Une arme du Viet Minh, les hiérarchies parallèles,” conference presented in Bien Hoa in November 1952 and reworked in November 1953. Reproduced in Trimborn, *Charles Lacheroy*, 53.

⁸⁸ It is significant to note that in addition to Godard, Goussault also accompanied Allard to his SHAPE presentation, and considerable space in the report was devoted to Goussault’s description of psychological warfare. See Annex II to Allard’s SHAPE conference, “l’Action Psychologique dans la Guerre Révolutionnaire d’Algérie.” SHD 1H/2411.

ills of colonialism, the army could resolve Algeria's 'nationalist problem' once and for all. In short, the Army in Algeria came to see itself as a force for national renewal.⁸⁹

Just as their reformist counterparts in the civilian administration, the principle target of these theorists' criticism was the colonial state. Its failure to live up to the promises of the *mission civilisatrice* created the 'favorable conditions' necessary for subversive forces to wage a successful Revolutionary War in Algeria. According to Colonel Bonnet, the repeated attempts and failures to extend full citizenship to autochthonous Algerians, embodied in the failed Blum-Violette project, had pushed them toward nationalism. At every turn, "the route to rapprochement was barred" and the colonial state maintained Algerians in a subordinate position, "opening the door to a revolutionary crisis."⁹⁰ General Chassin was even harsher in his criticism of the failures of colonialism, denouncing the very foundations of previous colonial policies:

The arrival of the West resulted in the destruction of social and religious frameworks within which yellow and black peoples had lived for centuries... We did not construct anything in their place. We thought it was sufficient to introduce material progress. Today we realize the gravity of our error and the force of nationalist—that is to say racial—sentiments, and religious sentiments... The West based its 'colonization' on foundations of an entirely material nature, and we realize today that they have no solidity because of it.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Others have made similar arguments. Peter Paret cites the Army's obsession with the decline of democracy during the war (see Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare*, 27-28), and more recently Martin Evans has discussed similar tendencies towards national renewal in Guy Mollet's concurrent civilian administration. See Martin Evans, "Guy Mollet's third way: national renewal and the French civilizing mission in Algeria," *French History and Civilization: Papers from the George Rudé Seminar* 2 (2009): 169-180.

⁹⁰ Bonnet, 244-245.

⁹¹ General Chassin, "Vers un encerclement de l'Occident," 551-552. For Chassin, the "only valid 'colonization', at the end of the day, is one based on conversion," though Christianity has lost its power of conversion.

France needed a “renovated civilization,” Chassin argued, “recharged with dynamism and moral force.” France needed a new civilizing mission in the world.⁹²

Military observers singled out the social and economic inequalities of colonial society as the raw material exploited by subversive forces. Analyses written by officers heavily involved in the earliest efforts to stamp out the insurrection in 1955 and 1956 focused not on FLN declarations, but on the inadequacies of colonial society. One founding member of the Psychological Action Service and a central promoter of Revolutionary Warfare theories within the civilian administration in Algiers, Captain Guy Caniot offered a scathing criticism of the colonial administration in a January 1955 report that reached the then-commander of French forces in Algeria.⁹³ Many of Caniot’s criticisms found reinforcement in the strategic report *Psychological Action and Political Action* written by the attaché to General Parlange, Colonel Lanusse, in 1956.⁹⁴ Parlange’s influence in Algeria as commander of the Aurès-Nementcha region and the special status as the region as the launching-point of the Algerian revolution in 1954 ensured that Lanusse’s report saw wide circulation.

Lanusse and Caniot shared two principal arguments which echoed the reformist agenda of the Lacoste administration in power by early 1956: first, that a troubling disconnect existed between the French administration and the autochthonous population in Algeria, and

⁹² *Ibid*, 553. Significantly, Chassin also concludes by warning of the coming race war between ‘whites’ and Asians, revealing the limits of his understanding of what a renewed ‘civilizing mission’ might look like.

⁹³ Captain Guy Caniot, “Fiche sur l’ambiance algérienne actuelle,” January 1955. SHD 1H/2408. Caniot had previously been a member of the Psychological Warfare Service in Indochina, and remained in Algeria in the *Presse* office of the Psychological Action Bureau, where he trained officers in the principles of psychological warfare and oversaw propaganda production.

⁹⁴ Colonel Lanusse, *Action psychologique et action politique*, Second Edition, October 1956. Fonds Charles Robert Ageron, IHTP ARC/2010/II. Lanusse’s report was submitted first in August and again as a revised edition in October 1956.

second, that the state had not properly pursued its policies of assimilation in the North African colony. Caniot did not hesitate to voice his criticisms of the administration's shortcomings. "Between the laws of Assimilation and the facts of Assimilation," he argued, "there exists a margin that no legislator could fill with a [legal] text."⁹⁵ Europeans' abandonment of the countryside meant that there were few interactions between the settler population and the autochthonous population in large parts of the country. The majority of 'Europeans' held prejudices regarding Muslims; "that is," Caniot protested, "when they do not fall into a more genuine racism."⁹⁶ But for Caniot, the "divorce between administrators and administrated" was more disconcerting.⁹⁷ Algerians perceived the state as totally foreign, and, he argued, to a certain extent it was. French civil servants only came to Algeria to do "purgatory" before returning to the metropole, and the colonial administration had no real knowledge of the country it ruled.⁹⁸

Colonel Lanusse extended these critiques. Algerians had lost confidence in France, he asserted, because France made too many promises it did not keep, and because France, in the minds of Algerians, had been closely associated with unjust local representatives. Maintained in a constant state of material and moral inferiority vis-à-vis Algeria's settler population, Algerians now invested their hopes for the future outside of France.⁹⁹ The solution for both officers was obvious: a purge of the administration and radical reforms to Muslims' rights.

⁹⁵ Caniot, "Fiche sur l'ambiance algérienne actuelle," 3.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 12-13.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 10.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 4-5.

⁹⁹ Lanusse, *Action psychologique et action politique*, 9-10, 15.

"Muslims can no longer be treated like citizens of second order," argued Caniot.¹⁰⁰ France must declare "without ambiguity" her break with former policies in Algeria, denounce the injustices of the colonial system, and achieve something concrete and immediate regarding the evolution of the country, fulfilling what had been for far too long only empty promises and hollow talk.¹⁰¹

Colonel Lanusse and Captain Caniot elaborated their programs in dialogue with the reforms initiated by Jacques Soustelle and continued under Robert Lacoste. Lanusse and Caniot drew on integrationist ideas to envision an alternative form of 'decolonization' of the French Union; one which took place *through* the construction of a constitutionally uniform French Union. Army strategists in Algeria picked up these critiques of colonialism, combined them with the apocalyptic imperatives of Revolutionary Warfare theories, and formulated a radical program of action that sought to create a new social order. In doing so, they carved out a role for the army as a modernizing force. Military commanders like Colonel Meyers and General Olie in Kabylie or General Parlange in the Aurès did not wait for Lacoste to delegate the army the mission of modernizing Algeria; they demanded it.¹⁰² And Lacoste freely consented. For the army, the 'modernizing mission' of integration constituted an essential element of Pacification.

¹⁰⁰ Caniot, "Fiche sur l'ambiance algérienne actuelle," 16.

¹⁰¹ Lanusse, *Action psychologique et action politique*, 19.

¹⁰² See for example the reports of Colonel Meyer and General Olie, which proposed a range of practical solutions for Algeria to the Resident Minister. Colonel Meyer, "Quelques observations sur la Pacification en Grande Kabylie," 31 January 1957, SHD 1H/2548; and General Olie, Report n° 149/K/Pol, 22 March 1956, ANOM 12CAB/165.

By late 1956 an institutional culture had developed amongst the higher echelons of the French army in Algeria that was committed to 'decolonizing' French rule in Algeria and willing to take whatever steps necessary to ensure that reforms were actively pursued; including, if necessary, supplanting the civilian administration. Many officers asserted that they were witness to a "new stage" in the history of the French Empire; milder reforms had been surpassed by the progress of History, and the "hour had arrived" to institute a true "equality of rights and equality of duties" for Algerians.¹⁰³ "In no way," Ximénès insisted, could reforms "be a question of returning to the 'status quo ante'." They must, he insisted, "establish a new equilibrium."¹⁰⁴ According to General Ely, the army would construct peace "through the establishment of a new order."¹⁰⁵

The army envisioned, Raoul Girardet argued in 1960, "a revolution of the Kemalist type, overthrowing old institutions and aimed at the destruction of traditional inequalities."¹⁰⁶ Central to this revolution stood the project of *integration*, which for the army implied not only the process of political, legal, and economic rapprochement laid out by Soustelle, but the creation of a fraternal community uniting autochthone and settler populations in mutual confidence and respect. As Girardet rightly noted, integration implied no shared "precise

¹⁰³ Bonnet, *Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l'antiquité à nos jours*, 261.

¹⁰⁴ Ximénès, "La Guerre Révolutionnaire et ses données fondamentales," 20.

¹⁰⁵ General Ely, quoted in Frémeaux, *La France et l'Algérie en Guerre*, 206.

¹⁰⁶ Raoul Girardet, "Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic," in Samuel P Huntington, ed, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 138. Girardet, a military historian, here plays the role of analyst; however, as Paul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux note, Girardet also served as an instructor at the Inter-Army Center for Instruction in Psychological Arms (CIIAP) created in 1954, and thus was intimately familiar with some of the discussions taking place in French army circles at the time. See Villatoux and Villatoux, 436-437.

institutional meaning” for army strategists.¹⁰⁷ Rather, it appeared—along with the idea of *l’Algérie Nouvelle*, the mythic community that integration would construct—as a utopian refrain punctuating the army’s Pacification programs. At the very least it sought an equalization of rights and duties for Algerian Muslims, at the most, a renewed global influence for France as head of a third Cold War superpower in the form of *l’Eurafrique* (Eurafrica), a united community of Europe and France’s Empire. The threads of integrationism and Revolutionary War theory increasingly converged and came to define, justify, and necessitate, for many within the French army, their actions in Algeria.

Teaching the Cure

Theories of Revolutionary Warfare structured the vocabulary of the war and shaped the Army’s understandings of its extra-military vocation. French strategic circles never universally accepted the theory, nor did it form, for many military personnel, the primary frame of reference for the Algerian War. But the military command places Revolutionary Warfare to its understanding of Pacification from 1956 onward, and officers accepted the basic premise that action on the population constituted the key to winning the war in Algeria. Whether officers they accepted the ideological aspects of Revolutionary Warfare or not – and many in the lower ranks appeared not to – most officers and troops still enacted and participated in activities highly inspired by this vision of modern war. Revolutionary Warfare became a defining feature of the mental landscape of the military in Algeria.

¹⁰⁷ Girardet, 139.

Partisans of Revolutionary Warfare were a minority, but vocal and influential in a period when strategic orientations in Algeria were crystalizing. High-ranking civil officials and officers who openly supported theories of Revolutionary Warfare between 1956 and 1959 included, among many others the Minister of National Defense Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (February 1956-May 1957), the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Ely; the Commander-in-Chief of French forces in Algeria from 1956 to 1958 General Raoul Salan, and General Maurice Challe, Commander-in-Chief of French forces in Algeria from December 1958.¹⁰⁸ The theorists of Revolutionary Warfare often had the opportunity to promote their ideas directly to new generations of military leaders destined for Algeria. Once 'discovered' in 1955 by the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Lacheroy was immediately redeployed to the General Staff of the armed forces.¹⁰⁹ The dynamic public speaker was promoted again in 1956 to an Information and Psychological Action Service created specifically for him in Paris by Bourgès-Maunoury.¹¹⁰ Others became instructors as well. Among them, Captain Hogard served as an instructor at the Military Center for Overseas Information and Specialization after returning from Indochina, and Captain Caniot a lecturer for the Regional Psychological Action Bureau in Algiers in 1955.¹¹¹ Their ideas circulated broadly in other forms as well. One special issue of the

¹⁰⁸ For examples of Bourgès-Maunoury, Ely, Allard, and Mégret, see the texts cited earlier in this chapter. On Salan, see chapter three, and on Challe, see chapter 4.

¹⁰⁹ The Etat-Major des Armées is the governing body which supervises the three branches of the armed forces in France. It is roughly analogous to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though the term also englobes their advisory staff and any special organizations attached directly to Etat-Major.

¹¹⁰ See Paul Villatoux, "Le colonel Lacheroy théoricien de l'action psychologique," 502-504. Lacheroy remained in Paris until 1957 when the new Defense Minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, redeployed him to diminish his influence.

¹¹¹ On Hogard's tenure at the Centre militaire d'information et de spécialisation pour l'outre-mer, see Villatoux and Villatoux, 314-316. Commandant Fossey-François employed Caniot as a lecturer in 3-week psychological warfare training stages from July 1955. See secret letter N° 0009/AP du 6 septembre 1955, Le General de division Lorillot commandant le 10^e Region Militaire au Ministre de la Defense national. SHD 1H/2408 d.1.

Revue Militaire d'Information dedicated to the topic of Revolutionary Warfare and edited by Lacheroy appeared in an exceptional run of 52,000 copies.¹¹²

More important, however, was the army's effort to train every new officer entering Algeria in the theories and techniques of anti-subversive and revolutionary warfare. Officers received this training at the army's Center for Pacification and Counter-Guerilla Instruction (*Centre d'instruction pacification et contre-guérilla* – CIPCG), located in Arzew, near Algeria's second largest city, Oran. This instruction played a crucial role in spreading a generalized knowledge of theories of Revolutionary Warfare and diffusing its vocabulary throughout the military establishment. Every new officer deployed to Algeria from 1956 onward, and particularly those charged with directing Pacification programs, attended a fifteen-day training stage at the CIPCG.¹¹³ Between 1955 and 1956, the center trained 2,000 officers. That number rose dramatically as the army's Psychological Action Bureau assumed control of the school. From 1957 to 1959, 7,172 officers and subalterns received training at the CIPCG, including 39 colonels, 136 lieutenant-colonels, 616 majors, 1,694 captains, 1,158 lieutenants, 1,434 second

¹¹² See "La Guerre Révolutionnaire: Données et aspects – Méthode de Raisonnement – Parade et Riposte," Special Issue, *Revue militaire d'information* 281 (February-March 1957). On the number of issues printed, see Villatoux and Villatoux, 318. This issue, edited by Lacheroy, seems to have had wide circulation. It appeared frequently in civilian and military archives from the period and was regularly referenced by contemporary figures. Beyond journals like *Revue de Défense Nationale* and *Revue militaire d'information*, which published a multiple articles on DGR or related topics from 1955 onward, the seminars and debates at the Ecole supérieure de guerre (ESG) and the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN) in Paris acted as principle forums for working out and disseminating theories on Revolutionary Warfare. On the role of the ESG, see Périès, vol. I, chapter 2 and vol. III, chapter 2.

¹¹³ Jean-Charles Jauffret, *Soldats en Algérie 1954-1962: Expériences contrastées des hommes du contingent* (Paris: Autrement, 2000), 179. Frédéric Guelton places the mandate requiring all officers to attend a year later, in 1957, though it is likely that Jauffret is correct, given that more than 2,000 officers were trained at the CIPCG in 1955 and 1956. See Lt. Colonel Frédéric Guelton, "The French Army 'Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerilla Warfare,'" in Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, eds. *France and the Algerian War 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002).

lieutenants, and 2,095 cadet officers – nearly half of all officers deployed to Algeria during the war.¹¹⁴




Figure 2.2: "Algeria in the International Balance Book," from a guidebook to Algeria for military officers entitled *Connaissance de l'Algérie*, published by the Psychological Action Bureau in Algiers, 1956.

The impact of such training is not entirely clear. A questionnaire posed to the Psychological Action Bureau's Itinerant Officers in January 1958 revealed that they estimated only 45% of officers to be familiar with the concepts of Revolutionary Warfare. When asked the diffusion of the theories amongst non-commissioned officers, the estimates of the

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 45

Itinerant Officers dropped to 6.3%.¹¹⁵ But for his part, Lt-Colonel Bruge found the instruction at Arzew to be effective. Drawing on the exit surveys of his students, Bruge compiled tables showing that 85-97% of his students found the instruction to be “extremely satisfactory” or “satisfactory.”¹¹⁶ Officers above the rank of Aspirant of Second Lieutenant appear to have held at least a cursory familiarity with the concept of Revolutionary Warfare, and certainly others – those who eventually served at the commanders of sectors and quarters, who directly supervised Pacification programs – were very familiar. A direct survey of reserve officers conducted in 1958 found 99% to be in favor of Pacification.¹¹⁷ At the very least, a significant portion of the officer corps believed in the necessity of civilian-targeted Pacification.

Operational orders, internal communications, requisite intelligence reports on the moral orientation of local populations and reports on the status of Pacification efforts filed regularly by commanding officers, all utilized a codified vocabulary which imposed a particular understanding of the war on its users through continuous and repeated use.¹¹⁸ Even shorn of its explicit ideological content, the discourse of Revolutionary Warfare inflected and shaped the ways in which military personnel understood the conflict. Gabriel Périès has argued that the vocabulary of Revolutionary Warfare became the “authorized discourse on the war,” the principle lens through which soldiers understood and discussed their role and relationship to the enemy.¹¹⁹ Likewise, Paul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux note that the quasi-universality of

¹¹⁵ “Synthèse des réponses des O.I. au questionnaire remis à la réunion du 8 janvier 1958,” SHD 1H 2433 d.2

¹¹⁶ Guelton, 45. Guelton notes that the “self-congratulatory analysis” of Bruge’s statistics could be a result of the exit survey’s lack of anonymity; however, he suggests, the diverse ranks of students and the size of the surveyed group suggest at least a bare minimum of reliability to the figures.

¹¹⁷ Jauffret, *Soldats en Algérie*, 175

¹¹⁸ My thanks to Denis Leroux for pointing this out to me.

¹¹⁹ Gabriel Périès, *De l’Action militaire à l’action politique*, 45.

certain expressions reflects a widely-shared set of “mental schemas.”¹²⁰ According to Gilbert Meynier terms that appear omnipresent terms in French documents such as “Politico-Administrative Organization,” never appear in the FLN’s own internal documents.¹²¹ Rather, these terms, entered into the official language that framed military exchanges from Revolutionary Warfare theory.

While it is difficult to measure the extent to which members of the civilian administration accepted the tenets of Revolutionary Warfare, these theories did impact the elaboration of joint civilian-military operations. Integrationist reform efforts and Revolutionary Warfare were entirely compatible, and often mutually informed, nourished, and reinforced one another. Resident-Minister Robert Lacoste’s arrival to power in February 1956 heralded a fruitful cross-pollination that birthed the official policy of Pacification which legitimated of the army’s extension of its activities beyond the bounds of policing and combat. The Lacoste administrations’ efforts work hand-in-hand with the army meant that a growing number of civil administrators gained familiarity with Revolutionary Warfare theories. Some civilian officials, such as Maurice Bourghès-Maunoury and Maurice Papon, then Prefect of the Constantine Department, openly expressed their support for the vision of the war that these theories proffered. Others demonstrated sympathetic positions in their public expressions of fears of ‘outside influences’ operating in Algeria. Mollet on several occasions confided his fears of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s underwriting of subversive activities in Algeria, and even the

¹²⁰ Villatoux and Villatoux, 24.

¹²¹ Gilbert Meynier, “La Révolution du FLN, 1954-1962” (paper presented at the conference “La Doctrine de la « Guerre Révolutionnaire » (DGR): Théories, Pratiques et continuités,” Institut Historique Allemand, Paris, April 2-3, 2013).

conviction that the FLN “looked to Mao Tse-tung as the man who had thrown out the white man.”¹²² His cabinet members shared his concerns over Egyptian and Soviet influence in North Africa.¹²³ Soustelle vocalized similar anxieties, though perhaps more publicly and with more force. In a July 1956 article in the *Revue de défense nationale*, Soustelle suggested that the “Algerian Rebellion” was “only one aspect” of a subversive Egyptian offensive stretching across the entire African continent.¹²⁴

But the policy of ‘Pacification’ which Robert Lacoste’s administration laid out for the French armed forces in Algeria in the summer of 1956 displayed the clearest influence of Revolutionary War theories on the civil administration. In a speech to the National Assembly on June 2nd, 1956, the Resident-Minister responded to the hypothetical question, ‘what is Pacification?’

[Pacification] aims to rally souls and hearts, to prepare future accords. The policy of pacification will have achieved its goals when we are able to provoke the rallying of vast portions of the population.

Rallying to what, and in favor of what? One is not saying: in favor of maintaining the status quo. That is false; utterly false. The army is not in Algeria to maintain privileges and social injustices. The army is there to defend the indissoluble links between Algeria and France; she is there to permit the construction of an *Algérie nouvelle* within the French community.¹²⁵

The Lacoste government shared more than a focus on securing the loyalty the population, however. Lacoste defined the process of Pacification through a series of meetings between his

¹²² Quoted in Connelly, 36.

¹²³ On Mollet’s cabinet, specifically Lacoste and Lejeune, see Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War*, 160.

¹²⁴ Jacques Soustelle, “La Rébellion algérienne dans le cadre du Pan-Arabisme,” *Revue de défense nationale* (July 1956), 826.

¹²⁵ *Programme et Action du Gouvernement en Algérie. Mesures de pacification et réformes* (Algiers: Service de l’information du Cabinet du Ministre résidant en Algérie, August 1956), 18.




Figure 2.3: A map of "Military Aid (Deliveries – Technicians)" from a secret report published by the French President's cabinet, entitled "The Action of Communism in Africa," September 1959. (Source: Service d'études générales, "l'Action du communisme en Afrique." ANOM 3R/573).

cabinet, the Prefects of Algeria's three Departments, and the Army general command in the summer of 1956. They envisioned Pacification proceeding in three steps: a preliminary "protective" phase, aimed at the elimination of "rebel bands" in the countryside; a secondary phase of "control and psychological orientation" of the population; and a third and final phase consisting of the establishment of institutions guaranteeing lasting contact between authorities and the population and ensuring their effective self-defense.¹²⁶ The principal objective of the second and third phases of Pacification was to "reestablish or develop contact with the autochthonous population." Obligatory and "systematically sought" in every territory with all available means, this policy of "contact" built on and expanded the earlier policies established by Soustelle. "Psychological action" played a "capital" role in this process.¹²⁷

Both civilian and military authorities under the Lacoste administration made a conscious effort to collaborate and to harmonize their policies in order to counter the growing nationalist threat in Algeria. And in 1956, civilian authorities adopted the broad outlines of Revolutionary Warfare and the coinciding counter-subversive strategies proffered by military authorities. These theories increasingly influenced the policy of Pacification as it developed from mid-1956. The explosive growth of Pacification programs under the guidance of the Psychological Action Bureau (and its successor, the 5th Bureau) in 1957 and 1958 only further ensured the proliferation of techniques and tactics inspired by Revolutionary Warfare. The operational procedures and institutions that emerged to address the non-combat aspects of

¹²⁶ Letter from the Resident Minister in Algeria to 'General Officers exercising a Commandment in Algeria', dated 10 July 1956. ANOM 12CAB/227, dossier "Directives Politiques Situation Politique et Militaire"

¹²⁷ *Ibid*

Pacification bore the profound impact of these 'apostles' of Revolutionary Warfare, ensuring the theory's lasting resonance long after it and its partisans fell out of favor.

For a growing number of officers during the Algerian War, a Revolutionary Warfare became means of seeing and speaking about the conflict. Its attractiveness lay in its ability to diagnose the weaknesses apparent in the fracturing French Union, and to propose solutions to the global cultural, social, and political shifts undermining French rule. It sought to provide a response to nationalists' calls for independence, an alternative model of 'decolonization' that maintained Algeria within the bounds of the French nation. French counterinsurgency strategies in Algeria emerged in connection with this effort to understand a changed postwar world. In some respects, the theorists were not completely incorrect; in a Cold War world, populations and their opinions did matter. In the face of internal and international public opinion in an era of new mass media, the army could no longer simply eradicate rebellious populations. But Revolutionary Warfare was a fantasy; a way to explain France's imperial decline without questioning its civilizing role in the world. Strategists recognized and attempted to instrumentalize the power of mass opinion as a defensive weapon. Even as the experience of the war increasingly demonstrated that anticolonial nationalism was not, in fact, directed by shadowy Communist forces, the notion that warfare had inexorably shifted towards managing civilians in conflict regions remained strong. Revolutionary Warfare theories played a central role in defining the outlines of the army's actions, distending the boundaries of its vocation far beyond combat and into the realm of civil governance. And for

the Psychological Warfare Bureau, the institutional embodiment of the army's Cold War zeitgeist, these years in Algeria meant an unprecedented rise to power.

3 Organize

'Psychological Action' and the Framing of a New Algerian Society

Just after three o'clock in the afternoon on June 13th, 1956, Robert Lacoste called his colleagues to order. "Until now," he began, "a certain number of directives have been sent that indicate the broad lines of action" to counter the growing revolution in Algeria. But the moment had arrived, he continued, to discuss the army's role in rallying the Algerian population to continued French rule "in a more methodical manner." Glancing around the conference room of the Government General building in Algiers, the Resident Minister of Algeria met the eyes of the assembled generals, prefects, and members of his cabinet through the lingering haze of cigarette smoke. "Psychological and political action must be accorded the greatest importance," Lacoste stated emphatically. "I am persuaded that most of you – if

not the majority – understand this.”¹ Confronted with escalating violence, growing popular support for the FLN, and the continued inefficacy of their own efforts at repression, French leaders in sought new solutions to recapture the loyalty of Algerians.

The civil and military leaders gathered in the afternoon heat on June 13th, 1956, saw the fight against the National Liberation Front (FLN) not simply as a military confrontation, but as an ideological contest – and the French were losing both battles. Despite the emergency powers granted to the Resident Minister, the nationalist insurrection had continued to expand in a spectacular fashion. It now appeared to draw popular support. Less than a month earlier, on May 18th, the FLN’s Army of National Liberation (ALN) claimed a sensational and gristly victory when one of its guerilla units ambushed a French patrol in the Palestro region, killing 20 of the 21 men. In the aftermath, local inhabitants mutilated the bodies of French soldiers, reportedly to express their enmity toward French rule.² In the weeks that followed, the FLN demonstrated the appeal of the nationalist struggle even more broadly by initiating student strikes in France and across North Africa. Just as the armed insurrection had grew, so did its appeal for indigenous Algerians.

For the officials assembled before the Resident Minister, it was painfully clear that both the initial wave of integrationist reforms and the military’s repressive efforts had failed to arrest growing popular support for the insurrection. As long as the administration lacked an effective means to counter this the FLN’s ideological onslaught, Lacoste exclaimed to his

¹ Transcript, “Réunion d’études tenue sous la présidence de Monsieur le Ministre résidant en Algérie le 13 Juin 1956 – Séance de l’après-midi,” page 1. ANOM 12CAB/199.

² For more on the ambush in Palestro (now Lakhdaria) and its impact on the conflict, see Raphaëlle Branche, *L’Emboscade de Palestro: Algérie 1956* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2010).

colleagues, any other efforts to 'pacify' Algeria remained ineffective. Enemy agitation combined in Algeria "with religion and nationalism into a truly revolutionary compound, a sort of vitriol that burns everything." Confronted with such a situation, he confessed, "we don't have an antidote."³ The Resident Minister and his colleagues agreed that the sole solution lay in some sort of 'psychological action' that could restore Algerians' confidence in France. But as the commander of the Aurès-Nementcha region at the heart of the armed insurrection, General Parlange, highlighted, the form of such action remained unclear. "We face well-executed propaganda," Parlange objected; "how can we oppose it?" The administration, he suggested, must establish regulations and train specialists as soon as possible, since, he quipped, "we can't improvise psychologists."⁴ As the meeting moved on to other pressing matters, the generals and prefects expressed their accord. To indoctrinate the Algerian population on a mass scale against FLN propaganda, and to prepare the army to assume the duty of doing so, the Resident Minister would create a new corps of officers specializing in the techniques of propaganda and psychological warfare. Under its guidance, the army could become a powerful ideological tool: a force of "four hundred thousand propagandists."⁵

Beginning in June 1956, civil and military authorities in Algeria set out to discover a new form of psychological warfare capable of restoring Algerians' affections for France. At first, this project did not appear radical. Like most militaries, the French army employed propaganda to justify its mission and demoralize its enemies. In 1956 the small army

³ "Séance de l'après-midi," 12CAB/199, p. 29.

⁴ Ibid, 30.

⁵ Ibid, 36.

Psychological Action Bureau in Algeria did just that, producing anti-FLN posters and pamphlets that broadcast the benefits of a 'French peace.'⁶ But for many policymakers, the notion of 'psychological action' represented more. Drawing on advances in modern social sciences and inspired by the techniques of indoctrination that many officers had witnessed in Indochina, the burgeoning military discipline of 'psychological action' promised new possibilities for conditioning Algerians' loyalty subconsciously. As the army struggled to translate these theories into practice, it transformed their scope and objectives into a program of colonial regeneration. By early 1958 a systematized program of psychological action comprised a central aspect of the war effort, and a driving force behind army strategy in Algeria. The army's Psychological Action Bureau grew to encompass an expansive array of programs, institutions, and operations aimed at engaging indigenous Algerians, and its chain of command stretched tentacularly from the highest echelons of the army down to the level of the battalion. To secure the loyalty of Algerians, psychological warfare initiatives expanded beyond mere propaganda to forms of direct action which attempt to transform the comportments, behaviors, and social relations of Algerians on a mass scale. In short, 'psychological action' became an effort to engineer a new Algerian society.

How, in the space of two years, did the Psychological Action Bureau grow from its limited origins as a propaganda service to become a principal motor of French military strategy in Algeria? And how did the French army's understanding of psychological warfare evolve from relatively conventional propaganda – leaflets, posters, and slogans – into a massive

⁶ See the dossiers of propaganda materials produced by the Psychological Action Bureau in 1956. SHD 1H/2500 and 2501.

program of social engineering which aimed to restructure Algerian communities around clandestine village councils and frame the population in a series of parallel organizations tied to the state? Histories and popular memory often pathologize the meteoric rise of the *Cinquième Bureau* (or Fifth Bureau, as the army's Psychological Action Bureau came to be known) as the intentional infiltration of army structures by a hard core of officers radicalized by their experiences in Indochina.⁷ But the postwar turn to psychological warfare was neither unique to the conflict in Algeria, nor simply the intellectual product of a radical officer corps. The Fifth Bureau emerged not only through the theoretical and ideological convictions of psychological warfare's practitioners, but also through ongoing tactical experimentation, and as a result of deliberate policy decisions by political authorities who sought new solutions to end the anticolonial struggle. In turn, the character of the institutional structures which emerged shaped the conduct of its actors and of the army. The unification of strategic analysis, doctrinal initiative, and practical implementation into a single organization drove both a radicalizing vision of what psychological warfare could achieve in Algeria and the progressive extension of the Fifth Bureau's influence into all realms of French army action.⁸

⁷ See for example Marnia Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire from Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), chapter 2 and page 207. This interpretation can be traced back to the early but exhaustive history of the war by journalist Yves Courrière in *La Guerre d'Algérie vol. III: L'heure des colonels* (Paris: Fayard, 1970), or even to contemporary actors who sought, after the defection of many psychological warfare personnel to the terrorist *Organisation d'armée secrète*, to dissociate the French state from such policies. Paul Villatoux attributes the probable origins of what they label the "black legend" surrounding psychological warfare to Pierre Messmer, the French Defense Minister from 1960 to 1969. See "Le 5^e Bureau en Algérie" in Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaïsse, eds. *Militaires et guérilla dans la Guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 2001), 399-419. This perspective is not entirely unmerited, particularly given the Bureau's efforts to extend its own reach after May 1958. But as we will see throughout the chapter, this view erases the complex institutional and individual dynamics driving the development of both the theories of psychological warfare and their institutional embodiments in the Psychological Warfare Bureau and its later iteration, the Fifth Bureau.

⁸ Here I draw inspiration from Michael Wildt's excellent institutional history, *An Uncompromising Generation: The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main Office*, trans. Tom Lampert (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

This chapter traces the evolution of the Psychological Action Bureau and its eponymous weapon from mid-1956 to May 1958. What drove the transformation of psychological warfare from a propaganda program largely inspired by the techniques of the Second World War into a massive project of social engineering? And how did the Regional Psychological Action Bureau come to play such a preponderant role in defining the French army's overarching strategy in Algeria? In the search for a new means to secure the enduring loyalty of Algerian colonial subjects, military intellectuals turned to applied psychology. These thinkers appropriated the techniques of Maoist revolutionaries, Nazi propagandists, and American advertisers, among others, to remake Algerian society along more French lines. The growing corps of officers engaged in psychological warfare did not elaborate their theories in a vacuum, but actively tested and adapted their theories on the ground. The doctrines and techniques of psychological warfare emerged in close dialogue with the direct experiences of Pacification unfolding in the field and the Bureau's conferences in Algiers, which united a wide array of academics, strategists, and civil servants. Armed with the scientific keys to manipulating the human psyche, and granted broadening authority to elaborate a radical program of action by military *and* civil authorities, the architects of the French army's psychological warfare programs sought to construct a new weapon in the struggle against anticolonial subversion. In the process, they made the French war effort into more than a campaign to defeat the FLN. It became a project to regenerate colonial society.

Psychological Warfare: the Key to Pacification?

By mid-1956, calls for 'psychological action' had become ubiquitous in the upper administrative circles of the civil government in Algeria. Officials shared a broad conviction that some sort of action on opinions was necessary to recapture the loyalty of the Algerian population from the FLN, whose small insurrection had rapidly grown into a popular movement. As Captain Guy Caniot of the colonial intelligence service warned early in 1955, "legislative measures [and] government decrees risk failing to achieve their aims if a parallel effort is not attempted in the realm of psychological action."⁹ In a "moral climate degraded by months of inaction and hesitation, perturbed by crimes, assassinations, the settling of scores, and punitive expeditions," echoed the head of Lacoste's cabinet Pierre Maisonneuve in 1956, "political actions must be extended by a major, profound, and continuous psychological action."¹⁰ Lacoste himself, echoing revolutionary warfare theorists, was unequivocal: "military action is nothing without an action on opinions."¹¹ Faced with a population increasingly sympathetic to the FLN's cause, Lacoste and his confidants worried that reforms and repression alone might not suffice to restore the legitimacy of French rule.

Despite the importance they placed on it by mid-1956, however, French leaders were still not quite sure what 'psychological action' actually meant. The new discipline remained

⁹ Captain Guy Caniot, "Fiche sur l'ambiance algérienne actuelle," January 1955. SHD 1H/2408. One of the first to call for 'psychological action' in Algeria, Caniot had directed the Psychological Action Section in Indochina. After writing this report, he was recruited into the Service de Liaisons Nord Africains, the Government General's intelligence service, where he worked in the press and information section until it was absorbed by the 5th Bureau. On his recruitment into the SLNA, see Maurice Faivre, *Les archives inédites de la politique algérienne, 1958-1962* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), 81.

¹⁰ Pierre Maisonneuve, "Esquisse d'un plan de politique algérienne," January 1956. AN 505/APII/344.

¹¹ Lacoste to Prefects and the head of the Regional Psychological Action Bureau, General Tabouis, "Directives d'action psychologique: le rôle de l'armée dans l'action psychologique," 7 June 1956. SHD 1H/1113.

vague and largely theoretical even for the army, who possessed neither firm procedures for engaging in a campaign of psychological action nor a large number of officers formally trained in its techniques.¹² Before 1957, the army applied the label broadly to any effort to maintain public confidence in France.¹³ The 'psychological action' campaign the army conducted in Algeria from 1955 consisted largely of conventional print or broadcast propaganda meant to highlight Soustelle's reforms.¹⁴ For a growing number of army strategists, however, 'psychological action' held the potential to move beyond conventional propaganda and create more effective methods of manipulating public opinion. Theorists such as Ministry of Defense specialist Maurice Mégret saw psychological action as a new discipline, born of interwar advances in behavioral psychology and scientific management, and perfected by the totalitarian regimes that arose in the middle of the twentieth century.¹⁵ The scientific and technical veneer of such theories made them a compelling – if unclear – solution for French leaders to counter the growing popular support of the FLN in Algeria.

¹² In searching for officers specialized in psychological warfare in 1954, the Psychological Bureau attached to the Etat-Major of the Armed Forces located fewer than 40, spread across colonial and metropolitan forces. Of those, not all appeared to have pursued formal training in such techniques. See the dossier "Officiers spécialistes de guerre psychologique, 1954-1955," SHD 1S/1.

¹³ See, for example, Note n° 35/AP/S, "Directives pour l'action Psychologique sur le territoire de la 10^e R.M.," 27 July 1955. SHD 1H/2403. No official definition of psychological action existed until the publication of the *Provisory Instruction for the Employment of Psychological Arms* in July 1957. This official regulation defined psychological action as "the coordinated creation of varied measures and means destined to clarify opinion, and to orient sentiments, attitudes, and comportment of neutral or friendly milieus; with the intention: to counter adverse influence; to prepare the active sympathy of neutrals; to fortify the willingness and determination of friendly milieus to fight." *Texte Toutes Armes 117: Instruction Provisoire sur l'emploi de l'arme Psychologique*, (Paris: Etat-major général des forces armées, 29 Juillet 1957), page 14, SHD 1H/2408.

¹⁴ On this campaign, see General Lorillot to Soustelle, "Action Psychologique en Algérie," 27 July 1955, and the "Note au sujet de l'action psychologique à mener dans les s/secteurs & quartiers de la division." SHD 1H/2408.

¹⁵ Maurice Mégret, *La Guerre Psychologique*, Que sais-je? (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956), 8-9.

But if psychological action was a critical component of French strategy in theory, its difference from propaganda in practice remained unclear. For general strategies of population engagement, the French military could draw on the long tradition of Indigenous Affairs and Arab Bureaus in North Africa, a fact which Lacoste consciously highlighted.¹⁶ Soustelle had already resurrected such a tradition with his policy of 'contact,' which aimed to establish regular, direct relationships between local populations and representatives of the French state.¹⁷ Lacoste wanted to make the army as a whole an instrument of contact. The Resident Minister defined psychological action as both propaganda and the cultivation of good-will through direct encounters. Every soldier, he insisted, "must furnish, in addition to his purely military action, a psychological action that is no less important and which is exercised through human contact."¹⁸ But such efforts at individual diplomacy were neither a traditional duty of the army, nor a skill the colonial administration had proven adept at employing in the past.¹⁹ The stern Prefect of Constantine Maurice Papon agreed. "If we don't know how to create civil and military structures capable of opposing such ideological methods," he warned the Generals assembled in June, "and if we don't know how to proceed with brainwashing in a

¹⁶ "Séance de l'après-midi," p. 27. On the strategic antecedents of Pacification in the conquest of Algeria see Jennifer Sessions, see *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), and for a comparison between the conceptions of 'Pacification' employed by French field marshals Bugeaud or Lyautey with the strategy employed during Algeria's war of independence, see Jacques Frémeaux, *La France et l'Algérie en guerre: 1830-1870, 1954-1962* (Paris: Economica et Institut de Stratégie Comparée, 2002), particularly chapter 7.

¹⁷ Soustelle, Circulaire N° 6098 CC of 22 July 1955 on the policy of "Contact," in *Pour l'Algérie, Pour la France: Directives aux autorités locales, avril 1956* (Algiers: Imprimerie officielle du Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, 1956), 77. For more on the Special Administrative Sections, see Chapter 1.

¹⁸ Lacoste, "Directives d'action psychologique," 7 June 1956. SHD 1H/1113. Lacoste had also made this connection clear in May, in his "General Directive to Officers and Subordinate Officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Stationed in Algeria." Reprinted in *Programme et Action du Gouvernement en Algérie: Mesures de pacification et réformes* (Algiers: Service de l'information du Cabinet du Ministre résidant en Algérie, 1956).

¹⁹ "Séance de l'après-midi," 12CAB/199.

rigorous, almost Marxist manner, then we will run aground with the task we wish to undertake.”²⁰ In a meeting with Minister of National Defense Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury in July, Papon cautioned again that countering the ideological assault of such a subversive enemy required “not just excellent men, but men with a wide experience with ideological methods and psychological works.”²¹ Lacoste and his collaborators needed experts.

To develop this expertise and these techniques, Lacoste and Commander of the French army in Algeria General Lorillot looked to the small Regional Psychological Action Bureau attached to the Lorillot’s general staff. Soustelle created the bureau in March 1955 to reinforce the morale of French troops and produce limited print and broadcast propaganda aimed at civilians. The Regional Bureau drew profoundly on the experience of the army’s Psychological Action Section in Indochina, whose dissolution in the same month provided the nascent office in Algeria with its documentary library and its commander, Colonel Albert Fossey-François.²² Under his leadership, the Regional Bureau, its three divisional offices (in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine), and its eleven sub-divisional offices pursued a gradually accelerating propaganda effort in conjunction with the civil government’s information services, and offered their technical expertise to both the military and civil administration.²³

²⁰ Ibid, 9.

²¹ See the minutes of the meeting Lacoste held with his generals and prefects for the benefit of Secretary of the state Max Lejeune, Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs Marcel Champaix, and Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, 19 July 1956. ANOM 12CAB/199.

²² Fossey-François formerly commanded the Bureau de la guerre psychologique en Extrême-Orient. On the transfer of psychological action documentation to North Africa, see see Paul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *La République et son armée face au 'péril subversif': Guerre et action psychologiques, 1945-1960* (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005), 267.

²³ “Directives pour l’action Psychologique sur le territoire de la 10^e R.M.,” SHD 1H/2403. For a more detailed overview of the actions of the *Bureau régional de l’action psychologique* from its creation in March 1955 until mid-1956, see Villatoux and Villatoux, especially pages 381-392.

This small but well-connected bureau played a crucial role in popularizing psychological action as a solution to the army's strategic conundrum. The Bureau's operational activity remained limited, but its headquarters in Algiers served as an institutional conduit through which psychological warfare theories entered into strategic discussions in Algeria. The officers of the Bureau itself, many with direct experiences of psychological warfare in Indochina, did not hesitate to offer strategic recommendations to policymakers. Lieutenant-colonel André Bruge, second in command under Fossey-François, did exactly that in July 1956 when he contacted Lacoste to recommend that the Resident Minister consider creating 'reeducation' or brainwashing programs in French detention camps along the lines of those he and others had experienced while imprisoned by the Viet Minh.²⁴ The Regional Bureau also drew on experts from beyond Algeria, and in the process tied strategic discussions in North Africa to a wider developing dialogue on psychological action taking place in metropolitan and international circles. For an accelerated training session on psychological warfare he organized in Algiers from October to November 1955, Fossey-François selected a list of instructors which included not only psychological warfare experts based in Algeria like Captain Caniot, but also Colonel Alazard, who headed the Armed Forces Psychological Bureau in Paris, and the firebrand revolutionary warfare theorist Colonel Charles Lacheroy. Fossey-François also invited civilian experts to lecture on the demography, history, and culture of Algeria (notably ethnologist Germaine Tillion), broadening the bureau's purview and its claims to expertise.²⁵ These

²⁴ Sylvie Thénault, "D'Indochine en Algérie: la rééducation des prisonniers dans les camps de détention," in *La guerre d'Algérie au miroir des décolonisations françaises, en l'honneur de Charles-Robert Ageron* (Paris: Société Française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, 2000), 242.

²⁵ Colonel Fossey-François, secret report on the "Stage Psychologique d'A.F.N. du 17 octobre au 5 novembre 1955," undated. SHD 1H/2408.

training stages grew in frequency and expanded their audience as the army enlarged its psychological action program over the course of 1956 and 1957. They also provided a fertile mixing ground for a number of contemporary discourses on applied psychology, revolutionary warfare, and colonial reform.²⁶

The Regional Bureau was not alone in its advocacy of psychological warfare, nor was it in 1956 the sole site within France where strategists sought to develop a comprehensive plan of psychological action for national defense. The theories that underlay its development flowed from a broader wave of interest in psychological warfare that reverberated between metropolitan France, its colonial warzones, and an international community of military thinkers and academics in the early 1950s. In the postwar Anglophone world, academic communications and social psychology research boomed. The United States Department of Defense directly funded much of this research, which sought to discover psychological warfare techniques that could counter or negate perceived subversive threats of Soviet inspiration at home and abroad.²⁷ Figures who blurred the boundaries between the academy and the military like Paul Linebarger and Daniel Lerner argued that the techniques of modern psychology could be employed to condition desired behaviors in target populations, or to

²⁶ The number of training stages increased particularly rapidly under General Salan, who assumed control of the French armed forces in Algeria in November 1956. Later stages frequently included many of the same instructors, some of whom, like Lacheroy, authored operational texts for the Regional Psychological Action Bureau on the basis of their lectures. After a training stage under the partial direction of Lacheroy and Antoine Bonnemaison in November 1957, for example, the Regional Psychological Action Bureau distributed the two men's speeches to its Itinerant Officers. See the "Bulletin de liaison et d'information des Officiers Itinerants" dated 11 November 1957, SHD 1H/2533.

²⁷ Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

capture audiences through symbols that worked on the unconscious.²⁸ At a growing number of institutions in the metropole – the *Ecole supérieure de guerre* in Paris, or the General Information and Psychological Action Service attached to the Permanent Secretary of National Defense, for example – French strategists drew not only on these works, but on a tradition of French social psychology that peaked in the 1940s and 1950s.²⁹ Embodied by thinkers like Gustave Le Bon and André Tarde, this school of thought focused on inculcating obedience and controlling crowds through suggestion.³⁰ This literature held great interest for the Regional Psychological Action Bureau, since they offered ‘scientific’ techniques for manipulating the opinions and emotions of target populations.³¹ In an era where ideology no longer sufficed to sustain Empire, scientific management offered a powerful alternative.

²⁸ Before publishing a textbook on the subject in 1948, Linebarger worked for five years in the American Psychological Warfare division in China. Daniel Lerner, who later became well-known as a founding father of development theory, spent much of the Second World War in the psychological warfare division of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force. In 1949 he published a monograph on his wartime experiences, and in 1951 an edited collection for U.S. foreign policy use which united many of the central theorists of American psychological warfare, including Harold Lasswell, widely considered to be the father of the field. French psychological warfare theorists frequently cited these texts. See Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948); Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day* (New York: George W Stewart, 1949); and Daniel Lerner, ed., *Propaganda in War and Crisis* (New York: George W Stewart, 1951). For a detailed account of the rise of psychoanalysis as a tool to understand Nazism and other totalitarian regimes, see Daniel Pick, *The Pursuit of the Nazi Mind: Hitler, Hess, and the Analysts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

²⁹ For more on these institutions and their engagement with psychological action, see Villatoux and Villatoux, chapter 5. As Maurice Mégret notes in the bibliography of his book on psychological warfare, the French-language literature on the subject was not well-developed, and thus French theorists relied heavily on the English-language literature. See Mégret, *La Guerre Psychologique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956), 125.

³⁰ Yves Cohen, *Le siècle des chefs: Une histoire transnationale du commandement et de l'autorité, 1890-1940* (Paris: Editions Amsterdam, 2013).

³¹ The Bureau's library included Le Bon and studies like those of Mégret that translated the broad lines of American propaganda theory, as well as many works with similar themes like Jacques Ellul's *La technique ou l'enjeu du siècle* (1954) and Walter Lippmann's *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (1955). See the "Liste des ouvrages de la bibliothèque du 5eme Bureau," 9 November 1959. SHD 1H/2403.

The French military had possessed a well-entrenched propaganda program since the First World War. After the rise of National Socialism, however, many liberal democratic governments including France quietly looked to these programs with renewed interest. Their shared enthusiasm emanated from the common experience of the Allied Powers' joint Psychological Warfare Branch during the Second World War, and from a lingering fear that liberal democracies faced the menace of both foreign infiltration and "renewed bouts of popular authoritarian 'sickness'" in an age of mass politics.³² Throughout the early 1950s, the former Allied powers continued to collaborate. The American military shared its technical insights and strategies for countering the perceived threat of subversive communist propaganda with its European counterparts, most notably through secret commissions attached to NATO and the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe.³³ Officer training exchanges also helped to circulate ideas and techniques. Several officers leading early psychological warfare programs in Indochina trained under the British in Malaysia, while five others trained at Fort Bragg, in North Carolina.³⁴ Military officials were happy to draw on the technical advice of Americans, whom they saw as the most scientifically advanced in the

³² Pick, 180. For contemporary accounts of the Psychological Warfare Branch and similar actions in the Second World War, see William E. Daugherty and Morris Jankowitz, eds., *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press for the Operations Research Office, 1960). For a brief overview of the French experience, see Villatoux and Villatoux, 118-121.

³³ See chapter 7 of Villatoux and Villatoux and the reports of the *Commission interministérielle d'action psychologique en matière de Défense nationale*, which represented France in NATO discussions, in SHD 5Q/19. Interestingly, while the United States contributed the greatest technical expertise, American representatives appear to have been relatively disinterested in collaboration, while nations like Portugal and Italy seemed quite enthusiastic. Other participating nations included Great Britain, Belgium, West Germany, and Greece.

³⁴ Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *Guerre et Action Psychologiques en Algérie* (Vincennes: Service historique de la Défense, 2007), 25.

field.³⁵ In Indochina, the French army widely disseminated the field manual on propaganda employed by U.S. forces in Korea.³⁶ These collaborations helped propel the development of French psychological warfare, and lent their propaganda methods a distinctly American flavor.

By 1956, the call for psychological warfare had become a “recurring structural element” of French military thinking, and a distinctively Gallic school of theory began to emerge.³⁷ For policymakers like Maurice Mégret, charged with studying its implementation by the Secretary of National Defense, psychological warfare constituted a risk unique to the context of the Cold War. Freud, Jung, Pavlov, and other psychologists of the unconscious had delivered propagandists the “keys to the human personality” by deciphering the human psyche. And just as mankind had marshalled the power of bacteria, chemicals, and atoms for war, Mégret insisted, totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union and Maoist China now employed psychology in a systematized assault on democracies.³⁸ Mégret’s vision of psychological warfare reflected the new science’s close ties to the military discourse on ‘revolutionary warfare’ that emerged concurrently.³⁹

Advances in psychology presented a crucial danger in the eyes of French theorists. They also yielded powerful defensive tools. As psychology specialist for the French counter-espionage service Antoine Bonnemaison argued, propaganda could condition reflexive

³⁵ See the extensive dossier compiled by the head of the Defense Ministry’s Centre d’instruction interarmées de l’arme psychologique in Paris, Colonel Alazard, following a U.S. Army training psychological warfare training session for NATO officers in Boeblingen Germany, May 1955. SHD 1S/49.

³⁶ Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *Guerre et Action Psychologiques en Algérie*, 25.

³⁷ Villatoux and Villatoux, 19.

³⁸ Mégret, 32, 38-39. In addition to heading the ‘Psychological Action Section’ of the Service d’Information Generale et d’Action Psychologique attached to the Secretariat General Permanent de la Defense Nationale, Mégret also served as one of France’s representatives to the NATO workgroup on psychological warfare.

³⁹ On the theories and doctrine of ‘revolutionary warfare,’ see Chapter 2.

emotional responses by using images and slogans to stimulate innate, subconscious instincts – struggle, nutrition, sexuality, and maternity.⁴⁰ Like Mégret, Lieutenant-colonel Bruge, and many more of his contemporaries, Bonnemaïson drew heavily on the work of Serge Chakotin, a former student of Pavlov and keen observer of Russian and Nazi propaganda methods.⁴¹ His 1939 book *Rape of the Masses* asserted that through repetitive, highly-orchestrated, and performative “sensory propaganda,” the National Socialists had won over the politically inactive mass that comprised ninety percent of German society. Mass rallies, the ubiquitous use of the swastika, slogans – all worked in concert on the subconscious to render populations tractable.⁴² Bonnemaïson remained ambiguous whether democracies could employ the same techniques to counter the psychological assaults of ‘totalitarian’ movements like the FLN in Algeria. Citing the gravity of the threat they faced, officers tied to the Regional Psychological Action Bureau, however, proved much less reticent.

The impact of this body of psychoanalytic theory on the activity of the Regional Psychological Action Bureau before 1956 is unclear. But its growing appeal for such an institution– seeded not only with veterans of the war in Indochina, but a disproportionate number of Viet-minh reeducation camp survivors – became increasingly palpable over the course of the year. A commission at the *École Supérieure de Guerre* in Paris noted that most French officers designated to oversee psychological action remained “generally without a

⁴⁰“Fondements de la Guerre Psychologique ; résumé de conférences fait par M. Bonnemaïson,” 7 November 1957, SHD 1H/2409. This particular document, based on conferences delivered in 1956 and 1957, was widely disseminated by the Regional Psychological Action Bureau, and came to constitute a central doctrinal text.

⁴¹ On the influence of Chakotin, see Villatoux and Villatoux, 82-83.

⁴² Serge Chakotin, *The Rape of the Masses: The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda*, trans. E.W. Dickes (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1952).

particular competence" in the matter, since they had not undergone any rigorous theoretical training.⁴³ Even the future director of the Army's psychological action training program at Arzew, Lieutenant-colonel Bruge, remarked that "before instructing others, it was necessary to instruct ourselves."⁴⁴ Officers of the Regional Bureau embraced texts like Chakotin enthusiastically, and read them through the lens their own experiences of Viet-minh 'brainwashing.' Bruge, who spent five years interned in a Viet-minh reeducation camp, interpreted such theory as the basis for both the 'Maoist' techniques employed by the Viet-minh and the subversive actions of the FLN in Algeria.⁴⁵ As 1956 progressed, the officers of the Regional Bureau began to marry these various intellectual strands into a cohesive theory of mass indoctrination which they sought to place at the heart of French strategy.⁴⁶

It was this evolving institution that Robert Lacoste expanded in the summer of 1956 with the aim of launching a broad campaign of psychological action in Algeria. And it was in part the new structures Lacoste granted the Regional Bureau that helped push it to the center of Pacification. Lacoste hoped that with the necessary men and materials, the Regional Bureau could provide the army with the methodological instruction and ideological content necessary to "play the role of the common bond" conjoining Algeria's subject and settler

⁴³ Cited in Villatoux and Villatoux, 391-392.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 445.

⁴⁵ In his self-published *Le poison rouge: la guerre psychologique... guerre sans frontières* (Nice: 1969), Bruge mixed a close reproduction of Chakotin's theories with an account of his time in Viet-minh reeducation camps and his deployment to Algeria, where he headed the Centre d'instruction de pacification et contre-guérilla, the Fifth Bureau's counterinsurgency school at Arzew.

⁴⁶ See for example the undated internal strategy piece entitled "Comprendre et agir (réflexions sur le problème psychologique algérien)," which combined a reading of Chakotin and Mao Tse-tung with an analysis of the FLN to propose the broad outlines of a French response. SHD 1H/2411.



Figure 1.1: A Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company assigned to the 5^e D.B. tours in eastern Oran between Mazouna and Rénault. (Source: ECPAD ALG/57/389). © ECPAD.

populations.⁴⁷ In practical terms, this turn to psychological action meant the creation of a number of new institutional forms. In June, Lacoste created three Loudspeaker and Leaflet companies on the model of those employed by the American army, to produce and distribute propaganda, to project open-air films, and to broadcast public addresses.⁴⁸ In July, Lacoste took the more radical decision to deploy specialized officers to army detention camps to explore the possibilities for 'reeducating' prisoners into pro-French propagandists.⁴⁹ Both decisions widened the Regional Bureau's responsibilities into the realm of direct action.

⁴⁷ Lacoste, "General Directive to Officers and Subordinate Officers..."

⁴⁸ On the Compagnies de haut-parleurs et des tracts, see Villatoux and Villatoux, 387-388, and Julia Heinemann, "Guerres surmédiatisées? Die Interrelation zwischen Militär und Medien im Indochina- und Algerienkrieg" (PhD diss., Universität Freiburg, forthcoming).

⁴⁹ Sylvie Thénault, "D'Indochine en Algérie," 244.

The most significant transformation however, came with Lacoste's creation in late July of a corps of Itinerant Officers (*Officiers itinérants* – OIs) to develop and direct psychological action. If the Regional Bureau already assured "the education and information" of soldiers on "the Algerian problem" through print propaganda, these 25 officers furnished it the means to directly observe and influence the actions of active military units.⁵⁰ These councilors fanned out across the Algerian territory to train unit commanders in the techniques of propaganda, "serving as their guides, instructors, and examples."⁵¹ They demonstrated techniques for public propaganda meetings, directed discussions photographic displays, and tract distribution. They also experimented with new techniques and offered suggestions to the military command based on their test experiences.⁵² By the end of 1956, the OIs gained the authority to not only "comment and develop" Pacification directives issued by Lacoste, but to "control [their] application and execution."⁵³

The Itinerant Officers provided the Regional Bureau an important tool, not only to directly implement and assess its theories on the ground, but to promote an increasingly ideological vision of the war. In addition to their mission to direct a "vast campaign to detoxify and reeducate the Muslim population," Lacoste ordered them to convince the broader army of the necessity of psychological action.⁵⁴ Military leaders selected the initial 25 captains and

⁵⁰ "Directives pour l'action Psychologique," 1H/2403.

⁵¹ Resident Minister to General Lorillot, "Action Psychologique," 15 October 1956. SHD 1H/2533.

⁵² The Psychological Bureau maintained an ongoing discussion on new techniques and practices in the pages of its internal bulletin, the "Bulletin de liaison et d'information des Officiers Itinérants." See SHD 1H/2533.

⁵³ Etat-Major – 5th Bureau, "Instruction sur la mission et l'emploi des Officiers Itinérants," 6 April 1958. SHD 1H/2533. Paul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux date this evolution to December 1956. Villatoux and Villatoux, 388.

⁵⁴ Bureau Psychologique – Etat-major de Constantine, "Officiers Itinérants d'action psychologique," 25 August 1956. SHD 1H/2533.

lieutenants because the majority had survived internment by the Viet-minh, and therefore understood “deeply from personal experience” the techniques to employ, rather than on the basis of any technical knowledge.⁵⁵ As a privileged relay between units in the field and strategists in Algiers, the Itinerant Officers became a dominant voice on Pacification. They shaped the implementation of programs in the field, but they also shaped the perspectives and policies of civil and military authorities through their reports.⁵⁶ Their ongoing efforts to test, assess, and modify psychological warfare techniques on location contributed to the broad perception of the discipline’s ‘scientific’ nature. By December 1956, the mission of the OIs evolved from technical council to the “permanent... implementation of a response to Revolutionary Warfare.”⁵⁷ They embodied both the Regional Psychological Bureau’s growing conviction that psychological warfare could remedy Algeria’s ills, and a new structural imperative to colonize other military bodies in the pursuit of this action. They became, in the words of one observer, “missionaries preaching pacification.”⁵⁸

To the institutional and doctrinal momentum gathering behind the Region Psychological Action Bureau in late 1956, French policymakers added new leadership. In the aftermath of France’s humiliating withdrawal from Suez and the Soviet Union’s repression of the Hungarian Revolution, Lacoste and Bourgès-Maunoury felt desperate to recapture

⁵⁵ Bureau Psychologique, “Fiche à l’attention du Colonel Goussault,” 22 February 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

⁵⁶ One duty of Itinerant Officers was to provide advice on how Pacification and psychological action programs could best be implemented. Summaries of such suggestions appear not only in military archives, but among the papers of civil officials. See for example the extensive “Etude sur les réponses faites par les officiers d’Action Psychologique Itinérants à un questionnaire concernant les problèmes et les méthodes de pacification en Algérie,” contained in the papers of Prefect of Constantine Maurice Papon, dated 1 August 1957. AN 99AJ/19.

⁵⁷ “Instruction sur la mission et l’emploi des Officiers Itinérants”

⁵⁸ Chef de Bataillon Mairal-Bernard, “5èmes Bureaux et 7ème arme,” *Revue des Forces Terrestres* 11 (January 1958), 89.

momentum in Algeria. In December, they replaced the traditionalist General Lorillot with a military commander more capable of combatting what they increasingly saw as communist-led revolutionary war: Raoul Salan.⁵⁹ Clever and ambitious, the enigmatic Salan had proven a brazen and capable leader in Indochina, and had promoted the use of psychological warfare to counter the 'Maoist' techniques of the Viet-minh. Now the blue-eyed General set out to do the same in Algeria. Under the guidance of Salan and a military command stocked with his fellow veterans of Indochina, the French army stood ready to embrace psychological action on a massive scale.

Towards a Model of Action: The 1957 Pilot Operations

On January 16th, 1957, General Salan called a young academic into his office. Jean Servier's reputation preceeded him. Caught in the first violent outbursts of the Algerian conflict in November 1954 while carrying out ethnographic research for his doctorate in the Aurès Mountains, Servier rescued a wounded teacher and organized an impromptu indigenous militia to defend the small town of Arris.⁶⁰ The French administration was desperate to arrest the growing popular momentum of the FLN's armed revolt, and for the past week, civil and military leaders in Algeria had buzzed about a radical proposal Servier had submitted to Pierre Maisonneuve in late 1956.⁶¹ Entitled "Constitution of a Base Political Organization," the

⁵⁹ Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie. Vol II: Le temps des léopards* (Paris: Fayard, 1969), 420.

⁶⁰ For his own somewhat sensationalist account of these events, see Jean Servier, *Dans l'Aurès sur les pas des rebelles* (Paris: Editions France Empire, 1955).

⁶¹ Maisonneuve met on January 12th with Servier as well as Pierre Chaussade, the Secretary General in Algeria, Colonel Ducourneau, head of Lacoste's military cabinet, and Lucien Paye, Director General of Political Affairs. Cabinet du Ministre Résidant en Algérie, Note de Service n° 220/CM, 11 January 1957. ANOM 12CAB/227.

project had elicited both enthusiasm and approbation. At its core, the proposal argued that to succeed in recapturing the loyalty indigenous Algerians from the FLN, French forces must not only destroy its clandestine infrastructure, but replace it with one of France's own devising. Such an organization, Servier argued, would allow French forces to undermine the population's ties to the FLN, to mobilize them in favor of the French cause, and finally, to construct the framework for a regenerated colonial state.⁶² Salan embraced the project enthusiastically, and directed Servier to design and implement a 'Pilot Operation' to test his model in collaboration with the Regional Psychological Action Bureau.

January 1957 witnessed a renewed wave of violence in Algeria. FLN attacks spiked in the preceeding month, when nationalist forces carried out more than 120 separate attacks. In the first week of January alone, six bombs exploded in the European neighborhoods of Algiers.⁶³ And on January 7th, Lacoste transferred full police powers to General Massu, launching a new phase of urban combat known as the 'Battle of Algiers.' January also marked a crucial transformation in the French military command. With his appointment in December, General Salan brought with him a cadre of trusted officers, many of whom had fought alongside him in Indochina, and most of whom were convinced anticommunists. Salan assigned command of the Army Corps of Algiers to the assiduous General Jacques Allard, and at the head of the Psychological Bureau he placed the emphatic and resolute Colonel Michel Goussault.⁶⁴ These leaders brought renewed energy to the army's search for novel strategies

⁶² Jean Servier, "Constitution d'une organisation politique de base." ANOM 12CAB/227.

⁶³ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 189-191.

⁶⁴ Raoul Salan, *Mémoires: fin d'un empire. « Algérie française, » 1^{er} novembre 1954 – 6 juin 1958* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1972), 66-69.

to counter the FLN's thriving insurrection. These new leaders were determined to resolve France's strategic shortcomings and put a decisive end to the "rebellion" that the administration had so far proven unable to snuff out.

Salan's arrival kicked off a period of experimentation in psychological warfare. As the army struggled to realize its goal of establishing durable 'contacts' with Algeria's colonized population, it sought new methods. In close collaboration with civil authorities and academics like Jean Servier, the French army launched a series of secret test operations which paired efforts to infiltrate and eradicate the FLN with new programs designed to draw Algerian colonial subjects into collaboration with the state. Through the experience of these aptly-named 'Pilot Operations,' the Regional Bureau elaborated new practices of psychological action, and systematized its theories into a unified strategic doctrine. It constructed a new model of Pacification that served as the basis for France's overarching strategy in Algeria for the rest of the war, and placed psychological warfare firmly at its center. The Pilot Operations conducted over the course of 1957 expanded the Regional Bureau's institutional form and its authority within the army in Algeria, and produced new techniques for waging the war. In the process, the Bureau transformed the army's vision of the conflict. Built to counter a purportedly maoist-inspired revolutionary war and drawing on the expertise of social scientists, the Pilot Operations made the French war effort into a project to engineer a new society capable of resisting subversion.

In the search for expertise that could help the military establish a more effective form of 'contact,' the military command sought to draw on social scientists. Jean Servier's academic expertise and his unique experiences working freelance for the Government General

positioned him advantageously to capture Salan's attention. Born in 1918 in eastern Algeria to European parents, and fluent in Arabic, Chaoui, and Kabyle, Servier studied ethnography at the Sorbonne, where he defended his doctoral dissertation on Amazigh culture in 1955. In 1956, he worked with the French secret services to organize the clandestine counter-maquis in the Iflissen Mountains known as "Force K." The effort ended in disaster in October when the group violently ambushed French forces and defected to the ALN, but the experience piqued the army's – and Servier's – interest in the possibilities offered by such clandestine structures.⁶⁵ Servier also spent part of 1956 working on administrative reforms under Lucien Paye in the Directorate General of Political Affairs.⁶⁶ Ambitious, confident, and outspoken, Servier did not hesitate to criticize the French state's lack of linguistic or ethnographic expertise on Algeria, nor to volunteer his own ideas as solutions to this shortfall. His appeals fell on receptive ears, attracting the attention not only of Paye, but of the army, who recruited him as an instructor. Servier passed the spring of 1956 training Special Administrative Sections (SAS) officers at the Military Center for Overseas Information and Specialization in Paris, an institution dominated by theorists of Revolutionary Warfare.⁶⁷ Servier's proposal for a 'Base Political Organization' reflected his unconventional set of experiences.

⁶⁵ On 'Force K,' also known as 'Opération Oiseau Bleu,' see Camille Lacoste-Dujardin, *Opération oiseau bleu: des kabyles, des ethnologues et la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Editions la découverte, 1997). On Servier's role, see also Fabien Sacriste, *Germaine Tillon, Jacques Berque, Jean Servier, et Pierre Bourdieu: Des ethnologues dans la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2011), pp. 231-239.

⁶⁶ For more on Servier's background, see Sacriste, pp. 193-269.

⁶⁷ Neil MacMaster, Neil MacMaster, *Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the 'emancipation' of Muslim Women, 1954-62* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009, 89. For more on the Centre Militaire d'information et de spécialisation pour l'outre-mer and the influence of Colonel Lacheroy's tenure as director, see Villatoux and Villatoux, 314-316.

Servier sought to correct a critical lacuna in efforts to win back the support of indigenous Algerians. For Servier, the FLN was not a popular revolution, but a Communist-inspired movement of “petit-bourgeois intellectuals” without deep ties to the “passive, resigned, politically uneducated mass” of rural Algerians they mobilized in their campaign against French rule.⁶⁸ Many ‘rebels’ took up arms not as sworn enemies of France, but following ‘traditional’ patterns of Amazigh resistance to outside authority.⁶⁹ The FLN’s continued success grew less from its broad allure, he argued, than from the government’s failure to engage Algerians in the project of remaking Algeria.

The solution, according to Servier, lay in pairing swift military repression with the creation of a clandestine political organization designed to “assure the political mobilization of the masses for the profit of France” rather than the FLN. This organization consisted of cells of local men armed for the self-defense of their village. These forces were not intended to replace French military units in battle, Servier clarified, but rather to engage the population against the FLN and cultivate popular support for French rule. Each cell delegated a representative to the *djemâa*, or village council, headed by a Political Commissar who issued orders, compiled intelligence, disseminated propaganda, and liaised with French military commanders.⁷⁰ “Constantly worked by propagandists,” this underground network would become both the “sure guarantor of free elections consistent with the interests of Algeria and

⁶⁸ Servier, “Constitution d’une organisation politique de base,” 1.

⁶⁹ Servier shared this perspective with Colonel Schoen, head of the Service de liaisons nord-africains. See the secret note to the Director General of Political Affairs (Lucien Paye), “Nécessité de distinguer entre rebelles et terroristes,” 23 November 1956. ANOM 12CAB/227. The report warns that the excesses of French repression – “summary executions...houses burned...women raped...emasculatation...interrogation following the method of the ‘third degree,’” among others – threaten to radicalize mere “attentistes” into “terrorists.”

⁷⁰ Servier, “Constitution d’une organisation politique de base,” 3, 5.

of France,” and the basis for a regenerated administration.⁷¹ Once the army eliminated the FLN, Servier explained, the *djemâa* could emerge from secrecy to become the formal municipal council, and the Political Commissar would operate openly as the village’s “elected official.”⁷²

Servier’s project resonated deeply with Salan and other superior officers such as Allard who ascribed the FLN’s continued success to its ability to manipulate the population through its own covert ‘Political-Administrative Organization’ (OPA). Conceptually, Servier’s political organization closely resembled the theoretical “parallel hierarchies” that Colonel Lacheroy attributed to subversive forces like the Viet-minh – and implicitly to the FLN. Enemy political agents supposedly used such clandestine structures to indoctrinate the population and to gradually replace the official structures of the existing state; a tactic, Lacheroy implied, that the French might themselves appropriate in response.⁷³ Servier’s project also paralleled a growing commitment within the army command to combat the coercive influence of the ‘OPA’ by mobilizing Muslims. Generals Noiret and Lorillot insisted in August 1956 that for psychological action “only action on the Muslim by the Muslim can yield results.”⁷⁴ And by November, Colonel Antoine Argoud began to elaborate a system that he labeled “Protection-Engagement-Control,” which aimed to draw Algerians into the fight on the French side through the organization of “self-defense” groups in the region around l’Arba (Larbaâ).⁷⁵

⁷¹ “Note,” undated and unsigned. ANOM 3R/387, dossier “Operations Pilote, 1957-1958.”

⁷² Servier, “Constitution d’une organisation politique de base,” 5, 6.

⁷³ See chapter 2.

⁷⁴ Emphasis in the original. General Noiret’s Top Secret report also contains Lorillot’s handwritten response. “Compte-rendu particulier de situation à la date du 1er Août 1956.” SHD 1H/2553.

⁷⁵ For a description of the counter-guerilla system he elaborated in the sub-Sector of Piémont, see Antoine Argoud, *La décadence, l’imposture, et la tragédie* (Paris: Fayard, 1974), pp. 143-145.

Servier's proposed operation paralleled the progression of French strategic thinking for a good reason: Servier was familiar with the theories of revolutionary warfare, and saw the utility of his own expertise for the army. While in Paris in 1956, Servier trained under the new head of the Psychological Bureau and confidant of Salan, Colonel Goussault, who likely arranged his meeting with Salan in 1957.⁷⁶ Servier actively sought to lend his ethnographic expertise to military debates on Algeria, and published articles in many of the journals where military theorists discussed revolutionary warfare, such as the *Revue militaire d'information*.⁷⁷ Servier did not appear to be entirely convinced by such theories. His insistence that much of the 'rebellion' could be explained by sociological factors unique to Algeria, for example, often chafed with psychological officers' predisposition to view events in Algeria through the lens of their experiences in Indochina. But he did share many of the same basic assumptions about the role of foreign agitators in driving the conflict, and the officers of the Psychological Bureau saw Servier's proposal as a potential solution to combat the subversive influence of the FLN. Servier's plan gave the Psychological Bureau a model of practice that fit its theories. Charged by Salan with co-directing the operation, Goussault and his second-in-command André Feaugas immediately set out to maximize opportunities to 'de-intoxicate' the population, and reframed the operation in the language of revolutionary warfare. By deploying "Marxist procedures in the service of our cause," they argued, the French army would make up its strategic disadvantage, and "little by little, expel the FLN."⁷⁸

⁷⁶ MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*, pp. 89, 90.

⁷⁷ Sacriste, 232-233. For Servier's criticism of the officers of the Psychological Action Bureau, see Jean Servier, *Adieu Djebels* (Paris: Editions France Empire, 1958), pp. 98-99 and 179-180.

⁷⁸ Fiche secrète n° 119/RM.10/PSY-PL "Opération Pilote," 10 February 1957. SHD 1H/2536.



Figure 3.2: Ethnologist Jean Servier visiting a village in the Dahra in early 1957, accompanied by one of his "medico-social" teams. (Source: ECPAD ALG/57/305). © ECPAD

Servier and Goussault launched the Pilot Operation in the rolling green plain of the Chélif valley around Orléansville, which spread between the steep foothills of the Dahra mountain range in the East and the coastal hamlet of Ténès in the West.⁷⁹ Servier recommended the region for reasons he deemed "sociological:" the dispersed nature of the population made it hard for the FLN to gain a foothold, and the inhabitants of Bou-Maâd – where Servier had pursued his doctoral field work in 1949 and 1950 – had rebelled against FLN tax collectors in late 1956, killing two and turning two others over to French authorities.⁸⁰ Appointed as Lacoste's representative to the operation's joint civil-military command and

⁷⁹ 3^e Bureau – Zone d'Orléansville, "Plan pour l'Opération Pilote I," secret. SHD 1H/2536.

⁸⁰ Servier, "Note sur l'extension de l'opération pilote" n° 013/OP, 5 June 1957. ANOM 12CAB/107. On Bou-Maâd, see Courrière, *L'heure des colonels*, pp. 34-35.

armed with a special budget of 500 Million francs, Servier directly oversaw preparatory actions in the scrubby hillsides around Bou-Maâd beginning in February 1957.⁸¹ Commandant André Feaugas doubled Servier as the operation's military leader.⁸² A former Indigenous Affairs officer and prisoner in Indochina, Feaugas led intelligence missions and directed the ten Itinerant Officers attached to the operation through the 'advanced psychological HQ' established by the Regional Bureau.⁸³ Servier and Feaugas held joint responsibility to develop an ideology for Operation Pilot and to pursue operations aimed at the population. The partnership strained, however, under the burden of the two men's differing visions of the exercise.

The operation unfolded in two phases, which its planners initially envisioned lasting three or four months in total.⁸⁴ The first aimed to root out and destroy the FLN infrastructure, and the second focused on constructing a new pro-French network modeled on the FLN.⁸⁵ In the initial stage, French forces sought to launch a major propaganda campaign, recruit potential Political Commissars and auxiliary units of indigenous fighters known as *harkas* (singular, *harki*), and gather intelligence that allowed them to map out the organization and

⁸¹ "Compte-rendu de la réunion relative aux Harkas, aux opérations « Pilote » et aux regroupements des populations musulmanes, tenue le 13 mai 1957 sous la présidence de M. Maisonneuve." ANOM 12CAB/107.

⁸² Note de Service n° 1369/CC, 11 February 1957. ANOM 3R/387.

⁸³ Prefect of Algiers and General Allard, "Instruction générale: Conduit de l'Opération pilote No I," Top Secret, 28 March 1957. SHD 1H/2536 d.1. General Salan described Feaugas as a "former A.I." (Affaires Indigènes), and the bulletin of CHEAM graduates announced Feaugas' release from prison in Indochina in 1954. See Salan, *Mémoires* p. 237 and *L'Afrique et L'Asie* 28 (4th Trimester 1954), respectively.

⁸⁴ This timeline appears in an undated, unsigned report, stamped by the P.C. Avancée du Bureau Psychologique, but given the language employed more likely authored by Servier. See "Operation 'Pilote,'" ANOM 12CAB/107.

⁸⁵ Fiche secrète n° 119/RM.10/PSY-PL "Opération Pilote," 10 February 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

location of FLN forces in the region.⁸⁶ The first weeks of the operation consisted mostly of preparatory work on the part of Servier and the Itinerant Officers assigned to the operation, who traveled the region to make contact with local communities, designated potential indigenous leaders, and spread French propaganda. General Allard intended to cap this period with a massed combat operation to deal a critical blow to armed insurgents, set to begin in March.⁸⁷ In their preparations, however, Feaugas and Servier contended not only with a population frequently reticent to engage French forces, but with military units unfamiliar and hostile to the new methods proposed. While Servier reported some success in organizing the first *harkas*, the Itinerant Officers faced resistance in their efforts to advise military commanders and train officers from local units in propaganda methods.⁸⁸ While the initially-skeptical commander of the Orléansville sub-Sector adopted their suggestions in short order, the commander of the city itself remained so dubious that the two Itinerant Officers deployed there had to put up propaganda posters alone, under the cover of darkness.⁸⁹ Such skepticism never disappeared, but a series of direct orders issued by Generals Allard and Salan and the start of combat operation in mid-March forced most French unit commanders in the region to

⁸⁶ For a comprehensive history of the *harkas*, see François-Xavier Hautreaux, *La guerre d'Algérie des Harkis, 1954-1962* (Paris: Perrin, 2013).

⁸⁷ For a comprehensive list of unit deployments and combat goals by sub-Sector, see Commander of the East Algiers Zone (ZOA) General Brebisson, "Instruction pour l'opération Pilote," 19 March 1957. SHD 1H/2536. The date of March 25th appears in an undated note from the Regional Bureau, "Note pour le Général commandant la Division Militaire d'Alger." SHD 1H/2536.

⁸⁸ Reports of Servier's activities appear largely absent from the archives, military or civil. The principle account of these *harkas* rather appear dispersed throughout Servier's mémoire, *Adieu Djebels*.

⁸⁹ Feaugas, "Fiche à l'attention du Colonel Goussault," 22 February 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

cooperate. Along with the limited participation of several of Servier's newly-constituted *harkas*, these repressive maneuvers appeared to succeed in restoring relative calm to Chélif.⁹⁰

Alongside these rolling combat operations, Servier and Feaugas launched the second phase of Pilot, aimed at "re-establishing contact" with the isolated and often destitute villages in the region. Accompanied by an armed escort and often working in conjunction, new "psychological action" and "medico-social" teams penetrated into communities recently cleared of enemy combatants in the scrubby hill-country of the Dahra.⁹¹ As the white-smocked female social assistants set up tents to shade themselves and army doctors from the sun while they administered vaccines and distributed powdered milk, the psychological action teams divided locals into groups of men and women.⁹² With the aid of a translator and loudspeakers mounted to a truck, an Itinerant Officer extolled the virtues of the 'Algérie Nouvelle' that France strove to create through its reforms, and decried the FLN's exploitation of Algerians.⁹³ The psychological teams then broadcast military fanfare through the speakers or projected films onto a screen while they distributed tracts and engaged villagers in discussion.⁹⁴ Feaugas frequently employed former FLN combatants the Itinerant Officers had

⁹⁰ Bureau Psychologique – État-major, "Bilan de l'opération « Pilote », " 10 May 1957. SHD 1H/2536. Military reports do not mention any combat actions by Servier's *harkas*, but Servier recounts a pitched battle between the *harka* in Bou-Maâd and a group of ALN fighters in *Adieu Djebels*, pp. 221-227.

⁹¹ Each Sector received one medical-social team consisting of a doctor and a female 'social assistant' equipped with two vehicles. Two additional social assistants were assigned to each SAS, and regularly participated in visits. The army also placed a Loudspeaker and Leaflet unit at the disposal of an Itinerant Officer in each Sector. See the "Instruction générale: Conduit de l'Opération pilote No 1," 28 March 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

⁹² Antenne Psychologique – 5^e Divison Blindée, "Etude sur la Pacification dans la Dahra," undated. SHD 1H/2536.

⁹³ A list of propaganda slogans and posters utilized during the operation appears in the undated document labeled "Pilote" in SHD 1H/2500 d.1. Representative themes included "Together we are constructing a New Algeria," "Communist Russia is the largest colonialist power in the world," and "A strongly unified Algeria is the vault-key to the French Union and an essential element of world peace."

⁹⁴ Bureau Psychologique – P.C. Avancée, "Opération 'Pilote,'" undated. ANOM 12CAB/107. For Servier's quite skeptical account of the CHPT's inefficacy, see *Adieu Djebels*, pp. 103-106.



Figure 3.3: Under the guidance of Captain Barault of the Fifth Bureau, a rallied FLN "political commissar" speaks to the assembled male inhabitants of the village of Mazouna, early 1957. (Source: ECPAD ALG/57/389). © ECPAD.



Figure 3.4: "Medical Assistance" in Orléansville, 1957. (Source: ECPAD BLED/57/76). © ECPAD.

'turned' to the French cause as speakers, or intervened personally to enjoin crowds to take up the struggle against the FLN and to select representatives for the *djemâa*.⁹⁵ Army doctors gave medical consultations and treated maladies, and the social assistants lectured Algerian women on proper hygiene and infant care, or, with the assistance of French paratroopers, washed and groomed children, re-dressing them in new clothing provided by the army.⁹⁶ In theory, the entire affair served as an opportunity to build a sense of solidarity, gauge the psychological 'climate' of the community, and gather any useful intelligence.⁹⁷ In practice, such day-long "shock operations" remained highly-orchestrated political theater that yielded uncertain results.

While the early experiences of Operation Pilot faced major difficulties, Servier and Feaugas clung to the operation's successes as signs that their new procedure worked. After the initial "shock operation," the contact teams revisited villages on a rotating basis. French forces typically returned to far-flung communities every fifteen days, in conjunction with market days to ensure a larger audience. In the city of Orléansville, the propaganda teams and loudspeaker trucks operated on a daily basis. Quantitatively, these encounters appeared impressive. In June alone, the medico-social teams gave medical consultations to 1,204 Algerians, a number which jumped in July to 2,377.⁹⁸ But these numbers belied the profound

⁹⁵ "Etude sur la Pacification dans la Dahra."

⁹⁶ Servier recounted this particular scene of washing children, which he labeled a "baptism by immersion into the 4th Republic" in *Adieu Djebels*, pp. 194-196. Photos of what may be the same event, taken in the douar of Beni Choumerane near Miliana, appear in ECPAD ALG/57/340.

⁹⁷ "Instruction générale: Conduit de l'Opération pilote No I," 28 March 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

⁹⁸ "Etude sur la Pacification dans la Dahra." In August, the number dropped to 1,509. The number of consultations per month remained relatively evenly divided between men, women, and children, with the exception of July, when the number of adult men treated nearly doubled, while women and children remained stable.

trepidation of Algerians toward French forces well into the operation. As late as October, Pilot's directors admitted that rural inhabitants often fled as French forces approached.⁹⁹ In the early weeks of action, Algerians frequently shredded tracts, tore propaganda posters from the walls of buildings, boycotted speeches or loudspeaker broadcasts, and rarely volunteered intelligence on the FLN. By the summer months, however, military authorities felt confident that the campaign had worn down the population's resistance, if only in limited ways. One commander estimated that psychological actions touched 60 to 70% of the population – but only 25% effectively. But in those communities "subjected to it in a sufficiently intense and regular fashion," he insisted, psychological action proved effective.¹⁰⁰ Another officer proved more enthusiastic, boasting that the "psychological crop-dusting" pursued since March had been so effective that "it was not rare" for public meetings to draw crowds of nearly 3,000 adults on market day, with many Algerians "demanding to speak at the mic themselves."¹⁰¹ Such experiences confirmed for Operation Pilot's leadership that despite setbacks, their new 'contact' techniques worked.

The main objective for this second phase of the operation was not simply to restore regular contact between the French state and the 'Muslim' population of Orléansville, however. Servier and Feaugas also sought to create a political network that could replace the FLN and tie indigenous communities to the French state. French commanders recognized the crucial need for medical care and food distributions to populations driven into endemic poverty

⁹⁹ Préfet d'Orléansville, "Opération Pilote – Mois d'Octobre 1957," 7 November 1957. ANOM 3R/387.

¹⁰⁰ Etat-Major 5^e Bureau, 9^e Division d'Infanterie, "Bilan de l'expérience 'Pilote au 1^{er} Juillet 1957," 12 July 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

¹⁰¹ "Etude sur la Pacification dans la Dahra."

by the colonial economy, and tied it to the army's "political" action early in the conflict.

General Vanuxem established soup kitchens and medical services for rural Algerians in the Aurès-Nementcha in mid-1956, citing "reasons as humanitarian as political," and General Jean Olié called for the same in Kabylie. Beyond fulfilling a dire need for medical care and nutritional assistance, the medico-social teams aimed to draw indigenous women into collaboration with state modernization efforts through the recruitment of indigenous assistants on location.¹⁰² Likewise, Servier constituted and armed 'Self-defense Groups' armed with hunting rifles as well as more formal auxiliary units (*harkas*) from local volunteers in order to draw communities directly into the struggle against the FLN. To knit all these groups together, the psychological action teams constituted secret village councils known as *djemâas* following the "shock" propaganda operations, and Itinerant Officers recruited individuals with leadership potential to become Political Commissars. The Psychological Bureau sent these recruits to a special training center attached to the counterinsurgency school at Arzew for "de-intoxication," and then covertly reintroduced them into the region to direct the *djemâas* and Self-Defense Groups.¹⁰³

The success of these efforts were mixed. The medico-social teams provoked enough demand on the part of indigenous women to serve as auxiliary nurses and translators that Servier asked to double the five teams currently operating, and created a school attached to

¹⁰² See (respectively): General Vanuxem, "Directives sur l'action politique des troupes," 28 September 1956, SHD 1H/2408; General Jean Olié, Note n° 140/K/Pol., 22 March 1956, ANOM 12CAB/165. In the same period, the Colonel charged with Pacification in Tlemcen launched the Aide Médicale Gratuite (AMG) program, which the army very rapidly expanded across the whole of Algeria. Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *Guerre et Action Psychologiques*, pp. 47-48.

¹⁰³ "Opération 'Pilote.'" ANOM 12CAB/107.

the St-Cyprien-des-Attafs Hospital in Orléansville to train the recruits.¹⁰⁴ Lacoste and the army command embraced the use of *harkas*, and sought to expand the number of auxiliary troops to fifteen thousand by the end of December 1957.¹⁰⁵ But the more clandestine elements of the network appeared to function poorly, if at all. Servier griped in June that his Self-defense Groups were not taken seriously by military authorities, who in turn complained that conditions on the ground often made it difficult to form such groups.¹⁰⁶ While Servier praised the enthusiasm inspired by the *djemâas* – purportedly re-baptized as the ‘Assemblies of the People’ at the insistence of the Beni Menacer community – they appear only infrequently in official documentation.¹⁰⁷ Colonel Goussault cautioned in May that French authorities often recognized the formal existence of the clandestine *djemâas* too early, exposing them to FLN reprisals.¹⁰⁸ In November, a group of FLN fighters ambushed and killed a French officer and the newly-revealed representatives of the *djemâa* in Sebâa Chioukh.¹⁰⁹ Later reports mention only briefly that 49 such delegations existed and functioned under the direction of the Special Administrative Sections.¹¹⁰ By July, the Itinerant Officers managed to recruit 46 “mediocre” Political Commissar candidates to command the *djemâas*, but the Psychological Bureau judged

¹⁰⁴ Servier, “Note sur le service d’assistance médico-sociale,” 6 June 1957. ANOM 12CAB/107.

¹⁰⁵ “Compte-rendu de la réunion relative aux Harkas, aux opérations « Pilote » et aux regroupements des populations musulmanes, tenue le 13 mai 1957 sous la présidence de M. Maisonneuve.”

¹⁰⁶ “Bilan de l’expérience ‘Pilote au 1^{er} Juillet 1957.” For an example of Servier’s criticism, see Servier to Lacoste, note n° 029/OP, 27 June 1957. ANOM 12CAB/107.

¹⁰⁷ Servier, *Adieu Djebels*, pp. 171-175. Fabien Sacriste points out that civil archives do not make mention of this assembly. See Sacriste, 251.

¹⁰⁸ Goussault, “Bilan de l’opération « Pilote ».”

¹⁰⁹ Capitaine Der Hovhanessian, O.I. détaché au S.A.T., Compte-rendu du le 2 Novembre 1957. ANOM 51/196.

¹¹⁰ The number of 49 comes from the July “Bilan de l’expérience ‘Pilote” cited above, while multiple reports from late 1957 such as those of the Prefect of Orléansville in ANOM 3R/387 note simply the creation of “special delegations” or the “implantation of a friendly political infrastructure” without further detail.

only five to “possess the qualities required to complete their mission.”¹¹¹ Those commissars the Bureau did reinsert into the Orléansville Sector provided only limited intelligence, and two were unmasked and assassinated by the FLN.¹¹²



Figure 3.5: French soldiers share tea with a Self-Defense group in Orléansville. (Source: ECPAD BLED/57/76). © ECPAD.

Well into 1957, the ‘friendly political infrastructure’ that the leaders of Operation Pilot hoped to create remained incomplete, contingent, messy, and ambiguous. It was far from the dynamic and highly-loyal network of secret cells that Feaugas and Servier imagined. But the importance of Pilot lay less in its achievements than in a conviction of its efficacy shared by the

¹¹¹ “Bilan de l’expérience ‘Pilote au 1^{er} Juillet 1957.”

¹¹² Servier, note n° 022/OP, 17 June 1957. ANOM 12CAB/107. Servier discusses the assassination of two commissars in *Adieu Djebels*, pp. 233-234.

officers of the Psychological Bureau and the military command. The operation itself was fundamentally flawed. The contact teams remained too thinly dispersed to effect the profound changes on Algerian society that Servier and Feaugas sought, and the operation never accounted for the possibility that rural Algerians might exercise any form of political agency in their engagements with French or FLN forces. But for Psychological Bureau, Pilot provided a model of practice that fit their theories about how psychological action ought to function. It gave them a concrete set of procedures and techniques that reached beyond conventional propaganda.

Servier's disagreements with military authorities over the efficacy of certain programs reflected a growing rift between the ethnologist's goals and those of the Psychological Action Bureau. For Servier, the primary objective of Operation Pilot remained the construction of a new Algerian-run administration accounting for indigenous social practices and built on the foundation of groups such as the *harkas*.¹¹³ Servier objected to the perpetual auxiliary status of *harkis*, arguing that they should be granted uniforms, salaries, and family allocations like real soldiers. Even the name 'harki,' he argued, signaled "racial and ethnic discrimination."¹¹⁴ The Psychological Warfare Bureau, however, sought from the beginning to use Pilot to disseminate propaganda and surveil indigenous populations more effectively. "The only rule" for Pilot-type operations, noted an officer of the Psychological Bureau, was "to progressively compromise the population."¹¹⁵ Psychological Bureau shared Servier's hope that such operations would

¹¹³ Sacriste, 251-253. I should point out that despite the progressive-sounding nature of Servier's appeal, his view of Algerians remained primitivist and paternalistic.

¹¹⁴ Servier to Lacoste, note n° 029/OP, 27 June 1957. ANOM 12CAB/107.

¹¹⁵ "Etude sur la Pacification dans la Dahra."

help create a more equitable Algerian society. Inspired principally by the theories of revolutionary warfare, however, Feaugas and the Itinerant Officers sought above all to enmesh the Algerian population in a propaganda structure that permitted them to manipulate Algerians' loyalties.¹¹⁶

Servier later criticized this "strange fever" that "gripped" the officers of the Psychological Bureau and caused them to view the enemy as "only a truly secondary element."¹¹⁷ He was not alone. Raymond Chevrier, the Prefect of Orléansville, complained to Lacoste not only that the Psychological Bureau needed to "better choose its slogans and adapt them more accurately to local circumstances," but that it also needed to better train subaltern officers charged with propaganda actions, who did not always appear "prepared for their role which is theirs."¹¹⁸ These critical assessments were likely valid. Selected on the basis of their experience in Indochina, Itinerant Officers only rarely spoke Arabic, and knew little about the communities they addressed, two problems Goussault openly recognized.¹¹⁹ And despite optimistic declarations about the Pilot programs' effectiveness in restoring calm to the Dahra, a temporary draw-down of operational forces in October made it clear that this calm resulted in no small part from the heavy presence of combat troops.¹²⁰

Undeterred by the continued opposition of active officers or by the limited gains Operation Pilot yielded, the Psychological Bureau, army leaders, and high civil authorities

¹¹⁶ For an example of this perspective at the highest levels, see General Salan's note on the Political Commissars, "Directive general n° 6," 5 March 1957. SHD 1H/2409.

¹¹⁷ Servier, *Adieu Djebels*, 181-182.

¹¹⁸ Chevrier to Lacoste, "Opération Pilote – période du 29 mai au 13 juin 1957." ANOM 3R/387.

¹¹⁹ Goussault, "Bilan de l'opération « Pilote »."

¹²⁰ Chevrier to Lacoste, "Opération Pilote – mois d'octobre 1957." ANOM 3R/387. The Psychological Bureau agreed: see "Bilan de l'expérience 'Pilote au 1^{er} Juillet 1957."

insisted that such efforts merited extending. Salan and Allard planned Pilot as the test case for a broader strategy, and they did not wait for the operation's completion before creating additional 'Pilot' operations.¹²¹ In May 1957, Salan expanded Pilot's operational zone to the coastal plain of the Mitidja west of Algiers, and created a new effort dubbed Pilot NK3 in the mountainous region around Palestro, south of the capitol. In July and August, the Psychological Bureau launched additional operations modeled on Pilot in Médéa and Aumale to the east Orleansville, in Mostaganem and Cassaigne to its west, and the Sersous plateau to its south.¹²² In late 1957, the army extended such efforts to the Department of Constantine.¹²³

The initial experience in Orléansville left both civil and military officials frustrated at the lack of coordination between the various forces engaged. Goussault insisted that Pilot's effectiveness suffered from civil officials' unwillingness to assist in the operation and because local military authorities had refused to obey instructions related to psychological action. Future operations, he argued, required the leadership of a psychological officer ranked highly-enough to impose his will.¹²⁴ Prefect Chevrier worried that the civil administration had not retained sufficient authority, and warned that "disposed of its own means of information and action," the Advanced Psychological HQ "had the strong tendency to disengage from all

¹²¹ General Brebisson prefaced his official instruction on Operation Pilot with the statement that "the results obtained...will determine in large measure the rapid pacification of the whole of the Algerian Territory." Brebisson, "Instruction pour l'opération Pilote," 19 March 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

¹²² Salan approved the ensemble of these operations in a note dated 8 May 1957, though most seem to have begun later than the note envisions. See General Salan to Lacoste, "l'Extension de l'Opération Pilote." ANOM 3R/387.

¹²³ These consisted of a Pilot operation around Saint Charles and a maneuver dubbed "Perce-Neige." See the "Procès-verbal de la Réunion de l'Etat-Major Mixte du 10 Février 1958," ANOM 3R/387. On Perce-Neige, see the dossier of documents bearing the same name in SHD 1H/2536.

¹²⁴ "Ordre du jour de la conférence du 13 Mai 1957." SHD 1H/2536.

hierarchy and to constitute a third power outside of both civil and military authority.”¹²⁵ For his part, Servier opposed many of the extended operations, often initiated by military authorities without his direct oversight and against his express recommendations. Servier vehemently protested in the face of Allard’s proposed NK3 operation. The “human climate” of a region should determine the creation of new Pilot Operations, Servier insisted, not “the valor of such or such unit.” In his estimation, Palestro did not fit the sociological criteria he laid out in selecting Orléansville because tensions in the region between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Berbers’ tended to radicalize both, a situation that worked to the favor of the FLN.¹²⁶

To resolve these conflicts of authority and ensure the coordination of subsequent operations, Goussault, Servier, and Chevrier met with Maisonneuve and other high officials in July 1957 to design an ‘Organization for the study and direction of Pilot Operations.’ Attached to Lacoste’s cabinet and composed of civil and military representatives, the organization delimited, financed, and executed new Pilot Operations. Lacoste designated Servier as his representative.¹²⁷ Despite his position, however, the self-assured ethnologist soon found himself outmaneuvered. Anxious to impose their vision for the Pilot Operations, Allard and Goussault progressively marginalized Servier. When he became too openly critical of the army command, Salan had him shuffled off into a largely symbolic position in the Government General at the end of 1957, where he effectively lost any say in the operation.¹²⁸ As Prefect of

¹²⁵ Chevrier to Lacoste, “Opération Pilote – période du 29 mai au 13 juin 1957.” ANOM 3R/387.

¹²⁶ Servier, “Note sur l’extension de l’opération ‘pilote,’” 20 June 1957. Servier also complained to Lacoste in an earlier note dated 6 June, bearing the same subject heading. ANOM 12CAB/107.

¹²⁷ Jacques Lenoir (assistant to Maisonneuve), “Rapport sur la direction des opérations « pilote »,” 17 July 1947. ANOM 3R/387.

¹²⁸ For a more comprehensive account of the infighting between the Psychological Bureau, Servier, and civil authorities, see MacMaster, *Burning the Veil* chapter 2, and Sacriste, pp. 251-256.

Algiers Serge Baret complained in August, the structure of the Pilot organization tended to favor military authority on the ground.¹²⁹ Isolated in his bureaucratic posting, Servier left Algeria in frustration in early 1958, and the army took complete control of the burgeoning array of Pilot Operations. Goussault and Allard's efforts to cut Servier out of the Pilot Operations reflected a more widespread conviction amongst superior officers that the army alone could restore order in Algeria. Convinced that Operation Pilot had revealed the means to do so, Salan's command now sought to assume greater control over all aspects of the war effort.

Through Operation Pilot, the Psychological Bureau elaborated a methodical and effective set of procedures for countering the FLN's influence over rural Algerians. The Pilot Operations allowed the Psychological Bureau to extend its authority and broaden its responsibilities, and pushed the Bureau's thinkers to synthesize a codified doctrine of psychological action. By August 1957, the heads of the Psychological Bureau wove together the muddled threads of theory and practice that had emerged over the past two years – social psychology, scientific propaganda, revolutionary war theory, and the practical lessons learned from Pilot and other experimental psychological warfare initiatives– into a coherent program of action. The Psychological Bureau now offered not only the techniques of contact that Lacoste sought so desperately in mid-1956, but a step-by-step procedure to pacify Algeria that conformed to the theories of revolutionary warfare circulating between superior officers, and

¹²⁹ Prefect of the Department of Algiers Serge Baret to Lacoste, "Direction des Opérations Pilotes," 19 August 1957. ANOM 3R/387.



Figure 3.6: A Psychological Action officer harangues men in the Dahra, October 1957. (Source: ECPAD ALG/57/481). © ECPAD

which appeared tailor-made to fit the Algerian context.¹³⁰ For a military command determined and struggling to recapture Algerians' loyalty, the Psychological Bureau held the keys to a solution.

Colonel Goussault described the outlines of the doctrine at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe in November, as part of General Allard's briefing on Algeria to France's NATO allies. In opposition to the mass societies of totalitarian or Marxist states, Goussault asserted, liberal societies were built on a "diversity of social structures [and] confessional associations." To protect Algeria against totalitarian movements like the FLN,

¹³⁰ For an example of this proceduralized version of Operation Pilot, see General Loth, Commander of the Army Corps of Constantine, "Note de service: directives concernant l'Action psychologique sur la masse musulmane," 2 August 1957. SHD 1H/1113.

Goussault continued, France must reconstruct Algerian society around varied social groupings such as farmers, butchers, youths, or even religious brotherhoods. The army must “organize and educate” such groups, which he explained meant placing them in a pyramidal scaffolding that allowed the army to gather intelligence, diffuse propaganda, and inculcate the “western values” necessary to resist the psychological assault of the enemy.¹³¹ The army accomplished such a framing (*‘encadrement’*¹³²) by imposing leaders and institutional structures capable of mobilizing “every member of the group.” In Algeria, Goussault noted, the French army had selected four such groups to ‘organize’ – *douars* (*‘villages,’* referring to the *djemâa* or Self-Defense Groups), women, youths, and Algerian veterans – and had begun to train “political monitors” to engage these groups in the struggle against the FLN. The army pursued the groups’ education through the Psychological Bureau’s “specialized means of information”: print propaganda, speeches and music performed by the Loudspeaker and Leaflet companies, and public community meetings led by Itinerant Officers.¹³³

The use of colonial elites to secure the loyalty of indigenous populations was not new in Algeria, nor in theories of colonial governance.¹³⁴ In fact, colonial policymakers such as Albert

¹³¹ “Les missions de l’armée française dans la guerre révolutionnaire d’Algérie, conférence donné à SHAPE par le Général Corps d’Armée Allard, Commandant le Corps d’Armée d’Alger, avec l’assistance des Colonels Godard et Goussault,” 15 November 1957. SHD 1H/2411. A typed but hand-corrected version, presumably Goussault’s own copy, can be found in SHD 1H/1117.

¹³² Literally ‘placing into cadres,’ or organized groups. This technical term, coined by the geographer Pierre Gourou in Indochina, circulated widely in postwar developmentalist literature and carried valences of management, surveillance, and social reorganization. To ‘encadrer’ was not only to organize individuals into structured groups, but to train them to behave in a disciplined way within those groups. See Sarah Hardin, “Developing the Periphery: Cotton Production, Pesticide, and the Marginalization of the Fulbe of Southeastern Senegal over the Twentieth Century,” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2013), chapter 2.

¹³³ “Les missions de l’armée française dans la guerre révolutionnaire d’Algérie”

¹³⁴ A vast literature exists on the topic. On Algeria, see Fanny Colonna, “Training the National Elites in Colonial Algeria, 1920-1954,” *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* 33, no. 2 (2008), pp. 285-295.

Sarraut had firmly linked the promotion of an indigenous elite to both colonial development and anti-Communist activism in the 1930s, and such ideas gained significant currency in the French intelligence community in North Africa.¹³⁵ The system that the Psychological Bureau proposed differed, however, in the scale and degree of complicity it implied. It aimed to enmesh all of Algerian society in a political infrastructure that could guarantee the active participation of every individual within it. In vision, if not in name, Goussault's doctrine of psychological action molded Servier's model to fit the 'Maoist' parallel hierarchies imagined by Colonel Lacheroy. Salan made this connection more explicit, and asserted to Lacoste that the "construction of a New Algeria" necessitated the "installation of primary parallel hierarchies." He cited the four laid out by Goussault. While Salan carefully noted that such a system did not simplistically "copy" the "revolutionary procedures of Marxism-Leninism," it is clear that he, Goussault, and others hoped to enmesh Algerian society in a similarly coercive apparatus.¹³⁶ To the Bureau's existing duty to transform the army at large into a weapon of propaganda, Salan now added a mission to radically restructure Algerian society – one which implied involvement in a broadening range of actions that targeted indigenous Algerians.

¹³⁵ Psychological Warfare theorists did not directly cite Sarraut, but as Thomas notes, his ideas had gained wide currency by the mid-1930s. On Sarraut and the links between colonial development and anticommunism, see Martin Thomas, "Albert Sarraut, French Colonial Development, and the Communist Threat, 1919-1930," *The Journal of Modern History* 77 no. 4 (December 2005), pp. 917-955. Thomas traces the concrete links between these ideas and French intelligence services in North Africa more fully in *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

¹³⁶ Salan to Lacoste, "Poursuite de la pacification," 7 September 1957. SHD 1H/2539.

Institutionalizing Psychological Warfare

As the Pilot Operations expanded, so did the Regional Psychological Action Bureau. And as the Bureau developed, its understanding of the utility of psychological action and what it could accomplish grew increasingly radical. To launch NK3, 'Perce Neige,' and the multiple other operations modeled on Pilot conceived from the summer of 1957, the Psychological Action Bureau required more personnel, greater authority, and the means to train the officers and civilian personnel its programs engaged on a large scale. Convinced that Pilot offered the only solution to the army's strategic deficiencies in rural Algeria, civil and military commanders from Salan to Lacoste to National Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury granted the Psychological Bureau the necessary resources and authority. But while civil and military leaders saw in Pilot a well-theorized model for understanding and resolving the conflict, officers in the field and local administrators often felt otherwise. More interested in the practical and logistical concerns of a difficult guerilla campaign, active officers questioned the utility and effectiveness of psychological action.

Such contestation, however, did not drive military leaders to alter their strategic vision. Goussault, Salan, Allard, and other partisans of psychological warfare remained confident that Pilot had finally revealed the 'antidote' to the subversive techniques of the FLN. Confronted with a lack of definitive results and with operational commanders' persistent resistance to their methods, the Psychological Bureau only intensified its commitment to "organize" Algeria's indigenous population. The Bureau espoused an increasingly utopian vision of the military's capacity to remake Algerian society, and sought to consolidate control over the means of effecting this transformation. By May 1958, the rechristened 'Fifth Bureau' and its partisans

commanded a broad array of Pacification programs and served as a principal motor of the army's strategy writ large. The Bureau became, remembered one officer, the "brain" of the French Army in Algeria.¹³⁷

From mid-1957, the institutional footprint of the Psychological Action Bureau expanded rapidly as it created or assumed control over a number of programs tied to Pacification. In addition to maintaining its now-considerable propaganda production efforts across a range of mediums (print, radio, and film), the Bureau broadened its operational and logistical capacities. The Itinerant Officers grew in number to 35 and then to 50 by November 1957, and the medico-social teams multiplied to total 19 as the Pilot Operations spread to new regions of Algeria.¹³⁸ To reorient the army toward the model of Pacification it envisioned, the Psychological Bureau increased the frequency of its psychological warfare training stages aimed at superior officers and high-ranking civil officials. Even more significantly, it moved in September to annex the military's pacification and counter-guerilla training school in the town of Arzew. The Bureau had coveted the center since 1956 for the large audience it would provide. Under the direction of André Bruge, the school now trained 380 officers of all ranks in the techniques and theories of psychological action per month – a rate that allowed the Psychological Bureau to directly instruct nearly half of all officers deployed to Algeria by 1960.¹³⁹ The Bureau created other instructional sites as well. A center for the indoctrination of

¹³⁷ Henry Descombin, *Guerre d'Algérie 1959-1960: Le Cinquième bureau, ou 'Le théorème du poisson'* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000), 28.

¹³⁸ "Fiche sur l'organisation de l'action psychologique," 28 September 1957. SHD 1H/2409.

¹³⁹ For more on the *Centre d'instruction pacification et contre-guérilla* at Arzew and the Psychological Bureau's maneuvering to annex it, see Denis Leroux, "Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d'Algérie: Le Centre d'instruction pacification et contre-guérilla d'Arzew, 1957-1959," *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire* 120

political commissars operated in Arzew from March, and in June Salan created a school in Issoire (Puy-de-Dôme) to train Algerian youth monitors. Intended to 'organize and educate' Algeria's adolescent population, the first class of 286 candidates began their training in July 1957. To finance these activities and explore others, Salan granted the Psychological Bureau a massive yearly budget of 120 Million francs.¹⁴⁰ The small propaganda service created only two years earlier very quickly came to comprise a veritable Pacification apparatus, encompassing nearly every aspect of the strategy it promoted.

The Psychological Bureau emerged from this expansion as an influential force within the army. The organization itself remained relatively small: its personnel comprised 53 officers distributed among the various army commands from the level of the État-Major of Algeria (Salan's general staff) to the subdivision of the Operational Zone, supplemented by the 50 Itinerant Officers it deployed across the territory.¹⁴¹ But it progressively absorbed or inserted itself into the direction of programs developed by other authorities in Algeria, conferring the otherwise small institution a disproportionate influence. This messy interpenetration followed from the understanding of 'revolutionary warfare' that underlay theories of psychological action and asserted that enemy subversion must be combatted on all fronts. It also emerged from role of the institution within the army. The definition of 'psychological action' stretched

n° 4 (2013), 101-112. The figure of 380 officers per month appears in the "Fiche sur l'organisation de l'action psychologique."

¹⁴⁰ Commandement Supérieur Interarmées, "L'arme psychologique en 10^e région militaire," undated. SHD 1H/1113.

¹⁴¹ The Bureau consisted of a Regional office of twelve officers attached to the Etat-Major, three bureaus of five officers attached to each of the Army Corps (Algiers, Constantine, and Oran), and twelve three-man bureaus attached to each of the Operational Zones, the territorial subdivision just below the level of the Army Corps. See the "Fiche sur l'organisation de l'action psychologique."

to encompass 'Pacification' as a whole, as the Psychological Bureau rapidly became the de facto decision-making body for all such efforts.¹⁴² As one of his colleagues asserted in early 1958, Colonel Goussault "does not fear the word:" the Psychological Bureau in Algiers "is a very important command."¹⁴³

The key moment for this consolidation of authority came with the new French President du Conseil Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury's decision in July 1957 to grant psychological warfare a formal place in the French military hierarchy. Acting on the advice of Colonel Lacheroy, Bourgès-Maunoury institutionalized the piecemeal psychological warfare offices as a structural element of the army command staff – a "Fifth Bureau" – at every echelon from the presidency down to the level of the battalion.¹⁴⁴ The form itself was nothing new; the Second Bureau, for example, which gathered and analyzed intelligence had an office attached to every level of the French military command. But whereas other bureaus functioned under the authority and for the benefit of the commanding officer, the Fifth Bureau operated semi-independently, issuing orders to its own psychological units such as the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Companies and medico-social teams. Military authorities further institutionalized the Fifth Bureau by producing an official doctrine on the use of the 'psychological weapon' on the 29th of July, authored by a committee including key revolutionary warfare theorists Jacques Hogard and Maurice Prestat as well as psychological experts Maurice Mégret and Antoine

¹⁴² Villatoux and Villatoux, 484.

¹⁴³ Colonel Mesnard, head of the Fifth Bureau of the Etat-Major of the Army, in a lecture at the *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre*. Cited in Villatoux and Villatoux, 433.

¹⁴⁴ Secrétariat d'Etat Aux Forces Armées, "Création du 5eme Bureau," 19 July 1957. SHD 1H/2403. The Secretary of Armed Forces also created Fifth Bureaus in metropolitan France, Germany, Tunisia, and Morocco, though they did not seem to embody the same ideological conviction as the Fifth Bureaus in Algeria. Villatoux and Villatoux cite Lacheroy's influence with Bourgès-Maunoury. See pages 422-426 especially.




Figure 3.7: The French military hierarchy in Algeria after the integration of the Fifth Bureau's parallel chain of command, December 1957.

Bonnemaïson.¹⁴⁵ Both measures codified the structures and procedures of psychological action already in place. They reflected the ideological ascension of revolutionary warfare theories within the military high command, and a willingness to incorporate psychological warfare formally into the structures of the military. This institutionalization consolidated the Psychological Bureau's authority over organizations like the training facility at Arzew, and spurred its further growth. In November, the head of the French Armed Forces' chiefs of staff General Ely ordered military commanders in Algeria to install Fifth Bureau representatives at

¹⁴⁵ The authors of TTA 117 drew case studies almost entirely from the Algerian context. See the *Texte Toutes Armes 117: Instruction Provisoire sur l'emploi de l'arme Psychologique*, SHD 1H/2408.

all levels of the military command, and placed Goussault's Regional Psychological Action Bureau in Algiers at its head.¹⁴⁶ The Fifth Bureau now possessed a semi-autonomous chain of command that reached from Salan's cabinet to the level of local administration.

The creation of the Fifth Bureau did not, however, cement the immediate or total acceptance of psychological action by operational forces in Algeria. Rank-and-file troops and many officers remained heavily skeptical of the Bureau's theories and doubtful of the efficacy of their techniques.¹⁴⁷ Itinerant Officers complained that operational units treated their propaganda materials with "insincerity, irony, even mockery."¹⁴⁸ "The old scrappers view the pacifiers like bad little boys view the priest," Feaugas quipped in early 1958. "There are thankfully lots of 'priests'," he continued, but too many general and superior officers remained "bad little boys," attached to "the vain trifles of military glory."¹⁴⁹ Many offered particular resistance to the Fifth Bureau's interpretation of the conflict as an externally-directed campaign of communist subversion.¹⁵⁰ In the field, some units regarded the Fifth Bureau with suspicion, as an external interloper into divisional affairs. Rumors circulated among the troops

¹⁴⁶ Le General Ely, Chef d'Etat-Major des Forces Armées, "Instruction personnelle et Secrète pour Monsieur le General d'Armée Commandant Supérieure Interarmées en Algérie sur Les Operations Psychologiques des Forces Armées en Algérie," 26 November 1957. SHD 1H/2409. By January 1958, the Itinerant Officers reported that they had installed Fifth Bureau officers in the majority of sub-divisional command posts: 95% percent of all Zones, 82% of all Sectors, and 56% of Quarters. See Cinquième Bureau – Etat-Major, "Synthèse des Réponses des O.I. au questionnaire remis à la réunion du 8 janvier 1958," undated. SHD 1H/2533.

¹⁴⁷ For examples of published contemporary critiques, see Jean-Michel Darboise, "l'Echec de la Pacification" in Darboise et al, eds, *Officiers en Algérie* (Paris: François Maspero, 1960) ; and the testimonies collected by the journalist Claude Dufresnoy in *Des Officiers Parlent* (Paris: René Julliard, 1961).

¹⁴⁸ "Fiche établi par le Lieutenant Safir à la suite de sa liaison du 2 au 3 avril 59 dans l'Algérois," 6 April 1959. SHD 1H/2533.

¹⁴⁹ Feaugas, "Fiche n° 6 à l'attention du Colonel Chef du 5^e bureau: liaisons dans le CAC (sauf ZEC) effectués du 18 au 27/3/58." SHD 1H/2533.

¹⁵⁰ On officers' skepticism, see the "Synthèse des Réponses des O.I." cited above. For an example of an Itinerant Officer debating revolutionary warfare models' capacity for explaining the conflict in Algeria, see Captain Jacques Mercier, *Rébellion en Algérie et guerre révolutionnaire* (Documentation O.I, 1958). Personal archive of the author.

that the Itinerant Officers were “spies” for the high command.¹⁵¹ The Fifth Bureau possessed the influence and authority to impose psychological action as a global strategy, but soldiers’ and officers’ commitment to implementing such a strategy was far from guaranteed.

The skepticism of active forces toward psychological action posed more than just ideological challenges for the Fifth Bureau. It also constituted a major factor in the successes and failures of the Bureau’s operations. Goussault reacted with frustration when he toured the zone of Pilot NK3 in June 1957, only to find that the operation’s commander had neglected to institute any of the measures outlined by the Orléansville model.¹⁵² Feaugas voiced similar concerns in early 1958 over the Pilot operation unfolding around Saint Charles, in the Constantine Department. Interested only in combat, Feaugas complained, the local commander proved himself “incapable” of leading psychological operations. The commander’s resentful, half-hearted efforts at psychological action and his “complete ignorance” of the Fifth Bureau’s procedural texts had rendered the atmosphere in Saint Charles poisonous enough that Feaugas encouraged military leaders to remove the commander and to “sponge out Pilot and recognize its failure,” since the “current seedy situation can only do us evil.”¹⁵³ In the face of such broad agnosticism, many within the Fifth Bureau came to see the ideological commitment of army personnel – and not the opinions of Algerians themselves – as the most significant factor in the success or failure of psychological actions.

¹⁵¹ Centre d’instruction pacification et contre-guérilla (Arzew), “La guerre psychologique en Algérie – Quatrième partie – Action psychologique sur la population musulmane,” 2. SHD 1H/2524.

¹⁵² Goussault, “Fiche au sujet des aspects politico-psychologiques de l’Opération NK3,” 3 June 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

¹⁵³ “Fiche à l’attention du Colonel Chef du Cinquième Bureau – Secteur de Saint Charles,” undated. SHD 1H/2533.

The moderate successes yielded by certain programs reinforced the Fifth Bureau's conviction that it had in fact discovered the secret to defeating the FLN through Operation Pilot. The Itinerant Officer deployed to Tiaret in 1957 waxed enthusiastic about the medico-social teams' success constituting local women's committees, an achievement which in his view conferred the army "real influence" over Algerian women in the region.¹⁵⁴ Another Itinerant Officer attested to the "interest," "enthusiasm," and "warm welcome" that public meetings inspired in rural communities around Batna. As proof, he cited the "1,500-2,000 individuals" who attended a film projection in Khenchela, as well as multiple public denunciations of FLN operatives.¹⁵⁵ These sentiments were not unique. By early 1958, the Itinerant Officers uniformly asserted that the Self-defense Groups, medico-social teams, and other psychological measures had tangibly improved relations between the army and indigenous communities on the ground, despite any difficulties such programs had faced.¹⁵⁶ Whether or not the officers' assessment reflected reality, Algerians did engage with these programs to varying degrees – strategically, cautiously, and in some cases with enthusiasm. The officers of the Fifth Bureau read this participation as proof that their procedures worked. The 'organization' of the population, they insisted, *was possible*.

Convinced of the success and importance of their methods in the face of persistent skepticism, the Fifth Bureau blamed the shortfalls of psychological action programs on flaws of implementation rather than design. The source of psychological warfare's continued failure to

¹⁵⁴ Capitaine Jean Louis Mercier, Officier Itinérant de la Zone Sud Oranais, "Compte-rendu de l'Officier Itinérant, Mois de Décembre 1957." ANOM 40G/67.

¹⁵⁵ Capitaine de Lorme, Officier Itinérant de la Zone Sud Constantinois, "Compte rendu du mois d'avril 1958," 1 May 1958. ANOM 40G/67.

¹⁵⁶ "Synthèse des Réponses des O.I."

provoke a spectacular resurgence of Algerian loyalty stemmed not from the conceptual defects of psychological action, according to Goussault and his subordinates, but from a lack of doctrinal commitment by officers charged with overseeing Pacification operations. The “greatest obstacle” to the success of psychological action, argued the head of the Fifth Bureau in the Batna Sector, was not the opposition of Algerians, but the “skepticism and indifference of Sector Commanders.” Psychological action suffered “principally...from the almost total ignorance of the nature and importance of such an action in a revolutionary war.”¹⁵⁷ The lack of qualified leadership became a recurring theme for Feaugas and the Itinerant Officers, who constantly cited the insufficient training, expertise, or technical skill of individual officers on the ground as the root cause of psychological operations’ continued inefficacy.¹⁵⁸ To make psychological action work, the Fifth Bureau no longer sought to elaborate new methods, but to convince the army to see the conflict in the terms that they themselves understood it: as a revolutionary war.

To cultivate the doctrinal unity it saw as necessary to the success of psychological action, the Fifth Bureau set out to evangelize its vision of the conflict to uninitiated members of the military hierarchy. With Salan’s backing, Goussault organized regular training stages in Algiers for superior officers and high-ranking civil officials. Colonel Lacheroy, Antoine Bonnemaison, Goussault, and even Salan lectured on the nature of the revolutionary war that

¹⁵⁷ Chef de Bataillon de Preval, “Action Psychologique,” Batna, 28 November 1957. SHD 1H/2536. Emphasis in original.

¹⁵⁸ See, for example, Feaugas’ report on his visits to various sites in the Constantine, “Fiche à l’attention du Colonel Chef du Cinquième Bureau – Liaison des 25, 26, et 27.1.1958 à Telergma, Constantine, et Saint Charles,” 28 January 1958. SHD 1H/2533.

France faced in Algeria and the centrality of psychological warfare for countering it.¹⁵⁹ These training stages often provoked enthusiastic responses. Upon his return from a session in Algiers, one member of Papon's cabinet recounted the "great interest" that psychological action held for the beleaguered departmental administration in Constantine.¹⁶⁰

The Fifth Bureau also targeted Sector and Battalion commanders. These officers directly oversaw Pacification efforts, and many had demonstrated significant skepticism toward psychological action during the Pilot Operations. But as Salan boasted, "the courses at Arzew permitted us to address this shortcoming" relatively quickly.¹⁶¹ Redesigned by Bruge during Operation Pilot, the curriculum at Arzew aimed to cultivate the "total and unanimous intellectual adhesion of officers to the method of pacification defined by the command" – in other words, to the Fifth Bureau's own model. Trainees studied the techniques of Pacification and case studies of Operation Pilot under active practitioners drawn from the Fifth Bureau and units in the field.¹⁶² They also participated in directed discussions intended to subconsciously teach them to adopt the vocabulary and conceptual framework of the Fifth Bureau. As Denis Leroux notes, Bruge and his colleagues sought to "win the acceptance of psychological action through a psychological action."¹⁶³ Many of the officers reported that the training they

¹⁵⁹ The Fifth Bureau appears to have organized such training sessions regularly from July 1957. One such training session aimed at Sector Commanders, took place under the direction of Lacheroy and Bonnemaison from November 4-8th, 1957. The Fifth Bureau organized numerous subsequent sessions over the course of 1958, including a day of training on 'psychological warfare' for 212 officers presided by Generals Salan and Dulac on February 12th. Short summaries of these training stages regularly appear in the "Bulletin de liaison et d'information des Officiers Itinérants," located in SHD 1H/2533.

¹⁶⁰ "Session de cours d'action Psychologique d'Alger – juin 1957," 3 July 1957. AN 99AJ/19.

¹⁶¹ Salan, *Mémoires*, 231.

¹⁶² "Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Bruge André, Commandant le Centre d'Instruction Pacification et Contre-guérilla d'Arzew sur l'activité du Centre," 1 September 1959. ANOM 3R/542.

¹⁶³ Leroux, "Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d'Algérie," 8.

received under Bruge gave them an “indispensable” understanding of “of this form of conflict,” and a “new faith” in the army’s mission in Algeria.¹⁶⁴ Arzew provided the Fifth Bureau a key institutional site, both to diffuse the techniques and procedures of Pacification, and to inculcate the attendant worldview that justified their use.

By late spring 1958, the Fifth Bureau drove the army’s strategy of Pacification in Algeria. It possessed a systematized program of action to complement and reinforce conventional combat; an unambiguous solution to the army’s strategic frustrations that Salan and his generals readily embraced. It commanded a growing array of specialized organizations to consummate this program. And it had begun to build a critical mass of officers who, if not necessary converts to the Fifth Bureau’s ideological vision of the conflict, still found inspiration in the possibilities offered by psychological warfare. The Fifth Bureau no longer sought principally to elaborate new techniques or procedures, but to discover an “idée force,” a central idea that could draw everyone in Algeria – settler, subject, and soldier alike – together in the fight for an “Algérie Nouvelle et Française.” More than the idealized portrait of the egalitarian, modern, and prosperous future society conveyed by their propaganda, the Fifth Bureau needed a powerful image, a striking and emotionally-charged symbol capable of galvanizing the population.¹⁶⁵ They did not have to wait long for the opportunity to create such a symbol.

¹⁶⁴ Annexed to Bruge’s report are several summaries of exit surveys completed by officers in mid-1959 that include excerpted comments. See the “Synthèse des déclarations des officiers du stage B.24 (24 Juillet au 8 Aout 1959).” ANOM 3R/542. Denis Leroux, cited above, discusses the reception of this instruction in greater detail.

¹⁶⁵ For an extended theoretical discussion of the “idée-force,” its role in psychological action, and the Fifth Bureau’s own proposed symbols, see: Centre d’instruction pacification et contre-guérilla, “Principes d’action Psychologique en Algérie.” SHD 1H/2524.

On the afternoon of May 13th, 1958, a massive crowd of nearly 100,000 settlers gathered in front of the seat of the Government General perched on the steep hillside rising from the port of Algiers. Driven to a frenzy by colonial “ultras” over fears that metropolitan officials would abandon Algeria in the aftermath of yet another governmental crisis, the settlers broke through the police cordon, sacked the building, and threw files and ledgers from the windows. In response, General Massu declared martial law, suspended the civil government, and announced the formation of a Committee of Public Safety – a term that conjured the French Revolution and images of the Republic in danger – to oversee the restoration of order. The following morning, General Salan assumed full civil and military powers in Algeria, ousting Lacoste, who, forewarned of the protests, had alighted to the metropole under the pretext of a meeting. As Pierre Pflimlin and Guy Mollet scrambled to assemble a ruling coalition in Paris, Massu and Salan worked to undercut them, and called before ecstatic crowds for the hero of the Second World War, General de Gaulle, to assume power and unite the nation. Tensions boiled between Algiers and Paris, and on May 24th on the orders of General Salan, French paratroopers invaded Corsica. Civil war loomed over the Mediterranean.

As French political leaders tried desperately to secure de Gaulle’s return, Algiers witnessed a series of striking demonstrations. On May 16th, crowds of Algerian and European men came together in the open forum facing the Government General to express their solidarity, chanting “AL–GÉR–RIE–FRAN–ÇAISE!” Demonstrators marched hand-in-hand in sight of the international and domestic press, calling for reconciliation between colonizers and colonized. The following day, Algerian women joined the crowds. In the evening, several

displayed their 'fraternity' with their French sisters by removing and burning their white *haïks*. On May 18th, the inhabitants of Algiers' slums marched into the center of the city bearing placards declaring Algerians' loyalty to France. International and domestic observers looked on in amazement at these seemingly spontaneous eruptions of 'fraternization' and solidarity.

Such scenes, however, were anything but spontaneous.¹⁶⁶ The heads of the Fifth Bureau – Goussault, his future successor Colonel Gardes, and the unflagging Colonel Lacheroy, who Salan transferred to head the Government General's information services on May 14th – rapidly recognized the potential of the unfolding events to either destroy or cement the legitimacy of the French army's project in Algeria.¹⁶⁷ In close coordination with Colonels Trinquier and Godard, the architects of the Battle of Algiers, the Fifth Bureau moved to capitalize on events and brand the coup as a progressive and egalitarian movement.¹⁶⁸ To constitute crowds of demonstrators, the Fifth Bureau drew on the organizations they or Godard had elaborated to surveil and control indigenous Algerians, or simply rounded up Algerians in trucks and forced them to participate by confiscating their identity cards. The army provided placards and banners, and coached Algerians in the slogans they later chanted before cameras and film crews. They directed the crowds with loudspeakers or plainclothes officers, orchestrating an enormous political theater for international and domestic audiences.¹⁶⁹ In the following days and weeks, the Fifth Bureau ordered similar

¹⁶⁶ Neil MacMaster has thoroughly discredited the long-held perception of events as spontaneous or organic by demonstrating the extensive role the Fifth Bureau and other army units played in orchestrating the demonstrations. See *Burning the Veil*, chapter 3.

¹⁶⁷ On Lacheroy's redeployment, see Villatoux and Villatoux, 547.

¹⁶⁸ MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*, 118.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 120-121.

demonstrations across Algeria. Conducted with the utmost secrecy to protect the veneer of spontaneity, the operations appeared to the army to be an unqualified success.

The Fifth Bureau emerged ascendant. Through the events of May, the bureau convinced the officer corps – and themselves – that they could indeed manipulate the population as easily and efficiently as they claimed.¹⁷⁰ As de Gaulle assumed the presidency on June 1st and called for the establishment of a new Fifth Republic, Salan and the army moved to sustain the momentum they had built by extending the Fifth Bureau's programs on a mass scale. "In eight days, we have taken a step twenty-five years into the future," Goussault announced triumphantly to his officers. But he cautioned them: "the enemy is still there;" the Fifth Bureau must ensure that the "peaceful revolution of 13 May" reached its full potential.¹⁷¹ In other words, it must radically transform Algerian society.

¹⁷⁰ Villatoux and Villatoux, 551.

¹⁷¹ Fifth Bureau – Etat-Major, "Bulletin de liaison et d'information des O.I. & des U.T.G.P.," 24 May 1958. SHD 1H/2533.




Figure 3.8: Organization of the Fifth Bureau central office attached to Salan's General Staff [État-Major Interarmées], July 1958. (Source: 5^e Bureau – Etat-Major, Bulletin de Liaison des O.I. et des U.T.G.P. no 39, July 1958. SHD 1H/2533)

*Technically, Goussault left the Fifth Bureau in June 1958 to act as Adjoint to Lacheroy in the Service de l'Information et de l'Action Psychologique attached to Salan's cabinet. In Practice, the SIAP assumed control over the Fifth Bureau, and Goussault remained in charge until December 1958 when De Gaulle had Salan and his retinue redeployed.



Figures 4.1-4.3: Accompanied by troops from the 6th Battalion of Alpine Chasseurs, an EMSI visits the village of Tacklich Ihadaden in the Sector of Fort National in Kabylie (now Larbaâ Nath Irathen), and bathes children. (Source: ECPAD ALG/59/35). © ECPAD

4 Evolve

Social Welfare and the Modernization of Muslim Women

The women of the village sat assembled on a dusty precipice. In their midst, a folding table stood set with a basin, a pitcher, a comb, and a bar of soap. A young French social assistant, her dress blindingly white in the harsh August sun, washed a small boy with the assistance of his mother. As she scrubbed his legs with a cloth, she spoke to the women: "Health is man's most precious possession... you must therefore protect the health of your body." The women watched – some with disinterest and some attentively – or chatted among themselves as she continued. "You must be clean. You must wash yourself upon waking with soap and water...the face and the hands." She rinsed the boy with water from a jerry-can that her armed military escort had lugged up the steep mountainside to the village. A second woman in spotless white, stern and practiced, dressed the boy in new clothing: shorts, leather shoes, and a tee-shirt. "No dirty clothing on a clean body," she announced, as she began to

lecture the women seated in the chalky soil around her on the 'proper' techniques for laundering garments.¹ The process began again, this time with an infant. The third member of the Itinerant Medico-Social Team bathed the child, dressed him, and then held him aloft, as if he had been baptized into the French Republic.²



The French army's visit to Ihadaden in August 1959 echoed thousands of similar actions in rural communities across Algeria. Drawing on models elaborated during the Pilot Operations, the Fifth Bureau created and deployed mixed teams of 'European' and North African social assistants in growing numbers from 1957. These all-female Itinerant Medico-Social Teams (*Equipes médico-sociales itinérantes*, or EMSI) roamed the Algerian countryside in an effort to penetrate into the lives of Algerian women. The basic medical assistance and the

¹ Instructional sheet, "Hygiène Séance n° 2," ANOM 3R/464.

² Jean Servier employs this metaphor in recounting a similar event in the Dahra. Jean Servier, *Adieu Djebels* (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1958), 1965-196.

instruction of hygiene, infant care, and domestic skills they offered ostensibly sought to improve the poor living conditions of rural women and to promote their social advancement. The anodyne façade of social welfare also hid the EMSI's importance as a strategic tool. Medical and hygienic assistance provided a critical opportunity to gather intelligence and to gauge local communities' attitudes toward French rule. The instruction itself aimed to push women – and the whole village by extension – into a process of profound social 'evolution' that the French command deemed necessary for Algeria's integration into France. And, as the attentively-composed photographs of day's events attest, the EMSI's periodic sojourns provided an occasion not only to distribute but to produce propaganda.³

By 1958, the Fifth Bureau had furnished the army command with a model of Pacification that appeared to finally offer it the means to cut off popular support for the ALN. But a key challenge remained: how could the army create affective bonds with rural communities which remained largely hostile – or at the very least distrustful – toward French forces? How could it cultivate feelings of identification with France capable of enduring over the long term? The answer, for the Fifth Bureau, lay in the body. The body long constituted a site where modern states acted to transform individuals' behavior and comportments to create and maintain public order.⁴ Inspired by a corpus of psychological warfare theory that explicitly

³ Images of this particular encounter appear in "Visite des ASSRA à Tacklich Ihadaden secteur de Fort National et de la 2/6e BCA ainsi que des légionnaires du 1er REP," 26 August 1959. ECPAD ALG 59-353 (see images in text).

⁴ Michel Foucault's concept of 'biopower' remains the seminal theoretical exploration of how modern states produce power through the bodies of their subjects. States produce power, Foucault argues, by regulating and optimizing the productive power of a population through disciplinary institutions; a move, he suggests, which simultaneously renders populations more governable. See Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality Vol. I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990). A growing number of works explore the role of the body – and particularly gendered or sexed bodies – in the modern French state's efforts to define national belonging. See, among other works, Joan Wallach Scott, *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and*

sought to condition desired behaviors by working on hard-wired human instincts, the Fifth Bureau now turned to the bodies of Algerians to inculcate reflexes of loyalty and assess feelings of national belonging. By training rural women in the comportments and behaviors of French modernity in domains closely associated with basic parental, nutritional, and sexual drives, theorists of Psychological Warfare insisted that they could condition a predisposition to “French” manners of living and a desire for French rule.⁵

In wake of the events of May 1958, however, the army aimed to accomplish more than the simple restoration of order in Algeria. The vision of ‘Pacification’ championed by General Salan envisioned a profound revolution of the colonial social order. In the face of the permanent ideological assault of the Communist bloc, the heads of the Fifth Bureau argued, a durable victory in Algeria required not only the elimination of the FLN, but also the reform of settler attitudes and the directed mass “evolution” of Algerians along French lines. The wave of ‘fraternal’ demonstrations in May 1958 jumpstarted the transformation, they insisted, but the army must assume the “revolutionary task” of regenerating the colony to secure its future as part of France.⁶

Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); and Naomi Davidson, *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). A broad historiography exists which examines the role of bodies in the construction of colonial social order. Notable works include Ann McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Laura Ann Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Ballantyne and Burton, eds., *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); and Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

⁵ See the series of four conferences on “La guerre psychologique” (which essentially just reproduced Antoine Bonnemaison’s lectures on the “Fondements de la Guerre Psychologique”) as well as the “Principes généraux de l’action psychologique,” taught at the CIPCG at Arzew. SHD 1H/2524.

⁶ CIPCG (Arzew), “Principes d’action psychologique en Algérie.” SHD 1H/2524.

The EMSI became a key tool in the army's effort to accomplish this *Algérie Nouvelle*. French army strategists saw Muslim women as both a susceptible population to rally to the French cause and as a key point of action to effect wider social change. Through their work, the EMSI aimed to begin inculcating the attitudes and comportments deemed necessary to participate in the industrialized, democratic, consumer society promised first by the policy of integration and then by de Gaulle's Constantine Plan.⁷ Medical assistance and the instruction of hygiene, infant care, and basic nutrition all aimed to make Algerians' bodies cleaner, healthier, and more orderly. They also attempted to teach 'Muslims' how to embody French cultural, physical, and gender norms. The army command believed that in altering the embodied habits of Algerian women to more closely reflect those of French women, they could promote mutual understanding between the settler and subject populations, accelerate the erasure of economic and social disparities, and eliminate the prejudices and racial tensions that defined French rule in North Africa since 1830. Paired with a comprehensive program of propaganda and cultural instruction, French military leaders believed the EMSI's action could rapidly transform women into full citizens of the French nation.⁸

⁷ The Constantine Plan, which de Gaulle outlined for the first time in October 1958, laid out a program of economic and social development aimed at erasing the disparities between Algerians and settlers, and between Algeria and the French metropole. It did not break with, but rather built upon the integrationist policies outlined by Soustelle, Mollet, and Lacoste. See Daniel Lefevvre, *Chère Algérie: La France et sa colonie, 1930-1962* (Paris, Flammarion: 2005).

⁸ A number of works have focused on the EMSI or on the French army's emancipation campaigns, and have emphasized the purely orientalist roots or of such programs or characterized them as functionalist tools that sought either to preserve colonial rule unchanged or to fashion it a progressive façade purely for international consumption. With the exception of Neil MacMaster, who takes quite seriously the perspectives of military strategists driving these projects, most of these works fail to place the French army's emancipation project fully within a context defined by the convergence of modernist developmentalism, social science theory, and colonial reform. Even more so than MacMaster, I emphasize the transformative aims of such programs, particularly in relation to Muslim bodies. See Marnia Lazreg *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: from Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Neil MacMaster, *Burning the Veil: The Algerian war and the 'emancipation' of Muslim women, 1954-1962* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); and Elizabeth

To understand how and why French military strategy came to focus on women's bodies, it is necessary to examine the genesis and evolution of the EMSI and other French army programs that targeted women. This chapter traces that development from the initial Pilot Operation in Orléansville in early 1957 through the beginning of 1960. For the Fifth Bureau, the EMSI served three essential functions. Conceived and elaborated as part of the Pilot Operations, the EMSI aimed above all to frame rural Algerian women in a surveillance apparatus designed to break the population's ties with the FLN and substitute French control. Medical aid and social welfare provided the EMSI a means to engage women and initiate that process. But emboldened by the apparent success of their methods in May 1958, the Fifth Bureau increasingly sought to use the EMSI to 'modernize' a slice of the population they regarded as culturally significant. For these officers, Algerian women represented a lever to profoundly transform Algerian society. Finally, the EMSI provided the army a means not only to diffuse propaganda, but to anchor its messages in the lives of Algerian women. Through the EMSI, the Fifth Bureau promoted a utopian vision of a renewed French Algeria, and aspired to demonstrate – for themselves as well as others – its reality in the altered habits of rural women. As French officers quickly learned, however, Algerian women participated in Pacification programs in ways that were frequently as strategic as the army's own attempted use of such programs. Seen as a marker of difference and a means for effecting moral change, the female body became a key site where the French army attempted to enact and measure

Perego, "The veil or a brother's life: French manipulations of Muslim women's images during the Algerian War, 1954-62," *The Journal of North African Studies* 20, No. 3 (June 2015): 349-374.

the 'evolution' of Algeria's 'Muslim' population. Transformed into a space of contest, women's bodies also became a site of popular resistance.

Medicine, Aid, and Surveillance

In their struggle to capture the loyalty of Algerian population, the French army weaponized medical and social aid. Medicine had long served as a tool of conquest and control in the colonial context, and it gained renewed importance for the French effort to counter the FLN's armed insurrection.⁹ From the opening months of the war, French authorities restricted access to medical supplies in an effort to deny the FLN the materials necessary to care for wounded combatants. Medical care became a tool of insurrection, as the FLN deployed medical aid to draw popular support. From 1956, ALN doctors sought systematically to cultivate good will by offering rural Algerians care as their clandestine units moved through the countryside. In the international arena, the FLN used such medical aid to stake claims to political legitimacy.¹⁰ The French government responded in kind. In Algeria and in mainland France, French officials targeted Algerians for medical and social assistance in an attempt to isolate them from FLN influence and renew their ties to the French state.¹¹

⁹ An extensive literature on the subject exists. See for example Megan Vaughan, *Curing their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Warwick Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). On the use of medicine in Algeria specifically, see Patricia Lorcin, "Imperialism, Colonial Identity, and Race in Algeria, 1830-1870," *Isis* 90 (1999): 653-679; and Richard Keller, *Colonial Madness: Psychiatry in French North Africa* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

¹⁰ Jennifer Johnson Onyedum, "Humanize the Conflict: Algerian Health Care Organizations and Propaganda Campaigns, 1954-62," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44 (2012): 713-731.

¹¹ Two important recent works have explored the role of medicine and welfare in Algerian War: Amelia H. Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), and Jennifer Johnson Onyedum, "Humanizing Warfare: The Politics of

The Itinerant Medico-Social Teams emerged within this broader contest through medical aid and public assistance. On the surface, the actions of the EMSI appeared purely medical: accompanied by an army physician, the EMSI vaccinated children and adults, distributed medications, and offered hygienic advice. But for the army, the EMSI's medical action constituted a means, not an end. Medicine was a tool of contact; a means of establishing and maintaining regular interactions with a segment of the population that French officers judged important and particularly inaccessible. Women represented 4.9 of 7.2 million indigenous Algerians, and nearly 84 percent lived in rural areas beyond the reach of French infrastructure or administrative oversight.¹² As a longstanding tool of the civilizing mission in Algeria, army strategists found medicine useful to prepare the ground for the "healthy, efficient, and productive social order" that they imagined integration would accomplish.¹³ But the Fifth Bureau embraced medical and social assistance because it also enabled the principle objective of the EMSI: surveillance. Like the Self-Defense Groups or the *djemâas* which targeted Algerian men, the Fifth Bureau intended to utilize the EMSI to co-opt Algerian women into the struggle against the FLN. Medicine was as a "seductive force," a service many rural Algerians desired or demanded, but only infrequently received.¹⁴ The Fifth Bureau aimed

Medicine, Health Care, and International Humanitarian Intervention in Algeria, 1954-1962" (PhD Diss., Princeton University, 2010).

¹² Neil MacMaster, 155.

¹³ Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 7.

¹⁴ I borrow this term from Richard Keller's "Geographies of Power, Legacies of Mistrust: Colonial Medicine in the Global Present," *Historical Geography* 34 (2006): 26-48. Hannah-Louise Clark argues that from 1900, hygienic and medical assistance created an informed Algerian public prepared to make medical claims on the state. See "Doctoring the Bled: Medical Auxiliaries and the Administration of Rural Life in Colonial Algeria, 1904-1954," (PhD Diss., Princeton University, 2014).

to use the medical care offered by the EMSI to draw Algerian women into contact with the state, where they could be observed and controlled.

The first female medico-social teams emerged as part of 'Operation Pilot' conducted around Orléansville by Jean Servier and Commandant André Feaugas. To build bonds of trust with the inhabitants of the dispersed villages that dotted the region, Servier formed teams of two or three female nurses employed by the army or the Special Administrative Sections, equipped them with several trucks he ordered rebuilt as "mobile dispensaries," and sent them into the open countryside accompanied by a military doctor to treat mild illnesses and injuries. The teams proved immediately popular. Servier claimed that with only five doctors and twenty "girls," his teams had offered Algerians 15,000 consultation over the period of one month – nearly a quarter of all free medical assistance offered by the French state in Algeria.¹⁵ Whether accurate or not, the attractive power of such medical aid impressed Servier and Feaugas, who quickly incorporated the medico-social teams into the formal structures of Operation Pilot. As the first combat maneuvers began in March 1957, each sector received a medico-social team that followed military operations and offered basic medical care and first aid. Their objectives remained modest, but strategic: the teams re-established administrative oversight over isolated villages, and worked to improve the health of the population. In both cases, military commanders encouraged the medico-social teams to privilege actions with "immediate, tangible" results over long-term improvements, so that the actions could be "exploited for propaganda."¹⁶

¹⁵ Jean Servier, *Adieu Djebels* (Paris: Editions France Empire, 1958), 186, 187.

¹⁶ General Allard, "Instruction General: Conduit de l'opération Pilote n° 1," 26 March 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

This model of action was not particularly novel. From 1900, the Government General in Algeria possessed a growing corps of indigenous medical auxiliaries serving rural populations, and as early as 1921, it formed Mobile Sanitary Teams to treat and contain smallpox and typhus epidemics.¹⁷ Following his 1912 conquest of Morocco, General Hubert Lyautey constituted a corps of female doctors to spread western medical practices and carry out ethnographic research on indigenous women. And in 1948, the Protectorate government in Rabat created a new system of *Maternal and Infantile Protection* (PMI) centers to instruct Moroccan women in the 'proper' practices of infant care, housework, and hygiene. French administrators intended to utilize the PMI both to eradicate 'traditional' practices deemed backwards and to counter nationalist agitation – aims strongly reflected in Servier's medico-social teams.¹⁸

The immediate context for such action, however, was the growing social and economic crisis provoked by the war. French commanders frequently responded with alarm to the abject poverty and poor health of rural communities they encountered.¹⁹ Few medical facilities existed to treat these populations – only 28 civil hospitals and 19 auxiliary medical centers existed in Algeria in 1955 – and the administration further restricted access to medications in an effort to deprive the ALN of supplies.²⁰ As Algerians fled the violence of the countryside and formed massive slums on the outskirts of large urban centers like Algiers and Oran,

¹⁷ Clark, "Doctoring the Bled," Chapter 5.

¹⁸ Ellen J Amster, *Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco, 1877-1956* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013), especially chapter 6. Despite the striking similarities, however, there is little evidence to suggest a direct lineage between medicine targeted at women in Morocco and Servier's efforts.

¹⁹ See for example the report of General Jean Olié in Kabylie, n° 149/K/Pol, 22 March 1956. ANOM 12CAB/165.

²⁰ Onyedum, "Humanizing Warfare," 35.

precarious conditions quickly devolved into a humanitarian crisis. The French army's widespread but haphazard practice of 'regroupment' only exacerbated the situation. Across Algeria, the army marked off massive swathes of the countryside as 'forbidden zones,' and forcibly relocated rural communities to tent camps, a process which regularly left them living in rudimentary conditions with few means of securing food or other necessities.²¹

To address the health concerns raised by this crisis, the army developed the *Assistance Médicale Gratuite* (Free Medical Assistance, or AMG) service in mid-1956. Working in teams, military doctors traveled between towns and villages offering free care to Algerians. The service grew rapidly, from 58 doctors attached to SAS officers in June 1957 to 476 deployed across Algeria by September.²² Demand, however, grew faster. AMG doctors performed 20 thousand consultations in 1956, and 16.7 million in 1959.²³ They often lacked supplies and transportation, and, overburdened, spent only minutes with each patient. Regardless of the cursory nature of the care offered, Algerians displayed clear enthusiasm for AMG. Doctors regularly received a warm welcome, and easily established a presence in rural communities.²⁴ AMG's ability to "win the confidence" of rural Algerians was not lost on military commanders,

²¹ On the Regroupment Camps, see Fabien Sacriste, "Les camps de 'regroupement': Une histoire de l'État colonial et de la société rurale pendant la guerre d'indépendance algérienne (1954-1962)," (PhD Diss., Université de Toulouse II Le Mirail, 2014); Michael Cornaton, *Les Camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1967); and Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le déracinement: la crise de l'agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964).

²² The number of doctors in had actually dropped from 85 to 58 between March and June. Direction du Service de Santé, "Etat numérique des médecines militaires détachées au titre des SAS à la date du 30 Juin 1957," and "Etat numérique des médecines militaires détachées au titre des SAS et des médecines militaires affectées dans les corps de troupe pratiquant l'A.M.G. à la date du 30 Septembre 1957." SHD 1H/2570.

²³ Figures cited in Jean-Charles Jauffret, *Soldats en Algérie 1954-1962: Expériences contrastées des hommes du contingent* (Paris: Autrement, 2000), 182.

²⁴ Onyedum, "Humanizing Warfare," 52-53, 57-58.

who regularly subordinated more profound care to cursory measures with greater propaganda value.²⁵

The EMSI sought to capitalize on this demand for AMG. As the medico-social teams arrived in isolated villages across Orléansville, crowds of men, women, and children formed to greet them.²⁶ It was the capacity of medico-social action to draw Algerian women, however, that held the most interest for Servier and the heads of the future Fifth Bureau. If wartime violence made it a challenge for the administration to reestablish regular contact with the inhabitants of rural villages, then women appeared even more difficult to engage for cultural reasons. Servier and his collaborators viewed 'Muslim' women as the dominated victims of "archaic prejudices," often treated like "beasts of burden" by their husbands, who kept them cloistered "at a distance from society." If Algeria was to undergo the "evolution" necessary for integration to succeed, Servier insisted, the state must bring Algerian women out of isolation.²⁷ For Servier and Feaugas, medical consultations, hygiene instruction, and the distribution of basic necessities like children's clothing or powdered milk constituted the sole means to "penetrate the family cell and act on Muslim women."²⁸ The teams therefore pursued a range of activities perceived as appropriate and appealing to 'Muslim' women. In addition to vaccinations and first aid, social assistants gave advice on infant care, sewing and knitting,

²⁵ Médecine-General Reynaud to General Salan, "Assistance Médicale Gratuit," 5 November 1958. SHD 1H/2570.

²⁶ Photos of early encounters show men, women, and children consulted in equal numbers, though the absence of young men of combat age seems particularly striking. See, for example, ECPAD ALG-57-340. This impression is backed by reports from the Dahra, which list equals numbers of men and women consulted. Antenne Psychologique – 5^e Division Blindée, "Etude sur la Pacification dans la Dahra." SHD 1H/2536.

²⁷ "Formation Politique" for Operation Pilot. SHD 1H/2536.

²⁸ Etat-Major 5e Bureau, 9e Division d'Infanterie, "Bilan de l'expérience 'Pilote au 1er Juillet 1957," 12 July 1957. SHD 1H/2536.

household economics, nutrition, and even basic literacy lessons.²⁹ “Experience has proven,” argued one Colonel, “that European women are welcomed favorably if they present themselves as homemaking, sewing, or infant care (*puériculture*) instructors.”³⁰

The composition of the medico-social teams also intended to attract women. Whereas medical auxiliaries in Algeria had traditionally been male, the Psychological Bureau recruited women because they assumed Algerian women would not readily engage with men. “Psychological action on Muslim women only has a chance of showing results,” asserted one social assistant, “if it is done by women.”³¹ Following similar logic, the Bureau recruited local ‘Muslim’ women to translate and act as intermediaries; an effort which quickly yielded enough volunteers to double the five initial teams Servier created.³² Servier and Feaugas displayed particular satisfaction at the fact that several of the young women working with the medico-social teams had formerly served as nurses in the ALN before the Psychological Bureau ‘turned’ them to the French cause.³³ Citing the positive effects of indigenous assistants’

²⁹ See the collection of instructional sheets produced by the Fifth Bureau for training ASSRA, labeled “Programme de Travail.” SHD 1H/2568.

³⁰ “Etude sur une campagne de fraternisation en Algerie,” undated. SHD 1H/2460.

³¹ Emphasis in original. An instructional document, based on the experiences of Mme Tournemine in the Guelma Sector, laid out the procedures for EMSI to follow to ‘organize’ Algerian women. Cinquième Bureau – Etat-Major, “Action psychologique feminine,” 20 June 1958. SHD 1H/2568.

³² Servier, “Note sur le service d’assistance médico-sociale,” 6 June 1957. ANOM 12CAB/107.

³³ Servier recounts the capture and conversion of a young nurse employed by the ALN commander Si Mourad during the course of Operation Pilot in *Adieu Djebels*, 190-194. Other instances appear frequently in the archives throughout 1957 and 1958: In one note, Feaugas describes Meriem A. as a former ALN nurse. In another, Itinerant Officer Captain Ricart asserts that their “forced immersion in the Rebellion” ensures that Bahia L (22) and Tedjania Y (18) will prove “useful” to combat its influence. See Feaugas, Fiche n° 1758/EMSI/SC, 7 August 1958, SHD 1H/2399; and Ricart, “Fiche Concernant l’emploi comme ASSRA de deux jeunes filles FSNA, ayant travaillé avec les rebelles,” 28 March 1958, SHD 1H/2569.

presence, military authorities made mixed teams of two “Frenchwomen” and one “Muslim” the standard model for all subsequent Pilot operations.³⁴

If the nascent EMSI acted through medicine, their purpose remained entirely strategic. From the first days of Operation Pilot, Servier planned to constitute “vigilance committees” of women and youths to compliment and reinforce the all-male Self-Defense Groups.³⁵ The apparent ease with which the early medico-social teams “reestablished contact” with Algerian women made them into an ideal tool for this task. As they carried out their social work, the EMSI endeavored to “detect the currents of Algerian female opinion” and to gather intelligence on FLN movements in the area.³⁶ As historian of medicine Richard Keller has noted, the clinical encounter constitutes a privileged moment for the disclosure of information; patients often divulge intimate details to medical personnel that they would never share with other state representatives.³⁷ The medical and humanitarian aid provided by the EMSI allowed them to move through Algerian spaces in ways conventional military forces could not. In communicating their medical and alimentary needs, women frequently also conveyed information about local FLN cells and their relationship with the village, whether they intended to or not. The women of Bordj Menaiel in Kabylie, for example, complained to the social assistant that they hesitated to utilize her services, since each time they did the local FLN

³⁴ General Salan to Lacoste, Note n° 359/RM.10/PSY-GP, 25 April 1957. ANOM 3R/387. By early 1958, difficulties recruiting ‘European’ personnel forced the Fifth Bureau to reverse this balance. See Captain Mercier, Officier Itinérant, “Fiche d’orientation: Equipes Médico-sociales Itinérantes,” 3 February 1958. SHD 1H/2568.

³⁵ Servier, “Note,” undated. ANOM 3R/387.

³⁶ Mercier, “Fiche d’orientation: Equipes Médico-sociales Itinérantes.”

³⁷ Keller, “Geographies of Power,” 29.

authorities obliged them to pay a restitution.³⁸ For many officers who oversaw them, the EMSI came to represent the most effective means to “take the temperature” of a given village.³⁹

This emphasis on surveillance grew more explicit as the institutional structures of the EMSI solidified under Fifth Bureau control in late 1957. To head the new EMSI program, Goussault appointed Madame Maugé, a resolute and outspoken army major who had participated in the repression of the 1947 Malagasy uprising and then trained nurses for the war in Indochina before arriving in Algiers.⁴⁰ Jacqueline Defretière, one of the original medico-social assistants in Orléansville, seconded Maugé at the EMSI’s headquarters.⁴¹ The initial cohort of social assistants – formally bestowed the cumbersome title of Auxiliary Rural Social Sanitary Assistants (*Adjointes sanitaires et sociales rurales auxiliaires*, or ASSRA) – consisted of 45 volunteers from among the ranks of the army’s female military personnel, supplemented by 8 social assistants poached from the SAS and 40 ‘Muslim’ auxiliaries recruited in the field; all paid from the civil budget.⁴² While some of the recruits had previously worked as nurses, many did not, and the medical instruction the ASSRA received as part of their training remained “elementary” and “theoretical,” covering only basic first aid and infant care.⁴³ Training stages

³⁸ Cinquième Bureau – Corps d’Armée d’Alger, “Compte-rendu d’activité hebdomadaire, Semaine du 28 novembre au 3 décembre 1958.” SHD 1H/1116.

³⁹ Interview with SAS officer L—* in the Ksour Quarter of Constantine. Aubagne, 27 May, 2013. (*The names of research subjects have been changed to protect their identity unless indicated).

⁴⁰ Neil MacMaster draws these details from Christiane Fournier’s hagiography of the EMSI, published in 1959 with the assistance of the Fifth Bureau. See MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*, 245 and 248, and Christiane Fournier, *Les EMSI: des filles comme ça!* (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1959), 44-48.

⁴¹ See Georgiette Brèthes’ brief memoir of the EMSI’s organization, Dossier Georgiette Brèthes Centre de Documentation Historique sur l’Algerie (CHDA), Aix-en-Provence

⁴² Goussault to Lacoste, “Assistances Médico-sociales,” 22 September 1957. ANOM 3R/387. On the budgetary origins of the ASSRA’s pay, see the “Fiche à l’attention du General Dulac” cited above.

⁴³ “Compte-rendu de Mlle K— L— sur le stage E.M.S.I. d’Octobre 1958.” SHD 1H/3868 (under derogation).

focused instead on the EMSI's 'educative' role. Conducted by the radical anticommunist and fiery orator Commandant Cogniet, training stages taught Islamic and customary law, the nature of the risks posed by revolutionary warfare, and the techniques of psychological action.⁴⁴ Several social assistants later praised their training for clarifying "the combat unfolding in Algeria" and for teaching the "means" to "fight a war of the minds."⁴⁵

As Colonel Goussault and General Allard consolidated control over the Pilot Operations, they fit the EMSI into their emerging project to "organize" Algeria's 'Muslim' population. By the beginning of December 1957, 21 teams operated in zones across all three departments, and by early 1958, the French army command already planned to expand that number to 71.⁴⁶ Like the *harka* or *djemâa*, the Fifth Bureau wanted to utilize the EMSI to progressively draw the rural population into the conflict in support of French forces. This process unfolded in stages. For the first month in a new region, the EMSI restricted their activity to contact in the most direct sense. They canvassed door-to-door and offered in-home medical consultations, distributed bon-bons to children, and gave hygiene advice, usually over a cup of strong coffee or mint tea.⁴⁷ These activities intended to insert the EMSI into the lives of rural women at regular intervals, to build a sense of familiarity, and to cultivate interest in

⁴⁴ Mme Maugé, "Rapport de fin de stage," 13 December 1957. SHD 1H/2568. On Cogniet and his involvement in radical anticommunist circles like the Cité Catholique, see Paul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *La République et son armée face au 'péril subversif': Guerre et action psychologiques, 1945-1960* (Paris: les Indes savantes, 2005), 539-540.

⁴⁵ *Toubiba*, n° 12, 25 June 1960, and "Compte-rendu de Mlle Kara Louisa." SHD 1H/3868.

⁴⁶ Fifth Bureau, "Bulletin de liaison et d'information des Officiers Itinérants," 2 December 1957. SHD 1H/2533. In April 1958, a note to General Dulac protested the possible reduction in the number of new teams to be created due to budgetary constraints, insisting that the total number of teams be expanded to 71 as planned. Actual statistics on the number of EMSI leading up to May 1958 are unclear from the archives. See "Fiche à l'attention du General Dulac; Equipes Médico-sociales Itinérantes," 2 May 1958. ANOM 1H/2568.

⁴⁷ Interview with Mme D—*, ASSRA deployed to Hassi Bahbah, Djelfa region. Aix-en-Provence, 10 May 2013.

the services EMSI offered. "Before providing the heart and the spirit with good words and good advice," asserted the social assistant Mme Tournemine in Guelma, "it is necessary to address the stomach and flatter the coquetry of women." "Little by little," she continued, "the most confident women will begin to confide their worries, their poverty, their desire to dress better, to live better, etc."⁴⁸

Once the EMSI sufficiently gained the trust of women in a given village, they were instructed to abandon house calls and medical assistance and begin to organize meetings. In order to encourage an atmosphere of confidence, the gatherings were open only to women. They served as an occasion for the EMSI to expand their lessons in knitting or infant care, and most importantly, to lead Algerian women in "directed discussions."⁴⁹ The social assistants gave brief lectures and posed questions on topics such as the policy of integration or the place of women in the modern family in order to subtly introduce opinions favorable to France.⁵⁰ Over time, the meetings of these "Women's Circles" aimed to build a sense of solidarity between the women, and allow the EMSI to select and train leaders from among group's members.⁵¹ This was the "organization" of the population in action: the EMSI gave the women of rural villages a structure (the Women's Circles) and organic leadership tied to the state. In

⁴⁸ Mme Tournemine, "Action psychologique féminine."

⁴⁹ Ibid. These instructions later appeared in their final institutionalized form as pacification instructions published by the Etat-Major Interarmées under General Challe. See Instruction 257/E.M.I./3/P.H., "Action sur les Milieux Féminins en Algérie," 27 March 1960. 1H/2568.

⁵⁰ CIPCG (Arzew), "Principes d'action psychologique en Algérie." SHD 1H/2524. Developed by the Itinerant Officers, this technique drew on active pedagogy methods recently developed in France, and heavily on theories of crowd psychology in the works of Gustav Le Bon and Serge Chakotin. For a comprehensive portrait of some of the themes discussed, see the excellent dossier of materials conserved by Hélène Lienhardt, who worked with the SAS officer in Douera from 1957 to 1959. Fonds Hélène Lienhardt, Institute d'histoire du temps présent (IHTP), Paris.

⁵¹ Instruction 257, Action sur les Milieux Féminins en Algérie"

theory, the Women's Circles would assume greater and greater responsibility over their own affairs, and eventually drive their own action in favor of France with minimal oversight from the teams.⁵² The EMSI's marriage of hygiene and surveillance did not represent a break with longstanding practices of colonial medicine, but rather their radicalization. Through the EMSI, the Fifth Bureau sought to secure the total compliance of Algerian women on a mass scale.

The early actions of the EMSI did appear to bear fruit. In the Renault quarter, on the western edge of the Chlef, the EMSI organized knitting circles on Monday and Thursday afternoons. Algerian women initially reacted with suspicion, but the atmosphere of the meetings quickly grew "relaxed" and "gay," and women attended in growing numbers throughout the fall of 1957.⁵³ Likewise, the Itinerant Officer overseeing the Southern Oran Zone, Captain Mercier, reported that the EMSI successfully constituted and trained eight-member "women's hygiene committees" in each of the zone's regroupment camps by December. The committees assisted the EMSI in their weekly meetings, and several played an active role on camps' self-governance committees.⁵⁴ For the Itinerant Officers directing these teams, such developments signaled the first successful step toward the complete 'organization' of the population.

⁵² CIPCG (Arzew), "Organisation de la population." SHD 1H/2524. By 1958, instructional materials published by the CIPCG defined the act of 'organization' as "to aid the individuals and the groups that compose [the population] to give themselves structures or to reinforce those that exist, in order to permit the collectivity to adapt to a modern and humane future in the French cadre."

⁵³ See the September and October 1957 reports of Captain Gabriel Barault, Itinerant Officer, Quartier Renault. ANOM 5I/196.

⁵⁴ Captain Jean Louis Mercier, Itinerant Officer, Zone Sud Oranais, "Compte-rendu, mois de décembre 1957." ANOM 4oG/67.

The officers of the Fifth Bureau quickly came to share the conviction that the EMSI's action comprised one of the most effective means to win Algerians over to the French cause. In their eyes, rural communities' openness to medico-social action indicated their political "ambiance:" heavy attendance in a given village or town meant the EMSI had begun to win back the loyalty of its population.⁵⁵ For the commander of the Guelma Sector, Colonel Bravelet, the weekly meetings organized throughout October 1957 by the EMSI in Héliopolis created "a climate of understanding," where women regularly "asked questions or explained their difficulties to the officers present." On one occasion, he stressed, nearly a quarter of women present unveiled during the course of the meeting "without anyone ever asking them to," a clear sign in his eyes of their growing "confidence" in the army.⁵⁶ The discovery that same month that the FLN had created an itinerant medical teams in the Dahra and intended to use female social assistants to recruit women into the FLN only reinforced the impression of the EMSI's efficacy.⁵⁷ The Fifth Bureau's positive appraisal may have contained a grain of truth. One former ALN commander in Oran remembered the anxiety that organizations like the EMSI provoked, since, he explained, many rural Algerians were not necessarily politically engaged, let alone active supporters of the FLN.⁵⁸ Whatever the reality, the leadership of the

⁵⁵ "Bilan de l'expérience 'Pilote au 1er Juillet 1957"

⁵⁶ Colonel Bravelet, "Réunion des femmes à Héliopolis," 26 October 1957. SHD 1H/2561.

⁵⁷ Colonel Godard's interrogations of Zohra Drif revealed that Drif planned to organize clandestine cells of female FLN activists to operate primarily in the domain of social assistance and aid to families of torture victims, a focus that elicited both fear and enthusiasm on the part of the Fifth Bureau. See General Allard's top secret letter to Goussault, "sur l'organisation féminine de la Zone Autonome d'Alger (interrogatoire de YACEF SAADI et DRIF Zohra," 11 October 1957. SHD 1H/2461. On the team in Orléansville, see Préfet d'Orléansville, "Opération Pilote – Mois d'Octobre 1957," 7 November 1957. ANOM 3R/387.

⁵⁸ Interview with Commandant Lakhdar Bouregaa, former commander of Wilaya V (Department of Oran), El Biar, Algeria, 31 May 2014.

Fifth Bureau embraced these successes as a sign that they had discovered in the EMSI a powerful tool for Pacification. At a meeting with the Itinerant Officers in January 1958, Goussault exhorted that “this feminine movement is very important: it could become the motor of *l’Algérie Nouvelle*.” He cautioned the officers to remain vigilant in their oversight of the EMSI, lest the Women’s Circles “abandon politics in favor of charity” or fall under the influence of the FLN.⁵⁹

In reality, however, Algerians’ engagement with the EMSI likely remained much more ambiguous than the Fifth Bureau claimed in the early months of 1958. Colonial medical encounters rarely reflected the straightforward compliance of colonized subjects, and the exchanges between the EMSI and Algerian women were no different.⁶⁰ As Neil MacMaster highlights, the EMSI frequently operated within conditions of dire poverty provoked by the war, and in the shadow of armed troops.⁶¹ In areas where the army ‘regrouped’ a large percentage of the population, the EMSI worked directly in the camps.⁶² The visible presence of French soldiers’ machineguns, the charitable distributions of medicine and powdered milk, and the rude surroundings of the camp all carried a coercive charge. While Colonel Bravelet

⁵⁹ Colonel Goussault, “Note à l’attention des MM. les Officiers Itinérants au sujet de la réunion du 8 Janvier 1958.” SHD 1H/2533.

⁶⁰ See Vaughn, “Curing their Ills,” and Nancy Rose Hunt, “Le bébé en brousse: European Women, African Birth Spacing, and Colonial Intervention in Breast Feeding in the Belgian Congo,” in Frederick Cooper and Laura Ann Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 287-321.

⁶¹ Neil MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*, 192-193. Given their intended use for propaganda, few of the photos of EMSI taken by army photographers and held in the collections of the ECPAD show the teams’ armed escorts. Photographs taken by soldiers or the ASSRA themselves, however, often capture these escorts. See for example the dossier of Christine Métras, CHDA.

⁶² In the Sebdoou Sector in the West Oran Zone (Tlemcen), for example, the EMSI worked almost exclusively in regroupment camps. Zone Ouest Oranais – 5ème Bureau, “Tournée n° 5 du 19.11 au 21.11.1959,” 24 November 1959. SHD 1H/4218.

celebrated the fact that women in Héliopolis now assembled “freely,” he also admitted that he “forced” local women to attend the first few meetings, and that he regularly placed a “protective unit” of soldiers around the gathering (an action, he explained, that prevented the prying eyes of men on the adjacent road).⁶³ Algerian women may have willingly attended meetings such as those in Héliopolis for the lessons and aid on offer, or for the opportunity to see a film projected. But as they made increasingly clear as the months advanced, they did so with diverse motives that only seldom reflected a renewed attachment to France.

New Women for a New Algeria

On the 8th of April 1958, an anonymous group of women dropped a letter in the mailbox of Radio Casbah. For months, the station had broadcast messages that proclaimed the promises of “l’Algérie Nouvelle et Française” and praised the French administration’s efforts to lead Algerians “to a modern and civilized new life.” Likely written by the Fifth Bureau, the radio propaganda had struck a chord: the group of “numerous” women the letter claimed as its authors praised the program. “We want Muslim women to be modern women,” the letter read, “every Muslim woman must lift off the veil or the *cachabia* that smothers her... and above all deprives her of her liberty.” The veil, the letter’s authors argued, was imposed not by the Qur’an, but by tradition. To allow women to “march in liberty,” the letter requested that the station give the order to unveil. Real or not, the letter aroused the enthusiasm of French military commanders.⁶⁴ Forwarding the letter to General Allard, General Massu insisted that it

⁶³ Bravelet, “Réunion des femmes à Héliopolis.”

⁶⁴ Neil MacMaster suggests that the letter was circulated by the officers of the Section Administrative Urbaine (SAU) in the Casbah, which seems likely. The vocabulary employed in the letter closely reflects Fifth Bureau

appeared “indispensable that the order to unveil now be given firmly and clearly.”⁶⁵ Allard agreed, and on May 6th sent copies of the letter to Salan and Goussault. “The action carried out on women for the last year by medical action teams, by Women’s Circles, and by propaganda have obtained un hoped for results,” Allard emoted; “The moment has come to make an official gesture toward the emancipation of women.”⁶⁶

The EMSI’s action was never only a means of surveillance. From the beginning, it also sought to transform Algerian women socially, culturally, and corporeally. For the army, Muslim women represented an ideal tool to regenerate Algerian society. Because women had long served as markers of Algerians’ cultural inferiority, they now constituted terrains where the army sought to apply modernizing pressure to its greatest effect. From the spring of 1958, the army became a driving force behind social reforms. To isolate Algerians from the FLN and bind them more permanently French society, the army aimed to remake women along French lines. Algerian women’s bodies provided the terrain for this modernizing project. Through the EMSI and a number of parallel programs, the Fifth Bureau sought to inculcate in Algerian women the tastes, comportments, and corporeal practices they deemed necessary for Algerians’ entry into ‘modern’ life. This process, army strategists believed, would narrow the social and cultural divides between Algerians and their ‘European’ counterparts on both sides of the Mediterranean, and lay the foundations of the society they envisioned that integration would create. As the Fifth Bureau set out to “evolve” Algerian women rapidly and on a mass

propaganda, and the reference to the traditionally masculine *cachabia* – and not the *haïk* worn by most women in the region around Algiers – suggests unfamiliarity with Algerian veiling practices. MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*, 123.

⁶⁵ General Massu, “Port du Voile,” 26 April 1958. SHD 1H/2399.

⁶⁶ Allard to Salan and the 5th Bureau – État-Major, “Port du Voile,” 6 May 1958. SHD 1H/2399.

scale, social welfare became the means not only to 'organize' and control Algerian society, but to transform it.

Algerian women became a focus for the army and the administration early in the conflict. Soustelle's policy of integration aimed to draw Algeria and France closer together, both by conferring Algerians the full rights and duties of French citizenship, and by intervening in society to 'lift up' Algerians socially and economically. 'Muslim' women constituted a particularly difficult obstacle for such an effort in the eyes of French administrators because they occupied a subordinate place within a population already viewed as under-developed or archaic. Veiled, isolated within the household, and "closed to progress," Algerian women were reservoirs of tradition.⁶⁷ In an Islamic society like Algeria, Servier and others insisted, men held total power over women and guarded it jealously. "Inferior to men in all domains," but still influential as "guardians of the home" and mothers, women were at once the victims of an anti-modern society and the mechanisms of its reproduction.⁶⁸ If French democracy required the autonomy and equality of all its citizens, an officer of the Fifth Bureau asserted, then the army must abolish women's subordinate place in society to allow them to progress toward citizenship.⁶⁹ Such ideas had deep roots. Debates about gender roles – and particularly the perceived subservience of indigenous women – served to mark out colonial subjects' inferiority and provide a moral pretext for Empire in a diversity of contexts.⁷⁰ In Algeria, these images

⁶⁷ Servier, "Formation Politique" for Operation Pilot. SHD 1H/2536.

⁶⁸ EMSI training document, "Condition de la femme musulmane avant l'arrivée des Français en Algérie," July 1958, SHD 1H/2568; and Jacques Carret, "La femme musulmane," 1958, 33. SHD 1H/2460.

⁶⁹ 5^e Bureau, "Introduction à une étude sur l'Intégration," dated 7 May 1958 but likely written later given that it references the events of 13 May. SHD 1H/2460.

⁷⁰ A vast literature exists on this topic. Important works include Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979); Mrinalini Sinha, "Gender and Imperialism: Colonial Policy and the Ideology of Moral Imperialism in Late

undergirded the French civilizing mission and justified the colonial state's repeated claims that Algerians stood incapable of assuming full citizenship.⁷¹ As George Trumbull notes, colonial ethnographers from the nineteenth century onward regularly "cast gender relations as a moral problem requiring a political solution," and thus made Algerian domestic life into a site "that demanded colonial intervention."⁷²

But whereas earlier generations of colonial administrators and academics had attributed the Algerian women's subordinate social status to immutable characteristics of the 'Arab race' or to the vagaries of a static body of Islamic law, the explosion of ethnographic works authored by the army and civil administration in 1958 and 1959 uniformly asserted that these factors were sociological.⁷³ Practices like repudiation, polygamy, arranged marriages, and even veiling derived not from the core tenets of Islam, they argued, but rather from

Nineteenth Century Bengal," in *Changing Men: New Directions in Research on Men and Masculinity* ed. Michael Kimmel, (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1987); Ann McClintock, *Imperial Leather* (1995); Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives*, ed. McClintock et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Laura Ann Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power* (2002). For works on Muslim women specifically, see Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) and Douglas Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

⁷¹ On the French colonial state's use of gender to constitute and justify Algerian difference, see: Frantz Fanon, *L'an V de la révolution algérienne* (Paris: La Découverte, 2001), originally published in 1959; Julia Clancy-Smith, "Islam, Gender, and Identities in the Making of French Algeria, 1830-1962," *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism*, ed. Julia Clancy-Smith et al. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998); Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), chapter 7; George R Trumbull IV, *Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria, 1870-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009);

⁷² Trumbull, *Empire of Facts*, 181-182.

⁷³ Notable examples include a study entitled "La condition de la femme musulmane en Algérie, aspect politique" produced by the Ministère d'état Chargé des Affaires Algériennes in July 1957, ANOM 81F/1218; Commandant Jacques Carret's widely-circulated study, "La femme musulmane," published by the Service de l'Action Administrative et Economique de la Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie in 1958, SHD 1H/2460; and a study based on a survey conducted by EMSI and distributed to SAS officers: L.P. Fauque, "Stades d'évolution de la cellule familiale musulmane d'Algérie," Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, 1959, ANOM 2SAS/7.

tradition, ritual, and the socio-economic conditions imposed by Algeria's pre-industrial economy.⁷⁴ As evidence, these officers pointed to the state-sponsored development projects of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, and Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, among others. Not only had these "Muslim reformers" liberated women, proclaimed one commandant from the *Corps d'Affaires Militaires Musulmans*, but more importantly, they had recognized that "the emancipation of women is the basis of the evolution of a people."⁷⁵ Wives and mothers constituted a powerful lever to shift Algerian society writ large, precisely because they were the linchpin around which the Muslim family turned. Within the "family circle," asserted the directives for officers overseeing the EMSI, women "are obeyed and respected...the words of the wife have a real influence."⁷⁶ Army ethnographers also saw women as natural supporters of such reforms. Their subordinate position in society ensured that they "desired" and "happily welcomed" emancipation.⁷⁷ "Make Muslim women feel the mediocrity of their condition," Goussault exhorted the EMSI, "and show them the path to follow with France to arrive at their emancipation."⁷⁸ With minimal pressure, Goussault, Salan, and others in the military command believed, the army could incite women to participate in

⁷⁴ See, for example, "La Famille Musulmane au contact de l'Occident," *Bulletin de Liaison et de Documentation du Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques et de la Fonction Politique* (January 1958): 14-17; and 5^e Bureau – Etat-Major, "La religion Musulmane est-elle à l'origine de la sclérose économique et sociale en Algérie?" *Bulletin d'Information du 10^e Région Militaire*, 10 May 1958. SHD 1H/2593. Very similar arguments appear in all of the above-cited documents.

⁷⁵ Commandant Petit, Corps des Officiers des Affaires Militaires Musulmans "Septième Conférence: La Femme Musulmane." SHD 1H/2411.

⁷⁶ Instruction 257, "Action sur les Milieux Féminins en Algérie."

⁷⁷ Carret, "La femme musulmane," 52. A CHEAM graduate, Carret worked for the SLNA, and participated in several psychological action training stages in 1957. See the letter from the Director General of Political Affairs to Salan's military cabinet dated 31 October 1957. ANOM 3R/463.

⁷⁸ Goussault, "Note à l'attention des MM. les Officiers Itinérants."

the integrationist project, and through their emancipation catalyze a larger transformation of Algerian society.

This logic relocated Algerian difference to a developmentalist scale. The army's emancipation campaign retained French culture as a universal model of modernity to be attained in Algeria, and frequently reproduced racist colonial stereotypes about Algerians in the guise of sociological or psychological "traits."⁷⁹ But rather than use Algerians' particularity to justify their exclusion from universal citizenship, the army now used the expanded French citizenship promised by integration as warrant to intervene in Algerian society and forcibly erase these differences. As de Gaulle himself declared to General Challe and a group of assembled officers, "we will not keep Algeria long if we do not transform it from top to bottom in order to make it a modern country." Therefore, he continued, "the army has an essential task to complete."⁸⁰ If Algerians were "saturated with Muslimness" by virtue of their socio-economic conditions, then army leaders hoped they could be *de*-saturated as well.⁸¹ The army saw social welfare aimed at women as a means to carry out this desaturation.

⁷⁹ For example, the "Principes d'action psychologique en Algérie," distributed during officer training at Arzew lists pride, a lack of irony, an obsession with justice, and extreme emotional sensibility as "Muslim character traits." Other course materials, such as the "Psycho-sociologie musulmane" reflect similar ideas, all informed by French racial stereotypes. See the dossiers SHD 1H/2524 and 1H/2524bis. For a history of these stereotypes, see Keller, *Colonial Madness*.

⁸⁰ Quoted from a meeting on 30 August 1959 in Maurice Challe, *Notre Révolte* (Paris: Presses de la cite, 1968), 115.

⁸¹ Naomi Davidson argues that French administrators "saturated" Algerian migrants "with an embodied religious identity that functioned as a racialized identity," and reinforced such an identity with an aesthetically 'Muslim' built environment. She demonstrates convincingly that such associations remained powerful and unchanged in the metropole throughout the Algerian War, but she does not fully account for the profound efforts of the GGA to open a space for Algerians to become more than 'only Muslim.' Whether or not such a project could actually overcome the profoundly-anchored racial prejudices of colonial society is doubtful. Naomi Davison, *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Quotation page 2.

This turn to women as a tool to regenerate Algerian society reflected broader developmentalist discourses circulating within France and beyond. Following the Second World War, French administrators used social welfare and hygiene campaigns to target women in both the colonies and the metropole on a new scale, in order to cultivate habits and sensibilities appropriate to a 'modern' industrialized consumer society and rejuvenate the French nation.⁸² And as the officers of the Fifth Bureau took pains to emphasize, newly-independent states such as Nasserite Egypt and Bourguiban Tunisia also viewed women as the key to state-directed social and political transformations. In all of these contexts, states endeavored to make women 'modern' by teaching them to master their bodies: to control their excess fecundity, to maintain their labor capacity through a healthy and active physique, and to foster their own individual autonomy by rejecting the markers of patriarchal traditionalism, embodied by the veil.⁸³ It was this model of bourgeois domesticity – the productive, clean, and educated housewife and mother – that the Fifth Bureau sought to impose on Algerian women. The parallels were not entirely coincidental. The Lacoste administration feared that the enfranchisement of Egyptian and Tunisian women would make

⁸² On hygiene and welfare campaigns in Metropolitan France during the 1950s, see Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Richard Ivan Jobs, *Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Steven Zdanty, "The French Hygiene Offensive of the 1950s: A Critical Moment in the History of Manners," *The Journal of Modern History* vol. 84, No. 4, (December 2012): 897-932; and Rebecca J. Pulju, *Women and Mass Consumer Society in Postwar France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Amelia Lyons' *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole* provides an excellent account of welfare programs targeting Algerians in the metropole in the 1950s.

⁸³ On such projects in Egypt, see Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); and Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). Both authors note that the authors of Nasserite reforms targeting women consciously saw themselves as participating in a 'modernizing' project that crossed international borders.

France appear retrograde in its failure to grant Algerian women the vote, and looked to Egypt and Tunisia as models to guide its own reforms to customary marriage law and women's civil status in Algeria.⁸⁴ Ironically, the colonial state now sought to shore up its exceptionalist claims that Algeria could only reach modernity through French tutelage by pursuing a modernizing project shared by former colonies.

The EMSI provided the army a means transform Algerian women into 'modern' political subjects that acted on multiple registers. On a material level, the hygiene and childcare instruction the EMSI dispensed as they circulated the countryside aimed to manage the wellness of the exploding Algerian population and produce healthy, ordered bodies. Lessons focused on the 'proper' practices of washing bodies and clothing, on sanitary food preparation, and on housecleaning; all with the intent to cultivate the embodied habits of cleanliness and the moral dispositions of self-management and self-motivation that the army deemed necessary for daily life in a 'modern' society. The EMSI endeavored to make cleanliness into "a major worry" that "little by little" became "a natural need."⁸⁵ They repeated hygienic advice at every visit, and demanded that Algerian women follow it. One lesson plan on how to wash and de-lice clothing, for example, insisted that for every visit after the demonstration, women and children must be dressed in clean garments. Those who were not would be excluded from any future distribution of children's clothing.⁸⁶ Despite the Fifth Bureau's constant reminders to avoid paternalistic attitudes, these lessons frequently proved as patronizing as they were

⁸⁴ MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*, 81-85. On reforms, see also Ryme Seferdjeli, "French 'Reforms' and Muslim Women's Emancipation during the Algerian War," *Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 4 (2004): 19-61.

⁸⁵ "Programme de Travail." SHD 1H/2568.

⁸⁶ See the collection of five "Hygiene-propaganda discussions" written by an ASSRA in the Dahra Sector, and later distributed broadly to all EMSI, dated 5 July 1958. SHD 1H/2461.

coercive. Instead of explaining that microbes on dirty hands caused illnesses, the EMSI learned at their training that they could simply tell Algerian women and children that snakes laid tiny eggs in the dirt. When children sucked their dirty fingers, the eggs entered their stomachs and hatched, making them ill. "With clean hands," the lesson concluded, "the snakes will no longer get into their tummies."⁸⁷

On a more intellectual level, the EMSI strove to teach Algerian women the values and dispositions the army saw as necessary for full French citizenship. The sewing and knitting workshops and natal care instruction the EMSI gave in the Women's Circles served to prepare Algerian women for their future role as "healthy and sound mothers" and to cultivate interest in French fashions. Lessons in spoken French, "normal daily life" in the metropole, and national principles like 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity' served as propaganda for French rule, and conferred a "basic education" in the principles of national identity.⁸⁸ Through discussions on themes like marriage and divorce, the EMSI intended to introduce the concept of 'emancipation' and demonstrate what gender relations looked like in a 'modern' consumer society like the metropole. "A modern woman knows how to stitch and repair clothing," insisted one representative propaganda lesson employed in the Duperré Sector, "a modern woman maintains a clean and agreeable home; for the happiness of the family, a woman must

⁸⁷ See the lesson on "Hygiène" contained in the "Programme de Travail."

⁸⁸ A list of themes appears in Mme Tournemine, "Action psychologique féminine," 1H/2568. A more elaborate set of instructions of teaching basic civics lessons around the themes of 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' appears in the notebook of Jeanine Rugenente from Douéra, who attended a training stage in El-Riath organized by Mme Salan on 22 September 1958. Although the event trained women in the MSF, the materials undoubtedly reflect the same themes taught by the EMSI (see below). IHTP Fonds Hélène Lienhardt.



Figure 4.4: The Female Attaché to the Special Administrative Section in Boulet (Oran Region) teaches Algerian women from the regroupment camp to sew during a meeting of the local Woman's Circle, February 1958. (Source: ECPAD ALG/58/81). © ECPAD

give her accord at the moment of marriage.”⁸⁹ According to the Fifth Bureau, such instruction worked consciously to introduce important civic concepts, and also subconsciously to build affective bonds with France. Themes like the “fight to guarantee the future of children” and the “acquisition of the right to a normal life, choice of spouse,” activated – at least in theory – the basic ‘parental,’ ‘sexual,’ ‘alimentary,’ and ‘combative’ drives that made up the human psyche.⁹⁰ Combined with the transformation of daily habits through hygiene lessons, the Fifth

⁸⁹ 5e Bureau – Secteur de Duperré, “Bulletin d’Information A.P. (à développer et à adapter localement) – Semaine du 24 au 30 Aout 1959,” 22 August 1959. SNOM 4SAS/100.

⁹⁰ “Annexe” to the “Etude sur une campagne de fraternisation en Algérie,” SHD 1H/2460. The Fifth Bureau based such ideas on the psychoanalytic model of psychology forwarded by Serge Chakotin. See Chapter 3. It is important to note that the EMSI themselves were not privy to such theories; for psychological action to work

Bureau asserted, such instruction would cultivate an active desire for the habits of 'modern' French life and condition women to identify with France.

The emphasis on 'emancipation' grew slowly through the early spring of 1958. As the EMSI expanded beyond the boundaries of the Pilot Operations, their action focused principally on medical aid and hygiene instruction. Many EMSI appeared content to limit their activities to medical aid. In Palestro, the EMSI limited any "social action" to the distribution of layettes and condensed milk. The team in Miliana still spent much of their time managing the nearly 70 medical consultations they gave per day in May.⁹¹ Likewise, an ASSRA deployed in Hassi Bahbah remembered offering nothing but maternal and medical assistance.⁹² In her deployment zone of Dra-el-Mizan, Mademoiselle Mercier organized a few meetings for women, but spent most of April reaching out to local civil and military authorities to "study the possibilities for action."⁹³ The reasons were often practical: many EMSI worked with little oversight and few resources within communities suspicious of the army's motives. The team in Palestro treaded lightly in part because local men strongly opposed their wives' attendance at the Women's Circles, and in Miliana, the doctor working with the EMSI was not always present.⁹⁴ Only the commanding officer of the EMSI in Hassi Bahbah – a draftee – seemed to openly oppose employing the EMSI for psychological warfare purposes. Despite any

effectively, the Fifth Bureau asserted, the doctrine must be known only by the elite few individuals directing the campaign.

⁹¹ Annexe n° 4, General Allard, "Réunion des Chefs des Equipes médico-sociales itinérantes," 21 June 1958. SHD 1H/2568.

⁹² Interview with ASSRA F—*, deployed in Hassi Bahbah. Aix-en-Provence, 10 May 2013.

⁹³ Chef d'Escadron Savary, "Compte-rendu visite de l'ASSRA au Quartier de Tizi-Reniff," 30 April 1958. ANOM 9150/294.

⁹⁴ Annexe n° 4, General de Brigade Roy, adjoint to General Allard, "Réunion des Chefs des Equipes médico-sociales itinérantes," 21 June 1958. SHD 1H/2568.

difficulties, the EMSI and the officers who directed them viewed their action positively. The EMSI in Miliana asserted that discussions on the “evolution of women” had been enthusiastically received, and the officer overseeing Mademoiselle Mercier predicted based on the success of her early meetings that her future activities would prove “very profitable” for the army. By early May, the Fifth Bureau itched to expand the scope of the EMSI’s action on a dramatic scale.

The coup of May 1958 profoundly accelerated the army’s modernizing project. The protests of May 13 and Massu’s suspension of civilian law provided the Fifth Bureau with an ideal opportunity to orchestrate the grand gesture in favor of emancipation they and Allard desired.⁹⁵ As Goussault and Godard organized the massive demonstrations of “fraternity” that flooded Algiers on May 16th, 17th, and 18th, they took particular care to stage symbolic actions by women. On the night of the 17th, twelve young women recruited by the Fifth Bureau entered the Forum facing the Government General, and in front of massive crowds removed and burned their veils. The next afternoon, a large group of women drawn from the slums around Algiers and pressed into service by the Fifth Bureau entered the Forum and unveiled while a military band led 100,000 onlookers in singing the Marseillaise. In the ten days that followed, these unveiling performances repeated in other Algerian cities as Salan, Massu, and other leaders of the coup toured Algeria to showcase the broad support for their movement. The Fifth Bureau coerced or threatened the participation of many of the women who unveiled,

⁹⁵ In the archives of the Fifth Bureau, an undated “Etude sur une campagne de fraternisation en Algérie” notes that to endure, the gains won by the army’s policies of ‘contact’ and ‘pacification’ must be concretized by some sort of fraternization campaign. This campaign, the document argues, must be launched to coincide with some sort of event, such as the start of the school year or “the application of certain reforms.” The note does not mention the events of May 1958, so it is not clear whether this study had an important impact on the Fifth Bureau’s engagement in May, but it does show that its officers had such an action in mind. SHD 1H/2460.

but they succeeded in hiding their role and passed the demonstrations off as spontaneous.⁹⁶

For French and international audiences, the events of May constituted a remarkable expression of fraternity between Europeans and Algerians. For the Fifth Bureau, they represented the triumph of the techniques of psychological action they had perfected over the past two years.

Through the May demonstrations, Salan and his co-conspirators hoped to bring back to power the only man whom they believed capable of uniting the politically-fractured country behind their efforts in Algeria: Charles de Gaulle. Their brazen seizure of power worked. Faced with the army's invasion of Corsica on the 24th of May, the General publicly announced that he had formed a new government in order to restore national unity. On June 1st, the National Assembly invested de Gaulle with full powers by a vote of 329 to 224, and three days later, he arrived in Algiers. Speaking to the crowds from the balcony of the Government General, de Gaulle pronounced four words that won him unanimous support: "Je vous ai compris," I have understood you. As de Gaulle outlined his plan for a new constitution and an ambitious program of social and economic development that sought bring 'equality' and 'fraternity' to Algeria (the Constantine Plan), army leaders saw their own integrationist project affirmed. De Gaulle, announced the Fifth Bureau's internal bulletin, "is the riposte to Revolutionary Warfare incarnate, because he embodies our French Civilization."⁹⁷ With the General in power, Salan,

⁹⁶ For a much more detailed account of these demonstrations and the Fifth Bureau's role in orchestrating them, see Neil MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*, chapter 3.

⁹⁷ 5^e Bureau – Etat-Major 10^e R.M., "Bulletin de liaison et d'information des O.I. & des U.G.T.P.," 10 July 1958. SHD 1H/2533.

Goussault, and many others within the French army command believed that they had finally gained the upper hand.

In the weeks that followed, the Fifth Bureau sought to sustain the emotional momentum of the “fraternization” demonstrations by actively engaging as many women as possible. Even before Salan had finished his tour, Goussault sent a message to the heads of the three army corps in Algeria ordering them to encourage women of all backgrounds – and especially unveiled women – to participate in “demonstrations of national regeneration.” He also encouraged the EMSI to work as quickly as possible to create Women’s Circles uniting “Europeans and Muslims.”⁹⁸ Officers did not hesitate to put these recommendations into action. In the Aumale Sector, Colonel de Maison Rouge ordered all units and SAS officers to stage public meetings, since, he argued, it was “indispensable to take advantage of this élan to intensify our psychological action.” When women refused to meet in public, he ordered his officers to “go to them.” Using loudspeaker trucks, de Maison Rouge’s units announced “that in Algiers, thousands of Muslim women...symbolically burned their veils in public, demonstrating their total adherence to the spirit of *l’Algérie Nouvelle*.” Even “hidden behind their blinds,” the Colonel insisted, women did “not miss a word.”⁹⁹

For their part, the EMSI greeted the events of May with enthusiasm, and embraced the cause of ‘emancipation’ with renewed vigor. In Biskra, ASSRA Louise Fabiani preached to the Women’s Circles that “France abolished slavery,” now, she continued, “it wants to help the

⁹⁸ Telex dated 20 May 1958, cited in MacMaster, “Burning the Veil,” page 132. SHD 1H/2461.

⁹⁹ Emphasis added. Arnoux de Maison Rouge, Commandant le Secteur d’Aumale, “Note de Service: Action psychologique,” 19 May 1958. ANOM 3SAS/21.

Muslim woman in her evolution, it wants to help her become a modern woman!"¹⁰⁰ Across Algeria, the EMSI attempted to use the momentum of May to create Women's Circles, where they encouraged women to unveil and to demand their rights to be equals alongside and active participants in civic life. For many, the "spontaneous" events in Algiers catalyzed a movement of popular support. One Fifth Bureau report announced triumphantly that Women's Circles had "everywhere encountered a real success among [Algerian] women, who have taken on the idea of an evolution of their condition and appear to have decided to obtain it."¹⁰¹ Not everyone, however, responded with such unchecked optimism. In a meeting with other EMSI team leaders, the head of the West Algiers Zone celebrated the fact that "in a general fashion all the Muslim women are overjoyed at the idea of the veil falling," but lamented that "none of them wants to be the first to abandon it." Her colleague heading the Eastern Algiers Zone proved even less enthusiastic: any "enthusiasm," she declared, was "very superficial."¹⁰² To survive, insisted the head of the EMSI in Constantine, the budding women's movement must be "channeled" and "framed" [encadré].¹⁰³

Colonel Goussault agreed. From late May, the Fifth Bureau set out to expand the EMSI and to extend the army's action on Algerian women by creating or coopting a number of other organizations. The number of EMSI in operation increased rapidly. By October 1958, the army employed 118 ASSRA, and by early 1959 it had raised that number to 213, who formed 85

¹⁰⁰ "Instruction civique," labeled as taken from the work of Louise Fabiani in Biskra. SHD 1H/2461.

¹⁰¹ Corps d'Armée d'Alger, "Synthèse mensuelle d'action psychologique et de pacification : mois de mai 1958," 26 June 1958. SHD 1H/2549.

¹⁰² "Réunion des Chefs des Equipes médico-sociales itinérantes."

¹⁰³ Denise Amesland, "Rapport," 8 July 1958. SHD 1H/2569.

teams dispersed across the three army corps.¹⁰⁴ The organization later reached its peak at 220 teams in 1961, a number that remained more or less stable through the end of the war.¹⁰⁵ In the aftermath of May, however, the Fifth Bureau also extended indirect control over two other organizations, the growing corps of Female Algerian Affairs Attachés (*Attachées Féminines des Affaires Algériennes*, or AFAA) attached to SAS officers, and the Women's Solidarity Movement (*Mouvement de Solidarité Féminine*, or MSF), a purportedly benevolent social work organization run by the wives of the army's top brass.¹⁰⁶ The use of such 'third parties' was not entirely new for the Fifth Bureau. Servier had cobbled together the original medico-social teams by poaching several nurses from the SAS in Orléansville, and the Fifth Bureau had attempted to work discreetly with the national social work umbrella group the *Union Nationale des Associations Familiales* in the Constantine Department to carry out maternal and household skills-training similar to that of the EMSI from October 1957.¹⁰⁷ After May 1958, however, the Bureau intended to use such organizations as parallel means of 'organizing' Algeria's female population on a mass scale.

¹⁰⁴ It was difficult to locate reliable statistics on the growth of the EMSI in the archives before 1960. For the numbers in October 1958, see Etat-Major – 6th Bureau, "Renseignements concernant la Pacification," 26 November 1958; SHD 1H/2540. For the number of EMSI as of March 1959, see "Fiches: Centres Sociaux – S.A.S. – Equipes Médico-sociales Itinérantes," 4 March 1959; SHD 1H/2461.

¹⁰⁵ There were 96 EMSI in the Army Corps of Oran, 83 in Algiers, 44 in Constantine. These teams consisted of 286 ASSRA and 33 PFAT. 136 of the ASSRA were classified as FSNA, or "Français de souche nord-africaine" – meaning Algerian. The overall numbers of personnel and teams remained more or less even until the end of the war, except that 'European' personnel left in increasing numbers from mid-1961 onward and were often replaced 230 "Harkettes," Algerian auxiliaries who received little training and reduced salaries, paid largely out of the budget for Harkis. "Situation Actuelle des Equipes Médico-sociales Itinérantes, 15 Février 1961." SHD 1H/2568.

¹⁰⁶ Before 1959, the MSF consisted of two organizations, the MSF headed by Madame Massu, and the *Comités d'Action Sociale et de solidarité féminine*, which operated conjointly with the aid of the army. They very quickly merged under the moniker of the MSF, which I have chosen to employ for the sake of clarity.

¹⁰⁷ Chef du Bureau Psychologique, "Fiche à l'attention du Colonel Directeur du Cabinet Militaire du Ministre de l'Algérie," 23 October 1957. SHD 1H/2569.

The AFAA and MSF operated autonomously but in close collaboration with the Fifth Bureau. As a result, the line dividing their action from that of the EMSI was often fluid. Employed by a SAS officer in towns or villages within their circumscription, the Female Attachés carried out a campaign to “arouse in women the need for an evolution in their daily living habits” that effectively mirrored the work of the EMSI. Their activities did not change radically following May 1958, but rather fell more closely in line with the Fifth Bureau’s program as the Government General granted the EMSI leadership the authority to train the AFAA as well as “guide and control” their daily operations.¹⁰⁸ Most AFAA regularly received propaganda materials from the Fifth Bureau, and many worked closely with psychological officers or EMSI. In many locales, the AFAA even constituted their own itinerant teams to carry out AMG or teach hygiene.¹⁰⁹

Such connections were more evident between the Fifth Bureau and the MSF. To the public, the Women’s Solidarity Movement presented itself as a grassroots organization that emerged organically during the events of May in order to promote the social advancement of Algerian women. In reality, however, Colonel Goussault created the movement, and the army provided the bulk of its funding.¹¹⁰ Led by Lucienne Salan and Suzanne Massu, the

¹⁰⁸ Direction General des Affaires Politiques et de la Fonction Publique, “Instruction sur l’emploi des Attachés Féminines des Affaires Algériennes,” 3 February 1958. ANOM 6SAS/64. The instruction notes that the diplomas for AFAA and ASSRA are interchangeable, and encourages AFAA to become ASSRA to advance their careers.

¹⁰⁹ These practices seem to have been particularly widespread in Oran. See the massive dossier of reports on the activities of the AFAA in the Department of Oran in 1958 and 1959: ANOM 51/218. For a detailed portrait of the types of documentation provided to the AFAA by the Fifth Bureau and its overlaps with EMSI material, see the personal archives of Hélène Lienhardt, AFAA in Douera from 1957 to 1959. Fonds Hélène Lienhardt, IHTP.

¹¹⁰ An “Aide-memoire” dated 17 October 1958 in the archives of the MSF notes that “The idea to launch a movement of women’s solidarity emanated from the 5th Bureau. It is Colonel Gousseau [sic] who launched it...” ANOM 13CAB/61. For just one example of the army’s financing of the MSF, see the letter from Lucienne Salan to Colonel Lacheroy dated 8 September 1958 requesting financing on the level of 2 million francs from the psychological action budget. ANOM 13CAB/37. Neil MacMaster and Diane Sambron have both demonstrated in

movement's leadership structure mirrored that of the army, and its officers consisted largely of the wives of each superior officer or general at corresponding departmental, zone, and sector levels.¹¹¹ The Women's Circles created by the MSF paralleled those of the EMSI in their methods and aims, and in their efforts to 'emancipate' Algerian women, local MSF representatives often worked with ASSRA or under the direct orders of the Fifth Bureau.¹¹² In the Miliana Sector, for example, the movement survived largely due to the efforts of Major Abrial, the head of the Sector's Fifth Bureau, and Madame Leroux, the lead team member of an EMSI.¹¹³ Bankrolled by the army, the Women's Solidarity Movement proliferated in 1958 and 1959. The army boasted that in the Department of Oran alone, 59 local committees sprang up by June 1st, 1958 – nearly half of the 122 total in existence across Algeria.¹¹⁴ By early 1959, 438 MSF circles and 495 Female Attachés joined their efforts to those of the 85 EMSI traversing the Algerian *bled*.¹¹⁵ Working in tandem, the EMSI, AFAA, and MSF provided the

detail the strong ties between the Fifth Bureau, but some historians insist that the MSF did in fact attract the earnest participation of middle-class "evoluee" Algerian women. See MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*, Ch. 5; Diane Sambron, *Femmes musulmanes, Guerre d'Algerie 1954-1962* (Paris: Autrement, 2007), 92-97; and Jaime Wadowiec, "Muslim Algerian Women and the Rights of Man: Islam and Gendered Citizenship in French Algeria at the End of Empire," *French Historical Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 649-676.

¹¹¹ See, for example, the "organigram" attached to Madame Maugé, Fiche dated 20 February 1959. SHD 1H/2569.

¹¹² Particularly revealing of this relationship is the note on the MSF authored by Division General Gilles, head of the Army Corps of Constantine, which notes that the MSF plays a fundamental strategic role for the army, since the army cannot act too directly to "integrate Muslim women into a free society" without appearing dictatorial or inuring the pride of 'Muslims'. The MSF, he notes, must closely collaborate to orient their action "around" the activities of the EMSI in order to compliment and extend them. General de Division Gilles, Cabinet Civil, "Le Mouvement de Solidarité Féminine," 27 June 1958. ANOM 3R/508.

¹¹³ Lieutenant-Colonel P. Barda, Miliana Sector, "Visite de Madame Massu dans les Centres de Solidarité féminine du Secteur," 21 November 1958. ANOM 4SAS/110.

¹¹⁴ Corps d'Armée d'Oran, "Qu'est-ce que le Mouvement de Solidarite Feminine," undated. SHD 1H/3217

¹¹⁵ As with the EMSI, the rapid and often ad-hoc creation of MSF committees and hiring of AFAA in 1958 and 1959 left few reliable statistics in the archives. The figure of 495 AFAA in March 1959 comes from the "Fiches: Centres Sociaux – S.A.S. – Equipes Médico-sociales Itinérantes," cited above, and the number of 438 MSF Women's Circles operating in May 1959 in R. Martinet to Mafart, "Demande de subvention du Mouvement de Solidarité Féminine," 22 May 1959. ANOM 14CAB/88. The ongoing role played by AFAA and the EMSI in running the MSF also means that in some locales the numbers of the AFAA and MSF likely overlap.




Figure 4.5: An Organizational Chart for the Women's Solidarity Movement dated February 1959. Madames Challe (here misspelled), Allard, Gilles, Jacquier, Gambiez, Massu, and Ollie are all wives of Generals deployed at the equivalent rank: General Challe, for example, was head of French armed forces in Algeria, and General Gambiez was head of the Army Corps of Oran (C.A.O.). Listed in parentheses are the Fifth Bureau officers (B/5) who liaised with each MSF representative. (Source: SHD 1H/2569).

army an ensemble of horizontal "parallel hierarchies" that all pursued the shared goal of 'emancipating' Algerian women.¹¹⁶ The army now turned to this ensemble to attempt provoke a rapid social 'evolution' that would draw Algeria closer to France.

In the months immediately following May 1958, the EMSI and their partner programs worked to convince Algerian women to throw off their veils and to enter civic life. The image of Muslim women unveiling served as a powerful symbol of Algerian women's purported desire to become more fully French during the May demonstrations, and the Fifth Bureau now

¹¹⁶ 5° Bureau – Etat-Major, 13° Division d'Infanterie, "Directive Psychologique pour la période d'après referendum," 11 October 1958. SHD 1H/4060.

charged the EMSI and MSF to encourage women to unveil themselves as the first step toward abandoning “certain traditions that bridle them and prevent them from leading a free life.”¹¹⁷ But despite the supposed outpouring of enthusiasm for unveiling reported by many ASSRA, the army quickly found most women reticent to abandon the veil. Where the army’s efforts proved more successful, however, was in its campaign to convince Algerian women to vote in the 28 September 1958 referendum on de Gaulle’s new constitution. Algerian women technically held voting rights under the Organic Statute of 1947, and in late June 1958, General Salan gave the order to enroll them on the voting registers.¹¹⁸ Salan and Goussault saw the referendum as crucial opportunity to prove “the willingness of 10 million *français* of Algeria to manage in common with 43 million *français* of the metropole the affairs of France,” and ordered the EMSI to focus their energy on convincing Algerian women to participate.¹¹⁹ From June to September, the EMSI registered female voters, propagandized, and even went door-to-door on the day of the referendum to conduct in-home voting.¹²⁰ Massive numbers of women turned out to vote and voted in support of the new constitution. Their participation was highly engineered. Once at the polls, many women received only ‘yes’ ballots, or military officials simply instructed them to vote ‘yes’ and forced them to select their ballots in front of everyone, rather than in private.¹²¹ Regardless, the leadership of the Fifth Bureau viewed the elections as “an act of faith...and hope” on the part of Algerians.¹²² Women may not yet have

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ MacMaster, 273.

¹¹⁹ Salan and Goussault, note n° 1661/CC to the Generals of Army Corps, 11 July 1958. ANOM 13 CAB/20.

¹²⁰ Télégramme n° 1593/CC signed General Dulac, 10 July 1958. ANOM 13 CAB/20.

¹²¹ Seferdjeli, 26. Neil MacMaster also discusses this vote-rigging in-depth in *Burning the Veil*, chapter 8.

¹²² “Directive Psychologique pour la période d’après referendum”

begun to unveil, they asserted, but the referendums offered proof that the 'movement' they had initiated in May continued to thrive.

But as 1958 rolled into 1959, momentum the army had tried so desperately to build through its expanding apparatus of women's organizations slowed perceptibly. In many places, Algerian women did appear eager to engage the EMSI. Despite rough conditions and a critical lack of supplies, the industrious members of the three EMSI circulating the Bouira Sector of Kabylie managed to run sewing workshops in seven different douars in addition to their door-to-door efforts and medical aid.¹²³ Mademoiselle Hamoudi, who headed one of the teams, insisted that women "love[d] to frequent the workshops," not only to use to the sewing machine but because it gave them an opportunity to leave the house and chat with one another.¹²⁴ Local women remained enthusiastic and attentive to the lessons the EMSI gave, and Hamoudi and her fellow team-leaders reported the growing desire of Algerian women to assist the ASSRA in their social work.¹²⁵ The Female Attaché based at Ain-Cheurfa in the Perrégaux Sector of Oran reported similar success with women in the nearby regroupment camp. Women in the camp not only assiduously attended the hygiene and infant care classes she offered, often against the objections of their husbands, but also put her advice into practice when caring for their own children.¹²⁶ In Biskra, the meetings of the women's circle run by Louise Fabiani were more overtly political, but still drew interested attendees. Over

¹²³ Colonel Lamarque d'Arrouzat, 5th Bureau – Bouira Sector, "C.R. d'activité des EMSI," 7 October 1959. SHD 1H/4395.

¹²⁴ ASSRA Hamoudi, "Compte-rendu d'activités du mois d'octobre 1959" SHD 1H/4395.

¹²⁵ See the packet of "Compte-rendu d'activités du mois de janvier 1960" authored by the three EMSI team captains,

¹²⁶ Sous-Lieutenant Kosina, Chef de SAS d'Ain-Cheurfa, "Compte-rendu sur les activités de l'attachée féminine de la SAS d'Ain Cheurfa," for June and December 1959. ANOM 51/218.

the course of several meetings, Fabiani encouraged local women to claim their full rights as French citizens, “to be educated women, to know how to read and write, to be able to make a living; the right to no longer be a slave, to no longer be married by force at 14 or 15 years old...the right to participate in civic life, to have an opinion that counts.”¹²⁷ Afterward, the local military command remarked – perhaps overoptimistically – that women did “not hesitate to express their enthusiasm” at Fabiani’s words, and now wanted “to live ‘differently,’ to be able to go out, to go to the cinema, to no longer be beaten, to no longer wear the veil, finally: to evolve.”¹²⁸ The Fifth Bureau viewed successful examples such as these as signs that Algerian women had embraced the army’s modernizing project.

Not all EMSI experienced a warm welcome, however. In many villages, Algerian women reacted to the EMSI with hostility, and where they did engage, they often did so strategically. In the rolling plains around Waldeck-Rousseau, women refused to come to meetings organized by the EMSI, which prevented the teams’ activities from developing beyond initial door-to-door contact efforts or medical consultations.¹²⁹ Likewise, the SAS officer in Oued Riou near Tiaret urgently reported to his superiors that at a January meeting of the women’s circle, one woman brazenly announced her opposition to emancipation in front of not only the assembled women, but the ASSRA and himself.¹³⁰ Officers frequently complained that women utilized the EMSI for the services they offered, but appeared little enticed by the

¹²⁷ “Instruction civique,” labeled as taken from the work of Louise Fabiani in Biskra. SHD 1H/2461.

¹²⁸ Lieutenant-Colonel Hervier, Chef d’Etat-major la 21^e D.I. et de la Z.S.C., “Rapport d’activité des A.S.S.R.A. actuellement en place dans la zone,” 6 March 1959. On Fabiani’s deployment to the zone during that time, see 5th Bureau – ZSC, “Equipe A.S.S.R.A. de Biskra,” 18 February 1959. SHD 1H/3868.

¹²⁹ Secteur du Tiaret, “Compte rendu hebdomadaire de Pacification,” n° 73/Sec.Tiaret/3, dated 19 January 1959. SHD 1H/4510.

¹³⁰ Secteur de Tiaret, “C.R. Hebdomadaire de Situation Psychologique – urgent,” 13 January 1959. SHD 1H/4510.

program of 'emancipation' they were supposed to so naturally desire. The commander of the Oran Center Zone lamented that while women in the douars readily attended the daily or bi-weekly visits of the EMSI, they were "more interested by the little immediate material advantages" to be gained "than by the ideas of social emancipation that we are trying to inculcate."¹³¹ In other instances, Algerian women used the EMSI's action subversively. An officer in Batna complained that rival families utilized the visits of the EMSI to fuel local conflicts, and that it was difficult for the team to work without locals intentionally misconstruing even the most anodyne actions of the ASSRA.¹³² Even in areas where Algerian women welcomed the EMSI, they sometimes resisted or ignored the teams' efforts to discuss propaganda. While women in Bouria attended sewing workshops enthusiastically, in many villages they also abstained from giving their opinions on current events, or refused to talk.¹³³ Hamoudi and her fellow ASSRA reported that women were quite aware of reforms to their legal status, but simply ignored them.¹³⁴ The motives of Algerian women are difficult to glean from the archives, but they were clearly not the unquestioning allies of 'emancipation' that army ethnographers imagined them to be.

The relationships the EMSI and their partner programs built with women across Algeria were nuanced, uneven, and often fragile. As the EMSI deployed to Sidi Boumedienne in Tlemcen remarked time and again, the ties between the EMSI and the women they engaged

¹³¹ General de Division Perrotat, "Synthèse Trimestrielle d'activité des Equipes médico-sociales," 15 December 1960. SHD 1H/4259.

¹³² Colonel Beugnet, Chef d'Etat-Major, Zone Sud Constantinois, "Mutation d'une A.S.S.R.A. – Problème des femmes musulmanes," 7 June 1959. SHD 1H/3868.

¹³³ Mlle Malika, Mlle Guria, "Compte-rendu d'activités du mois d'avril 1960" SHD 1H/4395.

¹³⁴ Colonel Lamarque d'Arrouzat, Cdt Secteur Bouira, "Enquête effectué par l'équipe Mlles Latreche Malika et Hamoudi Adda," 6 April 1959. SHD 1H/4395.



Figure 4.6: Madame Salan, wife of General Raoul Salan, visits Algerian women in the lead-up to the 28 September 1958 Referendum on de Gaulle's proposed Constitution. (Source: ECPAD ALG/58/431). © ECPAD.

remained “fragile, at the mercy of the smallest event [or] the slightest adverse propaganda,” well into 1959.¹³⁵ These relationships depended on a number of factors: local living conditions, the presence and strength of the FLN, and even the personality of the social assistants.¹³⁶ One factor, however, seemed determinant: need. In spite of their cursory medical training and the propaganda-oriented nature of their action, the EMSI still offered vital services as they carried out basic care, distributed powdered milk, or provided the opportunity to make much-needed

¹³⁵ “Action sur les Milieux féminins en Algérie par les Equipes Médico-sociales Itinérantes (E.M.S.I.)...pour le Bulletin des F.O.,” 29 August 1960 likely authored by Commandant Cogniet. SHD 1H/2461.

¹³⁶ In Oran, for example, the Female Attaché Mlle Eynard established such a rapport with women in the Ville Nouvelle neighborhood that they regularly embraced her as she departed; however, her gossip-prone colleague in the Saint-Leu neighborhood provoked multiple incidents with local women due to her lack of discretion. See Lieutenant Roesch, Chef de la SAU de Ville-Nouvelle, “Rapport sur les attachées sociales, mois de février 1959;” and Lieutenant Reale, Chef de la SAS de Saint-Leu, “Rapport sur les attachées culturelles, civiques, et sociaux,” 30 July 1959. ANOM 5I/218.

clothing in the Women's Circles. The participation of Algerian women often spoke more to the profound hardship generated by the French war effort or the conditions imposed by regroupment camps than the attractiveness of the EMSI's emancipatory message. Even as the Fifth Bureau celebrated Madame Salan's September 1958 goodwill tour of Algeria in propaganda photographs, the captain accompanying her noted the "misery" and hunger that drove the women in several of the villages to 'timidly' welcome the General's wife and the EMSI who accompanied her.¹³⁷ The EMSI sought to win the affection of Algerian women for France. But by 1959, just what they achieved was unclear.

It was more apparent, however, that the rapid and profound social transformation the army expected had not arrived. Military commanders at all levels remained convinced that the action of the EMSI yielded favorable results, but they increasingly saw 'emancipation' as a long-term endeavor that would require significantly more effort than they had imagined in the heady weeks of May 1958. As they launched a series of devastating operations across Algeria in early 1959, French military commanders reaffirmed their aspiration to transform Algerians on a mass scale.

Rendering the New Algeria Readable

In December 1958, President de Gaulle cleaned house. Seeking to reinstate civilian control over the administration in Algeria, the President purged Salan and his close cadre of superior officers from the military command. The enigmatic General who had held full civil

¹³⁷ Captain Schlumberger to Goussault, 'for us only,' "Manifestations féminines au cours du voyage du Général et de Madame Salan," 5 September 1958.

and military powers retired under pressure to France, where he remained only a short time. The leadership of the Fifth Bureau also fell under the new President's scrutiny: de Gaulle sequestered Colonel Lacheroy in a minor teaching chair at the *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre* in Paris, and Colonel Bruge was redeployed from Arzew to Masagasar.¹³⁸ The former heads of the Fifth Bureau, Colonels Feaugas and Goussault, both found themselves assigned to active duty. Feaugas became commander of the Palmeraies Sector, and Goussault the Guelma Sector, where a General visiting on inspection commented in 1960 that the ambitious vision of Pacification the blue-eyed Colonel had once helped to spearhead appeared to yield only 'superficial' results.¹³⁹ Many of the key architects of the strategy were now gone.

But even as the men responsible for the explosive growth of psychological action programs like the EMSI departed, their ideas came to dominate French strategy in Algeria as never before. Salan's successor as Commander in Chief of Armed Forces in Algeria, General Maurice Challe, set out to deal the ALN a devastating blow with a series of brutal operations that swept across Algeria beginning February 1959. The 'Challe Plan' deeply impacted the FLN: by the summer, French forces had reduced ALN troops by nearly half, and the leadership of the movement fractured under the pressure of the assault.¹⁴⁰ But this sweeping offensive constituted only the first stage of a process to reestablish control over the population – a

¹³⁸ On Lacheroy's redeployment, see Villatoux and Villatoux, 538. On Bruge, see Denis Leroux, "Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d'Algérie: Le Centre d'instruction pacification et contre-guérilla d'Arzew, 1957-1959," *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire* 120 n° 4 (2013), 110.

¹³⁹ On Feaugas' redeployment, see the "Bulletin de liaison des O.I. et des U.G.T.P." n° 53, 12 February 1959. SHD 1H/2533. The assessment of Pacification under Goussault in Guelma comes from General Charles Ailleret, *General du Contingent en Algérie, 1960-1962* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1998), 47-48. Cited as well in Villatoux and Villatoux, 490. It is interesting to note that despite his criticism, however, Ailleret decided not only to maintain but extend the operation of Fifth Bureau institutions like the EMSI and the Foyers Sportifs.

¹⁴⁰ Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 245.

process which Challe modeled directly on the procedures laid out by the Fifth Bureau.¹⁴¹ As the offensive unfolded, Challe maintained the Fifth Bureau's leadership over the widening array of Pacification programs that aimed to 'engage' the Algerians in the wake of combat operations and 'guide' them back into the French fold. Under the new leadership of the methodical Colonel Jean Gardes and his taciturn, deeply-Catholic assistant Commandant Cogniet, the Fifth Bureau set out to expand the action of the EMSI on a scale to match Challe's massed operations.¹⁴²

In this context, the EMSI held renewed importance for the French army, not only for the moral and material transformations they believed the teams' action would accomplish, but because the EMSI also provided a means to render the army's promised 'New Algeria' visible. Through the changes wrought to their lives by the EMSI, the army command attempted prove the reality of *l'Algérie Nouvelle* to Algerian women, and to demonstrate their visible 'frenchness,' both to Algerians and to international and metropolitan audiences. Confronted with a largely invisible enemy and an ambivalent Algerian population whose allegiance it claimed to hold, the French army also looked to the bodies of Algerian women as indicators of loyalty. In their cooperation or refusal of the EMSI's efforts to transform their hygiene or dress,

¹⁴¹ See Secret Instruction n° 4250, "Instruction pour la pacification en Algérie, approuvée par le General d'Armée Aérienne M. Challe, Commandant en Chef les Forces Armées en Algérie le 10 décembre 1959." ANOM 3SAS/129. Challe himself readily admitted this genesis in his memoirs, noting that Instruction 4250 "codified the lessons of several years of fighting against subversion." Challe, *Notre Révolte*, 44.

¹⁴² On Colonel Gardes' connections to the Cité Catholique, a reactionary anti-Communist Catholic group, see Marie-Monique Robin, *Escadrons de la mort, l'école française* (Paris: La Decouverte, 2004), chapter 11, and Lazreg, chapter 8. Both authors stress that other Fifth Bureau officers such as Goussault, Feaugas, and Cogniet had published in the Cité Catholique's journal, *Verbe*. While such an emphasis is appropriate for Gardes and Cogniet, under whom the rhetoric of the Fifth Bureau radicalized, applying the broad brush of 'catholicisme intégriste' to all the officers of the Fifth Bureau obscures not only the evolving institutional politics of the bureau, but the supreme emphasis officers such as Feaugas and Goussault placed on technicity, and the other connections shared between this generation of officers that may have shaped such emphases, such as training at CHEAM.

the army sought to read their affection or disaffection toward France. As the élan of 1958 faded into the uncertain atmosphere of 1959 and 1960, however, these efforts to render Algeria 'readable' proved increasingly difficult.

From their advent, the EMSI played an important role in French army propaganda. International politics placed a new emphasis on notions of 'just' warfare in the postwar period, and the FLN proved quite adept at using the aid work of the Algerian Red Crescent to build the legitimacy of its claims to represent the Algerian people.¹⁴³ The EMSI offered the French army visible proof for its own claims to be carrying out humanitarian work in Algeria. Romanticized images of smiling Frenchwomen holding happy infants or administering vaccines to grateful old women covered the pages of army journals like *Le Bled*, or in propaganda films like *Reviens vite, Toubiba!*¹⁴⁴ Hagiographic works such as journalist Christiane Fournier's *Les EMSI: des filles comme ça!* praised the salvific and humanitarian work of the army for French and international audiences, and provided useful material for newspaper articles or television interviews.¹⁴⁵ These images of the EMSI provided the army an especially important public relations tool after

¹⁴³ Works concerning the growth of human rights discourses and their impact on the conflict include Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Fabian Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria*, trans. Dona Geyer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). Helen Kinsella in turn examines the impact of the conflict on just war theory. See Kinsella, *The Image before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction between Combatant and Civilian* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), chapter 6. On the diplomatic role of the Algerian Red Crescent, see "Humanize the Conflict: Algerian Health Care Organizations and Propaganda Campaigns, 1954-62," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44 (2012): 713-731.

¹⁴⁴ *Reviens vite Toubiba*, 1 January 1957. ECPAD SCA/129.

¹⁴⁵ On Fournier, see footnote 39. Several television interviews of EMSI and Christiane Fournier are available on the website of the Institut National de l'Audiovisuel, See for example, "Christiane FOURNIER et l'action sociale en Algérie," accessed 23 June 2015, <http://ina.fr/video/I07106936>.



Figure 4.7: Three Propaganda posters aimed at Algerian Women. From left to right: "Are you not beautiful? Unveil yourself!" (1958); "Without renouncing traditions Algerian women will know how to take part in the evolution of the modern world" (1959?); and "I am a French citizen, I vote" (May 1960). The Fifth Bureau produced several posters like the one on the left in the aftermath of May 1958, but never distributed them. An attached note reads, "All poster propaganda concerning the veil of Muslim women is inopportune. The problem of the veil will be more rapidly and more easily resolved between women and between Muslims in the Women's Circles." (Sources: SHD 1H/2504, 1H/2502, and 1H/2506).

1958, as public revelations of its widespread use of torture in Algeria provoked widespread condemnation.

The most important audience for the EMSI's action, however, remained Algerians themselves. The EMSI served as both a conduit for the Fifth Bureau to funnel propaganda directly to women and a means to anchor that propaganda in their daily lives. The hygiene and civics lessons dispensed by the EMSI naturally contained a healthy dose of propaganda proclaiming French rule as the sole path to progress and prosperity. In Duperré, such lessons often took the form of a serial allegory about "Mohammed the Brave" and his unnamed wife, who learned about women's new equal rights and the proper steps to maintain a clean and orderly home with the help of a friendly SAS officer.¹⁴⁶ The Fifth Bureau supplemented this spoken propaganda with a range of radio broadcasts, films, posters, and "photo boards" assembled for the Women's Circles by the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Companies or the local SAS officer.¹⁴⁷ Alongside pro-French slogans, these boards featured photographs of national events and local community members, in order to encourage them to recognize the themes – integration, emancipation, etc. – at work in their own lives.¹⁴⁸ In some towns they seem to have generated interest; in others, Algerians discreetly removed the photos when army personnel were not present.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Secteur de Duperré – 5^e Bureau, "Bulletin d'Information A.P. (à développer et à adapter localement) – Semaine du 16 au 23 Aout 1959." ANOM 4SAS/100.

¹⁴⁷ From September to December 1958, the Fifth Bureau regularly broadcast a series of radio programs aimed at women: the "Billet de Lalla Safiya," who claimed to be a 'modernized' Muslim woman who preached unveiling, and the "Magazine sociale de la femme," the weekly broadcast of the MSF. Transcripts of many of the programs can be viewed in ANOM 13CAB/61.

¹⁴⁸ 5^e Bureau, "Nos techniques C.D.P.," February 1960. ANOM 4SAS/110.

¹⁴⁹



Figure 4.8: Participants in a Women's Circle discuss in front of a Photo Board displaying women who demonstrated and unveiled in Algiers on 18 May 1958. From top to bottom, the slogans read: "We enrich ourselves in our mutual differences;" "May 1958: The women of French Algeria proclaim their desire for emancipation and integration." Location unknown. (Source: ECPAD/BLED/58/652). © ECPAD

Through this propaganda, the Fifth Bureau sought to convey a concrete image of the "New Algeria" they claimed to be constructing, and to teach Algerian women to desire it. Many of the materials focused on the economic development projects and reforms to Algerians' civil status envisioned by de Gaulle's Constantine Plan. The EMSI regularly projected films such as *Ouargla: It was the Desert*, and *For You, Algerian Women*, which portrayed Algeria's future as a dynamic, egalitarian, industrialized territory where the job prospects and living conditions of Algerians would be dramatically improved.¹⁵⁰ Printed

¹⁵⁰ *C'était le désert: Ouargla*, 22 April 1959; ECPAD SCA/173. *Pour vous, femmes musulmanes*, 1958; ECPAD FT/524.

materials circulated by the EMSI and MSF such as the magazine *Femmes Nouvelles* (New Women) advertised the benefits of 'modern' life that the Constantine Plan promised to bring to Algeria: butane stoves, plastic furniture, and the latest Parisian fashions.¹⁵¹ Recipes, styling tips, dress patterns, and home-making advice encouraged women to begin to actively embody the lifestyle the magazines portrayed. Articles explained the 1959 reform of 'Muslim' marriage laws or described famous 'emancipated' Muslim women such as Princess Soraya of Iran in an attempt to construct a model of 'emancipated' Muslim femininity for Algerians to imitate.¹⁵² Through such propaganda, the Fifth Bureau proposed a highly assimilationist vision of consumer 'modernity', but one they saw as believable and desirable enough to win the affection of Algerian women.

The social assistants themselves embodied the most tangible symbols of emancipated womanhood. EMSI training taught Algerian social assistants to "live and dress like Europeans," unveiled and visibly independent in public spaces.¹⁵³ French commanders stressed that the ASSRA must maintain an "exemplary conduct, bearing, and morality" in order to serve as unimpeachable examples of 'emancipation.' In the Eastern Algiers Zone, General Faure banned social assistants from smoking publicly or wearing pants on risk of termination— including outside working hours.¹⁵⁴ The army command hoped that in

¹⁵¹ *Femmes Nouvelles* was published by the Government General's Service de l'Information under the oversight of an editorial board composed of Colonel Feaugas, Captain Guy Caniot, and a civilian named only as 'Mr. Foissy.' Colonel Gardes, "Journal Femmes Nouvelles," 11 October 1958, SHD 1H/2461; and Service de l'Information, "Note Intérieure," 25 July 1958, SHD 1H/2409.

¹⁵² For example, "Princesse, impératrice, simple citoyenne: Soraya," *Femmes Nouvelles* 11 (8 February 1959), 8-9.

¹⁵³ The Fifth Bureau adopted these recommendations from a Captain commanding the 3/20th Dragons in Kerrata. See "Fiche: Emancipation de la femme," 12 December 1957. SHD 1H/2461.

¹⁵⁴ General Jacques Faure, Note de Service 627/ZEA/5, 11 February 1960. SHD 1H/4295.

“demonstrating concretely the modern future that France has proposed” through their lessons and through their actions, the EMSI would lead Algerian women to “adopt... [and then] genuinely live the most French solution to the Algerian problem.”¹⁵⁵ In the propaganda they distributed and in their very presence, the EMSI sought to render the future they promised to Algerian women visible and seemingly real.

The mirage of *l'Algérie Nouvelle* dissipated, however, as the realities of life in the Algerian *bled* came into focus. The EMSI sought to anchor the promises of integration and emancipation in the lives of Algerian women, but the disconnect between the images conveyed by propaganda and the realities of wartime undermined any such effort. On a basic level, the EMSI's messages did not translate. Like most French army personnel in Algeria, few ASSRA spoke Arabic, and most had to rely on translators whose accuracy or faithfulness they sometimes doubted.¹⁵⁶ The silence imposed by this linguistic barrier reverberates in the archives, where Algerian women are largely absent, present only in attendance statistics or general assessments of the ‘psychological climate’ of a given community. But even with the aid of translators or Arabic-speaking Algerian team members, the EMSI often failed to effectively convey the basic facts of the army's emancipation project. Rumors circulated that emancipation would grant women the right to unilaterally divorce their husbands, or completely truncate the authority of fathers over their daughters.¹⁵⁷ A survey in 1961 revealed that a mere 13 to 25 per cent of women understood the jargon-laden language the Fifth Bureau

¹⁵⁵ Instruction 257, Action sur les Milieux Féminins en Algérie.”

¹⁵⁶ MacMaster, 262.

¹⁵⁷ “Compte-rendu de la tournée effectuée par Madame Maugé et le Capitaine Salanié en Z.O.A. & Z.O.O.,” 19 November 1959. SHD 1H/2569.

employed in propaganda, and that very few could identify important French leaders, let alone explain the intricacies of the Constantine Plan.¹⁵⁸ While Colonel Gardes, Madame Maugé, and others overseeing the EMSI repeatedly stressed that these rumors be refuted and the reforms explained at every opportunity, such efforts were evidently lost in translation.¹⁵⁹

Any problems posed by language were compounded by the cultural myopia of emancipation's assimilationist aims. Despite their efforts to root psychological action in an ethnographic analysis of Algeria, most Fifth Bureau officers and many ASSRA held only a superficial understanding of Algeria's cultural norms and regional diversity. The Itinerant Officer in the North Oran Zone objected to army's effort to encourage unveilings as early as June 1958, which he saw as a "profound error" that risked alienating Algerians. "The rejection of the veil," he argued, "must be a *consequence* of Muslim women's evolution" rather than a cause.¹⁶⁰ In many regions, such as Kabylie, women did not necessarily veil, or the garments women used to cover their head differed from the *haik* worn by the urban inhabitants of Algiers. One 1959 Algerian Affairs study noted that the veil signaled "social elevation," and in Berber regions only women from elite maraboutic families wore it. The veil proved more popular in urban areas, the study continued, because it allowed poorer women to dissimulate

¹⁵⁸ Laboratoire des Sciences Humaines Appliquées, "Etude sur l'information en milieu musulman féminin," 4 August 1961. SHD 1H/2463. The Laboratory of Applied Human Sciences was attached to the Comité d'Action Scientifique de Défense Nationale in Paris. With the assistance of the EMSI, they surveyed 818 women ranging in age from 15 to 85. The number of women was small and likely skewed – as even officers helping conduct the survey admitted – but its results are nonetheless striking in what they reveal about the sheer ineffectiveness of French army propaganda.

¹⁵⁹ See for example the cover letter attached to the copies of the 1959 marriage ordinance that the Fifth Bureau distributed to the EMSI: Colonel Gardes, note n° 1445/RM.10/5/ACT/EMSI, 11 March 1959. SHD 1H/2568.

¹⁶⁰ "Compte-rendu mensuel d'activité du Capitaine Barault Gabriel, Officier Itinérant d'Action Psychologique, Mois de Mai 1958." ANOM 13CAB/50.

their humble economic standing.¹⁶¹ In encouraging women to abandon the veil and adopt 'western' clothing as a sign of social advancement, the EMSI missed the fact that for many women, the veil itself marked an improvement in social standing. The army very quickly softened its campaign to overtly solicit unveilings – a series of posters produced in the aftermath of May 1958 encouraging women to "unveil yourself" were never published, for example (see fig. 4.6) – but the images of 'New Algeria' that populated army propaganda continued to assimilate 'unveiled' and 'modern.' As the wife of a SAS officer who worked closely with a regrouped village attested, the army's repeated pronouncements about "the emancipated woman of 13 May" and similar themes left many Algerians "totally indifferent."¹⁶² The vision of Algeria's future promoted by the EMSI did not necessarily speak to the aspirations of Algerian women.

While such inherent flaws may have weakened the appeal of their emancipatory message, the EMSI's actual operations sometimes did far more to undermine it. The logistical problems of transportation, lack of infrastructure, limited resources, and poor recruitment that had plagued the initial EMSI only grew with the organization's expansion. Well into 1960, army commanders continued to complain that teams lacked the vehicles necessary to be itinerant.¹⁶³ The EMSI organization also struggled with personnel problems. Faced with ongoing recruitment problems and a crippling lack of funds, military commanders relied heavily on indigenous auxiliaries to fill out the EMSI from 1960. These pejoratively-nicknamed

¹⁶¹ L.P. Fauque, "Stades d'évolution de la cellule familiale musulmane d'Algérie."

¹⁶² Monique Eoche-Duval, *Madame S.A.S. Femme d'officier, Algérie 1957-1962* (Paris: François-Xavier de Guibert, 2007), 184.

¹⁶³ See for example 3^e Bureau – EMI, "Fiche à l'attention du Colonel chef du 3^e Bureau: EMSI et Jeunesse," 18 October 1960. SHD 1H/2568.

“harkettes” received less training and fewer resources than those granted to full ASSRA.¹⁶⁴

The ASSRA themselves turned over at a high rate. By 1960, 235 of the 557 ASSRA recruited had left, either to get married, because they felt burned out by the demanding conditions of the post, or – tellingly – because they had been fired for disciplinary reasons.¹⁶⁵ Many EMSI did not pursue propaganda work, preferring instead to limit their interactions with Algerian women to medical assistance – a habit that solicited a stream of strongly-worded reminders from the Fifth Bureau that the EMSI’s first and foremost job was to “counter revolutionary warfare” and “retake control of the female population.”¹⁶⁶ Other ASSRA proved more insubordinate. The EMSI’s internal bulletin regularly listed ASSRA fired for “indiscipline;” and in a few isolated cases military authorities arrested Algerian ASSRA for spreading nationalist messages or funneling medical supplies to FLN forces.¹⁶⁷ The reality of the EMSI looked quite different from the image of the corps of self-sacrificing girls driven by ‘faith, courage, and perseverance’ that appeared in French propaganda.

Once EMSI finally did make it into the Algerian hinterlands, many teams confronted an almost total absence of the amenities necessary for the ‘modern’ in hygiene and domestic habits they sought to teach. The Constantine Plan’s promises to construct a ‘modern habitat’

¹⁶⁴ The term ‘Harkette’ derived from the fact that cash-strapped officers often paid these auxiliaries from the funds allocated for the *harka* units. Colonel Cavard, Commandant le Secteur de Telagh, “Situation et emploi des A.S.S.R.A. et Harkiettes,” 9 December 1960. SHD 1H/4494.

¹⁶⁵ “Fiche à l’attention de M. le Colonel Chef du 3^e Bureau: EMSI ayant cessé leurs fonctions,” 1960. SHD 1H/2568. The annex listed the most common reasons for individual ASSRA’s departures: “diverse reasons,” 84; “disciplinary reasons,” 44; marriage, 36; “not habituated to the particularly demanding work,” 35.

¹⁶⁶ “Réponses aux questions posées par le C.A.C. lors du voyage du Colonel Gardes,” March 1959. SHD 1H/2533.

¹⁶⁷ On the firings, see for example, *Toubiba* 7 (25 January 1960), which noted euphemistically that the EMSI had “separated” itself from three North African ASSRA “following their indiscipline.” On FLN collusion, see the two documents related to the firing of Mlle. Zohra Zerrari, dated 21 and 24 November 1961. SHD 1H/3833.

in Algeria, but most villages still lacked running water or a location to convene the Women's Circles, rendering the EMSI's advice impracticable. ASSRA Christiane Rubat de Mérac remarked with frustration that "it seems easy...to tell [women] that their *mechta* [stone farmhouse] is dirty, that they must clean it, that they must wash their children with hot water and soap, that they must mend their linens and open their dwelling to light and sunshine to kill microbes." But in rural Kabylie, she continued, "water is far, difficult to access, [and] rare," firewood hard to find, and the winter very cold. And to families who have nothing to eat, she asked, "how do you tell them that to be strong and hard-working they must maintain a balanced diet?"¹⁶⁸ The experience of forced resettlement and the close proximity of combat experienced by many communities likely amplified the irony of such instruction.

The material effects of these logistical problems varied greatly. Women in the Ain-Cheurfa regroupment camp still attended the sewing workshops at the Women's Circle, even though they did not have the money to purchase the materials they needed to actually practice their newfound domestic skills.¹⁶⁹ But in the Bonnier Special Administrative Section near Sidi-bel-Abbès, the lack of transportation the cursory medical training of the Female Attachés had dire consequences: eight young children died due to a lack of medical care between the first and fifteenth of November 1959 alone. "If we want our *oeuvre* of Pacification to bear fruit," the officer commanding the SAS protested, the army must find a "rapid solution" the "deplorable" conditions in Bonnier and elsewhere.¹⁷⁰ Such situations not only

¹⁶⁸ Christiane Rubat de Mérac, "Rapport d'action E.M.S.I., Année 61-62." CDHA fonds EMSI, dossier Métras.

¹⁶⁹ Sous-Lieutenant Kosina, Chef de SAS d'Ain-Cheurfa, "Compte-rendu sur les activités de l'attachée féminine de la SAS d'Ain Cheurfa, Juin 1959." ANOM 51/218

¹⁷⁰ Captain Joseph Marcel Fleck, Chef de SAS de Bonnier, "Rapport mensuel sur les attachées sociaux et les Moniteurs de la Jeunesse," 20 November 1959. ANOM 51/218.

impeded the army's own modernizing project, but bred resentment. In Cassaigne, within the boundaries of one of the original Pilot Operations, women still utilized the services of the EMSI in early 1961. But as the EMSI's commanding officer noted with chagrin, they also constantly criticized the slow pace at which France fulfilled its promises to build doctors' offices, schools, and roads.¹⁷¹ The EMSI may have succeeded in making women "avid for progress" in Cassaigne and in other regions. But they also failed to deliver the rapid improvements to Algerian women's living conditions that the army had promised.

Despite the army's efforts to demonstrate the existence of *l'Algérie Nouvelle*, its reality remained difficult to read, for Algerians and for many within the French army. In the immediate aftermath of the "revolution" of May 1958, the euphoria it generated may have been enough to cover over even the most glaring discrepancies between the French army's emancipatory discourse and the realities of war in the *bled*. But by late 1959, the friction between the two began to wear the utopian image of a 'New Algeria' thin. Algerians engaged with the EMSI and other Pacification programs on a massive scale, and many appeared genuinely interested in the medical aid that the EMSI offered or the social and material progress promised by the Constantine Plan. Many others, however, remained disinterested, guarded, or hostile. Even as the army dealt a decisive blow to ALN forces across Algeria, their confidence that they could easily transform and control the population wavered.

Faced with Algerians' continued ambivalence, the EMSI and their supervising officers scrutinized the bodies of Algerian women for any indication that they had taken up the causes

¹⁷¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Thenoz, EM-5e DB, "Synthèse trimestrielle d'activité des E.M.S.I.," 13 March 1961. SHD 1H/3988.

of emancipation and integration. Officers still aspired to see women unveil, at least in the privacy of the Women's Circles. But in the absence of such overt signs, they looked to women's adoption of new hygiene practices or to their simple participation in EMSI activities as signs that the transformation the army sought had begun. For some officers, even hostile rumors – purportedly launched by the FLN “in an attempt to discredit” the EMSI – became proofs of the “efficacy” of the teams' action, rather than Algerians' ambivalence or uneasiness toward it.¹⁷² Military commanders attempted to map women onto a grid of embodied behaviors where certain comportments signaled loyalty and others hostility.¹⁷³ But women were never as transparently readable nor as credulous as the army believed. Women in the FLN blurred, subverted, and manipulated gender roles in their struggle for national liberation.¹⁷⁴ Living in rural environments fraught with danger and deprived of resources, pulled between FLN forces and the French military, many rural Algerian women likely did the same. As many ASSRA admitted, their encounters with women in the *bled*, while often amicable, did not preclude those women from maintaining close relationships with the FLN. In tight-knit rural communities, the EMSI worked in intimate proximity to local militants, whose presence they saw viscerally reflected in the fluctuating attitudes – or even subtle warnings – of the women they engaged.¹⁷⁵ The EMSI may have reestablished the ‘contact’ sought by the

¹⁷² See for example Quartier autonome de Tiguiguest, “Compte-rendu Hebdomadaire de Renseignements Psychologiques, Semaine du 18.1. au 25.1.1960.” SHD 1H/4510.

¹⁷³ Laleh Khalili has argued that modern counterinsurgency maps men and women onto gendered grids in order to ‘read’ them as either civilian or combatant, an analytic model which proves helpful in the context of the Algerian War. See Laleh Khalili, “Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency,” *Review of International Studies* (2010): 1-21, accessed March 12, 2015, doi: 10.1017/S026021051000121X.

¹⁷⁴ Natalya Vince, “Transgressing Boundaries: Gender, Race, Religion, and ‘Françaises Musulmanes’ during the Algerian War of Independence,” *French Historical Studies* 33 No 3 (Summer 2010), 445-475.

¹⁷⁵ In a written account, Christiane Métras (née Rubat de Méric) recalls that villagers' attitudes in Kabylie changed dramatically when clandestine FLN forces were nearby. Métras herself has several encounters with militants,

Fifth Bureau, and some may have even built bonds of affection in their individual encounters with Algerian women. But they had not transformed Algerian society on the mass scale that the Fifth Bureau predicted.

On the evening of September 16th, 1959, French citizens on both sides of the Mediterranean listened attentively as Charles de Gaulle addressed the nation. The President began on a note that likely pleased General Challe and other military commanders: the army's Pacification campaign, he announced, had largely restored order in Algeria. But as de Gaulle continued speaking, any satisfaction that commanders such as Challe, Massu or Gardes may have felt quickly faded. The time would soon come, de Gaulle declared, for Algerians to choose their own fate. He outlined three options for Algeria's future: secession from France; "complete Frenchification," which echoed integration; or a "government of Algerians by Algerians" in close association with France. Algerians would be granted universal suffrage to vote on these choices, de Gaulle concluded, once the conditions could be determined.¹⁷⁶

The announcement shocked many within the French military command. De Gaulle did not intend to abandon Algeria, but rather to restore the nation's democratic legitimacy at home and abroad. But for many generals and superior officers fighting in North Africa, the very possibility that Algerians might vote for their own independence provoked intense and

either after they had been arrested, or, on one occasion, while completing her rounds, though they did not display particular hostility toward her. CDHA fonds EMSI, dossier Métras. Several of the former EMSI and SFJA personnel I interviewed also conveyed this sense of intimacy and recounted similar situations of coexistence with FLN forces within rural villages.

¹⁷⁶ Charles de Gaulle, "Discours sur l'autodétermination de l'Algérie, 16 septembre 1959," accessed June 28, 2015, <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/l-homme/accueil/discours/le-president-de-la-cinquieme-republique-1958-1969/discours-sur-l-autodetermination-de-l-algerie-16-septembre-1959.php>.

immediate unease. The army had built its strategy of Pacification on the premise of integration, and de Gaulle's announcement threatened to undermine them just as they had begun to succeed. "Now more than ever," General Massu asserted in a special directive following de Gaulle's announcement, "the principle effort of our pacification work must focus on the engagement of the population." The army's mission had not changed, Massu insisted; it must now "put everything in motion so that when the moment comes, the choice of this population works in favor of a French solution."¹⁷⁷ Faced with the uncertainty imposed by de Gaulle's new policy of Self-determination, the army turned with renewed resolve to the transformation of Algerian society. To drive this transformation, the army redoubled its efforts – not only toward Algerian women, but toward another group it saw as crucial: young people.

¹⁷⁷ General Massu, Commanding the Corps d'Armée d'Alger, "Directive d'action psychologique," 20 October 1959. ANOM 5SAS/90.

5 Train

Youth, Sports, and National Regeneration

It was mid-morning when the soccer match between Sintés and El-Affroun turned ugly. The two teams belonged to the French army's network of sports clubs, and met in the hillside town of Rovigo (now Bougara) for the army's spring 1961 Algeria-wide tournament. Despite the clubs' bitter rivalry, the first half ended without incident as Sintés slipped the ball past El Affroun's keeper, putting them up one to nothing. After locating a new game ball to replace the one which had been stolen by rowdy spectators during the break, referee Corporal Fontas began the second half. Sintés quickly scored another goal. Frustrated, and egged on by the jeers of the crowd, El Affroun's players made several hard hits, and a brawl broke out between the opposing teams' forwards. Still bitter at their own loss to El Affroun earlier in the tournament, the Rovigans watching the match rushed onto the field to defend the Sintés player, brandishing clubs and canes. After the 20-year-old El Affroun forward drew a knife

from his shin guard, military police intervened to restore order. In the chaos, the second ball also vanished, and Corporal Fontas called the game off 20 minutes early. As the rival teams loaded into their transports, a turbulent crowd gathered around El Affroun's truck, and began to pelt it with rocks and paving stones pulled up from the street. The military escort tried to push the crowd back to let the truck pass, but could not contain the angry mob. Calm only returned after the Second Lieutenant supervising Sintés' Sports Club drew his sidearm and fired it repeatedly into the air, dispersing the crowd.¹

The director of the Government General's Youth Training Service (*Service de Formation des Jeunes en Algérie*, or SFJA) was understandably upset when he received news of the incident. The army had created the sports clubs (*foyers sportifs*) not for entertainment, but as a tool to rebuild the state's relationship with young Algerians, and to prepare them to become "français à part entière."² Army leaders saw sports and athleticism as the key to the physical and moral regeneration of Algerian youths; a means to build nationalist solidarity with France, and more importantly, to teach the competencies and values that French officers deemed necessary for life in 'modern' society, such as self-discipline and self-motivation. But the violence sparked by the match in Rovigo offered compelling evidence that the army was failing in its efforts. "The Youth of Algeria is perhaps turbulent and little disciplined," the director of the SFJA chastised in a note disseminated to the heads of all sports clubs, "but the incidents of this past championship are not solely the expression of the indiscipline of the players." Blame

¹ Sous-Lieutenant Lemoine to the Colonel Echelon-Liaison, sous-préfecture de Maison-Blanche, 6 March 1961. ANOM 2SAS/143.

² Captain Fombonne, "Rapport concernant les Mouvements de Jeunesse 'Foyers Sportifs' et 'Foyers de Jeunesse'," 28 November 1957. SHD 1H/2567.

also lay in the “negligence,” “indifference” and “lack of authority” of the military personnel directing the sports clubs.³ The riot in Rovigo illustrated a central tension of the army’s youth project, and of Pacification more broadly. By early 1961 the sports clubs comprised a massive institutional landscape: 700 Clubs across Algeria enrolled nearly seventy thousand youths per year.⁴ But despite the centralized appearance of the program, the clubs were largely shaped by their own internal dynamics, by the motives of personnel on the ground, and by the young people who participated voluntarily in the clubs’ activities. In its efforts to capture Algerians’ loyalty, the French army command attempted to turn sports fields into training sites for a new generation of ‘modernized’ and integrated Algerians. Young Algerians, however, hardly felt constrained to play by the French army’s rules.

Just as the EMSI sought to frame Algeria’s female population in a new administrative apparatus, the sports clubs endeavored to engage another demographic the army deemed critical: Algerian adolescents and young adults. Concerned that a lack of jobs and educational opportunities led young men in Algeria to idleness, declining morals, or worse – engagement in the nationalist struggle – the French army command turned to sports as a tool to cultivate Algerian youths physically, socially, and culturally. The sports clubs trained young Algerians in the values of fair play and teamwork, and provided them a basic civics education. French leaders hoped that in the process, the sports clubs would transform young men physically and morally, and prepare them to become the productive workers and loyal citizens required for a regenerated, ‘modernized’ colonial society.

³ Colonel Bouldjoua, head of the SFJA, “Championnat de sports collectifs,” 2 August 1961. ANOM 2SAS/177.

⁴ Military Cabinet of the Commander in Chief of Forces in Algeria, “Fiche concernant le Service de Formation des Jeunes en Algérie,” 30 December 1960. SHD 1H/2566 d.1.

For French strategists, youths were a natural target for Pacification efforts. Not yet fully developed mentally or physically, young people appeared more easily assimilable than adults. Algeria's colonized population was also extremely young. In 1954, nearly half of Algerians were twenty years old or younger, a demographic imbalance which made youths both numerically and politically important as a significant bloc of future voters.⁵ But young people also provoked profound anxiety. As recent histories have highlighted, the conceptual category of *the youth* (*La Jeunesse*) as a homogenous social bloc itself emerged alongside efforts to reconstruct French society in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁶ By the early 1950s, government officials, educators, and social scientists shared a conviction that a widespread but ill-defined civilizational malaise gripped French society.⁷ The loss of faith in national ideologies after totalitarianism, the looming dangers of the Cold War, and the impersonal and bureaucratic nature of 'modern' life all threatened to isolate young people socially and psychologically from the nation. These concerns were only amplified for French civil and military leaders engaged in the Algerian War. Not only did Algerian youths face the same risks as their metropolitan counterparts, authorities argued, but the 'antimodern' pull of 'Muslim' culture, the socioeconomic underdevelopment of North Africa, and the subversive efforts of the FLN put them doubly at risk. To secure the future of France in Algeria, the French army needed to cement ties between the state and its future citizens. "Without the

⁵ "Journée d'information sur le problème de la jeunesse algérienne – exposée de Monsieur Breil, Directeur des Statistiques du Gouvernement General de l'Algérie," 6 May 1957. ANOM 3R/356.

⁶ Ludvine Bantigny, *Le plus bel âge? Jeunes et jeunesse en France de l'aube des « Trente Glorieuses » à la guerre d'Algerie* (Paris: Fayard, 2007); Richard Ivan Jobs, *Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); and Tara Zahra, *The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe's Families after World War II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

⁷ Bantigny, 35.

youth, nothing durable and solid can be seriously considered,” asserted one officer charged with treating the youth question; but “*with* the youth, everything can be hoped and dared.”⁸

To reclaim and rehabilitate young Algerians, the French army turned to sports and athleticism. The French state had placed a renewed emphasis on sports in the postwar period as one part of a larger effort to revitalize and rehabilitate the French nation through the organization, training, and rationalization of France’s youngest generations.⁹ French authorities in Algeria drew on these projects to transform Algerians. They believed that sports and athleticism could produce the disciplined, productive bodies required to create a ‘modern’ consumer economy in Algeria, and train the moral competencies deemed necessary for democratic citizenship, such as tenacity, teamwork, self-sacrifice, and self-governance.¹⁰ Sports also attracted French strategists because their public performance rendered these transformations visible for the wider Algerian public.¹¹ Through the sports clubs, French military commanders sought to train young Algerians to embody French cultural and gender norms on a massive scale, and to offer proof that the New Algeria they promised was more than a myth.

⁸ Captain Fombonne, “Rapport concernant les Mouvements de Jeunesse,” 28 November 1957; cited above.

⁹ For a discussion of the renewed interest in physical culture as a tool to regenerate French youths in the postwar period and continuities between these programs and Vichy practices, see Bantigny chapter 2 and Jobs chapter 3.

¹⁰ On physical culture’s perceived ability to produce ‘modern’ subjectivities through corporeal reform, see Susan Brownwell, *Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Wilson Chacko Jacob, *Working out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

¹¹ On sports’ abilities to convey cultural meaning through their visual performance and the utility of aesthetics, particularly for nationalist purposes, see George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975); C.L.R. James, *Beyond a Boundary* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); and Brownwell, *Training the Body*.

This chapter explores the development of the sports clubs and the evolving relationships they engendered between French military personnel and young Algerians through late 1961. Along with the Itinerant Medico-social Teams aimed at women, and the Self-Defense Groups targeting rural men, the sports clubs became a central aspect of the Pacification apparatus elaborated by the Fifth Bureau and institutionalized under General Challe. The sports clubs did not emerge solely as a product of the Fifth Bureau's theories, but as a collaborative effort between diverse elements of the French administration and the army in Algeria. This cooperation reflected a consensus that young Algerians represented a key stake in the struggle for French rule, and that sports and athleticism constituted the most effective means to secure their loyalty. The sports clubs generated ambiguous and often highly personal relationships between soldiers and young Algerians. But by the end of 1961, it was clear that they rarely yielded the feelings of national solidarity with France that authorities sought.

Youths in Danger

The French army never envisioned the sports clubs as mere social organizations dedicated to athletics. Like the EMSI, the French army command intended to use the clubs as a tool to place an important segment of Algeria's population under the surveillance of elites and progressively draw it into the struggle against the FLN.¹² The sports clubs began as a local initiative of officers in the Constantine region; one experiment among many that took place

¹² For an overview of how the French army envisioned this process would work, see the instruction "How to Educate a Population" contained in the secret "Instruction for Pacification in Algeria" n° 4250 approved by General Challe, 10 December 1959. ANOM 3SAS/129. Quote from page 76.

over the course of 1956 and 1957 as French military leaders attempted to 'reestablish contact' with rural Algerian communities. The clubs drew the interest of figures like Salan and Lacoste, however, because they touched on widespread anxieties that young Algerians were a key segment of the population to be won or lost in the struggle with the FLN. The FLN's leadership was not particularly young, but student activists and young militants comprised a highly visible segment of the Algerian national movement in the postwar period.¹³ As the armed insurrection grew in 1955 and 1956, many young men in the *bled* joined the maquis, and organizations such as the newly-founded *Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens* (UGEMA) began to call for general student strikes in support of the FLN.¹⁴ French authorities saw young Algerians as a population in danger, led astray by nationalists exploiting the 'natural' proclivity of youths for adventure.¹⁵ But Algerian youths were not beyond redemption. With proper training and oversight, they could be reclaimed for nation.

From early in the Algerian War, French officials saw sports as a potential tool to build positive relationships with Algerians. Active military units occasionally organized impromptu soccer games between soldiers and young men from the region where they were stationed, and the civil administration scheduled matches between high-profile metropolitan teams in

¹³ According to Gilbert Meynier, the average age of the FLN's 9 founding members was 39; 36 for the 29 *chefs de wilâya*; 40 for the 87 members of the FLN's high administration; and 41 for the 91 members of the GPRA and embassies. See Meynier, *Histoire intérieure du FLN, 1954-1962* (Paris: Fayard, 2002). On grassroots youth activism linked to various parties and the Association des oulémas, see James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Malika Rahal, "A local approach to the UDMA: local-level politics during the decade of political parties, 1946-56," *Journal of North African Studies* 18, No. 5 (December 2013), 703-724.

¹⁴ On the UGEMA and other student groups tied to the nationalist movement, see Guy Pervillé, *Les étudiants algériens de l'université française* (Paris: Editions CNRS, 1984).

¹⁵ General Vanuxem, Commandant le Zone Opérationnelle des Aurès-Nemencha, "Directive sur l'action politique des troupes," 28 September 1956. SHD 1H/2408.

Algeria as a form of pro-French propaganda.¹⁶ In the city of Constantine, the subaltern officers of the *Bataillon de Corée* took such efforts a step further, and created in late 1956 a “sports and leisure” group run by soldiers. Through sports, the organization aimed to keep young urbanites “of French, Muslim, and Israelite origin” off the streets and to encourage them to rebuild relations between their respective communities.¹⁷ In early 1957, an energetic and athletic cavalry Captain named René Henri Fombonne proposed extending a similar action to the rural hinterlands of the region around the city. Fombonne had fought in the Second World War, Morocco, and Indochina, and now became one of the primary creative forces behind the army’s youth services in Algeria.¹⁸ Fombonne hoped to use the ‘natural’ appeal of sports as a means to reestablish contacts between the army and a rural youth population thrown into disarray by the intensifying combat in the region. In close collaboration with the Civil Psychological Service established by Prefect of Constantine Maurice Papon, Fombonne launched the first 25 “Mixed sports clubs” in March 1957 as part of a propaganda offensive that spanned the easternmost reaches of Algeria and parts of Tunisia, code-named ‘Operation Siren.’¹⁹

¹⁶ Philip Dine and Didier Rey, “Le football en guerre d’Algérie,” *Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps* 106 (2012), 32.

¹⁷ Chef de Bataillon Lallemande, Division de Constantine, Etat-Major Bureau Psychologique, “Fiche au sujet du Groupe ‘Sports et Loisirs de Constantine,” 3 September 1956. SHD 1H/2565. This group was created at the orders of General Noiret, who had voiced his concerns about Algerians youths in a meeting with Lacoste, Max Lejeune, and Maurice Bourghès-Maunoury on 19 July 1956. See the meeting minutes in ANOM 12CAB/199.

¹⁸ In his career dossier, both Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Guth and Brigadier General André Gribius credit Fombonne as the creative force behind both the Sports Clubs and the Central Youth Service, the predecessor to the SFJA. SHD GR2000/Z/200/6103/61 (Dossier FOMBONNE, René Henri).

¹⁹ Papon’s Service Psychologique Civil consisted essentially of members of Papon’s cabinet, who worked closely with the SLNA and the local antenna of the Army’s Psychological Action Bureau. See the “Rapport du Service Psychologique Civil à l’Action Psychologique Militaire” contained in Maurice Papon’s personal archives, AN 99/AJ/19. On “Opération Sirène,” see the “Note à l’intention de Monsieur l’Inspecteur General, « Opération Sirène »,” dated 18 April 1957, in the same carton.

Fombonne's sports clubs endeavored to extend the army's influence over an otherwise inaccessible slice of the population: young men aged 14 to 20. Fombonne launched the clubs in small villages or hamlets where no state institution existed to engage young Algerians. The clubs aimed to engage adolescents through the "natural desire" to play, and offered gymnastics and simple sports that required minimal equipment and only rudimentary terrain, such as cross-country.²⁰ Once the troops overseeing the club established a regular clientele, they constituted teams for collective sports such as soccer or volleyball, and organized matches against neighboring clubs. Fombonne asserted that mixed-race teams would teach adolescents of "Christian," "Jewish," and "Muslim" background to live and work together peaceably. And in theory, the loyalty the fostered for the team translated to the nation. In playing soccer or handball, he argued, youths participated in the national struggle, and learned to feel solidarity with the national population at large.²¹ In form and concept, the sports clubs were not particularly novel. But they offered the army a means to organize, surveil, and hopefully to lead young Algerians.

For Fombonne, the sports clubs offered a solution to a critical problem. Since the eruption of violence in 1954, he argued, the administration had "practically abandoned" Algerian youths, particularly in the countryside. Unemployed, and cut off from contact with state institutions at a crucial developmental stage in their lives, young men became an easy target for the FLN's recruitment efforts. If France wanted to purge Algeria of 'terrorist elements', Fombonne insisted, it first needed to isolate the FLN from its source of new recruits.

²⁰ Fombonne, "Rapport concernant les Mouvements de Jeunesse," 28 November 1957.

²¹ Captain Fombonne, "Lancement et fonctionnement des Foyers Sportifs," 4 October 1957. SHD 1H/2567.

"When a housewife sees the tap to the kitchen sink running and the sink is overflowing, she doesn't try to sponge up the water in the basin," he argued, "she closes the tap." If the army wanted to empty the "basin of *fellaghas*," it must first shut off the "youth spigot that feeds it." The sports clubs provided a means to do so.²² Athletics appeared anodyne on the surface, but they served an important psychological function because they allowed the army to "occupy the numerous and dangerous moments of idleness" that might lead adolescents to delinquent behavior, or worse. More importantly, Fombonne asserted, the sports clubs created "frequent and friendly contacts" between 'Muslims', settlers, and metropolitan soldiers, and provided an opportunity to begin the "more profound human work" of preparing young Algerians to take part in the industrial development of Algeria envisioned by Integration.²³ The clubs provided the army a tool to assert control over young men in the *bled* and to train them in the 'physical, social, civic, and professional' values required by French citizenship.²⁴

Very quickly, Fombonne's clubs captured the interest of young Algerians. By June, they drew the regular participation of more than eight hundred youths, and on July 14th, five hundred of them marched in their club uniforms down the streets of Constantine alongside the army in a parade to celebrate France's national holiday.²⁵ In this initial success, Fombonne saw the possibility for action on a mass scale. In a report to Papon, he suggested that a system of

²² "Rapport du Capitaine Fombonne, Officier E.P.M., concernant le Mouvement Psychologique intitulé 'Foyers Sportifs' et son développement possible," 5 August 1957. SHD 1H/2567. French observers frequently employed the pejorative term *fellagha* (from the Arabic term for 'bandit') to refer to FLN militants.

²³ Fombonne, "Rapport concernant les Mouvements de Jeunesse."

²⁴ "Rapport du Capitaine Fombonne, concernant le Mouvement Psychologique..."

²⁵ Ibid.



Figure 5.1: Algerian children train for cross country. Location unknown, 1959. (Source: ECPAD ALG/59/397). © ECPAD

sports clubs could easily be created across the entirety of Algeria. The army had units deployed throughout the isolated villages and rural outposts of the Algerian countryside, and because the clubs required minimal personnel and supplies, it would be practical and cost-effective for these units to operate the clubs. After a year of operation, the Captain suggested, the clubs' impact could be deepened by converting the most successful among them into 'Youth Clubs' (*foyers de jeunes*). Equipped with a library and a workshop, these youth clubs would supplement physical education with hygiene and civics lessons, as well as homemaking classes for girls and practical instruction in masonry, farming, and woodworking for boys. By Fombonne's estimates, in two years the army could open 300 sports clubs and 60 youth clubs

across Algeria, allowing them to engage fifteen to twenty thousand rural youths.²⁶ Papon embraced the plan, and quickly doubled the 3.5 million Francs initially allotted for Fombonne's pilot program to 7 million.²⁷ Fombonne expanded his fledgling program to the heartland of the FLN's armed insurgency, the Aurès Operational Zone, and by mid-November, the dynamic Captain oversaw 55 sports clubs that engaged 2,800 children and adolescents across Algeria's easternmost department.²⁸

In Algiers, Lacoste was also preoccupied with youths. The Resident Minister viewed the lack of control over young Algerians as "the most burning problem" his administration faced.²⁹ Lacoste's generals and advisors worried that the "very marked hostility" many young Algerians displayed toward French authorities would lead them to embrace the FLN.³⁰ They saw the roots of this animosity in the longstanding social and economic 'underdevelopment' of the colony, the effects of which, they argued, disproportionately impacted adolescent males. Algeria's 'Muslim' population was exceptionally young, largely excluded from formal education, and plagued by chronic unemployment and underemployment. In 1954, only 323,000 Algerians aged 5 to 19 – one fifth of the total population in that age group – received any sort of schooling. In 1955 and 1956, the accelerating violence of the war reduced that

²⁶ "Rapport concernant les Mouvements de Jeunesse...", 28 November 1957.

²⁷ On the initial budget of the Sports Clubs, see the "Rapport du Service Psychologique Civil à l'Action Psychologique Militaire," and on its augmentation, the "Bilan de l'activité du Service Régional de l'Action Psychologique, Année 1957," both undated. AN 99/AJ/19.

²⁸ On the expansion to the Aurès, see Colonel Arfouilloux, Commandant Provisoirement la Zone Sud Constantinois et les Troupes d'Aurès, "Note de Service: Foyers Sportifs," 2 August 1957. ANOM 932/92. The figures for November appear in an undated document entitled "Fiche à l'attention du Colonel." SHD 1H/2567.

²⁹ See the verbal directives given to Salan by Lacoste, outlined in the secret "Projet de réunion au cours de laquelle sera étudiée la situation de la Jeunesse Musulmane," 21 April 1957. ANOM 12CAB/36.

³⁰ Transcript, "Réunion d'études tenue sous la présidence de Monsieur le Ministre résidant en Algérie le 13 Juin 1956." ANOM 12CAB/199.

number by 45,000.³¹ This lack of schooling only contributed to an exploitative colonial economy which left many Algerians with little or no work. The Government General's Director of Statistics Mr. Breil estimated that in Algiers alone, 15 to 20 thousand 'Muslims' aged 14 to 19 were unemployed; a significant percentage of the total 130 to 150 thousand urbanites out of work across Algeria. In rural areas, the Director warned, the situation was even worse: nearly a million agricultural workers lacked steady employment.³² Those who did work often did so for little pay. The average income in Algeria was less than a fourth of that in France; comparable, Breil noted, "only to that of the most impoverished countries in the world like India, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey."³³ Concerned first and foremost with making a living, the Directorate of Political Affairs asserted, the "exasperated" youth population of Algeria "is at the moment suffering a very understandable crisis."³⁴ Policymakers across North Africa saw the resolution of this crisis as a key goal and a major hurdle for Algeria's integration into France.

For Lacoste, this 'crisis' constituted a grave danger. Chronic unemployment only bred resentment, widening the "fissure" between Algerians and France.³⁵ As administrators openly admitted, exploitative state policies had created the economic and social inequalities that they

³¹ Direction générale des Affaires Politiques et de la Fonction Publique, "La Jeunesse musulmane algérienne d'aujourd'hui," 28 Aout 1956. ANOM 12CAB/182.

³² "Exposée de Monsieur Breil, Directeur des Statistiques du Gouvernement General de l'Algérie," cited above. Breil placed the total number of agricultural workers at 1, 030,000. Of those, 570,000 received salaries, only 110,000 of which were permanent jobs. According to Breil, these figures indicated that an absolute minimum of 600,000 workers were under-employed.

³³ Ibid. The median income "per head" in Algeria was 62,000 Francs, while in France it was 270,000.

³⁴ "La Jeunesse musulmane algérienne d'aujourd'hui."

³⁵ See the transcript of a meeting between Lacoste, Max Lejeune, and Maurice Bourges-Maunoury on 19 July 1956. ANOM 12CAB/199.

now sought to resolve.³⁶ At two workshops organized by the future Fifth Bureau in May and June 1957 to study the “Algerian youth problem,” experts, officials, and military commanders agreed that the state needed to put Algerians to work to resolve the long-term causes of unrest in the territory.³⁷ The task was urgent. As the organizer Captain Henri d’Humières noted tersely at the May meeting’s closure, “one more worker is one less *fellagha*.”³⁸ A practical solution, however, was less clear. To increase employment on such a massive scale, the administration needed to industrialize Algeria’s economy and grow its agricultural production. But to do so required large numbers of skilled workers, and educating rural Algerians was a long-term endeavor. Policymakers worried that as they struggled to develop Algeria’s workforce, the FLN would exploit young men’s “desperation” to turn them against France.³⁹ Attendees differed on the exact causes or the ideal solutions to Algeria’s ‘youth crisis,’ but they shared a conviction that without proper supervision and guidance, France risked losing the allegiance of an entire generation to the nationalist cause.

These fears about Algeria’s youth drew on anxieties circulating more broadly in French society that young people were particularly vulnerable to moral degeneration. In the aftermath of the Second World War, policymakers placed youths at the center of efforts to

³⁶ See the “Exposé de Monsieur Bolotte, Directeur du Cabinet du Préfet [d’Alger],” delivered at the “Journée d’information sur le problème de la Jeunesse Algérienne, Ben-Aknoun 4 et 5 Mai 1957.” ANOM 91/5Q/146. Bertrand Dupont de Dinechin, who helped train Youth monitors at CEMJA in Issoire (see below) relays very similar sentiments in his memoir, *Algérie guerre et paix: Défense et illustration d’une victoire oubliée sur la révolution* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1992), 44-48.

³⁷ A list of participants and schedules for the two meetings, held on May 4-5 in Ben Aknoun and in Sidi-Ferruch on June 1-2, as well as summaries of the breakout groups’ conclusions, can be found in the archives of the Prefect of Algiers. ANOM 91/5Q/146.

³⁸ Captain Henri d’Humières, “Conclusion - Journée d’information sur le problème de la Jeunesse Algérienne, 4 et 5 Mai 1957.” ANOM 91/5Q/146.

³⁹ “Journée d’information sur le problème de la Jeunesse Algérienne – La formation professionnelle des jeunes algériens et les débouchés.” ANOM 91/5Q/146.

reconstruct the nation physically and morally, and young people became an object of intense interest for a rapidly growing body of scientific, pedagogic, and psychological research.⁴⁰ Many observers saw postwar society as disorienting and isolating, particularly for young people. The explosion of mass media, the unclear structure of power in society, and the general collapse of ideologies that had long bound citizens to the nation all threatened to strip youths on both sides of the Mediterranean of any sense of national solidarity.⁴¹ Studies on the 'youth problem' rarely attributed young people agency; they were, by virtue of their immaturity, a group acted upon by outside forces – whether positively or negatively. The solution therefore to a youth at risk, most policymakers argued, was to ensure that the proper forces acted upon them. To that end, the French state sought to organize France's youngest generations and place them into cadres, where they could be trained and managed, and new elites could be cultivated to lead society in the future.⁴² More than other segments of the French population, young people constituted a target for the Fourth Republic's efforts to rationalize postwar society.

The army participated fully in this effort to '*encadrer*' young French men. By the mid-1950s, the civic formation of youths had become a major concern. Mired in an intensifying

⁴⁰ Jobs, *Riding the New Wave*, 24; Bantigny, *Le plus bel âge*, 16-18; and Zahra, chapter 5.

⁴¹ See for example President de Conseil Edgar Faure's May 1955 speech, reprinted by the Haut Comité de la Jeunesse de France et d'Outre-mer in "Problèmes relatifs à la Jeunesse, Documents," ANOM 81F/1736; J.P. Reynaud, "Patriotisme '57," SHD 1H/2565; and Bureau politique du Mgs le Compte de Paris, "La jeunesse et l'avenir: Qu'est-ce que la Jeunesse, ou va-t-elle, que souhaite-elle, comment la reconcilier avec l'Etat et la faire servir sans asservir," 23 March 1960; ANOM 14CAB/40.

⁴² On this effort to rationalize education and training in 1950s, see Jobs, 83; Bantigny, 16-18 and 214-216; and Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 167-175. On the idea of 'cadres' as a rational way of organizing social groups and its emergence in the 1920s and 1930s, see Bernard Comte, *Une Utopie combattante: l'Ecole des cadres d'Uriage, 1940-1942* (Paris: Fayard, 1991).

Cold War and two large-scale conflicts abroad, first in Indochina and now in Algeria, military leaders worried that French youths were neither physically nor psychologically prepared to defend the nation in the event of a total war.⁴³ The rising disorder in Algeria and young army reservists' widespread protests against their own mobilization in 1955 and 1956 only reinforced these anxieties.⁴⁴ The Ministry of Defense had operated a system of pre-military training centers in collaboration with the Department of Education since 1945, and in 1953 it created an Army-Youth Commission (*Commission Armée-Jeunesse* – CAJ) to serve as an advisory body and to work toward improved relations between the army and youth-oriented organizations in the metropole.⁴⁵ Faced with what it saw as a mounting crisis of confidence in the armed forces amongst young people, the Army redoubled the Army-Youth Commission's outreach efforts by creating regional and local committees across the metropole.⁴⁶ Even before they turned to the question of Algerian youths, French military commanders devoted considerable resources and attention to cultivating the civic consciousness and patriotism of young adults.

It came as no surprise then that Lacoste and other civil authorities in Algeria looked to the army to take young 'Muslims' in hand. As Fombonne and Papon independently developed the sports clubs in the hinterlands of Constantine, Lacoste and Salan worked closely in Algiers to explore large-scale solutions to Algeria's 'youth problem.' A growing number of military units offered improvised schooling for Algerian children, and in April the army collaborated

⁴³ Commission Armées-Jeunesse, "Ce que l'Armée attend de la jeunesse," *Armées-Jeunesse, publication trimestrielle* No. 3 (October 1957), 26. ANOM 3R/356.

⁴⁴ On these protests and administrative reactions, see Jean-Charles Jauffret, *Soldats en Algérie, 1954-1962: Expériences contrastées des hommes du contingent* (Paris: Autrement, 2000), 29-46; and Bantigny, 288-297.

⁴⁵ Jobs, 124-129; Bantigny, 294-300. For an overview of the Army-Youth Commission and its responsibilities, see the pamphlet entitled "Qu'est-ce que la Commission Armée-jeunesse?" 25 September 1956. ANOM 3R/473.

⁴⁶ Bantigny, 302.

with the Government General's Directorate of Social Action to design a system of Algerian Youth Training Centers (*Centres de Formation de la Jeunesse Algérienne* – CFJA) to teach young Algerians vocational skills and aid them in finding work.⁴⁷ But in 1957, these efforts remained limited.⁴⁸ Given the Administration's inability to "educate, incorporate, and in a general fashion technically instruct youths," Lacoste asserted to Salan, "it is urgent to at least educate them civically and to make them take a 'pro-France' position." In a "totalitarian country," he quipped, "this task would be the domain of the party;" in Algeria, he conferred it to the army.⁴⁹ The officers of the Fifth Bureau readily assumed the project, which fit well with the model of Pacification it was concurrently developing in Orléansville. Goussault and his subordinates already trained army conscripts to become agents of Pacification and monitored their morale.⁵⁰ They now aimed to extend a similar formative action on Algeria's youth writ large. As it did with programs targeting Algerian women, the Fifth Bureau rapidly became the institutional site where the diverse initiatives aimed at youths met and merged into a coherent set of procedures and policies.

To carry out the 'civic formation' of Algerian youths, Salan and Lacoste created a new corps of youth monitors. Carefully selected by the Itinerant Officers and trained in sports,

⁴⁷ On military instructors, see Jauffret, 186-188, and Henri d'Humières, *L'Armée Française et la jeunesse musulmane: Algérie 1956-1961* (Paris: Editions Godefroy de Bouillon, 2002), 37-39. On the CFJA, see chapter 2 of d'Humières, which includes excerpted directives issued by the army.

⁴⁸ D'Humières lists the number of army-run schools at 50 in January 1957, with a total enrollment of 2,000 students. By January 1958, there were 530 schools with 35,753 students, and by January 1959, 752 schools with 58,641 enrolled. D'Humières, *L'Armée française et la jeunesse musulmane*, 39.

⁴⁹ "Projet de réunion au cours de laquelle sera étudiée la situation de la Jeunesse Musulmane," 21 April 1957. ANOM 12CAB/36.

⁵⁰ The supervision of troop morale, often referred to as 'action psychologique sur la troupe,' was a central duty of the Psychological Action Bureau from its creation under Soustelle in 1955. Lacoste broadened this responsibility as part of his policy of Pacification. See "Directives pour l'action Psychologique sur le territoire de la 10^e R.M.," 27 July 1955, SHD 1H/2403; and "Fiche-exposé sur l'action psychologique en X^e R.M.," dated 1956, SHD 1H/2408.

civism, and the basic principles of leadership, these monitors would provide basic instruction and orient Algerian adolescents toward France.⁵¹ Goussault and his collaborators on Lacoste's cabinet saw the monitors as a tool to mobilize and transform youths while cultivating "a love of France... to the maximum." In theory, the monitors formed youths into trained, disciplined cadres, and constituted the "armature" of a new youth service to be conferred to the full control of the civil government at a later date.⁵² To train the monitors, Lacoste established a school in Issoire (Puy-de-Dôme) under the command of the Fifth Bureau, who outfitted it with an instructional staff themselves rapidly trained in Algiers by Colonel Lacheroy and General Salan before their departure to the metropole.⁵³ The first class of 286 trainees recruited from across Algeria joined their instructors in late June.⁵⁴

As the first monitors completed their training, however, it became more and more apparent that the military command possessed no clear vision of how they would be used. The army planned to employ some monitors as instructors in the CFJA, but for vast majority, deployed to Special Administrative Sections across Algeria in teams of three, the État-major provided only vague directives.⁵⁵ In principle, both the Chef de SAS and Itinerant Officers supervised the Youth monitors and directed their day-to-day actions.⁵⁶ In practice, however,

⁵¹ "Projet de réunion au cours de de laquelle sera étudiée..."

⁵² Cabinet du Ministre Résident en Algérie, "Instruction provisoire concernant l'encadrement de la Jeunesse Français-Musulmane d'Algérie," October 1957. ANOM 12CAB/168.

⁵³ Cabinet militaire du ministre Résident en Algérie, Message exprès 3431/CM, 13 June 1957. ANOM 3R/356. On the training of Issoire's instructional staff under Lacheroy, see the memoirs of Bertrand Dupont de Dinechin, who himself served as an instructor. *Algérie guerre et paix*, 189.

⁵⁴ General Salan, note 152/RM.10/CEM, "L'arme Psychologique en 10^e Région Militaire," undated. SHD 1H/1113.

⁵⁵ Salan admitted as much in a letter to Lacoste, and promised to issue further directives. See letter 1067/RM.10/PSY-AP dated 6 November 1957. SHD 1H/2566.

⁵⁶ Cabinet du Ministre de l'Algérie, "Instruction sur les règles d'emploi des Moniteurs de la Jeunesse issus du Centre d'Issoire," 21 December 1957. SHD 1H/2566.

these already-overloaded officers often had no clear idea how to employ the new Youth monitors, or no desire to assume the additional duty. As a consequence, the monitors often found themselves isolated in rural outposts with few resources and even less guidance.⁵⁷ The Sports Clubs provided an ideal solution to this impasse. Much like Servier's project for Operation Pilot, Fombonne's sports club offered the Fifth Bureau (and officers in the field) a practical model that fit well with its ideology and the new corps of monitors at its disposal. In December 1957, General Salan convoked the first meeting of a new regional committee of the Army-Youth Commission for Algeria, which he constituted with the express intention to bring together the various civil and military authorities treating the 'youth question.'⁵⁸ At the meeting, Fombonne presented the initial experience of the clubs and their possible development to near-unanimous approbation.⁵⁹ With Salan's approval, the Army-Youth Committee appropriated Fombonne and placed him in charge of directly extending the sports clubs to the Departments of Algiers and Oran under the supervision of Captain Henri d'Humières, whom it 'borrowed' from the Fifth Bureau to serve as the committee's permanent deputy.⁶⁰ In the Fifth Bureau, Goussault encouraged the Itinerant Officers to adopt the model

⁵⁷ In early Itinerant Officer reports on the Monitors, these problems appeared rampant. See for example "Rapport: Compte-rendu de la mission dans la Zone Nord Constantinois faite du 13 au 28 novembre [1957] par les Sous-lieutenants Jacquot et Capdenat." SHD 1H/2533. For their part, multiple SAS officers complained that they had "no time to control and surveil" the monitors. See, for example, SAS de Tolga, "Moniteurs de la jeunesse," 1 April 1958. ANOM 932/92.

⁵⁸ General Huet to General Salan, "Organisation du Comité Armées-Jeunesse de la 10^e Région Militaire," 19 December 1957. ANOM 3R/473.

⁵⁹ See the transcript of the meeting, "Comité Armée-Jeunesse, 1^{ère} réunion à Alger, 2 décembre 1957." SHD 1H/2559.

⁶⁰ "Organisation du Comité Armées-Jeunesse de la 10^e Région Militaire."

for the youth monitors under their supervision, and the two programs progressively merged together.⁶¹

Faced with what they widely perceived as a crisis, civil and military authorities initiated a number of experimental efforts to assert greater state control over young Algerians. By the start of 1958, the army had centralized many of these programs under the Army-Youth Committee, collaborating closely with the Fifth Bureau.⁶² The 'organization' of Algeria's youth now became a central component of the Pacification doctrine that the Fifth Bureau had elaborated through Operation Pilot. The sports clubs became a tool to modernize Algerians and their bodies on a mass scale, and to produce the future citizens of *l'Algérie Nouvelle*.

Fellahin into Frenchmen

It was not just the sports clubs' capacity to organize Algeria's youth that drew the interest of policymakers. It was also their power to transform. To counter the subversive danger posed by the FLN, military leaders sought to remake young Algerians into devoted French citizens. The games and athletic training offered by the sports clubs provided a means to do so. Civil and military officials in Algeria shared a common conviction that sports developed favorable moral and psychological characteristics as much as they developed bodies. By training young Algerians physically, French leaders believed they could also teach

⁶¹ Goussault, "Note à l'attention de M. Les Officiers Itinérants au sujet de la réunion du 8 janvier 1958." SHD 1H/2533.

⁶² As the President of the CAJ General Lacomme noted, while the high committee remained quasi-independent, it was essentially the Fifth Bureau that carried out its action from the level of the Army Corps down to that of the Sector. But even the Committee bore the considerable presence of officers affiliated with the Fifth Bureau, including Captain Caniot and Lt. Colonels Feaugas and Savani. See General de Brigade Lacomme, "Note: Comité Armées-Jeunesse et Service Central de la Jeunesse," 15 August 1958, SHD 1H/2558; and the "Liste des participants à la réunion du Comité Armées-Jeunesse du 2 décembre 1957," ANOM 3R/473, respectively.

them the values and habits necessary to make them the productive workers and ordered citizens.⁶³ Such ideas were not new. Since the interwar period, a broad array of state agencies, military establishments, and political movements in France had viewed sports and athleticism as key tools to harden the bodies and minds of young people against degenerative influences.⁶⁴ Such practices held renewed interest for military leaders who sought to rapidly and visibly reconstruct Algerian society, and the sports clubs quickly became a key means to engage and mobilize adolescent Algerians. By November 1958, the army had created 276 sports clubs, and by December 1959 that number grew to 600, which alongside 73 youth clubs reached an estimated 68,000 young Algerians.⁶⁵ For the French army, the sports clubs became a tool to fashion adolescent Algerians into French men and women on a mass scale. For young Algerians, however, the meaning of the sports clubs was much more fluid.

On a basic level, the activities of the sports clubs intended to produce healthy, efficient Algerian bodies. Military leaders saw young Algerians as idle, under-developed, and malnourished, characteristics which they linked to the difficult living conditions and endemic

⁶³ Michel Foucault highlights how corporeal discipline constituted a key strategy or tool for modern states to produce useable subjects. See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), especially pages 135 to 169. As multiple scholars have demonstrated, sports and physical culture constituted a key domain through which nationalist projects exercised such power. See Brownwell, *Training the Body for China*, 23-28, and Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, chapter 3.

⁶⁴ Joan Tumblety traces the development of physical culture as a tool of "normative masculinity" and its widespread use across the political spectrum from the 1920s to the 1940s in *Remaking the Male Body: Masculinity and the Uses of Physical Culture in Interwar and Vichy France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). See also Philip Dine's discussion of sport as a tool to construct and contest national identity in *Sport and Identity in France: Practices, Locations, Representations* (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), especially chapter 8.

⁶⁵ In November 1958, the Sports Clubs enrolled 20,352 youths. See "Renseignements concernant la pacification," 26 November 1958, SHD 1H/2540; and "Formation des Jeunes en Algérie," undated, SHD 1H/2558.

poverty that plagued Algeria's rural hinterlands.⁶⁶ Sports, Fombonne argued, conditioned the 'strength, resistance, and dexterity' as well as the physical and emotional endurance that young men needed to become productive workers or capable soldiers. Sprinting, jumping, and tumbling improved blood flow, strengthened muscles, and developed gross motor skills.⁶⁷ Combined with elementary hygiene instruction and the medical surveillance that the clubs permitted, gymnastics and athletic training reinvigorated young Algerians, homogenized their bodies, and laid the groundwork for their "social evolution."⁶⁸ This understanding of sports' reformatory power drew self-consciously on *hébertiste* methods of open-air physical training popular in France since the 1920s.⁶⁹ Closely associated with social hygiene, these methods of physical improvement resonated with the colonial policy of *mise-en-valeur* (literally 'putting into value') that had aimed to develop the labor capacity of colonial subjects in Algeria and elsewhere through athletic training since the 1930s.⁷⁰ The army now sought to employ these techniques on a wide scale to reduce Algerians' perceived physical and social inferiorities and to help them to 'catch up' to their European counterparts.

⁶⁶ "Rapport du Capitaine Fombonne, concernant le Mouvement Psychologique..." and Service de formation des jeunes en Algérie, "Règlement – 1ere Partie: Foyers Sportifs," 15 February 1961; ANOM DOC/SAS/4. For general concerns about the poverty affecting rural Algerians, see chapter 1.

⁶⁷ "Initiation aux Sports: Foyers Sportifs, Foyers Jeunes," undated, page 1. ANOM DOC/SAS/4.

⁶⁸ See the "Règlement – 1ere Partie: Foyers Sportifs," as well as the additional training manuals Fombonne wrote for the foyers sportifs: "Foyers Sportifs: Entrainement physique general, dossier de fonctionnement fascicule 1," 10 March 1958; and "Initiation aux Sports: Foyers Sportifs, Foyers Jeunes." ANOM DOC/SAS/4.

⁶⁹ On Georges Hébert and the development of *hébertiste* athletics in the interwar period, see Tumblety, pages 19-28.

⁷⁰ On the ties between sports and *mise-en-valeur* in Algeria, see Jacques Cantier, "Un enjeu essentiel: Vichy et les jeunes dans l'empire français" in *l'Empire colonial sous Vichy*, ed. Jacques Cantier and Éric Jennings (Paris: Odile Jacob), pages 97-99.



Figure 5.2: A youth monitor leads young Algerians from the regroupment camp in Boulet, Oran, in exercises. (Source: ECPAD ALG/58/81). © ECPAD



Figure 5.3: Youth monitors lead young boys and girls in calisthenics at the sports club in Waldeck-Rousseau (current-day Sidi Hosni), August 1958. (Source: ECPAD ALG/58/661). © ECPAD

More important for Fombonne and his collaborators, however, was sports' ability to develop moral character and teach self-discipline. Fombonne asserted that sports and games taught tenacity, team spirit, loyalty, and a respect for the rules. As they learned the attitudes necessary to succeed as individual players and as teams, he argued, young people also learned to integrate these values into their lives off the field.⁷¹ Sports forged adolescents into individuals by teaching them their own strengths and limits.⁷² By imposing rules, games also taught them the discipline and self-mastery necessary to become rational members of civil society.⁷³ Fombonne did not see these processes as unique to the Algerian context; he framed most instructional materials with discussions of youth psychology, and drew the bulk of his pedagogic material from youth organizations such as the republican *Union française des œuvres laïques d'éducation physique*.⁷⁴ He did assert, however, that the social and cultural features of Algerian society rendered youth training particularly urgent. For Fombonne and other self-proclaimed youth experts such as the linguist Philippe Marçais, the informal religious education that most 'Muslim' children received at home left them submissive, apathetic, fatalist, and insincere; a perspective that drew on well-rooted orientalist stereotypes even as it

⁷¹ "Règlement – 1ere Partie: Foyers Sportifs," 33; and Fombonne, "Foyers Sportifs: Jeux récréatifs et éducatifs, dossier de fonctionnement fascicule IV," 10 March 1958. ANOM DOC/SAS/4.

⁷² "Initiation aux Sports: Foyers Sportifs, Foyers Jeunes," page 1.

⁷³ "Foyers Sportifs: Jeux récréatifs et éducatifs, dossier de fonctionnement fascicule IV," 1.

⁷⁴ Given the rapid timeframe for expanding the foyers, Fombonne did not write most of the pedagogic material provided to the monitors but rather excerpted it from manuals and pamphlets published by the Algiers section of the Union française des œuvres laïques d'éducation Physique (UFOLEP) and the Fédération des œuvres laïcs de Constantine. See Fombonne's citations on the inside covers of the manuals cited above. For an overview of physical education pedagogy in Algeria and its ties to UFOLEP, see Johann Rage and Jean Michel Delaplace, "Les Lendits du Sud-ouest ... en Algérie: Les Contenus de l'Éducation Physique Algérienne entre Formation Physique et "Republicanisation" Des Masses," *French Colonial History* Vol. 5 (2004): 139-152; and Philip Dine, "Shaping the Colonial Body: Sport and Society in Algeria, 1870-1962," in *Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia*, ed. Patricia Lorcin (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

sought to attribute these features to mutable socio-economic factors.⁷⁵ Fombonne argued that the repetitive training of the body and group play could erase such characteristics and replace them with “western morals” such as ambition, perseverance, and cooperation. In the process, Fombonne hoped, the sports clubs would draw Algerians’ comportments closer to that of their European counterparts and lead Algerians to identify with France.⁷⁶ Through the work they effected on bodies, sports provided a means to transform Algerians’ moral dispositions, loyalties, and even tastes. If they could not inspire loyalty and discipline in young Algerians, military leaders reasoned, they could at least condition it.

While the intent behind such training was certainly coercive, Fombonne attempted to minimize any overtly disciplinary action within the sports clubs. The very utility of sports, he insisted, lay in its ability to effect a subtle psychological transformation while maintaining the appearance of neutrality.⁷⁷ In principle, attendance to the sports clubs was voluntary, driven only by young Algerians’ desire to play and the “snowball” effect of watching others compete. In the clubs’ daily operations, Fombonne cautioned Youth monitors to use “extreme prudence” when exercising discipline. An “overly rigid system” risked driving away young people “habituated to an almost total liberty,” and “the appearance of submission” was not the same

⁷⁵ Philippe Marçais, “l’Adolescent musulman.” SHD 1H/2565. Philippe Marçais was an expert in colloquial Arabic and a professor at the Faculté des Lettres d’Alger. He delivered several lectures at the Fifth Bureau’s psychological warfare training sessions in 1957, and later served on the Regional Army-Youth Committee formed under the supervision of Henri d’Humières. Other contemporary observers echoed Marçais and Fombonne in their characterization of ‘Muslim’ youths. See for example Jean Seux, psychologist, and Robert Foucqueteau, magistrate, “Note Relative à la délinquance et à l’inadaptation des Mineurs en Algérie,” May 1960, SHD 1H/2565; and General de Brigade Dunoyer de Segonzac, “Esprit de notre action,” 20 December 1960, ANOM 81F/167.

⁷⁶ “Règlement – 1ere Partie: Foyers Sportifs,” pages 41-43.

⁷⁷ “Rapport du Capitaine Fombonne, concernant le Mouvement Psychologique...”

as the “profound adherence” the clubs sought to cultivate.⁷⁸ Military leaders instead emphasized that the clubs should build loyalty through personal ties and cultivate “an élan and a taste for France.”⁷⁹ Youth monitors strove to build personal relationships with young Algerians and the extended community, not only to demonstrate their own interest in Algerians’ welfare, but the state’s concern as well.⁸⁰ They led regular discussions on topics such as “the duty of youths to choose a trade,” the roles of mothers and fathers in the family, and on practical matters such as how to tell time with a clock or sign a work contract. These lessons sought to habituate young Algerians to the social norms of an industrialized society and build a conscious solidarity with the metropole.⁸¹ The emphasis Fombonne placed on cultivating affective bonds differed from that of earlier state-driven youth movements, which often privileged strict enforcement of the rules and punitive measures to enforce discipline.⁸² The sports clubs endeavored to act on young Algerians’ comportments and preferences to subconsciously lead them to identify with France.

⁷⁸ “Règlement – 1ere Partie: Foyers Sportifs,” 14, 21-22. Likewise, an officer in the Fifth Bureau, warned officers in training that they must never give adolescents the impression that they were being surveilled, since it would produce a “disastrous...psychological effect” in young people of that age. See “Conférence du Sous-Lieutenant Bastien, Stage d’information des directeurs de Foyers de Jeunes, El-Riath, 8 au 14 décembre 1959.” ANOM 4SAS/110.

⁷⁹ General Dunoyer de Segonzac, Chef du Service de Formation des Jeunes en Algérie, note dated 5 January 1960. ANOM 14CAB/40. While de Segonzac saw this ‘taste’ primarily in affective terms, it did carry economic overtones. Members of the CAJ later argued that cultivating young Algerians’ consumer tastes was a necessary step in creating a consumer economy. See Comité Armée-Jeunesse d’Algérie, “Groupe de Travail No. 1, compte-rendu de la réunion du 27 janvier 1961.” SHD 1H/2559.

⁸⁰ Règlement – 1ere Partie: Foyers Sportifs,” 20.

⁸¹ Service de Formation des Jeunes en Algérie, “Education de base, Titre premier: Formation Morale et civique,” Archives of the Association S.F.J.A., Béziers; and S.F.J.A., “Éléments d’initiation et d’Adaptation à la vie occidentale: connaissances pratiques et principes d’hygiène.” ANOM 4SAS/61.

⁸² This was the case with the Vichy Regime’s *Chantiers de Jeunesse*, which emphasized total obedience and frequently employed repressive disciplinary practices. See Christophe Pecout, *Les Chantiers de la Jeunesse et la revitalisation physique et morale de la jeunesse française 1940-1944* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007), 131.

Fombonne's psychologized understanding of sports resonated with the Fifth Bureau's larger project to 'organize and educate' Algerians. The Fifth Bureau sought to place youths – like women, army veterans, and other social groups that they imagined were relatively homogenous – under the leadership of trained elites who could extend the army's influence. The youth monitors served as this core elite.⁸³ Selected in Algeria, candidates received five months of instruction at the Algerian Youth Monitor Training Center (*Centre d'entraînement des moniteurs de la jeunesse d'Algérie* – CEMJA) in Issoire before returning to North Africa to lead a sports club in teams of two or three.⁸⁴ The Fifth Bureau directly administered the school, which it conferred to the successive command of two officers of the Foreign Legion, Captain Lemaire and his successor Captain Frehis, both veterans of Indochina.⁸⁵ CEMJA's curriculum emphasized a technical mastery of sports, civics and propaganda lessons, spoken French, and a study of the state's development aims in Algeria; in essence, a more rigorous version of the materials the Fifth Bureau expected the monitors themselves to teach young Algerians.⁸⁶ The training aimed above all to inculcate a passion for *l'Algérie nouvelle* – in the words of Lacoste, to "heat them white hot" – before returning them to Algeria.⁸⁷ Trained as

⁸³ Secret Instruction n° 4250, "Instruction pour la pacification en Algérie, approuvée par le General d'Armée Aérienne M. Challe, Commandant en Chef les Forces Armées en Algérie le 10 décembre 1959," pages 75-76. ANOM 3SAS/129.

⁸⁴ The monitors were selected from among young men eligible for the draft. Service de Formation des Jeunes en Algérie, "Instruction sur la condition et l'emploi des moniteurs de la jeunesse," 3 August 1959. SHD 1H/1396.

⁸⁵ Colonel Lapeyronie, who served as an instructor at CEMJA, noted that "the faith that animated [Lemaire and Frehis] is that of officers who knew subversive war in Indochina and then Algeria." Jean Forestier, another instructor asserted that Lemaire was a former intelligence officer attached to General Massu's cabinet. Quoted in d'Humières, *L'Armée Française et la jeunesse musulmane*, pages 96 and 85, respectively.

⁸⁶ "Rapport du Cdt du CEMJA," undated, SHD 1H/2566; and Capitaine Frehis, Commandant le CEMJA, "Le centre d'entraînement des moniteurs de la jeunesse d'Algérie," 1 November 1959, SHD 1H/1396.

⁸⁷ "Projet de réunion au cours de de laquelle sera étudiée..."



Figure 5.4: President Charles de Gaulle inspects youth monitors in training at CEMJA in Issoire, June 1959. (Source: ECPAD F/59/227). © ECPAD

physical education specialists and instilled with patriotic zeal, these monitors would form a new 'cadre' of managers to direct the Algerian population in its evolution along French lines.

Within the club, the monitors worked to build team spirit and foster group solidarity, a process which military commanders believed would form 'disorganized' young men into a cohesive group. Monitors ensured the group's insertion into the hierarchy of command through the surveillance and lessons they provided, and by selecting youth leaders from among the club's participants.⁸⁸ In theory, the monitors funneled the young men singled out as potential leaders to Issoire, or to one of the youth clubs or Algerian Youth Training Centers

⁸⁸ Challe, "Instruction for Pacification in Algeria," 75-76.

to receive a more in-depth vocational training in masonry or agriculture that they could then bring back to their *douar*.⁸⁹ This system of 'encadrement' radiated the state's influence beyond the club by extending the chain of trained elites, and through young Algerians themselves, who, the Fifth Bureau argued, acted as a subtle transformative force as they carried the values and loyalties cultivated in the club into their families.⁹⁰ Through the subtle conditioning of sports and the selection elites, monitors progressively bound local communities to the state.

This effort to frame Algeria's youth population drew heavily on programs established under the Vichy regime. Preoccupied with similar concerns about social degeneration and national renewal, Vichy policymakers sought through organizations like the *Chantiers de la Jeunesse* to regenerate youths in the metropole and colonies through physical development, vocational training, and the inculcation of nationalist sentiments.⁹¹ In its effort to forge new leaders for Algeria, CEMJA closely paralleled the 'cadre' schools that Vichy authorities had established in the metropole and Indochina to train a new generation of elites to lead the population.⁹² These ties were not coincidental. In writing the curriculum for CEMJA, Captain Lemaire and his team closely followed the work of Jean Borotra, an army officer and the Minister of General Education and Sports until 1942 who helped to found Vichy's renowned

⁸⁹ See the reports "Formation de jeunes en Algérie," and "Information au sujet du Service de formation des jeunes en Algérie," both undated but likely written in 1959. SHD 1H/1268. Henri d'Humières also outlines this chain of recruitment in *L'armée française et la jeunesse musulmane*, page 210.

⁹⁰ "Conférence du Sous-Lieutenant Bastien, Stage d'information des directeurs de Foyers de Jeunes."

⁹¹ On Vichy youth programs in Algeria and the empire more broadly, see Jacques Cantier, *L'Algérie sous le régime de Vichy* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002), 289-304, and Cantier, "Un enjeu essentiel: Vichy et les jeunes dans l'empire français." On the Chantiers de la Jeunesse, see Christophe Pecout, *Les Chantiers de la Jeunesse et la revitalisation physique et morale de la jeunesse française 1940-1944*. In 1958, Salan undertook a disastrous effort to relaunch the Chantiers under the supervision of Captain d'Humières, rechristened as the *Jeunes Bâtisseurs*. See d'Humières, *L'armée française et la jeunesse musulmane*, chapter 7.

⁹² For such schools in Indochina, see Eric Jennings, *Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pages 188-198.

'Cadres School' at Uriage.⁹³ These ties were further reinforced in mid-1959 when de Gaulle's new Delegate to Algeria Paul Delouvrier – himself a graduate of Uriage – appointed the school's founder General Pierre Dunoyer de Segonzac as the head of the civil government's Youth Training Service (SFJA), which assumed the administration of the sports clubs from the army in late 1958.⁹⁴ While they eschewed its racial politics, the SFJA and its close collaborator the Fifth Bureau shared Vichy's conviction in sports' power to create strong leaders and a disciplined, hierarchical society.⁹⁵ Through the youth monitors, they aimed to cultivate a sense of communal belonging and progressively absorb Algerians into the state's sphere of influence. This dual effort to morally transform youths and to frame them in a state surveillance apparatus reached its nadir under the Fifth Bureau. It drew, however, on well-established patterns of governance shared by a diverse array of actors within the French army.

As Fombonne expanded the sports clubs across Algeria in 1958 and 1959, the experience of individual clubs varied widely. Local conditions, the interest of military personnel, and the attitudes of the community all played a role in determining the actions and efficacy of a given club. In some areas, the clubs closely reflected Fombonne's model. In the town of Miliana, the sports club offered a near complete schedule of activities from 8:00 a.m.

⁹³ Jean Forestier cites Borotra's work as the source of Lemaire's inspiration. Quoted in d'Humieres, *L'armée française et la jeunesse musulmane*, 85. On Borotra and his involvement in the Vichy state and the Uriages school, see Comte, *Une Utopie combattante*, pages 45 and 192.

⁹⁴ d'Humieres cites the connection between de Segonzac and Delouvrier. *L'armée française et la jeunesse musulmane*, 202.

⁹⁵ It should be noted that Vichy's sports programs were themselves not overtly racialized. In fact, both de Segonzac's and Borotra's politics were ambivalent enough vis-à-vis the Vichy 'national revolution' that both men became suspect: Petain closed Uriage in 1942, and German authorities deported Borotra to a concentration camp. On Borotra, see Tumblety, *Remaking the Male Body*, 209 and 212. On the closure of Uriage, see Comte, *Une utopie combatant*, chapter 15. On the close collaboration between the Fifth Bureau and the SFJA, see Generals Dunoyer de Segonzac and Challe, "Note de Service: Action sur la jeunesse – liaison SFJA / B5," 4 November 1959. SHD 1H/2399.



Figure 5.5: Sports club members perform "mouvements d'ensemble" at an athletics event in Djelfa, September 1959. (Source: ECPAD ALG/59/398). © ECPAD

to 6:00 p.m., six days a week. In the early morning, youth monitors trained attendees in gymnastics or led them in coordinated group movements. Singing or discussion followed in the mid-morning, covering topics such as bodily hygiene, the symbolism of the French flag, or "fraternité." After a midday break, the club reconvened for soccer practice, swimming lessons at the local pool, and group work to maintain and improve the clubs' facilities.⁹⁶ On Thursday afternoons local primary school teachers brought their classes to the club to encourage interactions between its "Muslim"-dominated membership and the school's mostly European

⁹⁶ See the packet of monthly "Emploi de temps du Foyer Sportif de Miliana" reports dated September 1958 through June 1959. ANOM 4SAS/110.

students.⁹⁷ However, the depth and variety of action in Miliana likely owed more to the attentive oversight of the local SAS officer and the presence of the army's Sector Headquarters in the town than to the universal utility of the sports club model.

Fombonne's vision did not always translate so easily in practice. Local conditions often made it difficult for youth monitors to implement the full array of activities that Fombonne and the Fifth Bureau outlined as obligatory. In some places, a lack of interest on the part of young Algerians meant that core exercises fell by the wayside. In the town of Baraki on the outskirts of Algiers, the sports club had more volunteers for its soccer team than it could possibly accommodate, but struggled to draw enough participants for gymnastics and other athletic endeavors that even slightly resembled military preparation.⁹⁸ In other locations the rhythms of daily life prevented the clubs from offering more than the most basic sporting activities. In the isolated village of Tolga in the Aurès (Biskra), youth monitors found their action restricted to a few hours at the beginning and the end of the day because most of the several hundred boys and young men they engaged worked or attended school. Between gymnastics, soccer and volleyball, the monitors could rarely fit the civics lessons or propaganda provided by the Fifth Bureau into the few hours they spent with youths.⁹⁹ Every club fostered some form of basic sports and physical training, but few provided the all-encompassing surveillance apparatus that French military leaders envisioned.

⁹⁷ Letter, MDL de Méneval, Animateur du Foyer Sportif, 27 November 1958. ANOM 4SAS/110.

⁹⁸ Chef de la SAS de Baraki au Chef de l'Echelon de liaison Maison-Blanche, "Moniteurs de Jeunesse," 27 March 1958. ANOM 2SAS/142.

⁹⁹ Captain Marc Geronimi, SAS de Tolga, "Moniteur de la jeunesse," 1 May 1958. ANOM 932/92.

The situations in Baraki and Tolga reflected a broader disconnect between French leaders' understanding of sports' capacity for moral regeneration and the social realities of many Algerian communities. While French officers uniformly viewed sports as force for social progress, many Algerians did not share this perspective, and often reacted to the launch of sports clubs with surprise or miscomprehension. Parents in Tlemcen saw schools, rather than sports, as the path to moral betterment, and questioned why the army would focus its energy on physical education.¹⁰⁰ The sports clubs provided Fombonne an effective tool to engage young men in Constantine, but they were poorly suited to conditions elsewhere. In many small towns like Hammam Bou Hadjar and Oued Sebbah in the agricultural belt around Aïn Temouchent, young Algerians were not the 'completely idle masses' that Fombonne imagined. The sports clubs in both towns were forced to close during harvest season since most young men worked as cutters in the grape fields, leaving the clubs empty.¹⁰¹ In other regions, the hardships imposed by the war or the meagerness of rural life made sports impractical. Echoing many of his colleagues, the SAS officer in Aïn-Abessa (Sétif) noted that it was difficult to convince malnourished youths to expend the energy required to play sports.¹⁰² In Planteurs, a sprawling shantytown in the foothills outside of Oran, families sent their children to the sports club barefoot so that they would not ruin their only pair of shoes through vigorous exercise.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Officier de SAS de Tlemcen, debriefing report, "Le Chef de S.A.S., président du Foyer Sportif," undated. SHD 1H/1212.

¹⁰¹ Adjudant-Chef Lesage, SAS de Hammam Bou Hadjar, "Rapport sur activité des moniteurs et attaché sociaux," 19 Septembre 1959; and Sous-lieutenant Hoffet, SAS d'Oued-Sebbah, "Rapport sur les attachés et moniteurs," 21 Septembre 1959. ANOM 5I/218.

¹⁰² Officier de SAS d'Aïn-Abessa, debriefing report, "Le Chef de S.A.S., président du Foyer Sportif," undated. SHD 1H/1212.

¹⁰³ Captain Basquin, Chef de la SAU des Planteurs, "Rapport mensuel sur les attachées culturels civiques et sociaux," 31 August 1959. ANOM 5I/218

Sports did not always hold the universal appeal that French commanders imagined; nor did many Algerians see sports as a tool of self-mastery like Fombonne and other authorities. The voluntary nature of the clubs ensured that when Algerians did participate, they often did so with motivations that often stood outside the logics that structured the clubs' action.

The expanding network of sports clubs also faced organizational challenges. While Fombonne and his successors in the SFJA worked directly with military commanders in all three regions to coordinate the extension of the clubs, the actual implementation fell to local military commanders or SAS officers.¹⁰⁴ As a result, the sports clubs frequently suffered the same logistical challenges that afflicted the EMSI – a dearth of supplies, insufficient funds, and even a lack of transportation for matches between clubs in different villages.¹⁰⁵ For its first three months in operation, the sports club in Edgar Quinet (Khenchela) had no playing field, no supplies aside from a few soccer balls provided by the Fifth Bureau, and no means to access its monthly operating budget.¹⁰⁶ These supply problems were often compounded by a widespread lack of oversight. Many SAS officers or unit commanders devoted only passing attention to the clubs and their personnel.¹⁰⁷ The Fifth Bureau attempted to remedy this problem early on by redeploying former instructors at Issoire as specialized Itinerant Officers

¹⁰⁴ Despite overseeing the foyers sportifs and several other programs, the Army-Youth Committee itself remained an advisory organization with limited staff: four officers including Fombonne and d'Humières, along with two secretaries and a chauffeur. See General Huet to General Salan, "Organisation du Comité Armées-Jeunesse de la 10^e Région Militaire," 19 December 1957. ANOM 3R/473. The SFJA provided more efficient organizational and logistical oversight, but implementation remained the duty of authorities on the ground.

¹⁰⁵ On the lack of transportation, see Bureau Interdépartementale de la Jeunesse, Oran, "Rapport trimestriel d'activités dans le groupe de départements d'Oran," 15 December 1959. ANOM 9260/6.

¹⁰⁶ SAS d'Edgar-Quinet, "Compte-rendu Mensuel No. 3 sur l'emploi des Moniteurs de Jeunesse," le 23 Mars 1958; and "Compte-rendu d'emploi des moniteurs de jeunesse," 30 January 1958. ANOM 6SAS/48.

¹⁰⁷ Salan and Goussault issued a note chastising officers for failing to ensure comprehensive enough oversight of the youth monitors. See Fifth Bureau – État-Major 10th R.M., note to the Generals commanding Army Corps, Zones, and Divisions, "Moniteurs de la Jeunesse," 10 January 1958. SHD 1H/2399.

focused only on the youth monitors.¹⁰⁸ Many monitors, however, continued to work with little supervision. An inspection of the Dra el Mizan Sector in mid-1959 revealed that while in principle the local Fifth Bureau officer assumed the responsibility of directing the sports clubs, in practice no officer in the Sector regularly kept track of their operations¹⁰⁹. Even monitors deployed to more regimented institutions like the youth clubs or the CFJA remembered only infrequent communications with their supervising officers.¹¹⁰ This widespread disconnect between youth monitors and even local military commanders reflected the ad hoc and often improvised nature of pacification programs like the sports clubs. But it also highlights the sports clubs' heavy reliance on the local initiative and autonomous action of military personnel at the lowest levels. Despite the clubs' panoptic appearance, individual encounters between monitors and rural youths shaped the clubs as much as the theories elaborated at higher echelons.

Despite these difficulties, the sports clubs drew the large-scale participation of young Algerians, and youth monitors frequently cultivated amicable relationships with the communities where they deployed. For all the logistical problems that plagued their club's early operations, the monitors in Edgar Quinet still managed to win the sympathy of the village within a few months, and ninety adolescents participated regularly in the gymnastics, soccer,

¹⁰⁸ 21^e D.I. / Commandement civil et militaire de la Zone Sud Constantinois, "Utilisation des officiers instructeurs du centre d'entraînement des moniteurs de la jeunesse algérienne d'Issoire mis à la disposition de la Z.S.C.," 18 June 1958. SHD 1H/3868.

¹⁰⁹ Bureau départemental de la jeunesse, Préfecture de la Grande Kabylie, "Compte-rendu de la visite faite à Dra el Mizan et Tizi Reniff le 17 Juin 1959." ANOM 9150/164.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Colette Garcia-Arnardi, former monitrice in the Department of Oran, Béziers, 11 May 2013; and Interview with former monitrices F— and L—, deployed to the Ouarsenis and Duperré. Paris, 5 June 2013.



Figure 5.6: The long jump at the finals for the Algerian Sports Club Championships, presided by Generals Challe and de Segonzac in Algiers, July 1959. (Source: ECPAD ALG/59/292). © ECPAD

and civics lessons they offered.¹¹¹ In the plains of the Mitidja south of Algiers, young Algerians attended the clubs with open enthusiasm.¹¹² Even the SAS officer in Planteurs insisted that the monitors had gained considerable influence over their young charges and even their parents, who, he claimed, encouraged their children to attend.¹¹³ In the eyes of many SAS officers, the clubs represented a powerful tool to cultivate close ties to local communities because weekly sports competitions often became a focus of village life. In N'Gaous, (Barika), the success of

¹¹¹ SAS d'Edgar-Quinet, "Compte-rendu Mensuel No. 3 sur l'emploi des Moniteurs de Jeunesse," le 23 Mars 1958. ANOM 6SAS/48.

¹¹² Colonel Gomez, Commandant le Sous-Secteur Mitidja, "Compte-rendu mensuel – moniteurs de la jeunesse, 20 juillet au 19 Août 1958." ANOM 2SAS/142.

¹¹³ Captain Basquin, Chef de la SAU des Planteurs, "Rapport mensuel sur les Attachés culturels et civiques et sociaux," 24 November 1959. ANOM 5/218.

the volleyball team made the matches into a focus the town's social life.¹¹⁴ Competitions between clubs became popular events, and often attracted large crowds of spectators. In Batna, unadvertised soccer matches regularly drew upwards of 300 attendees, and a tournament organized in 1959 to celebrate the anniversary of 13 May filled the city's stadium with more than 3,000 eager fans.¹¹⁵

For the army, the power of sports lay as much in its visibility as in the changes it sought to effect. Fombonne and the Fifth Bureau saw sports as a form of political theater. The spectacle of perfectly coordinated and synchronized matches served to prove France's ability to fashion young Algerians into vital, 'modern' subjects and to demonstrate to the extended community the reality of the material progress the army promised.¹¹⁶ Faced with the ambivalence, hesitation, or evasiveness of the communities they engaged, military commanders also scrutinized the matches and the spectators they attracted for signs that the army's efforts to transform the population were working. They read young Algerians' disciplined behavior in the club and on the field as an indicator of their modernization, and their parents' interest as a marker of the community's rapprochement with France. Echoing many of his colleagues, the Fifth Bureau Chief in Batna, saw Algerians' willingness to stand in silence while the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company broadcast the *marseillaise* before a match as an "encouraging" sign that the Algerians were no longer "indifferent and passive" toward

¹¹⁴ SAS de N'Gaous, debriefing report, "Un foyer sportif," undated. SHD 1H/1212.

¹¹⁵ See Zone Sud Constantinois – 5^e Bureau / Bureau départemental de la jeunesse, "Rapport d'activités" for March and April, and "Participation de la jeunesse à l'anniversaire du 13 Mai," 28 May 1959. SHD 1H/3868.

¹¹⁶ Fombonne, "Lancement et fonctionnement des Foyers Sportifs."

France.¹¹⁷ As with the EMSI and the Self-defense Groups, the measure of the clubs' success often boiled down to the number of adolescents in attendance.¹¹⁸ But attendance did not in itself demonstrate that a more profound transformation was taking place. The political neutrality that made sports useful for attracting the participation of young Algerians also rendered the meaning of that participation unclear. Sports may very well have taught the value of exertion or sense of self discipline, but there is no indication that the activities of the sports clubs cultivated feelings of solidarity. While they were eager to play, most Algerian adolescents remained ambiguous in their attitudes toward France well into 1960.¹¹⁹

In late 1960, however, Algerians' support for independence became increasingly clear. In a bid to jumpstart stagnating negotiations with the FLN, de Gaulle announced on November 4th that he saw an 'Algerian' Algeria as inevitable. His speech touched off furious debates in France and Algeria, and many Algerians saw it as a moment of opening. On Sunday, December 11th, as the President visited Tlemcen, Algerians poured into the streets of Oran and Algiers in the thousands in a spontaneous demonstration for self-determination, waving green and white flags and chanting "AL-GÉR-IE-AL-GÉR-IENNE!" The magnitude of the protests shocked the army, and particularly officers overseeing Pacification programs like the sports clubs. In the aftermath of the events, SAS officers across Algeria noted with consternation the

¹¹⁷ Zone Sud Constantinois – 5^e Bureau / Bureau départemental de la jeunesse, "Rapport d'activités," 22 April 1959. SHD 1H/3868.

¹¹⁸ The vast majority of reports on the foyers sportifs – both those written by SAS and active military officers – only list the average number of attendees for the month along with a sentence or two on the general 'ambiance' of the foyer.

¹¹⁹ French officers frequently complained about the apparent national indifference or subtle resistance of the young Algerians under their supervision in 1960. In the West Constantine Zone, for example, youths still attended the clubs in large numbers, but expressed increasing hesitation to be seen riding in military vehicles to and from matches. See the "Bulletin d'information Corps d'Armée de Constantine," 1 July 1960. SHD 1H/2553.

widespread involvement of young men they regularly saw on the soccer field.¹²⁰ As young Algerians grew progressively more insubordinate throughout the spring of 1961, these officers viewed the clubs and other youth programs in an increasingly pessimistic light, either as “useless,” or worse: as active sites of “nationalist solidarity.”¹²¹

The sports clubs embodied a consensus shared across military and civil lines that youths constituted a critical slice of the population to be won or lost. Confronted with the dangers of war and the ills of modernity, authorities insisted, young Algerians needed leadership, structure, and education. They needed rational management, and sports provided a means to effect it. Athletics did not only fashioned stronger, healthier, and more efficient Algerian bodies; in the process they also transformed morals, taught cultural tastes, and inculcated new comportments. French policymakers saw sports as a tool to fashion patriotic, disciplined subjects. But underneath its anodyne façade, did sports convey the cultural values that military leaders believed they did? From their origins in Constantine, the sports clubs relied on the direct impulsion of diverse personnel with even more diverse motives, not least of all the youth monitors, who as draftees and Algerians occupied an ambiguous position within the army and Algerian society. Sports had also long been a domain of intense nationalist activism

¹²⁰ See for example the comprehensive set of reports assembled by the Sous-Préfet of Oran, and the Departmental Youth Bureau of Algiers: Sous-Préfet d’Oran des Affaires Algériens, “Rapports d’activités des S.A.S. et S.A.U. durant les mois de Décembre 1960 et Janvier 1961,” 6 February 1961, SHD 1H/3090; and “Rapport du Capitaine Desbois, Chef du BDJ d’Alger sur le comportement de la Jeunesse musulmane à l’occasion des émeutes du 9 au 12 Décembre 1960,” 3 January 1961, ANOM 2SAS/8.

¹²¹ Interview with Second Lieutenant L—, Chef du CFJA in Saint Denis du Sig (Department of Oran). Béziers, 11 May 2013; and Captain Armand Derville, Chef de SAS de Berrouaghia, debriefing report, “Le Chef de SAS président du foyer sportif,” 25 March 1962, SHD 1H/1212.

in Algeria, and remained so during the war.¹²² Within the ranks of its young activists and fighters, the FLN emphasized its own project of corporeal reform as part of its effort to build the Algerian nation.¹²³ Such values were not incompatible with those taught at the sports clubs. The clubs opened a space for interaction between French officers and young Algerians, and sometimes forged intimate and amicable relationships between the two. But these encounters never succeeded in making Algerians into Frenchmen.

¹²² On the long ties between sports and nationalism in Algeria, see Youcef Fates, *Sport et tiers monde* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), pages 19-33; Fates, "Le club sportif, structure de l'encadrement et de formation nationaliste de la jeunesse musulmane pendant la période nationale," in *De l'Indochine à l'Algérie: La Jeunesse en mouvements des deux côtés du miroir colonial, 1940-1962*, ed. Nicolas Bancel, Daniel Denis, and Youssef Fates (Paris: La Découverte, 2003) ; and Dine, "Shaping the Colonial Body."

¹²³ In an interview, Commander Lakhdar Bouregaa, who led ALN forces in Wilaya 5, described at length a culture of moral propriety among maquisards which emphasized bodily cleanliness, fitness, and proper dress, both to present the most "civilized" face possible to French forces and to build the Algerian nation's virility. Interview, Algiers, 31 May 2014. Gilbert Meynier touches on similar aspects of FLN ideology in *Histoire intérieure du FLN, 1954-1962* (Paris: Fayard, 2002), pages 222-223.

Conclusion

In the middle of the night on April 21st, 1961, French paratroopers of the First Foreign Legion marched into Algiers and seized control of the government. The putsch had slowly percolated since the de Gaulle's announcement of Algerian self-determination in September 1959, and with the news of the French President's renewed efforts to open negotiations with the FLN, it bubbled over. The group of generals who led the putsch included Maurice Challe and General Raoul Salan, who arrived in Algiers from Spain a few days later. It was mid-ranking officers, however – the advocates and practitioners of Pacification such as Colonels Yves Godard, Antoine Argoud, and Jean Gardes – who spearheaded the revolt. As General Challe explained over the radio waves on the morning of April 22nd, this cadre of officers did not seek to overthrow de Gaulle, but rather to guarantee that France honored its commitment to defend Algeria from an externally-directed "rebellion" and maintain the territory as fully

French. They wanted to carry the task of Pacification to its full conclusion, and ensure that their efforts and the deaths of their comrades had not been in vain.

In Paris, the specter of invasion from Algiers that had toppled the government in May 1958 rose once again. But if Salan and his co-conspirators hoped to repeat the actions of three years earlier, they faced a very different set of circumstances. De Gaulle's government was not the instable leadership of the Fourth Republic, and the putsch did not draw the unified support of French commanders that Salan had captured on the 13th of May. In North Africa, the revolt immediately began to collapse as important generals hesitated or flatly refused to join, and de Gaulle quickly had the generals' collaborators in Paris arrested. Appearing on television on April 23rd, the former general dealt the uprising its death blow. Speaking in the name of the Republic, he ordered soldiers not to carry out the orders of the insurgent generals. Metropolitan opinion rallied behind de Gaulle, and in Algeria the vast majority of soldiers – most of them conscripts – refused to mobilize.¹ On April 26th, Challe turned himself in, while Salan and other organizers fled underground to continue their resistance within the ranks of the terrorist Secret Army Organization (OAS). Disbanded by the French Defense Minister on April 30th, the First Foreign Legion tore down its barracks and marched into custody, defiantly singing Edith Piaf's "Non, je ne regrette rien."² The uprising had ended.

¹ Martin Evans notes that 375,000 of the 400,000 troops deployed in Algeria refused to side with the generals. See Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 297.

² For a detailed account of the Putsch, see Maurice Vaïsse, *Alger, le Putsch* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1983); and Pierre Abramovici, *Le Putsch des Généraux: de Gaulle contre l'armée, 1958-1962* (Paris: Fayard, 2011). For a brief but nuanced overview, see Evans, chapter 10. On the OAS, see Olivier Dard, *Voyage au cœur de l'OAS* (Paris: Perrin, 2005).

The failed Putsch marked the beginning of Pacification's end in Algeria. As OAS violence mounted over the course of 1961, the involvement of high-profile figures like Salan, Lacheroy, and Gardes rendered the practices of psychological action and theories of revolutionary warfare increasingly unpopular in Algerian and metropolitan policy circles. In July, the army command shuttered the Center for Pacification and Counter-Guerilla Instruction in Arzew, and in August, the État-major ordered units to begin disarming and disbanding the Self-Defense Groups.³ In early October the commander of armed forces in Algeria, General Ailleret, laid out a new policy to govern the army's engagement with Algerians. In it, the General rejected Pacification, labeled integration a "utopia," and denounced psychological warfare, which he argued did not fit "within the French liberal and democratic tradition."⁴ "It is important not to see in the Muslim population an objective to conquer," his directive asserted, "but an ensemble of persons, each of which must be enabled in the present or in the future to freely choose his destiny." This policy, Ailleret noted, excluded "any paternalism, any pressure, any *encadrement*" and "any propaganda on the part of the forces of order."⁵ Ailleret's policy represented an explicit and self-conscious break with the policies that had governed French military action in Algeria since 1956.

³ After the dissolution of the Fifth Bureau in February 1960, the army command had largely purged the instruction at Arzew of references to 'Revolutionary Warfare,' but in effect continued teaching the same procedures and strategic perspectives as before. Denis Leroux, "Promouvoir une armée révolutionnaire pendant la guerre d'Algérie: Le Centre d'instruction Pacification et contre-guérilla d'Arzew, 1957-1959." *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire* 120 No. 4 (2013), 111. On the Groupes d'auto-défense, see François-Xavier Hautreux, *La Guerre d'Algérie des Harkis, 1954-1962* (Paris: Perrin, 2013), 275-282.

⁴ État-major interarmées – Bureau du moral, "Fiche: Directive sur l'activité de contact," 13 October 1961. SHD 1H/2060.

⁵ General Ailleret to the Prime Minister, "Contacts Armée-Populations," 4 November 1961. SHD 1H/1113.

The end of Pacification did not necessarily mean the end of its practices in Algeria, however. While Ailleret disavowed integration and recognized the likelihood of Algerian independence, he also saw the EMSI and youth organizations as important tools to promote a “climate of mutual comprehension and friendship” that would secure enduring links between Algeria and France.⁶ But in the face of the failed putsch, renewed negotiations between de Gaulle and the FLN, and the mounting violence perpetrated by the OAS, relations between army personnel and Algerians deteriorated rapidly. Beginning in April, officers directing Sports Clubs or EMSI noted a marked growth in hostility or even violence toward the teams. In one small village in Oran, locals welcomed the approaching EMSI not with the usual queue, but with a hail of stones.⁷ In another, Algerian adolescents abandoned their CFJA completely, leaving it empty save for its personnel.⁸ In many regions, the army maintained the former Pacification programs through April or even May 1962, and continued to cultivate relationships with Algerians. But even in villages where relations appeared the most amicable, Algerians made it clear from mid-1961 that they had embraced self-determination.⁹ On Monday, March 19th, 1962, their hopes were fulfilled. De Gaulle and the Provisional Algerian Government reached an agreement in Evian, and Algeria officially gained its independence.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Général Commandant la 29^e DI et la ZCO, “Compte-rendu hebdomadaire d’Action Psychologique du Semaine du 15 au 21 Mai 1961.” SHD 1H/4258.

⁸ Interview with Second Lieutenant L—, Chef du CFJA in Saint Denis du Sig (Department of Oran). Béziers, 11 May 2013.

⁹ In Perregaux, in the Oran Center Zone, for example, women readily engaged with the EMSI, but also asked them to “please quit talking about France.” Général Commandant la 29^e DI et la ZCO, “Compte-rendu hebdomadaire d’Action Psychologique du Semaine du 19 au 26 Novembre 1961.” SHD 1H/4258.

Even as Pacification lost favor in metropolitan circles and Algeria won its independence, interest grew in the theories and practices elaborated by French officers during the war. Because they believed they waged one front of a global war, French military commanders exported the theories and techniques they elaborated in Algeria to other warzones like Cameroon and the Katanga.¹⁰ From late 1957, they actively promoted their theories and practices to military officers from other 'western' nations. Partisans of Pacification spoke at international bodies like the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe and the Western European Union.¹¹ At Arzew, the Fifth Bureau trained dozens of foreign officers from Argentina, Great Britain, Portugal, and even Iran and Greece.¹² In the process, the French military popularized counterinsurgency as a framework for understanding postwar conflicts and instilled it with a sense of newness that belied its well-worn colonial origins.¹³ Extracted from the social and cultural context of the Algerian War, the theories and practices of French

¹⁰ Thomas Deltombe, Manuel Domerge, and Jacob Tatsitsa, *Kamerun! Une guerre cachée aux origines de la Françafrique, 1948-1971* (Paris: La Découverte, 2011); and Roger Trinquier, *Notre guerre au Katanga* (Paris: Éditions de la pensée moderne, 1963).

¹¹ On General Allard's promotion of Pacification at SHAPE, see chapter 2. For a copy of the resolution on subversive warfare adopted by the Western European Union during its Sixth Ordinary Session, see "Document 181: Definition of a joint policy for defense against the multiple forms of subversive warfare; report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments by Mr. Pisani, Rapporteur," 25 October 1960. ANOM 5Q/156.

¹² On these exchanges, see the administrative dossiers contained in ANOM 3R/542 and SHD 1H/2518.

¹³ A number of recent works have highlighted the impact French military thought during and after the war, particularly in Lusophone and Spanish-speaking countries. See Mario Ranalletti, "Une présence française fonctionnelle: les militaires français en Argentine après 1955," *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps* No. 67. (2002): 104-106; Mario Ranalletti, "Aux origines du terrorisme d'état en Argentine: Les influences françaises dans la formation des militaires argentins (1955-1976)," *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 105 (2010): 45-56; Luis Nuno Rodrigues, "'Preparing for the Next War': the Portuguese Army Staff Corps and the Military Reforms on the eve of the Colonial Wars," *Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies* 37 No. 1 (2012): 117-129; and Benjamin A. Cowen, "Rules of Disengagement: Masculinity, Violence, and the Cold War Remakings of Counterinsurgency in Brazil," *American Quarterly* 66 No. 3 (2014): 691-714. While a bit older, John P. Cann's *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997) provides an excellent overview of Portuguese officers' adaptation of Revolutionary Warfare concepts for their African colonies.

'counter-insurrectional' warfare became a principal foundation for the models of global security and counterinsurgency that continue to structure our post-Cold War world.

This 'new' method of warfare sought to restore peace by transforming Algerian society. In their search for a means to secure Algerians' enduring loyalty to France, the architects of Pacification drew on existing practices of colonial surveillance, postwar social sciences such as applied psychology and scientific management, and on an interpretation of Maoist revolutionary techniques forged through their experiences fighting in Indochina. Military commanders sought to secure Algerians' loyalty by remaking them in the image of Frenchmen. Youth sports camps, social welfare programs, and cultural education efforts sought to teach Algerians to embody French cultural, physical and gender norms. Emancipation campaigns encouraged Muslim women to abandon established family structures by removing their veils and entering the public sphere as voters. These social engineering projects aimed to reduce differences between Algerians and 'European' Frenchmen, and in the process regenerate colonial society.

Implicitly or explicitly, these Pacification programs sought to transform Algerians through their bodies. French strategists aimed to make the bodies of Algerians cleaner, healthier, and more orderly. The body constituted a key site to inculcate the attitudes and comportments deemed necessary for participation in the 'modern' (industrialized, democratic, consumer) society French leaders sought to create in Algeria. If colonial regimes marked out difference through the regulation of the intimate domains of the body and domestic life, then

the same domains became the principle sites to create sameness.¹⁴ The body however, was not only a terrain for doing, but for seeing. Joan Wallach Scott has illustrated how contemporary French citizenship rests on an abstract individualism made visible through the body.¹⁵ The French Army in Algeria defined national belonging as a set of embodied practices as much as a set of beliefs of moral dispositions. The army sought to counter the FLN by drawing Algerians into French civic life, and it sought to measure the degree of their engagement through their visible efforts to fulfill these embodied requirements of citizenship. For many officers, Algerians' ability to perform French 'modernity' became an indicator not only of their capacity but their *willingness* – or lack thereof – to be French. The French state's effort to read Algerian bodies was not unique to the Algerian War. But as I have suggested throughout the second half of this dissertation, the war represented a moment when this effort was particularly instrumentalized, and therefore it offers privileged insight into the embodied nature of French national belonging.

Pacification placed Algerian hearts and minds (and bodies) in the crosshairs of the French war effort. But at its core, the army's modernizing project was less about Algerians than about France and its future in the postwar world. Algerians constituted a terrain and an

¹⁴ Ann Laura Stoler demonstrates that intimate interactions (including those enacted through the body) acted as key sites where colonial states defined difference and exercised power. See Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Following Stoler, a growing body of work examines the body as a site for the exercise of colonial power. See, for example, Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, eds., *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History*, ed. Ballantyne and Burton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

¹⁵ Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, especially chapter 5. Naomi Davidson builds on this argument in her recent work *Only Muslim*, arguing that for French administrators, 'Muslim' bodies were so irreducibly "saturated" with markers of difference that their religious identity functioned as a racial identity. The key difficulty here is how to parse out how power dynamics shifted during a period when the state sought to reconfigure this religio-racial identity as socioeconomic and erase it.

objective in the struggle against the FLN, and thus became to object of intense interest on the part of authorities. For all the effort consecrated to closing the divide between Algerians and Europeans, however, Algerians remained for many officers and officials just as distant— if not more so – in 1962 as in 1954. Pacification fundamentally misread the popular nature of the nationalist movement it sought to counter, and discounted the very possibility that Algerians could be political actors in their own right.¹⁶ A persistent myth exists in popular culture and in policy literature which asserts that through its tactical innovation the French army won the war in Algeria, only to be outmaneuvered by Gaullist politicians in the metropole.¹⁷ But this view relies too uncritically on officers' assertions of their own success, and falls apart under the weight of archival evidence. In their efforts to transform Algerians into Frenchmen, military commanders only highlighted the difference between the two. The army's efforts drew on the same Eurocentric and paternalist models of progress that had defined Algerians' previous exclusion from full citizenship. And after all, the endemic poverty and socioeconomic 'backwardness' they sought to remedy was itself the product of 130 years of exclusionary and coercive colonial rule. Combined with the violence and dislocation French forces inflicted on rural Algerians, Pacification programs helped to crystalize the notion that French and Algerian culture were ultimately incompatible.

¹⁶ Recent work on Algerian nationalism has re-emphasized the populist and fluid development of an Algerian nationalist political culture, which often occurred outside or across the boundaries of formal nationalist parties. See James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Malika Rahal, "A local approach to the UDMA: Local level politics during the decade of political parties, 1946-1956", *Journal of North African Studies* 18 No. 5 (2013): 703-724.

¹⁷ Douglas Porch and Gian Gentile offer compelling deconstructions of such a narrative in recent counterinsurgency literature. See Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) and Gian Gentile, *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency* (New York: The New Press, 2013).

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